Success in the highly political and 

ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the 

global security environment in the coming 

decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and 

military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These 

challenges are expected to require better 

integrated, whole-of-government approaches, 

the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience.

Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an “unequal dialogue” between civilian and military 

leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true 

power but must modulate their intervention into 

“military” affairs as a matter of prudence rather 

than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 

have demonstrated that irregular warfare—

which is profoundly political, intensely local, 

and protracted—breaks from the traditional 

understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort.

One of the key challenges rising from 

irregular warfare is how to measure progress. 

While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political 

pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. 

Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major 

political milestones such as elections, and 

resource inputs such as personnel, money, and 

materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed—namely, 

outputs or results.

A second major challenge centers on 

choosing leaders for irregular warfare and 

stability and reconstruction operations. How 

to produce civilian leaders capable of asking 

the right and most difficult questions is not 

easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been 

a general erosion of the traditional Soldier’s 

Code whereby a military member can express 

dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to 

one’s superiors up to the point that a decision 

has been made. Many see the need to shore 

up this longstanding tradition among both the 

leadership and the ranks.

A third significant challenge is how to 

forge integrated strategies and approaches. 

Professional relationships, not organizational 

fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. 

In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the 

military and civilian leadership is a step in the 

right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes 

of authority.

Lanes of Authority 

Conflate

Persistent irregular conflict poses difficult 

new challenges for command and leadership 

and civil-military relations in general. Wars 

in Afghanistan and Iraq amply demonstrate 

these challenges. The Iraq engagement began 

with a short, conventional war that aimed 

massive military power to defeat a hostile state 

and depose its leader. The Commander in 

Chief, with the approval of civilian leaders in 

Congress, authorized the action, and military 

commanders carried it out successfully. But 

after the initial goals were achieved, the 

engagement in Iraq rapidly devolved into 

a counterinsurgency. Similarly, as conflict 

in Afghanistan shows, in an irregular war 

against an asymmetric, nonstate threat, the 

traditional lanes of authority no longer clearly 

separate the activities of the political leaders responsible for managing the engagement, 

the military commanders responsible for executing it, and the civilian officials responsible 

for diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and 

reconstruction.

As the war in Iraq progressed beyond 

the initial stage of regime removal, civilmilitary relationships began to break down 

as the war transmogrified into a counterinsurgency operation. Beginning in 2007 with 

the so-called surge, a dramatic rapprochement occurred that featured greater collaboration between U.S. civilian and military 

authorities and a more constructive melding 

of military, political, and diplomatic means 

to achieve stability. Although there are questions about why that same degree of cohesion did not develop earlier, the surge offers 

insight into the level of cooperation and 

communication needed in irregular warfare 

between military officers—whose traditional 

duties to apply force spill over into peacekeeping and nationbuilding activities—

and civilian officials who bear the dominant 

role in building a framework for peace, good 

 Strategic Forum No. 234

October 2008

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 234, October 2008 Strategic Forum 1

Irregular Warfare: New Challenges 

for Civil-Military Relations

by Patrick M. Cronin
2 Strategic Forum No. 234, October 2008

governance, and diplomatic ties that support 

long-term U.S. national interests.

So it is that, more than 6 years after 

the publication of Eliot Cohen’s Supreme 

Command, the command and leadership 

challenges emerging from Afghanistan and 

Iraq are providing plentiful new experiences 

on which to consider civil-military relations 

and leadership in the midst of what strategist Anthony Cordesman dubbed “armed 

nation building” but what may be more generally classified as “irregular warfare.” Clearly, 

soldiers are being asked to do far more than 

apply violence; they are expected to bring to 

the field a broad set of peacemaking and statebuilding skills in addition to their core combat experience. Modern warfare would appear 

to be less about direct combat and more about 

the larger ambit of seeking stability and peace 

in the midst of fighting. As Dr. Cohen wrote, 

the soldier’s ultimate purpose is to achieve

political ends designated by statesmen. 

But because political objectives are just 

that—political—they are often ambiguous, contradictory, and uncertain. It is one 

of the greatest sources of frustration for soldiers that their political masters find it difficult . . . to fully elaborate in advance the 

purposes for which they have invoked military action, or the conditions under which 

they intend to limit or terminate it.1

In both Afghanistan and Iraq there are 

questions about the quality of the planning to 

govern either country. Part of the problem may 

have stemmed from defining the objective as 

regime change, with humanitarian assistance 

and reconstruction as potential missions, 

without asking the basic questions about who 

would govern the country, how they would do 

so, and who had the mission to govern at both 

the central and local level.

Yet all might agree that, in the absence 

of clear objectives, it is easy to confuse military 

activity with progress and difficult to judge how 

military operations fit into the overall civil-military effort or how well they are contributing to 

resolving a problem consistent with national 

interests. Acknowledging both the difficulty and 

importance of defining goals and objectives, 

George Marshall once quipped that, if one gets 

the objectives right, “a lieutenant can write the 

strategy.” Not surprisingly, the development of 

goals and objectives is often the first point of 

tension in civil-military relations at the highest 

levels of government.

Despite the positive developments in 

Iraq, questions remain over how labor 

should be divided and civilian and military activities coordinated to support 

counterinsurgency operations in foreign 

theaters. Today, the need for overall political 

leadership and coherence appears greater 

but achieving it more difficult. At the same 

time, a distant, top-down style of strategic 

management or micromanagement of the 

complex tasks in remote contested zones 

seems quixotic.

So we ask ourselves, how does irregular warfare alter our thinking about civilmilitary relations? Is the putative decline in 

civil-military relations permanent, serious, 

and crippling? Or conversely, is it sui generis 

to a conflict such as Iraq or Afghanistan—

and overblown in terms of the problems it 

presents—depending mainly on individual actors and therefore manageable, given 

the right set of personalities? To what degree 

does command and control structure contribute to, or detract from, the ability to integrate 

civil-military efforts? And at what levels and 

in what venues should civil-military efforts be 

integrated in an irregular war?

