U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Follow-up Review of the 

Critical Incident Response Plans 

of the 

United States Attorneys’ Offices

January 2007

 

Report Number I-2007-001
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

Introduction 

Rapid response to critical incidents, including acts of terrorism, 

hostage situations, and natural disasters, is an essential function of the 

Department of Justice (Department). Critical incident response is also an 

integral part of the Department’s strategy for combating terrorism. 

To improve the United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) preparedness 

to respond to critical incidents, in 1996 the Attorney General directed the 

Department to implement the Crisis Management Coordinator (CMC) 

Program. 

As part of that program, the Attorney General directed each USAO to 

designate an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) to serve as the CMC 

responsible for developing a critical incident response plan (CIRP) and 

making other preparations to ensure that the USAO was ready to respond to 

critical incidents.1 The Criminal Division’s Counterterrorism Section (CTS) 

and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) were assigned 

to administer and support the CMC Program and to train the coordinators 

designated by the USAOs.2 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the need to 

respond quickly and effectively to critical incidents was highlighted in both 

the Department’s Anti-Terrorism Plan and the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security.3 For USAOs, the quality of that response depends, in 

 1 Critical Incident Response Plan, Decision Memorandum to the Attorney General, 

May 23, 1996 (signed May 24, 1996), 

http://10.173.2.12/usao/eousa/ole/usabook/crit/misc/cirp.htm. 

2 Prior to becoming part of the Criminal Division in December 2002, the CTS was 

part of the Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section. On September 28, 2006, the Department 

announced that the CTS would become part of the National Security Division established 

under the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-177 

(2006)). 

3 Memorandum from the Attorney General to USAOs, “Anti-Terrorism Plan,” 

September 17, 2001; National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, 

July 16, 2002. 
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large part, on developing and making any necessary revisions to CIRPs and 

conducting tabletop or field exercises.4

In 2003, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed the 

Department’s CMC Program to determine whether the USAOs had carried 

out the Attorney General’s direction to improve their ability to respond 

quickly and appropriately to critical incidents.5 We found that most USAOs 

had not effectively implemented the CMC Program. The USAOs’ CIRPs were 

inadequate in scope and content to ensure a quick and appropriate 

response to a terrorist attack or other critical incident. Also, the USAOs 

generally did not follow the standard crisis preparedness practice of 

conducting regular critical incident response exercises. 

In addition, our 2003 review found that the CTS and EOUSA provided 

only minimal guidance to the CMCs and did not keep the guidance up to 

date as changes in Department and national policy occurred. Further, the 

CMCs received only limited training, consisting primarily of two national 

conferences held in 1997 and 1999. The CTS provided no further training 

until March 2003, when it sponsored a 2-hour videoconference. The CTS 

and EOUSA also failed to track, thoroughly review, and file the CIRPs the 

USAOs submitted. Our 2003 report contained 10 recommendations aimed 

at improving the preparedness of the USAOs to respond to critical incidents. 

The OIG conducted this current follow-up review to examine the 

USAOs’ progress since our 2003 report to prepare to respond to critical 

incidents. Specifically, we reviewed whether (1) each USAO had a revised 

and approved CIRP; (2) each USAO completed the required annual CIRP 

exercise and accompanying after-action report; (3) EOUSA and the CTS 

provided direction and guidance that assisted USAOs in their efforts to 

respond to critical incidents, and (4) other factors affected the USAOs’ 

ability to prepare to respond to critical incidents 

In this review, we examined 93 revised CIRPs, 89 CIRP evaluations 

conducted by expert reviewers, and 101 after-action reports. We 

interviewed 10 EOUSA and CTS personnel and the CMCs for the District of 

Columbia and the Eastern District of Virginia. We also surveyed 93 CMCs 

4 Tabletop exercises are emergency preparedness drills that are completed in a 

conference room setting (not out in the field). Field exercises are emergency preparedness 

drills that require more active participation by those engaging in the simulated events. 

5 See the OIG report entitled Review of the Critical Incident Response Plans of the 

United States Attorneys’ Offices, I-2004-001, December 2003, 

www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/EOUSA/index.htm. 
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and interviewed 7 CMCs whose districts had activated their CIRPs in 

response to critical incidents that occurred after our 2003 review. 

Results in Brief 

Our review found that, since the OIG’s 2003 report, the USAOs, 

EOUSA, and the CTS have taken important steps to improve the USAOs’ 

preparedness to respond to critical incidents. Yet, while progress has been 

made, several areas remain in need of improvement. 

In May 2004, to ensure that the USAOs are prepared to respond to 

critical incidents, EOUSA and the CTS directed the USAOs to revise their 

individual CIRPs based on a model plan developed by an EOUSA expert 

panel. In this follow-up review, we determined that all 93 USAOs complied 

with this directive. 

Concurrently, EOUSA and the CTS instructed the USAOs to conduct 

tabletop or field exercises to test their revised CIRPs and to complete afteraction reports on the exercises. We found that all 93 USAOs had conducted 

at least one exercise and completed an after-action report since April 1, 

2004, and 53 had conducted 2 or more exercises between May 2004 and 

November 2006.6 

Additionally, in response to the OIG’s 2003 recommendations, EOUSA 

and the CTS: (1) provided training to CMCs on how to prepare effective and 

comprehensive CIRPs and develop and conduct exercises; (2) verified USAO 

CIRP activities through approximately June 2005; and (3) inserted questions 

(performance measures) pertaining to CIRPs into the USAOs’ triennial 

operations review process to assess the USAOs’ ability to respond to a 

critical incident. 

The value of the actions taken in response to our recommendations 

was confirmed by all seven of the USAOs in districts that were significantly 

affected by Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina, and Rita, which damaged Gulf Coast 

communities in 2004 and 2005.7 According to one U.S. Attorney, 

developing the CIRP and conducting exercises made staff in his office more 

effective when a crisis occurred. CMCs from other districts affected by the 

hurricanes also said that having conducted CIRP exercises proved 

6 One district had completed a CIRP exercise in April 2004, prior to EOUSA and the 

CTS instructing USAOs to conduct such exercises. 

7 See Appendix I for additional discussion of the USAOs’ and EOUSA’s response 

efforts during these natural disasters. 
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invaluable in producing timely decision making by managerial and 

supervisory staff. 

In addition, in the year following the hurricanes, all seven districts 

affected by the storms conducted a CIRP exercise. 

Yet, while we found that the USAOs that actually responded to critical 

incidents since our last review continued their CIRP activities, the majority 

of other USAOs have regressed in their required CIRP activities. In addition, 

we found that EOUSA and the CTS are not providing the necessary direction 

and support. 

The USAOs, EOUSA, and the CTS have not fully implemented 

corrective action in response to the OIG’s 2003 recommendations or the 

guidelines subsequently provided in the model plan and the USAOs’ CIRPs.8 

The model plan adopted in May 2004 requires an annual exercise and 

completion of an accompanying after-action report. However, in the 3 years 

since our December 2003 report, 85 of the USAOs had not performed an 

annual CIRP exercise and completed the accompanying after-action report. 

Initially, USAOs were responsive to the directives from EOUSA issued 

following the OIG’s 2003 report, with 78 districts conducting a CIRP 

exercise in 2004. However, only 39 USAOs conducted an exercise in 2005, 

and only 45 have already conducted an exercise in 2006 (as of November).9 

Also, EOUSA has not maintained a process to monitor the completion of 

exercises or after-action reports, and the USAOs are not utilizing the 

capabilities the CTS provided to share lessons learned from exercises or 

actual events. 

We also found that three additional improvements are needed. First, 

seven CIRPs that EOUSA initially deemed unacceptable were not 

subsequently reviewed. The OIG reviewed six of these seven CIRPs and 

determined that, in the 24 months since EOUSA found the districts’ CIRPs 

deficient, three of the USAOs had not addressed the areas of concern. 

Second, we found a significant turnover in the CMC position during the 9 

months from October 2005 to July 2006 – an annualized rate of 23 

percent.10 This figure is significantly greater than the 6-percent turnover 

8 The USAOs’ individual CIRPs adopted the language (including guidelines) set forth 

in the model plan. 

9 An additional 12 USAOs stated in their survey responses and subsequent e-mails 

that they planned to conduct an exercise by the end of the 2006 calendar year. 

10 The turnover rate for CMCs was 17 percent over the 9-month period, which if 

annualized would be 23 percent. 
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rate for AUSAs as a whole in 2005. Turnover among AUSAs serving as 

CMCs impairs USAOs’ critical incident response preparedness. Finally, we 

found that factors beyond the control of the USAOs, EOUSA, and the CTS 

could affect the ability of USAOs to respond to critical incidents. For 

example, the USAOs are experiencing continuing budget shortages that 

have limited the number of AUSAs on staff, thereby limiting staff availability 

for non-prosecutorial functions such as CIRP activities. 

The following sections provide more detail on the efforts by USAOs, 

EOUSA, and the CTS since our 2003 report to improve the quality of their 

critical incident preparedness. On pages v through viii, we describe the 

positive steps taken to prepare USAOs to respond to critical incidents. On 

pages viii through xiv, we describe areas where improvements are still 

needed. 

EOUSA, CTS, and USAO Efforts to Prepare to Respond to Critical 

Incidents 

Since the OIG’s 2003 report, the USAOs, EOUSA, and the CTS have 

taken positive steps toward ensuring the USAOs are prepared to respond to 

critical incidents. Beginning in early 2004 and continuing through October 

2005, EOUSA and the CTS collaborated on developing guidance and 

training to improve the USAOs’ ability to respond to critical incidents. 

These efforts included revising the model CIRP, completing a sample 

exercise scenario and after-action template, reviewing each district’s revised 

CIRP, and conducting two CMC conferences. 

In the spring of 2004, EOUSA and the CTS brought together a panel 

of four experienced CMCs to assess changes made to the model CIRP during 

the OIG’s 2003 review and to finalize a revised model CIRP. The revised 

model CIRP responded to a primary finding of the OIG’s 2003 report that 

only 16 percent of the CIRPs addressed more than half of the critical 

functions that a USAO may be required to perform during a critical 

incident.11 The expert panel met several times to complete a draft of the 

model plan and worked with EOUSA and the CTS to prepare a training 

conference, which was held in March 2004 at the National Advocacy Center 

in Columbia, South Carolina. The panel also constructed a sample tabletop 

exercise for use at the conference. At the conference, the revised draft was 

disseminated, and the attending CMCs reviewed the model plan and 

11 The 2003 review found that only 12 of the 76 CIRPs on file at EOUSA and the 

CTS addressed more than half of the 48 critical functions. Just 4 of these 76 addressed all 

48 functions. Eleven USAOs simply inserted their name into the prior version of the model 

plan. 
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participated in the exercise and small-group discussions. They also had the 

opportunity to critique and suggest improvements in the draft of the revised 

model plan. Sixty-one CMCs attended this conference, 49 of whom 

remained as their district’s CMC as of July 2006. Following the conference, 

the expert panel used the CMCs’ feedback to finalize both the model plan 

and sample tabletop exercise. 

In the 2003 report, we documented that since the inception of the 

CMC Program in May 1996, the CTS had sponsored only two training 

conferences specifically for CMCs (in 1997 and 1999). CTS officials told us 

that the Department’s anti-terrorism focus following September 11, 2001, 

had precluded additional training sessions for CMCs. Our 2003 report 

recommended that training be provided on how to prepare effective and 

comprehensive CIRPs. The March 2004 conference was the first training 

session held for CMCs since 1999, other than a 2-hour videoconference 

conducted in March 2003. 

In May 2004, EOUSA staff administering the CIRP improvements 

worked with EOUSA’s Security Programs Staff to have items pertaining to 

the CIRP and critical incident preparedness activities added to the triennial 

operations reviews of USAOs. The reviews are conducted by EOUSA’s 

Evaluation and Review Staff (EARS) and utilize self-assessment checklists, 

which are completed by USAO staff. The EOUSA added items to the 

checklist addressing whether the district had designated a CMC, revised its 

CIRP, conducted the required tabletop or field exercise, and completed the 

subsequent after-action report. According to the EARS Director, the goal of 

the EARS team during a triennial review is to assess a district’s overall 

operations and management and, if particular policies and procedures are 

not in place, recommend that they be implemented. These questions were 

added to address the OIG’s 2003 recommendation that performance 

measures be developed to assess the USAOs’ ability to respond to a critical 

incident. 

On May 10, 2004, the final version of the revised model plan was 

distributed to all CMCs with instructions to revise their existing CIRPs to 

follow the new format and submit them to EOUSA by May 28, 2004. As 

EOUSA received revised CIRPs from the USAOs, it forwarded each of them 

to one of four members of its expert panel to evaluate for compliance with 

the model plan’s requirements. All 93 USAOs eventually revised their 

CIRPs. 

In June 2004, the expert panelists began their reviews of the revised 

CIRPs using a checklist, which they developed, to evaluate the CIRPs for 

completeness and to note any additional comments on how a district should 
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revise its CIRP. The expert reviewers judged 68 of the revised CIRPs to be 

“acceptable” without further modification, while another 14 were “acceptable 

with changes.” Only seven of the CIRPs were deemed “unacceptable.”12 

This represents a marked improvement from our 2003 review, which found 

that 72 of the 76 CIRPs the OIG analyzed were lacking fundamental 

elements of an effective critical incident response that would have rendered 

them unacceptable under the current model plan. 

In early July 2004, using the feedback from the CMC participants at 

the March conference, EOUSA and the CTS completed the revisions to the 

sample tabletop exercise. They also prepared an after-action report 

template to assist CMCs in memorializing lessons learned from the exercises 

and the need for any changes to their districts’ CIRPs. The sample exercise 

and the after-action report template were sent to the CMCs with 

instructions to conduct an exercise within 30 days of receiving feedback 

from the expert reviewer on their CIRP. The OIG found that 78 districts 

conducted a CIRP exercise in 2004. The remaining 15 districts conducted 

their first exercise in either 2005 or 2006. Thus, after revising their CIRPs 

in 2004 and 2005, all 93 USAOs conducted at least one exercise and 

completed an after-action report.13 In our 2003 review, only 30 of the 

81 CMCs who replied to the OIG’s survey stated that their USAOs had 

conducted a CIRP exercise in the 7 years after 1996. 

In early 2005, in response to our 2003 recommendations, EOUSA 

began the process of monitoring the USAOs’ completion of their CIRP 

exercises and after-action reports. However, EOUSA discontinued the effort 

in June 2005, just prior to the staff person responsible for the monitoring 

transferring to the CTS. 

Also in 2005, the CTS requested and received approval to create a 

National Crisis Management Coordinator (National Coordinator) position to 

further the critical incident preparedness activities of the USAOs, including 

developing the training for the 2005 CMC conference held in October at the 

National Advocacy Center.14 Part of the agenda at the conference was to 

12 The OIG was unable to find documentation for the expert panel’s review of four 

CIRPs. These four USAOs reported they never received the evaluator’s comments. The OIG 

analyzed these four CIRPs and found they were in compliance with the new model plan. 

13 One district stated it had completed an after-action report for its 2004 exercise 

but was unable to locate a copy of the report; EOUSA did not have a copy on file. This 

district has not completed a second exercise. 

14 Seventy-five CMCs attended the October 2005 conference, 51 of whom remained 

their district’s CMC as of July 2006. 
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share the lessons learned by those USAOs whose districts were struck by 

hurricanes in 2004 and 2005. 

As part of this current review, the OIG interviewed CMCs from seven 

districts who stated in their survey responses that they had activated their 

CIRPs in response to hurricanes. At the time of the storms, each of the 

seven districts already had its revised CIRP approved. Six of the seven 

USAOs had conducted a CIRP exercise prior to the hurricanes striking their 

districts.15

In these interviews, the CMCs described their efforts both before and 

after the storms and commented very positively on the benefits derived from 

the response preparation activities. Commenting on the training exercises, 

one CMC said, “More than anything else, they provided awareness of the 

issues we would be dealing with. These are the people [in other law 

enforcement and response agencies that] we are going to be working with, 

and people will have already thought through some of these [critical incident 

response] issues.” Another CMC said, “It becomes second nature and these 

[decisions and activities] would be the type of things that may occur 

depending on the issue. It also forced some people to think about what our 

role would be depending on the incident.” All seven districts conducted a 

CIRP exercise in the calendar year after activating their CIRPs because of 

the storms. 

Finally, in response to an OIG recommendation, EOUSA and the CTS 

expanded the content on their web sites (both Internet and intranet) to 

provide additional information and resources to assist the CMCs in their 

efforts to conduct critical incident preparedness activities. During the 

course of this review, the CTS significantly increased the information 

available to USAOs on its “Docushare” intranet web site. 

