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32–200 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 109–761

DETECTING SMUGGLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 27, 2006

Serial No. J–109–102

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

JON KYL, Arizona, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Majority Chief Counsel 

STEVEN CASH, Democratic Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 4

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 1

WITNESSES 

Aoki, Steven, Deputy Under Secretary for Counterterrorism, Department of 

Energy, Washington, D.C. ................................................................................... 7

Ikle, Fred C., Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, D.C. ................................................................................... 12

Levi, Michael A., Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign 

Relations, New York, New York ......................................................................... 10

Nanos, George Peter, Associate Director, Research and Development, Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia .............................................. 9

Oxford, Vayl S., Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department 

of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. ........................................................... 5

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Steven Aoki to questions submitted by Senator Kyl ...................... 26

Responses of Vayl S. Oxford to questions submitted by Senator Kyl ................. 43

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Aoki, Steven, Deputy Under Secretary for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department 

of Energy, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ............................................ 68

Levi, Michael A., Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign 

Relations, New York, New York, prepared statement ...................................... 72

Nanos, George Peter, Associate Director, Research and Development, Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, prepared statement ........... 79

Oxford, Vayl S., Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., prepared statement .............. 86

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DETECTING SMUGGLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2006 

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND

SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Kyl, Chairman 

of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Kyl and Feinstein. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA 

Chairman KYL. All right. This meeting of the Judiciary Committee Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Subcommittee will come to order. I want to welcome all of you. Let me 

begin with my opening statement and then call on our Ranking 

Member, Senator Feinstein. 

The 9/11 Commission said that the greatest danger of another 

catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the 

world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons. Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least 10 years. 

There is no doubt the United States would be a prime target. 

In recent years, this Subcommittee has looked at threats posed 

by chemical, biological, and electromagnetic pulse attacks on the 

United States. Today, we will examine the most dire threat that we 

face: nuclear terrorism. We will be hearing from officials responsible for preventing the smuggling of nuclear weapons into this 

country, and we want to hear about the work that they are doing, 

the challenges they are facing, and what we in Congress can do to 

help ensure that the American people are protected from nuclear 

terrorism. 

The 9/11 Commission’s findings echo the argument of a review 

conducted before 9/11 by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, which 

found, and I am quoting, that the ‘‘most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons 

of mass destruction or weapons- usable material in Russia could be 

stolen, sold to terrorists or hostile nation states, and used against 

American troops abroad or citizens at home.’’ 

To Russia, we should now add other potential nuclear sources, 

such as Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Terrorists would need no 

more than 9 pounds of plutonium or 35 pounds of highly enriched 

uranium to create a nuclear explosion. A trained nuclear engiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:11 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 032152 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\32200.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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neer—and there are plenty of them looking for work worldwide—

could use this small chunk of material to create a nuclear device 

that would fit into a van or small watercraft. 

There have been plenty of efforts by terrorists and smugglers to 

acquire these nuclear materials. According to the IAEA, between 

1993 and 2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, and those were just the instances 

that we know about. of those confirmed cases, 21 involved materials that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon, and over 400 

involved materials that could be used to make a dirty bomb. It is 

clear that this threat is very real and deserves our utmost attention. 

Increased awareness of this threat spurred the President to create the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within the Department 

of Homeland Security in April of 2005. DNDO was intended to be 

a single, accountable organization with dedicated responsibilities to 

develop the global nuclear detection architecture and to acquire 

and support the deployment of the domestic system to detect and 

report attempts to import or transport a nuclear device or fissile 

or radiological material intended for illicit use. 

In addition to DNDO, other governmental agencies, such as the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the National Nuclear Security Administration, play a role in preventing nuclear terrorism, 

We will hear about these organizations today and how they work 

with DNDO to keep America safe. 

In its recent markup, the Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Homeland Security cut DNDO’s research and development budget 

by 30 percent. We want to look today at the impact of that cut on 

the ability of the United States to develop technologies for detecting smuggled nuclear weapons. In addition, I look forward to discussing nuclear detection programs that may come before the Senate in the near future. 

And, finally, I would like to consider the proposition that the 

United States is approaching the issue of nuclear detection at a far 

too leisurely pace. Some have advocated the Manhattan-type 

project as an approach to nuclear detection, modeled after the intensive all-out efforts by U.S. scientists to build the first atomic 

bomb. And I will be asking our witnesses today to address this and 

to give an idea of what additional funding could do for their offices 

and nuclear terrorism prevention in general. 

The Committee will hear from five experts. 

Mr. Vayl Oxford was appointed Director of the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office in September of 2005, reporting to the Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security, with responsibility for establishing the jointly staffed office and for directing all activities 

associated with the organization. Before this appointment, Mr. Oxford served as the transitional team leader and Acting Director of 

DNDO, and previously served as the Director for 

Counterproliferation at the National Security Council. 

Dr. Peter Nanos is the Associate Director of Research and Development, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA. Before going to 

DTRA, Dr. Nanos was the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, having served since 2003. He was named the 

Interim Director of Los Alamos in January of 2003, is a retired 

3

Vice Admiral of the United States Navy, and a 1967 graduate of 

the Naval Academy. 

Dr. Steve Aoki is the Deputy Under Secretary of Energy for 

Counterterrorism. Before assuming this, he was Senior Adviser for 

International Affairs to the Administrator of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. Before joining 

DOE, he served at the U.S. Department of State as the Director 

of the Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction. From 1993 to 1996, 

he was on the staff of the National Security Council with responsibility for nonproliferation and export control policy. He also was a 

program manager at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 

which is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Dr. Michael Levi is a Fellow for Science and Technology at the 

Council on Foreign Relations. He has also been a Fellow at the 

Brookings Institution and the Federation of American Scientists. 

Dr. Levi holds a Ph.D. in war studies from the University of London, Kings College, and an M.A. in physics from Princeton University. 

And, finally, we are honored to have with us today Dr. Fred Ikle. 

Dr. Ikle is a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies and a member of the Defense Policy Board. 

Before joining CSIS in 1988, Dr. Ikle served as Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy during the first and second Reagan administrations and Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency during the Nixon and Ford administrations. From 1999 to 

2000, he served as Commissioner on the National Commission on 

Terrorism. 

We have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today. I am 

interested in examining with them how to make the Nation safer 

by developing and deploying nuclear detection technologies. In today’s budget-constrained environment, we simply cannot spend 

money on every technology that might keep us safe. But if a nuclear 9/11 is, in fact, the greatest existential danger facing this Nation, then we must ensure that we are acting in a manner proportionate to the threat. That includes providing adequate funding, 

adequate authority, and adequate attention to the relevant agencies of our Government. 

Today the Subcommittee will consider whether enough is being 

spent on nuclear detection and specifically what the likely impact 

will be of the appropriations cuts on DNDO’s budget. In addition, 

I want to examine whether the money being spent is allocated correctly between organizations, missions, and technologies. And, finally, the Subcommittee is interested to know whether there is 

anything else the Congress can do to facilitate the work of the organizations represented here, and I certainly look forward to all of 

your statements and the lively discussion sure to follow. 