The war that “we are in and must win” 

(to paraphrase Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates) pits us against nonstate groups that 

seek to advance extremist agendas through 

violence. Accordingly, irregular warfare will be 

the dominant form of conflict among adversaries in the early years of the 21st century. To 

succeed in these messy and profoundly political wars, the United States needs a framework 

that appropriately and effectively balances the 

relationships between civilian and military 

leaders and makes the best use of their unique 

and complementary portfolios.

An Unequal Dialogue

In Supreme Command, Dr. Cohen 

advanced our thinking about civil-military 

relations. Concerned especially with a wartime 

environment associated with major combat 

operations, he contrasted the so-called normal theory of well-delineated command and 

civil-military relationships, in which soldiers 

are sequestered from political affairs, with a 

far more integrated politico-military model 

consistent with Carl von Clausewitz’s observation that war cannot be separated from politics or policy.

Normal theory took hold under the 

intellectual influence of Samuel Huntington, 

whose earlier classic, The Soldier and the 

State (1957), described how civilians maintained “objective control” over military professionals who were granted wide latitude to 

execute their primary responsibility, namely, 

the “management of violence.” Cohen juxtaposed against this traditional model a 

“Clausewitzian formula for civil-military 

relations . . . [in which] the statesman may 

legitimately interject himself in any aspect of 

war-making, although it is often imprudent 

for him to do so.”2

 Despite a “deep undercurrent of mutual mistrust” between statesmen 

and soldiers, Cohen argued, “[c]ivil-military 

relations must . . . be a dialogue of unequals 

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense 

University. Questions or comments may be directed to croninp@ndu.edu. Dr. Cronin thanks Allyn C. Buzzell, 

Director of Adeptus Associates, for his assistance in writing this paper.

in the absence of clear 

objectives, it is easy 

to confuse military 

activity with progress 

and difficult to judge 

how military operations 

fit into the overall civilmilitary effort
No. 234, October 2008 Strategic Forum 3

and the degree of civilian intervention in 

military matters a question of prudence, not 

principle, because principle properly opens 

the entire field of military activity to civilian 

scrutiny and direction.”3

Great wartime statesmen such as Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston 

Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion all probed 

into military affairs about which they presumably knew less than professional soldiers. 

In Gettysburg: The Final Fury, Bruce Catton 

wrote, “[t]he one strategist who realized [the 

Federal opportunity created by Lee’s invasion 

of the north] most clearly was that untaught, 

awkward, non-military man who could learn 

fast, and by the summer of 1863, he could 

understand a military equation as well as any 

man in America.”4

 Lincoln often argued military strategy with his generals, he stayed in 

touch with the battlefield by telegraph, and he 

was well aware of the primacy of his authority in wartime.

In such examples of great wartime 

statesmen, “[w]hat occurred between president or prime minister and general,” 

Cohen wrote, “was an unequal dialogue—

a dialogue, in that both sides expressed 

their views bluntly, indeed, sometimes 

offensively, and not once but repeatedly—

and unequal, in that the final authority of 

the civilian leader was unambiguous and 

unquestioned—indeed, in all cases stronger at the end of a war than it had been at 

the beginning.”5

Does an “unequal dialogue” in which 

civilian leaders hold the true power adequately describe contemporary civil-military 

relations? The nature of irregular warfare 

raises the question of whether our civilian 

(and military) leaders are sufficiently competent, given the asymmetric nature of the 

threat, to direct war efforts in a way that 

goes beyond reliance on simplistic rules of 

thumb. To succeed in such a complex undertaking, do our leaders not need to possess 

the attributes of the great war statesmen, 

including keen intuition, an eye for detail, 

an understanding of the unique context and 

larger political objective from which to judge 

military action, expert judgment and knowledge, and courage? If so, how can these 

qualities be developed in the next generation 

of civilian leaders?

The traditional notion of an unequal 

dialogue also raises issues regarding the 

power of civilian leaders to appoint military 

leaders. When is it appropriate for civilians 

to dismiss military leaders? Conversely, when 

is it appropriate for military officers to register dissent or, in extreme cases, to resign? 

Has the inherently political nature of irregular warfare unduly politicized our military 

leadership and forces, undercutting the separation of military officers and soldiers from 

political affairs?

And finally, are modern forms of communication and the democratization of the 

media at odds with military discipline and the 

traditional notions of the chain of command 

on which the safety and effectiveness of the 

warfighter—and his insulation from political 

advocacy—rest?

Nature of Irregular 

Warfare

Defining the types of engagements 

the United States is likely to face in the 

21st century helps frame the discussion. 

An insurgency is generally defined as a 

drawn-out political-military campaign 

by an organized nonstate movement that 

seeks to displace a government and control the population and resources of a country or region. Effective counterinsurgency, 

therefore, requires in-depth local, political, 

and cultural knowledge and influence that 

enable the affected government to mobilize the support of its people and resist the 

insurgency.

The Army’s revised Counterinsurgency

field manual, whose preparation was overseen by General David Petraeus, then U.S. 

commander of Multi-National Force–Iraq, 

and the Marine Corps’ counterpart publication embody these notions and challenge the military to think differently about 

the conduct of counterinsurgency (COIN) 

operations. These operations require the 

“synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 

and civic actions.”6

 Prevailing in these types 

of engagements, according to the manual, 

requires integrating forces into the civilian 

population and using both controlled force to 

protect local nationals and soft tools such as 

street money, jobs, humanitarian assistance, 

and construction projects to gain trust and 

cooperation.

Irregular, or asymmetric, warfare is an 

even wider phenomenon and may involve 

the notion of armed nationbuilding. It too 

requires a set of tools that combines military force with political and cultural influence to stabilize a government or replace 

it with leaders and institutions that coexist more peacefully and successfully in the 

world community.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have 

shown that irregular warfare breaks from traditional understanding of how military and 

civilian leaders should each contribute to the 

overall effort:

n Irregular warfare is profoundly political and not winnable in the traditional 

sense. There is no distinct point at which 

surrender is accepted or victory is declared. 

Instead, success is recognized when 

military operations transition, often subtly, 

to law enforcement and reconciliation. This 

characteristic makes it difficult to measure 

progress.

n Irregular warfare is intensely local. 