Areas Where Improvements Are Still Needed 

We found that, after being responsive to the OIG’s 2003 

recommendations through approximately June 2005, the USAOs have 

regressed in their critical incident preparation activities. Our current review 

found that USAOs were not fulfilling the requirement in the revised model 

plan for conducting an annual exercise and completing an accompanying 

after-action report. We also found that EOUSA and the CTS discontinued 

providing direction and support to ensure that USAOs continually prepare 

15 The one district that had not conducted an exercise prior to the hurricane that 

struck its district was the Northern District of Florida, which completed its revised CIRP in 

June 2004. Hurricane Ivan struck the district in September 2004. 
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for critical incidents, in contrast to their efforts following the issuance of our 

2003 report. 

The USAOs have regressed in their critical incident preparation activities. 

USAOs have not conducted annual CIRP exercises. Pursuant to 

the revised model plan, which was adopted by each USAO through its CIRP, 

the USAOs were to have conducted a tabletop exercise annually and should 

have completed at least three exercises by the end of 2006. While each of 

the 93 USAOs has conducted at least 1 exercise since revising its CIRP in 

2004, only 16 USAOs are in compliance with annual exercise 

requirements.16 Moreover, we found that only 53 (57 percent) had 

conducted at least two exercises during the 2004 to 2006 period.17 Survey 

responses and follow-up correspondence indicated that some of the USAOs’ 

did not conduct exercises because of difficulty scheduling them in 

conjunction with the prosecutorial responsibilities of both the CMC and 

other AUSAs in the office.18

USAOs have not continued to complete after-action reports. The 

rate of completion for after-action reports has decreased significantly since 

USAOs conducted their first CIRP exercises. While all but two districts 

completed an after-action report for their first exercise, only 24 of the 53 (45 

percent) USAOs that conducted multiple CIRP exercises completed afteraction reports for any of their subsequent CIRP exercises. Further, only 

eight USAOs completed an exercise and the corresponding after-action 

report in each of the three calendar years from 2004 through 2006. Under 

the model plan each USAO adopted, the USAOs are to complete after-action 

reports after each CIRP exercise or a critical incident. The reports are 

intended to memorialize lessons learned and necessary changes to a 

 16 Sixteen USAOs had already completed an exercise in each of the 3 years (2004 

through 2006); two additional districts had an exercise scheduled to occur prior to the close 

of 2006 and, upon completion, would also be in compliance with the model plan’s 

requirement. 

17 During this review, the OIG used a broad interpretation of what constituted a 

CIRP exercise. For example, the OIG considered it a CIRP exercise if a district participated 

in exercises with other federal, state, and local agencies that dealt with critical incident 

response, even if the USAOs’ participants were not utilizing the USAO’s CIRP as part of the 

exercise. Because one of the most important aspects of critical incident response is 

building relationships with other agencies, the OIG believes such activities meet the annual 

exercise requirement, especially since these activities encourage the USAOs to attend 

exercises in the field rather than relying on tabletop simulations. 

18 Five of the six districts that were affected by the 2005 hurricanes did not conduct 

exercises in 2005. 
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district’s CIRP. When there is no documentation of previous exercises, 

newly appointed CMCs have no records to consult on what activities the 

district has engaged in and what lessons should have been learned from 

those exercises. 

USAOs have not utilized the information sharing capabilities the 

CTS provided. In response to our survey, 52 CMCs stated that they had 

never received after-action reports, lessons learned information, or copies of 

revised CIRPs from other USAOs, EOUSA, or the CTS. In 2003, we 

recommended that EOUSA, in conjunction with the CTS, complete the 

development of an intranet site containing information on critical incident 

response, including lessons learned, exercise scenarios, and best practices. 

In response, EOUSA and the CTS developed a web site to provide USAOs 

with access to other USAOs’ CIRPs and after-action reports. Our survey 

found that 51 CMCs had visited the site, and 49 of them reported it was 

useful in locating critical incident planning information. The remaining 42 

CMCs (45 percent) reported they had never visited the web site. The EOUSA 

and the CTS designed the intranet to be the primary source of 

disseminating information on critical incident response planning. Thus, the 

large percentage of CMCs that have not visited the web site indicates CMCs 

are not utilizing the lessons learned and other information available to 

assist them in their critical incident response preparation. 

EOUSA and the CTS have not provided the direction and support needed to 

ensure that the USAOs continually prepare for critical incidents. 

EOUSA no longer assists the CTS with the USAOs’ critical incident 

response preparation. In April 2005, the CTS created a National 

Coordinator position to assist with the CMC Program; by September 2005,

EOUSA had ceased monitoring and ceded all involvement in the USAOs’ 

preparation activities to the CTS. At that time, the EOUSA staff person 

responsible for implementing the OIG’s 2003 recommendations transferred 

to the CTS to assist with the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Program. 

Currently, EOUSA does not have any staff assigned to assist the USAOs 

with CIRP-related activities. EOUSA’s diminished role occurred despite the 

lack of any change in the responsibilities of either organization pertaining to 

the CMC Program. 

In the 1996 decision memorandum implementing the CMC Program, 

the Attorney General instructed EOUSA to monitor timely CIRP submissions 

and updates, and instructed the CTS, in conjunction with EOUSA, to 

develop and ensure training for the CMCs. When the model plan was 

revised in 2004, it instructed USAOs to forward their revised CIRPs and 
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after-action reports to EOUSA. Thus, EOUSA still should have an active 

role in providing guidance to the USAOs and monitoring CIRP activities. 

We found that in 2004 and early 2005, EOUSA staff tracked the 

USAOs’ completion of the exercises and after-action reports, but those 

efforts ceased before all of the USAOs completed their first exercise. EOUSA 

and the CTS made no effort to track the completion of a second round of 

exercises. Neither EOUSA nor the CTS actively monitored the completion of 

exercises or after-action reports since approximately June 2005. Although 

the CTS created a National Coordinator position, CTS is not directly or 

indirectly involved in overseeing the performance of the USAOs because the 

CTS believes such activities fall under the purview of EOUSA. According to 

the CTS, its role is providing advice on exercises, policy updates, and 

emerging issues regarding critical response preparedness, while EOUSA 

handles the administrative functions, such as monitoring the USAOs’ 

completion of exercises. During the course of this review, however, the OIG 

found that EOUSA was no longer performing these administrative functions 

for the CMC Program. 

USAOs’ performance measures have been removed. In October 

2005, EOUSA removed three questions pertaining to CIRP activities that 

had been added to the EARS self-assessment checklist used in EOUSA’s 

triennial review of each USAO. According to the EARS Director, questions 

pertaining to the designation of a CMC, CIRP exercises, and after-action 

reports were dropped in 2005 “to streamline the checklist.” This action was 

taken without consulting the CTS.19 

During this review, the OIG informed the CTS of the questions’ 

removal, and the CTS subsequently initiated efforts with EOUSA to reinstate 

information about CIRP-related activities in the triennial review. On 

September 21, 2006, the EARS Director provided the OIG with new 

questions that USAOs would be asked about their CIRPs and CMCs as part 

of the evaluation process, and the questions addressed each of the items 

that had been removed. 

Competing responsibilities have diminished the National 

Coordinator’s effectiveness with the CMC Program. The Department has 

assigned critical incident planning efforts to the CMC Program’s National 

Coordinator, including making him the point person on the Department’s 

avian flu response preparation. Most of these efforts are not directly related 

to his responsibilities for managing the CMC Program. According to the 

CTS, these additional responsibilities have prevented the National 

19 EARS Director, September 21, 2006, e-mail. 
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Coordinator from completing the CMC Program tasks the CTS originally 

envisioned, such as serving as the primary link to the CMCs in the districts 

by disseminating policy, training, and exercise information. Also, EOUSA’s 

decision to not monitor the USAOs’ CIRP activities significantly limited the 

National Coordinator’s awareness of the USAOs’ current critical incident 

preparations. 

Because of these additional responsibilities, the National Coordinator 

has been unable to maintain an effective dialogue with the CMCs regarding 

CIRP-related activities since the October 2005 conference. We found 

through our survey that 62 CMCs had never received after-action reports 

(from exercises or critical incidents), other lessons learned information, or 

copies of revised CIRPs from EOUSA or the CTS.20 While this information 

was made available on the CTS’s intranet, the National Coordinator told the 

OIG he intended to communicate with CMCs directly, including providing 

information about upcoming exercises in which their districts could 

participate. 

Newly appointed CMCs have not received training. In the 

9 months after the CMC training conference in October 2005, 16 new CMCs 

were appointed and, as of July 2006, had not received any training.21 Eight 

of the 16 indicated they had no critical incident experience prior to 

becoming CMCs. In fact, of the current 93 CMCs, 52 stated in their survey 

responses that they had no critical incident experience prior to becoming 

CMCs, which highlights the need for timely training.22

In 2003, the OIG recommended that training and guidance be 

provided to the USAOs on CIRP activities. EOUSA and the CTS responded 

by conducting the 2004 and 2005 CMC training conferences and developing 

the model plan and sample tabletop exercises. However, the lack of training 

for recently assigned CMCs demonstrates a need to address the training of 

CMCs appointed between conferences, especially given the turnover rate in 

the CMC position. Even if EOUSA and the CTS were committed to 

conducting annual conferences (no conference will be conducted in 2006), 

any CMCs appointed shortly after a conference would go without formal 

20 The 62 CMCs versus the 52 CMCs referenced on page x, is based on the source 

of the information being EOUSA and the CTS, and does not include information received 

from other USAOs. 

21 Additionally, in response to our survey, several of these new CMCs stated they 

did not have the training materials from the 2004 and 2005 CMC conferences. 

22 Three of these new CMCs were designated as “acting” in place of CMCs who had 

been called to National Guard duty in Iraq. 
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training for nearly 12 months in the absence of readily accessible 

orientation materials. While the CTS has significantly increased the 

materials available on its intranet site, the OIG did not find specific 

orientation materials designed for newly appointed CMCs. Given the 

likelihood that newly appointed CMCs do not have prior critical incident 

response experience, training materials should be readily available to newly 

appointed CMCs to help them function effectively in the position. The 

number of newly appointed CMCs also underscores the need to ensure that 

each district complete after-action reports in order to provide 

documentation for successive CMCs at each USAO. 

Another reason new CMCs do not receive training is that the USAOs 

have not alerted EOUSA and the CTS when they appoint new or acting 

CMCs.23 The model plan does not require USAOs to promptly notify EOUSA 

or the CTS when there is a change, vacancy, or “acting” appointment to the 

CMC position.24 We found that several districts had not notified the 

National Coordinator of CMC appointments, thus delaying the CMCs’ 

acquisition of the background information they need to perform their role 

because they were unaware of where to get the information. During followup correspondence to our survey, four newly appointed CMCs asked the 

OIG how to acquire, and where to forward upon completion, materials on 

CIRP revisions, exercises, and training, even though the CIRP-related 

information is available on the EOUSA intranet.25 Further, we found that 

several districts with CMC vacancies had not designated a replacement 

CMC until assigning someone to complete the OIG’s survey. 

EOUSA and the CTS never determined that all 93 CIRPs were 

acceptable. We found that the seven CIRPs that the panel of experts 

deemed unacceptable were not reviewed again after districts revised and 

resubmitted them. CTS officials stated that they did not believe a second 

review was necessary because they trusted the USAOs to make the required 

revisions. Because there was never a second review of the seven CIRPs, 

EOUSA and the CTS could not demonstrate that all USAOs had acceptable 

CIRPs. An OIG review of current versions of six of those seven CIRPs found 

that not all areas of concern had been addressed in the 24 months since the 

23 The lack of specific personnel assigned to the CIRP program at EOUSA raises the 

issue of who at EOUSA USAOs would contact. 

24 The model plan does impose a 6-month revision requirement, and revisions are 

to be forwarded to EOUSA and the CTS. Thus, a newly appointed CMC would be denoted 

in the revised CIRP. 

25 While the National Coordinator is listed on the web site, instructions on where 

(or to whom) to send information to EOUSA were not readily apparent. 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

CIRPs had been found deficient.26 Of these six districts, three had not 

corrected the deficiencies that were the primary reason their CIRPs had 

been deemed unacceptable: the lack of contingency plans should one of the 

district’s branch offices become unavailable for operations. 

Other Factors Affecting the USAOs’ Ability to Prepare to Respond to 

Critical Incidents 

During the course of our review, we identified two factors 

that are adversely affecting the CMC program: 1) limited budgetary 

resources, which are generally outside of the control of the USAOs; 

and 2) high turnover among CMCs, which affects the continuity of 

CIRP-related activities.

Budget shortages and rescissions have limited the ability of AUSAs to 

complete non-prosecutorial functions. 

Budget shortages for the USAOs over the past 4 years (FY 2003 - 

FY 2006) have reduced funding available to the USAOs. According to 

EOUSA, this has reduced the number of AUSAs, while the USAOs’ workload 

has continued to increase. Consequently, according to CMCs, the ability of 

AUSAs to complete non-prosecutorial functions, such as CMC duties, has 

been restricted. Because of the collateral nature of the CMC position, 

reducing the amount of time CMCs dedicate to CIRP-related activities can 

have a significant negative impact on a USAO’s ability to prepare for critical 

incidents. Further, according to CMCs, AUSAs are evaluated on the 

number of prosecutions and not on CMC activities. Thus, AUSAs have less 

incentive to focus on CIRP-related activities. 

Turnover among AUSAs serving as CMCs adversely affects USAOs’ critical 

incident response preparedness. 

The turnover for CMCs since the October 2005 CMC conference has 

been much higher than that for AUSAs as a whole. Annualized, the CMCs’ 

rate of turnover was 23 percent – nearly four times that for AUSAs in 2005. 

Coupled with the lack of immediate access to training, high turnover 

disrupts the continuity of CMC activities.27 The turnover rate also 

 26 The seventh CIRP was not reviewed because the CMC indicated that the district 

planned to make significant changes to it in the immediate future. 

27 The OIG could not research the historical CMC turnover rate because the 

information was not available through the USAOs, EOUSA, or the CTS. 
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emphasizes the need for USAOs to keep EOUSA and the CTS aware of 

changes in the USAO’s CMC position. 

Conclusion and Recommendations 

In response to our 2003 report, EOUSA and the CTS have taken 

important steps such as an improved model plan that the USAOs have 

adopted, and the completion of exercises on a much more frequent basis 

that have improved the USAOs’ critical response preparedness. If pursued, 

these efforts can help USAOs respond quickly and appropriately to critical 

incidents. 

Yet, despite the initial responsiveness to the OIG’s 2003 

recommendations, the efforts of the USAOs, EOUSA, and the CTS have 

regressed since June 2005. We found that USAOs have not consistently 

completed after-action reports following CIRP exercises or actual critical 

events, or forwarded these reports to both EOUSA and the CTS to allow for 

lessons learned to be shared. The USAOs also have not consistently notified 

EOUSA and the CTS immediately upon a new CMC’s appointment. 

Moreover, EOUSA and the CTS need to clarify their responsibilities for the 

CMC Program. The CTS, if it is to be the lead component in directing and 

supporting the CMCs, needs to provide additional administrative assistance 

to the program to (1) ensure that the USAOs are actually conducting the 

requisite activities and (2) leverage the lessons learned by each of the 

districts as they engage in CIRP exercises and actual events by sharing the 

positive and negative experiences with all other USAOs. 

The response by USAOs in the areas affected by the 2004 and 2005 

hurricanes demonstrates the value of the critical incident preparations they 

undertook beginning in March 2004. However, other USAOs have not 

followed the CIRP requirements, nor have EOUSA and the CTS provided the 

necessary direction and support to ensure that USAOs continually prepare 

for critical incidents. 

In this report, we make seven recommendations to improve the 

USAOs’ critical incident response planning. We recommend that: 

1. EOUSA and the CTS clarify each component’s CMC Program 

responsibilities. 

2. In accordance with guidance provided by EOUSA and the CTS, the 

USAOs conduct exercises of their CIRPs. 
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3. The USAOs complete, retain, and forward copies of after-action reports 

to EOUSA and the CTS. 

4. EOUSA and the CTS establish a system that alerts EOUSA when USAOs 

do not: 

• Complete required CIRP exercises, and 

• Submit after-action reports for exercises and CIRP activations. 

5. EOUSA ensure that performance measures to monitor completion of 

CIRP exercises and after-action reports remain a part of its triennial 

review process. 

 

6. When vacancies occur in CMC positions (either permanent or 

temporary), the USAOs appoint new CMCs as soon as practicable; the 

USAOs also should notify EOUSA and the CTS immediately of any 

vacancies and subsequent appointments. 

