S. HRG. 109–335, PT. 3 

Senate Hearings 

Before the Committee on Appropriations 

State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs 

Appropriations 

Fiscal Year 2007 

109th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 

H.R. 5522 

PART 3 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESS 

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations, 2007 (H.R. 5522)—Part 3 
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27–927 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 109–335, PT. 3 

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2007 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON

H.R. 5522 

AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT 

FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 3 

Department of State 

Nondepartmental Witness 

United States Agency for International Development 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HARRY REID, Nevada 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

J. KEITH KENNEDY, Staff Director 

TERRENCE E. SAUVAIN, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Chairman 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi (ex officio) 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia (ex officio) 

Professional Staff 

PAUL GROVE

TOM HAWKINS

ROBERT LESTER

TIM RIESER (Minority) 

KATE ELTRICH (Minority) 

JENNIFER PARK (Minority) 

Administrative Support 

LASHAWNDA SMITH
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2006 

Page 

Department of State: Office of the Secretary ........................................................ 1 

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006 

United States Agency for International Development .......................................... 39 

Nondepartmental witness ....................................................................................... 91 

(1) 

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2007 

TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2006 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, at 2:17 p.m., in room SD–138, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Mitch McConnell (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators McConnell, Bond, Bennett, Brownback, Leahy, 

and Durbin. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH MC CONNELL

Senator MCCONNELL. The hearing will come to order. 

Madam Secretary, I apologize for holding you up. Today’s hearing will examine the fiscal 2007 budget request for your Department and Foreign Operations, and affords us an opportunity to 

learn more about transformational diplomacy and foreign assistance reform. I expect there will also be a question or two on matters falling under the subcommittee’s jurisdiction regarding the fiscal 2006 supplemental request. 

My opening statement will be brief. The President’s request to- tals $33.8 billion, $23.7 billion in Foreign Operations and $10.1 billion in State Department operations and related programs. This 

represents an increase of $2.8 billion and $600 million respectively 

above last year’s enacted levels. As in previous years, significant 

resources are targeted toward the Middle East, the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation, and combating HIV/AIDS. 

The President is to be commended for his commitment to advancing democracy worldwide, as reflected in the National Security 

Strategy and through his words and deeds. According to the Office 

of Management and Budget, the fiscal year 2007 request includes 

$1.7 billion for democracy, governance, and human rights programs, an increase of $400 million above the fiscal 2006 estimated 

levels. As this subcommittee has long been a strong supporter of 

democracy abroad, most recently demonstrated in the creation of a 

new Democracy Fund account in the bill last year, it would be help-
2 

ful to hear your views on why democracy promotion is such a priority to this administration. Is there a connection between good 

governance and poverty alleviation? What role do democracy programs play in the war against terrorism? Should more activities be 

targeted toward Asia and the former Soviet Union, where countries 

like Belarus and Russia seem to be heading in the wrong direction? 

As you were recently in Southeast Asia, I would appreciate hearing more about your trip, particularly any insights you may have 

with regard to the Burma problem. Let me also state for the record 

that I recognize your strong support for the struggle for freedom 

in Burma and the aggressive efforts of the State Department to encourage other governments to take that posture as well and to support Aung San Suu Kyi’s cause. 

I am hopeful that the administration can again urge the United 

Nations Security Council to debate the security threat Burma poses 

to the region. This year we need a formal debate and a resolution 

on Burma at the United Nations. 

Let me close by reiterating my concern with terrorism in South- east Asia. I note that the request includes $32 million in military 

assistance for countries in that region, a decrease of $6 million 

below the previous fiscal year, and $9.8 million for military training programs. While I support the increase in military aid to Indonesia, whose democratic achievements since 1998 have been remarkable, I hope you will clarify the $12 million cut to the Philippines. Many of us remain concerned with the ongoing conflict in 

the southern Philippines. 

Again, Madam Secretary, thank you for being here. Let me turn 

to Senator Leahy and then we will get right to your statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, always good to have you here. This is probably 

the first and last time we are going to hear from you on the fiscal 

year 2007 budget request until we get our 302(b) allocation and our 

bill is on the floor of the Senate. At that time the game is pretty 

much over because we usually lose ground in conference with the 

House. Programs that are important to you and to us are cut further. 

These hearings are useful, but I think you and the State Department could mount a far more effective effort. You have allies with 

Senator McConnell and myself, but there are many people who are 

not allies, and we have to convince them, too. Now, I believe your 

transformational diplomacy initiative has much to recommend it. 

We discussed this before. I commend you for it. But I think the 

funds requested fall short of what you need. 

It is one thing to deploy your staff more strategically and plan 

and coordinate foreign aid programs effectively. I think that is important. But I think ‘‘transformational’’ suggests something more 

far reaching. 

This budget cuts many of USAID’s core programs to promote democracy and fight poverty. It is true that in the aggregate it represents an increase, but that’s only because of funding for AIDS 

and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. We are providing hundreds of millions of dollars to the Millennium Challenge Corpora-
3 

tion, but a lot of that goes to tiny countries which really do not 

have any significant security importance to the United States. 

But in doing that, again the money—it is a rob Peter to pay Paul 

thing. You cut programs that have bipartisan support, proven results and that fund everything from girls education to providing 

clean water and improving agriculture. 

It is going to be a difficult year for this subcommittee. You will 

not find two stronger supporters than the chairman and myself, 

but a lot of domestic programs are being cut this year and it is 

going to be hard to say why we have to put more into foreign aid. 

You have to convince the chairman and ranking members of the 

House and Senate Appropriations Committees. 

I have some other concerns which are not only related to appropriations. There is the image and the reputation of the United 

States, which has obvious importance to our security. After 9/11 we 

had almost all of the countries in the world, with two or three exceptions, behind us, an outpouring of sympathy from every corner 

of the globe. Now we are seen by an alarming and growing number 

of people as an aggressive, occupying bully who locks up innocent 

people indefinitely, humiliates and physically abuses them, and denies them the right to even know what they are accused of. 

We get regular reports of Iraqi civilians, including women and 

young children, who have been mistakenly killed by U.S. soldiers. 

We spend billions on grossly overpriced reconstruction projects that 

are poorly designed, may never get finished, but have made some 

U.S. contractors rich. That does not make us safer, especially when 

we are such a good and generous country. 

Then there is U.N. peacekeeping. The United Nations is operating 18 different peacekeeping missions. One of them, in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, is trying to provide security for 

the first democratic elections in a half a century. At the same time, 

it is coping with armed militias and every possible logistical challenge in a destitute country the size of Western Europe, but one 

with virtually no infrastructure. That is just one example. 

Darfur will be next. It involves similar challenges and costs. We 

vote to send U.N. peacekeepers to some of the world’s most dangerous places, but then we underfund these missions. I might point 

out that, in underfunding them, they together cost in a year less 

than our military spends in a week in Iraq. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

It is time for us and the other nations who do not contribute 

troops to support these missions the way we would expect our own 

soldiers to be supported. 

I will put the rest of my statement in the record. I look forward 

to hearing from you and I have already discussed with you a couple 

of the questions I will ask. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Madam Secretary, thank you for being here. This is be the first and last time we 

hear from you on your fiscal year 2007 budget request, until after we receive our 

302b allocation and our bill is on the floor of the Senate. At that point the game 

is pretty much over since we usually lose ground in conference with House, when 

programs that are important to you and to us are cut further. 
4 

Hearings like this are useful, but they are far from sufficient. You need to mount 

a far more effective effort than you have in the past to get the funding you need, 

because the party in the Majority in Congress, with the exception of a few allies 

like Chairman McConnell, will want to cut your budget. 

While I believe your transformational diplomacy initiative has much to recommend it—and I commend you for it—I am afraid that the amount of funds you 

are requesting falls far short of what you would need to implement it effectively. 

It is one thing if all you hope to do is deploy your staff more strategically and 

plan and coordinate foreign aid programs effectively. But to me, ‘‘transformational’’ 

suggests something significantly more far reaching. 

This budget, contrary to the President’s promise, cuts many of USAID’s core programs to promote democracy and fight poverty. It is true that in the aggregate what 

you propose represents an increase, but that is only because of funding for AIDS 

and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 

While we are providing hundreds of millions of dollars from the MCC to tiny countries with little if any foreign policy or security importance to the United States, 

you would cut funds for programs that have bipartisan support, proven results, and 

that fund everything from girls’ education to providing clean water and improving 

agriculture. 

Chairman McConnell and I are among your strongest supporters here, but with 

the cuts the President is proposing to so many domestic programs this is going to 

be a very difficult year for this subcommittee. 

You may have big plans, you may have great policies. But if you don’t have the 

funds to implement them they won’t amount to much. They certainly won’t be transformational. Unless you can convince the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the 

House and Senate Appropriations Committees, much of what you hope to do will 

not be possible. I want to mention a few issues of special concern to me, and I will 

have questions on other topics as well: 

—First, is the image and reputation of the United States, which has obvious importance to our security. After 9/11 there was an outpouring of sympathy from 

every corner of the globe. Today, we are seen by alarming numbers of people 

as an aggressive, occupying bully that locks up innocent people indefinitely, humiliates and physically abuses them, and denies them the right to even 

knowwhat they are accused of. 

We get regular reports of Iraqi civilians, including women and young children, 

who have been mistakenly killed by U.S. soldiers. We have spent billions on grossly 

over-priced reconstruction projects that were poorly designed and may never get finished, but which made U.S. contractors rich. This is not making us safer. 

—Second, is U.N. peacekeeping. The United Nations is operating 18 different 

peacekeeping missions. One of them, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

is trying to provide security for the first democratic elections in half a century, 

while it copes with armed militias and every possible logistical challenge in a 

destitute country the size of Western Europe with virtually no infrastructure. 

This is just one example. Darfur may be next, and it will involve similar challenges and costs. 

Yet while the Administration votes to send U.N. peacekeepers to some of the 

world’s most dangerous places, we under-fund these missions which together cost 

in a year less than our military spends in a week in Iraq. It is time for us and the 

other nations who don’t contribute any troops, to support these missions the way 

we would expect our own soldiers to be supported. Yet, again, your budget does not 

do that, and it is going to cause serious problems. 

—Third, is Latin America. It has been sorely neglected by this Administration, 

despite protestations by State Department and White House officials to the contrary. Senator DeWine has noted it. Senator Coleman has noted it. There is no 

end to the interests we share with our southern neighbors—immigration being 

just one—and yet your programs and policies are a mere shadow of what they 

should be. It is a missed opportunity and this budget continues business as 

usual. 

Madam Secretary, I voted for you because I felt you have the qualities to do a 

good job. I know you are trying and I think you have outstanding people here and 

in our missions around the world. But I have to say I think the foreign policies of 

this Administration have too often been misguided and harmful to our national interests. 

I am sure you disagree, but I do not believe this country is safer because of these 

policies, and I do not believe the budget you are here to support is nearly adequate 

to protect our interests in today’s increasingly divisive and dangerous world. 
5 

Senator MCCONNELL. Madam Secretary, I assume you have a 

prepared statement. If you do, we will make that a part of the 

record, you can make some observations, and then we will go to 

questions. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Leahy. I thank you very much for this opportunity. I will ask to 

enter my entire statement into the record, but I will just make a 

few comments so that we may have ample time for discussion and 

questions. 

I do want to thank the members of this committee for the tremendous support that you have given to our need to support our 

men and women who practice diplomacy. The funding requested by 

the President for the State Department and for foreign operations, 

of course, does more than just support diplomacy, because it is really strengthening our national security. The challenges that we face 

are of course sometimes military, but overwhelmingly they are political and economic, and they are a matter of helping to create a 

cadre of states that are well governed and that are democratic. 

America is of course a Nation at war and we are engaged in a 

conflict against terrorists and violent extremists. Across the world 

our Nation’s men and women in uniform and the members of the 

foreign and civil supervisor, as well as our foreign service nationals, are shouldering great risks and responsibilities in advancing 

America’s diplomatic mission, working in dangerous places far 

away from friends and family and loved ones. They are performing 

with courage and fortitude and heroism, and I would just like to 

take this opportunity to honor them, particularly those who have 

given their lives, and to recognize the courageous public servants 

and their families who endure long times of service abroad. 

Mr. Chairman, the President’s budget is in support of a number 

of core missions: first of all, of course, to defeat the extremism and 

terrorism that we face in the world. You will see that there is support for coalition partners and for front-line states that are literally 

on the front lines against terrorists. But of course we know that it 

is not enough to have a short-term solution to terrorism, that is defeating the terrorists who on a daily basis plot and plan to destroy 

innocent life, but also to deal with the creation—with the circumstances that created those terrorists. We believe that the ideology of hatred which they espouse can only be met by advancing 

liberty and democracy. That is the goal that we have in the support 

for the young democracies of Iraq and Afghanistan, for a broader 

Middle East initiative that seeks to press authoritarian regimes 

throughout a region that for 60 years has had an absence of freedom, to press for change in that region. Change is coming. It comes 

with turbulence, it comes with difficulty, but change in the Middle 

East is coming. 

Of course, our democracy agenda is not limited to the Middle 

East, but also to continuing to press for the democratization of 

those places that are still not democratic in Europe. In Asia, you 

mentioned Burma, Mr. Chairman, and we have been very active in 

that front, but also to press for change—for the stabilization of de-
6 

mocracy in places that have already had democratic elections, for 

instance in Latin America. 

We face global challenges. HIV/AIDS—the President’s emergency 

plan for AIDS is to have an effect on those afflicted with AIDS and 

on those who might be afflicted with AIDS. We fight the counterdrug fight with allies around the world, and of course we have 

taken on recently the new challenge of the possible pandemic of 

Avian flu. 

Finally, we are engaged in working with transformational states. 

Those are the states that we believe have the capacity to make a 

great leap forward. They are states that are very poor, where poverty is still a problem, but where they can be recognized for their 

democratic tendencies, for their good governance, for their desire to 

fight corruption. It is really a new paradigm for the delivery of foreign assistance and the President’s Millennium Challenge Account 

has been a real tool in pressing countries to deal with the kinds 

of problems that retard development and that retard the development of state capacity, so that American foreign assistance is not 

simply a crutch, but rather an enabling mechanism for states to 

one day become independent of foreign assistance and to be able 

to attract trade and investment, which is after all how states really 

grow. 

Let me say that we have a number of initiatives under way in 

the Department, what we have called transformational diplomacy, 

and I would only mention two. That is that we have done a good 

deal now of global repositioning. We have repositioned 100 people 

from posts that are, we believe, posts that can afford to have fewer 

personnel, to reposition them to front-line posts in places like India 

and China where we really need more people. 

We are also requesting more positions, but I just want the committee to know that we have made a commitment that we will also 

reposition existing resources, that we will not just ask for new resources, that we will indeed make the hard choices about changing 

our global posture, which still looks more like the 1980s and 1990s 

than it should in 2006. 

Finally, we have also made changes in our foreign assistance 

under the authorities that are granted to me for the direction of 

foreign assistance, with the creation of a post in the Department 

which will help us to better align the programs of USAID and the 

State Department. That is about 80 percent of all foreign assistance. We believe that, with this program, which I have asked 

Randy Tobias to take on, and should he be confirmed by the Senate 

he would also be the USAID Administrator—the point here is to 

make sure that we make the best use of the very precious resources that we are given. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

We recognize that the American people have been generous in 

their support of the diplomatic mission, of foreign assistance. We 

recognize that the American people want to be generous because 

we are compassionate when we look to helping developing societies, 

when we deal with humanitarian crises. But we also recognize that 

we have an obligation of stewardship and efficient use of those re-
7 

sources, and we believe that this new structure should give us better opportunity to do so. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Chairman McConnell, ranking member Leahy, members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to present the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget for 

State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs and agencies. I appreciate this opportunity to address the members of the subcommittee and to talk 

about America’s role in meeting the unprecedented challenges of our world today. 

I look forward to working closely with Congress to ensure that America’s diplomacy 

has the necessary resources to secure our interests, advance our ideals, and improve 

people’s lives around the world. In all of these mutual efforts, of course, we must 

remain committed to our responsibility to be good stewards of the American taxpayers’ hard-earned dollars. 

The President’s fiscal year 2007 International Affairs Budget for the Foreign Assistance Programs, Department of State Operations, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies totals $35.116 billion. This total includes $23.72 billion for Foreign 

Operations and $10.078 billion for State Operations, as well as $1.317 billion in 

Public Law 480 Food Aid, and reflects a funding increase of $3.539 billion from the 

level appropriated last year. 

As I did last year, I want to emphasize that it is important to maintain a balance 

of resources between State operations and foreign assistance. The diplomatic platforms that we have—our people, our ability to operate in the field, our facilities— 

are the platforms from which we conduct our diplomacy and we are especially concerned that our people have the training, technology and facilities that they need, 

all with the requisite security. These vital components are necessary to the success 

of our diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs. 

Additionally, I would like to take this opportunity to encourage the members of 

this committee to continue to provide their full support and leadership in passing 

the fiscal year 2006 Emergency Supplemental request that is before you now. This 

urgently needed funding will support immediate political, economic, humanitarian, 

and operational requirements that will allow us to meet new challenges—and seize 

new opportunities—to build a better, safer, and freer world. 

Mr. Chairman, the funding requested by the President for State Department and 

Foreign Operations will do more than support our diplomacy; it will strengthen our 

national security. America is a Nation at war. We are engaged in a conflict against 

terrorists and violent extremists. Across the world, our Nation’s men and women in 

uniform and the members of our Foreign and Civil Service, as well as our Foreign 

Service Nationals, are shouldering great risks and responsibilities advancing America’s diplomatic mission—often working in dangerous places far away from their 

friends and loved ones. They are performing with courage, fortitude and heroism. 

Today, I want to honor those who have given their lives in this cause and to recognize the courageous public servants and their families who endure long periods of 

service abroad. 

America’s enemies remain eager to strike us, but our actions in the past 4 years 

have weakened their capability. Our diplomacy plays a vital role in defeating this 

threat. We are building partnerships with traditional allies and with new partners 

that share our perception of the threat. Most importantly, we are working directly 

with foreign citizens who wish to build thriving free societies that embrace democratic values and freedoms. 

This is indeed an extraordinary period. It is a time that is unlike any other since 

perhaps the end of World War II, when the United States took on the mantle of 

creating a stable and democratic Europe. Europe at that time was weak and divided. Today it is free and at peace. We learned from that experience that if we are 

faithful to our democratic values we are safer and more secure. When democracy 

and freedom are in retreat, we are more vulnerable, which we learned in a very 

graphic and painful way on September 11, 2001. 

The President has said that the only way to deal with the ideologies of hatred 

that we face in the world today is to present the world with the antidote, which 

is the spread of liberty and freedom. The men and women of our diplomatic service 

work daily in this cause. In his Second Inaugural Address, President Bush laid out 

the vision for American leadership in the world today: ‘‘[I]t is the policy of the 

United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our 
8 

world.’’ The President’s vision stems from the recognition that we are living in a 

time of extraordinary change, where the prospect of violent conflict among great 

powers is more remote than ever. Nations are increasingly competing and cooperating in peace, not preparing for war. Democratic reform has begun in the Middle 

East. The United States is working with our democratic partners in every region 

of the world to build global stability through a balance of power that favors freedom 

and advances liberty. 

At the same time, other challenges have assumed new urgency. The greatest 

threats today emerge more within states than between them, and the fundamental 

character of regimes matters more than the international distribution of power. It 

is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development goals, and our democratic ideals in the world today. Our diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals, through a strategy that is rooted in partnership, not paternalism—in doing things with people, not for them. This is the objective of our diplomatic efforts today and in the future. 

TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Mr. Chairman, the 2007 budget represents what we call transformational diplomacy. The objective of transformational diplomacy is to work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that 

will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the 

international system. 

We must transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes, 

and we must empower our people to practice transformational diplomacy. With the 

generous support of the Congress, my good friend and predecessor, Colin Powell, 

brought American diplomacy into the 21st century. Now, my leadership team and 

I are building on this strong foundation and beginning the generational work of 

transforming the State Department and USAID. This will not only strengthen national security, it will improve our fiscal stewardship. We are committed to using 

American taxpayers’ dollars in the most effective and responsible way to strengthen 

America’s mission abroad. 

In the past year, we have begun making changes to our organization and our operations that will enable us to advance transformational diplomacy. We are forwarddeploying our people to the cities, countries, and regions where they are needed 

most. We are starting to move hundreds of diplomats from Europe and Washington 

to strategic countries like China, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. We are supplying our people with additional training and language skills in order to engage 

more effectively with foreign peoples. Our national security depends, in part, on the 

ability of American diplomats to speak and master critical foreign languages. We 

must improve our communication skills in critical foreign languages such as Arabic, 

Farsi, Mandarin, Hindi, and Urdu to promote our national security, foster greater 

economic integration, and further the agenda of freedom. Consistent with our language and education initiative, the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget includes proposals to manage for results. We are enabling our diplomats to work more closely 

with America’s servicemen and women creating the most cohesive and unified diplomatic team in our history. 

To ensure better coordination of our financial resources I have announced the creation of the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance. This essential reform 

will sharpen our capability to use foreign assistance more efficiently and effectively 

to: further our foreign policy goals; bolster our national security; encourage prosperous, democratic and lawful societies that join us in overcoming the forces of terror; reduce poverty; and improve people’s lives around the world. 

We are making these initial changes using our existing authority. The additional 

funding we are requesting in the fiscal year 2007 budget will help us to implement 

our vision to transform the State Department to meet the challenges of the 21st century. For this purpose, we are requesting $9.3 billion for State Department operations. Transformational diplomacy begins by ensuring that our people are in the 

right places, with the necessary tools and training to carry their mission. We are 

requesting $23 million for 100 new positions on the new frontlines of our diplomacy: 

key transitional countries and emerging nations in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. These new positions will complement the 100 positions that we 

are already moving as part of our ongoing effort to best balance our global diplomatic posture. This repositioning effort will require a renewed commitment to secure and to modernize many posts overseas, and we are seeking $1.5 billion for security-related construction and rehabilitation of our diplomatic facilities. 

More and more, we are calling on our diplomats to leave their families and serve 

overseas in unaccompanied assignments, or ‘‘hardship posts’’. With your help, as 
9 

part of our effort to modernize the Foreign Service, we will institute a new pay-forperformance system that fairly compensates our men and women working abroad. 

New training will also make full use of dynamic new technologies, and we are asking for $276 million to provide for our workforce the latest information technology 

and to support professional training needed for success. 

These new tools and training will better enable our Nation’s diplomats to tell 

America’s story to the people of the world, and in turn, to listen to the stories they 

have to tell. We have heard the legitimate criticisms that have been made of our 

public diplomacy, and we are re-engineering how we do business. I have stressed 

that public diplomacy is the responsibility of every single member of our diplomatic 

corps, not just our public diplomacy specialists. We are creating forward-deployed, 

regional public diplomacy centers. These centers, or media hubs, will be small, lean 

operations that work out of our embassies or other existing facilities, enabling us 

to respond quickly to negative propaganda, to correct misinformation, and to explain 

America’s policies and principles. The $351 million that we seek will be essential 

to continue to revitalize our public diplomacy. 

To complement our public diplomacy, we must ensure that America remains a 

welcoming place for tourists, students, and businesspeople, while at the same time 

protecting our homeland from terrorists and criminals who would exploit our open 

society to do us harm. The State Department, in partnership with the Department 

of Homeland Security, has taken new steps in the past year to realize the President’s vision of secure borders and open doors. Our request of $1.1 billion will fund 

the Border Security Program and enable us to hire 135 new consular officers and 

passport staff to meet the growing demand of foreign citizens seeking to travel to 

America, while maintaining its fundamental commitment to serve each and every 

American citizen who travels abroad. At the same time, we are seeking $474 million 

to support educational and cultural exchanges, which increase mutual understanding between our citizens and the peoples of the world. 

Finally, we must continue to enable our Nation’s diplomats to work effectively 

with our partners in the United Nations and other international organizations. The 

United States takes its international obligations seriously, and we remain committed to strengthening the financial stability, efficiency, and effectiveness of international organizations. We seek $1.6 billion to fund assessed and voluntary contributions to international organizations. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, America’s purpose in this young 

century is to fuse our democratic principles with our dramatic power to build a more 

hopeful world. Our purposes are idealistic, but our policies are realistic. The men 

and women of the State Department have risen to the challenge of transformational 

diplomacy with enthusiasm and courage and are helping our partners around the 

world to build a future of freedom, democracy, and hope. 

Realizing the goals of transformational diplomacy will require a sustained effort 

over the course of a generation. Most importantly, it will require a strong partnership with the Congress. We will do our part to use our existing authority to make 

foreign assistance more effective and to enhance our ability to serve as responsible 

stewards of the American taxpayers’ money. Our goal in establishing the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance is a first step. We welcome a dialogue with 

Congress about how we can work together to improve further America’s foreign assistance, enabling us to respond more quickly and more effectively to the world’s development challenges. 

DEFEATING TERROR

When we speak about the Global War on Terrorism, we first think of what our 

military is doing in the mountains of Afghanistan or the towns and cities of Iraq. 

But we also need to think of the important role of our foreign assistance and diplomatic presence in places beyond Afghanistan and Iraq and in the array of states 

that are now fighting side-by-side with us in the Global War on Terrorism. As they 

are supporting us, we need to support them. In this budget we are requesting $6.2 

billion to strengthen the coalition partners who are standing shoulder to shoulder 

with us on the front lines in the fight against terrorism. Our assistance empowers 

our partners to practice more effective law enforcement, police their borders, gather 

and share essential intelligence, and wage more successful counterterrorism operations. In many nations, our assistance will also help to bolster thriving democratic 

and economic institutions reducing the societal divisions that terrorists exploit for 

their own ideological purposes. Our fiscal year 2007 request includes $739 million 

for Pakistan, $560 million for Colombia, $154 million for Indonesia, $457 million for 

Jordan, and $335 million for Kenya. 
10 

Essential to winning the war on terrorism is denying our enemies the weapons 

of mass destruction that they seek. We must develop new tools for counter-proliferation to confront and dismantle the networks involving rogue states, outlaw scientists, and black market middlemen who make proliferation possible. We are building on the achievements of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G–8 Global 

Partnership, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. We are working to stop 

Iran and North Korea from succeeding in their quest for weapons of mass destruction, and we continue to do everything in our power to deny terrorists access to the 

world’s most dangerous weapons, including conventional weapons like MANPADS. 

The fiscal year 2007 budget proposes to increase funding for the State Department’s 

efforts to help countries counter the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials. 

ADVANCING LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY

In December over 12 million Iraqi people voted in free elections for a democratic 

government based on a constitution that Iraqis wrote and adopted. Iraq is on a 

track of transformation from brutal tyranny to a self-reliant emerging democracy 

that is working to better the lives of its people and defeat violent extremists. The 

President’s request of $771 million, along with the supplemental request, is an essential part of our National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The funding for the Department’s operations and programs is a critical counterpart to the efforts of our troops 

in the field as we pursue integrated security, economic, and political tracks to success in Iraq. The supplemental request will fund programs that are integral to our 

counter-insurgency campaign and to the operation and security of our diplomatic 

mission, while the fiscal year 2007 request supports capacity development essential 

for Iraq’s transition to self-reliance. 

Our work also continues in Afghanistan. Four years after the United States, along 

with our Afghan allies and others, removed the Taliban regime, the Afghan people 

have established a democratic government. Millions of men and women have voted 

freely for the first time. Today, Afghanistan has a democratic constitution, an 

emerging free economy, and a growing, multi-ethnic army. Despite this dramatic 

progress, there is still much hard work to be done. The President’s request of $1.1 

billion for Afghan reconstruction, along with supplemental funding, will allow us to 

continue working with the people of Afghanistan to meet the remaining political, 

economic, and security challenges they face. 

The people of Iraq and Afghanistan are helping to lead the transformation of the 

Broader Middle East from despotism to democracy. This is a generational challenge. 

Elections are an important and necessary beginning and the freedom to choose invests citizens in the future of their countries. But one election does not complete 

the fulfillment of democracy. Successful democracies are characterized by transparent, accountable institutions of governance; a thriving civil society that respects 

and protects minority rights; a free media; opportunities for health and education; 

and the renunciation of terrorism and ideologies of hatred. On this last point especially, we will continue to insist that the leaders of Hamas agree to the conditions 

of the quartet to reject terrorism and work toward peace with Israel. 

Helping the nations of the broader Middle East to make progress in building the 

foundations of democratic societies is the mission of the Middle East Partnership 

Initiative, for which we are seeking $120 million. We are also requesting $80 million 

for the National Endowment for Democracy to continue its work in promoting lasting democratic change around the world. 

Progress in the broader Middle East offers hope, but the region still faces determined enemies, especially the radical regime in Tehran. Through its aggressive and 

confrontational behavior, Iran is increasingly isolating itself from the international 

community. In recent months, our diplomacy has broadened the international coalition to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This issue is now before the U.N. Security 

Council. 

The Iranian people should know that the United States fully supports their aspirations for a freer, better future, which is why the President requested $75 million 

in supplemental funding for democracy promotion activities. As we aim to isolate 

the government of Iran because of its defiance of the international community over 

its nuclear program, it is all the more important that we make clear to the Iranian 

people our commitment to their well-being. The funds we are requesting in the supplemental will enable us to expand considerably our direct communication with the 

Iranian people through public diplomacy, educational and cultural exchanges, and 

expanded broadcasting. 
11 

MEETING GLOBAL CHALLENGES

Like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, many other challenges in today’s world 

are global and transnational in nature. These threats breach all borders and affect 

all nations. Today’s global threats require global partnerships, and America’s diplomats are helping to transform our relationships with countries that have the capacity and the will to address shared global problems. 

One major global threat comes from disease, especially the scourge of HIV/AIDS. 

This pandemic affects key productive members of society: the individuals who drive 

economies, raise children, and pass on the customs and traditions of their countries. 

The United States is committed to treating people worldwide who suffer from AIDS 

because conscience demands it, and also because a healthier world is a safer world. 

The hallmark of our approach is the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. 

The Emergency Plan is rooted in partnership. Our approach is to empower each 

nation to take ownership of the fight against HIV/AIDS through prevention, treatment, and care. The results to date have been remarkable. In the past two years, 

the Emergency Plan has expanded life-extending antiretroviral treatment to 471,000 

people worldwide, 400,000 of whom are located in sub-Saharan Africa. As of last 

year, the Emergency Plan has extended care to more than 1.2 million orphans and 

vulnerable children. The President’s 2007 Budget requests $4 billion, $740 million 

more than the current year, to continue American leadership in the global fight 

against HIV/AIDS. Additionally, the 2007 budget includes $225 million to fight malaria, which is a major killer of children in sub-Saharan Africa. These funds respond 

to a pledge to increase United States funding of malaria prevention and treatment 

by more than $1.2 billion over five years. 

The United States is also playing a key global role in preparing for the threat 

of a possible avian influenza pandemic by providing political leadership, technical 

expertise, and significant resources. The most effective way to protect the American 

population from an influenza outbreak abroad is to contain it beyond our borders. 

The 2007 budget provides resources to continue these activities in countries already 

experiencing outbreaks of influenza and in other countries on the cusp of infection. 

Another key global challenge is to curtail the illicit drug trade and to dissolve the 

relationships between narcotic-traffickers, terrorists, and international criminal organizations. The 2007 budget requests $722 million for the Andean Counterdrug 

Initiative, which advances the President’s goal of strengthening democracy, regional 

stability, and economic development throughout the hemisphere. The Initiative provides funding for law enforcement, security programs, and alternative livelihood assistance for those at risk from the trade of illicit narcotics. 

