United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National 

Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM 

DOD Should Apply Lessons 

Learned Concerning the 

Need for Security over 

Conventional Munitions 

Storage Sites to Future 

Operations Planning 

Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, March 22, 2007

 

GAO-07-639T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 22, 2007

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 

Concerning the Need for Security over 

Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to 

Future Operations Planning 

Highlights of GAO-07-639T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform 

GAO is releasing a report today on 

lessons learned concerning the 

need for security over conventional 

munitions storage sites which 

provides the basis for this 

testimony. Following the invasion

of Iraq in March 2003—known as 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—

concerns were raised about how

the Department of Defense (DOD)

secured Iraqi conventional

munitions storage sites during and

after major combat operations. 

This testimony addresses (1) the 

security provided by U.S. forces

over Iraqi conventional munitions 

storage sites and (2) DOD actions

to mitigate risks associated with an

adversary’s conventional munitions

storage sites for future operations 

on the basis of OIF lessons learned. 

To address these objectives, GAO 

reviewed OIF war plans, joint 

doctrine and policy, intelligence

reports, and interviewed seniorlevel DOD officials. 

What GAO Recommends

The report GAO is releasing today

recommends that the Secretary of

Defense direct the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) conduct 

a theaterwide survey and risk 

assessment on unsecured

conventional munitions in Iraq, (2)

report related risk mitigation

strategies and results to Congress, 

and (3) incorporate conventional

munitions storage site security as a 

strategic planning factor into all 

levels of planning policy and 

guidance. DOD partially concurred 

with our recommendations. 

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites 

in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to 

be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and 

widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence 

reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq’s conventional munitions varied significantly, 

with the higher estimate being 5 times greater than the lower estimate.

Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat 

operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to 

lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread 

looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure 

conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities 

and assumptions. DOD’s OIF planning priorities included quickly taking 

Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The

plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would “capitulate and 

provide internal security.” According to an Army lessons learned study, this 

assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power 

deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document 

risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were proven wrong. 

Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed program for the 

disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting 

had already occurred. According to officials from Multi-National CoalitionIraq, unsecured conventional munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. 

forces and others. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites 

has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are 

being used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or 

maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in 

the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that 

some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual 

risk nor have they been physically secured. 

DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however, 

DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed by an 

adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites in future operations 

planning. DOD’s actions generally have emphasized countering the use of 

IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes 

that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric

threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. 

military strengths. For example, potential adversaries are estimated to have 

a significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower 

to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that this situation shows both that Iraqi 

stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on the 

amount and location of an adversary’s munitions can represent a strategic 

planning consideration for future operations. However, without joint 

guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of

an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into 

future operations planning and execution. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-639T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Davi M. 

D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 

dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss GAO’s report being 

released today on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to plan for 

the security of former Iraqi conventional weapons sites and the lessons 

learned for planning future operations. In March 2003, citing the failure of

Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspectors and other concerns, the United 

States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq in an operation known as 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Commander of the U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM) was primarily responsible for developing and 

executing the war plan for OIF.1

 The war plan’s military priorities included 

overthrowing the Iraqi regime by rapidly capturing Baghdad and disarming 

Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although WMD stockpiles 

were not found, Iraq had hundreds of thousands of tons of conventional 

munitions throughout the country at various storage sites.2

 The 

widespread looting of some Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites 

during OIF has been the subject of media reports. We previously reported 

on the looting and dispersal of radiological sources from a number of sites 

in Iraq after the invasion and DOD’s efforts to collect and secure those 

sources.3

 My statement today addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. 

forces over conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, and (2) DOD 

actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary’s conventional 

munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons 

learned. 

The observations I will discuss today are based on the unclassified version 

of our classified report on this topic.4

 To examine the security over Iraqi 

conventional munitions storage sites provided by U.S. forces, we reviewed 

field unit reporting and intelligence products and interviewed DOD 

 1

CENTCOM is one of five geographic combatant commands. A combatant command is a 

unified command established by the President of the United States with a broad continuing 

mission under a single commander. 

2

Conventional munitions are complete devices charged with explosives, propellants, 

pyrotechnics, or initiating composition that are not nuclear, biological, or chemical for use 

in military operations. 

3

GAO, Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery Effort and 

Apply Lessons Learned to Further Recovery Missions, GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 7, 2005). 