7. EOUSA and the CTS ensure that new CMCs receive timely orientation 

and training. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................3

Background....................................................................................................................................................4

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .........................................................................................................13

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW.......................................................................................................................15

EOUSA and the CTS developed a revised “model plan” that encompassed prior OIG 

recommendations. ................................................................................................................................15

EOUSA and the CTS provided improved training and guidance to CMCs.........................16

EOUSA and the CTS directed the USAOs to revise their CIRPs based on the “model 

plan,” and had the CIRPs reviewed by an expert panel............................................................18

EOUSA and CTS instructed USAOs to test their revised CIRPs by conducting exercises 

and to complete after-action reports on the results of the exercises...................................19

EOUSA incorporated questions into its triennial reviews of the USAOs to assess the 

USAOs’ ability to respond to a critical incident. .........................................................................20

EOUSA monitored USAOs’ completion of CIRP activities through approximately June 

2005..........................................................................................................................................................20

Since June 2005, the USAOs have regressed in their critical incident preparation activities, 

and EOUSA and the CTS have not continued to provide direction and support to the 

USAOs............................................................................................................................................................22

The USAOs have not conducted CIRP exercises on an annual basis. .................................22

USAOs have not continued to complete after-action reports. ................................................25

USAOs are not utilizing the information-sharing capabilities provided by the CTS.......26

EOUSA no longer assists the CTS with the USAOs’ critical incident response 

preparation. ............................................................................................................................................27

EOUSA removed the USAOs’ performance measures assessing the CIRP Program. ......29

Competing responsibilities have diminished the National Coordinator’s effectiveness 

with the CMC Program........................................................................................................................29

EOUSA and the CTS have failed to ensure that newly appointed CMCs have received 

training.....................................................................................................................................................30

EOUSA and the CTS never ensured that all 93 CIRPs are acceptable................................32

During the course of our review, we identified two areas that are adversely affecting the 

CMC Program...............................................................................................................................................34

Budget shortages and rescissions have limited the ability of AUSAs to complete nonprosecutorial functions.......................................................................................................................34

Turnover among AUSAs serving as CMCs adversely affects USAOs’ critical incident 

response preparedness. ......................................................................................................................34

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..........................................................................................35

APPENDIX I: CIRP ACTIVATIONS SINCE OUR 2003 REVIEW..................................................37

APPENDIX II: Survey .................................................................................................................................48

APPENDIX III: EOUSA RESPONSE.........................................................................................................60
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APPENDIX IV: NSD RESPONSE...............................................................................................................64

APPENDIX V: OIG ANALYSIS of EOUSA and NSD RESPONSE ...................................................67
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INTRODUCTION 

In May 1996, the Attorney General directed the Department to 

implement a Crisis Management Coordinator (CMC) Program to improve the 

USAOs’ preparedness to respond “quickly and appropriately” to critical 

incidents. At the heart of the CMC Program implementation was the 

requirement that each of the 93 USAOs develop a critical incident response 

plan (CIRP). The Attorney General directed that the Counterterrorism 

Section (CTS)28 and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys 

(EOUSA) administer and support the CMC Program. 

In 2003, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed the CMC 

Program.29 That review found, among other things, that the USAOs’ CIRPs 

were inadequate in scope and content and that the USAOs generally had not 

followed the standard crisis preparedness practice of conducting regular 

critical incident response exercises. The OIG conducted this follow-up 

review to examine the USAO’s progress since our 2003 report to prepare to 

respond to critical incidents. 

 28 In 1996, the units that would become the CTS were part of the Department’s 

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section. The CTS was formed in a December 1, 2002 

reorganization and placed within the Criminal Division. On September 28, 2006, the 

Department announced that the CTS would become part of the National Security Division 

established under the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 

No. 109-177 (2006)).

29 See the OIG report entitled Review of the Critical Incident Response Plans of the 

United States Attorneys’ Offices, I-2004-001, December 2003, 

www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0401/index.htm. 
Background 

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Source: OIG review of USAOs’ critical incident response 

plans 

Source: OIG review of USAOs’ critical incident response 

plans. 

• Requires ongoing communication with 

upper-level personnel at the Department. 

• Requires coordination among federal law 

enforcement agencies (more so than usual), 

state or local law enforcement agencies, 

local or state prosecutors, emergency relief 

services, or emergency response services. 

• Attracts close public scrutiny through the 

media. 

Critical Incidents 

Critical incidents include acts of terrorism, 

hostage situations, and natural disasters. 

Typically, these events involve one or more of 

the following factors (although the presence of 

one factor by itself does not automatically mean 

that an incident is critical): 

• Involves threats or acts of violence against 

government or social institutions. 

• Involves significant loss of life, significant 

injuries, or significant damage to property. 

• Demands use of substantial resources. 

Responding quickly and 

appropriately when critical 

incidents occur is an essential part 

of the Department’s mission, as 

well as an integral part of the 

Department’s strategy for 

protecting the nation from 

terrorism. Problems encountered 

during prior critical incidents – 

such as the Branch Davidian 

standoff near Waco, Texas, the 

bombing of the Murrah Federal 

Building in Oklahoma City, and 

natural disasters like Hurricane 

Andrew – resulted in significant 

congressional and public scrutiny 

of the Department’s actions. Afteraction reports on these and other 

critical incidents identified serious 

mistakes by the Department in 

areas such as communication and 

coordination between negotiating 

and tactical elements, personnel 

availability, crime scene 

management and evidence 

collection, and use of deadly force. 

Since 1998, at least 11 department and 5 other federal and legislative 

initiatives have focused on correcting past deficiencies and improving the 

ability of the Department (and other federal agencies) to respond to critical 

incidents (Table 1, page 4). Between 1988 and 1996, six initiatives 

established requirements for periodic exercises of emergency operating 

plans30 and assigned EOUSA responsibility for overseeing the emergency 

preparedness of the USAOs,31 including developing critical incident 

response training.32

30 DOJ Order 1900.6A, Department of Justice Crisis Management Plan, 1988. 

31 DOJ Order 1900.5A, National Security Emergency Preparedness Program, 1989. 

32 Memorandum from Merrick Garland, Principal Associate Attorney General, to the 

Attorney General, “Attorney Critical Incident Response Group,” January 11, 1996. 
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Federal actions taken between 2001 and 2006 reinforce the fact that 

being prepared to respond to critical incidents is one of the Department’s 

primary objectives. For example, the Department’s Anti-Terrorism Plan 

(2001) and the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002), two 

initiatives implemented to update the Department’s strategic objectives in 

the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, both identify 

responding effectively to critical incidents as one of the Department’s three 

major strategic objectives. 

The Department further reinforced the importance of the CMC 

Program and CIRPs in its fiscal year (FY) 2003-2008 Strategic Plan, which 

stated that “the Department will continue to foster the promulgation and 

dissemination of cooperative domestic preparedness initiatives in support of 

state and local emergency responders.”33

33 Department of Justice, Fiscal Years 2003-2008 Strategic Plan, p. 2.13. 
Table 1: Selected Critical Incidents and Federal Actions, 1988-2003 

INCIDENTS DATE FEDERAL ACTIONS

Dec 1988 — DOJ Crisis Management Plan 

Oct 1989 — DOJ National Security Emergency Preparedness 

Program 

Ruby Ridge incident — Aug 1992 

Hurricane Andrew — Aug 1992 

World Trade Center bombing — Feb 1993 

Branch Davidian standoff — Feb-Apr 

1993 

Apr 1994 — FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) formed 

Oklahoma City bombing — April 1995 

Jun 1995 — PDD 39, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism” 

Jan 1996 — Attorney General’s Critical Incident Response Group 

formed 

Freemen standoff — Mar-Jun 

1996 

May 1996 — USAO Crisis Management Coordinator Program 

formed 

May 1998 — PDD-62, “Protection Against – Unconventional 

Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas,” 

issued 

World Trade Center and Pentagon

attacks — Sep 2001 

Sep 2001 — DOJ Anti-Terrorism Plan issued 

Oct 2001 — Deputy AG issues “Guidance for Anti-Terrorism Task 

Forces” 

Oct 2001 — USA Patriot Act passed by Congress 

Anthrax attacks: New York,

Washington, D.C., and Florida —

Oct 2001 

Oct 2001 — Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of 

Operations Plan issued 

Nov 2001 — Anti-Terrorism Task Forces established in USAOs 

Nov 2001 — “Blueprint for Change, A Plan to Reshape the 

Department and Its Components to Focus on AntiTerrorism” issued 

Jul 2002 — National Strategy for Homeland Security issued 

Washington, D.C., area sniper

shootings — Oct 2002 

Nov 2002 — Criminal Division reorganized 

Feb 2003 — Homeland Security Presidential Directive issued 

Hurricane Ivan — Sep 2004 

Serial shooter, Arizona — May 2005- 

Aug 2006 

Baseline Killer (rapist) — Aug 2005- 

current 

Hurricane Katrina — Sep 2005 

Hurricane Rita — Sep 2005 

Source: OIG review of department and other documents. 

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Evaluation and Inspections Division 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

The CMC Program’s purpose is to improve crisis response. 

Since its inception in 1996, the CMC Program has been designed to 

improve the USAOs’ ability to accomplish their statutory responsibilities 

while responding quickly and appropriately to critical incidents.34 

Specifically, implementing better planning and preparation for responding to 

critical incidents is intended to improve the USAOs’ performance in 

providing legal services and following procedures during crises; enhance the 

USAOs’ coordination with law enforcement and emergency response 

agencies; ensure the identification and organization of resources needed to 

respond to a critical incident; and improve the USAOs’ anticipation of likely 

crisis situations.35 

At the direction of the Attorney General, each USAO was to improve 

its ability to perform during a critical incident by developing CIRPs. These 

CIRPs were to clarify Department-wide notification procedures, district office 

resources, headquarters response, and the command and control process 

during a critical incident. In addition, the Attorney General directed that 

EOUSA and the CTS administer and provide support to the CMC Program. 

 34 Each of 93 United States Attorneys (U.S. Attorneys) is the chief federal law 

enforcement officer within his or her particular jurisdiction and serves as the principal 

litigator under the direction of the Attorney General. 

35 Attorney General’s speech to CMCs at the first national training conference, June 

17, 1997, p. 7. 
The USAOs, CTS, and EOUSA have responsibilities in administering the 

CMC Program. 

Figure 1 shows the offices and divisions involved in the CMC Program. 

Each component has specific responsibilities, which are described in the 

following sections. 

Crisis Management Coordinators

Source: Organization charts for the Department of Justice, EOUSA, and Criminal Division. 

Figure 1: CMC Program Offices and Divisions 

Attorney General

Deputy Attorney General 

Executive Office for the 

United States Attorneys 

United States Attorneys

Crisis Management 

Coordinators 

Office of Legal Education 

Evaluation and Review Staff

Security Program Staff

Criminal Division 

Counterterrorism Section

National Crisis 

Management Coordinator 

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U.S. Attorneys. According to the 1996 decision memorandum, in the 

event of a critical incident the U.S. Attorney is the on-scene legal decision 

maker and is responsible for managing the Department’s response by, 

among other things: 

• Facilitating coordination and communication with federal, state, 

and local officials and prosecutors; 

• Preparing and securing search warrants; 

• Assisting law enforcement personnel in interviewing witnesses; 

• Making legal decisions, such as granting immunity; 

• Appearing before grand juries; and 

• Advising law enforcement personnel when necessary on collecting 

and preserving evidence. 

To coordinate and plan each USAO’s response to a critical incident, 

the Attorney General directed each U.S. Attorney to select a senior Assistant 

U.S. Attorney (AUSA) to be the CMC and directed that at least one AUSA at 

each USAO receive crisis response training. The CMC for each USAO was 

directed to submit a CIRP to EOUSA describing how the USAO would 

manage its responsibilities during a critical incident. The CMCs were also 

directed to coordinate the development and implementation of their CIRPs 

with appropriate federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency 

response agencies, and participate in crisis response exercises with those 

agencies. The CMCs also were responsible for identifying the resources 

their USAOs required to respond quickly and appropriately to a critical 

incident. 

The CTS and EOUSA. When the CMC Program was implemented in 

1996, the Attorney General assigned the CTS to review the CIRPs the 

USAOs submitted for content and quality and to provide feedback to each 

district. EOUSA was assigned to monitor timely CIRP submission and CIRP 

updates. To support the CMC Program, the Attorney General directed the 

CTS, in conjunction with EOUSA, to develop and ensure training for the 

CMCs. The Attorney General stressed “training and advanced planning are 

imperative” given the intense time constraints and public attention during a 

critical incident. Specifically, the CTS was to provide CMCs training in: 

• Coordination with law enforcement and emergency response 

agencies, 

• Legal and procedural crisis response, and 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• Specific planning to identify and organize resources and to 

anticipate likely crisis situations. 

The direction for the CTS and EOUSA to develop training was 

reiterated on October 21, 1999,36 and in the Department’s FY 2002 

Performance Report:

In the area of preparation for and response to acts of 

terrorism, the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section [now 

CTS] is responsible for administering the Department’s 

Attorney Critical Incident Response Group and its Crisis 

Management Coordinators program, which involves the 

development of a crisis response plan for each federal 

judicial district and the training of specially selected federal 

prosecutors from the U.S. Attorneys’ offices and the DOJ 

litigating divisions in crisis preparation and response 

techniques.37

Previous OIG report on USAOs’ CIRPs made 10 recommendations. 

In 2003, the OIG issued a report that reviewed the CMC Program to 

determine whether the USAOs improved their ability to respond quickly and 

appropriately to critical incidents by developing CIRPs, training staff to carry 

out the CIRPs, and exercising their CIRPs.38 In December 2003, the OIG 

reported that most USAOs had not effectively implemented the CMC 

Program as required by the Attorney General. That review found that the 

USAOs’ CIRPs were inadequate in scope and content to ensure a quick and 

appropriate response to a terrorist attack or other critical incident. Also, 

the USAOs generally did not follow the standard crisis preparedness 

practice of conducting regular critical incident response exercises. 

The OIG review also found that the CTS and EOUSA did not 

adequately administer and support the program. The CTS and EOUSA 

provided only minimal guidance to the CMCs and did not update the 

 36 Memorandum for the Attorney General from the Deputy Attorney General, “U.S. 

Attorney’s Offices’ Preparedness to Address Critical Incidents,” October 21, 1999, p. 4. 

37 Department of Justice, FY 2002 Performance Report/FY 2003 Revised Final 

Performance Plan/FY 2004 Performance Plan, Strategic Objective & Annual Goal 1.2-1.3: 

Investigate and Prosecute Terrorist Acts, p. 3. 

38 See the OIG report entitled Review of the Critical Incident Response Plans of the 

United States Attorneys’ Offices, I-2004-001, December 2003, 

www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0401/index.htm. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

guidance as changes in Department and national policy occurred. Further, 

the CMCs received only limited training, consisting primarily of two national 

conferences held in 1997 and 1999. The CTS provided no further training 

from 1999 until March 2003, when it sponsored a 2-hour videoconference. 

The CTS and EOUSA also failed to track, file, and thoroughly review the 

CIRPs the USAOs submitted. 

Our December 2003 report contained 10 recommendations aimed at 

improving the preparedness of the USAOs to respond to critical incidents. 

We recommended that the Deputy Attorney General: 

1. Ensure that performance measures are developed to assess the 

readiness of USAOs to respond to critical incidents. 

We recommended that all U.S. Attorneys: 

2. Revise the CIRPs to address the action items identified by the CTS, 

and regularly update the plans to reflect changes in law, 

departmental policy, or local procedures. 

3. Conduct and participate in periodic exercises to test the CIRPs and 

practice responding to critical incidents. 

4. Establish workload-reporting procedures that capture the time 

dedicated to critical incident response planning duties. 

We recommended that the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division: 

5. Provide updated training and guidance to the USAOs on how to 

prepare effective and comprehensive CIRPs. The guidance should 

reflect changes in legislation, policy, and critical incident response 

practice that have taken place since September 11, 2001. 

6. Review all USAOs’ CIRPs, including revisions, to ensure that the 

CIRPs cover all critical areas; provide individualized feedback to 

USAOs; and periodically report to the Deputy Attorney General on 

the status of the USAOs’ CIRPs. 

 

7. Provide the USAOs with training and guidance on how to develop 

and conduct appropriate critical incident response exercises, either 

independently or in conjunction with the FBI or other offices. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

8. In conjunction with EOUSA, complete the development of a web 

site containing information on critical incident response, including 

lessons learned, exercise scenarios, and best practices. 