The United States remains the world’s most generous provider of food and other 

emergency humanitarian assistance. We are also helping refugees to return to their 

countries of origin. Where that is not a viable option, the United States leads the 

international community in resettling refugees here in the United States. The fiscal 

year 2007 request of $1.2 billion for humanitarian relief, plus $1.3 billion in food 

aid, will ensure that we are prepared to extend the reach of American compassion 

throughout the world. 

BUILDING STATE CAPACITY

Many states cannot meet the basic responsibilities of sovereignty, including just 

and effective control over their own territory. It is critical to American security to 

build state capacity where it does not exist, to help weak and poorly governed states 

to develop, and to empower those states that are embracing political and economic 

freedom. 

We must anticipate and prevent the emergence of failed states that lead to regional instability and which become havens for terror and oppression that threaten 

America’s security. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has been established to address complex and challenging situations around the 

globe. The 2007 budget proposes to strengthen planning efforts for countries and regions of greatest concern. We seek to coordinate the deployment of United States 

resources to prevent the emergence of failed states, and to respond quickly and effectively to states emerging from conflict around the world. With an early and effective response, we can reduce the need for a more robust and costly military commitment. This budget request includes $75 million for the conflict response fund. 

HELPING DEVELOPING STATES

Where the basic foundations of security, governance, and economic institutions 

exist, the United States is advancing bold development goals. The President has embarked on the most expansive development agenda since the Marshall Plan, includ-
12 

ing new debt relief initiatives, the doubling of Official Development Assistance since 

taking office, and performance-based funding for international financial institutions. 

Development is an integral pillar of our foreign policy. In 2002, the President’s National Security Strategy for the first time elevated development to the level of diplomacy and defense, citing it as the third key component of our national security. 

States that govern justly, invest in their people, and create the conditions for individual and collective prosperity are less likely to produce or harbor terrorists. American diplomacy must advance these development principles. 

Our development assistance focuses on building the tools for democratic participation, promoting economic growth, providing for health and education, and addressing security concerns in developing nations, as well as responding to humanitarian 

disasters. Such investments are crucial to improving the lives of people around the 

world and enhancing our own national security. We seek to provide the necessary 

tools and incentives for governments to secure the conditions for the development 

of free and prosperous societies. 

Relieving the burden of heavily indebted countries is essential to ending a destabilizing lend-and-forgive approach to development assistance. At the Gleneagles 

summit last July, the G–8 agreed on a landmark initiative to provide 100 percent 

cancellation of qualifying Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ debt obligations to the 

World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 

United States leadership was instrumental in securing this agreement. We estimate 

that a total of 42 countries will receive up to $60 billion in debt relief as a result 

of this initiative. The Budget that I present to you today supports the United States 

share of the multilateral debt forgiveness provided by the G–8 proposal. 

We are also seeking support for our share of the G–8’s assistance package for Africa. This package will fight malaria, HIV/AIDS, and corruption and help to create 

an environment where democracy and economic opportunity can flourish. Specifically, the 2007 budget supports the President’s commitment to double assistance to 

Africa between 2004 and 2010. In addition, the request supports our commitment 

to help African countries to build trade capacity; to educate their citizens through 

a $400 million Africa Education Initiative; and to combat sexual violence and abuse 

against women through a new Women’s Justice and Empowerment Initiative. 

Although Africa is a primary focus of our efforts to reduce poverty and invest in 

people and reform, it is by no means the only continent on which our resources are 

directed. We seek a total of $2.7 billion for worldwide Development Assistance and 

Child Survival and Health funds. 

EMPOWERING TRANSFORMATIONAL STATES

We also seek to empower those states that are governing justly. The flagship of 

our efforts is the Millennium Challenge Account, which is helping states that are 

making measurable progress to achieve sustainable development and integration 

into the global economy. 

In 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, the nations of the world adopted a new consensus 

on reducing international poverty. Developed nations agreed to increase their assistance to developing countries, and developing countries committed to making 

progress toward good governance, economic freedom, and investments in the health 

and education of their people. In response to this Monterrey Consensus, the Administration and the Congress created the Millennium Challenge Account, which targets new development assistance to countries that meet benchmarks of political, economic, and social development. This innovative approach partners with and invests 

in low and lower-middle income countries that take ownership of their own economic 

development. 

In the past year, we have accelerated our efforts to negotiate and sign development compacts between transformational countries and the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation. To date, the MCC has identified 23 countries eligible for development 

compacts, and has approved compacts worth a total of $1.5 billion with eight countries: Armenia, Benin, Cape Verde, Georgia, Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua, and 

Vanuatu. Nine eligible countries have prepared proposals totaling $3.1 billion, and 

another six will soon submit proposals. We are seeking $3 billion of new funding 

in the fiscal year 2007 budget, with the goal of approving up to 10 new compacts. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, realizing the goals of transformational diplomacy will require a sustained effort over the course of a generation. Most importantly, it will require a strong partnership with the Congress. We 

at the Department of State will do our part to use our existing authority to make 

our diplomatic initiatives and our foreign assistance programs more effective and to 
13 

enhance our ability to serve as responsible stewards of the American taxpayers’ 

money. I look forward to working with the subcommittee. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Even though it is arguably only indirectly related to your budget, 

I would like to start off with the biggest issue confronting the State 

Department, the administration, and the country, and that is Iraq. 

Yesterday, I had in my office a Kentucky soldier who was in Iraq 

for a year. He left in January. This is a soldier who is completely 

apolitical, who gave me a report on his own initiative of his observations of what had happened during his year there. He served 

with a transportation company that was frequently squiring vehicles around the country and had a number of experiences, including 80 IED attacks on his convoys. 

During the course of the year his company lost two soldiers. This 

soldier went on to say that extraordinary progress had been made 

in Iraq in every aspect that he could witness, and he also expressed 

his complete and total frustration that nobody in this country 

seems to know anything about this progress. 

I know that there is a tendency to teach in journalism school 

that only bad news is news, but in a place like Iraq, I find a lot 

of soldiers completely frustrated by the fact that almost nothing 

that they are doing is being characterized as good work and almost 

no visible signs of progress seem to get out. 

IRAQ

Could you itemize for us some of the progress you see being 

made? Three successful elections last year; I think everybody 

thinks that that is a good thing. But what are some of the indicators of progress that are not being written about and therefore not 

being learned about by Americans here at home? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator McConnell. I would start 

with the political news because it is indeed very difficult when you 

see the bombings every day or the violence on TV. It is a harder 

story to tell of the political progress that is being made. I also recognize that at times it seems that the Iraqis are engaged in argumentation and debate and they cannot get this formed and they 

cannot get that formed. I would remind people that in fact these 

are people who are for the first time in their entire history, and 

really one of the only times in this entire region, that people who 

are very, very different—Sunnis, Shia, Kurds—sitting down to try 

and solve their problems politically, not by violence and not by repression. 

Of course it is difficult and of course it is contentious. But that 

is the process of democracy. The forming of a government of national unity, which we have encouraged that they do it as quickly 

as possible, but it is not surprising when they have existential 

issues, like resource allocation or how to deal with the Baathists 

who repressed people in the past, that it is going to be contentious 

and difficult. 

The good news is all elements of Iraqi society are now engaged 

in that and they are moving ahead. As you said, they have had 

three elections. The last one, 11 million Iraqis voted. That demonstrates that the Iraqi people want a political course, not a course 

of violence. 
14 

Second, it is true that the reconstruction has in some places been 

slower than we would have liked. But there is also very good news 

about reconstruction. The United States has been able with reconstruction funds to improve the capacity of an electrical grid that 

only had 50 percent of the generating power that the country needed. It was true that Baghdad was getting power most of the day, 

but most of the country was getting none. Now it is true that the 

power in Baghdad has been less than at the time of the war, but 

in part that is because the power is being spread over the entire 

country. We are increasing the capacity and expect that by the end 

of the year we would have increased that capacity significantly so 

that the country will have a more even distribution of power. 

Schools and clinics and children going to school are really the result of the reconstruction funds that this Congress has appropriated to the Iraqi people. Probably most importantly, the Iraqi 

people now on any day recognize that the time will come when 

there will be a government elected by them governing them, over 

which they have a say and where repression will not be the case. 

I would mention just one other thing and that is that the security forces of Iraq have improved quite substantially over the last 

year. During this most recent uptick in sectarian violence, the Iraqi 

army performed very well indeed. The Iraqi army is now often in 

the lead in counterterrorism operations and in stability operations. 

They have taken territory. They themselves are in control of 50 

percent of the Baghdad area. 

We are making progress then in creating security forces, in helping to improve the infrastructure of a country that had a completely deteriorated infrastructure, of getting schools and clinics 

and hospitals either refurbished or built, and in supporting the 

Iraqis in a political process that is going to lead to a dramatically 

different Iraq. That is the good news story against obviously a 

backdrop of significant violence. 

Senator MCCONNELL. So what are the next important milestones 

that we should expect in the next few months? 

Secretary RICE. The next important milestone is the formation of 

a government, the national unity government. Then we would expect that they will issue a program on which they will govern. 

If you do not mind, I will just take one moment to clear up something. I hear a great deal of the time that the Iraqis are slow in 

forming this government because they are haggling over jobs. That 

is the way that it is sometimes put. In fact, they are developing a 

program on which the national unity government would govern. 

They are developing the rules by which they will actually govern, 

what will be the responsibilities of the deputy prime minister, what 

will be the relationship of those ministers to subordinate ministries. And they are working on who will actually take certain positions. 

So you can see that it is a much more complicated set of negotiations that they are in than if they were just haggling over who was 

going to take the prime ministership. That said, we are pressing 

that they should finish this work as soon as possible. That is the 

next major milestone, Senator. After that, I think there will be 

milestones in Iraq security forces taking responsibility for larger 

and larger pieces of territory in Iraq. 
15 

Senator MCCONNELL. What are the Iranians doing in the country 

and in what way is that impeding progress for the new government? 

Secretary RICE. Well, the Iranians are not helpful in the south. 

We believe that there are indications that they may be supporting 

troublemakers, militias and the like, in that region. We also are 

concerned that they are not always transparent in relations with 

people in Iraq about trying to influence the direction of Iraq. 

We believe that—the Iraqis disagree, and we do not disagree, 

that Iran has to be a good neighbor, that they ought to have a good 

relationship with Iran. The British, of course, have been concerned 

that Iranian technology has showed up in some of the IEDs that 

are so devastating to personnel in Iraq. So there are several elements of Iranian policy that we find deeply troubling. 

Should Zal Khalilzad exercise the authority that he has to meet 

with the Iranian ambassador, an authority he has had for several 

months, these are some of the issues that we would intend to bring 

up with Iran in what would be a very limited set of discussions 

about Iraq. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Two more questions before I turn to Senator Leahy. Am I correct that American casualties are substantially 

down in recent months, and is that—if I am correct—a reflection 

of just what you were talking about earlier, that the Iraqis are taking on more and more of the burden of being on the point and dealing with the security issues? 

Secretary RICE. Senator, the trends are as you noted. Of course, 

every casualty is one that we mourn, but the trends are in that direction. Some of it may indeed be as a result of the fact that the 

Iraqis are more on the front line. There are some who believe that 

the insurgents or the terrorists have also taken a different tactic 

in who they are actually going after. 

But whatever the case, we would hope that as Iraqis step forward more and more that in fact they are going to have to do the 

brunt of the fighting. That is only as it should be because Iraq is 

their country. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Finally, what did you make of the reports 

that the Russians were providing information to Saddam Hussein 

as we began the war? 

Secretary RICE. I have gotten my hands on the document, which 

I wanted to do, and I have talked with the Russian foreign minister 

and asked them to look into this and to take it very seriously. We 

take very seriously any implication that someone might have been 

passing information that endangered the operation at the outset of 

the war and we will look for an answer back from the Russian Government once, hopefully, they have had a chance to look into it. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. 

Will we be able to find out what that answer is? 

Secretary RICE. Absolutely. We have wanted not to conclude before we have the discussion, but it is obviously a very serious matter and we are taking it up with the Russians. 
16 

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

Senator LEAHY. Madam Secretary, while we were waiting before 

the hearing began I discussed a matter with which I have a great 

deal of concern. That is the matter of Charles Taylor. A number of 

us had urged Nigeria for years to transfer Charles Taylor to the 

Special Court for Sierra Leone. We asked the State Department for 

a strategy to get Taylor to the court. We have not got that. 

Finally, last week Liberia and Nigeria cleared the way for getting Taylor to the court, which was good news. But then, rather 

than turn Taylor over, Nigerian President Obasanjo told Liberia to 

just come and get him. Now we find out according to reports that 

he has escaped and may no longer be in Nigeria, escaped from the 

villa where he was sitting and involving himself with matters in 

a number of countries. 

Now, if after all that time he has been sitting there, for all that 

time nothing happened, finally they said, okay, now we will turn 

him over, and now they let him escape, that boggles the imagination. It is totally outrageous. President Obasanjo has for years 

thwarted attempts to get Taylor to a court. I believe he bears responsibility for letting him escape. 

I understand he plans to meet with President Bush at the White 

House tomorrow. I would urge you to cancel that visit, cancel that 

visit until Taylor is in custody of the court where he belongs. I 

think it would send the wrong message if he escapes one day and 

the next day the person who had him in custody and let him escape 

is greeted at the White House. 

Do you want to comment on that? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. I certainly believe that the 

Nigerian Government has a responsibility, has a responsibility to 

transfer Charles Taylor safely to Liberian custody so that he can 

be brought to the court. I cannot confirm at this point what has 

happened to Charles Taylor, whether or not he has escaped. But 

obviously it would be a matter of the utmost seriousness if that did 

indeed take place. 

The Nigerians indeed did take Charles Taylor, at the behest of 

the international community, but I think there was an understanding that he would be monitored and that he would be at some 

point, President Obasanjo said when there was a Liberian government, turned over for prosecution on the court, and we were on 

course for that. If we are no longer on course for that, then we will 

have to examine why this happened and have consequences accordingly. 

Senator LEAHY. You said two things: one, he would be monitored; 

and second, when there is a government in Liberia he could be 

turned over. Now, they do have a democratically elected president. 

She was here just recently visiting, a very impressive person. I 

think it was known that Taylor was being monitored and he was 

involved in activities outside Nigerian borders. So the monitoring 

broke down if there was any monitoring. 

So they had a couple strikes against them. One, that broke down. 

Two, he wasn’t turned over. There was a court prepared to take 

him in Sierra Leone. He could have gone there. Now, if he has escaped, I think after the monitoring failed, after getting him to a 
17 

court failed, after keeping him in custody failed, I really think it 

would be a mistake to have President Obasanjo here with the kind 

of imprimatur of the United States on that visit that a presidential 

meeting would bring. 

Secretary RICE. We consider it a very serious matter, Senator, if 

he has indeed escaped, very serious. 

Senator LEAHY. Do you agree with me that Charles Taylor is a 

threat—— 

Secretary RICE. Absolutely. 

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. To security in that region? 

Secretary RICE. Absolutely. 

Senator LEAHY. Many of us consider him a mass murderer too, 

for what he did before. 

Secretary RICE. I think that it was really the President who at 

one point when he was in Africa insisted that he step down. We 

then supported the Liberians to end the violence there, in fact at 

one point having marines help in ending that violence. We believe 

now that we have a great deal at stake also in the success of the 

new Liberian Government. 

So I strongly agree with you, Senator, it is a very serious matter. 

Senator LEAHY. In that regard, considering what it cost when we 

did intervene, let us be willing to spend a fraction of that money 

now to help the new president succeed. Sometimes success is a lot 

less expensive than trying to clean up the mess afterwards, as you 

know. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE

The State Department has a program called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative that was enacted in the Intelligence Reform Act. This was one of those ideas that kind of zips through 

without a great deal of debate. Now the Department of State and 

Homeland Security have to implement it. We are talking about how 

to control the Canadian border and the Mexican border. It is almost treating them as though they are both the same thing. They 

are not. 

Canada is our largest trading partner. We have got a huge trade 

surplus with them, which we do not have with many countries. The 

State Department has a prototype of the card but there is no agreement on what format the card will be. Congress has authorized you 

to begin hiring staff to meet demand. Homeland Security still cannot figure out what technology it wants to use nor identify what 

kind of border crossing cards. 

The new Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Michael 

Wilson, strongly opposes the proposed card. I think we are on our 

way to a real train wreck here. I live an hour’s drive from the Canadian border. I see the travel back and forth. I see families that 

go across. There is a tremendous amount of commerce with the border States. 

Your Department has devoted a lot of time to meet the deadline. 

Are you just going to implement a law and then tell Canada to 

catch up? Or are you working with Canada? You have a lot of people in Canada who think that they are under attack. 

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, we are working with both Canada 

and Mexico on this issue. There is a law that requires a standard 
18 

document for passage on the two borders and we recognize that 

these borders are borders on which there is a great deal of commerce, a great number, a lot of people. I can tell you that the first 

thought was that we would require passports and—— 

Senator LEAHY. I am sorry? I did not get that. 

Secretary RICE. I said the first thought when this law came out 

was that we would require passports. 

Senator LEAHY. Which would be crazy. 

Secretary RICE. I was going to say that the first objection to that 

came from the former Governor of Texas, the President, who said 

that that would of course not work on borders where people move 

so easily. So we went—he asked us to go back to the drawing 

board. We did, and Mike Chertoff and I have worked to come up 

with an inexpensive but standard card that could be used for passage on those borders. 

We are working with both Canada and Mexico. We have gotten 

favorable response to the initiative that Mike Chertoff and I have 

taken, and we will try to make it as—— 

Senator LEAHY. Favorable in Canada? 

Secretary RICE. Favorable from—my Canadian counterpart at 

the time—of course there is a new government in Canada, but my 

Canadian counterpart at the time and Mexican counterpart understand that we have the law and they want to help us implement 

it in a way that is as helpful as possible. 

Senator LEAHY. You said it is in the law. Has the administration 

considered delaying this for a while or perhaps look at it again? If 

a family of four, for example, from Canada is going to have to 

spend about $250 to come down and visit the United States, they 

are not going to come down to the United States to spend money. 

Secretary RICE. Well, it is our hope that, Senator, we can have 

an answer that is in fact inexpensive and that is perhaps a onetime issuance, where people can go back and forth who go back and 

forth often. I do think that we need to recognize that the law was 

put there because we did have in fact very porous borders on both 

sides prior to September 11 and there were a number of problems 

on both borders, even on the Canadian border, prior to September 

11. 

Senator LEAHY. There is one store in Vermont with a line painted down the middle because, since they changed the border, half 

of it is in Canada, half in the United States. Are we going to say, 

Joe, can you get me that box of Rice Krispies over there? I am 

sorry, I will toss it to you because I do not have a passport. I mean, 

it is going to get that ridiculous. 

Secretary RICE. Well, we will try to make it as simple as possible 

for the people, Senator. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, welcome. I too have had the recent experience 

of going to Southeast Asia and I can report that it is fun to go to 

a country where they like Americans. I was with Senator Durbin 

in France. We did not quite have that sense while we were there. 

It is fun to go to countries that not only like Americans, but want 
19 

to become like Americans themselves, want to participate in the 

international economy, and want very much to trade with us. 

I congratulate you on the diplomatic efforts of the people we met 

there. The people you have on the ground there are some of our 

very finest. We do not often give them the sort of public accolades 

that they deserve. But the various Ambassadors and other State 

Department personnel that we met through this trip—we were in 

China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. Then we made a fueling 

stop in Kyrgistan, which turned into an evening when they were 

not able to fix the airplane. So we saw more of Kyrgistan than we 

had anticipated, but that was interesting too. 

On a more parochial note, there are several matters from the fiscal 2006 appropriations bill in which my office has an interest. I 

will not raise them specifically here, but I would like to send you 

some paper on both of these and would appreciate whatever help 

you can give us in nudging these things forward a little. They have 

gotten lost in the pattern. 

MICROENTERPRISE

You are aware, I am sure, of my continuing support of microenterprise activities. This is something that I pushed since I have 

been a Senator and particularly since I have been a member of this 

committee. Can you focus on that for us just a minute as to what 

is included in the 2007 budget and what you see for that kind of 

activity? 

Secretary RICE. Yes, absolutely, Senator. I can try to break out 

the numbers for you. I will send you the numbers, but let me just 

say that we have had a very strong emphasis on microenterprise 

in a number of places around the world. In Africa in particular, we 

have had a strong microfinancing, microenterprise approach. 

I would note that I have visited personally several places that 

are, for instance, women-owned businesses, where just a very small 

loan allows essentially a cooperative of women to get together and 

make goods that they can sell on the market. We have been very 

supportive of microenterprise. 

I also visited in Mexico very recently—it was actually when I 

was first Secretary, I think in my first couple of weeks, a trip to 

Mexico—a place that was not doing microlending, but actually a 

kind of small credit union that was helping communities to do 

microlending. So we feel very strongly that, particularly for the empowerment of women, microenterprise tends to be a very important 

tool that we can use. 

We used it, as you know, as well in Eastern Europe. So we have 

used it effectively all over. The United States has a good deal of 

this kind of activity, but we have tried to encourage it, not just in 

the United States but also in the international development banks, 

to have a focus on microlending, because it really does do wonders 

and it does so for a very small amount of money. 

But I will get for you a breakdown of the complete picture on 

how much is in this current budget. 

Senator BENNETT. I would appreciate that. My experience has 

been that there are at least some elements in the State Department that are less than enthusiastic about this. I understand the 

nature. Bureaucrats do not like money they do not control. I have 
20 

not run into that during your administration. That comes out of 

previous efforts on this issue. As I say, I have been interested in 

it for the last dozen years. 

So I would appreciate it if you and your leadership would continue to focus on this. Like you, I have a piece of embroidery in my 

office purchased from a woman in Morocco, who had I believe a $50 

loan that allowed her to buy the cloth and the thread necessary to 

produce this. She was working on one when I was in Morocco and 

I said: Can I buy that from you? She said: No, this one is already 

sold. So she did another one for me and sent it to me, and I keep 

it as a memento of how important that program is. 

UNITED NATIONS

Let us talk about the United Nations. The United Nations has 

had some rough times. The Oil for Food scandal I do not think has 

played itself out yet, although we may have most of the problem 

out as a result of the Volcker report. Secretary Bolton—Ambassador Bolton has been very forceful in insisting on some changes 

and reforms in the United Nations and at least on the surface U.N. 

officials have expressed support for these fundamental changes. 

Can you describe to us where you think we are on that and 

whether or not that is going to impact future budgets? 

Secretary RICE. Absolutely, Senator. We have been very strong 

advocates of U.N. reform, and of course there has been complete bipartisan support for pushing that agenda and coming even out of 

the commission that was headed by Senator Mitchell and Newt 

Gingrich. It was a very good road map in a sense for a lot that had 

to go on in the United Nations. 

We have had some progress. There are small things, like for instance there is now an ethics office, which one would have thought 

would have been useful some time ago, but we did finally get that. 

There is a peace-building commission, which should help with the 

process of creating peacekeeping forces and the infrastructure of 

stability support for countries that are going through post-stability 

operations. We think that is a very—post-conflict operations. We 

think that is a very useful new element. 

As you know, the Human Rights Council, which will replace the 

Human Rights Commission, we supported very strongly that there 

should be a replacement for the Human Rights Commission. We 

did not think that the Human Rights Council quite lived up to 

what it needed to be. So—— 

Senator BENNETT. You mean the commission? 

Secretary RICE. After the commission—when the Human Rights 

Council was put forward, the new Human Rights Council—— 

Senator BENNETT. I see, okay. 

Secretary RICE [continuing]. We still thought there were considerable problems with it. So we did not vote for it. It did go through 

and we have agreed that we will do everything that we can to 

make it work because we think it is important to have a Human 

Rights Council. 

The problem with the Human Rights Commission was at the 

time that Sudan was being accused of genocide it was actually sitting on the Human Rights Commission. It makes a joke of the notion of a Human Rights Commission. So we are hopeful that the 
21 

new Human Rights Council will be better, although we are concerned about some of the aspects of it. 

On management reform, which to us is really the key, that is improving the secretariat and the way that it functions, improving 

and being able to streamline personnel decisions, being able to create efficiencies in management, and perhaps most importantly, 

oversight of things like peacekeeping missions, some of which have 

had some very bad things happen within them, or something like 

the Oil for Food program. 

The secretariat needs to be reformed and there needs to be management reform. We have been the leaders on that. We have been 

very clear we agreed to a 6-month budget this time because we 

were not going to agree to an annual budget until these management reform issues are addressed. 

So we are working cooperatively, but we have also made very 

clear that we have to be able to—I have to be able to come to you 

and say that the American taxpayer dollar is being spent well in 

the United Nations and that the current structures do not allow us 

to have the kind of oversight and transparency and accountability 

that we need. So we will continue to press this reform agenda very 

hard. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you. 

I just close with a comment I just received in a conversation this 

morning. Senator McConnell talked about his conversation with 

the GI from Kentucky. A very prominent figure who has experience 

in this whole area said to me that the new parlor game in Europe, 

he said, after everybody has had a nice dinner and a few drinks 

and the uninteresting guests have gone home, they sit around and 

they play this parlor game, which is: What if, and then you fill in 

the blank with another country’s name, had the power and influence that America has? And they speculate, what would the world 

be like if, France, Germany, China, India, fill in the blank, had the 

kind of influence and control that America has. 

He said in every case, regardless of how they play it, the result 

is a disaster compared to the kind of world we have. You have an 

enormous responsibility, Madam Secretary, for the entire world, 

not just this country, and we appreciate the competent way in 

which you handle it. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Bennett. 

Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, thank you for joining us. Madam Secretary, 

last year an overwhelming bipartisan majority of the Senate voted 

79 to 19 that 2006, this year, would be a year of transition in Iraq; 

change would take place. The Iraqis would assume more responsibility for their own future. The United States would start looking 

to the day when we could leave successfully. We would hold the 

Iraqis responsible for good governance and protecting their own 

country and the President would report to us on a timely basis the 

progress that we are making. 

Many of our colleagues have just returned from Iraq. They spent 

the last year there—pardon me, last week there. Some of them 

came back to our luncheons today with reports that were not en-
22 

couraging. Though it may be true that the number of American soldiers being killed on a daily basis has gone down, the fact is that 

the killing in Iraq has increased. Some suggest we are in the midst 

of a civil war, of sectarian violence. This week, of course, American 

troops were used in an attack with Iraqi soldiers on a Shiite 

mosque, or at least near a Shiite mosque, involving the Sadr militia. 

IRAQ

The question I would like to ask you is this. For the last several 

weeks, the President has been counseling patience to the American 

people. In fact, last week when the President was asked when the 

day would come when there would be no U.S. forces in Iraq, he 

said: ‘‘That will be decided by future Presidents,’’ suggesting at 

least 2.5 more years that we would see American ground troops in 

Iraq. 

Is that not exactly the wrong message to be sending the Iraqis? 

Should they not at this point in time believe that we plan on leaving, that they have the responsibility to protect their own country? 

Is not the real test of the success of your policy when Iraqi soldiers 

will stand and fight and be willing to die for their own country so 

that American soldiers can come home, a day that we have not 

seen yet? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. I do not think there is any 

doubt that it is the responsibility of the Iraqis to secure their democracy. The United States and the coalition of willing partners 

liberated Iraq from Saddam Hussein. But I think the Iraqis themselves understand that the creation of a functioning democracy is 

in fact their responsibility. 

What we are there to do is to help them to get the tools and the 

capability to defend that democracy. They have a very difficult task 

because it is a country in which, first of all, in which that has 

never been done, in which the politics was always by either repression or violence. They are now trying, on the basis of the three elections and the constitution, to form structures of government and 

habits of governance that are indeed democratic and therefore require compromise and politics. 

They need our support in doing that. That is the kind of support 

that Ambassador Zal Khalilzad is giving them. It is the kind of 

support we intend to give them as we help them to make their 

ministries more capable, so that their ministries can deliver. It is 

the kind of support that we intend to give them in helping their 

provisional leaders to become more capable. 

Senator DURBIN. But I guess the point I am asking you is, should 

they not sense the feeling that I feel as I travel around the State 

of Illinois? The people I represent are impatient—2,316 of our best 

and bravest have died. 15,000, 16,000, 17,000 wounded. Should not 

the Iraqis know that we are not going to stay there forever, sit by 

patiently while they work out their governmental difficulties? 

Should they not know that we want to bring our troops home as 

quickly as possible? When the President says be patient, is that not 

the wrong message? 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think they do know that we want to 

come home. Indeed, I think the great majority of them want us to 
23 

come home because they want their own responsibility. We are 

training their security forces. Their security forces are standing up 

and dying in the line of fire in Iraq. We mourn every one of our 

own deaths, but Iraqis are dying. They are taking that responsibility. 

Many brave Iraqis are dying because they are willing against terrorists to speak out for the need for democracy and for justice, 

judges for instance who have been killed because they were willing 

to try people. So the Iraqis are taking responsibility. They just do 

not have at this point the tools to fully secure themselves. 

We have helped other—— 

Senator DURBIN. For 2 years—go ahead. 

Secretary RICE. I am sorry. We have helped other states to have 

those tools. I think that the patience that the President was referring to is the need to be willing to give them the tools or to help 

them develop the tools, not the patience to continue to shoulder the 

responsibility ourselves. I think they are doing it. 

I would just suggest on the government formation that we are 

pressing them that this needs to get done and get done very soon. 

But they are doing something very difficult. Sunnis were not a part 

of the political process until very recently and they have now been 

brought into the political process. They are really dealing with 

some of the hard issues that they must deal with in order for this 

government to function. 

Senator DURBIN. I would just say, Madam Secretary, we have 

given them over the past 3 years many things, including a lot of 

American lives and American soldiers risking their lives, billions of 

dollars. Support that we have never given to other countries in the 

past we have given to them. We have stood by them, deposed their 

dictator, tried to bring them to the point of self-governance. 

My suggestion is if this is descending into a civil war, as Mr. 

Allawi suggested, if we have opened Pandora’s box, as our own ambassador, Mr. Khalilzad, has said with the sectarian violence there, 

that there ought to be a clear message from our Government to 

their government that now is the time for them to accept responsibility. For 2 years we have been told, we are training soldiers, we 

are training policemen, things are going along just fine. Yet the 

American soldiers are still there. The National Guard units are 

still being rotated into Iraq. The families back home are going 

through the stress of separation. That still continues to this day. 

I just do not sense the feeling in the administration, as we voted 

in the Senate, that this is truly going to be a year of transition, 

that we will see American troops coming home. That is why the 

President’s message I think does not make it clear and may send 

a mixed signal at a time when we should be extremely clear. 

Secretary RICE. Senator, the President’s message I think, first of 

all, was to a very particular question. But he has been very clear 

that we will come home when the Iraqis are capable of performing 

these functions themselves. I think General Casey has testified 

that we—it will all be conditions-based, but we anticipate that 

there can be reductions of American forces. 

But I think we have to remember why we are in Iraq. I know 

that there were disagreements about whether or not it was time to 

deal with the threat of Saddam Hussein. But by dealing with the 
24 

threat of Saddam Hussein, by taking out the most murderous and 

aggressive dictator in the region, we have helped to create conditions in the Middle East in which it can be a different kind of Middle East, a Middle East in which you are not going to have the 

kind of ideologies of hatred that led people to fly airplanes into 

buildings on September 11. 

