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32–148 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 109–760

KEEPING TERRORISTS OFF THE PLANE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 7, 2006

Serial No. J–109–107

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

JON KYL, Arizona, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Majority Chief Counsel 

STEVEN CASH, Democratic Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 1

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 4

WITNESSES 

Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. ......................................................................... 18

Laylagian, Leon, Executive Vice President, Passenger-Cargo Security Group, 

Washington, D.C. ................................................................................................. 20

Rosenzweig, Paul S., Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Policy, and 

Jayson P. Ahern, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. ........................................................................................................... 5

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., statement ...................................................... 26

Laylagian, Leon, Executive Vice President, Passenger-Cargo Security Group, 

Washington, D.C., statement .............................................................................. 51

Rosenzweig, Paul S., Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Policy, and 

Jayson P. Ahern, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., statement ........................................................................................ 56

(1)

KEEPING TERRORISTS OFF THE PLANE 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2006 

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND

SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Kyl, Chairman 

of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Kyl and Feinstein. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA 

Chairman KYL. This hearing of the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security will 

come to order. 

The subject of our hearing today is called ‘‘Keeping Terrorists Off 

the Plane,’’ a simple title but one that is of the utmost importance, 

as was illustrated by events in Great Britain just about 3 weeks 

ago, and as we approach the fifth anniversary of September 11th 

next Monday. 

We have a distinguished panel. Paul Rosenzweig is Counselor to 

the Assistant Secretary for the Policy Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. He is also a law professor and published author with a background in litigation and public policy. 

Jay Ahern is the Assistant Commissioner in the Office of Field 

Operations at U.S. Customs and Border Protection. He was appointed to the position in March 2003 and oversees an operations 

budget of $2.4 billion and over 24,000 employees. He has been in 

public service for over 30 years. 

On the second panel, we have Jess Ford, the Director of International Affairs and Trade at the Government Accountability Office, GAO. During his over 30 years of service with GAO, he has 

directed the completion of numerous studies on national security 

and border issues for Congress, and we have one such study that 

we will be talking about today. And I will leave the introduction 

of Mr. Leon Laylagian to Senator Feinstein, but I want to thank 

him for traveling from New Hampshire to be with us today. 

If anyone needs a reminder of what is at stake in the war 

against terrorists, visit the international arrival gate of any large 

airport in the United States. The arrivals board will show incoming 

flights from places like Mexico City, Tokyo, Paris, Sydney, Rio, Manila, Tel Aviv, Montreal, London. There will be a crowd of people 

2

waiting outside the security area to pick up passengers from those 

flights. And the crowd will be made up of many different kinds of 

people, all carefully watching the stream of passengers for a familiar face, whether it is a grandparent, mother or father, child, 

friend, business associate. It is a place of reunions and embraces 

and laughter. 

Of course, if the terrorists had their way, none of these people 

would make it to the gate alive. Given the chance, the would detonate explosive aboard an aircraft or attempt to seize control of an 

aircraft and drive them into targets on the ground. 

We have to be clever in this war on terror—more clever than the 

terrorists. We have to know how to improve the security of international flights without unnecessarily disrupting travel for the 

many millions of people who fly into the United States each year, 

and without unnecessarily interfering with the work that commercial air carriers perform so well. 

Obviously, one of the best places to start is by simply keeping 

terrorists off of airplanes. How do we do that? How well do we do 

it? And what do we need to do to improve? 

Well, DHS has three primary tools at its disposal to screen passengers before they get on international flights. Each of these tools 

is in transition or experiencing problems. The first of these is the 

passenger name record, PNR, data. In the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Congress mandated that air carriers 

share PNR data with U.S. border officials so they can get a look 

at the information collected when a passenger is booking a flight, 

run that data against terrorist and criminal watchlists, and assess 

risk. 

Unfortunately, the European parliament has successfully challenged DHS’ agreement with the European Union Commission to 

obtain PNR data on flights originating in Europe, and DHS and 

the EU are up against a September 30th deadline to attempt to 

reach a new agreement. 

The second tool is the Advanced Passenger Information, System, 

or APIS. The information transmitted to the Department of Homeland Security by air carriers using APIS includes biographical data 

from passports presented by travelers, which CBP bounces off its 

terrorist and law enforcement databases. The problem is under the 

current regulation air carriers are permitted to transport that data 

up to 15 minutes after takeoff. That is 15 minutes too late if you 

have terrorists like those apprehended in the London bomb plot in 

August who want to simply blow up the aircraft in flight. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

required DHS to issue regulations allowing for pre-departure vetting of passengers. DHS has published that regulation for comment, but it will not take effect until some time in October or later. 

The third tool is DHS’ Immigration Advisory Program, the IAP, 

which places CBP officers in foreign airports to examine the travel 

documents that passengers are carrying and advising airlines who 

is not likely to be admitted to the United States. They apparently 

do a very good job of weeding out travelers within invalid or expired visas and fake passports and could play an important role in 

deterring terrorists. However, there are presently only three IAP 

teams stationed abroad in London, Amsterdam, and Warsaw, with 

3

Tokyo set to come online in October. That is too few airports, and 

DHS needs to aggressively expand the program. 

We will also discuss today the Visa Waiver Program. The Visa 

Waiver Program allows approximately 16 million foreign nationals 

from 27 countries to enter the United States each year without 

first obtaining a visa. The program is extremely beneficial to the 

United States and our friends in the international community, but 

it poses a severe security vulnerability because visa waiver travelers are not interviewed and fingerprinted by consular offices before getting on planes, as those who do get a visa are. 

Just this week, the Government Accountability Office issued a 

report raising serious issues about DHS’ oversight of this program. 

Senator Feinstein and I just briefly talked about this on the floor 

a moment ago. This has been one of her chief areas of concern, and 

we are going to want to examine what steps DHS is taking to mitigate risks in this program. It is fortunate that countries participating in the program will be required after October 26th to issue 

their nationals improved e-passports, which are machine readable, 

tamper resistant, and carry a digital photograph and an integrated 

chip, but on the downside, plenty of old grandfathered passports, 

many of them stolen or altered, and these will continue to be accepted for international travel. 

The bottom line at this point, nearly 5 years after the horrible 

incidents of September 2001, is that while we have taken a lot of 

steps to improve the security of our country, and in particular, 

travel from abroad on aircraft, there is obviously still a long way 

to go. And we know that terrorists have not been quiet during this 

period of time because we have too much information about plots 

in the works or disrupted plots that suggest that they intend to 

take advantage of our vulnerabilities. What this means is that everybody who is working this problem in the Government of the 

United States, including those of us in Congress, have got to do everything we can to identify where these creases in the system are, 

where the terrorists might attempt to exploit our open and wonderfully free environment for their horrible deeds and find ways to 

close those creases or close those loopholes. And the purpose of this 

hearing today is to focus on just some aspects of the problem so 

that as we approach this fifth anniversary, we can continue to not 

only engage in the oversight that this Committee has done, but 

also to propose any legislation or administrative fixes or anything 

else that we need to do to better secure our country. 

Now I will turn the microphone over to Senator Feinstein. There 

has been nobody who has been more focused on national security, 

not only since September 11, 2001, but before then. I had occasion 

to review the list of hearings that we held before September 11th, 

and I do not want to say that we told you so, but Senator Feinstein 

and I and others had noticed a lot of things that were not right 

about the security and about the threats that existed to the United 

States. And it is no surprise, therefore, that some of the ideas that 

we had were very quickly passed into law after September 11th. 