When attempting to direct forces and 

resources, it is not possible to form a theaterwide perspective, as commanders were able 

has the inherently 

political nature of 

irregular warfare 

unduly politicized our 

military leadership and 

forces, undercutting the 

separation of military 

officers and soldiers from 

political affairs?
4 Strategic Forum No. 234, October 2008

to do in previous conventional wars. Afghanistan has been described by one military 

leader as a valley-by-valley war. Iraq, or Bosnia in the previous decade, could be similarly described as a region-by-region, or even 

a town-by-town, war. Tactics are driven by 

local conditions, cultural and ethnic sensibilities, and the local religious leaders and 

other characters who wield their own peculiar brand of influence in a particular place. 

This characteristic makes it difficult to 

choose the right leaders and coordinate military and civilian tasks.

n Irregular warfare is of long duration. 

In fact, many military strategists view the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as merely tactical fights in a larger, global insurgency that 

is likely to take decades to defeat. With such 

an open-ended time horizon, it is difficult 

for senior political leadership to keep a sustained and steady focus on the demands of the 

engagement.

This was not the case when the United 

States entered the World Wars of the 20th century. For a relatively brief but intense period 

of time, the country mobilized to defeat the 

enemy, and a “wartime economy” supported 

the national effort. During an irregular war, 

many aspects of public life at home continue as in peacetime. Senior political leadership is likely to be distracted by domestic 

issues unrelated to the war, such as economic dislocations, national crises, or campaigns for elective office. The long nature of 

irregular warfare makes it difficult to sustain 

leadership continuity and focus and raises a 

range of military and civilian manpower and 

training issues.

These aspects of irregular warfare create a thorny set of challenges for both military and civilian leaders as they take up 

their respective, complementary responsibilities.7

 The answers to these challenges are not 

found in studying past wars or even the Cold 

War. As shown in the following paragraphs, 

however, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 

do reveal a number of challenges in civilmilitary relations whose solutions require 

fresh thinking.

Measuring Progress

In irregular warfare or a counterinsurgency action, there are no front lines, making it more difficult to assess progress toward 

military and strategic goals and objectives. 

While all agree regarding the relative difficulty of measuring progress, there is disagreement about its feasibility—and even its utility—in an enterprise that is “shot through” 

with cultural and political components that 

do not readily lend themselves to objective 

measurement.

Nevertheless, political leaders crave 

data to make sense of a war they have 

authorized and to maintain public support. 

In the May 2007 legislation funding the 

war in Iraq, Congress included language 

setting up benchmarks that defined “success” and requiring periodic reports to Congress by the top U.S. military commander 

and Ambassador in Iraq. Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle indicated 

that their continued support would depend 

on credible evidence of tangible military 

progress and signs that the Iraqis were taking steps to reconcile their ethno-sectarian 

differences, share power and resources, and 

establish a functioning government and 

adequate security forces. The war-funding legislation also demanded additional 

assessments measuring progress in other 

areas, such as reconstruction.

Military commanders are adept at measuring kinetic progress. General Petraeus’ 

reports to Congress on the situation in Iraq 

featured numerous charts detailing such 

things as the number of attacks, the number of civilian deaths, trends in U.S. military 

casualties, and the number of Iraqi security forces trained and ready. General Petraeus also presented financial data, such as 

how much money the Army paid to Iraqi citizens under the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program to lure them away from 

sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing.

Ambassador Ryan Crocker’s companion 

reports to Congress on political, economic, 

and diplomatic developments presented 

some measurable data but emphasized more 

his “most honest assessment of the situation in Iraq and the implications for the 

United States.”8

 Crocker cited numerous 

examples of where “the seeds of reconciliation are being planted” and reiterated that 

he is “constantly assessing our efforts and 

seeking to ensure that they are coordinated 

with, and complementary to, the efforts of 

our military.”9

These assessment and data collection 

efforts have indeed been useful in the public discussion about the war. But the fact 

remains that the attempt to measure political and cultural progress, fundamental facets of irregular warfare, is largely anecdotal, 

comprising specific projects or individual 

reports. Nevertheless, Ambassador Crocker 

acknowledged that “questions are sensible 

when a nation invests in and sacrifices for 

another country and people,” but that “we 

must not lose sight of the vital interests the 

United States has in a successful outcome 

in Iraq.”10

Some experts point to successful efforts 

to collect quantifiable information about the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—and argue 

that metrics are a useful management tool 

necessary for informed decisionmaking. But 

there is not a consensus on that point. Others believe that leaders may fall back on 

quantitative measures and that the quest for 

metrics keeps them from comprehending the 

political and strategic issues that drive counterinsurgency actions and irregular warfare. 

Most data collection efforts necessarily focus 

on kinetic events such as the number of suicide bombings; dramatic public events such 

as elections or street demonstrations; and 

inputs such as the amount of money spent 

the attempt to measure 

political and cultural 

progress, fundamental 

facets of irregular 

warfare, is largely 

anecdotal, comprising 

specific projects or 

individual reports
No. 234, October 2008 Strategic Forum 5

on the war. None of these data points serves 

well in determining what we really need to 

know, which is outputs—or what we are 

getting from the military, political, cultural, 

and diplomatic efforts we are making and 

the money we are spending.

Some strategists who are suspicious of 

metrics further believe that leaders may hide 

behind charts and numbers because the tangibility of things they can count helps reassure them in the midst of uncertainty and 

unpredictability. Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan have given variable pictures of reality—

sometimes informative, sometimes distorting. 

In this view, metrics are best seen as illustrative and suggestive, not accurate portraits of 

reality and not predictive. Tracking violence 

falling or rising, for instance, can be particularly misleading, as the surge suggested.

Bernard Fall proposed a novel measurement of progress that counted taxes collected 

from the Vietnamese citizenry by the French 

during the First Indochina War. But we clearly 

do not have fine enough metric tools to allow 

us to objectively measure all the facets of an 

irregular war, weigh the relative importance 

of each data element, and identify with some 

level of certainty when we have succeeded. 