That is a long-term project, is to leave a Middle East to our children and to our grandchildren that is not going to be poisonous in 

the way that the Middle East is currently poisonous. So I think 

when we think about what support we are giving to the Iraqis or 

the Afghans or to the broader Middle East initiative, that we think 

about it not just in terms of how it will make their lives better, but 

in terms of how it will make our lives more secure. That is why 

we are in Iraq. 

Senator DURBIN. You mentioned the coalition that came together 

for the invasion, the coalition of the willing, as the administration 

called it, primarily the British and others who were supporting us, 

but the British larger in number than others. That coalition has 

dwindled, has it not, over the years? It has really become more and 

more an American force, with few allies actually on the ground 

risking their lives. 

What does that tell us about the world view of what we are trying to achieve in Iraq? 

Secretary RICE. Well, in fact the coalition with a few exceptions 

has stayed relatively stable. We have had troops from as far away 

as South Korea. The South Koreans just agreed to re-up on their 

presence there. Poland just agreed to re-up on their presence there. 

Some forces have been taken out, but the countries have gone to 

other kinds of missions. For instance, the Dutch, who removed 

their forces, are now very integrally engaged in the training process for Iraqi forces. 

So I think you would find that if you went down the list of coalition members, with a few exceptions, we have lost very few and we 

have lost almost none in terms of support for the Iraqi enterprise, 

even if their forces are no longer on the ground. 

Senator DURBIN. I do not question that many nations have sent 

something, and we thank each one of them for doing that. But it 

clearly is an American undertaking, with the help of some coalition 

partners, and it has become more American by the day as they 

have reduced their numbers and our troops have had to stand 

alone, or, I should say, stand more to themselves and not with the 

broader coalition that initially started. 

I think that is a troubling development. It suggests that if the 

goals you describe, which sound so good as you speak them, were 

so clear to the rest of the world, they would be joining us, and they 

have not. 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I just think—and I can get you the 

numbers, but I think with very few exceptions the numbers of 

states actually represented on the ground is substantially as it was 

when we started. The difference is that we are using more Iraqi 

forces. That has allowed us to rely less on some coalition forces. 

There are places that are now stable where coalition forces can actually be removed because those places are stable. 
25 

But yes, the United States bore, really commensurate with our 

size and military power, most of the weight of the military operation. Britain of course was the second largest and there have been 

contingents from others. But I think it is important not just to 

focus on the numbers. The commitment of all of these countries to 

actually send their soldiers into harm’s way—Japan for the first 

time since World War II to send its forces from the Asian continent; South Korea, to send its forces into Iraq; small countries 

like Estonia and Lithuania and Latvia to send their forces into 

Iraq, because they understand the price of freedom—I think is 

something we ought to applaud. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Durbin. 

Senator Brownback. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Glad to see you here and congratulations 

on a lot of initiatives you have going. You have got a lot of irons 

in the fire and I am appreciative of them. 

IRAN

I want to talk about, if I could, Iran and Sudan and Chad, and 

then finish up on North Korea, just to give you kind of the sequence of things I would like to talk about. First, I appreciate your 

request for the $75 million on Iran and democracy-building in the 

supplemental, the bulk of that request for broadcasting purposes. 

I wondered if you could outline for us your current state of thinking of how we address the issue of Iran, the lead sponsor of terrorism, the lead state sponsor of terrorism in the world, apparently 

seeking nuclear technology for weaponizing purposes. I do not 

know that anybody knows that for sure. But I would appreciate 

your thinking about how do we go at Iran? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. I think there is no doubt 

that Iran is the single biggest threat from a state that we face. As 

you have put it, it is the fact that they are seeking, we believe, a 

nuclear weapon, indeed they are seeking—or at least they are seeking under cover of civil nuclear power to acquire the technologies 

that would make them capable of creating a nuclear weapon. They 

are the central banker for terrorism in the Middle East and problems in Iraq, problems in Lebanon through Hezbollah, problems in 

the Palestinian territories through some of the arms that they use 

of terrorism, and of course it goes without saying an unelected few 

who repress the aspirations of the Iranian people. 

So we have built an international coalition—the diplomacy I 

think has gone relatively well—to tell the Iranians that they will 

be isolated from the international community if they continue to 

seek the weapons, the nuclear activities that they are seeking, that 

could lead to a weapon. 

We need now to broaden that thinking and that coalition, not 

just to what Iran is doing on the nuclear side, but what they are 

also doing on terrorism. Those are some of the discussions that I 

have with these same states, that we cannot on the one hand talk 

about the need for a peace agreement in the Middle East and turn 
26 

a blind eye to what Iran is doing in the Palestinian territories. We 

cannot talk about getting rid of Syrian influence in Lebanon and 

having democracy in Lebanon without thinking about what the Iranians are doing for Hezbollah. 

So we have a number of tools I think at our disposal, including 

in sharpening the contradiction between the Iranian people and a 

regime that does not represent them through our democracy activities, through broadcasting, through support for nongovernmental 

organizations there, through highlighting the Iranian human rights 

record, and if necessary within the U.N. Security Council going to 

other measures that, should the Iranians not turn around on their 

nuclear effort, going to other measures that would further isolate 

the Iranian Government. 

So we have a full program, but I think diagnosing the problem 

is the most important, and it is that Iran is a problem not just on 

the nuclear side, but also concerning terrorism and its human 

rights record at home. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Are you getting cooperation from the Europeans to a fair degree on this? It seems like we are getting a lot 

more—I hear of a lot more, but I am not seeing the actions by the 

Europeans. 

Secretary RICE. We have been very united with the Europeans 

on the nuclear issue, completely united. Indeed, we have been able 

to bring the Russians along to a degree, but we have had to work 

harder on that and on the Chinese. The Europeans also increasingly note the problems with the Iranian regime. In this regard, 

the rise of President Ahmadinejad, who talks in very clear, shall 

I say, ways about the ambitions of the Iranian regime, has made 

it clearer to allies who thought, I think, that the Iranian regime 

was just a normal regime whose interests could be accommodated, 

to really worry about the true nature of the Iranian regime. When 

you have a president of a country saying that another country 

should be wiped off the map, that is just not right in civilized company in the diplomatic arena, and I think it has helped crystallize 

what kind of regime Iran really is. 

SUDAN AND CHAD

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to speed into other topics quickly. 

On Sudan and Chad, it looks like the genocide in Sudan is spreading to Chad and many of the same tools being used. I am hopeful 

that we can get NATO involved in this operation. The United Nations, the African Union has worked some and been somewhat 

helpful, but it has not stopped it at all, and it appears to be starting back up again. 

Do we have a decent chance of getting NATO involved in the 

Sudan-Chad border area? 

Secretary RICE. Well, I think we certainly have a very good probability of getting NATO involved in support of first the African 

Union mission. NATO is there, as you know, providing some support. But perhaps in a more robust way logistically. One of the 

problems is mobility for the African Union forces, so you can imagine NATO more helpful on some of the mobility issues so that the 

monitors can go out to places, which when there is monitoring the 

violence is less. It is just that it is a very, very big area. 
27 

We also expect that when there is a U.N. force, which will be 

more stable and more capable, that NATO can contribute also to 

the effectiveness of that force. The President talked with NATO 

Secretary General Yabu Skeffer when he was here last week. I 

have also had conversations, Senator, just very recently with the 

head of the AU and with the Nigerians, who have great influence 

in the AU, because the AU needs help. Sometimes they send mixed 

signals about whether they want help because the government of 

Sudan sends mixed signals. 

We are all for a peace process going forward and we are working 

very hard on that peace process. But we also have to be sure that 

the violence does not worsen in the meantime. You rightly note 

that western Darfur, where the troubles in Chad threaten to really 

create a really bad situation, we have got to deal with that, and 

we can only deal with that with more robust security forces. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, I think we are really going to have 

to step it up. I applaud what the President has done on it, but people are still dying and they are dying now spreading into Chad. I 

appreciate what you have done. I appreciate particularly what the 

Assistant Secretary has done, being over there four times. The 

President is very aware of it. But the genocide continues and it is 

spreading now into another country. I would really implore you to 

step it up further. 

NORTH KOREA

I noted in one of your testimonies recently you were calling for 

North Korean refugees to be admitted to the United States. Thank 

you. It is in the North Korean Human Rights Act, to allow that to 

take place. I talked with Secretary Chertoff about allowing them 

into the United States. That has been the holdup before, has been 

the Department of Homeland Security. So I am really hopeful we 

can. 

I think it really would send a strong signal to the North Koreans 

that we are serious about this and that the human rights issues 

are at the core of the violations of what this regime has done in 

North Korea. In 2 weeks we will have a group, a North Korean 

rally here on Capitol Hill with a number of refugees. I hope, if your 

schedule would allow it, you or even the President could meet with 

some of these refugees. They have incredible stories to tell of what 

they have experienced and the difficulty that they have had. 

But I do think us going not just at the nuclear questions on the 

Six Party Talks, which I think is good and important, but to expand the debate into the human rights area, where the North Koreans are amongst the world’s worst, if not the world’s worst on 

human rights violations—and you have got a lot of people coming 

out now to talk. They can tell real stories about, this is what I experienced there. It would be very useful and an important thing to 

tell on what this regime is. 

Secretary RICE. I agree completely, Senator. We also, as you 

know, have a human rights envoy in Jay Lufkowitz, who is trying 

to spread the word also around the world. We think one of the important elements here is to mobilize public opinion internationally 

about the human rights situation in North Korea. 
28 

AID TO AFRICA

Senator BROWNBACK. We are working on a bill on African aid, 

mirrored after the malaria effort that the President did last year. 

When we dug into this topic, we found that about 90 percent of our 

malaria funding was going to conferences and consultants, and 

most of the African leadership was saying: We know what to do 

here; we do not have any money to do it with. So they wanted assistance for bed nets, sprays, drugs, and they said that will really 

help. The President redirected the funding. 

What I have noticed in the African aid area the times I have 

been there is that we have put millions, billions of dollars into aid 

in Africa and there are many countries that are worse off today 

than 20 years ago. A lot of the money is scatter-shot. A lot of the 

money is spent on conferences and consultants and in capitals, and 

the problem is outside of the capitals and it is not needed for another building in the capital city. 

So I would like to see us—and we are working on this—to go at 

this approach, where we get, let us say half of the aid that goes 

to Africa goes for things or training Africans to do things, like doctors or teachers, rather than conferences and consultants. We will 

be working further with your office on that. 

Secretary RICE. Well, thank you, Senator. We will be a willing 

partner in that, because I think building capabilities, not building 

dependency, is part of this. I think also making sure that we are 

getting out and really touching people’s lives is very important. 

Randy Tobias will I think be a focal point for that should he be 

confirmed. 

Senator BROWNBACK. I have already met with him. Thanks. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Brownback. 

Senator Bond. 

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, I just returned from meeting with a lot of your 

people in Seoul, Korea, and in Delhi, in New Delhi. Some of the 

things just seem to make sense to me, that we ought to be using 

some of that malaria money for DDT spraying. That would save a 

whole lot of lives with minimal risk. 

But in North Korea the anecdotes we had, I tell my colleague 

from Kansas, what they told us: They rescued a full-grown man 

from North Korea who had fallen in the river. They outfitted him— 

it was easy to outfit him because the full-grown man was 5 foot 1 

and weighed 120, because of the near-starvation diets they live on. 

They have got a great project, an industrial park, just over the 

line in North Korea. The stories we hear is that the North Korean 

Government would be paid $50 a month for the labor, the laborers, 

and the laborers may get a whopping $5 or $6 a month out of it. 

That obviously, I concur with Senator Brownback on the extreme 

problems there. 

I want to commend your operations in India. I had a thorough 

briefing with your USAID Director there and they seem to be doing 

the proactive things, bringing in all the different resources that are 

needed to help India with its tremendously overwhelming poverty 

issue in so many of the rural areas. 
29 

One of the things I particularly commend them is their participation in the President’s agricultural knowledge initiative in India. 

The USAID office there is going to U.S. land grant colleges, which 

makes a whole lot of sense to me, and they will bring in the ag 

econ experts, they will bring in farm credit resources, and they also 

need to bring in food processors. 

AFGHANISTAN

Now, India is going to have to wake up and lift some of the regulatory redtape burdens on businesses. I told them that we are more 

than willing to help if you have a system under which U.S. businesses can come in and provide assistance. But I recall the question I have asked you previously, because when I returned from Afghanistan I learned from the president of Afghanistan and people 

over there, including our uniformed officers, that they are not getting the agricultural assistance that they need. It was apparently 

a contractor had not been able to provide those resources. 

It was my recommendation that USAID reprogram a small 

amount of that money and work in concert with our very able and 

dedicated land grant colleges to bring extension service personnel 

over. I wonder if there are funds that could be reprogrammed, because it is critical in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan when we— 

when, let us say, not ‘‘we,’’ but when the poppy fields are destroyed, 

the poppy farmers have an alternative source of income and some 

way of getting back on their feet, whether it is pomegranates or 

other crops that they raise. 

Is there some way that money could be reprogrammed? Or what 

can you do on that? 

Secretary RICE. Well, we do have a substantial alternative livelihood program going in Afghanistan to try to support the anti-drug 

efforts there. I think, Senator, at one point we talked about needing to have a strong agricultural program in Iraq as well. Of 

course, we, as you say, have this new initiative in India. 

As I understood your intervention the last time, you were asking, 

though, more about the structure of what we are doing than just 

are we spending money; in other words, the use perhaps of extension programs and of the land grant colleges. We will take a look 

at whether our programs are able to fully deliver. I am actually a 

big fan of the land grant colleges. I know the good work that they 

have done in agricultural extension. They are very popular because 

of what they have done in India during the Green Revolution and 

going forward. 

Again, it is something that we will certainly want to look at with 

our Afghan people. I do not know about the reprogramming of moneys that have already been dedicated to what is a substantial program on alternative livelihoods, but it is something we would certainly want to look at in the structuring of our programs. So I 

think it is a very useful thought. 

Senator BOND. I have done a lot of inquiry about the effectiveness of our agricultural efforts in Afghanistan, both from knowledgeable experts in agriculture from the United States, our leaders 

in that part of the world, and from the Afghan leadership itself. 

The simple answer is it is not working, and I can give you more 

details if we have a face to face discussion. But it is not working 
30 

and we are just trying to make sure it works, because I think everybody realizes if we cannot wean the Afghan agriculture off of its 

poppy production then we are going to have continuing problems. 

It should not be that hard once you give the farmers on the 

ground an alternative crop. They are not getting that much from 

poppies. It is the warlords who are making the money off of it. But 

indigenous agriculture, if brought back, ought to be able to give 

them the livelihood, and we need to deal other ways with the warlords to get them out of the production business. 

Well, let me leave it at that. 

Secretary RICE. I would like to—we should talk about that, Senator. I would like to hear what you have heard. 

Senator BOND. If you would give me a call—— 

Secretary RICE. I will do that, absolutely. 

Senator BOND. I would be happy to discuss that with you. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and we appreciate, Madam Secretary, all you are doing. I would say that as 

I have traveled around the world your efforts and the President’s 

efforts have really inspired people in many countries. India is one 

of the most enthusiastic countries. They talked about the nuclear 

initiative that the President proposed. That was new to me, but I 

have done my due diligence and I agree with the President and will 

strongly support the President in his proposal that can provide the 

energy that India needs to begin to bring its population up, particularly in the rural areas. Thank you. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Bond. 

BURMA

Thanks to the leadership of the President and you, the world’s 

list of pariah regimes is slightly smaller than it was when you 

came to office. We can safely remove from the list Iraq and Libya. 

Regretfully still on the list is a country that I have a great deal 

of interest in, that you and I have discussed on numerous occasions, and that is Burma. 

Nothing ever seems to change in Burma since the democratic 

election in 1990, which was swept by Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, 

the National League for Democracy. Shortly after the election Suu 

Kyi was put under house arrest and, except for a brief period a 

couple of years ago, she has remained there for 16 years. 

I am told the Malaysian foreign minister went to the country recently. I do not know whether he requested to see Suu Kyi or not, 

but he did not. In fact, he did not even see Than Shwe, the top general. 

What in your view could the United Nations do to begin to 

squeeze this regime? What are you and the administration doing 

to try to move the United Nations in that direction? If we are having problems increasing pressure against the regime, who is preventing progress toward shedding the kind of light on that regime 

that it well deserves and is the only way that gives us a chance 

to change it down the road? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. Well, absolutely Burma is 

one of the very worst regimes in the world. We have succeeded over 
31 

the last year in getting a discussion of Burma at the Security 

Council. We finally were able to remove the blocks to doing that 

and I think that did raise the profile for a lot of countries that perhaps did not focus as intensely on what was going on in Burma. 

For instance, a number of my European colleagues told me that 

after that discussion they went back and looked at what they had 

been doing on the Burma human rights dialogue and that they are 

now increasing their activities concerning this. So that is very helpful. 

But the truth of the matter is we need more help in the region. 

We need from the Southeast Asians and from ASEAN, which has 

from time to time told us that they would engage in quiet—— 

Senator MCCONNELL. Other than canceling the ASEAN meeting 

which was originally going to be in Rangoon this year, have any 

of the ASEAN countries developed greater interest in this problem? 

Secretary RICE. ASEAN actually issued a reasonable statement 

on Burma and asked that the Malay chair go to Burma. I think 

that the thought was that they would see Aung San Suu Kyi. I 

guess that that did not happen, but they continue to press to see 

Aung San Suu Kyi. That is a good thing. 

We have pressed very hard—the Indonesian president went to 

Burma and I know that he did talk very directly with the Burmese 

about their isolation. We need actually China to be more active on 

this front. We have our human rights problems—— 

Senator MCCONNELL. India as well, I suppose. 

Secretary RICE. India as well. 

We have our human rights problems with China, but it is not 

like Burma, and we would hope that they would raise some of 

these issues. India is a democracy and of course should raise this, 

and the president of India assured us that he would. So we are 

working the diplomacy. We have gotten a couple of good statements. I think we have gotten renewed interest from the Europeans. 

Of course, we are sanctioning everything concerning Burma. We 

do not allow travel and the like. So we have taken those steps. 

Senator MCCONNELL. I was the author of that bill. 

Secretary RICE. You were, and we use it to its fullest. 

Senator MCCONNELL. We both know it is not likely to do much 

good unless we get more cooperation. 

Secretary RICE. That is what we are trying to do. 

I do think that we have, by raising the profile, we have brought 

other countries on board. Frankly, I think the ASEAN is somewhat 

embarrassed by Burma and is therefore somewhat more active. 

I found myself in an unusual position up at the United Nations, 

Senator, during the U.N. General Assembly. We had an ASEAN 

meeting and I suddenly realized the Burmese foreign minister was 

in attendance. He launched into a discussion about how the biggest 

problem that was faced was drugs. I was glad actually at that point 

that I did have a chance to confront him directly about Burma’s 

human rights record. So I think we have to continue to do that and 

we have to continue to press countries in the region to take an active and more public line concerning Burma. Places outside of the 

region, places like Europe, can make a difference. 
32 

Senator MCCONNELL. When you meet with the Chinese and the 

Indians, is Burma your agenda? 

Secretary RICE. Absolutely, every time. Not just my agenda. It is 

on the agenda for the President. He raises it as well. 

BELARUS

Senator MCCONNELL. One other country I would like to discuss. 

I had a chance on a trip last summer to meet with some of the potential opposition from Belarus. What do you make of the status 

of the opposition in the wake of the unfair election that occurred 

recently, and do you have any hope that that regime might change 

from within. 

Secretary RICE. Well, I am glad that there was opposition this 

time, Senator. I think that is an achievement in a place that is the 

last really bad dictatorship in Europe. The Lukashenka Government is beyond the pale in comparison to anybody else in Europe. 

The fact that there was actually a single opposition candidate 

was in large part thanks to efforts that we and the Europeans and 

the Lithuanians had made to encourage the opposition to find a 

single focal point around which to rally, and they did that. I was 

with them in Lithuania and at that time they were very fractured. 

They came together. They were able to put forward a single candidate. He actually did get double digits in the vote, which is extraordinary given how unfair this election was. 

Senator MCCONNELL. I assume there were no international observers? 

Secretary RICE. There were. The OSCE was there and they declared it not free and fair. But there were observers there. That is 

a step forward. I am told that, despite the unfair playing field, 

there was a lot of press coverage, even some underground press 

about what is going on there. I noted today a little news item that 

Lukashenka has for some reason decided to put off his inaugural 

for a few days. We do not know the reason for that, but I do know 

that the opposition is planning to put up posters that continue to 

challenge him. People stood in the streets. They were arrested. 

They are still fomenting against the regime. 

So it is the nascent, incipient stages of opposition in Belarus. But 

it is far more lively than, frankly, I would have guessed a year ago 

when I met with what was a very fractured opposition in Belarus. 

I do not believe that Lukashenka under these circumstances and 

under greater isolation—you know that the Europeans have put 

forward some further sanctions. We also will put forth some further sanctions. 

I think he has been surprised at the opposition and the fact that 

there is opposition to him. I think it is a good thing. 

REFORMS IN UKRAINE

Senator MCCONNELL. Finally, I had a chance also to be in 

Ukraine last summer, and we have all followed with interest the 

elections there. Ukraine seems to be shifting back in the direction 

which it shifted away from during the Orange Revolution. I am curious as to what your observations are about that election and 

what it portends for the reform movement in Ukraine, a country 

desperately in need of genuine reform. 
33 

Secretary RICE. Well, Yanakovic, the deposed leader the last time 

around as a result of the Orange Revolution, did win the single 

largest vote count, but it was not large enough to form a government by any means. In fact, Team Orange, the two separate parts 

of it—part of the problem was that there was a split in the people 

who led the Orange Revolution. But if you put those numbers together they actually have greater vote count than Yanakovic did. 

Tomoshenko and Yoshenko together have a greater vote count than 

Yanakovic did. 

So I think it is probably fair to say that the expectations of what 

the Orange Revolution could deliver probably were out of line with 

what they were actually able to deliver. They did have some splits, 

personality differences, policy differences, that weakened their 

united effort. But we will see now what happens in government formation. 

I am encouraged by the fact that you still had, despite all the 

problems that the reform movement has had, that you still had 

more votes on that reform side than you had on the side of the 

Party of Regions, which is the Yanakovic—— 

Senator MCCONNELL. Under their system, what does that mean, 

that the reformers will have a majority in the parliament? 

Secretary RICE. Well, it means that now you have separate blocs 

and they will now have to form a government. So some combination 

of blocs have to come together in order to appoint the prime minister. 

I should say that of course we will work with whatever government comes into being there. It is our hope that whatever government comes into being, whether that is the bloc that includes Team 

Orange or if it is the Yanakovic bloc, is going to be respectful of 

what the Ukrainian people have clearly spoken for, which is reform, independence of Ukrainian policy, and a desire to have good 

relations with the West. 

So we will see how this turns out, but that is what is now happening. There were several blocs of parties, several parties that got 

votes. They now have to form a government and no single party 

has enough to form a government on its own. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Well, Madam Secretary, thank you so 

much for being here today. 

ADDITIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS

There will be some additional questions which will be submitted 

for your response in the record. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing.] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Question. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf addressed a Joint Session of Congress 

2 weeks ago, and met with Congressional leaders and the President to discuss her 

reform agenda for Liberia. Africa’s first woman president made a very positive impression on many of us in Washington. 

After decades of civil war, Liberia has no shortage of problems. Given America’s 

historical ties to that country and support for President Johnson Sirleaf’s reform efforts, the House included an additional $50 million for assistance for Liberia in its 

supplemental bill. 
34 

Madam Secretary, do you support additional funding for Liberia—a democracy 

dividend, if you will—and is it in America’s security interests to improve governance 

in Liberia? 

Answer. Thanks to strong Congressional support in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 

2006, the United States has been able to play the leading role in helping Liberia 

begin recovery from 14 years of civil war, generations of corruption, and a near-total 

absence of government services and of respect for human rights and the rule of law. 

This funding is key to helping the new government of Liberia establish the conditions for consolidating the peace and building prosperity. 

Our fiscal year 2006 programs, in addition to the Administration’s fiscal year 2007 

request of $89.945 million for Liberia, will accomplish our goals of reconstructing 

schools, hospitals, and government buildings; expanding primary health care and 

post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction activities; providing civilian police to the 

U.N. mission to monitor, mentor and reform the Liberian National Police; supporting security sector reform to create a professional, capable and fiscally sustainable Liberian military; supporting the return and reintegration of Liberian refugees 

and internally displaced persons; and many other activities. 

We plan to sustain the long-term, multi-year commitment necessary to support Liberia’s reconstruction efforts by maintaining programs and funding levels to meet 

Liberia’s needs. We have ongoing discussions with the Liberian government about 

the country’s needs and will continue to consider those needs in conjunction with 

our policies and budget priorities. We will, of course, work closely with Congress in 

formulating and pursuing these priorities. 

As for the impact on America’s security interests of improving governance in Liberia, the connection is clear. Liberia’s civil conflict was driven in large measure by 

a history of poor governance, exclusion, and corrupt misrule. Improved governance 

will enhance Liberia’s stability and prevent conflict; help address the needs and aspirations of Liberians; and set the foundation for investment and economic growth. 

Accomplishing these goals will clearly advance America’s security interests in West 

Africa. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN

Question. Reports of executions in Iraq continue to grow. The New York Times 

this weekend, described a pet shop owner, a Sunni, seized by gunmen. His body was 

found the next morning at a sewage treatment plant. He had been hog-tied, his 

bones broken, his face and legs drilled with power tools, and finally he had been 

shot. In the last month, hundreds of men have been kidnapped, tortured, and executed in Baghdad. The city’s homicide rate has tripled from 11 to 33 a day, according to military reports. The period from March 7 to March 21 was typically brutal: 

at least 191 bodies, many mutilated, surfaced in garbage bins, drainage ditches, 

minibuses, and pickup trucks. 

Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi has said, ‘‘If this is not civil war, then God 

knows what civil war is.’’ Prime Minister Jaafari has blamed ‘‘foreign terrorists’’ for 

these attacks on Sunni civilians rather than Shiite-militias; but he depends on the 

political support of those militias.’’ 

Where does the Administration draw the line between sectarian violence and civil 

war? Whichever term you prefer, how does this growing violence, these waves of 

executions, affect U.S. policy in Iraq? 

Answer. The increase in sectarian violence is a major concern to us and is one 

of the prime issues raised at every level with Iraqi governmental and political leaders. Nonetheless, we do not see this as a civil war. In Iraq, only terrorist leader Abu 

Musab al- Zarqawi and his Al-Qaida in Iraq organization is calling for civil war. 

Given the large turnout in Iraq’s elections and the broader support expressed for 

the efforts to form a government inclusive of all Iraqis, we believe that Iraq can and 

will overcome its ethnic and religious differences. Indeed, Iraq’s political leaders are 

committed to a government of national unity. Progress on the formation of that government of national unity continues despite an upsurge sectarian violence that 

began with the February 22, 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. Those 

who attacked the Golden Mosque sought to exploit divisions among the Iraqi public 

and the political leadership to foment and prolong sectarian strife. Iraqi government 

and religious leaders alike, in a demonstration of national unity, condemned the attacks, called for an end to sectarian unrest, and for security forces free from sectarian and militia loyalties. 

The United States and international community joined Iraqis in denouncing the 

attacks and underscored the importance of national unity and defying the terrorists 

and extremists who seek to provoke such conflict. The USG has been in touch with 
35 

Iraqi leaders to urge calm and will do our utmost to support the Iraqi government’s 

efforts to achieve it. 

The violence in Iraq only underscores the importance of our mission there. Helping the Iraqi Security Forces develop their capacity to secure their own country 

while carrying out a campaign to defeat terrorists and neutralize the insurgency is 

and continues to be our objective. 

Question. Russia has become an increasingly difficult partner for the Administration, in Europe, in the countries Russia thinks of as its ‘‘near abroad,’’ and beyond. 

The Administration has worked to strengthen ties with Russia, but the effort seems 

to have turned sour. What went wrong? The Russian government has tightened its 

grip on non-governmental organizations at home. It has a mixed record in dealing 

with Iraq and Iran, and Russian authorities may have passed sensitive military information to Saddam’s government before the start of military operations in Iraq. 

These are matters of serious concern, as are Russia’s outreach to Hamas, and its 

support for the undemocratic regime in Belarus. How does the Administration intend to face these challenges? What trajectory do you see the U.S.-Russian relationship following today? Does Russia still merit a place at the table with the members 

of the G8? 

Answer. The United States is deeply concerned and candid about problems in 

United States-Russia relations and United States-Russia differences. These include 

the direction of Russia’s internal evolution, including democracy, and many aspects 

of Russia’s relations with its neighbors. 

In discussions with Russian officials, we have been frank about our differences 

and concerns. For example, we made clear our concerns about the new NGO law, 

through both diplomatic channels and public fora as the bill was considered by the 

Russian Duma. We believe that our attention moved the Government of Russia to 

modify that bill. Now that the bill is law, we remain concerned about its potential 

impact on Russian civil society. We have pushed for fair, transparent, and consistent implementation of the law and intend to monitor the law’s implementation 

closely. We will continue to press for robust democratic development in Russia more 

broadly. 

On Belarus, the United States has acted in concert with our European partners 

to press for democratic elections and to protest the fraudulent ballot that took place 

March 19 and the subsequent crackdown against opposition leaders and other 

Belarusian citizens. We have also expressed our disappointment with Russia’s defense of these fraudulent elections and its condemnation of the performance of the 

OSCE Monitoring Mission, which documented that the elections were not free or 

fair. We have urged Russia to take a more constructive approach by pressing 

Belarus towards democratic reform and urging it to fulfill its OSCE commitments. 

President Bush has emphasized the importance of historical perspective: history 

is on the side of freedom. Speaking at Freedom House March 29, he reminded us 

that the 11advance of freedom is the story of our time,’’ and that ‘‘it’s an interest 

of a country like Russia to understand and welcome democracy.’’ That is why President Bush is committed to maintaining a frank discussion with Russia, aware that 

this path may not yield immediate solutions, but remains far more promising than 

seeking to isolate Russia. 

In this context, we continue to believe that attending the G8 Summit, a forum 

in which we advance our interests on major global issues such as energy security, 

is the right course of action. As President Bush has said: ‘‘I think that it would be 

a mistake for the United States not to go to the G8. . . . I need to be in a position 

where I can sit down with [President Putin] and be very frank about our concerns.’’ 

A balanced and honest view of United States-Russian relations must recognize 

areas of progress, too. It is in our interest to continue to seek cooperation with Russia, including on counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, Iran and the Middle East. 

On Iran, Russia has joined the international community in seeking an end to 

Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, most recently by joining other members of the 

U.N. Security Council in issuing a March 31 Presidential Statement that expresses 

support for the IAEA’s call on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities and 

return to negotiations. 

On Iraq and the possible compromise of military information, I have made clear 

to Russian officials, both publicly and privately, that the United States takes these 

reports seriously, we hope Russia does also, and will respond to our inquiries with 

a serious answer. 

Question. A growing body of literature points to the importance of nutrition in 

preventing progression from HIV to AIDS and in supporting the care of AIDS patients. Seven out of 15 focus countries under the President’s Emergency Plan for 

AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) are food insecure. PEPFAR has begun implementing 6- 

month bridge programs for individuals receiving ARVs, but their nutritional needs 
36 

will likely persist or reappear after this 6-month period. What is the U.S. strategy 

to integrate food security and nutrition programs with our HIV/AIDS treatment programs? How are we coordinating with the World Food Programme, USAID’s Food 

for Peace, and private voluntary organizations to integrate food and ARV programs? 