4

 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the 

Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations 

Planning, GAO-7-444 (Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007). 

Page 1 GAO-07-639T 
officials. We also collected and analyzed the various iterations of OIF 

plans, doctrine, and concepts of operations for coverage of the security of

conventional munitions storage sites. To examine DOD’s actions to learn 

from its experience with securing conventional munitions storage sites in

Iraq and apply these lessons learned to mitigate risks during future 

operations, we interviewed DOD officials about their efforts to identify 

and document lessons learned and examined documents on operations in 

Iraq. We performed our work from November 2005 through October 2006 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage 

sites in Iraq, combined with prewar planning priorities and certain prewar 

planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not

adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to DOD 

sources. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq’s conventional munitions varied 

significantly, with the higher estimate being five times greater than the 

lower estimate. Although the amount of looted munitions is unknown, 

field unit reports, numerous intelligence assessments, and imagery 

products showed that many conventional munitions storage sites were 

looted after major combat operations and some may remain vulnerable. In

October 2006, we could not verify that all sites had been physically 

secured. According to lessons learned reports and knowledgeable seniorlevel DOD officials, including field commanders, the widespread looting 

occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure 

conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities 

and assumptions that proved to be invalid. For example, the OIF war plan 

assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would “capitulate and provide 

internal security” and resistance was unlikely. Knowledgeable senior-level 

DOD officials stated that these Iraqi army units would have been used to 

secure conventional munitions storage sites. Our analysis of the various 

iterations of the war plan found that the OIF war plan did not examine the 

consequences of these and other important planning assumptions being 

proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed 

program for the disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after 

widespread looting had already occurred. While DOD had destroyed, 

disposed of or secured 417,000 tons of munitions, Multi-National CoalitionIraq officials told us unsecured munitions continued to pose a threat. Not 

securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly. For 

example, looted munitions are being used to construct improvised 

explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people and 

maintain the level of violence against U.S. and coalition forces and their 

Iraqi partners, which has hampered the achievement of the strategic goal 

Summary 

Page 2 GAO-07-639T 
of stability in Iraq. Moreover, estimates indicate that the looted munitions 

will likely continue to support terrorist attacks throughout the region. 

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, 

because of DOD’s understandable focus on current operations, DOD has 

given little focus to mitigating the risk to U.S. forces posed by an 

adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites in future operations 

planning. Instead, the department’s actions in response to OIF lessons 

learned generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an 

insurgency or terrorists during post-hostility operations. Although these 

actions are good first steps, our review of DOD publications—such as 

doctrine, policy, guidance, and procedures issued by the joint staff—used 

to guide operational planning and execution found little evidence of 

guidance concerning the security of conventional munitions storage sites. 

Without appropriate joint doctrine, policy, guidance, and procedures, DOD 

cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned regarding the security of an 

adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites will be a strategic 

planning and priority-setting consideration that is integrated into future 

operations planning and execution, so that these munitions do not become

the source of materials for making IEDs. 

Our report recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman 

of the Joint Chief of Staff to (1) conduct a theaterwide survey and risk 

assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq; (2) report 

ensuing risk mitigation strategies and results to Congress; and (3) 

incorporate consideration of conventional munitions storage sites security 

into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, 

instructions, manuals, and other directives. DOD partially concurred with 

our recommendations. 

When the United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq on March 17, 

2003, and the Iraqi government no longer functioned, many areas 

experienced widespread looting and the breakdown of public services, 

such as electricity and water in the cities. U.S. and coalition forces were 

then confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and 

infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Given the extensive

looting, as we reported in 2005, DOD could not assume that facilities and 

items within the facilities would remain intact or in place for later 

collection without being secured.5

 Many facilities, such as abandoned 

Background 

 5

GAO-05-672. 

