NO. 01-14-01005-CR

IN THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

HAROLD JOSEPH NORWOOD, JR., APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS

CAUSE NUMBER 13CR1311

IN THE 405th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

OF GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS 

REBECCA KLAREN ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

 STATE BAR NO. 24046225 

JACK ROADY CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

600 59TH STREET, SUITE 1001 

GALVESTON TX 77551 

(409) 770-6004, FAX (409) 621-7952 

rebecca.klaren@co.galveston.tx.us

ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED

 

ACCEPTED

01-14-01005-CR

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

8/3/2015 2:18:34 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 8/3/2015 2:18:34 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
ii 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 

Presiding Judge Honorable Michelle Slaughter 

Appellant Harold Joseph Norwood, Jr. 

Appellee The State of Texas 

Attorney for Appellant James Bennett 

 (Trial Only) Alvin, Texas 

Attorney for Appellant Zachary S. Maloney 

 (Appeal Only) League City, Texas 

Attorney for State Matthew Shawhan & Bill Reed 

 (Trial Only) Galveston, Texas 

Attorney for State Rebecca Klaren 

 (Appeal Only) Galveston, Texas 
iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

SECTION PAGE 

Identity of Parties and Counsel ii 

Table of Contents iii 

Index of Authorities iv 

Summary of the Argument 2 

Statement of Facts 3 

First Issue 15 

There must be evidence a witness is an accomplice before a court 

is required to include an accomplice witness instruction in its 

charge. If the court should’ve included the instruction, but the 

defendant didn’t object, the defendant must show he was 

egregiously harmed. 

How’s there harmful reversible error when there’s no evidence 

Lacy was an accomplice, Norwood didn’t object to the charge, 

and Norwood made no argument he was egregiously harmed? 

Argument and Authorities 15 

I. Accomplice Witness Applicable Law 15 

II. Lacy Was Not An Accomplice 17 

III. Norwood Wasn’t Egregiously Harmed: The Non-Accomplice

Evidence Corroborates Lacy & Tends To Connect Norwood 

To The Murder 20 

IV. Conclusion: No Ground For Reversal 24 
iv 

Second Issue 25 

Video proves Norwood walked towards the crime scene minutes 

before the victim’s car was stolen. Video proves Norwood was 

driving the car minutes after the victim was left dying in his 

bakery parking lot. Norwood had the victim’s car, his car key, 

and his cellphone. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, 

how’s there insufficient evidence to prove Norwood murdered 

the victim? 

 Argument and Authorities 25 

I. Relevant Sufficiency Law 25 

II. The Evidence Proves Norwood Killed The Victim 27 

Conclusion and Prayer 30 

Certificate of Service 31 

Certificate of Compliance 31 
v 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES

Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .................................... 25 

Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). ....................................... 20 

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) .................................. 17 

Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ...................................... 17 

Bingham v. State, 913 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). ................................... 16 

Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ....................................... 22 

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). .................................... 26 

Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). ................................... 21 

Ex parte Flores, 387 S.W.3d 626, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ..................................... 25 

Flores v. State, 551 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ....................................... 28 

Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). ..................................... 26 

Gaston v. State, 324 S.W.3d 905, 908 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd)

 ............................................................................................................................... 16 

Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ......................................... 26 

Griego v. State, 337 S.W.3d 902, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). ...................................... 26 

Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). .............. 16, 17, 21, 23, 24 

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). .......................................... 26 
vi 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979) ......................................................... 26 

Joubert v. State, 235 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). ..................................... 21 

Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ..................................... 21 

Mann v. State, 964 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). ...................................... 20 

Miller v. State, 177 S.W.3d 177, 184 (Tex. App.---Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d)

 ........................................................................................................................ 28, 29 

Moron v. State, 779 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). ...................................... 21 

Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). ....................................... 20 

Palomo v. State, 352 S.W.3d 87, 90-91 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. 

ref’d) ....................................................................................................................... 27 

Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). ................... 15, 16, 17, 19 

Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ...................................... 25 

Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). .................................... 20 

Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). ................................... 26 

Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). .................................. 26 

Wygel v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465, 469 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). ................................. 19 

Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) .............................. 15, 16 

STATUTES

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14. .................................................................. 16 

TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(2). ............................................................................... 27 
vii 

TEX. PENAL CODE §7.01 ........................................................................................... 15 

TEX. PENAL CODE §7.02(a) ....................................................................................... 15 

TEX. PENAL CODE §7.02(b) ................................................................................ 15, 18 
NO. 01-14-01005-CR

 IN THE

 COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE

 FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 HOUSTON, TEXAS 

 

 HAROLD JOSEPH NORWOOD, JR., Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

Appealed from the 405th Judicial District 

Court of Galveston County, Texas

 Cause No. 13CR1311 

 

 BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS 

 

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

 Now comes Jack Roady, Criminal District Attorney for Galveston County, Texas, 

and files this brief for the State of Texas. 

The one-volume Clerk’s Record is referred to in the State’s Brief as “C.R. page”. The Reporter’s 

Record is multiple volumes and is referred to as “R.R. volume number: page”.
2 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

 Harold Norwood raises two issues in an attempt to reverse his murder 

conviction. First, he claims he was egregiously harmed because the Trial Court didn’t sua 

sponte include an accomplice witness instruction in its charge. Norwood hasn’t shown 

there was an accomplice witness. Norwood has presented no evidence there was a 

conspiracy. And even if there should’ve been an instruction, Norwood has made no 

attempt to show he was egregiously harmed. 

