UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The Mediterranean Theater of 

Operati()ns 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

by 

Ernest F. Fisher, Jr. 

) MIUTAKi INSlRvcrDN \, 

Cl,'NlljR OF i"lIII/~4.RY I IISTORY 

(TNTlTJ) sr/~n~S ARMY 

WA.SHINCTON, D.C, 1993 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Fisher, Ernest F I CJ I HCassino to the Alps. 

(l'nited States Arm\' in Workl War II: The \lectilcrranean theater of operations: 4) 

Biblio~ral'll\: p. 

Includes IIldex. 

I World War, I '1:-ICJ-I CJ45-Campai~IlS-ltah. ~. Itah-lliston-{;erman occupation, 194:-1-1945. I. Title. II. Series: llnited States. Dept. oj the Arnl\ 

Office of \Iilitan Histon. l'nited States Arlll\ in 

World War II. I)7ti9.A5:i:l yo!. II, pt 4 [Difi:I.IH] 

940.54' 1~'7'-\OH, 

7fi-4:l097 

First Printed 1977-(t\1I I Pub b-I-l 

-------------

For ~H 1(' 1>y t It" ~ lI[)('ri 11 t ('II( '" II t of I ), "'llllj('11 t~. I'.~. (; O\'(' I'll 111('1 It I 'ri II t i llg O/li('P 

\\-:l~hillgtoll, IU'. :!()IO:! 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

Maurice Matloff, General Editor 

Advisory Committee 

(As of I March 1976) 

Otis A. Singletary 

University of Kentucky 

Edward M. Coffman 

University of Wisconsin 

Harry L. Coles 

Ohio State University 

Frank Freidel, Jr. 

Harvard University 

Peter Paret 

Stanford University 

Russell F. Weigley 

Temple University 

Maj. Gen. Robert C. Hixon 

United States Army Training and 

Doctrine Command 

Brig. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson 

United States Army War College 

Brig. Gen. William C. Louisell, Jr. 

United States Army Command and 

General Staff College 

Col. Thomas E. Griess 

United States Military Academy 

Cen1er of Military History 

Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., Chief of Military History 

Chief Historian 

Chief, Historical Services Division 

Chief, Histories Division 

Editor in Chief 

1Jl 

Maurice Matloff 

Col. Walter L. McMahon 

Col. James F. Ransone, Jr. 

j()seph R. Friedman 

· . . to Th()se Wh() Served 

Foreword 

From September 1943, when Allied troops came ashore near Salerno, 

until German surrender in May 1945, 312,000 Allied soldiers were killed, 

wounded, or missing in Italy. Was a campaign that from the first faced the 

bleak prospect of coming to a dead end against the forbidding escarpment 

of the Alps worth that cost? Was the o~jective of tying down German 

troops to avoid their commitment in northwestern Europe all that the 

campaign might have accomplished? 

The answers to those questions have long been sought but, as is the 

nature of history, must forever remain cOl-Uecture. What is established bet, 

as this volume makes clear, is the tenacity and intrepidity displayed by 

American and Allied soldiers in the face of a determined and resourceful 

enemy, harsh weather, sharply convoluted terrain, limited numbers, and 

indefinite goals in what many of them must have looked upon ~lS a 

backwater of the war. 

This volume relates the story of the last year of their struggle. Three 

volumes previously published tell of the campaign in northwest Africa, the 

conquest of Sicily and covert politico-military negotiations leading to 

surrender of the Italian armed forces, and the campaign from the Allied 

landings on the mainland through the bitter disappointment of the 

amphibious assault at Anzio. This volume is thus the capstone of a fcwrvolume series dealing with American military operations in the western 

Mediterranean. 

Washington, D.C. 

1 April 1976 

VII 

JAMES L. COLU;-";S. JR. 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 
The Author 

Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., graduated from Boston University in 1941, and 

in World War II served in Europe with the 50 1st Parachute Infantry, 

lOlst Airborne Division. He returned to Boston University and received 

an M.A. in 1947 and in 1952 a Ph.D. degree in history from the 

University of Wisconsin. From 1954 to 1959 Dr. Fisher was a historian 

with Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe. Since 1960 he has been a 

member of the staff of the Center of Military History. He is a retired 

colonel in the Army of the United States. 

viii 
Preface 

"Wars should be f(H1ght," an American corps comnunder noted in his 

diary during the GlmJxlign in Itah, "in better country than this." I It W~IS 

indeed an incredibly difficult place to fight a war. The Italian peninsula is 

only some 150 miles wide, much of it dominated by some of the world"s 

most precipitous mountains. 1\'or \\'as the \\"L'ather much help. It seemed to 

those involved that it was always either unendurabh hot or bOlle-chilling 

cold. 

Yet American troops f(H1ght with remark;lble courage ~lIld tenacity, and 

in company with a veritable melange of Allied troops: BclgiallS, BLlZilians, 

British, Canadians, Cypriots, French (including superb mountain troops 

from Algeria and Morocco), Palestinian Jews, Indi;lIls, kdians, :\lqXllese, 

New Zealanders, Poles, South Africans, Syro-Lcbanese, and Yugos\aviam. 

The combat;mts also included the U nited St~ltes Army's only speci;dized 

mountain division, one of its last two segregated all-!\'egro divisions, and ~t 

regimental combat team composed of Americans ofJlJxlIlese descent. 

Despite the f()l'bidding terr;lin, Allied commanders several times turned 

it to their advantage, achieving penetr~ltions or breakthroughs OVCT some 

of the most rugged mountains in the peninsub. To !nvass mOlll1t;linous 

terrain, the Allies at times resorted to amphibious bndings, notabh at 

Anzio. Thereafter German commanders, forced to reckon \\,ith the 

possibility of other sllch operations, had to hold back f())"(es to protect their 

long coastal flanks. 

The campaign involved one ponderous attack ~Ifter ;lIlother ;Igainst 

fortified positions: the Winter Line, the Gustav Line, the Gothic Line. It 

called f()r ingenuity in employing tanks and tank destroyers over terrain 

that to the armored soldier seemed to be one V~lst ;\I1tit~lI1k ditch. It took 

another kind of ingenuity in devising methods to get at the enemy III 

flooded lowlands along the Adriatic coast. 

It was also a campaign replete with controversY, as might have been 

expected in a theater where the presence of \ariolJs nationalities and two 

fairly equal partners imposed considerable strain on the process of 

coalition command. \1ost troublesome of the questions that caused 

controversy were: Did the American cOlIlIIlander, Mark Clark, err in 

focusing on the capture of Rome rather than conforming with the wishes 

of his British superior to try to trap retreating German /(lITes? Did Allied 

1 Martin Blumensotl, Sairrno to Cassino, CNITED STATES AR~IY 1:--; WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1969), p. 234, quoting Maj. Gen. John P. I.UC\'. 

IX 
commanders conduct the pursuit north of Rome with sufficient vigor? 

Indeed, should the campaign have been pursued all the way to the Alps 

when the Allies might have halted at some readily defensible line and 

awaited the outcome of the decisive campaign in northwestern Europe? 

Just as the campaign began on a note of covert politico-military 

maneuvering to achieve surrender of Italian forces, so it ended with 

intrigue and secret negotiations for a separate surrender of the Germans 

in Italy. 

This volume is chronologically the final work in the Mediterranean 

theater subseries of the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

series. It follows Salprno to Cassino, previously published. 

The present work was originally projected as two volumes in the series. 

The first, entitled The Drive on Rome, was to cover the period from the 

fall of Cassino and the Anzio breakout to the Arno River north of Rome, a 

campaign that lasted from early May to late July 1944. The second, 

entitled The Amo to the Alps, was to carry the story through to the end 

of the war. 

Dr. Sidney T. Mathcws, first to be design~ltcd to write The Drive on 

Rorne, left: the Center of Military History after preparing several chapters 

that proved valuable guides to research. Ultimately, the present author 

received the assignment and worked f()r many months on that volume 

under the original concept. Thereafter, the decision was made to combine 

what was to have been two separate narrativcs into a single volume. 

An entirely new approach thus had to be devised, one that involved 

considerable further research. The result is the present publication, which 

covers one of the lengthiest and most agonizing periods of combat in 

World War II. 

As with other volumes in this series, many able indiyiduals have helped 

bring this work to completion. Foremost among these has been the f()rmer 

head of the European and Mediterranean Sections of the Center of 

Military History, Charles B. MacDonald. His superlative skill in developing 

a lucid narrativc of military operations and his patience with my efforts to 

~lCquire a modicum of that skill have been pillars of strength during the 

preparation of this volume. To Mr. Robert Ross Smith, Chief of the 

General Histories Branch, goes a generous share of the credit f(n' refining 

and darif)'ing many aspects of the combat narrative. A vcry special thanks 

is also due Dr. Stetson Conn, former Chief Historian, who designated me 

for this task and encouraged me along the way. The arduous assignment 

of typing and rctyping many versions of the manuscript with skill and 

patience fell largely to Mrs. Edna Salsbury. The final version was typed by 

Mrs. Robert L. Dean. 

The excellent maps accompanying the volume ~Ire the work of several 

able cartographers and draftsmen: Mr. Arthur S. Hardyman and Mr. 