In conclusion, let me also thank our Ranking Member, Senator 

Dianne Feinstein, who has been a real partner in this effort to deal 

with technology and terrorism from the very commencement of our 

Committee work a decade ago. I think without the close working 

relationship that our two staffs have and that Senator Feinstein 

and I have, we could not have made the progress that we have on 

so many different fronts. She is going to have to go to another 

Committee meeting in just a few minutes, and so I am going to 

4

give her the remainder of the time here and comment on anything 

that you would like, Senator Feinstein. But any questions that you 

would like to submit to the witnesses after you are gone, of course, 

will be submitted for the record, and we would like to get the responses from all of the witnesses to those questions. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for your leadership. It is hard to believe we have both been either Chairman or Ranking of this Subcommittee now for 10 years. 

I guess we both grow older in the process—hopefully wiser, too. 

I would like particularly to recognize Pete Nanos. I would like to 

thank you for your work at Los Alamos on behalf of the University 

of California. It is much appreciated, and I hope you know that. I 

also welcome the other witnesses today. 

As Senator Kyl inferred, Senator Lisa Murkowski is doing me 

really a great favor by hearing a bill which benefits the water situation in California, which in turn benefits the State of Arizona because it enables us to wean off of Colorado River water. So I figure 

I should, at the very least, show up for the hearing, and I will. 

Let me begin by saying many lessons have been learned in combating the war on terror, and in turn, our Government has used 

a multi-layered strategy to protect our country. Central to the effort is the Government’s focus on detecting and intercepting nuclear materials and technologies. And the goal is that neither falls 

into the hands of terrorists or those who might sell these weapons 

to terrorists. 

Now, to many, such a threat seems remote, but, unfortunately, 

it is real. I was very surprised by this, but according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, from 1993 to 2004—that is 11 

years—there were 662 confirmed cases of smuggling of nuclear and 

radiological materials worldwide—662 confirmed cases in 11 years. 

While all of these cases arose in and out of other countries, the 

United States is certainly not immune. 

A recent GAO undercover operation proved that nuclear materials could be smuggled into the United States. GAO actually 

shipped here to Washington enough nuclear materials to build two 

dirty bombs through our Northern border and again through our 

Southern border. 

I am pleased that the fault was not with the detection devices, 

and there are efforts under way to ensure that the mistakes that 

were made are not repeated. However, clearly, there is more that 

must be done, and, clearly, we still have problems on both our 

Northern and Southern border. 

We have got to put in place an integrated system that provides 

our citizens with maximum protection against nuclear smuggling 

and do it in a way that is both efficient and cost effective. So I hope 

that our witnesses today will give us an update on where we are, 

describe options going forward, and suggest tangible solutions. 

Let me mention some steps that need to be taken. Today, only 

5 percent of containers at our seaports are screened. We all know 

that. GAO recently reported that DHS’ deployment of monitors at 

5

seaports and Southwest border crossings is 2 years behind schedule. GAO reported that DHS may be facing a cost overrun of $340 

million and that overall deployment may not be completed before 

2014. 

The new generation of radiation detectors are based on prototypes that GAO said were no more effective than the portals now 

in use and clearly not worth the price tag of almost 10 times the 

cost of the current detectors. So I hope that is something we will 

look into. 

Even after DHS completes its efforts, it appears we will still not 

have a device that can detect a nuclear bomb encased in lead 

shielding or uranium placed in a lead pipe. And, finally, it is unclear why DHS is not prioritizing development of the integrated 

cargo inspection scanning technology that has shown such promise. 

Now, I believe that our security situation has improved since 9/

11, and I would not want to give a contrary view. And the efforts 

are, of course, greatly appreciated. But the bottom line here is better is simply not enough. 

I would like to thank Senator Kyl for holding this hearing. I am 

delighted to work with him. And I think it is really very important 

that we tackle some of these specific issues and get some cost-effective answers. 

I am awful sorry I cannot be here, but I do have a series of questions, and I will give them to you, Senator. If you would be willing 

to submit them, I would appreciate it very much. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much. They will be submitted, 

and if there is nothing further, then I think the best thing to do 

is to start on my left and just start with Mr. Oxford and have each 

of the panelists in turn go ahead and make your statements, and 

then we will begin the questioning. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

So, Vayl Oxford, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF VAYL S. OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. OXFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to come 

before you today along with my partners from the Department of 

Energy and Department of Defense to discuss how DNDO is responding to the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. 

Today, I would like to briefly discuss the formation of DNDO and 

what its role is in protecting against this threat, some of our accomplishments over the last year since our inception, and some of 

our program priorities for the upcoming year. Then I will be glad 

to address some of the issues that Senator Feinstein brought up 

specifically. 

I would like to talk specifically about how we are enhancing our 

detection capabilities through next-generation capabilities and how 

through transformational research will help to overcome some of 

our longer-term challenges. 

Let me highlight some of the accomplishments we have made in 

the last year since our accomplishment and what our mission is. 

First of all, as you noted, we were set up as a joint office in April 

2005 to not only integrate DHS’ efforts in nuclear and radiological 

threat response, but also to work as a singular authority with our 

6

partners to coordinate efforts across the U.S. Government to do 

this. We were assigned specific responsibilities, as you noted, to develop the global detection architecture that sets in place the global 

strategy for dealing with this threat; to develop, acquire, and support the deployment of the actual domestic component of that architecture; to direct the nuclear and radiological research and development program within DHS; and to serve as a focal point to 

help coordinate the activities across the executive branch. 

In the year since its founding, the DNDO has taken major steps 

in accomplishing this mission. Let me cite some of our accomplishments. 

First of all, we have completed the first ever global detection architecture that identified key vulnerabilities and priority initiatives 

across the Federal, State, and local arena. On July 14th of this 

year, we awarded three contracts with an estimated value of $1.15 

billion for the next-generation passive radiation detection systems. 

The ASP program, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program, 

will enter immediately into operational testing as well as by January into secondary screening operations with Customs and Border 

Protection. We expect full production to begin in 2007. These will 

be an integral part of our land border crossing and seaport architecture within the U.S. 

We have completed two high-fidelity test and evaluation campaigns at our Nevada test site to fully characterize systems performance before we do go to deployment, and we have also completed a test series on the handheld, backpack, and mobile detection systems. As we speak, we are conducting a test and evaluation 

campaign to look at radiation detection pagers that our law enforcement and Federal officials routinely use in the field to make 

sure we understand their full performance. 

We have also begun the development of next-generation radiography systems to deliver imagine systems that will allow us to detect the shielding associated with the threat that Senator Feinstein 

mentioned. 

Finally, we are very close to awarding contracts for the next-generation improved handheld and backpack systems to deal with 

other avenues of our architecture. 

We are also taking steps to expand our detection capabilities into 

aviation and maritime domains and within the domestic interior. 

Deployments of radiation detection equipment at U.S. airports will 

begin with a pilot deployment later this year at Dulles Airport, and 

ultimately we will have a total of 30 airports equipped with radiation detection equipment. We have also committed to provide 

handheld and backpack radiation detection systems to the Coast 

Guard to allow them to successfully interdict radiation and radioactive materials offshore. 

We have launched a Southeastern Transportation Corridor Pilot 

program to deploy radiation detectors to truck weigh stations and 

other sites and, in addition, are providing the State and local authorities with the necessary training and reachback and operational protocols to effectively operate those. 