Nevertheless, no business would thrive without knowing how it is doing, and so finding a 

way to honestly gauge the output of the military and civilian work done in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other counterinsurgencies remains a 

sought-after objective.

Choosing Who Should 

Lead

The quality of leadership has always 

been a pivotal factor in the conduct of war. 

But in irregular warfare, the desired abilities and traits of military leaders may differ from past understandings of the nature 

of wartime leadership. Some observe that, 

in conventional warfare, military leaders 

have needed something akin to engineering “smarts” as they employ troops and 

the tools of war to systematically plan tactics, win battles, and build a victory. Irregular warfare, in contrast, puts a much higher 

premium on civil and political “smarts” in 

addition to the traditional skills of a military tactician.

In the United States, top military officials and commanders on the ground serve 

at the pleasure of the President. The choice of 

those leaders is influenced by who is available 

in the chain of command as well as political, strategic, and personal considerations. 

As the demands of leadership in the Iraq War 

intensified, the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefly 

attempted to devise specific job descriptions 

for general officers and others in the highest echelons of the uniformed Services, again 

mirroring a common practice in business. 

Although that effort was ultimately set aside in 

favor of more pressing concerns, the exercise 

yielded a deeper understanding about the personality characteristics and skill sets needed 

to successfully prosecute an irregular war, 

both from Washington and in theater.

According to one top military leader, 

effective leadership comes down to one thing: 

trust. As noted in the Army’s COIN field manual, those leading a war effort need the ability 

to work together—both among themselves in 

the “unity of command”11 and with political 

and civilian officials in a “unity of effort.”12 A 

collaborative personality, flexibility, adaptiveness, innovative thinking, willingness to listen, and mutual respect are among the traits 

that come to the fore in the execution of an 

enterprise that is, in the end, more a political 

enterprise than a military one.

Regardless of their respective talents, 

today’s military leaders up and down the 

ranks face a number of new pressures with 

which they must contend and that challenge the command and control structure on 

which an effective military force stands. These 

include the following:

Politicization of War. How far political leaders should go to intervene in military 

matters is a question that becomes even more 

problematic in the uncertain environment of 

irregular warfare. Going back to Eliot Cohen’s 

notion of “prudence versus principle,” the 

question is raised whether prudence points in 

the direction of more or less civilian intervention in military decisionmaking.

The most important function of civilian 

leadership is to ask the difficult questions. It 

is, however, rare for people to ask first-order 

questions that challenge underlying assumptions. Instead, there is a tendency to get distracted by details. The President and senior 

defense officials should vigorously examine 

the conclusions and advice of military leaders, 

and Congress should ask hard questions as 

well. Unfortunately, during the multiple congressional hearings on the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the level of discussion needed for 

serious analysis is often reduced to partisan 

wrangling. Visits to the theater by groups of 

elected leaders have been helpful in developing perspective and providing an opportunity 

for more informed political debate.

Although not a phenomenon unique to 

irregular war, elected leaders and civilian 

defense officials may believe that they have to 

use lofty rhetoric and articulate noble goals 

to “sell” the mission to a skeptical public. It 

then falls to military leaders to assume the 

role of pragmatists, putting events into perspective and tamping down unrealistic expectations. During testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, General Petraeus 

engaged in this sort of management of expectations when he answered a Senator’s question 

about U.S. goals. Petraeus stated, “Ambassador Crocker and I, for what it’s worth, have 

typically seen ourselves as minimalists. We’re 

not after the Holy Grail in Iraq; we’re not after 

Jeffersonian democracy. We’re after conditions 

that would allow our soldiers to disengage.”13

In discussing an irregular war with political leaders and the public, the danger appears 

of a mismatch between the rationale stated 

by the President and civilian defense and 

finding a way to honestly 

gauge the output of 

the military and civilian 

work done in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and other 

counterinsurgencies 

remains a sought-after 

objective
6 Strategic Forum No. 234, October 2008

national security officials and the pragmatic 

caution of military commanders. The result 

is confusion about whether the war is being 

“won” and an erosion of political resolve. The 

war in Iraq revealed a need for better articulation in the public forum that the military will 

help set the conditions for victory but will not 

win in the conventional sense—that a successful outcome depends on leveraging all the 

instruments of national power in a sustained 

effort that produces an enduring strategic 

partnership with the host country.

Soldier’s Code. The Soldier’s Code 

embodies the common ethos that a military 

member expresses dissent, based on legitimate 

facts, in private to one’s superiors and away 

from the public eye. Once a tactical or other 

decision is made, the soldier must desist and 

implement the decision to the best of his ability, regardless of whether it reflects his dissent. 

Thus, the code provides an avenue for constructive dissent, but it is not open-ended.

Many experienced military officers 

believe that the Soldier’s Code may need to 

be revitalized among both the leadership and 

the ranks. Seasoned military professionals 

believe the code is essential to maintaining 

discipline and is just as relevant in irregular 

warfare as in a conventional war or peacetime. If dissent is expressed openly, especially 

in the media, or is pursued beyond recognized boundaries, force morale and discipline 

may quickly break down.

Dissent. An irregular war is more prone 

than a major conventional war to be perceived 

by the public as an elective undertaking by the 

U.S. Government. To the extent it is seen in 

that light, there will be extensive public discussion of its motives and merits. Because 

the Soldier’s Code prohibits military leaders 

from expressing dissent in public, they can be 

accused of kowtowing to political leaders as 

opposed to providing their best professional 

advice. Even the effect of a national election 

may be seen as preemptively steering policy, 

apart from the exigencies of the war.

Clearly, military officers have always had 

their own political opinions. In an address 

to the New York legislature on June 26, 

1775, George Washington argued, “When we 

assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the 

Citizen.” However, military officers are obligated to provide their best professional judgment, but in the end, to follow the orders of 

the President. They can register dissent within 

the bounds of the Soldier’s Code, but it is less 

clear how far the military can go to question 

the nature of the conflict itself.

These issues were explored by H.R. 

McMaster in a book on the political and military decisions that led to the Vietnam War. 