But we did not get a whole lot of attention paid to them before. 

So I could not be more privileged to have a partner in this effort 

more capable and more committed than Senator Feinstein. 

4

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate those comments, and as you know, it has been a delight 

for me to work with you. 

I share your concerns on the Visa Waiver Program and have read 

the GAO report and am very concerned. You are correct, we have 

27 countries, 15 million people coming in a year. The US–VISIT 

Program knows who comes in, but they do not know who goes out. 

That part of the program is not functioning. To make it worse, no 

one can tell us when it will be functioning. So what this leaves us 

with is the soft underbelly whereby people can go to a visa waiver 

country, which there are 27 of now, and come in just with a passport. 

What complicates this is there is so much fraudulent passport 

use, and I want to read one sentence from the GAO report right 

at the beginning: ‘‘Stolen passports from visa waiver countries are 

prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk. While the DHS has 

intercepted many fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of entry, 

DHS officials acknowledge that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen 

or lost passport from a visa waiver country.’’ 

Now, I am privy to intelligence data. I cannot give you the numbers, but I can tell you there are tens of thousands of these documents stolen—passports, Geneva Convention travel documents, 

and international driver’s licenses. These become prime acquisitions for terrorists because they can simply come in from a visa 

waiver country with these documents. 

The report goes on: ‘‘DHS has sought to require the reporting of 

lost and stolen passport data to the United States and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has not 

issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries.’’ My 

question of DHS is: Why not? 

Secondly, while most visa waiver countries participate with 

Interpol’s databases, four do not. DHS is not using Interpol’s data 

to its full potential as a border screening tool because DHS does 

not automatically access the data at primary locations. Again, why 

not? 

Senator Sessions and I got into the immigration bill a passport 

fraud bill, Senator Kyl, which toughened the penalties for passport 

fraud. When we began to look into it, somebody that had a fraudulent passport was simply given the passport back and let go. My 

view is there has to be a price for the use of a fraudulent passport, 

and it ought to be a ‘‘go to jail free’’ ticket. We toughened the penalties. That is part of the immigration bill that apparently isn’t 

going anywhere right now. My thought was that you and I and the 

Committee might put this part out as a stand-alone, as we did our 

border tunnel bill, and just get it passed before we go out in October. So that is one thought that just germinated through my head. 

But in the 14 years I have been on this Committee and on the 

Immigration Subcommittee, we have had testimony about the Visa 

Waiver Program, and it has been one delay after the other in terms 

of setting up and getting effective the US–VISIT Program. I am 

5

very worried about it. We now have people who think, well, you 

will introduce a bill and let this country or that country come into 

the Visa Waiver Program. And I feel very strongly that if a country 

does not meet the statutory requirements for visa waiver, they 

should not be allowed to come into the program. This again, I repeat, is the soft underbelly. 

Now, let me comment on one other point that is coming to my 

attention, and that is the issue of cargo security aboard passenger 

planes coming into the United States. Every day passengers remove their shoes, take out their laptops, leave liquids behind, bags 

pass through electronic screeners, and everybody accepts this as a 

necessary inconvenience. And we have all stood in the lines and 

watched this happening, and I think it is one of the great things 

about America, that people just heave to and say, look, if it helps 

make things secure, I am prepared to stand there for an hour, an 

hour and a half. And so all the passengers really get my very serious commendation. 

But on some level, this provides a false sense of security. Recent 

news suggests that only 10 to 15 percent of air cargo is screened 

for explosive, even though this commercial air cargo gets stowed in 

the same compartments of passenger airplanes as checked luggage. 

This, in my view, is unacceptable and also unnecessary, especially 

given the other means of transportation often available for cargo 

transportation, including all cargo airplanes. 

My view is very firm. If we cannot get more cargo screened, we 

ought to prohibit it on passenger airliners and let it go somewhere 

else. But we have got to screen cargo because this, again, is another part of the soft underbelly of the Nation. And so I hope to 

ask some of these questions of our witnesses. I want to welcome 

them here and not prolong them any longer. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein. 

We will start with our two witnesses. We will start, Mr. 

Rosenzweig, with you and then Mr. Ahern. The clock says 5 minutes. If you can keep it roughly to that, that would be great. Of 

course, your written statements will be included in the record. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL S. ROSENZWEIG, COUNSELOR TO THE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, AND JAYSON P. 

AHERN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Thank you very much, Chairman Kyl, Senator 

Feinstein. I will keep to 5 minutes, though I will look forward to 

the questions and answers, since some of the answers to many of 

the questions you and Senator Feinstein have posed in your opening will take somewhat longer than 5 minutes for me to address. 

I am very pleased to be here today to discuss the ongoing efforts 

of the Department to prevent terrorists from entering the United 

States and posing a threat to international air travel. As you noted, 

the recently dismantled plot to blow up aircraft en route to the 

United States from Britain reinforces the importance of the homeland security mission. It reminds us not only that terrorists remain 

intent upon targeting air travel, but also of the importance of a layered approach to security. I will be happy to address all of the proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:05 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 032148 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\32148.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
6

grams that we have spoken of in the questions and answers. In my 

brief remarks now, I would like just address the Visa Waiver and 

the PNR—Passenger Name Record—program. 

As you know, the Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 27 

designated countries to come to this country for up to 90 days without a visa. VWP is at the forefront of our efforts to facilitate international travel. Millions of people use it every year. It is also at 

the forefront of our effort to defend against those who would abuse 

America’s welcoming nature. 

The program sets strict security standards for member countries. 

For instance, visa waiver country passports have to contain a chip 

with the user’s biometric and biographic data, a requirement that 

has been propagated over the past several years. Also, VWP travelers are required to enroll in the US–VISIT Program upon arrival, 

which collects their fingerprints and photographs and stores them. 

We have been moving forward on developing protocols for the reporting of lost and stolen passports, and to maybe make a bit of 

news, I can say that they have been cleared through the Government, and we anticipate rolling them out with an expectation of 

asking our EU colleagues to meet the new standards by April of 

next year. We have been coordinating with the Department of 

State on a series of bilateral approaches to the various countries 

to inform them of the new standards, and I will be happy to elaborate on what they are likely to be during our discussions. 

Just this week, as you alluded to, GAO did issue several reports 

on the Visa Waiver Program. We appreciate the GAO reports and 

their recommendations for improvement. In fact, we have already 

addressed many of the issues GAO has identified. We have made 

good progress. There is, however, still room for improvement, and 

most saliently, the current VWP program identifies security threats 

exclusively on a country-by-country basis. We think that, as we go 

forward, the program needs to look for security threats on a passenger-by-passenger basis. We look forward to working with the 

Senate and with our international partners to strengthen VWP’s 

security features. 

The second issue I would like to mention is Passenger Name 

Records. That is airline information that tells us about a passenger’s identity and travel plans, for example, information about 

itinerary or contact phone numbers. Federal law requires that airlines turn over PNR to the Department, and we currently collect 

it from 127 airlines. that number represents essentially every 

major carrier that flies to the United States. The depth and 

breadth of PNR makes it a vital tool for the thorough vetting of all 

passengers. 