As Secretary Chertoff officially announced 2 weeks ago, we have 

also launched the Securing the Cities initiative that will enhance 

protection and response capabilities in and around the Nation’s 

7

highest-risk urban areas. Using the New York area as our initial 

engagement, the DNDO and its regional partners will develop analytically based architectures, planning, equipment, and the necessary support infrastructure to protect those cities. We also plan 

to train over 1,500 operators at the State and local level in the use 

of this kind of equipment. 

There are remaining challenges, however, key, long-term challenges and vulnerabilities in our detection architecture that require 

a well-supported research and development program. These challenges include detecting threats from greater distances, in highly 

cluttered backgrounds, or in the presence of shielding and masking 

materials. 

Our exploratory research program is focused on innovative detection materials, advanced special nuclear material detection and 

verification, and algorithm development. We have received over 150 

proposals in response to the solicitation to National and Federal 

Laboratories, resulting in almost $40 million in research and development programs. A March 2006 solicitation for private industry 

and academia resulted in over 200 white papers, and we are currently evaluating 74 proposals for additional awards. In the upcoming year, we plan to begin our academic research program, which 

will fund colleges and universities to pursue innovative nuclear detection concepts and encourage them to train graduate students in 

the field of nuclear detection and related sciences. 

This concludes my prepared statement, and with the Committee’s permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for 

the record and, Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to take any questions 

you have. 

Chairman KYL. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Thank you. 

Dr. Aoki? 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN AOKI, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY 

FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. AOKI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear today to discuss nuclear terrorism and, in particular, how to prevent terrorists from attacking the United States 

with nuclear or radiological weapons. As requested, I submitted a 

written statement for the record, so I will confine my oral remarks 

to a few points. 

First, this is a hard problem. Detecting a clandestinely transported nuclear weapon or materials to build one is inherently difficult. The radiation signatures emitted by fissile materials are relatively weak and can be further attenuated by shielding. Nonetheless, we believe this is a problem that can be successfully addressed, particularly for situations like land or seaports of entry 

where we potentially have enough access to the items being inspected to have a good chance of detecting a smuggled weapon. We 

are working closely with colleagues at DNDO, DOD, and other 

agencies to develop, test, and implement the most effective technology for this mission. We are also pursuing research and developVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:11 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 032152 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\32200.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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ment to improve current systems and to explore fundamental advances in detection technology. 

The built-in challenges of the detection program, challenges 

brought to us by the laws of physics, make it vitally important that 

our approach to detection be embedded in a comprehensive, overall 

strategy that looks for multiple opportunities to prevent an attack. 

We need to block every step along the way, from terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials through delivery to the target, and to be 

ready to disarm a terrorist device should we uncover one before it 

is detonated. 

We also need to build the capability to identify the source of any 

illicitly obtained nuclear materials, both to track down weaknesses 

in security and to hold accountable those who contribute to an attack. 

Even if our individual measures and individual steps are not perfect, a coherent strategy can help deter attack by increasing its difficulty and reducing the likelihood that it can be carried to completion. Such a strategy necessarily cuts across traditional agency 

lines and responsibility, and we, therefore, welcome the role that 

DNDO is now playing to develop and articulate an overall strategic 

architecture that includes contributions from a number of Federal 

agencies, each acting with their own authorities and budgets. 

When you take a strategic look, this underscores the value of 

preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials 

in the first place. Although it is outside the scope of today’s hearing, I would note that DOE and other agencies have over the past 

decade made major investments to strengthen the security of nuclear storage sites in Russia and other countries, with this threat 

very much in mind. We have done even more to provide strengthened security at our own nuclear facilities in the United States. 

A related observation reflecting our experience in deploying nuclear detectors internationally and in conducting nuclear search operations is that attention must be given to the overall concept of 

operations for finding nuclear materials, not only the performance 

of individual portal monitors or the detectors. 

Our detection system needs to be able to identify the wide variety of natural and manmade sources of radiation that it may encounter in commerce or in ordinary shipments, but also to respond 

effectively and quickly if an alarm turns out to be real. 

As we increase the deployment of nuclear detection equipment by 

Federal, State, and local government authorities, we need to ensure 

that we also strengthen the ability to call in higher-level expertise, 

including national Render Safe Teams, when and if needed. 

Let me conclude with a brief summary of what DOE as an agency contributes to the nuclear detection mission. 

First, we operate the National Laboratory system that maintains 

expertise on nuclear weapons and related areas of science. Within 

the National Labs, DOE funds R&D specifically focused on the 

problems of nuclear detection. All of the agencies represented on 

this panel, and a number who are not here today, draw heavily 

from the National Labs’ science base in carrying out their own missions. 

Secondly, as I mentioned, DOE’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program carries out extensive cooperation with other countries 

9

aimed at improving security for nuclear materials and weapons. 

Through the Second Line of Defense and MegaPorts activities, 

DOE also provides assistance to install nuclear detection equipment at foreign border crossings and major seaports. These programs are important components of the overall detection architecture being developed by DNDO. 

Thirdly, DOE’s Office of Emergency Operations provides technical support for nuclear search operations, for disarming and disposing of a terrorist nuclear device should one be discovered, for attribution and consequence management in the event of a terrorist 

of any kind involving nuclear or radioactive materials. This mission 

is carried out by the specialist teams involving DOD or FBI as well 

as DOE experts. 

This concludes the prepared remarks, and I look forward to your 

questions and discussion. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aoki appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Dr. Aoki. 

And now Dr. Pete Nanos. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE PETER NANOS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 

Mr. NANOS. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be here today to address the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Radiation Detection 

program. I will excerpt and highlight a couple of issues from my 

prepared remarks. 

As the Associate Director for Research and Development at 

DTRA, I am responsible for making R&D investments in capabilities to reduce, eliminate, counter, and defeat the threat of weapons 

of mass destruction and mitigate their effects. 

Most importantly, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is a 

combat support agency, which means that the warfighter in the 

field is our customer and primary focus. Since our establishment in 

1998, we have been providing capabilities for the Department of 

Defense’s nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence 

management programs—the three pillars of the President’s National Strategy to Combat WMD. 

As the President stated in March 2006 in the National Nuclear 

Security Strategy of the United States, ‘‘There are few greater 

threats than a terrorist attack with WMD.’’ That message has been 

reflected throughout DOD guidance documents, starting with the 

National Security Strategy and included in the National Defense 

Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National Strategy to Combat WMD. 

Further, in the report of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, 

there is additional guidance. It calls on the need to generate the 

capabilities to locate, tag, and track WMD, their delivery systems 

and related materials, including the means to move such items; the 

capabilities to detect fissile materials such as nuclear devices at 

stand-off ranges—and the emphasis here is on stand-off ranges for 

DOD; interdiction capabilities to stop air, maritime, and ground 

shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials; 

10

and persistent surveillance over wide areas to locate WMD capabilities or hostile forces. 

The Department of Homeland Security Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, with personnel from several Federal departments, has 

drafted a global nuclear detection architecture. The Department of 

Defense retains the responsibility for implementing their parts of 

that architecture, both within their facilities in the United States 

and as part of its operations outside the United States. DOD is 

working with the other Federal departments to draft a Memorandum of Agreement to promote an integrated national research 

and development effort, without duplication, to provide better nuclear and radiological detection. 

Our DOD-specific missions require mobile and transportable detection systems. Stand-off is important, and even more important 

than that is high search rate. DOD has the responsibility to go into 

hostile environments, locate materials rapidly, and fix the situation. That requires a different technology in some cases; in other 

cases, different applications of technology in order to do that job 

properly. 