Page 3 GAO-07-639T 
government research facilities and industrial complexes, were no longer 

under the control of the former regime and had been looted. For example, 

hundreds of tons of explosive materials that had been documented by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency prior to March 2003 at the Al Qa Qaa 

explosives and munitions facility in Iraq were lost after April 9, 2003, 

through the theft and looting of the unsecured installations. We also 

reported that regarding radiological sources in Iraq, DOD was not ready to 

collect and secure radiological sources when the war began in March 2003 

and for about 6 months thereafter.6

According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons 

learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition forces 

were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage sites in

Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. These sources indicated 

that U.S. and coalition forces were overwhelmed by the number and size 

of conventional munitions storage sites, and DOD had insufficient troop 

levels to secure these sites because of prewar planning priorities and 

certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. Despite war plan and 

intelligence estimates of large quantities of munitions in Iraq, 

knowledgeable DOD officials reported that DOD did not plan for or set up 

a program to centrally manage and destroy enemy munitions until August 

2003, well after the completion of major combat operations in May 2003. 

The costs of not securing these conventional munitions storage sites have 

been high, as looted explosives and ammunition from these sites have 

been used to construct IEDs that have killed and maimed people. 

Furthermore, estimates indicate such munitions are likely to continue to 

support terrorist attacks in the region. 

U.S. and Coalition 

Forces Were Unable 

to Adequately Secure 

Conventional 

Munitions Storage 

Sites, Resulting in 

Widespread Looting 

U.S. Forces Were 

Overwhelmed by the 

Number and Size of 

Conventional Munitions 

Storage Sites, Leaving 

Those Sites Vulnerable to 

Looting 

U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional 

munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure these 

sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat 

operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit reports, 

lessons learned reports, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of 

Iraq’s conventional munitions varied significantly with the higher estimate 

being five times greater than the lower estimate. The commander of 

CENTCOM testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations 

 6

GAO-05-672. 

Page 4 GAO-07-639T 
on September 24, 2003, that “there is more ammunition in Iraq than any 

place I’ve ever been in my life, and it is all not securable.”7

Furthermore, the sites remained vulnerable from April 2003 through the

time of our review. For example, an assessment conducted from April 

2003 through June 2003 indicated that most military garrisons associated 

with Iraq’s former republican guard had been extensively looted and 

vandalized after the military campaign phase of OIF ended. It concluded 

that the most prized areas for looting were the depots or storage areas. 

The assessment further concluded that the thorough nature of the looting 

and the seemingly targeted concentration on storage areas suggested that 

much of the looting in the areas assessed was conducted by organized 

elements that were likely aided or spearheaded by Iraqi military personnel. 

Moreover, in early 2004, 401 Iraqi sites—including fixed garrisons, field 

sites, and ammunition production facilities—were reviewed to assess their 

vulnerability and the likelihood that anticoalition forces were obtaining 

munitions from those sites. Of the 401 sites, a small number of sites were 

considered highly vulnerable because of the large quantity of munitions, 

inadequate security, and a high level of looting. The majority of the sites 

were assessed as having low vulnerability—not because they had been

secured, but because they had been abandoned or totally looted. The 

review considered virtually all the sites to be partially secured at best and 

concluded that U.S. and coalition troops were able to guard only a very 

small percentage of the sites. 

U.S. Forces Had 

Insufficient Troop Levels 

to Provide Adequate 

Security Because of OIF 

Planning Priorities and 

Assumptions 

DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S. 

forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate security for 

conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of OIF planning 

priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. According to 

DOD officials, ground commanders had two top priorities during major 

combat operations that were set forth in the February 2003 OIF war plan. 

First, to overthrow the regime, DOD planned for and successfully 

executed a rapid march on Baghdad that relied on surprise and speed 

rather than massive troop buildup, such as was used in 1991 during the 

first Gulf War. This rapid march to Baghdad successfully resulted in the 

 7

Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request for Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 108th Cong. 133 

(2003). 

Page 5 GAO-07-639T 
removal of the regime. Another critical planning priority was finding and 

securing the regime’s stockpiles of WMD, which the administration 

believed were a threat to coalition forces and other countries in the region. 

The OIF war plan assumed that there was a high probability that the 

regime would use WMD against U.S. and coalition forces in a final effort to

survive when those forces reached Baghdad. As a result, a CENTCOM 

planner for OIF stated that ground commanders had to prioritize limited 

available resources against the volume of tasks, both stated and implied, 

contained in the war plan. 

Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF 

war plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being 

insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage 

sites, including the following: 

• The Iraqi regular army would “capitulate and provide security.” 

The OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and 

security forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual

surrender or desertion. As stated in the OIF war plan, the U.S. 