As you also know, however, European officials have expressed 

misgivings about the status of the program under European private 

laws. The U.S.-EU arrangement on PNR data sets strict limits on 

our ability to share PNR information, both within the Department 

of Homeland Security and with other counterterrorism and law enforcement agencies. And in May of this year, the European Court 

of Justice annulled the agreement based upon its reading of European law. DHS is strongly of the belief that continued sharing of 

PNR data is essential for safe and secure international travel. At 

7

the same time, we are committed to making sure that air travel is 

not disrupted by these events. 

As we negotiate with our European allies for a replacement 

agreement, we will not forget the key lessons of 9/11: the necessity 

of sharing information so dots can be connected before attacks materialize. The two programs I have highlighted stand at the front 

and center of DHS’ effort to prevent terrorists from entering the 

United States and posing a threat to international air travel. The 

information provided through the VWP and PNR, as well as 

through API and the IAP program you have mentioned, are essential to our homeland security efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Feinstein, I want to thank you for the opportunity to present this them, and I look forward to responding 

to your questions. 

Chairman KYL. I appreciate it. You have a lot to cover, and 5 

minutes does not do it justice. We will get back to you. Thank you. 

Mr. Ahern? 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you very much, Chairman Kyl and Ranking 

Member Feinstein. It is my pleasure to appear before you today 

and discuss the efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and 

what measures we have taken to increase the security and to protect the country against the threat of terrorism. 

First I would like to speak about our progress that we have made 

in enhancing security at our ports of entry, with a particular focus 

on aviation security. And, secondly, I would like to explain CBP’s 

critical role in response to the recent threat to aviation for flights 

departing the United Kingdom destined for the United States 

where this plot to blow up commercial aircraft reinforced the threat 

that this country continues to face today. 

To put our mission in perspective, and certainly both Senators 

being from Arizona and California, you realize that the Border Patrol, another operating component within CBP, annually apprehends over 1 million illegal aliens attempting to enter the country 

illegally between our ports of entry. And certainly that is a considerable challenge. But I would submit that the activity in our Nation’s ports of entry is just as daunting and poses other challenges. 

In this environment, we have to use risk management in order to 

determine which travelers are legitimate and law-abiding versus 

those that are attempting to circumvent laws. 

The universe is, for example, in 2005, fiscal year 2005, we had 

431 million people, travelers applying for admission coming into 

this country at our ports of entry. And although this is a largely 

compliant population of travelers, we actually had 565,417 people, 

individuals who were found to be inadmissible to the United States 

for a variety of adverse reasons. But most alarming is the fact that 

CBP detected 493 of these individuals to be inadmissible under 

suspicion of terrorist or security grounds. These include, in addition 

to the thousands of other arrests that we make at our ports of 

entry for narcotics and other violations of law, 7,662 criminals that 

were queried through the National Crime Information Database. 

And the number is significant as it continues to go up, but it points 

to one of the other enhancements that have been made since 9/11, 

and that is just not querying people solely on the biographic information but also using the biometric capabilities we now have at 

8

our ports of entry to identify individuals who may be traveling 

across our borders with aliases so we can actually do the biometric 

confirmation of who they are and confirm the warrant at that point 

in time. 

But speaking of the specific U.K.–U.S. threat, on August 9, 2006, 

this year, we were faced with a very serious threat to the security 

of our country and its citizens, and the thwarted London-based attacks certainly reminded us all that we must remain vigilant and 

continue our efforts in the detection and apprehension of potential 

terrorists before they step foot on a plane, in advance of their departure, and in advance of their arrival into the United States. And 

as our front-line border agency, CBP was rapidly responding to 

these threats by immediately implementing a pre-departure vetting 

process on all flights—that is approximately 130 flights a day—

from all airports in the U.K. that are destined to the United States. 

In order to accomplish this critical homeland security measure, 

CBP has been successful in large part due to the outstanding cooperation we have with our partners in the airline industry. In responding to these threats, we required the commercial carriers to 

provide Advance Passenger Information system, that data, in advance of departure, and CBP at our National Targeting Center 

then completed a thorough vetting of each individual against a 

multiplicity of systems, including terrorist watchlists and our 

Treasury Enforcement Communications System. This individual 

vetting required biographic information that was cued through an 

electronic swipe of the passport by the airlines overseas—again, 

pre-departure. Once the vetting was complete, we then would provide the information back to the airlines to be able to give an allclear, or if those individuals were not allowed to board, that was 

then coordinated appropriately with the U.K. government authorities. In a recent example, 3 days ago, on September 4th, through 

this process we actually identified an individual who was on the 

no-fly list prior to departure. He was given a no-fly and actually 

was turned over to the authorities in London before boarding for 

the United States. 

Just to summarize the amount of flights that have been vetted 

since the August 9th threat stream, 3,597 flights have been vetted 

coming into this country, and they were carrying 769,000 passengers destined to the United States. Of that population, 20 individuals were denied boarding for terrorist or security grounds predeparture. That shows how critical it is to get the information prior 

to boarding on aircrafts bound for the United States. 

Given this process overseas, this is why DHS and CBP provided 

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking—and it is currently posted in 

the Federal Register—that proposed to seek the Advance Passenger 

Information 60 minutes prior to departure or through an Advance 

Quick Query process real time up to 15 minutes prior to departure 

if the 60-minute requirement cannot be met because of transiting 

passengers at major international gateways. And this certainly is 

essential, as demonstrated by the U.K. plot, to make sure that we 

have this information in advance of departure so we can do a thorough vetting. 

I will certainly begin to summarize at this point because I do not 

want to go beyond my time, but I will be happy to talk about the 

9

Immigration Advisory Program that you spoke of that we have in 

three locations. We will have a fourth location up within a very 

short period of time, and we have an additional expansion plan for 

fiscal year 2007. And at this point in time, I will conclude and look 

forward to any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenzweig and Mr. Ahern appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Well, thank you again. There is far too much for 

you to cover everything. 

Let me begin by just focusing, Mr. Ahern, on the last thing you 

talked about. There has been some publicity about the problems associated with aircraft that take off where there has not been an 

adequate opportunity to vet all of the people on the manifest 

prior—or on the passenger list prior to takeoff. You described a 

rulemaking or mentioned a rulemaking that would expand this. 

Would you tell us what the status of that is, what you expect to 

come from it, and what will occur as a result? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. I would be happy to, Senator. Currently, the 

requirement that is provided to the carriers is to give the information, the Advance Passenger Information, which is all the information basically contained in a passport, electronically transmitted, 

the passenger manifest, if you will, so we can then run it against 

all our watchlisting systems. But, currently, that is mandatorily required 15 minutes after—upon wheels up, 15 minutes after wheels 

up. That we have seen through many of the flight diversions that 

have occurred on aircraft bound for the United States, that is too 

late in the process. And given the current threat stream that we 

are still working right now, that clearly would have been too late. 

So the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking went in about 2 weeks before the August 9th threat, and we actually have it proposed for 

getting the information 60 minutes prior to departure, but also 

through deliberations and very exhaustive discussions with the airline industry, who have been very supportive of this, we have 

learned also a lot of transiting passengers in major international 

gateways, we had to take a look at how could we make sure we 

do not negatively impact the airline industry as we impose this 

new rule. 

