UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4209

ALBERT GASS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge.

(CR-95-130-A)

Submitted: July 30, 1996

Decided: August 16, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Joseph J. McCarthy, DELANEY, MCCARTHY, COLTON &

BOTZIN, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey,

United States Attorney, Bruce C. Swartz, Special Assistant United

States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Albert Gass, Jr., appeals his conviction for assault on a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 111(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996). Gass

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction,

and we affirm.

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must,* the following occurred. On July 12, 1995, Gass,

a federal inmate, was being held in the United States Marshal's cell

block at the federal courthouse in Alexandria, Virginia. He and other

inmates were to be witnesses in an ongoing trial. Because there was

an order to keep him separate from the other inmates, Gass was in an

interview room with no bathroom. As Marshal Jenkins conducted

Gass to a bathroom down the hall, he passed the cell holding the other

inmates. Gass became agitated and shouted at one of the inmates.

Concerned because Gass was very disturbed and because he was

afraid the other inmates would become upset, Jenkins returned Gass

to the interview room without taking him to the bathroom.

Marshal Jenkins and Marshal Clarkson both testified that Gass

remained agitated and irate for the next few hours. Jenkins told Gass

that if he calmed down he could be taken to the bathroom. Gass began

striking the door to the interview room and screaming. Jenkins feared

that Gass would injure himself or damage the door or the screen

within the room. Jenkins warned Gass that if he did not stop, Jenkins

would spray him with pepper spray. Gass, using profanity, replied

that he would beat up the first person that came in the room. He continued to bang on the door.

After another warning, Marshals Jenkins and Clarkson opened the

door. Gass immediately charged through the door with his head down

and fists flailing, straight toward Marshal Jenkins. Jenkins sprayed the

pepper spray, but was unsure whether Gass was affected as the latter

struggled with Marshal Clarkson. Jenkins sprayed again; the marshals

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*Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).

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subdued Gass and placed him in a cell, where he was given a tub of

water and an electric fan to dissipate the effects of the spray.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), one who "forcibly assaults, resists,

opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with" certain federal officers, including United States Marshals, is subject to conviction. In

enacting § 111, Congress sought to give maximum protection to federal officers. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975). No

particular level of force is required to prove the offense--only a willful attempt to inflict injury or a threat to inflict injury coupled with

a present ability to do so. United States v. Sommerstedt, 752 F.2d

1494, 1496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985). Behavior

like Gass's has been held sufficient to sustain a conviction under

§ 111. United States v. Shedlock, 62 F.3d 214, 220 (8th Cir. 1995)

(pounding on a car door and advancing aggressively toward an officer

satisfies the force requirement of the statute).

We conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support

Gass's conviction under § 111(a)(1). Therefore, we affirm his conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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