Answer. The areas that are affected by HIV have long been plagued by systemic 

and chronic food insecurity. Food insecurity and consequent nutritional problems do 

play a role in every aspect of the Emergency Plan. However, factors contributing 

to the resolution of food insecurity are extremely complex, and largely beyond the 

scope of the Emergency Plan. Other organizations and international partners have 

a strong comparative advantage in the area of food assistance, agriculture and food 

security. Therefore, a key precept of interventions supported by the Emergency Plan 

is to remain focused on HIV/AIDS and the factors that may increase food/nutrition 

needs for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), and thus to provide support for 

food only in limited circumstances, while leveraging other resources when possible. 

The Emergency Plan is committed to evidence-based best practices in providing 

food and nutritional support for PLWHA receiving care and treatment. Recognizing 

that this is too large and complex a problem for any one agency to handle on its 

own, the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (S/GAC) will partner with other U.S. 

Government agencies, namely USAID, USDA, HHS, and Peace Corps, as well as relevant U.N. agencies and the private sector, to leverage resources to carry out targeted, therapeutic and supplementary feeding, micronutrient supplementation, and 

food security and livelihood support. 

Interventions to address the food and nutrition needs of PLWHA work at multiple 

levels and involve a variety of partners. The Emergency Plan strategy considers specific objectives, such as: to improve quantity and quality of diet among PLHWA and 

Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC); build or replenish body stores of nutrients; prevent or stabilize weight loss; preserve and gain muscle mass; prevent diarrhea and other infections; speed recuperation from HIV-related infections; and prepare for and manage AIDS-related symptoms that affect food consumption and nutrient utilization. 

We have established an inter-agency working group to identify program models 

and comparative advantages in this area. Membership includes USAID, USDA, 

HHS, and Peace Corps. And we are consulting with potential partners, such as the 

World Food Program, Food and Agriculture Organization, WHO and UNICEF, as 

well as PVOs and others from the private sector. A report to Congress detailing the 

Emergency Plan food and nutrition strategy is currently in development, and will 

be published in May 2006. 

Question. Secretary Rice has said that the Department of State will forward deploy officials to high priority cities and countries. How does the Department plan 

to provide adequate security for these forward-deployed officials, particularly in 

‘‘presence posts’’ where it will establish only minimal infrastructure? 

How are the departments of State and Defense providing for the security of personnel serving in provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq? Are 

these teams getting the ‘‘force protection’’ support they need to do their jobs effectively? 

Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is currently participating in an interdepartmental working group that is studying the concept of American Presence 

Posts (APP) and developing guidelines and procedures for opening APPs. The Secure 

Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act (SECCA) of 1999 (Public Law 106– 

113) requires that any new diplomatic facility meet collocation and 100-foot-setback 

statutory requirements. The collocation, setback, and waiver requirements uniformly apply to embassies, consulates, and American Presence Posts (APPs). Once 

a post has identified a potential APP site, the Regional Security Officer (RSO), in 

coordination with DS Headquarters and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), will conduct a physical security survey of the location to determine 

security requirements. APP sites must adhere to or be in the final stages of compliance with the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards prior to occupancy. 

Additionally, waivers to SECCA and exceptions to OSPB standards must be obtained for any site deficiencies that cannot be remedied. 

The Department of State continues to provide security for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) based in Regional Embassy Offices (REOs) throughout Iraq. The 

substantial security features of REOs include, but are not limited to, perimeter security in the form of ‘‘T-walls,’’ access control measures, anti-ram barriers, mylar on 

office windows, sandbags on housing trailers, and bunkers for use during sustained 

attacks. The amount requested in the Iraq supplemental under consideration by 

Congress will provide funding for perimeter security upgrades and overhead cover 

for housing and common use facilities. Extensive local guard programs, protection 

details, and an armored vehicle program support State Department personnel in the 
37 

execution of their mission off compound. The Department of Defense is responsible 

for security at PRTs established on U.S. military forward operating bases (FOBs) 

and incorporates similar security programs for the protection of PRT personnel. 

At the present time, there are at least 752 U.S. military and civilian personnel 

assigned to 23 PRTs located throughout Afghanistan. There are currently nine PRTs 

under International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) responsibility and fourteen 

under the responsibility of Operation Enduring Freedom (U.S./Coalition Forces). 

Force protection for U.S. civilian personnel assigned to PRTs is the responsibility 

of the military commander of the PRT. Force protection and security responsibilities 

for U.S. civilian personnel assigned to PRTs under U.S. military control are outlined 

in an MOU between Combined/Joint Task Force–180 (CJTF–180) and the U.S. Department of State signed in 2002. 

No formal force protection/security agreement exists for U.S. civilian officers assigned to ISAF/NATO controlled PRTs. However, informally it is understood that 

U.S. personnel receive the same level of force protection as required by the host nation’s senior civilian PRT staff. 

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you all very much. The subcommittee will stand in recess to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, June 8, in room SD–124. At that time we will hear testimony 

from the Honorable Randall L. Tobias, Administrator, United 

States Agency for International Development. 

[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., Thursday, March 28, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., Thursday, June 8.] 

(39) 

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2007 

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 3:04 p.m., in room SD–124, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Mitch McConnell (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators McConnell, Brownback, and Leahy. 

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL L. TOBIAS, ADMINISTRATOR 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH MC CONNELL

Senator MCCONNELL. Okay, why don’t we get started? 

Welcome, Ambassador Tobias. As you wear two hats these days, 

as the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and director of Foreign Assistance at the State Department, 

this hearing will examine the President’s fiscal 2007 budget request for USAID and the administration’s efforts to reform foreign 

assistance. 

I know my colleagues are keen on asking questions on specific 

programs and activities, and will, therefore, make only a few brief 

opening observations. 

Let me begin by expressing this subcommittee’s support for your 

efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance programs and activities. We’re aware of the significant 

achievements of the President’s emergency plan for AIDS relief 

under your leadership, and I expect you have the gratitude of millions of HIV-positive people across the globe for getting that important initiative up and running. This was certainly no small 

achievement, and we wish you similar success with your new responsibilities. 

According to the budget justification materials, the fiscal 2007 re- quest for USAID programs and activities totals $3.9 billion, a decrease of $371 million below last year’s enacted level. As I’m sure 

you’re aware of the strong congressional interest in health and development programs, it would be helpful if you could explain the 

rationale for the decrease in the Child Survival and Health Programs Fund and Development Assistance accounts. I’m specifically 
40 

interested in the impact the reduction will have on USAID’s democracy activities and programs that promote economic growth, agriculture, and trade. 

With respect to foreign aid reform, the subcommittee would appreciate an update on the administration’s efforts up to this point. 

We’ve tried, over the years, to underscore the importance of foreign 

assistance programs to U.S. security interests overseas. Our country learned, at great cost, that ungoverned spaces, such as those 

that allowed al Qaeda to train in Afghanistan, pose great risk to 

our way of life, and that all elements of our national power—military, economic, and diplomatic—must be integrated if we are to 

prevail in the long struggle against Islamic extremists. 

Be it through assistance to countries at risk of increasing acts of 

terrorism, like Indonesia or the Philippines, or assisting representative governments that will directly contribute to regional stability, 

such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the allocation of our assistance 

resources should support strategic objectives. 

It is important to underscore two basic assumptions underlying 

any foreign aid reform effort. 

First, programs must support policy. For this reason, the Senate 

recommended a new Democracy Fund account last year, the purpose of which was to consolidate all democracy programs and activities under a single account. I’m pleased that the President made 

the expansion of freedom abroad a major component of America’s 

foreign policy, but, to succeed, USAID and the State Department 

will need to coordinate all of our programs and policy in support 

of the national security strategy to a degree this subcommittee has, 

frankly, yet to see. I hope, under your leadership, that will be the 

case. 

Second, given limited resources, our assistance must be 

prioritized to those countries important to U.S. national interests. 

Frankly, this is sometimes out of kilter in the budget request. For 

example, in fiscal 2007, only $733,000 is requested for democracy 

and government programs in the People’s Republic of China, while 

$4 million is requested for similar programs in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Need I say more? I can assure you that democracy programs for China will be significantly increased as the 

legislative process moves forward. 

So, thank you for being here today, Mr. Ambassador. With that, 

I’ll turn it over to my friend and colleague Senator Leahy. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Tobias, you had a nice writeup in the Wall Street 

Journal yesterday. I think you deserved it. We’re going to spend an 

hour or so to cover the entire world of USAID’s programs, so I’m 

going to put most of my statement in the record. 

I join the chairman in welcoming you to this subcommittee for 

the first time as both USAID Administrator and Director of Foreign Assistance. I also want to thank you for the job you did as the 

Global AIDS Coordinator. My impression is that you got that program off to a good start, despite some less-than-helpful constraints 

in the law. Fighting AIDS is different from other problems you’re 

going to face now: reforming dysfunctional judicial systems, build-
41 

ing potable water systems, responding to famines or hurricanes, 

stopping deforestation, supporting nascent political parties, providing economic alternatives for opium growers, and building democratic institutions and market economies. Your new role will require more interaction with Congress. While the chairman and I 

tried to bring out a bill that had strong bipartisan support, we still 

have 100 different views here. Then you go across the street to the 

House, and there’s another 435. The President’s priorities are often 

ours, but not always. So, you have to balance presidential priorities 

and congressional ones. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

I will put the rest of my statement in the record, because I really 

would like to hear from you, and then I’ll have some questions. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Ambassador Tobias, we have 90 minutes to cover the entire world of USAID’s programs, so I will be very brief. 

I join Chairman McConnell in welcoming you to this Subcommittee for the first 

time as USAID Administrator and as the Director of Foreign Assistance. I also want 

to thank you for the job you did as Global AIDS Coordinator. My impression is that 

you got that program off to a good start, despite some less than helpful constraints 

in the law. 

Yours is a heavy responsibility. While your previous role involved some of the 

same countries and problems, fighting AIDS is different from reforming dysfunctional judicial systems, building potable water systems, responding to famines or 

hurricanes, stopping deforestation, supporting nascent political parties, or providing 

economic alternatives for opium growers. 

Building democratic institutions and economic systems that offer real opportunities for people to improve their lives within a just society, presents unique, long 

term challenges and opportunities. 

Your new role will also involve more interaction with the Congress than you are 

accustomed to. Some of it may not always be welcome, because in the Senate we 

have 100 different points of view of what’s wrong in the world and what USAID 

should do about it. And you also have to deal with the House. 

I hope you understand that the way we get this bill passed is by balancing the 

President’s priorities with the Congress’s priorities. They are often the same, but 

not always. Let me give you some friendly advice: don’t forget who pays the bills. 

You have already discovered that USAID has outstanding people. But its staff is 

a fraction of the number that are needed to effectively manage programs in so many 

countries with so many problems. It is also plagued by burdensome and self-defeating procurement and contracting procedures that one might expect to find in Russia, 

but not here. I want to know—not today but soon—how you plan to fix these problems. 

I have long believed that the United States needs a Director of Foreign Assistance. We need far better coordination, and I only wish your oversight extended to 

the international programs of other agencies besides State and USAID, like the Departments of Agriculture and Energy, the U.S. Foreign Service and the CDC. At the 

same time, there are good reasons for USAID’s autonomy, and we want to protect 

it. 

I am concerned that there has not been nearly enough consultation with the Congress about your position or the Secretary’s ‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ initiative. 

Your testimony today does not give us much more than the vague generalities we 

have heard already. One thing we have learned over many years is that when it 

comes to foreign policy and foreign assistance, real reform is difficult and it doesn’t 

happen unless the Congress is fully on board. 

We know what the problems are and there is a lot we can do to make our foreign 

assistance programs more effective. But we have to work together, from the beginning, which has not been the practice of this Administration. I hope this will be different because there is a lot at stake for all of us. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you Ambassador Tobias for being here. 
42 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Mr. Ambassador, why don’t you tell us what you think we need 

to know without reading a very lengthy statement—that would be 

appreciated—and we’ll get to the questions. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL L. TOBIAS

Ambassador TOBIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the 

opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today. 

I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman and to Senator Leahy, for your guidance and support in my 

former role as U.S. Global AIDS coordinator, and to thank you for 

your commitment both to that and to our foreign assistance programs. I look forward to working with both of you, and with the 

other members of the subcommittee, in my new capacity. 

My first couple of months as USAID Administrator have reinforced my belief that the men and women of the Agency are motivated by a true sense of mission and commitment, and I’m eager 

to do all that I can to sustain their dedication and ensure that their 

experience and capabilities are fully engaged as we embark on reforming our approach to foreign assistance. 

I have submitted a more detailed statement for the record, but 

I would like to focus some very brief opening remarks on the administration’s reform of foreign assistance for fiscal year 2007 and 

beyond. Beyond the discussions that we’re going to have in a few 

minutes, my staff and I certainly stand ready to address any detail 

of the fiscal year 2007 budget request with you or your staff as we 

go forward. 

Secretary Rice launched her Transformational Diplomacy and 

Development Initiative in January to address the incoherence and 

lack of focus in our foreign assistance programs. In doing so, she 

noted that both the content and the organization of foreign assistance require adjustment to meet the new challenges of today’s 

world. The Secretary noted that ‘‘The current structure of America’s foreign assistance risks incoherent policies and ineffective programs, and perhaps even wasted resources. We can do better, and 

we must do better.’’ Today, I want to commit to you that we will 

do better. 

In our current environment, the locus of national security threats 

has shifted to the developing world, where poverty, oppression, and 

indifference are exploited by our foes to provide haven for terrorists 

and the preparation of terrorist acts. As you have recognized with 

your attention to democracy programs, Mr. Chairman, foreign assistance can be an effective tool for countering these new threats. 

For this reason and others, foreign assistance has become a 

foundational pillar of our new national security architecture. 

As you know, under the reform initiative, the President has appointed me to be the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, in addition to my Senate-confirmed position as Administrator of USAID. 

The President and the Secretary have assigned me the task of 

bringing greater strategic coherence to our planning, our budgeting, and our implementation of foreign assistance. I intend to do 

this first by focusing on our three greatest challenges: the lack of 

strategic focus in our programs, our fragmented budgeting process, 

and our inability to adequately track, transparently and in suffi-
43 

cient detail, where our funding goes, all problems that I know the 

Congress has recognized for some time. 

First, as your staffs have been briefed, we have begun to introduce a new strategic framework to bring focus to the foreign assistance funding appropriated to both the Department of State and to 

USAID. The framework establishes a set of broad objectives for foreign assistance that will help transform countries into better, more 

effective partners to create a safer and more just international system. 

On the country level, this framework serves as a roadmap, guiding programming to help us achieve our overall goals. Here in 

Washington, with essential input from Congress, the framework 

will more clearly establish the goals toward which foreign assistance will be directed, and the measures by which we will track 

progress. Under the leadership of each of our ambassadors, U.S. 

Government country teams in the field will define the activities for 

which funds will be used to most effectively pursue those goals. 

These plans will then be reviewed in Washington for their consistency with overall goals and expectations, with funds allocated only 

after the plans are approved. It is my expectation that this approach will not only help us better manage foreign assistance, but 

will also help Members of Congress perform their oversight responsibilities more effectively. 

Second, with this framework in place, budgetary decisions and 

program funding proposals will be weighed against how they contribute to the overarching goal the Secretary has set for helping 

countries become more effective partners. 

Finally, we will track where the money goes, including the results it is producing. As you know from your experience in working 

with me on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, I have 

placed a great deal of emphasis on transparency for our funding, 

and I want to do the same for all of foreign assistance. 

It is our intent to produce joint country plans for 35 countries for 

fiscal year 2007 that we can share with you in February. By August 2006 we aim to have our new information system in place to 

begin to collect and track this data. 

Beyond this more strategic approach to planning and budgeting 

and the transparency we intend to provide, I also want to improve 

our responsiveness at USAID to the Congress in other ways. So, 

beginning today, I want to commit that USAID will provide answers to you for your information requests within 48 hours, and to 

formal letters within a week, or when that is not possible, we will 

be in touch with your offices within those timeframes to explain the 

reasons why and to work with you to establish a reasonable schedule that we will then meet. Along the same lines, I want to also 

commit to delivering congressional reports on time to enable you to 

do your necessary oversight to make our programs stronger. 

As articulated by both President Bush and by Secretary Rice, we 

are entering a new era of foreign assistance where our resources 

will be better aligned with our strategic priorities. We will be more 

accountable to the American taxpayers, and use their resources 

more efficiently and effectively. 

None of this will be easy. But, in recognition of the fact that our 

future as Americans is inextricably linked to those we seek to as-
44 

sist, we must be certain that our investments are producing the 

greatest results at the lowest cost to the taxpayers, and we will 

need the help of the Congress to achieve this aim. 

On a final note, Mr. Chairman, as you know, Abu Musab alZarqawi was killed in Iraq yesterday by U.S. Armed Forces. President Bush noted that ‘‘The ideology of terror has lost its most visible, aggressive leader.’’ What I want to note here is that in 2003 

al-Zarqawi was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death by a 

Jordanian court for masterminding the 2002 assassination of Laurence Foley, a USAID official in Jordan. The death of Laurence 

Foley was but one of al-Zarqawi’s many awful crimes, but I can 

think of no better way to articulate the deep connection between 

foreign assistance and our Nation’s fortunes in the world. The people who carry out our foreign assistance programs are literally on 

the front lines in the battle between hope and darkness. We must 

all take very seriously the responsibility to enable them to manage 

the best and most efficient programs possible. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to addressing your questions. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL L. TOBIAS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee 

today on the fiscal year 2007 USAID budget. 

I want to express my appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, and to you, Senator 

Leahy, for your guidance and support in my former role as U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and to thank you for your commitment to our foreign assistance programs. 

Your attention to strengthening democracy, Chairman McConnell, and your commitment to augmenting the voice of the disenfranchised, Senator Leahy, have helped 

citizens hold their governments more accountable across the globe. I look forward 

to working with you both, and with the other Members of the Subcommittee, in my 

new capacity as Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and Administrator of USAID. 

My first couple of months as USAID Administrator has reinforced my belief that 

the men and women of the Agency are motivated by a true sense of mission and 

commitment. I am eager to do all that I can to sustain their dedication and to ensure that their valuable experience is brought to the table as we embark on reforming our approach to foreign assistance. 

I just returned from two weeks of travel through Pakistan, then Afghanistan, and 

Iraq—where hundreds of brave USAID employees put their lives on the line every 

day in an effort to help people in nascent democracies build a free and prosperous 

future for themselves. As I traveled through the region, the full range of USAID 

programming was on display, from the humanitarian intervention in societies ravaged by natural disasters to the reconstruction of societies ravaged by tyranny and 

war; from efforts to secure peace and security to efforts to invest in people and help 

them build richer fuller lives for themselves. 

The message I took to President Musharraf of Pakistan and President Karzai of 

Afghanistan, as well as to President Jalal Talabani, Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki, 

and the newly-formed government of Iraq was of our commitment to a long-term 

strategic partnership between the United States and their countries. 

Democracy is taking root in Afghanistan and Iraq and the leaders I met are committed to a new direction for their countries. We are seeing some economic progress 

and through programs like Afghans Building Capacity—a multi-year investment of 

up to $125 million that amounts to the largest and most comprehensive such USAID 

effort in perhaps 20 years anywhere in the world—we will assist the Government 

and the people of Afghanistan as they develop the physical and human capacity in 

the public sector, private sector and civil society to sustain growth both in Kabul 

and the provinces. 

I recognize that my testimony this afternoon will be somewhat different from traditional budget testimony. I will briefly review the fiscal year 2007 budget request 

for USAID, but will focus my testimony on the Administration’s reform of foreign 

assistance for fiscal year 2007 and beyond. In addition to the discussion we are 
45 

going to have today, my staff and I stand ready to address any detail of the fiscal 

year 2007 budget request with you and/or your staff after this hearing. 

FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET

The fiscal year 2007 program budget continues efforts to build democracy, good 

governance and economic growth in Iraq and Afghanistan, and requests funds in 

support of other frontline states in the Global War on Terror. USAID will play a 

critical role in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that will be deployed throughout 

Iraq and Afghanistan. In Sudan, we are well on our way to standing up a mission 

in Juba. This will enhance our influence in helping move the country to peace, reconciliation and a better future. 

USAID is requesting $3.15 billion for its fiscal year 2007 programs. In addition, 

we anticipate working with the Departments of State and Agriculture on joint programs that total $5.4 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF), Assistance for the 

Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA), Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, the Andean Counternarcotics Initiative and Public Law 

480 Title II. We will also manage a portion of the $2.9 billion requested for the 

Global HIV/AIDS Initiative by the Global AIDS Coordinator and a portion of the $3 

billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation. USAID is requesting a total of 

$679 million for Operating Expenses and $132 million for contributions to the Capital Investment Fund. 

ENHANCING THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: REDUCING INEFFICIENCIES AND

INCOHERENCE

Secretary Rice launched her Transformational Diplomacy and Development initiative in January to address the incoherence and lack of focus in our foreign assistance programs. In doing so, she noted that both the content and organization of foreign assistance require adjustment to meet the challenges of today’s world. The Secretary noted, ‘‘The current structure of America’s foreign assistance risks incoherent 

policies and ineffective programs and perhaps even wasted resources. We can do 

better and we must do better.’’ Today, I want to commit to you we will do better. 

Under the previous USAID and State organizational structure, each agency maintained independent budgeting and planning offices to focus on their own part of foreign assistance. This required two staffs to develop multiple and parallel iterations 

of their individual budgets in the same program areas, two staffs to agree to and 

integrate a set of numbers, two staffs to brief the Hill, and a myriad of programs 

that may be redundant—or worse, at cross purposes. While each agency collaborated 

with the other, in spite of the best efforts of the people involved, it was done at 

great cost in time, personnel, and impact. 

Of great concern to me—and I know to many of you—is the inability of our Washington information systems to capture ‘‘all-spigots’’ funding levels across sectors or 

in a variety of other dimensions—information that is vital to the oversight work of 

both Congress and the Administration. I know it will not be easy, but we need to 

bring transparency and accountability to explaining the use and result of our foreign 

assistance funds. 

I realize that as I outline the challenges we face, I do not need to convince you 

this afternoon of what we need to do. Congress has consistently called for improved 

transparency in the way budgets are put together and funds expended—and vastly 

improved accountability for the results. I simply want to emphasize that I, too, am 

focused on that goal, and that I look forward to working with you in achieving it. 

In our current environment, the locus of national security threats has shifted to 

the developing world, where poverty, oppression, and indifference are exploited by 

our foes to provide haven for terrorists and the preparation of terrorist acts. As I 

know you have recognized with your attention to democracy programs, Mr. Chairman, foreign assistance is an effective tool for countering these new threats. For this 

reason and others, foreign assistance has become a foundational pillar of our new 

national security architecture. 

OUR APPROACH: WE WILL DO BETTER

As you know, under the reform initiative, the President has appointed me to be 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, in addition to my Senate-confirmed position of 

Administrator of USAID. The President and Secretary Rice have assigned me the 

task of bringing strategic coherence to our planning, budgeting and implementing 

of foreign assistance. I intend to do this first by focusing on our three greatest challenges: the lack of strategic focus in our programs, our fragmented budgeting process, and our inability to track, transparently and in sufficient detail, where our 

funding goes—all problems I know that Congress has recognized for some time. 
46 

First, as your staffs have been briefed, we have introduced a new Strategic 

Framework for foreign assistance appropriated to both the Department of State and 

USAID. This framework establishes a set of broad objectives for foreign assistance 

that will help transform countries into better, more effective partners to create a 

safer and more just international system. We believe that this goal of transforming 

countries can be accomplished if we focus on five objectives: achieving and maintaining peace and security; helping improve governance and democratic participation; 

contributing to and promoting investments in people; helping engender economic 

growth; and maintaining our commitment to respond to humanitarian disasters. 

At the country level, where the ‘‘rubber of our programs meets the road,’’ this 

Framework serves as a ‘‘roadmap,’’ guiding programming to help us achieve our 

overall goals. My intent is that we here in Washington—with essential input from 

Congress—will more clearly establish the goals toward which our foreign assistance 

will be directed and the measures by which we will track progress. Then, under the 

leadership of each of our Ambassadors, country teams in the field will define the 

activities for which funds will be used to most effectively pursue those goals. 

With their expert knowledge of country circumstances, our staff in the field will 

produce better integrated, more coherent country operational plans that indicate, for 

each activity, the partner, the amount of money, the expected outputs, and ultimate 

outcomes that will contribute most effectively to achieving the established goals. 

The country operational planning approach differs from the status quo in that all 

assistance agencies in country will work together as a country team to identify unified resources, both human and financial, to bring to bear on the goals and performance targets of each sector of assistance planned to drive country reforms. This process produces a single USG document detailing our approach to assistance guided by 

strategic goals. 

These unified plans will be reviewed in Washington for their consistency with 

overall goals and expectations, with final allocation decisions made only after plans 

are approved. By requiring detailed and specific planning up-front, directly before 

fiscal year 2007 funds are appropriated, we hope to improve the strategic focus of 

our programs sooner and increase the speed their implementation. 

Second, with the Framework in place, budgetary decisions and program funding 

proposals will be weighed against how they contribute to the overarching goal the 

Secretary has set of helping countries become effective partners. To ensure that our 

budget staffs at USAID and State allocate funds according to this goal in an integrated and consistent way, I have joined them into one budget, performance planning and results monitoring organization, under my direction. By bringing this staff 

together into one office, we have begun to streamline processes, improve efficiency 

and effectiveness, and reduce the burden that redundant functions place on our field 

staff. 

Finally, we will track where the money goes, including the results it is producing. 

As you know from your experience in working with me on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, I have placed a great deal of emphasis on transparency 

for our funding. To bring that same level of accountability to the rest of our foreign 

assistance spending, we are in the process of building a new strategic information 

system for USAID and State funds that will tell both you and me exactly who is 

receiving our funds, what they were doing with the money, what is expected as a 

result, and how that result will help us reach our goals. 

These changes represent a substantive shift in the planning, allocation, and programming of foreign assistance resources, including new responsibilities for both 

Washington and the field. Accordingly, this effort will remain a work in progress 

for some time, but we are moving as quickly as we can. It is our intent to produce 

joint country operational plans for USAID and State funds for 35 countries for fiscal 

year 2007 that we can share with you in February. By August 2006, we aim to have 

our new information system in place to begin to collect and track this data. 

Beyond this more strategic approach to planning and budgeting and the transparency we intend to provide, I also want to improve our responsiveness to the Congress in other ways. Beginning today, I want commit that USAID will provide you 

with answers to your informational requests within 48 hours and to formal letters 

within a week; or, when that is not possible, we will be in touch with your offices 

within those timeframes to explain the reasons why, and to work with you to establish a reasonable schedule for getting the information to you. Along those same 

lines, I also commit to delivering Congressional reports on time to enable you to do 

your necessary oversight to make our programs stronger. 
47 

CONCLUSION

As articulated both by President Bush and by Secretary Rice, we are entering a 

new era of foreign assistance where our resources will be better aligned with our 

strategic priorities. We will be more accountable to American taxpayers and use 

their resources more efficiently and effectively. 

None of this will be easy. But in recognition of the fact that our future as Americans is inextricably linked to those we seek to assist, we must be certain that our 

investments are producing the greatest results at the lowest cost to the taxpayer. 

We will need the help of Congress to achieve this aim. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any questions 

you may have. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

I appreciate your reference to the big news of the day. There has 

not been a whole lot of good news in Iraq recently, but certainly 

the death of al-Zarqawi and the appointment of the defense and interior ministers gives us some hope that progress will continue to 

be made. 

HEALTH PROGRAMS

I want to shift to another subject entirely, and that’s health programs. I’ve been a strong supporter of polio eradication programs, 

along with Senator Leahy and other members of this subcommittee. I was curious as to why the budget request includes no 

funding at all for programs related to polio eradication in Nigeria, 

a country which the World Health Organization has identified as 

of concern with respect to polio. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that we 

had significant polio eradication activities in fiscal years 2004 and 

2005 in Nigeria. We spent about $10.5 million. In 2006, we developed a number of concerns about both mismanagement and corruption in the system, although we did continue to fund programs 

using some money that was carried over. A number of changes 

have been made in Nigeria to tighten up the system. So, in 2007 

we expect that USAID Nigeria will receive polio funds. The level 

will be decided later in the year. We will take into account the epidemiology, the current pipeline, the scope of USAID’s role, what 

other donors are doing, what the Government of Nigeria is doing. 

But it’s clearly a very serious issue there, and one that we need 

to be addressing. 

BURMA

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you. I’m glad you’re moving in that 

direction. I also want to turn to another country that I have a longstanding interest in, and that’s Burma. I think we all know what 

the humanitarian situation is there, from significant HIV/AIDS infection rates to avian flu and now the potential for polio to reemerge. While negligent in providing for the welfare of the Burmese people, the military junta that runs the place, the State 

Peace and Development Council (SPDC), is guilty of human rights 

abuses against ethnic minorities, including murder, torture, and 

rape. 

Now, we all understand the solution to Burma’s humanitarian 

problems is political in nature; namely, reconciliation between 

Aung San Suu Kyi, and her political followers, who won the election in 1990, and the SPDC. In the wake of all this, what can the 
48 

international community do to effectively address these Burmese 

health crises? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Well, I think there are a lot of things that 

we can do, but we need to be sure that the things that we are doing 

are really supporting the people in need, and that we’re doing it 

separate from the government in power there. 

Senator MCCONNELL. They’re basically running the NGOs out, 

aren’t they? Denying them space—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. We have to find NGOs with whom we can 

work, who are working with Burmese both inside and outside the 

country. We’re doing a number of things there, some from Thailand 

along the Thai/Burma border. But this is a situation that calls for 

creativity when the governments of countries are oppressing their 

people and not willing to step up to meet the needs of their people, 

and we have to find organizations that we can work with. That’s 

exactly what we’re trying to do. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Are there some? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Yes, I think there are. I’m certainly not an 

expert yet on the circumstances there, but I believe there are some 

organizations that we are working with, and can work with. 

IRAQ

Senator MCCONNELL. You mentioned Iraq. What is your perception of progress in Iraq, as measured by USAID programs, and the 

likelihood of such programs achieving some level of success? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. I just came back from Iraq about 2 weeks 

ago, and there is real progress being made, but there’s a great deal 

more that can be done. 

Senator MCCONNELL. You met with the Prime Minister, did you 

not? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. I met with the Prime Minister. I met with 

the President. I met with all of our military and civilian leadership 

on the ground. I’ll tell you, one interesting experience I had was 

sitting in a room one day in a town 40 or 50 miles south of Baghdad with a group of about seven or eight leaders of Iraqi NGOs. 

Now, just think about that in the context of somebody trying to 

start an NGO in the time of Saddam Hussein. These people were 

enthusiastically explaining what their organizations were doing. 

They had already figured out that if they created an association 

among themselves they could have more influence on the provincial 

government that was being put in place. It was the beginning of 

democracy really happening there. 

But one of the things that we need to do with our USAID programs, and I took some steps both while I was there and since coming back to do this, is, certainly, to be focused on the long term, 

but we also need to be focused on what I refer to as short-interval 

scheduling. So, what I have asked my people to do is take it 90 

days at a time. What can we do, in the next 90 days, that can demonstrate real progress and demonstrate our support to the new 

Iraqi Government? 

