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Artillery, artillery units, edumation, miliiqry training, warf~are

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66,.
If HISTORY

of the

Field Artillery School

KVolume I

1911-1942

Fort Sill, Oklahoma .

.p Ij
PR EFACE

This history could not have been written without the assistance of a number of people. This debt I take. pleasure in acknowledging. Lt. Philip A. McCarthy, FA, gathered the material on

the water problem at Fort Sill, on the Officer Candidate School,

where he was for many months a battalion commander, and on

liaison pilot training at the Field Artillery School, The information on the Gribeauval system was translated by him. In addition

to his help on research, he offered many suggestions which were ii

always most valuable. Lt. Margot Beim, WAC, furnished the

scholarly translations of German and French sources used in

Chapter One, Lt. Leslie W. Hatfield constructed the tables

found in the book and checked the statistical information, The

several departments of the School and the file section of Post

Headquarters were unfailingly sympathetic and helpful. Thanks

must also be given to Master Sergeant Morris Swett and Miss

Ethel Hays of the Library of the Field Artillery School for their A

help.

Fort Sill, Oklahoma RILEY SUNDER LAND

1942 lst Lt., FA

sil

..'

4 1<

~i

, ______
TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

Preface

CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY

From the Romans Through the Renaissance ................ , 1

Gustavus Adolphus . . . . . . .

Frederick the Great .... . , , , , . . ,. ,. ........... . 10

Gribeauval and the French Azntllery .. .. , .. ........ . 12

Napoleon .. . . . . . . . . .,, . .... . . 14

From Napoleon to the Late Nineteenth Century ........ .. ....... 16

The Modern Field Gun .. s........... .d. 18

CHAPTER TWO . .

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL 25 Artillery Schools Alter the. Civil War . . .,,....., 27 Z

The German Artillery School. .. ,.,..... .. 29......,,. 29

CHAPTER THREE • ".

SESTABLISHMENT ANDFIRST Y F E SC OOL 33

Securing Personnel and Water .. . ... . . .. "'" 34

The First Class and the Early Courses ......... . . .... . 37

Courses For Enlisted Men ...... , . . . , . , ........... 43 "

Table--Sumnmary of First Year of Operation . . . , . . , ......... 44

CHAPTER FOUR

FROM SECOND YEAR TO CLOSING IN 1916 45

Improving the Enlisted Course ...................... 47

Eviction and Closing of the School ................ .... 49 rable--Summary . . .. . . .. . . . . . . ... 51

CHAPTER FIVE

THE WAR YEARS 53

Buildingt•he Wartime School ... . 9 9.9..9.. .. ... 55

Further' Expansion .... . . .. .......... .. , . , . 59

The War Course . . ..... . . . . 9 60

A Section of the Front ... .. . .. ..... . . ..... 63

The School's Doctrine and Theory . ......... ..... . 63

Wartime Problems . .. .... . , . . . 65

Aerial Observer Training ....................... 68

The Artillery Training System 1917-1918. , .............. 68

Table--Sumr mary .................. .. ...... 72

iii

_j ;._ !
4 ..-.. 1

CHAPTER SIX

F1OM DEMOBILIZATION TO CONSOLIDATION 73

The First Postwar Course 74

Housing, 1919 Style 75

School Troops ................... 76

The Postwar Commandants .................. 77

Course Content: Technicalities and Trench Warfare .... 78

1920 .................. ..... . . ... . 78

Changing the School Year................... 80

The Old Museum. ....................... 83

Table -- Summary ... ......................... 84

""CHAPTER SEVEN CONSOLIDATION OF THE AR'TILLtRY S'CH0#A-.' 85"

The' Consolidation Opposed ........ ... 87.

Course -of fe red. ,... .,,, . . , .: 89

Organization of the I 8th FA .. . . . . ,.. , ... 91,

School Organization and Agencies ....... 91 Table--Graduate@ 19Z2-19123 94

C'C HPTER l2OHT

THE SCHOOL 3ECOMES PERMANENT: I 9Z430.

Civilian Component CorrepoAndence Coursea;. * 9

Resident Officer Specialist Courses , . . . , , .. ... . 97

Training Techniques . .. , . ,, ,. , , " .98

The HiOne andri Tranuportationi hoW* i . * . 104

The Summer Training Program .. , ... ,, 105

Methods of- Grading ....... , . , . , , 106 The School's Role in Formulating Artillery Doctrine , . 106

Organization and Related Matters . , . . . ,1 . *07, 

Houses and Firebugs ..... ..... .. 114 F

The Cruikehank Board ... .. ............ 116

Table--Graduates 19Z41 9Z ... ..... ........ . 118 . ;44

CHAPTER NINE

A NEW SCHOOL IN A NEW ARMY

The Plans .. .. .. .. .. . * . . . . .1. . 119

Effects of the Thirtios: Thet New'Deal, CCC, PWA 121

Reorganization of the Artillery; the School's Role .... 123

Tactical Concepts in the Thirties . . ........ 127 New Developments . ................. 128

'Training Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

oCourse Schedules . . . . . .,. . . I . .. . I 4 . . 1.7

R elationship of FAS to C&OS. ............... 137

Comments on Instructional Methods ........ 137

Course Changes . . . . . . . . . . 140

Caliber of the Students; Entrance Requirements . . . . . 142

iiio

P \
The School Troops . . . . . . . 144

Mounted Activities 1.45

Reestablishment of the Museum ...... ....... 146

Table--araduates 93D-1934• 147

CHAPTER TEN

FROM DISARMAMENT BY EXAMPLE TO MOBILIZATION

Developments in Maintenance ................. 149

Testing of Night Lights .................... 151

TOward a Better Prime Mover ................ 152

A etter Weap n . . . ,,, ,,,,,,+ ,.,.,.. .. 1,54

New Methods of Transfers of Firei Shells . . ........ ,165

Developments in Techniques'l' r.'"..m.. 4 I -#' s .. . -.. .a . . 157

Tactical Changes', ,;-i - .- 9.. , , : . .

"Courses and Instruction, 1935-1940 ........ . ', . . . . '"160

The Instructor Problem,.'. e'.'+.. .'v... .'. . .. . " '

Extension Course Growth.., , ... ,. ... . '1

The Training Literature Project, 1936-1940 ...... . , 167

Student Quotas and Requirements ......... , ..... 1706$

Two Commandants . . . , .. . . . .. 172,

Expansion of Mounted Activities 173

Capstruction, 1936-1940 ........ . ..... . . 176

The Water Problem ... . ...... 179

The School Troops, 1936-1940 . . . . . . ..........

Two Disturbin-g Problems 197

Table- -Graduates 193t-1939.... ..... ...... 190

THE FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL AND THE .IA

SECOND WORLD WAR (1940-1941)

Effectm of Initial War Efforts ........ ...... . 191

The School Troops . *... 193

Plan and Counterplan for Courses, June-July 1940 .. •., .196

The School Gets Under Way .z............... OO

A Few Comments on Organization 204

New Instruction: Methods and Content ........... 205

Arrival of the 45th; Housing; Organization . . ........ 207 I

More Fire Direction Improvements ............. 210

The School Hits its Prewar Stride .............. 211

Gunnery Innovations ........ ............. 216

Training Literature 218

The Officer Candidate School . 221

Students and Their Treatment .9 r9

Enlisted Specialists Courses .............. 230

iv

-'! '

¶ , -
Organizational Matter.., Fall 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Increasingand-Improving OCS . ..... ... . ... 234

Llal '"•.l~t.T rlr•Ig"-235 iu •i rapittTr- ai. n , . . . . *. . . .... . .. 235

FAS Publications . . .. ........... . . ..... 235

Table--Officer Candidate Classes . . . ........... 237

CHAPTER TWELVE

FOUR HUNDRED OFFICERS A WEEK (Jan-Jun, 1942) Growth of the OCS.. . . . . . . . ... 239

Demise of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery .. . . . 248

The School of 1942 ..... ................. 248

i I....... ............................ ,-: ,,••.....- I....... . • ' A * -I

Appplndix 1--Peacetime Training of Cv~lv, Componeats'a. ,,

S the: Field Artillery School....,.. . , .., . .1..... , 251

.Appendix I1- -Army Size and Expense Compare4I to. . . .

-National Population and Income .2.5... .- ,... -", 3... 3

: -, ' ,, -

S~. . . . . . . . . ..... . . ... , ' , . :. ''.. ."

001 tv

.0

..4

I'.

--.. ------------------------. ,

". -.-.-
CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT- OF FIELD AR TILLER 

Y

From the Romans Thrut~ he Renaiussane

The wordI la rtillery" in far older than modern guns using explosive shell. for it anciently referred to missile weapons of

any sort-. catapults, ballistae, machines of wood aand cord which

flung stone@ or darts, etc. The Romrans, according to Vegetium

and *the isauthoritleie, ný bade' use: of machine s'Iight esnough to

a ccompany the .Legjions ý in ithe 'ifield, triueý .4fie ld, ar-tille ry 

i

Each cetl fteein

8 Vgtu'tts'had * da~tthrdwihg

ballista drawn by muici served by 10,mem. it Ralve'direct'support

to the heavy-infantry. There were also" 10'antgriGra~n by~oxeni

to defend the-walls. of the, camnp. Caesar, when'in,04ding Britain,

used the balli'stas and catapult. of his sehips ~to dis*peroe the Britons

gathered- on, the beach to: dispute hij; landing,

The use of machines to cast incendiaries was wall kn~wn

- ~ in classic and meadieval times, -French cirusaders under St. Louis

and Moslems attacklftgConstsiftkitopia Wereboth ifii turn attacked

by Greek fire and wildfire. Dimn memorieso61 the! latter compound

survive in the expression "to burrilike wildfire,"1 Although often

most deadly, 'these compounds,' however-dlost'sbrae' of thern came

to being gtiipowde r- were inicelidiarioa, riot, explosive'., for they

burned progressivol'ý ond did not de'ton'ate inst attnedusly.

Modern scholars 1bave almost ended the belief that Chinese

or Arabs invented gunpowderý and. it, is thought more likely that

Roger Bacon (1Z14? -IZ94) was the inventor, One of the foundations 

I

for the belief is the solution by Lt. Col. H. W. L. Hirne of the

cipher in Chapters 9 and -10 of bacon's "'Epistolao de Secretis

Operibus Artis et Natu-rao et do Nullitate Magiac*" (which when

solved gives a method of refining saltpetre, one of'the three ingredients of guaipowdoer) and his solution of the anagram in Chapter 

*

11which givA a the corrct proportion* of 'the Ingredients of the

explosive. Last of all a fragment of one of Wrcon's m-anuscripts, the Opus -Tortiumn, I Z67, tells tha Pope of an explosive compound

FW., of sulphur, saltpetre, and charcoal then in general use, accordingii to Bacon.. The~ existence of the Holy Itiquisitiozi was motive enough
for Bacon to be exceedingly careful lest comtemporaries link his

name with such devilish arts as the making of explosives, and he

succeeded PQ wolllthat.only today ziýay we Oo fairly certain Bacon

invented gunpowder.

Theme matters may still be disputed by scholars, but we

do know that cannons were used early in the 14th century. By

1324 theywere uaaed in besieging Metz. One early picture of 

a

cannon Ca queer vase -like. affair shpoting a missile like a croms-,

bow bolt) is dated ;327. The English were using cannon against

the Scots in 1327 and the term "canon" was used in its modern

senu.,.~ ~ pbo. belthpfixtepomn.fcno _~9 n~

major confli;At wgap jItq Eng&sh s,oftoxheopbrst

Crecy ini th q.-pe.n.goih unrdYer'ar.tnte

Fran4~n :u1sh~~h~~se. is mientions 4 almnost casually in

coaits.ppr y French srps dmost. hiuteriAA8,..cre6dited: Engl~aharchp~ps itht ahVi~try whc anot suarprimingwhen4

the nýature of early,,pi~ces is 9po#4,dsrod,. Thierp is smome, reason

to-belioe.v that English qourcees pvefe rred, to. rntnixnte, he. role of

cannon in their victory; pakrtAin$,for.fpr any yearm -the attitude of

the chivalry was that expression to Hotspur in'Shakespeare's

Henryj rv-, 

*

I~~ 

' LI i 

.Andthat. it,.was g~pseat~pjty, soitwasj

That -'illanous qalk,,petre; shoualdbe *digg'd:

Out of t4.*. Aoesftb~mlaeate 

*

W~iph many,&a gpoo4 talt Wr~pUow had ... troy' 

d

He, would, hjmmO~f havebm on & . o04(er~

br,. ,TwQ .typs s of, jg.;i #,r knowA~.to have existed then, thp born 

- brand the ribaizld, The. bombard, ancestor of heavy artillery,

was built of strips of iron beaten anad welded together and reinforced

by hoops. The contrivance was much like a barrels and thus originated the term "barrel". as~app&ied to a gun.. Unmouand. though this.

method of construction wax, .,it ms~vviveA until the perfection of. 

I

casting in the. lbt~h. century. The bombard wa. of large bore, eome-r

time.s asý great apý MOnchese .ahnO.wa4s gitsi mounted Lon a&'solid

block of wood which wAs laborigusly hauled by oxen.. EjAiation.

was proviýAe~ by digging.,undo rj hq bxeech, or by propping up-the fronk of thp mount. ThoeiriboulO was little more than a smooth bore

muskqmt iq size and power# mounted on a cart or blocko~f wood.

Somnetimnes many of these W0044 be Mounted together- -&A &Atici-.,

pation of the Gatling gun. In speaking of medieval artillerymen.

the term gunner is often used; however, these people were not

soldiers but civilian experts. Sometimes they owned the guns they 2
served and were paid by the number of guns emplaced or by the

weight of shot thrown. Given the superstitious ignorance of most

of those who lived in the Middle Ages, and considering these gunners

worked with flame, smoke, and thunder, the specifications for

Hell itself, it is not surprising that an atmosphere of sorcery hung

about the craft or that captured gunners were liable to summary

execution. This quasi-civilian status, this air of mystery, lasted

until quite modern times. Twelve of these quasi-civilian gunners are shown on the roll of the English Army for 1347.

The Battle of Poictiers (1356), the second great battle

of the Hundred Years War, was apparently fought without artillery. Since the English force involved was bat a raiding column,

it is no wonder that the ponderous. artillery of the time was unused.

In the second phase of the.Hundred Years War (1369-1396), the

French retired totheir castles and cities, refusing battle, and

relying on raid and ambush to harass the Onglish wandering about

the xavaged' French countryside. Such a policy was only practical

in the absence of an efficient English siege artillery. By 1408

the picture had changed, for by that year the then Duke of Burgundy

was able to own cannon. firing shot of 200 to 500 pounds. These

"weapons doomed the feudal castle." S*even years Later the English,

SJopening the last pha'se of the Hundred Years Warp captured HarflRsur

after a steady bombardment, This acticzi set a precedent which

the French later followed in conducting 60 successful sieges of

English strongholds in a year and four days (1449-50)-- an interesting contrast to the conditions in the second phase of the war. In

1451 the garrison-of Sayonne asked for terms as soon as the great '

guns were emplaced, and in 1453 Mohammed II battered down the

walls of Constantinople with great cannon throwing shot of 500

pounds. One of these very pieces, in 18070 broke the mast of an

English warship attempting to force the Dardanelles.

Thus by about 1400, the cannon had become a powerful

siege tool, and the day of the medieval castle with its thick stone

wal1is was rapidly passing. But in those 100 years in which the

cannon became established as a weapon, what about the field gun?

Actually th" ribauld was the oldest type of weapon that might be

regarded as a field piece. Rqeflection suggests, however, that a r

ribauld of one barrel was too light a gun to function as a true field

piece, for killing one knight at a time would never change the course

of battle. Also, the contrivances made by bundling ribaulds together were as bulky and immobile as the borxiawrds. The 15th

century artillerist was like an artilleryman of today who had only

the 240-mm howitzer and the 37-mm antitank gun--the one powerful

but unwieldy, the other, mobile but too light.

3

- .. . . ... K
In 1424 a Bohemian religious sect, the Husuites, having

revolted against their feudal German overlo~rds, faced the tactical

problems involved in opposing feudal knights with raw peasant

levies. Their leader, General John Ziska, reacted by forming a

square of fi•rm carts, chained together, and mounting small cannon.

The GermaLn knights threw themselves futilely against this armament. The happy improvisation wah later reduced to a system

incorporating gun carts specially built to rzount small cannon,

The scheme was very like field artiller,/ for the gun carte were

mobile and manned by troops trained to work with an army in

the field. It is not- known. what influence this, had on contemporary

artillery practices, but1in 1453 an.English attempt to storm French

siege lines was beatenback. largely,by a form of artillery, fire,

which,:in -the lightof later events., suggests small. cannon able to

fire fairly rapidly. Surely this wars an early use of cannon in

field foirtifications.

True field artillery accompanied the French in their invasion of Italy in 1494 when they took with:them horse drawn bronze

piece@ connected to the carriage, by trunnions. ýThese guns. also,, ,

utilized limbers. The gunners' 'skill in loading, firing, and ihifting fire was beyond that previously known. These techniques and

this p•ece were new on the battlefield, and le~d to such Later developments as the massing-of fires, the use of artillery to stop attacks,

and the 11softening up" byiartillery prior to an attack. It is dangerous,

in exar•.ning the actions of those who have gone before, to impute

modern motives and modern doctrine to Greekhoplites, or Renaissance

condottieri, but on the other hand, we may have in mind that'.doctrine

often comes from discovery of the principles implied in a happy

improvisation. Thus, we should be wary in saying that "Gaston

de Foix ordered an artillery preparation at lRavenna, " but We would

err too far on the other side if we did not see in it an action of a

sort from which the principle of artillery preparation might well

have been deduced.

At the time of the French invasion, the Swiss system of

massed pikemen and halberdiers formed the moat formidable

infantry in Europe -- against which the shock action of mounted

knights had been worse than futile. Similar formations of Scots

pikemen had always come to grief against English archers, but

archers were few in Europe. Thus even powerful rulers, such as

Charles of Burgundy, went down before the Swiss halberdiers.

Charles was found lying in a frozen ditch, his face one dreadful

gash from temple to chin. He had attempted to use cannon against

the Swiss, lut the lack of discipline and training of his mercenaries

and feudal levies made them unable to handle the weapon properly.

Moreover, his bombards were not suitable weapons for use in the

field.

4
For a century and a half, the Swiss infantry dominated

central Europe. When it was defeated at Marignano by the French

in 1515, contemporaries were impressed, and the role of the

field artillery was significant. The French had won Marignano

by the judicious combination of artillery and cavalry, the latter

charging and forcing the Swiss to halt and ground their pikes, the

former then firing on them. There is evidence that the French

guns were massed, for the Chevalier Bayard is quoted as saying

to the Grand Master of Artillery, "I pray you, fire seven or

eight guns altogether, 11 and a chronicler relates that gaps were

made in the lines of piketnen and-that-the Swiss were;t6lowvn into

the air like powder. Coordination'betwien a'rtiller 'and cavaliy

was not always perfect and many of 'the `Swisi dharges hit home

with resultant heavy losses to the French. But Swiss losses were

disastrously high.

At Ravenna (1512) Gaston de Foix found the Spanish and

Italians entrenched behind a ditch and an embankment. For

many years the records ofw assaults upon an enemy in position had .'

not made encouraging reading for ambitious generals, and the

youpg Frenchman was faced with a real problem.' In what terrmg

he saw him solution we do not know, biat it is recorded that he

opened the ball with a brisk bombardment of the enemy positions.

This fire eventually so galled them that their cavalry made a

premature attack , which greatly contributed to-their final defeat.

The cannonade as a preparation was not too successful, for the

first French infantry assault was repulsed. The Spanish cannon,

for their part, slew 2, 000 in the French center (actually, Germans 2

and GasconsI) while they were waiting the signal to assault.

Bicocca (15•2), notable as the defeat which ended the Swiss

belief in their own invincibility, is another example of the use of

artillery in the defense, this time a most successful one. The

SWiss were in arrears of pay and had threatened to leave if they

were not allowed to fight at once. Their French allies were forced '

to fall in with the plan and to prepare to attack a wall and ditch

thaL were well-covered by cannon aI~d backed with arquebusiers

and pikemen. The Swiss led the attack and threw themselves into

the dreadful ditch with matchless valor, but the steady fire of the

cannon, arranged to sweep the space before the earthwork, and

the fire of the arquebunters was too much for them. Every attempt • failed. The slaughter was great. It broke the spirit of the Swiss.

Why the French did not attempt a preparation, we do not know.

With the French defeat at Pavia in 1525, field artillery

passed under a cloud for about 100 years. Part of the decline was

,I-
due to an~accio1ent qn that day. When thq Fr..nPCh C~nAQnP-.,were

9prp~lms~e~, tey a4the4; fire masked by-%,the~iz -qwg: troops

drifting beform them.. At the same,,time,-the enemy arquebusiers

inflic.ýpd greatq damage. thruthe skillful us. of govexr and movemnent.

The other cause.W~as the, Imprcqveznent in small: apms. When the

cannon had been thp beat means of. attacki.ng masnses of pikexnen

the light cannon had flourished. Hioweve~r, with the development

of small arms, it was possible to form an infantry which could

successfully oppose pikemon. Thus, cannon tended to assurne the

1iken~iis of siege guns, and though they did not literallyr disappear for lOy9,P, 1 h~ua1ec~i cib2smaild,-slqW Th,

appzorved ho'ois a~ p~tt~m~fre, IefrPtJ WAOlinq

whe rV~rm id ui4tea~oAoti hgj Ad

Some of this trend toward using artillery as siege -guns ra 

y be ~ O u oprcin ~-uiA 1809

we find a, trnh~1~~i$i he: AM-0 ricpn -aerc .Colona k Al.

Tpu~~r~d w-thagt.s uL'$tl hIJ41"oýWA -day itý hO. been. tho4'ght't)at the lopgrr the, &%An the, 0 pr9, ...hq r~~k az~d- that tho b~trte -

cha.;ge _tie,,morq tlie~efc IA.'the.ýight:.of thgosetheoris', a,- 

a

gunner se~eking,* n'iore poWerfial we:.pon would .LIs~gthen the abaxret

and.,wider\tepwe ~ano Then, to koep the gan from 

-

blowing up~ in hisifacoe, he wouald have. tPastZ engthen i~t, thus. making

it a gQo~d Opal heavie~r tha ýitmnaededato-,be.; a 

a

-This i paxiod. o the late. Renaiasancoo though kxniriendl*- to

field artille~ry, was yet a time of great..progresu in Artil~ory ina

general. Many of the charact eristic features of modern aptilleya

originated during that period. During the 16th century i4fling,

pointed projectiles, breech loading, shells. and the gunner's * ~quadrant were well understood, in fct, the gunner's rule of Queen

Elizabeth's day in only a slightly changed form was used as 

a

eight for our artil~ory as late as 1898. -It was deficiencies in

metallurgy, cherp~stry, and ezlgineering that kept the Tudor and ;6 Elizabiothan gunners. from- showing, what -they could do.- The shell, *for inptan 'ce, wasm known in. lL573,. biat~the inventioni of a reliable a fuze. was an insoluble probliem at the Limes. Shells might burst a ~~inthe bore or gat the muzzle, in flight qr not at all. 0orpze valiant [ 

1

gunners lit the. fuze and then thrust the shall down the ba~rrel;

others hoped the blast of firing would ignite it. Breech.4oading pieces were by."o means uncommon, but #t was impossible to

get a gas-tight seal -for the breech or -a breech-that would always resist the shock of discharge. .6 6
The gunner's quadrant of those days, a segment of arc

graduated in degrees across which a plumb line moved, survived

until the American Civil War. Windy days offered a real problem,

and so the gunner's rule was invented. It was simply a graduated

stick with a movable bead. The bead set at the desired elevation;

the rule was held on the breach; and the muzzle was elevated until

it lined up with'the bead. The principle was that used in the eight

of the '03 Army rifle, the famous Springfield. In 1898 our artillery went to war with the gunner's rule mounted on the breech of

its cannon and improved with a peep sight, spirit level, and a

windage screw.-

Inone way the Elizabethans were curiously unprogressive,

for they had nosighting equipment. The familiar nick in the breech

and button at the muzzle were not invented until the 18th century.

The gun was sighted by noting the apparent difference in sime :between the circle made by the breech and that made by the muzzlej

* tiiimarking one-half the difference on the top of theo breech and lining

that. mark and the mu~zle edge. with the target., Perhaps it was

ftater weighing all of this -that some ea&rly gunner wrote:: When I

was first admitted a gunner, I thought it a shame to take the

Queen's pay ipr a gunner and do ne other service than watch and

ward,- to load & piece and shoot her off, which even every fool

may do."

That gunner actually did little justice to his profession,

for in that day the ,cpert gunner had to be a most learped man, uniting in himself the chemist, the ordnance engineer, the military engineer and the gunner. There was no one else to superintend the casting of cannon, the preparation of ammunition, the

emplacing of batteries foA siege or defense, or their handling in

action. In Tudor days, these experts were grouped in little bands

in various forts, each under a master gunner but under no central

control. The first step toward the formation of the Royal artillery was the appointment by Henry VIII of a Master Gunner of

England with jurisdiction over all these bands. Another forward

step consisted of sending home the foreign gunners who had been

intermittently in English employ since the early days of the 14th

century.

Tudnr gun crews had three men, the gunner, the servitour

or matross, and the laborer. The latter two titles clearly suggost the civilian connections Wf the arm, the title of "matross ' lasting

until well into the 19th century. Theme men went through 13

motions in loading, suggestive of the 13 commands of the English

Civil Wars a century later. Their equipment included a ladle,

7 •1NOW,
rammer, '.1upwige, wad-screw, coynG, linstock, priming iron,

flask of priming powder"anda leaden plate to cover the vent.

Major General Sir John Headlam, writing in the Coast Artillery

Journal, Vol 63, states: "Indeed, to any who served with a horse

or field battery ini.the 80's the detail for serving the vent, sponging,

ramming home, and 'springing the rammer' will sound very

familiar "r.

A document of 1620 illuAtrated the conception of the proper

amount of artillery to accompany ax expedition. of. 30, 000 men to the Continent, This force was to have two brass mortars (each

with a chief petardier and five assistants), and 18 cannon.of '

var.ying eias with a& master guner,, three matei, three, cofibtables

,or quarter gunners, 124 gunners, l00,carters, the.Master General

of Ordnance and his staff, a body of-enginserso and miscellaneous

personnel. ýThis arrangement allowed one cannon: for every 1500

men.. Ii 1690, an army-of William of Orange had one piece for

eve ry, 50.0 men, It would,..however, be anerror to deduceany

tactic.al trend from this, for 20 years later the grea't Marlborough

almost, •isposed of artillery in one of his battles.

Gustavus Adoiphu"

In 1631 a Swedish king and general, Gustavus Adolphus,

won the battle of Breitenfeld, using as one of his tools, a light

handy artillery that could freely maneuver on the field. His example was not. fully understood by his contemporaries, but his

use of artillery was fully modern and was to have its influence on

a Frenchman, Gribeauval, who in turn organized the artillery

Napoleon used. It was an exbeptional armywhose artillery, train.

ing, and doctrine were logically organized and developed for its

task, but Gustavus' army was one of those. Gustavus could build

his army as he wished, for Gustavus the Xing could inforce the

ideas of Gustavus the Great Captain. Most soldiers must take the

equipment and doctrine that comes to hand and make the most of

it, just as Napoleon inherited the artillery and, doctrines developed

under the Bourbons. He saw their faults but could not correct

them.

"Gustavus' artillery reforms were part of a general

reform intended to improve the mobility, fire power, and discipline of his army. The system of Gustavus' opponents, the

Imperial armies under Tilly and Wallenstein, was marked by

g•reat squares of pikemen and musketeers flanked by cavalry with

a line of almost immobile artillery drawn up in front; The soldiers
11

were hardeadimercenaries, exper t,, brave,, and cruel,. Gustavu%%@

planned to handle the Imps rial cavalry with pikes, fire power, and

146 own, cavalry.; the infantry.squareos wiree. to be witheredwith: grape

and .canister and then cuk tp by cavalry, The Swedish field artillery

included Z4-, 12-,L and 6-pdr cannon, short pieces of light weight,

mounted on good, high wheels for easy going on bad roads, To

give a rapid rate of fire to theme light pieces, Gustavus used fixed

ammunition, grape or canister lashed to a paper powder cartridge.

The fire power of the infantry regiment was increased by the addition of two 4-pdrs which fired six times a minute as against the

SL: four •andsam~i~ue of . mperial .nuuktcer5. 'The Imperial

cavalry ch4.rgSd at the tro, wheeLin.g.dfirinigprstOiswhenia range

of the enemy. The,, 9*wdiuh 4"vyl r-y chrged at th,;gallopk :sword,

in hand,, and -,hair infantry formed in small ,ha•dy uiito of pikemeno,

and uniuke,4'srs.,,

"The Swedish army Gustavus arrayed at Breitenfeld totalled

some 26, 800 men, 1.9, 100 were. Anfantryand 7 0i,.lr n....

over.l0 guns. They were alied with; some ZQ,1O00 Saxons, whAo

brokef1 Ad flodeariy in thb battle. The percentage of guns to troops in0 G4stavua' army may be compared to a U.S. corps of two divisions "

with somne 30, 000 men and 96 guns plus corps arti1lery.. The Imperial

army was somewhat, smallov and had only 26 cannon.

As at Ravenna a heavy cannonade opened the battle with

Swedish artillery striking the Imps rials; Again as at-Havenna the. *. enemy cavalry could not stand the fire and charged the Sw.edish

right flank without orders from old Tilly, who tore his beard and

cried, "They have mobbed me of my honor and glory I" As they

advanced from the Imperial left wing, the rest of Tilly's cavalry

at his right, not realizing the mistake, charged the Saxons at

Gustavus' left who took to their heels. Undaunted, the Swedes

moved mu.sketeers and artillery to the right and to the left furnishing an excellent example of the mobility of their artillery on the

field of battle. Seeing the Swedes left flank uncovered by the Saxons'

rout, Tilly moved his infantry mass obliquely to strike it. The

Swedes' right wing which had shaken off the premature cavalry

attack wheeled to the left and the Swedish cavalry charged the Imperial

pikemen just as the French Gendarmerie had charged the Swiss at

Marignano. The first charge was repulsed, but it shook the squares,

At Breitenfeld, Gustavus faced an army that had shortly

before slaughtered 30, 000 men, women, and children, citizens of

Magdeburg. Its general, Tilly, had given the order, then gone to

breakfast.

9
and ithen- the Swedish guns began cuttihg lohi eid, line!$ ihx themn. The

best of Gustavus cdavalry-threw i1tsei'f t thE Sp,1 and that portiovnof

the Impeirial line-broke ýand-fled8 hsp~zgteIneilatley

The !!emaining imperial infantry braced itself for the'expeceted cavalry

charge, It never came. Instead, the' Swedish artillery and the daptured guns began to work on-the squares and continued until night

came. Six thousand pikemen lay there. Then the Imperials began to

break and drift to the rear, and the Swedishi cavalry rode forward,

Here at Breiterdeld there was the coordinated action of

infantry. artillery, and cavalry-all working toward the-name end.

The; reward Vas :nOt -onlV,1Wyi 6tbory biii hiiith dii~r~ity'if 113is~sl'

about,7,j.OOO to 3'-0OOG', AtI UaiAgftnao some:6 bi hW~iWs P, ka eks

had been ible' toi rrAke goo~d'hsit ~ 'bu'a 3rSCeA thle'bk

of the Swedish losse, came from artillery'. Plainly the Iinpaieial

infantry masses could never carry their attacks 3me,

There was another notable, featidrd-of'Gstiavu& tactibs, ýthemrassing of~fire.- AtLeipsig, he- unitd'adlalýof his regjimental' us'i

one gteatt battery, 5and- at'the pasg ~the Lecih £o'rred f2 ' n. in

4 grimat batteriesL The inf"'tryls dem'a~d for'coiatinua~l :doid 264006'rt'

wan met -by giving- then sxh&'l quick;;firlii guns." the ihceito'r4s of the

cannon company of the -1942 infantkyregitriont, while the great bulk' of

the Swedish artillery was kept under central control. Breitenfeld for

all its interestiftg'-eattares cannot be seen'a's the beginniig of an epoch,

for in--the English, Civil;War whith'fllbowed snoon aifter') artillery wa's

tury the French usedocannon as~heiavy asl any Gustavus might have

captured.

The latter part of the 17th cenitury was marked by the introducition of the standing army princIpli in the forces of the'several great

powers, reflecting itself in the more soldierly aspect of the artillery.

This arm with its civilian traditions was, on the Continent. still often

supplied by contractors. Louvois (1641-1691), among his other reforms,

ended this in the French army and put the artillery under roy'al control

although the driversn and their teams remained civilians -- an anomaly that lasted until Napoleon. In the English army the Royal Regiment of

Artillery dates from the early 18th century.

Frederick the Great

With the era of the Enlightenment, and the battles of Frederick

the Great, began the golden age of smooth bore field artillery. The

campaigns of Marlborou~gh, though fought during the Enlightenment,

occurred prior to this period as can readily be seen by the great

10

~-*06
Duke's treatment of the arm. His campaigns are not instructive for

artillerymen, for though he handled the arm with his usual polished

competence, he left it as he found it. The number of guns in his armies well illustrate his views. Marlborough began his campaigns in Flanders with 1. 16 gune per 1, 000 men; at his last great battle, )AaLplaquet, he had .9 per 1, 000.

Frederick's 4~ampaigns are very different and are most instructive. It might perhaps annoy that prince to have hi. name

linked with the artillery, since at the beginning of his career he

berated it for ita immobility, he often complained of it in battle, and

the compoetition,44xrti~llry that.t began among the- great. powers during

his wars (and which 4initiate'd) . drew from him the anguished comn- 

:

plaint that #, had openesa an abys a into which the Prussian treasury

was being poured. -Yet though he did not like the arm, or so pre 

- tended, he used iti.in a way thaktmet an enduring pattern. Gustavus

seems. to have been. a little before his time,. but Frederick's. contemporaries paidd him the com'uplim~ent of imitation. Frederick began his first war with about Z. 5'jguns per 1, 000 men. At the end of the .I

Seven Years War~tho propovtion~ in the ,Priassiasý and Austrian armies.

had risen to 4 per1, 000 i~s against Marlborough's ..9. The Prussians 

-

I ~*. and Austrians sooght lightnesse.and mobility. by cutting the weight. of 

-

their, gun tubes, setting,, ratio between weight of tube and weight of

projectile of about one o1undred to okie, as against the contemporary

French practice of two -hundred to one,

Ill Fre deri ck's first eng~gemonit his ap~tillery was ordered to

concentrate on the..Austriman cavalry that it (might be iOoftene# for the

Prussian charge. The plan fil~ed, larpely baocause there wore not

enough cannon. 

. .Afte~r the battle, he srt to increasing his artillery, and his efforts were matched by the.Austrians. This roAultod in. an

artillery race. Frederick sought to use his artillery always to pave the way, though he often wavered in selecting the primary target. He

directed the fire first at the cavalry, in the next battle at the infantry,

and in the next a~t the hostile artillery, Finally he settled on infantry

as the proper target, concluding that the artillery could not cope with

a small line of objects like the hostile guns.

The classic example of Fredoorician artillery techniquie isI 

I

Leuthen (1757). The Prussian artillery, all on the,(laniks, inamood its fire on a portion of the Austrian line with. the greatest weigh~t of fire on

1% ~ the reserves. rhus there would be no support for -the first line when it

started to buckle under the Prussian charge. The attack was launched

into the 'IV" formed by the Ccrossing Lin*@ Of fire from the flanks so that

fire could continue to the last possible mnoment, "As it wae done near

Leuthen" was for many years the maxim in the German artillery schools.
The massing of five and the close oupport of infantry by -artillery

show the muster' -touch-. 'Another exarviol'e' of Fiodwritk'eý calent'was

the creation-of hors.s artiLLewy--*Lightart'llewywhoe. miobility wa-s

fu rthoi. Inc reased by.melantinglthe :cailnoaee rs on'horseback (1759),..:

He rmadd'a practice' of koeeping a re@6*ve force, preferi~bly h~witmers, with which he might intervene at crucial- momenta in the battle. However, he ha~d to caution the zealous Prussian gunners not to shoot over

the heads of their own infantry because of the inaccuiracies of the guns.

Gt"-'auval and the French Artillery

'teFrench ~'slWyail at this' time li a -state' o 'almost

whimsical disorder.v 'Oththe' crdi itOaithde' iltindo' 6f'thsa 

V

Royal R-ogliiezt iaf-Artillorý it~is btainsb ih~czrne

each. There we're, arttlloily sch6als-'at ldstii, lrarewa, -Straubouro,ý

Grenoblej and .-Perpignan.- T'heria waq a Miftlstry of 'War., 'founded. by

Louvois ," btat 'betweein, the 'battalions' "Mid 'compani 6 there f Wd zhog groeement as to 'ither-method 'or' mgte-riel1 ' ndno standavd had ever been.

settled on. Camn'~anding O'fflcieis tould subsmit their own bpecifications to foundries -and' arsenals', .'And the 'wildeist confdsioA.'of calibers

and'types'resulted.', Caition of on. fiunz'y"'vouldibo inable, ta'usw shot'-

from kn6therb aid no two' canzibaa of the' same foundryiwouLd be' exactly'

alike. Then6 *a-# atithis timte in the'Auitrian 'servide a middld-aged,

French 'colonel of artillery, one Jean-Saotisto- do Gribeaul'al (1715-

1789) who had been loaned to the harassed'Maria Theresa by Louis' XV.

Gribeauval seems to have been a true child of the Enlightenment, that

age which thought oarde w'and system -'the law of natur, ' "d of aati~re Is

God, and which rebelle d-agains t the traditional and disorderly.; HO had'

been impressed by the lightness and'mobility -of the Austrian -and

Prussian a~rtillery, he had his share of Gallic lo'gic, and he had 

a

system in m~ind. Reocalled to France.: he sourveyed the French artillery

and recommended eight points for appropriate action. 'These were: ¶,I

1. Standardization of calibers for all weapons. 

~

Z. Matching the caliber and composition of the artillery to the size and requirements of the army. 

'

3. Assignment of definite types of cannon, to the infan- 'try, with a decision as to their being infantry weapons manned by

infantry, o-r artillery pieces mianned by artillerymen and borrowed

f rom that arm.
tf

4. Standardization of all gun parts and carriages to

make parts interchangeable.

5. Standard rules for construction of howitzers and

carriages.

6. Standard rules for construction of mortars and

carriages.

7. Diameter# of shot and form of powder containers

and cartridges to be fixed.

8. Standard formulae for powder.

Oribeauval made his fight for rnbbility when theme principles

had been tentatively accepted and work had begun in drawing -tp the

speCifiCationa called for by 4, 5, and 6 above. A commission, was

formed which met at Strasbourg in. 1764 to experiment with equipment

'a It. Oribisauval. A comparison will be interesting,

Model of 1733 New U0461~

Type Range at 60 Weight Range at 60 We ight

Elevation Elevation

1Z-pdr 2952ydo 3200 lbs 1822 yda 1800 lbs

8-pdr 1860 ydo Z100 lbs 1666 yds 1200 lbs4

4-pdr 1608 yds 1150 Tbs 1546 ydo 600 lbs

The tubes and carriages were completely standardized, at

least a generation before Eli Whitney is supposed to have "invented"

standlardization. An order of March 31, 1766, over the signature of Duc do Choiseul, Minister of War, set the system for casting brass

guns, prescribed that their dimensions and weights should conform to

* the tables, sketches, and plans provided, with no alteration for any

reason. Allowances were not to the hundredth of an inch. Tho So "ffellie, nave, transom, bolt, understrap$ or any part .. for

instance, constructed at Auxonne, will assemble with the core - sponding parts of the appendage of the samne kind constructed i~t

Strasbourg . "The American Artllleriste Companion, by Louis

de Tousard. C. A. Conrad and Company, Phdadelphia, L809.

Vol. 1, Page 145; Vol. 2, page 279.

13
The differarxc, in range iwas- not thought important, for fire

was not accuratti l.aeyond one thousand yards., Tactical mobility -was

made easier by upe Of A prolonge, a long rope fas tened to the trail,

gramped by theicannoneers, and used by them to maneuver the piece,

This artillery of Geibeaiavat is of interest for two reasons of

about equal weight;

1. It -wasn the artlie.'y of Napoleon.

2. GribcwauvaL'm concepts dominated artillery well-into.

the 1 9th century.

ýThauiNapal~a'i shpuld have -profited, by the worlk of his prodscea more' ts,,zt' lutprisi~gbi 16-hot he w~laýa'gt#Adeait, an omnnivorousn reader, 1

~ndkpwldged~isdebtto~is tachrs.Amobuthosbe -must be listed

*the theorist, 'Gaibert* *4w~kn iý re~n#Lrkab1e -wovk Writteft be fore the

IPrerk'h JReyoliatiort priditr.ted -the 'itoalamthe use of decisive

bAttleal, Liv kik~lffthd Goalitt4y atackc by advancing columns rather than

by advancing lines, and other features of the "Napoleonic" system. Of

artiAW-ry Guib0ýrt Wrote: '1CpAan,, treat4.L individually and aimed at a

solitary- objua o'izto~~ial ext are not very.formidable ms-'

chii4,"a clear i'~ Nlafrzaee 'apoleonic. tactics do not -bear

the mark of Frsdeditiklf 1nffuoce in the massning of fire until Friedland,

iAd-ther* -the iniipirat1fai was that of ai alubordinate, Seharmont. -It has

booni 0uggeste4d that Napoleon was not a great tactician, that his tactics

are thase of the Revolutiohi~ and. tha.t~th& 'WNapolsonic" use of artillery

was foreshadowed by F'redsrick a, generiation before. However,V

.Napoleon's (sinv doev not rernt'cn thst alone.

Suropean tactics at the etart .0 the French R evolution bore

the stamp of the P'otsdam drill -grouni.- A-triple line, faultlewsly

dresrned by oalcers with survey instruments on, their staffs, advanced

at 72 pares to the min&*asge pattsing nowand &gain~ to fire, Long years

of-drill were nes*de, an4 'the eanxucripts of the'French Revolution

were short in time,. bat. fW1 of ardori- Aow -beot to use that ardor was

the probltem. The 19olUtio wags, double on*. A mass of skirmishes

to distract the loug, -thin,- enemy fiiie; a column of cheering fanatics

to advance under cover of the distrsotion. -Even if in the early battles

the 4.olumnn was more like a 4ch~ezina ino~, no great harm was done,

for the essence of the mAtttor was~to get tb hand strokes In a hurry.

Reflection suggest~s that a mass tif skirmic'hes, to prepare an assault

is niot a good substitutv, for a nas&' of artillery firo. This may be

obvious today, but giveA the weapomi of 1800, the concluaion was not

so pli~in- Then cannort did not have an effe4rtive range much greater

14

46I
II

than muskets, and so the fire power of many skirmishers was a respectable factor. But with the experience of battle, especially Friedland, and with the slow decline in the quality of the French infantry,

Napoleon turned to the mass of fire. .4

The happy inspiration that produced the first use of massed

artillery in the Napoleonic manner was that of Senarmont. who cornsanded the artillery of the I Corps at Friedland. The French attack

had been repulsed, their right was wavering and a counterattack might

have been disastrous. Senarmont seized the initiative, formed the

divisional artillery of the corps into two great batteries of 15 guns

each and moved forward with the advancing French reinforcements.

Opening fire at about 400K yards, Seinarmont soon closed to 200 and

moved beyond the Frenchline. Seeing theimnanskxver, Napoleon was 41

• ~~~thunderstruck, and cried out.- "M~y God, Senarmont. desertedJ W An -i•'

aide-de camp sent after Sonaronot came back with the answer: "Let

me go with my cannoneersI Jo reponds do twutl Napoleon drew the J

proper moral, as will be seen in his 9Zd maxim on the conduct of war: "In a battle, as in a s.i.ge, okill consists in converging a mass of fire

on a single point; once the combat is opened the commande r who is

adroit will suddenly and uznexpsctedly open fire. with a surprising mass

of artillery on one of these pointsi and is sure to seize it. " .

Thus, at Wagsam, Lauriston was ordered to take 100 guns and

prepare the way for Massena&' great attack. At Borodino, some 400

guns were aimed-at the great redoubt near the center of the Russian

line. Napoleon'.s enemies learned the value of mansed artillery from

him, and when at Lelpzig the Emperor saw the massed guns of the

allies beginning their work, he looked at them in silence, then

muttered some words to the effect that at last he had taught them

somethingl

At the end of the Napolenic era, the status of the field artillery

was as follows: .I

1. It hart become part of the army, and its civilian

character was gone.

Z. Ito tools were made in accord with mathematical

research--the old aura of witchcraft had been removed.

• , 3. The guns were muzzle-loading smooth bores,

rarely used at more than 1000 yards, and relying on direct laying

alone. They fired shell, shrapnel, solid shot. grape, and various

crude incendiaries.

, ~15"

II
- . ----- - . _ 

4. Guns, men and horses were formed in regiments

and batteriet. The distinction between divisional and corps or army

artillery was understood.

5. The principle of massed fire was understood

and clearly verbalized. Reserve artillery was common, for a shortrange gun once committed to a certain sector of front could not intervene on another.

From Napoleon to the Late Nineteenth Century

To complete the study of the development of field artillery,

several post-Napoleonic eraus hould-be noted.- -First,- there~was the

period of the American. Civil War, when thu smooth bore reached its:;

peak. then the transitional times wfiich introduced breech-loading and

rifling; and last of all, the era which saw the rirst rapid-fire field gun

using'indirect laying.

In 1859 an Englishman, Armstrong, produced a fairly successful breech-loading rifled field piece. . It was not thought, satisfactory

for field service and not until 1876 did the British adopt such a gun

as standard. With the appearance of these rifled breech loaders,

which were still laid by direct laying, and which recoiled back on

their wheels, we enter the transition period which lasted until the

appearance of the French 75 of 1897. In 1898 the American artillery

went bravely off with the 3. Z-inch breech-loading rifles of 1880 and

1892. There wag no recoil system, and the gunner laid directly on

the target with the old Civil War sight, somewhat improved by a

windage scale and a spirit level. Shell, shrapnel, and canister

were fired by black powder which hid the battery positions in dense

white smoke, often obscuring the target so that firing had to halt until

the range cleared.

The desirability of improving the fire power of the light field

piece by improving its rate of fire had long been admitted, and many

attempts made to secure that end. Using special devices, Saxon

artillery of 1780 could fire 14 to 16 rounds a minute. But as the gun

bounced back over the ground, because there was no recoil system, it

was necessary to re-aim the gun after each shot, and one wonders if ,

the Saxons did that. The method of loading, shoving the cartridge

down from the muzzle, then carefully ramming it home, was slow.

Finally, the black powder soon wrapped the gun position in a fog

through which the coughing gunner would peer in vain to find his target. In 1871 an Italian, General Biancardi, proposed a general

solution to the recoil problem, the connection of a hydraulic brake

with a pneumatic cylinder. The liquid would be pushed by the piston

through a valve into a cylinder filled with compressed air and cause a

16I,
further compression. When the shock of recoil was absorbed, the

liquid would be forced back in its cylinder, and the gun returned to

firing position.

The practical artilleryman of that, or any other day, had to

examine aniy proposed improvement from the standpoint of its effect

on mobility. If it lost any tactical mobility, it had to be vetoed. The

sailor, on the other hand, could make use of heavy machinery, and

so the sailors of the 1870's could put heavy guns and massive recoil

cylinders in their turrets. It is believed that the first practical

hydropneumatic recoil systems, ancestors of all we have today,

were put in HMS Thunderer in 1875 by George Bendel, a partner of

that Sir William Armstrong who created-the firot practical bireechloading rifled field gun, '

A second -requirement of rapid fire was easy and rapid

loading. This was supplied by the combination of a quick-acting

breech and brass cartridge cases',, introduced in 1881 by the rival

gunsmiths, Hotchkiss and Nordenfeldt. These cartridge cases could

be easily loaded and extracted, and.they swelled under pressure of

the explosion, thus forming a gas-tight seal-against the'breech. Although these quick-firing guns were'bu).l for naval use, the makers

built field guns on the same principle, butwithout recoil mechanisms,

so that the guns bounced rapidly back across the battle field. No

great power adopted them. Progress in naval gunnery was so fast

that by 1886 an English 30-pdr was built which, remodeled the following year as a 4. 7-in gun, fired10 rouinds in 47 seconds as against

the 5 minutes and 7 seconds for 10 rounds by-an orthodox 5-in gun.

The artillery patters for the future was growing clear. Although they

watched these proceedings with great interest, artillerymen noted

that these deadly cannon were mounted on steel pedestals two feet!

through, formed of steel several inches thick, and well able to • U'

absorb the shocks of firing with the short IZ-ln recoil. No such

apparatus could be lugged about the battlefield.

Even if such a rapid-fire cannon had been built early in the

I 9th century for artillery use, it could not have been used at full

efficiency unless capable of firing at unseen targets from positions

shielded from-hostile infantry fire. A system was needed which

would permit the gunner to point his gun at one object by aiming his

sight at another. Fortress cannon, in the good old days, were laid

for direction at night by lining up the carriago with chalk lines on the ib platform on which the gun was mounted, or by sighting down the tube

from muzzle to breech-at a light hung in the fort. The French in 1870

had eought to escape the superior German artillery by concealing their

own cannon, thus having their attention most forcibly brought to the

17

-- i
subject of indirect fire. After the war they tried to work out a

practical method. Thus, the 90-rms De Bange piece of 1880

vintage had sights which made it possible to set off an angle, of

which one leg was parallel to the axis of the bore. With this

sight they could aim the gun at the target by sighting along the

other leg at an aiming point. The problem thus became the

mathematical one of calculating the angle of aiming point to gun

sight to target.

The problem of lightness and mobility was being solved

by the invention of modern steels. Alfred Krtupp in 1847 built

the first modern steel gun of crucible steel, steel made in-&

closed vessel which excluded air and furnace gaaeo. Contemporary

accounts called it a marvel of lightness and strength. Thus, in

the 1880's there were present all the ingredients of tl.ý modern

field piece, waiting for some genius to combine them.

The Modern Field Gun

In 1886 a young German engineor, Konrad Hausener, became interested in cannon and their recoil. His fancy had been

stirred by an American magazine artitqe telling how the combustion

of gases had been used to propel a balloon, which suggested to

him that the gases from firing might be used in a recoil mechanism.

His experiments failed, and he was baffled until 1887, whan in the

Krupp Museum at Essen, he saw a field piece built on naval lines

with a carrtige in two parts. The upper portion recoiled against

a pneumatic cylinder and slid into place by force of gravity acting

along a plane inclined to the front. His first idea, a gun with a

selparate counter-recoil mechanism, failed. He then built the first

long-recoil mechanism that had the counter-recoil an integral part

of the whole. He patented it in Germany and France in 1891. The

mechanism had two tubes, one within the other, the inner containing

a liquid and a piston, the piston connected to the end of the outer

cylinder which contained air. The gun was to re*coiJ. puldng.the

piston back in the inner cylinder. The inner cylinder would be

fixed to the carriage, would slide out of the outer cylinder, lowering the air pressure in it so that the pressure of the outer air

would force the gun back into firing position. This counter-recoil

system was absurdly weak, Haussner later realized it, and in 1896

he made a gun with a workable spring counter-recoil system.

Krupp would have none of it, as he would have none of Haussner's

earlier work.

The French had been told that Krupp was making a gun with

a hydropneumatic recoil based on the Haussner system. This report

18
later proved false, but General Matthieu, Director of Artillery,

called in Major Deport, of the Puteuax arsenal, gave him the

situation as it then appeared, and put him to work. Luckily for

the French. Haussner had been so disgusted by Krupps' treatment of him, that he had let his patent lapse, and the French were

free to use it. Deport, like Haussner, realixed the defects of

the patent of '91, but unlike Haussner, he was able to find the

answer, a column of liquid whiodh was forced through small holes,

thus absorbing the recoil and compressing a column of air which

supplied the force to return the gun to battery.1

As the work progressed, the French learned they had been

misinformed, that far from adopting a new gun, the Germans were

earnestly re-.arming with old fashioned cannon, guaranteed to

"bounce back after every shot, like Frederick's cannon. Highly

* amused, the French waited until Krupps had completely equipped

the German artillery with these museum pieces, and then brought

out the famous French 75 of 1897, This masterpiece of the ordnance art, with its quick-loading Nordenfeldt breech, its brass

cartridge case, light weight, long-recoil system, and indirect

line of sight revolutionized field artillery. No more could the

gunners of Napoleon or Gustavus or Elizabeth have taken their

place in a battery. This was the first modern field piece, and

modern tactics and technique had to be devised to make the best

possible use of it.

It would be wrong to think that the secret of the French "

75 lay in any use of the Haussner system. Official French sources

show this, A letter of the French High Commissioner, March Z8, ,

1918, on the subject of guarding knowledge of the 75, states: "The

secrecy of the 75 m/m recoil mechanism residing mostly in the

assembly and the adjustment. " "The first assembly drawing of

the counter-recoil mechanism ever made, was prepared in order

to be sent over to this country as prior to this no assembly drawing

of any kind ever existed in France. "1 The parts of the mechanism

under question were assembling of the regulator, the free piston,

the counter-recoil mechanism, and the adjustment and tests of

the counter-recoil mechanism. In another letter of April 9 the

High Commissioner quotes a cable from home as saying 'The

secret which is kept because unknown to our enemies, consists in

4-* the manufacture and the special precautions in machining and

assembling the different parts. '

19
How was the new weapon to be used? Reading a text

I written in 1903, The Tactical Employment of Quick-Firing

Field Artillery, by a French officer, Gabriel Roquerol, we learn

that fire on an area, rather than fire at a point, should be standard

technique, a return to the ideas of Guibert and Frederick the

Great. The delivery of this fire was to surprise the enemy. The

angles at which the guns were to be laid, the elevations, the time

of burning, of the fuzes, were to be obtained beforehand by instruments, by iecoinalssance, by measurement on the map or by

preliminary fire. "The ideas above quoted," Poquerml wrote,

"lead to the logical conclusion that the fire of quick..firing artillery

should be characterized by very violent gusts of short duration,

separated by more or less prolonged intervals of calm. ", No

artillery should 'be kept in reserve; "In other words, with long

range guns the reserve of artillery could be considered as formed

by the artillery in position. It followed, therefore, that, aggreably to the leading principle that in war p6 force should remain

idle, the whole of the artillery had to be engaged from the Very

first."

This is still current doctrine and current technique, and

quite valid in 1944. It was not theofficial doctrine of the French

army before 1914.1 But the disagreement was not whether these methods could be used, but whether they should be used, and the

actual teaching of war brought them in favor by approximately 1915.

* The important point is that by 1903, and Roquerol's book, European *

* artillery had been revolutionized and was clearly modern. Old

materiel, ,ld doctrine, all had to be changed, and troops trained

in the new. With change and experiment in the air, the times were

favorable for the founding of a sbhool to teach and develop the new

techniques in the American Army.

French artillery tactics of 1914 were impressed by a

fancied superiority of maneuverability 6ver fire power. War was

to be short, marked by maneuver and open warfare. The battle

would be between infantTy units, between men rather than between

materiel. Only light artillery was thought really essential; heavy

artillery was included just to provide for the unexpected. Concentration of several 75-mm batteries was not thought neceseftty,

thanks to the power of the gun, and one should not be "overloaded"

with artillery. Fortunately for the French, dissatisfaction with this

official doctrine had forced a program of heavy and medium caliber

weapons, comparable to those the Germans had developed up to the

pilot model stage. The rest of the doctrine was under violent attack

but had not left the field of controversy. General Frederick Georges

Herr, former Inspector General of the French Artillery, Field Artillery Journal, 17:21.

20 ,

I.
Bibliog raphy,

The Origin of Artillery, Henry William Lovett Hime. Longrnans

Green and Co. London, 1915.

History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, Charles William

Chad'4-• kOman.. Methuen and Co. London, 1898.

History of the Art of War in the 16th Cent.• , Charles William

Chadwick Oman. E. P. Dutton and Co. New York, 1937.

Field Artillery Journal

16th Century Artillery Drill, Fletcher Pratt. 23:426-430,

Sept. 1933.

Breitenfeld--The Battle That Changed the World-- 1631,

Fletcher Pratt. 24:244-Z54, May 1934.

French Artillery, Past, Presenti and Future, General

Frederic 0. Herr,, 17ZZ1-.Z46, May-June 19'Z7.

Observations Upon the Evolution of Field Artillery Construction and Employment, Joseph M. Hanson. 13:423-439, Sept-Oct 1923.

Artillerist's Manual and British Soldiers' Compendium, Frederick

A. Griffiths. E. Jones, Zd Edition, 1840.

The Artillerist's Manual, John Gibbon. D. Van Nostrand, New

York. Zd Edition, 1863.

American Artillerist's Companion or Elements of.Artillery, Louis

de Tousard. C. and A. Conrad and Co. Philadelphia, 1809-13.

Manual of Field Artillery Exercises. H. M. 6'ationery Office;

London, 1877.

"The Tactical Employment of Quick-firing Field Artillery, Gabriel

Rouquerol (Translated by Capt P. DeB. Rsd liffa). Hugh Bees,

London, 1903.

4

Marlboriugh and the Rise of the British Army, C. T. Atkinson.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1921,

zH-: 
Achievements of Field Artillery Major E. S. May. R. A. Institution, Woolwich, 1893.

Napoleon (A History of the Art of War), Theodore Ayrault Dodge.

ioughton, Mifflin and Co, Boston, 1 904-07.

European Ships of War and Their Armament, J. W. King, U.S.N.

Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. , 1877.

History of the Development of Field Artillery Materiel. Field

Artillerv Schuol, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1940.

Makers of Modern Strategy; Military Thought from Machiavelli " . V to Hitler, - wEard Mead Earle. Princeton Univirsity Press,

Princeton, 1943.

Roots of Strategy, Thomas R. Phillip*. The Military Service

t'ublishing Co.., Harrisburg, Ptnsylvania, 1940..

SThe Tools ot/ War,. James Boy Newman. Doubleday Doran and Co.,

Oarden -City,•'New Jerboy, ast Edition, 1942.

Napoleon and' His Marshals, Archibald G. MacDonpll. The Macmillan Co.. New York, r914.

L'Artillerie Francaie~au XVIII Siecle, Ernest Picard. BergerLevrault et Cie, Paris, 1906.

SUnublimhed Correspondence of Napoleon I, Ernest Picard.

Duffield and Co., New York, 1913.

Jour.nal of the Royal Artillery

The Battle of Friedland, Sunday, 14 June 1807, Major A. F.

iBecke. .44:81-94, 1'91748.

A History of Artillery, Ralph Flealy. 47.230-242, 1920-21.

The Coast Artillery Journal

The Dawn of British Artillpry, Major General Sir John

Headlarn. 83:4-4.451, Sept-Oct, 1940.

Revue D'Artillerie

LYEmplo de L'Artilltrie au Cuurs de L'Histoire de Marignan

a Waterloo, General M: Peyregne. 123:429-452, May 1939.

• •i• ..
I Course of Instruction for Artillery Gunners (Artillery Circular

F and 1, 1893), U, S. War Department, Adjutant General's Office.

Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1893.

EncylopdiaBritannic&. 14th Edition.

Nelson's Encyclopedia.

New International Encyclopedia. Zd Edition.

* Decisive Battles; Their Influence Upon History and Civilization,

J. F. C. Fuller. Ch are Scribner's Sons, New York, M94.

23I
CHAPTER TWO

HISTOR ICA L-, ,CX0CK UNOZb THZ 7FICLD ANITILLEAR.CHOOL

It wotLd be a mistake to think that the opening of the School

of Fire (as the Field Artillery School was then known) in the fall

of 1911 marked the beginning of the first artillery school on the

North American continent. As early as the 17th century a "school"

was in existence in Boston. Also, the Army had artillery schools

which included the study of field artillery at a time when the very

location of the pre senttield Artillery school was -thought 'of as

part of the Great American Desert. One of the treas~arias of early

Americana is the will of Capt Robert Keayno of Boston in- the

Massachusetts Day Colony, for it describes the household goods

of an early settler in great detail. The artilleryman of today will

be more interested in knowing that Capt Kesayne was a most ardent

gunner, a momber of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company

of Boston, and that in his will the good captain, made provision for

a sort of artillery school. This was 1656. Keayne gave a room

to the company to be used for an armory, and 5 pounds "towards

the erecting of a platform planked underneath for two mounted

poices of ordnance to stand upon." The platform was to be built

at a convenient part of the training place so that the pieces could

be fired against, a backstop. Lot no one think his bequest a matter

of some Z0-odd dollars, for in buying power it wasinear to several (I

hundred in & day when wampum, furs, and whisky passed as money.

With the money went much sage advice on getting an expert gunner to instruct the militiamen in their trade,

Experience in the field during the Revolutionary War

suggested that a school where the artilleryman could learn his

profession would be of value. Thus, Cal Henry Knox, in September,

1776, suggested to a Congressional committee that an academy be ,,

created where the whole theory and practice of fortification and

gunnery would be taught. Though the suggestion came from Washington's Chief of Artillery, there is no record of its having immediate results other than a rather curious authorization for the commanding officer of the artillery, Knox, presumably, to send officers

to visit foundries, laboratories, and manufactories, and at the

diecretion and concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief, to station

officers at laboratories.

When plane for the post-Revolutionary army were being

discussed, Alexander Hamilton, himself an artilleryman, proposed

25 ' Ck• " ii"I

V..,1

-1
no less than four schools, one of them to, be a school of application for artillerymen and engineers. It Must not be thought

that there was anything startli 'ng or naovel in. these:ideas,. sound.

though they were, for the French had long hadsa system of artil 

- lery schools, and Frenc~h military thought was thoroughly familiar

to the soldiers of the Revolution.

After the lRevolutionary War, In June, 1784, the Congress

decided that standing armies were dangerous to the liberties of

a free people, and dismissed all but about a hundred office it an~d

men. Indian troubles, very, soon forced the re-establishment of

a standing airmy, the scalping knife appearing move of a ýmexztace.

than a standing army. .,One.of the features.,of this;army waiasthe.

establish ient.,(1794 of a- Corps of ArWllsr$ats mid-Engineers,

to which cadet's were attached. for instruction in -those. arts,!..Itwas soon found that the cadet in. &.,regiment, like..the. midshipman

on a ship, did not receive proper instruction, and, so the Unaited

States Military Academy was begiun in 1802,.5 The Mtilitary Academy,

then as now, warn not a service school, for profesaiwAal. training.

for artillerymen wa'*not giyen in it. The. cadet received. 

a

thorough, lbe raledacation and the sound. beginnings of his' military

educationo, butathe did not emnerge a finished soldier.,. Only. experience

and professio~nal schooling on the graduiate level wtduld do that4

To supply that post-graduate-trairting and to lauiprove the

training of the arm in general, a school for artillery wast ordered

established at Fortress. Monroe,. Va. , April. , So1824, John C.

Calhoun, the great Southern orator.-, then Secretary of War, had

been engaged in re -organizing the army. and was most active an F behalf of this school as part of-his plart. EfI~ven companies of

artillery, from the several regirrainta, werb to be assembled

there for instruction. Graduates 'of West Point who were newly

assigned to the artillery were to go there for a practical course

of instruction before joining their units. The companies were to

rotate annuaLly, so that all of the artillery would receive qhe benefit of specialized training at the school. Materiel was also to be

tested there. The scheme of rotating the companies lasted until

1i8Z, when economy supervened. The school itself, the first 

r

serVice school in the Army, lasted until 1835, when the beginning

of the Seminole War made it necessary to transfer all the troops

from the school to Florida.

Establishment of schools of instruction for artillery comnpanies was suggested again in 1855 by Jefferson Davis, who proposed a two year course to the Senate Military Affairs. Committee.

In 1857 a Lt Col Harvvy Brown war, Instructed to begin organizing

26

* up.
such a school, and its work began in 1858. There was a two year

course of instruction for the artillery companies, and graduates

of West Point spent a year there before joining their units. The

course they studie* covered the whole range of studies and prac- tics with which the artillery officer must be familiar. The. school

itself was known as The Artillery School. The Artillery School

this time was not to be so long-lived as before, 1br the Civil War

was at hand. In 1860 the U. S. Army had 16,006 men, otwhorn

929 were in the Department of the East, the remainder being

stationed in the Departments of the West, Texas, New Mexico,

Utah, Oregon, and California. Plainly, no men could be spared

from the task of coping with the South. The school was not used

for officer training during the Civil War, and did not reopen until

1868.

Aitillery Schools After the Civil War

This time, a more comprehensive attempt wasuoade to

set up a system of officer training. West Point, of course, continued its invaluable work. For garrison training, regimental

commanders were to receive reports from their battery commanders

as to the sort of trainiz4S given and thoe. ferward abstracts of these

reports to Waslhnivton. A mild. form of training and supervision,

admittedly, but even so it was a step forward, The .Artillery School

was revived. Five batteries, one from each regiment, were

stationed there. The scope of the course was essentially that

given in 1858. This school had one great drawback: it offered

only one course for officers. This meant that a man who had

served throuighout the Civil-War, had worked his guns at Malvern

Hill, and had seen the dead lying in the Wheatfield and the Devil's

Den, sat in the same class with a boy just out of the Military

Academy, to whom such stories had begun to be faintly boring.

The only variety in artillery studies was gained by passing officers

through both field artillery units and foot artillery units (as heavy artillery was then known).

The first school for Field Artillery was a shprt-livecl

experiment at Fort Itiley, Kan., where in February, 1869, four

batteries were ordered to assemble to form a school. Its course

would have covered the brigade (our battalion) and its use, the p

horse, maneuvre, firing, and drill. This interesting attempt lasted

3., but two years, because of the Indian troubles. The troops were

used as cavalry on the frontier. The men were often taken for

use as teamsters, the horses were broken down by improper use,

"and finally the batteries were scattered about the country again.