Wayne Hefner performed the difficult and tedious task of devising the 

layouts, and Mr. Grant Pierson, Mr. Howell Brewer, and Mr. Roger 

Clinton demonstrated professional skill in the drafting. Mrs. Lois Aldridge, 

x 
f(JrIl1erh of the World vVar II Records Division of the l\:;ltional Archives 

and Re(':ords Service, helped me find mv \\ay through the wealth of source 

m;ltcri;d. Equally v;tluable \\,;IS the assistance rendered hy \1r. Detm;u' 

Finke and \;liss H:lIlnah Zeidlik of the GeneLd Reference Br;lI1ch of the 

Center of \lilitarv History. The author is ;i\so t-,TLlteful f(lI' the comments of 

the distinguished P;lI1el that read ;lI1d revie\\'ed the m;lI1uscript. The Ixmel 

included Gener:!l Lyman L. Lemnitzer, j(JrIner Deputy Chief of Staff to 

the Allied commander in It;dv; Dr. Robert CO;lkln, Deputv Chief 

Historian; Co\. John E. Jessup, Jr., Chief, Histories Division; and Martin 

Biumenson ;lI1d Dr. Jeffrey Cbrke, fello\\' histori;ms. To GeneLl1 \brk 

Wayne Clark I o\\'e a special debt of gratit ude fflr generously allowing me 

to lise his di;u'y in the preparation of this volume ;llld fflr making helpful 

comments on the finished m:muscript. The final editing ;lIld preparation 

oj the mlume j(lI' public;ltion \\,;IS the \\ork of \1r. Ibvid Jaffi.\ assisted by 

\1r. Duncan \liller. Fin;dlv, ;1 "en special note of thanks to my \\ill>, Else, 

\\"110 throughout has been ;1 close, steadfast, and patient source of 

encouragement. 

The ;lllthor's debt to ;111 those \\'ithout \\'hose guic\;tnce and support this 

\ulume \\ould \lever kl\e come to CO III pletion does not dim inish in the 

least his sole responsibility f(lI' ;111 C!Tors of bct and intcrprcution. 

Washing1oll, D.C 

I April 1976 

Xl 

ER\;EST F FISHER, JR 

Contents 

PART ONE 

The Spring Offensive 

Chapta 

I. SPRING IN ITALY-1944 

Allied Strategy . 

Gaman Stratl'{fY 

Allied Command and Organiwtion 

Thl' Gl'rmanl . 

II. PREPARIl\"G FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 

The German Defemes 

AlRxandRr's Concept . 

A Cover Plan . 

Disposition oj thl' Allil'd Armies 

Planning the Offemive . 

Planning for Operatiom in the Liri Vallry 

Developing the Fifth Army Plan 

Gaman PrejJarations 

III. DIADEM'S FIRST DAY-II MAY 

Behind tfU' German Front 

Monte Cassino and the Rapido . 

Santa Maria Infante and the S-Ridge 

The Capture of Monte Majo . 

IV. COLLAPSE OF THE GUSTAV LJ:"\E 

German Countermeasures . 

Thf' If C(Jrps' Attack Renewed . 

The Germam Fall Back on the Right 

The Fall of Santa Maria Inlante . 

Attack on Castellonorato . 

The Germam Prepare To Withdraw 

Keyes Reinforces His Left 

Progress in the Liri VaUry 

The German Reaction . 

XIII 

Page 

3 

4 

6 

8 

II 

16 

16 

19 

21 

n 

26 

27 

29 

39 

42 

42 

43 

45 

56 

63 

64 

65 

69 

71 

74 

75 

76 

77 

79 
ChajJler 

V. BREAKTHROUGH ON THE SOUTHER1\' FRO:,\T 

The Eighth Army's Advance to the Hill('/" Line 

Thl'· Fifth Army's Advanre to the Hill('/" Lint' 

Breakthrough of the Hill('/" Line 

junllion With the B('(l(hhf'{ul . 

The Tenth Army Withdraws . 

PART TWO 

Breakout From the Beachhead 

VI. THE A:\ZIO BEACHHEAD. 

Italian Lands vs. German Bh)()d 

German Plans . 

The Terrain . 

The Opposing Foul's 

A llied Preparations 

Final Moves . 

VII. THE FIRST DAY 

A General Hazard 

Harmon's Plan . 

The Attack Begins 

The Attack on Cisterna 

Artion on the Corps' Flankl 

VIII. BREAKOUT FROM THE BEACHHEAD 

Artion on the Flanks . 

The German Reartion 

The Third Day . 

The Enemy Situation 

The Attack on Cori . 

The Capture of Cisterna 

German Countermoves 

PART THREE 

Drive to Rome 

IX. STALEMATE ALONG THE CAESAR LINE 

Clark's Deci~ion . 

Buffalo Buried-Almost . 

XIV 

81 

81 

83 

90 

93 

97 

103 

103 

107 

108 

110 

III 

117 

I~() 

I~() 

121 

I~~ 

1~8 

137 

142 

149 

150 

15~ 

153 

154 

154 

15() 

163 

163 

167 
Chapla 

"The most direct nrnte to RmlU''' 

Tmswtt Commits Hi, Armor 

The German Situation , 

InlantrJ Against Lanuvio , 

T/U) 1st Armored Division\ Attnd Reinj(med 

X. BREAKI~G THE ST ALE:'YfATE 

Stratagem on j\1ontf Artnni,io 

The German Reaf'tion , 

Exploiting the Penetration 

Preliminary iHow.\' , 

Keye.\' Plnn ' 

The 1/ Cort}.\' BfKins To Move 

The VI Cmp,l Beg;im To Aim1e 

XL THE FALL OF RO\fE 

The Rare for Rome 

Enl1)' Into Rome 

PART FOUR 

Rome to the Arno 

XII. I:\TERLCDE 1:\ RO~IE . 

The Vieu' From the Capitoline Hill 

PlanninK the Pursuit 

Th., Grrman Situation 

Rume in Allied Hands 

XIII. PURSCIT :\()RTH OF RO~'E 

F:iKhth Arm,vJoins the Pursuit 

Ke,\selring Outline,l His StratfKJ 

To the Trasimeno Lint' , 

The French .4dvance to tht' Oro{l 

The British Sertor , 

Kesselring Rcm/llrre.1 His Right J1'ing 

The hghth Army C/O,II',I vVith the Frieda LillI' 

XIV, THE PURSlTI E:\l)S . 

StrateKic Primities: Frana or Italy 

Breaking the Frieda Line . 

The Capture 0/ Volterra and Siena 

The 1~'iKhth Amrv 

Strategic Daisiorls , 

xv 

173 

175 

177 

177 

180 

184 

185 

189 

190 

192 

193 

194 

199 

203 

::W6 

211 

227 

227 

228 

231 

2~13 

236 

240 

241 

243 

248 

249 

250 

25~ 

255 

255 

259 

265 

267 

2()9 
Chapin 

xv. E:\,D OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL ITALY 

Afi\sion . 

ThR TP1Tain and th£' Plan 

Adl'(1llce Toward Leghorn 

The Captur£, oj Leghorn . 

The CaptllH 0/ Annma and Arezzo 

Paus£' at th£' Amo 

XVI. ALONG THE ARNO 

The Eighth Arm)' 

The German Situation 

El'anwtion 0/ Florena 

Thf' Li[,;lIrian Flan" 

Th£' Cost . 

PART FIVE 

The Gothic Line Offensive 

XVII. PLA\::'>,'!:\G FOR THE OFFE\JSIVE 

The Tfrrain . 

The Gothic Line . 

Gl'rrfwn Dispositions 

Changes in Allied Strategy 

Preliminary Afoves . 

Conference With Clar" 

The Allied Pum . 

Allied Re.L,TTouping . 

Doubts on Both Frontl 

XVIII. THE GOTHIC U\:E OFFE:\,SIVE BEGINS 

Preliminm) Operations 

Leese's Pum . 

German Preparations 

The Oifensive Begins 

German COllntermeasurn 

Thl" A.wiIl!t . 

Tit" Grrm(/Il.\ RI'IIl/lm!' Their LillI' 

Th!' Corimw Ridge . 

Thl' Fi/th Army-Plam and Rl'groujJing 

IV Curps Crosses the Amo 

The German Situation . 

XVI 

Page 

271 

271 

271 

274 

27() 

278 

280 

285 

288 

291 

292 

29~ 

294 

297 

297 

299 

~02 

303 

;105 

30() 

~08 

~09 

~IO 

312 

313 

:H:~ 

;114 

314 

~15 

315 

3 Hi 

316 

318 

319 

321 
XIX. BATTLE FOR THE PASS 

The Approach . 

Plans and Terrain . 

First Contacts . 

The Attack on thf Montialli Ridgf 

XX. A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 

Leese's Plan . 

Resuming thf Offensive . 

The Capture oj Rimini . 

TIIlf'{Jrd Imola . 

Battle for the Mountains 

The Germans Reinjorce . 

The De/ensf oj Battle Mountain 

The Imola Dril'e Abaruioned 

The Germans Take Stock 

Shijt B(lf'k to Highway 65 . 

PART SIX 

In the Northern Apennines 

XXI. FRO\I RIDGE TO RIDGE . 

Keyes' Plnn . 

1/ Corps Resumes hI Adl'mlu 

The Lil1ergnal/o Fscarpment 

Action on thl' Flankl . 

The PI'TSormel Problem 

Unrealistic Strategin 

XXII. TOWARD A WE\TER STALE\IATE 

The Eighth Army Advance to the Runco 

TIll' 1/ Curp.I' Pbl . 

The 1/ Corj)l' Auack Rnu'wed 

German Countermeasures 

Npw Plnns jiir 1/ CmjJ.I 

Kl'sselring Hospitalized . 

Thp Attack Continues . 

Operations on thl' IV Corps Front 

The ODl'nsivf Is Halted . 