I had a great conversation with General Corelli, the commander 

of the ground troops, about ways in which USAID and the military 

can collaborate in going into neighborhoods, starting in Baghdad, 

working on the last mile of connecting electric lines, water, sewer, 
49 

cleaning up the garbage, trying to get neighborhoods back to a 

more habitable circumstance, where people can get back to their 

lives. 

Our people there are working under extraordinary circumstances. The security requirements are enormous just to move 

around. I’m very impressed and very proud of what they’re doing. 

But I think there’s more that we can do by focusing on some smaller projects more quickly. 

AFGHANISTAN

Senator MCCONNELL. One more question, and then I’ll turn to 

Senator Leahy. 

Bring me up to speed on how you feel you’re doing in Afghanistan. Let me just say that when I first went there, in the fall of 

2003, I had the typical country-team briefing. I never met a more 

enthusiastic bunch of Americans about, (a) the way they were 

being greeted, and (b) how successful they were. That was almost 

3 years ago. Now we read reports that there’s some backtracking, 

and that the Taliban are more of a problem than they were previously. So, I’m interested in whether the enthusiasm level is still 

high for your people there, and whether they still think they’re 

making great progress. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. It is very high. I’m, again, very impressed 

with the morale and the commitment that our people there have. 

But I think it’s a situation that could tip either way, and we need 

to ensure that we’re continuing to do the things that need to be 

done. 

I met with President Karzai. I met with all of our own people, 

of course. I had some interesting experiences on the ground, including a meeting with a group of former poppy farmers, who, somewhat to my surprise, talked to me about how growing poppies is 

contrary to the teachings of the Koran and how they were eager 

to progress with our alternative-livelihoods program. These were 

people who were being taught skills like pruning fruit trees and 

getting orchards back into shape and growing other crops. But it’s 

more than that, it’s a need for roads—probably that’s the greatest 

need—and the need to develop markets. I also visited a USAID 

program where we are training people, who are going to all have 

jobs when they leave this training program, in some very basic construction skills of plumbing, working with electricity, building concrete-block walls, and some of those kinds of things. 

Senator MCCONNELL. In that regard, during my trip to Afghanistan we had extensive discussions with Karzai and others about 

the need to get trees planted. Afghanistan has basically turned into 

a desert, because all the trees have been cut down. Has any reforestation effort been initiated? I know there are a number of American foundations that are interested in this issue. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. There’s work going on in reforestation, 

which is a very pressing issue. 

There is a lot of focus on building new government capacity and 

capacity in the private sector, and getting citizens to understand 

the role that they can play in a democracy. I saw, for example, the 

program that we’re sponsoring with Voice for Humanity, which is 
50 

using new technology to communicate with people in rural areas. 

I think that’s making some progress. We need to try new things. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Good. 

Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE

I understand that the Director of Foreign Assistance position was 

created as part of Secretary Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy Initiative, in an attempt to better coordinate foreign policy priorities 

with foreign aid programs. But there’s a lot of concern that this 

may strip USAID of decisionmaking authority over what little remains of its budget. What is your response to that? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. That’s not the case. In fact, as I have said 

to a number of people at USAID, what now happens is that the 

person who is the Administrator of USAID has a seat at the seniormost tables in the decisionmaking processes at the State Department that no Administrator has ever had before. 

Senator LEAHY. Is that the most transformational part of it? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. No, but it’s something that will help in the 

beginnings of bringing USAID’s efforts in foreign assistance, and 

the Department of State’s efforts in foreign assistance into sync so 

that we’re moving forward together in a more strategically aligned 

way. We are beginning to make good progress as we put processes 

in place. 

Senator LEAHY. What is the most transformational part of this 

initiative? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Well, the first thing that we’ve done, Senator, is to take the USAID people who are engaged in policy planning, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation of programs and 

the people in the State Department who have been engaged in 

those same functions, and put them together into an integrated 

staff. They have all focused on foreign assistance, but they’ve been 

operating totally separately—they haven’t even been on the same 

planning calendars. As we go forward, our intent is not to have a 

USAID budget or a State Department budget, but a Foreign Assistance budget that will make all of it more coherent in a way that 

I think all of us can better understand. I think you’re going to be 

in a better position to make your decisions. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, we’ll be anxious to see what is done with 

the budget and how it will be structured. I would hope that there 

would be discussion with us as that goes along. 

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

In your statement, you speak of your strategic framework for foreign assistance. Let me make sure I have this right. You have five 

objectives: achieving and maintaining peace and security; helping 

improve governance and democratic participation; contributing to, 

and promoting, investments in people; helping to engender economic growth; responding to humanitarian disasters. What is new 

here? What is USAID doing today that does not already fit into one 

of these five objectives? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. I don’t know that there is, but at USAID 

today there are 1,400 strategic objectives. We need to bring focus 
51 

and coherence to the way in which we are doing these programs 

so that we are looking at them on a country-by-country basis across 

all of the programs, so we can get a total picture of what are the 

objectives we’re trying to achieve on the ground. 

Senator LEAHY. But you’re not suggesting that one size would fit 

all? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. No, quite the contrary. To some degree 

there are 154 countries where we’re currently doing some type of 

foreign assistance. I think there are buckets or categories that certain countries with similar characteristics will fit into that will 

have similar kinds of programs, and that’s also a part of this 

framework. But we intend a process here where the Secretary is 

going to be able to provide specific guidance to the field, to each 

country, that will be very country specific. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, I think you’ll probably find a lot of those 

1,400 objectives will be in many of those countries. I’m not suggesting it’s not a wise thing to reexamine our strategic objectives 

and determine how to make them more relevant. I would not want 

to change simply for the sake of change. But no matter what you 

do, if you don’t have the money, it’s not going to make much difference. We spend a very small part of our budget on foreign aid, 

especially for a country that’s our size and much less than a lot of 

other countries do as a percentage of their budgets. 

FOREIGN AID BUDGET

As you’ve talked about refocusing foreign aid, have your interagency discussions included a discussion of the need to significantly 

increase the budget for anything other than HIV/AIDS and Millennium Challenge Corporation, or are we going to have cuts in next 

year’s budget similar to cuts that we’ve had this year to many key 

USAID programs? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. The amount of foreign assistance, from the 

beginning of this administration to the present time, has almost 

tripled. It has been, obviously, the partnership of the administration and the Congress that has made that happen. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, except that in this year’s budget, the President cut global health programs by about 15 percent, $136 million; 

and yet, one of the places we show the good face and generosity of 

our country has been in these programs. But that’s been cut. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. But there’s still significant money in those 

programs. 

Senator LEAHY. Do you think there’s enough? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. I don’t think it’s ever enough. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, is $136 million less than last year’s level 

enough? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. If there was more I could probably find a 

way to effectively spend it. But my real focus, at the moment, is 

to ensure that we are spending the money that we have as efficiently and as effectively as we possibly can. I don’t believe we’re 

doing that. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, we’ve—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. I think we can generate some more funds 

by doing it all more efficiently. 
52 

Senator LEAHY. We’ve cut the contribution of the Global Fund to 

Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria by $250 million. We spent almost 

twice that this week alone in Iraq. Actually it’s $350 million, if you 

count the additional $100 million taken out of the Labor, Health, 

and Human Services bill. In countries where USAID works, there 

are few doctors, and hospitals are often crumbling cement structures built in the 19th century. As someone who understands the 

crisis in public health, why would you cut these funds? 

If we are spending roughly a billion dollars or more a week in 

Iraq, and we want to win the hearts and minds of people, I might 

suggest to you that the work we do on Global Fund to Fight AIDS 

and global health is probably winning more hearts and minds. 

These global health programs are the faces of America that are 

most welcome around the world. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. We shouldn’t lose sight of the size of the 

base in these programs. You mentioned HIV/AIDS. We’re increasing the financial commitment to our very successful PEPFAR programs in order to meet the commitment that the President made 

at the beginning of that. That’s been a very successful use of resources. We do need to support the Global Fund, but not at the expense of our bilateral programs. 

Senator LEAHY. I understand, but at the same time the President’s budget would cut family planning and reproductive health 

programs from $425 million to $357 million—an 18 percent cut. By 

the President’s statement, he said he knows that one of the best 

ways to prevent abortion is by providing quality, voluntary familyplanning services. Yet, despite the administration’s strong opposition to abortion, they want to cut a program that would primarily 

reduce unintended pregnancies and abortion and reduce child mortality. This defies logic. 

My time is up, but you know, I have a great deal of respect for 

your background and what you have done. I have no question in 

my mind of your commitment. I worry, as an American, that we 

have not just financial and security issues, but we have great 

moral issues to care about. Since we have so much more than most 

people, there’s a certain moral obligation to give back. I look forward to sitting down and chatting about this. 

I appreciate having you here today. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. I’d be happy to do that, Senator. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Senator Brownback. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, welcome. Good to see you here. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Thank you. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you for meeting with me on some of 

these topics previously. I also want to congratulate you on the announcement, I guess even just this morning, on inclusion of new 

countries in the President’s Malaria Initiative—Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Senegal. I think that’s an excellent move forward. 

I want to talk with you about a couple of idea areas that I’m curious about, and, you know, get your thoughts on them. It sounds 

like we’re tracking on the same line on this. The last trip I took, 

with Senator Durbin, to—went to Congo, Rwanda, and Kenya—it 
53 

was very striking to me the breadth of programs. It looked like, 

what you were saying, that we had 1,400 different strategic initiatives, when you can only probably get a couple of these accomplished. In eastern Congo, where people are striving to just live, it 

seems like, to me, you’ve got a hierarchical set of needs, and you 

need to hit those first, that they need food, agriculture, they need 

water, they need healthcare and education, and you’ve—you get 

past that, that pretty much is going to eat up most of your efforts— 

and should, because that’s what, you know, people need to survive, 

to start off with. 

I hope you can get this honed down to a few areas. We’re working on a bill in my office to take the assistance programs to Africa 

and, in a blunt-instrument approach, just say, ‘‘Half of this money 

has to go in one of these four areas, and it has to go for either commodities in these fields or training of people on the ground in those 

countries.’’ As we saw in the malaria program, when we were 

studying that, that only 7 percent of our malaria money—this is 2 

years ago—was going for actual commodities of bed nets, sprays, or 

medicine, and 93 percent was going for conferences and consultants 

and who knows what else. We had a hard time figuring out just 

what the money was going for. But the African leaders we met 

with said, ‘‘We know what to do with malaria, we just don’t have 

the money to do it with.’’ The same with drilling a water well; you 

know, it’s a pretty simple piece of equipment if you’re not going too 

deep, not particularly sophisticated to operate, but they’ve got to 

have it. If they don’t have it, there’s not clean water in your—we 

may be behind the eight ball in a lot of places. So, I applaud that 

effort, and we’re trying to do a similar bill to address those areas, 

in particular. 

I want to applaud your effort on AIDS. The President’s initiative 

on HIV/AIDS is saving lives, and lots of them. That’s one I hope 

the President and you are very proud of, because people are alive 

today because he went out on a limb to do that. I believe we’re 

going to do the same with malaria. 

In suggestion areas, there’s an emerging group of new NGOs and 

private groups that want to help out, particularly in the continent 

of Africa. I think there’s a real opportunity here for you and your 

office to help point the way. Gates Foundation is doing beautiful 

work in the health field. I met with some people associated with 

another great company the other day that want to put significant 

money into Africa. I’ve heard of another group today. They’re— 

you’ve got a great opportunity to help point people in the right direction and marry them with local NGOs. I would urge you to host 

a private donors summit, AID to host it, and to bring in some of 

these key new players. I think everybody knows the people that 

have been in the field for some period of time, and don’t ignore ’em, 

because, you know, God bless ’em for the work they’ve done for 

years. But you’ve got a number of emerging new players that have 

significant new resources and new energy, and just a hosting, really, of a private donors conference, like we do public donor conferences for Iraq or Afghanistan, of these groups, and have your 

targets of, you know, ‘‘Okay, one of our key targets is water-well 

drilling or orphans in Africa’’—I think people would respond to it. 
54 

If you could see fit—and you may not, on this one—but there’s 

a burgeoning youth movement. There was 140 places across the 

United States, about a month ago, that walked on a night walk for 

the ‘‘Invisible Children’’ of northern Uganda. This is a college-student movement that a group of college students went over there, 

did a film, spread it around here, and then started chapters around 

the country. Then, I had a young man in my hometown last Sunday night sit down with me, saying, ‘‘I want to go to northern 

Uganda and help these kids I just found out about.’’ He’s never left 

the United States. He may not have been out Kansas previously. 

But he’d like to help these kids in northern Uganda. I’m seeing a 

lot of that. I think there’s a moment you can harvest, if you had 

a targeted set of programs of what young activists could be a part 

of. I don’t know how you would do that. You’ve got great minds 

that could help out with that. I think you’ve got a great moment 

to be able to harvest some of those activities and marry ’em together, and you’ve got a left/right coalition that’s coming together 

to sponsor that. 

Hope those are things you’re looking at. I don’t know if you could 

comment, for a minute or two, about that. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Senator, I think those are wonderful ideas. 

As part of the malaria event that we had this morning that the 

First Lady hosted and that you referred to, we had a group of people from the private sector and foundation representatives who are 

interested in partnering with each other, and with the President’s 

Malaria Initiative, to leverage what we’re all doing together on the 

ground. When I was running the AIDS initiative, we started a New 

Partners fund where we set aside $200 million that was only available to organizations that have done less than $5 million with the 

Government on HIV/AIDS work in the last 5 years in order to create an opportunity to bring new partners in. Part of that program 

is to train them and give them the skills to work their way through 

the contracting and procurement process with the Government. 

But there are other organizations out there. As you and I talked 

before, large churches, for example, have the resources and the 

wherewithal, but they don’t know quite where to go. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Don’t know where to go. I—— 

FOREIGN AID COORDINATION

Ambassador TOBIAS. I’ve got people working to create kind of a 

clearinghouse. 

Senator BROWNBACK. If you’ve got the people on the ground I 

don’t mean to butt in, but you’ve got people on the ground, and 

they’ve taken me to a number of just phenomenal facilities. You 

know, Dick Durbin—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Right. 

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. I went to an orphanage in 

Rwanda—600 kids in this orphanage—and they asked Dick and I— 

we said—we asked, ‘‘Can we help?’’ And they said, ‘‘Yeah, we need 

a cow.’’ ‘‘Okay,’’ you know, ‘‘we can help with that.’’ But I was just 

thinking, your people knew about that, and if there was some 

clearinghouse you had here, and then somebody here that contacts 

a big church in Kentucky or Kansas, saying, ‘‘We’ve got this orphanage in eastern Rwanda, and 600 kids, and, frankly, they need 
55 

help. Would you adopt them?’’—I think these guys would jump all 

over it. Or a small corporation. Or a foundation. But you’ve got expertise on the ground that none of them have. If they could feed 

it here, and then you network with people here, it would be a—it 

would be a beautiful thing and really help people here who want 

to do that sort of thing. But you’re probably the only clearinghouse 

possibility we’ve got, to do that. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Frankly, I think part of what happens is 

that our people on the ground who have ideas like that, or people 

outside the Government who want to be involved, sort of look at 

the bureaucratic challenges, and they sort of give up. Part of what 

we have to do—and I think we can—is to get past that and make 

it easy, or make it sufficiently easy, for organizations to find the 

front door, to find the right place here, to get the information that 

we—that we can have, and—— 

Senator MCCONNELL. May I—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS [continuing]. Put them in touch. 

Senator MCCONNELL [continuing]. Interject on that point? Senator Brownback is right on the mark. I run into that all the 

time—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Yeah. 

Senator MCCONNELL [continuing]. Particularly with churches, 

who have both the interest and the wherewithal to help, but limited experience with Government bureaucracy. I think Senator 

Brownback is really onto something in suggesting that if you could 

harness those interested groups and people, you could magnify 

your impact exponentially. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. It also has the impact of building greater 

grassroots support among the American people for—— 

Senator BROWNBACK. Right. 

Ambassador TOBIAS [continuing]. Our whole foreign assistance 

program—— 

Senator BROWNBACK. Yeah. 

Ambassador TOBIAS [continuing]. And understanding why America needs to do what we’re doing. I do, I think it’s a wonderful idea, 

and—— 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, if you could—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS [continuing]. We’ll pursue all these things. 

Senator BROWNBACK. If there’s any way I can help out with that, 

I’d love to do it, because—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Thank you. 

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. You know, we think we’re 

going to have, what, 20 million AIDS orphans in Africa, and I’ve 

been to some of these places, and it’s just enormous. It looks like, 

to me, what you’re going to end up with is a lot of these children 

matriculating to towns, and then they’re going to get trafficked or 

involved in crime or whatever, because their village structure is 

blown up and it’s not just not going to happen, and the sooner we 

can get people to hook into there and help—and they would, but 

they need—they need your door—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Right. 

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. That you could do that. 

Then, finally—I’m past my time, but if you could personally host 

some of these corporate chieftans, and maybe just go to meet with 
56 

them, with the CEO of Pfizer, others, and just say, ‘‘Hey, you know, 

there’s a great thing you can do here, and I’ve got a specific project 

for you.’’ It may not be something they are interested in, but some 

of these guys that I’ve met with, they’d really like to help, and— 

but you’ve got to—I think, frankly, too, you’ve got to get ’em on the 

ground there to do that. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Senator Brownback, I have a meeting I’m 

going to have to make, but would you like to continue—if the Ambassador has a little more time—and then wrap the hearing up? 

Senator BROWNBACK. Good. If you wouldn’t mind, I’d appreciate 

that. 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you very much for being here, Mr. 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCONNELL. You’re doing a wonderful job, and we’re 

proud of you. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Thank you very much. 

Senator BROWNBACK [presiding]. Mr. Ambassador—I don’t mean 

to drive you overtime, but we’ve got you here—have you thought 

about that, a meeting with some of these business leaders? You’ve 

come and been in that environment, and personally taking some to 

some of these places that you would host ’em? 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Yes. Back in 2003, when I first came onboard as the AIDS Coordinator, then-Secretary Thompson of HHS 

had organized a trip to Africa that included a number of business 

leaders that I thought that was very successful. Many of them got 

very motivated. The problem was, at that point in time we weren’t 

really in a position to say, ‘‘Okay, now that we’ve got your interest, 

here’s how we can harness that. Here’s what you can do.’’ We do 

have a program in USAID that is specifically focused on trying to 

find partnerships with the private sector. One of the most successful that has come to my attention recently is a program where we 

spent about $10 million over 5 years in Rwanda helping about 

40,000 farmers who were engaged in growing coffee, but hadn’t 

really been growing it in a commercial way. They were helped to 

do a better job of cultivating and sorting and cooperatives were 

formed. The bottom line is that there are now 4,000 Starbucks 

stores in the United States that are carrying a premium brand of 

Rwandan coffee that came out of that project. USAID is out of the 

picture. 

That’s what development is all about. There are skills that the 

private sector, in this case, Starbucks, can bring to bear in a whole 

variety of ways. I agree with you, having been a CEO, that there 

are ways in which we can harness that expertise and skill. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Or even contacting ’em, saying, if they’re 

interested in going on their own, which I think a lot of ’em would 

want to—say, ‘‘You know, I’ve got the wherewithal myself to go. 

It’ll be a time issue,’’ but that if you can make it easy for them to 

see some of these front-line orphanages, healthcare clinics, I 

think—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Right. 
57 

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. People, once they see it, 

they’re just dramatically different. I think that’s what happened to 

Bill and Melinda Gates when they went to Mozambique. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. I think it’s a very under-utilized resource, 

and we should not only be encouraging the private sector on what 

it can do on its own, but ways in which we can partner. I saw a 

program in Africa a couple of years ago in the AIDS prevention 

area for young people, where Coca-Cola was loaning marketing people, the same marketing people who do focus groups and test marketing. They were testing prevention messages in the same way 

they would market a new soft drink to determine what are young 

people really going to pay attention to, what are they really going 

to hear? Those are the kinds of things that historically have been 

done mostly by public health professionals rather than marketing 

professionals. I think there are a variety of ways in which we can 

bring those resources together, and it is something I intend to pursue. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Good, because I just—there’s a real interesting moment right now that there’s a lot of energy to do this, left 

and right, young and older. I think as we engage those in these difficult situations, if we’ll engage the poor, they’ll save our souls in 

the process, because—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Yeah. 

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. We get changed in the process, 

because we get changed doing it, and it’s a—— 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Right. 

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. It’s just been beautiful, what 

I’ve seen, thus far. 

I want to thank you and congratulate you. We will—as I say, 

we’re working on a particular bill, and we’ll be working with your 

office about that, because sounds as—like, from what you’ve described, that we’re on some of the same track. 

I do hope, as a final thought and point, that, on the water-well 

drilling, in particular—I’ve worked with groups on drilling water 

wells that—they say they’re not getting the support out of your office that has been funded by the Congress. I’ve sent a letter on 

this, and I know this is one of the strategic initiatives that’s needed, because the AIDS money, it doesn’t go as far if you don’t have 

clean water and good food—or it does—isn’t as effective if a person’s drinking bad water. Same with malaria. It just weakens the 

system. There are quite a few groups out there willing to drill private water wells, and I think they—we can extend our money 

through them a lot of times, that they’ll match it, at least one to 

one, if not higher. I’m hopeful that’s something you can look at on 

getting more water wells drilled in some of these parts of Africa, 

in particular. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. The quest for water is what consumes most 

of the day for people—going someplace to get clean water and carrying it long distances. Access to clean water has to be a high priority. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Good. Thank you very much. Godspeed. 

Mr. Ambassador, appreciate it. Appreciate the thoughts that 

you’ve shared here today. 

Ambassador TOBIAS. Thank you, Senator. 
58 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator BROWNBACK. There will be some additional questions 

which will be submitted for your response in the record. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Agency for response subsequent to the hearing:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REFORM

Question. What do you see as Congress’s role in foreign assistance matters, generally, and with respect to foreign assistance reform, specifically? 

Answer. Congress’ role is essential to the success of our foreign assistance programs and, specifically, foreign assistance reform. I support the checks and balances 

system of our government that allows the executive branch to present a budget to 

Congress and for Congress to use its best judgment to direct how that money should 

be spent. We need to do our part to present Congress with a well-justified budget 

that clearly lays out our proposal for the way foreign assistance dollars should be 

spent, and transparently outlines the tradeoffs associated with diverging from this 

proposal. Our former foreign assistance budgeting practices did not clearly lay out 

these tradeoffs, leaving Congress with only one option—to use the best information 

they had available to earmark funds. 

The budgeting practices I am establishing with this reform will provide Congress 

with more detailed, timely and accurate information. In doing so, Congress will be 

better positioned to make informed decisions about how their budgeting priorities 

fit into a comprehensive picture of U.S. Government foreign assistance. We haven’t 

been able to do this before. 

I see the reform as a collaborative effort on the part of the executive and legislative branches. 

Question. There have been significant political changes in Central and South 

America over the years—best characterized as a lean to the left. For years, Congress 

has advocated increased assistance to countries in those regions, but the administration has not included significant increases in its annual budget request. 

In your opinion, what countries in the Western Hemisphere are most important 

to U.S. national security interests, what are those interests, and how is U.S. assistance used to further our security objectives? 

Please answer the same question with respect to Africa, East Asia, the Pacific, 

the Near East, Europe and Eurasia, and South Asia? 

Answer. U.S national security interests require that we seek to expand freedom, 

prosperity, energy security, peace and stability in the Europe and Eurasia region, 

not just to provide for our own security but to improve the security and prosperity 

of the world as a whole, with which our future is linked. To achieve our objectives, 

we use a range of diplomatic and assistance tools in cooperation with our partners 

and other donors, and we also seek to empower and strengthen the capabilities of 

key multilateral institutions like NATO the OSCE, and OECD, and to strengthen 

the U.S.-EU relationship. 

In Southeast Europe, the United States continues to have a compelling national 

interest in helping break the circle of violence that plagued the countries of Southeast Europe in the 1990s and support their path to Euro-Atlantic integration. Our 

top priorities for the Balkans are to reach a settlement this year on Kosovo’s future 

status without isolating Serbia, to help Serbia become stable and democratic, and 

to ensure the success of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s efforts to build a more integrated 

modern state that will be able to function without strong international supervision. 

To achieve our objectives, U.S. assistance focuses on promoting democratic development and a viable market economy that offers opportunities to all, and putting the 

region firmly on the path of integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

Also highly important to maintaining stability and promoting growth and democracy in the region is U.S. assistance to Macedonia, Albania, and the newly independent Montenegro. U.S. assistance is helping to achieve U.S. objectives by increasing local level stability through community development activities, supporting 

tolerance and multi-ethnic democratic pluralism, and promoting market-driven economic growth. 

U.S. interests also extend to Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia. More than a decade 

of U.S. assistance has facilitated progress in the economic, democratic and social 

sectors, although shortcomings remain in some areas. Bulgaria and Romania are in 
59 

the final stages of qualification for EU membership, and Croatia is in consultations 

with the EU on its future accession. 

In Eurasia, U.S. interests and assistance focus on supporting the sovereignty of 

post-Soviet states, as well as their democratic development, economic growth and 

energy security. Where possible, such as in Ukraine and Georgia, Euro-Atlantic integration is also a principal U.S. objective. Armenia and Georgia have achieved 

enough progress in their transition to have concluded compacts for Millennium 

Challenge Corporation assistance, while Ukraine, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan are 

MCC threshold candidates. In Central Asia, U.S. assistance also aims to ease pressures stoking Islamic extremism. In the South Caucasus region, U.S. efforts are 

helping to foster stability and democratic practices. Regional conflicts threaten regional security and impede the full democratic and economic development of the 

South Caucasus and Black Sea region. The United States is working to promote 

just, lasting, and peaceful resolutions to the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia, South 

Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. U.S. efforts also seek to mitigate ongoing conflict in Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Throughout Eurasia we are 

continuing intensive counter narcotics efforts, as well as the fight against the 

epidemics of HIV/AIDS and multiple drug resistant tuberculosis. In addition, our assistance programs address cross-border threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, trafficking in persons and narcotics, and other criminal activity. 

The United States is interested in ensuring that Central Asia does not produce 

another Afghanistan and continues to provide its critical support to the Global war 

on terrorism. Repression, corruption, poverty and isolation make the region a breeding ground for terrorism and extremist ideologies. Through our assistance, we are 

working to mitigate those conditions by supporting nascent democratic development, 

ensuring successful economic reform, enhancing border security, and furthering regional integration in trade and energy. 

In Belarus and Uzbekistan, the United States supports the democratic aspirations 

of the people, with a focus on increasing access to information and supporting the 

growth and capacity of civil society groups and independent political parties. 

U.S. relations with Russia, of course, are highly important, with elements of cooperation as well as areas of disagreement. We remain actively and constructively 

engaged bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally on key issues from 

counterterrorism to stopping trafficking in persons. We work together to cut off terrorist financing, share law enforcement information, improve transportation security, and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are actively assisting with recovery and development in the North Caucasus region. As Co-Chairs 

of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, we cooperate closely with Russia to promote a peaceful 

resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We also urge Russia to cooperate constructively on peaceful resolutions of the Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria 

conflicts that respect the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova within their 

internationally recognized borders. We encourage Russia to support reforms in 

Belarus and Uzbekistan, whose leaders have set these countries on courses of repression. The United States works with our NATO Allies and the EU to continue 

to urge Russia to fulfill remaining Istanbul commitments relating to withdrawal of 

its military forces from Georgia and Moldova. Fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments is a prerequisite for the United States to move forward with ratification of 

the adapted CFE Treaty. 

We are concerned about democratic backsliding in Russia. Russia’s new NGO law, 

which went into effect in mid-April, is a particular object of our attention. The 

United States worked closely with our European and G–8 allies to communicate our 

concerns about this legislation while it was still under Duma consideration. We believe this law will chill and deter independent civil society in Russia. We have 

pledged, together with our European allies, to closely monitor the law’s impact on 

civil society. Our assistance programs will continue to support NGOs and activists 

working to promote democracy in Russia. 

AUTHORITY OVER OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Question. As Director of Foreign Assistance, do you have authority over foreign 

assistance activities run by other government agencies—such as Treasury, CDC, 

and the MCC? 

Answer. As Director of Foreign Assistance, I maintain authority over foreign assistance funds allocated to the State Department and USAID, which include approximately 80 percent of the foreign assistance dollars appropriated by Congress. 

I will serve in a coordinating role for all foreign assistance, including that delivered 

through other agencies and entities of the U.S. Government. 
60 

DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Question. How has the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance been received by the various bureaus at State and USAID—have you been welcomed, or 

are you seen as threat? 

Answer. My new position as Director of Foreign Assistance has been embraced by 

various bureaus at State and USAID. As expected with any proposed change to status quo, there are those who would prefer the old way of doing things. Those bureaus in support of the change recognize the need to reform the way we plan, implement and measure the impact of our foreign assistance resources to be more coherent and strategic. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION

Question. Have you had an opportunity to review the budget justification materials that the Committee receives each fiscal year, and if so, do you find them adequate? Are you contemplating any changes to these materials for the fiscal year 

2008 request, or in the account structure of the budget request? 

Answer. Our fiscal year 2008 budget justification to Congress will differ markedly 

from previous justification materials. For fiscal year 2008, USAID and State will 

present one united budget justification that will include all foreign assistance funds 

and USAID operating expenses. In the near future, my staff will be consulting with 

appropriations staff to review our proposal for justification material. At this time 

we are not proposing changes to the account structure for fiscal year 2008. As the 

reform process evolves, if we encounter a need to recommend changes to account 

structure, we will work closely with your staff to explain the benefit of proposed 

changes. 

TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Question. What is your definition of ‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ and how does 

the fiscal year 2007 budget request support this concept? 

Answer. ‘‘Transformational diplomacy’’ is defined by the Secretary as, ‘‘To work 

with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves 

responsibly in the international system.’’ The fiscal year 2007 budget request aims 

to provide assistance to our partners to continue economic growth, support democracy, and expand individual opportunity. 

REGIONAL PRIORITIES

Question. There have been significant political changes in Central and South 

America over the years—best characterized as a lean to the left. For years, Congress 

has advocated increased assistance to countries in those regions, but the Administration has not included significant increases in its annual budget request. 

In your opinion, what countries in the Western Hemisphere are most important 

to U.S. national security interests, what are those interests, and how is U.S. assistance used to further our security objectives? 

Answer. The Western Hemisphere region as a whole is vital to U.S. national security interests. Those interests include U.S. efforts to defeat terrorism, to promote 

freedom, to fight the war on illegal drugs and to develop strong trading relationships. Allow me to highlight our assistance programs in five key Western Hemisphere nations: Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela. 

—Bolivia.—Evo Morales and his Movement toward Socialism (MAS) party have 

continued to waver on its commitment to free market economic policy, pluralist 

democracy, and counternarcotics—key U.S. national security interests. Among 

other activities, the U.S. Government is focusing assistance to Bolivia on programs that strengthen vibrant and effective democracies, including the support 

of counterweights to one-party control such as judicial and media independence, 

a strong civil society, and educated local and state level leaders. 

