Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The US Army in Kirkuk: Governance 

Operations on the Fault Lines of 

Iraqi Society, 2003-2009

Peter W. Connors

Occasional Paper 35
Cover art by Robin Kern, CGSC Copyright Registration #11-834 

C/E.
The US Army in Kirkuk: 

Governance Operations 

on the Fault Lines of Iraqi 

Society, 2003-2009

Peter W. Connors

Occasional Paper 35

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Connors, Peter W.

 The US Army in Kirkuk : governance operations on the fault lines of Iraqi 

society, 2003-2009 / Peter W. Connors.

 p. cm. -- (Occasional paper ; 35)

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 978-0-9837226-3-2 (alk. paper)

 1. United States. Army--History--Iraq War, 2003- 2. Iraq War, 2003---Political aspects--Iraq--Karkuk. 3. Civil-military relations--Iraq--Karkuk. 4. United 

States--Army--Stability operations. 5. Postwar reconstruction--Iraq--Karkuk. 6. 

Karkuk (Iraq)--Politics and government--21st century. 7. Karkuk (Iraq)--History--21st century. I. Title. 

 DS79.769.C65 2011

 956.7044’21--dc23

 2011043211

First Printing: November 2011

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. 

The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, 

or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at: 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication of this material without the expressed written permission of the 

Director of CSI.
iii

Foreword

The Combat Studies Institute presents The US Army in Kirkuk: Governance Operations on the Fault Lines of Iraqi Society, 2003-2009 by 

Dr. Pete Connors. This work chronicles the challenging task of bringing 

stability and representative government to the Iraqi city of Kirkuk after the 

fall of the Baathist regime.

Although the plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) required 

US forces to prepare to conduct stability operations at the end of combat 

operations, many commanders and their staffs rightfully focused on the offensive operations that were part of the initial invasion of Iraq. As a result 

many tactical units were not adequately manned or trained in civil-military 

lines of operation, such as governance, essential services, and the rule of 

law. Many commanders believed civilian teams from other US government agencies would assume responsibility for the new political order 

in postwar Iraq after the defeat of the Baathist regime. This assumption 

proved wrong and the responsibilities for creating new democratic governing bodies were in many cases given to tactical-level maneuver units.

Despite the lack of preparation for what became known as Governance Operations, US Army units in the initial years of the campaign in 

Iraq were able to develop and implement ad hoc plans to install representative forms of government in the cities and provinces of Iraq with varying 

degrees of success. In the case of the city of Kirkuk, there was the added 

challenge of creating democratic governing bodies in the midst of serious 

ethnic turmoil. The smoldering hostilities were a constant source of friction that chronically threatened to bring down the representative forms of 

government created in the city.

Dr. Connors’ study is a systematic recounting of how the US Army approached the challenge of creating democratic local forms of government. 

This work, however, is more than just a chronicle of the many units that 

deployed and operated in Kirkuk. Dr. Connors offers an analysis of how 

US Army brigades and battalions assisted a foreign population to adopt 

democratic institutions and resolve conflicts without resorting to violence. 

These insights may be of value to future Soldiers who find themselves in 

similar situations. CSI-The Past is Prologue!

Roderick M. Cox

Colonel, US Army

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Contents

Foreword..................................................................................................iii

Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................. 1

Chapter 2. Kirkuk-Ancient City in an Ancient Land1 .............................. 9

Origins of Kirkuk’s Diverse Population ...................................... 9

The Arabization of Kirkuk......................................................... 14

Competing Ethnic Narratives in Kirkuk .................................... 15

Chapter 3. Quelling Chaos, 2003-2005................................................... 21

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (CJSOTFN) ............................................................................................... 22

The 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Kirkuk .............. 24

Creation of the First Interagency Governance Teams................ 29

The 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in Kirkuk ................... 30

Regional Embassy Office and PRT in Kirkuk .......................... 37

The 116th Brigade Combat Team in Kirkuk ............................. 41

Chapter 4. Instability and Progress in Kirkuk, 2006-2009 .................... 55

The 3d BCT, 25th ID, Takes Responsibility in Kirkuk ............. 57

The 1st BCT, 10th Mtn Div Takes Over in Kirkuk ................... 64

The Role of the PRT in Governance Operations ....................... 72

The 18th Engineer Brigade Moves to Kirkuk............................ 75

The 2d BCT, 1st Cavalry Division Relieves 18th Engineer Brigade............................................................................................ 77

page 
vi

Chapter 5. Conclusion............................................................................. 93

Bibliography ......................................................................................... 103

APPENDIX-Order of Battle ................................................................. 115

The 173d ABN BDE—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 1......... 115

The 2d BCT, 25th INF DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 2....

115

The 116th CAV BCT, Idaho ARNG—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 3 ..................................................................................... 116

The 1st BCT, 101st ABN DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

4-/05-07.................................................................................... 117

The 3d BCT, 25th INF DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

06-08 ........................................................................................ 117

The 1st BCT, 10th MTN DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

07-09 ........................................................................................ 117

The 18th ENG BDE—Gap Between BCTs............................. 118

The 2d BCT, 1st CAV DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

08-10 ........................................................................................ 119

The 1st BCT, 1st ARMD DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

09-11 ........................................................................................ 119

 page 
1

Chapter 1. Introduction

The city of Kirkuk is situated in northeast Iraq approximately150 

miles from Baghdad along the Khasa River. Archeologists estimate the 

city to be more than 5,000 years old.1

 Kirkuk’s citadel, much of which 

is still in existence, dates back to 3000 BC. Known originally as the 

ancient city of Arrapha, Kirkuk rose to distinction while under Assyrian 

governance during the 10th and 11th centuries. Ruled subsequently by a 

succession of empires, such as the Babylonian, Median, Persian, Parthian, Macedonian, and Ottoman, Kirkuk slowly evolved into an ethnically 

mixed city inhabited by Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Assyrians. 

The city remained a home for this broad group of ethnicities into the 

20th century. The discovery of oil after World War I in the nearby Baba 

Gurgur region heightened ethnic tensions in Kirkuk. After assuming 

political power in Iraq in 1968, the Baath Party initiated deliberate “Arabization” procedures to ensure Arab control of the lucrative oil fields. 

Hundreds of thousands of Kurds and Turkmen were forced from Kirkuk 

and replaced by Arab settlers from southern Iraq, thereby significantly 

altering the city’s ethnic balance. After Coalition forces liberated Iraq 

and forced Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party from power in 2003, 

displaced Kurds and Turkmen began returning to Kirkuk to reclaim their 

land as Arabs fled the city. With proven reserves of ten billion barrels of 

oil, production levels of one million barrels of oil a day, and pipelines 

stretching to ports on the Mediterranean Sea, the Kirkuk region became 

a principal producer of Iraqi oil revenue. The equitable distribution of 

this revenue became a contentious issue in Iraq that further exacerbated 

ethnic unrest in the strategically and economically important city.2

Other factors have added to the tensions in the city. With the reKurdification of Kirkuk, a process that began with the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003, Kurds once again became the majority. Both major 

Kurdish political parties—the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the 

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—claimed Kirkuk as their regional 

capital and insisted that the city be recognized as the capital of any future 

Kurdish federal state in the new Iraq. A minority of Kurdish leaders 

held out hope for establishing of an independent Kurdish state despite 

previous failed attempts to do so.3 A more realistic scenario involved 

the annexation of Kirkuk by the semiautonomous Kurdistan Regional 

Government which oversaw Iraqi Kurdistan, an officially recognized 

region within the federal nation of Iraq. Unfortunately, a constitutionally 

mandated referendum addressing whether Kirkuk should remain within 
2

Baghdad-led Iraq or join Iraqi Kurdistan was postponed repeatedly 

between 2007 and 2010.4 If this referendum occurs and passes, however, 

non-Kurdish residents of Kirkuk, who are opposed to annexation, are 

likely to revolt, thus adding to the mounting ethnic tensions in the city. 

The Iraq Study Group Report, published in 2006 by the US Government, 

described ethnic hostilities in Kirkuk as an explosive powder keg and 

made the recommendation that the referendum on the future of Kirkuk be 

delayed to avoid potential violence.5

 In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent overthrow of the Saddam regime, the Coalition made a concerted effort to 

deal with the status of Iraq’s Kurdish population. In 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the US-led body installed to rule Iraq, added 

stipulations to the Transitional Administrative Law intended to remedy 

Baathist transgressions against the Kurds. These measures included 

restoring expelled residents to their homes, providing compensation for 

lost property or land, and promoting new employment opportunities.6

Unfortunately, major controversies involving Kirkuk remained unresolved. According to one study, “ethnic tensions, long-standing hatreds, 

[and] past atrocities,” characterize the historical context as well as the 

present situation in Iraq’s Kurdish region.7

 These festering issues abruptly confronted US Soldiers from the time they first arrived in Kirkuk in 

early 2003 through 2009 in the wake of The Surge. 

This Occasional Paper will describe, evaluate, and analyze US Army 

governance operations in Kirkuk between 2003 and 2009. While not a 

doctrinal concept when the campaign in Iraq began in 2003, the concept 

of governance operations aptly described the type of multi-faceted missions conducted by US Soldiers as they tried to replace Baathist governmental structures with representative institutions that reflected broad 

constituencies within Iraqi society. By 2010, the term governance had 

entered the doctrinal lexicon and was defined as the governing entity’s 

ability “to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior 

by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power 

is exercised in the society, including the representative participatory 

decision-making process typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority.”8

 Although many aspects of the governance operations 

conducted by the US Army units that served in Kirkuk were unique, others were more typical and fit easily into this broad definition. 

In revealing the US Army’s governance efforts in Kirkuk, this study 

will use the United States’ overall strategy for Iraq as its point of departure. According to a 2005 statement by the Department of Defense, the 
3

broad purpose of the campaign in Iraq was “to assist in creating an Iraq 

that is at peace with its neighbors, is an ally in the war on terror, has a 

representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, 

and has security forces that can maintain domestic order and deny a safe 

haven for terrorists in Iraq.”9

 Military commanders and administration 

officials had refined Operation IRAQI FREEDOM’s strategic objectives 

over time. In 2003, for example, the US Central Command campaign 

plan called for “A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a 

broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use 

and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors.”10 The 2005 

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq described the US long-term Operation IRAQI FREEDOM strategic objective as “An Iraq that is peaceful, 

united, stable, democratic, and secure, with the institutions and resources 

to govern themselves justly, and proving the fruits of democratic governance to the region, and a full partner in the global war on terror.”11 And, 

as the surge began in early 2007, documents released by the White House 

described the Bush Administration’s goal as, “a unified, democratic, 

federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is 

an ally in the war on terror.”12 Present in all of these statements was the 

desire to introduce dramatic changes to the way Iraq was governed at 

all levels. Kirkuk posed perhaps the greatest challenge to the Coalition’s 

desire to reform Iraqi politics. 

Governance operations in Kirkuk were shaped heavily by the counterinsurgency approach taken by the US Army in Iraq after 2003. One 

of the primary objectives of a counterinsurgency campaign is “fostering effective governance by a legitimate government...ruled with the 

consent of the governed.”13 To do this, the counterinsurgent force has 

to foster host nation military and police activities, establish and enforce 

justice and the rule of law, cultivate public and financial administrations, 

and create an electoral process for representative government.14 These 

tasks were not entirely unprecedented in the history of the US Army. 

Indeed, US Soldiers have been involved in developing new governments since the 1800s. Examples of this include Mexico in the 1840s, 

reconstruction after the American Civil War, Puerto Rico and Cuba in the 

Spanish-American war, Germany and Japan after World War II, the Civil 

Operations for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program 

in Vietnam, and governance efforts in Grenada and Panama in the 1980s. 

The governance requirements encountered by Soldiers in each of these 

contingencies were all quite similar in nature—implementing political 

and economic reconstruction and supervising essential political transi-
4

tions necessary to consolidate victory.15 This study will focus on both the 

Army missions in Kirkuk directly related to restructuring the city and 

province government as well as those tasks that fostered security and 

economic stability, both of which were closely connected to the establishment of new political structures.

More recently, US Army conventional combat forces have performed 

governance-oriented tasks, both on their own and when paired with 

specialized civil affairs units.16 These capabilities were demonstrated 

in the 1990s during the major peacekeeping operations in the Balkans: 

Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE. 

Several US Army divisions took part individually on a rotational basis 

as Task Force Eagle in the NATO-led effort. Because these operations 

placed heavy emphasis on security and maintaining a peaceful environment in the region, there was little requirement for Soldiers to provide 

extensive direct assistance to local governance. Both Civil Affairs and 

conventional units, however, did participate in limited ways in addressing those governance issues that did arise. US Soldiers liberating Kirkuk 

and other Iraqi cities in April 2003, however, were immediately required 

to become directly involved in local governance and in fact served as the 

actual governors of the city for a short period. Although the majority of 

the Soldiers who served in Kirkuk arrived without the benefit of experience in any type of governance, they adjusted quickly and were soon 

helping Kirkuk establish and strengthen its local government infrastructure. Colonel David Paschal, an Infantry Officer who served in Kirkuk 

in 2007, emphasized the unconventional aspect of the mission, stating, 

“I was involved with trying to figure out...a lot of things that they didn’t 

teach [me] in Infantry Officer Basic School.”17 

Following the overthrow of the Saddam regime, Soldiers from the 

173d Airborne Brigade (173d ABN BDE)—the first unit designated 

to establish a new government in Kirkuk—found themselves in the 

“midst of squabbling ethnicities,” as they attempted to restore the physical, political, and economic infrastructure of the city.18 Over the next 

ten months, the 173d ABN BDE established a 30-seat multiethnic city 

council in Kirkuk, helped develop five new city-wide directorates, and 

assisted Kirkuk’s officials with preparing their 2004 city budget, while at 

the same time successfully keeping the lid on ethnic violence. For an infantry unit that was untrained in governance to take on such complex political, social, and economic issues was striking. As the brigade prepared 

to leave Kirkuk in the winter of 2004, Colonel William Mayville, the unit 

commander, was uncertain of how to define a clearly successful political 
5

outcome in the city. He hoped that his Soldier’s efforts, at the very least, 

had helped Kirkuk to “break even.”19

Smoldering ethnic tensions persisted in Kirkuk throughout 2004. 

Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen were more concerned with pursuing their 

own respective ethnic interests than they were with accepting compromise or understanding the vagaries of western-style democratic procedures. Despite efforts of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division’s Team 

Governance to foster political progress in Kirkuk, most ethnic grievances 

remained unresolved, prompting KDP leader, Massoud Barzani, to proclaim “Kirkuk...the Jerusalem of Kurdistan.”20 Two years later, ongoing 

governance operations in Kirkuk were difficult for US troops because of 

their inability to distinguish not only friend from foe but also truth from 

fiction. The “dueling narratives” of the city’s contentious ethnic groups 

led Colonel David Gray, commander, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, to describe the chaotic situation in Kirkuk as “an amalgamation of a 

knife fight, a gunfight, and three-dimensional chess.”21

Although a succession of US forces had successfully kept violence 

in Kirkuk to a minimum, ethnic hostilities continued to simmer in 2007. 

“It’s a long-term, 1,000-year distrust of each other,” explained Major 

General Benjamin Mixon, commander of US troops in northern Iraq. 

“We have to try to build some bridges [as] best we can. But at the end 

of the day, it’s going to be up to [the Iraqis] to figure out how to make it 

work.”22

The operational environment in Kirkuk calmed somewhat by 2009 

when Colonel Ryan Gonsalves and the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 

1st Cavalry Division, assumed responsibility for the city. Their responsibilities included enhancing Kurdish-Arab relations, disrupting insurgent 

activities, securing the environment in which the Kirkuk political process 

could move forward, and protecting the local population. These activities 

were to be carried out in collaboration with the 2d BCTs Iraqi partners—

local Iraqi Security Forces and government officials. 

This study follows a chronological structure, discussing and evaluating governance operations in Kirkuk conducted by a succession of US 

Army units that operated in and around Kirkuk between 2003 and 2009 

(See Order of Battle-Appendix). The core chapters of this study rely on 

a variety of primary sources, including interviews with participants and 

unit documents, to examine the initial attempts by US troops to reorganize, structure, and actually run Kirkuk’s city government. The focus 

here is clearly on the operations of US Army units. Those efforts, how-
6

ever, were assisted by the Kirkuk Provincial Reconstruction Team, Judge 

Advocate General officers, nongovernmental organizations, the United 

Nations, and Iraqi military leaders and government officials, all of whom 

will be examined as well. Moreover, the discussion will at times trace 

the development of Iraqi national politics and Coalition decision making 

which also affected US Army Governance operations in Kirkuk.23

Finally, it is important to emphasize again that few if any of the US 

Soldiers that entered Iraq in 2003 were trained or otherwise prepared to 

conduct Governance Operations. Despite the complex and culturally-sensitive nature of these missions, US Army units adapted and learned. The 

relatively stable political development of Kirkuk between 2003 and 2009 

is a testament to the officers and Soldiers who served in the city during 

these six years. Their experience further offers critical insights to those 

seeking to understand the campaign in Iraq during this critical period as 

well as to military professionals who might face similar challenges in the 

future.
7

Notes

1. Several geographic entities are named Kirkuk. Kirkuk province has a 

city and a district named Kirkuk and a subdistrict name Markaz Kirkuk. Kirkuk 

in this paper will refer only to the city or the province and will be identified as 

such. 

2. Kirkuk Business Center, “About Kirkuk,” 2005, 1-7, http://kbciraq.org/

Kirkuk.pdf (accessed 12 February 2010).

3. The United Nations controlled zone in northern Iraq (1992-1996) had the 

potential of becoming an autonomous Kurdistan, however efforts by Kurdish 

leaders to form an independent state fell short.

4. See the Kirkuk Referendum in Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution.

5. James Baker and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), 45. 

6. The Coalition Provisional Authority, Law of Administration for the State 

of Iraq for the Transitional Period, Article 58, 8 March 2004.

7. Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Defense Report from 

AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare, The Kurdish Question, September 2009, 4. 

8. DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, “Governance,” http://www.dtic.mil/

doctrine/dod_dictionary/ (accessed 26 April 2010).

9. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, October 2005, 2. 

10. Catherine Dale, CRS Report for Congress No. RL34387, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress, 2 April 

2009, 31, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (accessed 21 January 

2010).

11. President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, 30 

November 2005, 3, http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/strategies/iraq_national_

strategy_20051130.pdf (accessed 18 March 2010).

12. President George W. Bush, “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” 

Briefing, January 2007, Slide 8, http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf2007/other/iraqstrategy011007.pdf (accessed 24 August 2010).

13. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC, December 2006), 1-21.

14. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency,, 5-15.

15. Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters, Autumn 

2003, 87, 89.

16. The US Army did not stand up specialized civil affairs units until after 

WW II. 
8

17. Colonel David Paschal, interview by Contemporary Operations Study 

Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 November 2009, 31. 

18. Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk (Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 95.

19. Colonel William Mayville, Donald Wright, and Colonel Timothy Reese, 

On Point II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 417. 

20. Massoud Barzani L. and Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq (New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 2006), 271.

21. Anderson and Stansfield, 95; Colonel David Gray, “DoD News Briefing 

with Colonel Gray from Iraq,” 21 April 2006, 1, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1264 (accessed 16 February 2010).

22. Major General Benjamin Mixon Rick Jervis, “US Scrambles to Keep 

Kirkuk from Igniting,” USATODAY.com, 15 May 2007, 1, http://www.usatoday.

com/news/world/iraq/2007-05-14-kirkuk_N.htm (accessed 9 February 2010). 

23. In 1976, Saddam Hussein changed the name of Kirkuk province to AtTamim. In 2006, the name was changed back to Kirkuk. The Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kirkuk is occasionally referred to as Team Tamim, but will be 

described only as Team Kirkuk in this paper.
9

Chapter 2. Kirkuk-Ancient City in an Ancient Land1

For centuries, Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians have lived in 

harmony in and around Kirkuk. “It used to be beautiful and very peaceful, a real mosaic,” One resident said in describing the region prior to the 

1958 overthrow of the British-backed Hashemite monarchy..2 Sunni and 

Shia Muslims peacefully coexisted alongside Christians while each group 

retained their respective languages and cultures. With the advent of panArabism, Arab nationalism, and the rise to power of Iraqi Baathists in the 

1960s, thousands of non-Arabs were driven from Kirkuk. Forced Arabization, which brought untold numbers of southern Iraqi Shia to Kirkuk, 

strikingly realigned the ethnic dynamics of Kirkuk. Kurds fared the worst, 

as hundreds of thousands fled into exile or were killed during the 1988 

Anfal extermination campaign.3

In the months following the defeat of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist 

regime by Coalition forces in 2003, the city of Kirkuk remained relatively 

peaceful. After decades of repression under Saddam, Kurds reemerged as 

the dominant winners in Kirkuk, and they vigorously lobbied for official 

incorporation of the city with its oil-rich surroundings within the boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdistan Democratic Party and PUK leaders used 

their new constitutional powers to regain a political majority in Kirkuk 

by ending the previous regime’s Arabization policies, encouraging Arabs 

to leave the city, and facilitating the return of displaced Kurds. Arab and 

Turkmen resentment toward Kurd actions led Coalition authorities to view 

Kirkuk as a potential “powder keg or tinderbox of ethnic hatred,” on the 

verge of erupting into civil war.4

 Competing, mutually exclusive, aspirations for Kirkuk among its multiethnic citizenry pushed tensions to the 

brink and often left fundamental politico-economic matters both unsettled 

and uncertain. Despite these concerns, serious civil unrest never materialized in Kirkuk, due in large part to the successful efforts of a succession 

of US Soldiers deployed to the city to assist with governance and to keep 

the peace. 

Origins of Kirkuk’s Diverse Population

 Its complex ethno-sectarian composition makes Kirkuk a textbook 

divided city. Kirkuk lies in the region of northern Iraq where “the cradle of 

civilization” or the Fertile Crescent of Mesopotamia first gave root to the 

establishment of non-nomadic agrarian culture and society. Early settlers 

domesticated animals, raised wheat and barley, and developed rudimentary irrigation methods. Cuneiform writing, the 60-minute hour and 24-

hour day, the concept of square and cube roots, and a system of weights 
10

and measures were all developed between 4000–3000 BC by residents of 

the region.5 

By about 2400 BC, a group of people called the Hurrians expanded 

southward from the Caucasus and assumed control of the settlement of 

Arrapha—the site of present-day Kirkuk—in northern Mesopotamia from 

the Assyrians. The Hurrians went on to play a major role in transporting 

goods and providing services for the great empires surrounding them. In 

approximately 1600 BC, the Hurrians merged with a group of Indo-Asyan 

peoples, formed the MItanni state, and went on to dominate central Mesopotamian culture for the next 200 years. By the 13th century BC, however, 

the Hurrian/Mitanni Empire had measurably declined after debilitating 

wars with the Hittites and Assyrians. The kingdom eventually collapsed, 

the Hurrians were absorbed into Assyrian culture, and Assyrians regained 

control of Arrapha.6

 

The Iranian Medes attacked Arrapha from the east in 615 BC, and, in 

alliance with Babylonia, drove the Assyrians out of Mesopotamia.7

 Over 

the next 400 years, Babylonians, Macedonians, and the Seleucid dynasty 

ruled Mesopotamia, followed by the Parthians (129 BC – 234 AD) and 

Sassanid Persians (224-636 AD).8

 With the Islamic conquest of Mesopotamia, Kirkuk fell under the influence of the Arab Muslim Abbasid Empire 

in 750 AD. Soon Baghdad became the center of Arabic civilization, and, 

for the next several hundred years, control of the region vacillated back 

and forth between several competing Islamic dynasties.9

 The Abbasid Caliphate and the Seljuk dynasty recruited Turkmen groups from central Asia 

to serve as soldiers in their respective military forces. After the Mongolian 

invasion in the 12th century, the Turkmen Black Sheep and White Sheep 

tribal confederations seized control of northern Iraq, including Kirkuk and 

the trade routes that ran through the city, and then they ruled the region for 

the next 200 years.10 

In 1534, Ottoman Turk sultan Suleiman the Magnificent captured 

Baghdad. Under Ottoman rule, Mesopotamia was the “Principality of 

Baghdad” and remained an Ottoman province until World War I. The Ottomans, who joined the Central Powers during World War I, lost Mesopotamia to the British, and the entire Ottoman Empire officially dissolved in 

1922. The Treaty of Sevres, between the Allies and the Ottomans (Turkey), 

forced Turkey to renounce sovereignty over Mesopotamia, which first became a British mandate, and eventually the modern-day state of Iraq. Ottoman influence in the region persisted, however, as the Empire’s Turkmen 

descendents still considered northern Iraq, including Kirkuk, their home.11
11

Under its mandate, the British government helped organize a voting 

referendum in Baghdad that led to the selection of Faisal I as King of Iraq 

in 1921. British officials divided Iraq into districts, introduced common 

law to replace Islamic codes, established the Indian rupee as the official 

currency, built a new army and police force manned by Indian immigrants, 

and assigned key Iraqi governmental positions to Sunni Muslims despite 

the fact that Shia Muslims were in the majority.12 Britain maintained a keen 

interest in Iraq due to the vast oil reserves near Basra and Kirkuk, but also 

because transiting through Iraq significantly shortened the trade routes to 

India, its prime colony. The British had also promised to help the Kurds 

establish their own nation in exchange for Kurd assistance in fighting the 

Ottomans during World War I. Instead, the British government reneged on 

this promise and split the Kurdish region into three areas that Turkey, Iran, 

and Iraq incorporated. Perceived British duplicity towards Kurdish independence remained a contentious point with Kurds to the present day.13

By 1925, the British and Iraqi governments had settled on the official boundaries of the new Iraq. Then, in 1927, petroleum engineers from 

the British-controlled Turkish Petroleum Company drilled Iraq’s first oil 

well—Baba Gurgur No.1—just south of Kirkuk. Geologists calculated 

that the Kirkuk oilfield stretched more than 60 miles from Kirkuk northwest through Dibs to a point south of Al Kuwayr along the Great Zab 

River. Issues involving Iraq’s oil wealth would henceforth dominate the 

country’s economic future and political debate. Preventing Kurdish political autonomy now became a matter of national security as Iraqis struggled 

with how to manage, protect, and share their newfound wealth within 

their own boundaries. Kirkuk’s oil became a source of continuing conflict 

between Kurdish leaders and the Iraqi government as nationalist Arabs 

grasped the importance of keeping Kirkuk within the new Iraqi state. The 

genesis of the Baath Party’s Arabization of Kirkuk and the manipulation 

of Kirkuk governorate (provincial) boundaries have revolved around Iraqi 

nationalist efforts to retain control of the Kirkuk oilfields.14 

The British mandate ended in 1932 when Iraq joined the League of 

Nations. During World War II, Iraq with a British garrison, eventually 

sided with the Allies and declared war on Germany and the Axis powers. 

After the war, Arab nationalism and resentment over Western imperialism grew as the United States expanded its Iraqi oil interests. Under the 

Eisenhower Doctrine, the US offered military assistance to Iraq in an effort to prevent Soviet expansion into the region. With British sponsorship, 

Iraq became part of the United Nations in 1945, became a charter member 

of the Arab League in 1946, and held its first free direct general elec-
12

tions in 1953. A military coup overthrew Iraq’s Hashemite constitutional 

monarchy in 1958; the country’s new prime minister Abdel-Karin Quasim, 

quickly strengthened relations with the Soviet Union.

Intent on promoting Arab unity, the Baathist Party, an organization 

that professed secular socialist principles, briefly gained power in Iraq for 

eight months in 1963, lost it for five years, and then rose to power again 

permanently in 1968. Iraq fought alongside Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in 

the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts. By 1975, the Baathist government had nationalized the country’s industries, including the lucrative 

oil business. Although it opposed the United States, Great Britain, Israel, 

and Iran, the Baathist regime recognized the Kurds in northern Iraq as a 

separate and distinct nationality, allowed the Kurds to establish their own 

militia—the Peshmerga, and acknowledged Kurdish desires for governmental autonomy. The regime refused to sanction a complete separation as 

a separate institution from Iraq. Saddam Hussein replaced General Ahmed 

Hussein al-Bakr leader of Iraq’s Baathist government when he resigned 

in 1979. Saddam Hussein would lead the Republic of Iraq for the next 24 

years until the United States military forcefully removed him in in 2003.15

Over the course of Saddam’s reign, Iraq waged an eight-year war with 

Iran, invading its neighbor to the east in 1980 over disagreements regarding the Shatt al-Arab waterway, the Strait of Hormuz, and religious differences with Iran’s leading Shia Muslim cleric, the Ayatollah Ruhollah 

Khomeini. Iran eventually forced Iraqi troops back across the border then 

assumed the offensive against Iraq. By the end of 1988, both Iraq and Iran 

accepted the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution 598, thereby 

ending hostilities in what had become a war of attrition.

Due to their historical ties with Iran, Kurds in northern Iraq rebelled 

against conscription into the Iraqi army during the 1980s. To quell the 

rebellion, in 1986 Saddam ordered a scorched-earth policy (the Anfal 

campaign), under which Iraqi security forces destroyed numerous Kurdish cities and towns by killing, capturing, torturing, and relocating thousands of Kurds. The most notable incident of this three-year campaign 

was the merciless murder of 5,000 Kurdish men, women, and children in 

an airborne-delivered poisonous gas attack on the village of Halabja, in 

Sulaymaniyah Province, 90 miles east of Kirkuk. The annihilation took 

less than an hour.16

Kurds in and around Kirkuk were also hurt economically by the IranIraq war. Oil export terminals and infrastructure were destroyed; Syria 

closed the pipeline to the Mediterranean; the price of crude oil dropped by 
13

75 percent. This forced Saddam to pledge future oil revenues to pay for the 

billions of dollars in debt that he had amassed in financing the war. 