We recommended that the Director, EOUSA: 

9. Establish a system for accurately tracking and reporting the 

status of USAO submissions and updates to CIRPs. 

10. With advice from the CTS, revise the operations review process to 

include a full evaluation of the preparedness of USAOs to 

respond to critical incidents. 

In this report, we discuss the USAOs’, EOUSA’s, and the CTS’s 

progress since our 2003 report in improving preparedness to respond to 

critical incidents. On pages 13 through 19, we describe the positive steps 

taken to prepare USAOs to respond to critical incidents. On pages 20 

through 31, we describe areas where improvements by these organizations 

are still needed. 
U.S. Department of Justice 13

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The OIG conducted this follow-up review to examine the USAOs’ 

efforts to prepare to respond to critical incidents. Specifically, we reviewed 

whether (1) each USAO had a revised and approved CIRP; (2) each USAO 

had completed the required annual CIRP exercise and accompanying afteraction report; (3) EOUSA and the CTS had provided direction and guidance 

that assisted USAOs in their efforts to respond to critical incidents, and 

(4) any other factors may impede the USAOs’ ability to prepare to respond to 

critical incidents. 

The scope of this review examined the USAOs’, EOUSA’s, and the 

CTS’s efforts taken since our December 2003 report to prepare to respond to 

critical incidents. In particular, we concentrated on the USAOs’ planning 

and preparation for responding to critical incidents and the actions taken by 

EOUSA and the CTS to assist the USAOs in those efforts. The fieldwork for 

this review was completed from May 2006 to November 2006. 

The methodology used in this review consisted of interviews as well as 

document review and analysis. We also we conducted an e-mail survey of 

the 93 USAOs and used follow-up correspondence and telephone calls to 

clarify survey responses by, and obtain additional information from, CMCs. 

Interviews. To examine the activities of EOUSA, the CTS, and the 

USAOs in critical incident preparedness, we interviewed officials from each 

of the three entities. 

 

Interviews with EOUSA personnel. From EOUSA we interviewed the 

Director, Acting Deputy Director (former Chief Financial Officer), Chief 

Operations Officer (and Acting Chief Information Officer), Director of 

Evaluation and Review Staff, the Assistant Director for Security Programs, 

and EOUSA Legislative Counsel (who was also the EOUSA Liaison for this 

review). 

Interviews with the CTS personnel. From the CTS, we interviewed the 

Acting Director, Deputy Chief, National Antiterrorism Advisory Council 

Coordinator, and National Crisis Management Coordinator. 

Interviews with USAO personnel. We interviewed current CMCs about 

critical incidents that occurred in their districts. We discussed these events 

with the following USAOs: 

• Eastern District of Louisiana (Hurricane Katrina), 

• Middle District of Louisiana (Hurricane Katrina), 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• Western District of Louisiana (Hurricane Rita), 

• Southern District of Mississippi (Hurricanes Katrina), 

• Southern District of Alabama (Hurricane Katrina), 

• Northern District of Florida (Hurricane Ivan), and 

• Eastern District of Texas (Hurricane Rita). 

Document review. To determine whether all USAOs had revised and 

approved CIRPs on file, had completed the required annual exercises, and 

submitted exercise (or critical event) after-action reports, we reviewed and 

analyzed all available CIRPs and after-action reports provided by the 93 

CMCs. In particular we focused on whether: 

• Each of the 93 USAOs had provided a CIRP, 

• The CIRP had been reviewed by an expert reviewer, 

• A revised CIRP was provided subsequent to the expert’s review, 

• The CIRP had been exercised, and 

• The requisite after-action reports had been provided to EOUSA and 

the CTS for exercises or critical events. 

Survey. To address all of our review objectives, we devised a 

60-question survey of CMCs using a software package capable of 

distributing the survey via e-mail to all 93 CMCs. (See Appendix II for the 

questionnaire.) This survey was designed to elicit information on the 

following areas: 

• Background of the CMCs, 

• CIRP training and guidance, 

• CIRP planning, 

• CIRP testing and exercises, 

• CIRP utilization, 

• CIRP activation, 

• CIRP effectiveness and lessons learned, and 

• Qualitative information on how the CIRP program could be 

improved. 

Survey follow-up. To verify and clarify survey responses from the 

CMCs, we contacted 85 CMCs and conducted follow-up interviews via e-mail 

and telephone calls. Through these interviews, we also obtained updates on 

2006 CIRP exercises scheduled to take place or conducted following the 

survey completion date.
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15

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

In response to the OIG’s December 2003 report, USAOs, 

EOUSA, and the CTS have taken positive steps toward 

ensuring that USAOs are prepared to respond to critical 

incidents. Beginning in early 2004 and continuing through 

October 2005, EOUSA and the CTS collaborated on 

activities to improve the USAOs’ ability to respond to 

critical incidents. As their first step, EOUSA and CTS 

developed a revised model plan that addressed OIG 

recommendations. EOUSA and the CTS provided improved 

training and guidance to CMCs, directed USAOs to revise 

their CIRPs based on the model plan, and had the CIRPs 

reviewed by an expert panel. EOUSA and the CTS then 

instructed the USAOs to test their revised CIRPs by 

conducting exercises and to complete after-action reports 

on the results of the exercises. EOUSA incorporated 

questions into its triennial reviews of the USAOs to assess 

the USAOs’ ability to respond to a critical incident. 

Through approximately June 2005, EOUSA monitored 

USAOs’ completion of CIRP activities. By addressing the 

requirements set forth by EOUSA and the CTS, USAOs have 

improved their ability to respond to critical incidents. 

EOUSA and the CTS developed a revised “model plan” that encompassed 

prior OIG recommendations.

In the spring of 2004, EOUSA and the CTS brought together a panel 

that included four CMCs experienced in crisis response planning to assess 

the changes made to the model plan during the OIG’s 2003 review and to 

work with EOUSA and the CTS to further revise the model plan.39 The five 

panelists met several times to complete a revised draft of the model plan. 

 

The final version of the revised model plan directed USAOs to address 

all of the essential functions that should be contained in a CIRP. In 

addition, the OIG reviewed all of the comments provided by the expert 

reviewers and found that, in those instances where a USAO’s CIRP was not 

 39 The panel consisted of five attorneys, four of whom were CMCs. The CMCs were 

from Oklahoma, Northern District; Utah; Virginia, Eastern District; and Wisconsin, Eastern 

District. The fifth attorney, detailed to the CTS, served as the key drafter of the model plan. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

16

acceptable, the reviewers gave additional direction to ensure compliance 

with the model plan’s standards. These actions were responsive to the 

OIG’s 2003 finding that EOUSA and the CTS had not provided sufficient 

direction to USAOs to develop adequate plans. In the OIG’s 2003 review, we 

found that only 12 of the 76 CIRPs on file at EOUSA and the CTS addressed 

more than half of the 48 essential functions that a USAO may be required to 

perform during a response to a critical incident. Only 4 of the 76 plans 

addressed all 48 functions. 

Our side-by-side comparison and analysis of the original and revised 

model plans showed significant improvement. The 19-page revised version 

is both comprehensive and detailed in its guidance regarding the required 

content for a USAO CIRP. It also addresses the OIG’s prior recommendation 

to ensure that the CIRPs cover all critical areas by encompassing all 48 

essential functions that a USAO may be required to perform during a 

response to a critical incident. 

EOUSA and the CTS provided improved training and guidance to CMCs. 

In addition to revising the draft model plan, the expert panel worked 

with EOUSA and the CTS to prepare the materials for a training conference 

held in March 2004 at the National Advocacy Center in Columbia, South 

Carolina. The materials included a sample tabletop exercise for use at the 

conference. 

At the conference, EOUSA and the CTS distributed the draft of the 

revised model plan for review and comment by the CMCs in attendance. 

The CMCs also participated in the sample exercise and engaged in smallgroup discussions. Following the conference, the expert panel used the 

CMCs’ feedback to finalize the model plan and tabletop exercise. Of the 61 

CMCs that attended this conference, 49 remained their district’s CMC as of 

August 2006. 

In 2005, the CTS requested and received approval to create a National 

Crisis Management Coordinator (National Coordinator) position to assist 

USAOs with their critical incident preparedness, including developing the 

training for the 2005 CMC conference, which took place in October. Part of 

the agenda at the conference was to share the lessons learned by those 

USAOs whose districts were struck by hurricanes in 2004 and 2005. 

Seventy-five CMCs attended the 2005 training conference, 51 of whom 

remained their district’s CMC as of August 2006. 
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Respondents to our survey gave positive feedback on both the 2004 

and 2005 CMC training conferences. The CMCs stated that the training 

was helpful in understanding the role that USAOs would play in a real 

crisis. The CMCs’ positive assessment of the 2004 and 2005 training 

conferences was in contrast to the CMCs’ responses during our 2003 review 

that training was insufficient. Our 2003 report documented that since the 

inception of the CMC program in May 1996, EOUSA and the CTS had 

sponsored only two training conferences specifically for CMCs (in 1997 and 

1999). From 1999 to the March 2004 conference, the only training session 

held for CMCs had been a 2-hour videoconference conducted in March 

2003. During that review, the CTS stated that the Department’s antiterrorism focus following September 11, 2001, had precluded additional 

training sessions for CMCs. 

The materials covered during the 2004 and 2005 CMC conferences 

were helpful in understanding the role a USAO would play in a crisis, 

according to survey respondents. In contrast, our 2003 review found that 

the CMCs’ previous training was narrowly targeted at anti-terrorism issues. 

Of the 26 CMCs we interviewed during the 2003 review, 24 identified the 

lack of training as the major hurdle they faced in improving their offices’ 

readiness to respond to a critical incident. Our 2003 report recommended 

that EOUSA and the CTS provide regular training for CMCs on how to 

prepare effective and comprehensive CIRPs, as well as develop and conduct 

appropriate critical incident response exercises. 

Also, in response to an OIG recommendation to complete the 

development of a web site containing information on critical incident 

response, including lessons learned, exercise scenarios, and best practices, 

EOUSA and the CTS each expanded the content of its web sites (both 

Internet and intranet). Additionally, during the course of our current 

review, the CTS further enhanced the amount of information available on its 

intranet site. As of October 2006, the web sites provided additional 

information and resources to assist the CMCs in their efforts to conduct 

critical incident preparedness activities. The site now includes electronic 

copies of the USAOs’ CIRPs, after-action reports, and the initial evaluations 

from the expert panel members. It also includes the 2004 and 2005 CMC 

training conference materials, as well as sample exercises and updated 

policy guidance. 
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18

EOUSA and the CTS directed the USAOs to revise their CIRPs based on the 

“model plan,” and had the CIRPs reviewed by an expert panel.

On May 10, 2004, EOUSA and the CTS distributed the final version of 

the revised model plan to all CMCs, with instructions to revise their existing 

CIRPs using the new format and content guidelines in the model plan and 

submit them to EOUSA by May 28, 2004. These revisions addressed the 

OIG’s prior recommendation that all USAOs revise their CIRPs to address 

action items the CTS had identified. 

Upon receipt of the revised CIRP from each district, EOUSA forwarded 

it to one of the four members of the expert panel to review for compliance 

with the model plan’s requirements.40 Prior to beginning their review of the 

CIRPs, the experts on the panel developed a checklist to ensure that their 

reviews were consistent and that all revised CIRPs met the model plan’s 

requirements. The checklist allowed reviewers to provide additional 

comments on how a district should revise its CIRP in order to be 

“acceptable.” This process addressed the OIG’s recommendation that the 

CTS review all USAOs’ plans to ensure that the plans cover all critical areas. 

In June 2004, the expert panel began the reviews. They judged 68 of 

the revised CIRPs to be acceptable without further modification, while 

another 14 were acceptable with changes. The expert panel found only 

seven of the CIRPs unacceptable.41 This represents a marked improvement 

from our 2003 review, which found that 72 of the 76 CIRPs the OIG 

analyzed lacked fundamental elements of an effective CIRP, which would 

have rendered these 72 CIRPs unacceptable based on the requirements 

contained in the current model plan. 

As required by EOUSA and the CTS, all 93 USAOs revised their 

CIRPs. Eighty-four USAOs submitted their CIRP to EOUSA before the end 

of July 2004; four submitted their CIRPs between August and October 2004, 

and one CIRP was submitted in October 2005. Sixty-eight of the plans 

required no changes or additions. Further, 68 CMCs stated in their survey 

responses that after their CIRP was reviewed, they made additional changes 

to their CIRPs based on their subsequent experiences with exercises and 

critical incidents. 

 40 According to CTS officials, only the four CMCs on the panel reviewed CIRPs. 

41 Four USAOs reported they never received the comments from an expert panelist. 

The OIG did not find these four evaluations in the EOUSA files; thus, there were only 89 

evaluations. Upon request, the OIG received CIRPs from these four USAOs, and our 

analysis showed the CIRPs were in compliance with the new model plan. 
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EOUSA and CTS instructed USAOs to test their revised CIRPs by 

conducting exercises and to complete after-action reports on the results of 

the exercises. 

In July 2004, using the feedback from the CMC participants at the 

March conference, EOUSA and the CTS completed the revisions to the 

sample tabletop exercise. They also prepared an after-action report 

template to assist CMCs to memorialize lessons learned from the exercises 

and the need for any changes to their districts’ CIRPs. The sample exercise 

and the after-action report template were sent to the CMCs with 

instructions to conduct an exercise (either using the sample or an exercise 

of their own choosing) within 30 days of receiving feedback from the expert 

reviewer on their CIRP. They were also instructed to forward an after-action 

report to EOUSA upon completion of their exercise. 

All 93 USAOs have conducted at least one exercise and completed 

an after-action report since revising their CIRP. While not every USAO 

completed their exercise within the prescribed 30-day time frame, we did 

find that every USAO completed an exercise and an after-action report by 

November 2006. Based on the CMCs’ responses to our survey, follow-up 

correspondence, and document review, the OIG determined that 78 districts 

conducted a CIRP exercise in 2004. The remaining 15 districts conducted 

their first exercise in either 2005 or 2006. 

In order to verify their completion and to ascertain the various lessons 

learned, the OIG reviewed after-action reports documenting exercises for 91 

of the 93 USAOs. Two CMCs stated they had completed after-action reports 

for their 2004 exercises but were unable to locate copies of them and 

EOUSA did not have copies on file. One of these districts subsequently 

completed a second exercise and an after-action report for that exercise but 

the district has not yet forwarded a copy. The other district has not 

completed a second exercise. 

The majority of USAOs completed multiple CIRP exercises. Fiftythree USAOs completed exercises in at least 2 of the 3 calendar years (2004-

2006), and 10 additional USAOs told us they planned to conduct an 

exercise before the end of the 2006 calendar year. Of the 78 USAOs that 

conducted an exercise in 2004, 49 (63 percent) had completed a second 

exercise by November 2006, and 8 planned to conduct their second exercise 

by the end of 2006. Within the group of 15 that conducted their first 

exercise after 2004, 4 USAOs had completed exercises in both 2005 and 

2006, and 2 others planned to conduct their second exercise by the end of 

2006. This is a marked improvement from the level of performance 
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observed during our 2003 review. In 2003, only 30 of the 81 CMCs who 

replied to the OIG’s survey stated that their USAOs had conducted a CIRP 

exercise in the 7 years since the inception of the CMC program in 1996. 

EOUSA incorporated questions into its triennial reviews of the USAOs to 

assess the USAOs’ ability to respond to a critical incident. 

In May 2004, EOUSA staff added questions to the self-assessment 

checklist used in the triennial operations reviews of USAOs. The checklist 

questions, answered by USAO staff, addressed whether the district 

designated a CMC, had an approved CIRP, conducted the required tabletop 

or field exercise, and completed the subsequent after-action report. These 

questions addressed the OIG’s recommendation that EOUSA revise the 

operations review process to include a full evaluation of the USAOs’ CIRPrelated activities.42 Responses to the questions served as an indicator of 

how likely the USAOs would be to respond successfully to a critical incident. 

These triennial reviews are conducted by EOUSA’s Evaluation and 

Review Staff (EARS). During the review, the EARS team examines a 

district’s overall operations and management. If particular policies and 

procedures are not in place, the review team recommends that they be 

implemented.43 

EOUSA monitored USAOs’ completion of CIRP activities through 

approximately June 2005. 

In response to our 2003 recommendation to accurately track the 

status of USAO submissions, in late 2004 EOUSA began monitoring the 

USAOs’ submissions of revised CIRPs, completion of their CIRP exercises, 

and forwarding of their after-action reports. The process tracked the 

completion of the tasks, but did not account for any subsequent revisions to 

districts’ CIRPs or additional exercises that USAOs should have conducted 

in 2005. EOUSA discontinued the effort in June 2005, just prior to the staff 

person responsible for the monitoring transferring to the CTS. According to 

EOUSA senior management, it is unclear whether EOUSA has an additional 

oversight role regarding the program outside of the EARS reviews. Senior 

management felt the EARS reviews would provide the requisite monitoring 

of the program. 