—Colombia.—The key U.S. national security interest in Colombia is to reduce the 

production and flow of illicit drugs to the United States. The U.S. Government’s 

alternative development program creates an environment for sustainable and 

equitable economic growth to create permanent licit alternative income-generating opportunities in areas vulnerable to drug production and trafficking. The 

program stimulates increased private investment and creates the policy and institutional conditions required to sustain and accelerate private investmentbased job and income creation. U.S. assistance also encompasses strengthening 

democratic institutions, expanding access to justice and the rule of law, anticorruption and the promotion of human rights. 
61 

—Haiti.—The installation of Rene Preval’s administration marks the resumption 

of constitutional governance in Haiti. The U.S. Government is committed to 

working with the new government of Haiti to help build a stable and well-governed state that is responsive to the needs of its people. Mindful of the need 

for economic development, the United States is supporting the provision of 

short-term emergency jobs while helping create the conditions for longer term 

growth and improved health and education services. We will work with the 

newly elected Haitian Parliament to strengthen institutional capacity and encourage participatory democracy as a counterbalance to centralized patronage 

politics. In the critical rule of law sector, our focus will be to reform the justice 

system and improve access to justice. 

—Nicaragua.—The highest priority in Nicaragua for the United States is ensuring 

free and fair elections. Elections will be held on November 5, 2006 for president, 

vice president, members of the National Assembly and delegates to the Central 

American Parliament. There is a continuing lack of public confidence in the Supreme Electoral Council’s handling of the electoral process and in whether or 

not presidential elections will be handled impartially. In coordination with a variety of international donors and organizations—including the Organization of 

American States and local nongovernmental organizations—U.S. assistance provides support for voter education activities, updating voter registries, delivering 

voter identification cards, and domestic and international election observers. 

U.S. funding is also helping to establish mediation centers nationwide to help 

alleviate congestion in the court system, improve access to justice, and enhance 

public confidence in the justice system. 

—Venezuela.—The dismantling of democratic institutions by President Hugo Chavez and increased control by the Venezuelan executive branch over the country’s 

five branches of government threatens the continuation of representative democracy in Venezuela, a key U.S. national security interest. Presidential elections will take place in December 2006, and opposition groups have raised serious concerns over the fairness and transparency of the government-controlled 

electoral process. The U.S. Government’s work in Venezuela is handled through 

the Office of Transition Initiatives. The objectives are to provide assistance to 

strengthen and reinvigorate independent democratic voices and reverse democratic backsliding by enhancing civil society dialogue, supporting constitutional 

processes, and strengthening democratic institutions. 

COUNTRIES MOST IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. IN AFRICA

Question. In your opinion, what countries in Africa are most important to U.S. national security interests, what are those interests, and how is U.S. assistance used 

to further our security objectives? 

Answer. The Africa region as a whole is vital to U.S. national security interests. 

Key areas of critical importance throughout the continent include counter-terrorism 

and the implications of extractive industries; establishing peace and security; and 

cross-cutting issues of governance, gender, the impact of HIV/AIDS, urbanization 

and youth. Allow me to highlight our assistance programs in Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Nigeria, and Liberia. 

The U.S. Government (USG) interests in Sudan are of both a security and humanitarian nature. Our goals in Sudan are to successfully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ending the crisis in Darfur and integrating all Sudanese regions into the Government of National Unity. Our assistance focuses on the displaced populations in Darfur, as well as on vulnerable populations in other regions 

of the country. We support resettlement activities for refugees and displaced persons 

and promote activities to protect civilians, especially the prevention of violence 

against women. Looking to the longer term, we are also raising local capacity to increase livelihood opportunities and strengthen community resilience and local economies. 

Liberia is a cornerstone in our strategy to promote regional stability and to inhibit 

the activities of illegal traffickers and terrorists in West Africa. After the signing 

of the Peace Agreement, the USG played a leading role in helping Liberia maintain 

the peace and begin the national reconstruction and rehabilitation process. In November 2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected as Africa’s first woman head of 

state in an election deemed free and fair by the international community. Current 

U.S. assistance is focused on solidifying the transition process by enhancing democratic governance, supporting agriculture and livelihoods, ensuring stability and security by taking the lead in reforming the armed forces and police, reintegrating refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, infrastructure development, and supporting 

the provision of essential social services. 
62 

The Horn of Africa, Somalia in particular, is critical to U.S. national security interests, given the potential for harboring and spreading extremism. U.S. assistance 

helps reduce poverty and related lack of access to social services (education in particular) to help lift people out of despair and provide options to extremism. It also 

helps stabilize and strengthen governance institutions that allow for peaceful resolution of domestic and regional problems. We are also providing food assistance to 

avert famine and building the region’s long-term capacity to ensure food security. 

In Nigeria, our interests are to fight corruption, counter increasing Islamic 

radicalization, and ensure stability in the energy sector. The USG is working with 

the Government of Nigeria to strengthen its governance institutions and reestablish 

military-to-military relationships. We are building partnerships to counter terrorist 

organizations, implementing recommendations to stabilize the energy sector, and 

working to expand formal financial systems. Our assistance is also being used to 

promote U.S. private sector involvement in the key sectors of agriculture and aviation to stimulate economic growth and trade. 

GLOBAL FUND

Question. If you can put your AIDS Coordinator hat back on for a moment, what 

level of funding is appropriate for the Global Fund in fiscal year 2007? 

Answer. The U.S. Government [USG] is by far the largest contributor to the fight 

against global HIV/AIDS. In fiscal year 2004, the USG provided approximately onehalf of the world’s commitment to international HIV/AIDS support. The U.S. Government has dramatically increased its commitment in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, 

while the rest of the world, so far, has not. With the $4 billion request for fiscal 

year 2007, the disproportion between the U.S. commitment and that of the rest of 

the world will likely continue to grow. 

Each country needs to find the right mix of bilateral and multilateral contributions to get the most immediate results from its investment. For the USG, the 20- 

year history of its bilateral programs means that these programs can move much 

faster in the focus countries than the Global Fund. Other governments have made 

similar determinations to invest heavily in bilateral efforts rather than multilateral 

options. 

The Global Fund remains an important part of the Emergency Plan strategy, and 

the U.S. Government remains by far its largest single contributor of funds. The 

Emergency Plan originally anticipated allocating $1 billion to the Global Fund over 

five years. However, we are now on track to provide over $2 billion to the Fund in 

just the first three years of the Emergency Plan, through fiscal year 2006. The 

President’s fiscal year 2007 request for focus country bilateral AIDS programs funding—$2.717 billion within Foreign Operations and $2.776 total—is, in part, an attempt to recover from the effects of the redirection of almost $527 million from focus 

country programs to the Global Fund and other components of the Emergency Plan 

over PEPFAR’s first three years. If focus country budgets are not fully funded again 

in fiscal year 2007, the capacity needed for a dramatic expansion of services in fiscal 

year 2008 will not be possible—and no increase in fiscal year 2008 spending could 

undo this setback. Without the fiscal year 2007 level of funding for the focus countries, it will not be possible to meet the 2–7–10 goals of the Emergency Plan—especially the goal of supporting treatment for 2 million. 

If the Global Fund maintains its core mission and a model that Congress supports, and as the Fund’s performance improves in the years to come, there will be 

opportunities to reassess the level of U.S. Government funding for it. For fiscal year 

2007, however, it is crucial that the USG continue to concentrate its resources on 

focus country programs. 

DEMOCRACY

Question. What is the total funding level for democracy, governance and rule of 

law programs in the budget request? 

Answer. The USAID request for funding for democracy, governance and rule of 

law programs for fiscal year 2007 is $856,175,000 (including DA, ESF, SEED and 

FSA). 
63 

FISCAL YEAR 2007 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET SUMMARY BY ACCOUNT FOR DEMOCRACY, 

GOVERNANCE & HUMAN RIGHTS 1

[In millions of dollars] 

Account 

Fiscal year 

2006 

estimate 

2007 

request 

Foreign Operations .......................................................................................................................... 1,281.1 1,573.4 

Development Assistance ........................................................................................................ 190.1 168.6 

Economic Support Fund ......................................................................................................... 655.7 756.3 

USAID-implemented Programs ...................................................................................... 422.4 502.4 

State Department/Global Programs .............................................................................. 233.4 253.8 

MEPI ..................................................................................................................... 99.0 120.0 

Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 55.4 87.3 

South Asia Regional ............................................................................................ 1.0 2.0 

EAP Women’s Issues ............................................................................................ 1.0 1.0 

Laos ...................................................................................................................... .................... 0.3 

House Democracy Assistance Program ................................................................ 1.0 ....................

Trafficking in Persons .......................................................................................... 11.9 8.5 

UNHCHR Nepal ..................................................................................................... 1.5 ....................

Human Rights & Democracy Fund Program (DRL) 2 ........................................... 62.6 35.0 

Assistance for E. Europe & Baltics (SEED) ........................................................................... 114.5 78.2 

State Department Programs ......................................................................................... 37.2 22.8 

USAID-implemented Programs ...................................................................................... 77.3 55.4 

Freedom Support Act ............................................................................................................. 165.4 140.3 

State Department Programs ......................................................................................... 40.9 32.1 

USAID-implemented Programs ...................................................................................... 124.5 108.2 

Democracy Fund (excluding UNDEF and HRDF) .................................................................... 23.6 ....................

National Endowment for Democracy ............................................................................. 15.1 ....................

Country Programs ......................................................................................................... 8.5 ....................

Inter-American Foundation: Local Governance & Democracy ............................................... 5.2 6.2 

INCLE ...................................................................................................................................... 50.4 322.8 

Women’s Justice Empowerment Initiative .................................................................... .................... 9.5 

Trafficking in Persons ................................................................................................... 5.0 7.0 

Administration of Justice/Rule of Law/Anti-corruption ................................................ 45.5 306.3 

Andean Counterdrug Initiative ............................................................................................... 64.2 62.7 

Administration of Justice/Rule of Law/Anti-corruption ................................................ 29.0 27.9 

USAID ............................................................................................................................ 35.2 34.8 

IO&P ....................................................................................................................................... 11.9 38.4 

U.N. Democracy Fund 2 ................................................................................................. 7.9 10.0 

OAS Fund for Strengthening Democracy ...................................................................... 2.5 2.5 

U.N. Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights .......... 1.5 1.5 

UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund ................................................... .................... 24.5 

State Operations ............................................................................................................................. 74.4 77.7 

Related Appropriations .......................................................................................................... 74.4 77.7 

The Asia Foundation 3 ................................................................................................... 8.5 6.5 

National Endowment for Democracy 4 .......................................................................... 65.9 71.2 

GRAND TOTAL ........................................................................................................... 1,355.5 1,651.1 

1 This table excludes: (1) funding for programs that support victims of war and victims of torture that is sometimes categorized as 

‘‘human rights’’; (2) funding categorized as ‘‘conflict management’’, including all Transition Initiatives (TI) funds, some DA and ESF funding, 

and USG support for the U.S. Institute of Peace; (3) funding for educational and cultural exchanges and public diplomacy programs funded 

through State Operations that promote democracy. 2 Fiscal year 2006 funds were appropriated in the Democracy Fund. 

3 Excludes portions of budget that are used for operating expenses and non-democracy grant programs. 

4 Excludes portion of budget that is used for operating expenses. 
64 

TAB 1.—USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE 

Operating unit 

Appropriation 

code

Fiscal year 

2006 estimate 2007 budget request 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Africa: 

Africa Regional ..................................................................... DA ............ 3,550 288 3,166 6,590 13,594 288 1,368 2,734 5,962 10,352 

ESF ........... ................ ................ 4,000 4,613 8,613 ................ ................ 9,000 9,250 18,250 

Africa Regional Total ....................................................... .................. 3,550 288 7,166 11,203 22,207 288 1,368 11,734 15,212 28,602 

Angola ................................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ 550 500 1,050 ................ ................ 2,482 1,586 4,068 

ESF ........... 250 1,850 270 ................ 2,370 200 1,500 200 ................ 1,900 

Angola Total ..................................................................... .................. 250 1,850 820 500 3,420 200 1,500 2,682 1,586 5,968 

Benin .................................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ 400 ................ 400 ................ ................ 400 ................ 400 

Benin Total ....................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 400 ................ 400 ................ ................ 400 ................ 400 

Burundi ................................................................................. DA ............ ................ 99 288 393 780 ................ 223 220 350 793 

ESF ........... ................ 611 1,200 1,200 3,011 ................ 250 1,000 750 2,000 

Burundi Total ................................................................... .................. ................ 710 1,488 1,593 3,791 ................ 473 1,220 1,100 2,793 

Democratic Republic of the Congo ...................................... DA ............ ................ 1,316 1,000 ................ 2,316 1,000 ................ 1,356 1,000 3,356 

ESF ........... 1,000 ................ 1,950 2,000 4,950 1,000 ................ 1,000 3,000 5,000 

Democratic Republic of the Congo Total ...................................... .................. 1,000 1,316 2,950 2,000 7,266 2,000 ................ 2,356 4,000 8,356 

Ethiopia ................................................................................ DA ............ 573 ................ ................ 1,000 1,573 600 ................ ................ 1,000 1,600 

ESF ........... 460 ................ 1,000 1,000 2,460 500 ................ 1,000 1,000 2,500 

Ethiopia Total ................................................................... .................. 1,033 ................ 1,000 2,000 4,033 1,100 ................ 1,000 2,000 4,100 

Ghana ................................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ 292 200 492 ................ ................ 250 250 500 

Ghana Total ..................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 292 200 492 ................ ................ 250 250 500 
65 

Guinea .................................................................................. DA ............ ................ ................ 569 ................ 569 ................ ................ ................ 579 579 

Guinea Total ..................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 569 ................ 569 ................ ................ ................ 579 579 

Kenya .................................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ 400 1,475 1,875 ................ ................ 500 1,402 1,902 

ESF ........... ................ 1,200 1,520 250 2,970 ................ 1,200 1,805 250 3,255 

Kenya Total ...................................................................... .................. ................ 1,200 1,920 1,725 4,845 ................ 1,200 2,305 1,652 5,157 

Liberia ................................................................................... DA ............ 1,000 ................ ................ 2,684 3,684 1,447 ................ 1,300 1,000 3,747 

ESF ........... 500 ................ 5,000 8,000 13,500 6,000 ................ ................ 7,500 13,500 

Liberia Total ..................................................................... .................. 1,500 ................ 5,000 10,684 17,184 7,447 ................ 1,300 8,500 17,247 

Madagascar .......................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ 492 400 892 ................ ................ ................ 400 400 

Madagascar Total ............................................................ .................. ................ ................ 492 400 892 ................ ................ ................ 400 400 

Mali ....................................................................................... DA ............ ................ 100 429 600 1,129 ................ 100 448 600 1,148 

Mali Total ......................................................................... .................. ................ 100 429 600 1,129 ................ 100 448 600 1,148 

Mozambique .......................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ ................ 992 992 ................ ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Mozambique Total ............................................................ .................. ................ ................ ................ 992 992 ................ ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Namibia ................................................................................ DA ............ ................ ................ 490 272 762 ................ ................ 465 310 775 

Namibia Total .................................................................. .................. ................ ................ 490 272 762 ................ ................ 465 310 775 

Nigeria .................................................................................. DA ............ ................ 132 1,318 1,846 3,296 10,352 ................ ................ ................ 10,352 

ESF ........... ................ 4,950 ................ ................ 4,950 ................ 5,000 ................ ................ 5,000 

Nigeria Total .................................................................... .................. ................ 5,082 1,318 1,846 8,246 10,352 5,000 ................ ................ 15,352 

REDSO-ESA ........................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ 836 1,000 1,836 ................ ................ 867 1,000 1,867 

ESF ........... ................ 300 500 ................ 800 ................ 200 800 ................ 1,000 

REDSO-ESA Total ............................................................. .................. ................ 300 1,336 1,000 2,636 ................ 200 1,667 1,000 2,867 

Regional Center for Southern Africa .................................... DA ............ ................ 500 483 ................ 983 ................ 1,000 850 ................ 1,850 

Regional Center for Southern Africa Total ...................... .................. ................ 500 483 ................ 983 ................ 1,000 850 ................ 1,850 
66 

TAB 1.—USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE—Continued 

Operating unit 

Appropriation 

code

Fiscal year 

2006 estimate 2007 budget request 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Rwanda ................................................................................. DA ............ ................ ................ 1,000 629 1,629 ................ ................ 1,000 648 1,648 

Rwanda Total ................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 1,000 629 1,629 ................ ................ 1,000 648 1,648 

Senegal ................................................................................. DA ............ ................ ................ 263 720 983 ................ ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Senegal Total ................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 263 720 983 ................ ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Sierra Leone .......................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ ................ 2,041 2,041 ................ ................ ................ 2,076 2,076 

ESF ........... ................ ................ ................ 5,940 5,940 ................ 500 500 1,500 2,500 

Sierra Leone Total ............................................................ .................. ................ ................ ................ 7,981 7,981 ................ 500 500 3,576 4,576 

Somalia ................................................................................. DA ............ ................ ................ 1,545 ................ 1,545 ................ ................ 1,571 ................ 1,571 

Somalia Total ................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 1,545 ................ 1,545 ................ ................ 1,571 ................ 1,571 

South Africa .......................................................................... DA ............ 2,178 ................ 1,565 1,430 5,173 ................ ................ 1,752 3,504 5,256 

ESF ........... 1,000 ................ 287 ................ 1,287 1,300 ................ ................ ................ 1,300 

South Africa Total ............................................................ .................. 3,178 ................ 1,852 1,430 6,460 1,300 ................ 1,752 3,504 6,556 

Sudan ................................................................................... DA ............ ................ 2,100 1,749 300 4,149 ................ 2,100 1,749 300 4,149 

Sudan Total ...................................................................... .................. ................ 2,100 1,749 300 4,149 ................ 2,100 1,749 300 4,149 

Tanzania ............................................................................... DA ............ ................ ................ 264 800 1,064 ................ ................ 310 764 1,074 

Tanzania Total ................................................................. .................. ................ ................ 264 800 1,064 ................ ................ 310 764 1,074 

Uganda ................................................................................. DA ............ ................ 1,218 500 660 2,378 ................ 1,000 1,419 ................ 2,419 

Uganda Total ................................................................... .................. ................ 1,218 500 660 2,378 ................ 1,000 1,419 ................ 2,419 
67 

West African Regional Program (WARP) .............................. DA ............ ................ ................ 4,280 600 4,880 ................ ................ 6,354 600 6,954 

West African Regional Program (WARP) Total ................ .................. ................ ................ 4,280 600 4,880 ................ ................ 6,354 600 6,954 

Zambia ................................................................................. DA ............ ................ ................ 300 450 750 ................ ................ 300 450 750 

Zambia Total .................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 300 450 750 ................ ................ 300 450 750 

Zimbabwe ............................................................................. DA ............ ................ 376 500 500 1,376 ................ ................ 700 700 1,400 

ESF ........... ................ 900 570 1,500 2,970 ................ ................ 1,000 2,000 3,000 

Zimbabwe Total ............................................................... .................. ................ 1,276 1,070 2,000 4,346 ................ ................ 1,700 2,700 4,400 Africa Total ...................................................................... .................. 10,511 15,940 38,976 50,585 116,012 22,687 14,441 43,332 51,731 132,191 

Asia and Near East: 

Afghanistan .......................................................................... DA ............ 7,500 ................ ................ 22,500 30,000 12,000 7,000 ................ 6,000 25,000 

ESF ........... ................ 3,000 8,000 47,000 58,000 ................ 3,000 9,000 124,000 136,000 

Afghanistan Total ............................................................ .................. 7,500 3,000 8,000 69,500 88,000 12,000 10,000 9,000 130,000 161,000 

ANE Regional ........................................................................ DA ............ ................ ................ ................ 2,028 2,028 ................ ................ ................ 3,225 3,225 

ANE Regional Total .......................................................... .................. ................ ................ ................ 2,028 2,028 ................ ................ ................ 3,225 3,225 

Bangladesh ........................................................................... DA ............ 1,238 ................ ................ 1,336 2,574 ................ ................ ................ 1,550 1,550 

ESF ........... 1,000 2,000 ................ 1,752 4,752 1,000 2,000 ................ 2,000 5,000 

Bangladesh Total ............................................................. .................. 2,238 2,000 ................ 3,088 7,326 1,000 2,000 ................ 3,550 6,550 

Cambodia ............................................................................. DA ............ ................ ................ ................ ................ .................... 237 ................ ................ 673 910 

ESF ........... 6,113 3,485 817 960 11,375 4,595 4,160 975 2,770 12,500 

Cambodia Total ................................................................ .................. 6,113 3,485 817 960 11,375 4,832 4,160 975 3,443 13,410 

China .................................................................................... DA ............ 2,475 ................ ................ ................ 2,475 ................ ................ ................ 733 733 

China Total ...................................................................... .................. 2,475 ................ ................ ................ 2,475 ................ ................ ................ 733 733 

East Timor ............................................................................ ESF ........... 3,000 ................ ................ 3,000 6,000 1,500 1,400 ................ 1,100 4,000 

East Timor Total .............................................................. .................. 3,000 ................ ................ 3,000 6,000 1,500 1,400 ................ 1,100 4,000 
68 

TAB 1.—USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE—Continued 

Operating unit 

Appropriation 

code

Fiscal year 

2006 estimate 2007 budget request 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Egypt ..................................................................................... ESF ........... 17,060 6,020 14,850 47,575 85,505 17,605 6,310 12,415 50,125 86,455 

Egypt Total ....................................................................... .................. 17,060 6,020 14,850 47,575 85,505 17,605 6,310 12,415 50,125 86,455 

India ..................................................................................... DA ............ 326 ................ ................ ................ 326 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

ESF ........... 200 ................ ................ ................ 200 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

India Total ........................................................................ .................. 526 ................ ................ ................ 526 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Indonesia .............................................................................. ESF ........... 5,200 7,000 3,400 14,850 30,450 1,975 3,464 ................ 14,175 19,614 

Indonesia Total ................................................................ .................. 5,200 7,000 3,400 14,850 30,450 1,975 3,464 ................ 14,175 19,614 

Iraq ....................................................................................... ESF ........... ................ ................ ................ ................ .................... ................ ................ ................ 25,000 25,000 

Iraq Total ......................................................................... .................. ................ ................ ................ ................ .................... ................ ................ ................ 25,000 25,000 

Jordan ................................................................................... ESF ........... 3,000 3,000 5,000 3,000 14,000 3,000 2,000 4,000 3,000 12,000 

Jordan Total ..................................................................... .................. 3,000 3,000 5,000 3,000 14,000 3,000 2,000 4,000 3,000 12,000 

Lebanon ................................................................................ ESF ........... ................ ................ 2,000 5,000 7,000 8,000 ................ 1,000 1,000 10,000 

Lebanon Total .................................................................. .................. ................ ................ 2,000 5,000 7,000 8,000 ................ 1,000 1,000 10,000 

Mongolia ............................................................................... ESF ........... 2,000 100 ................ 300 2,400 1,500 ................ ................ 400 1,900 

Mongolia Total ................................................................. .................. 2,000 100 ................ 300 2,400 1,500 ................ ................ 400 1,900 

Morocco ................................................................................. ESF ........... ................ 2,900 600 2,940 6,440 ................ ................ 1,000 7,000 8,000 

Morocco Total ................................................................... .................. ................ 2,900 600 2,940 6,440 ................ ................ 1,000 7,000 8,000 

Nepal .................................................................................... DA ............ 1,485 ................ ................ ................ 1,485 1,500 ................ ................ ................ 1,500 
69 

ESF ........... ................ 990 ................ ................ 990 ................ 1,000 ................ ................ 1,000 

Nepal Total ....................................................................... .................. 1,485 990 ................ ................ 2,475 1,500 1,000 ................ ................ 2,500 

Pakistan ................................................................................ DA ............ ................ ................ ................ 3,597 3,597 ................ ................ ................ 3,000 3,000 

ESF ........... ................ 12,600 ................ 7,400 20,000 ................ 8,000 ................ 19,000 27,000 

Pakistan Total .................................................................. .................. ................ 12,600 ................ 10,997 23,597 ................ 8,000 ................ 22,000 30,000 

Philippines ............................................................................ DA ............ 1,000 ................ ................ 1,000 2,000 ................ 651 ................ 250 901 

ESF ........... 3,000 ................ 2,500 1,000 6,500 1,000 249 ................ 6,500 7,749 

Philippines Total .............................................................. .................. 4,000 ................ 2,500 2,000 8,500 1,000 900 ................ 6,750 8,650 

Regional Development Mission Asia (RDM-Asia) ................. DA ............ ................ ................ 491 ................ 491 ................ ................ 640 ................ 640 

ESF ........... ................ ................ 3,564 ................ 3,564 ................ ................ 3,500 ................ 3,500 

Regional Development Mission Asia (RDM-Asia) Total ... .................. ................ ................ 4,055 ................ 4,055 ................ ................ 4,140 ................ 4,140 

Sri Lanka .............................................................................. DA ............ ................ ................ 1,233 ................ 1,233 ................ ................ ................ 750 750 

ESF ........... ................ ................ ................ 2,000 2,000 ................ 250 250 800 1,300 

Sri Lanka Total ................................................................ .................. ................ ................ 1,233 2,000 3,233 ................ 250 250 1,550 2,050 

West Bank and Gaza 1 ......................................................... ESF ........... 19,922 3,000 8,300 5,628 36,850 4,000 ................ 6,000 15,500 25,500 

West Bank and Gaza Total .............................................. .................. 19,922 3,000 8,300 5,628 36,850 4,000 ................ 6,000 15,500 25,500 

Yemen ................................................................................... ESF ........... 644 ................ 465 ................ 1,109 263 ................ 50 1,685 1,998 

Yemen Total ..................................................................... .................. 644 ................ 465 ................ 1,109 263 ................ 50 1,685 1,998 Asia and Near East Total ................................................ .................. 75,163 44,095 51,220 172,866 343,344 58,175 39,484 38,830 290,236 426,725 

Europe and Eurasia: 

Albania ................................................................................. AEEB ........ 1,200 500 2,127 2,100 5,927 1,000 300 1,554 1,935 4,789 

Albania Total .................................................................... .................. 1,200 500 2,127 2,100 5,927 1,000 300 1,554 1,935 4,789 

Armenia ................................................................................ FSA ........... 431 2,292 4,156 6,721 13,600 389 387 4,021 5,163 9,960 

Armenia Total ................................................................... .................. 431 2,292 4,156 6,721 13,600 389 387 4,021 5,163 9,960 
70 

TAB 1.—USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE—Continued 

Operating unit 

Appropriation 

code

Fiscal year 

2006 estimate 2007 budget request 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Azerbaijan ............................................................................. FSA ........... 1,143 1,885 4,335 1,486 8,849 672 1,422 4,040 1,000 7,134 

Azerbaijan Total ............................................................... .................. 1,143 1,885 4,335 1,486 8,849 672 1,422 4,040 1,000 7,134 

Belarus ................................................................................. FSA ........... 414 970 3,732 ................ 5,116 390 906 4,641 ................ 5,937 

Belarus Total .................................................................... .................. 414 970 3,732 ................ 5,116 390 906 4,641 ................ 5,937 

Bosnia and Herzegovina ....................................................... AEEB ........ 3,500 1,700 3,230 4,206 12,636 2,450 1,600 2,300 3,002 9,352 

Bosnia and Herzegovina Total ......................................... .................. 3,500 1,700 3,230 4,206 12,636 2,450 1,600 2,300 3,002 9,352 

Bulgaria ................................................................................ AEEB ........ 4,315 ................ 1,104 3,446 8,865 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Bulgaria Total .................................................................. 4,315 ....... 1,104 3,446 8,865 ................ .................... ................ ................ ................