The unsuccessful war with Iran wore down both the Iraqi state and 

Iraqi society. Yet less than two years after its termination, Saddam launched 

a new military adventure. Although the State of Kuwait had been an independent sovereign Arab emirate since 1961, many Iraqi leaders, including Saddam, believed that Kuwait was rightfully part of Iraq. Saddam’s 

government still owed Kuwait billions of dollars that it had borrowed to 

help finance the Iran-Iraq war. Kuwait’s surprisingly high levels of oil 

production and its Persian Gulf deep-sea port, however, enticed Saddam 

and he viewed Kuwait as lucrative property. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, 

defeating the small nation and annexing the country. In February 1991, a 

US-led, 38-nation coalition, backed by a UN Security Council Resolution 

678, launched Operation DESERT STORM, in which Saddam’s army was 

defeated and Kuwait quickly liberated.17

In the aftermath of the Iraqi defeat, the Kurds in northern Iraq rebelled 

against Saddam’s regime. Combined Kurdish militias from the KDP and 

PUK party gained control of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, including the city 

of Kirkuk. However, the more heavily armed Iraqi loyalist forces, led 

by the Republican Guard, suppressed the Kurdish uprising within a few 

months. In an effort to protect Kurds, the United States, Great Britain, and 

France initiated Operation NORTHERN WATCH, which established a nofly zone in northern Iraq. Subsequently, a small coalition of US, British, 

French, and Turkish ground forces provided relief for Kurdish refugees, 

protection for humanitarian relief efforts, and deterrence against further 

Iraqi attacks in Operations PROVIDE COMFORT I and II, which continued through December 1996.18

In response to Saddam’s ongoing refusal to allow United Nations 

weapons inspections, the United States and Britain launched Operation 

DESERT FOX in 1998. According to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, the four-day bombing campaign “struck military and security targets 

in Iraq that contributed to Iraq’s ability to produce, store, maintain, and deliver weapons of mass destruction.”19 After the first Gulf War, the United 

Nations also imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. By 1995, these measures evolved into an oil-for-food program; exported Iraqi oil revenues 

provided the means to purchase food, medicine, and other sustaining products to benefit the Iraqi people. Despite over a decade of involvement in 

Iraq, the US still feared that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction 

and had become a breeding ground for al-Qaeda terrorists. This fear combined with Saddam’s failures to comply with UN resolutions, prompted 
14

the US to seek a regime change in Iraq. A US-led military coalition initiated Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in March 2003. By 9 April, US Forces 

had captured Baghdad, Saddam’s regime had crumbled, and US Forces 

had liberated the Iraqi people.

The Arabization of Kirkuk

The Arabization of Kirkuk began in the early 1930s with the production and export of crude oil from the Baba Gurgur fields, long before the 

1963 Baathist coup. When Kirkuk emerged as the central hub of Iraqi oil 

production, Arab nationalists became keenly aware of the fact that Kurds 

and Turkmen, not Arabs, controlled the city. A limited number of Arabs 

from southern Iraq migrated to Kirkuk to work the oilfields, first for the 

Turkish Petroleum Company, then later for the Iraqi Petroleum Company. As pipelines opened and oil exports grew, Iraqi Petroleum Company 

moved its headquarters to Kirkuk and increasingly turned to experienced 

Arabs to fill high paying, high skilled, oil industry jobs. Additionally, as 

Kirkuk grew in size, Turkmen assumed increasing bureaucratic responsibility for city management and administration. Excluding Kirkuk’s Kurds 

socially and economically from the city’s booming prosperity, provided 

tension between the excluded Kurds and those Arabs and Turkmen who 

were gainfully employed. In 1959, a group of Kurds attacked a Turkmen 

residential area in Kirkuk. Iraqi nationalist military units from Baghdad 

soon captured then executed the Kurdish perpetrators. Shortly afterward, 

Kurds began voluntarily moving away from Kirkuk, while others transferred to jobs elsewhere. The oppression of Kurds in northern Iraq intensified soon after the 1963 coup and the Baathist regime assumed power in 

Baghdad.20 

Resolved to impose further anti-Kurd controls on Kirkuk, Baathists 

destroyed nearby villages and Kurdish neighborhoods within the city. 

Names of streets, schools, and public buildings changed from Kurdish to 

Arabic, and the Kirkuk police department recruited Arabs to join the force. 

The regime replaced expelled Kurds with Arab tribesmen, who resettled 

in outlying regions of the Kirkuk governorate, especially along oil pipelines. Kirkuk’s Kurds could not buy and sell property. The second Baathist 

regime in1968 paid Arabs to relocate to Kirkuk with guaranteed jobs and 

free housing. To ensure not only Arabization but also the de-Kurdification of Kirkuk, Kurds received similar financial incentives to leave the 

city. In 1974, fighting between the Pesh Megra and Iraqi forces resumed. 

This Kurdish rebellion was short-lived because the 1975 Iraq-Iran Algiers 

Agreement forced Iran to formally withdraw their much-needed support 

from the Kurdish fighters.21
15

Baathist efforts to marginalize Kurdish influence in Kirkuk accelerated 

from the late 1970s onward. The regime built six thousand new homes for 

arriving Arab families; farmlands, previously owned by expelled Kurds, 

became nationalized for Arab use by the Baghdad government. The demographic impact of Baathist Arabization policies on Kirkuk Province was 

striking. Throughout the period 1957-1997, the provincial population increased by 94 percent, from 389,000 to 753,000 residents—due entirely 

to Arab migration. During this time, the Arab community in the province 

grew nearly 400 percent from 110,000 to 545,000 residents. Meanwhile, 

the numbers of Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk Province dwindled from 

188,000 to 156,000 (17 percent less) and 84,000 to 50,000 (40 percent 

less), respectively. These demographic changes in Kirkuk were dramatic 

and served as the driving force behind the animosity and ethnic tensions 

encountered by US Soldiers when they liberated the region at the outset of 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.22 

Competing Ethnic Narratives in Kirkuk

Kurds today contend that Arabized Kirkuk is historically and demographically Kurdish. According to the Kurdistan Regional Government, 

Kurds wish not to recapture Kirkuk militarily, but to reclaim the city 

“peacefully through the democratic process and under the rule of law.”23

“We must secure and guarantee the historic achievements of our people 

and realization of our full and just rights by restoring Kirkuk and other 

Arabized areas...to the embrace of the Kurdistan region,” Kurdish representatives argued in the government’s 2006 Unification Agreement.24

Geography, not ethnicity, is the basis for Kurd insistence that Kirkuk is 

singularly linked to Kurdistan—“[Kirkuk is] not a Kurdish town, but a 

Kurdistani town.”25 

Additionally, Kurds claim to have had a plurality in Kirkuk prior to 

Arabization and that Turkmen are comparative newcomers, not having arrived until the Ottoman Empire. Kurds also see distinctly different Kirkuk 

Arab subsets. The original indigenous Arabs of Kirkuk were simply nomadic tribesmen who settled in the region, as opposed to those Arabs who 

came to Kirkuk under the recent Arabization process and now found themselves unwelcome. Kurds, however, consider both Turkmen and early Arabs as legitimate residents of Kirkuk and worthy of becoming protected 

minorities in the city. “We have no problems with the Turkmen and Arabs 

who lived in Kirkuk before 1957—they are Kirkukis. The Arab tribes are 

not originally from Kirkuk, but they settled a long time ago and became 

Kirkukis,” explained Nasih Ghafour Ramadan in describing Kirkuk’s 

complex ethnic situational environment.26 Finally, Kurdish leaders point 
16

repeatedly to the Baathist regime’s de-Kurdification of Kirkuk as prima 

facie justification for returning control of the city to the Kurds. Furthermore, the Kurdistan Regional Government considered it a legal right that 

all displaced Kurds be permitted to return home and that previous Kurdish areas which were relinquished during Arabization, be returned to their 

rightful owners—the Kurds of Kirkuk. 

Not surprisingly, Turkmen disagreed with the Kurdish viewpoint. 

They considered Kirkuk to be an original Turkmen city where other ethnic 

groups Kurds and Arabs, happened to reside. They viewed Kurdistan as 

their land, referred to as Turkmeneli. Turkmen argued that their arrival in 

Kirkuk, primarily as soldiers under the Ottoman Empire, predated that of 

the masses of Kurds who migrated to the region in the 1920s and 1930s to 

work the oilfields. Turkmen further claimed to have suffered through Arabization during the Baathist regime when they lost property and jobs, and 

were forced to register as Arabs in order to remain as residents in Kirkuk. 

The return of large numbers of Kurds to Kirkuk after Saddam’s demise was seen by Turkmen as Kurdification with more Kurds settling in 

the city than were ever expelled. Since 2003, Kurdish interests in Kirkuk 

have revolved primarily around control of the oil revenue, according to 

the Turkmen narrative. “The only reason the Kurdish people need Kirkuk 

is oil,” claimed Rayadh Sari Kahyeh, leader in 2005 of Turkmen Ele Party.27 Additionally, Turkmen opposed incorporating Kirkuk into Kurdistan, 

since, as Turkmen Ibrahim Beyraqdar pointed out, “it [Kirkuk] was never 

part of Kurdistan.”28 As an alternative, many Iraqi Turkmen supported the 

notion of a federal region and special status for Kirkuk. “Our position is 

that the best way forward is for Kirkuk to be a separate region,” explained 

Tahsin Kahyeh, Turkmen Islamic Union leader in Kirkuk.29 Unfortunately, 

the Turkmen position in Iraqi politics was geographically weak; since their 

people were so highly dispersed throughout northern Iraq, Turkmen represent only a minority of the local population wherever they live.30

With respect to Kirkuk’s Arabs, they readily admitted that Arabization did take place, but contend that the number of removed Kurds was 

insignificant. “We are not opposed to the return of those [Kurds] who were 

expelled by Saddam,” community leader Abd-al-Rahman Manshed al-Asi 

told the International Crisis Group. “But in the period 1991-2003, they expelled a total of [only] 11,856 individual Kurds from Kirkuk, a figure that 

did not justify the [large] Kurdish influx since the regime’s fall,” al-Asi explained.31 Arabs considered Kirkuk a mixed area that should not be part of 

Kurdistan. Indigenous Arabs favored special status for Kirkuk, as do many 

Turkmen. On the other hand, Arabs who went to Kirkuk under the Baathist 
17

Arabization program supported the concept of direct Iraqi central government control of the city. Additionally, numerous Arabs claimed “victimization” under Arabization for being relocated to Kirkuk against their will. 

Many of these Arabs were willing to move out of Kirkuk, if compensated 

adequately, however they now had nowhere to go. Still others claimed to 

have relocated to Kirkuk solely for the oilfield employment opportunities. University lecturer Abd-al-Karim Khalifa summed up Kirkuk’s Arab 

sentiment noting, “the region makes everyone salivate...a solution to the 

Kirkuk problem is easy to reach...once the central government decides that 

Kirkuk should remain an Iraqi town, then these parties that wish us ill will 

have to shut up.”32

Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Syriacs, who comprised the Christian 

community in Kirkuk, believed that, due to their historic connections to 

the Assyrian Empire (c.1800-600 BC) they too had legitimate rights in the 

city. Kirkuk’s Christians considered all other ethnic and religious groups 

in Kirkuk to be intruders, trespassing on their territory. “We are considered second class citizens in Iraq,” said Sargon Lazar Sliwa, leader of the 

Assyrian Democratic Movement. “But in fact all the others are guests...

this is originally Assyrian land, and we are the original Iraqis,” Sliwa explained.33 The number of Christians residing in Kirkuk in 2010 was comparatively small so their wishes and desires were often overlooked or disregarded.34 Additionally, since they were considered infidels by Arabs in 

Kirkuk, Christians feared possible oppression from Salafist Muslim sects 

in the city. After the fall of the Baathist regime in 2003, Kirkuk’s Christians were mostly concerned about a looming crisis brought on by ethnic 

tensions over which groups would control the city. “We are arming ourselves...we are afraid...there is talk of civil war,” warned Sliwa, who was 

also one of six Assyrian representatives on the Kirkuk governing council.35

 Although Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs have generally lived harmoniously in Kirkuk over the millennia, the discovery of oil and the more 

recent emergence of Iraqi nationalism in the late 20th and early 21st centuries were causes of the ethnic violence, tension, and unrest. In an effort to control northern oil production and subsequent revenues, both the 

Arabization and de-Kurdification policies initiated by successive Iraqi 

regimes politicized Kirkuk and unduly agitated its disparate population. 

Kurdish desires to return to power in Kirkuk derived from the assumption 

that Kurds needed the oil revenues as a financial base to form an independent Kurdistan. Kurd leaders however, agreed to the terms of Article 

112 of Iraq’s 2005 constitution, which stipulated that the fair distribution 

of Kirkuk’s oil revenues will be in proportion to Iraq’s population.36 This 
18

proportional distribution assured that the Kurds and all of Kirkuk’s population would receive a steady stream of oil revenue. This revenue may 

shrink considerably under an independent Kurdistan, since the region has 

no refining capabilities itself and relies on other regions and countries for 

pipeline usage and exportation.37 Central control versus regional control 

of Iraq’s oil industry remained a significantly unresolved controversy in 

Kirkuk. 

Clearly, based upon the demographic statistics provided earlier, Kurds 

were the largest ethnic group in Kirkuk. Power sharing arrangements between Arabs and Turkmen have been historically contentious. Since 2003, 

Kurds have insisted that power sharing be proportional based on residential population, while Arabs and Turkmen have demanded an equal distribution of power among the three distinct ethnic communities. Temporary 

solutions have addressed the power sharing issue; a permanent resolution 

has yet to emerge. 

Equally ominous is the emergence of Kirkuk as a focal point in Iraqi 

national politics. Kurds of Kirkuk have been described as separatists because of their desire to form an independent Kurdistan, while most Sunni 

and many Shia Arabs, who wish to retain Iraq’s territorial integrity, have 

been described as centrists or nationalists. Essentially, Kurds who wanted 

separation were adversaries to Arabs who wanted a cohesive, united Iraq. 

This conflict can be characterized as a contest of Kurd “separatists” versus Arab “nationalists.” In this equation, Arabs viewed minority Kurds as 

nationally obstructionist and the majority of Arabs considered the Kurds 

an impediment to the peaceful resolution of the vexing political troubles 

in Iraq. 

As for the city of Kirkuk, both the Iraqi Arabic Kirkuk Front and the 

Iraqi Turkmen Front proposed that Kirkuk remain separate from any independent Kurdistan region. The city administration should come from the 

Arab-dominated central Iraqi government and the city “power sharing” 

should be equal, not proportional. Kurds naturally opposed this alternative, preferring that Kirkuk join the Kurdistan region and be supervised 

autonomously by a proportionately based, local governing council—a system that favored the city’s Kurdish majority. A Kurd compromise might 

have been be the most likely outcome, one in which either Kirkuk becomes 

part of Kurdistan, or power sharing becomes proportional, but not both. 
19

Notes 

1. Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 9.

2. International Crisis Group, Iraq and the Kurds: The Breing Battle over 

Kirkuk, Middle East Report No. 56, 18 July 2006, 2.

3. Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the 

Kurds, 1993, Ch 3.

4. Anderson and Stansfield, 7.

5. Courtney Hunt, The History of Iraq (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 

2005), 12-16; Gilles Munier, Iraq: An Illustrated History and Guide (Northhampton, MA: Interlink Books, 2004), 9-11; the city of Kirkuk is approximately 50 

miles east of the Tigris River and, therefore, not within the boundaries of ancient 

Mesopotamia (land between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers); the western border 

of Kirkuk Governorate (formerly known as Tamim) is partially formed by the 

Tigris River near the village of Shaykh. 

6. Kessler Associates, Hurrian Empire of Mitanni, 2010, 1-4. http://www.

historyfiles.co.uk/KingListsMiddEast/AnatoliaHurrienMitanni.htm (accessed 

23 February 2010); Kessler Associates, Hurrian Kingdom of Arrapha, 2010, 1. 

http://www.historyfiles.co.uk/KingListsMiddEast/AnatoliaHurrianArrapha.htm 

(accessed 23 February 2010.

7. Iran Chamber Society, History of Iran: Median Empire, 2010, 2. http://

www.iranchamber.com/history/median/median.php (accessed 23 February 2010). 

8. Gilles Munier, Iraq: An Illustrated History and Guide (Northhampton, 

MA: Interlink Books, 2004), 15-17.

 9. Hunt, 35.

10. Anderson and Stansfield, 15-17.

11. Hunt, 51-56.

12. The plan to employ hired Indians as Iraqi soldiers and policemen was 

soon abandoned. The British then assisted Iraqis in establishing their own indigenous military and police forces, however the Shia were forced into the enlisted 

ranks, while Sunnis became the officer corps. 

13. During the Conference of Cairo, the British had another opportunity to 

assist Kurds in establishing an independent Kurdistan, but did not do so after concluding that Iraqi nation unity was a more important objective. 

14. Anderson and Stansfield, 26-30.

15. Munier, 39-45. 

16. Amer Salih, “Never Forget Halabja 88,” Kurdish Network Flashmovie, 

http://www.halabja.org/ (accessed 25 February 2010). 

17. “Essential Documents: UN Security Council Resolution 678, Iraq/Kuwait,” Council on Foreign Relations, 29 November 1990, http://www.cfr.org/

publication/11205/un_security_council_resolution_678_iraq_kuwait.html? brea

dcrumb=%2Fregion%2F408%2Fkuwait (accessed 9 August 2010). UN Security 

Council Resolution 678, passed on 29 November 1990, gave Iraq a withdrawel 
20

deadline of 15 January 1991, and authorized “all necessary means to uphold and 

implement Resolution 660,” and a diplomatic formulation authorizing the use of 

force if Iraq failed to comply.

18. John P. Abizaid, “Lessons for Peacekeepers,” Military Review, March 

1993, 11-19.

19. William S. Cohen, “Operation Desert Fox,” DoD Briefing, 20 December 1998, 1, http://www.defense.gov/specials/desert_fox/ (accessed 26 February 

2010). 

20. Anderson and Stansfield, 30-34.

21. Anderson and Stansfield, 35-39.

22. Anderson and Stansfield, 39-44. Within Kirkuk city, the 1957 Iraqi census 

indicated Turkomans represented 37 % of the population, Kurds 33%, and Arabs 

22%. By 2005, based on election statistics, Turkomans represented only 13% of 

the city’s population, Arabs 27%, and Kurds 53%. These figures do not total 100% 

since minority groups, such as the Assyrians, were not included in the analysis. 

See Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, 236-237. 

23. Kurdistan Regional Government, “Unified Cabinet’s Program: A Bright 

Future for All,” 7 May 2006, 1-2, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12

&smap=&rnr=95&anr=10934 (accessed 27 February 2010).

24. Kurdistan Regional Government, “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement,” 21 January 2006, 1, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp

?rnr=223&lngnr=12&anr=8891&smap=02010100 (accessed 27 February 2010).

 25. International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle 

Over Kirkuk,” 18 July 2006, 3.

 26. International Crisis Group, 3.

 27. International Crisis Group, 5.

 28. International Crisis Group, 5.

 29. International Crisis Group, 5.

 30. Anderson and Stansfield, 69.

 31. International Crisis Group, 5.

 32. International Crisis Group, 6. 

 33. International Crisis Group, 6. 

 34. Yahya Barzanji, “Kidnapping of Christian Assyrians in Kirkuk Continues,” Christians of Iraq, 4 October 2009, 1, http://christiansofiraq.com/kidnapping-ofassyrians-in%20Kirkukcontinues.html (accessed 1 March 2010). Approximately 10,000 Christians lived in Kirkuk in 2009.

 35. International Crisis Group, 6. 

 36. Lionel Beehner and Greg Bruno, “Why Iraqis Can’t Agree on an Oil 

Law,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 22 February 2008, 3, http://

www.cfr.org/publication/13298/why_iraqis_cannot_agree_on_an_oil_law.html 

(accessed 1 March 2010). 

37. The Arab-dominated Iraqi central government controls the cash flow to 

Kirkuk, which is seen by Kurds as problematic.
21

Chapter 3. Quelling Chaos, 2003-2005

Phase II of 1003V, US Central Command commander General Tommy Franks’ plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, called for the insertion of Special Operations Forces into Iraq about two weeks ahead of the 

main effort to destroy key targets and set conditions for the primary air 

and ground campaigns. In northern Iraq, this meant that teams of Special 

Operations Forces would support the Kurdish Peshmerga militia, protect 

the local oilfields, and assist Other Governmental Agencies (OGA) paramilitary teams in supporting anti-Saddam opposition groups.1

Realizing that it had few intelligence sources inside Iraq, the OGA 

presented a covert action plan outlining proposed Iraq regime change 

operations to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in February 2002. 

Shortly thereafter, President George W. Bush signed an Intelligence Order 

directing the agency to support US military efforts to overthrow Saddam 

and further authorized the OGA to disrupt the Baathist regime’s governmental operations by supporting opposition groups, sabotaging Iraqi facilities and financial systems, and misleading the regime with disinformation 

and deception.2

On 20 February 2002, just four days after the president signed the 

Intelligence Order, an OGA survey team infiltrated Iraq’s northern Kurdish region and began preparations for the arrival of paramilitary teams. 

US officials briefed PUK Secretary General, Jalal Talibani and Kurdistan 

Democratic Party President, Massoud Barzani, in March to reassure the 

two Kurd leaders that US financial assistance, the OGA, and the military 

were on the way. Finally, during the second week of July, two four-man 

paramilitary teams, called Northern Iraq Liaison Elements, crossed the 

Turkish border into Iraq. One team established a base camp close to the 

border, while the other moved further south to Sulaymaniyah Province, an 

area controlled by the PUK and just east of the Iraqi military stronghold of 

Kirkuk. The teams’ collective mission was to establish covert action bases 

from which to overthrow Saddam, penetrate the regime’s military, intelligence, and security of operations, and train and arm Kurdish militias to 

fight northern Iraqi forces. Their goal was to prevent eleven regular Iraqi 

army divisions and two Republican Guard divisions from moving south 

toward Baghdad as Coalition forces approached from Kuwait.3

Both teams of the Northern Iraq Liaison Elements were pulled out 

of Iraq abruptly at the end of August, due primarily to objections from 

the Republic of Turkey. By October, however, the Turkish government 

once again granted transit rights to the CIA teams. This time the teams 
22

were more robust, with Special Forces Soldiers from the 10th Special 

Forces Group attached to provide training for the PUK militia. In January 2003, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers 

acknowledged that Special Operations Forces personnel were already in 

Iraq. When asked at a press conference if there were US military forces on 

the ground in the Kurdish part of northern Iraq, General Myers responded, 

“I don’t think we want to get into where our forces are right now, but 

there are not significant military forces in northern Iraq.”4

 The next day an 

unidentified Pentagon press official elaborated further, “US military personnel are working with agency teams conducting liaison missions with 

Kurds in northern Iraq. A small number of US Special Forces liaison officers joined the CIA teams that have been meeting with Kurdish leaders in 

the autonomous Kurdish zone,” the briefing officer explained.5

On 15 March 2003, Kurdish forces destroyed a segment of the railroad 

line between Mosul and Baghdad, blew up numerous Iraqi government 

vehicles, and attacked both the Baath Party and Iraqi Intelligence Service 

headquarters. Twenty thousand protestors turned out in Kirkuk to march 

on Baathist offices in that city. In addition, the expanded operations of the 

Northern Iraq Liaison Elements in northern Iraq resulted in the recruitment of 90 informants, one of whom provided the critical location of Saddam Hussein’s Dora Farm complex southeast of Baghdad. Shortly after 

President Bush issued the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM execution order 

on 19 March, 31 additional Special Operations Forces teams infiltrated 

western and northern Iraq. The US-led Coalition ground offensive began 

the next day, followed by the “shock and awe” air campaign on 21 March.6 

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (CJSOTF-N)

In support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Colonel Charles Cleveland and several members of the 10th Special Forces Group’s planning 

element deployed to Europe in November 2002. In January 2003, the 

Combined Special Operations-North staging area switched from Diyarbakir, Turkey to Constanta, Romania due to the Turkish government’s 

refusal to allow the US military to base troops there or use Turkish air 

space. By early February, two battalions of the 10th Special Forces Group 

(Task Force Viking) arrived in Constanta and awaited further deployment 

to northern Iraq. Only one Special Forces company was able to infiltrate 

Iraq and make contact with the Kurds. The remainder of the 10th Special Forces Group (which was prevented from transiting through Turkey) 

flew from Constanta via a dangerous and circuitous route to Bashur and 

Sulaymaniyah airfields in northern Iraq. The 352d Special Operations 
23

Wing flew the aircraft and the troop movement was nicknamed Operation 

UGLY BABY. The two 10th Special Forces Group battalions along with 

one company from the 3d Special Forces Group—19 twelve-man teams 

(Operational Detachment A) and four eleven-man command and control 

teams (Operational Detachment B)—then moved to the “Green Line” (the 

1949 armistice line) and joined the Kurdish Peshmerga militia.7

By the last week of March 2003, Colonel Cleveland had repositioned 

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North to Arbil about 60 

miles north of Kirkuk. Task Force Viking, which at this point had grown 

to 51 Operational Detachment A teams, undertook three distinct missions:

● Support the 60,000-strong Peshmerga militia in preventing 

Iraqi government forces from moving south toward Baghdad.

● Eliminate the local Ansar al-Islam extremist group that threatens Kurds in the region.

● Protect the Kirkuk oilfields.

Charlie Company, 3d Special Forces Group, along with 6,500 PUK 

fighters, initiated Operation VIKING HAMMER on 28 March to drive 

approximately 700 fighters from the terrorist group Ansar from the Halabja salient, which ran eastward into Iran from Halabja, the city Saddam 

attacked with chemical weapons in 1988. After two days of heavy fighting 

that included numerous special operations forces-directed US air strikes, 

the remaining Ansar fighters scattered across the Iranian border.8

Throughout early April 2003, special operations forces Soldiers and 

their Peshmerga allies moved southward toward Mosul and Kirkuk, clearing Iraqi forces from several villages along the way. Although Task Force 

Viking engaged in intense fighting at Ayn Sifni, on the main road north of 

Mosul, and at Debecka Pass 30 miles north of Kirkuk, the special operations forces leadership also had to muster significant persuasive powers to 

restrain the over-zealous Kurdish militia forces from closing too quickly 

on Kirkuk.9

 By 9 April Peshmerga fighters, accompanied by Task Force 

Viking Special Forces Soldiers, liberated Kirkuk after fierce fighting along 

the Koni Domlan ridge to the north, the Jabal Bur ridge on the east, and in 

the village of Tuz, 20 miles south of the city.10 

Although Phase IV of the 1003V Central Command plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM clearly identified the likelihood that US Forces 

would become involved in stability and support operations, tactical commanders and staffs remained focused on the warfighting task. In the prelude to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, few Soldiers were tactically trained 

adequately in either the governance or rule of law operations. Many mili-
24

tary commanders believed that, after removing the Saddam regime from 

power, civilian teams from other US Government agencies would assume 

responsibility for the long-term management of postwar Iraq. In this regard, Central Command commander, General Tommy Franks, told civilian 

officials prior to the invasion, “you pay attention to the day after and I’ll 

pay attention to the day of.”11 As a result, the 10th Special Forces Group 

Soldiers improvised and then successfully implemented ad hoc governance plans for Kirkuk soon after their arrival in the city. 