In 1887, Congress authorized a school of instruction for drill and

S27

I4
tactics for cavalry and light artillery, wh~.ch was established 1892

at Fort Riley. It wua to include a regiment of cavalry and not to

exceed five batteries of field artillery.' Its staff was to be the

cominanding officer and the field officers of the units present.

The principal object was the combined operation of cavalr'y and

light artillery; ultimately, it became The Cavalry School.

During these years, the school at Fortress Monroe had

continued its work. An interruption occurred with the outbreak

of the Spaniuh-American War-in 1898. The school opened its

doors again in 1900 and offered a one-year course for the many

new officers coming from the increase of the armyr after the war.

In 1907 the Artillery COtps was separated into the Cbast A rtillery and the Field Artillery. The Field Artillery was to be six

regiments of six batteries each, leaving the Coast Artillery as a

corps. While this act put ihe Field'Artilleri, inits proper place

in the army organizational structure, at the same time, it deprived it of its school. 'Fortress Monroe, on the Virginiaý coast,

was most unsuitable for i.fiild aki'tlloery post. In the 61d smoothbore and black powder days, this was not so, for the coast defense

gun and the field gun could both 'be pointed out over the waters and

aimed at a floating kieg. The moderntfield gin',x hexiitance by

1907, demanded different facilities, for its misiion was quite

different from that of its cousin in the Coast Ai'tillary, Thus,

one very pressing 'reason for the es'tablishment of an artillery 1

school arose from the re-organization of 1907. A second arose

from the great changes that had been hrade in field artillery

rhateriel and techniques in the late 19th century, described in

our first chapter. A third reason was the general diulatisfaction

with the condition oi the Field Artillery, as shown by its work in

the war with Spain. In 1908, Theodore lRoosevelt wrote in his

autobiography, "Our artillery was still very inferior in training

and practice to the artillery arm of any one of the great powers

such as Germany, France, or Japan--a condition which we only

then began to remedy,

One of the remedies the President had in mind was sending

Capt Dan T. Moore to visit foreign artillery schools for a study

of foreign methods of gunnery and instruction. In 1009, Moore P

received permission from the Imperial Government to attend the

German Artillery School at Juterbog. This school and its founding,

because of the impression it made on Moore, affected formation

of the School of Fire at Fort Sill. Also, the German school was

founded under conditions rather like those surrounding the founding

of the American school. Like the American school, the German

28 .
school followed upon a great oechnical change in artillery materiel:

the introductioniof the rifled iield piece. Then, too, its founding

followed a war lnwwhich the. artillery was not pleased with its own

pe rformance.

The German Artillery School

The German.artillo ry began the introduction of rifled cannon

shortly~ after 1860, and by 1864 it had instituted a simple School of

Gunnery in which to teach the use of new weapons. Two years IUter,

they were at war with Austria. After that brief struggle. the German

artillery knew that their counterparts in Austria, though with th,.

defeated army,. felt they had. done ol] that brave and skillful rmen

could.. Th.ý Gsermmns were Less, satisfieO with their artillery and

tactics.. hI*4oW- t,,during the whole, course of the campaigni of

1866," wrote PirincO.Krait to H4oheritqe ingelfingen in his Letter-*

on Artillegy,'~l~u a rt*.l. play ýLjs.'visiy.e part With regard tothe qirm; cf th'a.ensmy's a ...... . After, the. campaign of

18666, we all, to.1I have. alregdy said# felt that we had not shot

sufficiently well." Th# QID=14A gplutlon -was, the artillery school

at Juterbog. Sotoog a h work there.,. qnd such was. the

effect on the Germnan a~rtillery,.. that- in, 1070 -1.871 it completely

mastered the, Trenoch, Wh~lh siacce Napoleon's day had thought itself the best on the Contih ent. It was to this school, with the

prestige of St. Privat. and Sedan still about it, that Moore went

in 190 9.

AccorOIESg t~o Capt Moore'Is repqrt, Joterbog taught officers,

of tho army how to ahoot, dsveloped and improved methods of fire,

tried new methods, tested materiel, and collected statistical data.

It offered five courses for officers: one for. oecond lieutenants who

had completed three years with their regiment&; one for captains

and senior first lieutenants; one for field officers and senior captains; one for reserve officers; and one for junior officers. There

were two termis a year, each of about four months. The reserve

officers came five times a year, for terms of 42 days., The course

for senior first lieutenants and captains covered target practice for

the battery, battalion, and regiment; tactical use of field artillery, principally the selelction and occupation of position, choice of arnmunik.ion and methods of firej ammunition supply service of German

and foreign armies; ciescr~ption of German materiel; and field artiller).,y f other armies. Teaching methods were intensely practical

in that there were no texts and no recit~ations. The student officers

solved problerns or gave Lectures themselves. All target practice

Was divided into school practice and battle practice. in school

practice, the object was to bring out and explain every mistake as * ,. soon as made. Time was no object, and there was no fire for effect.

29.
1

In battle practice, there wan fire for effect, the student wauj not

interrupted by the instructor, In Judging these problems, the

hits obtained and the time and ammurition needed were considered.

Theme courses were not suspended in a vacuum, so as to speak,

but were carefully coordinated with the unit training programr so

that they were a continuation and extension of the course given in

each regiment during the yearly training program. In comparing

this school with the one at Fortress Monroe, Moore stated that

at Monroe one would learn to calculate a range table hy use of the

appropriate formula; at Juterbog one would learn how to use the

range table to get hits.

The scale of the school is of some interest in comparison

with the ealy'American efforts, It had a onrnMatdant assiated

by two captains. There were two' ssistant commandants', four officers in the research departnment, and 18in'1tuct r h.'Nine

batteries of school'troopi did the firing. Sharing-the' same '*eser-.'

vation was- a school of heavy artillery, uridei,'the!domMa'ndanit'bof

the school we have beuis di'bcuusing, with a staff'of i'si'X, and four'

batteries of school trobps.\ The Gerrhan: school diffe;red'considerably from the Fi*ld Artillery School of later yearg, hwever. The

Germaih dourse's were Very .laz'tely gunneryand ;of a~fairl.V' simple

nature. ''Indirect fire wad neither stressed nor regarded i's Aorrni.l.

Probably because of Moore's experience with modern

field artillery, schools, an oreder of November 23, 1910, s'ent him 1'

to the Commanding Officer, Fort Sill, Oklahoma for duty in

connection with the establishment of a school for field artillery.

A December order formed a three-man board to meet at the post

to make detailed plans for establishing the school at Fort Sill or

some other suitable locale. Members of the Board weie Lt Col

David J. Rumbough, lt FA; Capt Dan T. Moore, 6th FA; Capt

Jesse G. Langdon, lot FA. ,.

Why warn Fort Sill chosen? It was then very p.inote from

the centers of population and industry. However, since 1905 much

artillery had been concentrated there, and the 51, 000 acres of the

reservation gave ample room •or target practice. Furthermore,

the War Department had in mind a School of Fire for the Mobile

Army that would include both infantry and artillery. It was thought

that Fort Sill offered plenty of room for such an ambitious program.

The reservation contained a great variety of terrain that offercd

good observation and had many tactical possibilities. Medicine

Bluff Creek lay north of the post, and ran generally northwest-southeast. South of the post buildings it was fairly flat, rolling country,

with little gullies. This belt of flat ground swept around to the west

30

I
of the post, an area about 6000-7000 yards across until it reached

the hilly ground that began Just north and west of the poet buildings.

West of this fairly level ground lay McKenzie hill, which was about

west-south-west of the post buildings; Signal mountain (1747 feet),

which lay due west; and finally March ridge and Jones ridge with

Brush canyon between them, This corridor ran east and west,

and at its east entrance was Mount Hinds (1584 feet). To the east

of Mount Hinds were Heyl's Hill, Rumbough Hill, and the Medicine

Bluffs, with Medicine Bluff No. I touching the northwest corner

of the built-up area, and with Medicine Bluff creek running below

and on the other side of the Bluffs. To the west and north of the

ridges and mountains described above lay still others, some only

hills, some dignifiEd&vith the name of mounta#. Inttermittent

streams and small creeks ran in the low grotind and there was

plenfr of wooded ground for concealment. To the northwest was

the Wichita National Forest. In climate, the area tended to be

dry, windy, and sunny. The dryness sometimes proved an embarrassment, and the heat of summer was always a trial to students

and troops,

Fort Sill itself was established January 8, 1869, by

General Philip Sheridan, and so named in August after a clamsmate of his, Brigadier General Joshua W. Sill, who fell at Stone

Piver, Tenn., in 186Z. The ihisslo of the post was to keep an

eye on the Kiowa and Comanche Indian tribes, who rode the war

trail in Southwest Oklahoma until 1875. A garrison was stationed

at the post, and they lived in the low buildings made of native

stone by soldier labor. Also, an Indian agency, which lasted

till 1901, was established. At that time the reservation was opened

to white settlement, and nearby Lawton was founded. These

Indian associations deeply colored the life of the post, even after

the founding of the School of Fire in 1911. A troop of Indian Scouts

was stationed at the post until 1897, and when the Apaches of

Geronirno's band were captured, it was to Fort Sill, that they were

finally sent, Geronimo himself liea in the Apache cemetery on

Cache Creek, within the limits of the Post. When in the narly

years of the School of Fire it was once evicted from its buildings

to make room for the School of Musketry, the store of the Indian

trader, William H. Quinette, was purchased and used am the school

building.

31

• 1
Bibliography

MS. History of Field Artillery Schools in the United States, SgtMorris Swett, Pet., Field Artillery School Library.

Historical Sketch of the Organimation, Administration, Materiel,

an Tctcs of theAtillery.United States Arm , William E.

Birkhimer, 1st Lt 3d Regt., U. S. Artillery. Thomas M. Gill

& Co., Washington, D. C. 1884,

The United States Army in.War and Peace, Oliver Lyman Spaulding,

Col U. S. Field Artille ry, G. P., .tt~am's Sons, -New York, 1.93.7.

Letters on Artillery, Prince Krait azu Hohenlohe niglefingien. Translated by Col N. L. Walford, RA 3d Ed. Edward Standford,. London,

Cockspur Streets, S. W. 1898.

Carbine and Lance, the Story of Old Fort Sill, Capt W. S. Nye, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1938.

MS. Report on the 'ev'a, FieldArtiltey Schol,i Juterbog.

Capt DIun T. Moore, Field Artillery Bchoo* 'Libra&y.

.3.1i

3Z

S.'.

- -- ---- - . I '' /*
CHAPTER THREE

ESTABLISHMENT AND FIRST YEAR OF THE SCHOOL

The three-man board selected to plan the school--Rumbough,

Langdon, and Moore--met at Fort Sill, January 2, 1911. Most

of the details of the work fell on the energetic Moore. Colonel

Henry M. indrews, 1st FA, became a member of the board vice

Lt Col Rumbough in March, as the latter was obliged, to proceed

to Hawaii. The difficulties encountered in pianping for the new

school were preserved in correspondence between:Captain Moore

and Colonel E. St. John Greble of the General Staff, who supervised the project. Especially troublesome were: -relations with

the Apache prisoners of war still on the reservation; securing an

adequate number of capablc personnel; and finding an ample water

supply. Interestingly enough, in the letters, the houring problem,

later such a trial to Moore and his successor*,; gotr only passing

mention.

j The Indian prisoners of war, the remnants of the Oand

with which Geronimo had terrorized the Border, were living on

the reservation with their herds which needed almost the whole

of the reservation for thair gqazing. School regulations for the

conduct of fire, prepared by the Board. were disapproved by the'

Adjutant General's office because they did not sufficiently protect

the lives and property of the Indians. This, M'4oore found confusing

for the regulations were based on what had been the actual practice

of the post, and so he wrote (Moore-Greble correspondence, letter

of March 17, 1911):

"JIt depends in the first place, upon what is

understood by property rights, for if this

reservation belongs to the Indians in the sense

that a farm belongs to its owner, then we have

no-right to use it for target practice. . .without

the consent of the Indians. This can, however,

not be the case, for by law it is a military

reservation and therefore can be used as such..."

He closed by saying: "This is such a magnificent reservation for

military work that it would be a shame to .'lose. it...." possibly

by an accident to an Indian stirring up a bad public reaction.

33
March 23, 1911, Colonel Greble replied:

"lConcerning the question of your regulations

for the conduct of fire on the range, let that

go. The War Department will probably decide

what iD to be done with the Apache prisoners

and I think they will prrbably be removed from

the eeservation, but until the question is settled there is no use giling a weapon to the

friends of the Indians. They and their prop-*

erty rights have been.protected in the past,

firings and they can be protected in the future

firings without making -a rumpus."

Actually, the Indians were present when the school opened its

doors in the fall of 1911, and were there until 1913, If any

difficulty arose, it does not appear i4. the records. . ,

Securing Pe Esonnel a&nd Water"

The nex.t problem was that of school personnel. There was

need of a large achool detachment, and with members able to do

the expert work required; there was a need of good instructors; .f:

there was a nbed for an administrative staff; there wav the problem

of providiing trained school troops. Moore's basic-plan called for

a white and a colored detachment, the former to furnish skilled.

artisanis, the rangb detail, etc.; the latter, horse-holders, janitors,

etc. In more detail, Moore wanted a carpenter shop, smithy,

paint shop, target detail, a statistical and record department,

range guards ("1i..)t is impossible to keep the people off these roads

unless a guard is placed over every gate. ") In selecting them, he

wanted good men with rank to give compensatioz, and authority

:' appropriate to the task assigned.

Col Greble doubted that the detachment asked for could be

obtained without specific legislative authority. Although Moore

promptly cited a paragraph in the 1909 appropriations act, which

in his judgement covered the point, Col Greble still felt Moore

wo•ld not initially get the number of men desired, and strongly

hinted that he should not labor the point (letters of March 3R,

April 18, and April Z5). His attitude may be summarized as:

"Get the schuol started and we can build it up later. " The high

cost of civilian help lade it impracticable as a substitute. In

all this correspondence, Moore vyas adamant about the necessity

for getting skilled men who could successfully use limited ajuiprnent, since, in his opinion, unskilled personnel "kuld botch the

34

S~34

i , e',,,. _.... _. _ ,_ _ _ ~
beat equipment. A proposal to dismount a battery, assign it to

Fort Sill, and use its members for orderlies, was also rejected

by Moore. He pointed out that such action would destroy the combM•t

value of the battery (the army then having but 36) and that its

officers and men would be thoroughly displeased at such an interruption of their work. The Board's report of April 25, 1911,

suggested a white detachment of 61 and had earlier added a colored

detachment of 47. In the end, the school detachment numbered

42 and had no colored troops. Captain Moore cheerfully accepted

the smaller detachment and stated. "Your letter of the 31st received and my but it was a relief. I now feel that the school is

well started and that if we do not succeed it will be our own fault,"

Getting the right men for the school staff and faculty and

to command the "instruction batteries" (school troops) was a

trying problem. In considering the personnel problems that-beset

the School's founders, it must be remembered that the Army then

had less than 300 field artillery officers. Every man had to be

used to the best advantage and bear hi.; share of the load.. Accordingly, instructors would also be battery officers in tIe school

troops and would do their full duty in each ophere. Thus Moore

must have pofderid. logg and earnestly before making his requests

for the staff and faculty. Only one of his requests was approved,

that asking for Lt Ralph Pennell for secretary, and with that

approval came the War Department's thrifty suggestion that

I - PennelJ command the School Detachment. Lt.Roger S. Pa.rrott,

formerly with Ordnance, was assigned to the school without

solicitation, perhaps as a good-will offering by the Department.

He proved a god-send to the harassed Moore. Therefore, when

the tim, came to begin school, the actual instruction for the Fall

term officers' courses was handled by Moore, Pennell, and Parrott.

Lt John C. Maul of the 5th FA instructed the Noncommissioned

Officers' Course.

When the instruction batteries arrived (A and B of the 5th

FA), they materialized in the form of uninstructed, gun-shy recruits (letter of August 8) that had to be whipped into shape by

September 15, which had been chosen as the opening day (,f the

Fall term. Moore wrote; "For personal reasons I naturally do

; not want to fail but there are reasons which make person&al reasons

,seem insignificant, namely, the good of the Field Artillery. As

post commander I am using all my authority to train these batteries

in the essentials with one object in view, to prepare them for the

school work, and I am going to accomplish that or burst in the

attempt.

35

- *
In the earlier portions of the Moore-Greble letters, the water

problem, which with the housing problem was to plague the Field

Artillery School for so many years, was not stressed. Moore did

fedl'some concern about it, noting tersely: "The Fort water supply

is still going down;" which drew the equally terse reply- "Give up

that drink habit. "1 In acknowledging the news about the school detachment (June 3), Moore wrote exultantly: "Everything seems to

be coming our way now, even the water supply, which can be conaidered solved for the present. They were digging around the

other day and accidentally unearthed aLwpoin•, which at the present

time is giving about 2, 000, 000 gallons a day. But by June 14

the spring had dropped to 15, 000 gallons a day and was OtilL going

down. All but one of the old wells were dry, and a new underground gallery was giving only 200,000 gallons a day., All of Moore's

worries about "drink" were back-, and- he wondered gloornily if

establishment of the new school at Fort Sill was justified. The

cause of the shortage, in his opinion, went back several years to

the damming of Medicine Bluff Creek to supply water for nearby

Lawton. The dam greatly lowered the creek, which in turn'dried

up the Post's wells that relied on seepage from the creek.$ 'As a

result, the water level was dropping'an'inch or two every day.

A Z000 foot well was put down in the vicinity of the present power

plant with little success. only a trickle of sulphur water. The

solution finally adopted was to borrow water from the 10-inch

pipe line Lawton had crossing the reservation to its new reservoir,

and to use great economy in drawing water from the old wells.

With the aid of pumps, the two reservoirs at the Fort were kept

full except for one brief period of shortage, By the time the first

classes arrived for the opening of school, the dam had been built,

the reservoir was almost full, and water, such as it was, came

throisgh the pipes in fair quantities. The water was not all it

could be, though. The new ;Xerarvoir, called Lake L~awtonka,

was then small and shallow. It evaporated rapidly in hot weather,

and during dry periods it quickly acquired a coating of green scum.

Residents were warned to keep a clean sock or rag tied over all

faucets to strain out minnows and the larger particles of rock

and mud. This was necessary as the water came into the mains

with no purification.

With these problems out of the way, or at least postponed,

work on the actual opening of the school proceeded. In July Moore

asked for full use of the Old Post, that square of low, gray, stone

buildings dating from 1870, but the War Department refused, having

in mind the eventual location there of the School of Mvq.ketry.

Nevertheless Moore was permitted to locate tha school there

temporarily. About 500 yards nor'thwest of the Old Post stuod

William Quinette's Trader's Store, a large, frame, barn-like

-. 36 % 4• .
building. About one mile d"e west stood the New PoU t 01910 -1911),

also a square, its extent shown in the map in back of the book.

Both the Trader's Store and the New Post~wereb used as siteki for

the School during the days of the great eviction-s.

The First Class and the Early Courses

When the School of Fire op'oned Its doors September 15,

1911, the staff and faculty con~sisted of four mnen: Capt Dan T.

Moore, let Lts Ralph M, Penaiell, Roger S. Parrott, auid John

C. Maul, L~ieuten~ant Maul was bo~rowed from the '3th FA to

teach the noncommi butone d officersi PFranel1 wo satscrotary; andl

Parrott, -the supply officqok. - 'Of- the 4Z-man dietachrr"Ont, ockfly 17

had arrived. .k

What was the backgrbt~nd of these mnen? Mociro:,was an

Alabaman, born in 1877. He began hisi.nilitary 6&reerVas ,kI

infantryman in 1898 with the Oltd U Cannecticat 1n~antry, Fr6iln

there he went to the Regulat Anrty in V899,% trauluferriig'tio the;:.

Artillery Corps in 1901. in- 1'964 ie was 'aa honor g~addate of

the Artit~ery 1chool at Frortrees'MqO'r6e. "Moore hac) se ried 46s "aide

to President ZDuosevelt. arotva Ws Pii G',c a gone' from Field Artillery to Ordnanc'e, Pennmell was -Wait Point '06

andA had begun as a cavalryman. Maul~wao a Olwo #na~te of -his. and

. . . 1. . 1 . had begun in the infantry.'

Four courses, known as Coullses A, B, C, and 1) vera

offered to students as follows: -

Course A Battery offiters

Course B Field officers

Course C Enlisted men

Course D Militia officers

These courses stressed gunnezy very heavily, and what tactics

was presented was given as a tactical framework for a gunnery

problem. Hence the name 'School of Fire,"1 for it was a school

to teach artillerymen how to fire anid not yet. a school to mtake

37 p
Fourteen captains reported for duty as studints or, September 15,

followed by five field officers in November.

The board had carefully planned a course of instruction for

these men, but after a few days trial it was thrown away. In

drawir.g up the course a certain level of experience had been

assuried, however, it soon became clear that no experience should

have been assumed, At the end of the year Moore reported: "The

average student offic.er was so deficient in elementary knowledge

that it was impossible for him to derive comrDensurate benefit , from the expenditure of ammunition. 1". The students were extremely

deficient in locating targets, sometimes never seeing, them at all.

"Correact observations often led to no changes of dataý, and doubtful rounds were often sensed erroneously. Many officers could

not remember the range they had last, commanded and had to peer

at the recor-4er.'e.sheet, CaLcuOation of firing datatook about 20

minutes at the 6eginning-~of thk €couree and the inte rval.between

the sensing of a shot and the .ext rotuAd was about one minute..

One man, ptacoo at an observation popt one and one-hall yard#

above the battery, a distaucdetoo antOl'.to register accurately on

the Anstr•-nehts, or indeed to make any difference in the shooting

of the piece, spent 10 minutes trying to: fitgure data to. compensate

for it, - This quest for extreme accuracy-was not stupidity on the

part of the men. it merely reflected the evil effects of years of

gunnery instruction in the classroom instead of on.the range.

The Capitoins were:. Wn, S. Guignard, Zd F.,A.., Hery

W. Butner, Ed F.'A,,: .8onhoke-'ayne.• .- I.F. A.,, Augustine Mclntyre,

3I F.A., Thomas W. H ,Uy4ay, 3d F. A., Wo. McKay Lambdin,

4th F.A., Geo. M. Bropks, 4th F,A., Albert S.. Fuger, 4th F.A.,

George M. Apple, 5thF.A., Poger O, Mason, 5th F.A., John

B. W. Corey,' st) F.A., Arthur F. Cassels, 5th F.A., Wmi, S.

Browhing, 5th:F, A., and Joe. F. Barnes, ith F, A.

The field officers were: Colonel Alexander B, Dyer,

4th F.A,., Lieutenant Colohels George W. Van Deusen, 2d F. A. ,

Samuel D. Sturgeis',3d F. A., Majors Ernest Hinds, 6th F A.,

and Ottho W. V. PFarr, 5th F.A.

4

38

INN. -

' !06
The Germans 45 years earlier had learned to their dismay that

their artillery could not handle its new weapons. Their successful remedy was the one that was to be applied with equal success

to the American artillery: a practical school. Faced with the

same sort of situation surrounding students, Moore threw away

the agreed-on course and improvised another.

Under the revimed plan, the first month was largely devoted to work with flash targets, preparation of firing data, and

methods of adjusting fire on the target. The flash target was a

mechanism on the end of a long stick. It was operated by a

soldier and would explode in the air, simulating a burst, after

the soldier had run to a location that would be appropriate for the

command announced by the student, After the training in fundamentals, the iitudents were allowed to proceed to actual firing

with the guns, with better results, There.they were taught that

the adjustment (getting correct data by observing the fall of the

shot) had to be as quick and economical am possible, and that

instead of a mathematically accurate adjustment, one had to be

satisfied with the smallest appropriate bracket. Then they were 4

taught to cover the bracketed area quickly with fire, The students'

minds were still filled with notions dating to the old smooth-bore

days when the gunner squinted down the barrel, like Dan'l Boone,

and let fly a solid cannon-ball at the enemy. Thus, the students

attempted to place a shell directly in a machine gun emplacement

or drop one exactly in a trench. With modern high explosive and

shrapnel, this practice was a @heer waste of time and money,

but that was something that could only be revealed on the range.

After the experience of the fall course, the School of Fire

was able to offer a spring course to another group of officers that

was better adapted to their backgrounds. In the Field Artillery

Journal, Volume II, 1912, are the course notes of Capt William

H. Burt, 4th FA, which permit a reconstruction of Course A for

that term in some detail. There was one lecture on conduct of

fire, Then the class started on panoramic sketching and locating

targets. There were three sessions on probabilities (that branch

of mathematics on which methods of conduct of fire rest), and

then some work on determination of firing data. In the seventh

"exercise" simulated fire began; it lasted until the Z3d "exercise."

At that point service practice began and dominated the course until

its end. Below is a detailed break-down of the course, by half-day

C; pe riods:

39 '1 ,,
Panoramic sketching and target location Z7

Lectures 5

Conferences (11 or. conduct of fire, 3 on

probabilities, I miscellaneous) 15

Panoramic sketching and kimulatedfire 13

Firing instruments 1

Firing battery I

Effect of fire I

Ballistics 1

Simulated fire 7

Critique of fire 3

Practical workon preparation of data 3k'

Service practice 21

Tactical exercises 6

Every problem was followed by a critique, except when

weather made it absolutely impossible. The fall of the shots was

plotted so that class-room critiques might be given with absolute

mathematical knowledge of what had happened.. Howeve r, in these

critiques no dtudent was criticised for breaking hard and fast"

rules, for the School laid down none, Eror work along more geheral

lines, the students were formed into committees to study and report

on various aspects of the ammunition supply problem for the several

divisions of the field armies. Boards were also formed to investigate and report on matters of interest to the field artillery. There

were several field exercises in which every command and post of

a two-battery battalion was filled by student officers.

Course D, the Militia Course, was held May 15 to June 15,

1912 as a "Joint regular army and militia field artillery encampnment." The peculiar phrasing of this name must have arisen from

the lack of funds for sending militia officers to a service school; "I

whereas, funds were available for an annual summer "encamp- . I

ment," such as the militia had held for years. Thus, the militia

were sent to school, and the class was called an "encampment"

In the orders which he received, Moore was told that, under the

post commander, he would have charge of the execution of details

connected with the selection of camp grounds, preparation and

execution of programs of instruction, drills, exercises, and the

collection and forwarding of reports, which were to be rendered

by every regular and militia officer Joining In the "exercises"

The salient idea was to give the militia as much instruction and

training as possible in the use of materiel, especially with ieference to efficiency of fire and the duties of each man in the battery.

The officers to attend were to be designated by the Chief, Division

of Militia Affairs. Similar orders went to the Quartermaster

40 A
General and Paymastir General, informing them of the encampment, -or Course D.- At the end of the clans, the students werem

to be "nmustered for pay, " by the Paymaster who would come up

from San Antonio. This money, incidentally, came from the

appropriation for the encampment and. maneuvers of the organized

militia.

Less formal orders came to Moore from Major William J.

Snow, then in the office of the Chief of Staff, Division of Militia

Affairs, the same Snow who later became the first Chief of Field

Artillery. Writing May 9, 1912, he said:

"As far as a program of instruction is concerned,

that I think is more or less a matter of form, my

idea being that you and McNair (later Lt Gen Lesley

J. McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces)

will go ahead and pump into the militia all the

instruction that they can absorb. This instruction

should be as practical as possible but at the same

time you need not limit yourself to much character

of work, but go ahead and make the best Field

Artillerymen you can out of the officers who will

be sent you. I think that you will find they are an

intelligent lot of men and can readily absorb

knowledge, and that they are greedy for work.

Keep them good and busy.."

On arrival, the class was divided into four sections, each

section being assigned to a different instructor:

Section A, Capt E. D. Scott, 6th FA. i

Section B, Capt W. F. Morrison, 2d FA.

Section C, Capt J. B. W. Corey, 5th FA.

Section D, Capt Marlborough Churchill, 5Lh FA. • 1

Class work began on Thursday, and the same instruction was given

on that day and the following Friday and Saturday.

7:30 A. M. to 9:30 A. M. : battery drill; panoramic sketching. 1-

~e. 9:30 A. M. to 12:00 A. M. : simulated fire; target identification;

sketching; keeping of records.

2:00 P. M. to 5:00 P. M. : use of probability tables; lecture by

Capt Augustine McIntyre; informal discussion.

, The unhurriedi pace of army life inthose days was shown by

the orders being r'-rmonnaly signed by the then Adjutant General, E. F.

Ladd, and being written as a vq ry forr~aJl letter, *t.thehthan- avan order

as we know it today. of

41
In the following weeks, Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays, and Sat.-

urdays were devoted to target practice, lunch was taken, and the

whole day spent in the field regardless of weather. On Tuesdays

and Thursdays, the mornings were given to battery drill, sketching, simulated fire, and identification of targets. The afternoons

were used for critic.;ies of the previous day's firing, based on reports of the rangc party which plotted every round fired. Some of

these critiques may have been conducted by the students themselves,

judging by the reports they rendered, Of the afternoons scheduled

for critiques, a few were devoted to lectures on materiel and

ballistics,

The student was first taught how to use observation instruments and to record his findings, Then came blackboard firing

to teach the proper sequence of tommands and corrections for

deflection, height of burst, and range. Next came smoke bomb

practice, followed by percussion fire and time fire on fixed and

moving targets. All students not at the battery recorded their

observations, which were in turn corrected and returned to them.

The student firing a problem first criticised it himself, and then

the instructor criticised it. At times there was a good deal of

congestion around the student firing, and the audible sensings of

his classmates sometimes interfered with his own plaintive "Lost,

three zero righti" The firing batteries, contrary to instructions,

sometimes helped militia officers out of trouble by smapplying missing

commands, correcting foolish ones, and occasionall, even laying

on a familiar target before it had been officially designatedl Before

the formal class-room critiques, each student waw given the record

of commands of the students firing, together with the report of

the range party that plotted the actual fall of the rounds,

The diversity of texts used (in the 1913 course) is of interest.

The French, German, and Russian firing regulations, school manuscripts on occupation of position, calculation of firing data, and

reconnaisance and communication for field artillery, were in use.

Not until the school year 1912.1913 did the School of Fire get a

press of its own. .

The students' reports, which were called fur in the orders

of the Adjutant General to Moore, reveal no doubt that this was no

encampment but a "tour of duty at this school as a student," as it

one-of them put it. Nor do the reports leave one in doubt about the

students appreciation of the School. One wrote: "Opportunities

to conduct or even witness firing of service charges by field guns

has been rare. " Another: "Even the most experienced among.,

us was a novice in conducting fire .... " One student strongly objected to publishing the records of effective and non-effective rounds@

42
"The result in sorne cases has been the display of obnoxious conceit

that has been nettlesome." Among the suggestions for improvemert

made by students were requests that only officers previously attaining a certain standard of efficiency be allowed to attend and that

the course be held twice a year. Actually standards of proficiency

were set for National Guard and Rewerve officers, and classes for

them were held twice yearly. Attendance at the school, it should

be noted, involved some sacrifice, both in loss of regular income

and in travel expense, which were not borne by the government.

Little information has survived on Course Be that given

field officers. General Order 7?,, 1911, prescribed that the course

should cover:. dties of artillery commanders; target practice;

reconnaisance and occupation of position in accordance with concrete

tactical problems; fire direction for the organization of which their

rank givec thern command; ammunition supply service, From the

briet'nexs of the course (November-December), the small number

of students, the smallness of the school, which ruled out separate

attention, and the absence of independent mention, one may ikssume

that.theve field officers Joined freely in the work of Course A,

which then was in its most advanced phase. They probably received duties proper to their rank in the several field exercises,

and were allowed to fire for effect in their problems.

Two couruis for tioncommimsioned officers were conducted

simultaneously with the two courses for battery officers. The fall

class was corducted by l1t Lt John C. Maul 5th FA, and'he lprirng

class by lot Lt F. W. Honeycutt 5th FA. The course was entirely

practical in nature ane• taught students those duties they fright be

expected to periorm in war. It covered the preparation of firing

da•ta, signalling, telephones, aketching, scouting, and observation

of fire. Al the •nd of the last course, two of the best students were..

allowed to conduct fire during service practice.

At the close of the year, Moore sat down to write his report

and make his requests, which should be noted in the light of the

table in the rear of Lhis history giving the size and cost of the U. S.

f' Army from 1911 on. He wanted an instructor for each 13 students,

or two instructors in all, since he expected but 26 students at a

u •time. A range guard of 17 men would be helpful, for there was

continual trespassing on the range during service practice. Fourteen

men for the stable detail would be useful for the school troops had

to care for the school's mounts as well as their own. All in all,

he wanted 56 more men, plus two officers to specialize in instruction,

and four for instruction and administration.

43

'Ii
Summary of First Year of Operation

COURSES

1911 L91 2 Total

R egular Army, Sept-Dec Jan-Jun Otf. EM

Course A (Battery Officers) 10 13 Z3

Course B (Field Officers) 3 6 9

Course C (Enlisted Men) 18* 20. 38

• ~~Militia -".- May-Jun

•,i:Course'D (Militia Office-s)- -. 21-Z '

'rotal" 53 38

* Academic Recor4s File

BiblLoJr!ph) chlL ar

Moore-Grebie, Correspondence, Field Artillery School Library.

Annual Reports, U.S.F.AS., 1911-12--19Z6-27,.

Summer. Carps.-File, Post Headquart'trs, Fort Sill, Okla.

Academic Recordo Fi1.a, Field Artillery School. -.

Field Artillery Journal, vol. 11, 1 912.

Proceedings of a Board of Officers 1911-19ZO0 Field Artillery

School Library. .

4j

I,

.'i

.I~

LL
CHAPTER FOUR

FROM SECOND YEAR TO CLOSING IN 1916

"This poet was struck by lightning yesterday, worte Moore

to Ma!or Snow on June Z?, 191Z. "Colonel Miller of the Infanty

arrived with inotructions from the War Department to make arrangementM for the permanant location here of the School of Miusketry.

When in it coming? This school is to move over to the New Post.

How they are going to be able to quarter un over there nobody knows."

'Room wa-s found in the barr&cks foemserLy, occupied. by one of the

batteries stationed at the Nor Post, .4nd on September 24, 1912, the

Scho~l, began moving into it. "' This bad news was typical of the

jolts that were to come in the next four years, which Were among

the most troubled of the School's career. However, these misfortunes could not be seen astthe fall work bsgan• There was one

improvement over the -year before, for the school, now had an

officer specifically assigned as. an instructor. -This was Capt

Aug•ostine McIntyre,', known as the "Villian" eve r, since his' Academy

days. The rest of the five instritcors -were taken fromthe instruction batteries, or ochool troops, Thus Moore, the ComrnahdAnt,

actually commanded A of the 5th FA, and CApt Marlborough Churchill

commanded B. Capt Robert Davis, who was to instruct the spring

noncommissioned offipars course, wao a battery officer in'Churchill's

battery, and a member of a-board, besidesa. McIntyre, Moore6 and

Churchill joined in instructing the officer clasi divJiding it into two

sections, of which McIntyre took one, and Churchill and Moore alternated on the other.: In that clasts were some who •became outotanding

artillerymen: Major Charlem P. Summerall, Capt Conrpd H. Lrnza,

let Lt Lesley .1. McNair, and IIt Lt Edward P. King.

The organizational changes of the next few yeais tell a"

story of modest growth and progress. For example, after McNair

finished the fall course at the school, he reported for duty February

1, 1913, as statistical officer. Assisted by a noncommissioned

officer he was engaged exclusively in that work. * A careful survey

was made of the range, and over 40 stations accurately plotted on J

the map. For each day's firing, the battery and target were carefully located with respect to these stations, and whcn plotted gave

the range within about five yards. Shots Lired were located by flank

observers, and by observers at the firing proint. The range could

1

The rival school did not actuallv appear for tv'o more

yearu,

45

I
then be directly and accurately scaled. Data thus obtained was

of Arnmense value in developing simple and satisfactory methods

of conducting fire.

Moore, Parrott, and McNair kept their posts until 1914.

Moore was relieved at his own request September 15, 1914. The

strain of organizing the school and of fighting for his ideas on the

proper handling of artillery had taken its effect in the form of

considerable opposition to him. As Moore left he could take with

him the satisfaction of having done a vitally importarlt job. A

memorandum for the Chief of Staff, aigned by Brig Gen M. M.

Macomb, Chief of the War College Division, December 18, 1914,

states: "The improvement made in the firing efficiency of the

Field Artillery by reason of this school has been beyond expectation, and the scheme of instruction ham been one of constant pro&-

ress and improvement."

Captain Moore was succeeded by Lt Col Edward F. McGlachlin, Parrott and McNotir were relieved in January and April,

1914, respectively. The number of instructort grew slowly and

steadily. In the school year 1912-1913, only Captain McIntyre was

listed as an instructor for the officers courses. In 1913-L914,

Capt. Mclntyre and Churchill were shown as instructors. In 19L4-i

1915 there were three: Capts Fox Conner, John W. Kilbreth Jr.,

and Daniel W, Hand. In 1915-1916, there was but one, Capt Edward,|

T. Donnelly. There was',never more than one instructor for the jf

noncommissioned officers, nor were there more than 4 for the H

militia. Instructors for the noncommissioned officers were:

191Z-1913 Capt Marlborough Churchill, faLl rourse

Capt Robert Davis, spring course y

1913-1914 l1t Lt Edmund L. Gruber (composer of the

"Caisson Song"), fall and spring courses

1914-1915 lot Lt Robert M. Danford (later Chief of Field

Artillery), fall and spring courses

1915-1916 lot Lt Kenneth S. Perkins, spring course (no

fall course given)

Instructors in the militia coursee were:.

1913 Capt Robert Davis

Capt J. B. W. Corey

lot Lt William H. Shephard

S1it Lt J. A. Crane

1914 No Course

1915 Capt C. Deems Jr.

Capt C. M. Bunker

Capt D. F. Craig

1st Lt Ralph MeT. Pennell

46

,...-
All of the instructors for the 1915 course had been students in the

preceding c3ure for Regulars and had been held over as instructors.

There was no . urse in the spring of 1916, because of the Border

troubles.

An for changes in the staff, Lt Parrott was replaced by lst

Lt Webster A. Capron in February, 1914. Capron remained as

Supply Officer until the final closing of the school in 1916. McNair's

relief in April, 1914, left the post of Statistical Officer vacant

until Lt Edwin Pritrhett arrived March, 1916. Pennell was relieved

as Secretary March, 1915, and Capt William Bryden held the post

from May 1915 until the school closed in 1916.

Despite its forced move to the New Post, the School of Fire

found cause for mild rejoicing when it began its fall course, since

the entering class had had better elementary instruction than its

predecessors. The rate of fire wea; a good deal faster. This was

believed to be only partly due to better training by the. batteries,

whose men, it will be remermbered, were very green in the preceding year. The number of rounds that students sensed as "Lost"

or "Doubtful" increased sharply, with a correspondingly sharp

decrease in the number incorrectly sensed.

In the course ending December 15, there were several

small tactical problems using two companies of the 9th Infantry.

The tactical phase of artillery work, aside from the several field

problems, was merely touched on. The first officer to fire each

day put the battery into position in accordance with the problem

given him. At first he did this by verbal orders issued from

immec4iately in rear of the position, but later greater effort was

made to simulate real tactical conditions.

In the fall of 1913, the school had to combine its instruction batteries in order to make one 4-gun battery. The 3..inch

pieces developed serious weaknesses and deficiencies in the carriages

which made it necessary to take them from the post for repair.

It may have been at this time that a course in communications was

offered, to fill in time left open due to a shortage uf materiel,

ammunition, and instructors. At any rate, such a course was

offered in the period covered by this chapter, though the time is

uncertain.

Improving the Enlisted Course

The scope of the noncommissioned officer courses offered

from the fall of 1912 on was broadened to includo instruction in the

47"

47•

S-. .--. .
theory and practice of conduct of fire, The purpose was to prepare

enlisted men to take over whRnofficers were disabled, to assist

in service practice, and to ready them for war-time commissions.

The aim of the first coursef had been more modest, merely to

train them in war-time duties as noncommissioned officers. Now,

something was to be done about a supply of officers for emergencies.

To make these men proficient members of th' battery detail, they

were instructed in map reading; receiving, caryirg, and delivering

messages; recornaisanc.. and identification of targets; route and

panoramic sketches; road reports; the telephone, and the- se, anA

care of instrumenPs. To quality them ae:,poemilbl•eifficera they

were instructed in selection and.occupatiol. of p0baitin* preparation of firing.data, and conduct of fire. The hours of practical

work. and the time devotod! to indoor instruction coincided with the

work and instruction of theiofficers' courses, except that the

enlisted man frequently had to. work outdoors in the afternoon as

well as in the morning. The enlisted students were used a members

of the detail while instruction war being giver-officers in the !econnaisancei selection, and-occupation of possition, Me'mbers 61.

the class not absorbed in 'these details were required to reconnoitbr

and identify targets and make aketches Juust-lie the student' officers.

Also, like student officers, they were required to record and *bjerve

fire. On days of service practice, membirs of the class assisted

the range officers, the time keeper, the ofSfier taking the height

of burst, etc. Tests were given at the end of nearly,every week.

"On the whole, the work of these •men-was thought to be excellent,

in many cases better than the student officer&. The spring course

of 1913 emphasize,:. work of- the battery and higher headquarters

details and closely followed the officers' course.

•. ~~~This coordination of thA noncommissioned and commissioned. '

classes was carried a stop further the next year (1913-1914) in

S that the noncommissioned officers assisted studeo battery command-

.ers in the preparation st firing data. As for instruction in duties

Speculiar to the detail, every day ome simple scouting problem

was solved, problems in which the enemy was always outlia1ed by

men manipulating canvas targets and firing blink ammunition.

It is interesting to record that 1912-1913, which saw a

press installed at the school (even though from lack of man-power

"full benefit could not be gotten from it) also saw moving picture

cameras added to the School of Fire equipment. The pictures

taken were used to study the workings of the gun squads an& of the

"materiel itself.

48
Ji

•Eviction and Closing of the School.

The range facilities at the disposal of the School.•(south of

Medicine Creek and west of the railroad) could be used more freely

after April 13, 1913, because of the removal of the Indian prisoners

of war on that date. They were given their freedom and their choice

of allotments of land in Oklahoma or of transportation to the Mescale ro

Apache Indian reservation in New Mexico. Eighty-seven chose to

stay in Oklahoma, and each received an 80 acre allotment. Major

General Hugh L. Scott was largely instrumental in having the Apache

prisoners moved from the post, just as he had been instrumental

in having them brought here. 1 This relief was probably soon forgotten in the. next, evicon.ofthe.,echoo.X. In "pten~be., 19.1Z, the [ School had been moved from the Old, Post to the.New Post. (The.

School of Fire was under the post commander at this timeI he was

well within htis rauthority i4 so disposing.Qf it.) There it had settled

down in a group of buildings deuignedor a.battery of field artillery,

although retaining for its use as a shop and a. store room one. building

and part of another in the Old Post. Thestudent officers had framed

and netted tents and a temporary structure for a. mess hall. ..L6t CoL

McGlachlin, commenting on this arrangement shortly after becoming

commandant, wrote: ". ... entirely unsuited for comfortable and

effective study during the windy and inclement weather experienced

during part of each regular term."

On November 8, 1914, Lt Col McGlachlin had to write:

'1On October 24, 1914, the school was dispossessed of its buildings

in the new post because of the approaching arrival of the last

battery oX the regiment stationed here, and put into. two barracks

of the Old Post formerly used by an infaztry battalion. 11 These

buildings were unsuitable for the school and their continued use

uncertain, because of the impending arrival of the School of Musketry,

which was to occupy the buildings. Apparently this eviction was

enough for McGlachlin, for ne proposed moving the School of Fire

from Fort Sill. .McQl'achlin's frame of mind is quite understandable.

In February 1915, the commander-to-be of the School of Musketry,

Col PJ. M. Blatchford arrived and assumed command of the Post,

and also, of course, of the School of Fire. What diplomacy McGlachlin used to stay on the Old Post until July, 1915, we can only

imagine, but he did manage to avoid an eviction during the school's

spring courses, He was preparing to move that summer when Blatch- ford strode into his office July 3, and inquired as to his moving plans.

His memory was perpetuated in the name of the south

entrance to Fort Sill on the Fort Sill Boulevard, Scott Oate (Gen,

Order No. 7, 1934, Field Artillery School).

49
On learning them, Blatchford shook his finger in McGlachlin's

face and shouted: "You get the hell out of here and get out quick I"

So the school detachment spent its Fourth of July holiday moving

into the last place of refuge left to the School of Fire at Fort Sill,

the ol]d Trader's Store of WilliaM H. Quinnette, which had been

acquired as the only possible solution. Moving of the School of

Fire from Fort Sill would never have been approved by the War

Department, which was still holding to the plan it had had in 1911.

At that time Moore had been warned that the School of Musketry

would come to Fort Sill, and the implication was made that the

two schools would be rmade' into -on6., . ..

The housing problem Wa moon ! to be o -erishaddwed by

another and gr&Ver one... 'e*olutibon ii Menico vws threatening

the safety of American bitikiisai in the'.Border states-, there was

no knowing What mid am, bitions might ppeal 'to iirre iponsible

insurrectos, and a heaivy 'concentration of American troops on the

Mexican border began.' The National Guard was serit to the Border

where the stateof.its tr&inin' cauhed alarm; A wire of August V3 from the Adjutknt dehieral•to the Commanding Officer, Fort'

Sill, read: ' ,' , .

"The Secretary of War having decided that he

considers duty with National Guard on border

as instructors one of the most important duties

that an officer can perform, he directs that

you be informed :thak as long as demand for

officers for duty as instrkctors for National

Guard obtains, it is not the intention to open service schools. Officers who have already left border or stations and are at schools or on

temporary duty at posts awaiting opening of

schools will not be distributed at present. If

conditions become such that officers are not

needed for duties above specified, 'and it is

deemed advisable to open service schools,

notification to this effect will be sent from

War Department as soon as it is positively

known that schools will be reopened."

On September 1, the post comrmander, then Brig Gen William A.

Mann, replied that both school batteries had been sent away. His

letter indicated that plans for consolidating the two schools had

not been abandoned: "The matter of continued training for the

two schools will be given (consideration) when the school session

begins, and it is believed that a start can be made looking towards

their consolidation into the school of fire for the mobile army."

.I / ' 50 "

- -. .-
The School of Fire opened its doors again, but briefly, February

20, 1916, when a class of 14 officers and one of 24 noncommissioned

officers reported. Or May 9, 1916, the then Commanding Officer of

Fort Sill, a Colonel Adams, wired the Adjutant General: ''Reference

your telegram this date designating all field artillery troops this post

for service Mexican border, recommend School of Fire for Field

Artillery be closed, and all officers of regiment on duty therewith be

available for duty with regiment. " His recommendation was approved

by wire that day. The School of Fire was closed, not to open again

until 1917 and the First World War. From July 9, 1916 to July Z, 1917,

there warn no Field Artillery officer on duty with the school. lit Lt

R. H. Kelley, 34th Infantry, was in charge of the school and its property

until August 1916, when he was replaced by Capt C. R. Lewis, 34th

Infantry.

COURSES 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916

Sep- Feb- Sep- Feb- Sep- Feb- Feb- TOTAL

Dec May Dec May Dec May May 9**

i.,Regular Army

Course A 13 18 17 13* 11 23 15 110

(Batte ry Off)

Course B 3 1 8 1 2 15

(Field Off)

Course C 25 28 22 15 15 18

(Eni Men)

Militia May-Jun May-Jun

Course D 20 17 37

(Militia Off) . ,

TOTAL 162

Enlisted Men 123

*Course not completed but certificates given.

**School closed May 9, 1916, certificates given 15 officer.

451

- 51i., 't-
Bibliography.

Annual Reports, U.S.F.A.S., 1911-12-1926-47, Field Artillery

School Library.

Academic Records File.

Pro.eedings of a*Boardof Officers, 1911-1920, Field Artillery

School Library.

Carbine and Lance, the Story of Old Fort Sill, Captain Wilbur S.

Nye. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1 938.

I.

3

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(I

S .~

I;.

'1

____ _ __ __-_ ~__ - --- ~ ~ *~'
CHAPTER FIVE'

THE WAR YEARS

The troubled situation in Mexico, the uncertain course of the

war in Europe, and growing tension with Germany arising from her

attacks on American shipping had caused grave concern over the state

of American defense, a concern which led to the passing of the National

Defense Act of 1916. Whatever -the wisdom of its provision#,.the

J timing of its passage wan ;such that there was a great dilution 0f, the

trained personnel of the Field Artillery ab we entered- .the war,.

The Adt provied for a salutary increase in. the Fiold Artillery

from 6 regiments to; 21 at the annual rate of,3 regiments.,ayear,

Accoardingly,ý in 1 916, '4, regiments 'we re split up:and'given, enouklh

recruits to make 7 regiments. In the fall of 1916-thiscreated a most

serious shortage. of officers, -so thateiven after 53 had been transferred

from other arms, there were no osc0zad.lieutenants: .. Of the .9 artillery i

regiments which existed when we entered the war, . 3 could be said to' be

trained'. Of the grand. total of 408. Regul-r officea•s in the arm, 275 had

had more than one year's setvice'. Of the enlisted men, there were

5, 253 with more than one year's service. The Field Artillery of the

National Guard (the old militia), the one reservoir, had 541 officers,.

and 12, 975 enlisted men. War experience was to show that the stay

on the Border, while of great benefit in improving mobilization procedures, had made little significant improvement in their state of

training. The burdens then, -of providing.efficient artillery tO support

an army of millions of men rested very Largely on the shoulders of the

275 experienced Regular officers. It was little, enough leaven for so

large a mass. The training of additional officers was therefore an

urgent problem.. .. . ,

A telegram was sent July 10s 1917 to the Commanding Officer

at Fort Sill, Colonel R.• M. Blatchford, warning him that an artillery

school would be re-established. This caused little excitement, for ,i ,1

Colonel Blatchford had troubles of his. own in expanding the School of

Musketry. On July l5 he was advised that seven students were -on

their way down from Oklahoma City, so 3gt Morris Swett, then

librarian of the School of Fire, and a member of the skeleton detach-

"ment~kbpt to watch the school property, was told to prepare for them.

Sgt Swett prepared for 7, and 21 climbed from the train--and faced the

drab reality. There was no dinner, no quarters, no gune, texts, or

instructors, and, in fact, there was not even an artillery officer.

There was nothing but the Quinette store, two frame shanties, and

some tents. it was a grim welcome for the now students, many of •

53

S66
whom were transferred from other arms.- Sgt Swett managed to provide half a loaf of bread and a jar of jam for the 21 students, and the

School of Fire began its wartime life.

The first instructor for the School, Lt Col F. E. Hopkins,

arrived, and on the same day, July 19, 1917, Colonel William J.

Snow received order@ at Syracuse, N.Y., to proceed to Fort Sill

and organize the School of Fire. Snow was one of those rare men

who deserve the adjective "remarkable. " Before coming to Fort

Sill he organized the Field Artillery Association and the Field Artillery Journal. During his brief stay at Fort Sill he created the wartime SchooL.,ofFirei , &*a:aChief of Field Artillery,, he successfully

-orsaninsed.and trained the wartime Fiel41;,ArtlUllr.y... Aftera..brief.

visit in Washington to get instructions mad advice# and to forage for

"instructors and equipment, b• procoeded to Oklahoma, whore he

found the temporary commadAnt, Coloel A. a. Fleming,. grappling_

with the instruction of the forlorn gromp that Sgt 8wett had met at the

station a fortnight before, By then the class.had owollen to 108I .

Ther e were 20 from the Field Artillery, ,Z0 from-the Cavalry, 40

from the Coast A.rtille ry Carps, .28 trom.the National Guard Field

Artillery, and 23 abncommisstonked officers, Siuiluded ae prospec-,

tive officers. There was,na course .of iastrukion,, and S now and 4

Fleming. made no attempt to set one up until all stuadente.had been

given a.grasp of fundamentals. This class, because of its checkered

•I career, was not included in -the List of war classes, but was always '

I known as the "Imera class."

Snow relates that from the day of his appointment as CommuAdant he felt that the School of Fire had toabe expanded a. hun4red-fold.

if it was to supply enough trained officers to meet the needs of the wartime Field Artillery. On arrival at Fort Sill he continued to mull over

the idea in his spare time, which was after he had retired for the night.

Fort Sill was a little too hot for comfort in the summer time, and so

as Snow tossed and turned in the sweltering heat, he sifted the project

through his mind. On mentioning the matter at an instructor's meeting,

he found that Captains Fr W4. Honeycutt and R. U. Danford had been

thinking along the same luest, so the three ofthern began working

together. Snow's recommendations. for the School were made August

4, and to push the matter through the War Department, he took leave

and arrived in Washington about the 15th. The Snow Plan, as approved A

September 12, 1917, had five points:

Z . Provide a course of 12 weeks, 100 officers

entering every week. e - -" i

54
3. Organize 6 departments: Artillery Tactics

(firing); Liaison; Engineering; Practical Ballistics; Artillery

Materiel; and Artillery Transport, The instruction was to cover:

field artillery drill regulations; tractors and motors; materiel; use

of range tables; probabilities; field artillery iketching; topography;

use of maps in the war zone; fuses; ammunition and ammunition

supply; hippology; optics; plotting boards; map firing; communication; artillery engineering; functions of different artillery weapons;

open warfare; close shooting, firing and observation of fire; adminiatration; tactics; and service firing.

4. Furnish necessary housing.

;5.i Build up school'troops and a larger school detachment. For the pln., Snow received $750, 00,0 for conistruction, and

the promise of school troops: instructors, and equipment.

Buildin• t Wartime schobr

The contract went to the Selden-Breck Construction Company

of St. Louis, Mo., They brought in two or thred thousan workmen

and had most of their work done in 40 days. SnoW had no time to'

brood over architect's plini, so he looked over the Air Service

buildings goingL up at Post'Field, chose those whose plans he liked,

told the contractor to add an extra story, and buaild similar ones for

the School. Actual supervision ot the constructiozwas turned over

to Col A. S. Flemngl, who onSnow's recommendation took over as

Commandant when'Snow was -called to assume 'command of a brigade.

The construction gave each class a dormitory to itself, with two

large sleeping rooms, shower rooms, a moss hall, etc. The instructors were lodged near the central building, Snow Hall. As then

arranged, Snow Hall had eight lecture rooms,' each capable of holding

about 200 students, a room for showing moving pictures, smaller

rooms for the sections into-which classes were divided, and the

offices of the Commandant. There was a library, a mess for instruc- , ,.

tors, and various shops for tailors, barbers, and the like. The streets V ;

were named, and the buildings numbered, like the streets and buildings ,

of a town. The School of Musketry was about 300 yards away in the Old '

Post. r I

Six departments were set up to instruct the incoming students:

1. Department of Firing

"Tiring instruction, firing data, blackboard and

terrain board work, Amoke-bomb practice,

observation of tire, service practice.

506

- ~...,..
2. Department of Liaison

Communication. and liaison with infantry and

the air, service,,

3. Department of Field Engineering

Sketching, maps, cover, maid shelter.

4. Department of Field Gunnery

Elementary probabilities, range tables, fighting

maps. barrage tables, correction for the day,

calibration, slide rule, etc.

5. Department of Tnsorttin

Harn'o sa, -.,ha rue oji 'i g, said ,dxikt,XqF light artillery; -

xmotors* aixd tractors for heavyyartillery,

6. Department of'M'ateriel

Practical study of all available French and

SchoolAmerican materiel.

At the me rvi~ce of these departments during 191?,,,,for us am

Sho-troops, were the 1.4th ' A, which was organised at Fort Bill

in May 19171 and the lot FA, which arrive~d from Hawaii December

23. The ist rA, lon~g to be~ associated with the Field Artille ry School,

is an old and famous regiment. Battery Do an. -Capt. Mossh. Porter's

Company of Artillery, was a -part of "Mad Anthony'-' Wayne's Lesion i

in its expeditio' n against the Indiana -in. 1793 and- 1794. -Battery E

could trace it$ Aknooptry direkctly- to aBraxtan, Bragg'sa batte ry of Buena

Vista fame.,. 'rhe present regiment had been organised -in, 1907. and

its battle honors were such. as to be an inspiration to all soldiers:I

* Indian Wars;,Seminole Wart Palo Alto; Res&:a do I& Palms&; Monterey, the AU~t1ujFreeriksbrg;Getysbrg;theWilderness; enisull 

Manassas; Chancellorsville; Virginia 186Z, 1863, 1864; West Virginia

1863; Cold, Harbor, Petersburg; Puerto Rico; Ban Isidro; and Luzon

1899, 1900. Nine batteries of school troops in all were available

when the seconid war class entered the School.

In Considering the wozk. of the fthool during the -First W&A6 d

War, it should be noted that only two courses were offered. By far

the more important of these was the course for field artillerymen.

To it went colonels of long service. and newly commissioned second

lieutenants. The only diifferences in course content cames about the

I' midpoint of the course, when there was specialization to. some degree

was a brief one Inatleyfm~wotL o~i observers (mentindltr.Te r-r.n ialojc ftecorefratl

loryen t tech as hootng.in dditonit tugh bateryoffcer
things they had to know if they were to produce efficient batteries,

and it taught field officers how-to. instruct or supervise instruction.

Tactics and liaison techniques :were introduced, but for mastery of

them the student had to go elsewhere. Gunnery was the star of the

Fort Sill show. A memorandum to the Chief of Field Artillery from

the Commandant, Cal Fleming, February 23, 1918, stated:

"The present war course at the School of Fire

is predicated on the assumption that the students

have had no artillery experience prior to the

present war, but that they have been taught a

"few of the most e*m.-'n. ntary essentials in their

regimentst that they havb had'at least an::

averajeshih ,schOol education, aud hve .

average intelligence, The constant effort

at the School is to develop any possibilities a- .

"-;student officer may possess, , In no .case are

*1i any such officers relieved for ihcompetency

unless they have established conclusively that

they- are-hopelessly incompetent. The primary

object is to -train~aitillery officers in their..,

elementary duties rather than to make eliminaHowever, in October 1918 the Commandant was authorized to send

incompetent officers back to their regiments.

The course had been laid down by Snow, embracing those subJecto which he thought a field artilleryman should know, plus some of

the new methods which had been developed in France. Insofar as the

course conveyed any doctrine, Snow was adamant about teaching the

doctrine of open warfare, since he regarded the trench warfare of

1915-1917 as abnormal. The new wrinkles in warfare were to be

covered by a French mission, which arrived August 3, 1917, at the

School of Fire; Major 0. R. C. F.X. Reille, Captains E. Durette,

Trives, C. P.F. Pierret, and Monroe, and later, Lt Negre.

Regarding instructors, some 14 or 15 had arrived at about the I i time Snow did. Others were taken from the "sero" class and given

some special training.

The students for the first class of the School of Fire arrived

September 27. Their backgrounds and experiences were of the most

diverse sort, captains from National Guard and National Army,

cavalrymen from converted regiments, coast artillerymen, etc.

Classes that fall arrived on Sunday morniag as a rule, a few brave

.57

I'

I-''
spirits on Saturday. and the, course started- with a talk by the Commondant, on Monday morning. -The day went, from 7: 30,in. the morning to

11:3.0, and from 1:30 P.M. to 4:30, not counting time spent~going.,to

and from the range. .Le ctu-rea we re often given -f ram. 5 until 6 in. the

afternoon. Service practice began~t1e fifth week. Each student fired

every other dayl Toward the end of the course, there were several

battery and battalion problems with aviation present. During the last

week, an organized infantry sector was occupied for 24 hours. All

communications were establishosd, and different. fires executed,

especially during the night. There were examinations every Sa~turday, and officers failing them went, before a boitrd of in~structors.

With the; oxp'#rioetc&g1aied in the. first few -Mauithe of the

regular clas~sess, the .School chLaIned its ;straotu1rq .and the methods

of instructionland har4a inof..tudlents,. nt. 1 rparQgalIi nation,

that of June 1918, .the numbve,ý'ef dspartrn9_ts .was met~at three, but

with-that exetoaBccrpinots8ho.o-lofl February 1 918, as

taken fromi Docuimont ;41 February -Z~B I1*16, the 80661~'of Frire,

gives. a. fair'pictur* of thOa l1410 4hoO1. T4h: staff and insttuctors.

numbered 95., of wkom .5v,*d';e 3'zrnch, .The Astighinerit numbered

300 enlisked men pwsIS n 1t4' VWrfench Artil~sXYine.. There were two light regiments. of scokolk tro~b tp 1~adte~~h n

heavy re" iment, the 9th. 'rhesAe mannmed aVarlotfo~ gLn., the. 

j American 3-1hch piece, Che French 75-nun gun, two *6 7-ivc'h gans,

two American.6-inch hawitimera. oneFenh15-vt q sp a.

one Wrreach 155-mm gunQPF..ý' Classes. h&4 bden 100 *ien each,.but

on February 9, this *iint up to 130.' *tbky weare grý#4aiiihg every two

womk~h-Aad mimaes February 233: ha.dbq4Afmat"-xixgw..k$y, 1.ig.t 'and

heavy artillkerymen were given difti rent 1hati tawtho rte~ I'bruary 9. .*,,*

The re. we re four depa rtmnints: Fi 'rings Ttctlcal Method, Foied

Gunnery, and Materiel. The -four departmenti -had been evolved from

the mix mentioned before by. conso~idating he Departments of Communication and Engineering into the Department of lactical Method,

and the consolidation of the Depakrtments. of )4Ateriel and Trrknsportation into the Department of Materiel. Instruction in equjitation. aaa

hippology was dropped. The Assistant Coin~uandan regulated ordinary matters of detail in developing c*tarmses caoordinating'depar~t

ments , and revising publication.. rhe re was, a weekly meeting, of

directors of departments, the Comamnda~ntp the Assistant Comnmandant, the Secretary, the hea~d of the French Nutssiox4. and when

necessary, the statisticalofficer, 

*

Certain entrance requirements had~ been set, for students,

and on February 5, the Commandaut received authority., to return

to their regiments all officers who failed to meet them.' 8tudents

58 

A
who were backward or ill had to ilepeat th~ir work, while those who

made exceptional progress advanced into another, clais. An entirely

unsatisfactory student was returned to his regiment. A card record

I..of the student'.a daily work ýwas kept for all sabjectu'which aidmitted

of such treatment. There was a fuarther check by the regular Saturday morning examinations. Using these records, student pormotinel

matters were dis cussed at the weekly meetings of the Commandant,

the directors, et &I.

Further ExF.Lneion

After. turnins the School over:ta,,Cal, Fleming, show nOk

Merimigal) wept to the command of a britjmde', of fiildu'ttVllery n~ th~

Carolinas. On>ft Vbruary '1 heý was-otde red. to! Wkshingto ~to' ao`s Odrre

the newly crsated-post bf Chief of Veld Art~liey. "

"When Snow arrived, he asked'thes Chief of SmtfEwhat'his d':tles

we re. The answer was, "I don't know!" 1S5, Snow had to~ create his

own job. A te r a few days of orien~ting himnself, he turned to the

status of the arm of Which hie was the now Chief, using a stack of

riports he had'borrow~ed from the Latsp~ectdr General. 1Stabmquehtly, he se~t toelegaramsto ailtField Ardfl~eiy Wriga d~m ,ommtandeis se daeking aera~ninormtio. He followed habyaquestionnaire. o-Wheti this'

data was in, the appalling truth was- befo~re him. There were 275

Field Artillery officer's of more than a year's experience, and 100 of A these' had been. sent overseas, Nor was the NAUl6niL Guard a source

of strength. In theg summer of' 1917, only 1'4% of its pe rvoniieihad

I ~~* had Ma~rc than a-'year's 11qrvice; 31% of tha'ýofficaerm and 47% of the ,

men were war voluknteer. with no previous experience.

Snow began to develop a' comprehoneiie schemnelor~ training

the Field Artillery. An enlarged School of'1ire wami a vital part of

that plan. On March V7, Snow presented his general plan which

called for-,

I. An artillery replacement training center; '

cadiat shol. A central office~r's training camp (officer

3. Expansion of the School of Fire to a weekly

~II~intake of ZOO Officiers;

4. Brigade training centers, fcor unit training of

brigades beforep overseas duty; and

AP

59

'6.
5. nspe cto r-instructors to visit the various brigades

* to assiat and supervise.

On April 1 5 this plan was approved, and Snow began sending more instructors to the School. The supply Qf students could niot increase

sharply until the new officer training schools commrented their output,

however, and the input did not hit 200 a week until October. The numrbar of instructors inAcreased from 95 in February to 247 at the armistice, the number of students, from 700 to 1554, pltxs 419 air service

cadets.

Tb~ de~si .nta or~iation of the School, was. some-whant

changed~ 4n Juýne -withi theapepartmqnt fFiignd ied Ounnery

being cons-olids. ad into the Depa~rtmentýof Ouzantory,-,an~d.the Depart.

* rnet of Tactical Method~beti.g r.enamodi -the. Department mof 9 edosulaissance. Col Laurin Le Lawoon was then Commandant, as of May 11,

* and, mqr~vaduntil the And of the war,

The ýWar Coarsa.

*Docurnent 48o ,previous ly. mentioned, and the annual report of

the tChief of Field Artillery for 019., -whichauo'vers the wm.' years at

ths.8chool, Save a detailed description of the course -during 'the yea~r

1918. By weeks, the *course was as follows:

lilt week: Entrouxace exzaiination; the trajectory, drill of the

gan. squad; demonstration by, firing bsate ry;..drill

regulations; drill in marchtng; guns and carriages;

. instrumentc;. foxes; -electricity., sketching.

Zd week: Firing data; tirrain board; drill of gun squad and :

firing battery; drill regulations, dispersion; guns,-

carriages, and ammunition; military 'oxplosvle s;

instruments; care of materiel; telephones and

3d week: Firing data and terrain board; drill regulations;

dispersion; guns,- -carriages, and ammunition

* maps; French ammunition; sketching; reconnaissance, tactics; telephones and buzzers.