XVII 

Page 

323 

323 

323 

325 

326 

338 

339 

340 

342 

343 

345 

346 

349 

351 

353 

353 

357 

362 

364 

366 

371 

372 

374 

376 

376 

378 

379 

381 

382 

387 

387 

39() 

391 
Chapter 

XXIII. STALE\,IATE IN THE \,IOUNTAI:\IS A;\;D Ol\' THE 

PLAll\' . 393 

Alexander Dpvelops His Stratpgy . 

Thp Captllrp of Forli . 

Rl'orgal/r::.atirJr/ and Planning on thl' Fifth Ann),'1 Front 

OuL,ide Influmres on Stratpg)' 

Command Changps 

Alpxandpr's Orders . 

An Allipd Direrti,11' . 

Thp Eighth Army's Advana Continul's 

German ReartiorlS . 

Attack on Faenza Rpsumed 

Thl' Fifth Arm)' Plam mul Waitl 

A German Countprattar/i 

The S talnf/atl' 

393 

394 

:197 

398 

399 

400 

401 

403 

403 

405 

408 

410 

XXIV. THROUGH THE WI:\ITER 414 

Sustaining thp Arm/pol' 414 

Strengthening the Army . 415 

Rpgrouping thp Army . 417 

Eliminating Enemy Bridgehp(uL, on the Eighth Army Front 418 

Gn7nan Di.lposilions . 4 I 9 

Oppration Fourth Term 420 

A Forerast of Spring 424 

Inlo the MlJllntaim . 428 

The Serond Phase . 432 

Tms(ott Halts the Attark 433 

PART SEVEN 

The Last Offensive 

XXV. STRATEGIES AND PLAl\'S 

German Strategic Problnnl 

The German Defenses . 

Allif'd Strateg)' and Plam 

jhl' 15th Army Grollji Ojil'mtiolls Plan 

The Eighth Army's Plan . 

Df'vf'loping thp Fifth Army\ Plan . 

The Plan . 

Allif'd Prf'pondermu"{' in Malerial ami Man/Jower 

XVlll 

437 

437 

442 

443 

448 

450 

453 

455 

4.C)7 
Chapter Page 

XXVI. BREAKTHROCGH ON THE EIGHTH ARMY FRO;-":T 459 

In the East . 459 

In the West . 459 

German Indecision 462 

The Eighth Arm)' Attack 463 

Breakthrough at the Argenta Gap 465 

XXVII. BREAKTHROlJGH ON THE FIFTH AR~IY'S FRO:\T 470 

Armor Joim the Battle . 476 

The II Corps A flacks . 477 

Breakthrough to the Plain 479 

Progress on th!' Flankl . 482 

Hitler's Strategic D!'ci,ions 484 

PART EIGHT 

Pursuit to the Alps 

XXVIII. RACE FOR THE PO 

The Pursuit . 

Crossing th!' Po 

XXIX. TO THE ALPS . 

Raif jor Verona 

Clearing the Po Valley 

A rmv (; roup Cs Situatio/l 

Victory on the Flanks . 

The LaoSt E ngag!'m!'nts . 

The Eighth Army Crosses the Adig!' 

XXX. THE CAPITCLATIO:\ 

The Wid!'nirlg Circle 

German Reservations 

Preparations ji)r a Cease-Fir!' 

The Surrender at Caserta . 

Army Group C's Last Hours 

XXXI. AN ASSESSMENT. 

Gfrm(l/l Strate{!;y 

The Commanders 

Allied Tactics . 

Thl' Surrendrr Negotiatiow 

XIX 

489 

492 

495 

499 

500 

502 

504 

50S 

507 

511 

513 

514 

515 

517 

521 

525 

535 

539 

540 

542 

543 
A/JjJl'luilX 

A. TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS 

NOTE OJ\' SOURCES 

GLOSSARY 

CODE :\'AMES 

BASIC ~lILITARY ~IAP SY~1BOLS 

I:\,DEX 

Maps 

Xu. 

I. The Battle filr Monte Cassino, 12 M a\ 1944 

2. FEC Capture of Monte Majo, 11-13 May 1944 

3. FEC Drive, 13-15 May 1944 .. 

4. II and VI Corps Link- Up, 22-25 ~LI\ 1944 . 

:J. Stratagem on ~Ionte Artemisio, 30 Ma\-I J utle 1944 

6. Fifth Army in Rome, 4 June 1944 . 

7. The Advance on Leghorn, 2-19 J uh 1944 

8. Capture of Altuzzo and Monticelli, 16--18 September 1944 

9. Operatiotl FOURTH TERM, 8-11 February 1945 . 

10. Operation ENCORE, 19 February-5 March 1945. 

II. The Last Battle, 10th Mountain Division Takes Lake Carda, 

27 April-I Mav 1945 . 

I. J um p-Ofl, I I May 1944 

II. Attack on Santa Maria InEm\e, 351st Inhmtn, 11-12 1\1a\ 1944 

III. Collapse of the Gustav Line, II Corps, 13-15 l\1a\ 1944 

IV. Approach and Breakthrough, the Hitler Litle, 15-23 ~fay 1944 

V. Capture of Cisterna, 23-2:") \1<1\ 1944 

VI. Shifting the Attack, 2:-}-26 \Iav 1944 

VII. The Drive fin· Rome, 31 May-4.June 1944 

VIII. Pursuit From Rome to the Trasimeno Line, S-20 J LIne 1944 

rag!" 

547 

548 

553 

557 

5()3 

42 

58 

7() 

98 

187 

213 

272 

327 

421 

425 

509 

IX. From the Trasimeno Line to the Arno River, 21 June-5 August 

1944 

X. The Approach to the Gothic Line: Concept of Operation OLIVE, 25 

August 1944 

XI. II Corps Attack on the Gothic Line, 10-18 September 1944 

xx 
XII. 

XIII. 

XIV. 

XV. 

XVI. 

Thrust Towards Imoia, 88th Division, 24 September-I October 1944 

I I Corps Attack on the Livergnano Escarpment, 1-15 October 1944 

The Winter Line, 31 January 194:'> 

Breakthrough Into the Po Valley, IV and II Corps, 14-21 April 

1945 

The Spring Offensive, 9 April-'2 May 1945 

Illustrations 

Page 

GeneralfeJdmarschall Albert Kesselring . 

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson . 

Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver Leese, General Sir Harold Alexallder, and Lt. Gen. 

~Iark W. Clark . 

~laj. Gen. Alfred W. Gruenther 

Liri Valin 

Maj. Gen. john B. Coulter 

:\faj. Gen. John E. Sloan . 

Maj. Gen. Geoffrev Keyes 

Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger 

Brig. Gen. Donald \V. Brann and General Clark 

""Ionte Cassino . 

Terrain Facing the C.S. II Corps . 

Terraill in French Corps Sector . 

American Troops Entering the Ruins of Santa ]'daria Infante 

MOllte Cassino Monasterv Shortly After Its Capture 

Vie\\" 0 f It ri . 

l:.S. Inbntry Approaching Itri . 

German Prisoners Captured at Itri 

Aerial View of Terracina . 

Maj. Gen. Lucian Truscott, j r. 

.\Iaj Gen. Ernest 1\". Hannon 

Brig. Gen. john W. O'Daniel 

Isola Bella . 

General O'Daniers Battle Sleds. 

Patrol :\loying Through Cisterna 

Disarmillg German Prisoners at Cisterna 

Aerial View of Valmontone and Highwav h 

Tanks of 1st Armored Diyision Assembling for Attack :\ear Lllluvio 

3d Division Infalltry Entering Valmontane . 

American Infantrymen Advancing Along Highwav 6 T()\\ard Rome 

Generals Clark, Keyes, and Brig. GeIl. Robert T. Frederick Pause 

During Drive on ROllle . 

XXI 

7 

9 

10 

II 

21 

23 

23 

25 

25 

~) I 

43 

45 

57 

72 

78 

85 

87 

88 

96 

106 

112 

113 

131 

13'2 

148 

155 

164 

176 

197 

198 

211 
Paw 

German Troops Withdrawing From Rome , 212 

Entering the Gates of Rome , 214 

American Infantrymen Pass Burning German Tank in Rome 217 

Romans Line Streets as U,S, Tank Destroyers Roll by Coliseum 220 

Aerial View of Civitavecchia , 2:18 

Grosseto and Terrain to the East , 243 

Generals Brann, Crittenberger, and Mascarenhas 251 

Lt. Gen, Wladyslav Anders With General Leese , , 253 

Aerial View of Cecina , 264 

General Alphonse JUill With General Clark at Siena 266 

Aerial View of Leghorn , 277 

American Patrol Entering Pisa 287 

Aerial View of Florence , 290 

II Giogo Pass , 324 

Artillen Battery in Action 328 

Carrying Supplies to Mountaiu Positions 331 

Captured German Positions in Gothic Line 333 

h QQ4 85t Division Troops on Mt. Verruca ' ./:) 

Looking Nort h From Futa Pass , 336 

Q43 Generals Clark and Keves Study II Corps Situation j\lap ,J 

German PrisonCl"s Captured Near Castel del Rio 347 

\lonte Battaglia ' 348 

\fen, \1 ules, Mud , 350 

Indian Infantry in Northern Apennines 372 

6th South Afi'ican Armoured Division Tanks Assembled for Attack 373 

Truck Crossing a Steel Truss Bailey Bridge , 388 

Italian \1 ule Train Transporting Supplies to the Front , 412 

General Clark Visits British 13 Corps Sector With General Kirkman 413 

Motor Transport in ,\'orthern Apennines , 4 II) 