Almost immediately, Kirkuk residents of all ethnic groups looked to 

the American Soldiers to restore and maintain law and order in the city. As 

a result, Task Force Viking transitioned smoothly from combat to stability 

and support operations, established a Civil Military Operations Center in 

the center of the city, and made every effort to discourage Kurd-on-Arab 

ethnic violence. According to the Forward Operating Base 103 Operations 

Summary, commander Colonel Kenneth Tovo became Kirkuk’s acting 

mayor. In the short term, the city functioned peacefully as Tovo initiated a 

series of public meetings to address the competing interests of the various 

ethnic groups vying for power in Kirkuk.12 By the time the 173d Airborne 

Brigade relieved the troops at Forward Operating Base 103 in mid-April, 

Kirkuk was, according to a US Army Special Forces history, the “most 

stable city in all of Iraq.”13 

The 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Kirkuk 

The 173d Airborne BCT assisted the 10th Special Forces Group in liberating Kirkuk. As part of Operation NORTHERN DELAY, on 26 March 

2003 nearly 1,000 Soldiers from the 173d Airborne Brigade parachuted 

into the Bashur Drop Zone located northeast of Arbil between the villages of Salah ad Din and Rawandoz. The paratroopers then moved south, 

as a component force of Operation OPTION NORTH, to support the 

10th Special Forces Group Soldiers and the Peshmerga militia in seizing 

Kirkuk and securing the northern Iraqi oilfields.14 Although some looting 

and violence occurred as the Pesh took control of Kirkuk, Kurdish leaders, pressured by the US military presence, successfully prevented widespread mistreatment of Turkmen and Arabs by their militia, the majority 

of which had withdrawn from the city by 13 April. Kurds stepped in to 

fill the vacancies left by Baathist city administrators, who had fled south 

in fear of possible Kurdish reprisals. Turkmen and those Arabs remaining 

in the city attempted to block Kurd control of Kirkuk. Resolving disputes 

among these competing ethnic rivals, while simultaneously attempting to 

rebuild the city’s infrastructure, economy, and political processes, became 
25

the central mission for the 173d Airborne Brigade Soldiers in Kirkuk during the spring of 2003.15

The experience of one young officer illustrates the earliest experience 

of the173d BCT in Kirkuk. The cheering crowds of Kurds waved enthusiastically as Captain Eric Baus, A Company commander, 2d Battalion, 

503d Infantry Regiment (2-503 IN), and 40 Soldiers drove through Kirkuk 

on their way to a compound that had previously been the Baathist center 

of municipal government. Although Baus’ orders were to clear and occupy 

the compound, he backed off when he saw the large crowd assembled 

there for an appearance by PUK leader, Jalal Talabani. “I think right now, 

discretion is the order of the day,” he said, observantly noting that armed 

Kurdish militia in attendance outnumbered him and his Soldiers three-toone.16 After Talabani’s speech, Baus and his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, successfully negotiated with Faridon 

Abdulkadir, PUK interior minister, for not only control of the compound, 

but for declaring Kirkuk a weapons-free zone and the establishment of 

checkpoints manned by PUK traffic police throughout the city. Captain 

Baus saw his unit’s role as staying neutral and being an independent force 

looking out for all the citizens of Kirkuk. “This is just a power struggle, 

and we can’t get in the middle of it,” he explained.17

 “Do you know you are in charge of a million people?” Colonel William Mayville’s interpreter asked privately after a meeting with Kirkuk’s 

community leaders.18 Mayville was commander of the 173d Airborne Brigade and was responsible for Kirkuk as well as dozens of villages, hamlets, and the oilfields surrounding the city that comprised his area of operations. Having been so busy first with combat, then peacekeeping, Mayville 

had not given much thought to the total population in the region. Although 

the brigade’s tactical operations center was at the Kirkuk airport north of 

the city, Colonel Mayville took an office at the former Baathist compound 

secured by Captain Baus. Mayville characterized the ethnic makeup of 

Kirkuk as a Rubik’s cube in expressing his opinion that “everything is a 

power game...[everyone] is fighting for position...we are still feeling each 

other out.”19

In early May 2003, during a meeting with leaders of the Kurdish Salhi 

tribe, the tribal elder, Sheik Quedar, thanked Mayville for liberating Kirkuk 

from the oppressive Saddam regime. The sheik described how regime enforcers had brutally cut out the tongues of the eloquent and effective Salhi 

spokespersons. Mayville diplomatically responded that he and his troops 

were honored to have been of assistance in securing freedom for all Iraqi 
26

citizens, and he told Quedar “that all the tongues are returned today, and 

to let wise men speak and their children sing.”20 Mayville negotiated a 

compromise with the tribe, allowing them to reclaim abandoned properties and urging them to be patient while awaiting official resolution of all 

pending land resettlement claims. Additionally, Colonel Mayville and his 

translator began broadcasting a live radio call-in show aimed at addressing 

and resolving ethnic tensions in Kirkuk. On his way to yet another official 

meeting, a bystander questioned Mayville if he was going to meet with the 

mayor. “I am the mayor,” he replied jokingly, later adding, “I’m making 

this up as I go along.”21

Soldiers from the 173d Airborne Brigade soon realized, however, 

that there was not overwhelming support for a western-style democracy 

among the citizens of Kirkuk. Each ethnic group seemed more interested 

in improving their own respective political and economic status in the 

city. Kurds and Turkmen wanted the Americans to help reverse the effects 

of the former regime’s Arabization policies and to remove all Baathists 

from power in Kirkuk. Kurds, in particular, were intent on reclaiming their 

homes, land, and other property rights. On 17 and 18 May 2003, Arabs 

and Kurds clashed in intense street fighting, because Arabs perceived that 

Kurds were moving back and resettling too quickly. “It’s tribal fights,” said 

Sergeant Christopher Choay of the 2-503 IN. “It’s hard for us to tell who 

is who...we can’t take anyone’s side...we’re like a messenger caught in the 

middle,” Choay continued.22 Although the 2-503 IN Soldiers increased patrols, carefully assessed the situation, and occasionally interceded to prevent further ethnic violence, it became clear to them that the volatile Kurd 

versus Arab undercurrent in Kirkuk was an issue that required constant 

attention in order to achieve security and stability in the city. 

Early on, Colonel Mayville and the 173d Airborne Brigade staff began 

to develop valuable insights into the social dynamics prevalent in Kirkuk. 

For example, Mayville realized that the predominant attitude among Kurds 

was since they had helped the US forces liberate Kirkuk, the Americans 

had a quid pro quo obligation to help them get their land back from the 

10,000 squatting Arabs.23 Patrick Clawson of the Middle East Quarterly, 

independently verified this Kurdish sentiment by writing:

Every Kurdish official we met told us these people must be encouraged to leave. Some hinted that the encouragement would be 

vigorous; others thought it would be sufficient to compensate Arabs, thereby allowing original Kurdish homeowners to return.24

Colonel Mayville undertook the long, tedious, process of attempting to 

change the minds of the Kurdish people and rebuilding a Kirkuk city 
27

government that represented all communities, all ethnicities, and all the 

people. To accomplish this, he took the practical step of invoking and enforcing the rule of law and guaranteeing that the rights inherent therein extended to all ethnic groups. “You establish the rule of law first,” Mayville 

said. “Once we’ve established this rule of law, then we can go back and 

revisit and redress issues and problems of the past. But you can’t do that 

and have a forward-looking strategy if you don’t first establish that we are 

a community that is based on the rule of law,” he further explained.25

Although the Arab, Kurd, and Turkmen leaders in Kirkuk generally 

understood the concept of extending the rule of legal rights to everyone, 

average citizens preferred to follow tribal customs and had no understanding and no tradition of democracy whatsoever. The burden, according to 

Colonel Mayville, fell on Kirkuk’s leaders to begin the slow process of 

educating the population in the fundamentals of democratic governance. 

Meanwhile, Special Operations Soldiers from the 96th and 404th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalions began managing the Civil Military Operations 

Center in Kirkuk city during the second week of April 2003. The center 

gave Kirkuk’s citizens a common place where they could all meet and discuss their respective issues with US military representatives. CA Soldiers 

restored water and electricity to Kirkuk, and a public health team supervised the distribution of perishable food throughout the city. 

Civil Affairs Soldiers were trained to support existing indigenous governments. In the case of Kirkuk, however, they had to start from scratch 

when the Soldiers discovered that Kirkuk had no city government. They 

helped Kirkuk’s population install an emergency council comprised of 

Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Assyrians. This group oversaw city functions 

until official interim City Council elections—organized by CA Soldiers—

occurred on 26 May 2003. From among 300 delegates, six members from 

each of the four principal ethnic groups were elected to the 30 member 

council, along with six independents (five of the six were Kurds).26 

“This is not full democracy...but it’s a first step,” stated US 4th Infantry Division commander, Major General Raymond Odierno, addressing 

assembled delegates prior to the election.27 Two days after the council election, the new members elected Kurdish attorney, Abdul Rahman Mustafa, 

mayor of Kirkuk. “I cannot describe how I am glad...after so many years 

of dictatorship, we’ve chosen our own leader.” said Kemal Kerkuki, local 

KDP leader and new council member.28 Resigned to the outcome of the 

election, but trying to make the best of a disappointing situation, newlyelected Arab city council member, Akar Nezal Altawil, said pragmatically, 

“We don’t have a choice...we must be happy...Kirkuk is not controlled by 
28

Kurds but by Kirkuk residents.”29 Altawil’s enlightened view would prove 

beneficial in keeping ethnic violence in Kirkuk to a minimum in the weeks 

and months ahead. 

Mayville’s political participation with Kirkuk’s leaders increased during the summer of 2003, particularly after significant numbers of the 173d 

Airborne Brigade troops were withdrawn from Kirkuk and consolidated 

on small operating bases outside the city. Kirkuk police officers and Iraqi 

Soldiers that became part of the newly created Iraqi Civil Defense Corps 

assumed greater responsibility for security in the city. At the same time, 

the political environment was changing, as new city leaders, new political 

parties, and new special interest groups emerged, demanding inclusion in 

the political process. Mayville likened the landscape to a Venn diagram in 

which competing, overlapping groups added enormous complexity to the 

task of governing Kirkuk—a city that had been purposefully suppressed 

and neglected for 30 years by the Saddam regime.30 

The paratroopers of the 173d Airborne Brigade assumed the lion’s 

share of responsibility for Kirkuk governance operations in 2003. To be 

sure, there were other entities in Kirkuk working to establish a new system 

of government. The brigade’s Soldiers partnered with contractors from the 

Research Training Institute (RTI), who had been hired by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to create a new blueprint for 

Kirkuk governmental structure. The US State Department and the United 

Nations had also established a presence in the city, but their numbers were 

insufficient to affect the situation in a meaningful way. When asked if the 

US military had been handed too much, Colonel Mayville responded: 

Today, you cannot simply focus on traditional military operations 

to the exclusion of civil affairs, of social and political issues, of 

the mandate for economic development, or whatever this city 

needs...the challenge is to find the right balance and to make sure 

we got it right.31

Mayville stressed the adaptive nature of his force and noted with pride 

how his Brigade had transformed as an organization to meet the challenges 

of what was actually a very traditional military mission—that of establishing stability and security in Kirkuk. 

In an interesting twist on the old counterinsurgency axiom—if you 

are not winning you are losing—Colonel Mayville observed, referring to 

Kirkuk, “that which is not success is failure.”32 Defining success or failure in Kirkuk, however, was ultimately an issue for Iraqis to ponder. The 

173d Airborne Brigade was in Kirkuk not to govern, but to facilitate the 
29

governmental processes in which the city’s citizens engaged. “Each one of 

my [Soldiers] is matched up with a local government official,” said Major 

Brian Maddox, a tank officer who led what the brigade called Task Force 

Civil. “Our motto around here is to put an Iraqi between us and the problem,” Maddox explained.33 By late 2003, ethnic tensions, churning just 

below the surface in Kirkuk, threatened again to erupt into violence. “We 

have to break even,” Mayville declared. “What I have to do every day is 

find the break-even point and get to it...and right now, break-even is just 

keeping [civil unrest in Kirkuk] below the surface,” he said, assessing the 

situation in December 2003.34

Creation of the First Interagency Governance Teams

The Coalition Provisional Authority representative in Kirkuk, Ms. 

Emma Sky, became a close political advisor to Colonel Mayville. The 

173d Airborne Brigade gave Sky the resources and authority to initiate a 

new concept called “Team Government” which served as an early model 

for the governance sections of provincial reconstruction teams that eventually proliferated throughout Iraq. Experts in various disciplines from the 

civilian agencies in Kirkuk became partners with brigade military personnel to address specific problems or issues in the city. For example, Army 

lawyer, Major Laura Klein, became part of the Team Government property 

claims and resettlement section; an infantry captain became liaison officer 

to the Kirkuk police; and civil affairs officers with civilian public administration experience began advising Kirkuk’s new city council and assisting 

the council in gaining access to US resources. Since there were insufficient 

numbers of both military civil affairs personnel and civilian subject matter 

experts in Kirkuk, “you just had to create these ad hoc liaison organizations [to get the job done],” Major Klein explained in a 2006 interview.

35

Since neither the governing organizations nor laws yet existed in postSaddam Iraq to decide property claims, Major Klein established her own 

claims and resettlement office in a local government building and attempted to negotiate temporary resolutions to the hundreds of contentious property disputes between primarily Kurds and Arabs. “We heard complaints 

and claims all day long,” Klein said. “We gave them three options—decide 

among themselves, split the land 50/50, or prohibit use of the property 

completely,” she explained.36 Despite Klein’s efforts, many Kurds forcibly 

removed Arabs from their property, while many Arabs actually agreed to 

leave, but only if the Americans gave them some place to go. Due to her 

property dispute resolution experience in Kirkuk, Major Klein helped officials in Baghdad draft legislation that eventually created the Iraq Property 

Claims Commission. Klein complimented her fellow brigade Soldiers for 
30

their initiative in stepping up and performing the nation-building mission 

in Kirkuk. “We were the enablers with the bodies on the ground...it was 

just people saying, ‘hey, the next step is we need to stand up the government, so let’s have an election,’” Klein said in describing the brigade’s 

positive outlook toward improving the lot of Kirkuk’s citizens.37

The 173d Airborne Brigade assumed authority for Kirkuk from Joint 

Special Operations Task Force-North in mid-April 2003 and retained overall responsibility for the city until February 2004. Task Force 1-63 Armor, 

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Riddle, airlifted into Bashur 

airfield in April 2003 and conducted operations in Kirkuk city and the surrounding region until November 2003. In addition, the 2d Battalion, 503d 

Infantry Regiment (2-503 IN) (Task Force Rock), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, had parachuted into the Bashur drop zone 

in late March 2003, moved into Kirkuk in April, and remained in the city 

until February 2004. Finally, the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment 

(1-508 IN), Task Force Red Devil, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

Harry Tunnell, airdropped into Bashur drop zone on 26 March 2003. The 

1-508 IN conducted combat operations initially in Irbil, then, moved south 

into Kirkuk on 11 April. In July, Task Force Red Devil deployed to the area 

of operations West and established its tactical operations center at Hawija 

along the Kirkuk-Bayji highway. The 1-508 IN redeployed in September to Forward Operating Base Bernstein at Tuz in the area of operations 

South and remained there until relieved by the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry 

Regiment, in February 2004.38 To varying degrees, each unit was engaged 

in supporting the brigade’s governance line of operation in Kirkuk province for the duration of the 173d Airborne Brigade rotation.

The 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in Kirkuk 

In early February 2004, US forces across Iraq began the first of what 

would become regular troop rotations. After a year in Iraq, units would 

depart by turning over their areas of operation to other US forces that had 

recently arrived. As the 173d Brigade was preparing to depart in February 

2004, they were transitioning the authority for Kirkuk to a new unit, the 

2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, which was a light infantry force that 

had established its headquarters at Kirkuk airbase. The 2d Brigade, commanded by Colonel Lloyd Miles, was comprised of the 1st Battalion, 14th 

Infantry (1-14 IN); 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (1-21 IN); 1st Battalion, 

27th Infantry (1-27 IN); 2d Battalion, 11th Field Artillery (2-11 FA); and 

Task Force 225th Forward Support Battalion. Task Force 1-21 assumed 

the mission of conducting full-spectrum—offensive, defensive, and stability—operations in Kirkuk in order to bring peace and security to the city. 
31

In addition to providing indirect fire support for brigade combat operations, Task Force 2-11 Soldiers also performed traditional infantry missions throughout Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk provinces.39 The 2d Brigade 

initially reported to the 4th Infantry Division then subsequently reported 

to the 1st Infantry Division after the 4th Infantry Division redeployed in 

March 2004. 

Task Force 1-21 quickly assumed responsibility for reconstruction activities, superintended hundreds of schools, issued small business loans, 

and recruited and trained Iraqi police in Kirkuk. By early February, there 

were six police stations, 2,200 regular police officers, and 1,200 traffic 

officers. Soldiers from Company C, 1-21, found that the new Al-Magdad 

police station in the largely Arab southwest sector of the city, was once the 

vacation home of Ali Hassan al-Majid—Saddam Hussein’s cousin, known 

as “Chemical Ali.” 

C Company operated out of Kirkuk Air Base and, in addition to performing daily reconstruction activities, conducted raids and searches as 

the battalion’s quick reaction force. House searches for weapons or insurgents had become, at this point, the more friendly “knock, ask, invited 

in” variety as opposed to the “kick in the door” approach. First Lieutenant 

Walt Cartin encouraged his men to continue the searches, despite their 

occasional reluctance. “I know it’s weird to invade somebody’s private 

space,” Cartin explained. “But some of these people are killing American 

forces.”40 Differentiating friend from foe in southwest Kirkuk remained a 

difficult, time-consuming problem for the American Soldiers. By addressing and resolving the problem, however, Task Force 1-21 Soldiers helped 

set conditions for improved governance in their area of operations. 

“I think we are going to be very busy over the next year,” C Company commander, Captain Bill Venable, said in describing the situational 

environment in Kirkuk. “We have a large, complicated mission where responsibility for success, whether conducting a raid or coordinating [police 

activities], is taken on by junior officers and noncommissioned officers.”41

Since US Forces in Iraq were drawing down from 130,000 to 110,000 

Soldiers, those remaining had to assume increasingly greater responsibilities. In Kirkuk for example, lieutenants with approximately 30 Soldiers, 

took charge of entire subsections of the city. “If we didn’t empower these 

junior leaders to get it done, it wouldn’t work,” Colonel Miles explained 

in acknowledging the performance of his young Soldiers.42 

A and B Companies of Task Force 1-21 also assumed similar mission responsibilities to those of C Company. Both worked from combat 

outposts, which were protected by sandbags and razor wire in central and 
32

eastern Kirkuk. When Task Force 1-21 arrived nearly 5,000 formerly Arabized Kurds, who had returned to Kirkuk, were living in the soccer stadium while awaiting resolution of housing disputes. However, the mood 

of the population was positive as most Kirkuk citizens appreciated the 

American presence. “Conditions are improving in the city,” explained 

Dashity Taleb, a former Peshmerga militia member, now a Kirkuk police 

officer. Taleb was, “very happy because the US Army...helped the Iraqi 

people fight the Saddam regime.” “The country is good now and day by 

day the conditions will be better,” Taleb told C Company Soldiers at the 

Al-Magdad police station.43

With assistance from US Forces, the people of Kirkuk province completed more than 700 individual projects—public works, public safety, and 

schools—since the fall of Saddam’s regime a year earlier. The positive 

trickle-down effect of these projects boosted the local economy. For example, work that restored electrical power to the region resulted in increased 

output at the Kirkuk oil refinery. More gasoline in the local market forced 

prices down, thereby increasing overall transportation with more buses 

and taxis serving the community, and more produce trucks bringing goods 

into the city from nearby farms. 

The 2d Brigade reconstruction projects planned for the remainder of 

2004 consisted of paving roadways, renovating existing plumbing, creating fresh water storage facilities, and a new auditorium for the Kirkuk 

Police Academy. “Cooperation that developed during operations to secure 

Kirkuk carries on in governing...this is only the beginning,” Major General Raymond Odierno, commander, 4th Infantry Division, told Soldiers 

at Kirkuk Air Base. “Millions of dollars will be spent here in Kirkuk and 

surrounding cities in the next 12 months,” Odierno explained.44 Unemployment remained a constant problem, particularly in the Arab section 

of Kirkuk, and not everyone was pleased with the seemingly substantial 

improvements completed thus far. “They (Americans) promised us a lot of 

things, but they don’t do it. They are too slow. We need many things. They 

did a lot of things, but not completed...the US controls our country,” Arab 

Mullah Shamal Jalal Azeez from the Kerdar Mosque in central Kirkuk told 

Captain Venable at a mid-February meeting with religious leaders.45 Mullah Azeez was looking forward with anticipation to the planned transfer of 

power from the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim 

Government scheduled for June 2004. 

On 23 February 2004, a suicide car bomber attacked the Rahimawa 

Police Station in the northeast section of Kirkuk, killing ten Iraqis and 

wounding 45 more. This was only one of many recent attacks across 
33

the country aimed at Iraqi security forces, Iraqi police, members of the 

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and politicians—anyone cooperating or collaborating with Coalition forces. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, deputy 

director of operations for Combined Joint Task Force 7, noted during a 

subsequent press conference, “We remain concerned at what is clearly a 

program of intimidation and targeting of not only the Iraqi police service, 

but all government officials.”46 Police officers in Kirkuk, however, were 

undeterred and remained dedicated to their mission after the Rahimawa 

bombing. “If you had a chance to talk with the ones [officers] who were 

injured...those individuals said they would not be scared off, that they do 

see it as their job to provide for the security of their people,” 2d Brigade 

commander, Colonel Lloyd Miles responded when questioned about the 

commitment of police in Kirkuk. “So I think if you can get that kind of 

attitude to spread among the ICDC [Iraqi Civil Defense Corps] and other 

police forces, then I think they’ll eventually work us out of a job,” Miles 

concluded.47 

Four battalions—about 4,000 soldiers—of Iraqi Civil Defense Corps 

security forces were part of the plan to support 2d Brigade in their area of 

operations. This was only a small portion of the 45 battalions of more than 

200,000 corps members anticipated for all of Iraq. While the Iraqi police 

operated within city limits, corps troops worked the countryside in Kirkuk 

province, performing traffic checks and personnel searches. Captain Victor Olshansky, Task Force 1-27, was one of the 2d Brigade’s liaison officers to the corps and was responsible for improving corps capabilities 

in the area of operations. Ten drill sergeants from the Infantry School at 

Fort Benning deployed to Kirkuk to work with Olshansky and others in 

training corps soldiers in the brigade’s area. Captain Olshansky explained:

We’ve started to work [Iraqi Civil Defense Corps] supply issues 

very deliberately. Right now...everything they use, from vehicles, 

office supplies, weapons and ammo, to food and bedding all comes 

from us. Long-term, we want...to get to the point where they can 

do it on their own without US Forces.48

The situational environment in and around Kirkuk continued to improve throughout 2004. For example, several high-ranking former Baath 

party members, including three generals from Saddam’s army, met with 

Task Force 1-27 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Leith, to negotiate a peace settlement in the Arab-dominated region west of Kirkuk.49 To 

the east, Task Force 2-11 worked with the newly established Iraqi Border 

Patrol to improve security along the border with Iran.50 Within the city 

of Kirkuk, Kurdish citizens were particularly pleased with improvements 
34

made by Task Force 1-21. By mid-2004, Kirkuk’s local population was 

publishing more than 100 newspapers and magazines that circulated, freeof-charge, throughout the city. Teacher salaries increased dramatically 

under Kirkuk’s new city government. “I can tell you that among the society now, you see democratic conduct spreading across the minds of the 

people...everyone can express their ideas and they are going to learn,” said 

Yassin Osman Aziz, an interpreter for Task Force 1-21. “Now I see day 

after day, it will be better,” the former Kirkuk teacher predicted.51

 After the Interim Government of Iraq assumed sovereignty over the 

country in June 2004, the United States, Coalition, and Iraqi Security 

Forces, along with insurgents, terrorists, and other anti-Iraqi forces all began concentrating on the upcoming January 2005 Iraqi legislative elections. The Interim Government scheduled three separate elections to be 

conducted simultaneously on 30 January 2005:

● The national Iraqi parliamentary election which chooses representatives for the transitional 275-member Transitional National 

Assembly.

● Governorate Council elections.

● The Iraqi Kurdistan legislative election in which 111 members 

are chosen for the Kurdistan Regional parliament. 

In a move designed to ensure the best possible security for Iraqis in and 

around Kirkuk leading up to and during the legislative elections, MultiNational Force-Iraq, the new senior Coalition command in Iraq, extended 

the 2d Brigade’s deployment until February 2005.52 As the number of insurgent attacks rose in December and early January, the Team’s Soldiers, 

often accompanied by Special Forces, increased the number of patrols and 

raids conducted in Kirkuk. 

In order to secure approximately 110 polling stations in Kirkuk, Task 

Force 1-21 planned and implemented Operation GIMLET HURIA in late 

December 2004.53 The 2d Brigade augmented the 1-21 Infantry with additional mechanized and engineering capabilities, and two Iraqi Army companies.54 Additionally, many others participated including Kirkuk police 

officers from all seven stations, police academy students, traffic police, 

a SWAT team, and members of the Emergency Services Unit. With more 

than 2,000 US and Iraqi Security Force soldiers involved, the operation 

locally promoted a joint nation-building stability and support effort with 

heavy emphasis on the role played by Iraqi security and Kirkuk government personnel. The Task Force commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark 
35

Dewhurst, made certain that everyone participating clearly understood 

the operation’s objective—to secure the polling and registration sites in 

Kirkuk from insurgent attacks throughout the election period and to ensure 

that Kirkuk citizens felt safe enough to participate in the election. Dewhurst’s message regarding the objective of Operation GIMLET HURIA 

was published in local newspapers and broadcast repeatedly over Kirkuk 

radio and televisions to further ensure that all residents of the city knew 

the plan. 

On 27 January 2005, Task Force 1-21 stopped all traffic in Kirkuk to 

prevent the possibility of car or truck bombings. On the eve of the election, the same Soldiers conducted a series of intelligence-driven raids on 

suspected insurgent safe houses. On election day, Kirkuk’s main police 

station served as a Joint Operations Center from which the various component leaders – Lieutenant Colonel Dewhurst, the Iraqi Army battalion 

commander, the police chief, and several civilian election officials – oversaw election operations. US forces, meanwhile, remained out of sight, 

but ready to react immediately to any threat of insurgent violence. Kirkuk 

police and Iraqi Security Force soldiers secured each polling station and 

searched voters for suicide bombing materials and other weapons. Although four voters were wounded in an enemy sniper attack at one of the 

polling sites, that was the only incident of violence during the election 

in Kirkuk. Task Force 1-21 Quick Reaction Force commander, Captain 

Jeremiah Cordovano, believed that the successful election was a key step 

toward Kirkuk’s stability:

The Iraqi people in Kirkuk took their first step toward democracy, 

and the local government and ISF’s[Iraqi Security Forces] confidence and citizen’s trust in them were significantly strengthened 

due to this [GIMLET HURIA] operation.55

In anticipation of the 2005 Iraqi elections, Kurds formed the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, an unprecedented coalition formed 

between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the PUK. The Alliance won 

90 percent of the 2005 Iraqi Kurdistan legislative election votes. After 

the Kurdish National Assembly—the Parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan—was 

officially seated in June 2005, members elected KDP leader Massoud Barzani, President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Nationally, the party won 

75 seats in the new Iraqi Council of Representatives, enough to elect the 

PUK’s Jalal Talabani President of Iraq. In the Iraqi governorate council 

elections, another Kurdish coalition, the Kirkuk Brotherhood List, won 26 

of 41 seats in Kirkuk province and re-elected Abdul Rahman Mustafa as 
36

governor. “All the major ethnicities of Iraq are located in this province,” 

Colonel Miles said. “It’s often said that if we get it right in Kirkuk, we can 

get it right in the rest of the country.”56

Politically, the election for Kirkuk’s population was all about their 

city, situated just outside of the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Many Kurds saw 

their overwhelming victory for seats on the Kurdish National Assembly as 

an opportunity to shift the Iraqi Kurdistan boundary legally in order to annex Kirkuk (the city). Kurds viewed the majority victory by Kurds in the 

Kirkuk governorate council election as an opportunity for the city to become part of Iraqi Kurdistan. “I am willing to die for Kirkuk,” said Hoger 

Sabah Salih, a Kurdish student living in Arbil capital of Iraqi Kurdistan.57

Kirkuk Arabs, however, preferred that Kirkuk remain in northern Iraq. The 

Sunni Arab political party, Iraqi Republican Gathering, promoted the slogan “Kirkuk for all Iraqis,” during the election campaign, and party leader, 

Mohammad Khalil, proclaimed the city “is the only home his people have 

known.”58 

Arabs, however, were seriously outnumbered in the Kirkuk governorate council election voting. PUK official Ahmad Askari predicted, “Kurds 

would push hard to link Kirkuk to Kurdistan if they took control of the 

provincial council...a high turnout will show that Kirkuk is Kurdish.”59

The Iraqi Election Commission contributed to the lopsided Kurd victory 

by permitting more than 50,000 previously displaced, but recently returned, Kurdish refugees to vote in the January 2005 election. Sunni Arabs 

simply looked on in dismay at the likelihood of Kirkuk and all its riches 

“slipping out of Baghdad’s control.”60

Addressing Kirkuk’s future immediately after the election was impossible because the Iraqi interim constitution called for completing a census 

and conducting a referendum vote to ratify the proposed new constitution later in the year. The continuing influx of formerly Arabized Kurds to 

both the city and the province enhanced Kurdish prospects for a favorable 

outcome to the constitutional referendum. Political leaders and military 

commanders in Turkey, concerned about their own restive Kurdish population, worried about the security ramifications of the massive movement 

of Kurds along its border and the possibility of incorporating Kirkuk city 

within Iraqi Kurdistan, a federal entity recognized by the United Nations. 

The ongoing migration of Kurds to Kirkuk, “could threaten territorial and 

political unity...and possibly set off a chain reaction leading to the breakup 

of Iraq,” Turkish General Ilker Basbug told a press conference audience 

in Ankara.61 Despite the success of Iraq’s first free legislative elections in 

January 2005, arbitrating and keeping the peace between Kirkuk’s his-
37

torically volatile ethnic populations would remain a full-time task for US 

Soldiers within the city. 