 In his second issue, Norwood claims the evidence was “factually” insufficient 

because driving the victim’s car doesn’t prove he committed the murder. Norwood’s 

argument ignores the overwhelming circumstantial evidence. The evidence proves he 

was near the scene of the murder, minutes before the murder. He had the victim’s car 

key, car, and cellphone immediately after the assault. He made admissions that a crime 

had occurred. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Norwood 

killed the victim and took his car. 
3 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

 Juan Navarro owned the Navarro Bakery located on Broadway and 38th Street in 

Galveston.1

 Navarro also owned a silver Lexus SUV.2 His bakers came in at 5 a.m. and 

the bakery closed at 10 p.m.3

 He usually stopped at the bakery after 11 p.m. to turn the 

alarm on.4

 After the bakery closed one night in January 2013, Navarro took a co-worker and 

his family to dinner.5

 They parted ways around 12 a.m.6 Navarro drove to the bakery. 

 At 12:23 a.m., Navarro turned into the parking lot.7

 He left his blinker on, but 

never went into the bakery.8

 He may’ve fallen asleep in the car. 

 At 1:04 a.m., an officer responding to an unrelated dispatch,9

 noticed what 

appeared to be a Lexus SUV in the bakery’s parking lot with its turn signal continuously 

blinking.10 The doors were closed and the headlights were on.11 The officer’s in-car 

video was not on.12 But, as the officer was returning to the police station to complete the 

dispatch, her in-car video was recording.13 At 1:28 a.m., the in-car video shows the 

 

1

 R.R. III: 46. 

2

 R.R. III: 54. 

3

 R.R. III: 47. 

4

 R.R. VI: 219. 

5

 R.R. III: 30. 

6

 R.R. III: 32. 

7

 R.R. VI: 67; State’s Exhibit 1 (bakery videos). 

8

 R.R. VI: 67; State’s Exhibit 1; State’s Exhibit 25 (Chevron video showing continuous blinking). 

9

 R.R. VI: 89. 

10 R.R. III: 112-13. 

11 R.R. III: 113. 

12 R.R. III: 114-15. 

13 R.R. III: 115-16; State’s Exhibit 24 (in-car video). 
4 

blinking light at the bakery.14

 At 1:37 a.m., a surveillance video at the Mercadito restaurant across Broadway 

from the bakery showed a single man dressed in all dark walk away from the bakery.15 

 At 1:41 a.m., the video shows the man return.16 The man was alone.17 He walked 

passed the restaurant and towards the bakery.18 Two of Norwood’s friends identified 

him as the man on the video.19 They explained they identified him based on his unique 

walk.20

 At 1:49 a.m., the videos from the Chevron station across Broadway from the 

bakery and the bakery’s indoor surveillance video show the blinking stopped.21 The 

Lexus’ headlights were turned on and it pulled onto 38th Street, away from Broadway.22

 At 1:59 a.m., Officer Ticas noticed a man lying in the bakery parking lot.23 He 

stopped and found Navarro gravely injured.24 He called EMS.25 

 Meanwhile, between 12 a.m. and 2 a.m., Richard Lacy testified he was at his 

 

14 R.R. VI: 32-33, 89; State’s Exhibit 24; State’s Exhibit 353 (screen shot of in-car video showing 

Lexus and blinking light at bakery). 

15 R.R. III: 33-34; VI: 137-38; State’s Exhibit 59 (Mercadito video). The lead detective testified she 

checked each video against the dispatch time. R.R. VI: 77-78. Evidently each video was a few 

minutes off. Id. So she adjusted the times to be consistent with dispatch. Id. 16 R.R. VI: 137-38; State’s Exhibit 59. 

17 State’s Exhibit 59. 

18 R.R. VI: 137-38; State’s Exhibit 59. 

19 R.R. V: 57-58, 71-72. 

20 R.R. V: 58-59; 72. 

21 R.R. VI: 24-25; State’s Exhibit 1 (bakery videos); State’s Exhibit 25 (Chevron video). 22 R.R. VI: 67-68; State’s Exhibit 25. 

23 R.R. III: 94-95. 

24 R.R. III: 94. 

25 R.R. III: 94. 
5 

neighbor’s house on 38th Street drinking and using drugs with several people, including 

James Nolan.26 The house was about a block behind the bakery.27 Close to 2:00 a.m., he 

saw a silver SUV on 38th coming from Broadway.28 Lacy thought it was his friend 

Joseph.29 It wasn’t Joseph, it was Norwood.30 Lacy, who’d known Norwood for a few 

days, had never seen Norwood drive the Lexus before.31 Norwood asked Lacy where 

there was a Coinstar.32 Lacy told Norwood the only one available at that time was at 

Kroger on 50th and the Seawall.33 

 James Nolan testified that on the night of the murder, he was with Lacy at a 

house.34 Nolan heard the conversation about the coins between Norwood and Lacy.35

Nolan said Lacy left with Norwood.36

 At 1:58 a.m., the silver Lexus parked at Kroger.37 Norwood, wearing all dark 

clothes, got out of the driver’s seat.38 Lacy testified Norwood had the car key.39 Lacy, 

wearing a yellow jacket and khaki pants, got out of the passenger seat.40 The men 