I do not mean that there is no overlap between our missions. 

Clearly, DNDO is interested in putting detectors in backpacks and 

mobile vehicles to use to protect our borders. However, the focus 

of our operations is different, and so some of the details of the engineering is different. The important thing, I think, between us is 

that we maintain a comprehensive S&T program that covers all the 

needs; we make sure that we share so that there is no duplication; 

and that we do the best we can to give our country the needed capability. 

The Department has focused on the WMD challenge for many 

years, and we have been making steady progress in expanding our 

capabilities to combat WMD and in building interagency partnerships. The QDR continues this momentum by providing specific 

near-term direction and longer-term guidance on capabilities and 

the required investments. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nanos appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Dr. Nanos. 

Dr. Levi? 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. LEVI, FELLOW FOR SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW 

YORK, NEW YORK 

Mr. LEVI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me 

to speak to you today about the challenge of detecting the smuggling of nuclear weapons and about the potential for transformational research in particular. 

I should say it is also an honor to sit here alongside so many 

dedicated and accomplished public servants. 

The threats from nuclear terrorism and from covert nuclear attack by a state are substantially different. We are speaking about 

both of them here today, but I want to separate my remarks on 

each of the two. I am going to focus on nuclear terrorism first. 

11

The first important point is that security at the source of nuclear 

materials is the most important part of the defense, but at the 

same time it is insufficient alone. 

The second important point to keep in mind is that preventing 

nuclear smuggling is different from preventing the acquisition and 

movement of radioactive materials. What we are fighting is terrorists with limited, though often substantial, capabilities that must 

acquire, possibly build, transport, and detonate a weapon, none of 

which, aside from perhaps the last step, are all that easy. And they 

have to do that within some strategic, political, or religious context 

that they have. 

Correspondingly, detecting nuclear smuggling involves detecting 

nuclear materials, but it also involves detecting nuclear terrorists, 

operations to build nuclear weapons, and the supporting fundraising, recruiting, and operational security efforts. On top of that, 

those efforts have to work together as a system. 

What does this mean for technology? The first thing we need to 

understand is that terrorist groups have varying capabilities and 

goals. That means that some may be more challenging than others. 

It is important to look at the worst-case scenario. It is also important to design defenses that could defeat less than worst-case plots. 

Experience from defense planning has taught us that designing a 

defense against the worst case does not always provide an appropriate defense against other targets. For materials in particular, 

that means looking at detecting shielded highly enriched uranium, 

but also at other target materials. 

How about transformational technology? First, it is very important, as Steve Aoki mentioned, that there are fundamental physical 

limits to what you can do in transforming technology. But there is 

room for progress. 

I want to make a few basic points, and the theme here is that 

there is room for improvement in the hardware, but that transforming detection is about more than hardware. 

We can improve detection sensitivity. We can also combine detection of radiation with detection of other materials that might be involved in nuclear terrorism. Shielding is one. Combining detection 

with profiling of potential terrorists is another. Detecting the explosives that might be part of a nuclear weapon and combining that, 

in particular in an automated way, getting the right software with 

nuclear radiation detection is important. 

Another opportunity, combination of hardware and software, is 

the ability to integrate multiple detectors, wide networks of detectors. That requires software to combine the pieces. It also requires 

portability, lower power, and lower cost for detectors. 

And, finally, we need to think about transformational concepts of 

operations, in particular leveraging intelligence to make best use of 

our detectors. The biggest source of intelligence may be at the 

source. The systems we are installing to prevent the theft of materials may also provide us with warning that theft has occurred. 

Let me describe a handful of specific policy measures that I think 

these imply. The first is that transformational technology is worth 

not only the investments that are occurring now, but is worth 

greater investment. The budget for transformational technology at 

DNDO is smaller than all but one program budget at DARPA, the 

12

Defense Department’s long-term, high-risk, ambitious detection 

program. 

On top of that, we need to make sure we are doing this in the 

widest context possible. DNDO is integrating radiation detection efforts. We need an approach that integrates all of our efforts to defend against nuclear terrorism. I would recommend that the place 

to do that is at the National Counterterrorism Center, the NCTC, 

both to lay out the responsibilities across departments and to make 

sure we have the right underlying intelligence assessment of what 

exactly the threat is to design and measure our efforts against. 

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levi appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Dr. Levi. 

And now Dr. Fred Ikle. 

STATEMENT OF FRED C. IKLE, DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify 

here. I am the rear guard for these excellent four witnesses, so I 

am in charge of looking backward. 

A sense of history helps us prepare for the future. Eleven years 

ago, the Defense Science Board fully explained the need for better 

tools to detect smuggled nuclear weapons and proposed specific 

technologies that could and should be developed. 2 years later, the 

Defense Science Board reiterated these recommendations. In 1999, 

the National Intelligence Council issued a report pointing out that 

smuggling nuclear weapons is much easier than building missiles 

and nuclear warheads that fit into them. Indeed, putting a nuclear 

warhead in a large container is less difficult than putting one into 

a missile cone. 

Yet, even including the Hart-Rudman Commission, Mr. Chairman, that you mentioned, nothing was done until 9/11. 

But even then, after 9/11, it was a long, uphill struggle to overcome the bureaucratic obstacles, including some people who mistakenly, unlike Dr. Levi, talked about physical limits as an absolute limit that you could not—that prevented you from making any 

progress. And that was an obstacle for a full year. But thanks to 

Vayl Oxford’s leadership, the interminable interagency debates 

about road maps were finally terminated and replaced by real research; real work at the laboratory benches is what we need. 

And as Dr. Nanos testified, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

is ramping up research and development on the specific, quite different nuclear detection systems that the combat commanders so 

badly need. Whether this urgent R&D for our military needs can 

move ahead with enough speed and conviction will be decided in 

part by Congress, especially the Appropriations Committees. What 

budget levels should be met for these military needs? In my rough 

estimate, a ramp-up to $200 million for fiscal year 2008 would be 

about right as a target. Compare this with the $251 billion next 

year—just 1 year—for the F-35 fighter aircraft, more than a thousand times larger than protecting us from nuclear weapons, or the 

more than $10 billion next year, more than 50 times larger, for 

13

missile defense. Now, I am all for missile defense and have spoken 

up on that for a long time. We need it. We need it to close half the 

barn door. But we must not leave the other half of the door open 

to smuggled nuclear weapons. 

Mr. Chairman, I shall use my remaining minutes to focus on the 

Pentagon’s challenges since the homeland security needs have received far more attention and are better understood. Assume the 

President has just received a reliable intel warning that a nuclear 

bomb is being smuggled on one of several ships sailing from North 

Korea. He would turn to the Department of Defense to take lead 

action to find this bomb and render it harmless. But today neither 

the Defense Department, nor DOE, nor Homeland Security, nor the 

FBI have the tools to find and safely disarm this bomb. The Navy 

could sink every ship sailing from North Korea, without proof 

which ship had the weapon and without confirmation that any of 

the ships had a nuclear bomb. Considering our intelligence quarrels about Saddam Hussein’s WMD, I am not sure we want to go 

that route? 

A Spanish philosopher once said, ‘‘The beginning of wisdom is 

fear.’’ But it is painful to explore the abyss of a justified deep fear. 