On 17 February 2005, the 2d BCT transferred authority for the Kirkuk 

area of operations to the 116th Brigade Combat Team from the Idaho Army 

National Guard, which had deployed to Forward Operating Base Warrior 

in December 2004. Commanded by Brigadier General Alan Gayhart, the 

116th Cavalry (CAV) (Task Force Liberty) was comprised of additional 

Army National Guard units from Oregon, Montana, Utah, North Dakota, 

New Jersey, and Maryland. The 2d Battalion, 116th Cavalry, relieved the 

1-21 Infantry in Kirkuk city, while the 1st Battalion, 163d Infantry replaced the 1-27 Infantry at Hawija, and 3d Battalion, 116th BCT assumed 

responsibility from the 1-14 Infantry for the southern sector of the 116th 

BCT’s area of operations.62

Regional Embassy Office and PRT in Kirkuk 

In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority had established a 

Regional Headquarters in Kirkuk, which converted to a Regional Embassy 

Office in June 2004. At the same time, the Provisional Authority relinquished sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government and the United States 

opened its Baghdad Embassy in the Green Zone, a heavily fortified area 

in Baghdad. State Department staff, which included representatives from 

the United State Agency for International Development, the Department 

of Justice, and the Project and Contracting Office managed the Embassy 

office in Kirkuk, along with three others in Mosul, Hillah, and Basrah. The 

Agency for International Development was an independent federal government agency that promoted US foreign policy objectives by providing 

host nations with a variety of useful services addressing economic growth, 

agriculture, democracy and governance, healthcare, the environment, and 

humanitarian assistance.63 The Kirkuk Project and Contracting Office provided program and financial management assistance to Iraqis concerning 

electricity and water, communications and transportation, security and justice, education, and oil issues.64 

With Regional Embassy Office Kirkuk, the US Department of State 

had a diplomatic presence in the city that facilitated coordination with local Iraqi officials and was conducive to obtaining firsthand information regarding the local economic and political situation. Embassy staff worked 

closely with United States and Coalition Forces, initially the 2d Brigade, 

25th Infantry Division. After the winter of 2005, the 116th BCT was assigned there to further US strategic objectives—stability, territorial integrity, broad-based governance—and to convey the message that America 

was there to help improve the quality of life for all Iraqis.65 One prob-
38

lematic issue left unaddressed by embassy personnel was the inadequate 

experience levels of local Iraqi officials who had replaced Baathist appointees after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The decentralized authority 

introduced by the Coalition Provisional Authority left many local governments in the hands of untrained administrators who struggled with delivering essential services to the people. The requirement to improve substantially the administrative skill levels of local and regional Iraqi officials had 

also been identified in National Security Presidential Directive 36, which 

outlined the policy and framework for a new, combined, civilian-military 

organization to implement nation-building programs in Iraq.66

To address the problem, the Embassy in Baghdad assembled Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils to oversee Iraqi and US reconstruction projects. This effort was short-lived however, as newly arrived 

US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad argued for a more formidable provincial presence, one similar to that of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

already operational in Afghanistan.67 When Khalilzad visited Kirkuk, he 

found that the 116th BCT had already set-up a successful provincial-reconstruction-team-like organization that would serve as a model for future 

governance and reconstruction teams in Iraq. Brigadier General Alan Gayhart’s Soldiers had worked hand-in-hand with Regional Embassy Office 

Kirkuk staff members to train provincial Iraqi officials in the basics of 

good governance, such as conducting meetings, forming consensus, and 

following parliamentary procedures. Their civilian skills and qualifications enabled the Idaho Army National Guard’s men and women to work 

cooperatively with State Department officials and the ethnically diverse 

provincial council, which significantly improved governance—lawyers 

mentored Iraqi judges, engineers worked at water treatment plants and 

sewage disposal facilities, and police officers assisted Iraqis in setting up 

Joint Coordination Centers.68

The provincial reconstruction team initiative in Iraq was officially 

established by Joint (US Embassy Iraq and Multi-National Force-Iraq) 

Baghdad Cable 4045 in October 2005. The mission called for teams to:

 Assist Iraq’s provincial governments in developing a transparent 

and sustained capability to govern; to promote reconciliation, increased security, the rule of law, and political and economic development; to support the Coalition counterinsurgency strategy; to 

encourage political moderates, and; to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.69

Shortly thereafter, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice inaugurated 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Ninawa, the first in Iraq, at For-
39

ward Operating Base Courage outside the city of Mosul, during a surprise 

visit to that city on 11 November 2005.70

 Ambassador Khalilzad then dedicated Provincial Reconstruction 

Team Kirkuk on 27 November 2005. “I urge Iraqis to take advantage of 

this opportunity to be a part of rebuilding Iraq. The team can help build 

capacity and systems based on the rule of law and building effective security systems to deal with the problems of Iraq,” Khalilzad told those in 

attendance at the official ceremony. “The PRT can assist these programs 

and can help, but the ultimate success will come from the decisions Iraqis 

make for themselves,” the Ambassador added.71 Just the week before in 

Al-Hillah, Khalilzad had expressed a slightly different point of view concerning the team initiative;

We regard Iraq’s success as our own. We are partners in building 

this new Iraq. The provincial reconstruction teams use all of the 

tools, military and civilian, to get behind the ideas the Iraqis feel 

are most important to build their national institutions to offer a 

better hope for the Iraqi people’s economic future.72

The notion that governance in Iraq would ultimately be an Iraqi responsibility, not a US responsibility, became a recurring Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM theme throughout the country, which included the province 

of Kirkuk. 

Whereas Coalition military officers led PRTs in Afghanistan, State 

Department officials assumed the leadership roles for the teams in Iraq. 

Although Baghdad Cable 4045 stipulated that the US Embassy would support teams at State Department sites and that Multi-National Forces-Iraq 

support those at military locations, there was no detailed doctrine describing how the Iraqi teams would function. As pointed out by United States 

Institute of Peace in an assessment of the Iraqi team effort, there were no 

“agreed upon objectives, delineation of authority and responsibility between civilian and military personnel plans, or job descriptions.”73 In April 

2006, Multi-National Corps-Iraq determined that the team mission was a 

State Department responsibility, therefore Defense Department funding 

could no longer be used to support the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

program. 

The resulting interagency dispute was not resolved until the departments of State and Defense signed a memorandum of understanding in 

November 2006 clarifying security and infrastructure funding and operating cost issues.74 Secretary Rice reemphasized the State Department commitment to the Provincial Reconstruction Team initiative by declaring, 
40

“We’re very focused on the need to build capacity in the local and provincial governments and to be able to deliver economic and reconstruction 

assistance.”75 Rice would add later, “We are long term partners in these efforts [to improve the quality of life for Iraqis] and the teams, Embassy, and 

US Government are all committed to helping Iraqis achieve these goals.”76

The Embassy staff in Baghdad also stressed that the team program was in 

direct support of the political track described in President Bush’s National 

Strategy for Victory in Iraq, “to build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis, and facilitate 

integration into the international community.”77 Despite this strong commitment to the team program in Iraq, challenges persisted related to the 

lack of skilled personnel, the integration of civilian and military resources, 

the sometimes-unclear chain of command, physical security and mobility, 

and the coordination of reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts both 

within the Coalition and between the Coalition and the Iraqi government.78

With respect to the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kirkuk, the staff 

divided two ways; some members worked from the Regional Embassy Office in the Kirkuk government building downtown and others worked from 

Forward Operating Base Warrior at the airbase. As of September 2006, 

the combined Kirkuk contingent numbered 25 people: 9 civilians and 16 

military, approximately 70 percent of the 36 personnel authorized for the 

team.79 The Kirkuk team mission statement called for “improving the livelihoods of Iraqi citizens in Kirkuk by promoting reconciliation, shaping 

the political environment, supporting economic development and building 

the capacity of provincial government to hasten self-sufficiency.”80 Despite being shorthanded, Team Kirkuk initiated and sustained a significant 

number of governance, economic, and reconstruction activities. For example, team members met several times weekly with representatives of 

the Provincial Council and the governor’s office and established strong, 

one-on-one, working relationships with key Iraqi officials. Since a western style banking system did not exist in Kirkuk, the Iraq Al-Aman Micro 

Credit Center and the Kirkuk Business Center were both established and 

housed in the Kirkuk government building. Team personnel provided the 

required assistance to establish these basic banking facilities. In addition, 

the Kirkuk team oversaw the transactions of the Project Contracting Coordination Office by tracing and coordinating all of the funds distributed 

for province projects, including those financed with Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funding.81

Advancing the rule of law in Kirkuk was a strategic objective for the 

Provincial Reconstruction Team. To that end, the staff assisted Iraqis in 
41

opening new courthouses, which included major crime units and trained 

prison guards, further emphasizing protecting human rights in the correction’ system. Team members continued efforts to repair or replace the water system, sewage disposal system, and the electrical grid damaged by 

neglect during the Saddam regime. Kirkuk’s citizens and the team staff 

developed plans for new businesses; these included a tire production facility, a sunflower seed processing plant, a vocational technical school, the 

Kirkuk Center for Business and Professional Women, and for the rehabilitation of an existing cotton gin and a sewing factory. The provincial Director General of Agriculture, Kirkuk University, and the agricultural team 

conducted dozens of training workshops for local farmers. The workshops 

comprised classes which included modern farming techniques, animal 

husbandry, disease prevention, irrigation, and fruit and olive grove management.82 The entire Provincial Reconstruction Team staff consolidated 

operations at Forward Operating Base Warrior in early 2007, and the Regional Embassy Office Kirkuk closed shortly thereafter.83

The 116th Brigade Combat Team in Kirkuk 

Nearly all of the Soldiers from the 116th BCT had participated in the 

mission to assist Iraqi forces in providing security for the January 2005 

Transitional National Assembly elections. The BCT’s comprehensive mission included: rebuilding critical infrastructure, restoring essential services, assisting Iraq’s new government, supporting economic development, 

enhancing communications, and improving security and stability in and 

around Kirkuk. However, the Brigade’s primary focus for the remainder 

of 2005 was on the pending referendum vote to ratify Iraq’s constitution 

and the Iraqi parliamentary election scheduled for October and December, 

respectively. 

Keeping the peace in Kirkuk would not be so easy, however, for the 

116th Cavalry BCT Soldiers. Technically, there was no enemy army and 

no forward edge of the battle area. The fundamental fight was to gain 

the support of the Iraqi people. United States and Coalition forces fought 

elusive insurgents and terrorists to gain the trust and confidence of Iraqi 

residents. Although the Brigade’s stability and security mission in Kirkuk 

was simple in concept, it was also “devilishly tricky,” because of the ever-present ethnic tensions between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen vying for 

control of the city.84 The situation confronting the 116th BCT Soldiers in 

Kirkuk was further aggravated by the continuing influx of tens of thousands of repatriated Kurds, as well as the cunning efforts of insurgents to 

exploit smoldering ethnic differences and to turn Kirkukis against each 

other and against the Americans. US troops maintained a constant pres-
42

ence in the city and patrolled continuously, often with local police. “Our 

whole purpose is to make sure the city is secure,” said the 2-116 CAV 

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Woods.85 Still, the number of security incidents in all of Kirkuk province fluctuated and doubled from 30 

reports per month in 2004 to 65 reports per month by late 2006.86

One troublesome issue facing the 116th Cavalry BCT was the continuing repatriation of Kurds to the region. New Kurdish settlements were 

popping up everywhere in and around Kirkuk. Newly arrived Kurds often 

clashed with Kirkuk Arabs, who were now the minority. “Our patience 

is about to end,” declared Sunni Arab tribal leader, Hussein Ali Hamdani.87 While Mahammed Khalil, Kirkuk provincial council’s Arab bloc 

leader, added emphatically, “Arabs will not give up Kirkuk...if America 

really wants to help, it will try to stop the Kurds from gaining control of 

Kirkuk.”88 Kurds, however, controlled both Kirkuk’s city and provincial 

governments and demonstrated their authority by changing the names of 

schools, streets, buildings, and villages from Arabic to Kurdish. Additionally, the Iraqi federal government was to have overseen the Kurd repatriation process according to the March 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority 

Transitional Administrative Law. However, Kurdish political leaders from 

both parties considered the federal effort insufficient and, of their own 

volition, began to control and finance the repatriation of Kurds to Kirkuk. 

“I can sit around with my hand out waiting for the federal government or 

I can spend the money myself...every last dollar in the till [helps] to bring 

Kurds back to Kirkuk,” said Rizgar Ali, the provincial council president 

and an official of the PUK. That party gave each returning Kurd family 

$5,000 to build a new home and provided Arabs with financial incentives 

for vacating their premises.89

“Tens of thousands of Kurds have resettled in the city and surrounding 

villages, many with the help of the parties,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Donald Blunck, the 116th Cavalry BCT operations officer.90 Turkmen council member, Tahseem Mohammed Ali added, “they are trying to 

change the demography of Kirkuk...I see no problem as long as there are 

negotiations between the various ethnicities and they go about it in a legitimate way.”91 US military commanders and Embassy officials considered 

the Kurdish political parties’ usurpation of the Kurd repatriation process 

slightly underhanded and were concerned that the aggressive actions taken 

by the PUK and KDP might not only increase local ethnic tensions in 

Kirkuk, but also weaken Iraqi constitutional efforts nationally. Lieutenant 

Colonel Anthony Wickham, the 116th BCT’s officer in charge of Team 

Government and liasion officer to the Kirkuk provincial government, em-
43

phasized: “If you have everyone participating, it’ll be a clean affair and 

you can accomplish your goals, but don’t go behind people’s backs, which 

[Kurd leaders] have a bad habit of doing.” Hickman added, “does that 

bring greater stability to Kirkuk? No. It brings pandemonium.”92

Fortunately, pandemonium failed to materialize in Kirkuk, as the 

116th BCT Soldiers, along with Iraqi police and security forces, successfully kept the lid on ethnic unrest and insurgent violence prior to and during the constitutional referendum vote and parliamentary elections by increasing patrolling and interacting extensively with Kirkuk political party 

leaders in late 2005. Team Government for the 116th Cavalry BCT was responsible for guiding and organizing Iraqi government officials, empowering legislative and executive branch officials in Kirkuk, and developing 

a functional local government capable of performing vital functions for 

all provincial citizens. As Team Government leader, Lieutenant Colonel 

Wickham also kept the 116th Cavalry BCT commander and staff apprised 

of increases in ethnic tensions, troublesome political issues, and favorable circumstances for advancing US policy in Kirkuk province. Along 

with US State Department and US Agency for International Development 

representatives, Team Government Soldiers, who were not themselves 

trained in public administration or governance, helped train Kirkuk provincial council officials in conflict resolution, parliamentary procedures, 

and organizational effectiveness.93

Throughout 2005, the 116th BCT initiated approximately 70 infrastructure reconstruction projects in Kirkuk under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Steven Knutzen, leader of the team’s reconstruction and 

economic development program. The brigade’s intent was to enhance 

overall governance by making tangible quality of life improvements for all 

Iraqis within the city. The diverse list of projects ranged from roads, sewer 

treatment plants, water towers, and street lights to police and fire stations, 

mosques and churches, soccer fields, banks, clinics, and schools.94 Faced 

daily with a myriad of reconstruction predicaments not normally encountered by a combat brigade, Colonel Knutzen commented wryly, “the Army 

has a lot of books on how to do things, but they forgot to write this one.”95

With unemployment in Kirkuk exceeding 50 percent, Knutzen’s intermediate goal was to hire as many Iraqis as possible to work on the various 

projects. Iraqis participated in determining which projects to undertake 

and then in prioritizing the list. In addition, BCT Soldiers patrolling the 

streets of Kirkuk would solicit project suggestions from local citizens and 

send the recommendations up the chain of command. “The intent is not to 

just put stuff out there, it’s to build a system,” Knutzen clarified.96
44

Another reconstruction challenge for the116th BCT involved convincing Iraqi contractors and project managers to embrace the concept of competitive bidding, a concept that was completely alien to them. In the Iraqi 

system, a local leader, such as a sheik, would recommend a certain project. 

The sheik would then communicate with a contractor friend who would 

submit a bid on the project and get the job. The contractor then often rewarded the sheik with a cut of the proceeds. “It’s the way they do business 

over here,” Colonel Knutzen explained.97 Additionally, since Iraqi loyalties typically ran in descending order from family—the highest priority—

to extended family, tribe, ethnic group, religious sect, then lastly, community and country, the 116th BCT Soldiers had to continuously encourage 

the citizens of Kirkuk to “believe in their [new] Government,” according 

to civil affairs projects officer, First Lieutenant James Philpott.98 If Iraqis 

were to do so, they could begin conducting more of their own business and 

solving more of their own problems. 

In another significant move, the 116th BCT transferred complete responsibility for security operations at Forward Operating Base Dibbis to 

the Iraqi Army’s 4th Division. “This proud day marks the first step in the 

transition of many military posts throughout Iraq from coalition control to 

Iraqi control...it signifies that the Iraqi Army is ready,” Brigadier General 

Gayhart said in his speech at the Forward Operating Base Dibbis ceremony.99 Back in Kirkuk city, Task Force 2-116 representatives met regularly 

with the Iraqi Director General for Water and Sewer to ensure that critical 

projects were on schedule. Additionally, the Task Force organized Soldiers into specialized teams to assist Iraqis with a variety of initiatives. 

Team Police, for example, developed a standardized reporting format for 

weekly Kirkuk police chief briefings, and Team Economics established 

an Arab projects council to focus on issues peculiar to the Kirkuk Arab 

communities. Battalion Soldiers also assisted Iraqi department of health 

officials with a polio vaccination campaign and helped local hospitals develop security protocols. Finally, the Task Force 3-116 medical section, 

led by Battalion Surgeon Colonel Laurence Plumb, trained Iraqi Army 

soldiers in combat life saver techniques, while Task Force 1-163 Soldiers 

trained Iraqis in hand-to-hand combat and defensive tactics procedures, 

and the Brigade S-5 Civil Affairs section helped organize and train Iraqi 

oil protection forces.100

Company B, 451st Civil Affairs Battalion, assigned to the 116th BCT, 

assessed the status of essential services in Kirkuk province and helped improve the quality of life for Iraqi citizens. Captain Alexander Carter, leader 

of the Civil Afairs Team in support of 2-116, explained that civil affairs 
45

team assessments often included recommendations for specific projects 

designed to address problems identified in the report: 

Our main job is to provide the 2-116 commander with an accurate 

and detailed assessment of a city sector’s condition in such areas 

as water, electricity, schools, sanitation, security, fuel, local leadership, medical care, etc. We try to speak to many types of Iraqis 

on the street, including religious or civic leaders, business owners, 

residents, and, of course, the children.101 In some areas we were 

pleasantly surprised at the level of improvement...projects that 

were initiated in the early days of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

are starting to show results at the level that really counts—the 

Iraqi family.102

By the summer of 2005, the Kirkuk Business Center had its own staff 

of 10 local men and women. The 116th Cavalry Brigade economics team 

assumed a consultative relationship with the business center staff that was 

now responsible for the management of the center. The staff broadened the 

range of services provided by the center to include: providing educational 

courses in accounting, budgeting, human resources, and information technology; adding an expanded micro-loan program for start-up ventures; 

conducting business security assessments; maintaining a monthly business journal; establishing an electronic business center for international 

investors; producing a yellow pages directory for Kirkuk; adding a Kirkuk 

Business Center certification program; and administering an economic development network of representatives from government and nongovernment organizations.103 Also during the summer, Soldiers from Fox Battery, 

188th Air Defense Artillery, attached to the 116th BCT, conducted and 

completed the first ever train-the-trainer class for Iraqi army sergeants. 

Previously, Coalition trainers taught common task skills to Iraqi Army 

soldiers by Coalition trainers. Now, Iraqi noncommissioned officers were 

able to teach common tasks to their own soldiers. “It is one more step 

toward having a self sufficient Iraqi army,” Sergeant Luke Rodgers wrote 

in a 2005 article describing the 188th Air Defense Artillery’s train-thetrainer program.104 The design and implementation of all these programs 

and initiatives were to convince local citizens to participate in the upcoming legislative election by showing them that their government was working and making significant improvements across the board and throughout 

the region. 

Brigadier General Gayhart considered the act of convincing the multiethnic Kirkuk provincial council to function as a legitimate and unified 

governing body on behalf of all the citizens of Kirkuk, to be the 116th 
46

Cavalry BCT’s greatest achievement during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

3. Repairing Kirkuk city’s devastated infrastructure—water, power, sewers, schools—was also an important task for the brigade. Closely interacting with the local Iraqi populace, leaders and ordinary citizens alike, and 

working jointly with Iraqi security forces were all critical factors in the 

116th BCT’s successful efforts to keep the peace in Kirkuk, especially during the legislative elections and the constitutional referendum. The skilled 

civilian labor—nation-building skills such as medical, legal, business, 

construction, and more that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

Soldiers brought to the fight—were invaluable in dealing with the myriad 

of unforeseen problems encountered by the team in Kirkuk.105 Protecting 

the oil infrastructure, pipelines, and Iraqi oilfield workers was a major 

task for Brigadier General Gayhart and the BCT soldiers, as was balancing and counterbalancing the actions of the principal political parties in 

Kirkuk. The 116th BCT observed that most of the violence was ethnic, 

not sectarian in Kirkuk. The BCT Soldiers kept violence to a minimum by 

constantly interacting with the general populace and the political leaders 

of the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen.

Promoting even rudimentary cooperation between Kurds, Arabs, and 

Turkmen was a fulltime job and a difficult one at best. “They hate each 

other...they have hated each other for centuries,” Gayhart explained in a 

2008 interview. “They take a different view of democracy than we do...

they are not going to become friends at the flick of a switch,” he added.106

The situation remained peaceful as the citizens of Kirkuk cast their votes 

in the constitutional referendum, and the 116th BCT subsequently relinquished authority for operations in north-central Iraq to the 1st BCT of 

the 101st Airborne Division at Forward Operating Base Warrior on 31 

October 2005. 

From spring 2003 to the fall of 2005, US troops kept ethnic tensions 

in Kirkuk from spilling over into violence; they maintained the peace 

throughout their successive troop rotations. After liberating the city in 

April 2003, the 10th Special Forces Group and 173d Airborne Brigade 

Soldiers, along with Peshmerga forces, quickly invoked the rule of law 

and established a secure situational environment in Kirkuk. Soldiers immediately transitioned from combat to stability and support operations. 

They established a Civil Military Operations Center in the city center, met 

with local leaders of all ethnicities, held public meetings to address residents’ concerns, and solicited Peshmerga support in preventing Kurd-onArab ethnic violence. As they had immersed themselves in the governance 

and rule of law issues in Kirkuk, Colonel Kenneth Tovo, commander of 
47

Forward Operating Base103 and the 173d Airborne Brigade commander, Colonel William Mayville both considered themselves the “Mayor of 

Kirkuk.” This attitude assisted the commanders to become more deeply 

involved in the social dynamics of the city all the while remaining neutral 

without taking sides. 

Attached civil affairs Soldiers proved to be a significant asset to the 

173d Airborne Brigade. Civil Affairs teams helped the Iraqis restore essential services to Kirkuk. They assisted with the installation of first an 

emergency, then an interim city council that consisted of an equal number 

of representatives from the four principal ethnic groups in the city. Colonel 

Mayville even attempted to match a brigade Soldier with each local Iraqi 

government official with qualitative success. He initiated a jobs program 

for Iraqis, effectively reducing unemployment. He further empowered junior officers and noncommissioned officers to manage and resolve Kirkuk 

governance issues at their platoon level. Finally, Mayville began an information operations campaign to educate the population both in the city and 

around the province so that the local citizens clearly understood what the 

brigade and the new government were doing upon their behalf. 

The governance-oriented initiatives established in 2003 by the 173d 

Airborne Brigade were continued and refined by the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 116th BCT during their respective troop rotations 

in Kirkuk. Governance of the population, rule of law application, economic development of the community, and reconciliation of the populace 

increased in importance with each successive US troop rotation. In 2005, 

two years after the beginning of the campaign, US Soldiers were gradually passing these obligations to Iraqi government officials to manage their 

own internal and external requirements of those operations. As the capabilities of Iraqi leaders improved and they gravitated toward their roles, 

Soldiers began to view governance in Kirkuk as an Iraqi, not a US, responsibility. Quelling chaos and preventing ethnic tensions from erupting 

into violence, however, remained an everyday job for Soldiers in the city. 
48

Notes

1. General Tommy Franks, American Soldier, (New York: HarperCollins 

Publishers, Inc., 2004), 390-396; Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, (New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 2004), 57; United States Central Command, “Compartmented Planning Effort,” 15 August 2002, 1-13, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/Tab%20I.pdf (accessed 3 March 2010). 

2. Woodward, 108-109.

3. Sedat Ergin, “The Story of the March 1, 2003 Motion,” PRIVATEVIEW, 

Autumn 2008, 40, http://www.tusiad.org.tr/FileArchive/PrivateView13.pdf (accessed 3 march 2010); Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, (New York: Simon & 

Schuster, 2004), 109-118, 139-142. 

4. Jamie McIntyre, “Pentagon Officials: Special Forces in Northern Iraq,” 

CNN.com, 30 January 2003, 1, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/29/

sprj.irq.us.troops/index.html (accessed 1 March 2010). 

5. McIntyre, 1. 

6. Woodward, 304, 350-351, 374, 382. 

7. Charles Briscoe, et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad, (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 2006), 81-83, 116-117, 120, 192.

8. Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: The Perseus Books Group, 2004), 305-320.

9. Thom Shanker, “How Green Berets Overcame the Odds at an Iraqi Alamo,” 

New York Times, 22 September 2003, 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/22/international/middleeast/22COMB.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 5 March 2010). 

Staff Sergeant Jeffrey Adamec, “We all made a mental promise...we were not 

going to move back from that point...we were not going to give up that ground...

we called that spot the Alamo.”

10. Briscoe, et al., 247-259, 365-366.

11. Franks, 441.

12. Briscoe, et al., 364-370. 

13. Briscoe, et al., 371.

14. “History of the 173rd Airborne Brigade,” 1, http://www.skysoldiers.com/

History-173rd.htm (accessed 8 March 2010); “Operation NORTHERN DELAY,” 

1, http://www.173rdairborne.com/manifest-iraq.htm (accessed 8 March 2010); 

“Operation OPTION NORTH,” 1, http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/

Operation-Option-North (accessed 8 March 2010); Units from the 10th Mountain 

Division and the 1st Battalion, 63d Armor Regiment also participated in Operation OPTION NORTH.

15. Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk (Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 91-95.

16. Ken Dilanian, “Playing Diplomat for a Day,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 

April 2003, A16.

17. Dilanian, A16.

18. Kevin Dougherty, “Army ‘Mayor’ Plans for Diversity in Kirkuk’s 

Future,” Stars and Stripes, 4 May 2003, 1, http://www.stripes.com/article.

asp?section=104&article=15349 (accessed 8 March 2010).
49

19. Dougherty, 1-2.

20. Dougherty, 2. 

21. Dougherty, 1, 3. 

22. Sabrina Tavernise, “Aftereffects: The North; Arabs and Kurds Clash in 

Kirkuk, and at Least 5 are Killed,” New York Times, 18 May 2003, 1-2, http://

www.nytimes.com/2003/05/18/world/aftereffects-the-north-arabs-and-kurdsclash-in-kirkuk-and-at-least-5-are-killed.html (accessed 9 May 2010). 

23. Patrick Clawson, “Iraq for Iraqis: How and When,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2004, 3. Saddam offered 10,000 dinars to Arabs who moved to 

Kirkuk in the 1970s and 1980s during the Arabization of the city; Colonel William 

Mayville, interview by FRONTLINE, 1 December 2003, 16, http://www.pbs.org/

wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/beyond/interviews/mayville.html (accessed 7 March 

2010). Colonel Mayville pointed out that many Arabs were forced to relocate to 

Kirkuk, while Kurds were forced to leave. 

24. Clawson, 3. 

25. Colonel William Mayville, interview by FRONTLINE, 1 December 

2003, 5, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/beyond/interviews/

mayville.html (accessed 7 March 2010).

26. Briscoe, et al., 381-383.

27. United Nations Foundation, “Kirkuk Elects City Council: Baathists 

Loose Jobs,” U.N. Wire, 27 May 2003, 1, http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20030527/33924_story.asp (accessed 6 March 2010).

28. Sabrina Tavernise, “Kurds mobilize to Elect One of Their Own in City of 

Kirkuk,” New York Times (nytimes.com), 28 May 2003, 1, http://www.nytimes.

com/2003/05/28/international/worldspecial/28CND-NORT.html?pagewanted=1 

(accessed 6 March 2010).

29. Tavernise, 1.

30. Mayville, 6-14.

30. Mayville, 20.

32. Mayville, 15.

33. Ken Dilanian, “In Kirkuk, US Soldiers Living Among Iraqis See Less 

Violence, Fewer Attacks,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 24 September 2003, 3, 

http://efamilyportal.com/brian/Iraq/129.html (accessed 9 May 2010).

34. Mayville, Colonel, 15.

35. Major Laura Klein, interview by Operational Leadership Experiences 

Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 August 2006, 6.

36. Klein, 4-5.

37. Klein, 9.

38. Wesley Morgan, American Units in Kirkuk, 2003-2010, Institute for the 

Study of War, 23 January 2010, 1.

39. “Lineage of the 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” 1, http://www.warriormemorial.com/history (accessed 12 March 2010).

40. William Cole, “Learning Ins, Outs of Insurgency,” HonoluluAdvertiser.

com, 11 February 2004, 3, http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dispatches/stories/021304 (accessed 12 March 2010). 
50

41. William Cole, “Hawai’i Troops Venture into Kirkuk,” HonoluluAdvertiser.com, 11 February 2004, 1, http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dispatches/stories/021104 (accessed 12 March 2010). 

42. William Cole, “Hawai’i Troops Learn to Adjust to Major Iraq Responsibilities,” HonoluluAdvertiser.com, 15 February 2004, 1, http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dispatches/stories/021504 (accessed 12 March 2010).

43. Cole, “Hawai’i Troops Venture into Kirkuk,”3. 

44. William Cole, “Soldiers Take On Duties of Departing Brigade,” HonoluluAdvertiser.com, 22 February 2004, 2, http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dispatches/stories/022204 (accessed 12 March 2010).

45. William Cole, “Hawai’i Troops Learn to Adjust to Major Iraq Responsibilities,” 3.

46. William Cole, “Security Corps Gradually Building,” HonoluluAdvertiser.com, 5 April 2004, 3, http://www.the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dispatches/stories/040504 (accessed 12 March 2010). 

47. Cole, 3. 

48. Cole, 1-2. 

49. William Cole, “Saddam Allies Ready to Give Up their Fight,” HonoluluAdvertiser.com, 29 February 2004, 1-3, http://www.the.honoluluadvertiser.com/

dispatches/stories/022904 (accessed 12 March 2010).

50. William Cole, “Hawai’i Troops at Iran’s Doorstep,” HonoluluAdvertiser.

com, 22 March 2004, 1-3, http://www.the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dispatches/stories/031404 (accessed 12 march 2010).

51. William Cole, “Troops Mop Up and Rebuild After the War,” HonoluluAdvertiser.com, 14 March 2004, 2, http://www.the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dispatches/stories/031404 (accessed 12 March 2010).

52. The 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; the 31st Marine Expeditionary 

Unit; and the 66th Transportation Company from Kleber Kasern, Germany were 

also extended. Two battalions from the 82d Airborne Division were deployed to 

Iraq for four months to provide additional security for the January 2005 Iraqi 

elections. 

53. Task Force 1-21 is the “Gimlet” battalion. “Huria” means freedom or 

liberty in Arabic.

54. The Scorpion Brigade was an elite 800-man Iraqi Army commando unit 

with headquarters in Hilla.

55. Captain Jeremiah Cordovano, “TF 1-21 Infantry Applies the Nine Principles of War in Kirkuk,” Infantry, January-February 2006, 37-40. Note: Fortunately for everyone, Cordovano’s QRF was not called upon as the situation remained 

relatively peaceful on election day in Kirkuk.