So we were able to come up with something that still provided 

a level of security pre-departure, which is called the Advance Quick 

Query, so that we can actually get real-time submission and provide real-time response, but closing it out 15 minutes pre-departure 

so that we still can make security vetting determinations prior to 

the aircraft pushing back. 

The public comment period closes on October the 12th. We will 

analyze those comments, and then we will move forward with the 

final implementation of the rule. 

Chairman KYL. And that seems logical that for 95 percent of the 

passengers, there is plenty of time to get the pre-screening done, 

and for the few that come in at the very last minute, you could do 

some real-time checking, and it wouldn’t be too burdensome. I 

mean, that is at least the way I look at it. Is that the pitch you 

are making on the rulemaking? 

Mr. AHERN. That is exactly what we are stating at this point, 

and that again is something we have learned through a very delibVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:05 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 032148 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\32148.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
10

erative process with the airlines. We do not want to have a negative impact on the airline industry and have the economic harm be 

created through this rulemaking process. 

Chairman KYL. Just one more question of you. You mentioned 

the fact that there had been 20 people detained as a result of the 

interlocking checks that you described, and I will get to that later. 

But what can you say about these 20 people? 

Mr. AHERN. A lot of these individuals were people that were on 

either no-fly or watchlisted individuals. Whether they actually 

posed a threat to civil aviation security, I would not go into detail 

in this particular hearing. I could say they were not part of the 

U.K. plot. Those individuals had previously been disrupted by the 

U.K. authorities. But these were individuals that presented security concerns, and we thought it was prudent to give a denied 

boarding and have them offloaded and turned over to the U.K. authorities. 

Chairman KYL. Okay. I did not think you could tell us much 

about them, but at least it illustrates the fact that something has 

to happen, and for the general public, who knows what might—

some may be fine, others may not. 

Mr. Rosenzweig, you talked about the Visa Waiver Program, and 

I am going to, since that has been such an interest of Senator Feinstein’s, leave most of that for her to get into, if she would like. But 

you talked about some new standards in April. Those I gather will 

make the passports themselves more secure, but would not do anything to solve the problem of, number one, the passports that have 

been stolen already, or manufactured; and, two, the lack of an oral 

interview, which is at least supposed to occur with the issuance of 

a visa and which sometimes can reveal information that is important for screening purposes. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. That is, I guess, one of the problems with 

speaking too quickly. I must misstated it slightly. The standards 

that DHS will be pushing out to our friends and colleagues in the 

European Union for which we will seek action by next April will 

be standards by which we ask them to do direct reporting of lost 

and stolen passports, both blanks and stolen issued travel documents, in a direct report to the United States. It will encompass 

both a time requirement and a request that they provide a 24/7 

point of contact within their government since we need somebody 

that we can reach on a real-time basis to resolve ambiguities when 

a document that we think meets—is lost or stolen is encountered 

by one of our CBP agents at the port of entry. 

So that is the standard that I was speaking about. It is the one 

that is directly responsive to the Enhanced Border Security Act. 

Chairman KYL. I think you described it correctly. I mis-described 

it a moment ago. And this is a problem because in the past we had 

not gotten notice from many countries of stolen passports. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. That is correct. We have been working with 

them to develop means for direct reporting, and then the secondary 

goal is the one alluded to by Senator Feinstein, which is to make 

it available at ports of entry to the CBP officer on the ground so 

that he can detail and use that on a minute-by-minute basis. 

11

Chairman KYL. But it is still a fact that many passports are stolen. That is still remains a problem. And, secondly—and I am going 

to get into the interlocking other mechanisms here in a minute, but 

there is no independent interview of the person coming here. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. That is correct. 

Chairman KYL. And just to illustrate the nature of this problem, 

Zacarias Moussaoui, who was the suspected 20th hijacker, was a 

French citizens, as I believe. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Yes. 

Chairman KYL. And I don’t recall whether he came here under 

the Visa Waiver Program, but he could have if he did not. And I 

am getting nods of heads that yes, he did. 

There is something about this clock that is giving me far more 

time than I deserve, and I do not know quite what it is. So what 

I will do, Senator Feinstein, is turn to you if you are ready, and 

then we will come back for another round. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I think to Mr. Rosenzweig, let me ask this question: The GAO 

report concludes that the Visa Waiver Program would be strengthened if DHS takes certain steps, including requiring that all visa 

waiver countries provide the United States and Interpol with nonbiographical data from lost or stolen issued passports as well as 

blank passports, and also development of clear standard operating 

procedures for the reporting of stolen and lost blank and issued 

passports. It also recommend that DHS develop and implement a 

plan to make Interpol’s stolen travel document database automatically available to immigration officers at primary inspection. 

What steps is DHS taking to implement that recommendation? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Thank you very much for the question. The 

news is good, albeit perhaps a little delayed. On the first of those, 

the development of uniform standards for reporting, that is precisely the set of standards that I was speaking about with Senator 

Kyl. We expect to have those cleared out of the executive branch 

within a matter of weeks. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Is this the April release that you were talking about? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. April will be the deadline that we would be 

asking our European colleagues to meet. I expect for them to have 

these standards in hand and to be sharing them with them as we 

go through the fall, recognizing that it is not an instantaneous 

process that they can turn on on a dime. We are going to ask them 

to— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Why don’t you give us—it might be useful—

the operational date. When will this be operational? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. We are going to ask our European colleagues 

who are members of the Visa Waiver Program to have this done 

by April 30, 2007. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So it will be operational May 1? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. That is our request. Whether or not all of the 

visa waiver countries meet that deadline and how we will deal 

with— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I guess this is the problem. No deadline is 

ever kept, and I cannot think of one that has been kept with this 

program. So, I mean, I really think this is important, and I think 

12

if a visa waiver country does not want to cooperate, they should 

drop out of the system. 

I think we are in an era now where I understand airlines want 

passengers. I understand the chamber wants business, but American citizens do not want terrorists. And, therefore, this becomes 

much more important than anything else. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I agree with your sentiments. We are not in a 

position to make a unilateral demand, and the only hammer we 

have is the rather stringent one of compelling a country to drop 

out, which has very significant foreign policy and—I am not apologist for the visa waiver countries. I think that they need to get 

with the program. But I cannot make them— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. There ought to be statutory regulations, and 

if somebody does not want to follow them, then they drop out of 

the program. Nobody forces a country to be in the Visa Waiver Program. 

So, I mean, I guess people can sort of develop a great affront and 

say, ‘‘Oh, I am appalled by this.’’ But, look, this country has been 

attacked in a major way, and we care about it. I guess it is the 

largest—it is a larger loss of life than Pearl Harbor. So, you know, 

people are concerned. They do not want it to happen again. 

So the stolen passport becomes a very interesting terrorist expediter, and we have got to control it. So, I mean, my view is that 

if you run into recalcitrant countries, please—I do not know how 

Senator Kyl feels about it, but I sure feel strongly. I would be willing to introduce the legislation. Whether it would go anywhere I 

cannot tell you, but— 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Well, I am quite certain that this colloquy will 

find its way into the capitals of the visa waiver countries, and I 

will certainly make sure that they are aware that I share your concerns. 

Chairman KYL. Senator Feinstein, would you just yield for a second, and then I will give you more time. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes, of course. 