 

26 R.R. IV: 107-08. 

27 R.R. VI: 68-69. 

28 R.R. IV: 110. 

29 R.R. IV: 109-10. 

30 R.R. IV: 110. 

31 R.R. IV: 112. 

32 R.R. IV: 113. 

33 R.R. IV: 113. 

34 R.R. IV: 65-66. 

35 R.R. VI: 65, 67. 

36 R.R. IV: 67. 

37 R.R. IV: 52-53; VI: 42-43; State’s Exhibit 62 (Kroger parking lot video). 

38 R.R. IV: 53-54, 120; State’s Exhibit 62. 

39 R.R. IV: 121. 

40 R.R. IV: 53-54, 120; State’s Exhibit 62. 
6 

entered Kroger and went to the Coinstar.41 Lacy testified Norwood had a cloth bag full 

of coins.42 Lacy testified the men cashed the coins and Norwood made him keep the 

cloth bag until after they left Kroger.43 The Coinstar receipt for $117.15 was issued at 

2:01 a.m.44

 At 2:11 a.m., Lacy and Norwood left Kroger.45 Norwood had the car key.46 Lacy 

testified he drove as they left because Norwood’s driving was erratic.47 As they drove, 

Norwood told Lacy he was taking a penitentiary chance in the vehicle.48 Lacy thought he 

meant something was going on with the car or that it was stolen.49 Lacy testified 

Norwood might’ve said he hit a lick (which could mean taking something from 

someone or taking something without permission).50 Lacy testified Norwood told him 

he shouldn’t say anything about the car.51 They got more drugs.52 

 At the hospital, a trauma surgeon tried to save Navarro.53 Unfortunately, his 

injuries were not survivable and he died at 8:13 p.m.54 

 At 2:30 a.m., the on-call detective (Detective Sollenberger) was called to the 

 

41 R.R. IV: 114-15. 

42 R.R. IV: 117-18. 

43 R.R. IV: 114-15, 134; State’s Exhibit 63 (video of inside Kroger). 

44 R.R. IV: 48-50; State’s Exhibit 64 (Coinstar receipt). 

45 R.R. VI: 69. 

46 R.R. IV: 121. 

47 R.R. IV: 114. 

48 R.R. IV: 122. 

49 R.R. IV: 122. 

50 R.R. IV: 139-40. 

51 R.R. IV: 137. 

52 R.R. IV: 123. 

53 R.R. IV: 8-9. 

54 R.R. IV: 15-16. 
7 

scene.55 When she first got to the bakery, she noticed a dry void in an otherwise wet 

parking lot.56 It was the size of a car.57 The wet spot was consistent with an air 

conditioning drip spot, as if a vehicle had been sitting and running.58 The victim’s key 

ring was laying next to him, but there was no car key on the ring.59

 Detective Sollenberger testified she was able to pull up a photograph of the 

bakery owner.60 The first officer on the scene identified him as the injured man.61 The 

bakery was locked and nothing looked disturbed inside it.62 

 An officer went to the victim’s home to learn why Navarro may’ve been at the 

bakery that late and to ask if there was a missing car.63 The victim’s wife told the police 

about the missing Lexus.64 The detective sent out a regional broadcast about the missing 

Lexus.65 Multiple officers looked for the Lexus.66 Detective Sollenberger also posted a 

Facebook post to the police account asking for information on the stolen car.67 

 The next day, the police got a tip that the car was parked on 38th Street.68 The car 

 

55 R.R. VI: 9. 

56 R.R. VI: 11-12. 

57 R.R. VI: 12. 

58 R.R. VI: 14. 

59 R.R. VI: 20. 

60 R.R. VI: 15. 

61 R.R. VI: 15. 

62 R.R. VI: 14, 16. 

63 R.R. VI: 15. 

64 R.R. VI: 16. 

65 R.R. VI: 16-17. 

66 R.R. III: 168-69, 183. 

67 R.R. VI: 17. 

68 R.R. VI: 25-26. 
8 

was warm and the air conditioning condenser was dripping.69 This indicated to the 

officers that the car was recently driven.70 An officer looked under the car and noticed 

what appeared to be blood in the driver’s side wheel well.71 The officers decided to tow 

the car to the police department for processing.72 

 While the police were still at the scene where the Lexus was found, a woman 

came up to them and said she feared Norwood was dead in the car.73 The police also got 

a call from Norwood’s brother.74 He too feared Norwood was dead in the car.75

Norwood wasn’t. Several agencies began looking for Norwood.76 On February 16, 2013, 

a Houston police officer arrested Norwood.77

 At the Galveston Police Department, the officers dusted the car for 

fingerprints.78 They found swipe marks on the driver’s door.79 This indicated to the 

officers that someone tried to wipe the door clean.80 Fortunately, the officers were still 

able to get a fingerprint.81 The fingerprint matched Norwood.82

 