Commander, CENTCOM, intended to preserve, as much as possible, 

the Iraqi military to maintain internal security and protect Iraq’s 

borders during and after major combat operations. According to a 

study prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, this 

assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat 

power deployed to Iraq.8 On May 23, 2003, the Coalition Provisional 

Authority dissolved the Iraqi Army, which the CENTCOM commander 

assumed would provide internal security. 

• Iraqi resistance was unlikely. Although the OIF war plan laid out the 

probability of several courses of action that the regime might take in 

response to an invasion, the plan did not consider the possibility of 

protracted, organized Iraqi resistance to U.S. and coalition forces after 

the conclusion of major combat operations. As a result, DOD officials 

stated that the regime’s conventional munitions storage sites were not 

considered a significant risk. 

• Postwar Iraq would not be a U.S. military responsibility. The OIF 

war planning, according to a Joint Forces Command lessons learned 

report, was based on the assumption that the bulk of the Iraqi 

 8

Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, On Point: U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

Page 6 GAO-07-639T 
government would remain in place after major combat operations and 

therefore civil functions, including rebuilding and humanitarian 

assistance, could be shifted from military forces to U.S. and 

international organizations and, ultimately, the Iraqis, within about 18 

months after the end of major combat operations.9

 Therefore, DOD 

initially did not plan for an extended occupation of the country or the 

level of troops that would be needed to secure conventional munitions 

storage sites in particular or the country in general. 

Joint assessments further showed that OIF planning assumptions 

contributed to security challenges in Iraq. According to a 2006 report by 

the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not examine 

the consequences of those assumptions proving wrong, further 

contributing to insufficient force levels to prevent the breakdown of civil 

order in Iraq.10 The Joint Staff strategic-level lessons learned report also 

discussed the effect inaccurate planning assumptions had on force levels. 

According to this report, overemphasis on planning assumptions that 

could not be validated prior to critical decision points resulted in a force 

structure plan that did not consider several missions requiring troops, 

such as providing security for enemy conventional munitions storage sites. 

DOD Did Not Set Up a 

Program to Centrally 

Manage and Destroy Iraqi 

Munitions until after the 

Completion of Major 

Combat Operations 

Despite prewar intelligence assessments of large amounts of conventional 

munitions, knowledgeable DOD officials stated that DOD did not set up a 

central office until July 2003 or set up a program to centrally manage and

destroy Iraqi munitions until after August 2003. These steps were taken 

well after major combat operations were completed in May 2003, because 

the department did not perceive conventional munitions storage sites as a 

threat. The central office was initially set up to address operational 

problems found during an assessment of nine Iraqi sites. This assessment 

found that DOD lacked priorities for securing the sites and uniform 

procedures and practices for securing and disposing of munitions. It also 

uncovered serious safety problems in the handling, transportation, 

storage, and disposal of munitions. 

 9

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One) (Norfolk, Va.: January 2006). 

10U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two). 

Page 7 GAO-07-639T 
In August 2003, the Engineering and Support Center awarded contracts for 

the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, and the first demolition of 

munitions under the program was conducted in September 2003. The 

program’s initial goals were to destroy the stockpiles at six depots and to 

have all enemy ammunition outside the depots destroyed or transported to 

the depots. The program also was tasked with assisting in the 

establishment, management, and transfer of depots to the new Iraqi army. 

According to the Engineering and Support Center, the program has 

received more than $1 billion and has destroyed or secured more than 

324,000 tons of munitions. This number, combined with military disposal 

operations, has accounted for more than 417,000 tons of munitions, 

leaving an unknown amount of conventional munitions in the hands of 

resistance groups or unsecured. This unknown amount could range 

significantly, from thousands to millions of tons of unaccounted 

conventional munitions. 

According to Multi-National Coalition-Iraq officials, unsecured 

conventional munitions from the former regime continue to pose a risk to 

U.S. forces and others. For example, some conventional munitions storage 

sites in remote locations have not been assessed recently to verify whether 

they pose any residual risk. These officials also stated that smaller caches 

of weapons, munitions, and equipment as well as remaining unexploded 

ordnance, scattered across Iraq, represent a more pressing and continuing

risk. These officials said that the coalition is working to reduce this risk by 

searching for and finding a growing number of caches, but it will be some 

time before it can clean up all the munitions in Iraq. The extent of the 

threat from smaller caches, however, is difficult to quantify because the 

location or amount of munitions hidden or scattered around the country is

unknown. 