56. Borzou Daragahi, “Divided Kirkuk a Rich Political Prize/Kurds Hope 

to Win Control of City and Its Oil Wealth,” SFGATE.com, 27 January 2007, 4, 

http://articles.sfgate.com/2005-01-27/news/17357175_1_rizgar-ali-kirkuk-sunniarab-kirkuk-last-week (accessed 10 March 2010).

57. Daragahi, 1.

58. Daragahi, 1.
51

59. Daragahi, 2.

60. Daragahi, 2.

61. Daragahi, 3. 

62. Several 116th BCT subunits relieved their respective 2d BCT counterparts before the official TOA ceremony on 17 February 2005. Task Force 3/16 

under Lieutenant Colonel Daniel McCabe, for example, replaced Task Force 1-14 

south of Kirkuk on 27 December 2004.

63. “This is USAID,” 29 April 2009, 1, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/ 

(accessed 17 March 2010).

64. Embassy of the United States, “Iraq Project and Contracting Office,” 1-2, 

http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/iraq_pco.html (accessed 17 March 2010).

65. United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Review 

of the Roles, Staffing, and Effectiveness of Regional Embassy Offices in Iraq,” 

Report Number MERO-IQO-09-09, August 2009, 16, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/128551.pdf (accessed 15 March 2010). 

66. President George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive 

36,” 11 May 2004, 1-3, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd051104.pdf (accessed 17 March 2010).

67. Ginger Cruz, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 2, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI090507/Cruz%20_Testimony090507.pdf (accessed 

17 March 2010).

68. Brigadier General Alan Gayhart, interview by Contemporary Operations 

Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 January 2008, 9-10, 15.

69. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” Baghdad Cable 004045, 1 October 2005, 1-11.

70. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at the Inauguration of the Provincial Reconstruction Team,” 11 November 2005, 1-2. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/56794.htm (accessed 24 July 2008). 

71. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, “US Ambassador in Kirkuk Inaugurates 

New Tamim Provincial Reconstruction Team,” Embassy of the United States 

Press Release, 27 November 2005,1, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/112705_

kirkuk.html (accessed 16 March 2010).

72. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Fact Sheet,” Embassy of the 

United States Press Release, 16 June 2006, 1, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/AI2-ProvincialReconstructionTeams-FACTSHEET.pdf (accessed 12 

March 2010).

73. Robert Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, Special Report 

185, United States Institute of Peace, March 2007, 3, http://www.usip.org/files/

resources/sr185.pdf (accessed 18 March 2010).

74. Perito, 3.
52

75. Andrew Lubin, “Economic Reconstruction in Iraq,” US Cavalry ON 

Point, 6 September 2007, 1, http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,148373,00.

html (accessed 16 March 2010). 

76. Jim Fisher-Thompson, “Rice Pays Surprise Visit to Iraq, Highlights Rebuilding Partnerships,” Embassy of the United States Press Release, 18 December 2007, 2, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/pr_12182007b.html (accessed 16 March 

2010).

77. President George W. Bush, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” National Security Council, November 2005, 8, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.

archives.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf (accessed 18 

March 2010).

78. Cruz, 4.

79. Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, 29 October 2006, 

16, http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-034.pdf (accessed 22 February 

2010).

80. United States Department of State, Kirkuk PRT Overview, 10 May 2008, 

Slide No. 5, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Kirkuk_PRT_Overview 

(10_May_2008).ppt (accessed 27 February 2010).

81. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 

Iraq: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Handbook No. 07-11, January 2007, 

30-31, 35, 41. 

82. Lubin, 3-5; Fisher-Thompson, 1-2.

83. United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Review 

of the Roles, Staffing, and Effectiveness of Regional Embassy Offices in Iraq,” 

Report Number MERO-IQO-09-09, August 2009, 16, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/128551.pdf (accessed 15 March 2010). 

84. Roger Phillips, “Boise Journalists Reporting from Kirkuk Find the 116th 

Brigade Serves as Ambassadors as well as Soldiers,” IdahoStatesman.com, 3 January 2006, 1. 

85. Phillips, 1.

86. Michael Knights, “Kirkuk in Transition: Confidence Building in Northern Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2010, 28, http://www.

washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus102.pdf (accessed 21 April 2010).

87. Steve Fainaru, “Kurds Reclaiming Prized Territory in Northern Iraq,” 

Washington Post, 30 October 2005, 1, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngn

r=12&smap=&rnr=77&anr=7125 (accessed 19 March 2010).

88. Fainaru, 1.

89 Fainaru, 3.

90. Fainaru, 3. 

91. Fainaru, 3.

92. Fainaru, 1.

93. Colonel Anthony Wickham, “Kirkuk Governance Pro and Con,” 11 May 

2010, 1-2, report on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute.
53

94. Roger Phillips, “Rebuilding Kirkuk Takes Some Different Tactics,” IdahoStatesman.com, 13 October 2006, 2, http://www.idahostatesman.

com/2006/03/01/10237/rebuilding-kirkuk-takes-some-different.html (accessed 

16 March 2010).

95. Phillips, 1.

96. Phillips, 1.

97. Phillips, 2.

98. Phillips, 2.

99. Monte Hibbert, “116th BCT and Dibbis Celebrate Transition,” Snakebite, Vol. 5, Edition 22, June 2005, 1, http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/AGPA/

docs/116BCT/v5e22_SnakebitesWV.pdf (accessed 22 February 2010). 

100. Snakebite, Vol. 5, Edition 22, June 2005, 9, 10, 14, 16, http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/AGPA/docs/116BCT/v5e22_SnakebitesWV.pdf (accessed 22 

February 2010); Snakebite, Vol. 5, Edition 23, July 2005, 2, 12, http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/AGPA/docs/116BCT/v5e23_SnakebitesWV.pdf (accessed 22 

February 2010)s. 

101. Monte Hibbert, “B Co., 451st Civil Affairs Bn. Improving Life,” Snakebite, Vol. 5, Edition 26, August 2005, 2, http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/AGPA/

docs/116BCT/v5e26_SnakebitesWV.pdf (accessed 11 March 2010). 

102. Hibbert, 7. 

103. Captain Ryan Robinson, “Kirkuk Business Center Sets Pace of Economic Recovery,” Snakebite, Vol. 5, Edition 26, August 2005, 7, http://www.oregon.

gov/OMD/AGPA/docs/116BCT/v5e26_SnakebitesWV.pdf (accessed 11 March 

2010). 

104. Sergeant Luke Rodgers, “Fox Battery, 188th ADA Trains the Iraqi Army 

Trainers,” Snakebite, Vol. 5, Edition 26, August 2005, 14, http://www.oregon.

gov/OMD/AGPA/docs/116BCT/v5e26_SnakebitesWV.pdf (accessed 11 March 

2010). 

105. Gayhart, interview, 22.

106. Gayhart, interview, 17.

55

Chapter 4. Instability and Progress in Kirkuk, 2006-2009

Beginning in 2006, Iraq entered a tumultuous period which threatened to undo much of the progress achieved since the overthrow of the 

Saddam regime. That period, however, began auspiciously as the political 

process that started in early 2005 when the first post-Baathist national 

elections saw fruition in late 2005 with the approval of a new constitution. 

Iraq then appeared to be entering a period of relative political stability. 

That promise was destroyed in March 2006 with the bombing of the Samarra Mosque, an important Shia shrine that had become target for Sunni 

terrorists intent on igniting a sectarian war in Iraq. Sunni-Shia violence 

spiked in the summer of 2006 as the newly-elected Iraqi parliament slowly 

formed a government dominated by Shia politicians. General George W. 

Casey, Jr., the senior Coalition commander in Iraq, described the unstable 

environment in Iraq as the coexistence of violence and progress.1 

While Coalition officials rightfully emphasized that 14 of Iraq’s 18 

provinces were secure, the situation in Baghdad, however, was rapidly 

deteriorating as ethnic, political, and religious tensions in the capital rose 

dramatically. After the destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, sectarian violence began to spread northward in Iraq. Even in relatively stable 

Kirkuk, five executed car and truck bomb attacks simultaneously hit both 

the PUK and KDP party headquarters buildings and a US-Iraqi convoy.2 

Colonel David Gray, commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 

101st Airborne Division, saw this upsurge in violence in Kirkuk firsthand 

when his unit deployed in and around the city in late 2005. In April 2006, 

Gray described the unique combination of a nascent insurgency and historical ethnic rivalries in Kirkuk as an “amalgamation of a knife fight, a 

gunfight, and three-dimensional chess,” expressed his concern over these 

sluggish delays by Iraqi officials in getting their new national government 

up and running.3 “The center of gravity for Americans and Iraqis right 

now is something hard to measure: Time...how much time and perseverance do we have?” Gray questioned.4

 In 2006 with sovereignty, international recognition, a new prime minister, and a duly elected council of representatives, governance in Iraq was now in the hands of the Iraqis. Major 

issues involving reconciliation, federalism, oil revenue sharing, sectarian 

militias, and the status of Kirkuk, would have to be addressed and acted 

upon by Iraqi government leaders, while Coalition officials assumed an 

increasingly advisory role. Concerned over the ability of Iraqis to rise to 

this sizeable challenge, General Casey observed, “We could do everything 

right and still lose.”5
56

In Kirkuk, significant numbers of Kurds continued to migrate back to 

the city in what they now referred to as “normalization”—the antithesis 

of Arabization. Returning Kurds became officially known as “internally 

displaced persons.” As sectarian troubles brewed in Baghdad, Kurdish 

leaders in Kirkuk grew more confident in their ability to control both their 

province and their city. The new Iraq constitution reinforced Kurdistan’s 

autonomy. Moreover, two Peshmerga divisions defended the region and 

Kurds enjoyed a strong working relationship with the US Army, which 

extended back to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in the early 1990s.6

“Self-determination is their ultimate goal...independence, have no doubt,” 

Colonel Gray said, describing Kurd motivation.7

The only obstacle encountered by the Kurds involved their ongoing 

desire to have Kirkuk city annexed by Kurdistan. Article 140 of the new 

Iraqi constitution addressed this issue, stipulating a referendum vote on 

the future of Kirkuk for 2007. It was unclear in 2006 whether the referendum on Kirkuk would involve all Iraqis or only Kirkuk’s population. 

Kurds favored the latter option and were willing to resort to the use of 

force if necessary to control Kirkuk, according to Colonel Gray;

Do not think they [Kurds] won’t resort to arms. The public sentiment is that Kirkuk is something worth fighting for.8

 Our [the 

United States’] current strategic objective is one Iraq, not a loose 

affiliation of federal states.9

However, Gray also sounded a note of concern that Kurdish goals 

for Kirkuk might not match the Coalition’s plans for the city. Aggressive 

patrolling by 1st BCT Soldiers and their Iraqi army counterparts helped 

keep ethnic violence—intimidation, coercion, assassinations, and kidnappings—to a minimum in Kirkuk during 2006. The total number of security 

incidents for all of Kirkuk province in 2006 averaged approximately 65 

per month.10 Faced with multifaceted challenges in the province, 1st BCT 

troops kept their fingers tight on “the pulse of the diverse region and developed a keen sense for the potential flash points,” according to Colonel 

Gray.11 Gray also reported that the Badr Organization, the armed wing 

of the Shia Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, had opened offices in Kirkuk 

and that Jaysh al-Mahdi, the paramilitary force run by Iraqi Shia cleric 

Muqtada al-Sadr, also had plans to open offices. 

By August 2006, the 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, and the 18th Strategic Infrastructure Battalion, 4th Iraqi Army Division, assumed responsibility for security in Kirkuk Province from the 1st BCT, 101st Airborne 

Division. Only the city of Kirkuk and the predominantly Arab village of 
57

Hawija remained under Coalition control. The transfer of authority was 

another positive indication that US Army-guided governance in Kirkuk 

was providing stability and served as an additional motivating factor for 

Kirkuk’s citizens to continue placing their faith and trust in the new Iraqi 

government. Approximately one month after the transfer of authority to 

Iraq’s Security forces, the 1st BCT 10st Airborne Division left Iraq. The 

coalition presence in Kirkuk would continue however.12

The 3d BCT, 25th ID, Takes Responsibility in Kirkuk 

In September 2006, the 3d BCT of the 25th Infantry Division arrived 

in Kirkuk. In retrospect, that autumn was a decisive moment in the coalition campaign in Iraq. In late summer 2006, retired Army General John 

Keane encouraged President Bush to “escalate in Iraq,” while a special 

team of Pentagon planners, dubbed the “council of colonels,” concluded 

that “the war was being lost and that a drastic change in strategy was urgently needed.”13 Sectarian violence continued to grow in magnitude and 

intensity during 2006, which prompted the National Security Council to 

conclude:

The situation in Iraq is unacceptable...our current strategy is not 

working. We did not have enough forces before...it requires additional troops to deal with sectarian violence and bring security 

to the people of Baghdad.14 Force levels overall in Baghdad have 

been inadequate to stabilize a city of its size.15

Meanwhile, Iraqi civilians were becoming increasingly frustrated with 

Coalition efforts to protect them from violence, regardless of the source. 

National Security Council officials recommended an increase in United 

States’ troop strength during an Iraq Strategy Review briefing. Robert 

Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in November 

2006 and began choosing new military commanders to implement the anticipated revised strategy. 

“Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat,” President Bush proclaimed in describing the enemy situation 

in Iraq during his January 2007 State of the Union Address. That address 

contained the momentous announcement of a troop surge of more than 

20,000 additional US forces.16 President Bush further encouraged US 

Forces to establish strategic partnerships with moderates in Iraq, be they 

Sunnis or Shias. He redefined the enemy as extremists of all sorts, noting 

in particular that Shia extremists were supported by Iran. In contrast Sunni 

extremists were assisted by AQI terrorists who were intent on forming 
58

an Iraqi caliphate. By 2007, the conflict in Iraq had become one between 

moderates and extremists, rather than simply Sunnis against Shias. Despite heroic efforts, Coalition efforts were falling short of deterring the 

insurgency in Iraq. Continued progress on the Iraqi political front was also 

insufficient to restrain the ongoing violence. In the United States, the will 

of the American people to continue the fight in Iraq was waning. Additionally, training Iraqi forces had become a time-consuming, burdensome 

process, and those adequately trained Iraqi units could not, on their own, 

stem the violence. A change in strategy was believed to be necessary. A 

shift to an updated course of action placed the primary emphasis on ensuring long-term security for Iraqi citizens, particularly those in Baghdad. By 

April 2007, Department of Defense extended the rotations to 15 months 

for all US units in Iraq. 

In Kirkuk and its vicinity, the 3d BCT had two organic infantry battalions, two support battalions, a field artillery battalion, a cavalry squadron, numerous embedded military and police transition teams, and civil 

affairs teams to assist in training and advising local government officials. 

The 3d BCT’s mission entailed conducting partnered counterinsurgency 

operations, training and developing Iraqi security forces, improving safety 

and security, fostering Iraqi self-sufficiency, and creating greater stability 

throughout Kirkuk Province in conjunction with local governments. The 

key desired outcome for the mission was to enhance prosperity and improve the quality of life for the Iraqi people. Accordingly, 3d BCT worked 

closely with Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk to expand essential 

services, finance economic development, improve the legal system, help 

Iraqis learn to govern themselves, and ensure that Baghdad-initiated national programs actually filtered down to the citizens of Kirkuk. Colonel 

Patrick Stackpole, the brigade commander, credited much of 3d BCT’s 

success to the governor of Kirkuk and the provincial council. During a 

briefing, Stackpole explained:

We continue to work with both and are impressed by the capacity 

and maturity of the political leadership in this province to put ethnic differences aside and place the long-term needs of communities above short-term ethnic gains.17

Although Kirkuk experienced security breaches every day—improvised explosion devices, car bombs, assassinations, kidnappings—Colonel Stackpole considered the level of ethnic and sectarian violence in 

Kirkuk to be less than that existing in other regions of Iraq. He attributed 

this comparative lack of violence to the long history of relatively peaceful 

coexistence among the resident Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Assyrians, 
59

but also to the “population [for] embracing its diversity and the overall 

resilience of the people of Kirkuk not to allow ethnic differences to divide them.”18 Despite deep-seated distrust of each other, Kirkuk’s Kurds, 

Arabs, and Turkmen had never fought among themselves in any sizeable 

military actions. Sectarian violence in Baghdad during 2006 and 2007, for 

example, was far greater than the limited amount of ethnic violence that 

occurred in Kirkuk.

Colonel Stackpole believed that the goal of those anti-Iraqi forces 

that were operating in Kirkuk—Islamic extremists, former regime members, Baath party loyalists—was to attack Coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces in order to discredit the new Iraqi government and to create 

concern in the population as to whether or not they could be adequately 

protected. To counter this threat, Stackpole expanded 3d BCT’s presence 

in the province by opening several small patrol bases to integrate fully 

with local residents, facilitate relationship building, and to help extend the 

reach of Iraqi government officials. Colonel Stackpole explained:

It’s allowed us to really engage with the population, understand 

and get to know them, and for them to get to know us as well. 

From day one we were constantly talking to tribal leaders trying 

to get them involved in the political process...engagement with the 

tribes [was] an ongoing daily process from the squad level all the 

way up through myself.19

Squad-size patrols, for instance, met regularly with village and tribal representatives to encourage their participation in local governance and to 

gather intelligence regarding the whereabouts of local insurgent groups. 

The 3d BCT also increased patrols and checkpoints south of Kirkuk to 

prevent insurgents who had been pushed out of Baghdad, from taking refuge in the city.20

Early in their rotation, 3d BCT Soldiers understood the importance of 

integrating Iraq’s tribal culture into the newly elected national and provincial governments. “People in [Kirkuk] province have lived thousands of 

years within a tribal system,” Lieutenant Colonel Drew Meyerowich, the 

commander of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry (2-27 IN) stated, “When you 

are trying to [create] a representative government in a society where tribal 

grand sheiks are the ones who historically provide for the people, [our 

effort] will not be successful unless the tribes are a part of the process,” 

Meyerowich explained.21 On 20 September 2006, 2-27 held the first in a 

series of cooperative meetings between US military leaders and sheiks 

from each tribe in the Hawija district of Kirkuk province to address tribal 

desires for fair representation in the new Iraqi government. Captain Jeffrey 
60

Fuller, the fire support officer for 2-27 IN, temporarily assigned to oversee 

the tribal meetings, described this first gathering as being “tremendously 

significant,” adding, “if the sheiks feel like they are being ignored by the 

government, they will communicate that to their people...by ignoring their 

interests, [we] would be crippling any effort to build a legitimate democratic government, and if we are not representing the tribal voice in the 

Iraqi government, then the government does not truly represent the people 

of this district.”22 Eventually, Captain Roland Keller, commander of D 

Company, 2-27 IN, met with local sheiks on a weekly basis to discuss 

tribal concerns and to inform the sheiks of Coalition activities and motivations. “We talk to the people on a regular basis to see if our messages 

conveyed to the sheiks are getting out into the villages...the people are 

beginning to understand that we’re here to help them return to a normal 

life where war isn’t impacting them on a daily basis,” Keller said.23 By 

meeting regularly with tribal leaders in Hawija, the 3d BCT helped foster 

legitimate representative governance in western Kirkuk province.

The 3d BCT considered rebuilding schools and other improvement 

projects in Kirkuk as critical components of their overall effort to enhance strong governance and encourage Iraqi self-reliance. Since the new 

Iraqi constitution guaranteed a free education for every citizen, assisting 

Iraqi government officials in improving education programs was clearly a worthwhile endeavor for the 3d BCT Soldiers. Under an additional 

program designed to improve the quality of life for Kirkuk’s population, 

the Soldiers of the 325th Brigade Support Battalion, with guidance from 

Chaplain (Captain) Martin Cho, began distributing school supplies and 

toys to orphans. In cooperation with a local children’s rights organization, 

support battalion Soldiers delivered the first of many shipments of supplies to 2,000 orphans in the Shorish, Chamchamal, and Kalar districts in 

November 2006.24

In February 2007, a team of the 3d BCT medical and Provincial Reconstruction Team Soldiers conducted an institutional assessment of 

Kirkuk’s only pediatric hospital. The purpose of the visit was to determine additional ways in which Coalition forces could provide medical 

assistance to the hospital staff. US Navy Lieutenant Daniel Grajeda, an 

environmental health officer attached to the 3d BCT and assigned to the 

team’s health and education section, emphasized that improving Iraq’s 

medical infrastructure was a critical component of the team mission to assist and facilitate the Iraqi government in becoming self-sustaining. At the 

assessment’s conclusion, Lieutenant Grajeda remarked, “basically, almost 

anything a child needs in terms of medical care can be provided here...the 
61

level of care is very good.”25 The 3d BCT surgeon, Captain Christopher 

Curtis, was similarly impressed with the hospital staff and facilities. “The 

standard of care is very high, and they manage to keep the hospital clean 

which is challenging in this [dusty] environment,” Curtis said, though he 

lamented the fact that there was just “one pediatric surgeon for the entire 

province.”26

Later in February, a Military Transition Team from the 3d Battalion, 

7th Field Artillery (3-7 FA) initiated a first-of-its-kind meeting between 

the Iraqi Army’s 1st Strategic Infrastructure Brigade and 50 local village 

leaders at Forward Operating Base Gaines Mills southwest of Kirkuk. The 

purpose of the meeting was to solicit the cooperation of local Iraqi leaders 

and their respective communities in helping the Strategic Infrastructure 

Brigade protect the oil fields and infrastructure in the Yachi region. The 

meeting’s host, Iraqi Brigadier General Mamoud Safeen, commanding 

general, 1st Strategic Infrastructure Brigade, impressed upon the civilian 

leaders the importance to them and to their villages of preventing sabotage 

attacks on the critical oilfield infrastructure. “Oil is the future of Iraq,” 

Safeen said. “It is not mine and it is not yours...it’s ours, and it’s the wealth 

of the Iraqi people,” he emphasized. “We need continuous cooperation 

from your communities to keep the oil flowing,” Safeen said admonishing the local leaders.27 Lieutenant Colonel Jack Pritchett, the commander 

of 3-7 FA, reinforced Brigadier General Safeen’s appeal for cooperation 

and explained the relationship between oil and effective governance in 

Kirkuk province. Since most local leaders agreed with the notion that the 

free flow of oil represented the future for Iraq, “they came to the meeting 

to see what part they can play in that future, not only in this province, but 

[throughout] the country,” Pritchett said. “It’s important for [local leaders] 

to understand that an attack on the oil pipeline is an attack on the future of 

their communities...if the oil is not flowing, they are not going to get the 

things they desperately need,” he explained.28

In yet another 3d BCT effort to support the governance line of operation in Kirkuk, Captain Christopher Degn, chaplain for the 3d Brigade 

Special Troops Battalion, began teaching an in-depth course on Islam to 

Soldiers interested in learning more about Iraqi life “outside-the-wire” at 

Forward Operating Base Warrior. Nicknamed “Qur’an 101,” classes met 

weekly to discuss, and help Soldiers better understand, Islamic history, 

culture, customs, and the Muslim religion. “I don’t want [3d BCT Soldiers] 

to spend a year out here and not connect with the people,” Degn said in 

describing his motivation for initiating the training.29 “Attending the class 

every week helps me learn and get an understanding of the people and 
62

their customs,” said Captain Matthew Greene, 2d Squadron, 6th Cavalry 

(2-6 CAV) intelligence officer, complimenting Degn’s program.30 Enhancing their knowledge of the local culture helped 3d BCT Soldiers better 

interact with local Iraqi leaders and political officials, thereby furthering 

brigade efforts to nudge Kirkuk closer to self-sustaining governance. 

In March 2007, the Soldiers of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry hosted a 

mayoral luncheon event at Forward Operating Base McHenry in honor of 

those local Iraqi civic leaders and law enforcement officials who had been 

the most cooperative and supportive of Coalition efforts to improve governance and to rebuild the surrounding communities. Because of their cooperation, these particular leaders were now experiencing fewer problems 

and reaping greater benefits for their respective constituencies. Addressing 

the gathering, 2-27 Commander Lieutenant Colonel Meyerowich tied the 

local effort into the Coalition’s ultimate goal of helping Iraqis establish 

local governments that can protect themselves and also, a national government that treats all Iraqis equally, irrespective of their sect, religion, or 

ethnicity. Meyerwich told the crowd:

I certainly can’t take credit for our increased success. Our success is attributable to the day-to-day interactions of my Soldiers...

when [local Iraqi citizens] see my Soldiers taking care of their 

communities, it makes building relationships easier and achieving 

success much more possible.31

One example of success in improving the capacity of Iraqi Sovernance 

was enhancing the rule of law in Kirkuk Province. Years of neglect under 

the Baathist regime had left the Iraqi justice system’s reputation tarnished 

and its perception weakened in the eyes of the public. The 3d BCT Soldiers 

helped Iraqis partially remedy this situation by establishing a major crimes 

court on an Iraqi Army base that used judges from Baghdad to hear important cases. The brigade also built a new courthouse in the town of Dibbis 

about 25 miles northwest of Kirkuk city. Dozens of local and regional 

Iraqi government officials, along with several judges and attorneys, turned 

out for the grand opening of the Dibbis courthouse in May 2007. “This 

new building is symbolic. It conveys to the people that the rule of law is 

important,” Major Gary Johnson, 3d BCT command judge advocate, said 

at the opening ceremony.32 Brigade Judge Advocate Captain Duane Kees 

explained the importance of legitimizing Iraq’s impaired legal system and 

further described the difficulties of dealing with Iraqi law;

Iraq has a codified judicial system, and a legislature and government based on that system...we’re trying to help Iraqi citizens 
63

have faith again in their laws by improving a legal system that can 

be trusted...[now] citizens will see their system work.33 Out here 

there are no books on how to bestow dignity to a people’s legal 

system, a system that’s foreign to me...out here at times it’s like 

I’m playing chess in the dark.”34

Building the new Dibbis courthouse is a prime example of 3d BCTs efforts to improve overall governance in Kirkuk province, and “legitimizing 

the rule of law in Iraq [became] a cornerstone of a better future for Iraq’s 

citizens.”35

In yet another indication that the rule of law was moving forward in 

Kirkuk, the police station in the Domies district of the city became the 

first officially validated station in Iraq to take the lead in comprehensive 

security operations within its district. According to Captain Ryan Nacin, 

fire support and assistant plans officer, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment (2-35 IN): 

Validation was the culmination of training credible and capable 

police forces through combined operations and partnerships to establish self-sustaining police stations throughout Iraq.36 Receiving 

a validation status is the result of a tremendous amount of effort 

and dedication by the Iraqi police officers and the Coalition forces 

that partnered with them.37

Adding his congratulations, battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Browder acknowledged that: 

 Today is a great day to be a policeman in Kirkuk...because it 

marks the culmination of almost four years of hard work, [and] 

you are the first and the only police station in Iraq to be validated 

as trained and ready to take the lead in security operations. We are 

very proud of the police at Domies, and of your sacrifice, courage, 

and dedication to your country.38

Colonel Browder’s congratulatory rhetoric was consistent with 3d 

BCT’s broader information operations campaign intended to compliment 

Iraqis whenever possible for a job well done, to increase the confidence of 

local citizens in their government officials, and to give credit to Iraqi leaders for significant accomplishments. 

Soldiers from the 3d BCT also assisted Kirkuk political leaders prepare for the eventual implementation of the principals spelled out in Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. Although it was still unclear during 

the 2006-2007 timeframe exactly when these principles would be official, 
64

the 3d BCT participated with city and provincial government officials in 

overseeing the normalization process, preparing for the census, and finetuning security in anticipation of a potential referendum vote.39 Colonel 

Stackpole and members of his staff worked closely with the Article 140 

Implementation Committee to ensure fairness in the process that involved 

repatriating Kurds displaced from their homes during the Baathist regime 

and relocating Arab settlers who had moved to Kirkuk in accordance with 

Saddam-era Arabization policies. As of spring 2007, Kurds and Arabs had 

submitted 3,600 applications for relocation funding. Stackpole, who anticipated receiving as many as 50,000 applications by the end of the year, 

continually emphasized to Kurds and Arabs alike to follow the established 

political process and move ahead rather than resort to violence. Newly 

displaced Arabs had the option of moving elsewhere in the province or 

returning to their traditional homes in southern Iraq. Colonel Stackpole 

credited the fully functional Kirkuk provincial council and the well-staffed 

Kirkuk team for the success of the normalization program in the 3rd BCTs 

area of operations.40

The 1st BCT, 10th Mtn Div Takes Over in Kirkuk 

 In October 2007, Stackpole’s brigade was relieved by 1st BCT, 10th 

Mountain Division. This unit, commanded by Colonel David Paschal, 

included 4 maneuver battalions, a field artillery battalion, and numerous support units. Paschal also enjoyed the partnership with several Iraqi 

Army units stationed in Kirkuk Province. Like the units that operated in 

Kirkuk previously, the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division conducted a variety of missions, including those focused on developing a stable form 

of governance in Kirkuk. Paschal’s desired end state for Kirkuk was a 

province—and a city—that had a more equitable allocation of resources, 

strengthened government legitimacy, increased capital investment, decreased unemployment, improved economic stability, and a fair and transparent justice system.41

To achieve these goals the Soldiers of the 1st BCT continued the Iraqi 

police validation process and the six-step reconciliation program for former insurgents; hosted criminal justice councils and a conference for the 

Sons of Iraq local militia groups; established literacy training classes in 

Hawija; created a Civilian Service Corps that provided on-the-job training 

for Sons of Iraq members and released detainees; launched drought mitigation and emergency feed grain initiatives; and operated an Iraqi Media 

Network television call-in show to communicate Iraqi government success stories to the citizens of Kirkuk.42 Colonel Paschal also expanded the 
65

governance mentorship program by assigning team and company level 

advisors to 18 district and subdistrict councils. As a result, communication 

between districts and the provincial government improved, all districts 

completed and submitted their respective budgets on time, and councils 

became more self-sufficient as their focus shifted from security to improving provincial economics and infrastructure.43

The 1st BCT worked with representatives of RTI International’s Local Governance Project (LGP), who, as noted earlier, were under contract 

with the US Agency for International Development to assist in strengthening municipal, district, and provincial governments in Iraq. RTI project 

contractors had been working in Kirkuk province since the summer of 

2003. In 2005 the firm defined their mission in Iraq in the following way: 

To improve the management and administration of governments; 

to provide technical assistance and training to local governmentelected officials concerning [their] roles and the functions of local 

agencies; and to support the establishment of a legal framework 

for a democratic, representative, and participatory form of decentralized government in Iraq.44

 A secondary objective of the RTI project involved assisting local Iraqi 

governments become transparent, accountable, and responsive to their 

constituents while defining the local government’s role in the shifting Iraqi 

political structure. RTI personnel and 1st BCT Soldiers assisted Kirkuk 

government officials in preparing their five-year provincial development 

strategies. They further assisted local leaders with refining their budget 

execution processes by using a customized computer-based information 

system to automate financial accounting and project tracking.45

The 1st BCT staff developed lines of operation pertaining to governance in Kirkuk including:

● Self governance—elect district and provincial governments 

that are able to allocate resources which gain popular support and 

the population views as legitimate.