Soldiers Relaxing During Lull in Bailie , 417 

Area North of Cinquale Canal, 92d Division Zone 4~3 

Ski Patrol, 1 Oth ~Ioulltain Division . 426 

Apennines, IV Corps Sector , 427 

Artillery Ammunition Being Brought Forward, 10th Mountain Division 

Zone , 4'28 

Monte Belvedere Massif From Lizz<lllo, IOtb Mountain DidsioJ1 Sector 430 

E\'acuating Casualties Over Mountain Trail 431 

SS (~:neral Wolff , 440 

The Last Heights BcI()re Bologna . 447 

Mountain Inhll1try in Tole Area , 473 

German Prisoners Captured by lOr h Mountain Di\'ision 475 

Infantrymen Entering the Po Valley 480 

34th Division Inl~mt rymen Pause in Bologna 481 

Aerial View of Po River Crossing , 490 

XXII 
Page 

Cerman Equipment Destroved Along Po 49 I 

American Troops Storm Ashore After Assault Crossing of the Po River 496 

Placing a Steel Treadway Bridge Across Po . 497 

Co\. William O. Darhy 500 

91 st Reconnaissance Squadron Moves Through Verona 

Railroad Station . 502 

ClOssing the Adige . 503 

Anwricll1 Infantry Enter Vicenz<I 50t1 

Partisans Before the Cathedral of \lilan 507 

Engin('er~ Repairing Approach to TUllnel, Lake Garda 50S 

Ceneral der Panzertruppen Heinrich von Vietinghofr gennant Scheel 515 

German Representatives Sign Surrender Document . 522 

Gcneral \torgan Receives German Represelltatives . 524 

(~eneralleutnant Joachim Lemelsen and Oberstlelltnant Victor von 

Schwcinitz 527 

General der Pan/crrruppen Traugott Herr Leaves Bol/allo hll' 

Surrender 52i:\ 

Ccneralkutllant Fridolin voll Senger und Ettcrlin Surrenders to 

(;cllcral Clark at Fiftcellth Anm (;roup Headquarters . 530 

C>t:rman Representatin's Receive Instructions From General Gruent her 531 

Prisoners of War Assemble at Foot of Alps 53~ 

88th Division Column in Alpine Pass 533 

Illustrations an' from Department of Ikft'l1se files, \\ ith the exceptioll of the 

photograph on page 212, which is from Yank MaWlZint,. and that on page 348. 

which was supplied by William C. Bell of the CCllter 01 \filitan Hislor\', 

XXIII 
The U.S. Army Center of Military History 

The CClllcr of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by the c:.s. Arm\,. It coordinates Army historical matters, including 

historical properties. and supervises the Army museum system. It also 

maintains liaison with public and private agencies and individuals to stimulate il1lerest and study in the field of military history. The Center is located 

at lO~m 14th Street, ~.\\'., Washington, D.C. ~()()()5-MO~. 

XXI\' 
PART ONE 

THE SPRINC; OFFENSIVE 

War is a matter of vital importame to the State; the province of life or 

death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly 

slUdied. 

SUN Tw, Thl' Art IIj War 

CHAPTER I 

Spring in Italy-1944 

An hour bd(l1T midnight Oil II :'vby 

1944, 1,660 gullS opened fire. Shells 

crashed along a 25-mile front from the 

slopes of Monte Cassino to the Tyrrhenian Sea. The crash and roar of 

artillery turned high ground beyond 

the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers into 

an inferno of flame and steel. The 

Allied Armies in Ital\' (AAI) with this 

preparaton' fire had' launched Operation DIADEM, a full-scale offensive that 

\\as destined to carr\' the U.S. Fifth and 

the British Eighth Armies from southern Italy to the Alps, where the Germans would at last lay down their arms. 

Spring in 1944 c;I1le early to Ital\'. 

On the 1'C\'erse slopes of a hundred 

hills overlooking the \'alleys of the Rapido ~lIId the Garigliano Rivers, as Allied 

and German infantrymen ellierged 

from their dugouts to stretch and bask 

in the warm sunshine, the\' could look 

back on several months o( some of the 

hardest fighting yet experienced in 

World War II. 

The campaign in southern Italy had 

grown out of the Allied capture of 

Sicily, \\hich had helped to bring about 

the overthrow of the Italian dictator, 

Benito Mussolini, and contributed to 

the surrender of Italy. Farly in September 1943, first elements of the British 

Eighth Arm)' had come ashore near 

Reggio in Calabria on the southernmost 

tip of the Italian mainland. Six days 

later additional British f()I'Ces landed in 

Taranto from warships. On the same 

da\' the C.S. Fifth Anm hit the beaches 

of Salerno and soon engaged in a bitter 

struggle against a tenacious enemy. 1 

In southern Italy, the Allies f(lUnd 

awaiting them not ~Iemoralized ItaliallS 

but a well-equipped and determined 

German foe. Fighting alone at that 

point, the GermallS had mO\'Cd s\\'ifth 

to OCCUPy Rome, liberate an imprisoned 

Mussolini, disarm the Italian militar\' 

f(l1'Ces, and OCCUPy the entire countr\,. ' 

For the next seven months the British and American armies achanced 

slowly north\\'ard from their respecti\{~ 

beachheads against a stubborn enemy 

fighting skillfulh in moulltaillous terrain. Battles at the VoltUrIlO River and 

at the historic Benedictille ~d)bey of 

:Ylonte Cassino toget her wit h an unsuccessful attempt to cross the Rapido 

River exacted a hean toll on both 

opponents. 

By the end of \brch 1944, the 

German armies between the Adriatic 

alld T YlThelliall Seas IX'low Rome had 

f(lUght the Allies to a virtual stalemate. 

The\' were also containing a beachhead 

at Anzio, some thirt\' miles south of 

Rome, \\here Anglo-American troops 

under the U.S. VI Corps had cOllie 

ashore in January I ~j44. With this 

I For details cOIHTrning this and the folio\\ ing 

pcriods St't' Allwrt :\, Carland and H(man! ~1. 

Smyth, Si(il,' alld thl' Sllfrl'lIdtr of !tal)' (\\'ashington, 

1'16'»), and ~Ltrtin BlulIlcnson. Salen/o to CW,lilll) 

(Washington, I !16H). both mlulllt's ill the l:i\: I n:D 

STATES ARMY Ii\: WORLD WAR II st'rit's. 
4 

beachhead and a modest bridgehead 

beyond the Garigliano River in hand, as 

well as a tenuous toehold on the slopes 

of Monte Cassino, Allied leaders believed they held the key that would 

open the way to Rome' and central 

Italy. 

The main Allied front stretched a 

hundred miles-from the Gulf of Gaeta 

on the Tvrrhenian Sea northeastward 

across thd Apennines to the Adriatic. 

(Map 1)* The Central Apennines had 

thus far confined the campaign largely 

to the coastal flanks. In the wild, mountainous region in the center lies the 

Abruzzi ~ational Park, a desolate wilderness with few roads and trails, defended only by weak and scattered 

German outposts, There small Allied 

detachments harassed the enemy and 

maintained contact between the ~\'idely 

separated main f()rces on the flanks. ' 

Monte Cassino, keystone of the German defenses in the Liri valley, towered 

above the Rapido River at the' threshold 

of the relatively broad valle)' of the Liri 

River, which' led enticin'gly toward 

Rome. From mid-January to midMarch the U.S. Fifth Army had f(mght 

unsuccessfully t.o drive German paralmopers and infantrymen from the 

ruins of Cassino and from the rocky 

slopes of Monte Cassino itself. Near th~ 

'[,yrrhenian coast the British 10 Corps 

had crossed the Garigliano River to 

establish an 8-mile bridgehead near 

Minturno. . 

In the Anzio beachhead the Allted 

troops in early YIarch had brought the 

last German coumerattacks to a halt 

* Maps I-XVI are in inverse oroer inside back 

cover. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

along a front approximately thirty miles 

long-from the coast about twelve miles 

northeast of Anzio southward as far as 

the bank of the Mussolini CanaL The 

beachhead enclosed by that front extended at its deepest al'x)lIt IIfteen miles 

from Anzin northeastward to,\'ard the 

German strongpoint of Cisterna, the 

distance along the coast being appmximatelv twenty-two miles. Thus there 

were two fron'ts in Italy in the spring of 

1944, and Rome, the objective that had 

eluded the Allies for seven hard 

months, seemed still beyond reach. 

Allied Strategy 

On 26 May 1943 the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff (CCS), composed of {he 

Chiefs of Staff of the British and the 

American military services, had instructed General Dwight D, Eisenhower, then Allied commander in (he 

Mediterranean, to launch the m,~j()r 

Allied assault against the Germans ill 

northwestern France early ill 1944. 

That strategic concept woul~l dominate 

the over-all conduct of the Italian campaign from its Sicilian beginnings in 

July 1943 until the end of the war. 

Eyen bef()re the Allies landed in Sicily, 

the Italian campaign had been allotl~d 

a secondarv role. Diversion of enemy 

strength fr~m the Russian tl'Onl as well 

as from the expected decisive area of 

operations-the Channel coast-\\as the 

basic goal of Allied strategy in the 

Mediterranean. The campaign in Italy 

was envisioned mainly as a great holding action, although engaging and destroying German divisions as well as 

seizing air bases near Foggia in southern Italy for Allied use in bombing 
SPRING IN ITALY-1944 

Germany were important considerations. 2 

Few Allied strategists held any brief 

that the war could be won solely by a 

drive either through the length of Italy 

or into the Balkan peninsula. Yet some 

British leaders, notably Prime Minister 

Winston S. Churchill and General Sir 

Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial 

General Staff, sought to in vest the 

Italian campaign with a larger role than 

did most of the Americans. Churchill 

envisioned an eventual Allied thrust 

IIlto the mid-Danube basin, where centuries before his distinguished ancestor, 

the Duke of Marlborough, had \;,on 

lasting fame at Blenheim. A determined 

man, Churchill would long cling to this 

theory even \\Chen the weight of strategic argument and events moved 

against him. 