We have become so used to the non-use of nuclear weapons, a dispensation that lasted for more than 65 years—one of the greatest 

accomplishments in all of military history. 

But the morning after, when this dispensation has abruptly come 

to an end, what will we do? All the concerns about affecting the 

public by active interrogation that Dr. Aoki properly referred to, all 

the budget constraints would be swept away. Dr. Nanos’ agency 

would be funded with billions to develop and build the technology—

precisely the technology recommended more than 10 years ago, but 

which we failed to build when we used the time to fill spiral-bound 

reports with ‘‘road maps’’ and ‘‘architectures.’’ 

Now, Congress has invested a great deal in improving the intelligence capabilities, which is fine. But a priority of this effort has 

been directed against individuals and organizations attempting to 

prepare an attack—cell phone chatter and financial transactions, 

suspicious people taking pictures below the Brooklyn Bridge, airplane passengers arriving with names on a list. This works when 

it takes a lot of people to do limited damage. 

But once the ultimate evildoers obtained a nuclear bomb and 

know how to detonate it, they do not have to chat on cell phones; 

they do not have to take pictures below a bridge, because the blast 

will destroy it from any angle; they will not use a passport with 

a name like Osama bin al Qaeda. So the suspect search for people 

will be less effective than the search for fissile materials. If only 

we had built the very best technology for this search. 

We have to take the enemy into account, Mr. Chairman, or as 

Winston Churchill put it: However absorbed a commander may be 

in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is necessary sometimes 

to take the enemy into consideration. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ikle appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

14

Chairman KYL. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Ikle, and all 

members of the panel. I think your last comment helps me to put 

into perspective the questions that I would like to pose. 

I have to some extent assumed, but will state specifically, that 

we all acknowledge the nature of the enemy that we are concerned 

about here today, an enemy that is so bent upon achieving its goals 

that it will literally stop at nothing, including overriding that 65-

year nuclear dispensation that you spoke of, Dr. Ikle. 

I do not have any doubt, having served on the Intelligence Committee and being familiar with what all of you are familiar with, 

that if certain terrorist groups were able to get their hands on a 

device which they could detonate, that they would try to find a way 

to do it. 

If we all agree to that, then it would be unthinkable for us not 

to do everything we could within reason to obviate that threat. Intelligence is, of course, the key place to begin. Dr. Levi pointed out 

that it goes far beyond just a detection device proposition. You 

would look at all the different ways in which it could be done and 

try to determine whether you can find out things about the people 

or the transportation methodologies or the other ways that you 

might have to detect the threat when it came. But at the end of 

the day, I think Dr. Ikle is correct. A lot of questions would be 

asked after the fact why you did not have a better way of finding 

out that this was going to happen or potentially detecting it. 

Now, I acknowledge the different responsibilities, and one of the 

benefits of having a panel such as we have today is that we have 

a glimpse of each of the entities that have the primary responsibility for our Government’s response to this as well as to area outside experts, both with experience. 

Do I understand—and I primarily ask the three of you this question, but anybody can chime in. Do I understand that in a very 

rough way, the research part of the effort is for the most part led 

by the Department of Energy; the applied technology deployment 

into the field to do the very best detection that we can with what 

we have available now is done through the Department of Homeland Security; and the application of what we need for the purely 

or primarily military applications would be accomplished through 

the Department of Defense; but that there is a lot of overlap? And, 

in fact, part of my question here is: Is the DNDO R&D group 

where the priorities are set, or is there some other level that goes 

across our governmental agencies that actually set the priorities for 

both the research and deployment of whatever technologies we 

have? 

Now, those are actually two questions, so any of you, since nobody else is here, we do not have a time limit. Let’s just have a 

conversation about this. Let me start with Dr. Oxford. 

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, if I could address that, and then ask 

Steve and Pete to jump in as necessary. 

First of all, the overarching technology road map that helps construct the executive branch’s response to this was actually done 

through the OSTP office within the White House, and we all contributed to the respective contributions to that. 

I think regarding your former question, both Steve and I own 

what I call transformational research; I think he calls it 

15

foundational research; but we do de-conflict those. For example, 

when he goes out and solicits proposals from the National Laboratories, I contribute members of his team to do the selection and do 

the proposal review so we understand where each of us are investing and how that will either transition to later stages of development or how we can de-conflict that directly. 

But our transformational research program is tied directly to our 

architecture, where he has broader objectives that allow him to address. We do take our transformational research program against 

our architecture as a backdrop for longer-term solutions that ultimately will lead to the system solutions that you referred to. 

Chairman KYL. Dr. Aoki? 

Mr. AOKI. Mr. Chairman, just to add a little bit to Vayl’s comments, I think one way to think about this is that there really is 

sort of a core science base, and DOE does and has over the years 

contributed to maintaining that science base. But because the solution to this problem, as several of the witnesses have pointed out, 

requires not only the kind of integrated system that DNDO is developing for detection in this country and at our borders, but also 

the best use of our intelligence resources, and ultimately perhaps 

our military resources, one of the things that we do is provide a 

lot of support for some of the other agencies. And so we work 

very—you know, our R&D programs work very closely with the intelligence community. We work very closely with DOD. We actually 

do provide a lot of applied R&D that is directed at their missions 

as well as at some of our own specialty areas, like the Render Safe 

Teams and Emergency Response Teams. 

So there may appear to be a certain amount of overlap. Some of 

that is inevitable because what you have here is a number of product lines, if you will, being built on top of a common substructure. 

We do work very hard at trying to coordinate, trying to get the priorities right, and trying to make sure that we are not keeping each 

other in the dark about what is going on. Some of that is informal; 

some of that is formalized. 

Chairman KYL. And I should not have shorted DTRA’s research 

role as well. Perhaps in the way I asked the question I did. I am 

sure Dr. Nanos will correct that. 

Mr. NANOS. Well, sir, I would like to say that the National Labs 

are a treasure in this regard. I mean, in terms of the development 

of a lot of the detection technology, and even when we are engaged 

with the universities or industry development sources, they provide 

the people that help us sort it out and put sanity in the equation 

and understand what we have. 

The DOD part of the equation, I think, I like to describe is a little bit different, and we may push on some technologies that would 

not—which might be being worked by others but would not necessarily be their first priority. If you think of Dr. Ikle’s scenario 

and back it up to prior to when the material gets shipboard and 

you—first of all, you need to study the terrain, the background, and 

understand where the material—what pathways it might take because time is clearly of the essence and you need to get out there 

and find the material now before it gets too close, or even worse, 

if it were diverted and went after an important overseas target. 

16

And so for that reason, we have to apply a long stand-off, potentially high-energy active sources to ferret out the material, and 

some of that in the hazardous environment we would operate in 

and with the rules of engagement might not be suitable for use in 

the other agencies’ scenarios, but would be perfectly acceptable in 

the combat conditions or near-combat conditions we would find ourselves in. 

So we will be pushing predominantly in that direction and developing and hopefully sharing that technology, obviously, but we may 

be pushing it harder in that direction than others would do. But, 

of course, at the same time, we will be relying on the DOE laboratories to provide us the scientists to help us do that. 