4th week: Smoke-bomb practice; dispersion; drill regula -

tions, care of anmmunition, harness and draft for

light artillery secti~ons; motors, for- heavy artillery sections; telephunes and switchboards.- and

reconnaissance.

P 60

4d
5th week; Firing data and terrain board; close shooting

and devices; observation of fire; harness and

draft for light artillery sections; motors for

heavy artillery sections; reconnaisance and

organization of battalion position; handling of

battalion detail; light signals; and general

organization of communications.

6th week: Close shooting and devices; maps; service

practice; air-ground communication; harness

and draft; aILd tractor and motors.

7th week; Service practice; maps; air-ground communication; and shelter and concealment,

8th week: Service piactice and tactical study of emplacernents (rer'tionn alternating); maps; air cornmul. -ation; and ghtlter and concealment.

9th week. Service practice,and organization of trench

positions.

10th week: Service practice, end vislts to emplacervents.

By departments, the course w-as organized as follows. The

Department of Materiel, which at first had had only the American

3-inch gun and 3, 8-inch howitzer, had a full assortment of materiel,

the American 4.7-inch gun and 6-inch howitzer, the French 75-mm

gun and 155-mm howitzer, and the French 155-mm 3un GOF. Classes

had 4Z hours in this department, and were divided into "light" and

"heavy" sections. The light secti.ons studied the 3-inch gun, the

75-mm gun, and the 6-inch htwitzer. The heavy sections worked

with the 4.7-inch gun, the 155-mm howitzer, ar.d the 6-inch howitzer. The course began with a lecture by thc Assistant Commandant

on the history of the field gun, the general principles of gun construction, and their practical application. A typical example of instruction

was that given on the excellent American 3-inch gun. The fi'st day

was given to a general description of the gun. On the ,econj day, the

recoil mechanism wav assembled ancd disassembled, On thv third

day, the breechblock and the elevating and traversinig mechanism,'

were covered. The fourth day was given to adjustinent5 of the sights

and quadrants. The department devoted four hours to am~nnunition

and its care. Oddly enough, it was this Department that covercA

the subject of battery administration. Officers in light artilie.-y regiments had 13 hours of instruction on harness and draft, five hours

-f which were devoted to lectures. Officers of the heavy artillery

61
units gave 13 hours to motors, 10 to trucks, three to tractors. The !

class did not receive driving instruction and spent most of its time

in the lecture room, although it did have access to a stripped chassis,

sectionalized motors, spare parts, etc. Capt L. P. McCarter of the

Department of Motor Transport (1914) was then an enlisted man

and one of the drivers in the demonstrations for motors students.

Capt McCarter would pilot a 5-ton tractor and 4.7- inch gun througlthe mud of what is now Rucker Park. His recollection of the course

was that it was not successful, being too theoretical in nature.

The Department of Gunnery, heir to the Departments of

Firing and Field Gunnery, tried to teach quick, accurate bensing

and decision, Methods of fire proper for open warfare formed the

greater part of the course. Students were told to keep their bursts

low and to seek the smallest possible bracket. Subjects covered

were: computation of firing data; the firing battery, simulated fire,

service practice; the trajectory; dispersion; application of the laws

of dispersion to field artillery; firing; meteorological corrections;

and use of maps to prepare firing data. There were about 25 students

to one instructor. The study of dispersion was no more then a

simplified presentation of the subject of probabilities, given a different

name and different approach to avoid frightening students. Its

purpose was to acquaint the artillery officer with the errors surrounding his work, and the action to take in event of change in their values.

Methods of this department conformed in general to those used at 1

the Schopl before the war.

The Department of Reconnaisance gave courses in tactics

and reconnaisance; topography and panoramic sketching; shelter

and concealment; ground communication; and air communication.

It opened with lectures on the technique of battery reconnaisance

and the general principles of artillery tactics. Then came a week

of field work, two hours a day. The first two were given to a

demonstration of the reconnaisance, selection, and occupation of

"a position, the rest to tactical rides in which an attempt was made

to give facility in handling a batteryl'detail. The second week began

with lectures on battalion reconnaismance and fire direction, and the

technique of handling battalion details, followed by a week of practical work. It finished with inspections of the lectures on prepared

positions and methods of occupying and improving fortified positions.

In the work on topography and sketching, the department tried to

- give students sufficient preparation for their work in gunnery. There

were six hours oil maps and five on sketching. Practical work in

sketching was obtained in the course on artillery reconnaisance,

Nine lectures were given on shelter and concealment. Twenty-four

hourp, were devoted to ground communication. Fourteen hours went

62
to elementary electricity and the buzzer circuits. Eight hours

were given to the use and tests of the service buzzer and the rest

of the course was devoted to miscellaneous aubjects. Little could

be given on switchboards and the larger telephones, partly because

of lack of equipment, and partly because the course was intended

only as a foundation. The work on air communication was only

such as was necessary to the officer in charge of a ground receiving

station, using radio and panel. There were ten hours on theory,

and four hours were spent inspecting balloon and airplane equipmerit. The practical application was under the Departmnent of

Gunnery.

A Section of the Front

One of the outstanding training aids was the 'Apache Gate

Sector, "1 as described by Major Harrison Fuller in volume 9 of

the Field Artillery Journal. An area in the vicinity of Apache Gateq

was turned into a most realistic represeetation of a sector of the

Western Front and used as a gunnery range. There were targets

of every kind, each in its proper relation to the others. The

observation dugout, capable of holding 25 itudents at a time, was

on Chrystie Hill (after Capt Phineas Chrystie, killed by explosion

of a 155-rnrn howitzer) looking west. Pumbough hill and Heyl's

hill were the routh boundaries. There were two distinct areas

within the enemy linen and others in the process of being built up.

The one just west of Chrystie Hill 'had a close net-work of communication trenches, with obnervation posts, command posts, and

front line, support, and communication trenches. To.the north'.

was a more extensive trench system. Six main communication

trenches joined the enemy's front and support lines. There were 1

no less than 11 enemy lookout and listening posts, some within S0

yards of our front lines. Among the targets were an emplaced

battery, a crashed airplane, tanks reprenented as supporting an

infantry attark, and all of them as obscure as they would be in

real war. Aerial observation was often used for adjustment of

fire from any one of the ten main battery positions that were regularly used for firing points against these targets. There were

two 1 Z-line switihboards on Rumbough hill to handle this traffic.

The School's Doctrine and Theory

From a description of training we come natitrally to a dimcussion of the underlying principles. Every effort was made to

"coordinate instruction given at Fort Sill with that being given in

the American schools in France, and returned officers were used

as instructors wherever possible. The School, however, never

iA

63
interpreted this at a dirertive to specialise in the methods of trench,

i.e., sietge warfare. On the contrary, these methods were illustrated,

hut the methods of the war of movement were stressed. Some members

of the French mission were most importunate in their efforts to revise

the doctrines set forth by Snow and the School of Fire into something

closer to their notions, One officer, not a member of the group

regularly assigned to Sill was sent there by the mission without Snow's

consent or knowledge, and immediately offered the Commandant ,

plan to reorganize the school along completely different lines. Snow

was forced to have him recalled at once to Washington,

Snow's attitude was justified. In the files of the Chief of

Field Artillery was a letter from General George R. Allin to General

Snow (November 14, 1918/350.05 Serial A) in which General McNair

is quoted to the effect that artillery overseas-was far behind the doctrine being given at the School of Fire. ,Artillery overseas was

firing by the map (uttobserved fire) and by sector, instead of concentrating on forward observation and pushing itself forward to

give the infantry adequate support. He commented bitterly that

the infantry was taking heavy losses due to the artillery's keeping

too far behind the lines. From that day forward, the School worked

on methods of using observed fire to support the infantry, the very

antithesis of the elaborate unobserved fire methods advocated by

the trench enthusiasts of World War I.

These teachings by the School were presented in a comprehensive weries of texts, printed on the School press, which had

attained the dignity of a new building all its own.

In all this it can be seen that the School had evolved from a

simple school of fire into something very closely approaching a

true artillery school. This evolution was a direct response to a

dire need--that of instructing officers who were ignorant of all

branches of their profession and p6% Of Just gunnry alone. The

beginning of the extension of the School of Fire into an artillery .

school had been ma 'e before the war. In hop very first report, of

July 1, 1915, Moore's successor, Lt Col E. F. McGlachlin made

certain proposals, which, had they been accepted, would have created

a true artillery school before the war, and just in time to have it

ready when it would have been most urgently needed. Briefly, he

recommended that Course A, the course for battery officers, be I • extended one month, and the fitting of harness, draft, and motors

be added to it. The officers were to be put in touch with the

work of the Field Artillery Board, which probably meant instruction *

in materiel. He recommended further that Course A be limited to

captains and senior first lieutenants and that a 10 months course be

64
set up for second lieutenants; that a course for militia officers of

low grade similar to that given noncommissioned officers of the

regular army be instituted; that militia noncommissioned officers

be permitted to attend the class for regular army noncommissioned

officers; and that an indefinite number of militia officers be permitted to attend their course, Course D, Considered in the light of

later events, these proposals were most wise and showed considerable foresight.

Wartime Problems

rhere were many problems besetting the school during the

war. Perhaps six deserve mention: relations with the School of

Musketry; the mathematical. background of entering students:;, the

water supply; the excessive turnover in instructor personnel;,:mess,

and morale. The expanded School of Musketry, the School of Fire,

and Camp Doniphan, first the camp of the 35th Division and then a

Brigade Training Center, all shared the reservation. Despite a

spirit of mutual helpfullness, there simply was no.t room enough

for all. A board of infantry and artillery officers was set up to

coordinate use of the range, but try as they did, they were 'continually stepping on each others toes, "! as Snow put it.; By July,

1918. the subject of the removal of the School of Musketry had come

up in official correspondence, and on September 12. s decision was

reached to send the School of Musketry from Fort Sill.

The officer shortagn being what it was, General Snow was

desperately anxious not to lose one man of possible merit, and ,

so he personnally checked reports of officer failures at Fort Sill.

Discovering that weakness in mathematics was a prime cause, as

in the present war, he decided at once to have a qualified mathematician investigate the requirements of the School of Fire. Professor

Lester R. Ford, of Harvard, was recommended. After some search,

Snow located him as a private in a Depot Brigade, Knowing very

well that a private would be unable to investigate the School and its

methods, Snow put the professor in civilian clothes and sent him

off with a letter introducing him as Professor Ford of Harvard. On

Ford's return to Washington with a most satisfactory report, Snow al

commissioned him and sent him to the Field Artillery Central

Officer's Training School at Camp Zachary Taylor, Ky., to form

a department teaching the candidates just that amount of mathematics

needed for success at the School of Fire. Ford was solemnly adjured

not to spend a moment on unnecessary instruction. Professor Ford

and his assistants were successful in this work, and Snow wrote that:

"I had plugged one leak,"

65

06

-s I.,p
In the summer of 1918 the water problem had become such

that General Snow 'aeve:ra12tihi" had to consider moving the School

from Fort Sill, and at one time was so concerned that he had a

weekly telegram sent advising him as to the water situation. Nor

were the experts of any great help, for they disagreed, as experts

will. On May 12, 1918 Lt James Follin stated that at the present

rate of -- onsumption the reservoir, Lake Lawtonka, would be empty

September 15. On May 16 Lt Col Dabney H. Maury pointed out

that the rainy season was coming so he thought it safe to say there

was a strong possibility of no water shortage.

"• May 30, 1917, shortly after the beginning of the war, the

city fathers of Lawton met and resolved that whereas the reservoir

was so full that it was often overflowing, they would be glad to

let the War Department have any part of the water then in the reServoir, or that might accufnulate there in future, reserving for the

city 1,000,000 gallons daily in winter, and 2,000,000 gallons daily

in summer. As a practical step, the city undertook construction

of a 24-inch pipe line from the reservoir to the post and contracted

to furnish the post 7., 000, 000 gallons a day through this line and two

10-inch lines owned by the Government and connected with the LawtAn

main. In Septerober 1917 the city further agreed to turn over exclusive tie of the 16-inch line, Alas, for the good intentions of

the Lawtonians, a drought occurred after these plans were made

and by August 17, 1918, Col Edmund Gruber, who was a former

instructor and was now in command of the brigade training center at

Camp Doniphan, arged Lbandonment of Fort Sill about Septembe r 10,

He felt that with the water situation, 2,000 officer 'ttudents, the

school for aerial observers, and two field artillery brigades could

not be accomodated, By this time the Lawtonians were thoroughly

alarmed and plans had been approved June 4 for raising the dam's

height from 50 feet to 60. Apparently the citimenry regretted the

overflow that had been passing over the dam in 1917. Plans were . ['

prepared for a filter plant, to make drinkable as much as possible

of the remaining water, 1 but these were not approved until January,

1919. For his par't, Snow removed every non-essential activity

from the post, such as the Remount Service. Moving the School

was in his mind, but there were tMo good reasons against it. For '*1 one thing there was no other place to put it. For another, had he

found a place, at least three months would have been required to

put the School into operation again with all its equipment, and a

loss of three months supply of officera was not to be thought of

then. The Fort Sill plant.was complete with its buildings, guns,

and school troops, and the reservation had been accurately surveyed.

[1 In Kipling'6 phrase, "It was crawling and it stunk!6,

66 !
A geologist sent to Sill by General Snow found nothing in the way

of more water. The problem ultimately was dissipated by the

providential fall of heavy rains sometime before October.

Because of the shortage of officers, there was a constant

demand for instructors from the School of Fire, and it may be

assumed that many of the personnel of the school, chafing at being

kept in the United States while their friends were going overseas,

were gently stimulating some of the demand, The tremendous

expansion of the Army had placed a burden on the Adjutant General's Department which it was then unable to handle, and so the

policy on relief of instructors waa often most erratic. As an

example of the exceedingly difficult personnel situation, one may

mention that shortly after;Snow became Chief of Artillery, he

asked the Adjutant General's office how'many officers there Were

in the artillery,. only to be told that the office didn't know, This

confusion resulted in officers on detached service with the School

as instructors being relieved as their units became eligible for

overseas service. :The trouble was chiefly ciused by an indiscriminate selection policy by the Adjutant'General's Office. In

May of 1918 the School felt compelled to protest to General Snow

against a practice of the Adjutant General of transferring 1intructore from the School without warning. This:was ffhially'adjusted

by Snow but not until many. officers had been taken.

Feeding the personnel at the School was often a vexing

problem. The post; is not on the main railway line from Oklahoma

City south, and the neighboring farm areas produce very little

garden produce, Even though supplies came 'through in carload

lots, and a herd of cattle was imported from Wisconsin to establish

a dairy, the management of the mess became increasingly difficult.

Snow turned to Fred Harvey, of the Harvey Restaurants, who could

not accept, but did suggest the name of a hotel keeper as a possible I'

reinforcement. -ie was hired, but was only fairly satisfactory.

There were a number of morale depressants at work during .

the summer of 1918, and there was concern that they might affect

the operation of the school. The post was an isolated one, with the

little town of Lawton the nearest community. Wichita Falls and

Oklahoma City, which were within a hundred miles, had not yet

had the development of the 1920'm. If a student displayed exceptional

ability he was apt to be kept as an instructor, if he did not make the

6 grade he would be eliminated from the service. The summer heat,

"-. ~the eternal hot wind, the dust seeping through the cracks in the frame

* buildings, the sense of pressure, all combined to make the summer

less than pleasant. As for the school troops, they worked their guns

67

Pei
14-16 hours a day, from before dawn to after dark, It is a tribute

to the American soldier of 1918 that the School's work was done,

and done well and cheerfully.

Aerial Observer TrainiLn

. The date on which the School begon instruction for aerial

observers is uncertain, but Document 48, February, 1918, showed

that it was being offered then as a two week course. The course

covered the organization of artillery and of a sector of the front,

ar-tillery targets and tacties, and the principles of observation.

On its completion, the students entered the Air Service School at

Post Field. In March 1918, when Snow was forming his general

' 'plan for traioing of the arm, he also consideored the general'problem

of air observers. Their status was uaPLtisfactory, for although

they were shown on the Tables of Organization of their regiments

as artillerymen, they were usually snapped up by the Air Service

on completing their training at For;t Sill.: This made regimental

commanders most unwilling to send good men to the School for

training as aerial observers. The solution finally reached was to V

keep these men in the Field Artillery, but detail them to the Signal

Corps, which then cont.rolled the, Air Service. There still remained

the problem of getting these observers in.sufficient quantity and

with sufficient training. The.Air Service agreed to cooperate and

a seven week course was set up for both flying cadets and field

artillerymenj The flying cadets received Air Service commissions,

the status of the field artiUlerymen was as indicated above. The

first of these classes entered August 25, 1918. The School of

Fire suggested later that the intake be set at about 100 a week,

as against the existfthg rate of nearer 60, in view of the removal of

the School of Musketry. However, this was not agreed to by the

Director of Military Aeronautics because of the epidemic of influenza. (For a fuller discussion of air training at Fort Sill,

consult the Appendix.)

The Artiller Training System 1917-1918

-Some mentibn hhoi-ld inade,of teteen.1'.lscilin'eof field 1 ,

, . artillery training during the First World War. Then the situation, 1.

at the School of Fire will more likely fall into its proper perspective.

First, the problem of creating officers. Except for the

flying cadets, all the students who came to the School of Fire were

officers. Some, of course, were Regulars from other arms, some

were National Guards. Where did the others come from?

68

HII
* -. .- - * - - - - - - - -. -. - -

The first attempt to meet the deficiency in officers was T

made by creating officer training camps, which gave a three months

course. These were emergency stop-gaps to produce officers before the first draft arrived in training camps. The first two camps

took men directly from civilian life, the last one took them from the

first draft. Depending upon their standing in class and age, graduates were commissioned in ranks up to and including major. Very

few of these men were qualified as officers. After some sort of

divisional organization had been created, each division was directed

to set up its own officer candidate schools, for all arms. Thus by

March, 1918, there were 25 or more officer candidate schools in

as many divisions, as well as the third camp, trying to produce

artillery officers, -Snow remarked that the only uniformity was in

the inadaquacy of the equipment and the poorness of the instruction.,

The instructors were graduates of previous classes in the same sort

of school, so what little might have been learned from: some harassed

artilleryman in Class No. I was watered down to nothing by Class

No. 10. Consequently, the establishment of a central officers

training school, where rigid standards could be enforced, was an

essential part of Snow's grand scheme of artillery training. There

was a good deal of opposition to Snow's plan in staff circles, and

the circumstance that compelled its adoption was the departure of

several divisions for France. The move posed the insoluble problem

of what to do with the divisions' officer candidate schools. General

Snow received authority to open his officer candidate school, known

as the Central Officers Training School on May Z0, 1918, and it

opened June 15, with 160 instructors and 3,800 students., 5..x

months later, according to General Snow, it had 14, 000 students.

A memorandum by Lt Col William Bryden, Assistant Commandant of the School of Fire, gives a good picture of COTS in opera'tion,

As the candidates entered from either the army or civilian life, they

spent two to four weeks in the "observation area,s 1 being processed,

taking physical training, learning close-order drill, and brushing up

on their mathematics under the Professor Lester Ford mentioned

earlier. The candidates were observed and graded with about 55%

being weeded out. Every week about six batteries of 200 men each

went to the training area on the other side of the valley, "crossing

the ditch" as the students called it. These batteries are of interest,

for instruction was carried on within them by the attached officers.

"These battery officers, when acting as instructors, were under the

five departments of the COTS, Mounted Instruction, Fire Discipline,

, Gunnery, Reconnaisance and Miscellaneous Instruction. Practically

all duties in and around the barracks except cooking were carried on

by the candidates, about 90% of whom were college graduates. At

times the school was so short of instructors that candidates had to be

69

-,.I. -
used, notably in draft, equitation, and smoke-bomb practice. It

was hoped to relieve this condition by getting ten graduates of every

class of the School of Fire assigned as instructors. There were

5, 214 men commissioned from this school, a class of 2, 454 graduating in August, 1918.1 From this Camp they were to go to a

replacement depot for two months, and then to Fort Sill for the

three month course.

Replacement centers were part of Snow's plan. He stated

that their need was recognized by the Army before the war, but that

it doubted the temper of the American people and feared that the

cry would go upt, "A hundred thousand men are already being mained

to step into the places of dead men. "Thus replacements were for.

merly obtai.deby brodithkq4.p rigades in this country. Moreover,

there were no training centers where enlisted specialists could be

trained for Field Artillery. By spring of 1918, it was no longer

possible to indulge in the luxury of useless fearsp and the Replacement Depots wore authorized. The first was organized at Camp

Jackson, S. C., May 8, 1918, and a Later one at Camp ;achary

Tatlor, Ky, Courses were given to officers, preparing them for

the School of Fire, as weLL as for enlisted men. At these two depots,

a total of 8. 125 officers &" T3, 335 enlisted men received training,

General Hinds, Chief df ArtUlery of the A.E.J., gave Snow a monthly

estimate of what he needed by way of enlisted specialists, which

was then divided between the two depots. The training period was

set at 72 days for enlisted men, but the demand. was so great that

the average stay was about 45 days.

The idea for brigade firing centers came from France. Genoral Pershing had set some up there, and the trench Military

Attache had several times suggested them to General Snow, who felt

he did not have the necessary guns. Finally, Snow offered to establish

them if the French could furnish the guns. Eventually, the centers

were begun, giant schools at which whole brigades of artillery would

be pupils. One of these was begun at Camnp Doniphan, on the Fort Sill

reservation. When the brigades began arriving at training centers,

it was found that the state of their training was such that proposed

courses had to be abadoaaed, and elementary training given to both

officers and men. It must be remembered that the great bulk of

* artillery officers were not products of Fort Sill, but rather from

Sh the old training camps of the first days of war, from the divisional

officer candidate s~kools, and in the case of the National Guard

brigades, 31% of their officers were commissioned from civilian

life by the governors of the states, with no military training whatever.

I The average class was about 400. The class after the August

1918 group graduated only 150.

70

+ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A report from Col Edmund L. Gruber, commanding the

firing center at Camp Doniphan, October 4, 1918, gives an idea

of the work there. There was a ten to twelve week course, beginning

with three to four weeks of preliminary instruction, then four weeks

of battery instructicn and school firing practice, two weeks of

battalion field exercises and firing, ard two or three weeks of brigade

exercises and firing. In the brigade exercise period, the brigade

occupied an organized sector, was constantly in the field, organized

its fires and liaison, and did everything an it would at the front. On

arrival in France, the brigade should be ready for the front after

two or three weeks in a training center over there. Col Oruber was

lucky in that he could call on the School of Fire for help, both in

instructional material and in the lean of instructors. Bythe signing

of the Armistice, seven brigades had passed through the' centers,

Since the Field Artillery always was.a highly technical'arm,

it required a great many technicians. In World War I, the Field

Artillery required at least the following types of enliAsted specialists:

drivers, cannoneers, supply sergeants, stable sergeants, mechanics,

cooks, horseshoers, saddlers, wagoners, buglers, bandsmen, bakers,

tailors, shoemakers, clerks, machine gunners, automatic riflemen,

trench mortar men, draftsmen, radio men, paiateri, telephone

operators, linemen, motorcycle drivers,, motor mechanics and

carpenters, Officer specialists included radio experts, artillery

observers, mo-tor experts, liaison officers, staff officers (supply,

operations, administration and intelligence), and experts on anobserved fires (fires prupared from map data). The great sulk of

the enlisted specialists were trained at the Peplaceme. Depots,1

However, the civilian Committee on Edu.cation and Special .Training

furnished 22, 550 specialists, including 3,443 mechanics, 627 radio

operators, 2, 090 truck drivers. Fifty privates a week were sent

to the Air Service Radio School at Austin, Texas, and 500 more

enlisted men went to the Ordnance plant at Raritan, N,. ., to become

motor and tractor specialists. Officer training was also scattered

among a great many places. At first, -adio officers were sent to

the Signal Corps school at College Park, Md., for a ten week course,

but after September 7, 1918, ten graduates of the School of Fire

were sent weekly to the Air Service Radio School at Columbia University, New York City, for a three weeks course. The training of

air observers has been mentioned. Fifty motor officers went to the

Ordnance School at Raritan, but after September 1, 1918, this

instruction was given at the brigade firing centers and at Camp Jack4, son, S. C. Instruction in communications, liaison, and unobserved i1

fire was also given at the brigade firing centers, as was a course in 4

staff training.

71

71
Sumnmary

I Oct 1017--4 April 1919

COURSES

Student Officers

Total student officers reporting 6, 211

Total graduated 3, 215

Total completing course but failed to graduate 515

Total relieved, discharged, etc. 4,481

(NOTE: Many relieved as. units. went overseas) .

S~~Aerial Ob~se~rvation (cadets)

Total cadets reporting 7125

SGraduates $is

Transferred and discharged 198

Died 2

. *Bibliography

Report c the Chief of Field Artillery to the Seore~ry of War, 1919, (I Washington, Government.Printing Office, 1919.

Signposts of Experience# World War Memoirs, Major General

William J. Snow, USA Retired, Chief of Field Artillery, 1918-1927.

United States Field Artillery Association, Washington, D. C., 1941.

AnnualR e.ortep U..F.A.8., ]•p. cit.supra.

Car*ine and Lance, op. cit. supra.

File- of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Field Artillery

School Library.

Document 48, Scheme of Instruction, School of Fire, February, 1918.

Captain E. Darett, French Army, Field Artillery Journal, Vol. 13.

Records of the City Enginepr, Lawton, Oklahoma. I *

File on Water, Post Headquiarter., Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

The Apache date Sector# Major Harrison Fuller, Field Artillery

Journal, Vol. 9.

72

I -

. . . .. -. .
CHAPTER 81)t

FROM DEMOBILIZATION~ TO CONSOLIDATION

At the cluse of World War 1, the Field Artillery numbered

22. 393 officers and 449, 760 oudisted men, thanks to the achievements of the programs described in tite last chapter. With the

beginning of the peace, the Army -was faced with the problem of

demobilizing this great force and of creating a peace tirhe army adequate to the missions our policy' might assign it. After the armistice,

classes at the School of Fire wre~ continued, for resumption~ of

hostilities warn thought not impossible. however, a November te-legram from General Snow' to Colones .Lau Jin LaWson', who was still

Commandant, advised that weekly classes woi01d be -cut 'to'60 e4acfh.

These men were CUTS men, either from 'the 14 elacemeint' Dopot, -at

Camp JAckson or from the COTS itself, knd fromf the 1gtaduating 'Class

at the Military Academy. The War Department was not receiving

resignations but was dindeavoring to discharge- *dice rs as quickly as,

possible. Those officers wishing to be diacharged~ere placed in

three classes#, The first were those Who *ished to *ever all conAzec-,

* ~tion with the Armyl the second, those who wanted a Reserve Cornmissioni, the third, those -'rho -wanted to be in the Pe'ular Army.

Tfhe first two were to be mustered out first, tha last'woiild be kept.

on pending Legislation on -the pe rronafent organization -of the Arm~y

In February .1919 the School began adjusting its str'ucture to

the changed conditions.. SmalL monthly: Clas see receoiving i three.-

month course, were bosun, February- 3, when the first,`%nd a'i it

happened, the Last, class of 13 reported. Six mor-e wert, to be

added from the school troops. No additional students were to come

until the course had been completely recast. 'According to the

strength return of February Z, there were at the Scha1ool atsir 114

insitructors, 332 students, and '3 cadets. No loes than 24 students

had been discharged, in the week, and. Class No. 46 had been mo worn

by attrition that only 13 graduated.

As fast as R~egular officer* of excperience became available,

members of the staff and students who dotired to remain in the

Regular Armny were to be sent to basic training schools, there to be

prepared for their career am R~egular*. With this directive to recast

the course, and fit it into a place between a basic course and hu adva.iced course, the now Commandant, Brig Gen Denimi H. Currie,

and the new Assistant Cotmnandant, Col Reno E. DoP. Hoyle, went

to work.

73
Between the last wartime -class, No. 54, which graduated

April 4, 1919, and the first Battery Officers Class, which entered

April 21, the. School of F'ire changed its siame and function. It be -

came the Field Artillery School, and its mission wat to train wellrounded artillerymen in the- battery grades, it was no longer just

a gunnery school, or primarily a gunnery school, it was an artillery

school.

The course, as tentatively outlined in a letter March 3 from

Col Rob~ert M. Danford to General Snow, was to last froin JanuLry

to December, with three terms of 15 weeks cach, and Live weeks

added i&t the end. There wuuld be 400 hours for Guninery, 590 for

Tactics,; 5'7;0. or. Uateriel, and, 240 for. Equitation. For the firitt year

the cpirase wtiald start ,iaApril and co*.$jtue excactly as- though it had

be giilhin -anuaary-..a r#.týber confus~ingprospect,,. There would bcjfour

departrnens. con4iactiug the. cour.e as giVen, abOVor, plus a fifthl adepartment of rosearch. A five months advanced class for field officears

and sertior captains was suggested, also..

frThe Irield A rtille ry Bohool,,and its work as actually laid down

frthe- balance of,1919 cofor'm favgrab.Ay to Danfordi's letter. Tilere

were the-Departments of pwý.ery, lMateriel, Tactics, and P',search,

each with a director and t~o assistantit, and Equitation with a director

and ono 4ssistant. -The ftinctlottaie f oux of t~e departments may be

inferred from their namnes, but,the Department of Research,- which

evolved from the Statis ticp1 Office, -deservea, a. word of explanation.

In 1919 it stuoied such subject& an were referred to it by the Comnstudies of the coFfiedAtilr Bfsoard, oStich parofjrects hnionsluf

studies or the cofiientd o srlope..y B od suach rofectortenctionsdef , 

the moment, s#Ad the in-vestlgodort of "iw methods of calculating

range tablets. IFor the 6chool, it-habitually prepared meteorological

data, located targets 4kad triangvlation' stationsa, and collected and

preserved topographical data about the reservation. Col Walter S.

Sturgill was then director. By 1921-192Z its duties had oxpanded to

include all drafting for the School, for the Field Artillery Board,

and for the Field Artillery Training RegalaLions Board, as well us

the preparation of texto on sound1 and SUash ra-iging and the develop.

inent of a circular slide rule for computing differential corrections

for the 75-ma gS".

The. First Poetwar Course,

The ccti~re offered was rno of 35 week~s And, throe terms

covering the duties of battery officers plus 6ome work ou handling

the battalion.' Of the 40 offic,:s who beg*A, Z3.ware relieved before

the end of the course, presuimably domobilized. The several departments offered their subject3 concurrently, with classes five days a

74
week from 8:00 to 11:30, 1:30 to 4:00, and evening study. Thus,

on the second day of the course, there were classes in map scales,

military history, opticG, and equitation; on the third day, mechanics,

algebra, and equitation.

An analysis of the course is interesting, since it occupied

the mid-ground between a basic course and an advanced course.

The program oi instruction offered work a good deal more technicaI

than any offered of recent years, The Department of Tactics taught:

topography (the use of maps), 54 hours; field engineering (battery

emplacements, camouflage, and a deep gallery shelter), 40 hours;

military history (largely research, study, and a thesis), 65 hours;

map problems (including field orders and reconiaissance), 52 hours;

tactical problems, 105 hours; and liaison (including communications),

46 hours. The Department of Materiel offered instruction in: elementary mechanics; optics and fire control instruments; chemistry

and explosives; interior ballistics; guns and carriages; ammunition;

machine guns and automatic rifles; electricity, telephone, and radio;

and motors and motor transportation. Motors received 86 hours,

electricity, radio and telephone, 63 hours; guns and carriages, 54

hours; elementary mechanics, 39 hours; and the rest, varying

lesser amounts. The Department of Gunnery gave 30 hours to

mathematic;s, 26 hours to exterior ballistics, eight hours to range

tables and meteorological bulletins, 13 hours to computation of

firing data, 12 houts to dispersion, 26 hours to the terrain board,

and about 115 hours to service practice. About 160 hours was

given to equitation during the year, 18 hours of it to draft. The

primary purpose of this course was exercise and recreation.

Hois'ng, 1919 Style

The housing situation that met the first students and instruc -

tofs of the Field ikrtillery Sclhool was described in an unsigned memor-andum for the Chief of Field Artillery, dated July 30, 1919.

"The permanent post of Fort Sill is distinctly

separated into the Old Post and the New Post,

these two parts of the post being about one

mile apart. In addition there are various areas

temporarily occupied. The School of Fire area

with the school buildings, barracks, and quart,-rs,

all emergency wooden buildings, is located between

the Old and New Posts; the post hospital (formerly

the base hospital) is north of and adjacent to the

- New Post; the Remount depot southwest of and

adjacent to the Old Post; the cantonments of the

75

•- .... _= ---- .. .. - -_ = -....-- .=.-. -
lit and 9th Field Artillery about one mile south

of the New Post; Post Field, about two miles

south of the New Post; and the former Camp

Doniphan area, west of and adjacent to the New

Post.

"In the Old Post there are quarters for 20 officers, 24 noncommissioued officers, and

barracks for 350 enlisted men; the New Pout

contains quarters for the officers and enlisted

men of one regiment of Field Artillery; the

School of-Fire area contains quarters for 48

married and 96 unmarried officers, no noncommissioned officers, and barracks for the

School of Fire detachment and 1, ZOO students

by crowding; but all these quarters are of an

emergency nature and the officers' quarters

unsuited for occupancy by officers on permanent dut7; Post Field has quarters and barracks

-. similar to those in the School of Fire area for

the personnel of the aviation school; the artillery cantonment, the Post Hospital, and the

Remouant Depot have only quarters and barracks

of a very temporary nature with no quarters for

marriod officers or noncommissioned officers;

there are no quarters or barracks in the Camp

Doniphan area, this having been a tent camp."

The quarters "unsuited for officers on permanent duty" were

occupied by officers on that status for many years to come. Officers' wives tried to cope with the Oklahoma dtust in the summer by

stuffing rags in the cracks, and sought wintertime warmth and comfort from coal stoves. Thanks to the board partitions, the officer

struggling with interior ballistics could hear a sopraiuo voice three

apartments away exclaim: "With all her husband's fogies, I would

most certainly think she could afford a new dress!" In 1919, the

coot of this establishment was estimated at $3, 460, 000. How a

value could be placed on buildings erected by soldier labor in 1870,

or on entrenchmnents, is not clear, but it was a most valuable plant,

and that wa s the one great obstacle against moving the school that

eager prop.rter.ts of Fort Benning or Fort Bragg could riot overcome.

School Troops

School troops present were the 1st, the 9th and the 14th Field

Artillery, all of them sadly understrength. For example, the 14th

76
had 22 officers and 225 men; the let, 25 officers and 397 enlisted

men, as of October 1919. Under the circumstances, it was hard

to get a battery together. In the winter of 1919-1920, the let FA

was organizing itself into a motorized regiment and in 1920 moved

into the Post Field area, which April 10, 1920, came under the

Commandant of the School, then General Ernest Hinds. The 9th

Field Artillery was put into the base hospital area, and the hospital

unit went into the old Post Hospital. The extreme shortage of

personnel ended in 1920. In the fall of that year, the l1t Field

Artillery was armed with the French and American 75-mm guns

and the 4.7-inch gun; the 14th Field Artillery had the French and

American 75-mm guns and the British 60-pdr; the 9th Field Artillery had the 155-mm howitzer, the 155-mm gun GPF, the 8-inch

I-. howitzer, and the 9. 2-inch howitzer. There were only two

batteries available for firing four afternoons a week for students

and two mornings a week for instructors--to keep them ahead of

their classes. This arrangement lasted until August 1921, when

the 9th and 14th were inactivated under War De#partment General

Order No. 33, leaving the lot organized as a horse-drawn 75-mm

gun regiment, with one motorized battalion. Its new colonel;

Ralph S. Granger, had a real problem ahead of him in whipping

the regiment into shape to fire for the School. General Hinds wrote

October 19, 1921: "Cranger is hustling with his new regiment.

He sent out recruiting parties in trucks and has gotten over 100

men. After two weeks driLling he had them firing for the School

yesterday. McLeod's battery was firing 23 out of 24 men at the

guns who had been 14 days in service. " With the activation of

the 1st Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, at Fort Sill, December

S1922, the field artillery component of the school troops reached

the form it held for many years.

The Postwar Commandants

The Commandants who grappled with the problems of the

School are as follows. Brig Gen Dennis H. Currie assumed command December 24, 1918, and was relieved June 10, 1919 by Brig

Gen E. T. Donnelly. Donnelly was relieved July 25 by Col R. H.

McMasters who held the fort until Brig Gen Ernest R. Hinds became

Commandant on October 25.

General Hinds was West Point '87, an honor graduate of the

old Artillery School at Fortress Monroe, Va., and served in Cuba

and the Philippines. From being Chief of Staff of the Philippines

Department, he went to France in 1917 where he was Commandant

of the American Artillery School at Saumur. From Saumur he

became Chief of Artillery of the American Expeditionary Force.

77
His services in the war earned him the Distinguished Service Medal.

Course Content: Technicalities and Trench Warfare

After the first term of the first Battery Officers Course, a

feeling arose among some of the instructors and students that it had

been far Loo technical. One old cavalryman complained he had to

work 15 hours a day. Currie, then Comrnandant, called a meeting

of the Director of Instruction and the senior instructors to discuss

the elimination of chemistry, gun design, and interior ballistics.

The consensus was against dropping them but favored their simplification. Col Walter Sturgill, whose department presented them, was

instructed accordingly, and told to report when ready for further

discussion. It was thought too that shortening the theoretical instruction in the first term would allow more time for tactics and liaidon,

thought highly desirable by officers with front experience.

The controversy raged between the exponents of open warfare

and those who thought that barbed wire and the machine gun would

make trench or siege warfare the normal thing. The devotees of

trench warfare thought themselves the modernists, the radicals.

In December 1919 General Hinds ordered the Assistant Commandant, then Major Augustine McIntyre, to survey the various courses

to note the weight being attached to open warfare and position warfare. Major McIntyre concluded that the right doctrine was not

being hammered into the students sufficiently, but at the same time

they were not being taught anything incorrect. Twenty-seven per

cent of the time spent on firing problems was devoted to the methods

of open warfare. This must not be taken at face value, for it reflected the relative difficulty of teaching the two. Half of the time

spent on tactical problems was spent on position warfare, the greater

part of this being devoted to French orientation methods (survey, which

was then and for some years after taught by the Tactics people). In

the next course given, this proportion was to be definitely changed, and

60 to 75 per cent spent on open warfare.

1920

The second postwar year, 1920, is of interest for the establishment of a comprehensive system for the instruction of enlisted specialists, the institution of a cdaas for National Guard officers, the extension of the Battery Officers Course to a full year, and the real establishment of the Motors Section of the Department of Materiel. December

Z, 1919, Lt Col Fred T. Austin reported to organize instruction for

enlisted specialists. To accommodate this change, the School was for

a time divided into an Officers' Division and an Enlisted Specialists'

Division (until October 1920). In May of 1920, instruction began with

78
classes of 15 weeks each for saddlers, horseshoers, and stable

sergeants, In the fall, a Z2 weeks course for communications

specialists got under way, covering elementary electricity, telephones, radio, signalling, line construction, and tactics. The

course for National Guard officers lasted from August Z3 to

Novembcr 20, snd allotted 96 hours to animal transport, 167 1/2

hou'rs to the firing battery, 36 hours to topography, 28 hours to

communications, 57 hours to motors, and 95 hours to gunnery.

In welcoming the incoming Regular Officers' claso of

January 1920, General Hinds, the Commandant, outlined the

Army educational system, that is, the basic, battery officers,

and advanced schools for artillerymen, and the higher schools of

the line and the General Staff. Then he went on to say that what

they would learn at the Field Artillery School under the orders of

the Chief of Field Artillery, would be open warfare, for that gave

instruction which would meet the greatest number of possible situ&-

tions, while unobserved fire methods applied only to special situations:

"The refinements of trench warfare will not be taught until open warfare has been mastered." And the General closed by -saying that he

would be delighted to see members of the class at his quarters when

it would. be convenient for them,. The course that these officers were

to take was given in three 15-week terms that were separated by oneweek intervals. Four hundred and twenty-nine hours were given to

tactics, 413 to materiel, 508 to gunnery, and 215 to animal transport.

Despite the claims that the previous course had been too technical,

it is notable that the Department of Materiel still offered work in

applied mechanics, optics, chemistry, and interior ballistics. The

course also covered instruction in telephones, radio and visual :1

signalling, practical and theoretical work on different weapons from i

the automatic rifle to the 9. 2-inch howitzer, and on motors and tractors. The work given by the other departments was the same as they

gave previously, except for the longer hours.

At the post itself, several changes occurred between July

1919, and April 19Z0. On September 2, the buildings of Camp Doniphan were sold to contractors for removal. The Liberty Theatre,

whose white semi-classic pillars were the scene of so many gradua- .

tions, was opened September 25. In October, Post Headquarters

moved from the hospital building of the Old Post to the Administration building of the New. And on April W0, Post Field came under the

jurisdiction of the Commandant.

The firm establishment of the Motors Section of the Depart -

ment of Materiel might be traced to a trip east by Captain A. E.

Higgins in 1920, to get engine assemblies and equipment. Captain

79
Higgins came back with some four-wheel drive trucks (FWD's), some

Indian motorcycles, and some White reconnaissance cars. From

some source, he also obtained some airplane engines, including one

Gnome-Rhone rotary. At this time, the Department of Materiel did

not have the organized group of enlisted instructors it later created.

Enlisted men might be called on to take a class occasionally, for

with a small staff every man had to turn his hand to whatever came

along, but they were not carried as instructors.

It was in this year that flash and sound ranging was taught

for the first time at the Field Artillery School.

Paragraph l, General Order No. 13Z, War Department, 1919

exempted service schools from corps area control in matters pertaining to the courses of instruction, or their separate organitation

and administration as schools. This directive prompted great discussion as to its precise meaning regarding the relationship of the

School to other echelons of authority. It probably meant that the

instruction and interior administration of the School were under the

Chief of Field Artillery, while the supply of the School, its role in

the summe r training of civilian components, court martial Juriadiction, etc., were under the 8th Corps Area. Between the two poles of

authority lay a twilight sone where authority was not well defined.

For example, in 1920 the Corps Area requested the Post Commander

to fill a quota for a clerk's school from school troops. The Commandant believed that school troops were exempt from Corps control " I

except for discipline and instruction and quoted General Order No. 18,

War Department, 19201 as saying: ".. exempted from the control of

the department commnader. " Corps Area replied that they thought

the contention just. But since there would be a large reduction in

the clerical force at Corps headquarters which handled much of the

supply and discipline for the post of Fort Sill, they thought it only

just that the post should furnish its share of the men. A compromise

provided that the School should train 17 clerks with its own facilities,

they being subject to future duty at Corps Area headquarters. Further,

Corps Area agreed to consult with the Commandant before insuing orders

in similar cases.

Changing the School Year

'ecs Sometime during the spring of 1921, perhaps about March, the

decision was made to change the academic year from that previously

chosen, January--DectbAnber, to the more normal September- -June.

One motivating factor may have been the great summer heat characteristic of Fort Sill. With a&i academic year of the usual kind, opie could

teach theory work indoors during fall and winter and have the pleasant

80 s.

. .

S. . .. . . . - - - - • - ' -• ' .- • . e , . . . . • . . . , . . . - - -, -,- -"-,,,-, --
Oklahoma spring for the more practical , tactical exercise# and

service practice. As a consequence, the Battery officers' Course

for 19ZI was sharply cut. This may have been welcomed by the

students, for they were receiving intensive instruction that year.

There was a shortage of officers, and the Schools were trying to

cope with the situation. General Hinds wrote to General Snow,

February 24, 1921:

The regiments will have to get on with the

absolute minimum until June 1922. There's

no other solution. We must run the schools

at full blast because in that way only can we

have competent officers to train the regiMents.... We have a good spirit here in

both the student body and the regiments.

We are working them almost unmercifully,

but I'm holding out the promise of better

times for them after one year more, June

1922.

Three courses for officers were offered in this "short year. "

They were: the Battery Officers' Course for Regulars; the Air Service Observers Course for Regulars; and the Battery Commanders

Course for National Guard Officers. Although shortened to six months,

the Begular Battery Officers' Course was still a complate one. Gunnery

went into such refinements as sound and flash, and high burst, ranging;

Materiel found time for chemistry, explosives, and interior ballistics,

Exterior ballistics and mathematics. had been dropped by Gunnery. Five

South American officers from Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile

attended this course.

The students of the National Guard class had had little experi- j

ence in their work and had to receive a good deal of instruction in the

fundamentals. Their class was 58 hours shorter than the one in the

previous year, but the totals were adjusted by cutting some 70 hours

from Animal Transport. Circular 143, War Department, 1920, prescribed that aerial observers for artillery had first to take a special

course at the Field Artillery School, followed by the Observers' Course

at Post Field. Complying with this directive, a course of 466 1/2 hours

was offered to members of the Air Service in the spring of 1921. The

tactical aspects of the course covered only topography, and practical

map problems and terrain exercises. Of the 74 hours allotted to

materiel, communications subjects took 50. The gunnery work was

quite thorough with 33 hours on elementary mathematics and dispersion. Barrage, counterbattery, and precision firing were well covered.

Twenty hours were spent on the terrain board, 6 hours on time fire,

81

a
and 48 hours on precision. As for the time given students to fire

these gunnery problems, it is stated in a letter that the Commandant doubted if eight problems per battery could be fired in one

afternoon.

In this year, the enlisted specialists courses reached full

development. Eight courses were offered, one of them, because of

its length of 45 weeks, ended in December 1921. The courses were:

master sergeants, battery clerks; battery mechanics; motor mecha-.

nice; communications; horseshoers; saddlers; atnd stable sergeants.

The course for master sergeants lasted 45 weeks, or 1,490 hours.

Subjects covered were: stenography; typing; administration (special

regulations and Army Regulations); elementary electricity; materiel;

tactics; and gunnery. Gregg shorthand was taught. "Electricity"

was really a thorough course in wire communication, up to the brigade

net. There were 27 afternoons of service practice. Plainly, the

level of this course suggests preparation for a reserve commission.

The battery clerks class~of'22 weeks included only stenography, typing,

and administration, these being practically the same as the master

sergeants' work. The battery mechanics' work of 22 weeks was

almost all practical, on the British, French, and American 75-mm

guns,' the mountain gun (the old Vickers Z. 95-inch) and the 155-mm

howitzer. Vise and bench work, welding, blacksmithing, and carpentry Were taught. The Motor Mechanics Course is Welf-explanatory. The mission of the Communications Course was to make

efficient members of the various details. There was a complete

grounding in electricity, telephone and radio, then work in topography,

visual signalling, training and use of the details, and the operatlor of

radio stations. Horseshoeing was both theoretical and practical, and

the men were taught to do pathological shoeing on the diagnosis of a

veterinarian. The Stable Iergeante Course was both theoretical and

practical, part being given by a veterinarian, part by an artilleryman.

It tried to develop men who could run a atable in garrison or field,

condition aninmals, diagnose injuries and diseases, and do simple

rmedical work, The work in the Saddler's course was entirely

practical, and they were taught the manufacture of various parts of

the harness.

The school year 1921-192Z marks the first conventional

school year, and the first course for Reserve Officers to be presented, plus four more courses for enlisted men. The Air Service

schools left Post Field, making this reservation solely an artillery

post. The Battery Officers' Course, called the Field Artillery Technical Course, saw a sharp increase in the number of hours given to

tactics, with corresponding cuts in materiel and animal transport.

For the first time, instruction in aerial observation was given in the

82

I S.,
Battery Officers' Course. There may be some connection between

this innovation and the fact that this year saw the last class for air

observers until World War II began. Instruction in ballistics,

chemistry, optics, and explosives was still given, but the Annual

Report of the Commandant suggests the elimination of chemistry and

explosives as a subject was under consideration.

The cut in the hours allotted to Animal Transport was only

to b. temporary, as events turned out. General Hinds thought that

the annual horse show that year had been "horrible" and determined

to double the allotment of hours for Animal Transport in the coming

year. He was very disturbed over the falling off in the standard of

horsemanship and thought the level of draft even worse. In his;

opinion, the automobile was responsible for the great lack of interest

shown.

Ammunition allotments for the students were most generous

as compared to prewar days, being 600 as against 57.

A course for National Guard officers was held in the fall, and

one for Reserve officers in the spring, each of about three months.

They followed the general lines of the Battery Officers' Course (or

Technical Course) but omitted ballistics, sound and flash, and highburst ranging, elementary electricity, buzzer, optics, chemistry,

machine shop work, and automatic weapons. The Air Observers f

Course was a condensation of the pertinent parts of the Battery

Officers' Course, omitting barrage, sound and flash, tactical entployment of field artillery and animal transport. The Enlisted

Specialists Division dropped its course for master sergeants and

added extra classes for horseshoers, battery mechanics, battery

clerks, and saddlers of the Regular Army, and a horseshoers class

for the National Guard.

The Old Museum

The present Field Artillery School museum should not be

regarded as the first of its kind at Fort Sill. After World War I

v: a very fine Ordnance Museum was established in the extreme north

C-building in the old School area. In it was a fine display of equipment of all kinds from the War, German equipment, small arms,

harness, etc. As the building was a wooden orae without aixy special

safeguards, it was not long before these items began to vanish. By

the period of 1920-09Z1 there was so much of this theft that it was

decided to change the Museum to a display on the second floor of the

Materiel building, and to put the reft in storage in the old stone warehouse, No. 22, Eventually everything was moved there and so remained

until the present museum was established.

83

r -~ 4
COURSES

1919 1920 1921 1921-1922 Regular Armr . :Apr. Dec Jan-Dec Jan-July Sept-June Battery Officers 15 s0 36 70

Enlisted Men 191 146

Air Service Officers Jan-Apr Sept-Dec j Obse rye rs 19 26

National Guard Aug-Nov Mar-Jun Sept-Dec Battery Commanders 1 II

R e rve. Officers . .... a.

"Battery Office a.

TOTALS

Officers Enlisted Men

Regular Arm.y 17 337

Air Service Officers 45

National Gus rd ..,34

Reserve Officers 12

26Z.- 37T

Bibliography

Files of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, kg, cit. oupra. Annual Reports, U.S. F. 1 .s,, o it. supra,

Recollections of Capt McCarter.

AF

.8

ii

S~84

.| -- '.*
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONSOLIDATION OF THE ARTILLER Y SCHOOLS

After the War, a comprehensi e system of service schools

was set up for the personnel of the Regular army and the new civilian components created by the National Defense Act. For the

Field Artillery, these included the Basic Course at Fort Knox,

the Battery Officers Course at Fort Sill, and the Advanced Course

I .i' at Fort Bragg. After completing these schools, an-officer was,

if selected, to go to the general service schools, the Command and

GeneralStaff School at Leavenworth, and the Army War College.

By 192Z, it was felt that the system did not accomodate post-war

conditions. Consequently a board headed by Brig Gen Edward F.

McGlachlin, the former commandant of the School of Fire, was

chosen to consider the situation and make its recommendations.

Besides McGlachlin, its members were: Brig Gen Ernest Hinds;

Brig Gen Fred W. Sladen; Brig Gen Hanson E. Ely; Brig Gen Malin

Craig; Col B ichmond P. Davis, Coast Artillery Corps; Col Paul.

B. Malone, Infantry; Col Harold B. Fiske, General Staff; Maj

Thomas DeW. Milling, Air Service; L~t Col Samuel R. Gleaves,

General Staff, recorder.

The letter of instruction sent to the board by General of

the Armies John J. Pershing, February 4, 1922, smurnariges

both the existing system and the objections to it. General Pershing

wrote that the system of military education was based un first

deductions from the lessons of the war, and on the educational

requirements both of a Regular Army of 280,000 -,nd the newly .

instituted civilian components (the Organized Reserves and the

National Guard). There were the further needs of educating a

large number of young officers and of giving the latest lessons of

war to Regulars who had not been overseas. Liberal appropriations to support this system had been expected. However, the

usual post-war reaction was setting in, and appropriations were

once again being cut to the lowest possible terms. Moreover, the

system dic! .oem too large and cumbersome for efficiency, with

its overlapping of courses and confusion of doctrine between schools.

General Pershing wanted the board to study the whole system of

army education with a view to its simplification. The Board should

set the exact place of each school in the scheme and include developmeat of a comprehensive system of instruction by correpoiidence

course for the National Guard and the Organized Reserves.

"". .I

85

. . . . . .. .. . . . . -.. 
The mission of the board witi to study the army school

system and make recommendationui for better coordinating

existing courses, reducing the time and oxpense involved, and

developing adequate courses of instruction for the civilian components. The board's procedure in fulfilling its mis~ion wasn to

visit Fort K(nox, Fort Sill, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Banniing,

Camp Bragg (as it was then known), Fortress Monroe, Langley

Field, Camp Humphreys, Camp Alfred Vail, the Military Academy,

Camp Meade, and Washington, D. C. The plan~band curricula of

each of the schools visited were inspect~e4, and in Washington the

Board conferred with the Chief of each arm concernted, or with

his representative,

After due deliberation, the board established thes post-war

framework of the army educational system. Mentioned hard are

only those recommendations that deal with the Field Artillery School.

The board urged that the artillery schools be concentrated

at Fort Sill at the beginning of the school year 1922-1923. The

reasons given were principally those of economy: economy in

overhead of officers and- nen; economy in: the cost of maintenance

directly chargeable to the combined schools; loes milea~ge, as

changes of station to Fort Sill would average 400 miles less than

changes to Camp Bragg; and economy in utilization of water and

sewage facilities, those at Fort Sill being permanent whereas

those at Bragg were of wood, Yearly savings were estimated at

$240, 000. There would also be better coordination in the subjects

taught. The board voted 5-4 to recommend that the Field Artillery School be moved to Fort Benning as soon as funds could be

obtained to erect an artillery post there. As for courses of in- I

struction, the discontinuance of the basic course was recommended,

and it was suggestod that new officers of the Regular Army receive their basic training in troop schools conducted by their units.

As soon as this training was completed and openings were available, they-we re-to-go to the service schools which would offer:

Battery officern courses--To give as thorough a

technical knowledge as one year would permit; I'

Advanced courses--To complete the tactical and

technical training of the officers of the arm;

Special courses- -National Guard and R~eserve officer

courses and refresher courses for field and general

officers;

86.
Enlisted courses--To train certaLin selected enlisted

men is technicians and instructors in the duties of

enlisted specialists of the arm in the Regular Army

and the civilian components.

The battery officers courses were not to be radically dif-erent

from the existing basic courses except that certanf basic subjects,

common to all arms, like military courtesy, would be dropped and

technical artillery matters substituted. There was to be no change

in the advanced course other than the minor ones coming from the

combination of three courses into two. Enlisted specialists courses

were to remain the wame. There were to be no changes in correspondence courses, which would continue to be conducted by corps

area commanders, As an amplification oý its request for special

courses for officers, the board listed courses for officers detailed

in or transferred to the Field Artillery from other arms. All

officers below field grade, or field officers with little or no experience, were to be required to take either of the two officer's

courses.

The Consolidation Opposed

Opposition to the proposed consolid'ation of the schools came

from General Snow, who was still Chief of Field Artillery, and Brig Gen Albert JT. Bowley, Snow felt that as the R~egular Army

grew smaller, the prospective burdens on the service schooli in

an emergency would increase, and therefore he advocated not one

two, but three artillery schools, Bragg, Sill, and one on the West

Coast. General Snow was also of the opinion that the investment

in Fort Bragg and the large range there should be utilized. In

his opinion, the alight economy of lowering the cost of utilities

was far outweighed by the advantages of keeping the schools seperate.

The only consolidation he would approve would be moving the basic

course from Fort Knox to Bragg. General Bowley stated he wanted

the school to be moved to Fort Bragg because that reservation had ,

not been paid for, and if a school were maintained there, the re would

be a better chance of keeping the reservation. He tried to persuade

General Pershing to his point of view, in a conversation in which

General Pershing listened affably but said nothing. (Bowley to

Snow, May 2Z, 192Z, files of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery.

General Bowley's activities on behalf of the Bragg site continued

for many years. In the end, the schools were consolidated at Fnrt

Sill. It is known that General Pershing disapproved of moving the

Field Artillery School to Fort Benning, and it may be that he also

disapproved of moving it to Fort Bragg.

4

87
In May and June of 192Z the staff of the Field Artillery

School took it more or less fcr granted that the schools would be

consolidated at Fort Sill, and they planned accordingly. It was

necessary to rearrange existing housing facilities to create new

onep, to plan the new cournee, and to get the personnel who would

arrive from the other schools comfortably settled before the students arrived in fall. In June, General Hinds asked for all the

school property from Fort Knox, furniture, printing press, 200

horses, everything movable 6&d valuable. In 1921, Hinds had

obtained $181,000 with which to convert temporary bachelor

quarters into quarters suitable for married ufficers, He then

received authority to convert one of the C-buildings into 18 family

,api'ments. Sixteen good barracks in the base hospital avea were

next m.ide into married officesks' quarters. Officers on the post

had been marrying at a rate which complicated the housing problem,

and the General feared some of them would have to take tiny fourroom beaverboard apartments. The quarters situation was solved,

however, for the time, by the new constructon, byithe removal of

the Air Service Schools, and by the departure of the 9th and the 14th

Field Artillery regiments. These arrangements opened up enough

room for the Commandant to request the stationing here of a demonstration "attalion of infantry and a full aviation squadron for work with the officers cours6s. There was room for most of th'e lot

Field Artillery at the New Post, and for an infantry battalion, an

artillery battalion, and the headquarters battery of the lot at Post IFie•'d.

Aa order June 9, 1.922, to the Commanding General, 5th

Corps Area, directed the -sending of 7 majors, 6 captains, 20 first

lieutenants, 2 warrant officers, I field clerk, and 84 enlisted

men from Camp Knox to Fort Sill. The movement included all

school property except guns, carriages, trucks, and tractors. An

order of the sam,.date and to the same effect, to the Commanding

General, Camp Bragg, mentioned only the detachment of 29 enlisted

men, and such books, papers, records, and maps as the Chief of

Field Artillery might direct,

The Fort Bragg detachmenL arrived July 1, 1 92Z, and the

Fort Knox officers and enlisted men, including the colored detach-

* sment, August 12. On the arrival of the colored detachment, the

men camped on the site of the present Administration building,

according to Master Sergeant James C. Johnson. Their eventual

quarters were war-time wooden barracks Just south of the station

* ihospital. The detachment brought with it an excellent baseball

team which won its first Post championship cup in the summer of

1923.

* I ''
Courses Offered

After the consolidation of the schools at Fort Sill, six

courses were offered for officers in the school years 19ZZ-1923

and 1923-1924: the Battery Officers' Course; the Advanced Course;

the Refresher Course; the Course for Field Officers Detailed to

Four Years in the Field Artillery; the National Guard Officers'

Course, the Reserve Officers' Course.

The Battery Officers' Course devoted much more time to

equitation.than had previous classes, carrying out General Hinds'

intention of the year before. In the 1922-1923 class, the rules of

procedure for lateral firing were liberalized, leaving a good deal

more to the judgement of the student. Although this lessened

pressure on the student, the class of l923-19Z4 replied to the

Department of Gunnery's request for suggestions with a recommendation that there be no stop watch held on the first problems and

that instructors intervene to suggest better commands, They

further objected to the practice of calling all deficient students

into the Commandant's office in a group, as being rather eambarassing. The hours devoted to Gunnery were cut down from

508 in 1921 to 358 in 1923-1924.

The Advanced Courses heavily stressed tactics, and the

Department of Tactics for many years had the responsibility of

the detailed planning of the course. In round figures, in the first

Advanced class, Tactics had 11 times the hours allotted other ( courses, in 1923-1924 it had six times the hours allotted the next

highest, Gunnery. Even in this second year the Gunnery course

was a refresher course rather than instructional, and student

sentiment thought it should be enough to bring them thoroughly

up to date. They felt themselves rather confused by the use of

British, French, and American materiel in the work. In the

previous year, the comment of the School had been that few of

the class could be considered thoroughly competent instructors

of their junior officers. i .1

The Refresher Course as given in 1 924 to a general officer

was described in a letter to General Snow. The student was not

bound to any regular class and followed a tentative schedule of

instruction. On one day, selected as typical, he spent two hours

with the Department of Tactics covering essentials, one hour taking

up the use of the battery commander's telescope and the range

finder, and one hour on the preparation of firing data. In the afternoon he went out with a battery on a problem in reconnaisance, and

spent a short period at a firing point. In some cases he went with

89
the Advanced class to certain conferences or demonstrations, at

other timas he accompanied a battalion commander inspecting

his battalion. The idea was to prepare him to command an artiIlery brigade and enable him to coordinate instruction, to see faults,

and to correct them. Not until 19Z6 were refresher courses attempted for officers of lesser grade.

The course for field officers of Cavalry and Infantry detailed

to four years with the Field Artillery was about 655 hours long, and

was thoroughly criticized by the Commandant, General Hinds, in

May, 1923. He urged in its place that such officers take the advanced course. He felt they would be of more use in the three years and

three months left than if they had only had the abbreviated course,

for they would feel more sure of themselves.

The National Guard and Reserve Officer Courses given in

1922-1924 were the same as previous years as far as content was

concerned. However, in the fall of 1923 the courses were changed

insofar as they were combined into one course, and provisions were

made for two classes each year, one in the fall and one in the

spring. This course became the pattern for the Officer Candidate,

Battery Officer, and Basic courses of the Second World War. The

course was not an easy one. One reserve officer, writing in Volume

XIII of the Field Artillery Journal, said: "It is the rare and highly

ambitious young man who devotes as much as eight hours of solid

unremitting work to his business; fourteen hours a day of highpressure work is no unusual average for a student in the Reserve

course at Sill.

The enlisted specialists' department in these two school

years of 1922-1923 and 1923-1924 suffered a great contraction of

its activities and at no time was operating near capacity. There

were only five courses offered in each year. In the first, there

were communications courres, one each for Rogulars and National

Guardsmen; horseshoers courses on the same oasis; and a battery

mechanics class for Regulars. In the second year, there were

horseshoers and communication classes for the Regular Army and

National Guard together, and horseshoers, battery mechanics, and

saddlers courses for the Regular Army only,

The only formal change in the organization of the school in

this two year period saw the demise of the Department of Research

in September, 1922. The Book Department began during the school

year 1922-1923. The correspondence on its founding has been lost,

probably in the fire that destroyed Snow Hall. It was intended to

play a role like the then existing Sook Department of the Command

-90

90

-S ,
and 3•eneral Staff School. It began with a small amount of cash

on hand--and through the courtesy of several business houses:

who shipped goods on consignment. Since there were no Army

Regulationb dealing with the subject, it was modeled as closely

as possible after the Post Exchange. The staff at this time was

probably an officer, a steward, whose duties were those of a

Pont Exchange steward, a bookkeeper, and a shipping clerk.

There were then no civilians employed, The Book Department

sold both by mail and over the counter. It furnished students

with non-issue supplies a~t a reasonable price and was the financial

agent of the Reproduction plant in distributing instructional

literature. Ini 1923-1924 the Book Department-Reproduction

plant combination expanded its field to include the manufacture

of maps, overprints, zinc etchings, and photo lithographs.

Organization of the 18th FA

December It, 1,92, the let Battalion of the 18th Field

Artillery was reconstituted at Fort Sill. In 1923 the War. Depart-.

ment approved the ststioning here of a demonstration battalion

Infantry appeared. Their arrival fixed the combination of units.

that wa~s to last for so many years, until the activation of a

battalion of the 77th in the thirties. It should be noted that the,

20th Infantry was not a war-strength battalion. It was the settled

policy of the School to have all units authorized as war-strength

units and to keep thef, as close to that as possible. In 1924-1925

the Chief of Field Artillery recommended accordingly. The reasons

for this policy were that nowhere else within the Continental United

States could an artillery officer learn to work with the warstrength units that would be his to handle in tirhe of emergency.

At that time, however, mention of the policy would have produced

a sardonic laugh, for the school troops were well below their

authorized strength. In October 1923 they were 400 below strength,

and the batteries had to use cooks as drivers and cannoneers.

There was prosperity in the oil fields; there was rejoicing in

Wall Street; and men were purchasing discharges as rapidly as

possible. In both 1922 and 1923 the lot, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th,

and 7th Corps Areas were directed to recruit for Fort Sill, and

did so with little redult, obtaining a scant 53 men in 1922, for

example.

School Organization and Agencies

The end of the Department of Research did not by any means

mean the end of research and experiment at the School. As an

91

Li -a
example, in 1923, the Advanced course, in Field Exercise No. 9,

had its targets in "hostile" territory invisible from any ground

held by friendly troops, and all firing was base4dpn photos prepared by the Air Service. About two days were needed to prepare

the firing charts based on the aerial photographs, which were taken

of the entire corps zone of action from about 6, 000 yards behind

the friendly lines to 10, 000 yards behind the enemy. Some 69

small photos were pieced together 9n a scale of 1/10, 000 and

re-photographed at 1/20,000. An aerial observer would note the

hectometric coordinates of a target and bend the location to 

a

battery whose position had been spotted on the chart by survey.

In one case, fire for effect was opened on receiving the necessary

data, and four hits out of 30 we re secured by one battery on 

a

target ZOOxZ00 yards.

The Wa- Department's General Order No. 53, 1915,

directed that the Field Artillery Board be composed of: the

permanent regimental commander of the Field Artillery regiment

stationed at Fort Sill, who will be president; the lieutenant-colonel

of the same; the Commandant of the School of Fire; the commanding

officers of the two instruction batteries, A and S of the 5th Field

Artillery; and the Secretary of the School of Fire, who would be

recorder. In 1918-1919, General Snow succeeded in having the

Commandant made president, and communications went through

him. In 1920, the Commandant was still president, and the Board

had added one officer from the Chief's office, azrlordnance officer..

and four officers chosen by the Chief. The Board was still charged

with the preparation of regulations, although there was also 

a

Drill Regulations Board. In 1922, the Board was moved from Fort

Sill to Fort Bragg, no doubt to lighten the b~rden on the Commandant and to make use of the facilities then made available at Bragg.