Chairman KYL. Mr. Rosenzweig, what four countries do not 

share lost or stolen passport information with Interpol? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I have that in my briefing book, but I am just 

going to— 

Chairman KYL. Okay. We might as well just get their names out 

right here. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Holland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden. 

Chairman KYL. All right. Holland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Yes. 

Chairman KYL. And regarding your request in 2005 to certify 

their intention to report lost or stolen passport data to DHS, what 

countries failed to certify their intent to share that data? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I do not believe any country failed to certify 

their intent to share that data. 

Chairman KYL. All right. Double-check that for us. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Yes, we would be happy to get back to you. 

Chairman KYL. Okay. Thank you. 

Go ahead, Senator Feinstein. 

13

Senator FEINSTEIN. Those are very good questions. Let me follow 

up. When will American inspectors at airports have full access to 

Interpol data on passports? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. That is the second part of your earlier question. We completed a pilot test on historical data with the Interpol 

database through something known as the Mind Mobile Interpol— 

Mr. AHERN. Network Database. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Network Database. Thank you, Jay— just this 

past July, and we are analyzing the results. That test actually 

demonstrated some operational difficulties in making a live connection to Interpol that need to be resolved. My goal would be to have 

those resolved, at least in theory, by the end of this year and then 

operational in the second or third quarter of next year. That is an 

aspirational goal. I should add— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Of 2006? I am writing it down, and I am 

going to get you to sign it afterwards. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Operational when? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. My goal is second or third quarter of next year, 

2007. 

Mr. AHERN. Senator, if I might add a little more, give my colleague here a break for a second, if I might, some of the things that 

are happening I think that are important to make sure for the 

record it is reflected that we get a considerable amount of lost and 

stolen passport information directly into our systems today through 

the State Department. We also get a direct feed from the U.K. Government to the State Department on lost and stolen passports. So 

we have a considerable amount of lost and stolen passports in our 

system today, so that is fed in through the Department of State’s 

class system into our integrated border inspection system. So we do 

have access to a considerable amount. 

Certainly, we look forward to getting the full link with Interpol, 

but even with Interpol, I think there is an important thing that we 

need to make sure as we go forward, and certainly, we realize, as 

does the head of Interpol, that we need to make sure there is a 

good quality data in that system, to make sure that it is updated 

and current, because a lot of reported lost passports get retrieved. 

And even in the U.K. flight vetting, as we were looking against 

some of the lost and stolen passport database access we do have, 

we found a lot of individuals who had reported a passport as being 

stolen that had later been retrieved, and we were then doing an 

interview with these individuals on the basis that it was a lost document, and they just had not reported its retrieval. 

So we need to make sure that the quality of the data that is put 

into the Interpol database and we then have access to is well defined and accurate and current. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I would be willing to make a bet that your 

numbers will not come anywhere close to the number stolen in a 

given year from EU countries that are members of the Visa Waiver 

Program. 

Mr. AHERN. I do not want to debate that fact with you. I just 

wanted to talk about where it is— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. You do not want to do that, because it is a 

huge number. And that is really the concern because—why would 

14

somebody steal these passports? Only one reason: to sell them on 

the black market to somebody who could not get a passport legitimately. 

Mr. AHERN. That is clearly the purpose, to gain illegal access into 

some country. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Now, I asked the question about American 

inspectors at airports, but let me put it another way. Would this 

include all primary immigration inspectors, Mr. Rosenzweig? The 

earlier question I asked about having that available. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. You mean the access to the Interpol lost and 

stolen database? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. In the long run, yes, as with— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But that is not in your date of the second or 

third quarter of next year. That is just airports. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. That would be for airports, yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. Then we have ports of entry, shipping 

ports of entry. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Yes. The plan, of course, would be to propagate 

it from air ports of entry and sea ports of entry, which are relatively minor and modest. But land ports of entry are an amazingly 

numerous and difficult task, and, of course, it requires technology, 

it requires an investment of a substantial amount of money, and 

it will require deployment and training. It will not be instantaneous. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me just conclude by thanking you for 

your work. I know it is hard because I know there are cross-conflicts, and you are caught right in the middle of them. But it is just 

so important—this country has been such a sieve—that we close 

some of those doors. 

I was telling the Senator, the Chairman, I should say, that even 

before 9/11, I had been very concerned about the misuse of the student visa program, and I could not get anybody’s attention. We had 

some evidence that there was a lot of fraud going on, even a bogus 

school set up next door to one of our offices in California. You had 

California officials at schools convicted of falsifying information 

about foreign students present that were not present. And then 

just recently, I saw where 11 students from Israel did not show up 

at the university, the University of Montana, I believe it was. 

Chairman KYL. Egypt. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Excuse me, Egyptian students did not show 

up at the University of Montana, which raises a whole question 

about how this program is being monitored, if, in fact, it is. Do you 

have any information on that? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. We track students through our SEVIS program, the Student Entry Visa Issuance System. My familiarity 

with the 11 Egyptians that you were talking about comes only from 

the same place it does with you, which is the newspaper—or perhaps you have better information than I. I do know that we track 

them down. 

We continue through Immigration and Customs Enforcement to 

register schools within the SEVIS program as recipients of students. The issuance of visas to students, though, is a responsibility 

of the Department of State out in the various posts, and so I would 

15

probably have to defer on who is getting issued and what the 

standards are to somebody from that Department. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Would you be willing to take a look at it and 

give us a report in writing as to how it is now being monitored and 

whether, in fact, it is? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I think the universities finally came to the 

table and agreed to monitor students to see first, if they were accepted, if they came, and then to send that information to INS; secondly, that they remained in school and actually took the courses, 

and check—I do not know whether it was by quarter or by year, 

but it was one of the two. And I think that is very useful. 

We know that the student visa programs were used by terrorists 

who actually committed attacks on this country, so I think it is 

something that is well ordered. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I would be happy to get back to you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

For either one of you, why can’t DHS do more to get Passenger 

Name Record data on transatlantic flights? Going back to something I talked about in my opening statement. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I think that one is in my square. We do get 

Passenger Name Record information on transatlantic flights. However, because of European concerns about privacy issues, the Department is prohibited, except on particularized case-by-case bases, 

from sharing that information with anybody outside of the Customs 

and Border Protection. So, for example, CBP cannot share that information with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, much less 

the FBI or other counterterrorism or counterintelligence agencies. 

That has, as Secretary Chertoff has said, placed some very significant limits on our ability to use that data to assess terrorist 

threats from unknown terrorists—cleanskins. Where we use API, 

Advance Passenger Information, for known terrorists, watchlist 

matching, the Passenger Name Record is principally of use for us 

in identifying the unknown terrorists. 

The European Court of Justice has just struck down the agreement that limited our ability to use Passenger Name Record data, 

and, indeed, my boss is in Europe today trying to negotiate a replacement. 

I have to say that European privacy concerns are tending to pull 

us to use even less of the data, if I read the members of their parliament correctly. That I think would be inconsistent with American interests in making better use of that data as a vital means 

of identifying who is coming. 