Mr. LEVI. Let me just make a couple comments. Two witnesses 

have pointed out that active interrogation technology, which, in 

particular, lets you deal with some shielding challenges, is acceptable in different ways in different situations. The hazards to people, to operators, and to enemy combatants are all judged in different ways. There is an in-between scenario also. If we have 

strong intelligence, not even after a single attack but strong intelligence that material has escaped, we might be willing to cross over 

other lines. But that requires a conversation now about what the 

rules are and what rules we would use in the future that can guide 

the technology development. It is not technology in a vacuum. It is 

technology within a context that we need to look at. 

We are not going to develop the technology during the time 

frame between warning and possible attack. We have to look at it 

now. 

We also talked a bit about a scenario where a state lets material 

go, where a state deliberately tries to attack covertly. And I think 

Steve Aoki’s point earlier about the necessity of investing in attribution so that states cannot do this anonymously is incredibly important. And it is also important to understand that this is not primarily a technology effort to characterize the materials after an attack or before an attack. That is part of it. But the biggest shortfall 

right now is having fingerprints to match whatever we find to. 

There are important things that have been done. There is more 

important analysis and more in the way of intelligence operations 

that could be done. And there also needs to be better integration 

across the U.S. Government. 

I do not hold a clearance, but I have been told that there is poor 

sharing in some important cases between critical parts of the U.S. 

Government in what they know about foreign nuclear materials 

holdings. And I think that would be very important to investigate 

and to address if that problem genuinely does exist. 

Chairman KYL. Dr. Ikle? 

Mr. IKLE. The useful distinction that we can see percolating 

through these good responses is really peacetime prevention, which 

DNDO is rightly focused on, enormously important, and wartime 

response with DTRA, for which DTRA has to equip the Department 

of Defense. And different rules apply. Different rules can be used. 

It is really almost an entirely different world if you think of the 

full consequences that we get into in a world after a nuclear weapon has been used. 

17

Having said that, I am little bit troubled occasionally by the use 

of the word ‘‘architecture.’’ It sounds kind of good, purposeful building of a big program, a big structure. But architects normally know 

their building materials. They know what the beams can carry. 

They know what the roofing can do. And so even for the most ambitious structures, they know what they work with. 

In this area, it is the very materials, the tools, the detection 

equipment that is in flux, that should be greatly improved. And as 

we improve it, the architecture will change. So this has to be an 

iterative process. Otherwise, it is like you were trying to build an 

air force architecture with the bases, the hangars, the logistics department, training of the pilots, but you do not want the airplanes 

are like. And that is a bit the situation we are in here. 

So we have to think more of an iterative process where we get 

better tools and we can do different things with the structure, the 

deployment, or call it the architecture, based on these different 

tools. 

Finally, a very brief word on attribution, which was properly 

raised by Dr. Levi. That is a deep problem, and as was indicated, 

it gets into classified areas. I do not know whether your Committee 

wants to have a closed hearing on that sometime, but it is a big 

problem area. That is all I can say now. 

Chairman KYL. Well, and it would be wonderful if we could say 

someday soon in an unclassified way that our scientists have now 

figured out a way, going back to the genomic kind of projects in biology, to figure out the source of every nuclear emission should 

there be some kind of material released from an explosion. And so 

whoever you are thinking about doing it, just like the FBI and the 

fingerprints, we will find you because we know what each of you 

have. 

It would be nice to be able to use that as a deterrent, so if you 

have that capability, it is one that you probably want to announce 

in advance. 

Mr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, I think it is around the corner, and we 

hope will have it before the first attack. 

Mr. LEVI. You can also go partway to disclosing your capabilities 

in order to achieve a meaningful deterrent. There is an analogy 

here. When states like India and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, they did not release all the details of what they were doing, 

but they published limited amounts in technical journals to show 

that they had certain capabilities. 

I have encouraged DOE scientists to try to look at doing something similar—publishing enough to get the other guy worried, but 

not enough so that he can evade your defense. 

Chairman KYL. And, of course, I think it is obvious that there 

is much about this entire area that is classified and obviously has 

to remain classified. 

One of the undercurrents to the testimony here is the relative 

priority of spending on near-term detection devices and programs 

that enable us to meet a potential current threat, on the one hand, 

versus the kind of research that has got to be done for more robust 

activity. To some extent, that also breaks down between the nonmilitary and military, although to some extent, while you might 

18

consider the military the more active or robust threat, it does not 

necessarily have to be. 

And so I am wondering how each of you would evaluate—and, in 

particular, I will put this to Dr. Oxford, too—how we evaluate our 

spending priorities with the kind of spending reductions that I 

talked about in my opening statement and what kind of impact 

that has and what we can do about that. 

Now, I know you did not come here to complain, so I am eliciting 

this information from you under penalty of something. 

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, I understand the budget pressures 

that we are all under, and I will try to not make this sound like 

a complaint. 

First of all, getting to the basis for your question, we think right 

now, given the sparsity of what this country has been investing in 

this area, we have got to have a balance between near-term and 

future capabilities. For example, the contracts that I mentioned 

that were awarded on the 14th of this month will be our next-generation technologies for probably 10 years. The upgrades to those 

systems in the passive detection arena are going to come primarily 

in two areas: upgraded software, which can be immediately 

downloaded in the fielded systems so the hardware investment is 

not wasted, because we have actually already set up a national algorithm team that consists of national experts from the laboratories as well as industry to constantly improve the algorithms in 

which these detectors will give us the answers. So I think that becomes a very cost-effective solution. 

Separately from that, both DOE and ourselves, and I am sure 

Dr. Nanos ultimately—I am not sure what his program looks like 

right this minute—will be investing in advanced detector materials. Now, based on our design philosophy, at least for the domestic systems, we are building these in a way that we can retrofit. 

So if we come up with a replacement to sodium iodide—for example, lanthanum bromide is one of the detector materials that is 

being looked at pretty hard—we would have a design methodology 

where we could retrofit our systems, just like we will the software, 

to upgrade those systems as new materials become available. 

So that kind of balance allows us to do things now without waiting for the future necessarily, so we get what we call capability and 

coverage, expecting then improvements to come over time. 

Now, there are long-term challenges that we just do not have capabilities for right now, and that is why we still need that balance 

in the longer-term R&D. As Dr. Nanos has mentioned, and in my 

opening statement I mentioned, stand-off distances for detection is 

problematic, and we need to aggressively look at what we can do 

in that arena. 

Regarding the reductions that are currently in the Senate mark, 

there was $35 million of a $100 million reduction in our transformational research program that will affect many of the programs that we expected to start next year. Specifically, the academic research program, which we think is the future for this 

country in this area, was essentially zeroed out. That will hurt our 

ability to get the universities and colleges engaged in this topic to 

bring the best and the brightest to the forefront, you know, in the 

5- to 10-year horizon. 

19

So we think in the transformational side that we need to work 

with the Senate in the conference process to see if we can restore 

that. 

Likewise, some of the other reductions will affect our ability to 

start working with our major urban areas to help them provide detection systems to protect them against a weapon that could be developed inside this country. So just looking outwards from the border may not be an effective solution, especially for a dirty bomb, 

where the materials could come from a domestic source and essentially be transported directly into one of our major urban areas. 

So there are a variety of things like that. The shielding problem 

that we have talked about, that program was cut in half in the 

2007 mark. That will be our next-generation capability to actually 

automatically identify shielding in cargo. So we think those become 

critical vulnerabilities as we go forward over time. 

Chairman KYL. Okay. Thank you. 