On September 5, 1924, post headquarters and school headquarters became one. In 1911 the School of Fire had been under the 

L

* Comrmanding Officer, Fort Sill, Okla., a situation not always to

the iiking of the School. After the Wbr, the Commandant of the

School had through senio: rank become commanding officer of the

Post cf Fort Sill as well as of the School, but the two headquarters

had been kept separate. Old timers tell of General Irwin, as

Commandant, sitting down in the morning and sending himself

(as Post Commander) an official letter, then that afternoon, seating himself in Post Headquarters and answering his own letter.

One is reminded uf Braxton Bragg, who, occupying the dual roles

of Post Comnmander and Posol Quartermaster, before the Civil War,

managed to stir up a hot quarrel in official correspondence betweien

his two incarnations. The annual report for 1924, which was written

92 i,
in June of that year, recommended merging the two headquarters,

and that summer General Snow as Chief approved it. General

Order No. 1, Headquarters, Field Artillery School. September

5, 1924, created the new organization.

All post and school activities are grouped in four divisions:

the School Headquarters; the Academic Division; the School Troop

Division; the services. The School Headquarters consisted of the

Commandant, his aide or aides, and hi3 staff. The Academic

Division, under the Assistant Commandant, included all the activities formerly referred to as the Field Artillery School, more

formally, all activities connected directly with the instruction,

discipline, and administration of the student body. The School

Troop Division included many oi he activities formerly grouped

under the Post. It included responsibility for all combat troops

stationed permanently at the Fietd Artillery School. The Command- K

Ing Officer, School Troops, commanded this division, and was

responsible for its training, discipline, and administration. The

Services included: the Adjutant; Quartermaster; Ordnance; Engineers;

Signal Office; Post Surgeon; Post Veterinarian; Finance Office;

Provost Marshall; Fire Marshall; Staff Judge Advocate; Recruiting F

Officer; Chaplain; School Exchange; Guidon (post newspaper);

and the Red Cross., The services also furnished the administrative

staff of the Field Artillery School.

The executive was primarily charged with the coordination

of the several divisions and services. The Commandant's office

was put on the south side of the south wing of Snow Hall, the Assistant Commandant on the right, the executive on the left,

and the Secretary across the hall, The administration building

in the New Post was turned over to the services. 1w,

The New Commandant

The new Commandant, Maj Gen George LeRoy Irwin, who

arrived July 1, 1923 was largely instrurne|ital in making these

new arrangements. General Irwin was WVest Point '89. After

graduation from the old Artillery School he spent five years on

garrison duty and then went to the IPhiliplnes for two years. On

his return to the United States he spent eight years on various

. duties before attending the Army War College. After the War

College came Panama, and after Panama, France, where General

Irwin commanded the 32d Division in the Second Battle of the

Marne, receiving the Diitinguished Service Medal for his work

there. On returning to the United States he was assigned to the

Inspector General's Department until 1923.

93

V6..
COURSES 1922-23 1923-24 ,TOTALS

Sep-Jun Sep-Jun Off. EM

Regular Army

Battery Officers 120 75 195

Advanced Course 26 33 59

Refresher Course 4* 4

Field Officers Detailed

in the FA for 4 Years 4 22 26

Enlisted Men 58 75 133

National Guard Sep-Dec

Battery Officers 30 70** 100

Reserve Officers Mar-Jun

13 13

* Various times during the year

** National Guard and Reserve Officers combined this year and

all following courses 3 months, Fall and Spring

Bibliography

Files ofthe Office of the. Chief,. of Field Artller_ op. cit, supra.

Annual Reportss U.S.F.A. S. , op. cit. supra.

"Fort Sill through a Reserve officer's Field Glasses, Kingsley

Moueb, Field Artillery Journal, Vol. XIXII.

' I

*1

94

- - ;,, 94 
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SCHOOL BECOMES PER MANENT: 1924-1930

The years of 1924-1930 were significant in the history of

the school. The first of these was the year when the School and

the Post were consolidated, and the last, the year in which Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley approved Fort Sill ao the permanent

location of the Field Artillery School. In between these dates, new

courses were established, there was progress in the organiz.tion

of several departments of the School and in the training activities

and methods used, more students came to the institution, and the

housing problem became severe. Also, there- ere the great

fires of the middle and late twenties and thp. Cru.ikshank Board

which recommended that the. Field Artillery.School be permanently

established at Fort Sill.

Civilian Component Correspondonce Courses

The McCl•chlin Board had recommended that a system of

correspondence courses for the instruction of the civilian cornponents be created. August 28, 1924, a Correspondence Coursel

Board was begun, composed of Major William F, Sharp and five

assistants. The Board was charged wi~h the preparation and forwarding of all correspondence courses, in addition to their other

duties. The courses paralleled those given at the School, and .were divided into the Bsic, ,*Lttery70fficerlp, and Advanced courses.

Subjects covered inctuded"

The Basic Courpse i I '

j

I. Organization of the Army

2. Elementary battery training:

a, for horse drawn anits, ' b. for motorized units

3. Elementary gunnery

4. Artillery movements mounted

5, Field Artillery ammunition

6. Care of animals and stable management

7. Motorized trs:isportation

95 I,

S! / i
The Battery Officer's Course

1. Preparation of fire

2. Reconnaisance, selection, and occupation

of position; combat orders

3. Preparation of fire (a continuation of 1

above)

4. Observation of fire

5. Field Artillery signal communication

6. Conduct of fire

7. On the march and in bivouac

The Advanced Course

1. Special fire missions

2, Combat orders and problem solutions

3. Tactics I- -the battalion in the Advance

and in rear guard actions

4. Tactics II--F'sld Artillery in the offense

5; Tactics flI--Field Artillery in the defense

6. Tactics IV--Field Artillery with the cavalry

division

7. Methods of training

bince these coursbe were prepared by members of the Board

in addition to their other duties,' a real strain was placed on them.

This was remedied April 27, 1925, by reconstituting the Correspondence Course Board as a Board of Review to pass on courses '

prepared by the several departments. After the reorganization, it

was estimated that some three and one-half months were needed

from the time a course was begun to the time it was put in the

mail. No clerical or enlisted aid was provided to that a total of

1,000 hours was spent on these courses by members of the reorgartized board. By March, 1926, a total of 599 National Guard

officers, 2, 024 Organized Roserve officers, and 98 other individuals ,

were taking thd~e courses, but previous experience indicated that

* uly 20 percent would complete their courses. This figure of 540

was about 15 times the number of students who took the National

Guard and Reserve Officer's cov-rse at the School during the school 1!

year 1924-1925, thus despite the mortality, the courses brought

about a substantial increase In the School's overall usefullnese.

A yearly program of revision of existing courses and addition

of new ones was begwi in the school year 19ZS-19Z6. In the year

*. 1927-1928 the Board war changed again to the Correspondence Course

Section, The uew Section included one member chosen by each

department plus the Assistant Secretary. Subcoursee prepared by a

4i 96
department were reviewed for the Section by the member from •4

that department and by the president of the Section. The Assistant

Commandant then gave the final approval. One handicap that

bothered the. Section was that since the courses were actually

conducted by the several corps areas, the members of the Sectior%

had no contact with the officers who were giving the courses and

had little idea of how many students were taking them.

A course for National Guard field officers, which had been

requested by the Chief of the Militia Bureaus was first offered

November 1, to December IZ, 1924. Ten officers were scheduled

to attend, but only sevon did so. Tactical studies occupied 133

of the 206 hours allotted.

A branch assignment group course for Reserve officers

was given September 7-19, 1925, to Z1 officers, More than half

of thu course. was devoted to gunnery.

R esident OffiCe r Specialist Courses

Courses. for officer specialists were introduced Septe.mber

15, 1 9Z7, wiih the offering of advanced instruction in horsemanship.

The mission of thecourse was to qualify officers to act,&a instructors in driving, draft and equitation in their units, Battery officers

on arriving at the School had previously showed that they had had

little instruction in their nilts, Four officers began the courses,

and one more was added from the.School horse show team. The

course allotted 400 hours to driving and draft, 915 to equitation,

81 to animal management and horseshoesig, and 18 to the horse

show and the transportation show. The course was thought by the

School to have been successful.

The Advanced Course in Motors began in September, 19Z8

in compliance with the following instructions from the War Department: "It is the policy of the War Department to send officers of

the Field Artillery to various motor transport schools, to provide

at least one officer in each motorized unit who is a qualified motor

mechanic and who can train the enlisted men to be mechanics and

operat,¶ motor trapsportation skillfully and economically, "1 The

School felt it could comply with the directive by setting up an Advanced Motors Coorse at the School with equal emphasis on the

knowledge of ino.. +ics, maintenance, operation, and training,

The course was actually organised by Capt Malcolm Cox

and Sgt David Hagen, according to Sgt (now Capt) HIagen's -ecollection, The first course was not fully satisfactory. For one thing,

97

,4-
it was too short, lasting only five months. For another, there

was no modern equipment at hand for instructional parposes. The

Commandant, General Aultman, very bluntly called the course a

"flop. "' In the next year it was extended to a full nine months, and

motor equipment was borrowed from Lawton motor dealers so a

student could see motor assemblies of postwar vintage.

"Honors" courses were instituted under the provisions of

a letter from the Adjutant General's Office, August ZZ, 1930, which

authorizld service schools to offer courses in advanced professional,

technical, scientific, or c1litural subjects, for which they had

qualified instructors. The subjects covered were to be in fields

such as law, pedagogy, economics, foreign languages, metallurgy,

etc. Students doing exceptional work could volunteer for the course

but could not actually take it without the approval of the School.

The course was to culminate in a thesis. Satisfactory completion

brought either a letter of commendation or an appropriate entry

on the efficiency report.

No such courses were taken in 1931, and the subsequent

histfry of the venture may be quickly surveyed. Almost every

year, several carefully selected officers with fine potential and

acceptable topics would enroll only to find in the spring that they

were far too busy to complete their work. One officer, in 1932,

Capt P. W. Allison, of the Advanced Class, did satisfactorily

complete an Honors Course on the Self-Propelled Battery. Capt

H. C. Harrison Jr. was unable to complete his work in 1933 because of the closing of the school in the CCC emergency. N*

courses were taken in 1934 or 1935, and it having been made

discretionary with the Commandant in 1935 as to-whether such

courses were offered, they were then dropped. Few if any instructors then at the school were capable Uf giving instruction along the

broad cultural lines laid down in the original letter.

T raining To chnigue s

Good progress along technical lines was made by the Department of Gunnery in this period 19Z4-1930. Aerial observation was

covered in both the Battery Officers Courses and the Advanced

Course. Night adjustment of fire from forward observation posts,

aided by airplanes ciropping flares, was practiced in the same year.

The sending of firing data by radio from forward observation posts,

a most significant advance, and the use of aerial photos in the preparation of fire, were techniques employed more often tn those

years.

9I

98 •

"* . -i .,
Extensive use was made of the terrain board as a means of

instruction, no less than Z5 percent of every indoor period being

given to it in the year 19Z3-1924. One of the boards used was the

Baranoff terrain board, a most elaborate machine made in Germany.

It r-ould produce any effect found in actual firing, including dispersion.

The student looked through a hole in a screen at a stretch of terrain,

which through lighting effects was made to seem most realistic.

The scale was such that instruments could be used with the board.

The machine was 4lso used in the aerial observation training given

to Advanced(Course students.

Both students and the School were dissatisfied with the gunnery

part of the early Advanced courses, since the time was heavily

weighted with tactical subjects and gunnery offered more as a refresher. The Advanced Claosmwhich gradu~ted in June 19Z4 formed

a committee, at the suggestion of the Commandant, to report on

their gunnery course. They suggested that the course be instructional rather than refresher, that there be more terrain board practice, that service practice etart in January and be preceded by

explanations and demonstrations. The School had given members

of this class over 30 hours extra instruction over the Christmas

holidays and during evenings. The records suggest that not every

I phase of this course had been graded, which resulted in a tendency

to omit the work required. Be that as it may, the years saw a

steady increase in the gunnery component of the Advanced Course,

from 98 hours to 158, from 158 to 208, Z08 to 217 (before the development of modern methods of fire direction) and on up to 333 hours in the last Advanced class given.

During the school year 1925-19Z6 the Department of Gunnery's

methods of instruction were somewhat changed. In teaching the

theory of gunnery, the instructor covered the subjects assigned in

a conference, then the student went to the blackboard and solved

practical problems emphasizing the points covered. Every effort

was made to teach, rather than to find out what the student knew.

In practical gunnery, demonstrations covered every point, and

the instructor fired a type problem, beforehand. Stop watches were

used only for statistical purposes and had little bearing oatthe problem.

Students knew the standard sought and were encouraged to consult

the instructor. Almost every problem was completed even if the

instructor had to assist the student. A student's skill was judged

"by his work in the later periods of the course, the first part being

instructional only. In 1930, in service practice, the student was not

required to stand on his own feet entirely, according to a memorandum of March 1. Certain minor departures from book procedure were

99
permitted the battery executive in aissut4ng the student by interpreting incorrect commands. Correct commands in incorrect

sequence, for example, would be executed correctly.

The gunnery grading system of 1925 was as follows. No

matter in what manner the proficiency of an individual might be

accomplished, it would automatically fix the proficiency of individuals standing above him on the relative scale. Low men in the

class averaged 32 problems. Every student had five free problems.

Any student who received a satisfactory mark on half of his problems

was proficient. A board of Lhree instructors passed on all problems

to secure uniformity in grading. A problem once rated as ""S" by

them could not be re-graded "U. " As applied to a type of problem,

axial adjustment of shrapnel, the initial data counted 15 %; choice

of ammunition 5%; commands 5%; sensing and ranging Z5%; handling

of sheaf 20%; handling of corrector 20%; and general estimate 10%.

a The Department of Tactics, then handled bothjthe technical

and tactical aspects of communications as well as most other tactical

matters, In the school year 1924-1925, in addition to regular instruct'

tional duties, the department handled the tactics part of the Correspondence Course work, reconnaisance problems in the field, research,

the writing up of field exercises for the Field Artillery Bulletin, and

preparation of the annual tactical inspection of school troops. The

department was organized in 1924-1925 into a command section and

six other sections, whose instructional subjects were:

ComnaiLud Section: Artillery tactics.

lot Section: 0-I functions; military organization;

field engineering (including orientation,

topography, work with aerial photographs).

Zd Section: G-2 functions; Artillery intelligence;

military history. .

3d Section: 0-3 functions; training and leadership;

methods of instruction; Artillery staff

duties; combat orders; solution of map

problems,

"4th Section: G-4 functions; logistics.

Sth Section: Signal communications; liaison.

6th Section: Tactics of associated arms; tactirs of

separate arms,

100
Thede subjects wc.re the primary assignments of the instructors of

each section. Each map problem was gone over by a board of

review in the department and would be solved by at least one office r.

The assignment of subjects to a section varied from year to year,

but the type of organization was not changed.

The amount of practical instruction was held at the highest

possible level. Thus, the first instruction in the reconnaissance,

selection, and occupation of position consisted; of moving blo:ks

about a terrain board. The instruction emphasized the importance

of the light field artillery battalion with stress being laid on speed

and simplicity of installation. Demonstrations of battery and

battaliol, problems in reconr.aissanca,. selection, and occupation of

position included problems in conduct of fire in the first, and fire

direction in the second. The Advanced Cl-Las had one series of

problems for the battalion in which the batteries and details were

outlined, and another series in which each student commanded 

a

complete br ttalion. Eighty per cont of the problems given wer 

i

in open warfare. In 19Z6-1927.,the department added demonstrations

of the conduct of fire by artillery units supporting attacking infantry,

and of the ammunition supply of division artillery. A field exercise

showing the operation of all artillery staffs of division artillery was

added. A five-day general field exercise was held for the second

time, replacing the former two three-day. exercises.

I

Experimentation in better communication in moving situations, so as to Tive better support to the infantry, went on actively.

In ?7-1928, che SCR-77-B radio was used for liaison communication with the Znfantry by being broken down into series of loads. and

nmanhandled from place to place by perspiring doughboys. Xt was

powered by a 35 pound battery, which was in turn made mobile by ,,

an infant.yman. In 1927-1928, an SCR-109-A was installed in 

a

horse-drawn wagon, coa.-verted from a former ambulance, by

Master Sergeant Clarence Burleson. The antenna was 24 wires

strung two inches apart and running the length of the wagon under

* the bows. The battery containers were two longitudinal box seats

against the sides of the vehicle. The set had a good range and

was able to operate while the vehicle was in motion. Sgt aurleeon

convinced the Assistant Commandant, Lt Col William P. Ennis, of

"the set's worth while on a march. A horse having been injured,

Ennis directed that at the next halt a message be sent requesting

a veterinary ambulance. At the halt he inquired if the message was

being sent, and was told that it had been sent while on the maich

almost immediately after he gave it. The colonel simply had not

realized that the set could transmit so far while in motion. From

then on he was an advocate of vehicular radio. By 1931, the School

101
had three radio wagons and a radio truck, and each regiment of

school troops had a radio wagon.

The Department of Animal Transport was responsible for

some 13 activities: equitation, driving and draft, animal management, saddling, correspondence courses, stables, pastures, construction, riding hall and riding pens, saddle room, administration,

and supply room. A good deal of the instruction was given in a

former airplane hangar, 200 x 67 feet, which was re-erected across

from where the Administration Building stood in 1944. If a class

had more than one section, the other section had to work out-ofdoors, since the hall only held one at a time. There were some

300 goverrnment horses at the Department's disposal.

The Department of Materiel, in the late twenties, had a dual

role, instruction and automotive maintenance. There were three

commissioned instructors, one of them the director, and an officer

in charge of the motor pool. Of the enlisted staff, two were instructors in the machire shop, one was instructor in the Sun room, three

were in charge of the motor shop and supply, and eight were assistant

instructors in the motor mechanics and Battery Officer, coursves.

These figures were as of 1925-1926, but the organization did not vary.

Methods of obtaining enlisted instructors differed. In one case, a

notice was put in the Daily Bulletin asking for applicants. In another,

a young soldier who had attracted attention by his work with the lot

Field Artillery was asked if he cared to transfer after his current

enlistment.

The Department gave instruction in automotive vehicles,

guns and carriages, ammunition and explosives, machine guns,

and sighting and aiming devices. In each subject, a background

was laid by one or more lectures on development of the machine,

how well it served its purposes, and future employment. Other

lectures followed, accompanied by demonstrations, and in turn

followed by practical work. In field artillery combat weapons and

ammunition, the lecture and demonetrat.on method was the basic

form ..)f the instruction. Instruction was given on the three types

of 75-mm guns, the 155-mm howitzer, the 155-mm gun GPF, the

Vickers mountain gun, the 8-inch and 240-mm howitzers, and the

heavy machine gun, caliber . 30. The enlisted courses covered in

detail the construction, operation, and efficient maintenance of all

materiel issued to the Field Artillery, such as motor vehicles, the

French 75-mm gun, the 155-mm howitzer, except fire control and

comnmunications equipment. Instruction in machine shop practice

including p.actical wo k, was also given.

102

..

A"I.
During the school year, two mechanics and two assistant

mechanics working under the truckmaster made minor repairs and

adjustment*. When the Battery Officers course was studying motors,

thus putting an extra strain on the auto shop facilities and personnel,

these four made all repairs necessary to keep academic division

transportation in running order. Monthly inspections were given by

one mechanic who went over a different vehicle every day, thus

averaging 35 days between inspections for each vehicle. Routine

daily inspections were made by the chief of the section to which the

vehicle was assigned. During the summer months, the enlisted instructors gave a good general overhaul to all vehicles.

In 1929, General Pelham D. Glassford made an interesting

comparison of the Command and General Staff School, the Infantry

School, the Cavalry School, and the Field Artillery Schcol, showing

the attitudes of the several schools on the relative weight given to

classroom and field instruction. For the Advanced course at the

Field Artillery School, 4Z. 5•% of the time was spent outdoors as

against 43. 8% for the Iniantry School, this despite the highly technical nature of the artillery arm. The Command and General Staff

School spent 14% of the time outdoors the first year, and .11% the

second. In courses for officers of company or comparable grade,

the percentages of outdoor instruction were: Infantry School, 61, 4%61

Field Artillery School, 56. 6%; Cavalry School, 38.0%. in courses

for civilian components, the Field Artillery School took the lead in

the courses for field officers, and was second in those for officers

of company or comparable grade.

It should be emphasized again that the Field Artillery instruc.,

tion was well-geared to warfare of the thirties and forties, Both

Battery Officers and Advanced Officers courses received instruction

in air adjustment of artillery fire and in preparation of fire from

aerial photos. In I'Z4-19Z5, "practically all" of the battery officers

at the School fired at moving targets. Forward observer radio sets

were in use as early as 1923-19Z4. National Guard and Reserve

officers in the field exercises usually held the roles that would be

theirs in their home organizations. An economy move in 1927-1928,

the substitutiorz of 37-mm subcaliber ammunition on a round for

round basis for a large percentage of the School's ammunition allotment handicapped instructions for far more rounds were required for

each adjustment of fire, thus cutting down the number of problems

that could be fired.

103

SO..

4.,
T

The Horse and Transportation Shows

One of the most colorful events of the school year was the

annual Horse Show, ordinarily held in the spring and first held

in 1923, The site was first the horse show ring, which was south

of the present Officer's Club, and just about where the tennis

courts are. Later it was put on in Rucker Park, north of the

present hospital. The show took the better part of three or four

days. Judges included some of the outstanding local horseman and

civilian and military enthusiasts from other posts. The show

differed from the ordinary horse show in that many events of

strictly military character were introduced. Thus, in 1929,

there was a competition between troopers' mounts, for enlisted

men only. There were events for artillery horses and officers'

chargers, Jumping events were set aside for officers' jumpers,

school troops' officers' jumpers, enlisted men's jumpers, and,

remount jumpers for the Advanced Class in Horsemanship only.

Cups were offered to stimulate interest in features of a rtiilitary

character. The Commandant's Cup was offered to members of

the Battery Officers' Class riding government mounts, the American ' I

Remount Association Cup was open to the Battery Officers Class only,

for remount training, and the Pierre Lorillard Cup was given to a

member of the Advanced Class in Horsemanship for *rpmount training.

Beside the cups mentioned above, others were offered yearly by

Maj Gen Baird Markham and John McEntee Bowman.

The Transportation Show, a strictly military version of the

Horse Show, was held yearly, either in the spring or fall, as a

scheduled part of the curriculum. It served to demonstrate the

highest standard of condition and appearance of personnel and

equipment, to demonstrate the standards that could be obtained

with issue equipment, and to arouse interest in maintenance. Sometimes two weeks or more would be spent in cleaning individual har.. I,

ness. Gun wheels would be sandpapered before repainting, and

rough metal castings would be carefully smoothed. Some equipment

was saved for the event and not used for the rest of the year, one

organization going to the length of saving an especially shiny and

well-maintained escort wagon Just for the show. Between shows

it was carefully lifted into the eaves of a building, where moth and

rust could not corrupt, nor inspectors break in and make unkind .1 "I

comment.

The competition eventually became so cutthroat that byl 930

the unit commanders had to certify that all work was done by enlisted

personnel using issue supplies, except paint for insignia and engine

blocks, and that the vehicles and animals were those regularly issued.

104
Also that no shoe polish was used on the harness. Events in tho

motor drawn class were: trucks, artillery reel and cart, "20"

tractor; trailer kitchen, etc.; and in the horse-drawn class: draft

test, 6-horse teams; battery reel, 4-horse teams; gun sectinn;

escort wagon, etc. Perhaps the most spectacular event was the

figure eights through narrow staked spaces that horse-drawn reels

and gun sections would execute at the trot or gallop.

The F'ield Artillery School Horse Show Team participated as

such in local shows &nd in shows in neighboring cities. Its members

were trained in the arts of Jumping, cross-country riding, and the

higher eqaitation to Include whatever was needed to prepare a horse

for the three-day event at the Olympic Games, the idea being that

by competing with the best talent in the world, these men would

develop into excellent instructors for the horse-drawn units of the

artillery. Only competition would reveal in peacetime whether the

School's mrethods of training and conditioning wore sound. Members

of the team in 1928-1929 were: Major C. P. "Toddy" George, ist

FA (in charge);, Capt J. J. Waters, lt FA; Capt N. 1. McMahon, lot FA; Capt W. H. Colbern, lot FA; and lot Lt Z. Y, Argo, 1o8t FA.

George and Argo were members of the 1928 Olympic team. Members

of the School team Joined in the Syracuse, National, and Toronto

shows as members of the Army team. As the School team, they took

75% of-the priszs at the November and February Shows at Oklahoma

City.

The Summer Training Program

A good portion of the School's resources were devoted annually

to the training of the National Guard, Lhe ROTC, the CMTC, and the

Organized Reserves in their summer encampments. This was in

addition to the preparation of correspondence work for those groups.

Adequate assistance wall not given until the School had begun the

common type of school year, leaving its summers free. A memorandum from General S;%w's office, issued during the 1922-19Z3

school year, suggested his wish then to have "All officers of Field

Artillery.... 

some form of employed 

instruction during duty 

the 

in connection 

summer months 

with the 

every 

civilian year 

comin F

ponents of the Armnr, for all Regular Field Artillery troops will be

so employed. 1 It was always necessary to reconcile that sentence

with the fact that for the School, the summer months were the only

ones in which leave could be granted, equipment repaired, and troops

refreshed and retrained for the demands of the coming school year.

During the summer of 1923, the School troops furnished a battalion

of infantry, two batteries, and some 80 men for cooks, mess sergeants,

orderlies, and instructors for the summer camps. There were in

105

: 1%
I,

addition constant calls on the School for motor transportation. The

band of the let Field Artillery was practically turned over to the

National Guard for the summer.

In the su'mmar of 1924, the School did succeed in concentrating its attention on its problems, but from 1925 on the civilian

components were a summer responsibility of the School. Thus, in

1 925, the 203d and 206th Coast Artillery (AA) wer.e trained at Fort

Sill, for the cost of sending them to the sea coast had been found

prohibitive. Three groups of Reserve officers, totaling 75 men,

were also present at various times. Despite technical difficulties,

thn camp was regardied as successful, and was held agiain in 1 926.

As foi demands on the Schoo~t troops, in 1928, for example, the

* School furnished one battery each to the ROTC and CMTC as long

as their camps lastid,

Methods ofOra&n

Practical and theoretical work was graded independently,

Each department built a marking scale for each type of problem

it gave, the scale being based on 100 points and fixing within

narrow limits the cuts a student would get for errors committed.

It was objective in nature. All problems or exercises were so

marked but the student would be told only that the work was satisfactory or unsatisfactory although points missed would be brought

to his attention. Sixty-five per cent was satisfactory. At the end

of a course students were not graded as first, second, etc., but as

"Satisfactory"o',r"Unsatisfactory. 1 ,A student satisfactory in every

subject received a diploma and a certificate with proper notations

as to his ability to instruct in each course. A student rated as uinsatisfactory in one or more subjects would get a certificate showing

his rating as satisfactory or unsatisfactory in each subject and his

qualifications as instructor in any particular subject. The student's

safeguard was that even if a department marked him as unsatisfactory,

his proficiency in the finil analysis would be determined by tht faculty

board on the basis of whether he would be an asset to the Field Artillery.

The School's Role in Formulating Artillery Doctrine

June 25, 1928, the Chief's office wrote to the School that two

Renault tanks were being shipped to Fort Sill from Fort Leonard Wood

Mix- for use as targets or as otherwise desired. They were used as targets,

but the Chief thought the results inconclusive. In 1930 the War Department called on the Chief's office for data to support the claim that the

Field Artillery could deal with tanks. The Chief's office asked the

Field Artillery School to supply the data.

106 j -!
i0

At this time, the School had no data on firing against the fast

tanks then being built. The old Renaults plodded along at 3 miles per

hour;, the pace of the infantry they had been built to escort in the

role of armored, self-propelled guns that French doctrine had envisaged. However, there were three railway targets on the reservation which could be used es "fast tanks. " One was on the south slope

of Mt. Hinds, one was south of Arrow Ridge in the eastern part of

the reservation, and the third was in the Punchbowl just north of

Medicine Bluffs. This last was operated by truck and cable, the

others by gravity. To get data, the School undertook to have each

member of the Battery Officers' Course fire three problems against

these moving targets, and each member of the Advanced Class two.

SThree Methods were tentatively developed. In the first, the

officer conducting fire announced appropriaLw corrections., In the

second method, mthe -gunner kept his settings the same, but led- or

trailed the target by the amount his shots were leading or trailing.

In the last, he corrected by putting the center hair on the place

where his last shell burst,

The above),is an example of the steps in the formulation of

doctrinet, the reqkiest foW a solution, the stating of-a hypothesis, and

the use of current claises to test the hypothesis. The School's role

is obvious. It is interesting to note also that in testing the hypothesis,

the School students received the best current instruction on the manner

o0 meeting the problem.

Organisation and R elated Matters.

How was the machine constructed that presented instruction,

undertook research, and published volumes of materials? At this

stage in its development, the Field Artillery School had come almost

to be a small university. How?

The activities of the Field Artillery School fell into four

groupings: the Commandant, his aides, and staff; the academic

division under the Assistant Commandant which comprised all

activities connected directly with the instruction, discipline, and

administration of the students; the School troops division made up

of all combat troops permaniently stationed on the post; the services

(adjutant, quartermaster, ordnance, chaplain, etc.) whose heads

formed the administrative staff.

* The Commandant at this time (19Z8-1930) was Brig Gen

Dwight E. Aultman. The general was a graduate of the Academy,

class of '94. He was a field soldier who had fought at San Juan Hill

107
and in France and had received the Croix do Guerre with Palm and

the Distinguished Service MAedal. He had also been an instructor at

Leavenworth and the War College. His staff consisted of the Assistant. Commandant, then Lt Col William P. Ennis, the Secretary, the

Assistant Secretary, the Commanding officers of the Colored and the

White Detachments, the Supply Officer, the Range Officer, and the

commanding officer of the 3d Ammunition Train (motor transportation).

The faculty was organized into four departments: Tactics,

with a director and 18 instructore; Gunnery, a director anc 1I Iinstructors; Materiel, a director and two instructors; Animal rransport, a director and six instructors. The allowance of instructors

was based on those required for the Command and General Staff

School, a sore point with the School authorities, who felt there was

no similarity between the two. They did not want to have more than

Z0 students to an instructor at a firing point, and on problems in the

reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position, felt they

needed 3 instructors for every 6 students. These were problems

not faced by Leavenworth, which had others peculiar to it.

The faculty with the Commandant's staff formed two boards,

the Faculty Board and the Academic Board. The Faculty Board included the Commandant, the Assistant Commandant, the sentor

instructors in the four departments, and the senior membe r of the

Correspondence Course section. This board advised the Commandant on all matters pertaining to instruction, but the final decision

was his. The Academic Board consisted of theCommandant, the

Assistant Commandant, the senior instructor of the four departments, the Secretary. It determined all nAtters relative to the -t

standing, rating or classification, and proficiency or deficiency of

students. A majority action of the board was subject only to War

Department review.

The functions of the faculty itself extended to many fields

beyond instruction. They prepared the correspondence courses*,

reviewed the tactical inspections of Field Artillery made by Corps

Area commanders, reviewed and revised field artillery training

regulations, published the Field Artillery Bulletin, tested and reported on various types of materiel as requested by the Chief,

. answered various questions submitted by the Chief, and corresponded with all service schools, with the Command and Oeneral

Staff School, and with the Field Artillery Board.

As for the duties of the memberb of the staff, the Secrstary

and the Assistant Secretary were veritable Pooh-Bah's. The former

was Mess Officer; Library Officer; supervisor of motor transportation;

108

4

" ,- -. i " lu
supe rvis;qr:of the routine, ouatneso administration of the Academic

Division, of academic records, .ndof. the preparation of weekly

schedules, and, in addition, was responsible, for the assignment

of firing ranges. The Assistant Secretary was in charge of the

receptiop, housing,.; And .parture of all stud4nts,. and was responsible, foptho Reprodiction Department, print shop, bindery, photographic studio, 4rafUtng room, nimeo .room,. lithographic section,

and, in addition to his other duties, was personnel adjutant of the,

Academic Division.

The Field Artillery School Library, as indicated above,

wh- !.:,der the Secretary. In direct charge of the library, from its

founding to 1944, was Master Sergeant Morris Swett, USA-Ret. In

the years 1922-19Z9, Sgt Swett built up the library from 18,068

volqmes to appro xniataly 34, O00.- The •iroculatio,in that period 4

rose from about _3,000 to *bout 43,1000.. : U 1:924-19.25, fire.destroyed

some 5, 000 volumes, ;some. of which were replaced by the generosity

of the--othex W04oery ,0 1. - Thm. library.bouaght its books through

the Book Department at substantlaI savings, and had its own bindery

which was useful not only. in the preservation of books but in preserving A

the many documez~ts the School *ccumialated.

The library was often enriched by books bequeathed by office,r@

and enlisted men. Formerly, the interested and expert soldier had to

acchmulate his own military library, for the system of training literature was not complete, and the libraries of the service schools, when

existing, were not impressive. Consequently, many individuals built

libraries of great professional and literary value, from which the

School in time benefited.

The adjutant's office was organized as a service of the School

September 5, 1924. It was charged with the issuance of all orders,

and the preservation of all orders, except those pertaining exclusively

to the interior adminisitration of a department or service. It also

acted as a stenographlc pool, trading stenographers back and forth

with the other services. Personnel included the adjutant, his

assistant, and 10 enristed men (1925) who were detailed on special

duty from organizati.ons at the Post. Each of them had specific

duties assigned in aiditlon to those usually coming under his general

designation. Thus t'ae sterographer recorded, cross-indexed, and

announced in orders the assignment and termination of noncomrmeisioned

officers' quarters.

;• . The personnel adjutant, acted as such for Post headquarters,

the Field Artillery School, the various Ordnance and Quartermaster

companies, and the casual detachment. He was in charge of the

109

th Fel heacedassuh Atil:ryScoo, orPot eaqurtr
orders section, all correspondence on enlisted men, miscellaneous

reports, and of supervising and checking the reports and records 'of

Reserve officers reporting to the Post for active duty.

The White and Colored Detachments had a total strength of

300 men and were commanded by instructors from the Depattments

of Tactics and Animal Transport respectively. The majority of the

White Detachment were instructors, ausistant instructors, and

technicia•s in the different activities of the Academic Division; the

Colored Detachment took care of Animal Transport activities, such

as the Horse Show Team, stables, etc., provided maintenance men

for the barracks and mesa halls, and for the school buildings. Promotions were sl•w in the Colored Detachment bicause of the low

turnover. Men~tended to re-enlist, and htoncommissioned'officers

stayed in the Army until they had reached the retirement age. Many

of the detachment were excellent 'riders, and the trophy case of

their barracks was filled with ribbons won not'only at theMPoit shows,

but at show:% and fairs innearby communities. One of the unofficial

activities of the detachment was the mounted escort, Which was

drilled as cavalry and would turn out for great' occasions onthe Post.

The detachment was largely recruited 'by the efforts of'the men tfiemselves who would persuade friends and neighbors to join, (Account

of'Master Sergeant James C. Johnson.)

The White Detachment took an active part in Post athletic

events, winning the YMCA trick meet in 1925-1926 and in that same

year the Post football championship (for the second year). To .

supplement their rations, and aid in taking care of the enlisted

specialist students who were attached for rations and quartbrs, the

men operated a I10-acre pig farm, with 109 acres of corn, alfalfa, '

and green vegetables. In one winter, 17, 400 pounds of pork was produced. The living quarters were very poor, were heated by '+!

stoves, and had Inadequate sanitary facilities. The suspension of

recruiting caused the detachment to drop in strength in 1926-1927,

and it was sometimes necessary to borrow men from the School

troops, despite the many demands on the latter.

The range detail, 46 men under a master sergeant (1926),

was divided into the 'ange detail proper, and the communication

detail. The former took care of targets, building and repairing

observation posts, gun emplacements, dugouts, roads, and bridges.

The cornrmunication detail built and maintained the network of range

telephone lines. The range detail, as a whole, supplied range

guards. and also did general construction work on the Post. In

summer, it helped the civilian components in outlining safety measures,

instructing range officers and range guards, and in keeping communications open with the range guards.

110

.....'.--,
Correspondence course activity in December 1.929 attained

the dignity of autonomous status when General Aultman took it

from the Academic Division and placed it directly under himself.

This did not, of course, operate to reduce the work of the Academic

Division, since all courses continued to be either written or 'reviewed

by it. However, this did not meat with the full approval of the Chief,

and in the following year the section returned whence it came.

It was in that same year, 1929, that the subject of survey,

then called orientation, was transferred from the Department o(

Tactics to the Department of Gunnery.

The planning of the yearly schedules was, done by the Assistant

Commandant and the Departmnents. of Ounne ry and Tactics when the

course involved the work of more than one department, e. g., the

Advanced Caursel and by the Assistant Commandant and the depart.

ment in question when only one department was involved, e. ad , one

of the officer specialist courses. For courses of the first type, the

Assistant, Commandant would send around a calendar showing the

hours per woek set aside for.instrwction,- and the total number of hou rs

available to each department that year, The directors of the various

departments would then submit to the Departnent of Gunnery (for the

Officers Advanced Course) an appropriate distribution of departmental

time per subject, the sequence of periods for each subject and the

hours for each period, and special requirements with respect to troops

and areas, The department charged with the preparation of the schedule would combine the wishes of the four departments, and then submit it to tho Assistant Commandant, who would coordinate the various .

courses. In the case of specialist courses, the department concerned

would follow the same process but deal directly with the Assistant

Commandant.

Previously mentioned was the so called "exempted" status of

the School and of the differences of opinion which sometimes existed

because of the twilight zone of authority in which the bounds of power

were obscure. In the school year 1928-1929, discussion arose over

the assumption of court martial Jurisdiction by the 8th Corps Area,

and over its demands oa the School for troops for the summer camp

and for various details during the school year. In November 1928,

a demand was made on the School for cooks and bakers, and the Corn- '

mandant, General Aultman, felt obliged to point out that the School

troops were already so far understrength that batteries were firing

with only two and three gun sections instead of the normal four.

Because of the never-ending problems, demonstrations, and service

practice, School troopsa ha a far heavier load here than at ordinary
- - ..- . -- --..... -L

garrisons, so that taking men away during the school year put a

still heavier burden on those who were left.

That same winter an attempt was made to lighten the burden

on the School caused by the yearly sumrme r camps. In the summer

of 1928 school troops had given 967 man-days to the ROTC, 269

man-days to the CMTC, and 79 man-days to the reserve officers,

as against only one battery in 196. However, nothing came of

the attempt.

These practices by 8th Corps Area must not be regarded

as a jockeying for position, or an attempt to hoard men on the

one hand and eixtend authority on the other. The Corps Areas

had a very. real problem in training civilian components, and did

their utmost to solve it.. Indeed, they would have been ngellgent

had they not, On the other hand, the report of the Inspector Genoral, March, 1928, states that demands upon school troops were

"unusually severe. " The assumption of court-martial Jurisdiction

war made in the spring of 19Z8, Here General Aultman felt there

would be no conflict in practice, and in the interest of cooperation

and good feeling, no issue was raised in the matter by the Chief's

office.

The policy under which studmnts were sent to the School

from the Regular Army, as laid dow'n December 6, 1929 was as

follows. 'On appointment, officers wore to be assigned to their

units for three years, where they would receiveltheir basic training.

The Battery Officers' Course was to be taken as soon as possible [ ~after this three-year period, On completion of that course, followed

by a period on other duty, or after the completion of 11 years doty,

the Advanced Course was to be taken, Courses were to be completed

before the student could be assigned other duty. Until 97% of the

officers of a branch or arm, except the Air Service, of more than

three years service and less than 50 years old, had had a one year

course at their school, the total of the arm's school quota would

be 8% of its actual commissioned strength. The age limits for

admission to the Battery Officers' Course were made the same as

those for the Command and Oeneral Staff School. Otherwise than

in exceptional cases, the limit for the Advanced Course was 50,

An officer with II years or more years active service need not

have taken the Battery Officers' Course to be eligible for the Advanced,

but an officer who had taken the former should have had at least

three years of other duty.

It was noted in 1928 that entering students showed many

deficiencies in knowledge and background. Their knowledge of

112 'A"

ol
field service was poor, andmnytdid not. know how to care for

themselves and their animals in the field. Concealment was never

attempted, and-speed rarely stressed. They were weak in both

tactical knowledge of handling batteries, and battalions and in the

use of the details, and: the mounted drUl of the batte ry was new to

many.

Some discussion arose in 1926 as to whether National Guard

and Reserve Officers should be given diplomas or certificates.

The Commandant, then General Irwin# had proposed that diplomas

be given National Guard and Reserve officers on their successfully completing a course at the School, in place of the certificates

of proficiency usually awarded. General Snow, then Chief, feared

there -might, be confusion between this document, 'whichwould actually

mean no more than the old, and-the diploma that was given to Regulars,

leading these officers who had taken the shorter course to misunderstand the nature, of the course they had completed.. -

The last of the organizational matters to be mentioned, that

of designingthe rield Artillery School!' coat ofiarms, is of more

general interest. The subject was raised as early as December 1924

by an officer of the General, Staff charged with providing heraldic

bearings for army organimations. In March of 1925, some designs

were submitted by Capt Lewis E. R•egnier, a student at the School

whose hobby was heraldry. They included a cross-bow, one caanon•

three cannon, and a profile of the cannon that has become so familiar,

with the crest and ar.n in armor grasping three thunderbolti. The

Chief's office took the barrel of our familiar caimon, and displayed

the top view. The arm with the bolts was made that of Saint Barbara,

patron Saint of artillerymen, the Chiefts office reje~ctinr the suggestion

that the Saint grasp a table of logarithms. The design was then

submitted to the General Staff's heraldic expert. He disapproved very

strongly of the suggested design and particularly of the cannon used.

That an officer from another branch should tell the artillery what

sort of gun it should have in its School crest, and a very junior officer

at that, brought correspondence from the School whose tenor can be

imagined. Nevertheless, with patient guile, Major Edward P. King,

then in the Chief's office, waited a few weeks until the offender was

transferred from Washington, and then re-submitted the design. It

was approved bythe Adjutant Genesal's office, April 8, 1926. We

might note in passing that a shoulder patch was also suggested, the

familiar profile of Signal Mountain and its blockhouse on a contrasting

field.

113
Houses and Firebug.

During these years the School was harassed and bedeviled

by a housing situation that almost drove the School from Fort Sill.

To begin with, the physical plant was intrinsically poor. There

were the buildings erected in 1869 and 1870 by soldier labor, whose

design conformed to ideas of comfort and convenience proper for

the frontier of that era& There were the wartime emergency buildings of frame, tarpaper, and beaverboard, whose builders would

probably have scoffed at the notion that they would be doing yeornan

service 10 and 15 years later. There were the buildings of the New

Post, built in 1910 and 1911, good sturdy buildings, but far too few

for the needs of the Post. This in itself would have been a handicap,

though no more than.a nuisance and headache to the Assistant Secretary when classes arrived. But in addition, for several years the

Post was plagued by a gang of firebugs whose exploits seem unbelievable until one recalls what they fired: lumber, beaverboard, and

tarpaper.

Successive Commandants recognized the housing problem

and made the best .|,,issible use of their resources to alleviate the

situation. A comprehensive housing plan was drawn up in the school

year 1924-1925 to guide future efforts. A riding hall was built by

soldier labor, Fireproof buildings were built for records and fire

control instruments, Steam heat was installed to try to cut the fire

hazard, before its nature was realized. A fireproof annex was

built for the library, and a few bungalows were built for battery

officers.

But these efforts at self-improvement, laudable though

they were, did little to ease the aggravation of the housing situation r

coming from the fires that racked the Post from 1921 to 1929.

Between 1921 and 1926 there were no less than 19 fires at Fort

Sill of a nature serious enough to be mentioned in official correspondence. Among the losses were: the officers' quarters D-l,

plus three lesser fires in 1921; three fires in Snow Hall in 1922-1923;

the Old Post stables in December, 1924; the School library in August,

1924; the School motor shops in December 1924; the Service Club,

December 22, 1924; 106 officers quarters (seven buildings) June, 1925;

the million dollar ordnance warehouse fire, 1925-192b; the Officers'

Mess, June, 1926. The most spectacular of those were the destruction

of the ordnance warehouse and the 106 quarters, but all were very

serious fires, Given the prevailing high winds of Oklahoma, there

was always the chance that fire might get out of control and sweep

the whole of the School area. There was always that chan qe, ana that

was one of the sinister goals of the gang of firebugs who threatened to

destriy the School.

114
There had been su many fires from coal stoves, and the

buildings were of such inflammable character, that more or less

of a fire hazard was expected. Not until 1924, after the Library

fire, was the existance of a firebug suspected. Even then sonme

two years of detective work and the help of J. L. Fallon, an agent

of the Justice Department, were needed to locate the ring, which

was finally found to be centered in the Post Fire Department, some

of whose members were setting the firc:a for epccitement. The first

clu' to the identity of the ring came when one of its members,

assigned the job of burning an ordnance warehouse containing more

than 2, 000 hand grenades and 1, 500, 000 rounds of ammunition,

became frightened and gave the alarm after setting the fire. He

was unable to give a good explanation for his presence in the area,

and the breaking of the ring followed.. Thirteen enlistcc men pleaded

guilty in Federal District Court, in Lawton, Octoper 11, 1926, and

received sentences ranging from two to 32 years.. The men attempted

later to dig their way out of the jIail but the attempt was discovered

in time.

The destruction of the 1C6 quarters made it necessary for

many of the officers and their families to live in Lawton. A board

of officers was formed which, working with the Chambper of Commer ce,

had little trouble in finding accommodations for the 50 or more

families forced to move. Some difficulty occasionally iroso if there

were a number of junior officers in a class, for their rental allowance

* and pay would make it difficult for them to meet the cost of living

off the Post. There was, in addition, the added trouble and expense

of securing transportation between the Post and Lawton.

Discovery of the firebugs did not end the fire hazard, unfortunately. Quarters B-5 went up in smoke in 1927, and there were

two fires in B-6 that year. The warehouse in which officers furniture

was stored burned to the ground May, 19Z8; Hanger No. 4 at Post

Field followed suit, January, 1 9Z9, and on August 8. 1 9Z9. Snow

Hall burned to the ground. Most of the correspondence and records

stored in the building must have gone, for the files in the Administration building today do not go beyond August, 1929.

The acting Commandant, Col George P. Tyner, went to work

with great energy, and re-esta' :-.ijhed the School in three temporary

buildings which were to be knc i .•s the Academic Building, the

Faculty Building, and the heac - rters Building. The latter two •"• had been 24 sets of bachelor quarters. This used up the last reserve

of buildings, and left the School plant as: The Academic Building;

the Headquarters Building; the Faculty Building; the Library and its

annex; the Print shop; the book bindery; the instrument room; the film

115
room; the Materiel Building; the Motor Building; the three academic

garages; the blacksmith shop; the Animal Transport Building; the

horseshoeing shop; the stable guard house; the Riding Hall; two wagon

sheds; seven stables, the veterinary hospital; the carpenter and

paint shops; the storehouse; two target sheds; and the range communication shed. All students were put in Lawton on a rental basis,

since the bachelors also had to be moved off the post.

The Cruikshank Board

The series of fires at Fort Sill, culminating in the destruction

of Snow Hall and hence calling for a program of reconstruction,

cont~dbuted to the need for deciding whether the School was to be

located here permanently. For many years, Fort Bragg, N. C., ,hai

had its partisans, who did not neglect to urge its advantages as a site.

Paragraph 2, Special Order No. 4, War Department, 1930, appointed

Brig Gen William Cruikshank, Brig Gen Louis H. Bash, assistant

to the Quartermaster General, and Lt Col William Bryder., to report

on the most suitable permanent location for the Field Artillery School.

Besides Forts Sill and Bragg, the board considered Brady,

Texas, Jordan Narrows, Utah, and Camp Knobx, Ky. The last three

could be ruled out. The Utah reservation was too small, and it had

neither regular army troops nor permanent facilities. Brady,

Texas, had no reservation, no troops, no facilities. The Camp Knox

reservation was too small, chere were no permanent housing facilities,

and practically no range facilities, nor was its climate very good for

winter operations.

The board was then able to embark on a detailed study of the

two favorites. The climate at Fort Sill was warmer, drier, windier,

and sunnier; not comfortable, by any means, but still permitting outdoor instruction almost every day. Fort Bragg had a good deal more

rain, and about 30% more snow. The suitability of the terrain for

artillery instruction, as between the two posts, seemed a matter of

individual opinion. If it were extensively cleared of ttmber, the

terrain at Fort Bragg k,)uld probably have been better than that at

Fort Sill, the board thought, but it noted that the post there was not

in the center of the reservation, and that footing was not good off the

roads. Further, there was considerable haze and mist. Fort Bragg

was closer to centers of ptopulation, but their places of amusement

cost a good deal. It was diificult to tell which post was more popular

with enlisted men. For the three previous years, Fort Sill had had

more desertions, but also more re-enlistments.

116
I

In hop.sing facilities, despite the fires, Fort Sill had the

advantage, There were no quarters at S .rt Bragg for the battalion

of infantry; there were quarters for about 60 officers as against

I' I about 80 at Fort Sill; and the nearest town was 12 miles away.

Fort Sill had elaborate range equipment consisting of 300 miles

k of telephone wire, 4 miles of underground cable, 36 range guard

posts, Z2 concrete battery emplacements, 1 dugouts with overhead

cover, etc., all of which were lacking at Bragg. The water supply

at Fort Sill was poor, but on being told May 5 that locating the School

here depended largely upon an ample supply of good water, Lawton

voted a bond issue of $600, 000 to improve it. The BoLrd was moit

careful to wait until this had been done before it reached any decision.

Having considered all these things, the Board reasoned that

further construction at Fort Bragg would be necessary oefore the

School could be moved there, and that-there would be an inevitable

drop in efficiency for some months following the move. The advantages of Fort Bragg over Fort Sill, as advanced by the witnesses

who favored the move, were not such as to balance this in the judgement of the Board. Accordingly, Sec.'etary of War Patrick J. Hurley

approved the Board's report December 10, 1930, and Fort Sill became the permanent home of the School.

V 

(

I,,

41

117

.II
Graduates 1924-192..

COURSES

TOTALS

Regular Arm, 1924* 19Z5* 19Z6* 1927* 1928* 1929* Off EM

Battery Office rs 75 67 71 69 68 71 421

Advanced Ofiicers 33 25 27 24 29 27 165

Refresher Course 8 d 9 d I 3 d 5 a 26

Refresher Course ja Id 3 d I"L 6

for General Officers

Advanced Motors 5 6 10

Adv. Horsemanship 5 6 6 17

Enlisted Men 60 83 79 .71 76 97 466

National Guard &

Reserve Officers

Battery Officers 37 48 37 46 55 66 Z89

Field Officers 7** 6** 9 9 10 9 50

* All years denote the school year from September of the year

indicated to June of the following year. 4

*0 Only National Guard Officers in these years.

a--Course of 2 months duration.

c--Course of 5 months duration.

d--Course of 3 months duration.

e--Course of 6 months duration,

Bibliograph.

The Lawton Constitution, October, 1926.

Annual Reports, U.S. F. A. S., op. cit. supra.

Files of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, op. cit. supra.

Correspondence on Coat of Arms, The Field Artiller) School Library.

201 File, Maj Gen George LeRoy Irwin, Post Headquarters. Ft Sill, Okia.

201 File, Brig Gen Dwight E. Aultman, Post Headq,,..rters, Ft Sill, Okla.

Nlorse Show Programs, the Department of Anina,.', Transport, Field

Artillery School.

"tiThe Transporta Lion Show," Thesis, 2d Lt D. F. Brown, F. A.,

Field Artillery School Library.

118 .. ,. II8
"CHAPTER NINE

A NEW, CHOOL IN A NEW ARMY .,: -

The Plans

During the year 1930-1931 the Chief's office prepared an

economic survey of the School which serves &s a good starting

point for the story of its rebuilding in the years 1931-1935. The

initial costs of the buildings then used by the Sc.n, J., the class

rooms and administration buildings, the officers' and noncommissioned officers' qugrte:se,: the barracks, stables, ard storage

sheds, was set at $755, 067. 00, as against the $950, 000 of 1919.

The difference undoubtedly reflects the great fires, and, perhaps,

a different statistical base. (The bass of 1930-1931.was -the initial

cost. In the case of the Old Post quarters, this base could not

be used, for they-had been almost aJlbuilt by soldier labor in

1870, and so were estimated at their current replacement cost.

The annual cost of utilities was about $35, 000. 00. The public

animals had cost $60,000.00 and their annual maintenance was

about $21,300.00. The several supply services furnished $656, 474.ZZ

worth of supplies annually, of which $634, 795.00 was for ammunition.

Pay and allowences of the staff, faculty, and enlisted detachments,

** plus civil service pay, plus funds for scientific and educational

equipment not items of issue, added to other annual charges, made

the total yearly expense of the School about $1, 154, 000. 00, of

which over half was charged to ammunition. Pay, allowances, and

transportation of students came to about $488, 000.00. However,

it must be noted that this type pay and allowances continued as long

an a man was in the Army regardless of whether he war in or out

of school. Hence, deducting those figures, the true annual cost of

the School was estimated at $714,041.00, broken down as fullows:

Civil seTvice pay $ ...7, 9Z0.00 0

Educational supplies 15, 385.00

Annual upkeep of public

animals for instructi•onal m

use ZI, 390.00

Repairs to school buildings,

light, wattpr, gas, etc. 34, 551,00

Ammunition 634, 795.00

$714. 041.00

119

I...

- ,.
The Inspector General, writing absout the School before the

Cruikshank Board had arrived at its decision, stated that officers'

living quarters were inadequate and caused hardship to officers,

especially lieutenants forced to live off the Post. Becauwe nf poor

transportation, these students were practically compelled to buy

automobiles, and such extra expense ate into their commutation

of subsistence and almost forced them into debt unless they had

outside incomes. He further felt that the expenditure of thousands

of dollars a year on the upkeep of outworn buildings was (alse

economy. His recommendation was that the construction of suitable

quarters be begun as soon as a permanent location of the School

was decided upon.

With the report of the Cruikshank board in, and approval

probably thought certain, another Board consisting of Col Charles

M. Bund6l, I st FA, Lt Col Lesl•y 4. McNair, Assistant Commandant,

Maj George M. Peck, Executive, and Maj John M. Mellom, Post

Quartermaster, were appointed to druw up a-hoosing program, The

Army and Navy Resistor, January 17, 1931, described this

$11, 000,000 program, whose major items were:

An admenistration building

Two artillery barracks on west side of New Post

Infantry barracks opposite the ball park

Medical detachment barracks

Mate rial building

Animal Transport building

Six stables

Nurses'k quarters

Veterinary hospital V

Sixty-bed addition to hospital

Officers' mess

Post gytynasium and theatre

Forty-three noncommissioned officers' quarters

Thirteen battery officers' quarters

Twmnty-nine field officers' quarters

Twenty-six apartments

Three bachelor officers' quarters

Laundry, bakery, warehouses, shops, etc.

This program was not conmpletely carried out; for example, no Post

gymnasium was built, and an old airplane hanger was used as the

gymnasium. However, on the whole this program guided subsequent

building efforts.

120
Effects of the Thirties: the New Deal, CCC, PWA

In 193Z, a limited amount was appropriated by Congress to

begin reconstruction of the Post. These funds were used to provide

for troops then in temporary quarters at Post Field. Barracks for

one battalion each of infantry and artillery and for two batteries of

artillery; five sets of battery officers' quarters; ten sets of noncommlssinned officers' quarters; three utility buildings; and quarters at

Post Field for Air Corps personnel were also provided. Shortly after

the iaiauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, an emergency public works

program was begun as one of his administration's measures to revive

tne nLtioral economy. On September 21, 1933, the War Department

announced that the Public Works Administration had allotted

$4, 392, 000,00 for Fort Sill.

This building program could not be nicely adjusted to the needs

of the academic year, for one of the main elements of the Roosevelt

plan was speed in putting these appropriations into circulation.

Accordingly the building of.a new Fort Sill was pushed energetically,

and the School adjusted itself to the program. During 1933 and 1934,

units were shifted from. building to building like pieces on a checkerboard. The stone barracks in the Old Poet, which had been occupied

by the Ammunition Train, the White, and the Colored Detachments,

were taken over for School use. The Ammunition Train went to Post

Field, The Colored Detachment went to its old wooden barracks

alongside the hospital, which had been used for the overflow from the

hospital. The patients were to be put in a building formerly occupied by Animal Transport. The Department of Materiel moved into a rebuilt-ordnance warehouse. The Communications Section of the Departmerit of Tactics went into a reconditioned building which was destroyed

later. School Headquarters was placed in the brick building later the

Post cafe, Despite all efforts, the quarters for married students could

not be finished in time for the usual opening of school in the fall of 1934,

so it was necessary to postpone the opening until October 8.

The Administration Building was completed in 1935, and with

that the School was fairly well settled in its new barracks, quarteroo,

and classrooms. The Motors Section of the Department of Materiel

moved near the railroad tracks at this time, the buildings given it

being old Motor Transport Corps sheds from the last war. Salvaged

lumber was used in their building. 1

1. Standing in one of the sheds, one can look up at the roof

(1944) and see the beams all rharred and blackened by one of the

disastrous fires of the 1920's,

121
The building program was only a part of the general impact of

the New Deal on the School, for it was called on to play a vital role in

the organization of the Civilian Conservation Corps in this area, This

activity took three forms. Fort Sill was used as a reception center

for incoming members of the CCC; nmmbers of the staff and faculty and

School troops officers were placed on duty with the Corps; and the Commandant was placed in control of 41 CCC companies in Oklahoma, Texas,

ColoradS, and Wyoming.

Preparations for the reception of the CCC began April 28, 1933,

and at first were handled almost entirely by the Ist Battalion of the

38th Infantry. By May 11 there were 650 CCC men here, by May 26

there were 2, 400, with more arriving at the rate of 400 a day. These

men were housed in the National Guard camp, known as the "concurrent

* camp area." Some 60% of the staff and faculty were released for duty

with the CCC, in addition to calls upon the School troops. This left

but two officers per battery, plus about 16 key men of the Academic

Division. It was not possible for the School to carry on its work while

so shorthanded, and so it closed May 22, 1933. By June 30, no less

than 7, 300 members of the CCC had passed through the reconditioning

process at the concurrent camp, well ahead of the deadline set by

Presidential order,

During the summer of 1933, it was feared that there might be

some trouble in opening the School in the fall unles most of the officers called away for CCC duty were returned. For the most part,

only those who had been actually carried as instructors were returned,

but a few extra men did come back. To supplement the number of

instructors aesigned as such, the School, in common with other service schools, had made use of School troops officers, and it was their

lack that was being felt. irhe responsibility for the administration and

discipline of the CCC companies lasted until April 25, 1935, when it

was taken from the Commandant and his staff and given to a headquarters in Oklahoma City.

.1

With the new Administration, which was defense minded and

convinced that governmental spending could start the stalled economic

machine, the field artillery was able to enter on a long range program

of technical improvement calling for more mobility, better gunnery,

better weapons, better communication, and better training. The

method used was that of taking full advantage of the latest developments

of American technology in all fields, from motors to pedagogy. The

first great step was the substitution of the motor for the horse as the

prime mover for the guns.

122 01
On November 9, 1931, the War Department approved the

organization of a truck-drawn battery, which was described to the

public in a press release the following April 16. The battery used

Ford trucks as its prime movers, the idea being that in an emergency,

prime movers could be secured from any automobile dealer on any

Main Street, The 75-mm guns were modified for high-speed towing

by pneumatic tires and new axles. Major General Harry 0. Bishop

was then Chief of Field Artillery, and w-s most active on behalf of

this project. It proved successful and, since the new Administration

was more defense minded than its predecessors, funds were forthcoming frum the Public Works program for the motorization of all

light artillery in the National Guard, March 23, 1933. The motorization policy for the Beguar Army was announced the following December.

Under it, all f(eld artillery in the Philippine and Hawaiian departments,

one half of the divisional 75-mm batteries in the Continental United

States, one battalion of 75-rrm guns in the mechanized cavalry brigade,

all medium and heavy field artillery units, and the field trains of

horse-drawn, horse, and pack artillery units were to be motorioed.

Having these changes in mind, in August 19 33, the Chief of Field

Artillery requested the School to alter its courses so that officers of

the civilian components would receive the utmost instruction. in truckdrawn artillery. On August 23, the Commandant replied that It had been

done.

The Commandant then was General Cruikshank, whose board I

had recommended that Fort 5ill be the permanent home of the School,

He became Comma..dant February 8, 1930, succeeding General Aultman, who had succumbed to ill health. General Cruikshank was

another West Pointer, of the class of 193. He had twice returned to

him Alma Mater as an instructor in mathematics, had fought in Cuba

and in France, winning the Distinguished Service Medal and the Legion

of Honor. After the war, General Cruikihank was assigned to the

operations division (G-3) of the General Staff, following this by three

years in Panama, after which he became Commandant.

Reorganization of the Artillery; the School's Role

The motorization program was promptly followed by an increase and reorganization of the arm, effective December 1, 1934.

Within the Continental United States, all light battalions, with a few Sminor exceptions, were to have two active gun batteries and one

inactive battery. A considerable number of inactive units were reconstituted in order to form more battalions so that more officers

might have experience in command. Under this program, the lst

Field Artillery was to be completely motorized. The 18th Field

Artillery underwent considerable change: Battery C was inactivated,

123
while the regimental headquarters and headquarters battery, less

the band, the service battery, and the Zd Battalion, less Battery F,

were activated and stationed at Fort Bill. The field trains of the

18th and lIt were motorized. The Ist Battalion of the 77th Field

Artillery was activated at Fort Bill as a completely motorized unit.

The 4th Field Artillery Brigade headquarters and headquarters

battery was likewise activated at Fort Sill.

By July of 1935, 7,487 enlisted men were added to the field

artillery, making it possible to have nine cannoneers for each gun

section, a fifth section for each battery, and an assistant driver for

each vehicle. And, most important, it became possible to bring the

school troops to full war strength, After these changes, the status of

Lhe field artillery as of September 13, 1935, was as follows. There

were 44 gun or howitzer battalions and an even 100 firing batteries,

an observation battalion with hut one battery, and an ammunition

train. Of these firing batteries, 86 were divisional artillery, one was

corps artillery, and 13 were in OHQOreserve. Of the 100 firing

batteries, 41 were truck-drawn 75-mm gun batteries, (including two

mechanized batteries in GHQ reserve), 18 were 155-mm howitzer,

truck-drawn, and there were two batteries of motorised heavy artillary, All elements of brigade ammunition trains and service batteries

were motorized, so overall motorization was about 70%, more than

that of any other Great Power.

This picture of the organization and strength of the Field

Artillery was given by its new Chief, Upton Birnie, Jr., in an

address at the Army War College, September 13, 1935, Of the

status of doctrine, he had this to say,

"Through a development in our system of fire I :

direction, wherein the battalion commander through a

staff officer gives firing data direct to batteries, we

have made it possible to reduce the dead time between

designation of targets and fire for effect,... and at the

Field Artillery School . ., ncreasing insistence (is

being placed) upon the need of closer, more prompt,

and efficient support of the other arms .. and a demand

that our officers develop the ability to engage targets at

short and mid-ranges and to deliver prompt and acca- 7.

rate fire without. the utilization of accurate maps,

working away from the intricate technique of preparation of fire, and emphasis is being placed more and

more on simplicity , ,

124
An

Of these and kindrud developments, General Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, wrote in his Annual 14-port for the

fiscal year ending June 30, 1935:

"The present year definitely marks the

beginning of a long deferred resumption of military

preparation on a scale demanded by the most casual

regard for the nation's safety and security ,.. (1)t

(the War Department) frequently, between 1922 and

1935, expressed its conviction that in the conditions

then prevailing resided grave potentialities for diaaster.

The Field Artillery School did its part in supporting the new

mobility concept. May 5, 1933, the Chief's office ordered the School

to test an experimental battalion of light, truck-drawn field artillery.

In that same year, Battery A of the lat Field Artillery was given

modern, truck-drawn equipment, and it proceeded to make tests of

new traction devices, field kitchens, and methods of laying wire with

trucks . The Field Artillery School, meanwhile, proceeded with its

test of the light battalion, handing in its first report in September of

1935. This was not satisfactory and was returned for revision and

extension, which was completed October 14, 1935. The report concluded that motorization should continue gradually as engineering

defects were eliminated and an adequate supply of vehicles was assured. An for considerations o~f battle efficiency, experience in|

exercises had shown that the maneuverability of motorized artillery

in forward areas approiched that of horse-drawn artillery and exceeded

it in rear areas. There was little choice between them as to ease of

finding cover and concealment, but motori'ed artillery was less vulnerable and less liable to fatigue. Specifically, the School urged that combat trains, regimental headquarters batteries, the service batteries of

horse-drawn regiments, and ammunition train@ be motorized. Mainte.-

nance sections were recommended for both regiments and battalions.

As for maintenance practice, the report suggested that simple repairs

be taken from 3d echelon maintenance and assigned to operating units

when time and road space permitted. These conclusioni were the

result of tests made In general field exercises and carefully kept

records of all operating details, costs, and repairs.

Then as now, mobility meant maintenance problems. The

"'4 rxiotor maintenance system of 1931 was largely based on the Quartermaster Corps. First echelon was thcse repairs made by dri.,ing

personnel using the vehicle tool kit; second, repairs by battery

personnel, who were limited to preventive maintei.ance, inspections,

and assisting the first echelon. Third echeton repairs were made by

2 125

I'
divisional units of the Quartermaster Corps. The annual progress

report of the School for 1931 took mild exception to that by remarking

that such progress had been made in motor maintenance that the Field

Artillery could assume greater responsibilities. A report dated

October 31, 1931, was much more specific, stating that the Field

Artillery could easily make repairs that were the monopoly of the

Quartermaster Corps, that the latter immobilized vehicles for days

and months; and that the necessity of bringing vehicles to the Quartermaster for repair would result in a constant rearward motion during

combat.