From its inception, therei()}T, the 

Italian campaign played a larger role in 

the strategic and political aspects of 

British war planning than it did with 

American planning. Cntil the Allied 

landings in l1ortin\'estern France in 

June 1944 much of British strategic 

thinking would be f(>cused on Italv, the 

scene from September 1943 to June 

1944 of the only active land campaign 

in western Europe. There was, more-

, Cllless olherwise indi, aled. the discussion OIl 

Allied slraleg'j is based upon the /()llowing publkalions: Fidd Marshal. the Viscount Alexander of 

Tunis. /)nj)(llrh. 19 Apr 47, published as "The 

Allied Armies in Italy from 3 September 1943. to 

I:! Decemher 1944," ill tht' ')u/JIJ/onnlt to Tit" 

Lonlion Gauttr of £) .June 19.'i0 (hereafter (ited as 

Alexander Despa/ril); Maurice \'lalloff. Slra/egic 

Plannmg jor Cnalil;on Warfi:lre. 1')43-44, U:'oil rEn 

STATES ARl\IY IN WORl.D WAR II (Washington. 

1959): and .John Ehrman, "Historv of the Second 

World War. United Kingdom Series," Voh .. V and 

VI. Grand Siralego; I London: Her Maiesn's Stationery Office, 1956). 

5 

over, an emotional factor involved with 

the British, a f~lCtor not shared bv the 

Americans because it stemmed 'from 

Britain's immediate and distant past. 

When the British came ashore in southern Italy in September 1943. it was t()r 

them only partial compensation for 

their f(:>rced withdrawal from the Continent at Dunkerque more than three 

years bet()re. Not since the Napoleonic 

wars in the early 19th century had 

British arms been driven so ingloriously 

from the mainland of Europe. For 

Americans only General Douglas MacArthur's flight from and ultimate return to the Philippines would have 

anywhere near a comparable emotional 

meamng. 

During a top-level Anglo-American 

planning conference at Quebec in August 1943 (QUADRANT), the CCS had 

drawn up a blueprint for an Italian 

campaign. Operations in Italv \\'eiT to 

be divided into three phases. The first 

was expected to culminate in the surrender of Italy and the establishment of 

Allied air bases in the vicinitv of Rome. 

The second phase would be the capture 

of Sardinia and Corsica. The third 

called f()r the Allied armies to maintain 

pressure against the Germans in northern Italy to help create conditions 

vorable t()l' both the cross-Channel invasion (OVERLORD) and the entrv of Allied 

forces into southern France (l~ter designated ANVIL, and still later DRAGOON). 

During the months that the Allied 

armies battled their \\'aV to the line 

marked by the Gariglian(;, Rapido, and 

Sangro Rivers, British and American 

planning starts in London and Washington continued a debate that would 

prove to be among their most acrimonious during the war and would att(~ct 
6 

all planning for operations in Italy until 

late 1944. The basic issue was whether 

exploiting the Italian campaign to the 

Alps and possibly beyond (essentially 

the British position) or landing on the 

southern coast of France with a subsequent advance up the Rhone Valley 

(basically the American lX)sition) would 

best assist the main Allied enterprise: 

the cross-Channel invasion of northwestern France. 

The question was debated at the 

SEXTANT-EUREKA Conference in Cairo 

and Teheran in November-December 

1943. Although the conference yielded 

a victory for the American view that 

OVERLO~D and ANVIL \\cre to be the 

main Allied tasks for 1944, the British 

left Cairo convinced that the Americans 

had also agreed to t urn Operation 

ANVIL into something more elastic that 

would not serioush affect the campaign 

under wav in Italv.:l 

To the' Americ:ans the decisions made 

at Cairo and Teheran meant that, in 

addition to remaining a secondarv operation (or even tertiary, considering 

Ar-;VIL), the Italian campaign would also 

be governed by a limited objective strategy-attainment of the so-called PisaRimini Line, a position considerably 

short of the Po Valley and the towering 

Julian and Karawanken Alps, toward 

which the British continued to direct 

their gaze and their hopes. The American view reflected a long-held cOlwiction that the Allies should concentrate 

on driving along the most direct route 

into the heart of the Third Reich rather 

than on nibbling away at enemy /(H'Ces 

" Mati"f!, Strategic Planning jor Coalition Warfare, 

1943-44, pp. 378-387. See also Arthur Bryant. 

TrillmjJh in the West (New York: Doubledav, 1959), 

p. 77. . 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

with a series of peripheral operations of 

indeterminate length that could deflect 

Allied strength from the main thrust. 

Yet, as is so often the case, the 

f(ntuncs of battle would f()rce modification of the carefully contrived international agreements. For when it appeared in late March that the Allied 

armies could not reach Rome before 

early June, the British and American 

high commands agreed than an ANVIL 

concurrent with OVERLORD was impracticable. The American Joint Chiefs of 

Staff reluctantlv acknowledged that to 

open a new fi'ont-ANVIL-in the Mediterranean before the issue in Italy had 

been decided would be risky, difficult, 

and perhaps imJX)ssible. They also recognized the advantages of ~ strengthened OVERLORD. Those could be realized onh at the expense of ANVIL. 

BO\\ing to the inevitable, the JCS on 24 

March agreed to JX)stJX)l1e ANVIL and 

to transfer from the Mediterranean to 

OVERLORD all the amphibious means 

beyond that required for a one-division 

lift. But the specter of ANVIL had not 

been efkctivcly exorcized and would 

continue to haunt the planning staffs of 

the Allied armies' headquarters in Italy 

/()r months to come. 

German Strategy 

Controversy over strategy also afflicted the German High Command. A 

lengthy debate over whether to defend 

the Italian peninsula south of Rome 

along its narrowest part or along a 

more extended line in the Northern 

Apennines had finally been resolved by 

the German head of state, Adolf Hitler, 

in favor of the advocate of the first 

proposition, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, a /()rmer General der 
SPRING IN ITALY-1944 

Flieger who had been promotc~ to th~ 

rank of field marshal In 1940 ImmeciIately after the armistice with France. 

Although Kesselring harbore.d n~) illusions about holding the Allies IIldcfinitely below Rome, he reasoned that an 

Alli d breakthrough south of Rome 

would be less disast~ous than one in the 

1\'"orthern Apennines into the. Po Vall.ey 

and the agricultural and mdustnal 

heartla nd of Italy. 4 Furthermore, 

strong German f(mes in Central It.al)" 

might discourage or thwart an Allied 

amphibious operation across th e ~driatic and into the Balkans, from whIch 

the Germans drew critical supplies of 

raw materials for their industry. These 

f()rces would also kee p Allied air bases 

in Italy farther away from Germany. 

The Germans would adhere to the 

decision to hold the front south of 

Rome as long as militarily possible. N~)t 

even the establishment of the AnZlo 

beachhead and the hilure of the Germans to drive the Allies back into the 

sea prompted Hitler 01' Kesselring to 

change this strateb'Y, even though the 

beachhead se riously threatene d the 

Germans' efe nsiv~ lin es across the 

waist of the peninsula farth er south. 

As the first signs of spring came to 

Italy in 1944, few on the ~erman side 

could deny that the high tide of German arms had already started to ebb, 

but Adolf Hitle r refused to read the 

4 Italian industl·Y. centered largely in the north. 

in mid-June 1944 ' accounted (il!' 'about 15 perce nt 

o f the wtal German-co ntrolled a rmaments output. 

See the following Fore ign Military Studies, prepared by (')rmer German o ffic'ers from 1945-54: 

l'roducllon afte r SeptembeJ' 1943 , MS # D-003: 

Activities o f German Chief of \1ilitary Economy in 

Italy, 1941-45, MS # 0-029: German Use of Italian 

Mu'nitions Industry, 1\1S # D-OI :l, Filed in \1odern 

Military Branch , "Iational Arc hives and Records 

Service, 

7 

FIELD MARSHAl. KESSEl.RINC 

portents. Still in J-X)ssession of most of 

the European continent, he firmly resolved to de lCnd it, even though he 

knew that the Allies had ve t to CO 111 mit 

the bulk of their forces. ('~rl11all armies 

were not only to dc/c nd the interior of" 

Fortress Eun')pe, but also all its outlying 

peninsulas and islands. 

Given Hitle r's resolve, the Armed 

Forces Operation Staff" (Wl'lmllmhtjul'hrnngsstab, WFSt) had little choice but to 

an:ept the (;erman situatioll carly in 

1944 as one of strategic defense along 

interior lines but without the advantages that normally stem from inter.ior 

lines. The numerous unengaged Allied 

f()rces in the Mediterranean, the Ncar 

and Far East, Af"rica, the United Kingdom, Iceland, and the United Sta tes 

could be, the Cermans believed, · committed at any time against the periph-
8 

ery of Europe and f(m~'ed the Germans 

to keep reserves spread thinly over the 

entire ContinenL5 

Competition for reinforcements 

among the various theaters of operations, particularly from the German 

,hmy High Command (Oberkommando 

des Heeres, OKH) for new divisions to 

stem the advance of the Red Army on 

the Eastern Front, came to a head 

about 1 April 1944. Hitler reacted by 

directing the Armed Forces High Command (Ohnkommanrio dn Wf'hmuuht, 

OKW) to prepare a study showing the 

location, strength, mobility, organization, and composition of all German 

military f()rces. The study disclosed that 

the w~stern theaters had a total of 

f()rty-one divisions su fficien tlv trained 

and' equipped to fight in the' east. Of 

these, twenty \\ere already committed 

on the various defensive fronts and 

twenty-one were being held in general 

reserve behind the invasion-threatened 

northwest coastal regions of Europe. 

