### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 20, 200 5
CLAUDE L. GLASS v. GE ORGE UNDERWOO D, JR.
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Knox County No. 3-436-04 Whee ler A. R osenbalm, Judge

No. E2004-02871-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JULY 18, 2005

This is a leg al malpra ctice c ase. The plaintiff sued his forme r lawy er, c laiming th e l aw y er was neg lige nt in his repr esentation of t he plainti ff in a case invol ving alleg ed racial discrimination. Upon our finding that the defe ndant supported his motion for summary judgme nt with ex pert proof that he did not violate the applica ble standar d of ca

re in his represe ntation of the plaintiff a nd our further fi nd in g t hat the p la intif

f s ub mit te d n o e xpe rt

pr oo f that th e de fe nd a nt d id v iol a te the app lic able standard of

car e, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d; Ca use Rem anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., joined.

Claude L . Glass, Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee, pro se, Ap pe lla nt. Stephen C. Dave s, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the Appellee , Geor g e Unde rwood, Jr.

OP IN ION

I n November

of 2000, the plaintiff/a ppellant, Claude L . Glass, re tained the defe n d a n t/ ap p e ll e e , G e o r g e U n d e r w o o d , Jr

. , a s h is a tt o r n e y to a s s is t h im in p r o s e c u ti n g a ra cial discrimination lawsuit ag ainst Br oad Elec tric Serv ic eCo mp an y ( h e r e in a f ter “ B E SC O ” ) in the United States District Court f

or the Eastern District of Tenne ssee. That lawsuit culminated in a jury verdic t in favor of BESCO and, there afte r, the District Court g rante d Mr. Under wood’s motion to withdraw as attorne y

of re cord in the c ase a nd Mr. Glass wa s g iven permission t o proce ed pro se and in forma pa up e ris . A subsequent motion filed by Mr. Glass to vacate and set aside the jury verdic t in favor of B ESCO was denied as set forth in the District Court’s memorandum and orde r ente red D ece mber 13, 2002.A l t ho ugh M r. U nd erwo o d ’ s m o t i o n fo r summ ary judgm ent st at es t hat M r. G l ass ’ s co m p l ai nt i s b arred b y t he 1

st at ut e o f

l i m i t at i o ns as s et fo rt h at T

. C

. A

. § 2 8

- 3

- 1 0 4 , t he t ri al c o urt d i d no t grant the m o t i o n up o n those gro und s and t he t rial co urt’ s o rd er d o es no t ad d ress the a sserti o n that M r. G l a ss ’ s co m p l aint i s b arre d b y t he st atute o f l i m i t ati o ns. I n t h i s a p p e a l , n o i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d o r a d d r e s s e d a s t o w h e t h e r M r

. Gl a s s ’ s c o m p l a i n t w a s b a r r e d b y t h e s t a t u t e of lim itatio n s.
-2- On July 16 , 2 00 4, Mr

. Gl a ss fi le d a c omp la int a g a ins t Mr

. Un de rw oo d in the Kn ox Cou nty Circuit Court for leg al malp ra cti ce. T he complaint asse rts that, with reg ard to the D istrict Court
case , Mr. Glass “suff

ere d the inconvenienc e of incurring expenses” and “lost a le g al rig ht, remedy or intere st” as a r esult of the alleg ed “ne g lige nt or wrong ful ac t[ s ] ” of Mr. Unde rwood. The
co m p l ai n tfu rt h ers t at es t h e f o l l o wi n g:
The De fenda nt during the term of his service as leg al counsel to the Pl aintiff fa iled to perform his duties diligently and failed to disc lose to the Plaintiff, J ury and the Court mat t er s of fa ct which we re pe rtinent to the sty led ca se. Due to the De fe nd a nt’ s f

a ilu re to d isc los e d [si c ] the se fa c ts a n a dv e rs e de c isi on re su lte d in the sty le d c a se be fo re the Jury a ndthe Cou rt

. The De fenda nt was aw are of these matters of fa ct p ri o r t o and during the proce eding s befor e the c ourt but ref used to or fa iled to disclose these matter s of fa c t to the Pla int if

f andCou rt

. The Plaintiff discover ed a rig ht of ac tion ag ainst the Def endant on De cembe r 1, 20 03 , w he n th e Pla int if

f b e c a me a wa

re of the ma tte rs of

fa c t s uff ici ent to p ut a
rea son ab l e p er s o n on notice that he ha s suffer ed an injury as a r esult of the De fe nd a nt’ s w ro ng fu l a c t or ne g lig e nt c on du c t.