This report proposed that the battery be the first echelon,

that the battalion (if independent, otherwise the regiment) be the

second, and that the two between them have adequate personnel to do

everything but complete overhaul., which meant breaking down and

reassembling the vehicle. Third echelon was to be brigade motor

oupply with no additional personnel, and fourth and fifth echelons

were left as before. The combat arms would be self-sustaining to

include all ordinary repairs, even major ones.

Studies by members of the Motors Section of the Department

of Materiel and by members of the Advanced Motors Class convinced

them that the Field Artillery should be allowed to make its own repairs

up the limit of its capabilities, and that it would be practicable, with

very little increase in overhead, for a battalion of field artillery to be !

practically self-sustaining for quite extended periods. Reflecting ,.

these attitudes, as well as the impression that the Quartermaster

could not be depended on, the Department of Materiel in 1 934 and

1935 was doing 3d, 4th, and .th echelon maintenance on vehicles of

the School troops and of the School itself. Parts were drawn from

the Quartermaster to do this work, and the School mechanics thought I,,

nothing of reconditioning a motor and issuing it to School troops in

exchange for another. This attitude was reflected in the purchase of .. I'

tools both by the School and by School troops. The tools desired were

not items of issue, so no objection was raised to their purchase by

battery and School funds (1931 et seq., account of Lt Rudolf Eppler).

With these studies aiud practical experience behind it, in

November 1934, the Field Artillery School suggested that the rather

confusing system of weekly and bi-weekly inspections prescribed at

that time, which involved no considerations of mileage, be discarded

for a 1000-mile or monthly inspection, whichever condition arose the

sooner. This was to include the corrcction of mechanical deficiencies,

lubrication, appearance, and adjustment, and must be considered a

direct step toward the practices of 1944.

126

*I
To gain practical experience in the field of doctrine, in 1935

the School was conducting experiments in the artillery support of an

advance guard during its deployed advance to and from successive

phase lines. Truck-drawn artillery moving cross-country under adverse

conditions of terrain and weather was repeatedly tested. The oeneral

Field Exercises afforded splendid opportunities for such work.

Tactical Concepts in the Thirties

Again in the field of doctrine, the Chief of Field Artillery in

1935 called on the School to assist him in commenting on the proposed

triangular (three regiment) division, a type devised for great mobility

and more ease of control. Lt Col Lloyd E. Jones, Lt Col Archibald V.

Arnold, Lt Col John E. Lewis, Major Rex W. Beasley, and Major

William H. Cureton were appointed a board, and reported December 6,

1935, the Commandant, Major General Henry W. Butner, concurring.

The report began with the assumption, popular then, that the future

Army would probably be confined to the North American continent.

The square division, they thought, was well adapted to a breakthrough,

if its flanks were secure on impenetrable obstacles, but it had no

strategic mobility. In recent experiments, all but rifle companies of

the division had been motorized, numerical strength cut, and weapons

of greater fire power supplied. The board accepted those principles,

and tried to find the means of giving the resulting division adequate

artillery support.

Assuming that only the 75-mm gun and the 155-mm howitzer

would be available for division artillery on the outbreak of war, the'

board tried to supply enough for the minimum needs of the division.

This it set at ý four-battery battalions (48 guns) of light artillery and

2 three-battery battalions (24 guns) of medium artillery. The tank

company would be taken from the division on the theory that "normal

tactical employment of tanks requires their concentration in irnpressiye numbers on favorable fronts. ' A reconnaissance group with

air observation, armored cars, and motorcycles was suggested.

There would be no organic antiaircraft. Earlier, in 1931, Major

Carlos Brewer, had strongly opposed mixing calilwus in the

battalion, as some then favored, on the grounds that the new method

of fire direction could not operate under those conditions and the

Board made no move in that direction. This board report, with its

emphasis on mobility ano adequate artillery support, and its conceptions of the use of armored units, was important; i t accurately indi- cated the trend of tactical thought at the Field Artillery School.

1. Memorandum of Lt Col L. E. Jones, Oct 30, 1935, File

353, FAS.

1Z7 ,
During the school year 1935-1936, a study was made of the

use of artillery in the tupport of, and defense against, wide envelopments, a prominent tactical feature of the Second World War.

In its concern for mobility and continuous support, the School

ventured to take exception to a War Department letter of April 1935,

which laid down that motorized artillery woul, proceed at two and one

half miles per hour when in a column with foot troops, and would hold

its accustomed place at the rear of the column, The rough draft of a

School letter to the Chief of Field Artillery, October 1935 (file 353

FAS) stated that paragraph 39Z b of the Field Artillery Field Manual

prescribed that the field artillery of the advance guard should advance

by bounds. The School had tested that method with its battalions of

infantry and concluded that it was the most efficient and economical

means of advance. The letter further urged that artillery with the

main body of the column also advance by bounds. This method was

especially necessary, the School felt, because the advance guard

was being taught to advance semi-deployed from one phase line

to another, rather than by the old columnar system of point, support,

advanced party, etc.

INew Developments

Its concern for the mobility of the Field Artillery did not lead

the School to neglect the various problems of gunnery. Antitank

firing was carefully studied, especially in the years 1930-193Z.

Experiments prior to 1930 had involved two condemned Renault tanks, !

cledd drawn by horse or limber, and railroad targets. There was

uncertainty as to the best gunnery methods, but it was agroed that shell wa& the only projectile, that telescopic sights web'e essential,

that fire 'should be direct and opened under 2, 000 yards, and that the

75-mm gun M1897 was not suitable for the mission. Serious study

began with the request for data from the Chie( of Field Artillery

mentioned in a previous chapter. In 1931 firing by the School contained a good deal of work on moving targets to develop the best

means of antitank gunnery, and data thus obtained was carefully

record-ed.

In February of that year, the School had two methods of antitank gunnery. In both, ranges to critical terrain features were determined and the deflection set at zero. In the first method, the battery

commander identified the target and commanded an appropriate deflOCtion shift appropriate to the speed of thea tank. The battery commander also ordered range changes of about 100 yards per four rounds,

assuming 12 rounds per minute. The gunner changed deflection by

spotting the burst with respect to a mark on the horizontal hair and

used that for the next round. In the second method, the battery commander ordered both range and deflection changes.

k.z

- * .
By September of 1931, three more practical mrithods had

developed. In the first, the battery commander identified the target

and announced the range. The anner tracked the target, estimating

the lead, using the appropriate mark on the horizontal scale, and

commanded "FIRE." The first burst was sensed with regard to the

horizontal scale and the target tracked with the graduation at which

the burst was sensed. The battery commander handled the range

throughout. When using the collimator sight, the gunner made

appropriate changes in the amount of his lead. In the second method.

the battery commander gave both range and deflection changes, -"ich

were set by cannoneers other than the gunner. The gunner simply

tracked the target and commanded "FIRE" when the gun was laid.

In the third method, the battery commander ordered deflection shilts,

and the range finder operator called out the ranges, tracking continuously. Method number Z above was adopted by the Chief's office

May 193Z. 1

In December 1931 the School gave its report to the Chief's

office on the year's antitank firing, in which the first method of those

hlisted above scored consistently better results than the second. There

were 52 problems with 37-mm ammunition and 46 with service aminunition. With the 37-mm, th- first method averaged . 85 hits per problem

as against . 64 with the second, and results with the third method were

comparable with the latter. Suggestions for a practical antitank weapon

were of interest. It was thought the gun should have a shell only powerful enough to put out a tank by a direct hit; high velocity, tracer projectiles; automatic fire; self-propelled mount, with the gun perhaps

removable; and all-around traverse. With such a weapon, the tank

could be driven from the battlefield, in the School's opinion.

General Birnie's remarks on the status of the Field Artillery

included some comments oui a new and greatly improved method ol

fire direction that had been developed at the School. During World

War I, there had been considerable dissatisfaction within the artil- "

lery at the support it had been able to give the attacking infantry,

and that dissatisfaction spurred postwar attempts to find a remedy.

Major Carlos Brewer, then head of the Gunnery Department, 1931,

concluded that part of the fault lay in the txisting method of massing

the fires of the battalion by descriptive reference to a terrain feature

or by giving the guessed-at coordinates of the target to the batteries

for them to plot. Brewer's idea was to use a firing chart on which a

base point was plotted with fair accuracy, battery positions located by

,, survey, and targets designated with reference to the base point by the

method used in aerial observation of fire.

* i. File 35?. 16 FAS.

IZ9 o. f
Targets were plotted as soon as the observer completed his adjustmeet, and the data telephoned to the batteries. The first dernonstration of this new method was held in the spring of 1931 and was fully

successful. To eliminate the triangle of error at the target caused

by differences in site, Major Orlando Ward, then head uf the

Gunnery Department, suggested that the batteriew register on the

base point and be plotted on the chart by their adjusted data. Using

an observed fire chart based on this method, it was possible in 1935

to mass the fires of a battalion on a target with great speed and

accuracy. far better than the results obtained in the First World War,

Interest in the development of better weapons for the Field

Artillery wam constant. In March and April 1930 the School was

called upon to test an experimental self-propelled Sun, a 75-mm

gun M1916 on a Mark VII mount. Comperirg it with the performance

in the same tests of a horse-drawn 75-mm gun M1897 and the 3-inch

gun M190Z, the School found its mobility fully equal to the horse-drawn

pieces, but its mechanical reliability low, with. the motor-constantly

overheating and actually losing pý%rts. The School's report concluded:

"", For the reasons stated above, the self-propelled mount tested is

unserviceable and.unsuitable as an accompanying gun or for any other

purpose. Nevertheless, the basic ideas embodied have much merit

and are entitled to further considmration.!. Further studies and the

building of other'models were urged.

Four 105-mm howitzers were issued to Battery F, lot FA,

for test in October, 1931. In the course of these tests the pieces

were moved B20 miles, fired 657 rounds&.- Again it was a case of

' ~the Schlool finding the model tested urisatisfactory,lt. but expreseing .

its faith in the basic idea. During these same years, the 4, 2-inch

chemical mortar was used as an experimental substitute for the

6-inch mortar of the last war.

One of the interesting projecta of 1931 was the development

of a truly "all-purpose' gun, which in the American army took the

form of a 90-mm gun-howitzer capable of antiaircraft missions.

Sketches in military journals of those years show divisional artillery of the future blasting away at enemy aircraft. The German

88-mm gun was surtewhat Like this in conception, but with one vital

difference, it was not a howitzer (a weapon of low muzsle velocity

that can lob shots over a hill). The School strongly opposed develop- h 4 merit of such a weapon, saying it would be more effective either as

gun or howitzer. The muzzle velocity of a piece with howitzer

characreristics would be too low for attacking aircraft, while the

computing equipment would be another load to carry. Further, it

pointed out that enemy aircraft on bombing missions would not be

apt to harass front line troops.

130
In June 1933 the Office of the Chief of Engineers submitted

for War Department approval its proposals for wartime mapmaking. This forbade instrumental work ahead of the front lines,

thus ruling out location by intersection, and did not provide the

1/20, 000 map which the Field Artillery was accustomsed to using

for fire control purposes. The School commented accordingly

to the Chief's office. During the next school year, 1933-1934,

more attention was paid to survey, to remedy the lack of this type

of map, but the 3chooi was not satisfied with this alone. In February, 1934, the Chief's office was requested to furnish data on

the role of the Engineers in mapping, which was nut clear, and

permission was requested for the School to puclish a text on survey.

In this text the following principles were to be laid down: location

of geodetic points by the Engineers; supply of air.photos by the

Air Corps; using these as bases, field artillery survey to insure

coordinated firing char$s and overlays about 24 hours after survey

* began.

I Approval of those principles came speedily from the Chief's office, which noted that the existing methods of Field Artillery

ourvey were based on the situation in the last war, when beautifully detailod maps of Northern France made it possible to locate

battery positions by short surveys. Present day operations in

poorly mapped country demanded survey methods, personnel, and

equipment with which the Field Artillery was not equipped. The

School was accordingly directed to begin the necessary studies of

the survey problem.

*0

The simplification of method began to receive increasing

emphusis after 1933. In an address by Maj Gen Henry W. Butner

to the Regular Class, October 8, 1934, it was stated that "The

tendency at the School today is to frame our instructional matter

for reserve officers newly commissioned to meet an emergency.

Simplicity in procedure is recognized as important... " New

regulations for the conduct of fire were prepared after TP 430-95 .

was issued, embodying many of the ideas of a Col Spaulding. These

led the student from akial fire to small-T, and from small-T to

large.

In the late twenties there was but one sound and flash ranging

battery in the United States, and detachments from it were sent to

the School to give demonstrations in the location of hostile artillery

by its sound and flash. In the 1931 demonstration, the equipmeni

was placed near the Horse Show Ring, where Butner Field and the

File 061, FAS.

4.1
tennis courts nor are (1944), and two bombs were exploded near

Signal mountain. These bomb bursts were located by the operators,

and a platoon of howitzers was registered on them later. By April,

1 932, sound-ranging equipment had been installed at the school,

and it was planned to train school personnel to operate it. During

the spring of 193Z, its operation was largely due to the cooperation

of Capt P. W. Allison, of the Advanced class, an expert uti sound

and flash work.

Work on better communication went forward side by side

with work on better mobility and improved gnrlery'. In 1933,

possibly influenced by the success of the ambulances that had

been converted into radio wagons, the Communications section

of the Department of Tactics modified the standard SCR - J61 for

use asa vehicular radio and supplied sets so modified to liaison

officers in general field exercises. Following this action, the

School suggested to the Chief's office that sets so modified be

made an item of issue. This the Chief could not approve for,

although he was most careful to urge continued experiment, it was

his policy that only standard equipment that would be available

in war should be issued. Communications practices in fire direction

were improved during the school year of 1933-1934 by adopting

special telephone procedure for the routing of fire mnissions and by

utilizing the commercial practice of uimplexing, which provided a

net with greater capacity. 'I

When the triangular division was under discussion ip 1935,

the su4gestion was made, as it.had been in 1.929, that all cbmmuni- 1

cations weithin the division be placed under the Signal Corps. The

6chs"I was asked to comment on this proposal since it related to

the artillary. A board comprising Lt Col Loyd .Z Jones, Lt Col

Archibald V. Arnold, and Maj A. C. Stanford was emphatic in

condemning it. They pointed out that communication was vital

to the success of the artillery mission. Should it fail, who would

be held responsible for the failure to give support, the Field Artillery, or the Signal Corps? Demands on communications details

were so varied that they could only be prepared for by training

with the other members of the artillery team. And they summed

it up by a quotation from Gen G. S. Gibbs, Chief Signal Officer

in 19Z8, to the effect that any communication system which operated

as a single system with all of its systems interconnected toust be

under single management.

132 I.

............................ ........................
Training Literature

.All of the advances in the three great functions of the Field

Artillery would be of little use unless the Regular Army and the

civilian components were trained in them. Of the enlisted men of

the Regular Army, of the civilian components of all grades, only a

minority could expect to pass through the Field Artillery School.

T'Vie majority had to depend uprin the training Literature prepared by

the Army, and so did officers who had been to school and desired to

keep abreast of their profession or whose turn to go to the School

was still years in the future.

The training literature system of 19Z9 had six parts. There

were the training regulations written for reference use by the instructed officer, They were prepared by.a section of the Field Artillery Board and revised by the Field Artillery School and the Chief of

Field Artillery. There were the texts prepared at the School for use

with extension courses (correspondence courses). There were the

texts used by the POTC, some of which were official, and some of

which were published by houses specializing in that work. There was

the Basic Fiele Manual, with matter common to all arms. There

were technical texts, such an the ordnance handbooks. Lastly, there

were the Field Artillery School Notes prepared for resident instruction but no doubt straying far and wide from the fort,

Lt Cal Lesley J. McNair became Assistant Commandant.

June 23, 1929, and held that post until June 30, 1933. As Assistant

Commandant he was in charge of instruction and seems to have

turned his attention to the problem of training literature soon after

his arrival for in 1929 he wrote many letters and reports on the

training literature situation. His suggestions included the following:

moving the training literature section of the Field Artillery Board to

"the Field Artillry Scyhol .and printing all Field Artillery lire rature

there; having only two classes of publications, a series of texts for

the civilian components and the new or student officer, and a Field

Artillery Manual written as a reference work for the experienced

officer. He then proceeded, during his four years at the School,

to try to carry out these reforms.

In February of 1930 the Adjutant General's office, in a

letter to the Chief of Field Artillery, surveyed the existing situation ane gave its views on what the ideal should be. The 1930

Oystem f training regulations was to be largely superseded by

field mai. ials. These manuals were to make available in condensed

form for ýeeady reference in the field approved principles, doctrines,

and methods and were also to be sufficiently comprehensive for

"133"j ' A

_ _ _.

_____n
garrison and school training. Technical regulation, and training

manuals were not expected to be superseded. The manuals of each

arm were to give all the Information needed by that arm for mobilization, training, and field service, except that gi-ven by the basic

field manuals, which were not to be duplicated.

Those views were unexceptionable, for no one could object

to the perfect field manual as outlined above, but when the manuscript 6f the new Field Artillery Field Manual was sent to the

School for comment, exception was taken to much of the new text

in an indorsement written by Lt Cul McNaii, July 2, 1930. He

noted that the training mission of the Army was broadened immensely

after the war and that it included troops in:being, classes of all

kinds at the Field Artillery School, extension course students, and

the ROTC. This mission could not be met by the manual sent to

the School. It was suitable only for troop training by the experiepeed

officer, thus did not meet the requirement of suitability for school

use. The text as a whole lacked clarity, simplicity, and uniformity.

Objection was taken, for example, to the rule that automobile

vehicles should be serviced Itby the numbers," Some of the manual's

comments on organization were better fitted for a volume on tactics.

In this correspondence, the argument was sometimes advanced

by the School that in its extension course texts it had the closest

existinrt approach to the ideal text for the civilian components and

the uninstructed officer. Those texts, as the name implied, were

written for use with the extension courses: they were an "extension"

of resident instruction. However, in 19301 the Chief of Field ArtI--

levy said that delay in the approval of certain training regulations

had made it necessary to issue special texts for extension courses.

These special texts were printed at the School, and a supply over

and above that needed for the extension courses was on sale at the

Book Department. The extension courses themselves were printed

by the Government Printing Office.

Recommendations to change this system were made by the 'I

School several times between 1930 and 1932. In 1930 it was suggested

that the literature section of the Field Artillery Board be moved to

the School. In 1931 it was recommended that the ROTC and extension

course texts be combined. When this was done, and the two merged

in the Field Artillery Book series, it was next recommended that

the Field Artillery Books be the only instructional texts for the

Field Artillery and that in its next revision, the Vield Artillery Field

Manual be made only a source of reference for the instructed officer.

I Sept. 27, file 300.7 PAS.

134
However, there was one drawback to School publications. Although

they were approveu by the Chief's office before publication, nevertheless, unorthodox, i. e., not yet approved methods, tended to

appear in them to the great confusion of officers in the field, who

would see one. method outlined in the Field Marual and yet another

in the latest text from the School.

Complaints to this effect influenced the Chief's office in

June 1932 to restate the relative status of the various texts. It

was prescribed that all field artillery literature would conform to

the Field Artillery Field Manual, though experiments should

continue and results be recorded. No changes except to correct

erroru were to be made to the Field Manual until July 1, 1934.

Until then all Field Artillery trainine literature would %onform to

the Manual,.

be TWo illustrations of how this policy affected the School might

be given. In.,the one case~new Tables of Urganization and new radio

equipment were received at the School neither of which were contemplated in the Field Man4al. A new Field.Artillery School Note,

ST-45 was written for temporary local use covering these matters,

and the School asked to whatextent the new equipment, new Tables

of Organization and new School Notes could be used in resident instruction. The Chief's office raised no objection but did make some

changes W, T-45. In the second case, it was discovered that TR 430-85,

the official gunnery text, prescribed no method of handling the sheaf

to compansate for staggered gun positions. Publication of a school

note covering this point was approved, provtding that it not be referred to, labeled, or considered as a change to TH 430485.

In February 1933 the special texts and the Field Artillery

Books were merged into one Field Artillery Book series of which

some were primarily for extension course use, 13 primarily for

the RqOTC, and six for use by the School and the eerA ce in general.

The Field Artillery School Notes, it was decided in November, 1934,.

would end as such and instead would become instructional memoranda

for instructpre conference&. They would be' available only to the

School and the Chief's office and would contain references to the 4

specific paragraphs of the official texts that were being explained. p.

The Field Artillery Field Manual was revised by theField

Artillery Board, under its president, Col Augustine McIntyre, and

submitted to the School for its comments in 1934. The Commandant

named a board for that purpose: Lt Col R. E. D. Hoyle, Lt Col

February 24, file 352. 9, FAS.

135 t.

I.
Carl A. Baehr, Maj Rex W. Beasley, Maj Orlando Ward, and Maj

J. E. Lewis, who submitted their report, January 11, 1935, They

outlined in detail a program of ftild artillery training literature,

and their program was approved. B~riefly, it called for the Field

Artillery Field Manual to be issued as a series of pocket else reference books containing doctrine, principles, and data in convenient

and condensed form, A detailed chapter by chapter outline was

given as part of one book. The Field Artillery Books of the 1934

series would be completed for use as instrurtional texts. These

and the Field Manual would be the entire Field Artillery training

literature for peace and war. The Fleld Artillery School was to

prepare all training literature except that on subjects with which

it was not closely concerned, e.g., pack artillery.

A letter from Maj Can Upton Birnie Jr., then Chief of

Field Artillery, to Col McIntyre, dated January 24, 1935, suggested

that the Field Artill'ery Board may have had rather similar ideas.

Indeed, he stated that in his opinion the School's suggestions conformed in general to the Board's ideas, but that he wanted their

opinion-before coming to a decision, Presumably their concurrence

came quickly, for his directive of March 7, 1935 provided that

except for calibers and weapons not at the Field Artillery School,

its Commandant was -charged with revision of the Field Artillery

Field Manual and all training literature supplementary thereto,

the task to be known as the Field Artillery Literature Project.

Revision of the former was to begin at once and continue until

completion, tentatively set at 1937. It was to have approved prin-.

ciples and doctrines in convenient and condensed form. Service of

the piece would be included, and, if need be, consideration would

be given to issuing it in two or more volumes. The rest of the report of the Field Artillery school board was also approved subject

to some minor changes, auch as not numbering chapters consecutively.

This new project was a clear-cut victory for the School and,

though he was no longer Assistant Commandant, it should be regarded

as a victory for the principles laid down by Col McNair five years or *1

more before. Henceforth the role of the School was to be an even

more important one, for now it was in real truth th. fountainhead

of Field Artillery doctrine.

About September 1934 the Chief of Field Artillery suggested

the establishment of a "Field Artillery Digest. " Its scope was to be

the tactics and technique of Field Artillery, but also it was to treat

new matters or those not fully covered in official literature. The

School, in an indorsement prepared by Maj Carlos S. Brewer, concurred, and the beginning of the Digest was ordered in November.

136

- *-., .* -,
It was to be a yearly publication to be distributed free to all 4egular

Army officers and at a nominal charge to Reserve and National Guard

officers. The firstoadition was to be submitted by the School for

approval about August 1935, and it was to appear the following month.

It was duly prepared. The first issue appearsd in October, 1935.

General Birnie was moved to write to General Butner, then Commandant, that the Digest had received many favorable comments.

Course Schedules

Prior to November, 1933 schedules were prepared, an

we have indicated before, very largely by the two Departments of

Gunnery and Tactics. November 28 a letter from Capt Frederick

H. Black, then Secretary to the Assistant Commandant suggested

the appointment of a board of three officers, one from Tactics,

one from Gunnery, and the secretary of the academic division to

prepare the Battery Officers, Advanced, and National Guard and

Reserve officer courses. On December 19 it was decided that a

board so organized would prepare the courses handled by two or

more departments.

Relationship of FAS to C&GS

The relationship of teachings at the Field Artillery School

to those at the Command and General Staff School, as the Chief

of Field Artillery wanted to see it in 1935, was something like this. i

a. The Field.Artillery School to keep in step

with the general tac.ical doctrine (reinforced brigade, division,

and corps) as taught at the Command and General Staff School and adapt its artillery instruction thoreto in conformity with

the Field Artillery Field Manual.

b. The Command and General Staff School, in

its artllery instruction, to adhere to the methods of artillery

employment taught at the Field Artillery School. 1

Comments on Instructional Methods

One aspect of certain FAS courses not covered previously

was the thesis requirement. Students in both the Battery Officer

and Advanced Class were required to prepare themse which counted

for 5% of their final grade. This requirement was begun by General

Snow in 1923. He had been disturbed by the lack of contributions

from the Field Artillery for service journals and wrote to General

Irwin, then Commandant, seeking his reactions to a requirement

137 .
that each student officer prepare an essay on some field artillery

subject at the end of his colirse. Irwin was in accord and suggested

a length of between 1, 5001 and 4. 000 words and with publication

of the moat suitable ones in the Field Artillery Journal. By 1930

the required thesis was to be 2, 000 to 5, 000 words long, its subject one of military nature or capable of military application to be

chosen by the student but approved by the Asbistant Commandant.

In it the student was to support or demolish his hypothesis by carefully marshalled data. In grading thesms, directors were to allow

20% for originality, 30% for supporting data, 30% for keenness

of analysis and logical presentation, and ZO% for the soundness

and completion of the conclusion. In the grading process, theses

were thoroughly analyzed, and their faults pointed out to the student.

Abs-nce of data supporting the conclusions advanced •as one of

the more common faults. Though these theses were to demonstrate

ability in research on the baccalaureate level, students were prone

to record their observations and opinions as self-evident conclusions.

The oetter theses were later submitted to the Field Artillery Journal

for publication. Because of the late opening of the School in 1934

the requirement of the thesis was suspended for that yeao only.

Teaching aids left something to be desired at that time. The

Department of Materiel used training aids in some form or other

j almost from its beginiiing, for example, a cutaway of a 1917 Packard

axle was used for years. In the late twenties and early thirties it

was necessary to borrow vehicles from Lawton au )mobile dealers

in order to demonstrate modern motor practice, Lhe Green Chevrolet

Company of Lawton lending the School a 193Z Chevrolet chassis in

January, 1933. School funds were alto used to purchase secondhand Ford and Chevrolet equipment. In 1932 the Department of

Materiel built a cutaway Buick with display material given by the

Buick people and a cutaway Buick frame salvaged from a bad fire

in Oklahoma City, The use of assemblies for training purposes

was begun before 1934 by Capt C. C. Brown (account of Master

Sergeant C. W. Carter) who put his assemblies under a protecting

sheet of glass together with a worksheet or information sheet. The

Armament section of the Department of Materiel had one cutaway

of the recoil mechanism of the 75-mm gun M1897 and a few charts,

nothing more. Its training aids were the guns themselves, and its

examinations were of the essay type. (Account of Lt Rudolf Eppler).

At least 50% of the work consisted of conferences.

This cohdition in the Department of Materiel led to an

illuminating exchange of correspondence between the School and

the Chief's office. In 1932 the School suorziitted a proposed school

text on materiel to the Chief's office for approval. This proposal

138

-1
drew in reply a criticism of the whole course in Materiel. The Chief

noted that the course devoted 4Z of its '70 hours to lectures. This

was very poor distribution, for in his opinion the course should have

been about 95% practical work. This letter was given the Assistant

Commandant, Lt Col Lesley J. McNair, for his comments. McNair

remarked that the course was too short for detailed study, that intensely practical work was more appropriate for a battery mechanics

class, and finally, that in work of this sort, the time spent on purely

mechanical tasks often far exceeded the instructional return. As

for the text itself, it was pointed out that it was a condensation of

some 2,000 pages of source material, a great aid to students.

The reply made by the Commandant, then General Cruikshank,

was accommodating in-spirit. Cruikshank said the purpose of the

text was to make it unnecessary to search through many manuals for

technical Information and that its approval would permit cutting lecture hours from 42 to 15. He added that the term lecture was misleading for the materiel was actually on display before the students

and was handled by them during the lecture, The intent of the School

was to give an undetstanding of the principles involved leaving it to

the student to acquire detailed familiarity after he went back to his

unit.

This reply did not fully satisfy the Chief, although the point

raised by the School on the desir-ability of compiling material

scattered through a number of manuals into one instructional text

was later accepted by the War Department. Under the Chief'& orders

the materiel course was thoroughly revised by cutting out lectures,

devotin .59 hours to practical work, 7 to conferences, and 4 to

examinations. Sights and ammunition received 20 hours and the rest

was devoted to guns and carriages. Still along the line of increased

practicality, the Chief objected to the undue stressing of probabilities. 'I

The use of coins, cards, and dice was to be confined to elementary

instruction.

The correspondence course revision which was completed in

1931 offered the Field Artillery a&complete method of instruction in

artillery. According to McNair, it was "the first time the achievements of the School could be used by everyone in the arm. " Practically all of it was based on texts printed at Fort Sill, no leas than ten

being prepared for this revision. The lessons themselves were

printed or mimeographed by the Adjutant General's Office, and the courses conducted by the Corp. Areas, but in 1932 the War Department ordered 21, 500 copies of extension couirses printed at the School,

In 1 935 the kit for one problem included: two small grid sheets; one

map of Fort Sill on the 1/62, 500 scale; one combined protractor and

field artillery plotting scale; a phnto mosaic; and five pieces of tracing

paper.

139
The scope of extension courses and the hours of credit allowed

were fixed by the War Department and not by the School. In theory

courses for the various arms were of approximately equal length and

completion of corresponding subcourses was supposed to bring officers of different arms to corresponding stage* of development. The

importance attached by the War Department to these courses is

shown by the fact that successful completion of a certain number of

courses was a prerequisite for promotion in the civilian components

Course Chawges

There were several changes in the coursed offered at the

School- -either from a desire to keep abreast of technical progress

or from economy-which resulted in consolidating the Battery Officer's

Advanced Courses into the Regular Course. In January193Z a letter

from Fort Sill to the Chief of Field Artillery remarked there were

only a-few technically qualified communications officers-in the arm

and no attempt war being made to remedy the need. The Battery

Officer's and Advanced Courses were not designed to prepare such

experts. The Chief's recommendation,. presented later, was to

allow more time for communications in:the Battery Officer's Course

or to have an advanced course in communications, preferably the

latter. A six months couree was suggested, to begin at a time that

would allow two months work before the enlisted specialists class

arrived and to be followed by four months with them,

On October 31, 1934, the School formally requested approval

to start such a course stating am its reason that the Signal School

course did not offer enough practical schooling in the problems of

smaller troop units. Approval was given in December. The course I,. was later criticised, in the fall of 1936, as being too short to

familiarise the uninitiated student with electricity and magnetism,

the fundamentals of both radio and telephone. Without such preliminary training, it was suggested, the student could not master radio

procedure and theory.

As a result of the creation of this course, the Advanced

Motors Course was cut to Z1 weeks so that there could be eight

officers in each course. There were to be no more than eight

officers at a time charged against the arm's quota for service

schools. Another class for motor mechanic. was instituted in the

school year 1934-1935 to meet the increased need for mechanics so

* that such courses were then being offered fall and spring.

140
Much of the burden of training National Guard units was

borne by some 62 sergeant instructors, National Guard regulations

prescribed that these men devote three months of every four-year

tour of duty to appropriate refresher training. The Chief of the

National Guard Bureau moved to put this provision ir. ) effect and

accordingly a sergeant instructor's course of three months, to include such subjects as might be required to refresh them in the

latest tactics and technique of field artillery, was approved by the

Adjutant General February 7, 1936. The School was requested by

the National Guard Bureau to report in detail on any sergeant instructor thought unqualified for his post as well as on each student's

knowledge of his arm and his general qualifications.

Consolidation of the Battery Officer's and Advanced Courses

was first mentioned in a letter of August 22, 1932, from Lt Col

]obert M. Danford of the Chief's office. Danford warned that the

arm's 1933-1934 quota for all service schools was being cut to 58

and suggested several expedients for meeting this situation such as

meirging the two officers classes, cutting their enrollment 50%,

shortening them, ox dropping the Advanced Course completely. Of

these proposals, the School felt that cutting the size of the classes

was the only solution, Although this would make for a seemingly

large overhead per student, still it was justly argued that the prod uctivity of the School was not to be judged by its output of students

alone but by its texts, its extension courses, its development of

doctrine, and its testing of materiel. There was strong opposition

to dropping the Advanced Course, Major Orlando Ward pointing out

that it was the laboratory for the maneuver of fire and the study of

fire direction.

By October the Chief's office was in favor of merging the

two classes and suggested that the elimination of common matter "

plus an entrance examination for the purpose of weeding out the

unprepared would permit a satisfactory course on a high level. The

School accepted the idea of an examination, which it thought should

be held about March of the spring before the student's entrance. As

for changes in the courses, the School suggested taking 124 hours

from the Animal Transport part of the Battery Officer's Course, 80

hours from Gunnery, 50 from Materiel, and adding 313 to Tactics.

A three months "senior course" was considered but was never

carried out because of the uncertainty regarding living quarters in the

fall of 1934, when the opening of school was postponed because of a

lack of quarters. Opposition on the part of the General Staff to the

idea of an entrance examination for the Regular Course prevented

such an interesting experiment from being attempted.

141 0.a
Major Edwin F. Parker Jr., writing in Volume 24 of the

Field Artillery Journal, page 202, made a detailed comparison of

the two old courses and the new one.

BOC Regular Advanced

Animal transport 315 200 164

Motors 195 134 149

Gunnery 443 347 233

Tactics 265 53a 724

General field exercises 192 212 192

Materiel 70 so 27

Fire direction 105,

This course was approved December 7, 1933. The consolidation of

the Battery Officers and Advanced Coarges. proved a windfall to ton

members of the Battery Officers C-urse of 1932-1933 in ,, most

unexpected way for, when the elimination or reduction of the Advanced

Course began to seem probable in the fall of 1932, the Chief reversed

an earlier decision and authorized the Commandant to transfer from

the Battery Officers Course to the Advanced Course the maximum

number of graduates of the old Basic Course whom t1⁄2e Commandant

regarded as qualified, I 'V

Caliber of the Students; Entrance Requirements

The interest shown in entrance examinvtions for the new

Regulai' course was perhaps part of a wider concern with entrance

examinationw as a means of improving the caliber of students attending

the Field Artillery School. In 1931 Lt Col Lesley J. McNair-, t]en

Assistant Commandant, sent a questionnaire to all Battery Officers

Course students. with less than eight years commissioned service. Of

*. the 48 who returned the questionnaire, 38 had received no systematic

instruction from older officers apart from troop echoole. Of 24 who

had been with a motorized uniti 16 had had no systematic tra'.,lngrin

motors. Forty-six had had little or no training iii the deliberate preparation of fire. These examples might be continued almost indefinitely

4 and revealed the haphazcrd, casual nature of the training given young

officers. It was found that student performance at the School was

directly related to length of troop duty with a gun battery. Superior

I4

142 ,

4 S""x-
students everpe-rd 5 years and 4 months of such duty, excellent

averaged 3 -.rc, and satisfactory averaged 2 years and II months.

This clearly revealed that a. young officer's "training" was simply

what he managed to pick up and that if left to himself, he would -n

time learn his Job.

The School, commenting on this, stated that troop schools

should not be used to prepare for the Field Artillery School but

that extension courses might well be uned for that purpore. The

Chief of Field Artillery in turn asked for a list of courses that

students should take. This was sent the following fall, together

with the results of a questionnaire given to the students of the next

Battery Officers Course -- which had yielded the same results as

the earlier questionnaire.

In January 1932 Maj Gen Edward L. King, Assistant Chief

of Staff, suggested the use of extension courses as a basis for

troop schools which would also tend to make students better -prepared

for the service schools. Although its comment was not officially

requested, the opinions of the School were revealed in semi-official

letters to the effect that the first years of an officer's stay in the

Army should be given to instruction on practical subjects, such as

horseshoeing, which could not be taught by mail, On the whole,

however, King's idea was thought to be an excellent one, suggesti.ngj

an approach that might greatly improve troop schools.

At this period entrance requirements for Reserve and National

Guard officers, in the form of extension courses completed, did exist.

In 1931, for National Guardsmen, at least two years service was

required, preferably a captain's rank, and completion of subcourses

on the Firing Battery, Preparation of Fire I, and Organization of the

Field Artillery. Field officers had to complete those, plus Conduct

of Fire I and Combat Orders I. From officers with that background

state adjutant generals filled their assigned quotas and had alternates

as well. States without quotas for any one year chose alternates only.

Field officers were recommended from the National Guard as a whole.

The requirements in terms of extension courses for Reserve officers

were higher than for members of the National Guard, and the Coin- .

mandant, General Butner, sought in 1 934 to have the National Guard

requirements raised to match those of the Reserves stating that the

class standing of the two groups reflected the difference. These

requirements simply reflected the requirements for promotion to the

next higher grade in the Reserves, and in 1935 the Adjutant General's

Office informed the Chief of Field Artillery that requirements for

entrance of Reserve officers would be changed to a specific list of

extension courses.

143 #4

-f i- A
Not until the yea. 1933-1934 were entrance requirements set for enlisted students, and then they were set in modest, general

terms. Motor mechanics, horseshoers, saddlers, and battery

mechanics were to have such character, experience, tochnical ability,

and past and prospective service as would indicate their suitability for

further training along those lines. Motor mechanics were to be capable

of becoming motor sergeants; battery mechanics, chief mechanics.

Communications course students had to be members of a brigade,

regiment, or battalion headquarters battery, have an 8th grade education, or its equivalent, plus certain technical skills.

The School Troops

School troops at Fort Sill performed a variety uf chores,

among which were the training of civilian components, the organizing

and staffing of the CCC, testing of new equipment, and the routine

support given the School, The Citisens' Military Training Camp held

yearly at the Post was the Job of the infantry battalion, which during

these years 1930-1935 was the lot Battalion, 38th Infantry. Thus, in

the surmmer of 1931 it conducted a camp for 1000 students and in

addition gave active duty training to the. officer cadres of four infantry

regiments of the Organited Reserves. This activity was continved

through the next four summers. The 18th Field Artillery during the

fiscal year 1930-1931 trained 60 Reserve officers and during the

summer periods supplied instructors, firing batteries, and technicians,

The l1t Field Artillery gave similar aid, and in 1931 noted that its

summer duties had been "not excessive." i

The 38th Infantry processed the CCC, as mentioned before, a

task comparoble to running several CMTC camps at once, The other

units of School troops supplied officers to the CCC from 1933 until

after the end of this period in the School's history.

The testing of new equipment went on continually. The 18th

Field Artillery in school year 1930-1931 tested panoramic sights

M1917 for the field pieces, automatic rifles for antiaircraft defense,

the experimental reel cart RL-23, and the 12-drop switchboard, 'i

Tests of sights and automatic rifles continued in the following year,

and in 1933-1934 a 75-mm pack howitzer was studied. The lot Field

Artillery in 1930-1931 received four 105-mm howitzers for testing.

These were assigned to Battery F as alternate armament. Panoramic

sights were issued the regiment for test in 1931. Equipment for A

experimental truck-drawn battery was issued March Z6, 1933. Tests

were conducted with traction devices, methods of carrying and laying

wire, field kitchens, and modifications of truck bodies, and periodic

reports were rendered to the Chief of Field Artillery. Battery E in

144

.j,
the same year was given a 75-mm pack howitzer for test. The

newly activated 77th Field Artillery made five tests of motor -equipment over difficult terrain.

These School troops faced a variety of problems. The 38th

Infantry was for many years plagued by poor range facilities. The

pits at the range were in poor shape because of the rotting of wartime timber. The area swarmed with flies following occupancy by

the civilian components, and it was necessary to pitch tents on the

earth during a season prone to rain. The problem of personnel was

often vexing. In the summer of 1930 the 18th Field Artillery was

overstrength, thanks to an influx of recruits, and at the end of the

school year was under strength again. Recruiting was suspended in

the last three months ofi 1932 so that. the next school year -began with

the lot and the 18th short 145 mren and the infantry battalion short 3Z.

These recruiting restrictions wer'e removed in November 1932 which

brought temporary relief. The reorganization of 1935, with its increase in the strength of the arm, did much to aid in solving this

problem,.

Summer camp activities, however necessary, were a drain

on the troop's strength, as has been mentioned before, :Until 1934,

vehicles older than 1920 were in use, and often not even too many of

them, so that problems-of maintenance and administration were

serious, A questionnaire from the Chief of Field Artillery's office

to the I st Field Artillery brought the reply that their most important

problems were: ".,. proper motorized equipment for the motorized

battalion. Maintaining highly trained batteries ,,. for the Field

Artillery School. •,

Work for the School went beyond the usual duties in service

practice and general field exercises. Battery B of the 77th was for

some months the Post Military Police Detachment. When the Army

was undergoing motorization in 1934, the let Field Artillery gave

courses for officers and men of units to be motorized. ,

Mounted Activities

During the school year 1930-1931, the Horse Show team was

put under the department of Animal Transport and its members used

as instructors as much as their duties permitted. Capt Edwin Y.

Ik .aArgo of the let Field Artillery, a member of the team, was also a

' rrember of United States Olympic Team in the Los Angeles Olympics

in 1932. He distinguished himself in the steeplechase, where he went

on to take 40 Jumps after his shoulder was dislocated. In 1933 the

members of the Horse Show team were called back from CCC dutyl

145

' 1

4-i
i ii

to try out for positions on the Army Horse Show Team which was

to compete at New York a'.d Toronto, Half of the members of the

team were to be from the Field Artillery, and the Chief, General

Bishop, was most anxious that so long as the arm was not completely

motorized, it keep its name for good horsemanship. Members of the

Field Artillery School horns show team were members of the Army

Team at New York, Chicago, Toronto, and Miami. It should be nothd

in passing that team expenses were paid by the horse show committe,

and individual expenses by team members themselves, which could be

defrayed from the winnings, if any.

Later in 1933 General Bishop wrote to the Commandant that

it was desired the Field ArtillerySchool sponsor mounted sports and

horsemanship in the molt effective possible way. HIe inclosed a proposed directive for the School's comments. Of these comments, only

one is important, ramely, that the officers of the team be charged

with the instruction of the Class in Advanced Horsemanship. The directive was accordingly issued February Z, 19.4, ordering that the Horse

Show Team and the Polo Team be maintained at the Field Artillery

School as agencies for increasing the general efficiency of Field F

Artillery officers in horsemanship and in the care, training, and conditioning of animals. Members of the team were to be assigned to

organisations at the Field Artillery School, and while they could not

be used as instructors in general, they could give such equitation instruction as would not interfere with their primary mission. Under

this diiroctive, mounted activities at the School prospered (refer to

the next chapter),

Reestablishment of the Museum

One of the projects in which General William Cruikshank was

most interested while Commandant was the revival of the museum at.

Fort Sill. On its behalf he corresponded with the Chief of Field Artillery and various other interested persons to secure exhibits for the

museum. For his part, the Chief, Maj Gen Upton Birnie, Jr., gave

hearty cooperation. The first curator, lot Lt Harry C. Larter, was

highly praised by the next Commandant, General Butner, for his perse-

"verance and interest. The Geronimo Guardhouse, where the old Indian

had been confined to sober up after his periodic sprees, was converted

into & museum btilding, and the Field Artillery Museum was officially

opened by General Birnie, December 10, 1934.

" e.The Museum included arms and equipment from the last war,

examples of American uniforms and equipment from past wars, a fine

collection of Indian relics and pictures and documents of interest to

146

I- . .. .' .•l..',Q

ni
P omemnber of the Field Artillery. No funds were allotted to it specifically, but were obtained from Book Department funds by request to

the Assistant Commandant. Interest increased steadily, with 9, 370

visitors in 1938, and 13, 735 in 1939. '

Graduates 1930-1934

TOTALS

COURSES 1930* 1931* 193Z* 1933* 1934* Off EM

]REGULAR ARMY

Battery Officers 66 49 48 43 206

Regular Course 52 52

Advanced Course 33 50 48 12 143

Refresher 4 1 6

Adv Communications 4 C 4

Advanced Motors 4 6 7 4 4 25

Adv Horsemanship 6 5 6 4 3 24

Enlisted Men 86 85 73 128 163 535

NATIONAL GUARD

RESERVE OFFICER8

(Fall only)

Battery Officers 58 58 65 19 51 251

Field Officers 7 7 10 24 .1

-

735 535 i

*1 -The year denotes the school year from September of the year indicated to the following June.

a -0 Course 2 months duration

b -- Course I month duration

c -- Course 5 months duration

147
Bibltography

AknnuallRegorts, U.S.F.A.S., 19V7-1928to 1939-1940, The Field

Artillery SXcool Library.

Files of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, op. cit, supra,

The Field Artillery School File&.

201 File, Brig Oen William Cruikshank, Post Headquarters, Ft Sill,

Okla.

ZOI File, Maj Gen Henry W. Butner, Post Headquarters, Ft Sill, Okla.

"New Construction at the Field Artillery School, by Major Edwin F.

Parker, Jr., The Field Artillery Journal, Volume 24.

I1

.. .i
CHAPTER TEN

FROM DISARMAMENT BY EXAMPLE TO MOBILIZATION

In our last chapter it woke pointed out that the Field Artillery

had entered upon the finai phase of a technical revolution- -the full

application of every field of modern technology to field artillery--a

technical revolution which began with the invention of the modern

field piece by Deports and which still continues. In the early thirties

the American Field Artillery began to leave every vestige of the

pro-machine world behind. The horse that had drawn the sjuns of

Napolsoa, -just as it had drawn the chariot of Hector, began to Lose

its role. Whersou targets had been pointed out by gesture or description, even as the Chevalier Bayard had pointed out the Swiss to the

Master Gunner of rrance four centuries before, they were now given

to the batteries In terms of mathematical quantities, Everywhere the

machine and machine-like, 4.o., mathematical, habits of thought

replaced the old ways. The next step taken by the Arnprican Field

Artillery was to be the acquiring of a more powerful weapon drawn

by a more reliable prime mover. This materialized in the substitution of the 105m-mm howitser and the 6 x 6 truck for the 75-mm

gun sand the 4 z 4 truck respectively.

Devclments in Maintenance

The first contributions of the Field Artillery School were

made in the field of imintanancae. In April 1936 the Chief of

Field Artillery, Ma) Gen Upton Birnie, Jr. j directed the School

to appoint a board to conduct a series of field service tests aof the

echelon system of motor rmaintpknance with reference to its suit&-

hility for war-time, to determine the practicability of the existing

record, and to set up Tables of Organization for motor maintenance

unilts within the field artillery. The members of the board as

appointed were: Maj Boland P. Shugg; Capt Leonard S. Arnold;

Capt Lawrence E. Ha~duck; Capt Frank A. Menning; list Lt Charles

R. Hutchison. The board stqidied the operation of two civilian fleets,

plus, the fleet at Frort Sill, devised and tested different mainterance

systems in general field exercises, and studied pertinent War Depart

ment documents. Its partial report was rendered in July of 1936.

This report designated the first three echelons as follows,

The first echelon was the driver and his assistant, who were to be

made responaible for minor repairs and general everyday upkeep

of their vehicle. The second echelon was the battery, which was

149
charged with caretaking, minor repairs, and replacements that

could be made in two hours. The third echelon was the regiment

(or separate battalion) which would reinforce the efforts of the

batteries, supervise all work, and install unit subassemblies.

The conclusions of the final report were based upon extensive

field tests of three methods devised by the board. In the first of

these, the battery literally did everything, with the regiment left

only acdininistration and supply. In the second method, the battery

was left only fleet operation and supervision of drivers, the regiment doing everything else. In the third, the battery was given

the same responsibilities it had been given in the first method

above, but the regiment was given a maintenance platoon with

substantially similar equipment to that in the battery, to "1rcinforce" the latter, This was the recommended method.

not With this final report the Chief of Field Artillery could

S not concur, His disapproval showed appreciation of the board's

thorough work, and he pointed out that the system of maintenance .

prescribed by him in 1937 conformed to that outlined in-the first or

partial report, in which the battery performed the simple, and the

regiment, thecomplex tasks. But he could not concur With the

final report, for he felt it placed a great load on the battery which

that unit, a fighting, not an administrative unit, should not have to

bear, He further objected to the creation of a regimental motor

platoon which duplicated that in the battery. It will be recalled that ( earlier there was an attitude of independence in the arm in regard to

motor MM-n14anAnCe, an attitude to which the Chief now veferred,

saying that whatever conditions may have bicen in the past, there

was now no need for the arm to burden itself unduly with motor

, /i.

and Gner&l Birnie accordingly directed that the School teachings

and practices conform in every respect to the motor maintenance

system set up in 1937. The Quartermaster Corps and the Field

Artillery were planning to set up a model third echelon at Fort

Sill for test and demonstration. The scope of the motors courses

were accordingly changed in the spring of 1938. The heavier repair

operations, which the Field Artillery had thought itself forced to

perform were taken over by the Quartermaster Corps in full. The

scope of the courses then covered only: the echelon system of motor r

maintenance; the tools, equipment, and personnel provided; motor

supply; practical work on unit assemblies and vehicles; technical

inspections; driver training; march maintenance; field expedients;

motor park administration, and records.

•. 150

i~ISO tic.,

Il01
The idea of "preventive maintenance" was brought to the

Field Artillery School by Capt Morris Daniels after a visit to.

the Detroit plant of General Motors in the summer of 1937. His

idea was to have vehicles inspected by a three-man team, two

mechanics, and a recorder, with immediate repair of things

found wrong o~r needing adjustment. The idea previously had been A

to repair after a breakdown. The idea was.at once adopted by the

School and was being taught in the fall of 1937.

The next development of importance was a report of the.,-

Motor Maintenance Board of the School, under Lt Col Poland P.

Shugg, September Z8, 1938. Stating that for the past two years

the operation of military motor vehicles had been under intensive

study at the School, the rep irt severely criticised existing concepts :of preventive maintenance (which must be distinguished from

the maintenance system discussed previously). The, report stated

that too much depended upon the interpretation of regulations by

relatively inexperienced ppraionnel, that inspection meant looking

for flaws, and maintenance meant repair after failure, The board

proposed a change to AR 850-15 by setting up~definite, schedule4,

preventive maintenance, with 1000-mile and 6000-mile maintenance

services replacinglthe 3000-mile. Scheduled marintenance services

"were carefully defined as clearnng, lubrication, servicing, repair,

adjustment, stc. Services of vehicles were divided into types, as

daily, weekly, lubrication, 30 day or 1000-mile, six-month or

6000-mile. Everything proposed was definite and clear and in

contrast to the vagueness of the old regulations. .-

In February, 1939, the School again urged such a change to

All 850-15, in a letter from Col Shugg to Maj Rex W. Beasley in

the Chief's office, The 6000-mile service was seen as a fairly

comprehensive ono in which all engine acceseories such as carburetors, generators, etc., would be removed for cleaning and

servicing. The 15,000-mile service recommen4ed by automobile

manufactors for civilian fleets was comparable to this, the difference

reflecting the effects of driving in low gear frequently, in dusty

columns, and cross-couqtry.

Testing of Night Lights

In 1938, the accepted method of blackout marching was ":

described as follows by Col E. H. DeArmond, while acting

Commandant: "The leading vehicle of the group when lights are

,forbidden hs nothing to follow on dark nights ejcept a dismounted

man carrying a flashlight in the back of his shirt. Hence, our

present rate of march on extremely dark nights is the speed of a

I 151 '!
man on toot, &uiding the truck, in truck-drawn artillery. This is

very unsatisfactory." The Quartermaster Corps was therefore

actively eeeking something better, and in 1938 sent some nightlighting devices for test by the §chool. Lt R. W. Fletter performed

the tests under the auspices of the Department of Materiel. An

attempt had been made to provide light. which would illuminate

the road and still not be visible from an airplane, but this attempt

was not successful until shields were added to the lights. Lt Fletter

reported that the lights as issued for test were not satisfactory,

and he suggested they be mocilfied by the addition of shields and

that enough be issued for the test of a column.

Toward a Better Prime Mover

At this time, the program of modernization and motorization

had provided the Field Artillery with a miscellany bf civilian vehicles,

concerning whose suitability there were doubts. This situation was

no reflection on any one concerned since only Very large orders

would have made the manufacture of special types economically

Justifiable, and those orders were not forthcoming in peace time.

In December 1936 a letter of the Adjutant General called for reports

on the suitability of the vehicles issued to tacticsi units, and a

board, Lt Cal John E. Lewis, MaJ John A. Chase,- Capt Ernest V.

Holmes, and Capt Oliver W. van den Barg, was set to work on

the matter,

The board classed the 4x4 1-1 /Z-ton and the 6x6 4-ton as

the most satisfactory, saying all other field artillery vehicles were

unsuited for field service. The board did not say that the existing

4x4 was the answer, only tkat it was the best of its class. Standardization of a 4x4 type, elimninating the station wagon and the pickup truck, was urged. For general policy, the adoption of commnercial

vehicles was suggested, tbgether with the devising of ways and means

to use them to best advantage. Design competition was recommended.

The board accepted the 4x4 oecause it was commercially available;

its preferance for the 6x6 was clear, and this report was the origin

of the 6x6 of today.

In 1938, the Chief of Ordnance anked the Chief of FieA ,,rtillery for the Field Artillery's views on the sor~of prime movers it needed. As spokesman for the arm, the Chief answered and sent

a copy of his answer to the School for its comment. The Chief's

letter proposed: A commercial 4x4 with light tractors to pull it

out when it mired; tractors to draw the 155-mm howitzer; the use

1 This term "Chief" is used to mean the office over which this

officer presided as well as the individual himself.

152

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of commercially available vehicles. With these views the Field

Artillery School cpuld not agree. It was pointed out that the very

need for tractors revealed the makeshift nature of the 4x4 as a

prime mover. In-its place the School urged a light 6xb, for it

felt that the development of multi-wheeled drive was the outstanding

recent automotive development, and in its experience, the 6x 6

4-ton Indianas at the School had outperformed everything else. As

for the argument of commercial availability, it was thought this

point, on which the whole of the Chief's thesis depended, was invalidated by the technical resources of modern industry.

This exchange is cited to show the School's role in the creation of the 6x6 Z-L/Z ton truck. The argument turned essentially

on a matter of high military policy: Would the United States have

time to arm in an emergency? If so, there was time to re-tool for

quantity produation of the 6x6. Presumably the Chief thought otherwise. The School apparently felt that this process of re-tooling

would be go swift that nothing would be lost.

Not long after this exchange, the School was in a position to

give a report based on a formal test of a 6x6 and a 4x4. These were

standard commercial types, the .6x6 a three ton model being considerr j,

ed asla carrier for the light tractors which each feliment was to

have to pull its 4x4ts from potholes and buffalo wallows. Both models

were powered with the same engine. After testing both in a. patch

of very muddy ground near the Fish Hatchery, and comparing their

performance with that of a six-horse team which was adopted as

a known ttandard, (and which outperformed both trucks), it was

concluded that they lacked power and flotation,

Tkho&?sties 8ealeaaf the Department of Materiel then provided two. tzucks built to secure the maximum in power and flotation.

A Marmon-Harrington 4x4 was given 8. Z5x20 dual tires on all four

wheels with Hipkins devices to secure maximum flotation and was

re-powered with a Hercules Diesel truck engine. The 6x6 that was

being tested was given a Buick engine, like that used in early halftrack tests at Fort Knox, and dual wheels with traction dovices, The

tests, under Capt van den /erg, were conclusive. The 6x6 outperformed every vehicle on the Post and actually pulled a tractor out of

the mud in which it had stuck. The School's experience of many years

of operation of the powerful 4-ton Indiana[6x6 prime mover for the

1S5-mm howitaers was regarded as confirming the results of the test.

In the report of the tests, the School conim~nted that it was

strongly oppoved to the 4x4 as a prime mover, but that it was satisfactory as a cargo truck and personnel carrier. It was conceded

K ........................................-.--.- 153
that the 4x4 could serve as A prime mover in dry weather, but

it was clearly stated that the most satisfactory prime- mover for

field artillery, including the 105-mm howitzer, was a 6x6 with

suitable traction devices. 'Among the recommended traction de-.

vices was listed the front-mounted winch developed by the Braden

Winch Co. of Tulsa, Okla., for oil field use. It was suggested

that no further time be spent in testing trucks, but that a light 6Xb

be developed to be used with 4x4 cargo and personnel carriers, and

reconnaisance vehicles.

A Better Weapon

Dissatisfaction with the 7,-,nrm gun M1897 ("the French

75") as the light weapon of the division artillery was expressed

in the last war when the gun was at the height ofrits popularity.

Because of its flat ,trajectory, the weapon could not reach an

enemy behind a hill of any slie, nor could it be e~mplaced behind

a hill, The projectile was too small to be powerful. On the otherhand the Germans in the last war had a 105-mm howitaer that was

a satisfactory weapon, and a number of captured pieces were brought

to this country for test, and experiment.. by'the. end of 19Z1- two f

American 105-mm howitzers had beei, developed. Work on the

type continued for the next 15 years but without developing a highly

satisfactory model, In 1936 the German army was re-equipping

its divisions with horise-drawn 105-mm howitzers, and the other

Great Powers were taking interest in the howitzer type. Although

this awakened interest in the United..Statese, a large number of 75-mm

guns U1897 were left over from the lase v1ar, and qs a.measure of

economy, these were belagimodernized .% h eplittrail carriages.

The project of a modern carriage for the American 105-mm howitzer,

to match the satisfactory tube which had been evolved, was just too

low in priorty to get action while the 75'1 and the 155's were being

mode rniz~ed.

A study of the 105-rmm howitzer, to determine what charaio..

teristics would be desirable in the piece, and what should be its

role in the division, was Oegun by the School in September 1938, as

directed by the Chief. The weapon was, of course, familiar to the

"School, for both the old German howitzer and various American

"The last rounds of 3-inch gun ammunition were fired at

Fort Sill June Z6, 1936, by Maj Gen Upton Birnie, Col E. H. Do

Armond, Col Charles S. Blakely, Col Donald C. Cubbison, and

Col Ralph M. Pennell.

154 '

.- . .166
modelr had been used and tested here. In its report, the School

laid down that among the qualities desirable in an ideal 105-m m4 howttae were an elevation of 65 degrees, a variable length of

recoil to eliminate the necessity of digging a recoil pit, and a

traverse of 45 degrees, The elevation was insisted upon because

experiment had shown that shell-firo delivered at ultra-high angles

was much more effective than that delivered at a low angle of

impact. The 105-mm shell, it was noted in passing, per .Otund of

shell fired, was much more effective than the 75-mm shell. As

for the role of the piece in the division, the School suggested a

combination of 105-mm and 155-mryi howitzers, although the

directive under which the report was made asked only for a choice

batwoen the piece as the sole weapon in .the division, or as a

companion to the 75-mm gun.

w In December 1938 the Chief warned the School teat should

War break out in the. near future, the Field ArtilLety must expect

tmake use of the 75-mnm gun MI 897-with-collimator sight. Development of the present model of l0b.xmm howitter was progressing

steadily duxing theme months, and in May, 19391 the suggestion

was aade by the FrieldArtilLery. School that there be no further test

orexpe.riuent of the piece. and that immediate mantfacture and

distribution be begun of the existing pilot model. Purchase of 132

of these weapons was recommended by the Chief of Field Artillery

in Optober 1939.

Now Methoda of Transfers of Fires Shells

During the years 1935-1940 the Department of Gunnery

worked on tests of transfers and transfer limits, on time shell,

aerial photographs, calibration of pieces by measurement of wear

in the tube, air-ground observation, fire direction, statistical 1'

analysis of the arm's service practice, sheaf., and on accuracy

of various concentrations and methods of preparing initial data.

In these toots of transfers and transfer limits, attempts were made

to find the most acouraLtt way of tranaferring fire from one target

to another, and within what limits of range and deflection fire

could be .,ccurately transferred from one target to another without

recomputing the corrective factors applied to the basic data. There 1were three types of corrective factors under toot, and s, thre

types of transfers.

The K was a corrective factor, equal to the difference between the elevatior. of the check point range computed from map

data and the 'olevatiou determined by adjustment, reduced to plus

I ~or minus yards per thousand yards of range. In other words, it

was the range correction per thousai. ards.

ii.,

I, . •,--. • '•a
The VE was ,nother corrective factor, equal to the difference

between the ovation for the check point range computed from

meteorological data and the elevation determined by adjustment, reduced to a plus or minus feet per second, and applied to the range

effect in yards of a one foot per second change in muzzle velocity

at the range of subsequent targets.

Map data corrected was data determined by measurement

from the map, corrected for the effects of the prevailing weather

upon the trajectory.

On Ortober 14, 1939, tests wo-'c s.onciucted to test the relative

accuracy of mra- iata .,urrected, K transfers, and VE transfers

ior the 75-mra gun MZ. Nine guns were used, representing the base

pieces of a brigade, and the transfers were based on registration of

a single gun, Tests were also conducted to~determine the accuracy

of K and VE transfers-for the 1 55-mm howitzer between low-angle

zones, based on registration in one zone, and also to determine probable errors. In tests of the 75-mrn guns, averaget error for map

data corrected for deflection was'll. 4 milse for rangi, 80 yards, ,

for K transfers, deflection error, ll-.8mils, range wrrori 96 yards;

for VE transfers, deflection error, 11. 2 mile, range error, 46 yards.

After the base point registration, each of the nine guns then

registcred with a precision adjustment on its own target in the translor area, The adjustment elevation, in each case, was compared in

turn with computed initiaL data for m=p data corrected, a K -transfer,1 !

and a VE tranafer, thus determining the range errors. T~e survey

was by transit. Inassnuch As VE transfers depended for accutracy

upon artiller'y survey, meteor"oTgical data, noa-ataduartl conditions,

and initial laying of guns, they should, if correct# have in theory no

limits so long as the same powder charge is used. FM 6-40, par&.

429, stated: "However, for targets outside of transfer limits, the

VE correction should on the whole give better results than the K

change. " The School report commented that the K transfer limits

were probably adopted because a quick, workable-rule was needed,

and that, given premiseo of equal accuracy, VE transfers wore

better than K and covor a wider area. Map Mai corrected was said J

to be good for any direction and range if initial survey was accurate,

corrections for non-standard conditions were accurate, and initial P

laying was accurate. Tests of 15-mm howitzer transfers revealed

that transfers between zones would be erratic.

Further tests, held in December, 1939, confirmed the results

of the first series. Again nine 75.mm guns )w(2, representing the

base pieces of a brigade, were used. Centers of impact were fired

,. 156 I..'
with shrapnel, each burst being plotted by two to four observers.

Comment on these tests wao that for guns and howitzers as a whole,

VE transfers were better than K transfers, and that map data

corrected fires, on the whole, were as good as the transfers.

World War I experience- had showed that as a projectile,

shrapnel lacked the lethal effect of shell. However, there were

many who correctly inferred that the trench warfare of 1915-1917

would not be the pattern of future warfare, but incorrectly held

that shrapnel would again come into its own 3n more mobile future

war. In 1928, General Aultman, then Commandant, flatly stated

that shell was the only artillery projectile. In the years 1935-1940

experiments were conducted at Fort Sill to determine the best

methods of firing time shell, Demonstrations in 1937 and 1938

featured time fire.

Developments in Techniques

The study of aerial photographs of all kinds--oblique, vertical, wide-angle, mosaic--was constant during 1935-1940. In the

beginning of the period. research arA.study wacconducted to discover means of using ob•lqus photographs fpr the conduct of fire.

Strip mosaics on a OQ/ 00.0 scale covering a front of 7, 000 yards

were in use then '•th very satisfactory results. Continued emphasis

was placed or, air photos as a basis of survey operations and preparation of firing data, Instruction in the use of aerial photographs was

a scheduled part of the Regular, Nat.ional Guard, and. Res'erveacoursea

between 1935 and 1940. Wide angle photos wcre tested as firing charts

in the school year 1939-1940.

In 1936 each officer of the Regular course, unless he declined,

made two flights, one for orientation and adjustment of the radio in

the airplane, and other as an artillery observez. The time spent in

the air came to about an hour and a quarter. There was also a halfhour balloon flight for orientation only. National Guard and Reserve

officers, unless they declined (and the nature of insurance policies

must be kept in mind) received a 20-minute balloon flight for orientation only. Airplanes were used in demonstrations and field exercises,

72 hours of flying time being thus expended in 1936-1937. ..

The status of fire direction in 1936 was covered in a lette'

from Lt Col Orlando Ward to Maj Gen Upton Birnie, April 16, 1936,

giving suggestions for points to be covered in Birnie's next addrews

to the students of the Army War College. His suggestions were: I,

"Stress the flexibility of our observed fire using

our present rneans of fire direction and then show the greater

157
flexibility given by radio. Enunciate the principle t'iat

our methods are now such that the man who sees thf target

shoots at it, that in the battalion any observation post is

available to any battery, and that all-batteries are available to any observation post. That the exact location of

the batteries insofar as the observers are concerned is

not as essential now as in the World War. Thap we can

get fire in five minutes or less with a battery and in ten

minutes or less with a battalion. That the effect of a

battalion is considerably greater than a world war battalion.

In the Napoleonic Wars, in the Franco-Prussian, and in

the Civil War it was necessary to mass artillery on the

front line in order to mass its fire. Not so with the modern

long range gun with our present methods of technlque'of

cornmmunication."

The service practice of the various Field Artillery units

was a valuable source of gunnery data and cast much light on the

state of training (if the several commands, when subje'tted to

:ritical analysis. Up to 1935, the School supplied statistical data

on the results of its own firing, but in the spring of that year it

was requested by the Chief of Field Artillery to analyze the results

of the service practice of the whole arm by six-month periods.