Chairman KYL. Isn’t the problem here that not everybody is 

known to be a terrorist who is a terrorist? Sometimes you have to 

put a few things together to connect the dots, as the saying goes, 

to figure out that this person is probably not somebody you want 

to allow to get on the airplane and come to the U.S., or at least 

you want to check some additional things before you do that. So 

given the fact that there is an awful lot of gray in here, you do 

need to share that data, say, with the FBI or someone else to say, 

‘‘Do you know anything about this person? Is there a problem 

16

here?’’ Is that the problem? And if so, what can the United States 

do, what could the Congress do to persuade our European friends 

who are, for the most part, on the Visa Waiver Program that this 

is something they need to help with? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Well, I am going to let Mr. Ahern tell you a 

little bit about the actual uses because I think that is an important 

point. 

On the second of those, that is the argument that I made as recently as this morning to members of the EU, that enhanced data 

sharing is the foundation of the Visa Waiver Program, and that our 

ability to get information about individuals so that we can target 

our resources better allows us to be more forthcoming and facilitative in the travel sphere, and that the converse of that is equally 

true. 

Jay? 

Mr. AHERN. Senator, certainly you have hit on a real critical 

issue, and that is the ability to identify individuals who are not 

watchlisted and who could be associated with individuals who may 

be. And one of the things that the Passenger Name Record system 

provides us is a research capability. Currently, 127 airlines that fly 

to the United States provide that information to us. That actually 

accounts for 95 percent of the air travel. Before there is any alarm 

over the 5 percent that remains, that is very small or charter airlines that do not have a reservation system, and so they are not 

able to comply with the existing law. But the ability to take it and 

put links and have our tactical targeters at the National Targeting 

Center or through the local targeting units we have throughout the 

country, to be able to do linking of individuals on reservations is 

critical for us for national security because, as we find more people 

look for individuals that are not watchlisted to try to introduce 

them into the country, it is a critical national security tool that we 

have to have. 

Chairman KYL. Let me just ask one final question here relating 

to the additional resources that might be provided to the Visa 

Waiver Program Oversight Unit. There has been publicity about 

the small number of people at headquarters who are available to 

provide oversight, and I would be anxious to get your ideas about 

what we can do. Is it necessary for us to authorize something here 

or to appropriate more money or to direct that more people be put 

into the oversight position? Because, again, this is a program which 

is designed to operate to make it easy for people when you do not 

have the usual checks of, for example, the oral interview that is required for the visa issuance. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I believe that at this point I am supposed to 

say the President’s request for funding for fiscal year 2007, which 

I believe the current appropriations bill meets, will, we think, cover 

our resource needs. We operate with full-time staff in my office as 

well as several contractors who provide assistance. We also call 

upon the resources of ICE and CBP agents overseas to participate 

in the country reviews. So at this juncture, we are confident that 

the President’s request, if fully funded, would meet our needs for 

the— 

Chairman KYL. Well, how many people are in the headquarters 

right now to oversee this program? 

17

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. The Visa Oversight Unit has two full-time staff 

and—three contractors? 

Mr. AHERN. Three contractors. 

Chairman KYL. See, that is the problem. That is the question I 

got this morning on an interview. How can they possibly do this 

with two? I said, ‘‘Gee, I do not know. I will ask this afternoon.’’ 

I mean, it seems implausible that with the number of millions of 

passengers and the difficulties—and we have only scratched the 

surface here in the brief time we have today discussing that—that 

that is an adequate number. And so I guess I would be curious 

when you say that the new budget submission will provide adequate resources, how many people will that provide? And I realize 

people are not everything. A lot of it is the technology as well. But 

how many would you have overseeing it? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Perhaps I should clarify that the five people 

here in Washington are not the ones responsible for each country 

review. Before we review Norway’s compliance or Brunei’s compliance, we assemble a team comprised of other DHS employees and 

also contractors, give them training on the country conditions, and 

then send them out for an intensive 2-week study of a particular 

country’s security arrangements, passport issuance processes, et 

cetera. So the five people that you and I are discussing are essentially the administrative, bureaucratic head back here in Washington. They are not the arms and the legs who are responsible for 

all the millions of people. In addition, we call upon many other resources at CBP and in the Policy Directorate to do things like meet 

with Interpol to discuss the integration of lost or stolen—of their 

stolen travel documents database into Customs and Border Protection. 

Chairman KYL. Why don’t you simply, if you would, submit for 

the record a little statement that provides the justification or the 

rationale for the number of positions sought in the new budget submission. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I would be happy to. 

Chairman KYL. And any other information that you think would 

be useful to us. 

I have some additional questions I will ask you, if I could, for the 

record, and we will leave the record open for you to not only answer those questions, but if other members of the Committee have 

questions they might want to submit, you will receive those as 

well. 

Senator Feinstein, anything else of these witnesses? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. No, I have nothing else. Thank you. 

Chairman KYL. There is so much more we could go into, and I 

am sure there is a lot more you would like to tell us. We have another panel, and we are constrained by time. But please, if there 

are other things that you think you need to bring to our attention 

to provide a complete picture, do that as part of your submission 

in the questions that we will get to you. And I want to thank you 

both, as Senator Feinstein did, for your service. Please pass that 

on to the folks that you work with as well. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Thank you. 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much. 

18

Chairman KYL. While this panel is retiring, I will again mention 

that Jess Ford is the Director of International Affairs and Trade 

at the GAO, and we have reports and some questions of him, and 

I will allow Senator Feinstein to introduce for the record our other 

witness. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. The Chairman has graciously asked if I 

would introduce Leon Laylagian, and I am very pleased to do so. 

He is the Executive Vice President of the Passenger-Cargo Security 

Group, which is a nonprofit trade association. He is a pilot of 757s 

and 767s, as I understand it; first officer; a graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; he previously served the Air Line Pilots Association as a security liaison; and a former representative 

of the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations and the Independent 

Pilot Pilots Association. He has also served as a member of TSA’s 

Aviation Safety Advisory Committee for cargo security in 2003. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you. 

Mr. Ford, would you like to begin? And then we will just turn 

directly to Mr. Laylagian, and then have our questions. 

STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL 

AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Feinstein. I 

will try to be brief. You have already covered some of the main 

points in our reports, which were issued on Tuesday. I am pleased 

to discuss these reports. 

In fiscal year 2005, nearly 16 million travelers entered the 

United States under the Visa Waiver Program, covering 27 participating countries who are allowed to come here for 90 days or less 

without obtaining a visa. Participating countries were selected because their citizens had demonstrated a pattern of compliance with 

U.S. immigration laws and the governments of these countries 

granted reciprocal visa-free travel to U.S. citizens. The Visa Waiver 

Program was created in 1986 as a pilot program and was made 

permanent by law in 2000. 

The Visa Waiver Program facilitates international travel for millions of foreign citizens seeking to visit the United States each 

year, creating substantial economic benefits to our country. However, travelers visiting the United States under the Visa Waiver 

Program can pose significant security risks, for example, because 

they are not interviewed by a consular officer prior to their travel. 

In addition, border inspectors at U.S. ports of entry may not know 

the visa waiver traveler’s language or their local fraudulent document trends in the traveler’s home country, nor have the time to 

conduct an extensive interview. 

Lost and stolen passports from visa waiver countries are highly 

prized among travelers seeking to conceal their true intent and 

identities and nationalities. DHS officials have acknowledged that 

an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered 

the United States using stolen or lost passports from a visa waiver 

country. In fact, passports from the Visa Waiver Program countries 

have been used illegally by hundreds of travelers attempting to 

enter the United States. 