The matter s of fa ct include but ar e not limited to the De fenda nt’s knowledg e of pe rt ine nt c on te nts a ndfa c ts that w a s [s ic] su bmi tte d a s e vid e nc e a nde xhibi ts duri n g the proc eeding s befor e the Jury and Court on or a

bout J uly 2002 and Aug ust 2002 and there afte r.
The De fenda nt failed to obj ect to the c ontents or adve rse c ontents and matters of fa ct t h at wa s [ s i c] s u b m i t t ed as ev i d en ce an d ex h i b i t s d u ri n g t h e p r o c e ed i n gs befor e the Jury

and Court on or a

bout J uly 2002, Aug ust 2002 and there afte r.
The D e f e n d a n t f a il e d to d is c lo s e th e matt e r s o f f a c t to th e Pl a in ti f

f d u r ing the proce eding s on or about J uly 2002, Aug ust 2002 and thereaf ter through Oc tober 2002.

I n r e s p o n s e to th is c o mp lain t, o n A u g u s t 2 5 , 2 0 0 4 , M r

. U n d e r w o o d f il e d a mo ti on for summary judgme nt which asserts that M r

. G lass’s complaint should be dismissed because it is barre d under the applicable statute of li m i t at i o ns and bec ause Mr . Under wood did not deviate f rom the 1-3-

appropriate standa

rd of c are in his repr esentation of Mr. Glass. The motion for summary judgme nt is s up po rt e d b y

Mr . U nd e rw oo d’ s a ff

ida vit wh ic h s ta te s a s f

oll ow s:

I , Geor g e T. Unde rwood, Jr., am the defe ndant in the ca ptioned case . I have be en lic e ns e d t o p r a c t i c e l a w i n t h e S t a t e o f T e n n e s s e e s i n c e 1 9 8 8

. B y v i r t u e of my e du c a tio n, tr a ini ng , a nde xpe ri e nce, I a m f a mil iar w ith the sta nd ardof c are in Knox C ounty

for law y ers involved in the ty pe litigation involved in this case. I make this aff

idavit of my

own knowledg e for

the purpose of supporting a Motion fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt.

I repr esente d Claude L

. Glass in a rac e discrimination c ase ag ainst Mr. Gl ass’s former employ er, B roadw ay Electric Service Company (B ESCO). The c ase w as tried to a jury

verdic t in the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of Tenne ssee. At the conclusion of the trial on Jul y 29, 2002, the jury

returne d a
ve rd ic t in fa vo r o f the de fe nd a nt and a g a ins t Mr

. Gl a ss. Mr

. Gl a ss wa s pr e se nt i n court whe n this verdict was r eturne d.

Pursuant to conver sations betwee n M r. Gl ass and me, I filed a Motion to be Wit hdraw n as Attorney

of Recor d and ser ved a c opy on Mr. Glass on November 4, 2004. The Court g rante d t h e M o t ion and enter ed a Me morandum and O rder al l o wi ng the plaintiff to Proce ed in Forma Pauperis on November 13, 2002. Procee ding pr o se, the plaintiff f iled a Motion to V ac at e J u d g ment, which wa s denied. Attac hed i s t h e C ourt’s Memora ndum and Orde r ente red on D ece mber 13 , 20 02

. At ta c he d are c op ie s of the Mo tio n a nd Me mor a nd um a nd Or de r a s w e ll
a s my su pp ortin g c or

re sp on de nc e to M r. Gl a ss o f O c tob e r 1 5, 2002

. Afte r m y withdrawa l from the ca se I did not repre sent Mr. Glass a ny further

.
I t is my op ini on that in my

pr e pa ratio n a nd tr ia l of thi s c a se that I c omp lie d w ith the appr opriate sta n d ar d o f car e for lawy ers in such litig ation in the Knoxvi lle, Kn ox Cou nty , Te nn e sse e c ommun ity