Others? Dr. Nanos? 

Mr. NANOS. I would like to emphasize something that 

Mr. Oxford said, the system aspects of what we are talking 

about. You know, a detector, an individual detector, is a component 

of an overall system, and if you think of the radar now to the 

transmitter-receiver processing software and that sort of thing, 

each mission has sort of a system aspect to it that we have to develop. And as new technologies come along, you do not throw away 

the system. You introduce it to the system. And I think that is an 

important point. 

And I think that part of this effort and a very important part of 

it is to work the system aspects of this and then to optimize the 

components for these systems. 

The detection business 10 years ago was largely one that was 

based on protection of people and some detection of events, but not 

trying to prevent smuggling or not trying to locate material the 

way we are today in the field. So some of the—although we did a 

lot of work on detectors, we did not do it in the system context. And 

I think that is probably—Vayl, I don’t know if you agree with that, 

but I think that is probably one of the biggest sea changes that we 

are undergoing right now. 

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, if I could add to something, Dr. Ikle 

mentioned something, that there has been probably a 50/50 split in 

the technical community as to whether we are at our physical limits on understanding this problem or being able to do something 

about it. Let me just give you one analogy that suggests that we 

are not. 

I would contend that the detector community has never met the 

signal processing community, so what Pete is saying I think is absolutely true. There are things we can do in the signal processing 

area, just like we did in the ASW business for years, that will allow 

us to start to take some of these signatures that are buried in a 

cluttered environment and extract them. 

The detector community did not necessarily worry about that. 

They worried about the physical detector and not necessarily the 

system solution, as Pete is saying. So when you get a group of just 

physicists in the room who do not think about signal processing, 

20

you would get that same kind of argument. We think there is a different approach. 

Chairman KYL. Well, go ahead, and I will add one more question 

for Dr. Ikle. 

Mr. IKLE. It is a very important question you raise, Mr. Chairman, the question you raised about near-term and more advanced 

or longer-term tools and investments. I would think, if you look at 

the other large budget allocations, particularly in the Pentagon, 

quite a bit of it is certainly for the long term. The more than 1,000 

times larger budget—and we are talking about for DTRA, the F35 is really more for the long term. The very important ballistic 

missile defense project is also rather long term. It has made some 

progress, but it has still quite some way to go. 

So it makes sense to compliment these long-term efforts, which 

I think are mostly necessary for our military capability 10, 20 

years hence, in this area as well. 

A very encouraging idea that Dr. Oxford mentioned is the retrofitting of currently deployed things with improved equipment. And 

to the extent that that can be provided in advance, it would help 

a great deal. So it remains a difficult balance, long-term life versus 

short term. 

There is another balance we have not touched on, and that is the 

enormity or the damage of the event that we want to prevent. 

There is a lot of talk about dirty bombs. They are nasty. Scattering 

of medical isotopes could do similar things. One of the best decisions, I thought, of Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff was to 

raise the radiation level tolerable after a dirty bomb to the level 

that you encounter every time you fly to Arizona. It was a ridiculously low level. Of course, you have to evacuate a city for a century or whatever. So there are flexible ways of handling the dirty 

bomb that is, as we all realize, much, much less dreadful than a 

full-scale nuclear explosion. 

There is the risk of chemical plants, often mentioned in Congress, being attacked by terrorists, and some of these could be terribly nasty because there is a dirty bomb probably in there, the 

damage they do. So these less bad or lesser dangers probably do 

deserve less attention. 

Chairman KYL. Dr. Levi? 

Mr. LEVI. First, let me say I think Dr. Ikle’s comments on radiological weapons, dirty bombs, are right on the point. In particular, 

adjustments to the radiation threshold levels were very smart to 

do. 

Let me try to give you yet another perspective on the near-term 

versus long-term thinking. Our near-term investments are defending us against some subset of the threat. They are not going to defend us against the—they are not going to give us high confidence 

against the worst-case threats, but they are going to give us meaningful defense against some of the lesser threats. Let me give you 

an example of a situation I would not like to see happen. 

We look at all the radiation detection technologies, decide that 

they can’t detect well-shielded highly enriched uranium that has 

been properly cast and so on. So we say we are not going to deploy 

the lesser systems. 

21

Then a group comes along, a terrorist group that is really good 

a stealing things, but not good at technical measures, not good at 

recruiting scientists. They break into a weapons facility, get the 

material. They cannot do much to hide it, let’s say. They try to 

bring it into the country, and we do not have the detection systems 

capable of detecting it because we have only looked at the worstcase threat. I think that is a situation we want to avoid. 

What we want to be doing—and I think this is one way to think 

of the near and long term—is to use a capabilities-based approach. 

This is the way that the Defense Department has been doing planning for the last 5 years or so, where we look at a range of capabilities, both of the potential opponents and of the defense, and try to 

simply cover as much of that space as possible, to have good capabilities against whatever we can defend against, and then in an evolutionary way try to improve that. 

It is the way the Defense Department has been heading. They 

have been developing better ways to actually do carefully planning 

under that. And it is probably the right framework for thinking 

about this as well. 

Chairman KYL. Well, a good example of that is in the area of 

missile defense. There is controversy about it, but it makes sense 

given the fact that there is some potential threat today. In the case 

of terrorism, it makes even more sense, it seems to me, because 

there is a very real threat of terrorism today. But concomitant to 

that is what is the relative prioritization in spending research dollars if there is a potential—again, the predicate here is that this 

is the worst calamity that we can imagine and, therefore, we probably ought to be setting aside some concomitant amount of research dollars to deal with it. 

Is there a need for a Manhattan-style effort here that would 

eventually enable us to have a pretty good chance to protect 

against this ultimate threat to our citizenry? Dr. Ikle? 

Mr. IKLE. Some of us, especially you, Mr. Chairman, have argued 

for kind of a Manhattan Project and made that case at high levels 

of the executive branch, and at the time, the executive branch was 

close to that but then went off in a different direction. 

The advantage of the Manhattan Project, as I would see it, is not 

just the perhaps somewhat larger budget, but that the scientists 

interact more vigorously than if we have to parcel out contracts to 

different universities and the four or five laboratories and agencies 

and so on, and it becomes more parceled. And I do hope that 

DNDO under Vayl Oxford’s leadership will be able to pull these 

many excellent contracts that they are letting out intellectually together and have a system that the overall reinforcement and interaction of these ideas of different physicists, be they at universities, 

at the labs, or wherever, that can mutually reinforce each other, as 

was the case at the Manhattan Project the way it was led. 

Chairman KYL. Mr. Oxford? 

Mr. OXFORD. let me address that a little bit. I take a similar 

view, but maybe a different pathway. For example, when I inherited DNDO, before it actually was formalized, the total budget 

within DHS to deal with both the acquisition and the R&D account 

was about $173 million. We are operating this year with a total 

22

budget of $318 million. The President’s budget request in 2007 is 

$535 million. We are on the right trajectory. 

I think there are cases where you could throw too much money 

too quickly until the community is ready to accept it; otherwise, we 

would be sitting here in front of you next year wondering why we 

had wasted a billion dollars when the community was not ready to 

effectively spend it. 

So I think we are looking—whether it is a Manhattan Project or 

just a very prudent planning and execution strategy to deal with 

threat, I think we are on that right trajectory. And I think if you 

look at our 5-year projections, we will be over a billion dollars within the next several years if we get the support not only through the 

White House but the Congress as we go forward. 