 42 The additions to the EARS review also addressed the OIG’s recommendation that 

the Deputy Attorney General ensure that performance measures be developed to assess the 

readiness of USAOs to respond to critical incidents. 

43 Interview with EARS Director, May 24, 2006. 
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Steps taken by USAOs have had a positive impact on their 

preparedness. 

As part of this review, the OIG interviewed CMCs from the seven 

districts that indicated in their survey responses that they had activated 

their CIRPs in response to a natural disaster. All seven districts had their 

revised CIRPs approved prior to the hurricanes that hit the districts. Six of 

the seven had conducted a CIRP exercise prior to the storms.44 Moreover, 

all seven districts conducted a CIRP exercise in the calendar year after the 

storms. 

During these interviews, the CMCs described their respective districts’ 

planning efforts before the storms and their recovery efforts after the 

storms. They commented very positively on the benefits derived from the 

crisis response preparation activities they had previously completed. A 

more detailed description of the positive impact of crisis response planning 

on these seven districts appears in Appendix I.

 44 The one district that had not conducted an exercise prior to activating its CIRP 

because of a hurricane was the Northern District of Florida. However, Hurricane Ivan came 

ashore in September 2004, and the Northern District of Florida had completed its revised 

CIRP only three months earlier. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

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Since June 2005, the USAOs have regressed in their 

critical incident preparation activities, and EOUSA and 

the CTS have not continued to provide direction and 

support to the USAOs. Our current review found that: 

(1) USAOs have not completed CIRP exercises and afteraction reports on an annual basis as required; (2) USAOs 

are not utilizing the information-sharing capabilities 

provided by the CTS; (3) EOUSA no longer assists the CTS 

with the USAOs’ critical incident response preparation; 

(4) EOUSA removed performance measures assessing the 

CIRP program from its triennial review process; (5) 

competing responsibilities have diminished the National 

Coordinator’s effectiveness with the CMC Program; 

(6) EOUSA and the CTS have failed to ensure that newly 

appointed CMCs receive training; and (7) EOUSA and the 

CTS never ensured that all 93 CIRPs were acceptable. 

The USAOs have regressed in their critical incident preparation activities. 

The USAOs have not conducted CIRP exercises on an annual 

basis. Our current review found that USAOs are not fulfilling the annual 

exercise requirement stipulated in each district’s CIRP. As of November 

2006, only 16 USAOs were in compliance with the requirement, having 

already completed an exercise in each of the 3 years (2004 to 2006). 

Another two districts were potentially in compliance because they had 

completed exercises in 2004 and 2005, and had an exercise scheduled prior 

to the close of 2006. 

While each of the 93 USAOs has conducted at least 1exercise since 

revising its CIRP, we found that only 53 (57 percent) had conducted two or 

more exercises during the 2004 to 2006 time period.45 An additional 10 

districts stated that they would attempt to complete their second exercise 

prior to the close of the calendar year. Thirty USAOs had only completed 

their initial CIRP exercise and had no plans to conduct a second exercise 

during the remainder of 2006.46

During this review, the OIG used a broad interpretation of what 

constituted a CIRP exercise. We considered it a CIRP exercise if the USAO 

 45 The 53 districts that conducted at least 2 exercises included the 16 that are in 

compliance (and the additional 2 that are potentially in compliance) with the annual 

requirement referenced above. 

46 Exercise data are current through November 2006. 
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participated in exercises with other federal, state, and local agencies that 

focused on potential critical incidents, even if the USAOs’ participants were 

not implementing or following their CIRP as part of the exercise. In 

interviews, CMCs, including the expert panel members, told the review team 

that one of the most important aspects of critical incident response is to 

know other agencies’ personnel and to build relationships with them. 

Therefore, the OIG concluded that it was appropriate to accept such 

activities as meeting the model plan’s annual exercise requirement, 

especially since these activities encouraged USAOs to attend exercises out 

in the field and not simply conduct a tabletop simulation. 

Pursuant to Section 8.2 of the revised model plan, which was adopted 

by each USAO through its own CIRP, the USAOs are to conduct a tabletop 

exercise annually. To be in compliance with the model plan and their CIRP, 

USAOs should have completed at least three CIRP exercises by the end of 

2006 (one each calendar year beginning in 2004).47

 

We found that USAOs have regressed in their critical incident 

preparations. Although 78 districts conducted a CIRP exercise in 2004, 21 

of these 78 have not completed another exercise nor do they plan to conduct 

one in the remaining portion of 2006. USAO exercise activity dropped 50 

percent in 2005, when only 39 USAOs conducted an exercise.48 Forty-five 

USAOs had conducted an exercise in the first 11 months of 2006. An 

additional 12 USAOs stated that they planned to conduct an exercise by the 

end of the calendar year.49 See Table 2. 

 47 Most USAOs did not conduct their initial CIRP exercise until August 2004. If one 

uses that as the starting point for the 12-month cycle instead of January 1, 2004, the 

results of our analysis would change only slightly. Forty-nine districts would have 

completed their required second exercise by August 2006 (two exercises within the 24-

month span), while the remaining 44 would not have. 

48 The 39 USAOs include 12 USAOs that completed their first exercise and 27 

USAOs that completed a second exercise in 2005. Three USAOs did not complete their first 

CIRP exercise until 2006. 

49 The 12 USAOs that planned to complete an exercise prior to the end of the 

calendar year, includes the 2 USAOs referenced previously that would come into 

compliance with the annual requirement plus an additional 10 USAOs that would be 

completing their second exercise. 
Table 2: Number of Districts that Completed CIRP Exercises, 

Calendar Years 2004-2006 

Calendar Year Number of Districts 

2004 78 

2005 39 

2006 45 

2006 (pending) 12 

Source: CMCs’ responses to OIG Survey. 

We also found that 12 USAOs did not conduct an exercise in 2004 

despite the review of their CIRPs by an expert panelist in 2004 (the latest 

being reviewed on August 5, 2004). These USAOs failed to adhere to 

EOUSA’s directive that they conduct a CIRP exercise within 30 days of 

receiving their CIRP review from the expert panel.50 Eleven of these 12 

USAOs subsequently conducted their first exercise in 2005 (the latest taking 

place in November). The twelfth USAO conducted its first exercise in 

January 2006. 

In survey responses and in follow-up correspondence, some CMCs 

indicated that exercises were not conducted because of difficulty in 

scheduling exercises around the prosecutorial responsibilities of the CMC 

and other AUSAs on the critical incident response team (CIRT). In our 

review, we found that at least three, and as many as seven, AUSAs in each 

USAO have important responsibilities when activating the USAO’s CIRP, 

such as “the Criminal Division Chief will provide advice on legal issues 

arising at the Command Post and will direct CIRT members to execute 

particular assignments.”51 According to the First Assistant United States 

Attorney from one of the districts that responded to an actual critical 

incident, all of these CIRT members should participate in exercises to 

increase their exposure to issues associated with critical incident response. 

Other survey respondents indicated they conducted only one exercise 

because they were unable to coordinate exercises with other federal 

agencies in their districts. While multi-agency participation is not a 

requirement, these CMCs felt that a CIRP exercise needed the involvement 

of other federal law enforcement agencies operating within their district. 

 50 One of these 12 USAOs was faced with an actual critical incident in fall 2004; 

thus, its completion of their first CIRP exercise in March 2005 is understandable. 

51 Critical Incident Response Plan, Southern District of Alabama, Section 4.3.3. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

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Because they were unable to arrange the participation of other agencies, the 

USAOs decided not to conduct their own exercises. 

In addition, six districts that were affected by the hurricanes in 2005 

and activated their CIRPs did not conduct exercises in 2005. If these 

districts had scheduled exercises in September 2005 or shortly thereafter, 

the exercises would have become unnecessary given their real-life response 

efforts. 

USAOs have not continued to complete after-action reports. 

Since USAOs conducted their first CIRP exercises and completed the 

corresponding after-action reports, the completion rate for after-action 

reports for subsequent exercises decreased significantly. All but two 

districts completed an after-action report for their first exercise, but only 24 

of the 53 USAOs that conducted subsequent CIRP exercises completed 

after-action reports. Further, just seven USAOs completed an exercise and 

the corresponding after-action report in each of the three calendar years, 

2004 through 2006. See Table 3.

Table 3: Number of Districts that Completed After-action Reports 

After Conducting Exercises, 

Calendar Years 2004-2006 

Calendar 

Year 

Districts 

Completing 

Exercises 

After-action 

Reports 

Completed 

Percentage 

Completing 

Reports 

2004 78 76 97% 

2005 39 23 59%a

2006 45 26 58%b

Source: CMC’s Responses to OIG Survey. 

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a If the 12 districts that completed their first exercise in 2005 

are removed, the after-action report completion rate for those 

conducting a second exercise falls to 12 out of 27 (44%). 

b If the 3 districts that completed their first exercise in 2006 are 

removed, the after-action report completion rate for those 

conducting second (or third) exercises falls to 23 out of 42 (55%).

Under the plans created by USAOs pursuant to the model plan, they 

are to complete after-action reports after each CIRP exercise or after a 

critical incident. The reports are designed to memorialize lessons learned 

and denote necessary changes to a district’s CIRP based on exercises or 

critical incidents. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

26

One USAO that participated in several exercises in preparation for a 

National Special Security Event did not complete an after-action report (or 

written documentation of any kind) for those exercises.52 The USAO stated 

that the exercises were discussed by senior staff, but any comments or 

lessons learned were never committed to writing. However, when there is no 

documentation of previous exercises, newly appointed CMCs have no 

records to consult on what activities the district has engaged in and what 

lessons should have been learned from those events or exercises. 

In contrast to the lack of after-action reports generated by the district 

referenced above, the Northern District of Alabama produced a report 

following its response to an investigation of church fires led by the Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The report provides 

lessons learned that could benefit any district: 

As ATF was the lead agency, we should have established a 

closer working relationship with the ATF case agent sooner than 

we did. We should have asked ATF earlier to provide us with a 

computer that had internet and email access. While we were 

able to maintain contact through the agent’s email service, this 

was inconvenient and time consuming due to the agent’s other 

priorities. 

Cell phone communication was very difficult [in the area] for all 

agencies. Also, [as] there was no phone line available for 

dialup, it was necessary to communicate over the ATF email 

system with the USAO. Also, we were not able to access 

Westlaw, although we could have used ATF desktops had one 

been available. 

USAOs are not utilizing the information-sharing capabilities 

provided by the CTS. In response to our survey, 52 CMCs stated that they 

had never received after-action reports, lessons learned information, or 

copies of revised CIRPs from other USAOs, EOUSA, or the CTS. In our 2003 

review, we recommended that EOUSA, in conjunction with the CTS, 

complete the development of an intranet site containing information on 

critical incident response, including lessons learned, exercise scenarios, and 

best practices. In response, EOUSA and the CTS developed a web site to 

provide USAOs with access to such information, including other USAOs’ 

CIRPs and after-action reports. 

 52 Examples of National Special Security Events include the Olympics, national 

political conventions, Super Bowls, and presidential inaugurations. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

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Despite the availability of the information, our survey found that 42 

CMCs (45 percent) had never visited the web site. The large percentage of 

CMCs that have not visited the web site indicates CMCs are not utilizing the 

lessons learned and other information available to assist them in their 

critical incident response preparation. This lack of use is troubling given 

that, of the 51 CMCs who had visited the site, 49 found it useful in locating 

critical incident planning information.53 

Also in response to our survey, 30 CMCs stated that information they 

had received from EOUSA, the CTS, or from other USAOs was relevant and 

helpful for critical incident planning and was incorporated into their 

CIRPs.54 Moreover, after our current review began, the CTS further 

enhanced its intranet and now includes electronic copies of the USAOs’ 

CIRPs, after-action reports, and the initial evaluations from the expert panel 

members. It also includes the 2004 and 2005 CMC training conference 

materials, as well as sample exercises and other updated policy guidance. 

To maximize the benefit of the site, USAOs need to complete the required 

exercises and after-action reports so that their lessons learned can be of use 

to other districts. 

EOUSA and the CTS are not providing the direction and support needed to 

ensure that the USAOs continually prepare for critical incidents. 

EOUSA no longer assists the CTS with the USAOs’ critical 

incident response preparation. EOUSA has ceded all involvement in the 

USAOs’ critical incident preparation activities to the CTS despite there 

having been no change in the responsibilities of either organization 

regarding the CMC Program. When the CTS created a National Coordinator 

position to assist with the CMC Program in April 2005, and the EOUSA staff 

member responsible for implementing the recommendations in the OIG’s 

2003 report transferred to the CTS in September 2005, EOUSA ceased 

monitoring the USAOs’ CIRP-related activities. Currently, EOUSA has no 

staff assigned to formally assist the USAOs with CIRP-related activities. 

 53 Data based on responses to OIG survey question 18. CMCs may have visited the 

web site before the additional information was recently added; thus, they responded that 

they had visited the web site and found it useful but still had not received any after-action 

reports, lessons learned information, or copies of revised CIRPs. 

54 Based on responses to OIG survey questions 56. 
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When the CMC Program was implemented in October 1996, EOUSA 

was assigned to monitor timely CIRP submissions and updates.55 To 

support the CMC Program, the Attorney General instructed the CTS, in 

conjunction with EOUSA, to develop and ensure training for the CMCs. The 

Attorney General stressed “training and advanced planning are imperative” 

given the intense time pressures and public attention during a critical 

incident. 

When the model plan was revised in 2004, both EOUSA and the CTS 

envisioned that EOUSA would still be engaged in an active role, including 

providing guidance to (and monitoring) the USAOs’ CIRP activities. The 

model plan states that USAOs should forward their revised CIRPs and afteraction reports to EOUSA. In 2004 and early 2005, after EOUSA and the 

CTS directed the USAOs to revise their CIRPs and conduct the first of what 

were to be annual exercises, staff responsible for the CIRP program at 

EOUSA tracked the USAOs’ completion of the exercises and after-action 

reports.56 However, these tracking efforts ceased around June 2005. At 

that time, all but five USAOs had completed their first exercise.57 Based on 

the documents used to track the USAOs’ performance of CIRP activities, 

there was no attempt by EOUSA to monitor the completion of a second 

exercise by the USAOs or the accompanying after-action reports. In 

interviews with EOUSA and CTS personnel, we learned that neither 

component has actively monitored the completion of the CIRP exercises or 

after-action reports since approximately June 2005. 

Although the CTS created a National Coordinator position, the CTS is 

not directly or indirectly involved in overseeing the performance of the 

USAOs. CTS officials told us that they believe such activities fall under the 

purview of EOUSA. According to the CTS, its role is to provide advice on 

exercises, policy updates, and emerging issues regarding critical response 

preparedness, while EOUSA handles the administrative functions (e.g., 

monitoring when the USAOs complete exercises). During the course of this 

review, however, the OIG found that EOUSA was no longer performing these 

 55 Critical Incident Response Plan, Decision Memorandum from Principal Associate 

Attorney General to the Attorney General, May 23, 1996 (signed May 24, 1996). 

56 The staff used a table to track when each USAO’s revised CIRP was received; 

which expert panelist completed the review; and whether the district had completed the 

CIRP exercise and forwarded its after-action report to EOUSA. 

57 The last USAO to complete its first CIRP exercise under its revised CIRP did so on 

June 7, 2006. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

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administrative functions for the CMC Program. For example, EOUSA did 

not have copies of all districts’ after-action reports. 

EOUSA removed the USAOs’ performance measures assessing the 

CIRP Program. In October 2005, EOUSA removed three questions 

pertaining to CIRP activities that had been added to the EARS selfassessment checklist used in EOUSA’s triennial review process of each 

USAO.58 According to the EARS Director, the questions were dropped in 

2005 “to streamline the checklist.” This action was taken without 

consulting the CTS.59 After the questions were removed, EOUSA and the 

CTS had no method of gauging the USAOs’ performance of CIRP-related 

activities since EOUSA had stopped its monitoring efforts in June 2005. 

During this review, the OIG informed the CTS of the questions’ 

removal, and the CTS subsequently initiated efforts with EOUSA to reinstate 

the information about CIRP-related activities into the triennial review. On 

September 21, 2006, the EARS Director provided the OIG with new 

questions that USAOs would be asked about their CIRPs and CMCs as part 

of the evaluation process, and the questions addressed each of the items 

that had been removed. 