. Th e ple a din g s w e re fi le d in the app ro pria te court of c ompetent jurisdiction, necessary discovery

was pursue d, defe ndant’s Motion for

Summary

J udg ment was succ essfully opposed, appr opriate w itnesses
wer e ca lled to testify

at tri al and cross-examination was conduc ted of the defe ndant’s witnesses. I t is myopinion as a pra cticing attorney that there was no neg lige nce on my

part in the pre paration and trial of this case

. [Numbering in origina l omitt ed]

On Octobe r 15, 2004, af

ter he aring arg ument of both parties, the tria l court ente red its order g ranting Mr. Under wood’s motion for summary jud gm en t and dis missed Mr. Gl a ss’ s ma lpract ice su it upo n g ro un ds that Mr . G la ss “ faile d to pr e se nt e xpe rt pr oo f i n opposition t o the def

endant’ s aff

idavit that asserte d that there was no de viation from the standard of

car e on his part in his repr esentation of Claude L

. Glass.” A subsequent motion-4-

fo r n e w t ri a l f ile d b y Mr . Gla ss wa s ove rr

ule d by or de r en te re d De c e mbe r 2, 200 4, a ndthi s appea l followed.

The sole issue we addre ss in this c ase is w hether the trial court erre d in gr anting Mr. Under wood’s mot i o n for summ ary judgme nt based upon the attestation in Mr. Un de rw oo d’ s a ff

ida vit that he didno t de viate fr om the app lic able sta nd ardof c are in h is
re pr e se ntatio n o f M r. Gl a ss.
The Tenne s s e e Su p r e me Co u r t s u mm ar iz e d th e s tan d ar d b y w h ic h w e r e v ie w a

s u mm ary judgme nt in Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc

. , 1 5 S. W.3 d 8 3, 88 -8 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) a s f oll ow s:
The standa

rds g overning an ap p el l ate c ourt’s re view of a motion for summary judgme nt arewell settled. Since our inquiry involves purely a question of law, no pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss atta c he s to the low e r c ou rt ’s jud g me nt, a ndou r t a sk is confined to re viewing the re cord to d etermine whether the re quirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have bee n met. Se e Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 955 S.W .2d 49, 50-51 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; C o w de n v
. S o v r a n B a n k / C e n t r a l So uth , 816 S.W .2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991)

. Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 56.04 provides that summary judgme nt is appropriatewher e: (1) the re is no g enuine issue with r ega rd t o the materia l fac ts releva nt to the claim or defe nse contained in the motion, se e By rd
v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993) ; and (2) the moving party is entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law on the undisputed fac ts. See A n d er s o n v. Standard Register Co. , 857 S.W .2d 555, 559 (Tenn. 1993) . The moving party has the burde n of proving th at its mot ion satisfies these re quirements. See D ownen v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 811 S.W .2d 523, 524 (Tenn. 1991) . When the party seeking summary judgme nt ma

kes a proper ly supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving pa

rty to set forth specific fac ts e stablishing the exis tence of disputed, materia l fac ts which must be resolved by the trier of fac t. Se e By rd v . H all , 847 S.W .2d at 215.

To pr op e rl y

su pp ort its mot ion , the mov ing pa rt y mus t e ith e r a ff

ir ma tiv e ly

ne g a te an essential element of the non-movi ng party ’s claim or conclusively establish an aff irmative def

ense. See McCarley v. W

est Quality Food Serv ., 960 S.W .2d 585, 58 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; Robinson v. Ome r , 952 S.W .2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997). I f the moving pa

rty fails to neg ate a

claimed ba sis for the suit, the non-moving party ’s burden to pr oduce evidenc e establishing the exis tence of a g enuine issue f or trial is not trigg ere d and the motion for summary judgme nt must fail. See M cCarley
v. W est Quality Food Serv