These reports, as prepared at Fort Sill, tabblated data on types

of problems fired, times required for solutions, methods of obtaining the initial range, average errorE initial data, the allotment

of problems as between junior and senior officers (the results often

showed that human nature is frail), the ratings of problems by the

organi.zations, and brief comments by the School on the organizatioafs conduct of its service practice. In later years, the six morth :• ~period was changed to a calendar year, and reports were so rendered

for 1938, 1939. and 1940. On February 7, 1942, the School requested

that, because of the pressure of wartime expansion, it not be asked

to perform the task for 1941. This relief was given a week later.

Tactical Changes

A meeting of representatives of the Departments of Gutnery

and Tactics in December 1937 elected to etandarize certain elements

of fire commands in liaison and air-ground missions for greater

& speed. Commands from Lhe fire direction center were to include

only the base deflectioA shift or new compass, the range, and an

appropriate command for any element differing from a prearranged

standard. A 90 yard sheaf and a site of 300 were to be standard.

Col E. H. De Armond then proposed that the battery habitually adjust

with a parallel sheaf, changing as appropriate when beginning fire

158

1I

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-•CAW

for effect. By April 1938 there had been sufficient experience with

the 90 yard sheaf to justify a negative report on its utility. A report

by Capt Thomas A. Roberts seemed to prove that staggering of

pieces would not in practice be so great as to maki thi parallel

sheaf impractical in the majority of cases. The Director of the

Department of Tactics, Col Lloyd Jones, recommended use of the

parallel sheaf, as materially reducing the amount of time needed

for computation by either the battery corarnander or the executive

and calling for fewer commands at the gun position,

Tactical research went forward at the same time. During

the school year 1936-1937, attention was given to the artillery support

of mechanised forces, and to support of and defense against wide

envelopments. 'A most intensive study was made of the proposed i -

triangular division, The schedu).d instruction of the Regular Course

was changed to permit test of certain aspects of the new division.

STwenty' seven problems and field exercises were changed from an

assumption of the old squire division organization and based on the

new division. Special tests were made employing the new communications platoon of the regimental headquarters battery and the 81-mm

mortar battery, then proposed as a part ofthe division. The class

was given special' instrcUton on the employment and organization of

the divisicsn# especially of -its artillery, involving detailed studies of

organization, communication, supply, command and staff, and employ..

ment of the mortar battery. Data was worked out covering road spaces,

march formations, and vihicular loads,

An intensive test of the six gun battery and four battery battalion

was made in 1939, the report being dated August Z. It was found that 1W

the battery had greater fire power and greater density of fire, but was

harder for the executive to control, and was definitely more cumbersome. Concealment was a problem. Overhead was not increased.

The four battery battalion was only a little more difficult to handle on

the road and joing into and out of position. More time was required

I for the reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position, and the

establishment of signtsl communication required more time, materiel,

and personnel. Pire directien was no more difficult. From the organizational standpuiat, the principal advantages lay in better support for

the infantry in displacements. It was recommended that if the number I

"of guns in a division were increased that the increase should be incorporated by adding a fourth battsry to each battalion. After that was

done, then consideration should be given to the six gun battery,

In 1936 a letter was received from Brig Gen Waite r Short, then

4 Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School, in which exception was

taken to the current teaching of the Field Artillery School that the supported infantry commandei, could give the supporting artillery an -A,

159

LI §_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
expected development of the attack on which a schedule of prepared :I

fires could be based. A lively discussion arose in which Lt Cal

Orlando Ward remarked in a letter to the Chief, General Birnie:

"(T)he direct support artillery's control should be by spots rather

than by line, and by call rather than by time." Lt Cal Ward used

that phrase in commenting adversely on an article which used the

term "phases of action, " which to him implied something not far

from the old time schedule and rolling barrage. General Birnie's

reply was thac 'phases of action" were used to estimate the groups

of fire to be placed on important terrain features in the best way to

assist the infantry through the various phases of the action: "These

groups are placed in selected areas, lacking better information, but

are flexible in character... our adopted fire direction methods

which allow abandoning... the schedule should better information of

the enemy be available.J' .

The doctrine taught at the School was modified along the lines

defended ,by. Lt -Col Ward to provide that schedule fires were not always

possible in.every phase, particularly in the beginning of a moving { situation. To eliminate the 1"30-minute phasc lines" in planning

schedule fires, the term "schedule fire" itself wat redefined to include

all prearranged fires, including those fired on call. A letter of the new

Chief, General Robert M, Danford, to Cal Augustine McIntyre, rNovember Z9, 1937, stated that in the past the School unduly stressed schedule

fires but that the new edition of Field Artillery Book 224 corrected this.

Courses and Instruction, 1935-1940

Course. schedules were set in the following manner rThe

interdepartmental committee, referred to before, first received

its directive and definitions from the Assistant Commandant for

the Regular course, the National Guard and Reserve Officers'

coturse. the Refresher course, and the Sergeant Instructors' course.

The several departments then submitted chronological lists of instructional periods, and under each period gave its duration, title, whether

theoretical or practical, and the troop and area requirements. The schedule wa q then prepared by the committee and submitted to the

Assistant Commandant. The Battery Mechanics' course was prepared

by the Director of the Department of Materiel and the Academic Division Supply Officer. Schedules for the other courses, e.g. Advanced

Horsemanship, were prepared by the director of the department conducting them and submitted to the Assistant Commandant. However,

in March I•.8, this was changed in that hoursi were allotted by the

Assistant Comrmandant is well as the master schedule prepared by

the schedule committee minus the member of any department which

did not instruct in the course.

160

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The requirement of the thesis was continued until October

1938 when it was dropped. "due to the variety of instruction which

it is necessary to give in a course," Because the Regular course

of 193 9-J940 was cut in hr'lf, one may surmise no thesis was re- _71 quired in that y~ear. either. Military History was -preferred, by the. i.•

School as, a subject for the last few years of the thesis, though

mathematical and engineering subjects were permitted. The best

of them were to be reviewed by a board consisting of the Assitant

Commandant, a field officer from the Department of Tactics, and a

company officer from the Department of Animal Transport. A $50. 00

prize was awarded the best by the Field Artillery Journal, which would

publish it. Instructors were assigned to aid students in the preparation

of their theses in the school year 1937-1938, and each received a 100-

word critical review. Thanks to this helpful supervision, rather like that given a graduate student, that year's theses were all satisfactory,

and most of them werw thought excellent. In lieu of ,theses, o. ,the' 4h

Motors Section of the Department of .Materiel conducted seminars for

advanced students to which the officers of the Post and School were

invited; the Communications Section of the Department of Tactics still

required theses from its advanced students.

During the 1935-1l936 year anm,experimental, wartime motor

officert,' courte was given to selected enlisted men cf the School troops

who were either reserve officers or of 4 type to become such, -The

course was very brief, being largely in the nature of a refresher course,

and intended to fit the men to become motor officers. The 1936-1937

school year saw the Motor Mechanics course almost double in attendance,

so that instructors had to be borrowed from the School troops. The

studsnts did repair jobs on the School troops fleet in two hour -periods,

had one hour practical wor-k. 60 minutes theoretical, and a ten minute

writ. A trouble-shooting laboratory was set up that saved School

troops the uae of some 60 vehicles. An interesting feature of the course

was a 750 mile motor march through the Kiamichi Mountains.

In the spring and summe i2 of 1937 the practice was begun of

sending both eniisted-and commissioned instructors for summer visits

to commercial plants and government arsenals. It will be recalled

that the idea of preventive maintenance as known today was the fruit

of one of those trips. The widespread use of training aids also dates

from that period, for these instructors-turned-student were able to

study the methods used by various large corporations to train their

employees, In only one way was the use of training aids curtailed.

This was in the Department of Gunnery, in which terrain boards and

the Field Artillery Trainer (miniature Suns) were used just enough to

make sure the students. could use them in training the ciyliian components. The elaborate Baranoff machine was put into storage after the

Administration building was opened.

161

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S.. . .. ."-•. . . . . . . . .. -_ • - . . .. . -
General Birnie, while Chief, sought, via a letter of November

Z1, 1936, to make the Refresher course aL means of priming those

senior officers who were the best material in the artillery. He tried

to get the arm to recognize the importance of troop service by picking

carefully the men for those assignments and then giving them the

chance to take the Refresher course. It should be noted that taking

the Refresher course often meant a financial hardship, for the officer

had to maintain himself at Fort Sill and his family at his permanent

post.

General Field Exerrise No. 8, the "five-day war," wea one of

the high spots of the year, the culmination of its work. 11GFEx 8" for

1938 lasted from Tuesday, May 31, to Saturday, June 4, inclusive.

On Tuesday there was a march in several columns from Fort Sill to 

a

concentration and bivouac area in the Forest Preoserve. 'Bttdents made

march tables, joined the units at the gun shads, and conducted the

march, Antiaircraft dolonse was streamed. During the first ýnight information was received which led to the decision to assume an active

defense, and the covering force occupied its position. On June I there

was the re:onnaissance and occupation of a position on the reservation

by an infantry brigade and part of the artillery, with firing of interdiction, counterbatteryl, and harassing missions. The enemy attacked

at dawn the next day, and a counterattack enveloping the hostile left

flank was launchod at8 A. M. Following a wide envelopment of the

hostile flank during the night of June Z-3, the enemy withdrew at about

4 A.M. On June 3, Friday, there was development of the hostile lines

in the South Arbuckle area, followed hy a decision to attack by a wide

envelopment of the north flank. The night of June 3-4 was spent in movement to attack positions, and the attack was launched shortly after dawa on Saturday.

There was firing at all appropriate times during these days.

The students planned and conducted the marches and had a chance to

familiarize themselves with their commands before the attack reafly

got under way. Practically all students joined in the attack requiring

a preliminary maneuver, about half in the counteroffensive phase of

an active defense, and about half in the nial.n attack by a wide envelopment. '1

The duties of student officers were as prescribed in the regu- lations of the School. When acting as P ommandere of School troop

units, they could give the ý-ecessary orders for the tactical employ- ment of the unit, They could assunm no training or disciplinary

* functions. Their only administrative functions were those necessarily

arising from the tactical handling of troops. In service practice

(1939 et seq.) Regular course students acted as executives, being

162
supervised by the battery executive and being countermanded only when danger was imminent. Students were also safety officers, but

were closely iupervised by the regular safety officer, who was still

held responsible•

While it was intended that the Regular course give the same.

instruction to all, a certain amount of specialization was practiced,

Beginning in 1937 a.trief course in meteorology was given to eight

selected officers of the class, "to keep the course alive"• In 1939

the scope, though not the length of this short course, was increased to

offer enough Instruction to permit the selected officers to later train

the meteorological section of the brigade headquarters. Sound and

flash ranging instruction was offered in 1939 on a similar basis. In

May 1939 the let Observation Battalion was at Fort Sill to instruct

classes at Lhe School and carry out. a, 14 day training program. Eileve;.

hours of instruction was given the Regular course, and '8 hours to the

National Guard and Reseso., Eight officers of the Regular class were

selected for 8 days of instruction, June 12-20, It was hoped to offer

the work again in 1940 but the Second World War prevented this.

The Inistructor Problem

Between l.931 and 1934 the number of officers assigned to the

staff, faculty, and detachments dropped from 39 to 32. During this

period, the School greatly expanded its functions, as had been indicated

above, To remedy the deficiency, School troop officers were used in

instructional capacities, as circuametances permitted. This was not a

satisfactory remedy, and one. Commandant after another pressed for an

inutrease in the officer strength of the School. This was never possible,

for there wam #.n actual shortage of artillery officers inthe United Sates.

In 1939, 26 School troop officers were being used as instructors, and

Col Augustine McIntyre4, the Comnmandant, asked the assignment of 26

officers to the staff and faculty so that these might be released to full

duty with the School troops. The Chief replied there were 537 officers

allotted for assignunent to troop@ in the United States, on the basis of

organization quotas, among which the Sill units were favored as much

as possible, and were four to 11 mea in excess of their quota. The

total excess was 24, almost the nunmber requested as additional instruictors. Given the condition of shortage, and the War Department's oppo- sition to a further increase in overhead, the Chief did not feel he could

ask for Z4 more officer's. McIntyre did not win his battle until the school

year 1939-1940 when the number of authorized members of the staff and

faculty was set at 60, releasing the School troop officers. After June,

1940, the war cast the problem of officer instructors into different

forms,

163

K - i7'i ______
The problem of enlisted instructors was thought to &rise from

a lack of enough grades and ratings to hold good men, for a man who

became qualified as a motors or communications expert also qualified for a well-paying Job in civil life. Various efforts were made to

provide additional grades and ratings and also make service at the

Field Artillery School more attractive. In 1936-1937 the R~oad Maintenance Section of the Academic Division was abolished in order to

release grades and ratings for instructors. Men would be transferred

back and forth between departments, and between the School troops and

the White Detachment. Communication instructors were often obtained

by taking men from School troops to serve from January until June. In

this case a solution was sought by placing the Meteorological Section

with its four grades and ratings in the Communication@ Section, and

placing mefl in it who could be qualified inboth fields. In.this one

instance it proved very hard to -get men of that calibesr. . Efforts to make service more attra'ctive took many fortns. The

provision of decent living conditions was supposed to raise the morale

of tho whole command, bat of curse it also tended to reduce enlisted

turnover, Classes were held inwhich men could qualify themselves for

better positions, e. g., shorthand classes which were given in the White

Detachment in April 1937. This detachment provided three pool tables,

a weight lifting class, eight sets of golf clubs, a volley ball, a complete

set of baseball equipment, and eight tennis rackets for recreational us*.

The Colored Detachment organized an orchestra, had dances at the *eevice club, and built a new reading room. For self-improvement, it

offered courses in arithmetic, English, history, and typing. The

colored soldiers were very successful in their athletics, and their

trophy case had five cups won in the two years at Camp Knox, and Fort

Sill baseball trophies for 19Z3, 1939. 1940, 1941, and 194Z. There

were also cups from the 1925 and 1932 Horse Shows, and a Transportstion Show cup from 1926. All in all, they had lh cups plus innumerable

horse show ribbons.

Although enlisted instructors were often borrowed from School

troops, this was no part of Cal Mc~ntyrele policy during these years, r

and he did his best to sl ,re the School troops from such calls, A last ' 4

prewar attempt to secure grader and ratings was evidenced by his

recommendation that the headquarters and headquarters battery of the

4th Field Artillery Brigade and the combat train of the let Battalion of

the 77th Field Artillery be inactivatted to release grades and ratings.

T1 Is was disapproved, on the grounds that it would go against the Chief's

efforts to activate other units. Only the coming of war and conscription

substituted other problems for this one.

164

rI
Correspondence which was exchanged in the cases of nine

enlisted ,lstructors who. wed without permission shadedsome light

on the type of soldier who held such a post. These nine were, used

as instructors in both officer and enlisted classes in the Department

of Materiel. Most of them had attended civilian or Ordnance training

classes, and all of them were qualified for promotion to higher ratings

as soon as such became available. The average length of service was

nine yesrs, and the average pay, $48. 00 a month. None had debts

other than for cars or homes, and none gave evidence of family

troubles.

Extension Course Growth

The role of extension courses was growing. At this time the

War Dep•rtment ordered 2000 courses on each, of the fourloevels of

the Field Artillery extension couases, from which itmay be inferred

that the ngmber of enrolled students, assuming students. would take

several. courses, Was at. least two or three thousand. This number

was mouiy times the yearly attendance of the School and considering

the ise. ofthe American Army in peacetirce, was a group of, considerable proportions. In May 1939 there were, accordinzg to the Adjutant

General's Office, no less. th4n 103, 000 students, mostly officers, in

the oxtension courses of the, Army, so the above,,estimate is well within

the limits of probability.

The extension course revislon of 1936-1937 removed the distincticn between officers assigned to mutorined units and those *#signed

to horse-drawn units; mredo unnecessary any distinction in the 20-series

(for lieutenants) as between RqOTC and non-ROTC graduates; established

one common series on marches and shelter, and on the reconnaissance,

selection, and occupation of position; "nd added a course to the 10-series

(for beginners) on materiel, to make the work on the firing battery more

intelligible.

Thea ideal extension course lesson, as defined by the Adjutant

General's Office in January 1938, avoided questions that could be

answered with one word, or directly from the text. Tha student was

to get only the principles from the text, and by applying them solve a

brief, explicit problem with little background material. By background

material is meant any encumbrance describing the old war between Blues

and R~ed& with a lengthy dissertation on Blue's economic situation, or a

long and irrelevant discussion of the strategic background of the problem.

Finally, the time limit was to be estimated with realism and the student

encouraged with an occasional short lesson.

165

.. -.. . .. . . . .... . .... lk: - - ~ -...
It was necessary to keep the extension courses abreast of the

latest developments in technique, usually done through the yearly

revision, but at times these revisions had to be shifted about to meet'

an uuiusual situation. Between December 1938 and January 1940 it

was necessary to revise five Field Artillery Books and 12 subtourses.

Six of these twelve were the gunnery courses, the revision of which

was concentrated in this period to leave the next year free for revisions

arising from the new triangular division. This load, according to Col

McIntyre, was about 50% above normal.

Other changes in extension courses came from War Department directives which altered their content, scope, and texts. Thus,

in April 1939, the War Department directed a drastic change of previous policy to be carried out in the three years beginning 1940-1941.

Both courses and texts were affected, As for courses, itwas ordered

that only such instruction be given as woudd prepare the "student for his

duties on mobilimation. About 75% of the course was to be devoted to

instruction appropriate to the grade, and Z5% to'the duties of the next

higher grade. Previously, courses had fitted officers for the next

higher grade, and one may perhaps see in this step a reflection of the

European crisis. If practicable, the course length should be about 30

hours. The first step in carrying ouk this directive would be to eliminate the Command and General Staff courses from the 50 and 60-series

and substitute suitable arm and service courses. The second step was

to be a readjustment of the other series along the lines above,

Special texts, such as the Field Artillery Books, were to be

used only in the absence of War Department publications on an

essential subject, for eubcourses which would otherwise require the

use of small portions of several War.Department publications, or

when economy overrode all other considerations. In meetinig such

problems, first consideration should be given to amplifying memo-.

randa with the lessons.

The department that prepared these courses, the Extension

Course Department, was under a director with the rank of major,

and was composed of the JBook and Text Section with two officers, the

Subcourse Section with two more, and the Illustrations Section with

one. The primary mission of the department was the preparation of 1

all field artillery extension course material, but it also prepared texts

S'., for ROTC use, and edited and coordinated all instructional material

for resident instruction. The average yearly production was about

three texts and eight eubcourses revised or prepared. The printing

of all strictly field artillery material was done at the School printing

plant.

166 •i I
In preparing this extension course material, a routine was

A •lowing followed, year, Durinsi both one eubcourses -school year, and -the revision progir.n fot tho fol- teots# was blocked out in conformity

with the. Chief's orders, In preparing the first draft, a member of the It

ExtensionCourse Depairtmeont worked with a msnbi r of the department teachingi tht 'subJect. The@ department; itself -then prepared the finished Ii Tmanulscript.

The Training Literature Project, 1936-1940

The training literature project, noted in the previous chapter,

wan to be completed by 1937. How was it faring? In 1936, the

training literature system included: the 430-series of training regula- tions; the Field Artillery Field Manual in two volumes, Organization

and DrUil, Tactics and Technique; the Field Artillery Book series, the Field Artillery School instructional texts (instruction memoranda,

Field Artillery School iotes, etc.). The training regulations were a "N

series Of looseleaf pamphlets.; the ,iol4' Miknul was in plirt a duplica- tioz of the training regulations and in'part like a textbook.

Manual on.. .F... .. Arti.lery*

The status of thp Field Aftilliry Books'may be shown by an .,4

illustrative Manual incident. $ine in 1936 the parts of the new rtie on .lannery An tM firil•ng battery could not be cometrod on1+"ii"

schedule, theAhool aupgosted issuing Irield Artilliry'Dooks'161 and

162 to the troops, at the expense of the Book Department. The Office

of the Chief of rield Artillery approved, 'but the War Department did

not concur, saying it co€uld not approve a general distribution, and'

instead ordered revision of War Department literature.

The origin of two of the Field Artillery Books may be of interest, Field Artillery:Book 161 began as' a gunnery instruction memorandum

August 1935, pending it. final approval as a Field Artillery 'Book. F'AB 120, Motors, was based on instruction memoranda M-Z6 to M-49 inclusive, reduced about 12%. It was used in its entirety for the lRegul&r ;' and Motor Mechanics courses, but the Advanced Motors course used it only as a review in the first part of the course, mince it needed more

advanced texts and usee some civilian books.

Work was progressing steadily on the new Field Artillery Field

Manual and by the summer of 1937 the Schooi had completed Parts Two, and Four to Eleven, inclusive. Criticism of the field rmanual by the

Adjutant General and the Office of the Ohief of Field Artillery, and

revision to meet these criticisms, took until February 1939. In April 1939 the fieW. maina&l weeaback again, ..the. W~e..Department saying it

was thought advisable to hold up the revision until changes incident

t•x the new diviusinal organization could be announced, and some points "

167 Ij

I.I

...- '. . .. ,,- ____ •
of doctrine also were raised, In the same month-the Adjutant OIneral'u

Office announced the number-block systemiof aumbeoing field rmnual+s

under which the Field- Artillery's manuile became the 6-series.. For

example, under this systpm, Volumes _W, IV, and V of the Field

Manual became FM 6-20, 1940' edition. Portions of' the Field Manual

revised *ccording to this latest plan began going back to the War

Department in May 1939, and the first portions of it began appearing

in tne fall'of 1939.

It will also be recalled that the Field Artillery BoQks had been

outlined as an integral part of the training literature project. Jnder

the topic of extension courses, it was noted how they were affected by

the directive of 1939 which changed the scope and content of the

extension courses. Having traced the Field Artillery Field Manual

to its completion by the School, the history of the Field Artillery

Books should4oe traced through the same period of years.

.",,In 1938 the Chief of Field Artillery comenented that the scope

and content of the Field Artillery Books was correct and well established. Further revision, it was believed by that authority, should be

handled in this manner.. Changes should first appear in instruction

memoranda at the School and be ironed out in lnstruction:and.expiriment there., Those little texts would bear the warning "Experimental,

for use in resident instruction at the Field ArtiUlery School only."

Changes in the Field Artillery Field Manual under preparation would

be authority for changes In the Field Artillery Books at their next

revision. As for the coardination of text and subcourse revision,

the 8choal. should try to rexa t t t before the corresponding subcourse was urp for revision,. ad revise ahead • schedule, if the

demand warranted. No texts.were to be revised in 1939-4940 because

of the change in arMy~organiaation.. Minor changes could be put inbne,

notes in the subcourses and, lastly, because of the cost, revision should be undertaken only When nOcessary,

Eventual elimination of the Training Regulations series was

foreseen by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Brig Gen ft. M. Beck, Jr.,

in June 1938. In the spring of 1939 came the War Department directive, previously referred to, which marked the Field Artillery Books

for eventual extinction, however long they might linger as ROTC

texts. After weighing this directive, the Office of the Chief of Field

Artillery in October 1939 considered that the War Department wanted

the new Field Artillery Field Manual to be suitable for use with the

ROTC and other civilian components, and to eventually replace all

but five Field Artillery Books, The Field Artillery Books would be

continued an D OTC texts until the new Field Manual appeared, and

168
then it would be seon to what extent it could replace them. The 

- '

Field Manual wguld also be used at the School supplemented by

ins trudtion' mirno randa.. .

wftithtegothoitr in taing a~ds, mo~rlng pictures

grow;iný imnpdrtance arid by 1939, if not earlier, there was 'a training

film prograna, with films listed in order of priority, and each arm

allowed &'quota. If the 10ieid Artillery School were called on to

prepare a film on the 75-mm gunix n any of its incarnations, the

School wodild prepare an outline or "picture plan,"1 which would go

to the Chief's office, from there'to the Signal Corps, and thenc-e

to Wright Wield', where a scenario would be prepared by the Train'-

ing Film Field Unit. This would return to the Department of Mani

teriel, from there to the Extension Course Department, and out

* from them, via the"- Assistant ýConimandant. A l1imion and 'tuchni'-o

Lal directlz'..Werd at,- the ri~eld Artilltry:4chool to coave:y 'the

scenario to the officer in uhaaige of thd filmn unit, 'and to'*iork with

him ariuithe film crew that shot the picture.

1i si.1e an'.l pro "i'ctioti 6f traihing literitdre wekre hanidle'd by

the 'Book:Depa'tmunt and'the Beeproduction '))epaivi1aaent'-ro spsectiveily','

The: Book frupartuaent'wau the' sal.. 'agent for the 1R.epvoduction

Departiventt. It sold ilnsttuctiona'l-ltewature and non-los'%id 651APpliS, * ~~~for #k~mple, vimsentialw training liternature, school' su* ' lies ucus

and, the *training literature' for'civilian, components, ' The Reproduction

Department did the necessary printing~ ano rxotoduction for 'tho

School,. plum work for ladal units and adtivities at cost, Absolutstl?

no pri~Vate work was handled,' Th~e vdidme'of work done was -most'

impressive. During tht'school year 1935-1936" chosen at Vandom, it ade4, 96, 713' inapressions in doing 90i jobs. 'The ething'

department made '566 etchings, 31 halftones, an~d 211I brats-splates, The mrntaeograph department ran 840, 498 copies of 3,703 stencils.

The lithograph department made 7?, 855 lithograph impressions and

103, 860 multilith impressions, Plainly, there was the capacity to

hanije the emergency requirements of 1941-1946.

The Field Artillery Digeot-was suspended indefinitely in

'1'May 1939. No issue had been published ina 1938, General Danford

*1 agreeing to Wput what material was aivailable in the Field Artillery

Journal. Iax 1939 theie'School argued that what material was 41'an f

was unsuitable, being he'rely descriptive of technical processes

which were either being cove'red in new nanuals or were eloe insufficiently crystalimedi With some regret, General Danaford agreed.

169
Sudeat quota. and RoeQgrements .

Officers of ho Regular Army were sent to tht I'l.ld Artillery School under a policy which except for an increase in the

yearly quota, did not change. during 1935-1.940.. In,. ,une..1936 .the

quota of Regular Army artillery students was trimmed from 58 to

56. In order to send as many of those men as possible to the.

Field Artillery School., the o'.aeional details to the infantry and

Cavalry schools and to foreign schooli were eliminated, but even

with thic, the tf-nrdency would be tc build up an inrreasing backlog.

It was feared rhat by 1942-1.943 the majority of entcring'utudents

would have had six years service whereas previously the average

was four. This General Birnie managed to avert by an increase

in the yearly quota, which may be noted in the table at the end

of this ,chapter.. The War Department'.•uota fpr service schools

did not at this time. reflect economic, consideration# as much as.

it did a shortage of office rs for troop O1

•fy..

Students in the Regular Course who were selected under this

quota did not have to apply for detail to the Field Artillery School

but wer* selected by the War Deportment oa. thq chief's T0commqndation, .,t4ou4hAn,;.xcep46lnl ca se the iniftativa.might, come from

the War Department. An age limitioG 48 years. was, set in 1936,.

effective in the. fal.oof 19,38, but since students .tendqd. to enter while,

in thel'r twmntiss, tl.6'e.rv was of limited application. National Quard

officers who wished to attend applied through channels to their

sa'. *a5 Ad4jutant General# who in tqxn 4ozwarded it through the corps

area commander, to tbse Chief of t.ýe National Quard Bureau. The

Reserve officer -applied throu.gh. his. corps commander. The Allotment of Reserve officers by branch to attendeervAie schools was

set up annually by, the War Department and given to corps areas.

Officer ,pecialists) mr.tor, horsemanship$ commnication, applied

to the Chief after completing the Regular Course, but by 1938 they

also had to have the recommendation of the Commandant and to have

been members of the most recent Regular Cocrue.

, I

After graduation from the course, Regular Army students

could select their next station from a list of available vacancies.

Up to 1939, the Chief's office tried Lo favor school troops in making

such assignments, but that practice was slowed by the activation r

of 20 new batteries in that year. Oficer specialists in seeking

admission to their particular course had to sign a statement that

they wouJ.d not seek a detail to another 4.rM %intil they had completed

four years postgraduate service OA th the Field Artillery. Graduates

of Advanced Motors were dim tributed among motorized units as

"equitably as possible.

170

I *. 170 .4'•
National Guard and Reserve officer requirements, in more

%Ietail, stipulated that the applicant pass a physical examination

iminediately before submitting 7 h4s .pplication 4nd that he paso

another on reporting to the School. Hpe had to, be less than 40 or,

the opening dlay of the course. ard could not be serving at his own

expense. Until the fall of 1937 only a few subcourses were required to have been co.npleted, but after that date 16 were required.

It was not the policy to send officers of the civilian components to

more. than one course as officers.

National Guard enlisted men were also r,-quired to pass

the two physical examinations and to have at least a year to serve

in the Guard. after completion. of the, course.. A certain technical

proficiency in their specia.lty. was requir.ed, and, like officers,

they could go to only one service school, though they might go again

as officers. , .

When a battery commander in the Regular .Army sent one

of his enlisted men to the Fi~ld Artillery School in 1938, his '!Approval

of each man should be e quivalent to a certificate that the man is

qualified in the grade which he now holds. and shows'every indication

of suitability for a higjher.grade... (and) provide good instrucLor

material for his organi.atkion.. ' In more' detail the requirements were:

battery mechanics, im Shi grade.education and three to six years

experience as a machinist or carpenter; communications specialiat,

an 8th grade education, one year in the communication section of a

headquarters battery, qualified to send and receive ten 5-letter code

groups per minute, and receive and transmit five characters per'

minute by semaphore; horseshoers, at least one enlistment with one

year's apprenticeship, literL to, of sturdy physique and oven dispo- I

sition; mo-tor mechanics, 8th grade education, at least one year's

experience in military automotive maintenance, able to instruct, able

to receive and give instruction on the duties of a regimental or battery

motor sergeant or senior mechanic; saddler., literate, one year's

apprenticeship, one enlistment; sergeant instructors, completion of

the following sub-courses: Firing Batte,'v 1, Preparation of Fire

1, Field Artillery Signal Communication 1, and Conduct of Fire I.

E xcept for the requirements for motor mechanics, the ubove were

suggested by Col McIntyre in his letter of Majrch 1, 1938. -

Enlisted classes that were not filled from the servict, were

filled by drafs from school troops, but demand3 on these courses

were riving in 1938, and so Col McIntyre suggested fall courses

for battery mechanics and communications specialists. In many

cases, enlist6d students did not meet the entrance requirements.

171
Of the 203 students in enlisted coimmunications in the years 1 937,

1938, and 1939, 90 men from 76 different'organizations did not meet

the requirements for proficiency in cods, and a similar situation,

according to the Assistant Commandant, Col LeRoy P. Collins,

existed in other courses. The Chief's ofice ruled that if the

instructions for the current year did not produce improvement,

the only remedy would be to report offending organizations to

Corps Area commanders.

A complete academic records system for enlisted men was

installed in 1937-1938. The changed system showed the grade

attained and the student's rating, as against the bare statement of

previous years that the student had graduated or failed. These

records, however, were not broken down by subcourees.

There was also a system of requirements that enlisted men

had to meet before enrolling in the extension courses, based on

the principle that students must meet age and education requirements for a commission in the organized Reserves and may be

expected to meet other requirements incident to appointmentt. This

was interpreted by AR 140-29 as meaning practical knowledge

about equal to that acquired by a&graduate of the CMTC Blue Course.

For organizations under his command, Col McIntyre took the regulations to require the rank of sergeant or higher. Any others

had to be men of exceptioital ability who could meet a practical

test in conformity with an order of the 8th Corps Area during their

current enlistment.

Two Commandants

In this chapter we have often mentioned the names of Maj

Gen Henry W. Butner and Col Augustine McIntyre, and it may be

well to say something of their army careers. Ceneral Butner

graduated from West Point in 1898, and except for a year at the

Staff College, was on troop duty until 1918, when he went to France,

winning the Distinguished Service Medal there. From 1920 to 1924

he was Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, and

followed this with duty in the Phillipines and Hawaii. General

Butner was Commandant from 1934 to 1936.

Colhnel Augustine McIntyre, his successor, returned to

the Field Axtillery School for the fourth time in 1936, He had

*• been a student in 1911, senior instructor from 1912 to 1914,

Assistant Commandant in 1919 and 1920, and in 1936 took over the

School as its Commandant. In 1914-1915 he was a military observer

with the itoyal and Imperial Austro-Hungarian forces. From there

he went to Hawaii, and from Hawaii to France as a Brigadier General.

S17Z

"0
His postwar service, after leaving the Field Artillery School, was

spent with troops, iha Hawaii,_and as Pre~sident of the Field Artillery

Board, from wbich'high~ly rospo. ;sible post he camre to Fort Sill.

Expansion Qf Mounted Activities

The Chief of Field Artillery's direc~tive of 1934, establishing

the Polo Team and the Horse Show Team as among the important

activities of the School, enad directing attention to the importance of

mounted work, had its desired effect, , Horses. and horsemaniship

flourished at Fort Sill between 1935 and 1940. Was this a stop

backward? Many of those who criticized the American army, urging

it to adopt the mechanized warfare of the Germans, were unaware

that the bulk of the, Go rM&A Amy was maue. up of infantr~y divisions,

These divisions, iricludiAIg their artille~y, were orgaspized on a

horse -drawn basis,. and were, so. organized during, the~ir great: days

of 1939-1940. In 1940, as in,1,935, thiq A~pprlAn infantry division

was more highly motorized than its opposite number in Germany.

Interest in.,the ho.rsp was not, thezh a. step backward. The horse

shows and. polo teams,. zýormpover, .we ro legitimate tra~ining activities, I

Both re presented, competition at itz keenest and thereby sev~erely

tested the artilliery's methods of horse training, and horse management...

Between 1.935. and 1940 the Department of Animal Transport

greatly expanded its activities to include mmiapy things beyond formal.

instruction. Additional instruction in polo. anid equitation on a volunteer basis ga iven to stdnsof tie-Reaular course. Classes

were also held for women and children, for the Boy Scouts and

Girl Scouts, and a mounted troop of Girl Scouts was organized. The

Department sponsored and organized the two biggost horse shows

of the year, the Field Artillery School Horse Show and the Interpost Show, held in the equestrian stadium which was rebuilt in

1936-1937 ar.d named in honor of the late Lt Col William H. Rucker,

The Interpost Horse Show includnd the spring hunter trials and

race meet, and featured teams from other posts. Fall hunter trials

were also held, and informal horse shows were held monthly in the

riding hall throughout the winter and early spring. These mounted ;4

activities all came officially under the Department of Animal Transport in April 1936.

The tacilities with which the Departmenet did its work were

a mixture of the very goo'd and. the very poor. Rucker park was

an admirably equipped equestrian stadium and a beauty spot besides,

The new býarracks and headquarters of the Department was a mode ra,

173
' p -

well constructed building -The old stables of the departmenthad been where the Adminis t ation Building Later stood, and its construction, of course, made a change ne~eswary The hew stables

were new in name only, being built of salvaged lumber, and were of

the open shed type. The tack rooms we're nOt weatherproof. The

horse show shop was put in another building made of salvaged lumber,

and was regarded as a fire hasard.

One of the activities stressed in the Chief's'directive of 1934

was polo. This game was regulated by the Polo Association which

divided the United States into six circuits, of which Fort Sill was

in the Northwestern (Oklahoma, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri,

Nebraska, Iowa, Idaho, North and South Dakota). There were two

big tournaments, the National Intercircuit, and the National 12-Goal ,

Championship. Most of the School'!'."games wire of course in '

intracircuit tournamentu. :'The association gave financial ,id to

teams appearing in the national tournaments.

The first big polo year was 1935-1936, When Lt 0.. X.

Cusack, No. 1, Capt C. N. McFarland, No. '.,, Capt Eugene

McGinley, No, 3, and CaptH. W, Kiefer, No. 4, with Lt V. B,

Barnes, substitute, won 16'Of 22 tournament games.' Five 66 the

six games lost were lost by one goal. This polo activity was not

by any means confined to the "varsity. 11 In all, there were five

polo teams at the School, 36 officers played, and about 80 public

mounts were engaged. This number of officers must have beep close to half the number permanently stationed at the post and does

not include the students who played after close for recreation and

exercise." '" '

As for the type of polo played, the policy was to concentrate

on 12-goal and intercircuit competition, which was held within reach

of most players. Horsemen of a class good enough to enter compe- I'

tition for the Junior championship were thought better employed

coaching younger players. Within the limits thus set, the Polo

Team did consistently well. In 1936, Capt Hugh(Cort, Capt C. N.

McFarland, Lt E. A. Walker, and Capt H. W. Kiefer wor. the

circuit tournament, and the Devereaux Milburn Cup, with MaJ H. W.

Watson as No. 1. In September, 1936, MaJ Watson and Capts

McFarland, Kiefer, and Smith won two tournaments at Shreveport,

La., beating Houston, then the new National Intercircuit Champions.

The next year was even better. The Northwestern Intercircuit

was won at Fort Sill in June, 1937. Later in the summer, at Chicago,

the Field Artillery School took second place in both the National Intercircuit and 12-Obal Championship tournament. Thp Devereaux

17

174
"Milburn tournament and the Northweate rn.Inte rcircuit were, won at

Fort Sill in June,, 1938.. Members of lthe team were;,Capt John

A. Smith, team captain; Capt A. E Solem; lot:Lt T•. E., Walker,

and let Lt D. W. Smith.

•Sine 1930, no.Field Artillery team had. won the National

* Into rcircuit, but,under ,the leadership of.Capt J. ýA. Smith,, the Field

Artillery School team won-the NatiQn&l Inte rcircuit, the Northwestern Intercircuit, ani, the .Northwestern Intcacircuit and went

to the semi-finals of the AZ-Goal Championship which w&s never

completed becaube of rain. Members were: Capt.A. R. S. Bai-den,

Capt A. E. Solem; let Lt M. W. Brewster. let Lt D. W. Suduuth

joined after his graduation from the Regular Course, and let Lt

E. A. Walker pl&yesd.g, f onsi e , part, 9fthe y Te. he

DeverosuxM.i.lb, rn.,CUp,,was won egain June 25, 1939,

The.. Horse 051owtoam was the.other,instrwentay- Iwhi•4'ch'it

wasproposed t9.keepjahigh ,#taA4rd ri horsqmanship,and pneintain L

interest in equestrian activitits.. The •Horse Show section 9 .the

Department of Animal Transport in.thejfallof .1,936 waq .c9rqposael ofI

Maj N. J. UM¢:Mahon, lot FA (in charge); Capt E. L. Andrews, of

the Detachment; knd Lt A., X& 3o4m, all stationed on the Post.

With the Olympic tra.4ningoqua wtre; Capt 1. L. Kitts, 18th ]FA;

Capt F. J-.Wil4e.um, .8t TA; let Lt H. .3. Is0acoqn, 18th FA. Kitts

and Willems remained with the team an members of the dressage

and three-day teams respectively. . lot Lt A. G. Stone, let FA,tl

joined the section in Decembe.r. Members of the team were employed

throughout the year in instruction, with McMahon conducting classes

in advanced horsemanship, and. Capt Kittes teaching the departmental

staff. three times weekly. Personnel of the team joined in the fall J

and spring hunter trials; the 1936 Olympics; the Portland, Ore., F,.

horse show; the National Horse Show at New York; the Toronto

Winter Fair; the International Competition in Chile; the Olympic

Horse Show in London.

One of the most fondly romembered exploits of the Horse ,,

Show Team was the viisit to the, Mexico City show, in Decembe r 1938,

when the team won 4l. b.ut two primes*., The., Megicans had most

hospitably iyvited bks team (Mexican eoldi•rs were often welcome

guests at Fort Sl) but for some time administrative difficulties p.

threatened to aske the trip impossible. When these had been cleared

from the way, Maj McMahon, Capt Andrse,,, Capt L. S. Griffing,

Capt H. S. Isaacson, and at W, A. Harris made the trip. Nor should

their gallant horses, Virginia Navarre, Billy the Kid, Silent Sam,

Judge, Honolulu Tomboy, Drumme r Boy, Stone Verne, and Osito,

be forgotten. The trophies won, equestrian bronzes cast in the

175

S.,,

! •
Mexican arsenals, and bearing such names as "BRevolucianario del

Norte" -and "Revolucianario del Sur" were later on display in the

Officers Mess at Fort Sill.

Preparations for the 1940 Olympics, shhedauled for Finland,

went forward in 1939, the team training actively at Fort Riley and

Fort Robinson between June and October. After the tTials, had been

completed it was plain that no Olympics wbuld be held for'many years,

and the members of the team returned to "ort Sill. With the expansion

of the Army in 1940, dissolution of the team became necessary.

Construction, 1 936-1940

The physical frame in which these activities took placC, the

buildings and facilities of the post, were constiantly beiinigmproved

during this period. For one thing, the Roosevelt Administration

was comMited tea policy of aiding recove-'y through a., blic' Works

program; for anotheri the gradual kwaktning of the American people

to the menace of an aggressive Germany led to a slow but steady

improverhent in the condition-of the Army . ,

Two of the most familiar local landmarks, Theatre No. I

and the Swimming Pool, date from this period.s The graceful white

columns of the old Liberty theatre had framed many a graduation j

ceremony, but the building was believed to be far past the period of economical repair, if not actually dangerous, and in 1936 efforts

were made to get early action o4 it., Unfortunately the theatre at

Fort Knox had No. I - priority, and Fort Mill had to wait for a-while. Trhe next obstacle to be overcome was' that of i lack-of W'. P. A. labor, as by December, 1936, the state's quota was filled., Patrons of theLiberty theatre ha& to be content with glowing tales of~the- now theatro, which they were told would be like the one at Fort Sam Houston. The

local Dramatic Club, whose productions, unlike those of many dramatic

clubs, were financial as well as artistic successes, took a deep

interest in the project. Through the good offices of the Commandant, '

Col McIntyre, they were able to have some of their ideas put in the

final plans. The Illustrations Section of the Extension CoUrse Department made plans for the scenery, stage lighting, and back stage

facilities of the thefatre. The theatre was finally opened October 13,

1938. Its appearance, both exterior and interior, wwas most pteasikn.

The necessity for economy in construction, fo' providing a maximumr

of seating space at a minimum of cost, resulted in a building that

was functional and modern, in modified Spanish style, and free of the

gimcracks and gewgaws that disfigure so many theatres. It was a

true asset to the Post.

176
Anyone who• ha•sver ipent a. summer at-Fort Sill' can apprei.

ciate the need for meay large swimming pool@. • ýThey are mOst

essential: for relief from-the heat. -"For many years 'the'only'pool J;.

open to the majority of the command' wm 'that fornied by damrning

Medicine Bluffs Creek near the bluffs. There were other pools on

the reservation,' but ualeos one. hadl aca~r 'they could not be used.

The main. wimllingp.l-"' was often 'unusable' in timei of drought

because the creek's normal flow decreased to a point that the water

in the pool became stagnant and unsanitary. The pool was improved

in 1934 by building a rock and- concrete dam, and retaining wails of

the same material on either side 'of the creek for about 100, yards.

A drought in 1936 forced the closing of the pool in August,

and C•l ;Mcntyre, moved•to get W.,P.A. ;funds for-the building of at '

new pool back of the officers Mess.. The'W.PA', agreed' to 'furnish

money for enlisted men's and officers' pools if the School could provide' 25% ottht cost, and even thist figure would. be cut to 15% in actual

cash by credito/for fornishial gravel:and machinery. By the use of"

local funds such- as. the lducation and' Rocreation fund, it was possible

to raise the Sohools share,of the, expense, but then it was' found that '

W. P.A. -labor could notbe oabairAd..' CCC men could not be'usod on

such a project, so 4anthe "a the two pools, one just behindthe Offsicer'- Club, and one -a. tkb'.eshOree of'Medicine Bluffis;O(dekahere some

of the base ho'spital wsldWhad been in- the lastwar, we're built' by

soldier labor and School funds.

' As the International situation worsened' steadily' in' the late'

thirties, an increase ia the Army became unavoidable, and it was

increased to about 166, 000'men.- Of the resultant increase, 600

came to Fort Sill, which called for & change in the School' housing

program. Col McIntyre accordingly had the plan redrafted, and it

was approved by the Chief, oenoral Birnie, substantially -as McIntyre

submitted it, with costs shaved a little to bring them in line with:,

those of the now obsolete program of a few years back. W.P.A.

projects on the post at this time were at a standetiJl due to the lack

of labor, since the state's quota was filled. Col McIntyre also

pointed out in November that the lengthy period of uncertainty as to

the definite location oft the Field Artillery School was another reason H

why construction at the IPoat seemed to lag behind the activity at

other posts. ' '. .

"Col McIntyre's new housing program was presented to the

Washington press in February 1937 as a $6, 000, 000 five year plarn.

The more important items were: barracks for the 29th Infantry,

the 77th Field Artillery, the lot Field Artillery, and the quartermaster detachment; an annex to the administration building; post

177
theatre; 72 sots, of noncommiss ionsed officers quarzto esat-Post Frield;

* ~drill and riding hall; reproduaction plantl post chidrenls school, gym.-

riasiumn and rec~reation hall. :The program wasimoat comprehensive,

but was not adopted in its entirety.

*The second great~building period bogan with approval by the

Bureau of the Budget of $1.2'90, 000 for Fort Sill in June 1938 to b.c

used for barracks. for 1, 000 men and additional noncommissioned

officers and nurses..quarters, no doubt a part of the money appropriated to combat the "recession" of 1937-1938. Five hundred thousand

dollars in W.P?.A. funds was made available if the needed labor coulid

1)c secured. Col McIntyre was quite appreciative of the work of the

W. P. A-., once writing that the ever-present scoffing remarks, as

far &s this post was.L-oncernad, wert ** entirely. unwarranted:.

Them.* men that. we have are. oecollent workers i.,

* A revised conetruction program was -sent in toi the Chief of

Field Artillery in November 193S, .appropoo of which. McIntyre remarked earlier in the year that he had enough projects on hand to

keep the W, P. A. busy fox a year. -In commenting on the program,

General IDenford.:.the Chief,. suggested that all motorization.faciiities!

* ~be put in one group with one priority sad tht cuts be made in stre~t

lighting and road construction. The builldings in which he seemed

most interested weret: garages. for the School troops. three quartermaster warehouses; a guardhouse; an addition to the veterinary hospital.- a reproduction plant; an addition to the Administration

building; a materiel building; a drill and riding hall,, a gymnasium; and a post children's school. A-letter ef 1939 stated that the program

was favorably regarde~d by G-4. With the coming of war in Europe, * and the resulting need for swift expansion of the Army, in. the beginning temporary structures only were authorized. and with the one or

two exceptions, no new permanent buildings of importance could be

* begun whil?% the war was on.

Room for (iring was anothor and most important facility.

During 1939-1 940 the range was increased by the purchase of land

connecting the reservatian with the Wichita Mountains Wildlife

Refuge on the west, extending the northern boundary to the country road leading to Medicine Park, and extending the reservation farther 

t

south, permitting firing south of Signal Mountain. In all, the increase

added someA 20, 000 acres, and permitted firing at ranges up to ZO, 000

yards.

* The National Guard camp at Fort Sill, the so-called concurrent

4 camp, came in for its share of improvemzent- -when its turn came.- 

A

letter of December 1938 said that the concurrent camp estimates for

178 

.
Fort Bill included, Owtmmzig PPIoS,. assez~bly bWlA, etc,, which -the M

War Department did not normally include aunti the satire concurrent

*camp projeqt wait 4g lk b.4S4 state of comapletion. F~urther, concurrent

camp prolecto qouldnP~t be included with pe rmanent cons truction for

Ii -the Reogula.r Army,. sisp.ially sinvethe; Nxtional Defense Act. speci - fically forbade permanont construction in sueh camps.-. Fort Bill

warn listed for saxly work lwitbhlwtwo years), however. -Actually, the

time arrived agS~a4.-desl o.ooaex!,th&An that, for in June. 1939 General

Danford wI.s ble. to; write; th~at $400, 000 wauld be -spent on rehabili -

- . tating the camp, and it was actually conoplesed A.a moat ~useful time,

June 1940.

The Water Problem

* .oarly dfftra.40f oxel. $o puarit -of tb. wato . Irom lAke

Lawtonhfh14 I tj*tq& bY tnAI l9~5, whwentke problsm -

resuvemote iua&iWioxemt~qrxn,ý that oA qapiwcity.. Agitation began

in that yea:s tQ raiweUp Isvol, 0-414h 4am,, ewproj*,at that was .,qpodily

approv 4, in -WA Phigtq#nbutWks not i xneiately carried Into~. effect,.

Colonel Ucintyroe entered the smceo, in-Augae~t.1 936 with a. letter to

-I ~~the. 44ieL VZOPosing thatsipceaicis in~military population.wak,

in~minept, wgi4es~p~repply-was dooirablie. Also, :the

water warn then only eight fv*et b0lo6wthctop of the dam,. andsamy sort

of rain would moon send it over the top to be wasted. The Chief's

reply noted briefly tazt the project had boon, approved in Washington,

the rest thnis being up to the state officials. There the matter rested

for two years. *'

:in 1,937.7 here were ruxaors 'of a further increase i.n troops at .

Fort Sill; iad -a wnesting botwiel, repro& entatives of the Post and the

city considered ad4it~ioxw to the filter pl~nt, -then running at capacity,

and the provision of increased water storage facil~tiss, -The dam

raising project was apparently not mentioned at this meeting and did

not arise again until the winter of 1937-1938. Approval of the dam

-project. this, Urns; doepenM4d on LAwto'sk~ raising $90, 000.0 Qo f the

necessary cost 4nd guaranteeing that~a. uscful unit of the 4am. could

be bitilt for the eetimst*4 cost. Colonel McIntyre again a.rgedi

strongly *as a pre~parednas measure. .Ad~ the. project Was approved.

by theW,V. A,-:in February 1938. .

* When bvwildiiig began., it was XL4Zosemsy frtechgiglal reasons

to lower the level of the water in the. rese~rvoir, and a drought.

promptly follokwed. The most s~evere restrictions on water use.

oere imposed.. Fo; gsasuplqk the latriness were closed in the National

Guard camp area in. the owomoir of 1939. This, crisis causned a cartain concera in the Wakr pappartmontt where some people thought it

179
might bepermanent., Mclntyre wrote-July .22 i1939:

"IfTo-boe who doesz'tkAoW;thi whole story of

the present water shortage, theie may occutr doubts

as to the suitability Of FortBSill as A mobilis&tion

center in time of war, Many'still remember the

shortage in 1917'and will think that this is likely to

occur again. If I am not. mistaken. as a safety precaution the lake was lowered the equivalent of 19* feet

during the construction of the now dam. -This was

followed by the present drought period. Once this is

over and the lake fills up to the new dam, the water

supply will be permanently solved."

To meet the emergency, Lawton laid a pipe line from Lake

Saush to Lake -ed Johnson to Lake Thonuta, and tried'to dig soie,.

new wells., whidh when completed were thought- to contain fluorite.

salts in dangerous proportions., In April 1940 the drought was still

on, Lawton was. putting down. more wells- and was'borrowing from

the reservoir. A pump newly placed by the Post at the old Ambrosia

Springs was pumping Z00, 000 gallons a day. But these were regarded

as makeshifts, and there' was 'doubt that Vort Bill could play its 'prt in the crisis growingmore apparent daily. .

The Schoel Troops, 1936-1940

Of the many things done by the S.hool troops during the five

years or so before the war, there are three that are especially noteworthy: the special duty battalion; the long training marches; and the

departure for maneuvers in 1940. The first is of interest as a means

of handling an always annoying training problem, the second illustrater

a mobility that would have seemed fantastic a decade before, and the

third illustrates a happy contrast with 1916.

The work that the School troops did specially for the School

may be summed up as tests of one sort and another, service practice

firing, the supply of motor vehicles, field exercises, and, for both

Post and School, the special duty battalion. In addition to the many

tests mentioned earlier, in connection with progres's along various oi

lines, one may mention a test of the 75-mm gun M1916 with St.

Chamond recoil. This test was made by Battery B, l1t Battalion,

77th FA which found them satisfactory. A test also was made of the

gunne r'Is quadrant MI and the range quadrant. Ml in Octobe r of 193 9.

On this occasion it was decided to recommend the gunner's quadrant

for all precision firingi requiring an accuracy setting down to , IrA

and to recommend the other for types of firing where accuracyto the

nearest . 5ri was sufficient.

180

I ---- -

-mmm,
The;troops!, wor. in supporting. service practice, went, on as

usual: thanks. to. the hard w.q4-.&Adedication of those men. The

supply of motor yveo Ie from phpo1.,,troops torxnstrAtional pisr- S~~~~~poss, Le'Sxclue~ye o ofthe ti p ,th yr' mee .urni f s hod for Admiaisktrativo e

purposes, imposed n rddU sha:4ships.. -The annual rport, for

1937-1938 had a table showing the extentof this work. In-September,

the lot Field Art•1lery gave aan average of 21 vehicles on each..of nine

days; in October# Z9 on each of 19 days; in Novembrc,; 35 on each of

26 days. The 29th ufastry, haci no denraada n.aide -on it until December,

then it furnished 10. yehiclo.e on eachof eight days and contipued *A &a

like scale tp theend of the.year, The 2d AmmurnAion Train inr

January gave 27 vehicles on each of 25 days, in February, 26 on each

of 23 days. The contributions of the 18th Field Artillery range f'crn

zero to 37 as against 21 to 130 by the lql Fiele. Artillery. A motor

poo ,w4e IerOMd,1 *e (oUew.I*g yea1 whkch opateO4lte ,wA

voht•c w•U.e Well 4s ,th•se $tskp qn•m• the. Ath ri*AL Artil•r¥e Brlgade, ., bm~t the.report fkr, "t ar states that .demopds, go the SchooI trops'

vehicles continued heavy...

The role of *thq $ahool Lroopia officer in the field exercises

was, anluo)az pe.,.rpapoe was a. pa~rt of the. School.

staff on tho~a _ocxaim.. ',-'T.he peffectfunct$ongfthe School troops

was as inlmpatott.he pawt ,f.ct oansg 9,1 )l•aW tory e.qolpmeont so

that the .studont wsWall.bo lrse tojgrapple withtho, problem IWolf. These officers were responsible at all times for .the p~roper. trainin 1a4 n4 sci" pline of School troopd. They complied with all orders on the conduct of

the oxzciq*e t.athey might receive frQm instructors, and they acted

as assstant Jnstructors.when so requestecd by the Academic Division.

They took no part in the tactical han4Ling of their Lunits .during these

exercises, kintess the exercise so prescribed, or it woo necessary to

prevent damage. .. .

The special. dsty~batta&lon was organized in 1 936, its personnel detailed ona. percetage basis and rotated strictly. The recon- -I" 

ciling -of administratifie necespity with training needs is always a

problem for any ¢ommauder, and thip was an attempted solution.

Under this system, 91,61#,of the enlisted men of the combat units

were. rqreiving ml4tUry training. .Qn the other hand, men in admini.-

strative deti.ls from coin4t •'pte, such as. room orderlie.s and

kitchen police recelved13)% of the training received by the men in the .

group. above. This speciAtldpty uvitsupplipd aU labor for Post projects.

..

* I

* I
Typical of the leMS trali"`gmardhe weI VOthOse 6f th6e lit

Field A rtille ry., In' Octobe r 193 5 its headji-iV1 arte. c fAtaiY thica'h~d

to Ft. 'Sam-Hoaston and back in. five yays a distauto of 946 miles,.

In the following year, 'itLWofttI, 030 maie to -Tort Crocketto Textas,

and returned. Zattery B with the Band jolzaed' inthe Pionleer Cole-:

* bration in Clay County, Texas. 168 miles, and E went to the Fair

at P~ond Crook, Okl., 363 miles. -In 193 it surpassod itselfwith a march to Little Rock, Ark, , and return, 1, 165 miles. For

* service practice and taci~tcal training, a night march of 109 miles

was made from Ardmores Okla., to Fort Sill$ October I -Z, the

regiment taking position and firing on the morning of the Zd. It

may be that the longest trip by any of the field artillery units from

the Post was the 77th'. Jaunt to Carlsbad Caverns, N. M. , and

return$' 1, 336 miles. Proies's~nal pride in the achievements of the

* artillery should rist'a'vezhadowi the fact' that the I ii. Balloon Squadron

probably beaes,' Post champiand; by joining- in the 2 d Ai'my Mana.ive is

at Camp C~uster$ Mich., "marching" a total of a, 329 miles. Clearlyl

war had taken on a new aspect. ' ' 

'

The expansion vf the Army (discussed more fully latow)

resulted in changes@ in' the -organization of Scphopl troop&., 0A Auagust

1, '1-936-, 'the, 1ut Field.Artillery aid~the 18th. rieldArtillary were

roorganimed by reconstititing the h..dquartors. avid lisadquartaerw

batteries and combat trains 'of the 'Ltmand 2d battalions. The net'tt

reorganizationft came In '938.,

C and Fofte -t Felcl~tilr b iativaingther :it tans

and redi~stributig -their piarsonamlnd that of the other four letter

.batteries a"d headlquarters. batta riot. It was believesd that' batteries

C &ad -F of tke .1I8th 31.34 Artillery. could be created by itsactlvatlng*1 the two unmbat tranas &ad shillin szadess'aad ratings. The combat

traln~of the 1 at Battalion was already equipped with Lhe mondified 

*

75-mm gun 141897 and~ equipm~ent for the other would have to be

drawn. This reactivation was part Of a, larger plan to 'add. 20 more

firing batteries, by reactivating with personnel from disbanded serviebatteries. A upectacolar part of the reorg~nizatiuni'at Fort Sill

was a -march made by Battery E of ithe lath, briAgiuig hoases and guans.

from Fort Sam Houston, where they had belon~ged to'the 12th Field

Artillery. Horses and men arrived in fine shape, having covered

4 421 milesa in 14 daysL. In all, five batterie's were atdeds to the S5chool

that winter, including one mnore for the 77th Field Artillery, Colonel

McIntyre was most anxious to inactivate five combat trains to secure

their fuands and men for the now ba~ttrios, but the Chief of Field

Artillery disapproved, saying that it was desired to keep them active

at Fort Sill as the nearest possible approach tc, the war-strength type

I'A.
of organization always sought'fo0. thseFi4'ld' Artillery School. The

last increase of the period came November 14, 1939, with the

creitidnif 'tAI413d& Btalion6f the I st Field Artillery from other

"organisktibnu1in the regiimnent iatd from the headquarters and headquarters battry of the 4th Field' Artillery B rigade, '

"AnOthexi irmpo'.ra1ht organiratiinal chhange inl 939 occurred

whenh the School Troop* DIvision, one bf th.efour divisionsl' of the

Field ArLillery Schdol discussefd earlier, wag:aboliahed Augus t 19.

Its functions were discharged by'the Office of ths 'Commandant.

Thus, there were throe divisions left in the School: the Commandant and his staff, the Academic Division, and the Services.

Open fighting in the Second World War began in the fall of

1939, *,iien the' Polsh Re4ibli'elected' to westtthOerr•ia'Amy4 . -

Durintg the Tirst 'World Warb '&border erie ad forced the closing

of the SChobl." This 'time bur ddfinsed Wire- fair sttdnt*ei, but-war inh

E~urope held grave potentialities for •zsh and its caniing 'bt•ughL .

uncertainty, The School's role was thought to be fairly well defined,

but it was hot possibl kto: rnhw the futtise. The frst trbope left the

post In December, .hihn the' regime ntl'iheadquattesit 'and headquar- .1

tens 'battery and Id Utt&Ub•of the lst.FieldAttiliety left for"

mawduvere in Udisth Caitiam.' The l0t Aattalion of the 77th Field

Artill~iy went to the Lueiuiana-Texas uaMnuvers in April 1940.' and

the 1 it Battalion of the 58th 'Infantry left for the Louisiana-Texas

. maneuvers in February. That left the 18th Field Artillery present

at the post as the'only School troops, but #vqn in this there. was

unc rtainty, for the 1939 Protective Mobilisation Plan provided no

School troops for the school, a serio•a omission. A new Table of

Organization: for the'School' under the Protective Mobllisatior. Plan

had been submitted' correcting this deficiency, 'but as of early 1940 it

had not been approved. Meanwhile, the 18th carried on. 'Its let

Battalion was teznporarfl--owjanised as a motorized battalion. The

headquarters battery of the Id Battalion became a firing battery and

each of the two gur. baitteries of the 2d Battalion was turned into two firing batteries, thus meeting the service practice requirements of the

School. On June 1, 1940, the 3d Battalion of the regiment was organized as a 155-mm ho*itser orgtnimatio•k *ith a cadre of 55 enlisted

men from the Zd Battalion of the 77th Vield Artillery, the balance

being recruits and men transferred from within the regiment.

I"'

183

A.

06I
Growth of theArmy

The fipot siseable. icroom oftor World W~r ,in the.oenListe

strength of the Army, that between 1935 and 1937, increased thei. •

Army as a whole from 137. 960 In 1935 to 178,1;01, in 1937, and.

brought the Field Artillery close to its authorised strength by the

summer of 1937, This was the build-up that brought 600 men to

Fort Sill, making something of a housing problem. It also brought

another problem that required a uiseable extension of the School's

functions: the training of Thomason Act officers.

The increase in the enlisted atrength of the Army had aggravated the officer shol'tage, a problem partially met by the Thomason

Act of August 30, 1 935, whick provided for the annual trai;ing, of

"1, 00 ,young oesorv,.eofficers, .50 of whom were to'be choses for

commi!ion!sin.,the.Fiold Artillery of the A ogular. Army. A school. .

system was, nee.dd, to. train, them, and to provide a moans of judging

the compavaive worth. of. ca.didates. *.

Mting the school year.1936.1937 the Sc..ool reprodkiced a, u

Cracle.d tho .examination for all. field artillery oubjects &ad one subject common to thearms, but was, not called'on to prepare the' exami- . nations Or at cos of study. Even so, thij task requir•d an average..

of.48.7 hours from. each of 56 officers and enlisted men. For the

next year, thesfield Artiller.y School was called on to prepare.the

field artillery (branch subject) examinations, a common subject

(motors) examination,. and troop skhool courses for th ,training of

ThomasonAct officers. From thon until the time when all Reserve

officers were..caJsUd on.active duty, this was part of the regular

A unctions of the School, The preparation of courses for the troop

school was madisc anadded rasponaibillty of the schedule committee,

working within the limits set by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of

Field Artillery, The total ntimber of hours that could be spent in

branch subject instruction was set by the Chief of Staff, and the

breakdown of the hours suggested by the Chief of Field Artillery.

Each course had a guide to insure uniformity as between posts, a

list of texýs, the schedule proper, and the examinations, The r ,

common subjoct was motor maintereance, concrete proof of the !"

School's aughority on this subject. I e

An for the status of the Regular Army Field Artillery in

1937, and 1938, of the 100 firing batteries in the Army in 1937, 33

were horse-drawn, dix were pack, and 61 were truck drawn. The

Field Artillery's most pressing problems for 1938, according to a

letter to the Army Historical Section were: "' ... the development

and improvement of gua carriages, time fuzes for high explosive

184

i- ...-. + +. . ..-. .
S~artillery, shell, antitank rapid guns, methods radio of equipment, fire adjustment motor by transport aerial observation, for heavy

[ ~firing maps and map substitutes, a.nd new Tables of Organization.

The concern for the common safety extended to Latin

America, and an Act of June 24, 1938, authorized the President

to admit citizens of the Latin American states to receive instruction at American service schools. The President set the annual

total at 60 officers and 12 enlisted men, which when broken down

between the several schools, allowed six for the Field Artillery

School. Between 1920 and 1927, 20 Latin American officers, including 13-Cubans, hakd attended the School. This act restored the

practice.

The crisis in European diplomacy which culminated in the

disastrous capitulation of Munich in the fall of 1938 created a demand

for a&further increase in the Army, which President R~oosevelt met

in his message to the Congress, January 1939. In it he asked that

the armed forces be put in a "state of readiness,"1 and said that a

special rearmament budget would follow. A few weeks later an

appropriation of $550,000,000.00 was put before the Congress

chiefly for equipment of various kinds, bat it was followed in April

by an increase in Air Corps and officer personnel.

the state 

The 

of 

Chief 

the Army 

of Staff's 

at that 

report 

time: 

for June 30, 1939, summarizes (1I .

"The Army, still struggling towards its absolute minimum under the National Defense Act, was

short much of its critical armament and equipment:

critical because it was materiel not manufactured by

industry except for war purposes, and because the

fabrication involved a time factor of from several

months to nearly two years. There were deficiencies

in personnel, not large, but vital to a force expected

to have the great proportion of its strength prepared to

operate on M-day. And there was serioUs shortage in

immediate war reserves, materiel needed to keep the

War machine running until industry could be geared to'

i.. produce it. Further, due to economic neceasity, it

developed that the War Department program had dealt

with a restricted defense, one that would limit the

power of decision and freedom of maneuver to narrow

confines. The people, for the first time since the

World War, awoke to the situation and felt the peculiar

185 P.
shock of helplessness that had been the constant

attendant for years of those charged with the

responsibility for their defense."

The Chief of Staff was then General Malin Craig.

An authorization of July 1939 provided for more enlisted

men, if funds were appropriated. After the beginning of actual

fighting, they were forthcoming, and in November 1939, the

enlisted strength of the Army crossed the Z00, 000 mark.

The Field Artillery underwent considerable organizational

changes in the reorganization of the infantry division on a threeregiment basis. The brigade was eliminated as a unit, and for its

headquarters was substituted the artillery section of division headquarters, as the agency of the division artillery commander for

exercising command. One three-battalion, nine-battery regiment

of 75-mnm guns was substituted for two regiments, each of two

battalions and six batteries. The medium battalion was reduced

from the three to two battalions, and the brigade ammunition train

was eliminated. ;y October, the Field Artillery was able to supply.

the full complement of division artillery for five Regular Army

divisions and one complete corps artillery brigade.