No economy of f()rce could be achieved 

by a general retirement elsewhere or by 

evacuating offshore positions, since such 

movements would involve establishing 

long and more vulnerable land fronts 

that would require even larger defensive forces. Ii 

:, Information in this section, unless otherwise 

noted, is based upon Oberkommandu der ~VehrmachtfuehTlmgsstab, Kriegstagpbufh (OKW/WFSt, KTB), Au-

.Iarbeitung, die OKW-Kriegsschauplaetze im Rahmen der 

Gesamtkriegsfuehrung, 1.1-31.111.44. mls. IV(I), 

IV(2), edited by Helmuth Greiner and Pen\' Ernst 

Schramm (Frankfurt alMain: Bernard and (~raefC, 

1961), (hereafter cited as Greiner and Schramm, 

cds., OKW/WFSt, KTB). 

"Ibid., pp. 56-57. According to General Walter 

Warlimont, deputy chief of the OKW operations 

staff, distribution of this study was canceled f()r 

security reasons. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

The Germans clearly had no alternative to a wholly defensive strategy 

throughout 1944. Only by practicing 

the utmost economy could the German 

command manage'to husband forces 

that could be shifted from one theater 

to another in case of unexpected emergencies. The Wl'hrm(/(ht/w,hnmg.I.llah 

(WFSt) realized that Germany had to 

pin its hopes on the accomplishment 

of a more formidable objective: "While 

stubbornly defending every foot of 

ground in the East, we must beat off 

the impending invasion in the West as 

well as all possible secondary landings 

in other theaters. Then, with the fiJrces 

released by this victory, we can recover 

the initiative and force a decision in the 

war." 7 This was a rational strategy but 

given Hitler's decision to attempt to 

defend Italy south of Rome, a strategy 

unlikely to succeed. 

Allied Command and Organization 

When General Dwight D. Eisenhower 

left the Mediterranean Theater in December 1943 to become Allied commander in northwestern Europe, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson assumed comma~d of Allied Forces in 

the theater. Ex~erience in the diplomatic and military fields as Middle East 

commander mad'e Wilson an excellent 

choice for a theater with troops of 

many nationalities and where delicate 

relationships with several neutral nations were involved. For example, the 

British Chiefs of Staff had hopes of 

eventually bringing Turkey into the 

war, but it was im portant to keep Axisoriented Spain out of it. There were 

'Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

pp.56-57. 
SPRING IN ITALY-1944 

also. partisan movements to be sustained 

in the Balkans. 

Wilson's deputy was Lt. Gen. Jacob L. 

Devers, the senior American officer 

who also served as Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA), later 

changed to Mediterranean Theater 

(MTOUSA). M~j . Gen. Thomas B. Larkin was Commander of Services of 

Supply, MTOUSA, and responsible for 

the logistical services to the U.S. Army 

eleme~ts in the theater, while logistical 

support of the British forces in Italy 

was the responsibility of Allied Armies 

in Italy (AAI) headquarters. British logistical functions in rear areas wer~ 

exercised by Headquarters, North Afncan District. Both Allied logistical systems furnished support for the various 

national contingents unde r Allied command in the theater. 

In over-all command of the Allied 

ground forces in Italy was General Sir 

Harold R. L. G. Alexander, whose 

conduct of the British retreat in Burma 

had led Prime Minister Churchill, after 

Alexander's return from the Far East, 

to make him Commander in Chief of 

the British forces in the Near East. 

During the Allied campaign in Tunisia, 

in J 943, Alexander had become Eisenhower's deputy. 8 

The British contingent of the AAI, 

the Eighth Army, was commanded by 

Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver Leese, who early in 

World War II servcd with distinction as 

hean of the British 30 Corps in the 

• Alexander had commanded the British 18th 

Army Gruup in l'\onh Africa, 18 Feb 4:>-1:; ;,,1a), 

43. On Sicily and in Ita" his headqua rt e rs was 

known as l!lth Arm)' Group. 10 .lui 43-11 J an 44; 

Allied Forces in Italy. 11-18 Jan 44 ; Allied Central 

Mediterranean Force. 18 .Ian-l.J Mar 44: and Allied 

Armies in Italy (AAI). 9 Mar- 12 Dec 44. 

GENERAL WILSON 

North African campaign. In sharp contrast to General Leese's outwardly casual manner was the vigor and intensity 

of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, who since 

Jan uary J 943 had led the Amcrican 

contingent, the U.S. Fifth Army. Clark 

eI~joyed the unique opportunity of having organized and trained the army he. 

commanded through many months of 

combat. A former instrucror at th e 

Army War College, Clark had served as 

Chief of Staff of the Army Ground 

Forces. In June 1942 he went to England to command the U.S. II Corps, 

and the next month he took COllllll<lnd 

of the U.S. Army Ground Forces in the 

European Theater of Operations. He 

left that post in October to become 

Deputy Commander, Allied Forces in 

~orth Africa, under Eisenhowet'. 

General Clark's chief of staff, Maj. 

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, had come to 

London in August 1942 as deputy to 

Eisenhower's own chief of staff, Maj. 
10 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GENERALS LEESE, ALEXANDER, AND CLARK 

Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. Gruenther 

continued to hold that position when 

Eisenhower moved to North Africa. In 

January I~43 at Clark's request he was 

assigned to head the Fifth Army staff 

As his operations officer, Clark had 

picked a close friend and long-time 

associate, Col. Donald W. Brann, [or-
merly chief of staff of the 95th Infantry 

Division. 

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, a former 

commander of the Eighth U.S. Air 

Force in the United Kingdom, was 

Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF). British 

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor was his 

deputy and commander of all British 

air formations in the theater. 9 

For operations, Eaker’s forces were 

divided into three Anglo-American 

commands: the Mediterranean Allied 

Tactical Air Forces (MATAF), under 

Maj. Gen. John K. Cannon, who also 

commanded the U.S. Twelfth Air 

Force; the Mediterranean Allied Coastal 

Air Force (MACAF), under Air Vice 

Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd; and the 

Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air 

Force (MASAF), under Maj. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, who also commanded 

the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force. General 

Cannon's tactical command comprised 

the U.S. Twelfth Air Force (less elements assigned to the MACAF) and the 

British Desert Air Force (DAF). Eaker’s 

operational control of the MASAF was 

limited in that Twining’s primary operational responsibility lay with the U.S. 

Strategic Air Force, based in England 

under the command of Lt. Gen. Carl 

Spaatz. Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean theater remained throughout 

the campaign under the command of

Admiral Sir John Cunningham with the 

senior American naval officer being 

Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, also the commander of the U.S. Eighth Fleet. 

Once primary American attention 

and resources shifted to the cross-Channel attack, and the Mediterranean thea9 History AFHQ, Part III, pp. 652–53. 

GENERAL GRUENTHER 

ter came under a British commander in 

January 1944, the CCS placed the 

theater under the executive direction of 

the British Chiefs of Staff.. Thus General Wilson was responsible to the Combined Chiefs through the British Chiefs 

of Staff, an arrangement that would 

give the British Prime Minister greater 

opportunity to intervene in the shaping 

of strategy for the theater.. 

The German 

In May 1944 all German-occupied 

territory in central Italy was nominally 

under the control of Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring. His appointment as Commander in Chief, Southwest (Oberbefehlshaber, Suedwest), had 

been an attempt to create a joint com- 
12 

mand similar to those in other theaters 

controlled by the Armed Forces High 

Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW). Kesselring was responsible to the OK W through the Armed 

Forces Operation Staff (Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, WFSt) for operations and 

nominallv had full tactical authoritv 

over all' units of the Army, Nav}:, 

Luftwaffe, and Waffrn-SS in Italy. The 

Naval Command, Italy and the Luftflotte 

II, senior naval and air commands in 

the theater, were not, however, unequivocallv under Kesselring's command 

and r~mained directly s~bordinate to 

their service chiefs in Germanv. Onlv in , I 

the event of "imminent danger" to the 

strategic situation would Kesselring's orders be binding on these two commands, and in such an event Kesselring 

was to keep the naval and Luftwaffe 

headquarters in Germanv constantly inf(:>fmed of his actions.1O Actually, Kesselring's prestige as the senior Lufiwaffe 

officer in Italy and his close personal 

relations with the naval commander, 

Vice Adm. Wilhelm MeendsenBohlken, enabled the field marshal to 

secure the full support of I:x)th headquarters without ever having to invoke 

his pm-vers under the "imminent danger" clause. 11 

Kesselring's other title, commander 

of Army GnmtJ C, provided him with 

command over a conventional entity in 

the administration, t1-aining, and supply 

hierarchy of the German Army. In this 

capacity he reported directly to the 

,,, The order containing Kesselring's appointment 

as Commander in Chief. Southwest. and the delineation of his authority. dated 6 November 1943. may 

be found in ~nglish tra,nslation in ON L Fueher 

DIrectives. 1943-45, p. 103. 

11 MS # C-064 (KesselrIng), p. 35. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Armv High Command (Uberkommando 

des Heeres, OKH). 12 

In the spring of 1944 Kesselring had 

under his over-all command the Trnth 

Anny, at the main front, led by Generaloberst' Heinrich Gottfried von Vietinghoff, genannt Scheel, and at Anzio 

the Fourteenth Armv under Generalol:x:rst 

El:x:rhard von Mackensen, and the provisional Armff Abteiiung von Zangen, a 

rear-area catchall organization in northem Italy built around the LXXVII Corps 

headquarters and named fix its commander, General del' Infanterie Gustav 

von Zangen. Its unconventional compo~ 

sition sprang from a dual function as a 

reservoir f()r replacements and theater 

reserves and as the responsible agency 

in its sector for coast-watching, construction of rear area defenses, and 

antipartisan warfare. 