. , 960 S.W. 2da t 58 8; Ro bin so n v . O me r, 952 S.W .2d at 426. I f the moving pa

rty succe ssfully

neg ates a claimed ba sis for the ac tion, the non-moving party

may n o t simplyrest upon the plea dings, but must offe r proof to e sta bli sh the e xiste nc e of

the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c la im.-5-

The standa

rds g overning the as s essm ent of e vidence in the summary judgme nt
c on te st a re a lso we ll e sta

bli sh e d

. Cou rt s mus t vi e w the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t fa vo ra ble to the no nmo vin g pa

rt y a ndmus t a lso dr a w a ll re a so na ble inf e re nc e s in the nonmoving pa

rty ’s fa vor. See R obinson v . Omer, 95 2 S. W.2 d at 42 6; Byrd v. Ha ll , 8 47 S .W .2 d at 21 0- 21 1. Cou rt s sh ou ld g rant a su mma ry jud g me nt o nly wh e n b oththe fa c ts a ndth e in feren c e s to be dr a wn fr om the fa c ts p e rm it a
re as o nable pe rson to rea ch only one conc lusion. S e e M c Ca ll v
. W il de r, 913 S.W. 2d15 0, 15 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; Ca r v e ll v. Bottoms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995).

I n Horton v. Hughe s , 971 S.W .2d 957, 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), w e noted that in a suit for l ega l m al p ra ct i ce t h e p l ai n t i ff m u s tp re s en tco mp et en tev i d en ce s h o wi n g: (1) that the a ccuse d attorney o we d a d u t y to the plaintiff, (2) that the attorney brea ched that duty , (3) that the plaintiff suffe red damag e, and (4) that the bre ach proxi mately cause d the pl aintiff’s damag e. W hen determining whether a lawyer breache d a duty, the question bec omes whether the lawyer failed to exe rcise the degree of care, skill, and diligence c ommonly possesse d and exe rcised by othe r attor ney s p ra c tic ing in t

he sa me jur isd ic tio n. Ex c e pt for ob v iou s, c om mo n s e ns e mistakes, establishing the applicable standard of care and determining whether a lawyer breac hed that standard require expe rt evidenc e. (empha sis added) (citations omitted)

Th e re qu ir e me nt o f e xpe rt pr oo f i n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r an atto rn e y me e ts the app lic able
s t an dard w as also noted by this Court i n Cleckne r v. Dale, 7 1 9 S. W. 2 d 5 3 5 , 5 4 0 ( T e n n . Ct. App. 1986) whe rein we stated that “w hether a lawy er’ s conduct me et s t h e applicable prof essional standards is g ener ally

believed to be bey ond the common knowledg e of la ypersons.” And in Laz y S ev en C oal Sales v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 8 1 3 S. W. 2 d 4 0 0 , 4 0 3 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 1 ) , th e T ennesse e Supreme Court ac knowledg ed that “[t]he varied nat u re o f the pra ctice of law under score s the
nece ssityof e x p ert proof intended to ac quaint the finder of fa ct with the applica

ble profe ssional standard in e ach c ase.”

I n h is b ri e f, Mr . G la ss d e sc ri be s v ari ou s matte rs re la te d to his dis c ri min a tio n s uit a g a ins t BESCO that he a lleg es were not disclosed t o him by Mr. Underwood. Mr. Glass also a lleg es that Mr

. Un de rw oo d faile d to a dd re ss c e rt a in de fi c ie nc ie s in e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b y B ESC O i n th a t c a se a ndsp e c if

ie s e vid e nc e that he a lle g e s Mr . U nd e rw oo d f a ile d to g a ther - al l of

wh ic h M r. Gl a ss ind ic a te s w a s n e c e ssa

ry fo r the pr op e r p re para tio n o f h is c a se fo r t ri a l. We de e m th a t a ll o f the se alleg ations relate to the question of whethe r Mr. Unde rwood bre ache d a duty to Mr. Glass by

failing “to exercise the deg ree of ca re, skill, and dilige nce c ommonlypossessed and e x er ci s ed by other attorney s prac ticing in the same jurisdiction.” As we have indicated, resolution of this iss ue re quired expert testimony . As a li cense d attorney prac ticing in Knox County , Mr. Under wood i s qualified
as an e x pert to attest to the standa rd of c are require d o f at t o rn ey s i n h i s position and it i s our de te rm inatio n th a t th e abo ve c ite d a ff ida vit fi le d by Mr