In Dereliction of Duty, Colonel McMaster discusses whether U.S. military leaders 

should have more aggressively challenged 

the President and Secretary of Defense on 

what many of them came to believe was a 

flawed military strategy.

The advisory role of top military leaders 

was clarified in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 

Under that law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are 

the primary military advisors to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. The statute charged the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with providing the 

full range of military advice and opinion on a 

given matter. The statute also fostered greater 

unity of command among the Armed Forces 

and created a mechanism by which dissenting 

opinions by any of the Joint Chiefs other than 

the Chairman would be presented along with 

the Chairman’s advice. However, some senior 

military officers believe that the law, despite 

its intention, concentrated too much authority in the Chairman and resulted in a level 

of advocacy unhelpful to the development of 

sound strategy and operational planning by 

military commanders on the ground.

In the context of these issues, would it be 

a dereliction of duty for Active-duty military 

officers to give voice to their doubts about the 

wisdom of an operation? Dereliction of duty is 

a violation of military law involving the failure to perform expected duties. If military 

officers have grave reservations about the wisdom of a strategy or tactic, some hold the view 

that these officers have a moral obligation 

that goes beyond their constitutional obligation to obey civilian authority and their duty 

under military law to obey an order.

Similarly, would it be an act of moral 

courage for military officers to resign when 

they believe that a course of action is a dangerous folly or, worse, based on false claims? 

Here again, the intensely political nature of 

irregular warfare makes it more likely that 

military leaders will face crises of conscience 

that could lead to resignation.

To the extent that public opinion about 

a counterinsurgency operation or irregular 

war tends to become polarized, military officers are exposed to pressures that can compromise their effectiveness and cause a breakdown in force efficiency and discipline. The 

nature of their obligations under the Constitution and military law, especially in an irregular war, may need clarification through additional education and training.

Information Technology. The level 

playing field for information and opinion created by the Internet and encouraged by contemporary American culture has further politicized war. Anyone with a thought or a video 

camera can distribute words and images 

across the globe for access by anyone. This 

democratization of the media has created 

endless temptations for soldiers, especially 

younger ones, to express their views from the 

battlespace via social networking sites, emails, 

and blogs, activities that can be at odds with 

military discipline and, in some cases, force 

security. Unfettered access to the Internet may 

also conflict with traditional notions of decorum, confidentiality, and security in the civilian Foreign Service.

The Army has adopted military blogging 

rules to counter the security risks associated 

with “war diaries” and other personal writings 

posted online. Generally, all blog postings must 

the war in Iraq revealed 

a need for better 

articulation in the 

public forum that the 

military will help set the 

conditions for victory 

but will not win in the 

conventional sense
No. 234, October 2008 Strategic Forum 7

be vetted by a superior officer, and the Army 

reserves the right to shut down a blog if it is 

deemed to compromise discipline or security.

Despite these measures, it is clear that 

putting the media in the hands of soldiers, 

both at home and in a war zone, entices some 

military members to express their opinions 

more freely than military norms have allowed 

in the past. As such, the information revolution presents new challenges for force protection and discipline that have not been encountered in previous wars.

Chain of Command. On a daily 

operational level, senior military officers have 

noticed a greater expectation among junior 

officers to participate in senior-level discussions about strategies and tactics and to have 

their views heard and considered. Educational 

and cultural factors, as well as the environment of irregular warfare, may be working to 

alter accepted chain of command practices.

For example, one of the paradoxes 

of a counterinsurgency operation is that 

“many important decisions are not made by 

generals.”14 According to the Counterinsurgency manual:

Successful COIN operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and 

Marines at all levels. Indeed, young leaders—so-called “strategic corporals”—

often make decisions at the tactical level 

that have strategic consequences. . . . Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires 

more than just mastering Service doctrine; 

they must also be trained and educated to 

adapt to their local situations, understand 

the legal and ethical implications of their 

actions, and exercise initiative and sound 

judgment in accordance with their senior 

commanders’ intent.15

Small fissures in the chain of command 

may also be appearing because junior officers, like younger soldiers in general, tend to 

be facile with the Internet and more outspoken about their views than their predecessors. 

Some of them are also politically organized, 

and a growing number have entered the public dialogue by voicing their views through the 

print, broadcast, and electronic media.

Experienced military leaders believe 

that these trends could portend erosion in 

the norms of professional ethics and that 

steps should be taken to reemphasize respect 

for the chain of command. At the same time, 

there is support for creating mechanisms 

that encourage and provide channels for 

healthy debate among professional soldiers 

at all levels.

Personnel Development. Irregular 

warfare requires the military to adapt its education and training programs to the situations 

that soldiers are likely to face as they conduct 

counterinsurgency operations and postconflict 

stabilization activities. Officers emerge from 

these programs better prepared to blend military tactics with awareness of the social and 

political dimensions of their activities. Military officer education and training programs, 

at both the undergraduate and professional 

levels, now address civil-military relationships 

and frameworks for building cooperation, 

communication, and mutual trust with civilian partners.

These military education programs 

have room for non–Defense Department 

officers. One promising approach is for 

civilians from the State Department, intelligence services, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Agency for International 

Development, and other agencies involved 

in foreign affairs to attend military courses 

that prepare officers for the blended responsibilities of an irregular war. Coming 

together in common educational settings 

can promote acculturation between military and civilian personnel who will interact in the field.

A related issue for the civilian diplomatic 

and development corps is an urgent need for 

more personnel. With some success, the Army 

has been rebuilding during wartime, shoring 

up its recruiting programs and offering incentives to reenlist. The executive branch, in contrast, has not asked for an increase in State 

Department staff, despite the fact that 20 percent of existing positions are unfilled and 

that there is a shortfall of staff to handle incountry assignments.