As with any drama, \\'hether historicalor theatrical, the setting is one of 

the key elements in its development. 

For over two millennia ltalv's bootshaped peninsula has provided a colorful and challenging stage for historical 

drama. The peninsula's uniqueness lies 

partly in the variety and challenging 

120KW was. in certain respens, nominally superior to the three branch high commands: Army. 

Luftwaffe, and NaVY. The OKW ,,'as responsible 

thmugh its chief. General!eldmarschall Wilhelm 

Keitel. to Adolf Hitler in his capacitv as Commander ill Chief of t he German Armed Forces. 

During the period (overed by this volume. however. 

Hitler also held the position of Commander in 

Chief of the Arm\". Staff funnions affecting military 

operations ,,'ere, moreover, divided horilontally 

and g-eog-raphicall} betw{'en the OK Wand the 

nmninallv "mer-level OKH. Concerning Italv, for 

example. the chief of the WFSt of OKW, rather 

than the chief of staff of OKH, was Hider's chief 

adviser for operations. See MSS #'5 T-\OI (Winter 

et a/.). The German Armed Forces High Command, 

and T -I I 1 (Halder pt at.). The German High 

Command, both in CMH. 
SPRING IN ITALY-1944 

nature of terrain surpassing anything 

the Allied armies would encounter in 

northwestern Europe during World 

War II. 

When staff officers at Allied Mediterranean headquarters studied the maps 

of Italy, they noted, as had other 

commallders since Hannibal's dat', that 

the peninsula's most striking geographic 

feature is the high, rugged A pennine 

mountain chain which divides the country into three rather clearly defined 

compartments-the eastern coastal 

plain, the central mountain region, and 

the western coastal plain. 

The eastern coastal region is a narrow, largely treeless plain bordering the 

Adriatic Sea and extending northward 

appmximatelv 200 miles fmm the Gargano peninsula, the spur of the Italian 

boot, to the Po Valley. In the summer 

the entire region is dry and dust'l, and 

in winter frequent rains turn much of it 

into a vast quagmire. The coast is 

generally low and sandy, fringed by 

lagoons and backed bv the naITO\\' 

pl~ins from which rise ~leeply scarred 

hills. Along the plain run only one 

main hIghway and one railroad, as well 

as a negligible number of fair secondary roads. From the plain a series of 

flat-top ridges extend westward into the 

Central Apennines. These ridges are 

separated by numerous streams f10wing 

through narrow, steep-sided alluvial valleys that cut across the Allies' projected 

axis of advance. 'This configuration 

would make large-scale deployment of 

tracked and wheeled vehicles off the 

roads almost impossible, and was only 

one of several drawbacks that had eliminated the east coast from consideration 

by Allied planners as the major area of 

effort for the spring offensive. 

13 

The Central Appenines, which by 

their size and sharply folded structure 

largely determine the shape and form 

the backbone of the peninsula, consist 

of numerous parallel ridges alternating 

\~iith flat-oottomed valleys, all running 

in a northwest-southeasterly direction. 

The upper courses of the' Tiber and 

Arno Rivers flow through the broad, 

alluvial valleys parallel to these ridges 

bef()l'e cutting narrow canyons through 

the mountains and turning \vestward to 

the sea. T'he ridges are not continuous 

but are interrupted by deep transverse 

water gaps and by prominent saddles 

several thousand feet below crest 

tion. In the Central Apennines the 

highest point is the Gran Sasso d'Italia 

(9,583 feet high). Southward t he peaks 

gradually decrease to approximately 

3,000 feet in the vicinit'l of Benevento, 

about thirty miles northeast of Naples. 

The lower slopes of the mountains are 

usually terraced and planted with vineyards and with citrus and olive h'Toves, 

while the upper slopes generally support a thin cover of evergreen or scrub 

oak. 

Within this central mountain region 

rugged heights and deep ravines severeh: restrict cross-countrv movement. 

As ,~ith the east coast c~rridor, onlv 

one railroad and one highway ru;} 

through the area, thus presenting a 

f(Jrmidable obstacle to east-west movement of anv militar'l significance. South 

of a line nlnning f;om Rome northeast 

to Pescara f(mr good roads enter the 

mountains' from the east, but only two 

continue on to the western half ~f the 

country. Furthermore, all roads arc 

flanked by high, rugged terrain and 

can easily be blocked by demolitions or 

defended by small forces. Narrow and 
\4 

tortuous with very steep gradients, the 

roads are frequently blocked by landslides during the rainy season and in 

winter bv snow. North of the RomePescara line, roads crossing the Apennines afe more frequent, but they cross 

even higher passes and from midDecember to mid-March are often 

blocked by heavy snows. Military operations in this region would require units 

well trained in mountain warfare, which 

were in short supply among the Allied 

t<m:es in Italy. 

The grim logic of the inhospitable 

terrain Ie ft Allied commanders little 

choice in their selection of sites for 

ll1<~or military operations-the peninsula's western half, including the Liri 

valley and the coastal plain. Although 

the western coastal plain shares many 

of the disadvantages of the other regions, from the Allied poinr of view it 

was the most f~lvol'able of the three, t()r 

its long, exposed left flank could easily 

be turned by Allied sea power. The 

plain extend~ northwestward 100 miles 

from the mouth of the Garigliano River 

to San Severo, a small port about 

twentv miles west of Rome. Less than a 

mile ~\'ide at its northern and southern 

extremities, the plain broadens to a 

maximum of eight miles along the 

lower Tiber. At the t()ot of the Alban 

Hills just south of Rome lie the Pontine 

~1ars'hes. Crisscrossed with drainage 

ditches and irrigation canals, the region, 

although seeming to offer a favorable 

maneuver area fi)r militarv fimTs, was 

actually quite un blVorable , for the d~­

ployment of wheeled or tracked VdllcIes on a wide front. South of the 

marshes to the lower reaches of the 

Garigliano River, the coastal plain resembles the 20-mile stretch northwest of 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Rome in that it offers more favorable 

terrain for the deployment of armored 

formations than do the Pontine 

Marshes. 

Another major geographic feature of 

the region west of the Central Apennines is the Liri valley, 'which also offers 

a f~lVorable route int~) central Italy and 

Rome. The gateway to this vallcy,' leading through the mountains southeast of 

Rome, lies at the junction of the Liri 

and the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers. 

In 1944 the Germans had dosed this 

gateway \\ith a series of for'midable 

defensive positions across the Liri valley 

and anchored on both flanks bv two 

great mountain bastions, Monte M~o 

~nd MOllte Cassino. Located south of 

the valley, Monte M~o I'ises to approximately 3,000 feet and sends steep-sided 

spurs into the Liri valley. To the north 

the vast bulk of the Monte Cairo massif, 

southernmost peak of a great spur of 

the Central Apennines, towers to a 

height of 5,000 feet. From the summit 

of this mountain a ridge thrusts southwestward, terminating abruptly in 

Monte Cassino. The Allied commander 

in Italv, General Alexander, had long; 

believe~l :\lonte Cassino to be the key t~) 

the gateway leading into the Liri vailey. 

Bef()re this gate\\'ay, like a moat beneath a castle wall, flows the Rapido. 

Throughout the \\inter of 1943-44 the 

U.S. Fifth Armv had tried in vain to 

blast open this' gate. Now once a!rdin 

Alexander turned his attention toward 

a new strateb>1c concept which this time 

he hoped would lead the Allies into the 

Liri valley and place them irresistibly on 

the road to Rome. 

Rome, the immediate objective of the 

Allied armies in Ital\' , lies in a gap 

carved through a range of hills that 
SPRING IN ITALY-1944 

separate the upper Tiber basin from 

the sea. North of the citv rise the 

Sabatini Mountains; south' of it. the 

Alban Hills. This was the region of 

Latium, cradle of the ancient Roman 

republic. 

The western half of the peninsula is 

also well served by a network of good 

roads, particularly in the vicinity of 

Rome, to which, for many centuries, all 

roads in Italv have led. In the coastal 

corridor th~' roads cross numerous 

stream beds, many of which are either 

dry or easily forded during the summer, but in winter and early spring 

often become raging torrents. Else-

\\' here the roads freq uent ly pass 

through narrow defiles, providing ideal 

sites for demolitions and mines, something at which the Germans were particularly adept. 

In this region numerous villages nestled in the valleys, sprawled 3long the 

main roads, or perched like miniature 

fortresses on the hilltops. Solidly built 

of native stone, the latter villages provided excellent observation points as 

well as cover f<)r troops. 

The mountainous terrain, the narrow, twisting roads, the intensivelv cultivated plainsL and valleys all combi'ned to 

compartmentalize the countrvside and 

15 

relegate armor largely to the role of 

self-propelled artillery in support of the 

infantry. Already in the advance to the 

banks of the Sangro and Rapido Rivers 

the Allies had experienced, but not yet 

fully mastered, the difficulties peculiar 

to fighting over this kind of terrain. 