The School in Mobilization

Originally. it had been planned that on mobilization the Field ; Artillery School would pass under corps control. Then in 1938, it

was decided that: "Except as otherwise directed by the War Department, the existing status as to installations exempted or not exempted

from corps area control will continue initially during mobilization

until otherwise prescribed. " Under the Chief of Field Artillery's

1939 Protective Mobilization Plan, the School was to provide a re-

• fresher course for officers and an officer candidate's course for

enlisted men. They were to begin at M + 15 and reach a peak load

of 4, 000 students at M + 110 for the two courses. On March Z4,

1939, this role was enlarged, the School being directed to submit

plans for enlisted specialists courses of 75 days length, a refresher

course of one month, and an officer candidate's course of 12 weeks.

A• The actual outbreak of war was followed by a period of great

confusion as to the size of the Army. On September 7, the Chief of

Field Artillery wrote that the Army would expand to 280, 000 men,

which would involve the Field Artillery in an increase second only to

the Air Corps. Fort Sill would be about doubled In troop size. Two

days later he was writing that there would be an increase of but

186 t - i

- 1 o4
17, 000. On September 12 the rumored size was back to 280, 000.

This period of confusion as to the role of the Army, hence its size,

and so the size and role of the School, was not the fault of the Army

planners. They had been directed to prepare for a definite and

clear-cut war situation with a very apparent menace that could be

met by prearranged methods. The situation of 1939 was something

else. It was not war, but it would have been dangerous to think of

it as peace.

Uncertainty as to how the School might be affected tasted

until October 6, when word was received that the School might be

clofed earlier than usual. The final instructions came October

21, directing that compensating plans previously made ba put into

operation November 1. The Regular Course and the Advanced

Courses in Motors and Communications ended February I, and

the communication course scheduled for February I never began.

To meet the problem of giving 7-1/z months instruction in a three

months period, instruction was given eight hours a day and during

the Christmas vacation. In this way it was possible to cover about

52% of the normal course, and the hours were alloted to give the

best possible instructioa under those circumstances. Work on the

extension courses did not stop, and was carr ed on as usual for

the benefit of members of the civilian components not on active duty. (

Two Disturbing Problems

Judging by the correspondence, two problems were regarded

as especially disturbing in the winter of 1939-1940. These were:

the role of the Field Artillery in the new army; what cou•ses the

School was to offer in 1940. The concern over the role of the Field

Artillery really encomppsed three related problems: the correct

employment of the division artillery of the new triangular divisions;

the training of future corps and army chiefs of artillery and their

staffs; the loss of command prestige by the Field Artillery since the ,

previous war, To express itself on the problem of the correct use

of the divisional artillery, the•.cho6l prepared an instruction memorandum, "The Employment of Divisional Artillery in the Triangular

Division, " in which its views were set forthj, and sought to have

the text adopted as official by the War Department for use as a training guide during this organizational phase. The text was thought by

the School to conform with the War Department directive of January

24, 1939: "The assistants are primarily commanders, though they

may perform some staff functions, in the same manner as does the

File 353, F.A.S.

187

*1' *!
present field artillery brigade commander." Keeping to this line

of thought, the text gave to the division artillery commander the

dual role of commanding officer of the division artillery and artillery advisor to the division commander. The new Tables of Organization were said to make no difference in the tactics and technique

of the regiment beyond a change in the manner of ammunition supply,

and none in those of the battery and battalion. In all this, the School

was anxious to retain the division artillery under central command

with an eye to the massing of fire and feared a tendency toward

dissipation of effort.

The War Department was not wil)ing to publish the text,

replying on January 9, 1940, that control was centralized in the

division commander, the chiefs of the infantry and artillery sections

exercising only such command as he directed. However, this was

a tentative arrangement, and publication of the text would be considered again when reports on the spring maneuvers had been made.

This step toward a solution, the study of reports from the

field, was also suggested in the School's letter of November 15, 1939,

which had posed the three questions, The suggestion was that the

field artillery cotaimanders of the nine divisions about to maneuver

submit, at the conclusion of the maneuvers, reports which could be

studied at the School for the formulation of doctrine. On the second

and third problems, those of the training of higher artillery staffs,

and the loss of command prestige through the retirement for age of

those artillerymen with eaperience in the echelons of higher command,

it was suggested that there be established an advance class of three or

four monthb duration, and that the field artillery extension courses of

the 60-series be made almost wholly corps and army artillery subjects,

and required of every field officer. 1'

A more detailed proposal for such an advanced course was

submitted December 1939 by Col Leroy Collins, then Acting CommAn-

"* dant,. who wrote the suggest-ions above, His plan was a four month

course at the Field Artillery School for the higher field artillery

commanders and staff officers. The first class was. to be chosen

with an eye to their doing pioneer work in starting the course, The

course proper was to have a one month refresher phase, followed ,

by a three month phase of higher artillery studies, covered by

committee studies and reports, interspersed with conferences and

map maneuvers.

The second problem was that of planning the approaching school

year. The question was opened in a letter from Col Collins January

5, 1940, stating it had been customary to s;abmit recommendations for

188

-, -'-I , 
the next school year at about this time, and information on the War

Department policy would be appreciated. He felt that they might

want a shorter year, perhaps ending March 1. In the absence of suchI

data, on February 8 the School made its official proposals which

provided for a full-length Regular Course, if maneuvers did not interfere. If they did, it was suggested the course last from August to

April. Also suggested were: National Guard and Reserve officer

courses, spring and fall; Advanced Horsemanship, 39 weeks; Advanced

Motors, 19 weeks in fall; Advanced Communication, two classes; and

a three month Refresher Course in the fall. Two courses each

could easily be given in motor and communications, and if it proved

necessary to cut the Regular Course, an Advanced Course in Gunnery

was suggested.

A full series of enlisted courses was also suggested: sergeant

instructors, fall; motor mechanics, fall and spring; horseshoers,

fall and spring; saddlers, fall and spring; battery mechanics, spring; communications, fall and spring; enliett.i horseme.nship. All but

the sergeant instructors course were 19 weeks long, I

To these proposals the Chief replied February 15 by siying

he preferred June as the closing date of the School for 1941. The

project for two communication classes was disapproved because of

the officer shortage. No sergeant instructors course would be given.

The course on vnlisted horsemanship would have to be confined to

students from Fort Sill, since no funds were avuilable to bring them

from other stations. A decision on a refresher course was delayed.

The first emergency course of the Field Artillery School

was the spring National Guard and Reserve Officer Course, beginiing

rebruary 10, which was the usual three month course, but which,

because of the war, was increased from 45 to 131 students. In April,

Denmark and Norway were t6 fall, in May, the Low Countries, and

payment would be demanded for the years that the locust had eaten.

SI

189

.P-
Graduates 1935-1939

COURSES

*• TOTALS

Regular Army 1935* 1936* 1937* 1938* 1939* Off. EM

Regular Course 51 65 67 61 61 305

Refresher Courseb 10 14 9 12 8 53 S C

Adv. Communications 9 8 8 8 33

Advanced Motorec 9 8 8 8 8 41

Adv, Horsemanship 3 ,.3 4 4 6 20

Enlisted Men 239 325 178 193 232 1167

National Guar(-

Reserve Officers

, attery Officers 95 98 96 87 178 554 _ _

I 6W 1167

Denotes the school year frop September of the year indicated

to the following June,.

** The school year was abbreviated in 1939-1940, and all classes

ended in February 1940.

b- -Cours," I month duration

c--Couxee 5 months duration

Bibliography

201 File, Maj Gen Henry W. Butner, Post Headquarters, Ft Sill, Okla,."

Z01 File, Col Augustine McIntyre, Post Headquarters, rt Sill, Okla. .. File* of the Office of the Chief of Field A 'rtillery, pp, cit. supra.

Annual Reports, U. SF.A.S., 1927- -- 1939-40.

jI

190

lA.
CHAPTEP ELEVEN

THE FIELD AR TILLER Y SCHOOL AND THE

SECOND WORLD WAR (j c .0-1941)

Effects of Initial War Efforts

Ia March of 1940 the Adjutant General wrote to the Chief of

Field Artillery that, funds permitting, corps maneuvers would be

held every spring. These would be attended by all students and

part of the instructional staff of the service schools, after which

courses would be resumed. The immediate response of the School

was that courses should be lengthened to compensate for the time

lost. The Chief disagreed, noting that the plan was quite tentativo,

"As events showed, it was never carried out.

Motor insteuction that spring was of some importance for

it was one of the courses heid despite the emergency, A letter of

May 24 to the Pontiac Motor Company says that the officers' course

was for a class of eight who showed aptitude and interest. Sixtyfive hours were Siven to pitnciples of design and construction, Z74

hours to diagnosis and repair, 368 hours to operation and maintenance,

and 32 hours to research. The enlisted classes were held twice a

year to make motor sergeants and motor mechanics. Each class

was of about 5) men with an 8th grade education and at least a year's

apprenticeship. Both courses studied driving in convoy and made

trips to nearby manufacturing plants. The officers visited the engi•,

necring Laboratory at Oklahoma University.

At this time, the drought was continuing. In order to raise

the dam, army engineers had in effect built a now dam enclosing

the old, which temporarily weakened the anchorage of the old dam,

making it advisable to lower' the level of the reservoir. This had

been followed by the drought which caused a oevers water shortage.

.Two more deep wells were being drilled in LAwton at this time. It

was hoped that if they contained fluorine salts, these would not hurt

aduls' teeth, and an exchange of water could be arranged between

the Post and Lawton. In addition, the Post was pumping water from

.'a... the old Ambrosia Springs, and between tb,.i two, it was hoped Fort

Sill could accomodate a larger military population. In May, the

German Army overran the Low Countries, and Britain and France

stood at the edge-of disaster. By August, disaster had overtaken

France, Britain was fighting to avoid it, and President Roosevelt

requested authority to call out the National Guard, including Oklahoma's

45th Division, whose summer camp was at Fort Sill. Wam there water

enough~for it?

191
The dam had been finished in the summer of 1940. and good

rains began to raise the level rapidly, but one could not be sure the

drought would not return. Colonel McIntyre was rather sure in

July that it would not, and that there was water at hand to supply

30, 000 people. The Office of the Chief of Field Artillery doubted

the wisdom of sending the 45th Division to Fort Sill, on the grounds

that a milita ry population of about 30, 000 persons should not be

maintained on the Post unless precipitation were at least one-half

of normal. This problem was soon taken from Col McIntyre's

hands by his retirement July 31. This was made the occasion for

a signr.1 honor, the awarding of the Distinguished Service Medal,

rarely given in time of peace, and Oklahoma honored the eminent

artilleryman and military educator with its Distinguished Service

Medal.

His successor was Brig Gen Donald C. Cubbison, West

Point '04. General Cubbison followed his graduation with 10 years

garrison duty, then to the Phillipines, and back to go into Mexico

with Pershing. A period of duty as tres4urer of the Military Academy was followed by five years at Stanford University as Professor

of Military Science and Tactics. The General was Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School in 1937-1 938t which'was followed

by troop duty in Continentai United States and Hawaii.

On receiving a radiogram from the War Department that the

45th Division would be concentrated here, Cubbison requested that f

army engineers be sent to Fort Sill to check on the amount of water

available. He also approache*d the Lawton Chamber of Commerce,

urging them to drill two more deep wells, so that he could have

something definite to show the War Department. The Lawton people

agreed, and began work on two wells in addition to those mentioned

earlier. By August 22, Cubbison had the report from the two army

engineerc, a4pessimistic one, on the basls of which he felt it

would be inadvisable to concentrate the 45th at Fort Sill. .,1

The Commanding General, 8th Corps Aren, had previously

requested a report from the City Engineer of Lawton, Wayne Hendricks,

and this when received settled the matter. Dated August 23, It

stated that since April, 1940, 936, 000,000 gallons had accumulated

in Lake Lawtonka for the exclusive use of the Post, which was being

supplemented by 500, 000 gallons a day from the Medicine Bluffs I:•,..:•Crock iine. As for Lawton, it was receiving 2, 488, 000 gallons a day from three deep wells and three shallow wells, of which 488, 000 was

surplus. in aldition to these wells, the city was digging two others,

which would soon reach the unfailing water table which supplied the

other wells. This report clinched the matter, and the 45th was

46

192 t

I ., -. . . 1 !~
concentrated at Fort Sill. Hendricks had estimated matters correctly,

and the water crisis was over. It October, Lawton did have to draw

twice on Lake Lawtonka, but only because alterations were then being

made in the city's water pipes. Rain began to fall in November at

such a rate that the reservoir was soon full, and in the following year

was pouring at such a rate that part of the Post was under water and

construction was delayed.

In the light of the later development undergone by the Post,

one may wonder what would have happened if the Air Corps board

which visited the Post July 29 hadi succeeded, or had desired, to

acquire 16 acres of land for a bombing range. McILncyre had told

them there was no land to spare, and the board went its way.

The Horse Show and Polo teams were disbanded by August

of 1940. In April, a memorandum from the Assistant Commandant

had quoted General Danford as wanting to keep the team on the

"highest plane of efficiency possible, " as well as desiring a limited

amount of local polo. Of the team members, some were kept as

instructors, and the team horses assigned to them as mounts.

Voluntary polo and voluntary riding classes (there Was nows class

of newly commissioned Regulars at the School) were begun..

With regard to the plant of the School, on July 5, 1940, the

eve of the great war expansion, the reservation proper covered

51, 242 acres, from the open prairie of the east to the Wichita@ on

the west, the whole shaped much like a figure seven. There were

standing: Administration Building; Station Hospital; Nurses' Quarters;

Officers' Quarters; the Old Post Chapel; Museum; Officers' Mesa;

New Chapel; and Post Theatre. The Ist Field Artillery was in

the yellow stucco barracks on the west of the New Post parade grounds. F

The 18th Field Artillery was in the barracks to the south of the

parade ground, and in two others nearby. In this same area were -

the Post Exchange, "Quardhouse, Signal Office, and Quartermaster

Office. South of here were the gunsheds and stables of the 18th.

The National Ouard camp was a mile and a half south, and Post

Field was a little more than half a mile beyond.

The School Troops

The 1939 Protective Mobilization Plan provided for no school

troops, a disturbing omission. In 1940 the School submitted an amendment, calling for one regiment less ammunition trains of truck-drawn

75-mm guns, one regiment less ammunition trains of truck-dr&.-n

"* 155-mm howitzers, and one battalion of horse-drawn 75-mm guns.

These were to bo so organized that when the organisations assigned

193

* -........ t' .7'. ... .. I
to tactical units departed on mobilization, the troops necessary for

the School's work under the protective mobilization plan would

remain, This was partly done by giving the 18th FieJd Artillery one

battalion of truck-drawn 75-mrn guns, one battalion of horse-drawn

75-mrn guns, and one battalion of truck-drawn 155-mm howitzers,

and by the War Department's action of April 18, designating the 18th

Field Artillery as School troops. The importance of this was shown

in June, when the Third Army wanted to take the 18th Field Artillery

away for maneuvers. With the School ordered to open for instruction

July 1, this would have been crippling, but McIntyre was able to cite

the above letter, and the Adjutant General later told 8th Corps Area

that the 18th Field Artillery was not available.

When McIntyre was in the midst of organizing the 3d Battalion

of the 18th Field Artillery (it was activatea May 27) orders came

transferring the Zd Battalion of the 18th to the 76th Field Artillery on

the West Coast. The indomitable McIntyre promptly set to organizing

another battalion for the 18th Field Artillery, and pressed General

Danford to send some trucks for the 18th by August 1, pointing out

that the lot and 77th Field Artillery regiments were to be away

maneuvering at that time, which would place a heavy drain on his

motor transportation. The lst Field Artillery returned to Fort Sill

from maneuvers about April bringing back 13 firing batteries and a

band. On October 1, they became the lot, 51st, and 53d Battalions,

and together with the lIt Battalion of the 77th were being usetd to the

limit as School, troops. The School's infantry battalion, which was

part of the Z9th infantry Regiment, was redesignated the I t Battalion

of the 38th Infantry and raised to war strength, so that the 29th Regiment, School troops at the Infantry School, could have their battalion

name and records back, and be made war strength.

The 349th Field Artillery, a Regular Army Regiment of

colored troops, was activated August 1940 at Fort Sill. Unfortunately

for the School, they were armed with 155-mm guns GPF, whose long

ranges made them unsuitable for use on the reservation and which

were difficult to move over the range roads. This regiment was

quartered in a tent camp on Quarry Hill. Not until 1942 were they

given field guns and designated as School troops.

Development of new techniques continued in the early months

of 1940, and some interesting things were done with quickly developed

aerial photographs and with wide-angle photographs. In March the

Chief, through G-2, inquired of the military attaches in London,

Berlin and Tokyo if those powers had ever made use of photographs

developed in the airplane as a means of adjusting artillery fire. Neither

the British nor the German armies had ever experimented with it,

194

.............................
but the Japanese had, both in China and at home. They had concluded that the idea was of limited value, and apparently it was not

then being used or experimented with. Tests at Fort Sill were conducted June 6 and 7. On the first day, six problems were fired with

the 155-mm gun, with two volleys for each problem and a photograph

of each. There was one problem on a time schedule, the rest were

fired at the observer's command. From the burst of the shell to

dropping the photograph at the command post averaged seven and onehalf minutes. It was another six minutes before the aircraft could

observe the next shot, On the next day problems were fired with a

regiment of light artillery. From these tests it was concluded that

it would be speedier and simpler to have an observer over the target

area. Centers of impact. and concentrations could be spotted just as

well by plotting them on a vertical photograph and dropping that.

The Field Artllery School in March asked for a wide-angle

camera and an aircraft with a tandem aerial camera mounted for

further tests on the best type of photographs for fire control purposes. In view of the past work on the subject, the Chief objected

ýto the scope of the tests, and the requests were reduced to a 9-lens

composite photograph of the School area and a battle map of the

reservation. On July 25, the Chief suggested sending a new standard

wide-angle camera to make wide-angle verticals, contoured battle

maps, and uncontoured battle maps all at the 1 /20, 000 scale. In

replying, the School suggested covering not only the reservation

but also a strip six miles wide around the reservation, since it held

the wide-angle photograph to be a basic tool and not a makeshift.

The job was done by August 17. The importance the School attached

to the wide-angle photograph ie shown by an exchange of correspondence, in which the School agreed to a listing of map substitutes in

order of desirability; the accurate contoured map at 1/20, 000, the

controlled mosaic, and the wide-angle (900) photograph.

Tests of thQ wide-angle photograph as a firing chart were

carried out in May and Jane, by battery, regimental, battalion, and

brigade concentrations, made in• response to a request for data fr-om

the Chief's office. The first was based on a precision adjustment by

an air observer, the second and third were sensed on the mass of

fire as a whole, the fourth was an adjustment of the 155-mm gun on

a strip made by two wide-angle photographs, scale 1/40, 000, the

fifth and sixth were transfers based on centers of impact pinpointed

on a photograph by an air observer. Comparison of the photographs

with the fire control map of Fort Sill showed an average distance

error of 17 y9rds, and an average angular error of five mils, so

that the results were as good av could be obti,.ined from a good

1/20,000 map.

19'

195 I

'II
Plan and Counterplan for Courses, June-July 1940

The alarm felt at the progress of the German arms through

ihe Low Countries and France may be measured by the question

McIntyre asked Danford May 25: Would leaves be cancelled? The

answer then was: No. Early in May (May 14) it was thought the

Army would get 15, 000 men, and after the beginning of the fiscal

year, be increased to 280,000. By any sign, the crisis had begun.

By June the strain on facilities was seen in such a way that the War

Department was considering sendiing enlisted specialists to civilian

schools and perhaps also to regional schools under corps area commanders, To all this the Chief was opposed, preferring to concentrate at Fort Sill. So, McIntyre was asked what would be needed to

double facilities for enlisted specialists. The reply was: sik

63-man barracks, two 250-man mess halls, two recreation buildings,

and two supply buildings. in the meantime, Col McIntyre making his

wanted to use the School 12 months a year, giving short courses for

young officers, special courses for field officers, and training mutor

and communication specialists as fast as possible. And he was calling

in leaves of key men in response to Danford's radio of June 12.

The first authoritative word came in a Danford radio June 15,

saying that classes would begin July I with a one month refresher

¶ for 100 Reserve officers plus three month enlisted specialists courses.

On August 1, there would be a three month basic course for newly

commissioned Regulars from West Point and the college BOTC units. .1

McIntyre's inquiry if the refresher course would be the one month

course prescribed under the Protective Mobilization Plan drew 

a

yes, with added weight from a War Department radio limiting courses

for the then new officers to one month. It is not impossible that

McIntyre's query was prompted by the beginning of doubts as to the

worth of such a course. Probably it was, for that same day he suggested a three month course that could be a trite Battery Officers

Course, as well as an advanced course for field officers of the

Reserves and National Guard.

This suggestion was not answered until July 17, when the

Chief radioed that consideration was being given to dropping the

one month course and starting a three month National Guard and

]Reserve Officers Course that would be the same as usual except

* i that Regulars would also attend. To this McIntyre heartily assented,

recommending 100 students a month starting August 11. Two days

later (July 19) Danford wired that the Chief of Staff was inclining

toward such a three month course. And Danford approved McIntyre's

recommendation of a three month advanced course for field officers,

196
,'overing the tactical employment of corps and army artillery. The

first course, he agreed, should be a specially selected group to

help formulate the literatitre on this important subject. Approval

by Danford of the three month course came on July 26, with orders

to change its name to Rattery Cfficers Course (Special). The first

class was to enter August 15.

The War Department Plan for emergency schooling which

was hammered out in those hectic days of June and July 1940 was

outlined in its letter of Tuly 31 to the Chief of Field Artillery.

There were four courses authorized for the emergency: refresher

courses for selected officers of all components of the Army;

specialist courses for selected officers of all components, including

Regulars, National Guards, and Reserves on cxtended active duty;

a special basic course for newly commissioned officers; specialist

courses for key enlisted personnel. These would not exceed 12

weeks (this limit was later said to have been set personally by the

Chief of Staff), and the detail of National Guardsmen to refresher

courses would be expedited.

Meanwhile, what of the one month refresher courise ? Its

opening was postponed from July 1 to July 10 due to the difficulty

experienced by corps area headqaarters in filling their Reserve

officer quotas. When it did open, its instruction was specialized

according to the transportation and weapons of the units from

which its students came. Thus, the first section studied the 155-mm

gun o" '"40-mm howitzer; the second, the truck-drawn 75-mm gun,

or 75-mni howitzer; the third, the 155-mm howitzer; the fourth,

the 75-mm gun, horse-drawn, and the 75-mm pack howitzer, This

"course was criticized on two grounds: (I) It was too short; (2) most

of the students needed a true Battery Officers Course since they had

nothing to 'refresh.

The first basic course for the ne v Regulars ran from

August to November. Before describing the course, we can profitably consider some comments by Brig Gen Jesmond D. Balmer on

the military background of the students of the basic course, for

they illuminate the reasons for maintaining service schools in

addition to the Military Academy. In September 1942, Brig Gen

Balmer, then Commandant, said: "However, experience at the

Field Artillery School has shown that the average ROTC graduate.

Reserve officer, and the average National Guard junior officer who

attended the above experimental Battery Officers Course and subsequent battery officer courses have been at least on a par with the

197

S . .- . . .. . - . , ' . .m ,, l. . .. .. •
average graduate of the Military Academy as far as field artillery

trainh•g is concerned.

The course given these men was as follows:

Hours Total#

Department of Animal Transport

Animal management (including 14 hours

horseshoeing) 22

Driving and draft 12

Marches 36

Equitation 71

141

Department of Materiel

Materiel 55

Mout'r transport 64 1

Department of Gunnery

Conduct of fire 28

Firing battery 26

Service practice 49

Preparation of fire 60 -- " 163m

Department of Tactics and Communication

Artillery tactics 21

Combat orders 2

Fire direction 6

Logistics 2

Signal communications 36

]Reconnaissance, selection and

occupation of pooition 26

Military history -

Battalion field exercises 9

104

1. Of the first Basic Class, it was said by Col Collini, that

at the beginning the ROTC honor graduates had the advantage, but

that at the end he thought there would be little if any difference.

198

-- *~I top -
Hours Totals ::,

General

Physical training 8

Dismounted formations and drill Z

Guard duty, discipline, customs

of the service 5

Mess management 6

Military hygiene 3

Clothing and supplies Z

Records and paperwork 8

Individual equipment 2

Military law 8

.44.

Mis callane ous

Opening exercise 1

Graduation exercises 4

At disposition of the Assistant . .

Commandant . 6

On the completion of this course, with the resultant freeing of facili- I

ties, the new Advanced Course was to begin.

wive courses were being offered for enlisted specialists. which, with their capacities were:

Communications 144 men

Battery mechanics 64

Motor mechanics 96

Saddlers 18

Horseshoers 18

The enlisted horsemanship classes are not listed with the above,

since they had only quasi-official status. The capacity shown above

was a real strain on the School's resources as they then were, for

the standards of instructions were such as to turn out men qualified

to be instructors and noncommissioned officers on their return to

their units. As many instructors as possiblehad been taken from the

School troops, therefore, if more could not be supplied, the School

recommended that it concentrate on relatively few men of a caliber to

return and instruct in their own organizations, rather than try to

expand to train individual nmtor mechanics, battery mechanics, etc.

This was not approved. Instead, more instructors were allowed.

199

~ ~ --- -. . . . .
rThe capacity for officer classes during this summer was

set at monthly 100 man classes of National Guard and Reserve

officers, which could be increased to 125 after the basic course

left, and still leave room for a 40 man advanced course. By

September, on this basis, the School would be carrying 50% of

what had been regarded as its mobilisation load.

The School Gets Under Way

The system of Battery Officers Courses (Special) and

officer specialist courses for the emergency was established by

a War Department letter of August 1. This directed that the

refresher course be discontinued after August 9 and its place

taken by the Battery Officers Course, which was to be subs tantially the same as the old National Guard and Reserve Officers.

Course. The classes were to include Regulars, National Guardsmen, and Reserves on extended active duty (but not Thomason Act

officers) who had at least six months to serve after the course was

completed. Officer specialist courses would begin August I and

were to run for three months. A new course would be held every

three months thereafter. It would be open to the same categories

of ufficers.

Students were sent to the courses from the corps areas,

the four armies, and the armored force. The commanders of the 4

four armies and the armored force, according to a letter from the

Adjut4nt General's office of December 4, could select duch a proportion of Regulars, National Guards, and Reserves (except Thomason Act officers) as they thought best. Corps area commanders

would select and order to active duty for 12 consecutive months

Reserve officers in the grade of captain with not more than four

years service in grade. If there were not enough of these to fill

their quotas, senior first lieutenants could be chosen instead.

One mission of the battery officer classes was to train

battery commanders for replacement centers, which was thought

to be a far more urgent mission than the training of officer specia-1

lists. The corps areas were calling up their Reserve officers to

command replacement center batteries on completion of their courses.

By October, even second lieutenants were included in these groups, so

tut . pressing was the need.

It was observed that students in one of the early battery officer classes lacked knowledge of basic military subjects, particularly

those taught in the Basic Course at Fort Sill, These were listed in

the letter as: dismounted drill and formations; guard duty, military

m0A 2OO00

"•. I•. s~o

, e• -
courtesy asid discipl•ne; customs of the service; mess managementi

military .hySiemsi supply and. administration; individual equipment;

and military law. The master program for their work was as riven below:

Regular Extra

Hours Hours

Department of Tactics Communication

Artillery tactics 37

Combat orders 4

Signal communication 33

Field exercises 20

Firedirection 3

History 2

Logiesais 7 Maps.& ,it ap substitutes 6.

lReconnaiesmnce ,32

Staff duties 7

Subtotal. r

Department of Ouann ey.

Fire directisa 1i

Firing battery 30 2

Observed fires 96

Unobserved tIres 90 13 (15 extra hours for night exercises)

Subtotal 234 1s

Department of Materiel 30

Department of Motor Transort 60 A

Department of Animal Transport'

Animal management 11

Driving & draft 32

Equitation 17

Subtotal I r

I. , General_ Opening exercises I

7 TOTAL 476 1s

1. Students take either animal or motor transport depending

on type of transport of the regiment to which they are assigned.

I01 201 I

I'

tt
The ammutition Lllowanc. per battery offive-r student-in! October

was 108 rounds of shrapnel for the 75-Mm- guns and 40,rounds of

37-mrm sub-caliber. ammunition.• -

The lack of basic knowledge on the part of a Battery Officer

class did not indicate that the finished product was of little worth

to the Army. In the fall of 1940, a battalion commander wrote to a

friend of his in the School that:

"The officers coming to us from Bill have a

certain air of confidence and they do fine work either

in the batteries or on the staff ... If it hadn't been

ior the Field Artillery School I would have had an

almost impossible task trying to. handle and speedily

train a battalion with these young officers. But all

those who come from Sill have sufficient foundation

so I can go right ahead with all types of training and

schools without any slowup at all."

These same graduates were also to be called on to fill vacancies on

the Staff and Faculty of the School. The seasoned Regulars were

being called away. Reserve officers called straight from civilian

life often lacked familiarity with the latest techniques, e.g., jin fire

direction, so the graduation of these first few classes was eagerly

awaited by the School authorities.

The new Advanced Course (Special) which, was to train the , i

higher echelons of field artillery dornmand, and on which such hopes

were put, began November 14, for 12 weeks, and was to be followed

by a fresh class every 12 weeks. As proposed by the School, Septem-'

ber 11, this course had two phases: F

Phase I

Refresher of current doctrine and technique 100 hours

Studies of foreign artillery 16

Unassigned 4

Phase II

Historical tactical studies 60 •i

Doctrine and method 184

Application 96

Unas signed 4

202 j.

06.

i, , 

- .
I. 

. Phase I was to qcquaint students with the modern methods

being taught to Junior classes and inform them as to foreign artil- AV

lery. . Itwould bring ost thezvalue of thorough training of. subord- inatoe, in techniques applicable ivarious field condition, and,

would acquaint these senibr officers with the technical possibilities that they should have iamind in making demands on lower units.

Phase II was to consist of committee studies and exercises

to find and test doctrinds and methods applicable to .the higher field

artillery commands. It was in turn divided into thres subcouroes.

The first was a tactical study of field artillery in selected operations, seeking to learn what happened, and how it ifluenced the

outcome, The second was composed of studies and reports by

committees to produce logical conclusions from which an American

artillery organiosation *ad doctrine could be devised.-The third

was made up of map and terrain exercises, involving artillery ofL

the division, -corps, and arnrW. Both group and individual exercises ,

were provided.

The Chief of field Artillery thought this an excelilent course

as outlined but cautioned that in succeeding classes, which would

have a large number of National Guard and Reserve officers, the

present amount of refresher work should bit the minimum. It was

also suggested that logistics receive more aktentionc In the committee

studies, attention should be paid to current operations insofar as

information was available, but in view of the overwhelming German

strength in 1940, false conclusions should not be drawn. Actual

approval of the course came October 14. It must be keptin mind

that this course was in no sense a revival of the old Advanced Course,

but that, in the words of one officer,. "It begins where the old course

left off."

Of the enlisted courses given at that time (Fall, 1940) only

the communications class was open to National Guardsmen, for the

policy then was to keep National Guard organizations together. In

October, it was 4ound that of Enlisted Specialists Class No. Z. 40%

of the students had had three months or less ttailining and 10% had

"had one month or less. The course did not by any means permit giving J

these men their basic train$ng. But, the School's burdens were

lightened by authority to retain enlisted students as instructors, which

was givan September 21. By 1941, it was the practice to send a

number of unassigned men from replacement centers to these classes.

They could then be kept #s, Instructors if they proved suitable,

Z03
iT

A-Few Comments on-Oriaaniation -. i

With the great increase in firing, the' range officer had-by

mid-1940 become a key man; Aided by a Z2-man detail, he maintained and operated the range system, furnlshing the clerical and

technical help necessary, erected and maintained permanent c'onstruction 4a. he had done in the past), operated moving targets

(still in use), and destroyed duds. A civilian had once contracted

to do the latter task but had been unsatisfactory.

The nervous system of his domain was the complex range

teLephone system. It had a permanent overhead wire system, with

range guard posts and control points on one circuit which connected

into the main post system through a switchboard in the eange Office

in the Administration building. At each control point was a pe rmanent

switchboard, There was a separate circuit for a&% firing points and

concrete gun positions. These circuits rau into the switchboard at

the control point. The range guard post circuit and the firJpg point J

circuit were tied together through the switchboard at the control

point, and the entire system connected with the post system through

the board in-the Range Office.

Inwaddition to these dutiesi the' rangel officer was the game X

warden and custodian of the game warden's fund. The range detail

operated a s-aLl game farm and planted feed patches in'the Same

sanctuary and on the range.

The Motors section of the Department of Materiel became

the Department of Motor Transport in October, 1940, with Colonel

Leon P. Cole the first director. The subjects had become so

dissimilar that it was advisable to have each taught in a separate

department. In recent years motor transport had risen to such

importance as a subject that it warranted a department of its own.

Besides no officer could then hope to master both motors and maqi

teriel and function satisfactorily as an instructor iii both.

The great increase in the work of the School had not yet

brought a corresponding increase in the number of civil service

employees, There are no recordo earlier than 1935, but we can

say that from 1935 to 1940 all hiring was done by the Secretary's

office of the School. Reqzesets for help would be sent to the Civil

j Service Office in St. Louis, Mo. , which would in turn send a list

of eligibles from which the School would choose the person desired,

From 1935 to 1938 inclusive there were but five civil service employees, one draftsman and four typists (aside, of course, from those

working for Quartermaster, Ordnance, etc.). In 1939 the number

rose to six, and in 1940, to ten.

204

i? I ,

,
Sone of the bestknw of hs gii ervat. was, Masitor

Sergeant Morris Swett USA £tet.,, librarian of, se rield Artillery •+ a~~~chool for over, 30 yearp, ,When the time~o go 8rloant I$Wetolsi•••

retirement drew near,- his appointment an a non-competitive basis was arranged i. recoglitian~ofo his unique services andria bJt•im. ,:

jBoth the Chi{ef o riold. Artil~lery, General Danford.anid Col 'i - _ _+_.__ _ _

Mclntyre united their efforts an Sgt. Swett'*s behalf,

ThV- Nepartmont of E•xtension Courses changed it names to

Departmi-.r .,, Publications on November Z, 1940. This was done

because in _.;Aition to preparing extension courses, the Department

worked on field manuals, technical manuals, and instruction memoranda,, .&• coordin.ted thi various +problemz and misoellsanous

litevature prepared at the School with. War Department literature

and with one another,.

4ew lnstructipn. Methods and ptent.,

in 1 90. same dLiffculties arose over . teaching and pub- lishi•g of experimental methods, which in time became the accepted methods of 1942-1944, but were at that time heterodox, It had

been noted that West Point Graduates learned one method at the

Academy and anothabr at the School. 1A Cal Fay a. Pricketto artillery instructor at the Academy, bbserved that FM 6-40, 1939 ed.,

taught adjustvlent with a fork, whereas the School used c_ that the

text opened from a closed shes( in percussion bracket, and the

School used a 100-yard sheaf. 'he problem was a difficult one for

the now methods were Just then being introdce•€d. According to

Gene raJ, Cubbison, theylhad been created largely @t the insiotence, of Col McIntyre who thought the existing.rmethods should be simplitied.

General Danford was aware that the situation existed, but

did not want to give any instructions on it for he knew that progrets s

had to be made, and progress meant change. However, he wanted

the students to understand that the new methods were experimental,

and that the official text would.be modified when definite. chwAges

were dec'ided on,. . • . . .

Colonel Mctyre's methods had been taught for a year,

according to General Cubbison. Until the previouS July, they had

been given together with the old methods, but since then only the

new techniques had been taught. As they resceved thi instruction,

the students were warned of every deviation from the prescribed

method and advised to conform to the existing methods on their

return to their organisations, until the new methods became standard.

I,-

205

.1.

w'i .A _ý -I, Abf - O "w

+ . . .. " .. + + + . .. . .. . • . . ..
Aside from gunnery, what changees were being made in field

artillery methods in geasral ? Goneral Cabbisbn was asked that

question byi high rtakings officer' and had the several departments

prepare ,what was meant to he a comprehensive reply. They said

the greatest changes in the tactics' and technrque of Aield artillery

had come from changes in organization- the: adoption of a triangular

division and standard operating procedure for its use. Orders were

made much briefer than before, classing many things as routine

after careful training. Speedy reconnaisance, selection, and occupation of position was stressed.

The revision of field manuals by the School kept pace with

all theac changes'. In utging revision of FM 6.401. iring, which

was soon undeitaken, the School commented that conduct of'fire

was being simplified by development of the so-called tangent method.

the changes being limited to discarding unnecesa4z.y refinements. The

existing tm rhods of fire were called u istasfactory in that they were

too complicated, could not take advarnage of corrections, and did

not facilitate massing U, fire, The simplified methods developed at

the af:hool met those objections and, it was argued should be published

as soon as possible.

A change to Chapter Three, Part Two, of FM 6-20, Tactics

and Technique, was forwarded for approval in November, to meet

the tactical and organizational requirements for massing of fires,

"The underlying principle of the change was surprise and mass. To

make this possible, the tactical commander was to retain control

of all fires deilvered in furtherance of the tactical mission. The

battalion was made the fire unit and the battalion commander, the

fire director.

An instruction memorandum was prepared on the use of the 4

divisional artillery's antitank battery of eight 75-mm guns M1597A2

on the MZA3 carriage (a modernized gun with a split trail carriage

for wide traverse). Writing to the School November 16, 1940 the

Chief's office said that since it had long felt the need of literature on "t

the employment of the 75-mm antitank gun with the artillery regiment

he was enclosing with his letter a monograph by Col 0-6 H. Franke

S 1to - serve as a start for the discussion of the subject. Copies of this

paper had also been sent to the senior artillery officers of the several

divisions for their comments, together with a questionaxaire on the

subject. Since Col Franke was then at the School with the Advanced SCourse, it was suggested tlat he be consulted. The inrtruction

memorandum appeared In the course of time.

206 2I

' i r.
A different type of training literature was proposed by the

War Department, October 9,. 1,940, for the benefit of Reserve officers

awaiting cal to active, duty. The Department suggested that the

serviceO schools prepare troop school problems and training bulletins

for schoole to be conducted by the several corps areas. Detail of

necessary personnel was promised. The material would be subject

only to the approval of the Chiefs of the respective arms and would be

ordered direct by corps areas. TO this, the School's reaction was

Lhat the project was worth while but--if reserve officers were put

on that duty the first six months would be taken up with their training

alone. As for Regulars, those on the staff were struggling with the

expansion program. Such a project would 'eqiaire six more officers,

four of them good Regulars. The use of unmodified extension course

problems wap thought to be inadvisableo, The Chief's office made it

clear that no .extra funds or RegSklars were available, to-which the

School replied January, 1941, that itcould not under those conditions

do the project justice. There the matter rested.

Theextension courses wore not to be untouched by the war.

Their prncipal.market, if ono may ace such a term, had been with

the National Gus tds. and ites wvea,. and thoes men wore now being

called to active duty iip•ver increasing, umber. .Circular 99 War

Department, 19.40. ravognised that officers of the civilian components

were now. receiving practica I experience and training, and it so•ght

to adjust the promotion requirements accordingly. The third provision

of the circular exempted all grades and branches frorn the military

knowledge roqu~irements' fo' promotion for those officers who had'had

instriAction1 , trainitg, or duty Which was the equivalent of the specific

sub-coursos of the extension course. The War Department required

such a Alst of equivalents, from the Chief~s office for the Field Artillery,

and they in turn asked the Field Artillery School. The School thought

the proposition undesirable on the ground that an officer would have

only to mark time and avoid a&: efficiency rating of unsatisfactory,

and the ripe pear wowA4 in time 1ll in his lap-bit..-th& School gave the

list nevertheless. The list included the course equivalents of 4i.1A

months aVtive duty, of a year's, and of the successful completion of

certain courses at the. School, Plainly, this was the first great blow

to the extqnsion course system, for it re.moved one of the greatest incentives to enrollqpjt.

Arrival of the 45th; Housing; Organization I

.' All. th coooffieprs, all these Ptudents, and all these battalions

that we have descrioed as moving to Fort Sill had to be bivet places

to live, and on top of the expansion of the School, the 45th D$ision

was expected in the Fall. If that division had arrived about the 15th

Z07
of September, they would have found about one-third of the concurrent'Aamp occupied by. Regular# and a great many student officers

"who had lately moved in.: A camp they could use in the interim was

being built on Gunnery: Hill, but the students were still it. the concurrent camp whon4hs 45th arrived. The smaller of the infantry

barracks -was, then used as a hospital for the '45th until the cantonment hospital was done.

The hbusing of officer instructors was also a headache. There

were soon to be 90 of them on the staff, mostly married and with

* families, and with no place to go. The War Department policy then

was to pay commutation and let the officer find his own quarters,

which had worked well enough in normal times, e.g., after the 1920

fires, but at present there simply were not homes enough in Lawton

to absorb the inflow. General Cubbison suggested Federal tuoring

Administration housing for' Lawton, a project which Danford promised

to push.

Housing on the post was being pushed with all possible speed

to accomodate the enlarged classes. In fact, 0-4 was quoted- as

saying that no construction anywhere equalled the speed of that at

Fort Bill. The studenta of the' School began moving into their cantonmeat are, in JTvaary of 1941. This speed attracted attebin,' &i*A an

investigation disclosed that the constructing quartermaster'alse had

overhead expenses 33. 3%. lose than the lowest in his zone. Money

was saved by his personal attention and small, efficient force. One

empie of the mnethodse ho used was the practice of borrowing trucks from the Post Headquarters as against renting them at $10.00 a day,

exampl ftemtosh sdwstepatc fbroigtuk and of repaying the Post by work for it. Thiedevoted and efficient

officer, Lt Col Lawrence B. Woods, had $12,000,'000 worth of construction at Fort Sill. Every item was completed either on schedule

or before, with an overhead of less than 2. 6% end $7814 000. 00 was

turned back in.

o expansion tThis at the Field Artillery School, impressive as

it was, only part of the general expansion of the Field ArtilleryS

By October 15, full complemuents of the arm had been provided for

nine regular army divisions, two armored 'jivipions, two observation

battalions, and one corps artillery rogiment. This should be comparod I 4

with the providing of the artillery for five Livisions of the year before,

a virtual doubling of the arm in a year's time,,

The 45th Division completed its conventratibh 8uptember 26,

1940, and a complete change in the organizatidn of the Field Artillery

School became neceosary, for the commander of the 45th, General Key,

outranked General Cubbison. Therefore, on November 12, the Post

7.08 ?.O"8

I I
lost its exempted status, and everything on the reservation except

the Wield Artillery School proper, the detaohments, the lgth Field

Artillery, and the 15th Observation Squadron, passed under control

of General Key. General Key took over Cubbison's headquarters.

etaff, the executive, the adjutant, the inspectors, headquarters

persoorel, etc. This was to be Lhe forerunner of the station complementr- The military police detachment was merged with the 45th's

military police. In one way, the arrival of the 45th Division was a

benefit to the School, for by arrangement with General Key, the

batteries of the 45th were to fire for the School.beginning in January.

A specific area for the training of the 45th was laid out which was

to enable both the 45th and the School to keep out of one anotherts

way. If more room was needed by either party for any occasion,

requests would clear through the range officer.

"Organizational changes were taking place on the staff of.the

Schiool, which was being increased in size by assignment of Reserve

officorq.. r (One interesting assignment was thatLof an officer from

the U. 8. -Coast and Geodetic Survey, Lt A, J, Hnokinson, who joined

the School to spend some time in developing survey methods and. in

teaching instructors,) A school roster from the spring of 1941 shows

145 officers on the staff and faculty, of whom 88 were Reserve officers.

The absence of National Guardsmen does not indicate prejudice

against them but simply the War Department's policy of keeping

National Guard units together. Animal Transport was the only departmont in which Regulars outnumbered reserves. Proportions in the

other Departments ran from rather loes than two to one in Tactics

and Communiucations, to a flat four to one in Materiel. Some of these

Poservea were men called to duty expressly to fill a place on the

faculty; others were students who had attracted attention. In December

1940 the School's Table of OrganiZation allowance of Reserve officers

was far above that actually present fo- duty. The reason given was

that it was expected Regulars would be taken from the School at an

increasing rate, in which case there would be authority at hand to ,.

call up Reserves as rapidly as needed.

The ammunition allotment for 1941, which these men were to ,

use in instructing their students, was unchanged from that given

earlier for the individual battery officers, 108 rounds of 75-mm

ammunition, and 40 rounds of 37-mm, but the total amounted to

285, 120 rounds of 75-mm ammunition and 105,600 rounds of 37-mrtsr

Two officers were left to take care of the peroonneL records

of the 900 officers among the student body and facultyl

A

209

b..'
F ! ammunition, for ZZO officers were expected to enter the couse. every

four weeks. No allowances were included for the advanced and officer

specialistw classos. The Basic Course allowance was the same as for

the battery officer. students (the two courses were ,well- -nigh identical),

and basic students were included in the 2, 640 student officers expected

during the year to keep the peak load within the authorized total of 750.

The year's allotment of 75-mm shell was later jumped to 428, 500

round@.

The school troops that fired this ammunition were to be, if

General Cubbison's December recommendations were accepted:

The 18th organized *.a four battalions, two equipped with 105-mm

howitzers, one with 155-mm howitzers, one with 75-mm guns

horsedrawn; the 1st, 51st, and 53d Field Artillery Battalions (the

old 1 st Field Artillery ReBiment); the 1at Battalion of the 77th

Field Artillery; and one' battalion of the l42zd Field Artillery, should

it arriva. The equipping of these organizations as indicat&ed'as still

very much in the class of things hoped for. The first four 105-turn

howitzers ME2 were to arrive about February 1941, the School having

lost its other four to the Rock Island Arsenal for' modification, In

November, 'the School's two pack howitzers wsre taken to Alaska

for test since they wire the only two available. In return, the one

at West Point was shipped here.

More Fire Direction Improvements I

The first period of progress in fire direction spent itself i

in 1935, having lasted four years. 'In this there was-nothing very

mysterious- -it meant only that the men who had worked on it were

transferred away from the Field Artillery School in the course of

routine army shifts of personnel. Their successors left the matter

where it was, and no substantial change could'be noted until the

arrival of Col H. L. C. Jones in 1939. While an instructor at

Leavenworth, Jones had been impressed by the new ideas in fire

direction, but after reflecting on them concluded better could be

evolved. On leaving Leavenworth he was given a battaliol at Marfa,

Texas, where hm proceeded to work out his techniques. By the timne

he was ordered to Fort SBll in 1939 as director of the Department of

Gunnery, h3 ha, m•de most substantial advances in the methods of

fire direction, advances which he then urged upon the arm. i,

Their worth was almost self-apparent and by November 1940

had acquired such status that they &Lppeared in the Field Artillery

Journal as teachings of the School. The most important changes

made by Jones, which set fire direction substantially in the form

it has today, were to centralize all computation at the fire direction

2 0 ,

ZOt

4top
center for both observed and unobserved fire, so that it was no

longer split between battery and battaliono and to prepare both

observed and unobserved fires from the same fire direction chart.

A team of officers was formed to apply these methods in demon-.

strations.

One of the members of this team was Capt Abbott H. Burns.

In the past, computers had had to leaf through firing tables to convert ranges into elevations in rnils and had sweated mightily over

the application of correcting factors. Burns did not care tn go

through this process and invented a graphical firing table, essentially a slide rule, from which elevations could be read directly

and which applied corrections by simply tovuing the alide. This

brilliant stroke greatly speeded the process, arod. by eliminating

complicated the time-wasting calculations rnr ';! it possible to use

enlisted computers.

The massing of the fires of'the whole artillery of a division,

in situations in which no map en:lmted, was developed by Col Einar

Ojelsteen in the',spring of 1941, in reponse to a suggestion of the

Chief of Staff, General George Marshall.

The School Hits Ats Prewar Stride

During the greater part of 1941, the Battery Officers Courses

dominated the School. By far the greater proportion of officer students

were members of that course, and troop and area requirements for

every other sort of irrstruction at the School was adjusted to the needs

of those classes. The basic mechanism for filling the classes was

the assignment of quotas to various organizations and commands by

the Adjutant GeneraWi" office on the basis of a memorandum from the

Office of the Chief of Field Artillery which gave the schedule of ch sees.

In-practice, however, the Commandant often had to complete quotas

by taking officers from the Peplacement Training Center at Fort Sill,

a practice limited by the need for officers in the Replacement Center.

As a solution to the officer shortage problem, the Chief's office was

trying to start an officer pool at each - 3nter, but since the country

was then at peace and financial restriL ins were involved, this proved

difficult.

*i When students began their work, it was soon observed that

in this war as in the previous one there was a direct relationship

between the student's mathematical background and his performance

at the School. Battery Officerb Course No. 6 was given a little

introductory courso in mathematics, and it was noted that the 17

who failed it had below average scores in gunnery. A more detailed

211

-- * I.,,. _

IL.e*
investigation was made of Battery Officers Course No. 10, which

had 222 members, 25% of them Reserve officers, the balance,

National Guardsmen. The table, below gives their mathematical

background.

Background No. of students

(1) No algebra 8

(2) No geometry 21.

(3) No trigonometry 78

(4) No logarithms 72

(5) None of the above 6 (all National Guardsmen)

(6) Only one of the above 11 (three Reserves, eight

Natioral Guardsmea,)

All six of those with little background did below the general average of

work in gunnery. Of the 17 in groups 5 and 6, two failed the subcourse

on :i•'ing Battery; five, Observed Fires; .seven,, Unobserved Fires;

eight passed all three subcouress..

Deficient students whose potential value seemed to justify it

were turned back to later classes. It was then found difficult to

make artillerymen of infantry officers, many of whom fell by the

wayside, which suggested that an officer needed some artillery experience to do well with the Battery Officers Course. Deficient

students might themselves ask . to be turned back. Directors

interviewed students who were deficient, or seemed likely to be.

If the student failed to graduate, the infov~aiation so gained would be

of use in reclassification proceedings. As of June, 1941, the students

were told eithor that their work was satisfactory or unsatisfactory,

no numerical grades or class standings being given Out. Sixty-five

per cent or better was satisfactory.

In the Regular course, where all sLudents were artillerymen

of some experience, it had been customary for students to act as

executives. For a while, this was the practice in the special course

but in April this was changed to provide that selected officers would

go to the battery positions to observe the organization's executive

and safety officer in the performance of their duties. The students

would be given such instruction as circumstances permitted, and

reports on them were no longer required.

On graduation, students in classes 12 to ZZ (and possibly

others) could indicate the assignments they preferred on the basis

of d list posted on the class bulletin board. The Commandant was

given this authority, for the classes indicated above, for Reserve

officers ordered by corps area commanders to temporary duty at

the Field Artillery School.

21Z

.1
The capacity of F1ield Artillery School for students in

the Battery Officer Classes may be shown by a table.

August-December,. 1940. (classes 1-4) 300

Decemb':r 1940-June 1941 (claspes 5-11) 600

June 1941-June 194Z (claseee. lZ-60) 7Z0

The sharp increase in capacity reflects a decision to increase the

Army by many divisions. It will be noted too that classes were increased from 100 each, entering every month, to ZOO, also entering

monthly, then changed to about 60, entering every week.

The actual formulation of schedules and programs was done

by the Assistant Secretary under the Assistant Commandant. When

a course wa& begun, the Assistant Commandant alloted to each

department the number of hours it was considered to need. The

department then prepared a master schedule for the alloted hours,

indicating whether the subject was theoretical or practical, the

number of hours for any individual subject and a brief description

of the instruction. Upon receipt of these programs, the Assistant

Secretary consolidated them into the master program for the course.

When this was approved, he then made out the schedule for the course.

These schedules wee-snade on a block system, certain hours being

alloted for certain subjects. During the period described in the above

tables the Battery Officers Course had three classes at the School at

all times. Schedules for the officer and enlisted specialist classes

were prepared in the departments having charge of their instruction.

If they needed troops and areas. their requirements were fitted into

the Battery Officers Course .chedules.

The Battery Officers Courses were the controlling factore in

the use of range areas and school troops. Certain priorities on

these were given to departments for individual instruction. No request

for troops could be greater than indicated in the troop and area chart,

which was prepared by consultation with the departments. The

several departments gave the Assistant Secretary weekly statements

of their troop requirements on forms provided for the purpose I2

days before the week involved. Instructors could nnt change theme

troop 'equirements. Range areas were secured directly from the

range officer, and transportation was requested directly from the

motor pool.

The Advanced Course had not been as successful as hopedi

and as early as January 1941 its merger with a proposed field officers'

course was suggested by the School. In many cases, officers sent

to take the course hPwd not met the staiidards set for them, and the

course was not then much benefit. An analysis of the origin of the

213 Zl3 k•. 
students fr'om the civilian components in one %class showed their

rank varied from captain to brigadier general, their artillery service, from mero to 24 years. Nor did all of the Regulars who

attended meet the requirements. It was also, considered that the

use made of these students after graduation wase a poor return for

the efforts expended during the course, for only four of the first

class wore assigned to duty with the higher echelons of command.

This may be partly explained by the fact that under the policy as it

was then, National Guard students in the class could not after

graduation be taken from their units for duty with the higher

echelons for which they had presumably been trained. Of classes

2-5 inclusive, 60% of the class were National Gu&.rdsmen, whose

assignment was accordingly reatricted. In August 1941, a change

of course content to incl•de something of value to field officers

was proposed by Brig Gen eorgeIR, Align, so that these men

could take with them something of use to their organilations. Of

course, as the Army continued to expand, many students must

have found their way to the higher echelons for which they had been

trained,

The Advanced Course as of March 1941 included 120hours

refresher work on current Battery Officers Course subjects and

360 hours of advanced work. In the advanced work were 210 hours

on map problems and terrain exercises; 80 hours individual studies

on assigned subjects; 70 hours of committee studies. Of the map

problems and terrain exercises, 28% of the time was alloted to

division artillery subjects, 34% to corps artillery and artillery with

the corps, and 38% to Army artillery and artillery with the Army.

To recapitulate, there were several officers' courses that

were offered in February 1941. The Battery Officers Course was

12 weeks long and closely paralleled the old National Guard and

Reserve Officers Course with a new class entering every four weeks.

The Officer Specialists Course was a grouping of three courses:

Communications, Horsemanship, and Motors, and was 12 weeks

long. A now class entered every 13 weeks. The choice of a name

for it was unfortunate, since the officers did not spend fouL weeks

on each of the above subjects. The Advanced Course was Just

described. It too ws 1Z weeks long with a new class eve::y 13

weeks, The Basic Coarse was only for newly commissioned

lRegularm and was also a 12 weeks course. It was offereu once a

year.

214

"" I
Up Meging of the Advanced Course with a proposed Field

Officers Course wasmentioned above. Another suggested merger

was that Qf the 1941 Bauic Course with. Battery,Qfficers Course

No. 13, whtch,was proposed by the Chief of Fied.Art ilery. . Since

the two courses were very similar, this would have made little

difference, except for the inclusion of animal transport subjects

for all students. This plan was opposed by General Alltn, then

Commandant, and later abandoned. In passing, it may be stated

that the Battery Officers Course, the Basic Course, and what

was to be. the Officer Candidate Course were practically identical

and that all wtemmed from the old National Guard and Reserve

Officers Course. This course, or these courses, ,'I be

described later in detail.

its pupose was to fill the gap between the Battery Officers Course

and the Advanced Course, where there was no instruction for

battalion commanders and senior battalion officers. Class No. I

began July 7, 1941, and graduated September 3. Class No. 2 began

September 10, and the course was offered in this manner until

Class No, 13, which was extended to 12 weeks. Xt seems worthwhile to describe this course in detail; the groat majority of the

officer students who Wmssed.through the School took one of the two;

courses. Field at 4Bttry Officers.

The course, in general,: covered the tactics and technique

of the field artillery battalion with special emphasis on command

and staff functions of division artillery. The Department of Communications reviewed the latest developments in communication

equipment and facilities, only 14 hours being ailoted to it. The

instruction given by the Department of Gunnery fell into three

subdivisions. Thirteen hours were given to observed fires,

including terrestial and air observation and conduct of service

practice. Unobserved fire received 54 hours. The subjects

covered may be grouped under survey, and preparation of firing

charts and firing data. Survey instruction covered use of the

transit, running a traverse, long and short base intersection, night

survey, use of aerial photographs, and survey for fire direction.

Preparation of firing charts and firing data dealt with computation

of base angles, meteorological data, corrections from registration,

and prearranged fires. The third division was fire direction (31

hours), under which thfo student learned fire direction technique, duties of members of the fire direction team, division artillery fire

direction, and battalion and division survey and fire direction plans.

215

. ,

1i '
The 'eOpartment of'Materiel aicquainted the "student with

sighting arid laying, equipmlnt, ammunition.i maintenance1 and, the.

105-mm howitser.•(L(Onlysix'hours were devoted to it,}), Motor

transport av'e 12 hours to covering the' latest developments' in

operation', maintenance, and inspection of field artillery motor

vehicles, under the general topics of preventive maintenance,

command inspect!ons, and marching. Twelve hours were allotted,

The Department of Tactics began with studying the duties and

training of the intelligence, operations, and supply sections of

artillery staffs, for 51 hours. Then came tactics in general,

including artillery in the defense and the attack, in support of

armored forces, defense against armored and air attacks, and

liaison. Practical exercises and demonstrations were included.

A wire of August 29, 1941, from the Adjutant. General's

office, gave the Commandant authority to transfer officers from

Advanced Course No, 4 to Field Officers Course No. 2 if in his

opinion they lacked the qualifications for the former course.

Two classes in survey and fire direction were offered

April 30 - May 26," and May 27, - June 23. Members ofL the classes

were taken from aniong graduates of the Dattery Officer classes,

In the first two weeks, the students acted as members of survey

parties; in the second two weeks, they conducted survey parties.

of 

The 

School 

course 

troops 

provided 

fire 

three 

direction 

three-hour 

teams. 

periods 

No more 

in 

classes 

drilling 

along 

members 

this

2

line were held.

Gunnery Innovationos

Research and tests continued duritug these months of expansion. On September 4 and 10, 1940, further extensive tests of the

relative accuracy'of map data corrected, K , and VE transfers

were made using the 4. 7-inch gun and theM3 -mm howitzer in addition to the 75-mm gun. The firing was based on a transit survey

with meteorological messages given every hpur, each burst located

by the 2d Observation Battalion, and trigonomnetric computation used

whenever possible. It was concluded that when firing with the same .4

charge within transfer limits, there was little practical difference

between map data corrected, K transfers, and VE transfers. Out- "

side transfer limits, VE transeers were found to--e most effective,

and transfers across zones could be effective when massing several

batteries.

216

•S.
in April;1941 t~he-ckhool was asked abogt-the ert.ye oerite

of these methods, and basing its answer on the tests previously I" mentioned, replied thet when mneteorologicat data was not. oYilable.,, and registration was! permitted, E transfers should bO. used. After

meteorological data was at hand,. VE transfers were to be used.

Once the VE was Obtained, it was said to be accurate as long as

positionGan-d ammunition were unchanged. whereas a new K should

be obtained every few hours. With a VE,, new meteorolojical

messages took care of any corrections necessitated by changing

weather. In commenting on this, MaJ George Keyser, then director

of the Department of Gunnery wrote that VE tranefors were nothing.

more than map data corrected, further corrected by registration

factors, and that over a period of years the School had learned that

for all around accuracy there was little difference between K and

YE..

A photographic grid system was formally submittodlto the

Chief of Field Artillery September Z6, 1941, with the comment that

it was based on several years work. The grid system consisted of

parallel vertical and horizontal lines 1.8 inches apart and startinj

in each case with one through the center of the.photograph, The

vertical center line was designated AA while the corresponding

horizontal line was given the designation MM. To the right and upward fron the center Ules the designatioun followed the alphabet.

To the left and downward from the center lines the designations ran

backward through the alphabet starting with LL as the first grid line

to the left of the center and with ZZ as the first one below. Being

based upon the arbitrary 1.8 inch grid square, regardless of the

acale of the photograph, the grid furnished no information as to

ground distances, and would give the enemy no information of value

if a message referring to it were intercepted. ,.

The new methods of gunnery, referred to before, appeared in :,

print in instruction memorandum 0-7, March 1941, Several changes

from the 1939 edition of NM 6-40 were included. The text taught the

use of c instead of the fork for light and medium artillery except when

special eccuracy was desired. Deviations were measured, when it

was intended to use them# but were not announced aloud. In the various

types of bracket fire, there was no set rule for bringing in the battery,

and a 100 yard sheaf was used for all calibers. In axial bracket, axcept

in firing at a moving target, fire was opened at the center of the bracket.

In amall-T. deflection was not senses until fire for effect was begun; in

large-T, range was not sensed until fire for effect was begun.

J

S~217
Newmethods of fire were approved in .M1ay bf the Chief's

office. The Sequence of command was altered, so that the cornmand for shell and charge came just after the command for method

of adjustment. The battery commander formed a 100-yard-sheaf byannouncing deflection differences after getting the width of the

battery front from the executive. The term "map data corrected"

was discarded, the term meteorological data being used instead.

The limits of the K transfer were set at 1, 500 yards over and short

and 400 mile rightand left of the check point. The VE transfer was

to be replaced by the meteorological transfer in a manner similar

to that for the K transfer.

Training Literature

Some paragraphs back it war mentioned that the Field Artillery School, at the request of the Chief'. officer, supplied a table

showing what exemptions from extension c€ursei should be granted

for completion of various School courses, and peribds of service.

The School's recommendation was that successful completion of the

Battery Officers Course plus a year's service should tako care of

all of the 20-series, and all but three of the 30-series, Administration, Field Artillery Staff Functions, and Camouflage. Eight of the

40-series and-three of the 50-series were not covered. Service in

higher grades of course accounted for many of these non-exempted

subcourses. It will be recalled that the 20-series covered the

mobilization assignments of second lieutenants, the 30-series,

those of first lieutenants, etc.

An attempt was made by the School in the spring of 1941 to

have the responsibility for approval and revisiion of subcourses

decentralizod to the Chiefs of the several arms. The Adjatant

General's office would not agree to this, pointing out the very considerable powers over these courses already possessed by the Chiefs. For example, the initial determination of what courses should be

revised for any school year, and when they should be revised, rested

with the Chiefs. Responsibility for coordination of these courses was

the War Department's, and it was not wilLing to deprive itself of the

corresponding power.

The War Department had previously suggested the S-.hool prepare instructional material for corps area Reserve officer schools;

the School had demurred on the grounds that it could not cio .% worth.

while job without facilities which the War Department probably would

Snot spare. To this, the War Department repliod in February 1941

that training of Reserve officers was now very largely in the hands of

other Reserve officers, who requi•ed a guide. Elaborate lessons arn

* I 218

I ¶

qL.
problems were not desired, only a sort of brief training bulletin,

The .Cbief ilaeued.orders to that effect, So bulletins.were plannod

to provide material suitable-for conferences conducted by-instruc-.

tors from the Officers Reserve Corps. The bulletin would, bo

"prepared by the Department of Publications, appr.oved by the Chief,

printed at the rie.: Artillery School, and ordered from the School

by the several corps areas. Their issue began in April, when a

letter wab sent.to the coarmanding. gonerals of all corps areas,

informing them the bullotins were available.

As the Array grow, and officers grappled with the problem

of training swarms rif recruits, the demand for training literature

grew accurdingly. In 1941 and 1942 officers and organizations

turned increasingly to the School to supply them with information,

Orders carae to the Book Department for Field Artillery Books,

sensing pads, and -raphical firing tables; to the Secretary for

instruction memoranda and catalogues, or sometimes Just for "all

publications available. !' Requests came for material on. various subJects, ae.n., ntitank dafense, i Various colleges asked aid in pro.- ,t

paring courses, e S., camouflage, and basic artillery, Librarians

auked for books and book titles. A. oaeet asked for data on which to

base &.- histo.ry eo field artillery motor materiel. The new Tank

Deetroyer School requested ioppropriate training literature and asked

to be put on the School's mailing list. The most intereuting roquest,

perhaps, came from ail Ar Corps Officer who was charged with preparing a military training program for Air Corps reception centers

In his district. He desired a program which would give the cadets

some idea oe what the rot of the Army did, how to defend an airdrome, etc., and he had 30 days in which to arrange his course. "

3pecifically he asked that the Field Artillery School draw up a course

covering felid artillery fundamentals in three one hour lessons, plus

a manual for btudents, and one for instructors. In ten dayet a detailed

lesson plan plus certain instructional matter was on the way. It was

not possible to prepare a Lmanul in such a short time, but the School ., "

invited r-.)quests for further ksslstance.

A change in the organiaation producing training literature

was made in March 1941 by creating a Training Literature Board

which whenever practicable would do the writing or revision of '1

publications and training films. It was not to be a formal board like

the Field Artillery Board but rather a small group of officers

funct~onisil, directly under the Commandant. The Department of

Publications was to continue preparing ail extension courses, instruction .memoranda, and such other literature ac might be necessary for

the functioning of instruction at the School. Colonel Leon Ft. Cole

was rhosen to leave the Department of Motors and lead the board

219

I.0
pending the arrival: of Col .E. -R.'Van Deusan, wh6'had compiled

the training literature used' at the'Camp lackson, ipl&ernent Depot

in the last war.- Other members were Majors Thomas -M'. 'Watlington and Wilbur R. Pierce. It was, planned to'assign -t9erve officers

as the board swung into its work,

By July of 1941 the School considered itself ready to produce

sound films:and film btripe on new developments of value and

training subjects. The War Department was at that time uAdertaking

a comprehensive program of training films and film strips. The

training films, in general, were made by the Signal Corps. Requests

for films were made by the individual branches, and submitted to the

War Department for approval, after which they were shot by a Hollywood trained crew. Major M. P. Echols FA, then in Hollywood,

suggeste'd that 16-.mm films be made at Fort Sill for circulation in

the Field Artillery, . .

was Regarding School troopse in May, the 18th'Fie~d Artillery

was completely: occupied in working for the battery officer classe..