So the trajectory is right. We are getting the priorities established. We could have thrown too much money too soon had we not 

gone through some of this planning phase. 

Chairman KYL. Yes, Dr. Aoki? 

Mr. AOKI. I guess I would just want to add one comment to that, 

that is, this is not only a science and technology issue, but also—

you know, we used the word ‘‘architecture’’ occasionally in the testimony, but what architecture is really all about is the flow of information. And what we are trying to do in designing the system that 

Vayl is responsible for is to make sure that not only do we have 

better detectors in the sense of better physics packages that go out 

and sense radiation at border crossings or in the hands of policemen or wherever, but also a better ability to synthesize and utilize 

that information and make sure that if somebody picks up something that is a warning sign, that information gets to someone who 

can appreciate it and analyze it and draw the proper conclusion. 

So I think one of the things that we need to focus on here is not 

only making sure that the science is properly funded, but also that 

within—that science is placed in the right operational context, 

which includes a great deal of time and attention placed to the 

management of the information, the connectivity between the different parts of the system, so that the very precious nuclear weapons expertise, for example, at Los Alamos National Laboratory can 

be brought to bear on the kinds of things that we—the signals we 

are getting out in the field and conclusions, proper conclusions 

drawn and sent back to the operators. 

So some of this is not only about putting more money into R&D, 

it is also about, as I think several people have commented already, 

the systems aspects. 

Chairman KYL. Dr. Levi? 

Mr. LEVI. Let me expand on a couple of things that Dr. Ikle and 

Dr. Aoki have said. The labs have a very particular advantage in 

dealing with these things. In many cases, we are going to be trying 

to detect not just nuclear material but nuclear weapons. As far as 

I know, universities do not know details about what nuclear weapons—what forms nuclear weapons might take. Industry does not 

know that. The labs do. So they can take advantage of that knowledge. 

Context—I think several people have emphasized it. Information 

flow. I think DNDO is to be complimented from one particular initiative, which is to make sure that facilities that we are helping acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:11 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 032152 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\32200.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
23

quire protection and accounting systems actually report to the 

United States when those systems detect something missing. That 

has not been a focus in the past, and DNDO should get as broad 

support as possible. 

But let me also give you one more example of how thinking of 

this as a system matters. I doubt that technological advances will 

give us the ability to have ubiquitous radiation sensing along, for 

example, the border. Okay? But here is what it can do: If we have 

an ability to actually stop a significant number of people crossing 

the border, then the technological advance can help make detectors 

smaller and more portable so that if we have something like the 

catch-and-release policy we have now, at least we do not catch 

someone with plutonium and release them. 

Those sorts of integrated concepts of operations are incredibly 

important, and if we have that context, these technological investments will be much more valuable. 

Chairman KYL. Dr. Nanos? 

Mr. NANOS. Sir, as a student of both the Manhattan Project and 

the Polaris, from my strategic system experiences, there is a part 

of it that is often not discussed, and that is the tremendous industrial base ground that was prepared during that time and the ability to do things concurrently. And I think it is probably too early 

now, but, you know, this story may ultimately be written in our 

ability to cost-effectively produce exotic materials that we have 

never produced before. In other words, as we look to some of the 

detector technologies creating high-purity crystals and things like 

that, and then being able to churn out many thousands of them at 

reasonable expense may end up being the biggest challenge we 

have in terms of our defense. 

So as the S&T opens up the doors, we have to be aware of where 

the major industrial base challenges are and move on those very 

quickly because it does not do us any good to do the S&T and then 

not have the production capability or not be able to afford the result. 

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, could I add an exclamation point to 

that? 

Chairman KYL. Sure. Before you do, let me just—first of all, I 

have a 3:30 meeting. Secondly, I promised some people we would 

finish within an hour or so, and we are a bit beyond that. And I 

do not want to impinge upon your time either. So what I would like 

to do is just conclude with Mr. Oxford and then, Dr. Ikle, if you 

had something, to conclude our hearing with that, but to make the 

point that—I mean, I could sit here all day and listen to you. The 

one thing that I do want to get out of this in terms of a written 

question to all of you—and I would like to submit a couple here—

is any suggestions you have about this issue that has been now addressed directly and indirectly about the coordination of effort and 

the prioritization and the ultimate authority and responsibility for 

doing that so that we don’t just end up with a Government that 

has a lot of capability and an industry with a lot of capability, laboratories, others with a lot of capability, some organizational structure in the Government to deal with it, but not having a very clear 

chain of authority that utilizes all of this in a sensible and ultimately responsible way. 

24

Mr. OXFORD. If I could show you how this is working right now, 

for example, when we signed the Spectroscopic Portal program contracts, we have an agreement with NNSA that they will begin procurement from those contracts. So the systems they field overseas, 

where they can field these systems based on the host nation agreement, they will have the wherewithal to now buy from these contracts, therefore, hopefully reducing the unit costs for those contracts. 

As Pete mentioned, one of the long poles in this tent is the fact 

that there is one sodium iodide manufacturing facility in this country. It is a French-owned company operating out of Ohio. So in this 

case, what we have done is we have gone out with a separate solicitation from the detector program to solicit bids from not only that 

company but also other companies within the U.S. to see if we can 

enhance the domestic production of sodium iodide crystals and to 

reduce the overall costs. Right now as a singular source, they are 

drawing about a 25-percent profit on the crystals. Those are the 

kinds of issues that Pete just raised that, as we start getting into 

the systems and the industrial capacity, we have to look forward 

because that becomes a long pole in terms of the production capacity. 

Chairman KYL. Dr. Ikle? 

Mr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing by itself helped integrating the thinking among the involved agencies and scholars. 

And I think more can be achieved just by your Committee pulling 

this—make sure this effort pulls together from the industrial side 

on the one hand, the scientific side on the other, what the laboratories can do, as Dr. Levi had pointed out, because, you know, 

weapons is quite different from what the university can do, and 

how do you fit these together so that the country as a whole will 

rapidly and greatly improve its capability in this important area. 

Chairman KYL. Let me conclude by echoing something that Dr. 

Levi said, although he was too self-effacing here. I am humbled to 

be in the presence of people whose reputations I know and whose 

contributions to this country’s security and prosperity are not, I am 

sure, nearly appreciated, not just in the room but elsewhere. We 

have got some tremendous talent in this country and people who 

have sacrificed, who have served the country in ways that did not 

perhaps provide as much remuneration as they could have acquired 

otherwise, but certainly their contributions to our society in the 

long run will make a much greater difference. 

I just appreciate that and hope that the contribution that we in 

the policymaking area can make will match the kind of scientific 

effort that all of you have been responsible for. 

To that end, I invite your comments, your suggestions. This is 

not just an end of a process here but I hope the beginning of a 

process. Dr. Ikle, as you pointed out, perhaps we can play a role 

in this with this Subcommittee, but not even just this Subcommittee, the Congress generally. 

I will follow up with the questions that Senator Feinstein had for 

the panel, as well as a couple that I would like to ask, and really 

elicit any other advice or suggestions that you have, and then perhaps we can get together again. 

25

I will just conclude by saying thank you to all of you, and thank 

you to those in the audience who I am sure share this appreciation 

for our panel here today. 

This hearing will now be concluded. 

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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