● Improve essential services—a government capable of meeting 

and maintaining population basic needs.

● Promote economic development—increase capital available in 

the area of responsibility, decrease unemployment, and improve 

economic stability.

● Promote the rule of law—provide a fair and transparent justice 

systems and counter the influence of anti-Iraqi forces.
66

Subsequently, the 1st BCT’s operational framework for legitimate governance in Kirkuk described the numerous programs, projects, and initiatives designed to educate political leaders and improve the capabilities of 

local, district, and provincial institutions.46

The brigade operational framework identified another important 

component which involved the implementation of a 13-point agreement 

reached in December 2007 between the two leading political parties in 

Kirkuk—the Sunni Arab Iraqi Republican Gathering and the Kurdish 

Kirkuk brotherhood list. According to the agreement, Arabs, Kurds, and 

Turkmen shared joint governance authority in Kirkuk at a ratio of 32 percent each and the remaining 4 percent is for the Chaldo-Assyrians. The 

Arab block discontinued its boycott and returned to the Kirkuk provincial 

council after the agreement was signed. By mid-2008, however, Iraqi Republican Gathering members were dissatisfied with the agreement’s implementation and accused Kurds of blocking many of the agreed upon administrative powers. Kurds, on the other hand, continued to assert that power 

in Kirkuk was rightfully theirs, citing the 26 of 41 provincial council seats 

won by the Kurds in the 2005 elections.47 According to the 1st BCT S-9, 

Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, not all of the issues satisfied Kirkuk 

Arabs, but the 13-point agreement built transparency and legitimacy in 

local government and Arabs saw that they were truly represented.48 Soldiers participated in discussions between Kurd and Arab political leaders, 

kept the dialogue going, and prevented disagreements from spilling over 

into violence. Assisting Iraqis to manage the unresolved issues inherent 

in the 13-point agreement was a critical task for the 1st BCT Soldiers and 

representatives of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk. Resolving 

conflict was especially critical because of the looming provincial elections 

planned for October 2008.49 

Throughout 2008, unsettled questions involving Kirkuk caused problems for the Iraqi Parliament which was attempting to pass both the Provincial Powers Act and the Provincial Elections Law. In February, the 

parliament narrowly passed the Provincial Powers Act and then in July, 

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, vetoed the election law passed by 

the Council of Representatives. Talabani claimed that clauses requiring an 

equal division of powers in Kirkuk and the replacement of the Peshmerga 

with Iraqi security forces in the province were unacceptable. Kurdistan 

Alliance members had walked out of parliament over these issues. A further point of contention was whether the referendum to determine whether 

Kirkuk would join the Kurdistan Democratic Party region would be on 

the provincial elections ballot. After several weeks of additional negotia-
67

tions, Iraqi legislators reached a compromise that postponed the provincial 

elections in Kirkuk, Dahuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniyah provinces, until a 

date to be determined. The compromise further postponed elections from 

1 October 2008 until 31 January 2009 for the remaining 14 provinces, did 

not reduce Kurdish power on the existing Kirkuk provincial council, and 

approved the appointment of a special Council of Representatives committee to address the overall Kirkuk dispute. This modified version of the 

election law passed on 24 September and was ratified 7 October 2008 by 

the Iraqi Presidential Council.50

The 1st BCT’s Civil Military Operations (CMO) section, consisting 

of the brigade S9 and 6 Soldiers, worked hand-in-hand with the 10-member Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk governance team during 2008 

to identify, encourage, and develop moderate potential candidates for the 

Kirkuk city and provincial councils. The CMO operations section and 

team members urged Arab political parties to expand and to become more 

involved in the Kirkuk political process and prodded all eligible Kirkuk 

citizens to cast their votes in the forthcoming provincial elections. According to the brigade CMO operations section leader Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, the 1st BCT changed its focus from security to governance 

in February 2008.51

Civil Military Operations Soldiers used a series of 30, 60, and 90-

day milestones to track and evaluate the brigade’s progress in attaining 

governance line of operation goals and objectives. They also assessed the 

performance of the city, district, and provincial councils in Kirkuk using a 

diversified set of criteria for measurement that included: code of conduct, 

council executive functions and relations, meeting and organizational procedures, citizen participation, project oversight, budgeting and auditing, 

and strategic planning. Periodic written evaluations described how councils were performing when measured against each criterion. For example, 

if a council was performing satisfactorily when measured against the code 

of conduct track, then the evaluation might read, “council is generally 

honest and works for the benefit of the community with personal gain for 

themselves lower in priority.”52 Finally, a comprehensive written assessment summarized the council’s overall governance performance, recommended corrective actions if necessary, and identified resource requirements. These assessments assisted Iraqi officials in Kirkuk with reaching 

for their ultimate goal of self-sufficiency and simultaneously provided 1st 

BCT Soldiers greater insight into Iraqi politics.53

The 1st BCT Judge Advocate Section organized a rule of law working 

group in January 2008 which coordinated brigade and Provincial Recon-
68

struction Team legal assistance activities in Kirkuk Province. Members 

of the working group included the brigade deputy commanding officer, 

brigade command judge advocate, provincial reconstruction rule of law 

team, provincial and local police transition teams, and several US civilian 

advisors to the Iraqi police. The group developed a comprehensive rule of 

law strategy that emphasized improving legal systems and infrastructure, 

and building law enforcement and judicial capabilities, with the intent of 

creating fair and transparent adherence to the province rule of law. Because of the working group’s effort, Colonel Paschal upgraded rule of law 

to a separate line of operation in the brigade campaign plan.54

Lieutenant Colonel Roseanne Bennett, the brigade’s Judge Advocate, credited improved security, better integration, extensive command 

involvement, cooperation between Iraqi judicial and police leaders, and 

the Provincial Reconstruction Team rule of law team for significant improvements to the legal system in Kirkuk. By 2008, training programs for 

police, correctional officers, station chiefs, and deputies were operational; 

four new district courthouses were built; and a major crimes unit facility was nearing completion. These successful efforts to upgrade the legal 

infrastructure in Kirkuk allowed the 1st BCT rule of law team to devote 

more time, energy, and money to improving various judicial processes, enhancing the capabilities of their Iraqi counterparts, and expanding public 

access to the court system.55

The 1st BCT Soldiers and Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk 

representatives also worked with several civilian organizations such as 

Save the Children, the Kirkuk Jurist Union, and the Kirkuk Net for Civil 

Society to both improve the Iraqi justice system and educate the public 

regarding their legal rights. These affiliations led to and resulted in Iraqis 

opening their own Iraqi legal information office and an Iraqi women’s 

legal aid clinic in Kirkuk. As Lieutenant Colonel Bennett noted, these 

organizations were established to provide, “Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems,”56 In March 2008, the Iraqi judges moved the major crimes court 

from the K1 Iraqi army base to the Kirkuk courthouse in Kirkuk city to improve accessibility for defense attorneys, families, and the public. The 1st 

BCT rule of law team viewed the fact that Iraqi judges were beginning to 

actually convict criminals as a positive sign that the Soldiers’ system-wide 

training efforts were paying off.57 Finally and perhaps most importantly, 

in May, Iraqi judicial and police officials convened the first Criminal Justice Council at Forward Operating Base Warrior to discuss various criminal justice system issues. “Our efforts will have an enduring impact in 

Kirkuk...the CJC [Criminal Justice Council] is a testament to the improved 
69

relationships and increase cooperation among our Iraqi counterparts...and 

the willingness of Iraqi leaders to assume complete responsibility for their 

legal system,” Lieutenant Colonel Roseanne Bennett said, adding later, 

“we got this right for our province at this time.”58 Multi-National ForceIraq commanding general, Raymond Odierno apparently agreed, having 

told Colonel Paschal during 1st BCTs out briefing in 2008, “your rule of 

law [in Kirkuk] is more advanced than we have in Baghdad.”59

Colonel Paschal emphasized the connection between security and 

good governance in Kirkuk. Attacks in the Kirkuk area of operations 

dropped from 350 per month in July 2007 to less than 100 incidents in October 2008.60 Improved security set the conditions for expanded 1st BCT 

efforts along the governance, economic development, and rule of law lines 

of operation. Paschal also described how improvements in nonlethal lines 

helped weaken the insurgency. “I had to address the political, the social, 

and the economic needs [in Kirkuk] that were fueling the insurgency,” he 

explained.61 After three months in Iraq, the 1st BCT reassessed their campaign plan priorities. As a result, their security operations and Iraqi forces 

training became part of the brigade’s nonlethal lines of operation. Large 

cordon and search operations gave way to direct action targeting of insurgent leaders, and the team opened five additional company-sized combat 

outposts and joint coordination centers, located in conjunction with Iraqi 

security forces. Adding these additional outposts helped extend the government and the team’s reach deeper into the province that complied with 

Multi-National Force-Iraq Commanding General David Petraeus’ intent to 

“get out and live among the people.”62 

With respect to ethnic tensions in Kirkuk, average citizens interacted 

reasonably well, according to Paschal. It was the heightened rhetoric of 

the political leadership that stirred up ethnic discontent. Thus, helping 

local politicians deal with the contentious power sharing arrangement in 

Kirkuk consumed significant amounts of BCT and Provincial Reconstruction Team time and energy. “There were three key positions: governor, 

deputy governor, and provincial council chairman. Each of the ethnicities 

[Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen] was going to take one and that was pretty 

easy to figure out,” said Colonel Paschal.63 The most significant challenge 

involved determining the makeup of the provincial council. Since Kurds 

enjoyed a majority in the province, they naturally demanded a majority 

of seats on the council. Arabs, on the other hand, consistently opposed 

granting majority status to the Kurds. “Coming up with [a power sharing 

agreement] was the biggest challenge I spent time on, both personally and 

in conjunction with the PRT,” Paschal noted.64
70

The 1st BCT also expanded the Sons of Iraq program, a program initiated in Kirkuk province by 3d BCT, 25th Infantry Division, during the 

previous rotation. The members were primarily from local Arab tribes and 

balked at the idea of being described as part of the “Awakening” movement. “We haven’t been asleep,” the recruits told the brigade Soldiers. 

“We are not going to use the Awakening...we want to be Isnad (support) 

forces”65 Colonel Paschal willingly concurred with the request. “You guys 

are going to support the legitimate Iraqi security forces and not replace 

them,” he explained to the Arabs. “That was a great information operations theme for me,” Paschal said.66 Eventually, the 1st BCT employed 12 

contractors each of whom hired several hundred Sons of Iraq members, to 

perform security duty on main supply routes. The Sons, many who were 

unemployed former Saddam-era Iraqi army soldiers, used the money that 

they earned to support their families and to purchase goods from local 

markets throughout the province. The 1st BCT soldiers convened quarterly Sons of Iraq Unity Conferences and hired unemployed Iraqi teachers 

to teach the members how to read and write. The ability to read and write 

qualified the members to seek employment as liaison officers. The Sons of 

Iraq sent their liaison officers to work with Iraqi police and security forces. 

That was “a huge success story in my mind, exchanging LNOs [liaison officers], cooperating and working together,” Colonel Paschal pointed out.67

Integrating Sons of Iraq members into Kirkuk society was another indication to local Arabs that government was working for Arabs too and that 

they should consider further increasing their participation in government 

activities. 

The 1st BCT was also deeply involved in facilitating Iraq’s national 

reconciliation program to integrate former insurgents into the country’s 

new democratic society. Former insurgents began arriving at Forward Operating Base Warrior asking to join the program. When Colonel Paschal 

asked Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Odierno for more guidance about reconciliation, the general told him bluntly 

to just “figure it out.”68 Initially, Paschal was disappointed in the general’s 

response, but soon realized that reconciliation had to be figured out at 

the local level—one size did not fit all. The brigade began holding reconciliation days every month to accommodate screening those citizens who 

wanted to enlist in the national program. On reconciliation days, Soldiers 

thoroughly screened the applicants and then entered their personal data 

in the Biometrics Automated Toolset/Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment system. Those citizens who passed the screening were 

accepted into the program and signed a declaration of allegiance to the 
71

government of Iraq. Reconciled former insurgents attended required training classes and eventually took positions with the Sons of Iraq Isnad forces 

or the Civil Service Corps in Kirkuk. By the time the 1st BCT redeployed 

in December 2008, 780 applicants were in various stages of the Kirkuk 

reconciliation program pipeline.69

The 1st BCT governance mentorship program was another important 

component of the brigade’s governance line of operation. Iraqi leaders 

from 5 districts and 13 subdistricts in Kirkuk province participated in the 

training. The purpose of the mentorship program was to teach Iraqi government officials the fine points of conducting meetings. “You can’t just 

go to the council meeting and say you are all jacked up...that was a terrible council meeting,” explained Colonel Paschal.70 Brigade and Provincial Reconstruction Team mentors assisted council members step-by-step 

through the meeting, planning, and execution process. They prodded by 

asking questions such as “What is the focus of this week’s city council 

meeting? What are the inputs and outputs? Can I help you make some copies [of the agenda]?”71 Soon, council meetings became more effective and 

efficient as the members focused on accomplishing the tasks in their respective agendas and started closely following parliamentary procedures. 

Although economic development in Kirkuk province improved at a 

reasonable rate during 1st BCT’s rotation, Colonel Paschal thought that 

unresolved issues involving political power-sharing and whether or not 

Kirkuk city would become part of the Kurdistan regional government constrained his ability to attract additional outside investment. “They [outside 

investors] weren’t sure who they were going to be dealing with in the future because the outcome hadn’t been decided...are they going to deal with 

the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] or an Iraqi province,” Paschal 

stated in pointing out the nature of the dilemma.72

Colonel Paschal also lamented the difference between Kurds and Arabs in their respective approaches to the political process in Kirkuk. The 

two Kurdish political parties, KDP and the PUK, recognized the need to 

work together and to cooperate in local elections. As a result, Kurds nominated a compromise candidate acceptable to both parties, Mustafa AbdulRahman, who was eventually elected the governor of Kirkuk province. 

The Arabs, however, voted by tribe or by clan, each of which submitted their own candidates. Their failure to cooperate resulted in a diluted 

overall effort and they ultimately lost by a split vote. The 1st BCT and 

Provincial Reconstruction Team governance teams worked tirelessly with 

Kirkuk’s Arabs, first to bring them to the table, and next to convince them 
72

to consolidate their efforts and form a viable political party.73 Otherwise, 

the political process would lead to governance that could be perceived as 

unfair, especially by Kirkuk’s Arabs.

Colonel Paschal was similarly concerned with the flow of funding 

from Baghdad to Kirkuk. “The Minister of Education [in Baghdad] had 

money...I needed teachers, I needed school [supplies]...the link to get that 

money into Kirkuk was lacking,” Paschal said.74 He attributed this shortcoming to an inadequate Iraqi middle class bureaucracy, which had seriously diminished under the Baathist regime, and to an unwillingness of 

those Iraqis who were serving in bureaucratic positions to spend the money and to make things happen. Paschal also expressed his concern regarding continued one-year US unit rotations. He favored individual Soldier 

rotations, noting that “counterinsurgency in this environment is a relationship based game...I could go back in and at least know the key players, 

know how they think, know how they operate, and then potentially move 

them to the next level.”75

The Role of the PRT in Governance Operations

Clearly, Paschal and his Soldiers relied on the Kirkuk PRT for critical support in the campaign to foster good governance in Kirkuk. That 

team was led by Mr. Howard Keegan, US State Department; deputy team 

leader, Lieutenant Colonel David Menegon, US Army; US Agency for International Development senior representative, Dr. Jeffrey Ashley, and; attached brigade S9 liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, US 

Army. Together the brigade and Provincial Reconstruction Team developed a joint campaign plan to ensure that working together complemented 

each other’s efforts. Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk also provided 

a mentor to each of the BCT’s battalions. In effect, the BCT became “a 

supporting effort to the PRT [provincial reconstruction team” for nonlethal 

lines of the operation, according to Colonel Paschal.76

In February 2008, Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk began developing a comprehensive strategy and monitoring plan that covered the 

following critical pillars of operation: rule of law, economic development, 

governance, health and education, essential services, agriculture, and public diplomacy. The intent of the plan was to improve Team Kirkuk’s assistance programs by establishing realistic objectives, benchmarks, and 

also metrics and measuring results, all of which contributed to a more 

self-reliant Iraq and was consistent with the team mission to “improve 

the livelihoods of Iraqi citizens in Kirkuk by promoting reconciliation, 

shaping the political environment, supporting economic development, and 
73

building the capacity of provincial government to hasten self-sufficiency.”77 The plan further intended to break the prevailing project-by-project 

approaches to building governance in Kirkuk by implementing overall, 

broad-based, strategies versus simply managing projects. To that end, 

planners developed the following five-part process to address each of the 

team’s pillars of operation: conceptualize, communicate, and concur; develop the strategic framework; prepare a performance monitoring plan; 

map and chart projects, and; report to stakeholders.78

The Kirkuk PRT strategic planning process also included a “value 

chain analysis” that specifically involved collaboration with 1st BCT regarding nonlethal projects and programs. According to team deputy leader, Lieutenant Colonel David Menegon, the “value chain” was a linked 

series of coordinated activities designed to maximize value and minimize 

costs by identifying project needs and pinpointing areas in which the team 

should focus its efforts.79 Responsible individuals at the team and their 

BCT counterparts developed strategic objectives for each of the seven key 

pillars of operation. The governance pillar objective, for example, called 

for “provincial and district government entities to self-govern effectively 

and deliver government services to the people.”80 Increased expenditures 

of Iraqi government funds and improvements in the effectiveness and legitimacy of provincial and district governments were indicators of success 

with respect to the governance objective, in which everyone in the province now had a stake. Additionally, each strategic objective had a series of 

expected intermediate results and performance measures. The increased 

capacity to execute budgets was one of the intermediate results associated 

with the governance objective and included budget preparation, budget 

execution, and improved funding of district and subdistrict projects as performance measures. The revised strategic planning process helped the 1st 

BCT develop a unity-of-command effort in Kirkuk that included specific 

objectives and a methodology for measuring results.81 “There’s a growing feeling in the community for everyone to work together,” team leader 

Keegan observed, describing the Kirkuk environment in October 2008.82

Keegan also described several additional Provincial Reconstruction 

Team Kirkuk accomplishments which were achieved in conjunction with 

the 1st BCT, including the introduction of civil rights into the corrections 

system, an electronic funds transfer program that allowed a few banks 

in Kirkuk to transact international business, establishing and opening the 

professional business women’s center, and the expanded Al-Aman microfinance operations center. With help from the team, efforts by Kirkuk’s 

provincial governor convinced the Baghdad government to fund addi-
74

tional oil refining capacity which finally progressed by late 2008. “On the 

political side, I think we’ve made more progress as far as getting a true 

unity government back in place,” Keegan said. “We do have a seated government...it’s been meeting regularly...we still maintain a quorum in our 

provincial council...it’s been business pretty much as usual,” he added.83

Unfortunately, although Arabs and Turkmen participated in most provincial government functions, both blocs boycotted official council meetings 

for several months during 2008 to protest the Kurdish-dominated council’s 

threat to support Kurdistan regional government efforts to annex Kirkuk. 

About 30 US Army Reserve Soldiers from the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion were attached to PRT Kirkuk to provide security services and expertise in various disciplines. Soldiers from the battalion, who were members of the governance team, recorded and transcribed the proceedings of 

all weekly Kirkuk provincial council meetings in chambers at the Kirkuk 

government building. A report of one meeting, for example, noted that 30 

members attended from the Kurdish Brotherhood List and the Turkmen 

bloc on 17 June 2008. Rizgar Ali, a PUK party Kurd and provincial council chairperson presided over the meeting in which Arab bloc members 

were conspicuously absent. 

Provincial Reconstruction Team governance Soldiers also attended 

and recorded the proceedings of weekly western Kirkuk Arab group meetings. US Ambassador Thomas C. Krajesky, senior advisor on northern Iraq 

affairs at the US Embassy in Baghdad flew to Kirkuk and attended the 23 

June 2008 Arab group meeting. Hawija district council chairperson, Abu 

Saddam, addressed the group, expressing his concern that the changing 

demographics in Kirkuk would affect the upcoming elections and that the 

current Kurdish migration would likely increase the number of Kurd seats 

on the provincial council. He took the opportunity to call for Arab unity 

in preparing for and participating in the approaching provincial elections. 

The 418th Civil Affairs Battalion Soldiers compiled the records from hundreds of such meetings during their rotation in Kirkuk.84

Thomas Keegan, the provincial reconstruction team leader, expressed 

concern that American citizens were losing patience with the Iraq war effort, but went on to point out and explain the importance of helping Iraqis 

develop smooth-running national, provincial, district, and city governments:

What we have asked the Iraqi people to do—basically go from 

a dictatorship to a full-blown democracy in just a few years—is 

exceptionally difficult for any group of people...most here had no 

background at all in democracy or true government...they’re mak-
75

ing great strides.85 We [need] to make sure that what we’re doing 

is not for us; we’re doing it for them...we’re training them to take 

over [and] the best thing that we can do is to leave a functioning 

structure in place at the end of our tenure.There’s a real opportunity to help these people, and I think they deserve it.86

But in late 2008, the PRT’s role in making that opportunity available 

came under threat as its military contingent was scheduled to decline from 

30 Soldiers to 10 during the overall US troop reduction initiative in Iraq. 

Such a drastic cut would likely derail many of the delicate political and 

social advances made by the team during the past several years, according 

to Keegan. Lack of a security detail would hamper daily team movements 

to Kirkuk’s downtown provincial government building and prevent team 

members from walking the streets and talking to local citizens—“a key to 

reconciliation,” Keegan said. “If we don’t get out, it’s hard for us to know 

what the people are after...[the cuts] couldn’t come at a worse time,” he 

explained.87 Iraqi team translator, Araz Ahmed, agreed, noting, “the American presence is the only thing keeping the fragile peace between Kirkuk’s 

ethnic groups.”88

Only two civil affairs teams, eight Soldiers total, replaced the 30-member company from the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion at Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk, when the company redeployed in December 2008. 

Additional team security was eventually provided by the 18th Engineer 

Brigade that replaced the 1st BCT in the same timeframe. Nine months 

later, Keegan finally left for another State Department assignment after 

serving more than two years in Kirkuk. 

The 18th Engineer Brigade Moves to Kirkuk

In November 2008, the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division was relieved 

in Kirkuk Province by the 18th Engineer Brigade. Headquartered in Heidelberg, Germany, the 18th Engineer Brigade deployed initially to Tikrit, 

Iraq in May 2008. In November, the brigade relocated to Kirkuk, and was 

assigned to the 1st Armored division, which led Multi-National ForceNorth. The brigade’s focus in Kirkuk was reconstruction and nonlethal engagements with the provincial government. The 1st Battalion, 67th Armor 

(1-67 AR) from the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, served as the 18th 

Engineer Brigade’s only maneuver battalion. Colonel Matthew Russell, 

commander of the 18th Engineers, also spoke at the transfer of authority 

event in Kirkuk, pledging that, “his Soldiers would earn the respect of 

the people of Kirkuk and build on US Forces’ successes there, just as the 

troops of the 1st BCT did.”89 In less than a month after the 18th Engineer’s 
76

arrival in Kirkuk, the United States and the Government of Iraq announced 

that they had successfully concluded negotiations on two historically significant agreements:

A Strategic Framework Agreement that covers our overall political, economic, and security relationship with Iraq, and a Security Agreement—otherwise known as the Status of Forces Agreement—that implements our security relationship.90

Bilateral negotiations had begun the previous March and the Iraqi cabinet and the Council of Representatives approved the Strategic Framework 

Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement agreements on 27 November 

2008, with the Iraq Presidency Council endorsing the Council of Representatives vote on 4 December 2008. In an official letter to US troops 

in Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq Commanding General, Raymond Odierno announced that Status of Forces Agreement would become effective 

1 January 2009 and noted that both agreements demonstrated the United 

States’ commitment to Iraq, its people, and to good governance, security, 

and stability in the region.91 Bush administration officials credited the success of the surge, increased security gains, and the expanded capacity and 

confidence of the Iraqi government with setting the proper conditions for 

harmonious negotiations with Iraqi officials.92 

In Kirkuk, news of the Strategic Framework Agreement and Status of 

Forces Agreement agreements came just three weeks prior to the fourth 

Kirkuk Criminal Justice Council conference at the Iraqi Police Academy. 

At this conference, Kirkuk political leaders, provincial judges, Iraqi army 

commanders, provincial police chief Iraqi Major General Jamal Thakr 

Bakr, Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk representatives, and 18th 

Engineer Brigade Soldiers focused their discussions on how to implement 

the agreements locally and what the impact might be on the city and the 

province. “The event was significant because it took place on the eve of the 

effective date of the security agreement and the Iraqi army commanders 

from the province were in attendance,” explained Captain Jennifer Venghaus, command Judge Advocate for the 18th Engineer Brigade and rule 

of law expert for Kirkuk province.93 Conference attendees also addressed 

potentially controversial rule of law issues posed by the new agreements, 

such as Iraqi jurisdiction over Coalition forces, arrest and search warrants, 

and the procedures for detaining Iraqi army soldiers by Iraqi police. Guest 

speaker at the conference, Lieutenant Colonel David Snodgrass, deputy 

commanding officer for the 3d BCT, 25th Infantry Division told those 

gathered, “the people of Iraq have come through a lot of adversity during 

the past five years, [but] it is the beginning of a new year...the dawning of 
77

a new day for Iraq.” To reassure the Iraqi attendees of continued Coalition 

assistance, Snodgrass added,“The United States will recognize the sovereignty of Iraq...and the US remains committed to supporting the Iraqi 

security forces and the government of Iraq as they improve their capabilities.”94

Surprisingly, Multi-National Force-Iraq ordered the 18th Engineer 

Brigade to redeploy once again in February 2009, this time to Forward 

Operating Base Marez in Nineveh Province to oversee the Mosul Reconstruction Cell. During their short stay in Kirkuk, the 18th Engineer 

Soldiers worked to enhance governance and improve infrastructure in the 

province. “Our time in Kirkuk has prepared us perfectly for our new mission in Mosul,” Colonel Russell said, acknowledging that his unit was 

ready for its next assignment.95 “We’ve conducted uncharacteristic lines 

of operation that a normal engineer brigade doesn’t do, but we took it on,” 

Russell later explained.96 

The 2d BCT, 1st Cavalry Division Relieves 18th Engineer Brigade

Colonel Ryan Gonsalves and the 2d BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, took 

control of the Kirkuk area of operations on 14 February 2009, “a pivotal moment in the ethnically diverse province, since Kirkuk was the only 

province...that did not hold provincial elections on 31 January 2009,” according to Major Robert Blackmon, brigade Judge Advocate.97 The transfer of authority event, by this time referred to as a Provincial Partnership 

Ceremony that involved local Iraqi citizens and politicians, Iraqi police 

and soldiers, Provincial Reconstruction Team representatives, and Coalition forces. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry (1-8 CAV), under Lieutenant 

Colonel David Lesperance, deployed to Hawija and the 4th Battalion, 9th 

Cavalry (4-9 CAV), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Shoffner, 

assumed responsibility for the Kirkuk city area. In his speech, Colonel 

Gonsalves praised the Iraqi security forces and the team for their progress 

and excellent work, and stressed the importance of the reconciliation program in Kirkuk. He also emphasized that the operational environment in 

Iraq was changing, and as such, although the security threat remained serious, reconstruction and helping Iraqi leaders solve Iraqi problems would 

be key priorities. While encouraging those in attendance to become stakeholders in the governance process and reconstruction efforts in the province, Gonsalves told the audience: 

Kirkuk represents an opportunity for Iraq to prove its ability to 

resolve differences through meaningful discussion with all parties 
78

represented. Each one of us believes the future of Iraq is bright, 

but we still have work to do...as partners we will share in the labor 

ahead of us, and each one of us will feel personal pride when that 

goal is reached.98

Early in the 2d BCT’s rotation, Colonel Gonsalves reorganized the 

brigade staff into three working groups in order to build stronger relationships with the Iraqi leaders who would soon be assuming responsibility 

for security and governance in Kirkuk province. The Iraqi Security Force 

and Security Working Group focused on training Iraqi military and police units, coordinated insurgent targeting, and ensured that the brigade 

was still prepared to conduct contingency operations, if necessary. The 2d 

BCT’s Economics and Governance Working Group concentrated on assisting Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk in developing civil capacity and initiating governance-oriented plans and programs in the province. 