69 R.R. III: 186; VI: 26. 

70 R.R. III: 186-87; VI: 26. 

71 R.R. III: 188, 191-92. 

72 R.R. III: 193. 

73 R.R. III: 194-98. 

74 R.R. VI: 29. 

75 R.R. VI: 29-30. 

76 R.R. VI: 53-54. 

77 R.R. V: 141-43. 

78 R.R. IV: 88; V: 178. 

79 R.R. V: 200-01. 

80 R.R. V: 200-01. 

81 R.R. V: 179. 

82 R.R. V: 147, 149, 151. 
9 

 The police officers immediately tried to locate the victim’s cellphone.83 They 

called it and had the service provider ping it.84 The pings didn’t provide an exact 

location.85 However, the officers were able to get the phone’s call logs.86 There were 

several calls made after the victim was found.87 The officers determined each person 

called knew Norwood.88 The officers also determined that a call was made to check 

someone’s bank account balance.89 The bank recorded the telephone call.90 Dietrich 

Simmons made the call to the bank.91 She testified she got the cellphone from 

Norwood.92

 The day after the murder, Richard Lacy spoke to his brother about Norwood.93

Lacy knew he’d been in the car.94 His brother urged Lacy to do the right thing.95 Lacy 

called 911 to say he had information.96 Lacy voluntarily went to the police station twice 

and gave two statements.97 He told the police what he knew about Norwood.98 Lacy said 

 

83 R.R. VI: 17-18. 

84 R.R. VI: 17-18. 

85 R.R. VI: 18. 

86 R.R. V: 132. 

87 R.R. V: 133-36. 

88 R.R. V: 137-38; VI: 44-48. 

89 R.R. VI: 45. 

90 R.R. VI: 45. 

91 R.R. VI: 45. 

92 R.R. V: 59-60. 

93 R.R. IV: 137. 

94 R.R. IV: 137. 

95 R.R. IV: 137. 

96 R.R. IV: 127-28. 

97 R.R. VI: 34, 36-37. 

98 R.R. IV: 128-29. 
10 

he’d seen Norwood continue to drive the Lexus after their Kroger trip.99 He said 

Norwood used a cloth to wipe the car down every time he got out of it.100 

 Lacy testified he thought he also told the police that the night before the murder, 

he and Norwood walked by the bakery and on the way to the corner store.101 Norwood 

said to Lacy “That’s a nice car.”102 

 On cross-examination, Lacy agreed Norwood didn’t say he stole a car, hurt 

someone, or killed someone.103 Lacy agreed he didn’t see Norwood steal the Lexus or 

hurt anyone.104 Lacy said he didn’t assume the car was stolen until after Norwood said 

he was taking a penitentiary chance by driving it and Norwood wiped the car down.105

 During Norwood’s case-in-chief, he recalled Lacy.106 He questioned Lacy about 

his criminal history.107 Lacy said he saw Norwood drive the Lexus for 4 or 5 days.108

When Norwood asked if Lacy would be surprised the car was recovered within 2 days of 

the murder, Lacy said he could be wrong about the days.109

 Lacy voluntarily gave the police a DNA sample and the clothes he was wearing.110

 

99 R.R. IV: 125. 

100 R.R. IV: 126. 

101 R.R. IV: 136. 

102 R.R. IV: 136. 

103 R.R. IV: 144. 

104 R.R. IV: 145-46. 

105 R.R. IV: 147. 

106 R.R. VII: 53. 

107 R.R. VII: 54. 

108 R.R. VII: 60-67. 

109 R.R. VII: 68. 

110 R.R. IV: 129. 
11 

He also gave the police the shoes he leant to Norwood.111 None of the victim’s DNA 

was on Lacy’s clothes or Norwood’s shoes.112 One of Lacy’s shoes tested positive for 

presumptive blood.113 The DNA test showed it was a mixture.114 Lacy was the major 

contributor.115 The data regarding the minor contributor was too small to make an 

identification.116 

 Lacy told the jury he had a prior felony conviction for forgery and for possession 

of a controlled substance.117 He admitted he has a drug problem.118 He told the jury he 

was under arrest for a misdemeanor offense of obstructing a passageway, but didn’t have 

a deal with the State for his testimony.119

 Detective Sollenberger testified that initially Lacy was a suspect because he was 

on the Kroger video 10 minutes after the vehicle was stolen.120 She testified, however, 

that Lacy was ruled out as a suspect early in the investigation.121 The detective explained 

that the police were able to speak to Lacy’s roommates, including James Nolan, and 

corroborated what Lacy told them.122 The Kroger and Mercadito surveillance videos also 

 

111 R.R. IV: 129-30. 112 R.R. VI: 194, 199; State’s Exhibit 360 (DNA laboratory report). 

113 State’s Exhibit 359 (forensic toxicology laboratory report); State’s Exhibit 360. 

114 State’s Exhibit 360. 

115 State’s Exhibit 360. 

116 State’s Exhibit 360. 

117 R.R. IV: 105. 

118 R.R. IV: 108. 

119 R.R. IV: 106. 

120 R.R. VI: 138. 121 R.R. VI: 138. 122 R.R. VI: 138, 143. 
12 

corroborated Lacy.123 Lacy was not with Norwood when he assaulted the victim and 

took his car. 