19

For example, we reported that from January to June of 2005, approximately 300 individuals had their passports confiscated at the 

border because they were considered to be fraudulent. In 2002, 

Congress mandated that the DHS review the security risks poses 

by each of the visa waiver countries’ participation in the program 

at least every 2 years. In 2004, DHS conducted its first mandated 

biennial reviews of 25 of the 27 member countries and subsequently determined that all of them should remain in the program. 

However, we have identified several problems with the country 

review process. Specifically, key interagency stakeholders, such as 

the embassies overseas and DHS forensic document analysts, were 

left out of portions of the review process. Also, the country assessments prepared by DHS were not completed in a timely fashion 

and contained some dated information that did not necessarily reflect current risks. For example, they conducted the review from 

May through September of 2004, but did not transmit the report 

to Congress until November of 2005, over a year after these trips 

were taken. 

DHS has not provided sufficient resources to the Visa Waiver 

Program Oversight Unit to effectively monitor the risks posed by 

the visa waiver countries on an ongoing basis. While the unit developed a strategic plan to monitor the program, it is unable to 

fully implement the plan because it does not have enough staff and 

resources. In addition, DHS has not established Visa Waiver Program points of contact with U.S. embassies so that it can communicate directly with foreign government contacts and field officials 

who are best positioned to monitor compliance with the program’s 

requirements and report on current events and issues of potential 

concern. Without this outreach, DHS is not able to leverage the existing resources at U.S. embassies in all visa waiver countries to 

obtain current information on potential risks, as well as the country’s progress in addressing these risks. 

Our report identifies a number of actions that DHS has taken to 

try to mitigate some of these risks. For example, they terminated 

the use of German temporary passports under the program when 

they learned that these documents were not well controlled. 

In the interest of time, I am just going to quickly summarize our 

recommendations. We made several recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security to strengthen this program, including the creation of a real-time monitoring mechanism to improve 

communication between the Department and overseas posts; to improve additional resources for the Visa Waiver Program Unit so 

that they can conduct their mission. We also made a series of recommendations to mitigate the program’s risks, including communicating clear operating standards for reporting lost and stolen 

passports. Finally, we recommended that the Congress consider establishing a deadline by which the Department must complete its 

biennial country assessments to provide more timely reporting to 

the Congress. 

We believe these recommendations will help strengthen the program, and it is essential that the Department take strong actions— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, Mr. Ford, would you 

just repeat that last recommendation once again, please? 

20

Mr. FORD. We recommended that the Congress consider establishing a deadline by which the Department would complete its biennial country assessments and report that information to Congress. And, again, that was to address the timeliness problem that 

we found with the last report they sent to you all. They sent it to 

you in November of 2005, but it was based on information collected 

in 2004, and a lot of that information was dated as well. So some 

of the information in the report you received was 2 to 3 years old. 

We think that Congress needs to have more up-to-date information 

so they have a better understanding of what the security risks are 

in these countries. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. FORD. With that, I think I will close, and I would be happy 

to answer of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Thanks very much. Like our previous witnesses, 

there is a lot to talk about. We do appreciate your succinctness and 

directness. 

Mr. Laylagian? 

STATEMENT OF LEON LAYLAGIAN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, PASSENGER-CARGO SECURITY GROUP, WASHINGTON, 

D.C. 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. Thank you, Chairman Kyl, Senator Feinstein. I 

thank you for the opportunity to be here today and provide testimony on— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Could you turn on your microphone, please? 

Just press that button. 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today 

to provide testimony on this most important issue of aviation security. My name is Leon Laylagian. I am the Executive Vice President of the Passenger-Cargo Security Group. PCSG, a trade association, working with legislators, regulators, and aviation security 

professionals, is dedicated to providing solutions in efforts to improve aviation security. PCSG has a professional partnership with 

over 22,000 airline pilots, an affiliation with nearly 400,000 airline 

passengers, and numerous industry leaders. I am also an airline 

pilot of 17 years with over 12,000 hours of flight time in a variety 

of aircraft, both domestically and international. I have flown for 

three passenger carriers and presently fly a Boeing 757 and 767 for 

a major all-cargo airline. My airline security work began in 1993, 

and I have served in many different capacities with unions and 

grass-roots efforts to improve airline security. I have served on various government working groups, including the TSA’s Aviation Security Advisory Council for cargo security in 2003. I am also a 

graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, also having 

served in the United States Navy. 

The British police foiled the recent London airline bombing plot 

and, much like the 1995 Operation Bojinka, averted mass murder 

on an unimaginable scale. The human element, intelligence gathering, and its proper distribution carried the day in both cases. 

However, on a day-to-day operational scale, available technologies 

are necessary tools to add important layers of security. 

21

As a working group member of the 2003 TSA Cargo ASAC, we 

waited a long time for rulemaking that falls short of reality. Placing the Known Shipper Program at the tip of our cargo security 

spear is not the answer. Other members of the ASAC hold the 

same discomfort with this approach, which seems to favor a perceived economic bias against technology application. In the U.S., a 

very small percentage of our belly-checked or loaded-in-belly-pits 

cargo undergo electronic or physical inspection. Some technology is 

transported around the country for use on a purely random basis, 

while a majority of the cargo relies on the Known Shipper Program, which we all know did nothing to prevent Charles McKinley 

from shipping himself from New York to Texas. Of course, this does 

not address the all-cargo airline, which is a tragic loophole. 

On an international arena, many countries are using technologies to inspect significant portions of the belly freight loaded on 

passenger jets. The tools vary from high-energy X-ray and CT scan 

to spectral analysis, K–9s and sub-pressure simulation or altitude 

chambers. 

Two countries in particular have a proven track record over the 

last 5 years using what is now old technology for mitigating smuggling, contraband, and terrorist-related shipments. No single layer 

is perfect, but the combined strength of the multiple layers will 

best deflect the terrorist vector. 

Back to the Known Shipper Program, this has the potential to 

be a very valuable tool used to focus on which shipments require 

more scrutiny. Presently, the TSA has not required the development of a central database due to shipper concerns of proprietary 

information with respect to competitors. Instead of the green or red 

vetting of the program, we would recommend a more articulate program to include green, yellow, orange, and red to account for not 

only the origin and destination of the shipment, but also to address 

the supply chain. And those that handle packages in the chain 

should have a thorough and meaningful background check. 

A 40-percent electronic inspection requirement should be in addition to this program, coupled with a random inspection feature 

which would make an enhanced Known Shipper Program a very 

useful tool. 

As a final note on international operations, it would be of benefit 

to the American public if the TSA collaborated with our European 

counterparts and took advantage of their repeated offers to demonstrate to us how they employ technology effectively without damaging throughput or incurring a cost burden. Legislators such as 

Senator Feinstein have introduced language in the past to improve 

this segment of aviation security. While many of the technologies 

are not perfect, they are effective at mitigating threat. If we require spending on R&D for 2 years with implementation beginning 

1 year following, we will embark on a process that will add a meaningful layer of security. The question is: Do we buy the computer 

today, or do we wait a few months for the improvements? The answer is: We need the tools now to get the job done and can ill afford 

doing nothing when we can be doing something to mitigate the 

threat. 

I call on Congress to enact a law that will address the urgent 

need to inspect cargo instead of relying on the paperwork that only 

22

addresses the chain of custody of a given shipment, and to provide 

the necessary funding to support this critical element of our National infrastructure. 