Croatia .................................................................................. AEEB ........ ................ ................ 2,125 3,711 5,836 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Croatia Total .................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 2,125 3,711 5,836 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Eurasia Regional .................................................................. FSA ........... 130 65 330 65 590 140 65 490 65 760 

Eurasia Regional Total .................................................... .................. 130 65 330 65 590 140 65 490 65 760

Europe Regional ................................................................... AEEB ........ 265 108 704 118 1,195 216 95 1,104 103 1,518 

Europe Regional Total ...................................................... .................. 265 108 704 118 1,195 216 95 1,104 103 1,518 

Georgia ................................................................................. FSA ........... 2,055 722 809 6,007 9,593 1,537 659 706 5,993 8,895 

Georgia Total .................................................................... .................. 2,055 722 809 6,007 9,593 1,537 659 706 5,993 8,895 

Kazakhstan ........................................................................... FSA ........... 856 397 3,864 ................ 5,117 ................ ................ 4,238 ................ 4,238 
71 

Kazakhstan Total ............................................................. .................. 856 397 3,864 ................ 5,117 ................ ................ 4,238 ................ 4,238 

Kosovo ................................................................................... AEEB ........ 5,575 2,175 3,575 2,730 14,055 6,297 1,925 2,646 5,150 16,018 

Kosovo Total ..................................................................... .................. 5,575 2,175 3,575 2,730 14,055 6,297 1,925 2,646 5,150 16,018 

Kyrgyzstan ............................................................................. FSA ........... ................ ................ 2,644 1,800 4,444 1,000 200 3,180 1,676 6,056 

Kyrgyzstan Total ............................................................... .................. ................ ................ 2,644 1,800 4,444 1,000 200 3,180 1,676 6,056 

Macedonia ............................................................................ AEEB ........ 2,687 1,612 1,931 3,996 10,226 2,615 1,000 1,807 2,546 7,968 

Macedonia Total ............................................................... .................. 2,687 1,612 1,931 3,996 10,226 2,615 1,000 1,807 2,546 7,968 

Moldova ................................................................................ FSA ........... 1,645 1,138 1,644 2,599 7,026 1,696 1,825 2,384 173 6,078 

Moldova Total ................................................................... .................. 1,645 1,138 1,644 2,599 7,026 1,696 1,825 2,384 173 6,078 

Montenegro ........................................................................... AEEB ........ 1,200 560 1,028 ................ 2,788 300 ................ 600 1,250 2,150 

Montenegro Total ............................................................. .................. 1,200 560 1,028 ................ 2,788 300 ................ 600 1,250 2,150 

Romania ............................................................................... AEEB ........ 450 1,400 2,700 950 5,500 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Romania Total .................................................................. .................. 450 1,400 2,700 950 5,500 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Russia ................................................................................... FSA ........... 4,162 5,565 25,418 3,105 38,250 3,155 3,615 18,299 3,815 28,884 

Russia Total ..................................................................... .................. 4,162 5,565 25,418 3,105 38,250 3,155 3,615 18,299 3,815 28,884 

Serbia ................................................................................... AEEB ........ 1,805 1,400 3,000 1,000 7,205 4,027 1,400 3,500 1,000 9,927 

Serbia Total ...................................................................... .................. 1,805 1,400 3,000 1,000 7,205 4,027 1,400 3,500 1,000 9,927 

Tajikistan .............................................................................. FSA ........... ................ 350 2,100 1,636 4,086 ................ ................ 2,554 1,692 4,246 

Tajikistan Total ................................................................ .................. ................ 350 2,100 1,636 4,086 ................ ................ 2,554 1,692 4,246 

Turkmenistan ........................................................................ FSA ........... ................ ................ 1,090 ................ 1,090 ................ ................ 1,100 ................ 1,100 

Turkmenistan Total .......................................................... .................. ................ ................ 1,090 ................ 1,090 ................ ................ 1,100 ................ 1,100 

Ukraine ................................................................................. FSA ........... 1,041 3,746 7,088 6,360 18,235 3,207 1,446 4,593 9,391 18,637 
72 

TAB 1.—USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE—Continued 

Operating unit 

Appropriation 

code

Fiscal year 

2006 estimate 2007 budget request 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Ukraine Total .................................................................... .................. 1,041 3,746 7,088 6,360 18,235 3,207 1,446 4,593 9,391 18,637 

Uzbekistan ............................................................................ FSA ........... 500 ................ 2,710 ................ 3,210 1,002 ................ 2,580 ................ 3,582 

Uzbekistan Total .............................................................. .................. 500 ................ 2,710 ................ 3,210 1,002 ................ 2,580 ................ 3,582 Europe and Eurasia Total ................................................ .................. 33,374 26,585 81,444 52,036 193,439 30,093 16,845 66,337 43,954 157,229 

Latin America and Caribbean: 

Bolivia ................................................................................... ACI ........... 2,970 ................ ................ 400 3,370 2,000 ................ ................ ................ 2,000 

DA ............ ................ ................ ................ 2,574 2,574 ................ ................ ................ 2,466 2,466 ESF ........... ................ 1,000 1,356 1,109 3,465 ................ 1,000 1,000 1,100 3,100 

Bolivia Total ..................................................................... .................. 2,970 1,000 1,356 4,083 9,409 2,000 1,000 1,000 3,566 7,566 

Caribbean Regional Program ............................................... ESF ........... ................ ................ ................ ................ .................... 1,000 ................ ................ ................ 1,000 

Caribbean Regional Program Total ................................. .................. ................ ................ ................ ................ .................... 1,000 ................ ................ ................ 1,000 

Colombia ............................................................................... ACI ........... 13,750 ................ 2,621 9,198 25,569 13,806 ................ 2,694 8,522 25,022 

Colombia Total ................................................................. .................. 13,750 ................ 2,621 9,198 25,569 13,806 ................ 2,694 8,522 25,022 

Cuba ..................................................................................... ESF ........... ................ ................ 7,650 ................ 7,650 ................ ................ 6,500 ................ 6,500 

Cuba Total ....................................................................... .................. ................ ................ 7,650 ................ 7,650 ................ ................ 6,500 ................ 6,500 

Dominican Republic ............................................................. DA ............ 280 1,350 ................ 350 1,980 900 950 ................ 150 2,000 

ESF ........... 1,000 ................ ................ 980 1,980 2,000 ................ ................ ................ 2,000 

Dominican Republic Total ................................................ .................. 1,280 1,350 ................ 1,330 3,960 2,900 950 ................ 150 4,000 

Ecuador ................................................................................. ACI ........... ................ ................ ................ 2,000 2,000 ................ ................ ................ 3,400 3,400 
73 

DA ............ 690 ................ 300 ................ 990 ................ ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 ESF ........... 600 400 780 200 1,980 150 550 400 1,078 2,178 

Ecuador Total ................................................................... .................. 1,290 400 1,080 2,200 4,970 150 550 400 5,478 6,578 

El Salvador ........................................................................... DA ............ 1,387 ................ 500 1,840 3,727 ................ ................ ................ 250 250 

El Salvador Total ............................................................. .................. 1,387 ................ 500 1,840 3,727 ................ ................ ................ 250 250 

Guatemala ............................................................................ DA ............ ................ ................ ................ 1,485 1,485 ................ 100 ................ 2,991 3,091 

ESF ........... 1,891 396 ................ 2,168 4,455 1,850 ................ ................ 1,150 3,000 

Guatemala Total .............................................................. .................. 1,891 396 ................ 3,653 5,940 1,850 100 ................ 4,141 6,091 

Guyana .................................................................................. DA ............ 310 780 440 450 1,980 1,000 ................ 1,000 ................ 2,000 

Guyana Total .................................................................... .................. 310 780 440 450 1,980 1,000 ................ 1,000 ................ 2,000 

Haiti ...................................................................................... DA ............ ................ 795 791 2,350 3,936 ................ 2,850 4,150 2,000 9,000 

ESF ........... 5,650 5,250 1,309 16,591 28,800 ................ ................ 5,700 10,000 15,700 

Haiti Total ........................................................................ .................. 5,650 6,045 2,100 18,941 32,736 ................ 2,850 9,850 12,000 24,700 

Honduras .............................................................................. DA ............ 600 ................ ................ 1,380 1,980 600 ................ ................ 1,848 2,448 

Honduras Total ................................................................. .................. 600 ................ ................ 1,380 1,980 600 ................ ................ 1,848 2,448 

Jamaica ................................................................................ DA ............ 1,014 ................ 1,261 200 2,475 1,687 ................ 150 ................ 1,837 

Jamaica Total ................................................................... .................. 1,014 ................ 1,261 200 2,475 1,687 ................ 150 ................ 1,837 

LAC Regional ........................................................................ DA ............ 506 500 90 8,299 9,395 ................ ................ 2,326 1,000 3,326 

ESF ........... 3,000 ................ 2,960 1,000 6,960 ................ 1,500 1,995 1,600 5,095 

LAC Regional Total .......................................................... .................. 3,506 500 3,050 9,299 16,355 ................ 1,500 4,321 2,600 8,421 

Mexico ................................................................................... DA ............ 2,610 ................ ................ 790 3,400 1,700 ................ ................ 300 2,000 

ESF ........... 2,083 400 2,100 1,533 6,116 3,000 ................ 2,000 1,200 6,200 

Mexico Total ..................................................................... .................. 4,693 400 2,100 2,323 9,516 4,700 ................ 2,000 1,500 8,200 

Nicaragua ............................................................................. DA ............ 2,750 2,000 ................ 2,398 7,148 2,116 ................ ................ 2,116 4,232 
74 

TAB 1.—USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE—Continued 

Operating unit 

Appropriation 

code

Fiscal year 

2006 estimate 2007 budget request 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

Rule 

of 

law 

Political 

process 

Civil 

society Governance 

Democracy 

and 

governance 

ESF ........... ................ 3,366 ................ ................ 3,366 ................ 1,500 1,500 ................ 3,000 

Nicaragua Total ............................................................... .................. 2,750 5,366 ................ 2,398 10,514 2,116 1,500 1,500 2,116 7,232 

Panama ................................................................................ ESF ........... ................ ................ ................ 990 990 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Panama Total ................................................................... .................. ................ ................ ................ 990 990 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Paraguay ............................................................................... DA ............ 980 ................ ................ 1,000 1,980 250 ................ 250 1,330 1,830 

ESF ........... ................ 980 1,000 ................ 1,980 250 250 250 1,250 2,000 

Paraguay Total ................................................................. .................. 980 980 1,000 1,000 3,960 500 250 500 2,580 3,830 

Peru ...................................................................................... ACI ........... ................ ................ 1,200 2,960 4,160 ................ ................ 1,000 3,400 4,400 

DA ............ ................ ................ ................ 1,287 1,287 ................ ................ ................ 1,740 1,740 ESF ........... ................ 1,090 ................ 890 1,980 ................ 1,000 ................ 1,000 2,000 

Peru Total ......................................................................... .................. ................ 1,090 1,200 5,137 7,427 ................ 1,000 1,000 6,140 8,140 Latin America and Caribbean Total ................................ .................. 42,071 18,307 24,358 64,422 149,158 32,309 9,700 30,915 50,891 123,815 

Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance: 

Office of Democracy and Governance .................................. DA ............ 2,227 19,800 3,366 2,723 28,116 2,500 7,150 3,500 2,750 15,900 

Office of Democracy and Governance Total .................... .................. 2,227 19,800 3,366 2,723 28,116 2,500 7,150 3,500 2,750 15,900 

Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation ....................... DA ............ ................ ................ 891 ................ 891 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation Total ......... .................. ................ ................ 891 ................ 891 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................
75 

Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance 

Total.

.................. 2,227 19,800 4,257 2,723 29,007 2,500 7,150 3,500 2,750 15,900 

Office of Global Development Alliances: 

Office of Global Development Alliances ............................... DA ............ ................ ................ ................ 1,880 1,880 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Office of Global Development Alliances Total ................. .................. ................ ................ ................ 1,880 1,880 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................Office of Global Development Alliances Total ................. .................. ................ ................ ................ 1,880 1,880 ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Program and Policy Coordination: 

Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination ...................... DA ............ 80 80 80 80 320 78 79 79 79 315 

Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination Total ........ .................. 80 80 80 80 320 78 79 79 79 315 Program and Policy Coordination Total ........................... .................. 80 80 80 80 320 78 79 79 79 315 

ACI Sum ... 16,720 ................ 3,821 14,558 35,099 15,806 ................ 3,694 15,322 34,822 AEEB 

Sum.

20,997 9,455 21,524 22,257 74,233 16,905 6,320 13,511 14,986 51,722 

DA Sum .... 34,759 31,434 32,122 85,629 183,944 38,255 24,571 39,122 62,682 164,630 ESF Sum .. 78,573 66,788 82,948 192,369 420,678 61,688 46,283 73,840 317,683 499,494 FSA Sum .. 12,377 17,130 59,920 29,779 119,206 13,188 10,525 52,826 28,968 105,507 IDA Sum ... ................ ................ ................ ................ .................... ................ ................ ................ ................ ....................

Grand Total—USAID Democracy & Governance .............. .................. 163,426 124,807 200,335 344,592 833,160 145,842 87,699 182,993 439,641 856,175 

1 Notional—program under review. 
76 

TAB 2.—USAID HUMAN RIGHTS 

[In thousands of dollars] 

Operating unit 

Appropriation 

code

Fiscal year 

2006 estimate 2007 budget request 

Victims 

of 

war 

Victims 

of 

torture 

Trafficking 

in 

persons 

Total 

human 

rights 

Victims 

of 

war 

Victims 

of 

torture 

Trafficking 

in 

persons 

Total 

human 

rights 

Africa: 

Africa Regional ................................................................................................................ DA ................... 2,950 2,778 1,966 7,694 3,000 2,825 2,000 7,825 

Africa Regional Total ................................................................................................... ......................... 2,950 2,778 1,966 7,694 3,000 2,825 2,000 7,825 

Ethiopia ............................................................................................................................ ESF .................. ................ ................ 300 300 ................ ................ 300 300 

Ethiopia Total .............................................................................................................. ......................... ................ ................ 300 300 ................ ................ 300 300 Africa Total .................................................................................................................. ......................... 2,950 2,778 2,266 7,994 3,000 2,825 2,300 8,125 

Asia and Near East: 

Bangladesh ...................................................................................................................... DA ................... ................ ................ 891 891 ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Bangladesh Total ........................................................................................................ ......................... ................ ................ 891 891 ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Cambodia ......................................................................................................................... DA ................... ................ ................ 2,331 2,331 ................ ................ ................ ................

ESF .................. ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Cambodia Total ........................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 2,331 2,331 ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

India ................................................................................................................................. DA ................... ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 374 ................ 374 

ESF .................. ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 270 ................ 270 

India Total ................................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 644 ................ 644

Indonesia .......................................................................................................................... ESF .................. ................ ................ 1,400 1,400 ................ ................ 386 386 

Indonesia Total ............................................................................................................ ......................... ................ ................ 1,400 1,400 ................ ................ 386 386 

Iraq ................................................................................................................................... ESF .................. 5,000 ................ ................ 5,000 ................ ................ ................ ................
77 

Iraq Total ..................................................................................................................... 5,000 .............. ................ ................ 5,000 ................ ................ ................ ................

Nepal ................................................................................................................................ ESF .................. 301 ................ ................ 301 ................ ................ ................ ................

Nepal Total .................................................................................................................. ......................... 301 ................ ................ 301 ................ ................ ................ ................

Pakistan ........................................................................................................................... DA ................... ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Pakistan Total ............................................................................................................. ......................... ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 

Philippines ....................................................................................................................... ESF .................. ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 250 250

Philippines Total .......................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 250 250 

Regional Development Mission—Asia (RDM-Asia) ......................................................... DA ................... 743 ................ ................ 743 ................ ................ ................ ................

Regional Development Mission—Asia (RDM-Asia) Total ........................................... ......................... 743 ................ ................ 743 ................ ................ ................ ................

Sri Lanka .......................................................................................................................... DA ................... 1,000 ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 ................ ................ 1,000 

Sri Lanka Total ............................................................................................................ ......................... 1,000 ................ ................ 1,000 1,000 ................ ................ 1,000 Asia and Near East Total ............................................................................................ ......................... 7,044 ................ 4,622 11,666 1,000 644 3,636 5,280 

Europe and Eurasia: 

Albania ............................................................................................................................. AEEB ............... ................ ................ 1,530 1,530 ................ ................ 1,343 1,343 

Albania Total ............................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 1,530 1,530 ................ ................ 1,343 1,343 

Bosnia and Herzegovina .................................................................................................. AEEB ............... ................ ................ 800 800 ................ ................ 1,905 1,905 

Bosnia and Herzegovina Total .................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 800 800 ................ ................ 1,905 1,905 

Bulgaria ........................................................................................................................... AEEB ............... ................ ................ 145 145 ................ ................ ................ ................

Bulgaria Total .............................................................................................................. ......................... ................ ................ 145 145 ................ ................ ................ ................

Eurasia Regional .............................................................................................................. FSA .................. ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 80 80 

Eurasia Regional Total ................................................................................................ ......................... ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 80 80 
78 

TAB 2.—USAID HUMAN RIGHTS—Continued 

[In thousands of dollars] 

Operating unit 

Appropriation 

code

Fiscal year 

2006 estimate 2007 budget request 

Victims 

of 

war 

Victims 

of 

torture 

Trafficking 

in 

persons 

Total 

human 

rights 

Victims 

of 

war 

Victims 

of 

torture 

Trafficking 

in 

persons 

Total 

human 

rights 

Europe Regional ............................................................................................................... AEEB ............... ................ ................ 673 673 ................ ................ 275 275 

Europe Regional Total ................................................................................................. ......................... ................ ................ 673 673 ................ ................ 275 275 

Georgia ............................................................................................................................. FSA .................. ................ ................ 222 222 ................ ................ 220 220 

Georgia Total ............................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 222 222 ................ ................ 220 220 

Kazakhstan ....................................................................................................................... FSA .................. ................ ................ 680 680 ................ ................ 242 242 

Kazakhstan Total ......................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 680 680 ................ ................ 242 242 

Kosovo .............................................................................................................................. AEEB ............... ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 200 200

Kosovo Total ................................................................................................................ ......................... ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 200 200 

Kyrgyzstan ........................................................................................................................ FSA .................. ................ ................ 350 350 ................ ................ 170 170 

Kyrgyzstan Total .......................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 350 350 ................ ................ 170 170 

Moldova ............................................................................................................................ FSA .................. ................ ................ 972 972 ................ ................ 777 777 

Moldova Total .............................................................................................................. ......................... ................ ................ 972 972 ................ ................ 777 777 

Russia .............................................................................................................................. FSA .................. ................ ................ 750 750 ................ ................ ................ ................

Russia Total ................................................................................................................ ......................... ................ ................ 750 750 ................ ................ ................ ................

Tajikistan ......................................................................................................................... FSA .................. ................ ................ 510 510 ................ ................ 28 28 

Tajikistan Total ............................................................................................................ ......................... ................ ................ 510 510 ................ ................ 28 28 
79 

Ukraine ............................................................................................................................. FSA .................. ................ ................ 1,218 1,218 ................ ................ 1,195 1,195 

Ukraine Total ............................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 1,218 1,218 ................ ................ 1,195 1,195 

Uzbekistan ........................................................................................................................ FSA .................. ................ ................ 600 600 ................ ................ ................ ................

Uzbekistan Total .......................................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 600 600 ................ ................ ................ ................Europe and Eurasia Total ........................................................................................... ......................... ................ ................ 8,450 8,450 ................ ................ 6,435 6,435 

Latin America and Caribbean: 

Ecuador ............................................................................................................................ ACI .................. ................ ................ 100 100 ................ ................ ................ ................

Ecuador Total .............................................................................................................. ......................... ................ ................ 100 100 ................ ................ ................ ................

Haiti ................................................................................................................................. DA ................... ................ 1,400 1,000 2,400 ................ 1,000 ................ 1,000 

ESF .................. ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 300 1,000 1,300 

Haiti Total .................................................................................................................... ......................... ................ 1,400 1,000 2,400 ................ 1,300 1,000 2,300 Latin America and Caribbean Total ........................................................................... ......................... ................ 1,400 1,100 2,500 ................ 1,300 1,000 2,300 

Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance: 

Office of Democracy and Governance ............................................................................. DA ................... 4,504 4,505 ................ 9,009 4,000 4,000 ................ 8,000 

Office of Democracy and Governance Total ............................................................... ......................... 4,504 4,505 ................ 9,000 4,000 4,000 ................ 8,000 Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Total .......................................... ......................... 4,504 4,505 ................ 9,009 4,000 4,000 ................ 8,000 

ACI Sum .......... ................ ................ 100 100 ................ ................ ................ ................AEEB Sum ....... ................ ................ 3,148 3,148 ................ ................ 3,723 3,723 DA Sum ........... 9,197 8,683 6,188 24,068 8,000 8,199 4,000 20,199 ESF Sum ......... 5,301 ................ 1,700 7,001 ................ 570 2,936 3,506 FSA Sum ......... ................ ................ 5,302 5,302 ................ ................ 2,712 2,712 

Grand Total—USAID Human Rights ........................................................................... ......................... 14,498 8,683 16,438 39,619 8,000 8,769 13,371 30,140 
80 

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS FUNDING (ALL-SOURCES)—NEAR EAST, EAST 

ASIA PACIFIC, AND SOUTH ASIA (INCLUDING CENTRAL ASIA) 

[In thousands of dollars] 

Fiscal year 

2006 

estimate 

2007 

request 

Summary—Near East and Asia 

Development Assistance ................................................................................................................. 49,431 40,209 

ESF .................................................................................................................................................. 489,011 600,472 

USAID implemented ............................................................................................................... 299,426 390,152 

State/Global Programs ........................................................................................................... 189,585 210,320 

FSA—USAID & State Programs ............................................................................................. 40,384 34,303 

Democracy Fund (excl. HRDF) ................................................................................................ 12,673 ....................

INCLE ...................................................................................................................................... 27,590 286,425 

The Asia Foundation .............................................................................................................. 8,500 6,500 

TOTAL ................................................................................................................................. 627,589 967,909 

Bilateral Detail 

Development Assistance (DA): 

Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................ 30,000 25,000 

ANE Regional ......................................................................................................................... 2,028 3,225 

Bangladesh ............................................................................................................................ 3,465 2,550 

Cambodia ............................................................................................................................... 2,331 910 

China ...................................................................................................................................... 2,475 733 

India ....................................................................................................................................... 326 ....................

Nepal ...................................................................................................................................... 1,485 1,500 

Pakistan ................................................................................................................................. 3,597 4,000 

Philippines ............................................................................................................................. 2,000 901 

RDM-Asia ............................................................................................................................... 491 640 

Sri Lanka ................................................................................................................................ 1,233 750 

DA Subtotal ....................................................................................................................... 49,431 40,209 

Economic Support Fund (ESF)—USAID implemented: 

Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................ 58,000 136,000 

Bangladesh ............................................................................................................................ 4,752 5,000 

Cambodia ............................................................................................................................... 11,375 13,500 

East Timor .............................................................................................................................. 6,000 4,000 

Egypt ...................................................................................................................................... 85,505 86,455 

India ....................................................................................................................................... 200 ....................

Indonesia ................................................................................................................................ 31,850 20,000 

Iraq ......................................................................................................................................... .................... 25,000 

Jordan ..................................................................................................................................... 14,000 12,000 

Lebanon .................................................................................................................................. 7,000 10,000 

Mongolia ................................................................................................................................. 2,400 1,900 

Morocco .................................................................................................................................. 6,440 8,000 

Nepal ...................................................................................................................................... 990 1,000 

Pakistan ................................................................................................................................. 20,000 27,000 

Philippines ............................................................................................................................. 6,500 7,999 

RDM-Asia ............................................................................................................................... 3,564 3,500 

Sri Lanka ................................................................................................................................ 2,000 1,300 

West Bank and Gaza 1 ........................................................................................................... 36,850 25,500 

Yemen .................................................................................................................................... 1,109 1,998 

ESF Subtotal—USAID ........................................................................................................ 298,535 390,152 

Economic Support Fund (ESF)—State/Global Programs: 

Iraq ......................................................................................................................................... 55,440 87,270 

S. Asia Regional .................................................................................................................... 990 2,000 

MEPI ....................................................................................................................................... 99,000 120,000 

Laos ........................................................................................................................................ .................... 250 

EAP Regional Women’s Issues ............................................................................................... 990 800 

UNHCHR Nepal ....................................................................................................................... 1,485 ....................

HRDF ...................................................................................................................................... 31,680 ....................
81 

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS FUNDING (ALL-SOURCES)—NEAR EAST, EAST 

ASIA PACIFIC, AND SOUTH ASIA (INCLUDING CENTRAL ASIA)—Continued 

[In thousands of dollars] 

Fiscal year 

2006 

estimate 

2007 

request 

China ............................................................................................................................. 19,800 ....................

Muslim—outside Middle East 2 .................................................................................... 11,880 ....................

ESF Subtotal—State/Global ..................................................................................... 189,585 210,320 

Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA)—USAID implemented: 

Eurasia Regional .................................................................................................................... 590 840 

Kazakhstan ............................................................................................................................. 5,797 4,480 

Kyrgyz Republic ...................................................................................................................... 4,794 6,226 

Tajikistan ............................................................................................................................... 4,596 4,274 

Turkmenistan ......................................................................................................................... 1,090 1,100 

Uzbekistan .............................................................................................................................. 3,810 3,582 

FSA Subtotal—USAID ........................................................................................................ 20,677 20,502 

Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA)—State implemented: 

Eurasia Regional .................................................................................................................... 8,038 7,410 

Kazakhstan ............................................................................................................................. 555 538 

Kyrgyz Republic ...................................................................................................................... 6,200 2,349 

Tajikistan ............................................................................................................................... 1,390 1,497 

Turkmenistan ......................................................................................................................... 680 810 

Uzbekistan .............................................................................................................................. 2,844 1,197 

FSA Subtotal—State ......................................................................................................... 19,707 13,801 

Democracy Fund: 

NED programs: 

China ............................................................................................................................. 2,970 ....................

Tibet .............................................................................................................................. 248 ....................

N Korea ......................................................................................................................... 990 ....................

Other Country Programs: 

Thailand ........................................................................................................................ 1,980 ....................

Iran and Syria ............................................................................................................... 6,485 ....................

Subtotal Democracy Fund ........................................................................................ 12,673 ....................

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE): 

Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................ 26,500 38,000 

Indonesia ................................................................................................................................ 515 525 

Iraq ......................................................................................................................................... .................... 247,600 

Philippines ............................................................................................................................. 350 300 

Thailand ................................................................................................................................. 225 ....................

INCLE Subtotal .................................................................................................................. 27,590 286,425 

1 Notional—program currently under review. 

2 Programs may also be implemented outside of Asia. 

STATE DEPARTMENT/USAID DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS

Democracy and governance programs are technical assistance and other support 

to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments, non-governmental actors, 

and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and institutions 

that are responsive and accountable to citizens. They also include efforts to promote 

democratic transitions in countries that are not reform-minded. 

Programs are organized around core concepts considered the key building blocks 

of democracy. Democracy programs promote the rule of law and human rights, 

transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive political process, a free 

and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen participation in 

government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive and accountable. 
82 

COORDINATION OF DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS

Question. Within USAID and State, who specifically has authority over democracy 

programs, and how do USAID and State currently coordinate to ensure that democracy programs support U.S. policy objectives? How about coordination with the National Endowment for Democracy? What are your plans to improve this coordination? 

Answer. The Director of Foreign Assistance has authority over all foreign assistance, including democracy programs. State and USAID are reforming foreign assistance processes to ensure that they advance the Secretary’s transformational diplomacy goal of, ‘‘Helping to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that 

will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the 

international system.’’ The reform has identified five primary objectives toward 

achieving this goal, of which one is supporting states to ‘‘govern justly and democratically.’’ All State and USAID programs in democracy will advance this objective 

in a manner that supports the Secretary’s goal. At present, coordination with the 

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is performed in Washington primarily 

through State’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, through which 

the NED receives its Congressional appropriation as well as additional Washington 

funds. Coordination in the field is done through the respective embassies and 

USAID missions. USAID works closely with the NED core institutes, such as the 

International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute 

(NDI) both on policy issues and field operations with respect to the programs 

USAID manages. 

DEMOCRACY FUND

Question. Last year, Senator Leahy and I created a new ‘‘Democracy Fund’’ account as a first step to improve the conduct and management of democracy, governance and rule of law programs by consolidating activities under a single account. 

Do you support the Democracy Fund? 

Answer. I support the objective of the Democracy Fund. I concur that we need 

to improve the conduct and management of democracy, governance and rule of law 

programs, in addition to programs in other sector areas. As Director of Foreign Assistance, my aim is to bring increased coherence, accountability and transparency 

to the use of our foreign assistance resources. I look forward to sharing with the 

Committee our progress in this regard. 

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS IN CHINA

Question. Understanding you inherited the fiscal year 2007 budget request, how 

do you justify the inadequate request of $733,000 for democracy and governance programs in China? 

Answer. I agree we should be taking every reasonable opportunity to advance democracy in China. State’s Bureau for Democracy Human Rights and Labor supports 

a $20 million/year democracy promotion program in China—USAID’s request was 

to continue a modest Development Assistance (DA) funded program with universities (and possibly expanding to NGOs). The $733,000 allocated to democracy and 

governance, out of a total of $5 million in DA for China, was allocated with the additional $20 million in ESF for democracy in mind. 

BRANDING

Question. What is USAID’s branding policy with respect to democracy assistance? 

Would you agree that there should be exceptions to branding—such as assistance 

provided to support elections? 

Answer. USAID’s branding policy for assistance awards was established by federal rulemaking, including solicitation and adaptation of comments by USAID 

grantees, and is published at 22 C.F.R. § 226.91. The published regulation anticipated Congress’s concern by including seven ‘‘presumptive exceptions’’ under which 

branding is not required for programmatic reasons, including several that may 

apply to democracy programs, and one specifically that provides an exception if 

marking would ‘‘compromise the intrinsic independence or neutrality of a program 

or materials where independence or neutrality is an inherent aspect of the program 

or materials, such as election monitoring or ballots, and voter information literature; 

political party support or public policy advocacy or reform; independent media, such 

as television and radio broadcasts, newspaper article and editorials; public service 

announcements or public opinion polls and surveys.’’ 
83 

USAID PERSONNEL

Question. A number of key positions at USAID remain unfilled, including the Assistant Administrator for Management, the Assistant Administrator for Europe and 

Eurasia, and the Inspector General. 

Do you have a timeframe for when these positions may be filled? 

Answer. I share your concern. These positions are critical to the success of our 

new strategic framework. I expect that we will be able recommend nominees to the 

President’s staff in the coming weeks. 

Donald Gambatesa was sworn in as Inspector General on January 17, 2006. 

CONTRACTORS

Question. USAID relies on a number of institutional contractors at USAID who 

provide support services to bureaus and programs. 

Do you believe a conflict of interest exists for contractors working at USAID, and 

how do you ensure that they represent the interests of the Agency and not their 

employers? 

Answer. In the absence of appropriate safeguards and vigilance, there could be 

the potential for a conflict of interest. At USAID we take this issue very seriously 

and have worked to fully comply with the letter and spirit of the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation on Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest (FAR 9.500) 

which limits certain activities that are vulnerable to such conflicts. Since 1999 

USAID has applied the FAR standards to organizations performing designs, evaluations and audits. When mitigation of a potential conflict is not feasible, USAID restricts follow-on work. These policies include solicitation and contract clauses as well 

as non-disclosure agreements to assure contractors are aware of limitations. Contractors have a strong incentive to hew closely to the rules, as they are aware that 

any deviation could endanger their ability to compete on future contracts. 

Our best guard against these issues is awareness of the rules. We accomplish this 

through our annual ethics training as well as regular outreach trainings conducted 

by our General Counsel. While we expect our contractors to have corporate codes 

of conduct, our supplementary training helps sensitize contractor employees to 

unique vulnerabilities under Federal contracts. These include assuring that contractor employees are not privy to sensitive internal Government information. 

In addition to training and contract clauses, USAID Cognizant Technical Officers 

monitor vulnerabilities to conflicts of interest. The Ombudsman for USAID’s Office 

of Acquisition and Assistance can address concerns raised by contractors and their 

employees. Finally, the Inspector General maintains a hotline that can be used if 

someone is concerned about an apparent conflict of interest. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER

TUBERCULOSIS

Question. Tuberculosis [TB] is the leading cause of death among people who are 

HIV-positive, because of their weakened immune system. One-third of the more 

than 40 million people with HIV/AIDS are also infected with TB. In areas such as 

sub-Saharan Africa, up to half of AIDS related deaths are caused by TB. 

In fiscal year 2005, 1.8 percent of PEPFAR’s funding was directed toward TB/HIV 

activities. In fiscal year 2006 this number grew to about 2.5 percent of PEPFAR’s 

budget. Given that TB is the leading cause of death of those infected by HIV/AIDS, 

do you plan to devote a larger portion of the PEPFAR budget towards programs designed to combat the threat caused by TB in the fiscal year 2007 budget? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2005, $19.3 million went to supporting TB-related activities 

in the fifteen focus countries. That amount is planned to increase to $40.1 million 

in fiscal year 2006. In addition, $91.5 million in additional funds are planned to support other bilateral country programs in fiscal year 2006. Focus country funding is 

expected to increase in fiscal year 2007 as well. Fiscal year 2007 Country Operational Plans are currently being produced and will be submitted for review in late 

2006; these plans will set forth planned spending levels for TB/HIV activities in fiscal year 2007. 

The President’s budget request also includes $91.3 million in fiscal year 2007 for 

support of TB activities in other bilateral countries. In addition, the U.S. Government is the largest donor to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, contributing one-third of the Fund’s resources. The Global Fund finances essential HIV and TB programs in resource-limited settings. The Emergency Plan emphasizes TB care and treatment for co-infected patients be included in the country 
84 

level plans, and it is considered and priority program area in guidance that has 

been provided to the countries in establishing their operational plans. The Emergency Plan supports programming that includes diagnosis of latent TB infection, 

treatment to prevent development of active disease, and general TB-related care. 

Because of the high rate of co-morbidity between TB and HIV/AIDS, we are also 

urging the counseling and testing facilities the United States supports to offer HIV 

testing to those who present with TB or other infectious diseases. The Emergency 

Plan has developed ‘‘basic preventive care packages’’ that include key support and 

preventive therapies. These packages include the tuberculosis treatment therapies 

mentioned above. 

The Emergency Plan will continue to work with its partner USG implementing 

agencies that have programs focusing on TB and malaria, coordinating those programs with the Emergency Plan efforts focusing on HIV/AIDS. 

BLOOD SAFETY

Question. Another problem facing in the developing world is the inability of medical providers to test blood to be used in blood transfusions for AIDS and other potentially deadly diseases. This problem is particularly acute in many sub-Saharan 

countries. 

PEPFAR is making tremendous efforts to address this problem in the program’s 

fifteen focus countries. However, tainted blood is still a major problem in many nonfocus countries in sub-Saharan Africa. What efforts do you propose to address this 

problem in non-focus countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa? 

Answer. With the knowledge that turning the tide against global AIDS requires 

a global fight, the Emergency Plan supports HIV/AIDS programs in 108 countries 

in addition to the 15 focus countries. The Emergency Plan strategy is to develop lessons learned from the rapid scale-up of national integrated prevention, treatment, 

and care programs in the focus countries, and have the greatest impact possible in 

the countries most affected by HIV/AIDS. These lessons learned are being applied 

to non-focus countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, in an effort to put into 

practice the most successful and comprehensive programs. 