 The Medical Examiner testified Navarro had abrasions on his head, face, 

forehead, check, ear, both knees, and his elbow.124 He had 2 broken ribs.125 Navarro had 

a hemorrhage under both sides of his scalp and a hemorrhage over the left side of his 

brain.126 He had a basal skull fracture stretching from one ear to the other.127 There was 

blood coming out of his ears, which is a characteristic of the skull injury.128 The Medical 

Examiner testified a basal skull fracture is most commonly seen in car accidents where 

the person’s head is moving very quickly and suddenly stops or when people fall from a 

height and there’s a hyperflexion.129 He said a basal skull fracture is always fatal.130 The 

doctor said Navarro could’ve been struck while his head was still or could’ve been 

pushed over and his head struck a fixed object.131 The Medical Examiner testified the 

manner of death was homicide and the cause of death was blunt force head trauma.132

 The Medical Examiner testified he reviewed the crime scene pictures of the 

scene.133 Based on the scene, the doctor explained the victim’s facial abrasions and the 

 

123 R.R. VI: 138, 144. 

124 R.R. V: 17. 

125 R.R. V: 38-39. 

126 R.R. V: 17-18. 

127 R.R. V: 18. 

128 R.R. V: 22. 

129 R.R. V: 27. 

130 R.R. V: 27. 

131 R.R. V: 33. 

132 R.R. V: 33. 

133 R.R. V: 34-35. 
13 

pattern on his chest could’ve been caused from a fight, from getting rolled over by a 

vehicle and being caught under the undercarriage, or getting his head slammed to the 

ground.134 The doctor explained that the vehicle could’ve caused the basal skull fracture 

if the victim was lying flat on the ground, with his head up and as the tire came across 

his chest, slamming his head back.135 The doctor agreed that the victim could’ve been 

trying to get up when the car rolled over his chest.136 The doctor also agreed that 

Navarro could’ve been standing up or in his vehicle and received a blow to the head that 

caused the brain hemorrhages.137 The doctor testified, based on the crime scene photos, 

the rib fractures could’ve been caused by the vehicle rolling over the victim’s chest.138

The Medical Examiner testified a vehicle, used to run over someone in this way, is a 

deadly weapon.139

 Norwood did not request any instructions in the jury charge and affirmatively 

stated he had no objections to the charge.140 There was no accomplice witness language 

in the charge.141 

 The jury convicted Norwood of murder and made an affirmative finding of a 

deadly weapon.142

 

134 R.R. V: 35. 

135 R.R. V: 35-36. 

136 R.R. V: 36-37. 

137 R.R. V: 37-38. 

138 R.R. V: 38-39. 

139 R.R. V: 39. 

140 R.R. VII: 81-82. 

141 C.R. 159. 

142 C.R. 164, 166. 
14 

 The jury heard Norwood had 17 convictions---7 for drug convictions, a failure to 

identify conviction, 3 evading arrest convictions, 3 theft convictions, and 3 assault 

convictions.143 The jury found both enhancements for possession of a controlled 

substance true and sentenced Norwood to 80 years confinement.144

 This appeal followed. 

 

 

143 R.R. VIII: 37-44. 

144 C.R. 174. 
15 

FIRST ISSUE

There must be evidence a witness is an accomplice before a court is 

required to include an accomplice witness instruction in its charge. 

If the court should’ve included the instruction, but the defendant 

didn’t object, the defendant must show he was egregiously harmed. 

How’s there harmful reversible error when there’s no evidence Lacy 

was an accomplice, Norwood didn’t object to the charge, and 

Norwood made no argument he was egregiously harmed? 

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

 Norwood doesn’t cite to any evidence from any source that Lacy was a coconspirator accomplice witness. Consequently, the Trial Court did not err by omitting a 

sua sponte jury instruction that he was. Even if there was error, Norwood wasn’t 

egregiously harmed by the omission because the non-accomplice evidence corroborates 

Lacy’s testimony by tending to connect Norwood to the crime. 

V. Accomplice Witness Applicable Law

An accomplice is a person who participates before, during, or after the 

commission of the offense with the requisite culpable mental state.145 A person can be 

an accomplice as a direct party or as a co-conspirator.146 

 

145 Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

146 Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE §7.01

(person is “criminally responsible” for his own conduct or for “conduct of another for which he is 

criminally responsible”); TEX. PENAL CODE §7.02(a) (describing criminal responsibility as a direct 

party); TEX. PENAL CODE §7.02(b) (describing criminal responsibility for a party as a co-
16 

 If a witness is an accomplice, Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.14 requires 

a jury instruction that a conviction cannot rest on the testimony of the accomplice 

witness “unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with 

the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the 

commission of the offense.”147 The accomplice witness rule reflects “the legislative 

determination that accomplice testimony must be taken with a certain degree of 

caution.”148 “Accomplices often have an incentive to lie, such as to avoid punishment 

or shift blame to another person.”149

The evidence in the particular case dictates whether an accomplice-witness 

instruction is required.150 A witness may be considered an accomplice as a matter of 

law or as a matter of fact.151 A prosecution witness who is indicted for the same 

offense as the defendant or a lesser-included offense is an accomplice as a matter of 

law.152 “If a prosecution witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial court is 

under a duty to instruct the jury accordingly.”153 “Failure to do so is error.”154 When, 

however, there is doubt as to whether a witness is an accomplice—i.e., the evidence is 

conflicting—then the court may instruct the jury to determine the witness’s 

 

conspirator)). 

147 Zamora, 411 S.W.3d at 509-10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14. 

148 Gaston v. State, 324 S.W.3d 905, 908 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d); see 

Bingham v. State, 913 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 

149 Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 439. 