Not unlike their military counterparts, 

civilian agencies also contend with internal 

cultural issues that may lessen their effectiveness as partners in a counterinsurgency operation. Most civilian personnel are trained 

and equipped to handle program management and crisis response activities, with little emphasis on strategic analysis and adaptive thinking on the ground. COIN operations 

require more multifunctional, cross-sector 

diplomatic and development staff (as opposed 

to specialists) who are lateral thinkers and 

“integrated designer-strategists” capable 

of applying novel approaches to resourcing 

and collaborating with a variety of actors in 

uncertain situations. These issues are beginning to be addressed under Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice’s concept of “transformational diplomacy.”

On both the military and civilian sides, 

better foreign language capabilities to manage 

the human dimensions of irregular warfare 

are sorely needed.

Integrating Civil-Military 

Relationships

Recent developments in the war in 

Iraq suggest that professional relationships, 

not organizational fixes, are essential to 

succeeding in an irregular war. This supposition has been borne out by the productive collaboration between General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Their offices 

were on the same hallway, and their physical proximity reflected a close partnership between the two leaders that produced a breakthrough in U.S. efforts to 

senior military officers 

have noticed a greater 

expectation among junior 

officers to participate in 

senior-level discussions 

about strategies and 

tactics and to have 

their views heard and 

considered
8 Strategic Forum No. 234, October 2008

stabilize the country, quell extremist activity, and restore a functioning government 

and society in the fifth year of the war. The 

importance of skillful integration of effort 

between the senior American official in 

country and the top military commander 

in theater has likewise been demonstrated 

in Afghanistan.

Why the importance of civil-military relationships is elevated in an irregular war goes back to the mosaic nature of 

counterinsurgency operations. According to 

the Army’s Counterinsurgency field manual, “Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing 

the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.”16 Participants in a 

COIN operation include not only military 

personnel but also diplomats, politicians, 

medical and humanitarian aid workers, 

reconstruction workers, security personnel, narcotics officers, contractors, translators, and local leaders. All these diverse 

players must share common overall aims 

and effectively communicate as they perform complementary and sometimes conflicting tasks.

The interaction and coordination that 

must take place in irregular warfare require 

mutual respect and leadership from the top 

down, both in the field and in Washington. 

Achieving this level of cooperation between 

two fundamentally different cultures is one 

of the challenges of an irregular war. Following are some of the issues that are in various 

stages of discussion and resolution.

Who Does What. Out on the streets of 

a counterinsurgency operation, the degree of 

civil-military integration is dictated by conditions on the ground and available resources. 

According to the Counterinsurgency manual, “Political, social, and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian organizations 

and expertise; however, effective implementation of these programs is more important 

than who performs the tasks.”17 In the frequently dangerous environment of an irregular war, soldiers may be the only personnel in 

the area. As a result, they may be called upon 

to render aid to local nationals and perform 

other services and tasks that are at the heart 

of a counterinsurgency operation.

“Soldiers and Marines are expected to be 

nation builders as well as warriors,” instructs 

Counterinsurgency.

18 One of the turning points 

in the war in Iraq was the engagement by military commanders in a dialogue with insurgent 

groups and tribal leaders. According to General 

Petraeus, “we employed non-kinetic means to 

exploit the opportunities provided by the conduct 

of our kinetic operations—aided in this effort 

by the arrival of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRTs].”19

PRTs are under military command and 

include civilian personnel and contractors 

engaged in construction and development 

missions. Among other things, the military 

provides a security envelope in which the PRT 

can safely operate. One of the primary roles 

of the teams is to work with local officials to 

institute good governance practices and economic development capacity.

General Petraeus’ statement about cooperative civil-military missions suggests a kind 

of handoff of certain tasks from military personnel to civilian workers when they become 

available, but also a recognition that, until that 

time, Soldiers and Marines will use all the tools 

at their disposal to achieve the political, social, 

and economic goals of a counterinsurgency 

operation. This accommodation, however, cannot be permanent or institutionalized. As Secretary Gates said in a recent speech, “The Foreign 

Service is not the Foreign Legion, and the U.S. 

military should never be mistaken for a Peace 

Corps with guns.”20

Civilian Operational Doctrine. 

Another concern that surfaced is the “hole” in 

doctrinal authority governing civilian activities in conjunction with military counterinsurgency operations in an irregular war. 

With no clear lanes of separation, civilian and 

military activities can be difficult to coordinate and may sometimes collide. U.S. civilian agencies involved in foreign affairs need 

to develop a doctrine to guide their own 

field operations—one that is tailored to the 

requirements of an irregular war, along the 

lines of, but distinct from, the Army’s Counterinsurgency field manual. Such an effort 

would build upon, and complement, recent 

efforts to develop clearer guidelines between 

U.S. military and nongovernmental humanitarian relief providers, who need to balance 

their own security requirements against a traditional approach that in some cases required 

them to retain the aura of impartiality among 

partisans in the fighting.

Planning and Resources. Some 

veteran Foreign Service officials believe that, 

on the civilian side, we have failed so far to 

bring the same kind of analysis of goals and 

resources to bear in an irregular war that is 

standard practice on the military side. This 

lack of effective planning leads to a mismatch 

of civilian tools in the field and a shortage of 

Foreign Service staff empowered to make decisions and manage the complex tasks associated with in-country stabilization and assistance activities.

Part of the problem may be cultural differences between how military and civilian 

planners approach problems and the nature 

of the problems they tackle. On one side, the 

military culture operates under the concept 

that, when we see a problem, we fix it. On the 

civilian side, the emphasis is more on managing issues that we know cannot be completely 

resolved. To engage effectively in coordinated 

planning, each side should recognize the 

value of the other’s approach and find common ground.

Although military planning is a wellhoned discipline, the runup to the war in 

Iraq revealed a flaw that may be endemic 

to irregular war. Under well-established 

planning precepts, when a war is contemU.S. civilian agencies 

involved in foreign 

affairs need to develop 

a doctrine to guide their 

own field operations—

one that is tailored to 

the requirements of an 

irregular war
No. 234, October 2008 Strategic Forum 9

plated, the initial discussions between civilian defense and military leaders should pin 

down the nature of the conflict, and from 

that discussion, realistic goals and objectives based on U.S. national interests may be 

derived. The initial failure to understand the 

political, cultural, and human dimensions 

of the conflict put U.S. forces at a severe disadvantage. In the Iraq War, defense planners 

initially erred when they took a maximalist approach to setting goals and objectives 

while taking a minimalist approach to allocating resources.