PEPFAR supports international blood safety organizations to partner with host 

countries in the development of comprehensive systems that include low-risk blood 

donor selection, blood banking, and blood safety training. The goal of these programs is to increase blood supply through donor recruitment. The programs also 

work to ensure blood safety through proper screening of donors and donated blood. 

Currently, the Emergency Plan supports: 

—National programs to improve the quality of blood supplies through improved 

policies; 

—The establishment of laboratory facilities and commodity procurement; and 

—Healthcare worker training and management for technicians needing blood safety expertise. 

The Emergency Plan also provides technical assistance to support countries in implementing the foundational components of effective national blood transfusion services. 

PERU COCA PRODUCTION

Question. In April this year, I traveled to Latin America on a CODEL. While in 

Peru, I met with Susan Keogh, Director of Narcotics Affairs in Peru. Ms. Keogh informed me that approximately 400,000 acres are being deforested annually for the 

cultivation of coca and other plants. On average, there are approximately 40,000 to 

100,000 coca plants per two acres, which require about two tons of chemicals to be 

used for their production. 

Since coca is very vulnerable to diseases, coca growers cover the coca with pesticides which are very deleterious to the environment. Some portions of these chemicals almost always find their way into rivers and streams, as coca must be cultivated close to a water supply. 

When I asked what efforts the Peruvian Government is taking to combat these 

problems, Ms. Keough remarked that the Peruvian government hardly focuses on 

this issue of cocaine and its effects on the environment. 

I noticed your fiscal year 2007 Budget Justification notes that, ‘‘Limited government presence in the highlands and jungle allows illegal coca cultivation . . . to 

flourish’’ and that ‘‘USAID strengthens state presence through programs to reduce 

coca cultivation.’’ Could you elaborate on your efforts in Peru? 

Answer. As in so much of the South American region, the deforestation rates in 

Peru are abysmal, and while coca production does play a role in this, many analysts 

believe it is by far less a contributing factor than illegal logging and agriculture ex-
85 

pansion. The relationship between coca cultivation and deforestation in Peru has declined rapidly in recent years as profitable legal crops have expanded the agricultural frontier. This has resulted in a legal agricultural market that dwarfs the illegal coca market in terms of total land use. Furthermore, according to the latest statistics, Peru’s total coca crop, 120,000 acres, is declining. 

The primary threat of deforestation deriving from coca farmers, and other colonizers, is driven by poor agricultural practices that result in the complete loss of 

soil nutrients in just a few years. USAID/Peru’s Alternative Development Program 

directly addresses this threat, as described below in response to the last question. 

A lesser threat related to coca farming is posed by new farmers wishing to colonize 

new areas to grow coca. Nevertheless, compared to years past, the ‘‘new colonizers’’ 

are responsible for much less deforestation than 15 years ago. Andean Counterdrug 

Initiative [ACI] funding also addresses this issue by consolidating the Government 

of Peru’s efforts to protect national parks and strengthen the sustainable forestry 

concession program as described below. Dissuading colonizers is also an important 

byproduct of programmed eradication and interdiction activities. 

Peru’s coca production thrives in areas that present development obstacles and 

where the government has a very limited presence. In these neglected and generally 

impoverished areas, coca production and processing brings violence and lawlessness 

and provides a source of financing for remnants of terrorist groups that inhabit 

them. Given the charged and threatening atmosphere of narco-trafficking in cocagrowing areas, traditional state services and development projects cannot rely on police presence which means that education, health, and private investment projects 

are very costly and difficult to implement. USAID strengthens state presence in 

these areas through a multi-pronged approach, supporting activities to reduce coca 

cultivation and promote licit alternatives, complemented by actions in local government strengthening, health, education, economic growth, and environment. 

A key component of the USG’s comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy, USAID/ 

Peru’s Alternative Development Program operates in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, including the State Department’s Narcotics Affairs Section and 

the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as the Government of Peru 

[GOP], to reduce illegal coca production in Peru in a sustained manner. USAID pursues this goal principally through ‘‘voluntary eradication,’’ where coca-growing communities sign an agreement with the GOP to pursue a licit lifestyle and destroy 

their own coca plantings. The GOP and USAID then support the community’s transition to a licit lifestyle by providing development assistance based on the community’s priorities. This assistance often takes the form of infrastructure (bridges, 

roads, schools, and health clinics). Many of the specific investments in communities 

are leveraging State presence where it did not exist previously. A school brings the 

Ministry of Education; a health center, the Ministry of Health; a bridge or a road 

forces the local governments to maintain the infrastructure. Alternative Development-supported projects provide an opening for government ministries to establish 

themselves in the communities and begin to provide traditional services to the local 

population. 

USAID interventions also assist coca producers in moving towards high-paying export crops like coffee, cacao, and palm oil production. These productive activities are 

catalyzing interest the private sector, making national and international businesses 

stakeholders in the Alternative Development Program. All activities are closely coordinated between local governments and community members, thereby reestablishing local governments’ role as an effective and transparent governing body that 

addresses the needs of its constituencies. In addition, USAID interventions must 

pass an environmental review which works to mitigate any further degradation, and 

all USAID projects are required to use ‘‘best practices’’ in land and agricultural 

management, as well as, minimize the use of pesticides. All forestry projects must 

be designed to be sustainable, to reduce future environmental problems. 

Question. What efforts is USAID involved in to combat not only coca, but the adverse impacts production of that illicit crop has on the environment? 

Answer. Fragile eco-systems are threatened by coca production and the rampant 

illegal logging in Peru. USAID promotes licit livelihoods through the reduction of 

poverty, the conservation of biodiversity and the implementation and enforcement 

of existing environmental legal frameworks in Peru. USAID interventions are also 

held to a strict standard including an environmental assessment before any projects 

begins and required environmental planning as the project is implemented. Most 

logging of Peru’s precious timber stock is illegal and is often carried out in concert 

with narco-traffickers, as log trucks are often used to carry hidden stashes of drugs. 

Given that the forest sector is one of Peru’s largest, untapped sources of jobs and 

export revenue, USAID’s Environment Program is helping to formalize the forest 

sector. Activities include support to communities living in the coca growing areas 
86 

to substitute coca cultivation with forest certification activities and increase their 

sales of licit certified wood products in Peru and the rest of the world. This includes 

efforts to not just protect forest land, but make it sustainable for the future. 

In nationally protected areas and parks, USAID programs work with local communities and the GOP to protect the eco-systems and develop natural resource management strategies that improve livelihoods while protecting these areas. Additionally, the program fosters greater GOP presence in protected areas by enabling municipal authorities to assume their roles in the implementation and enforcement of 

existing environmental legal frameworks that will prevent further expansion of coca 

into protected areas. USAID is also aware of the impacts to water quality that occur 

due to coca refinement. While the Mission does not have any programs in this area, 

it is aware of the Embassy in Bolivia’s work to address it. 

Question. USAID’s fiscal year 2007 request for Environment and Natural Resource funds for Peru is $3.070 million which is a 24.4 percent decrease from fiscal 

year 2004. Further USAID’s fiscal year 2007 request for Alternative Development 

is down 14.5 percent over that same period. Can you explain this trend? 

Answer. Since 2001, overall development assistance to Latin America and the 

Caribbean has increased from $862,452,000 in fiscal year 2001 to $1,696,841,000 in 

fiscal year 2007. The funding levels for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative have remained consistent between fiscal year 2004 through 2006. USAID recognizes the intrinsic relationship between the environment and coca production though and has 

therefore supplemented the environment programs with $2.8 million in fiscal year 

2005 and 2006 ACI funding. 

Question. I note that the Andean Counterdrug Initiative funds from Agriculture 

and Environment have increased from $2.9 million to $35.1 million over this period 

of time—representing a 1,077 percent increase. Are any of these funds being used 

to mitigate the harm being done to the environment due to coca production? 

Answer. The appearance of the enormous increase in the agriculture and environment sectors with ACI is due to a definitional change in the funding codes during 

this last reporting period. Previously, we attributed the bulk of ACI funds to the 

economic growth sector under the ‘‘other economic growth code’’. A change in the 

code’s definition last year made it necessary to attribute our ACI funds to the agriculture sector with the codes corresponding to ‘‘Rural Development’’ and ‘‘Agriculture Production and Productivity.’’ All ACI-related activities remain the same. 

All of our agricultural and infrastructure activities follow strict standards designed to protect the environment and must undergo environmental impact assessments, including the use of integrated pest management techniques and organic 

production whenever possible. Farmers are taught to use sustainable agricultural 

practices that maintain the viability of their land and permit permanent cultivation, 

therefore eliminating the need to clear-cut jungle regions to access fertile land. The 

sustainable cultivation of long-term and profitable crops, combined with other social 

benefits, has been successful in preventing a return to coca cultivation and encourages these young and unstable communities (often they are ‘communities’ in name 

only) to stay put and develop, linking up with local government rather than migrating deeper into the jungle and clear-cutting virgin forest for new coca fields. 

Over the last 4 years, ACI funding has helped prevent colonization by supporting 

sustainable forest management and park protection activities managed by USAID/ 

Peru’s Environment Program. These activities are specifically designed to prevent 

both illegal logging and coca colonization into delicate and still intact ecosystems in 

the upper and mid-Andean jungles where coca cultivation is focused. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE DEWINE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE FUNDING

Question. Mr. Administrator, how do you justify the dramatic 21.6 percent cut in 

Development Assistance and Child Survival and Health funding from the fiscal year 

2006 appropriated levels for the Western Hemisphere? Even if you compare fiscal 

year 2007 to the fiscal 2006 request, it’s still a cut of approximately 18 percent. 

Answer. Overall U.S. Government assistance levels for Latin America are not expected to decline in fiscal year 2007. Foreign assistance for the region has nearly 

doubled since the start of the administration, rising from $862 million in fiscal year 

2001 to a planned $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2007. Reductions in the Development 

Assistance and Child Survival and Health requests are partially offset by increases 

in the request for ESF, which is $31 million more than the fiscal year 2006 level. 

For additional consideration is the complete picture of U.S. Government resources 

going to the region. The Millennium Challenge Account will be providing significant 
87 

resources, through Compact agreements, to Nicaragua ($175 million) and Honduras 

($215 million), as well as through Threshold Country Program funding to Paraguay 

($37 million). The Millennium Challenge Account projects compliment our efforts by 

supporting economic growth, infrastructure, and other projects where USAID has 

been active in the past. 

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION

Question. The President’s request includes $3 billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC]. While the MCC does not fall directly under the authority 

of the Director of Foreign Assistance, the MCC consults with your office and you 

sit on the board as Administrator. Please explain your strategy for determining levels of other assistance if a country is MCC eligible. For instance, if a country receives a compact for a major infrastructure project, will that country be eligible to 

receive the same amounts of Development Assistance they had before becoming 

MCC eligible? I’ve heard concerning rumors that a blanket policy would be applied 

and it seems to me you may want to look at these issues on a country by country 

basis. 

Answer. My role in relation to the Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC] as 

Director of Foreign Assistance is to coordinate the work of the MCC with other U.S. 

agencies involved in foreign assistance. Millennium Challenge Corporation staff participate on the country core teams where their programs are active. These country 

teams are meeting now to review country allocation levels and establish priority 

program areas for each recipient country. MCC participation with these teams allows for collaboration between the work the MCC is doing and other U.S. Government agencies. Their participation aids in assuring that the work of U.S. Government agencies complements each other in helping to achieve the Secretary’s transformational diplomacy goal of, ‘‘Helping to build and sustain well governed states 

that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly 

in the international system.’’ The final allocation of State and USAID funding will 

take into account the work of the MCC to ensure that our programs complement 

one another in achieving the Secretary’s goal. We have not set guidance to preclude 

or include considerations of funding from one account or another as the country 

teams allocate their budgets. Their guidance directs them to develop a plan that will 

help the country advance in achieving the Secretary’s goal, taking into account all 

U.S. Government foreign assistance resources, including MCC funds. 

HAITI FUNDING

Question. As you may know, I worked to include $40 million in additional funding 

for Haiti in the Senate passed fiscal year 2006 supplemental. The conference report 

includes $20 million. As Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator, 

what are your plans for Haiti in the short-term? Have you met with the USAID Mission Director or the Ambassador yet? 

Answer. The U.S. Government will use the supplemental funds to help Haiti reduce internal conflict and provide the basis to rebuild by addressing key sources of 

stress and conflict in social, economic, and political spheres, notably through increasing access to primary health services and basic education, creating employment 

and rebuilding assets for sustainable livelihoods, and fostering improved rule of law 

and responsive governance. All interventions will be undertaken to achieve shortterm visible and measurable results while still developing the capacity of institutions to sustain results. 

I would look forward to any opportunities in the near future to meet with both 

our Ambassador and our Mission Director. 

INTERNATIONAL DISASTER AND FAMINE ASSISTANCE

Question. The International Disaster and Famine Assistance Account request for 

fiscal year 2007 is cut by $62 million from the fiscal year 2006 enacted levels (including the supplemental funds). As you know, these are the emergency funds that 

save lives. In addition, there is evidence that the use of these funds in emergencies 

are some of our best PR efforts overseas. For the past few years, we’ve been relying 

on supplemental funding for these core humanitarian activities. I believe doing so 

is dangerous fiscal planning that limits critical activities that respond to the large 

number of natural and man-made disasters. Do you believe $349 million is sufficient 

to address the emergencies we know about such as Sudan, northern Uganda, Congo, 

and Indonesia as well as the unforeseen emergencies to come in fiscal year 2007. 

Answer. We have confronted a series of major disasters over the past several 

years. Supplemental appropriations have been essential to an effective response. At 
88 

this point, we believe the requested level will be adequate and will allow us to respond effectively. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

U.S.-UKRAINE FOUNDATION

Question. Congress has iterated its support for programs administered by the 

U.S.-Ukraine foundation, but USAID’s decisions regarding funding for these programs has not reflected Congress’ support. Is this lack of targeted funding for these 

programs a reflection of the general draw down of ESF funds for Ukraine, or have 

USAID country officials made these decisions for other reasons? 

Answer. First, before I answer your question, let me state for the record that our 

programs in Ukraine are funded predominantly through the Freedom Support Act 

(FSA) and not through ESF funds. 

USAID has funded the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation [USUF] since July 1997, when 

USUF was awarded a non-competitive grant. This grant has been extended several 

times and the total award amount has increased to its current level of $22,245,918. 

The final extension to this grant has been made, taking it to July 2007, in accordance with the 10-year limit on USAID assistance instruments. During the period of 

this grant, USAID’s funding level in Ukraine has dropped four-fold, from $163 million in 1997 to $41 million in 2006. Nevertheless, USUF’s average funding level has 

remained fairly consistent at about $2.2 million per year. 

USAID recognizes the importance and value of Ukrainian Diaspora groups and 

we hope to continue benefiting from their participation in the USAID assistance program. Since there are currently many active and capable Diaspora groups, we expect to select a future program implementer via a competitive process. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

RUSSIA

Question. In July, the United States and other nations will be meeting in St. Petersburg for the annual G8 summit. Increased attention has been paid to this year’s 

summit because Russia is hosting it. 

The irony of this gathering of democratic nations in Russia is that Russia is becoming increasingly un-democratic. It has been 2 years since President Putin won 

reelection with no opposition. Since then, the Kremlin has opposed the democratic 

movement in Ukraine, supported a blatantly manipulated election in Belarus, rolled 

back democratic reforms in Russia, and continued its heavy handed policies in 

Chechnya. 

The latest crackdown on democracy is a law requiring civil society groups in Russia to re-register with the Justice Ministry in order to exert greater control of their 

activities and finances. 

The President proposes to cut aid to Russia from $80 million in fiscal year 2006 

to $58 million in fiscal year 2007. Almost none of this goes to the government. 

Shouldn’t we be doing more, not less, to support democracy in Russia through civil 

society and the media? 

Answer. We are doing a great deal to support the democratic process in Russia. 

U.S. assistance in Russia supports democracy programs that encourage volunteerism and civic responsibility through support to a wide variety of both Russian 

and American non-governmental organizations. Programs help Russian citizens, especially young people, better understand and apply democratic values and more 

proactively exercise their civic rights and responsibilities. In particular, the United 

States supports Russian human rights organizations, independent media outlets and 

good governance watchdogs. The proposed fiscal year 2007 budget level for Russia 

reflect the impact of competing priorities in a resource constrained environment. 

Our relationship with Russia will always be important for the United States. In 

the coming years, we intend to use foreign assistance to further our strategic partnership with Russia on areas of common interest such as countering terrorist financing, mitigating conflict in the North Caucasus, advancing implementation of 

Russia’s local self governance law and strengthening the Russian judiciary. We also 

intend to support Russian reformers to help the country complete its transformation 

to an open, democratic society. 
89 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

DISPLACED CHILDREN AND ORPHANS FUND

Question. In fiscal year 2006, $3 million was appropriated for USAID in the State 

and Foreign Appropriations bill. The funds were to be used as a pilot project for 

orphans, displaced, and abandoned children. To date, I haven’t seen any evidence 

the funds have been put to use. 

What has happened to these funds and please outline in detail what has been 

done with the funding for this very important project? 

Answer. It is the explicit mandate of USAID’s Displaced Children and Orphans 

Fund [DCOF] to directly address the concerns outlined in the language of the State 

and Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill. This office is charged to prevent child 

abandonment, address the needs of orphans, displaced and abandoned children and 

provide permanent homes through family reunification, guardianship and domestic 

adoptions. USAID will meet or exceed the $3 million appropriated in fiscal year 

2006. 

Of the earmarked $3 million, $1.5 million will be used to reduce the abandonment 

and separation of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This program 

integrates two coordinated efforts that: (1) combine poverty alleviation, training of 

social workers, promotion and support of children’s rights, and communications and 

outreach, and (2) ensure minimum care standards and increase the reinsertion of 

separated and abandoned children with their families through support and training 

to local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and government institutions. 

The additional $1.5 million will be used to support programs in Ukraine and 

Georgia. The goal of the Ukraine program is to build a continuum of family care 

services for children who are at risk or outside of family care. This program includes 

activities designed to strengthen and develop systems of family preservation, foster 

care, and adoption. The DCOF program in Georgia is targeted to assist vulnerable 

families to improve their ability to care for their own children as well as strengthening and expanding local NGO and government capacities to promote the physical, 

cognitive, emotional and psychosocial well being of at-risk children. 

Question. In your new position, you will direct all foreign assistance. How will you 

use your position to advance the causes of orphans, displaced, and abandoned children in the developing world? 

Answer. Hundreds of thousands of children are separated from their families or 

are in danger of becoming combatants as a result of civil war. Millions of children 

work or live on the streets; and as many as 40 million children will be orphaned 

in HIV/AIDS affected countries by 2010. 

—I will work in the coming months with the Special Advisor on Orphans and Vulnerable Children, who is located within USAID, to implement a strategy that 

calls for a more effective and coordinated U.S. Government response. Our initial 

findings will be reported to the Congress in the next several months. 

—We need to collaborate closely with UNICEF and leading non-governmental organizations to formulate our response, and to ensure that in countries that have 

completed National Plans of Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, that 

resources are made available and that results are monitored and documented. 

—The U.S. Government currently implements a number of effective programs 

that make a huge difference in the lives of millions of highly vulnerable children around the world. Programs are located in Africa, Asia, Europe and Eurasia, and Latin America. Activities include: 

—Expanding care and support programs for children affected by HIV/AIDS at 

the community level in countries hardest hit by the epidemic; 

—Helping reintegrate child soldiers back into their families and communities, 

and providing psychosocial support for these children; 

—Providing vocational and educational opportunities for street children and 

other displaced children; 

—Expanding effective community-level support for orphans; 

—Preventing increased disabilities through treating and preventing blindness, 

and education and testing related to other disabilities; and 

—Food from Public Law 480 and donations from the United States to the World 

Food Program bring life-sustaining food to millions of children annually. 

CHILDREN IN CONFLICT AND CRISIS

Question. What has happened to these funds and please outline in detail what has 

been done with the funding for this very important project? 

Answer. It is the explicit mandate of USAID’s Displaced Children and Orphans 

Fund [DCOF] to directly address the concerns outlined in the language of the State 
90 

and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. This office is charged to prevent child 

abandonment, address the needs of orphans, displaced and abandoned children and 

provide permanent homes through family reunification, guardianship and domestic 

adoptions. USAID will meet or exceed the $3 million appropriated in fiscal year 

2006. 

Of the earmarked $3 million, $1.5 million will be used to reduce the abandonment 

and separation of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This program 

integrates two coordinated efforts that: (1) combine poverty alleviation, training of 

social workers, promotion and support of children’s rights, and communications and 

outreach, and (2) ensure minimum care standards and increase the reinsertion of 

separated and abandoned children with their families through support and training 

to local non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and government institutions. 

The additional $1.5 million will be used to support programs in Ukraine and 

Georgia. The goal of the Ukraine program is to build a continuum of family care 

services for children who are at risk or outside of family care. This program includes 

activities designed to strengthen and develop systems of family preservation, foster 

care, and adoption. The DCOF program in Georgia is targeted to assist vulnerable 

families to improve their ability to care for their own children as well as strengthening and expanding local NGO and government capacities to promote the physical, 

cognitive, emotional and psychosocial well being of at-risk children. 

MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH

Question. Despite significant scientific advances, millions of children and their 

mothers still die from treatable and preventable causes in the developing world. 

Each year, more than 10 million children under age 5 die—40 percent of these 

deaths occur within the first month of life. More than half a million women die from 

pregnancy- and child birth-related causes each year. Although the United States has 

played a critical role in providing the funding and expertise that has saved lives in 

past, funding for low-cost, low-tech interventions has stagnated. 

Under your leadership, how would the U.S. Government address the millions of 

preventable deaths of children under 5 and their mothers? 

Answer. USAID will focus its efforts in countriesthat continue to have a high burden of preventable maternal and child mortality to maximize our impact on health. 

We will work with host country governments and partners to scale-up country-appropriate packages of high-impact interventions, such as childhood immunizations, 

oral rehydration therapy, household water disinfection, vitamin A, antenatal care, 

and active management of the third stage of labor. By coordinating closely with 

other USG initiatives, such as the President’s Malaria Initiative, and with other donors, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF] the Global Alliance for 

Vaccines and Immunizations [GAVI], and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, we will be able to complement other funding in such a way that 

maximizes impact on maternal and child survival, health and nutrition. Finally, we 

will concentrate our new investments in emerging areas, such as neonatal health, 

in order to accelerate the decline in infant and child mortality. 

CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much. That concludes our 

hearings. 

[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., Thursday, June 8, the hearings were 

concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.] 
(91) 

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2007 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESS 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—The subcommittee was unable to hold a hearing 

on the nondepartmental witness. The following statement was submitted for the record:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE NATURE CONSERVANCY

The Nature Conservancy (TNC) urges the Committee to continue its strong tradition of support to international conservation by appropriating, in fiscal year 2007, 

$165.5 million (the President’s request) for conservation of biodiversity within the 

Development Assistance account of the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID); $107.5 million for the Global Environment facility (GEF), the same level 

as in recent years; $20 million for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) 

debt-for-forest program (the same level as in recent years); and $8 million for international conservation programs within the International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account at the Department of State. The Conservancy urges the Committee to provide firm legislative direction to USAID, to keep Parks in Peril funded 

and operating in fiscal year 2007 at its recent average level funding of $7 million, 

while negotiations proceed to expand and enhance this valuable program. 

The mission of The Nature Conservancy is to preserve the plants, animals, and 

natural communities that represent the diversity of life on Earth, by protecting the 

lands and waters they need to survive. Our work in the United States and abroad 

is closely related. For example, it is not possible to protect migratory birds in their 

summer ranges, inside the United States, without also taking care of their winter 

ranges in Latin America and the Caribbean. A healthy natural environment is a key 

element in genuinely sustainable economic and social development around the 

world. Too often, short-term considerations drive bad choices, whose results can be 

catastrophic for both the natural world and for the people who live with and by 

means of that world. A healthy and sustainable environment promotes peace and 

security. 

We support local conservation groups in the developing world that work to raise 

the effective level of protection at parks and nature preserves established by the 

local governments. We work with local communities to increase the constituency for 

conservation. We support sustainable development projects to create jobs and improve the productivity and standard of living of rural people living in and near protected areas. We work cooperatively with landowners to promote conservation on 

private lands. We are a private, non-profit organization. Our last private capital 

fund campaign raised more than $1 billion, $120 million of that for our international work. We are planning a new private campaign, which will raise even larger sums for international conservation. 

About 83 percent of our operating budget is raised from non-governmental 

sources, but government grants fill a critical need. For example, the assistance we 

receive through our cooperative relationship with USAID is vital to our international operations. It is difficult to raise private dollars for international operating 

(as distinct from capital) expenses. Without USAID’s support, these programs would 

be damaged. 
92 

Our Parks in Peril (PiP) program is widely regarded as among the most successful 

and respected in the tropical world. PiP has brought real protection to 45 major 

‘‘sites’’ (parks and nature preserves) comprising more than 40 million acres, in 17 

countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. The PiP methodologies have been applied at many other sites, and millions of additional acres, that never received 

USAID funding. In recent years, USAID has supported PiP with about $7 million. 

The leverage on the U.S. investment in PiP is high—more than $400 million raised 

by us and by our local partners for conservation work at or near the PiP sites. 

Your Committee has praised Parks in Peril in its past reports. We urge you to 

do so again and to add language directing USAID to fund the program at $7 million 

in fiscal year 2007 while design continues for an enhanced and global version of this 

effort. If funding is allowed to lapse for even 1 year, some of the achievements of 

the program will be disrupted. Furthermore, such a lapse would waste funds; it 

would cost more money to restart the program from a complete stop, as compared 

to continuing it during the design phase for a global effort. 

The Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) is also funded within Foreign Operations. The Administration has included the TFCA in its request for broader debt 

relief, and has indicated that it anticipates spending $8 million on TFCA in fiscal 

year 2007. We recommend that TFCA be given a separate line item and funded at 

$20 million, the same level as in recent years. TFCA has shown good results and 

good leverage on the Federal investment. TNC alone has donated $5 million to 

TFCA deals. TNC is a donor to TFCA deals, not a financial beneficiary, but the 

cause of international conservation benefits greatly. TFCA deals are likely over the 

next year or two in Guatemala, Paraguay, Botswana, Belize, Jamaica, and Brazil. 

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is the largest single source of environmental funds (including conservation) in the world. The U.S. Government contributes 22 percent, which is leveraged nearly 4 to 1 by other governmental donors, 

then further leveraged at least 2 to 1 by local ‘‘match,’’ so that ultimately every dollar of U.S. money is leveraged by at least 10 to 1, and sometimes up to 20 to 1, 

for on-the-ground environmental projects. The Administration’s request level for fiscal year 2007 is $56.25 million, barely half the pledge level of recent years. This 

request appears to assume that current talks within the GEF for administrative 

changes (favored by the U.S.) to enhance efficiency, will fail. We are concerned that 

the low request number will, if adopted, make failure nearly inevitable. We urge the 

Committee to instead appropriate at least the level of recent years—$107.5 million—in fiscal year 2007. Some portion of that $107.5 million could be made conditional upon successful adoption of changes in the GEF acceptable to the U.S. delegation. 

Thank you for this opportunity to submit testimony. 
(i) 

LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND 

PREPARED STATEMENTS 

Page 

Brownback, Senator Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, question submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 88 

Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator from Mississippi, question submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 33 

DeWine, Senator Mike, U.S. Senator from Ohio, questions submitted by ......... 86 

Durbin, Senator Richard J., U.S. Senator from Illinois, questions submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 34 

Landrieu, Senator Mary L., U.S. Senator from Louisiana, questions submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 89 

Leahy, Senator Patrick J., U.S. Senator from Vermont: 

Opening statements ......................................................................................... 2, 40 

Prepared statements ........................................................................................ 3, 41 

Question submitted by ..................................................................................... 88 

McConnell, Senator Mitch, U.S. Senator from Kentucky: 

Opening statements ......................................................................................... 1, 39 

Questions submitted by ................................................................................... 58 

Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Department of 

State ...................................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Summary statement ......................................................................................... 5 

Specter, Senator Arlen, U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, questions submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 83 

Tobias, Hon. Randall L., Administrator, United States Agency for International Development .......................................................................................... 39 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

Summary statement ......................................................................................... 42 

The Nature Conservancy, prepared statement ..................................................... 91 

(iii) 

SUBJECT INDEX 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Page 

Additional Subcommittee Questions ...................................................................... 33 

Advancing Liberty and Democracy ........................................................................ 10 

Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 29 

Aid to Africa ............................................................................................................. 28 

Belarus ...................................................................................................................... 32 

Building State Capacity .......................................................................................... 11 

Burma ....................................................................................................................... 30

Defeating Terror ...................................................................................................... 9 

Empowering Transformational States ................................................................... 12 

Helping Developing States ...................................................................................... 11 

Iran ........................................................................................................................... 25 

Iraq ........................................................................................................................... 13, 22 

Meeting Global Challenges ..................................................................................... 11 

Microenterprise ........................................................................................................ 19 

North Korea ............................................................................................................. 27 

Reforms in Ukraine ................................................................................................. 32 

Special Court for Sierra Leone ............................................................................... 16 

Sudan and Chad ...................................................................................................... 26 

Transformational Diplomacy .................................................................................. 8 

United Nations ......................................................................................................... 20 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative .................................................................. 17 

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 58 

Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 49 

Authority Over Other Government Agencies ........................................................ 59 

Blood Safety ............................................................................................................. 84 

Branding ................................................................................................................... 82 

Burma ....................................................................................................................... 47

Children in Conflict and Crisis ............................................................................... 89 

Congressional Budget Justification ........................................................................ 60 

Contractors ............................................................................................................... 83 

Coordination of Democracy Programs .................................................................... 82 

Countries Most Important to the U.S. in Africa ................................................... 61 

Democracy ................................................................................................................ 62 

And Governance Programs in China .............................................................. 82 

Fund .................................................................................................................. 82 

Director of Foreign Assistance ................................................................................ 60 

Displaced Children and Orphans Fund ................................................................. 89 

Enhancing the Impact of Foreign Assistance: Reducing Inefficiencies and 

Incoherence ........................................................................................................... 45 

Fiscal Year 2007 Budget ......................................................................................... 45 

Foreign: 

Aid: 

Budget ........................................................................................................ 51 

Coordination .............................................................................................. 54 

Assistance Reform ............................................................................................ 58 

Global Fund .............................................................................................................. 62 

Haiti Funding ........................................................................................................... 87 
Page

iv 

Health Programs ...................................................................................................... 47 

International Disaster and Famine Assistance ..................................................... 87 

Iraq ........................................................................................................................... 48 

Maternal and Child Health ..................................................................................... 90 

Millennium Challenge Corporation ........................................................................ 87 

Our Approach: We Will do Better .......................................................................... 45 

Peru Coca Production .............................................................................................. 84 

Regional Priorities ................................................................................................... 60 

Russia ....................................................................................................................... 88 

State Department/USAID Definition of Democracy and Governance Programs ..................................................................................................................... 81 

Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance ........................................................ 50 

Transformational Diplomacy .................................................................................. 60 

Initiative ............................................................................................................ 50 

Tuberculosis ............................................................................................................. 83 

U.S.-Ukraine Foundation ........................................................................................ 88 

USAID Personnel ..................................................................................................... 83 

Western Hemisphere Funding ................................................................................ 86 

Æ