Costs of Not Securing 

Conventional Munitions 

Storage Sites Have Been 

High 

As reported by DOD and key government agencies, the human, strategic, 

and financial costs of not securing conventional munitions storage sites 

have been high. Estimates indicate that the weapons and explosives looted

from unsecured conventional munitions storage sites will likely continue 

to support terrorist attacks throughout the region. Government agencies

also have assessed that looted munitions are being used in the 

construction of IEDs. IEDs have proven to be an effective tactic because 

they are inexpensive, relatively simple to employ, deadly, anonymous, and 

Page 8 GAO-07-639T 
have great strategic value.

11 To illustrate, the Congressional Research 

Service reported in 2005 that IEDs caused about half of all U.S. combat 

fatalities and casualties in Iraq and are killing hundreds of Iraqis. 

Moreover, Multinational Forces in Iraq reported that the attacks against 

the coalition and its Iraqi partners continued to increase through July 

2006, representing at least 40 percent of all attacks on coalition forces. 

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we 

found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security of 

an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic planning

and priority-setting consideration during planning for future operations. A 

critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured conventional munitions 

storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces, as illustrated by 

intelligence assessments that show one potential adversary, for example, 

also has considerable munitions stockpiles that would require a sizable 

occupying force to secure or destroy. Despite the strategic implications 

regarding unsecured conventional munitions storage sites, our analysis 

shows that securing those sites generally is not explicitly addressed in 

military policy and guidance, particularly at the joint level. We reviewed 17 

DOD publications—which Joint Staff officials told us were relevant to our 

review—to determine the extent to which each of those publications 

contained guidance on the security of conventional munitions storage 

sites. A list of these publications can be found in our March 2007 report.12

In reviewing these documents, we found little evidence of guidance 

regarding conventional munitions storage site security. Although several 

publications addressed defeating IEDs during an insurgency after major 

combat operations have ended or provided tactical-level guidance on how 

to dispose of explosive hazards, including munitions, or make those 

hazards safe, none explicitly addressed the security of conventional 

munitions storage sites during or after major combat operations as a 

tactical, operational, or strategic risk.

DOD’s Actions in 

Response to OIF 

Lessons Learned Have 

Not Focused on 

Securing 

Conventional 

Munitions Storage 

Sites during Future 

Operations 

Because of DOD’s understandable focus on current operations, the 

department’s actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have 

 11Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: Effects and

Countermeasures, RS22330 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 2005). 

12 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the 

Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations 

Planning, GAO-7-444 (Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007). 

Page 9 GAO-07-639T 
emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists 

during posthostility operations. The specific actions DOD has taken are 

discussed in our report. These actions are good first steps toward 

broadening DOD’s focus beyond the ongoing tactical and operational 

counter-IED efforts used against Saddam loyalists, rejectionists, or 

external terrorist groups in Iraq to planning and executing strategic 

counter-IED campaigns for future operations. However, the actions do not 

directly address the strategic importance of securing conventional 

munitions storage sites during major combat operations so that they do 

not become the source of materials for making IEDs during an occupation 

or become used for other forms of armed resistance. 

Based on our work, a critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured 

conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat 

to U.S. forces during future operations. Furthermore, other potential 

adversaries are also learning lessons from the United States’ experiences 

in Iraq and will likely use asymmetric warfare against U.S. invading forces. 

We believe these potential adversaries will likely develop military doctrine 

to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States if possible 

and try to undermine the United States’ political commitment with 

unconventional warfare. Therefore, the number, size, and geographic 

separation of an adversary’s munitions storage sites could pose a 

significant security challenge during an occupying force’s follow-on 

operations. A large amount of munitions in such an adversary’s country 

could require an occupying force to dedicate significant manpower to 

secure or destroy the contents of the major munitions storage sites. 

Furthermore, the remnants of an adversary’s forces, insurgents, or 

terrorists could draw from any large conventional munitions storage 

network left unsecured by an occupying force. 