The Investigative Task Force worked with provincial judges and other 

Kirkuk legal system officials to enhance the rule of law and to train Iraqi 

police in proper evidence collection procedures. The new staff configuration greatly enhanced information flow and significantly reduced the 2d 

BCT’s response time in both identifying and then resolving problems.99

As US Forces throughout Iraq began to draw down and deploy from 

Iraq, the 2d BCT partnered in Kirkuk province with the 15th, 46th, 47th, 

and 49th Brigades of 12th Iraqi Army Division, commanded by Iraqi major general Abdul Amir Zaidi. The 10th Brigade (Peshmerga), Kurdish 

Army, under Brigadier General Sherko Fatah Al Shwani also operated in 

northern districts of the province. A significant component of 2d BCTs 

mission entailed turning over the security line of operation in Kirkuk to 

these Iraqi security forces. During a 2009 visit to Kirkuk, Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, praised local political 

leaders and Iraqi military commanders for their significant achievements 

in improving both governance and security in the province, noting, “Iraqis 

are working their way through the rule of law and [learning] how to govern 

themselves.”100 Mullen, however, cautioned Kirkuk government officials 

and Iraqi Security Force commanders warning them of the challenges they 

faced now that Iraqi security would lead security operations and further 

pointed out that US military forces in Iraq would be drawing down from 

125,000 to between 35,000 to 50,000 troops after the January 2010 Iraqi 

elections. “My message to [Kirkuk’s population] today,” Admiral Mullen 

explained, “was that we were leaving, and [they] better figure it out.”101

Faced with the evolving security arrangements in Kirkuk and with 

the upcoming 2010 national parliamentary elections, Colonel Gonsalves 
79

believed that the primary goal for the 2d BCT in Kirkuk was to strengthen 

community relations by enhancing ethnic interactions among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In an earlier interview, Colonel Gonsalves provided a 

more detailed description of 2d BCTs mission in Kirkuk;

Building trust in all communities is [our] goal. This will improve 

the security environment and the political process greatly.102 Our 

mission is through, with, and by our Iraqi partners, [2d BCT] 

builds trust in all communities to enable dialog by providing a secure environment for the political process to go forward, neutralize al-Qaeda in Iraq and violent extremists, set the conditions and 

transition security, governance, essential services, and economics 

in a representative manner in order to enhance Kurdish-Arab relations and protect the people of Kirkuk.103

The 2d BCT planners developed a list of specific tasks designed to 

address 13 critical drivers of instability in Kirkuk. Colonel Gonsalves explained:

 Our efforts are currently focused on issues associated with the 

disputed status of Kirkuk, KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] boundaries, a perceived lack of legitimate representative 

governance, security forces, insurgents, oil, drought, SOI [Sons of 

Iraq] transition, public services, land-property disputes, the return 

and absorption of displaced people, and unemployment.104

The corresponding tasks intended by the brigade to help mitigate these 

causes of instability focused on protecting the people, enabling the political process, enhancing communications, building trust within the various 

Kirkuk communities, maintaining neutrality, maintaining liaison with the 

Peshmerga, and strengthening connections with the Iraqi Security Force 

throughout the province. As an example, Gonsalves noted that, having 

worked together successfully since 2003, the Kirkuk provincial council 

was proficient at solving its own problems. However, new national programs forced upon Kirkuk by the government of Iraq occasionally disrupted the council’s ability to govern itself. Also, the Iraqi government’s 

dispatching of additional Iraqi Army forces to Kirkuk, while insisting that 

Peshmerga troops redeploy elsewhere from Kirkuk, created resentment 

and instability between Kurd and Arab council members.105

Mediating disputes between the Shia Muslim-dominated Iraqi Army 

and Kurds or their Peshmerga forces became a full time occupation for the 

2d BCT Soldiers in 2009. Defusing volatile situations and acting as local 

power brokers was an ongoing requirement for the brigade personnel. “In 
80

the absence of political mediation, the situation may quickly deteriorate 

into violence, assassinations, and maybe [civil] war,” said Iraqi political 

analyst, Haider al Musawi.106 Fearing a potential clash between the Iraqi 

army and the Peshmerga, US Army spokesperson in Kirkuk, Major Scott 

Rawlinson, later observed, “the greatest threat is that some minor incident 

could start a chain reaction that could lead to armed conflict.”107 Since 

Kirkuk’s Arab leaders often complained that American mediators favored 

the Kurds, Colonel Gonsalves hosted a joint luncheon meeting in March 

2009 for Arab general Zaidi and Kurdish general Al Shwani at Forward 

Operating Base Warrior in an attempt to resolve differences between the 

two military leaders and their respective ethnic groups. Kurds were particularly suspicious of Zaidi since he had served in Saddam’s army in the 

Kirkuk area during the Baathist regime. Although the generals resolved 

several minor issues at the meeting, Al Shwani insisted that Kurds had the 

right to field their own army.108 Prior to the March 2010 Iraq national elections, Iraqi Security Force and Kurd army forces established combined 

coordination centers and joint checkpoints in Kirkuk province, under the 

supervision of US forces. According to a December 2009 Department of 

Defense report to Congress, “US force presence in the disputed areas continued to play a key moderating role between Pesh Megra and government 

of Iraq forces.”109

Colonel Gonsalves and the 2d BCT encountered two additional governance related issues in the spring of 2009. The first involved the release 

of a long-awaited United Nations Assistance Mission-Iraq’s report on disputed internal boundaries in northern Iraq. UN special representative Steffan de Mistura personally presented copies of the report to Prime Minister 

Nuri al-Maliki, President Jalal Talibani, and president of the autonomous 

Kurdish region, Massoud Barzani. This report, prepared by a team of diplomats and other experts, was analytical in nature and was intended to 

serve as a point of departure for future discussions, and therefore offered 

no concrete suggestions regarding the future of Kirkuk Governorate. Adding to the confusion, the report outlined four potential options for dealing 

with the future administrative status of Kirkuk: 

● Remain as a standard Iraqi governorate.

● Become a governorate managed jointly by Baghdad and the 

Kurdistan Regional Government.

● Become a governorate with special status and expanded selfrule.

● Step back and reformulate article 140.110
81

The United Nations Assistance Mission-Iraq report went on to suggest that 

local government officials and political leaders resolve disputed internal 

boundary differences locally, using the constitution of Iraq for guidance, 

reaching a political agreement, and then validating the agreement through 

referendum.111

Ethnic tensions heightened in Kirkuk among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, since the United Nations Assistance Mission-Iraq’s report failed to 

offer specific solutions to provincial problems and simply recommended 

further dialogue. Kirkuk’s officials were looking for someone higher up 

in the government of Iraq to help them resolve the boundaries problem, 

but United Nations and the Government of Iraq “basically kicked the can 

down the road,” explained the 2d BCT deputy commander, Lieutenant 

Colonel Hugh McNeely.112 As a result, Colonel Gonsalves, Lieutenant 

Colonel Andrew Shoffner, and the 4-9 CAV Soldiers stepped up their interactions with political leaders in Kirkuk, offering suggestions, refereeing 

debates, and interceding in disputes when necessary. “As we get questions 

[about the United Nations Assistance Mission-Iraq’s report],” Gonsalves 

said, “our responsibility is...to ensure that we get [Kirkuk government officials] accurate and timely information.”113

The second governance issue that affected 2d BCT operations in 

Kirkuk involved the Kurdistan Regional Government’s presidential and 

national assembly elections. These elections would be the first for Iraqi 

Kurdistan’s 2.5 million citizens since 2005. In February 2009, the Kurdistan Government announced plans for the elections scheduled originally 

for May, but postponed them until late July to allow more preparation 

time. Additionally, the existing Kurdistan national assembly passed a new 

constitution for the Kurdistan region in early summer 2009. This new 

Kurdistan constitution conflicted with the Iraqi national constitution on 

several points. For example, the Kurdistan Regional Government constitution claimed that all of Kirkuk province, including Kirkuk city, be the 

autonomous Kurdistan region. Iraqi national political leaders in Baghdad viewed the Kurdistan Government claim for Kirkuk as an attempt 

to splinter Iraq. “This lays the foundation for a separate state—it is not 

a constitution for a region,” complained Osama al-Nujaifi, a Sunni Arab 

member of the national parliament. “It is a declaration of hostile intent 

and confrontation...of course it will lead to escalation,” al-Nujaifi said, 

denouncing the Kurdistan Regional Government constitution.114 By July 

2009, the Kurdistan Government relented and postponed a constitutional 

referendum that was concurrently scheduled with the Government parliamentary and presidential elections. 
82

 “From a political perspective, we see Kurd-Arab tensions rising daily...all along the fault line now, [but] not to a level that we can’t control,” 

Colonel Gonsalves stated in May 2009 as Kurdistan Regional Government election campaigning got underway.115 Despite rising ethnic tensions, however, Gonsalves did not expect any major difficulties requiring 2d BCT assistance before or during the Kurdistan elections. In April, 

Gonsalves had met with president Massoud Barzani regarding potential 

support for the elections by the 2d BCT, which eventually involved only 

information sharing and reliance on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights, rather than actual ground force participation in polling 

site security operations. As scheduled on 25 July 2009 Iraqi Kurdistan 

held peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections and Barzani was reelected Kurdistan Regional Government president with 70 percent of the 

vote, as expected. The Kurdistani List, a PUK and KDP combined effort, 

and the Kurdish Movement for Change List (Gorran) won 59 and 25 of the 

111 national assembly seats, respectively.116

In a continuing effort to communicate clearly and concisely with local 

Iraqis, the 2d BCT expanded information operations in Kirkuk; themes 

and messages reflected the newly combined Iraqi and Coalition approach 

to security and governance in the province. The brigade also convinced 

the 10th Peshmerga Brigade to assign a liaison officer to the Kirkuk Provincial Joint Coordination Center. This move improved the time required 

to resolve critical issues and helped prevent overreactions due to misunderstandings. To further improve relationships among the stakeholders in 

Kirkuk, Colonel Gonsalves began inviting provincial political leaders and 

government officials to weekly security meetings, which typically only involved the Iraqi army, Iraqi police, and Peshmerga. Political leaders were 

thus exposed to discussions involving insurgent targeting and the local 

implementation of the terms and conditions of the Strategic Framework 

Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement agreements. “We will probably see more involvement, both from the governor and the security chiefs 

in Kirkuk,” Gonsalves said in May 2009, then added, “the dialogue we 

have right now is working very well.”117

Further, the 2d BCT continued and improved sovernance-related 

projects initiated by previous US units. For example, the 2d BCT Soldiers acquired and delivered 250,000 books to 900 schools, renovated or 

constructed 25 schools, rewarded exemplary Iraqi police with US Army 

medals, granted hundreds of micro loans to small businesses using the 

Commander's Emergency Response Program funds, and organized grievance meetings to resolve community issues involving Iraqi citizens, po-
83

litical leaders, and local police. Brigade troops created a Kirkuk Chamber of Commerce database, which contained all of the city businesses, 

established an Iraqi military engineer facility at K-1, and organized the 

Kirkuk Women’s Rights Conference. They also trained Iraqi police force 

investigators how to process evidence, educated judges and lawyers on 

criminal forensics, recommended procedures for developing agricultural 

cooperatives, expanded the Kirkuk grain silo, and improved waste removal services for the community.118 The 2d BCT deputy commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh McNeely, proudly noted, “the partnership between the 

Government of Iraq, the civil affairs team, the [2d BCT] battalions, and 

Provincial Reconstruction Team was responsible for these projects coming 

together.”119

In March 2009, the 2d BCT transferred the responsibility of paying the 

Sons of Iraq from US forces to Iraqi government officials. “This is a great 

step in the right direction...by taking over payments, Iraqi officials are 

showing us that they are truly taking over from Coalition forces and showing their citizens that they are taking the lead,” said Sons of Iraq leader, 

Skeikh Farhan, after receiving his March monthly salary.120 Later in the 

year, brigade Soldiers began installing placards that read: “Iraqi partnership provincial approved convoy, thank you for your patience and support” 

on all military vehicles in acknowledgement of the Status of Forces Agreement requirement for the all US combat forces to withdraw from Iraqi 

cities. Soldiers advising and assisting Iraqis still traveled within Kirkuk 

city to meet with their counterparts and other government officials. “These 

signs show that we are working with our partners and that we’re abiding 

by the security agreement,” said Major Frazier Epperson, the 2d BCT information officer.121 Brigade engineering officer, Major Andrew Liffring, 

further explained, “that by adding the signs, the brigade is...showing that 

the US military is [now] in a supporting role rather than being directly 

involved in the day-to-day operations of the city.”122

In September 2009, 2d BCT released 165 detainees from a Coalition 

detention facility at Forward Operating Base Warrior. Under the provisions of a new detainee release program, the Kirkuk provincial council 

members took responsibility for the released prisoners and began helping 

them reintegrate into local society. In explaining the significance of the 

detainee release program, Captain Erin Barrett, the 2d BCT provost marshal, said:

This program has been a unifying factor among the council members, because they are all eager to help detainees, no matter their 
84

ethnicity...and this was huge because the GoI [government of Iraq] 

is taking ownership of the issue, which is what we wanted.”123

In December 2009, during the transition between the 2d BCT and 

the incoming Soldiers from the 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division, the 2d 

BCT Soldiers introduced their replacements to the provincial and district 

council members, Iraqi army and police commanders, political party representatives, Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk representatives, and 

several Sons of Iraq leaders. The intent of these meetings was to ensure a 

seamless transfer of authority with the 1st BCT and to reinforce the strong 

relationships established during 2d BCT’s rotation for endurance. “The 

partner relationship is the core of why we’re here,” Major Christopher 

Norrie, operations officer for 2d BCT, had explained in February 2009 

when the brigade first arrived in Kirkuk.124 Clearly the lasting relationships 

built by 2d BCT Soldiers with the Kirkuk community enabled them not 

only to comply with General Odierno’s objective of enhancing Kurd-Arab 

relations, but also assisted them in promoting good governance by keeping 

their fingers on the pulse of ethnic tensions in Kirkuk. 

Between 2003 and 2009, each successive US Army unit that deployed 

to the Kirkuk area continued the governance line of operation programs. In 

many cases, Soldiers refined and improved earlier governance programs 

and introduced new ones. For example, during the 2005-2009 timeframe, 

civil affairs teams began to formally train Iraqi government officials and 

added the rule of law as a separate line of operation. As that period closed, 

a joint common campaign plan with Provincial Reconstruction Team 

Kirkuk placed brigades in a supporting role to the team for nonlethal 

operations. Iraqi leaders in Kirkuk built new courthouses, established a 

criminal justice council, validated the city’s police force, expanded the 

repatriation and relocation program, and improved overall Kurd and Arab 

reconciliation efforts. By late 2009, as US Forces throughout Iraq prepared to draw down their troop strength, Iraqis in Kirkuk were trained and 

ready to accept the responsibility of governing themselves. 
85

Notes

1. “General Casey Outlines Iraq Situation in News Conference,” American 

Forces Press Service, 12 October 2006, 1, http://www.defense.gov/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=1567 (accessed 22 July 2008). 

2. Willard Payne, “Crossfire War-Civil War Extends to Northern Iraq-Five 

Bombs in Kirkuk,” NewsBlaze.com, 17 September 2006, 1, http://www.newsblaze.com/story/20060917151044payn.nb/topstory.html (accessed 23 March 

2010).

3. Colonel David Gray, “DoD News Briefing with Colonel Gray from 

Iraq,” 21 April 2006, 1, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.

aspx?transcriptid=1264 (accessed 16 February 2010).

4. Robert Zelnick, “Iraq: Last Chance,” Policy Review, December 2006 & 

January 2007, 1, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/4884111.html 

(accessed 23 March 2010).

5. Zelnick, 1.

6. According to Robert Zelnick, some Kurds joked that Kurdistan would become the next American state.

7. Zelnick, 5.

8. Zelnick, 5.

9. Zelnick, 5. Zelnick points out that the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 

also proposed creating a federation of the nine predominantly Shia provinces in 

southern Iraq. 

10. Michael Knights, “Kirkuk in Transition: Confidence Building in Northern Iraq,” Washington Institute for NearEast Policy, April 2010, 28, http://www.

washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus102.pdf (accessed 21 April 2010).

11. Gray, 6. 

12. Mike Alberts, “3d Brigade Inherits Job Well Done,” Hawaii Army Weekly, 8 September 2006, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/HAW_Display.

asp?art_id=6589 (accessed 12 April 2010).

13. Thomas Ricks, The Gamble, (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2009), 

photo captions 172d.

14. “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials,” 10 January 

2007, 1-16. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-1.html 

(accessed 6 February 2007).

15. “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” National Security Council, 

January 2007, 6. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.

pdf (accessed 6 February 2008).
86

16. President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address – 2007,” 23 January 

2007, 5. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070123-2.

html (accessed 6 February 2008).

17. Colonel Patrick Stackpole, “DoD News Briefing with Colonel Patrick 

Stackpole via Teleconference from Kirkuk,” 8 June 2007, 1-2, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3985 (accessed 12 April 2010). 

18. Stackpole, 1. 

19. Stackpole, 4.

20. Andrew Lee Butters, “The Cloud Over Kirkuk,” Assyrian International 

News Agency, 21 March 2007, 1, http://www.aina.org/news/2007032194755.jsp 

(accessed 12 April 2010). 

21. Mike Alberts, “3d Brigade and Tribal Leaders Make History in Hawija,” 

Hawaii Army Weekly, 6 October 2006, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/

HAW_Display.asp?art_id=6684 (accessed 12 April 2010). 

22. Alberts, 1. 

23. Alberts, 1. 

24. Mike Alberts, “3d Brigade’s BSB Supports More Than Its Own in Iraq,” 

Hawaii Army Weekly, 17 November 2006, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.

mil/HAW_Display.asp?art_id=6854 (accessed 12 April 2010).

25. Mike Alberts, “Pediatric Hospital a Model for Medical Care,” Hawaii 

Army Weekly, 16 February 2007, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/HAW_

Display.asp?art_id=7092 (accessed 12 April 2010).

26. Alberts, 1.

27. Mike Alberts, “Military, Civilians Cooperate to Secure Iraqi Infrastructure,” Hawaii Army Weekly, 16 February 2007, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.

army.mil/HAW_Display.asp?art_id=7091 (accessed 12 April 2010). 

28. Alberts, 1. 

29. Michael Tuttle, “Deployed Study Qur’an, Improve Cultural Awareness in 

Iraq,” Hawaii Army Weekly, 2 March 2007, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.

mil/HAW_Display.asp?art_id=7143 (accessed 12 April 2010). 

 30. Tuttle, 1. 

31. Mike Alberts, “Wolfhound Relationships Aid Kirkuk Success,” Hawaii 

Army Weekly, 2 March 2007, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/HAW_Display.asp?art_id=7141 (accessed 12 April 2010). 

32. Mike Alberts, “3d BCT Helps Build Courthouse,” Hawaii Army Weekly, 

22 June 2007, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/HAW_Display.asp?art_

id=7535 (accessed 12 April 2010).

33. Alberts, 1.
87

34. Mike Alberts, “Soldiers Help Legitimize Iraq’s Legal System,” Hawaii 

Army Weekly, 6 July 2007, 1, http://www.garrison. http://www.crossfitresults.net/

hawaii.army.mil/HAW_Display.asp?art_id=7587 (accessed 12 April 2010).

35 . Alberts, 1.

36. Mike Alberts, “2-35th Cacti Help Iraqi Police Become Self-sufficient,” 

Hawaii Army Weekly, 29 June 2007, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/

HAW_Display.asp?art_id=7562 (accessed 12 April 2010).

37.Mike Alberts, “3d BCT Helps Build Courthouse,” Hawaii Army Weekly, 

22 June 2007, 1, http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/HAW_Display.asp?art_

id=7535 (accessed 12 April 2010).

38. Alberts, 1. 

39. The Kirkuk referendum to decide whether Kirkuk and portions of other 

Iraqi governorates would become part of the Iraqi Kurdistan region was to have 

taken place prior to the end of 2007 as stipulated in the Constitution of Iraqi. The 

vote was first postponed until June 2008, and as of this writing has been postponed indefinitely. 

40. Colonel Patrick Stackpole, teleconference, 8 June 2007, 3-4. 

41. Colonel David Paschal, “Warrior Brigade,” Briefing, 9 December 2008, 

Slides 3-5, 17. 

42. Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, “BCT S9-Civil Military Operations,” 

Briefing, Slides 24, 28-32, 35, 39-41; Colonel David Paschal, “Warrior Brigade,” 

Briefing, 9 December 2008, Slides 20-23, 25, 29, 31. 

43. Bennett, Slides 14-18, 27. 

44. “Strengthening Local Governance in Iraq,” RTI International feature 

page, 1, http://www.rti.org/page.cfm?objectid=91AD4ED9-F623-4C93-8CCF98BA9F7C82F5# (accessed 20 April 2010). 

45. “Building Foundations for Local Governance in Iraq,” RTI International 

brochure, 1-2, http://www.rti.org/brochures/Iraq_LGP-SLGP_04-06_web.pdf 

(accessed 20 April 2010).

46. Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, “BCT S9-Civil Military Operations,” Briefing, Slides 3-4. 

47. Major Kirk Decker, 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, a member of PRT 

Kirkuk’s governance team in 2008, provided the author with a copy of the 

13-point agreement, entitled “Final Agreement Between KBL and Iraqi Republican Gathering (IRG),” 2 December 2007; Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, 

“BCT S9-Civil Military Operations,” Briefing, Slide 4.

48. Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, interview by author, 22 April 2010.

49. Government of Iraq postponed provincial elections until 31 January 2009.
88

50. Kenneth Katzman, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, CRS Report for 

Congress No. RS22079, 3 June 2009, 6-7, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/

RS22079_20090603.pdf (accessed 27 February 2010).

51. Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, interview by author, 3 March 2010.

52. Lieutenant Colonel Roland Bennett, “BCT S9-Civil Military Operations,” Briefing, Slide 19.

53. Bennett, Slides 4-6, 19.

54. Lieutenant Colonel Roseanne Bennett, “Kirkuk Rule of Law Efforts 

(2008),” 5-6.

55. Bennett, 1-2.

56. Bennett, 3.

57. Previously, Iraqi judges were handing down too many acquittals due to 

a lack of evidence. Since Iraqi police investigators were not presenting hard evidence, only coerced guilty confessions, judges were obligated to acquit. Training 

by the 1st BCT and PRT helped Iraqi police investigators gather and present solid 

evidence, resulting in more guilty verdicts for legal hard evidence. 

58. Bennett, 9. 

59. Colonel David Paschal, interview by Contemporary Operations Study 

Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 November 2009, 32.

60. Colonel David Paschal, “Warrior Brigade,” Briefing, 9 December 2008, 

Slide 13. 

61. Paschal, interview, 2.

62. Paschal, interview, 8.

63. Paschal, interview, 6.

64. Paschal, interview, 6.

65. Paschal, interview, 20-21.

66. Paschal, interview, 21.

67. Paschal, interview, 23-24.

68. Paschal, interview, 26.

69. Paschal, interview, 2, 27-28.

70. Paschal, interview, 29.

71. Paschal, interview, 29 .

72. Paschal, interview, 31. 

73. Paschal, interview, 32. 

74. Paschal, interview, 35. 
89

75. Paschal, interview, 35. 

76. Paschal, interview, 14, 30. 

77. Lieutenant Colonel David Menegon, “Kirkuk PRT Overview,” 10 May 

2008, Briefing, Slide 5.

78. Lieutenant Colonel David Menegon, “Draft for a White Paper,” 2-5, unpublished document. 

79. Menegon, 3-4. 

80. Menegon, briefing, Slide 10.

81. Menegon, Slides 2 and 10.

82. Heath Druzin, “Kirkuk Reconstruction Team Sees Progress, But Fears 

Cutbacks,” Stars and Stripes, 14 October 2008, 2, http://www.stripes.com/article.

asp?section=104&article=58115 (accessed 16 March 2010).

83. Federal News Service, Washington, DC, 3, 6, http://www.defense.gov/

home/blog/docs/0829keegan_transcript.pdf (accessed 16 March 2010).

84. Major Kirk Decker, “Government Operations, Period: 17 June 2008-26 

June 2008,” 17 June and 23 June 2008, 1-6, document.

85. Federal News Service, Washington, DC, 29 August 2007, 9, http://www.

defense.gov/home/blog/docs/0829keegan_transcript.pdf (accessed 16 March 

2010).

86. Federal News Service, 4, 8.

87. Heath Druzin, “Kirkuk Reconstruction Team Sees Progress, But Fears 

Cutbacks,” Stars and Stripes, 14 October 2008, 2, http://www.stripes.com/article.

asp?section=104&article=58115 (accessed 16 March 2010).

88. Druzin, 2.

89. “18th Engineer Brigade Assumes Mission in Kirkuk Region,” MNDN PAO, 13 November 2008, 1-2, http://www.hqusareur.army.mil/news/archive-2008/releases/2008-11-13_02_18th_Engineers_Kirkuk.pdf (accessed 16 

March 2010). 

90. President George W. Bush, “Fact Sheet: The Strategic Framework Agreement and the Security Agreement with Iraq,” Office of the Press Secretary, 4 December 2008, 1, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/ (accessed 29 April 2010).

91. General Raymond Odierno, “To the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq,” 4 December 2008, 1, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/baghdad_bureau/20081205_ODIERNO.pdf (accessed 29 April 2010).

92. President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet, 4 December 2008, 1.
90

93. Mary Rose Mittleteadt, “Security Agreement Hot Topic at Criminal Justice Council,” MNC-I PAO, 3 January 2009, 1, http://www.usf-iraq.

com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=24698&itemid=128 (accessed 19 

April 2010). 

94. Mittleteadt,1. 

95. Stephen Barker, “Headquarters of US Army Europe’s 18th Engineer Brigade Moving for the Third Time During 15-Month Deployment,” USAREUR 

PAO, 10 February 2009, 2, http://www.hqusareus.army.mil/news/release/2009-

02-10-01_18th_Engineers.pdf (accessed 29 April 2010). 

96. “130th Engineer Brigade Assumes Responsibility for Mosul Reconstruction,” MNC-I PAO, 17 July 2009, 1, http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_cont

ent&task=view&id=27287&Itemid=128 (accessed 29 April 2010).

97. Justin Naylor, “At the Edge of History,” First Team News, 25 February 

2009, 1, http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/02/25/17419-at-the-edge-of-history/

index.html, (accessed 1May 2010). 

98. “2d BCT Partners with ISF at FOB Warrior,” MNC-I PAO, 18 February 

2009, 1, http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=25447

&Itemid=128 (accessed 29 April 2010).

99. Colonel Ryan Gonsalves, interview by the Institute for the Study of War, 

Washington, DC, 18 May 2009, 2, 13.

100. Michael Carden, “Kirkuk Progress is Impressive, Mullen Says,” American Forces Press Service, 13 July 2009, 1, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55105 (accessed 13 January 2010).

101. Carden, 1.

102. Carden, 1.

103. Gonsalves, 2.

104. Gonsalves, 1-2.

105. Gonsalves, 1-2, 4.

106. Trenton Daniel, “Ethnic Tensions in Kirkuk turns US Military into Mediators,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9 March 2009, 2, http://www.mccmatchydc.

com/world/v-print/story/63590.html (accessed 18 January 2010).

107. Missy Ryan, “Uneasy Calm for Iraq, Kurdish Troops in Disputed Area,” 

Reuters AlertNet, 22 April 2009, 1, http://www.relierweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/RWST-7RCRE8?OpenDocument (accessed 18 January 2010). 

108. Ryan, 1. 

109. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, December 2009, 31-32. 
91

110. United Nations Assistance Mission-Iraq, “Discussion Paper: Possible 

Options for the Future Administrative Status of Kirkuk Within the Iraq Federation,” 22 April 2009, 3-4.

111. “UN Mission Submits Report on Disputed Internal Boundaries in Northern Iraq,” UN News Service, 22 April 2009, 1, http://www.un.org/apps/news/

printnewsAr.asp?nid=30553 (accessed 17 January 2010).

112. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh McNeely, interview by author, 3 May 2010.

113. Gonsalves, interview, 12. Note: Colonel Gonsalves and his staff conferred periodically with State Department liaison to UNAMI and US special representative to northern Iraq, US Ambassador Thomas Krajeski, and then with US 

diplomat Alan Misenheimer after August 2009. 

114. Sam Dagher, “Kurds Defy Baghdad, Laying Claim to Land and Oil,” 

New York Times, 9 July 2009, 2, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/

middleeast/10kurds.html (accessed 3 May 2010). 

115. Gonsalves, 7.

116. "Electoral Commission Announces Final Results of Kurdistan Region 

Elections," KRG.org, 8 August 2009, 1, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr

=223&lngnr=12&smap=02010100&anr=30895 (accessed 22 January 2010). 

117. Gonsalves, interview, 3, 11.

118. These 2d BCT accomplishments are described in a series of articles by 

Justin Naylor, Jason Douglas, and Melanie Trollinger that appeared in First Team 

News from February to December 2009 and are accessible at http://www.hood.

army.mil/1stcavdiv/news/2009/feb/mainheadlines.htm (accessed 1 May 2010). 

119. Justin Naylor, “Building the Building Blocks of Education,” First Team 

News, 25 September 2009, 2, http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/09/25/27914-

building-the-building-blocks-of-education/index.html (accessed 1 May 2010).

120 Justin Naylor, “US Military Makes Last Payment to Sons of Iraq,” First 

Team News, 27 March 2009, 1, http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/2http://

www.crossfitresults.net/7/18851-us-military-make-last-payment-tosons-of-iraq/

index.html (accessed 1 May 2010).

121. Justin Naylor, “Signs of the Security Agreement,” First Team News, 

15 July 2009, 1, http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/07/15/15/24367-signs-of-thesecurity-agreement/index.html (accessed 1 May 2010).

122. Naylor, 1.

123. “Detainee Release Program a Success in Kirkuk,” MND-N PAO, 10 

September 2009, 1, http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&

id=27825&Itemid=131 (accessed 1 May 2010). 

124. Justin Naylor, “The Beginning of an Important Partnership,” First Team 

News, 25 February 2009, 1, http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/02/25/17420-thebeginning-of-an-important-partnership/index.html (accessed 1 May 2010). 