Mistakes and Self-criticism. Some 

civilian officials believe that the agencies 

involved in diplomacy and development tend 

to avoid self-criticism and are generally loath 

to rethink a program midstream or learn 

from their mistakes. This is an ingrained cultural trait that makes them less responsive 

and adaptive to unexpected developments, a 

real handicap in the uncertain environment 

of irregular war.

The Army has worked hard to offset this 

all-too-human tendency. An internal history 

published in June 2008 entitled On Point II

“testifies to the Army’s strength as a learning organization.”21 The U.S. Army Combat 

Studies Institute study covered the 18-month 

period immediately following the overthrow of 

the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, from May 2003 to 

January 2005, during which the Army had to 

essentially reinvent itself by transforming into 

an organization capable of conducting diverse 

and complex “full-spectrum operations.”22

According to David Ignatius, rather than 

blame civilian leaders or pursue failing tactics, the “Army developed a new doctrine for 

fighting a counterinsurgency; it learned how 

to work with Iraqi tribal leaders; it pursued 

al-Qaeda into every village of Iraq; it experimented with soft power by working closely 

with Provincial Reconstruction Teams.”23

Ignatius called the Army “that rare institution in American life” that puts into practice “philosopher George Santayana’s maxim 

that ‘those who cannot learn from history are 

doomed to repeat it.’”24

U.S. diplomatic and development officers 

see a need to ingrain in agency planning and 

analysis procedures the notion that it is not 

a weakness, but a strength, to engage in selfanalysis and internal criticism.

Headquarters versus Field. Both 

diplomatic and foreign assistance officials 

worry about the politicization of foreign aid 

and reconstruction programs overseas. Among 

the symptoms are the undue centralization of 

authority in Washington, excessive micromanagement from headquarters, and a shortfall 

of manpower and fiscal tools to support the 

Country Team.

Overall, there is a tendency in a centralized structure to pursue high-level strategy 

changes to solve a problem in the field. This 

tendency is reinforced by bureaucratic sensitivities to congressional oversight and Government 

Accountability Office standards that can be 

unforgiving when it comes to potential waste, 

fraud, and abuse, even in irregular conflicts. 

This only increases the illusion that headquarters is exercising control. In the end, policy issues are “resolved” and implementation 

issues remain unfixed. In particular, field staff 

has been constrained by its inability, first, to 

hire the right personnel who will have enough 

time in country to foster local relationships and 

an understanding of political, social, and economic needs; and, second, to sign contracts in 

the field to effectively “move money” to where it 

is needed. These procedural mechanisms need 

to be fixed in order to provide greater flexibility 

and responsiveness.

In a critique of the development and current practice of U.S. security cooperation programs, Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly wrote that many of the authorities and 

instruments for engagement already exist. 

However, “they may be more effectively harnessed if leadership is devolved from Washington to the ‘frontline country team,’ in which 

the ambassador is responsible for coordinating 

and directing American policy.”25

In an irregular war, in which field staff 

must effectively interact with military forces, 

other civilian agencies, and host country and 

alliance organizations, attention should also 

be given to empowering midlevel staff closest 

to the issues and opportunities presented by 

the engagement. There is a pressing need for 

more expeditionary officers empowered to 

make decisions in the field.

Funding Allocation. The military’s 

responsibilities in irregular warfare have led to 

a shift in budgetary resources for foreign assistance programs. A July 2008 report by Washington, DC–based Refugees International, entitled U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global 

Engagement, warned that U.S. aid to Africa 

is becoming increasingly “militarized,” favoring kinetic operations to restore order and protect populations over long-term development 

projects aimed at the root causes of terrorism, 

genocide, and displacement.26 According to the 

report, the percentage of development assistance controlled by the Pentagon went from 

3.5 percent to nearly 22 percent during the past 

decade, while the U.S. Agency for International 

Development’s share of development assistance 

declined from 65 percent to 40 percent.27

Some believe that change in budget allocation has made the United States a “profoundly unbalanced power.” The Defense 

Department’s assistance budget now dwarfs 

that of State, even though Federal spending on 

international affairs has almost doubled since 

2001. Much of this increase, however, has 

been designated for security assistance costs 

and is offset by the declining dollar, leaving 

far too little for core diplomatic operations.

Secretary Gates frequently voices his 

concerns about the risk of “creeping militarization” of some aspects of U.S. foreign policy. This was one of his points in a recent 

speech when he stated, “It has become clear 

that America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded far 

too long—relative to what we traditionally 

spend on the military, and more importantly, 

relative to the responsibilities and challenges 

the initial failure to 

understand the political, 

cultural, and human 

dimensions of the 

conflict put U.S. forces at 

a severe disadvantage
10 Strategic Forum No. 234, October 2008

our nation has around the world.”28 A year 

earlier, a Reuters article quoted Gates as saying, “The non-military instruments of America’s national power need to be rebuilt, modernized, and committed to the fight.”29 Gates 

has likewise frequently been on record in 

interviews and testimony as advocating a 

new approach to making use of the full 

range of national power to “deal with the 

challenges to our freedom, prosperity, and 

security around the globe.”30

Virtual Communications. Advancements in telecommunications have brought 

fundamental changes in how civilian and military leaders manage a war—and the potential 

for tipping the fragile balance between civilian 

and military authority. Although virtual meetings can help promote better communications, 

teleconferencing in wartime may create a misleading sense of immediacy and provide the 

illusion of headquarters control that may not 

reflect reality. There is also the danger of civilian leaders crossing the line and interfering in 

tactical areas that should be the province of 

professional soldiers. The ability to “beam” into 

a conference room but “tune out” what is being 

said is all too real. The fact that most teleconferences are run on Eastern Standard Time also 

may result in the disruption of staff cycles for 

the key players who have to prepare for and 

participate in the conferences.