Competing responsibilities have diminished the National 

Coordinator’s effectiveness with the CMC Program. In April 2005, the 

CTS created a CMC National Coordinator position with the intent that the 

individual would be primarily responsible for identifying and providing 

resources to the CMCs in the districts.60 This information was to include 

upcoming exercises in which USAOs could participate and best practices 

identified in after-action reports. However, due to the National 

Coordinator’s expertise in other critical response areas, he has been 

assigned to other Department work groups and task forces that have 

reduced his support to the CMC Program. We found through our survey 

that 62 CMCs had never received after-action reports (from exercises or 

critical incidents), other lessons learned information, or copies of revised 

 58 These checklist questions were: (1) Has the USAO designated a Crisis 

Management Coordinator? (2) Has the District conducted either a tabletop exercise of their 

Critical Incident Response Plan or exercised their plan in a full field exercise in the District 

or Region? When? (3) Did the USAO provide an After-action Report of the exercise to 

EOUSA and the CTS? 

59 EARS Director, September 21, 2006, e-mail. 

60 The CTS filled the National Coordinator position with a First Assistant United 

States Attorney on temporary detail from a USAO. 
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CIRPs from EOUSA or the CTS.61 While the information was made available 

on the CTS’s intranet, the National Coordinator told the OIG he intended to 

communicate with CMCs directly. 

The CTS originally envisioned that the National Coordinator, who had 

been one of the four expert panelists who evaluated the CIRPs, would serve 

as the primary link to the CMCs by disseminating policy, training, and 

exercise information. The National Coordinator would also be involved in 

creating training materials and information for the CMC Program web site. 

These tasks were contained in our 2003 recommendation that the CTS 

provide updated guidance reflecting changes in legislation, policy, and 

critical incident response practice. 

Since arriving at the CTS, the National Coordinator has also been 

assigned by the Department to other critical incident planning efforts, 

primarily serving as the Department’s point person on the multi-agency 

avian flu planning committee. Most of these efforts are not directly related 

to his responsibilities for managing and guiding the CMC Program. For 

example, the National Coordinator became one of the principal drafters of 

the Homeland Security Council’s National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, 

work that demanded a significant amount of his time. According to the 

CTS, these additional responsibilities have prevented the National 

Coordinator from fully completing many of the CMC Program tasks, such as 

keeping the CMCs aware of exercises that were being conducted by other 

local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in their districts so that 

the USAOs could participate. 

EOUSA, meanwhile, has not provided support needed by the National 

Coordinator. The National Coordinator’s effectiveness has been diminished 

by EOUSA’s decision to not monitor the USAOs’ CIRP activities. EOUSA’s 

abandonment of its activities significantly limits the National Coordinator’s 

access to information on the USAOs’ current critical incident preparations. 

EOUSA and the CTS have failed to ensure that newly appointed 

CMCs have received training. In the 9 months between the last CMC 

training conference in October 2005 and July 2006, 16 new CMCs were 

appointed and, as of October 2006, had yet to receive any formal training. 

Eight of the 16 newly appointed CMCs indicated they had no prior critical 

incident experience. Further, of all the current CMCs, 52 indicated in their 

 61 The 62 CMCs versus the 52 CMCs referenced on page 24, is based on the source 

of the information being EOUSA and the CTS, and does not include information received 

from other USAOs. 
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survey responses that they had had no critical incident experience prior to 

becoming a CMC. Three of the new CMCs were designated as “acting” in the 

place of CMCs who had been called to National Guard duty in Iraq, but the 

other new appointees were permanent. Additionally, in response to our 

survey, several of these new CMCs stated they did not have the training 

materials from the 2004 and 2005 CMC conferences.62 

In 2003, the OIG recommended that training and guidance be 

provided to the USAOs on CIRP activities. EOUSA and the CTS responded 

by conducting the 2004 and 2005 conferences and developing new guidance 

materials (the model plan and sample tabletop exercises). While a 

conference was not held in 2006, CTS officials stated they are scheduling 

one for 2007. Forty-six of the 93 CMCs stated that the conferences should 

be held on an annual basis, while an additional 34 believed the conferences 

should be held on a biannual basis. However, the CMCs also stated that 

due to scheduling and resource demands on AUSAs, it may not be practical 

to hold an annual conference. 

Moreover, even if an annual conference were possible, some CMCs 

could be appointed shortly after the conference and go without training for 

up to 12 months in the absence of readily accessible orientation materials. 

We believe that there is a need to address the orientation of CMCs appointed 

to the position between training conferences, especially given the high 

turnover in the CMC position (discussed further on page 32 of this report). 

While the CTS has significantly increased the materials available on its 

intranet web site, the OIG did not find orientation materials designed for 

newly appointed CMCs. Further, the OIG’s review found that the training 

and other CIRP-related materials currently available on the intranet lack 

basic guidance for newly appointed CMCs who enter the position without 

prior critical incident response experience. Basic orientation materials 

would enable CMCs to more quickly understand the expectations and 

responsibilities of the position and to apply the advanced guidance on the 

web site. The number of newly appointed CMCs also underscores the need 

to ensure that each district complete after-action reports to provide 

historical information for successive CMCs at each USAO. 

Another reason new CMCs do not receive timely training is that the 

USAOs have not alerted EOUSA and the CTS when they appoint new or 

 62 The materials from both conferences were recently uploaded to the CTS intranet. 
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acting CMCs.63 We found that several districts had not notified the National 

Coordinator at the CTS of their CMC’s appointment, thus delaying the 

CMCs’ obtaining the necessary background information to perform their 

role. During follow-up correspondence to our survey, four newly appointed 

CMCs asked the OIG how to acquire, and where to forward upon 

completion, materials on CIRP revisions, exercises, and training, even 

though the CIRP-related information is available on the EOUSA intranet.64

Further, we found that several districts with CMC vacancies had not 

designated a replacement CMC prior to assigning someone to complete the 

OIG’s survey. The model plan does not currently impose a requirement that 

USAOs promptly notify EOUSA or the CTS when there is a change, vacancy, 

or “acting” appointment to the CMC position.65 

EOUSA and the CTS never ensured that all 93 CIRPs are 

acceptable. We found that the seven CIRPs that the expert reviewers did 

not deem fully acceptable were not reviewed again to ensure that 

deficiencies were addressed. Similarly, the 14 CIRPs found upon initial 

review to be “acceptable with changes” were not subsequently reviewed to 

ensure that deficiencies were addressed. Our 2003 recommendation stated 

that all USAO CIRPs should be reviewed, including revisions. CTS officials 

told the OIG that they did not believe a second review was necessary 

because they trusted the USAOs would make the required revisions. 

Because there was never a second review of the 21 CIRPs, EOUSA and the 

CTS could not demonstrate at the time of our review that these CIRPs were 

acceptable. 

An OIG review of current versions of the seven CIRPs previously 

deemed “unacceptable” found that the areas of concern had not all been 

addressed in the 24 months since the CIRPs had been found deficient. As 

part of this review, the OIG requested the most recent versions of the CIRPs 

from six of the seven districts that had submitted unacceptable CIRPs.66 Of 

these six districts, three had not yet corrected the deficiencies that were the 

 63 The lack of specific personnel assigned to the CIRP program at EOUSA raises the 

issue of who at EOUSA the USAOs would contact. 

64 While the National Coordinator is listed on the web site, instructions on where 

(or to whom) to send information to EOUSA were not readily apparent. 

65 The model plan does impose a 6-month revision requirement and revisions are to 

be forwarded to EOUSA and the CTS. 

66 The seventh CIRP was not reviewed because the CMC had already indicated that 

the district was planning to make significant changes to it in the immediate future. 
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primary reasons their CIRPs had been deemed unacceptable. In all three of 

these cases, the districts had not revised their CIRPs to provide for 

contingency plans if one of the districts’ branch offices were to become 

unavailable for operations. The OIG conducted telephone interviews with 

the CMCs in these three districts. The CMCs acknowledged the need to 

make the suggested revisions and stated that the changes would be made 

promptly. After the interviews, one of the three districts forwarded to the 

OIG a revised CIRP that included the changes prescribed by the expert 

reviewer.
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During the course of our review, we identified two areas 

that are adversely affecting the CMC Program: 1) limited 

budgetary resources, which are generally outside of the 

control of the USAOs; and 2) high turnover among CMCs, 

which affects the continuity of CIRP-related activities.

Budget shortages and rescissions have limited the ability of AUSAs to 

complete non-prosecutorial functions. 

Budget shortages for the USAOs over the past 4 years (FY 2003 - 

FY 2006) have reduced funding available to the USAOs. According to 

EOUSA, this has reduced the number of AUSAs, while the USAOs’ workload 

has continued to increase. Consequently, according to CMCs, the ability of 

AUSAs to complete non-prosecutorial functions, such as CMC duties, has 

been restricted. Because of the collateral nature of the CMC position, 

reducing the amount of time CMCs dedicate to CIRP-related activities can 

have a significant negative impact on a USAO’s ability to prepare for critical 

incidents. Further, according to CMCs, AUSAs are evaluated on the 

number of prosecutions and not on CMC activities. Thus, AUSAs have less 

incentive to focus on CIRP-related activities. 

Turnover among AUSAs serving as CMCs adversely affects USAOs’ critical 

incident response preparedness. 

The turnover for CMCs since the October 2005 CMC conference has 

been much higher than that for AUSAs as a whole. Annualized, the CMCs’ 

rate of turnover was 23 percent – nearly four times that for AUSAs in 2005. 

Coupled with the lack of immediate access to training, high turnover 

disrupts the continuity of CMC activities.67 The turnover rate also 

emphasizes the need for USAOs to keep EOUSA and the CTS aware of 

changes in the USAO’s CMC position. 

 67 The OIG could not research the historical CMC turnover rate because the 

information was not available through the USAOs, EOUSA, or the CTS. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

In response to our 2003 report, EOUSA and the CTS have taken 

important steps such as an improved model plan that the USAOs have 

adopted, and the completion of exercises on a much more frequent basis 

that have improved the USAOs’ critical response preparedness. If pursued, 

these efforts can help USAOs respond quickly and appropriately to critical 

incidents. 

Yet, despite the initial responsiveness to the OIG’s 2003 

recommendations, the efforts of the USAOs, EOUSA, and the CTS have 

regressed since June 2005. We found that USAOs have not consistently 

completed after-action reports following CIRP exercises or actual critical 

events, or forwarded these reports to both EOUSA and the CTS to allow for 

lessons learned to be shared. The USAOs also have not consistently notified 

EOUSA and the CTS immediately upon a new CMC’s appointment. 

Moreover, EOUSA and the CTS need to clarify their responsibilities for the 

CMC Program. The CTS, if it is to be the lead component in directing and 

supporting the CMCs, needs to provide additional administrative assistance 

to the program to (1) ensure that the USAOs are actually conducting the 

requisite activities and (2) leverage the lessons learned by each of the 

districts as they engage in CIRP exercises and actual events by sharing the 

positive and negative experiences with all other USAOs. 

The response by USAOs in the areas affected by the 2004 and 2005 

hurricanes demonstrates the value of the critical incident preparations they 

undertook beginning in March 2004. However, other USAOs have not 

followed the CIRP requirements, nor have EOUSA and the CTS provided the 

necessary direction and support to ensure that USAOs continually prepare 

for critical incidents. 

In this report, we make seven recommendations to improve the 

USAOs’ critical incident response planning. We recommend that: 

1. EOUSA and the CTS clarify each component’s CMC Program 

responsibilities. 

2. In accordance with guidance provided by EOUSA and the CTS, the 

USAOs conduct exercises of their CIRPs. 

3. The USAOs complete, retain, and forward copies of after-action reports 

to EOUSA and the CTS. 
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4. EOUSA and the CTS establish a system that alerts EOUSA when USAOs 

do not: 

• Complete required CIRP exercises, and 

• Submit after-action reports for exercises and CIRP activations. 

5. EOUSA ensure that performance measures to monitor completion of 

CIRP exercises and after-action reports remain a part of its triennial 

review process. 

6. When vacancies occur in CMC positions (either permanent or 

temporary), the USAOs appoint new CMCs as soon as practicable; the 

USAOs also should notify EOUSA and the CTS immediately of any 

vacancies and subsequent appointments. 

7. EOUSA and the CTS ensure that new CMCs receive timely orientation 

and training. 
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APPENDIX I: CIRP ACTIVATIONS SINCE OUR 2003 REVIEW 

In responding to our survey, seven USAOs reported that they had 

activated their CIRP in response to a natural disaster. The OIG interviewed 

the CMCs from those districts, and the United States Attorney for one of the 

districts, to learn about their USAOs’ planning efforts before the storms and 

their recovery efforts afterwards. The CMCs commented very positively on 

the benefits derived from the crisis response preparation activities they had 

previously completed. The following sections provide the salient portions of 

the interviews the OIG conducted and contain brief descriptions of the 

critical incidents causing the CIRP activation, the activities each USAO 

undertook, and how well the CMCs believed CIRP activities had prepared 

the districts for the critical incident. 

Hurricane Katrina 

Four districts were hit by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the costliest and 

one of the deadliest hurricanes in the history of the United States. Katrina 

caused devastation along much of the north-central Gulf Coast 100 miles 

from the storm’s center. The effects were catastrophic in New Orleans and 

in coastal Mississippi. In response to this hurricane, the Middle and 

Eastern Districts of Louisiana, Southern District of Alabama, and Southern 

District of Mississippi activated their CIRPs. 

Middle District of Louisiana

Headquartered in Baton Rouge, the USAO for the Middle District of 

Louisiana had an approved CIRP and had exercised its CIRP once prior to 

Hurricane Katrina. 

According to the U.S. Attorney for the district, the USAO’s immediate 

goal after Katrina was to get the criminal justice system functioning. The 

district’s CIRP stipulated that contact be established with the FBI and other 

federal agencies, and that teams were to be assigned to cover federal law 

enforcement agencies, the courts, and the FBI command center. For the 

USAO’s Criminal Division to function properly, it had to maintain 

communications with the U.S. Marshals Service. It also needed to process 

anyone who was arrested and protect arrestees’ constitutional rights to 

allow for successful future prosecution. In addition, based upon the 

potential for criminal activity, the USAO researched legal issues such as the 

Insurrection Act, determining whether Louisiana had a martial law statute 

(which it did not), and under what circumstances federal officers may 
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enforce state laws. To this end, the USAO worked with the state Attorney 

General and the Louisiana National Guard General Counsel to authorize the 

National Guard to use force to enforce state laws. 

The U.S. Attorney said that his district’s CIRP did not address a 

number of issues prior to Katrina that proved to be important. USAO staff 

conducted considerable research, while other personnel were actively 

involved in response efforts out of the office. Based upon the district’s 

experience, the U.S. Attorney said he now believes that other USAOs can 

benefit from what was learned. “A week after the storm, I knew a lot more 

than I knew before,” he said. The U.S. Attorney stated that USAOs need to 

be more familiar with certain response-related issues, and the USAO is 

working with the National Advocacy Center to provide all USAOs with 

materials on topics such as Emergency Support Function #13 (ESF-13),68

Title 10 versus Title 32 troops,69 the Insurrection Act, the Stafford Act, and 

regulations and policies regarding reimbursement for local and state 

agencies’ personnel. 

The U.S. Attorney stated that the USAO had made several 

improvements to its CIRP based on the district’s Katrina experience. 

Because he and his staff concluded that they needed better and additional 

communications with state authorities, the USAO has acquired radios that 

interface with the state’s communication network. According to the U.S. 

Attorney, the satellite phones the USAO had at the time of the storm were 

not functional, and direct connect phones functioned much better. The U.S. 

Attorney added that in future critical incidents he would want multiple 

communications platforms because he could not be sure which system 

would work under various circumstances. 

 68 According to the CMC National Coordinator, ESF-13 is part of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s National Response Plan. ESF-13, which addresses law enforcement, 

public safety, and security, details how the federal government uses its assets to assist in 

response efforts. ESF-13 would help state and local officials in obtaining federal law 

enforcement personnel to provide law enforcement services (non-investigative). 

69 According to the CMC, the statutes governing the activation of National Guard 

units fall under Title 10 and Title 32 of the United States Code. Units activated for Title 32 

missions come under the command of a state’s governor. Additionally, Section 502(f) of Title 

32 allows the National Guard to be called up for federal service, while remaining under the 

control of the governor. Title 10 allows for a call to active duty for national service in 

missions funded by the federal government. Under Title 10, the units serve under the 

command of the National Command Authority (the President and Secretary of Defense) and 

receive all of the rights and benefits of active national service. 
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Due to problems locating USAO personnel in the immediate aftermath 

of the storm, the U.S. Attorney also noted that the USAO has now provided 

employees with EOUSA’s emergency contact information and web site 

address. Thus, any district employee can call in and let EOUSA know 

where the employee is located. Employees have submitted additional 

contact information to the USAO so they can be more readily located after a 

disaster. 