Thank you again, Chairman Kyl, Senator Feinstein, and I welcome any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Laylagian appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much. I just heard an official 

this morning taking the opposite side of the issue that you just articulated, but it is one of these great conundrums. You have technology that is available today that is not the best, but it is what 

we have. And you try to get it out into the field, and somebody 

says, ‘‘Well, but we have something just around the corner that is 

going to be a whole lot better. Why don’t you wait?’’ Of course, it 

is more expensive. And it is always a very difficult proposition as 

to what you put your money in. And then you have the long-term 

research into something really, really great for things like nuclear 

weaponry. For example, we held a hearing on that in this Subcommittee that you will want to look into. So, I mean, there is no 

easy answer to that question, I appreciate. 

Mr. Ford, you talked about the deadline on the visa waiver country assessments, and I just wonder: What is it that takes so long 

to get those done? Is it the lack of staff? 

Mr. FORD. Well, we think that is part of the problem. We do not 

think that the Oversight Unit was adequately resourced in conducting the review. There were a number of interagency team 

members who were involved in the process. The site visits were 

taken in—I think it was from June to September of 2004. It took 

over a year for the reports to be drafted and cleared, and we know 

that the content of the report, which is classified contained a lot 

of outdated information. And there was other information that subsequently was available that was not in the report. 

So we think for these reports to be useful to Congress, they 

should have as much current information in them as they possibly 

can. So that is one of the reasons we suggested that Congress may 

want to require that DHS, you know, speed the process up. 

I might add that I mentioned that they reviewed 25 of the 27 

countries. The other two countries that they did not get to, they 

began the review of that in the spring of 2005, and they still have 

not reported the results of those two countries to the Congress yet. 

So I am not so sure that they have been able to resolve the timeliness factor about getting this information quickly to the Hill. 

Chairman KYL. I appreciate that. Could you just quickly tell me 

what you see as the security benefits of the new e-passport for visa 

waiver travelers? 

Mr. FORD. I think the e-passport, because of the additional protections that it has in it, has the potential to ward off some of the 

risks from the old passports that can be more readily counterfeited 

or can be used—someone could take a blank passport that had 

been stolen and insert a photograph. 

The new e-passports have the new technology which makes it 

much more difficult for them to be counterfeited. The concern that 

we have, though, is that many passports are good for 10 years, so 

even with the new e-passports, they may be good for the people 

23

who get them now, but for those people who continue to have the 

old passports, or access to them, that is where the risk is. And 

until, you know, the old passport system is exhausted, we are going 

to have a potential security risk, in our view. 

Chairman KYL. Thanks very much. 

You all had to wait a long time, and then you sat through the 

first panel, and I said we would try to conclude this by 4 o’clock, 

so I am going to quickly move on to Senator Feinstein here. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ford, I think your report is excellent, and I really thank you 

for it. I think you point out a number of things that are obvious 

and some that are not obvious, and clearly we should take some 

action. 

You indicated that you felt that the Congress should take some 

action, and I would like to talk to Senator Kyl, and hopefully we 

will initiate something along the lines that you suggest. 

I would ask you, Mr. Laylagian, about the cargo inspection. You 

say that a meaningful inspection formula would require 40 percent 

using electronic or physical means, 40 percent chosen by an enhanced Known Shipper Program. What is that? 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. Well, it would better refine or articulate the 

Known Shipper Program to cover not only—you have the 400,000 

known shippers, but you have hundreds of thousands of handlers 

that would be involved in the movement of those shipments from 

the departure point to its arrival. And what the enhancement 

would be would be, in essence, a package profiling system should 

be collected in a central database, would be the best way for the 

TSA, I think, to manage that because they would have control over 

that information. And depending on the knowledge of where the departure point is, who the shippers are, who the ownership of those 

shippers are, and where it is going and how it is getting there, 

what hands are being put on that shipment on its way would better refine what type of technology application should be put on 

that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So, in other words, you measure the shipment by those who touch it. 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. That would be a big part of it, and the content. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So if you get those who touch it well known, 

then you can find danger points, either with people who are not 

well known or people who may not be reliable shippers. Is that the 

point? 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And then you would have the series of red, 

green, yellow, whatever the colors are, that would identify what the 

problem was. 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. What the vetting level of the handlers might be. 

I mean, right now the background check information is not to a 

level that it should be. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Do you think that is more effective than Xray or K-9? 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. It is a tool; it is a layer. I mean, if you were trying to cover a hole in the ground and you had one pie plate to cover 

it, if it was a manhole, you would have a hard time preventing 

things from going through there. That is the Known Shipper ProVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:05 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 032148 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\32148.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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gram. You have got one pie plate over that hole. You add different 

types of technologies, they are not—none of them are perfect in 

their forms the way they are right now, but they do a reasonable 

job of getting that job done. You add two, three, four pie plates, you 

start mitigating, you start adding the layers to cover that hole and 

protect it. You are never going to make anything perfect, but right 

now essentially we are— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, let me ask you a question. This would 

be applied to all airports or major airports? 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. It could be applied across the system, and it 

could be done effectively across the system, and it could be done 

on a risk assessment basis as to which airports you would choose 

to cover or not. There are some small airports that do not have the 

infrastructure or logistics to manage certain types of electronic inspection equipment. Portable systems might be effective for them 

during seasonal portions of the course of the year. But it may not 

be that way, in which case you would be able to make those decisions with the more refined Known Shipper Program, making that 

a better tool to make that call. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Has this been discussed with TSA? 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. It has. It has certainly been discussed during the 

ASAC. There is an ongoing discussion right now. There is the 

freight assessment system, which has turned into the Cargo Working Group. It is a continuing conversation as to how they work 

those details out. 

There is a lot of resistance to setting up a central database, 

which I think is problematic for the Known Shipper Program. 

There are certain things that are hindering the effectiveness of the 

Known Shipper Program right now, and rather than just making 

it a good or bad proposition, my recommendation to make it more 

articulate by adding four steps rather than two, would be better 

able to decide which shipments should receive more scrutiny—shipments of sweatshirts, high-energy X-ray, I mean, there are certain 

things that you should not be seeing in that shipment, and that 

would be a way of deciding how that tool could be better used. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. Well, thank you. If you have any 

other—I appreciate your writing here, but if you have any other 

specific recommendations of what we might do, I think we would 

both appreciate receiving them. 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. There are a number of aviation security professionals and even managers that work in the cargo arena for passenger carriers. If I can collect them and sit down together with 

you, I think we clearly could make recommendations. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. If you would do that, that would 

be appreciated. 

Mr. LAYLAGIAN. Yes, Senator. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much, and I want to thank this 

panel as well. Mr. Ford, we know where to get you, and we will 

probably be in touch with you from time to time, but we appreciate 

the report that you issued here, and your testimony as well. And, 

likewise, Mr. Laylagian, if you can get some recommendations to 

us from other folks, that would be appreciated, too. 

25

We will leave the record open—I don’t know how many days, but 

a few days—for other members to submit questions to you and for 

you to submit anything else that you think would be useful to us. 

We appreciate your testimony very much, and if there is nothing 

else, then I will adjourn this meeting of the Subcommittee. It is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Submissions for the record follow.] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files.]

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