How telecommunications technology 

potentially changes the nature of civil-military relationships is a matter that bears further scrutiny. Both military and civilian leaders agree, however, that there is no substitute 

for developing face-to-face relationships based 

on trust and for observing first-hand developments on the ground.

Maintaining Strategic 

Patience

The world is on a 24-hour news cycle, 

but an irregular war is a lengthy undertaking 

that requires strategic patience and steadiness 

of purpose. Political leaders naturally want to 

avoid explaining this fact to the citizenry, who 

generally prefer quick results with as few sacrifices as necessary. Because of this tension 

between public expectations and operational 

reality, the President and civilian defense leaders may push military commanders beyond 

their comfort zone in terms of strategy, manpower, and equipment, creating internal friction between the civilian and military leaders 

responsible for the war.

Even within the military, strategic 

patience is a virtue not completely mastered. 

Military leaders, with their ingrained willingness to shoulder difficult tasks, may deemphasize how long it will take for counterinsurgency operations to bear fruit. They will 

also, quite naturally, be concerned about the 

opportunity costs that long-term employments 

impose on their ability to reset and adapt to 

meet other operational requirements. In their 

efforts to motivate troops to accomplish difficult and dangerous tasks, they may not effectively communicate the length of the commitment and the uneven progress military forces 

are likely to encounter.

The realization that an irregular war is 

a long march creates gaps between expectation and reality on the civilian side as well. 

Agency appointments in country are generally for a year or less, while efforts to restore 

stability within a traumatized and displaced 

population can go on indefinitely. Diplomatic and development personnel on overseas 

assignments may become frustrated unless 

they understand the long-term horizon under 

which they must necessarily labor. For example, a military justice law for Afghanistan, 

devised under the guidance of the U.S. Ambassador working with Afghan officials, took 4 

years to legislate.

Because of the complex nature of 

irregular war, it takes time to build a sense 

of progress, and we leave ourselves open to 

a sense of failure if we neglect to see the 

long-term horizon. It will take both strategic success and political skill to explain 

the long-term nature of irregular war and 

develop a consensus that the United States 

and its allies have little choice but to make 

that commitment.

Managing Relations

The mandate to cooperate in an irregular war becomes more problematic and 

complex in an alliance structure, such as 

the multinational coalition in Iraq and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance 

in Afghanistan. Never in the history of alliances has the ideal of completely seamless 

interaction been attained. The first Gulf War 

demonstrated a high degree of cooperation 

with coalition members, but that war had 

limited objectives and did not slide into the 

sloppier and more political phase of irregular war.

As a result, we are learning as we go 

how to coordinate U.S. military and civilian 

activities with multinational partners and 

host governments. U.S. efforts to manage 

coalition and alliance relations are based on 

several premises:

n Working with allies is always problematic but preferable on burdensharing grounds 

to independent action.

n Working with the host government is 

both a constraint and a necessity.

n The ultimate objective is transition of 

authority to a stable host government, supported by competent security forces, capable of meeting the needs of the populace and 

providing the basic infrastructure to support 

economic development growth. Successfully 

managing transitional relationships with 

both host government officials and security 

forces is, therefore, a priority. Military transition training of host country security forces 

and coaching, training, and mentoring of 

it will take both strategic 

success and political skill 

to explain the long-term 

nature of irregular war 

and develop a consensus 

that the United States 

and its allies have little 

choice but to make that 

commitment
No. 234, October 2008 Strategic Forum 11

local officials are critical contributions to 

postconflict stabilization.

In the search for the right balance 

between military and civilian contributions—between command and leadership—

in an irregular war, much has been learned 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Gates 

acknowledges that “the lines separating war, 

peace, diplomacy, and development have 

become more blurred, and no longer fit the 

neat organizational charts of the 20th century,” but that “[a]ll the various elements 

and stakeholders working in the international arena—military and civilian, government and private—have learned to stretch 

outside their comfort zone to work together 

and achieve results.”31

Although there has been undeniable 

progress in rebalancing the capability portfolios of each of the players, all the problems have yet to be resolved. What is clear 

is that the world will continue to look to the 

United States for leadership. How to best bring 

together America’s civilian and military assets 

to protect our national interests and support 

our alliances and local partners is an essential conversation that should be continued.

Notes

1 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, 

Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: 

The Free Press, 2002), 241–242.

2 Ibid., 8.

3 Ibid., 12.

4 Bruce Catton, Gettysburg: The Final Fury

(New York: Berkley Books, 1976), 7.

5 Cohen, 209.

6 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Army, 

December 2006), 5–1, available at <www.fas.org/irp/

doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>.

7 For an extended discussion on irregular and 

modern warfare, see Patrick M. Cronin, ed., The 

Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern 

Warfare and Strategic Surprise (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).

8 Ryan C. Crocker, “Report to the U.S. House of 

Representatives on the Situation in Iraq,” presented 

before a joint hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2007.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 U.S. Army, 2–2.

12 Ibid., 2–3.

13 Anna Mulrine, “General David Petraeus Gives 

Congress a Sobering Report on Iraq,” U.S. News & 

World Report, April 11, 2008.

14 U.S. Army, 1–28.

15 Ibid.

16 U.S. Army, 2–1.

17 Ibid., 2–2.

18 Ibid., foreword.

19 David H. Petraeus, “Report to Congress on the 

Situation in Iraq,” September 10, 2007.

20 Robert M. Gates, speech before U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, Washington, DC, July 15, 2008.

21 See David Ignatius, “An Army That Learns,” The 

Washington Post, July 13, 2008.

22 Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Rees, On 

Point II: Transition to the New Campaign—The 

United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute, June 2008), available at 

<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/OP2.asp>.

23 Ignatius.

24 Ibid.

25 Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, The 

Frontline Country Team: A Model for Engagement

(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, June 

2008), foreword.

26 Refugees International, press release, July 17, 

2008.

27 Ibid.

28 Gates, speech.

29 “Gates Calls for Rebuilding of U.S. Development 

Agencies,” Reuters, July 18, 2007.

30 Gates, speech.

31 Ibid.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

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INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Patrick M. Cronin

James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
12 Strategic Forum No. 234, October 2008

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