The U.S. Attorney also said that the state has a tendency to 

immediately set up multiple command posts, which the USAO has to 

identify and with which the USAO must coordinate. During Katrina, the 

Sheriff and the State Police set up different command posts.70 It was not 

until the Law Enforcement Coordination Center was set up that response 

efforts became more coordinated. The U.S. Attorney stated that the Law 

Enforcement Command Center needed to be established faster. “It was 

pretty chaotic until we got that set up,” he said. 

According to the U.S. Attorney, the value of the CIRP and the 

exercises was that they required the USAO’s staff to think about what they 

had to accomplish if a crisis occurred. He stated that an important 

emphasis in the plan was to keep in contact with the courts and judges. 

Because of the CIRP, the USAO had a plan in place for doing that. Further, 

because the USAO had exercised its CIRP, it had the advantage of “lessons 

learned” and the time to think about what needed to be in place during a 

critical incident and how to get things up and running quickly. 

Eastern District of Louisiana

The USAO for the Eastern District of Louisiana is headquartered in 

New Orleans. It had an approved CIRP and had exercised that CIRP once 

prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

 

According to the district’s CMC, due to the mandatory evacuation of 

New Orleans, the USAO’s initial priority after Katrina was to re-establish 

contact with the USAO’s staff. The EOUSA executive staff and the FBI 

helped to locate USAO staff that were unaccounted for in the days following 

the storm. This allowed the USAO to focus on other things such as looting, 

violence, and other the criminal activity after Katrina. The USAO worked 

very closely with the agencies temporarily located at the Joint Operations 

Center, which became the Law Enforcement Coordination Center. 

 70 The state has not yet addressed the issue, according to the U.S. Attorney. 
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The CMC said that his district’s CIRP did not specifically address a 

number of legal issues that arose that proved to be important. With reports 

of different police agencies seizing guns, the USAO reminded the agencies 

that “the Second Amendment had not been suspended.” Legal guidance 

was also required on different types of arrests and screening decisions on 

prosecutorial matters. 

The USAO needed to coordinate with EOUSA and the Department’s 

Office of Legislative Affairs on conducting initial appearance pre-trial 

hearings out of the district. Federal legislation was passed allowing the 

Eastern District hearings to take place in the neighboring Middle District of 

Louisiana (Baton Rouge). The significance of the out-of-district hearings 

was that they were being used for the first time, and the authorization for 

them needed to be established. Also, 2 days after the storm, the USAO in 

the Eastern District successfully petitioned the courts to temporarily 

suspend the applicability of the speedy trial statute because the courts were 

likely to be closed for a significant period of time. 

According to the CMC, having an approved CIRP and exercising the 

CIRP proved to have been very valuable in allowing an effective response, 

including timely decision making by managerial and supervisory staff. The 

CMC said the lessons learned from Katrina included a recognition that the 

CIRP needed to address more than just terrorist incidents. Previously, the 

USAO looked at its role during a critical incident as supportive of the FBI 

and Joint Terrorism Task Force and local law enforcement. To perform this 

function, the USAO’s teams were geared to respond to a criminal incident 

and assigned to focus on either warrants or appellate briefs. Now, teams 

are designed to work more broadly with state law enforcement, the 

Louisiana National Guard, and other federal agencies as events require. The 

CMC also stated that the USAO’s alternative work sites had been 

inappropriate because they were all within the city, and that they were 

designating different sites if needed for future incidents. 

Southern District of Alabama

Headquartered in Mobile, the USAO for the Southern District of 

Alabama had an approved CIRP and exercised that CIRP once prior to 

Hurricane Katrina. 

According to the CMC, the U.S. Attorney gave the staff a few days off 

to prepare for the storm before Katrina made landfall. The CMC stated that 

a formal group was not dedicated to remain in the city and said that there 

was no formal command post set up prior to the storm. The USAO, while it 
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had a seat at the Emergency Management Agency for Mobile County, only 

coordinated with the agency by phone. 

After the storm, the USAO’s office was flooded and closed for 

approximately a week, and the district court was non-operational as well. 

Because the USAO was not closed very long, the headquarters staff did not 

relocate to another location. When the USAO reopened, it made 

accommodations for an AUSA from Mississippi for a brief period. 

When asked about the USAO’s activities immediately following the 

hurricane, the CMC stated that there was little need to provide counsel as 

there were few legal issues related directly to the storm itself. When asked 

about lessons learned, the CMC stated the USAO needed a more systematic 

procedure for communications. After the storm, the USAO established a 

central number for employees (or others) to call to get information such as 

when the office would reopen. The CMC also said that the USAO should 

have been better able to stay in touch with staff during the storm and its 

aftermath. Finally, the CMC indicated that the USAO needed to do more 

planning for an alternate work site, since the office is in an area that is 

prone to flooding. 

The CMC told us that the CMC training and CIRP exercises helped in 

the USAO’s preparation for a critical incident. “More than anything else, 

they provided awareness of the issues we would be dealing with. These are 

the people [in other law enforcement and response agencies that] we are 

going to be working with, and people will have already thought through 

some of these [critical incident response] issues.” When asked if his 

experience with Katrina would make the USAO more or less likely to 

conduct additional CIRP exercises or other critical incident activities, the 

CMC responded that the USAO would be more likely to do so, if only to test 

the plan. 

Southern District of Mississippi

The USAO for the Southern District of Mississippi has a main office in 

Jackson and branch offices in Gulfport and Hattiesburg. The USAO had an 

approved CIRP and had exercised that CIRP three times prior to Hurricane 

Katrina. 

According to the CMC, who is also the USAO’s First Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, there was minimal storm damage to the Gulfport office because of 

the anti-terrorist precautions that had been implemented, including 

bulletproof glass that was boarded over hours before the storm made 
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landfall. Also, concrete security barricades prevented much of the storm 

debris from hitting the building. The USAO’s offices were on the third floor, 

which was above the flood waters. Although the USAO had intact office 

space, little could be done because the power was out (80 percent of the 

state was without power immediately after the hurricane). The Gulfport 

office had no communications; although satellite phones were working, the 

USAO did not have one. Cell phone communications were eventually 

restored, but landlines were not functional until November 2005. 

The USAO’s main goal in the aftermath of the storm was to sustain 

operations and work with the courts. According to the CMC, the Gulfport 

office’s work resumed as quickly as possible in staff members’ homes and at 

the Hattiesburg office (which generally is not staffed but has space 

available). The Jackson office, which took on the bulk of the workload 

following the storm, eventually housed a few New Orleans AUSAs. The U.S. 

Attorney usually worked out of the Jackson office, and the team in Jackson 

made sure that their presence was known. However, immediately after the 

storm, even the Jackson office was not operational. 

The USAO worked with the state to authorize federal law enforcement 

officials to assist state authorities. “We wanted to make sure that federal 

[law enforcement] officers were deputized through the Governor’s emergency 

order,” the CMC said.71 According to the CMC, the process flowed very 

smoothly. 

When asked about the problems that were encountered because of the 

storm, the CMC stated that there were issues with the Emergency Support 

Function personnel (ESF-13) that came from other jurisdictions and acted 

as liaisons with the Department of Homeland Security. 72 According to the 

CMC, the ESF-13 initially assigned quit 2 weeks after the hurricane, and 

additional ESFs that arrived from other places were not really up to speed 

on local matters. 

 71 For federal officials to implement state law, each officer needed to be deputized. 

72 According to Mississippi’s State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, 

“Emergency Support Function (ESF) #13, Public Safety and Security, integrates Mississippi 

public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident 

management activities associated with potential or actual major incidents. The primary 

purpose of the ESF is to establish procedures for the command, control, and coordination 

of all state law enforcement personnel and equipment to support local law enforcement 

agencies.” (http://www.msema.org/cemp/esf13.html) 
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When asked about additional lessons learned from dealing with 

Katrina, the CMC responded that the USAO would seek to house the 

jurisdiction’s critical incident response personnel at one unified incident 

command center in the future. Because the Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC) on the coast was not big enough to support all law enforcement 

groups, the FBI and state and local police were at different locations during 

and after Katrina. “We have a grant now to develop a new EOC where we 

can have everybody at the same place; we have had a meeting of key law 

enforcement to start the planning,” the CMC said. 

The CMC also stated that the USAO has surveyed its personnel about 

their concerns and the staff discussed those issues. These topics included 

what needed to be done in the 72 hours preceding the expected landfall of a 

future storm, such as when they would begin shutting down the office and 

the network server; how they would secure information, communications, 

documents, and determine what would need to be moved. Other areas of 

improvement included providing the staff with a laminated wallet card 

displaying emergency contact information. Also, instructions on how to 

shut down the network server have been added to the CIRP to allow that key 

task to be completed even if the system administrator cannot make it to the 

office. 

The CMC said that the USAO had already had a Continuity of 

Operations Plan in place but had modified it to include possible relocation 

to the Hattiesburg office. The Hattiesburg office is in the federal 

courthouse, and the USAO believes it would be a good alternative location 

for the Gulfport and Jackson staff. As part of ensuring that Hattiesburg 

would be an effective alternative, the USAO set up high-speed network 

access and made sure that the office has administrative and other supplies. 

The CMC told us that the office will be fully capable whenever the USAO 

needs to support staff there. 

When asked about the usefulness of the CMC training and CIRP 

exercises, the CMC responded that they were a “huge” help. The CMC also 

said that his district’s entire post-September 11 terrorism effort has helped 

them develop an all-hazards approach, from providing computer backups to 

a security deposit box. The CMC also said that the target hardening (of the 

Gulfport office building) also had a direct impact on protecting the office’s 

resources. 
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Hurricane Rita 

 Hurricane Rita was the fourth most intense Atlantic hurricane ever 

recorded and the most intense tropical cyclone ever observed in the Gulf of 

Mexico. Rita caused $10 billion in damage on the U.S. Gulf Coast as it 

made landfall on September 24, 2005, near the Texas-Louisiana border and 

continued on through parts of southeast Texas. The storm surge caused 

extensive damage along the Louisiana and extreme southeastern Texas

coasts and completely destroyed some coastal communities. Due to this 

hurricane, the Western District of Louisiana and the Eastern District of 

Texas activated their CIRPs. 

Western District of Louisiana

The USAO for the Western District of Louisiana’s offices are located in 

Shreveport and Lafayette (where the CMC is located). The USAO had an 

approved CIRP and had exercised that CIRP once prior to Hurricane Rita. 

Prior to the storm, the CMC stated that office personnel discussed 

whether staff was to evacuate, but they did not. The Lake Charles location 

is not staffed by the USAO, but two judges work out of it. The USAO 

decided that the senior litigation staff would be available to coordinate and 

communicate with the FBI command post and the CMC would be the first 

person to represent the office. The USAO established a personnel rotation 

among four AUSAs plus the U.S. Attorney so that at least one representative 

from the USAO would be at the command center or in Lake Charles at all 

times. 

The CMC stated that pre-storm discussions were held on a possible 

curfew, what arrests would likely be made and by whom (state versus 

federal), and what type of charges would need to be brought. According to 

the CMC, most of these charges were state offenses. Discussions also took 

place about where arrestees would be taken. When asked about the legal 

assistance provided immediately after the hurricane, the CMC stated that 

the USAO’s efforts consisted primarily of helping to coordinate activities 

between other agencies. 

Following the storm, the FBI set up a mobile command center in Lake 

Charles; representatives from 15 agencies were present, including the 

USAO. The command center was law enforcement-oriented, while the state 

Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) had its own command center for 

emergency responders, energy companies, rescue and relief workers, and 

charitable relief organizations. The OEP’s command center was used for 
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meetings during morning and evening shifts at which law enforcement 

groups from outlying areas would coordinate with the emergency responders 

and others. These groups met to establish operational relationships and 

avoid conflicts. The USAO attended those meetings. 

According to the CMC, the Lake Charles personnel had no 

communications capabilities for 3 days following the storm. Once the Lake 

Charles-based personnel became available to resume their duties, they 

assumed the command post rotations. A couple more weeks passed before 

the Lake Charles courthouse reopened. In the interim, the USAO handled 

all office activities at its Lafayette location. 

When asked about the benefits of the district’s prior CIRP activities, 

the CMC stated that they were helpful. “Just by putting the plan together, 

it forced all of us to think about it and address the issue [of critical incident 

response]. Then by selecting team members and doing exercises, it forced 

the team members to review the plan and to think about these things. It 

becomes second nature and these [decisions and activities] would be the 

type of things that may occur depending on the issue; it also forced some 

people to think about what our role would be depending on the incident.” 

Eastern District of Texas

The USAO for the Eastern District of Texas has offices located in 

Beaumont, Lufkin, Tyler, Texarkana, Sherman, and Marshall. The USAO 

had an approved CIRP and had exercised that CIRP once prior to Hurricane 

Rita. 

According to the CMC, as the hurricane approached, the County 

Judge in charge of emergency management requested the USAO take the 

lead in orchestrating evacuation efforts. As a result, several of the USAO’s 

staff were assigned to the county Emergency Operations Center during the 

pre-evacuation, evacuation, and recovery effort. The CMC said, “We have a 

very good working relationship with the local law enforcement officials. We 

worked hand in hand with the police and fire departments.” The U.S. 

Attorney conducted conference calls with Senators Cornyn and Hutchinson 

and White House staff to request emergency transportation. 

The CMC said the district became involved in a myriad of activities 

before and after the storm that went beyond the scope of activity that a 

USAO would normally perform. He stated that the USAO provided support 

regarding the postal service (trying to get checks to people in the 

community), the theft of federal property, and several state-related matters. 
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The office also worked with the National Guard, FEMA, and the Army Corps 

of Engineers. In order to carry out the district’s duties and responsibilities, 

the CMC said that the USAO needed generators to maintain power in its 

office and had to acquire them directly from the Army Corps of Engineers. 

The CMC also stated that the USAO played a significant role in 

organizing the evacuation of citizens through the Jefferson County Regional 

Airport. The evacuation focused on homebound patients who were not able 

to evacuate themselves. The local municipalities did not have enough 

vehicles to evacuate everyone by ground transportation. In response, the 

USAO acquired idle school buses and had the seats removed. The buses 

were used to transport the homebound patients to the airport to be 

evacuated by military aircraft. 

According to the CMC, the district adapted its use of the CIRP as it 

responded to this incident. Staff used the plan’s list of hotel phone 

numbers, put out media notices according to the plan’s guidance, and used 

the plan for ordering additional phone lines. Based on lessons learned, the 

USAO is now the emergency operations center for the next disaster. They 

have installed a wireless internet, back-up generators, and they now have 

extra phones on hand. The CMC added that when you are operating a 

command center you are also going to need computers and other items. 

When asked if the CMC training and CIRP exercises helped in the 

USAO’s preparation and response to the hurricane, the CMC said, 

“Absolutely.” The CMC added that because continuity of operations is 

critical, “We had already come up with a Continuity of Operations Plan, 

which was developed in 2004. We had already decided who the employees 

were going to check in with. When you lose [track of] 50 employees, you 

need to know where they are; our employees know they need to check-in.” 

The CMC said they created and utilized a spreadsheet with all the 

information so the USAO would be able to quickly locate its personnel. 

Hurricane Ivan 

 Hurricane Ivan was the strongest hurricane of the 2004 Atlantic 

hurricane season. Ivan made its U.S. landfall as a strong Category 3 storm 

and caused an estimated $13 billion worth of damage. Because of this 

hurricane, the Northern District of Florida activated its CIRP. 

Northern District of Florida

The USAO for the Northern District of Florida consists of four 

divisions: Tallahassee (headquarters), Gainesville, Panama City, and 
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Pensacola. The USAO’s CIRP was approved just prior to the arrival of the 

storm; thus, the USAO had not yet conducted a CIRP exercise. 

The CMC stated that prior to the storm, the U.S. Attorney had the 

Pensacola staff shut down their systems and move their computers, 

personal items, and important documents to internal office areas. Office 

personnel were then permitted to take care of personal matters as Pensacola 

is only a quarter of a mile from the water and the staff knew the city would 

take “quite a beating.” 

The first floor of the USAO’s building flooded and major interstate 

highways were closed due to bridge damage. According to the CMC, “You 

could not move; there was no assurance the roads would be passable.” The 

CMC also told us that there were no communications. While the office had 

a phone tree, no phones – cellular or landline – worked. The United States 

Marshals Service helped out by going to the homes of USAO personnel to 

verify that they were unharmed. 