. Un de rw oo d statin g that he “ c omp lie d w ith-6-

the stan d ar d of ca

re f or lawy ers in such litig ation in the Knoxvi lle, Knox C ounty , Tenne ssee comm u n i t y ” wa s sufficient to shift the burde n to Mr. Glass. Ther eupon, Mr. Gla ss was re quired either to produc e expert proof of his own that M r. Underwood did bre ach the applicable standard of
c are or to p ro du ce pr oo f that th e a lle g e d o mis sio ns of Mr . U nd e rw oo d w e re c le arl y ne g lig e nt a s a matter of “common sense.” The recor d does not indicate that Mr. Glass submitted any expert proof in opposition to Mr

. Under wood’s aff idavit that he complied with the applica ble standar d of ca

re. Mr. Glass does not a ssert that the alleg ed omissions of Mr. Under wood wer e obvious mistakes as a matter of common sense , and we do not otherwise fi n d t h at they wer e. I n the lang uag e of McCarley v. W

es t Quality Food Serv., as cited by the Court in Sta

ple s v . CB L, Mr. Under wood’s aff idavit “af firmatively

neg ate[s] an essential ele ment” of themalprac tice suit - that Mr. Unde rwood brea ched the applicable standard of car e. Mr. Gla ss has failed to c reate a g enuine issue of material fa c t w ith re sp e c t to that ele me nt of the su it an d, the re fo re , we ho ld that th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in g ranti ng Mr . U nd e rw oo d s umm ary jud g me nt.

Our de cision in the instant matter is consi s tent with our opinion in Hutter v. Cohen , 55 S.W .3d 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). I n that case , the plaintiff client also sued f or leg al malpra ctice and cha rg ed that the two defenda nt attorney s failed “to file m otions, make court appe ara nces, a nd follow strateg ies ag ree d upon betwee n the parties.” Id. a t 5 7 4

. E a c h o f t h e t w o d e f

e n d a n ta t t o r n e ys filed an aff

idavit in which he attested that in his professional opinion he had not de viated fr om the
acc epted standa

rd of c are for attorney s prac t i ci n g l aw i n the county wher e the a ction arose . The plaintiff re sponded with his own aff idavit stating that in his opinion based upon his own attendanc e of, although not g raduation from, law school, his discussions with other attorney s in the county , and his famil iari ty

wi th the fa c ts o f the c a se , th a t the defe nda nts ha d d e viate d f ro m th e app lic able standard of

car e. We conc luded that the ac tions and skill required of the defe ndants was a matter bey ond the common knowledg e of a lay person, a nd we affirme d the trial court’s summary judgme nt based upon its ac cepta nce of the def endants’ a ffidavits that they had exerc ised the skill required of them in their represe ntation of t he plainti ff and its determination that the pl aintiff “ha d not cre ated a disputed issue in t h at h i s aff idavit did not demonstrate his competenc e as a witness to offer

a contra ry opinion.”

Mr. Glass conte nds that the aff idavit submit ted by

Mr. Under wood in support of his motion for summary

judgme nt does not meet the c riteria se t forth in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06 which provides that “af fidavits shall be made on persona l know ledg e, such fa cts as would be a dmissibl e in evidenc e, and shall show af

firmatively that the aff

iant is c ompetent to te stify to the matters stated there in.” Mr. Gl a ss a pp are ntl y arg ue s th a t Mr . U nd e rw oo d’ s c omp e te nc y to t e sti fy a s a n e xpe rt a s to the app lic able standard of car e is belied by Mr. Under wood’s plac ement of a public advertisement which states that he is “[n] ot ce r ti f

ie d a s a c iv il tria l o r

e s tate p lan in g s p e c ia li s t b y th e T e n n e s s e e Co mm is s io n on Continui ng Education and Specialization.” We disag ree

. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, R PC 7.1, (2004) prohibits an attorney from making a false or misleading
com mu n ic a ti o n ab o u t h im o r h e r s e lf o r ab o u t h is o r

h e r s e r v ic e s

. T e n n

. Su p

. Ct

. R. 8 , RP C 7

. 4, (2004) f urther pr ovides that an attorney shall not state that he is certified as a specialist in a field of law if he has not bee n so certified by the Tenne ssee Commi ssion on Continui ng L eg al Education and-7-