150 Id. 151 Id. 152 Id.; Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 

153 Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 631. 

154 Id. 
17 

accomplice status as a fact issue.155 

When the evidence clearly shows that the witness is not an accomplice, then 

the court is not required to instruct the jury on the accomplice-witness rule at all.156 

 If the trial court improperly omitted an accomplice witness instruction, the 

appropriate harm standard depends on whether the defendant preserved his 

complaint by bringing the omission to the trial court’s attention.157 If the error was 

properly preserved, the appeals court must reverse if “some harm” is shown.158 But if 

the defendant failed to preserve the complaint, the error “must be ‘fundamental’” 

“and requires reversal only if it was so egregious and created such harm that the 

defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial.”159 

VI. Lacy Was Not An Accomplice

 Norwood claims the Trial Court erred by not sua sponte including an 

accomplice witness instruction in its jury charge because Lacy was Norwood’s coconspirator. Norwood is wrong. 

 According to the Penal Code, a person is a co-conspirator and is criminally 

responsible for another, 

If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one 

felony, another felony is committed by one of the 

 

155 Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 439-40. 

156 Id. at 440. 

157 See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632. 

158 Id. 159 Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 

157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). 
18 

conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony 

actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, 

if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful 

purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a 

result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.160 

 Notably, Norwood doesn’t identify the supposed conspiracy Lacy and 

Norwood entered into. Norwood doesn’t cite to any evidence and there is no 

evidence from any source that there was a conspiracy. 

 Norwood speculates that Lacy might’ve been a co-conspirator in some kind of 

conspiracy because the night before the murder he went for a walk with Norwood. As 

they walked by the bakery on their way to a store, Norwood said he liked the Lexus 

parked at the bakery. There’s no evidence Lacy and Norwood formulated a plan or 

had a common understanding to take the car. There’s no evidence Lacy knew 

Norwood was going to steal the car the following night and kill the owner. There’s no 

evidence Lacy anticipated or reasonably should’ve anticipated Norwood was going to 

steal the car and run over the victim. 

 Norwood argues Lacy was a conspirator because there was blood on his shoe 

when he talked to the police in the days after the murder. There’s no evidence tying 

the blood to the victim. There’s no evidence explaining when the blood got onto the 

shoe. This is no evidence of a conspiracy. 

 Norwood further claims Lacy was a co-conspirator because he was in the 

 

160 TEX. PENAL CODE §7.02(b). 
19 

Lexus after the murder and drove the Lexus when they left Kroger. This argument is 

based solely on Lacy’s presence in the car after the murder. Mere presence doesn’t 

make a person an accomplice161 or a conspirator.162

 To be clear, there’s no testimony or evidence that Lacy was with Norwood 

when Norwood committed the murder. To the contrary, the evidence establishes 

Norwood was alone. The Mercadito video shows Norwood was alone when he 

walked away from the bakery and then 4 minutes later returned and walked towards 

the bakery. 

 The video is not the only evidence that proves Lacy was not at the bakery. 

Nolan testified Lacy was with him at a house before Norwood showed up to ask if 

there was a nearby coin machine. There’s no evidence Lacy intended Norwood to 

commit any crime when Lacy was using drugs and drinking with Nolan at a house 

blocks away from the bakery. 

 Because there’s absolutely no testimony and no evidence that would make Lacy 

an accomplice as a matter of law and because there’s also no conflicting evidence 

suggesting Lacy was an accomplice as a matter of fact, the Trial Court wasn’t 

obligated to instruct the jury on the accomplice witness rule as it could apply to 

Lacy.163 

 

161 See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 439.

162 See Wygel v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465, 469 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). 

163 See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 439-40. 
20 

VII. Norwood Wasn’t Egregiously Harmed: The NonAccomplice Evidence Corroborates Lacy & Tends To 

Connect Norwood To The Murder 

 Because Norwood didn’t object to the jury charge and affirmatively stated he 

had no objections to the charge,164 this Court reviews the alleged error to determine 

whether the omission caused Norwood egregious harm.165

 Norwood made no effort to explain how he was egregiously harmed by the 

absence of an accomplice witness instruction in his brief. Norwood’s failure to brief 

doesn’t impact the outcome of this case because he wasn’t harmed and certainly 

wasn’t egregiously harmed. 

Jury charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, 

deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.166 The 

error must have been so harmful as to effectively deny the defendant a fair and 

impartial trial.167 The egregious harm standard “is a difficult standard to meet.”168

The omission of the accomplice witness instruction is generally harmless unless 

the corroborating (non-accomplice) evidence is “so unconvincing in fact as to render 

 

164 R.R. VII: 81-82. 

165 See Mann v. State, 964 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 

166 Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

167 See Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

168 Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 
21 

the State’s overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive.”169 In 

other words, if the non-accomplice evidence corroborates the accomplice testimony 

by tending to connect the defendant to the crime, the failure to give the instruction is 

generally harmless.170 

 Evidence corroborating an accomplice need not directly link the accused to 

the offense or be sufficient in itself to establish guilt; instead, the corroborating 

evidence need only tend to connect the accused to the crime committed.171 “Even 

apparently insignificant incriminating circumstances may sometimes afford 

satisfactory evidence of corroboration.”172 Furthermore, there need only be some 

non-accomplice evidence tending to connect the defendant to the crime, not to every 

element of the crime.173

 The evidence tends to connect Norwood to the murder. 