In our report, we concluded that a fundamental gap existed between the 

OIF war plan assumptions and the experiences of U.S. and coalition forces 

in Iraq, contributing to insufficient troops being on the ground to prevent 

widespread looting of conventional munitions storage sites and resulting 

in looted munitions being a continuing asymmetric threat to U.S. and 

coalition forces. The human, strategic, and financial costs of this failure to 

provide sufficient troops have been high, with IEDs made with looted 

munitions causing about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in 

Iraq and killing hundreds of Iraqis and contributing to increasing 

instability, challenging U.S. strategic goals in Iraq. Further, DOD does not 

appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessed the risk 

associated with unsecured conventional munitions storage sites to U.S. 

Conclusions and 

Recommendations 

Page 10 GAO-07-639T 
forces and others. Such a survey and assessment combined with 

associated risk mitigation strategies—such as providing more troops or 

other security measures—could assist DOD in conserving lives and in 

meeting its strategic goal to leave a stable nation behind when U.S. forces 

ultimately leave Iraq. We recommended that the Joint Chief of Staff 

conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured 

conventional munitions in Iraq and report ensuing risk mitigation 

strategies and the results of those strategies to Congress. 

We also concluded that in preparing for future operations DOD’s actions in 

response to OIF lessons learned primarily have focused on countering 

IEDs and not on the security of conventional munitions storage sites as a 

strategic planning and priority-setting consideration for future operations. 

Although good first steps, these actions do not address what we believe is

a critical OIF lesson learned, the strategic importance of securing 

conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat 

operations. Unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can represent

an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would require significant 

manpower or other resources during and after major combat operations to 

secure. Therefore, since joint doctrine is to present fundamental principles 

as well as contemporary lessons that guide the employment of forces, we 

believe that it is important that DOD clearly and explicitly address the 

security of conventional munitions storage sites in revisions to joint 

doctrine. Therefore we recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

incorporate conventional munitions storage site security as a strategic 

planning factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including 

joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and other directives. 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the 

department conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding 

unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. DOD stated that while it is 

imperative that a complete and thorough assessment of conventional 

munitions storage sites be conducted, military commanders in theater are 

aware of the significant risk posed by the sites, and similar studies and 

assessments have been conducted over the past 3 years. DOD also stated 

that from a manpower perspective, an in-depth, theaterwide survey is not 

feasible without significantly degrading ongoing efforts in Iraq and the 

region. As the evidence in our report clearly supports, we made this 

recommendation because we did not see any evidence of a strategic-level

survey or an effective, theaterwide risk mitigation strategy to address the 

commanders’ awareness of this significant risk or the findings of the 

studies and assessments regarding security of conventional munitions 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 11 GAO-07-639T 
storage sites. Accordingly, the intent behind our recommendation is to 

have DOD assess the risks associated with unsecured conventional 

munitions sites on a strategic, theaterwide basis to develop an effective 

risk mitigation strategy.

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the 

department report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of 

those strategies to Congress. In commenting on this recommendation, 

DOD stated that risk mitigation is doctrinally sound; however, the 

department and Joint Staff recommend that these briefings to Congress 

remain at the strategic level. In making this recommendation, it was not 

our intention to detract tactical units from the current warfighting mission 

or to suggest congressional oversight is needed for each tactical unit. 

Instead, we are recommending that DOD alert Congress of its assessment 

and the actions being taken to mitigate the strategic risk associated with

unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. 

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the 

department incorporate the security of conventional munitions storage 

sites as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and 

guidance and stated that the Joint Staff will incorporate the appropriate 

language in joint doctrine, manuals, and instructions. DOD stated that 

(1) Iraq is a separate case and should not be considered the standard for 

all future operations and (2) war plans must reflect proper prioritization 

based on desired operational effects and resources available as it may not

always be possible or desirable in a resource- and time-constrained 

environment to secure all sites or destroy all munitions. We agree with 

these statements. The purpose of this report was not to suggest that Iraq 

be the standard for all future conflicts or to restrict commanders’ planning

prerogatives. Instead, the report suggests that as DOD incorporates OIF 

lessons learned into joint doctrine, it includes what is a key OIF lesson 

learned—an adversary’s stockpile of conventional munitions can be an 

asymmetric threat to U.S. forces. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

For questions about this statement, please contact Davi D’Agostino at 

(202) 512-5431. Other individuals making key contributions to this 

statement include: Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director, Renee Brown, 

Donna Byers, John Van Schiak, and Nicole Volchko. 

Page 12 GAO-07-639T 

Contacts and 

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