93

Chapter 5. Conclusion

After US and Coalition Forces liberated Iraq in 2003, Simzad Saeed, a 

formerly “Arabized” Kurd, returned to Kirkuk, staked a claim, and built a 

new house with money provided by the Government of Iraq. “I was forced 

to leave after the first Gulf war [in 1991],” Saeed said, “I feel at home 

[now].”1 Over the next several years, approximately 200,000 displaced 

Kurds returned to Kirkuk, seriously disrupting the social dynamics of the 

city. For the vast majority of these repatriated Kurds, their loyalties lay 

with Kurdistan, not the new Iraqi government in Baghdad. 

On the south side of Kirkuk in a rundown district built on reclaimed 

swampland, Faisal Mathor Mohammed, an Arab and former Iraqi army 

officer in the Baathist regime, resided in a small house provided by Saddam’s government in 1987 during the “Arabization” initiative. “They gave 

me land in Kirkuk and 10,000 dinars—enough to buy a house and furnish 

it fully—I have lived here ever since,” Mohammed said, implying his reluctance to leave as thousands of returning Kurds lay claim to the city.2 

For centuries Kurds have viewed Kirkuk as their traditional home. 

Arabs, Turkmen, and Assyrians have also ruled Kirkuk at various times 

during the city’s history. These groups compete for control of Kirkuk and 

ethnic tensions continuously threaten to erupt into outright violence, particularly since the discovery of vast quantities of untapped oil in the region. According to Martin Chulov, Baghdad correspondent for the Guardian, “all along Kirkuk has had the feel of a boom-town-in-waiting, sitting 

on a subterranean lake of fabulous wealth that would one day create fortunes.”3

 “The real conflict [in Kirkuk] is about oil,” added Sharlet Yohana, 

an employee of the North Oil Company, owned by the Iraqi Ministry of 

Oil and headquartered in Kirkuk. “Oil may well provide our future wealth 

and comfort, but...we will never have peace until the political problems 

surrounding the oil are solved,” she explained.4

Heightened ethnic tensions, Kurds moving in, Arabs moving out, everyone jockeying for their share of oil revenues—this was the situation in 

Kirkuk after Soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group and the 173d 

Airborne Brigade liberated the city in 2003. Not surprisingly, these same 

conditions still existed six years later in Kirkuk as 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry 

Division completed its tour in Iraq in December 2009. According to a February 2010 Annual Threat Assessment by the US Intelligence Community:

Arab-Kurd tensions have potential to derail Iraq’s generally positive security trajectory, including triggering conflict among Iraq’s 

ethno-sectarian groups. Many of the drivers of Arab-Kurd ten-
94

sions–disputed territories, revenue sharing, control of oil resources, and integration of Peshmerga forces–still need to be worked 

out, and miscalculations or misperceptions on either side risk an 

inadvertent escalation of violence. US involvement—both diplomatic and military—will remain critical in defusing crises in this 

sphere.5

Governance related issues facing the successive rotations of US Soldiers to the Kirkuk area of operations were both numerous and complex. 

A rich history involving the rise and fall of empires and the various migrations of diverse groups of peoples to the region were instrumental in 

creating Kirkuk’s present-day multiethnic society. Arab-dominated Iraqi 

government regimes in Baghdad had marginalized Kurdish and Turkmen claims to Kirkuk for nearly a century, as demonstrated by Arabization—the ethnic displacement initiative that increased dramatically in the 

early 1990s. Kurds regained political control by filling the majority of 

local Kirkuk government positions in 2003 after US and Peshmerga forces 

took the city. Subsequently, ongoing efforts by US Soldiers, members of 

Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk, and the new Iraqi government 

to normalize Kirkuk by reversing Arabization,which allowed substantial 

numbers of Kurds to return, proved both time-consuming and complicated. By 2009, internally displaced Kurds overcrowded Kirkuk. Although 

the normalization process was ongoing as of 2010, building new homes 

and creating new private sector jobs for returning Kurds rather than simply 

displacing Kirkuk Arabs helped stabilize ethnic tensions in the province.6

Another troublesome Kirkuk governance issue involved the referendum to decide the future administrative status and boundaries of the province as stipulated in Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution. Originally 

scheduled for December 2007, the Kirkuk referendum vote was postponed 

twice and in mid 2011 appears to be postponed indefinitely—which precludes disrupting nationwide governance progress in Iraq. As described 

in Chapter 4, United Nations Assistance Mission-Iraq suggested four possible options for addressing the status of Kirkuk. These options were unofficial and meant only to serve as points of departure for further discussions 

among Kirkuk’s stakeholders. Moreover, the United Nations’ report failed 

to address the critical issues involving disputed boundaries and Kirkuk’s 

annexation by Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurds naturally favored Kirkuk joining 

the autonomous Kurdistan region, while Kirkuk’s Arabs and Turkmen opposed such a move. Since Kirkuk province did not participate in the January 2009 Iraqi provincial elections, the Kirkuk referendum was neither 

addressed, nor included on the March 2010 parliamentary election ballot. 
95

In the first half of 2011, the tensions continued to rise between the 

ethnic groups regarding the future status of the city. From 2003 onward, 

US Forces in Kirkuk successfully dealt with the disputed boundaries issue by calming tensions along the so-called trigger line—the new de facto 

demarcation line separating Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq proper.7

 In describing Arab-Kurd tensions on the trigger line to the House Armed Services 

Committee in September 2009, Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander, 

General Raymond Odierno, explained; 

In Iraq, many of the struggles are about power, land, and resources that is reflective in the Arab-Kurd and Government of IraqKurdish Regional Government tensions. The key issues include 

the pending hydrocarbon law, revenue sharing, and the disputed 

internal boundaries in...Kirkuk [province].8

 

Stalemated governance issues in Kirkuk, however, should not serve 

as an indictment of US Army efforts to stabilize both the city and the 

province. On the contrary, each successive Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

troop rotation to Kirkuk dealt effectively and efficiently with the numerous, thorny, governance-oriented problems they encountered. Beginning 

in April 2003, for example, unit representatives met regularly with the 

Kirkuk provincial council to help members streamline processes and develop programs that met the needs of the people. The efforts of successive 

brigades in mentoring the council were highly successful as indicated in 

a 2009 United Nations Assistance Mission-Iraq’s District Analysis Summary, “overall, the KPC [Kirkuk Provincial Council] has been one of the 

more capable councils in Iraq. Living conditions, education, access to 

electricity, and employment indicators in Kirkuk are relatively good compared to other provinces, despite the Baath-era destruction.”9

 Although hampered briefly by a lack of extensive training and experience in governance operations, Soldiers that served in Kirkuk performed 

admirably as “honest brokers” in the region by remaining neutral, quickly 

resolving conflicts, mediating disputes, and deftly preventing ever-present 

ethnic tensions from boiling over into violence. Despite initial objections 

from the Kurd-dominated Kirkuk provincial council, Soldiers also developed and implemented the Sons of Iraq program in Kirkuk. Funded initially by the US and then by the Iraqi government, the initiative put previously unemployed Sunni Arab men to work. US soldiers screened, trained, 

and organized Sons of Iraq recruits into military-style units that successfully integrated with traditional Iraqi security force organizations.10
96

Another example of the substantive role US brigades played in Kirkuk 

governance was the significant grassroots support Soldiers provided to the 

Iraqi national reconciliation program. Success of the reconciliation initiative in Kirkuk is directly attributable to the US Forces’ willingness to 

publicize and explain the project, establish checkpoints, conduct extensive 

screening, process thousands of bits of biometric data, and train approved 

applicants. Additional examples of US Military efforts to improve governance in the city and larger province include strengthening the rule of 

law and establishing a criminal prosecution court; training, mentoring, and 

validating the Kurdish-led police force; and using Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds to spur economic development and create 

new businesses therefore providing jobs for the unemployed citizens of 

Kirkuk. 

Each successive US Army unit assigned to Kirkuk during Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM built governance successes on its predecessor. Each 

unit left an enduring and positive impact on Iraqi governance in the province. From this experience six specific insights can be drawn which may 

prove useful to Soldiers involved in future stability and support operations: understanding overarching considerations, filling vacuums of authority and government, dealing directly with rule of law issues, mounting 

aggressive information operations, controlling ethnic violence and partnering with local security and government officials.

The first insight addresses general considerations. Military commanders should make every effort to ensure that their Soldiers understand the 

entire campaign plan. Some historians have suggested the US military 

units that liberated Iraq in 2003 may not have been very aware of, nor 

completely trained for, Phase IV operations requirements, including the 

governance line.11 Although Soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group 

and the 96th and the 404th Civil Affairs Battalions may not have considered stability and support operations a core mission, they nevertheless 

initiated a series of successful governance-oriented activities in Kirkuk 

immediately after they freed the city. In fact, in Kirkuk, Phase IV began 

before Phase III officially ended. Thus, although the adage—effective security sets the conditions for good governance—is correct for most situations, there may be instances in which combat and governance operations 

overlap, the later beginning before the former ends. For this reason, if 

campaigns call for full spectrum operations, all units should have some 

preparation for governance operations. As the first US Soldiers establishing a presence in Kirkuk demonstrated, initiating governance operations as 

early as possible is a successful, abiding, and rewarding endeavor. There 
97

are several additional general observations that apply to all US Army rotations in Kirkuk. For example, as they collected more information about the 

political, social, economic, and ethnic dynamics of the city, Soldiers realized the importance of remaining neutral so that they could play the role of 

“honest broker.” In addition, brigade commanders empowered junior officers and noncommissioned officers to deal with local governance issues 

at grass root levels. Soldiers understood that everything they were doing 

in Kirkuk was not for themselves, but for the Iraqis. However, they further 

understood that governance in Kirkuk was clearly an Iraqi responsibility. 

As a result, Soldiers slowly and continuously assumed a more supporting, 

secondary, role in Kirkuk governance, as they increasingly turned over 

responsibilities to Iraqi government officials. 

The second insight is that any vacuum in government must be filled 

as soon as possible. Shortly after liberating the city in April 2003, the10th 

Special Forces Group Soldiers contacted several key local government 

officials in Kirkuk. The 96th and 404th Civil Affairs Battalion Soldiers 

established a centrally located Civil Military Operations Center in Kirkuk 

where citizens could hold public meetings and voice their complaints. 

Opening the Center quickly demonstrated to the Kirkuk population that 

the Americans were there to help. Soldiers met with local Iraqi leaders, 

then assembled them together to identify and address critical issues. Soldiers also asked the leaders of competing groups in Kirkuk to be patient, 

convincing them to honor a temporary peace agreement while their leaders identified and sorted out the critical issues. These local Kirkuk leaders then explained the city’s evolving situation to the general population. 

The commanders of the 10th Special Forces Group and the 173d Airborne 

Brigade filled the governmental vacuum in Kirkuk by serving as acting 

mayors of the city, while Civil Military Operations Center Soldiers established a representative emergency governing council and then organized official elections, all in less than 30 days. Although not all Iraqis in 

Kirkuk appreciated the advantages offered by western-style democracy, 

moving quickly to establish a governing council by holding local elections 

proved invaluable to get the city rapidly back up and running. During the 

summer of 2003, the 173d Airborne Brigade further enhanced governance 

in Kirkuk by introducing the “Team Government” concept that served as 

the prelude to provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq. This program partnered Soldiers with civilian experts in various disciplines to assist Iraqis 

in addressing the problematic issues of Kirkuk. Eventually, US Soldiers 

in subsequent rotations included outlying tribal and village leaders in the 

governance process, so that everyone in the Kirkuk province could reap 

the benefits of working together and cooperating with each other. Brigade 
98

commanders also assigned liaison officers to the various Iraqi governmental agencies with whom they dealt, while Civil Affairs teams trained, mentored, evaluated, and critiqued members of the Kirkuk provincial council. 

By 2009, the 2d Brigade, 1st CAV began inviting Kirkuk government and 

political leaders to sensitive security meetings to broaden the situational 

perspectives of these local officials. Brigade Soldiers prepared the Kirkuk 

population for nationwide Iraqi elections and helped them understand the 

local ramifications of Iraqi government initiatives, such as the Strategic 

Framework and Status of Forces Agreements. Throughout their respective rotations, the US Army brigades in Kirkuk continued to identify and 

address the causes of instability in the region, while helping local citizens 

understand that their new government was working on their behalf.

The third insight is that rule of law issues were critical to good governance in Kirkuk. After liberating Kirkuk in 2003, Soldiers from the 10th 

Special Forces Group immediately recognized that Iraqi citizens of all ethnicities looked to the Americans to restore law and order in the city. With 

only limited resources of their own, the 10th Special Forces Group solicited assistance from Peshmerga forces in controlling the city until troops 

from the 173d Airborne Brigade arrived and established a temporary Iraqi 

police force. Early efforts by US Soldiers to establish and enforce the rule 

of law in Kirkuk were instrumental in maintaining stability in the city 

while local officials attended to the task of installing a new representative 

government. US Soldiers in Kirkuk helped Iraqis refurbish old courthouses and build new ones; they also provided guidance and security for the 

Iraqi judges who began traveling to the city to adjudicate legal cases. Rule 

of law issues gained added significance in 2008 when the 1st BCT, 10th 

Mountain Division, upgraded the rule of law issues to its own separate 

line of operation in the brigade campaign plan. This helped pave the way 

for moving the prosecution of major crime cases to a courthouse located 

in downtown Kirkuk; that same courthouse provided a legal information 

office and a women’s legal aid clinic within the city. Finally, the brigade’s 

Soldiers assisted Iraqis in organizing an unprecedented criminal justice 

council meeting that brought judges, judicial officials, and Iraqi police 

leaders together for the first time to discuss Kirkuk criminal justice system issues. These rule of law initiatives, nurtured by the US brigades in 

Kirkuk, provided Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems and helped the average 

citizen of Kirkuk to understand that their new government would treat 

them in a fair and unprejudiced manner.

The fourth insight is the importance of information operations. In 

April 2003, shortly after their arrival in Kirkuk, US Soldiers initiated aggressive information operations to inform citizens of US intentions and 
99

to solicit the local population’s cooperation in keeping the city peaceful. The US operations message also asked Iraqis to be patient as their 

new local government transitioned and assumed responsibility in the city. 

Soldiers organized public meetings, broadcast live radio and television 

call-in programs, and addressed citizen complaints. Later, Soldiers used 

various information methods to educate the general Iraqi public regarding 

the features and benefits of representative democracy. During fall 2004, 

the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, successfully employed operations 

in a “get out the vote” campaign, convincing the Kirkuk population that 

they would be safe during the January 2005 national and governorate elections. Eventually, US brigades in Kirkuk used information operations to 

selectively praise and publicize the accomplishments of cooperative Iraqi 

government officials, and, thereby, boost the image of those officials in the 

eyes of the citizenry. Finally, Soldiers effectively used information operations to publicize successes with the Sons of Iraq program and to explain 

the ramifications of national level Iraqi initiates, such as Strategic Framework Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement.

The fifth insight is that effectively controlling ethnic violence was 

a key component of the Army’s governance line of operation for both the 

city and province of Kirkuk. Aside from basic security operations, successive US Army brigades in Kirkuk introduced a number of initiatives 

designed to reduce ethnic tensions among the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. Although Arab and Turkmen representatives periodically boycotted 

provincial council meetings, they regularly cooperated and maintained a 

dialogue with the dominant Kurds at the prodding of US Civil Affairs 

Soldiers. Brigade efforts to minimize ethnic tensions in Kirkuk included 

Team Government’s significant participation in helping Iraqis resolve repatriation, relocation, resettlement, and both property claims issues and 

disputes. Soldiers also helped Iraqis reconcile with nearly 1,000 Sunni 

Arabs, many of whom, after qualifying through screening and training, 

found employment with the Iraqi Civil Service Corps or the Sons of Iraq. 

This was another successful program that integrated disenfranchised Arabs into Kirkuk society and demonstrated to all Arabs that the government 

could work in their favor. Civil Military Operations section Soldiers from 

the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, worked tirelessly with the principal 

Kurdish and Arab political parties in Kirkuk to resolve problems encountered while implementing the December 2007 13-point provincial power 

sharing agreement for the region. The government of Iraq dispatched additional Iraqi Army troops to Kirkuk in 2009, because mediating disputes 

between these predominantly Shia Muslim Iraqi Army forces and the 

Kurdish Peshmerga units in the area had become an additional fulltime 
100

responsibility for the 2d BCT, 1st CAV Soldiers. Brigade efforts to reconcile Kurd and Arab disputes kept ethnic violence to a minimum, thus 

enabling local Iraqi governments to run smoothly and without interruption 

in Kirkuk.

The final insight is the requirement for US Soldiers to work alongside 

the host nation government officials such as the police, local leaders, and 

bureaucrats. US brigades deployed to Kirkuk where they trained, mentored, and validated Iraqi police forces in the city. A stronger and more 

competent police force emerged—another sign for the Kirkuk population 

that their government was looking out for them, regardless of their ethnicity. Soldiers assisted the Iraqi police in establishing a joint coordination center (JCC), then assigned liaison officers to that headquarters, and 

further encouraged Peshmerga, Iraqi Army forces, and Provincial Reconstruction Team Kirkuk to provide their own staff to the center. The JCC in 

Kirkuk focused on protecting urban areas, but more importantly, the center provided a shortened reaction time for incidents, which de-escalated 

the situations and prevented simple overreactions and misunderstandings 

from becoming violent acts. Soldiers further assisted Iraqi political officials and bureaucrats to manage business affairs, prepare budgets, computerize operations, and attract international investments. Establishing and 

funding the Kirkuk micro loan program and assisting Iraqis in opening the 

Kirkuk Business Center, provided much-needed employment opportunities for returning Kurdish citizens and reconciled Sunni Arabs. In 2008, 

the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, and PRT Kirkuk developed a joint 

common campaign plan under which the BCT became the supporting 

effort to the team for nonlethal lines of operations, such as governance. 

Additionally, since successful counterinsurgency operations rely heavily 

on building relationships with local populations, Colonel Paschal pointed 

out that future US missions requiring a governance component might favor individual Soldier rotations rather than unit rotations to maintain the 

continuity with host nation officials. Finally, to better address governance 

and other critical issues in Kirkuk, the 2d BCT, 1st CAV reorganized the 

brigade staff into three working groups: Iraqi Security Forces and security, 

economics and governance, and an investigative task force. This innovation further strengthened relationships with Iraqi officials who assumed 

increased governance and security responsibilities in Kirkuk.

These six insights offer guidance for US Soldiers who, in future campaigns, find themselves responsible for fostering new governments or assisting existing governments in improving their operations. As the Soldiers who served in Kirkuk discovered, however, even the most efficient 
101

and well-resourced governance operations would not lead to inevitable 

success. In Kirkuk, some of the differences between the ethnic groups 

proved to be almost insurmountable. As of mid-2011, Iraqi government 

officials had not yet reached a durable settlement regarding disputed internal boundaries, power sharing, and revenue sharing in Kirkuk. Ethnic 

tensions will likely continue indefinitely in Kirkuk until these perplexing 

and contentious concerns are appropriately resolved. Despite these very 

real obstacles, the Soldiers who conducted governance operations in the 

city greatly assisted Kirkukis in establishing rule of law and a new political system in post-Saddam Iraq. Moreover, the efforts of the US Army 

have placed the city in a position where a peaceful settlement is at least a 

possibility in the near future.
102

Notes

1. Martin Chulov, “Kurds Lay Claim to Oil Riches as Old Hatreds Flare,” 

The Observer-guardian.co.uk, 14 June 2009, 1, http://www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2009/jun/14/kurds-iraq-kirkuk-oil (accessed 16 May 2010).

2. Chulov, 1.

3. Chulov, 1.

4. Chulov, 2.

5. Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” 2 February 2010, 23, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf (accessed 31 March 2010). 

6. Michael Knights, “Kirkuk in Transition: Confidence Building in Northern Iraq,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2010, 1-7, 14-19, 

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus102.pdf (accessed 31 

March 2010). 

7. From 1991 to 2003, the unilateral ceasefire line, known as the green line, 

separated the Kurdistan region from the rest of Iraq. During the US invasion 

of Iraq in 2003, Kurdish security forces pushed beyond the green line into additional areas. The forward edge of these additional areas represents the trigger 

line. Kurds now claim ownership of the territory between to old green line and 

the new trigger line. 

8. General Raymond Odierno, General Odierno’s HASC Testimony, 30 September 2009, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 29 September 2009, 6, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC093009/Odierno_Testimony093009F.pdf (accessed 20 May 2010). 

9. Knights, 23.

10. Knights, 33.

11. Donald Wright and Colonel Timothy Reese, On Point II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 49-80. 
103

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rm/2005/56794.htm (accessed 24 July 2008). 

Stackpole, Colonel Patrick. “DoD News Briefing with Colonel Patrick Stackpole 

via Teleconference from Kirkuk,” 8 June 2007, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3985 (accessed 12 April 2010). 
115

APPENDIX-Order of Battle

American Units in Kirkuk 2003-2010

This Order of Battle includes only “ground-owning” infantry and cavalry units. Estimates of areas of operation are generally rough, same as dates of transfer for authority between units.1 

The 173d ABN BDE—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 1

● Commanded by Colonel Bill Mayville, the 173d Airborne 

Brigade (ABN BDE) assumed control of the Kirkuk province in 

mid-April 2003 from Joint Special Operations Task Force-North, 

elements of which had been the first U.S. forces to enter Kirkuk 

city. The 173d ABN BDE remained there until February 2004.

● Task Force 1-63 Armor commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

Ken Riddle, was airlifted into Bashur Airfield in mid-April 2003, 

then operated in and around Kirkuk city through October 2003.

● The 2-503 Infantry (2-503 IN) (Task Force Rock) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dom Caraccilo, airdropped 

onto Bashur Airfield in late March 2003. The unit moved 

into Kirkuk on April 10 and remained responsible for the city 

through January 2004, except for a few days in June when 

2-503 supported 4th Infantry Division operations in Salahuddin.

● The 1-508 Infantry (1-508 IN) (Task Force Red Devil) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry Tunnell, airdropped into 

Bashur Airfield in late March 2003. In early April the unit operated 

in the Irbil area, and in mid-April moved with the rest of the brigade 

to Kirkuk. From July through August, the 1-508 IN was responsible for area of operations West, the area along the highway from 

Kirkuk toward Bayji, with its tactical operations center in Hawija. 

From September through January, the 1-508 IN was responsible for 

area of operations South, with its tactical operations center in Tuz.

The 2d BCT, 25th INF DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 2

● Commanded by Colonel Lloyd Miles, the 2/25 Infantry Division (2/25 ID) deployed to Forward Operating Base 

Warrior (Kirkuk Airbase) in January 2004, thereby maintaining responsibility for the province until February 2005.

● The 1-14 Infantry (1-14 IN) (Task Force Golden Dragon) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David Miller, deployed to Forward 

Operating Base Bernstein, Tuz, in January 2004, where the unit 
116

fell in on the 1-508 IN. In early April 2004, the 1-14 IN moved 

to Tel Afar, then in mid-April to Najaf, before returning to Forward Operating Base Bernstein in early May. In June the battalion 

relocated to Kirkuk Airbase (the 1-120 Armor assumed responsibility for Tuz as brigade boundaries shifted), sharing Kirkuk 

city with the 1-21 Infantry. In October the Infantry battalion operated out of sector in Samarra for a month. In late December 

the 1-14 IN left Kirkuk behind for good and relocated to Mosul.

● The 1-21 Infantry (1-21 IN) (Task Force Gimlet) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Dewhurst, deployed to 

Forward Operating Base Warrior in January 2004, and maintained responsibility for Kirkuk city through January 2005.

● The 1-27 Infantry (1-27 IN) (Task Force Wolfhound) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Leith, deployed to Forward Operating Base McHenry in January 2004 and maintained responsibility for the Hawija-Zaab area west of Kirkuk through January 2005.

The 116th CAV BCT, Idaho ARNG—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 3

● Commanded by Brigadier General Al Gayhart, the 116th 

(116 CAV) deployed to Forward Operating Base Warrior in December 2004, and relieved the 2/25 ID in February 2005. The brigade maintained responsibility for the 

city and most of the province through September 2005.

● The 1-163 Infantry (1-163 IN) (Montana Army National 

Guard) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Walsh, deployed to Forward Operating Base McHenry in December 2004, 

relieving the 1-27 IN in January. The 1-163 IN maintained responsibility for the Hawija region through October 2005.

● The 2/116 Cavalry (2/116 CAV) deployed to Forward Operating 

Base Warrior in December 2004, relieving 1-21 IN. The 2/116 CAV 

maintained responsibility for Kirkuk city through October 2005.

● The 3/116 Cavalry (3/116 CAV) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dan McCabe, deployed to Forward Operating Base 

Warrior in December 2004, then relieved the 1-14 IN of their responsibility for the region south of Kirkuk city in late December.
117

The 1st BCT, 101st ABN DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

4-/05-07

● The 1/101 Airborne Division (1/101 ABD) commanded by Colonel David Gray, deployed to Forward Operating Base Warrior in October 2005, thereby relieving the 

116th BCT. The 1/101 ABD maintained responsibility for 

the Kirkuk brigade area of operations through August 2006.

● The 1-327 Infantry (1-327 IN) Commander Lieutenant Colonel Marc Hutton, deployed to Forward Operating Base McHenry October 2005, relieving the 1-163 IN. The 1-327 IN maintained responsibility for the Hawija area through August 2006.

● The 2-327 Infantry (2-327 IN) deployed to Forward Operating Base Warrior October 2005, thereby relieving the 

2/116 CAV (and possibly 3/116 CAV). The 2-327 IN maintained responsibility for Kirkuk city through August 2006.

The 3d BCT, 25th INF DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 06-

08

● The 3/25 (3/25 ID) commanded by Colonel Patrick 

Stackpole, deployed to Forward Operating Base Warrior in September 2006, thereby relieving 1/101 ABN DIV. 

The 3/25 IN maintained responsibility for the Kirkuk brigade area of operations through early October 2007.

● The 2-27 Infantry (2-27 IN) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Drew Meyerowich, thereby relieved 1-327 IN at Forward 

Operating Base McHenry in September 2006; 2-27 IN maintained responsibility for the Hawija area through September2007.

● The 2-35 Infantry (2-35 IN) commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Michael Browder, thereby relieved 2-327 IN at Forward Operating Base Warrior in September 2006; they maintained responsibility for Kirkuk city through September 2007.

The 1st BCT, 10th MTN DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

07-09

● The 1/10 (1/10 MTN) commanded by Colonel David Paschal, 

deployed to Forward Operating Base Warrior in September 2007, 
118

thereby relieving the 3/25 ID in October. The 1/10 MTN maintained responsibility for the Kirkuk brigade area of operations 

through early November 2008. (In explanation, the 1/10 MTN was 

scheduled to be relieved by 2/4 Infantry Division [2/4 ID], however, the 2/4 ID was assigned elsewhere in Iraq because the situation 

in Kirkuk was downgraded from a BCT headquarters to an “engagement brigade headquarters “ by Multi-National Corps-Iraq .)

● The1-87 Infantry (1-87 IN) commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Chris Vanek, relieved the 2-27 IN at Forward Operating Base McHenry in October 2007, then maintained responsibility for the Hawija area through September 2008.

● The 2-22 Infantry (2-22 IN) commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Dennis Sullivan, relieved 2-35 IN at Forward Operating Base Warrior in October 2007, then maintained responsibility for Kirkuk city through September 2008.

● The 1-71 Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Darrin Ricketts, deployed to Forward Operating Base Bernstein in 

October 2007, then maintained responsibility for the Tuz area 

through December 2007, when the squadron moved to Tikrit.

The 18th ENG BDE—Gap Between BCTs

● Commanded by Colonel Matthew Russell, the 18th Engineer 

Brigade deployed to Tikrit in May 2008, then relocated to Kirkuk 

in October thereby assuming provincial-level reconstruction and 

engagement responsibilities from 1/10 as an “engagement brigade 

headquarters.” During this time, the brigade relied on 3/25 Infantry Division in Salahuddin for direct support. The 18th Engineers 

remained in Kirkuk through January 2009, when Multi-National 

Corps-Iraq again deployed a BCT headquarters to the province.

● The 1-67 Armor (1-67 AR) (from 2/4 Infantry Division) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Casey, deployed to Iraq in September 2008, and was attached to the 

18th Engineer Brigade in Mosul as the brigade’s one maneuver battalion. The unit operated in the Kirkuk area of 

operations until February 2009, when it moved to Mosul.
119

The 2d BCT, 1st CAV DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 08-

10

● Colonel Ryan Gonsalves of 2/1 Cavalry Division (2/1 CAV) 

relieved the 18th Engineer Brigade at Forward Operating Base 

Warrior in February 2009. His unit maintained responsibility 

for the Kirkuk brigade area of operations until December 2009.

● The 1-8 Cavalry (1-8 CAV) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

David Lesperance, deployed to the Hawija region in February 2009, 

and maintained responsibility for the area until December 2009.

● The 4-9 Cavalry (4-9 CAV) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Andy Shoffner, relieved the 1-67 AR at Forward Operating Base Warrior in February 2009, then they maintained responsibility for the Kirkuk region through November2009.

The 1st BCT, 1st ARMD DIV—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

09-11

● Commanded by Colonel Larry Swift, the 1/1 Armored Division 

(1/1 AD) relieved the 2/1 Cavalry Division at Forward Operating 

Base Warrior in December 2009. One of the last BCTs (rather than 

Advisory and Assistance Brigades) to deploy to Iraq, his unit maintained responsibility for the Kirkuk brigade area of operations.

● The 1-30 Infantry (1-30 IN) (from the 2/3 Infantry Division), 

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Cormier, relieved 

the 4-9 CAV at Forward Operating Base Warrior in December 

2009, thereby maintaining responsibility for the Kirkuk region.

● The 1-37 Armor (1-37 AR), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Catlett, relieved the 1-8 

CAV in the Hawija region in December 2009. 

__________________________________________________________

Notes

1. Wesley Morgan, “American Units in Kirkuk, 2003-2010,” Institute for the Study of War, 2 January 2010, 1-2; John McGrath, “US Forces in Kirkuk,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, 19 January 2010, 1.


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