Also present were three battalions not previously mentioned in this

account, the 70th, 71st, and 83d field Artillery Battalions, equipped

with horse-drawn 75-mm guns. They wire earmarked forl use by the

Officer Candidate School when it opened,

The 45th Division left on February Z8 and March 3 of 1941

to make room for the new Field Artillery Replacement Training

Center, which was to occupy its area. Originally planned for Fort

Knox, the Replacement Ceinter was put at Fort Sill because the:

Armored Force Headquarters was placed at Fort Knoxý With the

Replacement Center was a Reception Center for newly inducted men.

While these establishments were not part of the School, cooperation

was very close ýetween them.

With the departure of the 45th Division, the Commandant

again became Post Commander. The School and School troops were

an exempted activity under the Chief of Field Artillery. The Post,

and the Commandant as Post Commander, was under the Corps Area.

1. Despite the war, three horse shows were held this year, a

Junior show May 10, the InterpOst horse show, race meet, and hunter

trials as a local show May 30'June 1, and another show in October.

Brig Goa C. P. George, the noted horseman, then commanding the

Replacement Center, was Among the judges.

220

46ii , ),~I'..)

j~i *~*. - " j .
Cor'ps troops at the Post were under the Commauding Ueneral oa

the Army Corps, &ad te Rsplacemoen Center was under the Corps

Area with general supervision over the conduct of training ex..-

cismis by the War Department through the Chief of Field Artillery.

The nature of the cooperation referred to above may be ,

briefly illustrated. On opening, the Replacemont Center was very :

short of quadrant and panoramic sights, so trainees were sent to

the gun parks of organizations on the Post for instruction. Horses,

equipment, and personnel were often loaned to the Center, with at

least one entire training cycle completed by using the horses of the

18th Field Artillery. When trainees progressed to the point that

they could do work for the School in service practice and tactical

prublems, they were so employed.

The Office r Candidate School I

Prew%,.r pLanning sofths Officea Candidate School, '0CS"

as it was universally called, may easily be traced to 1934, for a

War Department letter of May 3, 1934, speaks of "the various .1

officer candidate schools ani othertraining activities under corps I

ares control." In 1935, the course planned for these schools,

whatever it-had beon befer., was reviseid to make it three months

long. The concept of a multitude of training schools under many

Jurisdictions oppareatly went unchallenged until about 1937, when

General Birnie told Colonel McIntyre that the War Department

was thinking of reducireg the large naumber of "officer filler and i '

replacement schools" to a minimum and placing them under the .

Chiefs of Arms. In 1939 Jurisdiction over the schools was given to

the several Chiefs.

In 1939 the officer candidate course proposed by the Protective Mobilization Plan was thoroughly revised by the School.

A table will illustrate the results:

Before revision After revision

Military courtesy, interior 52 hra Military discipline, 49 hrs

guard, organization of interior guard,

the Army, etc. hygiene, milllaw

Care of arms, ceremonies 20 *

*Ceromonies and inspections in unscheduled timea.

ZZI

1, S.-
Befcre, revision After revision;-

Animal Transport 70 hr.

Motor Transport 50 Motor Transport 50 hre

Materiel 13 Mate riel 33

Gunnery 174 Gunnery' 205

Communications 30 Communications 34

Tactics 85 Tactics 100

It was further proposed by the School that the instruction of candidates

be condescted by officers assigned to the batteries in which ths candi-

* dates were to be grouped. This did not suit the Chief's office, who

thought that training in more technical subjects should be conducted

by departments as it was in the last war..

The creation of officer candidate. schools in World War II was

directed by- Litter from the Adjutant General,. January 15, 1941.

The schools were to open.July. 1, 1941, offering three month courses

to warrant officers andl enlisted men who had six months Federal service before applying. They were to be no older than 36,- would be

commissioned second lieutenants, and would have to serve a year j

after graduation. The Field Artillery was allowed IZ5 men per classIi

for a yearly quota of 500. With the exception of the Air Corps, the

candidate need, not have been from the branch in which he desired a 1

commission. A later letter directed the convening of boards of three

or more officers, including one medical officer, to pass on applicants

through 

for the schools, 

channels applications 

to the post commander 

to go from the 

and organisation then to the exarniW.ng

commander K

board. A.

Later letters somewhat modifiel the provisions of the first

letter. It was provided that an of'lcer candidate with less than three

months to serve after graduation could be discharged and re-enlist,

that candidates who would be 21 on graduation could be admitted, and '1

that examining boards and corps area surgeons could waive certain

defe-r.s. In January it was not planned to provide any extra facilities

: for .',e OCS at Fort Sill, the Adjutant General wiring the Chief:

"Offxher candidate courses will be conducted within facilities at your

disposal, no additional housing "eing contemplated."

2272

St'I

~jj.
T'he School was requested January 24 to forward an OCS

"course similar to. that provided for the 1939 Protective Mobilisation Plan, With its reply the School suggested instead a four week

basic course after which unsatisfactory students could be weeded out

and the rust to take the regular Battery Officers Course. This plan

was not acceptable to G-3, who pointed out that it would exceed the

12 week maximum. The quota of students. ior 0C8 was doubled even

before it. opened.. On his April visit to Fort Bill,. General George C.

Marshall inquired what would be needed to handle a capacity of 4Z0

students. In reply, the Field Artillery School requested more firing

batteries and about 14 instructors and 10 enlisted men for every 100

candidates. This plan was not carried through, but in the reply to it,

the Chief's office wrote that the OCS capacity would be Z50, thus

doubling it.

A second -War Department letter of April 26 provided for.

125 man classes enteringLat sir, week intervals, It stated that the

predominating considsration governing admisston to OCS would be

demonstrated qualities of outstanding leadership, to which educational requirements would be secondary. Appointments to the

Organised Poesrves were discontinued, and commissions could no

longer be earned via the extension course route g Men who had reenlisted to take the course, as provided above, could if they failed

be discharged, if the man so preferred. Others would be returned

tri their organisations. At this time, it was planned to give reserve

commissions to. successful graduates.

Since mathematics, or the lack of it, had proved to be such a

batrier to many students, it was mildly surprising that the Field

Artillery School suggested as mathematical requirements for OCS

entrance only a working knowledge of common fractions, decimals,

addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. At the samear*

time, it recommended that college mathematics not be made L

requirement for ROTC students, on the ground that mazy capable

men would be excluded fronm the reserve list, since many colleges

did not require mathemadtcs for gr~duation.

As originally planned in 1941, the OCS organizational schemet

cailed for a commandant of candidates, Major Carl H. Jark, an

executive officer, an adjutant, and a supply officer. Eich class was

comrn4aded by a class tactical officer with one asaistant class tactical officer per hundred stvadsnts. As the school grew, the expe*nding

classes were grouped into battalions, three to a battalion. In the

beginnIng, mess and supply were handled though the White Detachment of the Field Artillery School until the growth of OS forced the

organization of a separate service battalion. Texts and equipment

223
were issued by the Book Department and turned in~by the student at

the end of his course. Non-issue supplies,. as in. the past, were

sold at cost. The instructors were:drawn from the several departments of the Field Artillery School according to a quota.

The first class of 1Z4 entered July 10, and 79 graduated

October 10. The group included four selectees, -f an average age

of 25, 48 National Guardsmen who averaged 26, and 70 Regulars

who were Z& on an average. Until September 1941 it had been

intended to give these men reserve commissions, but eventually

it was realized that this would create a "hump" in the reserve list

like that which existed for so many years in the Regular Army. To

avoid this, the graduate of this and succeeding classes were commissioned in the Army of the United States (AUS). In effect, the

door to reserve commissions was barred to enlisted men for the

duration, for with the opening of OCS thoy were no longer allowed to

enroll in extension courses as a means-of advancing themselves.

But considering the splendid opportunities opened by 00, :it is not

likely that any felt an injustice.

Theso first classes lived in tents and were warnod not to

bring dependents to LAwton, for not even tents were available there

for wives and children. According to size,' each class was broken

into sections of about 30 men, under students who were detailed as

section marchers. The latter were responsible for forming their

sections for all formations, reporting attendance at each, and insuring the proper conduct of the section during duty hours, They

also reconnoitered the routes prescribed for going to and from all

formations and took the section along the proper route. Marching

was at attention at all times unless otherwise directed by a tactical

officer. Tho sections were in turn divided into 10 man sqoads, led

by squad leaders who reported late and absent members to the

section marcher.

Students performed no fatigue details during duty hours,

with the exception of those inen who served in the mess halls at

meal times, the charge of quarters at the class mail room, and

the battalion and headquarters charge of quarters. Rosters were

kept by eacls class tactical officer and duties rotated so that durixig

"his stay at the School each student performed all d~ities enumerated

above. Posters were arranged in the larger classes so that no

student did the same duty more than once. This system broke down

with smaller classes but was largely rectified by the substitution of

enlisted mail orderlies for the day roomi and having but one charge

of quarters with simpler duties.

224

, A

-I'
The course given at OCS was very similar to the Basic

Course and virtually identical with that given to the batte r" officers. Considering that almost all field artillery officers immissioned during the war' took the course, and that it was the

policy to send all officers of battery grade to one like it, its

importance must be recognized. Composition of the course wau:

Pegular Extra

Subject Hours Hours

Department of Tactics & Communications:

Tactics:

Organization of the army & field artillery 2

Defense against chemicals 3

Associated arms 10

Combat orders 6

Artillery tactics 9

Artillery staff duties 7

Logistics 5

Camouflage & field fortification 7

PSOP & battery exercises 45 2

Map & air photo reading 10

Subtotal '70- 4

Communications:

Signal communication for field artillery 33

Administration:

Military discipline,courtesiss, customs 2

Military law 8

Administration & mess management 6

Subtotal

TOTAL

Department of Gunnery

Firing battery 30 2

Observed fires 90

Unobserved fires 76 8

Fire direction 13

TOTAL Z09 10

Some from ROTW and CMTC did not take the course in the

"early days of the period.

225

ZZ5 ~..,
Department of Materiel:

Materiel k ammunition (motor-drawn; ections) 47

Materiel & ammunition (.horse-drawn sections) 33

TOTAL 80

Department of Motor Transport: 6

Operation & maintenance 71

Department of Animal Transport:

Equitation 26

Animal management 15

Driving & draft 44

TOTAL 85'_

G1RAND TOTAL 480 182

The course was 13 weeks long. Candidates arrived at Fort Sill on

"Monday and Tuesday, completed their processing on Weodnesday"

afternoon, and began work Thursday morning. There were eight

hours of instruction a day, half in the morning, half in the afternoon.

Drill formations and inspections were held before: class in the morning.

Study hours were from 7:30 P.M. to 1:00 A.,M,

The motors course took three daysiof the first week and six

days of the second. It began with a conference, i.e., class-room

discussion and a movie on military vehicles and driver training. Then

followed four days of conferences and practical periods on motors,

transmission, clutch, steering, lubrication, axles, etc., finishing

with a complete 1,000-mile maintenance service, "trouble shooting,"

and a command inspection. One day was given to driving :a stake

course and difficult driving. The final two days were divided between

conferences and practical work on marching, ending with a 10-hour Ile

motor march, and a final examination.

The materiel course was given six days of the third wetk.

Two days of conference and practical periods wete divided among

small arms, the . 50 cal. machine gun, the 37-mm antitank gun, ,1

the 75-mm pack howitzer, and the 155-mm howitzer. The 105-mm

howitzer received four days, covering: sights, tube and breech, *1

* recoil mechanism, elevating and traversing inechanism, the carriage,

the wheels and brakes, and a final examination.

Students take either animal or motor transport but not both.

2 The 18 extra hours are for night exercises,

226

S* I p4
Next came gunnery, from the fourth week to the ninth. The

subject was introduced with the organization of the firing battery.

Then came a conference o:, artillery arithmetic and fire commands,

laying the battery, and firing charts. This was followed by practical

work in the use of fire control instruments, laying the battery by

cumpass and base angle, determining the minimum elevation, and

measuring the adjusted compasses and base angles. A conference

with blackboard problems introduced axial precision fire. After

this the candidate couJd look back on his first week of gunnery and

feel that it wasn't so bad.

In the fifth week, a minimum of 12 hours was devoted to

subcaliber firing of axial problems. The student was graded on

each problem fired, grades being based on initial data, fire commands,

procedure, speed, sensing, and effect. Survey was introduced by

a conference followed by practical work on the transit, intersection,

and short and long base problems. The work of the safety officer

was begun as was work on K-transfers and meteorological data.

The sixth week was known as the "bloody sixth" and was

laden with examinations. Fire direction was taken up with conferences and practical work. The duties of each member of the team

were studied. Target area surveys were taken up, then connecting

surveys, and lastly, position area surveys. A conference introduced small-T precision fire. There was a review conference and

practical session on the firizng battery and the posts and duties of

its personnel.

The seventh week was begun with the fire direction team,

K-transfers and metro messages, Small-T precision problems

were fired on the blackboard, followed by conferences on forward

observation. Th6 week also had its quota of examinations.

Forward observation problemq were fired in the eighth

week. Fire direction teams were formed and given both conference

and practical wo-k using photograph,,, grid sheets, and maps.

Practical work was given on survey with a photo map. Large-T

firing was brought up via the blackboard route, and more examinations.

The next week, tie ninth, gave three days to gunnery, firing

large-T precision, and bracket problems. There was a practical

period on fire direction using aerial photographs and a conference

on the use of the oblique photograph. The (inal examinations were

conquered--by most of the students--and the successful had completed

a 3sod 50% of the OCS course.

227

-womb
After gunnery came communications, three days of thes

ninth week, and two days of the tenth, The course was divided

into wire and-radio. Under radio, thelstudent studied ovoice

procedure and discipline, the various nets, etc., in both class

and practical periods. Under wire, he studied circuits, laying

wire, splicer, voice procedure,, etc. Conferences were held on

ciphers, codes, and visual communication.

Tactics began in the 10th week with about 12 hours of

mapping, followed by class work on combat orders and combat

intelligence, and on the organization and use of the battery detail.

Saturday was given to a demonstration on the battery in displacement, reconnaisance, and selectior. of position.

The 1 1th week introduced the tactical use of aerial photographs, Army administration, military law, and military corres.-

pondence were taught in class. After these came a conference and

demonstration of( infantry in the attack, camouflage and battery:

supply. Selection of battery positions was covered in class.

Conferences and practical periods wirs alloted the 12th

week for the organization of battery positions, the use of battery

and battalion details, and reconnaisance, selection, and occupation of position for the battery and the b*Atalion. There were Conferences

on armored artillery, the liaison officer, and infantry and artillery

in the defense. All examinations were finished on Saturday afternoon.

Only two and one half days remained for the 13th week. An

entire day was reserved fori demonstrations of tank traps, mine fields,

booby traps, battalion aid stations, and the field kitchen and rations. The course ended with an overnight battalion problem with students

acting as enlisted men and officers of the battalion. About 40 rounds

of 105-mm ammunition were alloted for the morning's firing.

Below is a table which illustrates the similarity between

the Basic Course for newly commissioned regulars and the OCS course,

Department Officer Officer Difference

Candidate Basic

Tactics 124 hours 91 hours +30 hours

Communication 36 28 + 8

Gunnery 244 150 +94 4

Mate riel 36 46 -10

Motor transport 72 48 +24

Animal transport 112 -112

228 "
The major difference lay in giving the new Regulars instruction in

equitatic' applicable The instruction was not on a different leveli it was that to junior officers of field artillery,

Students and Their TrPatment

General Alin, the Commandant, believed thr-t of the men in

the firpt OCS class, many were deficient in educational background,

others, in ertillery experience, but hr, was of no rnind to relieve

them. General Danford's reaction was that he most certainly did

not want men in the course who were not officer material and that

he wanted them worked as hard as possible to weed out those who

could not stand the pressure, He noted too that the course was

verysimilar to the battery officers- work, with gunnery substantially the same, He felt'that the course should be' more ba'sic with

some work on mathematics, mess menagement, and duties of the

executive, for he expected them to come back for the Battery

Officers Course. General Allin wrote in turn that the gunnery course

had been made the same as that given the battery officers, ior it

was' not expected that these men would ever return'for a battery

officers class.

Candidates who had been ill could be turned back to a later

class by the Commandant of OCS on recommendatsion of a board of

oificers. This would not affect quotas of incoming candidates.

Where candidates demonstrated their ability by practical tests,

they were graduated even though their academic work did not indicate proficiency; This ability was judged partly on the basis of

ratings given them by their instructors and by their classmates.

These ratings were made by suctiorn mates twice during the course

at the end of the 5th and 10th weeks. The actual process involved I•

rating the members of one section, less oneself, in order of

preference, giving the number "1" to the top man and so on down.

For the most part, student ratings and those of tactical officers

were in close agreement. Obvijous discrepancies were investigated

immediately. The records kept on the r.tudent, his previous achievmenti in the army, his intelligence score, the grades given by

departments, also of course entered into the decision to graduate a "'

man,

The number of graduates from the first two OCS classes

did not please General Marshall, who called it a meager return on

. the effort exp ided. He directed an investigation of why onlV 60. 5%

and 54% respe.. ively of the two classes had graduated. This investigation revealed that in addition to the deficiencies commented on

before--such as lack of educational background--that in one class a

229

-S - 9 
candidate had had as little, as one day's recruit training and that,

three men had had only a week or loes. It was also the belief of

General Align that men not fit to be officers should be weeded out

before commissioning, rather than after. The table at the end of

this chapter shows that the percentage of graduates varied sharply

from class to class, depending on the level of the class itself.

Discussion of the graduation assignments of the first OCS

graduates began in July, when the plan was to allot most of them

to corps areas and none to the schools, as General Allin desired.

The /rgg.,ments that General Align advanced for keeping some of

thesee men for the School were for a few days at least regarded as

even better arguments for putting them on troop duty, but by July

Z9 General Danford wrote that Allin cquaWd have about all the;OCS

graduates he, wanted. The compromise finally reached was to

give 25 graduates to the-School, releasing the reserve o1ficers

thus made surplus. The balance of the men wore to go to troops

rather than replacement centers, as Allin had suggest44e because

of the shortage of combat officers.. And the. corps areas wore said

to be counting on their allotments. Of Class No. 4, 50% wore assigned to the Replacement Training Center at Fort Bragg, 30% to the

Center at Fort Sill, and 20% to Camp Roberts, Calif., excepting

those kept for the School. Since Danford and Allin were takinj

officers from the replacement centers to fill the Battery Officer

Courses, that-offered another reason, for sending OCS men to the

centers as quickly as possible.

In planning the graduation ceremonies for the officer candidates. ithadbeenhopedtheymightlistento a radio address by

General George C. Marshall, but this was not possible. Fortunately,

General Robert M. Danford, the Chief of Field Artillery, was able

to be present, and the graduates received their commissions from .

him. With these commissions they also received the same rights, I .I'

privileges, and benefits as members of the Officers Rteserve Corps

of the same grads and length of sorvice on activo duty, as pr~ipd4W

by an Act of Congress signed by the President, September 22, 1941.

A paternal government also permitted them to retain ail serviceable A

articles of clothing issued them. ..

SI ~Enlisted Specialists Courses '

In the summer of 1941, the School was offering instructiom

to enlisted specialists in communications, motors, materiel,

saddle-making, horseshoeing, and horsemranship. The first three

were luminped together in a so-called "enlisted specialists class"

which entered monthly, for a 12-week course, although the wen of

Z30
the course pursued three different lines of study. The capacity for

this course, or three courses, as you prefer, was about 300. The

otheropumrses wore conducted quarterly, with a capacity of 110 men.

Students. were obtained f=r these classes by letters to the A.&jutant

General telling how many students were wanted, when the courses

began, and what they were. That office in turn set quotas for the

various organiaation& and commands.

A conside rable expansion of the motors courses both for

officers and enlisted men was being considered that summer. It

was pointed out that between 1928 and 1941, 155 officers had mucctemfully completed the Advanced Motors Course, of whom 105 were

]Regulars. Few of them were now motor officers, thanks to the

expansion oftthe Army, and the output of the class -was thought small

by comparison with the total number of Field Artillery battalions,

Before theme clasmes were put on a weekly basis, to attain the desired

output, instructors habitually remained with their section of the class

all through the course. Later instructors remained with their particular

subject,..rather than with the group, and the group passed from instrmctor to instructor, Entrance standards, which had existed (or

some time ,for enjistedstudents, were kept, but improved by the addition of the Army General Clasuiflcation Test and the mechanical

aptitude test. If a student who failed the course also did not meet

these requirements, the fact was noted in a letter to hie organisation

commander which went back through channels, accumulating unfavorable indorsements as it went.

The classes were divided into groups on the basis of the

roster, but after the class had been under observation for some time, there might have been an informal grouping by class performance.

However the clams was split, the policy of the Department of Motor

Transport called for about four men to a group, Class work also

was broken down into phases, with enough time allowed for each '. I'

phase for the majority of students to master the subject. At that

time, written examinations were still of the essay type (fall, 1941),

objective tests being introduced later when classes grew so large

that it was hard to grade a multitude of evaay examitiations.

Two courses were added in the fall of 1941, a Diesel course

for officers and enlisted men, and a course in repair of signal equipment. The Diesel course was four weeks long, was of course conducted by the Department of Motor Transport, and was for officers

and enlisted man successfully completing the motors course. Oil

December 30 the name was changed to Enlisted Specialists Tractor

* ° Course. The course in repair of signal equipmsr.t was also four

weeks long and was for graduates of enlisted communications.

Z31 ,

SII II
Organizational Matters, Fall 1941

In August 1941 there were ZZO commissioned officers on the

staff and faculty plus 24 commissioned officers and stallf or OCS.

The enlisted instructors and staff numbered 1,233. The School

troops were the 16th Field Artillery Regaiment, and the ?0th, 7l1t

and 83d Field Artillery Battalions, horse-drawn, and armed with

75-mm guns. rhese three latter units were not designated School

troops but were attached to the School and used exactly as School

troops. The enlisted instructors were for the most part former

students of the School who had been sent here from Peplacement

Centers. They were not members of any unit. It was considered

poor policy to keep an enlisted student from some organization as

an instructor, for it made unit commanders reluctant to sendgoo~d'

men.

j A shortage of medical officers was plaguing the Post until

well into.1942, In September there wers only 55 medical officers

on the Post, while no less than 55 were authorized for the Cantonment Hospital alone. These men had to operate the 1000-bed Cantonment Hospital, the Post Hospital, the Venereal Clinic, and eight

infirmaries, To this, the Chief could only reply that there was a

scarcity of medical officers throughout the Army, since the Surgeon

General was finding it hard to get them. In January of 1942 the

problem was a little worse, for of 72 medical officers then authorised, ,

only 42 were available.

A table gives the capacity and output of the School as of August- September.

Length Annual

Cans._._.s Si__. • Ente._.. .ks Total

Officer

Battery officers 56 Week 12 2,856 672

Advanced course 30 Qtr 12 120 30

Field officers 30 Bi-mon 8 10 30

Communication 30 Qtr 12 120 30 I

Motors 20 Qtr 12 80 20

Horsemanship 10 Qtr 12 40 10

Officer candidates 125 Semi- 12 1,000 250

qtr

232 . K
Length Annual

Clas&s Sixe nter (weeks) Total

Enlisted

"Communica~ions 146, Mon 12 1,7•2 438

Motors 100 Mon 12 1,200 300

Battery mechanics .67 Mon 12 8Q4 201

Saddlere 30 Qtr 12 1;0 30

Horseshoers 30 Qtr 12 Izo 30

Horsemanship 50 Qtr 12 200 50

It will be noted that the capacity of the Battery Officers Course had

doubled by the fall of 1941 and that its annual output was then two and

one-half times that of OCS. In October of 1941 the Fieid Officers

Course was increased to 60,. -and the Advance Course cut to 20, for

the recent maneuvers had shown the need.of better training for batallion commanders.

A major organimational change was the removal of the Communications Section of the Department of Tactics and Communications

from that Department and its establishment as a separate department,

November 15, 1941. Before its separation there were three sub...

sections, radio, wire, and comn•and post (irreverently known as

"odds and ende"), Enlisted instructors came from a pool under

Master Sergeant Clarence Burleson, The radio and telephone sobsections were split in 1940. Instruction in meteorology had to be

dropped because the students did not have the background to benefit.

by the instruction.

The Department of Gunnery in December was formed into a

department headquarters, four instrilctor groups, a research group, :

and an 0C5 jroup equal in sise to three of the instructor groups.''

Three of the .Instructor groups took care of the Battery Officer$ ]

Course*, and the fourth group had the Field Officers Coutrse, the

Advanced Course, and Officers Communication. For aLL these

activities, the director, Maj George Keyser, wanted 76 instrucýors,

A new source of instructors opened up in November when the

assignment of National Guard officers was permittebd, This was a

reversal of long contiuing policy which had previously kept National

i' ~Guard organimations intact, No doubt by cotihcidsnQs, some 180 extra -,

officers were assigned to OCS in January. Since the previous summer,

the Field Artillery School had added a course for field officers, enlisted

tractor mechanics, enlisted radio mechanics, and had made room for

100 more students in the officer specialist courses, with no increase

in instructor strength, which was then 247. In December a request

was made for about 160 more, to give a total of 400. This request

233

233 IA•
"crossed"O a letter from th3 Chief's office informing the School that

it was to get 180 more officers to take care of a great increase in

OCS capacity.

These new instructors who were assigned to 0OS gunnery!

received a:short course to prepare them foi their new duties.

Six hours were given to discussions of the organizationrof the OCS,

the instructor and the student, methods of instruction, lesson

planning, grading, conduct of service practice, etc. They also

found that there was still a bad housing shortage in Lawton, even

though over 650 houses had been built in the past year. To alleviate

this, in February 1942, the Defense Housing Corporation recommended the building of 1, 000 homes.

A. statistical comparison of the School at the-time, the fall of

1941, with the peak effort of 1918, will show that 1918 had already

been passed. The student enrollment of fall 1941 was 2,092, aa

against the 1918 peak of 1,554. The School troops had 4, 064 men

as against the. 1918 3#870. The enllsted detachments were.l, 343

men as against 850. In only'0ne respect-was the '1941 Field Artijiery

School smaller tha, the 1918 School of Fire, there were 17 fewer..

commissioned officers on duty., The Field Artillery'School ot 1941

included an officer candidate schqol, which was then on a modest

scalel had the officer candidate school, of 1918, the Central Officers

Training School, been added to the School of Fire of 1918, the

difference would be apparent. *

Increasing and Improving OCa

One of the first steps taken to improve OCS was the decision

to conduct preparatory schools in the replacement centers, which

was made in the late fall of 1941. -The requirement that OCS itudents have six months experlirnce had kept, a great many of them out

of the first classes, and many of those who entered were not too well

qualified. In ono class atone there were seven who had had practically no recruit instruction, all of which had to be given here. These

preparatory schools were to help such situations. Replacement

centers were also considered as a means of giving a ten weeks course

to ROTC graduates to replace -the old six weeks summor course..

This is of interest, for it is the first step along the path that ultimately Led to sending all ROTC•graduates to the OCM•

An increase to a capacity of 500 students was proposed by

the Chief in August in a letter asking what the OCS would need in ")

the way of extra buildings and personnel. These needs were set

at 10 63-man barracks, 2 recreational buildings, 6 administration j

,1W .
buildings, a 1000-maun snoss hall, 12 motor repair &hope# etc.., of

which the barracks and 2 motor repair shope had already been

approved. Thirty-one more officers and 88 enlisted men would be

n9edei1...too. Approval of this construction wits delayed: until

October,14, ithe; recreation- buildings being objected to,. buat when

approvedi, completion by January I was required. The capacity.

of 500 men was to be reached by classes of 4Z a week beginning

January 1 and rising to a peak of 500 capacity March 19, according

to the Chief's plan of November 18. This is reflected in the table

at the end of the chapter.

Liaison Pilot Training

The fall of 1941 also saw the Frield Artillery move a. good

deal %:looor to the long sought goal of organic air observation for

the arm, General Staobrt M.* .Danford sttrted -the. chain of events

with a. letter 1to the War -Deps. tment 4n~ the-fall-of 1.940-in #hkdch hoe

suggested that the time~was rips to provide organic air observation

for the, field. artillery. The reply -was not too encouragingi. -But,

even as these letters were -being exchangod, small slow. lIgh aircraft were being very successfully flown in the Bouthern maneuvers

than proceeding. Proapscts.of,a. favorable decisiem seemed far

t brighter-in-the fall of 1941 when the Assistant Secretary of War,.

John J. McCloyl wrote to General Alinm that he had: taken the F I matter up- and that some action would be taken on it.

The action came by an authorization by the Adjutant General

of a test of organic air observation for the field artillery at Post

Irield,, JorLSilJ early in .19#2. The approval Was dated Decemnber

10, 1941. Twenty-eight light planes, with would-be pilots and.

mechanics, were.accordingly assembled for a six weeks course.

* Each of the prospective pilots was required to hold a civil Pilot's

license, so the six week course was adequate. Of the 33 who began

the pilo~t training, 20 completed. These with the planes were then

formed into two units, which were sent into the field for tests under

service conditions. Thorse tests were most successful and contributed

directly to the decision to equip the FieAd Artillery with organic obser. 

'

vation.

.4.. FAS Publications

Between December 7 and January 1 the old publication systemn

practically came to an end, and that event was of no little importance.

Because of the pressure of the School in the fail of 1941, it was not

possible to have a revised edition of Field Artillery Book 161, on

gunnery, ready in time for the opening of the R OTC fall te rm.

235
The instruction memorrnda were distributed &ratis in its stead to

all ROTC units that had ordered copies, A little later, an urgent.

request came from General Danford that the School collect samples.

of all current traihing -literature, field mantale, technical manuals,

Field Artillery Books, special texts, anything and everything that

might be of value, and rush it to Brig Gen Edward K.ng in the

Philippines. The request was dated November 12, so the books a

must never have reached Bataan.

Use of the Field Artillery Books w"s practically restricted

to ROTC instruction that fall. Six of them were approved for that

purpose by the War Department, since the field manuals were not

detailed enough. Only two were provided for the extension courses,

and onn of them. was the Abbreviated Firing Tables;, One of these

Field Artillery Books did survive for general use-in a rather curious

way,,, Field Artillery-Book 161, which-was rewritten in field manual

style as a new edition of FM 6-40, Firing; However# in kmwritinl'

it,- the editoles were :cautioned not to make it too terse, for it was to

be used for.OC students. As it wasn finally submitted, there was

but one technical chaAge, and that was made in the coromnnds for

"mite and corrector, CHO added the provislonthat data sheets might

be made by either batterwy or battaLiono and that each battery construct and maintin its own firing chart to permit rapid decentralination of fire direction. The text was printed at the Field Artillery

" School's-own pressi because of the pressure on the Government

I lPrintingj Office.

The extension course revision program for 1941-1943 was

submitted in June 1-941 despite the increasing likelihood that all

R eserve officers would be called to active duty. On December 10,

a wire fromn General Danford said the extension course was apt to be .

of small importance because of that probability, and in 1942 the

extenision courses ended for the duration.

236
Officer Candtiato Classes

c

A Datet, . No

S Enrolled Enrolled Oraduated Iraduated

S

"" 10.1-41 79

- s 13"4 127 " 11-1 2-4 -'

3'- 2 '8 3-25-42 49

"-4 -8-41 56 4-11-42 46

56 46

-T.. 1.1-42 63 4-0-42 51

T '..1 go z '... 58 

10 . 2.. -5-42 .. 60 '4.-29-'428

11 2Z-12-42 601 -___4_2 ..... 61" ____1

12 19-2•g.342 . 44

1L3 -642121 5-19-42 98

M I h-il-4 107

1512 Ile2_________ 1

1- 3-19-42 1122 -0

17 ' 3-26-42 123 6.16-42 111

18 4-2-42 243 6.-3-42 (80

19 4-9-4- 256 63042M 

Z' 4-16-42 245 712 210

r-23-42 239 MM0 228 "22 2-o•z' 42 '7.21-.i 125z,

23 -- 7-4Z 499 7-.Z8-42 41 '

24 -14-4z 503 8- 4••'0-4 2

S1811-42 437 I,

Zr -Z82 7 -18-42 .193

27 28a 6"t'•-4Z 6-25-42 ' 5 506 0 9-3-.,z Iz M ,

Z9 'r•-18 -42 501 9-10-42 3.9q ..

I i

I.

237

-f
Bibliography

SFiles of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, op. cit. supra.

Files "u'fthe Field Artillery School, op. cit. supra.

File on Water, Post Headquarters, Ft Sill, Okla.

Recor~s of the City Engineer, Lawton, Okla.

201 File, Col Augustine McIntyre, Post Headquarters, Ft Sill, Okla.

SIZ01 File, Brig Gen George R. AlLin, Field Artillery School.

20) File, Brig Gen Donald C. Cubbison, Post Headquarters,

Ft Sill, Okla.

'i

II

!.

S i,

238

4

i P
CH-APTER TWE LVE

FOUR HUNDRED OFFICERS A WEEK (JAN-JUN, 1942)

Growth of the OCS

The Advanced Course was among the first victims of the

war, and its demise was directly caused by the New Division

Officers Courses. These were first mentioned in a letter of

December 29. This letter described a plan to have 35 artillery

officers from each of the new divisions then being planned for

activation come to the Field.Artillery School. These 35 would

include the division artillery commander,' the executive, S-i,

S-Z, S-3, S-4, the four battalion commanders with their executives, and the battery commaýnderk. The battery commenders

would be taught all angles of battery administration, some rnate'riel,

a little gunnery, and methods of instruction. The fiel4 officers and

Field Officers Course only cut to four weeks. By working, eating,

and living together the officere would go to their battalioni welded

into a team. However, for some reason, the division artillery

executive never took the course as finally established.

For a while it was feared that tho' Field Officers Course

would hive to be suspended while the new division groups were at

Fort Sill, even though suspension of the Advanced Course had' been 1

agreed on in January. Fortunately, it was not necessary to do

this and only the Advanced Couirse ended. Advanced Course No. 5 4

was merged with the New Division Officers Course for one special

course, and with that, the course terminitdd. I.'

The 180 extra instructors granted OCS were part of a

December plan to increase the School to a capacity of 2, 000. No

more school troops would be provided and no more housing. Instead of barracks, the students would be placed in tents, and the .,

63-man barracks would be converted into class and administration

buildings. In war, thday's giant increase is tomorrow's inadequacy,

so in early January 1942 a capacity of 4, 500 was being discussed,

and by the 14th of January the figure was up to 6, 000 with weekly

classes of 500 entering April 1. A telegram from the Chief of

Field Artillery, January 20, 1 942 so advised the Field Artillery

S 'School and was followed by another asking what facilities would be

needed. Allin set this at 444 more officers, 608 more enlisted men,

and 100 buses to take the students back and forth on the range. Everything else was ptromised by the Chief, but the buses were not to be '

239

I Z239
I.I

had. Quartermaster truck companies were furnished instead. On

the question of physical facilities, General Allin was most insistent

that adequate mes@, halls, housing better than tents, and sufficient

school troops be furnished, waying that otherwise it would not be

possible to maintain the standards of instruction.

Brig Gen George R. Allin, who could stand so firmly for

what he felt were the needs of the Field Artillery School had been

Commandant since .January Zo, X941. He was a West Point graduate of the class of '04. After four years of t-.oop duty, he returned

to the Academy as an instructor in mathematics and gunnery. This

was followed by four years of troop duty, after which he went to the

Phillipines. During the last war, he served in the United States,

became a brigadier gene~raJAA 1,919,, and spont the following. two . . .,

years on General Staft duty, in France. After that, Align served

with G-1, the Inspector Genewl's department, and in Hawaii. His

tour of duy a.4.,J ort Sill ended .une 30,, 194;.

"The requirement for housing, ;turdier than tents was met

by approval, of tarpaper and frame hutmento:..ebruary Z4, The

coi 'truction program as a whole, hQwevG r, had not beon approved,

although .six weeks had passed singe.,the need of expansion and the

scale of it had been decided upon. It would take 30 days to asseemble

materials for construction, 30 days more to complete -the simplest

buildings, and another 30 days to complete the more elaborate

strtictures such as mess.halls. Expansion of the,.OCS would accord- :

ingly be delayed by the date of approval plus 90 days. Knowledge

of this made Allin no0st insistent in urging the need of haste. Finally,

he suggested that the. Chief's office simply tell him how many artillery officers would be needed, and he would, expand proportionately

if he had ty hold classes under the trees. Approval for the constroction requested finally came March 12, which explains~why the 500-man

classes did not begin to arrive April I but May 7 instead. Apparently

Align drove the carpenters to cut the building lag from 90 to 60 days.

Having obtained the buildings in which to put his 500-man j

classes, Alin had nor to fill them with good men and find good instructors to teach them. For inutructors, Allin proposed to use .

OCS graduates, for these men had turned in a better performance

than the reserve officers. As for filling the classes, on December

24, 1941, Align suggested pelmyitting older znen of abilitytp a;tend s

OCS, with a view to their eventually becoming battery apd battalion

commanders. General Danford liked the idea, and brought it, to

the attention of G-1, who, as of the first of the.year, was considering

it. Another suggestion of AllIn's was that likely men be segregated

at the replacement centers and given special training, He thought,

I2

•:] ~240 ' '

.II L i,,
too, that a clothing allowance, like that given the Air Corps0 should

be provided,..so that no financial burden-, might deter a promising.

candidate. He suggested again that the age limit for officers be

made 44. Allin felt that if a 44-year old private could do troop duty, so could a 44-year old'officer, and, as he put it, it w'as only

democratic that every enlisted man should have the chan•e to

* A appire to the highest command, To these suggestions, General

Danford was able to reply that the age limits had been lifted, and

that the Congress had passed a bill providing the clothing allowance.

Volunteer officer candidates (VOC) from the raaiks of those

deferred for family reasons were admitted by a War Department

teletype of Meech 2, 1942. Theme men would be allowed to voluiiteer for induction into selective service. They would be font to - replacement centers for triaining, and if- found qualified at the end

of basic tratningi would be sent on to OCS. Those found unqualified

would bc discharged.

An experiment which apparently did not succeed was an attempt

oy the Army Air Forces to train administrative officers by sending

prospects to the field-artillery OCS; The candidates did poorly

because of their lack of background, were discontented because of

their poor performance, and many requested relief fromi.kh8Mool,

General Allin interceded ou tho'ir behalf, and they were sent back to

lRandolph Field.

The increame in capacity resulting from these efforts was

spectacular. Until January 1. it was 250. On January 1, it was

720. It wasl, 440 February 26; 2,880, April,2; 6, 000, May 7.

Class sizes soaredfziom 120 to 240, from 240 to 500, and in July,

weekly classes of 550 were planned,

With the tr.Tmendoue expansion of the OCS, it acquired some

is:teresting organizational features. The organization of classes

into battalions proved inadequate to handle the mass of students,

and the battalions were formed into a regiment, the Student ]Regi- f

ment. The classes orginally had been administered from one building, CC-l (CC for concurrent camp), but now each battalion needed , a headquarters building of its own, with an officer acting as battalion r

commander. This change was effected about April-May, 1'942. The

class tactical officers were responsible to the battalion commander,

and he in turn to the Commandant of Cadets.

Tactical officers were key men in the OCS organr ation and

were closer to the students than were the instructors. Their duties

could be divided into two categories; administration, and the tactical

241

241
t

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4:

education of the candidates. Administration involved observation

nf the .td49ntS b ased .fn an.int~tk tknqowleo he of. him, ;which obliged

the tactical officerto attend manyý classes -and: service practices,...

The tactical. Qf£cere aleso prepared and :put into, effect, the is.chedulos

which aynchronised the movement of 6, 0.00,students, through a small

area at the peak traffic..periods of the day., Movement into and out.

o.f the moest halls presented the worst problems. Supply and laundry

formation3, issuance and return of supplies, pay formations, and

the myriad personnel problems were all under the jurisdiction of

the "tac" officer. Twice during each class, the tactical officer

would become a Class A agent officer drawing 50 to 60 thousand

dollars, and paying it out to the 500 men oe hie class. At night

time,-,the tactipal.lofficer brought.his class records..up.to date ..

Tactical.,edcation. embraced formal instruction in military

courtesy,•.clse.order -drill and ceremonies, close combat, :customs

of the service, discipline, and education by inspection.and example.

The formal instruction was given after duty hours in a carefully

integrated syatem, which, culminated in a battalion review. Neatness, precision, and leadership were. stressed. The ph•ka desig.-

nated as education by inspection, included the round oe Laily inspection of quarters, dai•y inspection in ranks, and the weekly uniform

inspection. All deliquencies draew demerits. Hair cuts, daily I

showers,. shaves, shined shoes, cleanbrass, were mustu. Quarters I

were kept on the West Point system with a place for everything, and

quarters were required to be ready for inspection any time after the

student left :or class.,

The. rAtings by. the tactical. officer, which with the ratings

by hie.fallow airdeats, .me=t,so.zmch to the candidate,. were based on the intimxate knowledge of the man glained by the tactical officer •"

as he performed theme duties. i o

The regulations under which the candidates lived were very

like those of onlisted, men everywhere, with one or two small privileges. Call to,quarters sounded daily except. Saturflays and.holidays,

and whken it had sounded, the candidates were.:reitricted,ta their area

for study and instructiqn. During week days, the men were restircted

to the.Peast, but could got a week end pass .if there. was nothino special

sche•4uledAfa Sun4ay. As between candidates. there was no difference

in rank,. Noncomrmissioned officers kept the rank they had had in

their organizations, and those who had had no rank became corporals,

but no insignia of rank was worn. The uniform off duty was the

prescribed Class. A uniform, and fatigues with leggings were worn

duriugsduty hours. Each candidate took care of his own section of

the. hutmnent and took his turn as hut orderly. When his turn came,

he spent two days as section marcher and a week as squad leader.

gi2

li
The. doe irit, and deliquency -systemn was similp~r to that at

West Point.. Demerits wowe given for misconduct, were carefu411y

recorded, and were punished with restrictions only, neve-r with

extra duty.. There was. very little (roe time, the students being 

!

always on the moVs. Saturday afternoon@ were pj~ally given to

formations,. and if by somne chance one were free, the student could,

if his record wore good# have a pass until 2 A. M. Sun4ay morning.

Because the student's week wasn so Crizi, speed was impersdive.

Sluggishness of mind or body was zot permitted.

Con~trary to what one might have expectod, there wasn no

supervised recreation or compulsory study. The &mount of study * Iwas contzolled; by the. candidate.. bot study in the c~.l&6qrdqom was.,A

encouar&Vqd.. After the. ca~llto quar~ters, silence was atrictly enforced,

QleI~riquent students could boe handled by being tssrned back,

by being sent to the salvage school, or by being relieved. QOn

of the duties. 

o0ghe tactical officer was to boaoxne. thorouaghly acquainte'd iwith eac~h of the. men under him. Vions of theam did not

meet khe standardsa sethis instructors and the student hirqselc

we re interviewed and a solution attempted* A student whose da'(icm iency was academic only, and who seemed to be good material,

could beo transferred to anotheir class to repeat the work, This

authority to turn back was requestea by General Allin Januaty.4

I. and granted January 8 by the Chief's office. No candidate who showad veas~eoable proop"ct of tie-coming. a, satisafacto ry officeorwas to

be dismissed-but could instead Lb. toarned back to a later class. 

A

* report. w~s to be given on each case, including the reason for the

action.

The salvage school wav begun by Lt Col Craigle Krayenbohl,

then Commandant of Candidates, September 1942. to give basic

* instruction in gunnery, tactics. and mathematics to those officer

candidates w)wo had not attended a preparatory school and we re

finding it hard to stp~y abreaat o~f their classmates. Also, it was

directed at beIlping those students who Jacke4 the, nscoos&ary milit& ty * backop~qd, poerhaps because they came from another arm or sertetce.

The. course. lasted four wooeks, covering basic~vthema6tics, duties.

of the firing battery and of the executive, fire control. instrumsntes,:

applying the IS-corrsctlion, and other buga~boos of the inexperiencedt.

Upon roporting for duty, students were interv~iewed, and those

whose backgrouikd was clearly insufficient were sent to te svalvg*

t school, On completing~tho salvatgo.;'bopl, cantdido~tes were either

put in a new OCS claasa or in olass doing t~e work they were having

at the time of transfer to the school. This system had the advantage

* 243

A
of removirig Men' who womld havo -slowe~dadwW the pace' Of their I

classmiates aud a-lso enabled the OCS to'-"digest" sovoewAlhu.ndred

stuglerits: during the 'criticar pe viod whein soa nany meb'*efe being"

sent to.Fort Bi1l without the benfit of an'adequate ba'ckground.`

Rel~ief'w~sz,' of course, the final reuort; Cases of diseiplinary nature were' given to the Eftam rini Board at '~aqatr

for final interviov' and tonsultatioan of the pertinent records. The

Board wasn composed of the Exiecutive of th Student Regiment, the

class tacticaX officer, the battalion commander, and a disinterestead

field officer. Non-gruduates were transferred immediately upon

relief. Those desired for school sarvice commands were so transferred; others went to the division or army or corps whence they

camreo, thosetivom units overvseas went to an~y convienient combat

command.

if an effort to-remedy deficiencies before ihey &t~oo and

to meet 1ho difficulty thah being ezPM ioiead th getting klcindidatee,

Army Grotand Foroce headquarters move4 ~o' Ue ~p preipavatowy

schools et all- Field Artillery lReplactm~nt Tralnfiaig Cente rs) with

a four weeks (ibarse-1rgahised by the Field Artille ry'Sabeet, The.

course as devised in Sioptezrrbe r covered Ooiinokl.in, vnnline*' msth;.

ematirs#'s'omrvice of thlU Oie -fre contr~l intufriaz.ius. maps, and

aerial photographs, communication.';urvoy,'obeseidand&Matabserved

an hecltri~ining. Experiments had been conducted in which '' ;

p',sopactive cardidats's were coached' in elementary nmathemnia ice and

piractical gunnery, given a few weeks of preparatory work, -and then

sent toOCS, 'whije they had done well, 'It was hoped su h a methods

if applied at all replacement centers, would supply a steady flow

of qualifie.~. candidates,

To create a close link between the staff of OCS and the student

bogy, so-cailled honor comniittees wire organized in Mai'ch 1941 by

Lt Col lKrayenbuhl on his faturn from a trip to the Infantry OCiS at

Fort Bienning, Ga. His hope was that many problemb c'wuld be solved

ioy thet sitUcati thernaelves '*ithoiit'the 'neceisit~y of cungulting the

tactical officers and that the ýcommitteess could presezit the tioW'pointI

of thei2r'clo~s on theA~dministration of the Sc'hool as it affected them.

About the'fourth week. of euch clas aI ' existence, one student was

elected by the memnberis of each section to represent th~m. Among

questions toitsidered proper for discussion by the conamiittes were:

misconduct by any membe r of the smction; the aid to b6 offered aL

forma:tion@., The honor committee was in Ao sense iL secret ssr,#Ate;

it as hevoice of the student body.'

244
It will be. recalled tat a&as a had been organiae4. on a

sequad, sectioA,.. and -baLt n basis., ColKrayeabuhL1s utcsser.

as Comi•andant OtCaunddates1, Col.J, 3.4 Turner# alte.red Wel. arrangeamnt without, however, abolishing the squads and idecions.

which were a great convenience to the instructional departmeto. I ': ~The students were-formed so far as possible into batteriep which i

simulated the Table of Organisation of a battery of light artillery.

Each battery had a cadet captain as battery commander, three

battery officers with appropriate cadet rank, a cadet first sergeant,

and a cadet platoon sergeant for each platoon. The platoons were

three squads of ten men each, each with their squad leader. The

battery commander was responsible to the tactical officer for all

platoons within his battery. Zach of the Junior officers commanded

a platoon. The cadet first sarieant was charged with takiag attendance reports from the platoon sereanto, formations of-the battery,

and police of the battery area, .

These cadet posts were rotated byrostert anoan attempt

wasmade togive, each man a day's experience in each rank. Weekly

parades and ceremonieawe re held to.Sive the cadet officers a change

to develop poise and presence, The senior class of the. student

battalion chose its own staff officers, published the order ,of ams rch,

and ueed the junior classes to make up the battaries in the battalion.

their command and administrative problems, the tactical officers

correcting mistakes and assisting with technical details. The poppose of tke system was not to observe the student wider pressure 4 1

.bat to allow him to apply his schooling and correct his own errors.

Some features of the instruction given these candidates are

of interest,. The targets used in service practice were old materiel, f"

piles of Junk, or small btructoes put up by the range detail. At

the beginning of serice practice, the instructor identified several

prominent terrain features and told students who could not identify

them to stand up. Difficult targets would be avoided early in the

course and ridgeline targets were not chosen. The telephone. operator was trained to watch the instructor, so that is signalled, he would

not send the commind given by the student. The latter was not

allowed to fire a tOutid.. that would obviously be wasted. Instead f

the instructor would tell the student where the round would have gone

and charge him with a wasted round. Lost rounds, were found by

the instructor and charged to the student, and missensings were

9 handled by -telling the student to take another look and charging

, ' him for the help. -If a second were misseansed, the student might

'* I be told to sit down or charged another 2s of his hundred points and

told to go ahead,

I i I,-'

245

*'*+.*l s , ~i , lI -
an all brackst problems,. the. student had to have his initial

data -ready the moment he.was called on,, in firing such problemse

the student opened fire with one gun, ,chaaGed to sAlVo t•re when

making a. 2H.2Gyard, range chae j, and: used vo1 lrey in .fire .or

effect.; Inpreciuion.fire. the instructor allowedthe student to fire'

one round for effectp then'.gave -him five constructive rounds, -and

asked him to give the adja•,tad elevation.. in. grading the problem,

the student was assessed a penalty on time or ammunition wasted,

or on lack of effect, or on any help given. The economical use of

ammunition reflected the slash in the School's allowance after the

war beSan.

The Saturday demonstrations were often spectacular, since

dozens Of, field pieces pounded a small area, gradually covering it

with dust~and-blick smoke and:manifesting the power of massed

artillV'y. In one such demonstration, given in,JAne. 194Z. the ..

first concentration was fired on a target selected by the director,

which he announced by a loud'speaker, The fire di ectiom center,

below'the spectkitors, spotted it on a fire direction chart an. gave

the Orders to -t battalions. An area of about 400 square-yards

around, th target was.,premptly covered with shell, The second

conqUPtration was assumed to be an area with a counterattack .

organfting in it and was passed to the battalions to engape at once*,;

Concentration No. 4 was an infantry target on which one battalion

adjusted, the retalof the division artillery then being brought in.,

The fifth concentration was spotted on two oblique photographs, and L

then plotted on'a. vertical photograph which was used as a 'firing

chart. In the last, two concentrations of time fire were placed on

a knoll, riddling it with pplinters.

The. mechanics of graduation, and the requirements for it, . V

were altered somewhat as time Went on. In July, the final type

physical examiation %as waived if tho graduate had hed such an

examination within oix months of graduation and there was no record

of intervening illness. In March the Field Artillery Schoolwad,

permitted to-prepare the letters of appointment and commission

for graduates rather that requesting them of the Adjutant Goneral

some t~w weeks- in advance- oft radation, as the practice had been. .

was feared that with the lrowth o"th OCC, the 'Adjuttt General's It W go AjuatGeea'

Office would be placed undo r a very great burdenw A full reporto

of course, was to be made of all commissions furnished, The

Field Artillery School was later given power to commission officers

physically unfit for combat. certifying them as limited service.

withoutmfirst securing the approval of the War Department.

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Using, their clothing allowace oft1501,10, which. wasý later .• increased to $150,00, graduates could, bouytheiriunifortt••frn" the

Army Exchange Service, with its branch.. in the Fort Sill Poets

Exchanges. It war also possible to visit the QuaartermkasteVWa•re•-

houte at certain hours to buy issue cLothing aado•uipmint. The

students could of course buy their uniforms from the Lewton merchants and were. allowed to spend the money as they thought best;.

The tactical officers arranged visits for the purpose of buying uniform equipment and published lists of desirable items. Early in

1943, as an~experimetit,. one of the graclduating clasees was allowed

to wear officer's uniform to graduation, mans insignia. This so

improved the appearance of the class that The practice was continued,

anrd andidates were required to have blouse, cap, shoes, and two

pair of slacks at the time of graduation.

Ahorty befo r graduatqns sclass partiwvereohoeld,ý f....o..i.

a suggestion of LtCIo;Craliie Krayoe&WM made earlyin 1,943.4 The

scene, for. these would be sme of the. mess halls, 'with entertalmoent

by the studentseand! food prepared be the moss personnel and eo'rved I

by volunteers from the Service Detachment. The parties wr64fiNiced

by the dividends from the Post Exchange. This was only iair, since I

the students spent many thouando of dollar in the Post Mxchaagee

but were otherwise unable to share in the profits as were the organima- I

tions stationed permanently on the Post, Before the pirty, the class

chose its outstanding students, usually one from'aach oection, and

at the colebration they were awarded some practical gift afi a prime

at the party. The CommrandAnt of the 1ield Artillery School. members

of his staff and I'-the OCS staff, were invIted as guests"

As fat an possible, graduates were allowed to choose the

post or organization of their assignment. Lists of possible assignMenet 'would be posted on the bulletin boards, ar.4 the stusdeats could

list three -choices in order of preference, Students ordered topoite s

of embarkation were volunteers as far as possible. Should' the number i

of officers requested exceed the number of volunteers, the balance

were chosen by JAM from the rest of the class, In the latter case,

exceptions were allowed only when faully circumstancee of extreme

importance interfered or the officorw.ass 1Aited led•i•e or over-age

in grade. , Beginning with Class No. 40, 25 volunteers rcould take

the liaison -pilot training course. As the Army reached- the limits

of its si*t, the amount of choice allowed was limited to a selection

between the three replacement centers at Fort Bragg# Camp Bobe rts,

( sand Fort Bill, the officer listing them in order of pref* rence, and '

attempts were made to match the preference as closely as possible.

2'4

4?.- - I ,
£xpreau &ions, of sais (a ction- with the 4s, now. ofinas rot were

forthappming from their coxamanders, ZrigýQen Loiaim-J, $1ortior

wrote %bt he o eevdb;hsMmandhd und u!ogd

D emise of the. Offics.abi the, Chief-of Field Arilr

A~letter from General Danford to Gene ral Alinm, dated FIebrkiary Z4, 1942, told the Field Artillery School~that the office of

ization of the army into the three major V~oupingx of Army Ground ~ Forcias, Army Air Forces, and Army Supply Forces. Since a good

*~k Osrhe. -itqdc~r 40prtnag~tq fhe r"af 1943,h and thisitded

Inre motorv mechanics,o se00;c to their cwwur' 50r comu they ictionamj

146 batte~ry mechaicsary0 673hisshoerp3; Uptontdlner, Jr0. randi

n~cA Vc, 20;trotxnefcbaai, of194T2.osmns~,hos-I

shoer, and saddler classes entered every 12 weeks.. the rest,ý every

four. The class in enisted horsemanahip was discontinued in July

1942 follqwing the.eltziniAtion ofltheluathoree-dvawn artilleryi. In

its plo.e~ came ealisted specialite', ciasese for pack masters, for,

pack rtillihwy was growing in importance with-the incre~ased; fighting

on difticult terrain. Classes for saddlers and hormsehooreswer.of

*1 ~course continua.s&,,

In the sphere of-organisation, the School and the Post split * - agains April 11, 194, Cal Kenneth S.. Perkins, 030e..of the pioneers

of the Schoool of Fire, 13ecoming Post Comnmader.. The Table of'- 

*

Organisation, under which the School. was theab operatiagý was. based '

in gensel .on.two and oze-half instructors for each 30-student scin

OCS t~Act4aal officers weve allowed at the rate of three per class of

5010.. Tb. officer stpength for a peak load of. 6669S.atudente should

be 806, it was corwidered., The policy of relieving officiers after

on@ .ypar,ath ~h.Schaool weta.into. effect in the spzing of 1942. The.

1942. From ten employees in January 1941, the rumber went to 127

nube cvl o eric epoyesgrw ey apdl I 9424d8~

;4?
in Decemlber 1941, and byMsarch of 1942 there were 185. clerks,

janitorso Itypists, librariarmtas,; etc,: .Bfare MArch d 194•3r• af - ,

them had permnenu*tai:Y$.sa.srvlc*s wapig , rn:~ ~ c 9J~ t30. the. School wait permitted to •iro people -ret~on.the~civi~l. oorvice.

register. After July 1. hiring was done under the war service

regulations, andappint.*eZats were temporary, not to exoeed the duration plus siximontho, The civil service register was made up J

on the. basls of weekly examinations in Lawton, By July, 1942 there j

were about 380 civil service employees working for the School' . j

Their hiring, it should be emphasized, was done by the School,

never by the Post. ,

Troop requirements of departments were given to the

Secretary. ffi~R not later th*nA pqoon o*tho Wed~esday I& 4Ays-,

before the start of the week in which instrutction was .to be. giv, ...

"The School troops' Planu and Training office. with oqn, office•,,

assistod.by: two, neanoumiesioned officera, assesmble4 the requests,

estimated the requirements foreQaqhhal•days and coor4ftatad.

requests to fit them to the number of troops available. On the

Thiured4y. Ammaelakoly 6fllowisg. reesipt of the requests, the

operations officers of, all Sakool troops conferred with the .Schoo

operations officers to settle all difficult points,. Classroom assip.,.

meat charts were made by the Assistant Seoestryo, requests for

rooms being handedý in an the Thursday ton days. before the beginning of the week.iA whiah they were to be used.

The 8cho,4 troops which were allotted by the process we

have described differed very m.tch in their status. Although they

are calledSchool troops for simplicity's sake, reference to some

of theme " that 14.OffleWl.coozoeapondence snight have been both

tactlesa and erroneos.u. Sexes *I them, wo re difeaojleAV¥phol

troops, having• been so designated by, competent authorif&y; iome

were OHQ units temporarily under School control; some were (ONO(

Sunlt. attache& to the ThArd -rmy and. wder School -control for. the .

time being. A total of 36 batteries were available for use in April

1942. The following units were present as of July and were used

Sas School troops: the 18th, 349th, an~d lZth Field Artillery Bealments; and the 47th, 70th, 71st, and U3d Field Artillery Bottalions.

One can probably assume that it was from these troops that April's

36 batteries were drawu. Infantry for demonstrations and problems

were obtained by periodic visits of battalions from the Third Army.

Although nothing like the old Brigade Firing Center* of the

, (' First World War existod at Fort Sill, units did come here ior com1.4 bined unit training, sometimes for only a few days. Thus, the

division artillery of one division spent November 27-29, 1942, at the

Z49

6I
Post June on 1942 such stlatid.'1hat a mission. artiller~y An nuamed oionedivision British observer: writing in! arrived 'eyery mouth

, ! fo r a months% staf'duringwhieh •they provided &;r~tlle ry, for• the,-- ' • ~School and pirfected their own-'traininll.:..., .

i •' The -last- iniformation needed to comp~aet the picture ofUthse

School in the spring of 194Z, when it had acquired the characteristics it kept throughout the war, conesrns publi:ations. Companies from 20th Ciintu•'y-Fox, Paramount, ý and Warner Bros. came to

Fort Si'll in Match to make six training-films on the 105-inm

howitzer. Subjects included the Sun itself, fire direction technique,

and organization of position. The revision of seven Field Artillery Books for, use by the RqOTC in -Cho-echool yoar,1942•-1-941,was ordered ' '!

by thelleoliemenat and' Sah0i q,'Commandi n ,April, a14 that wad. now'.

t; a prirhk-y mts4'ionj, atlh6kthg te -books wei' stU lboinj sold-to • ! .

studentevat Tort Bill, 'That Iarme5'bit'sh obszrver'spoke .f the Ir0. Zpd)AUton1plaat.'s running nilht and dayi' turning osit training s

literature for the ShOol and the Army..1⁄4' l-o.. ... -

STh'4Fibld Artillesy'School,'had some it long'way intS years,

frorA the handful- of students and instructors !A the Indian Trader's

store to a most effective instrument-*( war, By its training of' . thousands- of artille rymen in the two World Wars, and in the true&

between# by the nbvel and effective techniques it devised, it did

much to create that powerful artillery which any army needs to

break the enemy's will. Its cost was small; it effect wan great.

a ' a'• , ,Aiblio riaphy '. ,.I i

Eils. of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, op. cit. supra;•

iles of the'rwiel Artil.ery Sehool, op. cit, supra.. ' ' 2

FileV oF the Student; Regiment, the Officer Candidate School, Ft Sill,

Okia, . ...

Files of the Department of Gunnery, Field Artillery Sehool, Ft Sill,

Okla.

, . , A. a • .. - .

I P

,i' '-' L

Xa" 250
PEACETIME TRAINING OF CIVILIAN COMPON•NTB ,$

AT THE FIELD AltTILLERY SCHOOL

NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERiq

B. 0. F.•Lr. 0. S. M.

Enr, rLL p.Pass En. •all. Pass znr. -rail 'Pigs

1912 Z4 21;

* 1913 20 - 20

1915 26 9 17

1920 11 - 11 .

1921 30 7. 23

1922 34 4 30 36 2 34

1923 42 7 SS '14 .- , 14

19Z4 43 15 z8 7 7 . J

1925 40 13 27 17 - 17

19Z6 51 16 35 6 ' - 6 U 3 - ',23 "

1927, 44 16 208 a 8 25 25 i

:i193$ 47 9 38 10 1 9 2? 6' 21 •

'1.929 1 a 43 8 - 8 26 3 23

"1930 48 7 41 S - 21 i 13

1931 39 5 34 8 1 7 26 9. 17

1932 39 4 35 7 - 7 to - o0

1933 35 1 34 6 - 6 18 1* .7

:" "1934 9 -9

1935 38 1 37

I 1936 71 1 70 16 - 16

, 1937 61 2 59 16 - 16

1938 64 3 61 16 16

,1939 S 3 55 1 16

1940 61 5 56 16 1 15

Totals 9B6 139 84' 68 2 66 333 30 303

'I

1,,

+ !... 1- -. .. . . . .. . . _ . . . .- .. . .. . . . _ .... • . .. ... .. . ",•
S~~R ESEV;• Or. rIl'CERtS

B 0.D .C . r .O0 . ;

Enr. TLi;. Palo@ Enr. r page.

1922 14 2 12 1923 , , z .1 , , •I ~

1924 1. 0 13 . 1925 39 4 35 1926 21 6 is

1927 21 8 131-

1938 16 5 17 1929 16 1 15 . 2 •

1930 35 7 28

1932ý 10 34 2 •8 10 - . .•4 , .4 .. • 1 934 18 1 17 . 1935 36 1 33 ,•,

1 9 3 6 " " - 3 5 6 .2 9 •

1937 35 1 34 .' ,

•1 93 9 . , 054 5 , 1940 69 4 65.

129 5Totals 66 461 a 8.0 0

, 6e

It

.1i

,_: l
APPENDIX .I

' Poplt•i~on :National Army SmOf U.S". -. e .... Income.. En4pens. 3

Year (1,000) Army? Percent (Billions) (1,000) Percent

1911 93, 682 783, 315 .088 3.. Z 197,199 0,632

S1912 95,097: 91,461 .096 33.0 184,122 .557

1913 96,512 92,035 .095 34.4 202,128 .587

1914 97,927 97,760 .099 33.2 208, 349 .627

1915 99,342 105,993 .106 36.0 202,_160 .561

1916 100,757 107,641 .106 45.4 163,176 .403

1917 102, 172 250,357 .244 53.9 377,940 .701

1918 103,587 3,673,888 3.546 61.0 4,868,955 7.981

1919 105,003 836, 882 .797 68.3 9,009,075 13.190 :1 1920 106,543 &00, 367 .188 74.6 1,621,953 2.174

1921 108,207 Z27, 374 .10 54.6 1,118,076 2.047

1922 109,872 146,069 .132 6o.6 457,756 .755

S1923 111,537 130,964 .117 71.5 397,050 .555

1924 113,202 140,644 124 71.5 357,016 .499

1925 114,867 134,624 .117 79. Z 370,980 .468

192" 116, 531' 133,033 .114 80.6 364,089 .451

1927 118,196 |3J, 079 79.3 369, 114 .465

1928 119,861 134,331 .12 8Z.4 400,989 .486

1929 121,526 137,360 .113 85. z 425,947 .499

1930 123,191 137,472 .111 71.04 464,853 .654

1931 124, 070 138,648 .111 54.3 . 478,418 881

1932 124, 822 133,042 .106 40.1 344,007 .857

1933 125,693 135,011 .07 4Z.3 301,613 .713

1934 126, 4?.5 136,970 .108 49.5 243, 260 491

1935 127,157 37,960 .108 55.7 273,421 .490

1936 128,429 166,114 .129 64.9 382,588 .589

1937 129, Z57 178,101 .137 71.5 378, 167 .528

1938 130,215 183,447 .140 64.2 431, 501 672

1939 130,943 187,886 .143 70. 8 489, 545 .691

"" 1940 131,669 Z64,035 .200 77.8 667, 138 .857 i

1941 132,000 506,815 .383 95.6' 3,635,508 3.802

*Bureau of Census Figures for Continental U. S. -- Annual Midyear

Estimates of U. S. population.

ZIncludes Philippine Scouts. Figures 1919-1926 include World

"War I emergency personnel still in service. All emergency enlisted

men still in service were discharged on July 2, 1921. All officers

undergoing medical treatment were discharged by Novembcr 11, 1926.

253

..... .i:
3 Civil expenditures are included lot the years 1915-1931.

Expenditures up to.and through 1931 Include expenditure? of the

War Department for rivers, harbors, flood control, an4Panama 4 .

Canal. 22xpsadituris:ibi'1932 to date represent gpe- ndftugwe* by

the War Department for the War Activities program only'#'

4 Nttibual Bureau of iconorri ,c lAe earck and National. bidustria1

Conference Board, World Almanac 1933, p. 423. (InIlude busineis

savings.)

SUS. Department of Commeice, World Almanac i944. -I

4

25..

I,

1 ".1

' hi

AI,

'.1

II

• I

- - *U