Spe c ia lizatio n. Com me nts to R PC 7. 4 s ta te that “ [t]he c e rt if ic a tio n p ro c e du re s a

re de sig ne d to
re qu ir e that th e la wy e r d e mon str a te a hig he r d e g re e of sp eci ali z ed abil ity a nde xpe ri e nc e than is sug g ested by

g ener al licensure to prac tice law.” Mr. Under wood is a license d attorney in good sta nd ing , a ndhis dis c los ur e that he ha s n ot b e e n c e rt if ie d a s a sp e c ia lis t do e s no t in a ny way ne g a te his competenc y to testify

as to the standar d of ca

re a pplicable to those in his profe ssion. He nee d not have de monstrated “a

higher deg ree of spec ialized abilityand experienc e than is sug g ested by g ener al licensure to prac tice law” in order to testify as to that standar d.

Mr . G la ss a lso c on te nd s th a t Mr . U nd e rw oo d’ s a ff ida vit la c ks trus tw ort hi ne ss b e c a us e it incorre ctly

ref ers to B ESCO as “Mr. Gla ss’s former employ er” and incor

rec tly states that Mr. Under wood serve d a co p y o f h i s withdrawa l as attorney of re cord on Mr . Glass on Novembe r 4, 20 04 . T he re c or d c on fi rm s th a t B ESC O w a s n ot M r. Gl a ss’ s e mpl oy e r - his c a se a g a ins t B ESC O
arose out of BE SCO’s refusa l to employ hi m

. The re cord a lso confirms that Mr. Unde rwood’s motion to wit hdraw as Mr. Gla ss’s attorney was a ctually

serve d upon Mr. Glass on Nove mber 4, 2002, rathe r than November 4, 2004. Howeve r, while we acknow ledg e that Mr. Underwood’s aff idavit does contain these misstatements, we find them t o b e i n conseque ntial and they do not dim ini sh the a ff

ida vit ’s pro bative va lue a s to wh e the r M r. Un de rw oo d a dh e re d to the re qu isi te standard of

car e in his repr esentation of Mr. Glass in the suit ag ainst BESCO.
Finally , Mr. Glass ar g ues that “motions to quash subpoenas submitted by the def endant a nd his c oll e a g ue s is c omp e te nt su mma ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e that a ‘g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f a c t’ e xists
a ndthat su mma

ry jud g me nt w a s in approp ri a te .” I n th e c on te xt of thi s a rg ume nt, Mr . G la ss ref ere nces a motion to quash filed by

attorney L awr ence P. L eibowitz who served a s mediator in the discrimination suit aga inst BESCO. Mr. Glass cites Mr. L eibowitz’s assertion in that mot ion that documents which the subpoena or dered t h at M r. L eibowit z bring to court have ne ver be en in Mr. L e ibo wi tz’ s p os se ssi on . T he do c ume nts re fe rr e d to are do c ume nts wh ic h Mr

. Gl a ss c on te nd s sh ou ld have be en submitted to Mr. L eibowitz by Mr. Under wood during the cour se of the disc rimination suit. This m otion was later sustaine d by the trial court, although it is unclea r whe ther the moti on was sustained upon this gr ound or upon the a lternate g round urg ed by Mr. L eibowitz in hi s motion t hat
an y t h i n g h e l ea rn ed as a m ed i at o r i n t h e c as e w o u l db e i n ad m i s s i b l e i n a s u b s eq u en tco u rt h ea ri n g. Howeve r, eve n if these pleading s do show that the documents in que stion we re not pr ovided to Mr. L e ibo wi tz by

Mr . U nd e rw oo d, thi s d oe s n ot a lso c on sti tut e pr oo f that f a ilu re to p ro vid e the se documents wa s a bre ach of Mr. Under wood’s prof

essional dut y

. Other than his ref ere nce to the cited lang uag e in Mr. L eibowitz’s moti on, Mr. Glass does not indicate grounds for his arg ument that the other motions to qua sh cre ate a g enuine issue of material fac t as to whether Mr. Underwood met the applicable standard of

car e.

For the fore g oing r easons, we affirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand for c ollection of c os ts. Cos ts o n a

pp e a l are a dju dg e d a g a ins t th e plaint if f/ app e lla nt, Claud e L . G la ss.

_________________________________________ SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE-8-