The CMC said that the state has an excellent emergency preparedness 

system based in Tallahassee, including secure phones and building plans 

and photographs of every office. However, the CMC said that there was no 

coordination and everyone did everything on their own because 

communication systems were inoperable. 

The office was closed for 2 weeks because there was no electricity. 

The courts were also closed, and the local jail was severely damaged (1,300 

inmates had been evacuated). According to the CMC, “It was not an issue of 

how do we get work done. It was how do we get [water] to drink.” The CMC 

also stated, “Local law enforcement were overwhelmed. Deputies from other 

counties were brought in to assist local, state, and federal law enforcement 

in preventing looting and anarchy.” 

Based on their experience with Hurricane Ivan and the results of the 

subsequent CIRP exercise,73 the USAO moved its alternative office locations 

farther away [from their normal places of operations] because, he said, 

experience had shown that “in some areas, you just had to leave.” 

When asked if the CMC training and CIRP exercises helped in the 

USAO’s response to a second storm – Katrina – that struck the area a year 

later, the CMC said yes. 

 73 All three of the district’s branch offices had coordinated an exercise conducted in 

May 2005. 
APPENDIX II: SURVEY 

A. SURVEY OF USAO CRISIS MANAGEMENT COORDINATORS ON CRITICAL 

INCIDENT RESPONSE PLANNING 

B. Background 

1. What is your name? 

2. In addition to being the CMC, what other responsibilities do you have? 

3. What is your District? 

4. When did you become the CMC? 

5. Before becoming the CMC, did you have any prior crisis management or 

critical incident planning/response experience? 

 Yes 

 No 

6. If you became the CMC after January 1, 2003, who was your predecessor? 

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C. CIRP Training and Guidance 

7. What CIRP training have you received? Check all that apply. 

Training or guidance on drafting a Critical Incident Response Plan 

Training on conducting an exercise (simulated or table-top) 

Training on drafting an after-action report 

Have not received training and none is scheduled 

Have not received training, but training is scheduled 

8. If you have not received training and none is scheduled, do you know why? 

9. If you received training, how was it obtained? (Enter FC for formal classroom, 

RM for review of material, B for both, or O for other) 

 Drafting a CIRP 

 Conducting a critical incident exercise

 Drafting an after-action report 

10. If you received training, when did you receive it? (Enter month and year) 

(1) Drafting a CIRP

(2) Conducting a critical incident exercise

(3) Drafting an after-action evaluation

(4) Other

11. If you responded “Other” to question 10, please explain: 

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12. Did you attend the joint Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Coordinators’ and 

Crisis Management Coordinators’ Conference in 2004? 

Yes 

Yes, but only the CMC portion of the conference 

No 

13. Did you attend the Crisis Management Coordinators’ Conference in 2005? 

Yes 

No 

14. Did you find these training opportunities and conferences helpful in 

understanding the role United States Attorney’s Offices would play in a crisis, in 

relation to other federal agencies, as well as with state and local authorities? 

Yes 

No 

I attended neither conference, nor have I received any training 

15. Do you believe more CMC conferences should be conducted? 

Yes, on an annual basis 

Yes, on a biannual basis 

Yes, on a triennial basis 

No 

16. If you answered “No” to either question 14 or 15, please provide a brief 

reason why. 

17. Should other types of training be provided and, if so, what types of training 

should be available? 

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D. CIRP Planning 

18. Did you find the critical incident planning information on the Anti-Terrorism 

Advisory Council’s website 

useful?(http://10.173.2.12/usao/eousa/atac_irs/index.html) 

Yes 

No 

Have not visited the website for planning information 

19. Did you find the model plan useful in updating your District’s Critical 

Incident Response Plan? 

Yes 

No 

Have not used the sample plan 

20. In formulating your District’s plan, did you consider unique local concerns 

and/or vulnerabilities i.e., earthquakes, militias, etc? If there is a specific local 

vulnerability that your plan addresses, please explain in question 60. 

Yes 

No 

I was not involved in formulating the District’s plan 

21. After a CMC evaluator reviewed your District’s CIRP in mid-2004, did you, or 

your predecessor, make changes to your District’s CIRP based on comments the 

evaluator provided about your Plan? 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

22. In completing the CIRP, it was supposed to contain several subcomponents 

(checklists, CIR kit, etc). Has your District completed these items? 

Yes 

No 

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E. CIRP Testing and Exercises 

23. Did your District conduct a table-top or simulated exercise required by 

EOUSA in 2004? If you answer “No,” skip to question 25. 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

24. If your District conducted an exercise in 2004, was the required after-action 

report provided to EOUSA? 

Yes 

No 

25. In addition to the exercise required in 2004, has your District tested your 

CIRP in any other exercises in 2005 and/or 2006 (simulated or table-top)? 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

26. If you answered “No” to question 25, do you have an exercise scheduled in 

CY 2006? 

Yes 

No 

27. Since January 1, 2005, has your District participated in any other exercise, 

such as one with the local FBI office or an exercise involving the activation of a 

command center (i.e., an exercise to test preparation for responding to a critical 

incident)? 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

28. If you answered “Yes” to any question from 25 to 27, please provide the date 

(s) for exercises you intend to conduct or have conducted, and the type of 

exercise (simulated or table-top) that you intend to conduct or have conducted? 

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29. What did your District conclude from its most recent exercise? Check the 

most applicable answer. 

The CIRP and the exercise did not prepare the Office for a potential critical 

incident that might occur after the exercise 

The CIRP and the exercise prepared the District for incidents similar to those 

covered by the simulation exercise 

The CIRP and the exercise prepared the District for a full range of critical 

incidents which might occur 

Other 

30. If you checked “Other” in response to question 29, please explain. 

31. Did you complete an after-action report for any exercises your District 

participated in since 2004 (re: questions 25 through 27)? 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

32. If you replied “Yes” to question 31, did you provide a copy to EOUSA or CTS? 

Yes to EOUSA 

Yes to CTS 

Yes to both 

Neither 

Don’t know 

33. Is your District reporting the time it spends on CIRP activities? 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

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34. To whom is the time spent on CIRP activities reported (check all that apply)? 

Office timekeeper 

EOUSA 

Reported on USA-Form 5 only 

Do not report CIRP activity 

Other 

Don’t know 

35. If you checked “Other” in response to question 34, please explain. 

F. CIRP Utilization 

36. Have there been occasions when your District formally or informally used 

elements of your CIRP, such as activating the CIRP team, using checklists, or 

activating the telephone tree, without officially activating the CIRP? 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

37. If you responded “Yes” to question 36, please describe the circumstances: 

38. Without officially activating the CIRP, have there been occasions when your 

District formally or informally used your CIRP as a guide or reference in 

managing a crisis or scheduled event? 

Yes 

No 

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39. If you responded “Yes” to question 38, please describe the circumstances: 

G. CIRP Activation 

40. Do you know the specific circumstances under which a critical incident 

would be declared and your District CIRP activated? 

Yes 

No 

41. Has your District experienced a critical incident since January 1, 2004? If 

your District did not experience a critical incident, mark “No” and skip to 

question 48. 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

42. If you responded “Yes” to question 41, who declared the 

event/circumstances to be a critical incident? 

U.S. Attorney (or designee) 

FBI 

Other agency 

State/local authorities 

43. Once the CIRP was activated, was an urgent report sent to EOUSA? Please 

provide the date of the urgent report or indicate “NONE SENT.” 

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44. If you experienced a critical incident, was the incident one which allowed 

your District to plan ahead (such as a trial or political convention)? 

Yes 

No 

Not applicable 

45. If your District had a critical incident or incidents occur, what was the 

incident (check all that apply) 

A threatened or perceived terrorist act 

An alert to the possible existence of a biological, chemical, or explosive threat 

A terrorism-related trial 

An unplanned demonstration or political convention 

A severe weather event 

An event which required closing down or relocating your office 

An event which impeded access to your paper or electronic files 

An event which impeded communication with federal judges 

Other 

46. If you responded “Other” to question 45, please explain: 

47. If your District experienced a critical incident, how did the new role played 

by the Department of Homeland Security affect your District’s ability to 

respond? Check one. 

Improved our ability to respond 

Had no effect on our ability to respond 

Worsened our ability to respond 

Not applicable 

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48. If a city or town in your District evacuated due to weather or other event, did 

you activate your CIRP? 

Yes 

No 

Don’t know 

Not applicable 

49. Is your CIRP available electronically to all District personnel who would be 

involved in managing a critical incident? 

Yes 

No 

H. CIRP Effectiveness and Lessons Learned 

50. Does your plan enable your District to address issues critical to United 

States Attorneys offices? Check all that apply. 

Communication among federal, state, and local authorities (including the 

media) 

Legal services to federal agencies 

Safeguarding of staff and sensitive information (such as grand jury material) 

Address known local vulnerabilities (such as earthquakes, weather events, 

militias, etc) 

District continuity of operations 

Provide for interoperability with other District security plans 

51. Have you received after-action reports, lessons learned information, or 

copies of revised CIRPs from CTS, the EOUSA, or other USAOs after an incident 

occurred in another United States Attorneys Office? 

Yes 

No 

52. Have you received after-action reports, lessons learned information, or 

copies of revised CIRPs from CTS, EOUSA, or other USAOs after a simulation 

exercise occurred in another United States Attorneys Office? 

Yes 

No 

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53. Have you received critical incident planning/response information from 

other USAOs by other means (informal contact, telephone call, etc)? 

Yes 

No 

54. If you responded “Yes” to question 53, please detail the information received. 

55. Did you find this shared information (questions 51-53) relevant and helpful 

for critical incident planning in your District? 

Yes 

No 

Not applicable (never received this information) 

56. If you responded “Yes” to question 55, was this information incorporated 

into your District’s CIRP? 

Yes 

No 

57. If you made changes to your District’s CIRP, did you subsequently supply a 

copy of the revised Plan to EOUSA? 

Yes to EOUSA 

Yes to CTS 

Yes to both 

Neither 

I. Conclusion 

58. Does the CIRP process need improvement? 

Yes 

No 

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59. If you responded “Yes” to question 58, how would you improve the CIRP 

process? 

60. Please use this space to comment on any of your answers in this survey: 

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APPENDIX III: EOUSA RESPONSE 

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APPENDIX IV: NSD RESPONSE 

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APPENDIX V: OIG ANALYSIS OF EOUSA AND NSD RESPONSES 

On December 8, 2006, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) sent 

copies of the draft report to the Executive Office for United States Attorneys 

(EOUSA) and the National Security Division (NSD) with a request for written 

comments.74 EOUSA and the NSD responded to us in memorandums dated 

January 8 and January 9, 2007, respectively. 

EOUSA and NSD Response 

Both components agreed with the seven OIG recommendations to improve 

the USAOs’ critical incident response planning. Their responses stated that the 

components would work with each other, as well as with United States 

Attorneys’ Offices (USAO), to resolve and implement solutions to the OIG’s 

findings. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: EOUSA and the Counterterrorism Section (CTS) 

clarify each component’s Crisis Management Coordinator (CMC) Program 

responsibilities. 

 Summary of EOUSA and NSD Response. Both components agree with the 

recommendation and will meet to develop a clear understanding and delineation 

of each component’s respective responsibilities. Appropriate protocols are 

expected to be in place by March 5, 2007. 

 OIG Analysis. Recommendation 1 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by EOUSA and the NSD to delineate each component’s responsibilities 

are responsive to our recommendation. In order to close this recommendation, 

please provide a copy of the protocols by March 30, 2007. 

Recommendation 2: In accordance with guidance provided by EOUSA 

and the CTS, the USAOs conduct exercises of their critical incident response 

plans (CIRP). 

Summary of EOUSA and NSD Response. Both components agree with the 

recommendation. By March 5, 2007, EOUSA will establish a protocol for 

verifying exercise performance by the USAOs. The NSD believes that EOUSA 

can best track the completion of exercises by the USAOs and ensure districts are 

 74 During the course of this review, the Counterterrorism Section (CTS) became part of 

the National Security Division. 
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aware of the requirement to exercise their CIRPs. The NSD will assist EOUSA as 

necessary. The NSD also will send a new tabletop exercise to all districts and 

post the exercise on its Docushare intranet site within 30 days. 

 OIG Analysis. Recommendation 2 is Resolved – Open. The proposed 

actions of both components are responsive to our recommendation. In order to 

close this recommendation, please provide a copy of the tabletop exercise and 

validation protocols by March 30, 2007. 

Recommendation 3: The USAOs complete, retain, and forward copies of 

after-action reports to EOUSA and the CTS. 

Summary of EOUSA and NSD Response. Both components agree with the 

recommendation. EOUSA, with assistance from the NSD, will develop protocols 

by March 5, 2007, for periodically checking to determine whether each USAO 

has maintained, retained, and forwarded to EOUSA a copy of its after-action 

reports. While the NSD recognizes it needs to be aware of the content of the 

reports in order to pass on best practices to other districts and to assist with 

corrective action if needed, it believes that all of the “official record” copies of the 

plans and reports should be maintained in one place at EOUSA. 

 OIG Analysis. Recommendation 3 is Resolved – Open. The proposed 

actions of both components are responsive to our recommendation. The OIG 

will defer to the decision of the components as to where any “official record” 

copies will be maintained, provided that the NSD retains the content of the 

completed after-action reports. In order to close this recommendation, please 

provide a copy of the protocols for determining whether each USAO has 

maintained, retained, and forwarded to EOUSA a copy of its after-action reports 

by March 30, 2007. 

Recommendation 4: EOUSA and the CTS establish a system that alerts 

EOUSA when USAOs do not: 

• Complete required CIRP exercises, and 

• Submit after-action reports for exercises and CIRP activations. 

Summary of EOUSA and NSD Response. Both components agree with the 

recommendation. By March 5, 2007, EOUSA will establish a protocol for 

identifying when a USAO does not complete a required CIRP exercise or submit 

an after-action report; the NSD will work with EOUSA to develop such protocols. 

 OIG Analysis. Recommendation 4 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by EOUSA and the NSD to establish a protocol to periodically notify 
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EOUSA when USAOs do not complete required CIRP exercises is responsive to 

our recommendation. In order to close this recommendation, please provide a 

copy of the protocols by March 30, 2007. 

Recommendation 5: EOUSA ensure that performance measures to 

monitor completion of CIRP exercises and after-action reports remain a part of 

its triennial review process. 

Summary of EOUSA and NSD Response. Both components agree with the 

recommendation. By March 5, 2007, EOUSA will take steps to ensure that the 

performance measures used to monitor completion of CIRP exercises and afteraction reports remain a part of the Evaluation and Review Staff (EARS) review 

process. The NSD will provide EOUSA with technical assistance as needed 

regarding the content of the portion of the EARS review concerning the CMC 

program. 

 OIG Analysis. Recommendation 5 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by EOUSA and the NSD to ensure that performance measures remain a 

part of the EARS review process are responsive to our recommendation. In 

order to close this recommendation, please provide a description of the actions 

taken by March 30, 2007. 

Recommendation 6: When vacancies occur in CMC positions (either 

permanent or temporary), the USAOs appoint new CMCs as soon as practicable; 

the USAOs also should notify EOUSA and the CTS immediately of any vacancies 

and subsequent appointments. 

Summary of EOUSA and NSD Response. Both components agree with the 

recommendation. EOUSA agrees that by March 5, 2007, it will remind the 

USAOs of the importance of filling vacant CMC positions as soon as practicable 

and of notifying EOUSA and the CTS of any vacancies and subsequent 

appointments 

 OIG Analysis. Recommendation 6 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by EOUSA to remind the USAOs of their responsibility to appoint CMCs 

and to alert EOUSA and the CTS of any vacancies and appointments are 

responsive to our recommendation. In order to close this recommendation, 

please provide a copy of the notice sent to the USAOs by March 30, 2007. 

Recommendation 7: EOUSA and the CTS ensure that new CMCs receive 

timely orientation and training. 

 Summary of EOUSA and NSD Response. Both components agree with the 

recommendation and by March 5, 2007, will meet regarding the compilation of 
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basic orientation materials that can be easily recreated and made available to 

each new CMC as they enter into the CMC position. The NSD will also continue 

to plan, in conjunction with the EOUSA National Advocacy Center, periodic 

training conferences for all CMCs. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 7 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by EOUSA and the NSD regarding the compilation of basic orientation 

materials for new CMCs are responsive to our recommendation. In order to 

close this recommendation, please provide a copy of the orientation materials by 

March 30, 2007, as well as a proposed schedule for CMC training conferences.