 While a defendant’s mere presence at the crime scene is insufficient to 

corroborate accomplice testimony, “‘[p]roof that the accused was at or near the scene 

of the crime at or about the time of its commission, when coupled with other 

suspicious circumstances, may tend to connect the accused to the crime so as to 

furnish sufficient corroboration to support a conviction.’”174 The Mercadito, the 

 

169 Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632. 

170 Id. 171 Moron v. State, 779 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 

172 Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 

173 Joubert v. State, 235 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

174 Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 
22 

Chevron, and the bakery videos establish the Lexus was at the bakery when 1 man 

walked by the Mercadito restaurant. The Mercadito video shows the man was alone 

and was wearing dark clothes. The Mercadito video then shows the man in dark was 

still alone when he walked towards the bakery 4 minutes later. Two people identified 

Norwood as the man walking on the Mercaidtio video. 

 The Mercadito, the Chevron, and the bakery videos show the SUV’s blinking 

light turned off 8 minutes after Norwood walked towards the bakery. The Chevron 

video shows the SUV turned onto 38th Street when it left the bakery. Nolan testified 

he heard Norwood discuss coins with Lacy and then the men left the house on 38th

Street. 

 It’s certainly a suspicious circumstance that 10 minutes after the victim’s Lexus 

left the bakery, the Kroger video shows Norwood park it. Norwood was still wearing 

dark colored clothes. He cashed coins and left the Kroger in the victim’s SUV. 

 Norwood’s fingerprint on the SUV corroborates the videos and the witnesses. 

The wipe marks on the SUV shows Norwood’s effort to destroy evidence. 

 To add to the suspicious circumstances, Norwood also had the victim’s 

cellphone after the murder. He gave it to Simmons, who called the bank to check an 

account’s balance. All the other calls made with the phone after the assault were to 

people Norwood knew. 

 

487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). 
23 

 The timeline, the physical evidence, and the witnesses’ testimonies tend to 

connect Norwood to the murder.175 Lacy’s testimony was corroborated.176 

 Additionally, the jury was well aware Lacy may not be truthful. Norwood 

attacked Lacy’s credibility when he crossed him, when he recalled him in his case-inchief, and during his closing argument.

During the testimony, Norwood highlighted Lacy’s criminal history. He 

attempted to show Lacy was only testifying because he was hoping for a deal on his 

recent obstruction of a passageway arrest. And he illustrated Lacy was wrong when he 

testified that Norwood drove the car for 4 or 5 days. 

 In closing statements, Norwood reminded the jury that Lacy is a repeat 

convicted felon.177 He argued Lacy couldn’t keep his story straight.178 He argued Lacy 

had every reason to lie because he was in the car after the murder, helped Norwood 

cash the coins, drove the car away from Kroger, had blood on his shoe two days later, 

and the car was found in front of his house.179 Norwood told the jury it was more 

 

175 See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (“[N]on-accomplice evidence can render harmless a failure to submit 

an accomplice witness instruction by fulfilling the purpose an accomplice witness instruction is 

designed to serve.”). 

176 See id. (“Under the egregious harm standard, the omission of an accomplice witness instruction is 

generally harmless unless the corroborating (non-accomplice) evidence is ‘so unconvincing in fact as 

to render the State’s overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive.’”). 

177 R.R. VII: 112-13. 

178 R.R. VII: 113. 

179 R.R. VII: 113-14. 
24 

likely Lacy committed the crime.180 The jury was aware that it could take Lacy’s 

testimony with caution. 

VIII. Conclusion: No Ground For Reversal

 There was significant non-accomplice evidence that tended to connect 

Norwood to the murder. The non-accomplice evidence was not so unconvincing as to 

render the State’s overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive. 

The purpose of the accomplice witness instruction was fulfilled and any error was 

harmless.181 

 Norwood’ first issue should be overruled. 

 

180 R.R. VII: 114. 

181 See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632. 
25 

SECOND ISSUE

Video proves Norwood walked towards the crime scene minutes 

before the victim’s car was stolen. Video proves Norwood was 

driving the car minutes after the victim was left dying in his bakery 

parking lot. Norwood had the victim’s car, his car key, and his 

cellphone. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, 

how’s there insufficient evidence to prove Norwood murdered the 

victim? 

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

III. Relevant Sufficiency Law 

 Norwood only challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence. He doesn’t 

challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence. He argues that proving he drove the 

victim’s Lexus after the murder isn’t sufficient to establish he committed the murder. 

 The Court of Criminal Appeals has determined and repeatedly affirmed182 that 

the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing 

court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each 

element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable 

 

182 See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“As the court of appeals properly 

noted, this Court now applies only one standard ‘to evaluate whether the evidence is sufficient to 

support a criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt: legal sufficiency.’”); Ex parte Flores, 387 

S.W.3d 626, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting that court “did away with” factual sufficiency 

review in Brooks ); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that Jackson

standard is only standard for courts to apply in determining sufficiency of evidence). 
26 

doubt.183 Therefore, in analyzing Norwood’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

this Court applies only the Jackson v. Virginia standard. 

 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court views all of 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determines, based on that 

evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, whether a rational jury could have 

found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.184 The reviewing court 

also considers both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable 

inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.185 Circumstantial evidence is as 

probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial 

evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.186 The evidence is insufficient when 

the record contains no evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence, probative of an 

element of the offense.187

 The reviewing court does not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence 

or substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder.188 Because the jury is the sole judge 

of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight given to their testimony, any conflicts or 

inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict.189 

 

183 See Griego v. State, 337 S.W.3d 902, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

184 See Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 318–19 (1979)). 

185 See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

186 See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

187 See Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

188 See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

189 See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
27 

 To obtain a conviction for murder, the State must prove the defendant intended 

to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that 

caused the death of an individual.190 

IV. The Evidence Proves Norwood Killed The Victim 

 Norwood claims the evidence is factually insufficient to prove murder because it 

only shows he drove the victim’s car. Norwood is misstates the evidence. 

 The timeline of events is detailed above. In short, nobody else could’ve 

committed the crime within the established timeframe. To summarize, Norwood was 

near the scene 7 minutes before the Lexus left the parking lot. He was alone. Two of his 

friends identified him as the man in dark clothes walking towards the bakery. Norwood 

stopped on 38th Street, blocks from the bakery, and asked Lacy about a coin machine. 

Nolan overheard the conversation. Lacy left with Norwood. Norwood drove to and 

parked the victim’s Lexus at the Kroger 10 minutes after leaving the bakery. Detective 

Sollenberger testified she repeatedly timed the drive from 38th to the Kroger.191 On 

average the drive takes 7 1⁄2 to 8 1⁄2 minutes.192 There was no time for anyone else to 

have committed the murder, stolen the car, have a conversation about a coin machine, 

and then drive Lacy to the Kroger.193

 When Norwood and Lacy left Kroger, Norwood told Lacy he was taking a 

 

190 TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(2). 

191 R.R. VI: 70, 33-34. 

192 R.R. VI: 70. 

193 See Palomo v. State, 352 S.W.3d 87, 90-91 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) 

(circumstantial evidence of guilt include proximity to the murder scene near the time of the murder). 
28 

penitentiary chance by driving the car. He said Lacy shouldn’t tell anyone about the car. 

And he told Lacy he hit a lick. The jury could reasonably conclude that Norwood’s 

admissions, coupled with the other evidence, was proof his consciousness of guilt. 

 The jury also knew Norwood had both the victim’s car key and his cellphone 

after the assault. When the police got to the bakery, they found the victim’s keyring next 

to him. The Lexus key was missing. Lacy testified Norwood had the key when he was 

driving the Lexus minutes after the victim was hurt. Simmons testified Norwood gave 

her the victim’s cellphone. The jury could reasonably conclude car keys and a cellphone 

would’ve been on the victim or in his immediate reach. The car key was never found. 

Based on his injuries and the timing, the jury could reasonably infer that only the 

murderer would have those items.194

 Lacy testified Norwood had a cloth bag with coins. Norwood made Lacy pull the 

bag out of the Kroger trash can. Lacy testified Norwood threw the bag out as they drove 

away. The victim’s wife testified her husband kept coins in a cloth bag. The jury could 

reasonably infer Norwood’s action of disposing of the cloth bag was an inference of 

guilt.195

 Throwing the coin bag away and hiding the car key were not Norwood’s only 

attempt to conceal evidence. Lacy testified Norwood wiped the car down every time he 

 

194 See Flores v. State, 551 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding a defendant’s unexplained 

possession of a victim’s stolen property may be sufficient to sustain a conviction). 

195 See Miller v. State, 177 S.W.3d 177, 184 (Tex. App.---Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) 

(attempting to hid evidence is circumstantial evidence of guilt). 
29 

got out of the car. When the police processed the car for fingerprints, they found wipe 

marks. They also found Norwood’s fingerprint. This is more proof of Norwood’s 

guilt.196

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the 

evidence establishes Norwood murdered the victim and took his SUV. 

 Norwood’s second issue should be overruled. 

 

196 See id. 
30 

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State prays that the judgment 

of the Trial Court be affirmed in all respects. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 JACK ROADY 

 CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

 GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

 /s/ Rebecca Klaren 

 REBECCA KLAREN 

 Assistant Criminal District Attorney 

 State Bar Number 24046225 

 600 59th Street, Suite 1001 

 Galveston, Texas 77551 

 Tel (409)770-6004/Fax (409)621-7952 

 rebecca.klaren@co.galveston.tx.us
31 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned Attorney for the State certifies a copy of the foregoing brief was 

sent via email, eFile service, or certified mail, return receipt requested, to Zachary S. 

Maloney, attorney for Harold Joseph Norwood, Jr., at zachmaloeny@gmail.com or 

2925 Gulf Freeway South Suite B #295, League City, Tx 77573, on August 3, 2015. 

 /s/ Rebecca Klaren 

 REBECCA KLAREN 

 Assistant Criminal District Attorney 

 Galveston County, Texas 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

 The undersigned Attorney for the State certifies this brief is computer generated, 

and consists of 6,284 words. 

 /s/ Rebecca Klaren 

 REBECCA KLAREN 

 Assistant Criminal District Attorney 

 Galveston County, Texas