'rhe greatest problem was searching out 

a skillfully camouflaged enemy, who 

frequently withheld his fire until the 

last moment. \Vhereas the attacker 

might readily ascertain that an orange 

grove or vineyard harbored enemy 

troops, it was generally impossible to 

determine t heir exact location and 

strength without actually entering the 

area and risking heavy losses. After 

several costly encounters, the Allies had 

adopted th~ tactic of backing off and 

battering the suspected area with artillery or mortar tire bef()J'e moving in to 

mop up, yet this was slow and costly ill 

terms of materiel. Since deployment off 

the roads \vas otten difficult and f}'C'-

quently impossible, and since the enemy 

used demolitions, mines, and ambush 

cunningly, the tactical problem of keeping losses to a minimum vv hile advancing along the roads would be one of 

the most di fficult and persistent encountered by the Allied !()l'ces throughout the entire campaign. 
CHAPTER II 

Preparing for a New Offensive 

The German Defenses 

The ~n:rmans h~d closed the gateway 

to the Lm valley wIth f()rmidable defenses along two lines, or, more properly, 

zones, that they had constructed across 

the peninsula from OrUma on the 

A?riatic to the mouth of the Garigliano 

River on the Tyrrhenian Sea. One of 

these two lines the Germans had named 

Gustav. 1 Crossing Italy at its narrowest 

the line incorporated' some of the bes~ defensive terrain on the peninsula. It 

extended almost a hundred miles 

~orthward to the Adriatic coast, which 

It reached at a point some two miles 

northwest of Ortona. 2 

The m~st heavily fortified part of the 

Gustav Lme was the central sector 

opposite the Eighth Army. Anchored 

on Monte Cairo, the 5,415-f{)ot summit 

of the mountain massif f()rming the Liri 

valley's northern wall, this sector of the 

Gustav Line followed the high ground 

southeast to Monte Cassino, then ran 

south along the west banks of the 

Rapido and Gari Rivers across the 

entrance to the Liri valley and a terminus on the southern slopes of Monte 

Majo.:l From Monte Majo's eastern 

I Phonetic designatioll fur the letter "G" in German alphabet. 

'\is # T-Ia (Westphal et al.l, CMH; Situation 

map, 7-10 May 44, AOK 10, KTB, LaKekarten, 4-

20.V,44. . 

3 Considerable confusion appears tu have existed 

dunng these and earlier operations as to which 

stream was the Rapido and which the Gari. Based 

f()othills the line continued south of the 

village of Casteif()rte, where it turned 

southwestward along high ground 

north of Minturno and thence on to 

the sea. 

With steep banks and swift-f1owing 

current the Rapido was a formidable 

obstacle, and the Germans had supplemented this river barrier with numerous fieldworks, Along the river's west 

bank stretched a thick and continuous 

network of wire, minefields, pillboxes, 

and concrete emplacements. Between 

the Rapido and the Cassino-Sa nt' Ang~lo road, the Germans had dug many 

sht trenches, some designed to accommod~te no more than a machine gun 

and Its crew, others to take a section or 

even a platoon. 

The entire fortified zone was covered 

by German artillery and mortar fire 

given deadly accur~cy by observers lo~ cated on the mountainsides north and 

south of the Liri valley. Allied forward 

observers and intellig~nce officers estimated that there were alxmt 400 enemy 

guns and rocket launchers located 

upon a 1:25,000 map of Italy, the Gari, beginning 

Just south of Cas~lllo town, meets the Rapido 

flOWing from Sant Elia through Villa, making a 

lX'nd to t he east of Cassino about a mile north of 

Sant·Angelo. It is doubtful whether the map IS 

accurat:, Sll1et' a stream flows through Cassino 

town. 1 herefore, sime "rapidu" could approximately be applied to either stream and the current 

of both is extremely fast, the authur has chosen the 

name Rapldo to designate the majur river in the 

area, 
PREPARING FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 17 

north of Highway 6 in the vicinity of 

the villages of Atina and Belmonte, 

respectively, nine and six miles north of 

Cassino. Of these the British believed 

that about 230 could fire into the 

Cassino sector, and about 150 could fire 

in support of the defenders or Monte 

Cassino and Cassino town. 

Opposite the Fifth Army sector, however, only a small portion of the Gustav 

Line was still a part of the dcf(~nsive 

positions that the Germans had selected 

in the autumn of 1943, fix south of the 

Liri valley the front followed a line 

where the British 10 Corps had established a bridgehead beyond the Garigliano during the winter fighting. This 

meant that in some areas being the 

Fifth Army the Germans were holding 

a defensive line not of their own choosing and t hat in some sectors (t he 

French, f<)r example) the Allies rather 

than the Germans possessed high 

ground overlooking the enemy positions. ~ 

The Gustav Line was a zone of 

mutually supporting firing positions-a 

string of pearls, Kesselring called them. 

While those sectors of the line located 

in the Liri valley and along the coastal 

corridor were relatively deep defensive 

zones, ranging from 100 to 3,000 yards 

in depth, those in t he mountains were 

much thinner, partlv because the nX'ky 

terrain made it extremely difficult to 

dig or build heavier de fenses, but 

mainly because t he local German comrnand~rs doubted that the Allies, unable 

to usc armor and artillen t here, would 

choose to attack througl~ such f()l'bid-

'Situation map. 7-10 Mal 44, AOK 10, KTB, 

Lagekarten, 4-20. V. 44. 

ding terrain. In any event, an attack 

over the mountai,~s, they believed, 

would be relatively easy to stop. ~) 

Except for barbed wire, railroad tics, 

and steel rails, the materials used in 

constructing the Gustav Line positions 

were readily obtainable on the site. 

Whenever p:)ssible the Germans utilized 

the numerous stone houses of the region as shelters or firing positions. 

Locating machine guns or an antitank 

gun in' the cellar, enemy troops piled 

crushed stone and rubble on the 

ground floor to provide overhead protection. If lXlIllbs or shells dcstroved the 

upper part of the house, the additional 

rubble would simplv reinf(lIT<' this 

cover. Allied troops would frequenth' 

fail to detect these cellar positions, 

sometimes l10t until hours after a position had been overrull and t he Germans had opened fire 011 the rear and 

flanks of the assaulting troops. 

Firing positions f()!· inbntn weapons 

were mostly open but usuallv connected 

by trenches to covered rx:rsonncl shelters. The shelters ranged from sim pic 

dugout,~ covered with a bver of logs 

and earth to elaborate rooms hewn out 

of solid rock, the btter often used as 

command posts or signal installations. 

Invariably well clIl1oul1aged, most inbntry shelters were covered \\'ith nxks, 

earth', logs, railwav tics, or steel rails. 

Behind the Gustav line the Germans 

had constructed the other defensive 

zone-the Fuehrer Riegel, or the llitlcr 

5 MS # C-064 (Kesselring-); MS # C-071 (Vieting-hoff (I al.). Unless otherwise cited the f()ll()wing 

section is based UPOIl these references, See ,dso 

Eng-r Rpt ,,/atchd l1lap. 13 Apr 44, in filt" , XII' 

PanzN Corpl, 1 ,,/Nr, 211/44 g,Kdo,\. KTB. Anlagt'n 

1,1 V -301V44, 
18 

Line. t; This line lav from five to ten 

miles behind the (~usta" Line. Beginning on the 'ryrrhenian coast near 

TerTacina, twenty-six miles northwcst of 

the mouth of the Garigliano and the 

southern gatcway to t.he Anzio beachhead, the Hitler Line crossed the 

mountains overlooking the coastal highwav and the Itri-Pico road from the 

noi·thwest (lnd west, and thence the Liri 

valley via Pontecorvo and Aquino to 

anchor at Picdimonte San Cermano on 

the southem slope of the ;\lollte Cairo 

massif. Although essentially a switch 

position, as its 'name implied, the line 

was made up of field\\'orks simibr to 

those in the Gustav Line and was. at 

least in the Liri valley sector, as strong 

as or, in some instances, e"en stronger 

than the btter. 

Manning the German defense s\stem 

011 the southern front was the e<jui"alent of about nine divisions. One of 

these \\'as in reserve; the remainder 

"'ere divided among t\\O regular and 

one provisional corps headquarters. All 

were under the cOlllmand of the Tenth 

Army. The XIV Panzer Cor/).';, commanded bv Generalleulmtllt Fridolin 

von Senger und Ettcrlin, held a sector 

of the Gustav Line extending fmm the 

Tyrrhenian coast across t he A urunci 

~{()untains to the Liri and a junction 

with General del' Gebirgstruppen (General of Mountain Troops) Valentin 

Feuerstein's LI Mountain Cmf)s. Along 

6 Colloquiallv, the Cerman word Rlegrl means the 

bar of a door: in military parlance it is generally llsed 

in the combinatioll Ri,'p;l'lltelhlllg which is best I ranslated as "switch position." When the Allied threat to 

the FlIPhrer Riep;d increased. the Germans renamed it 

the Sl'lIgl'r RY·gd after General Fridolin von Senger 

und Etterlin. eommander of the XIV Pan::.n C"'"/JI. 

through whose senor a major portion of the line ran, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the panzer corps' front were the 94th 

Infantry Division in the coastal sector, 

and the 71 st Infantr). Di-uision in the 

Petrella massif. A composite Kampj~ 

gruppe made up of a re~,-jmental group 

detached from the 305th Infantry Division and a regiment from the 15th 

Panzer Gren(ufier Divi'iion lay between the 

71st Division an d the Lil:j River. The 

remainder of the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Divi'ii(m was in corps reserve and watchjn g the coast. 7 

In the U Mountain Corj)s sector the 

44th Infantrv (fl Ii. D) DiFlsion K manned 

the valle\ -positions, and the elite lst 

Para('h1l.te Division continued to hold the 

Moille Cassino sector, including the 

town of Cassino. In the mountains 

north of the yfollte Cairo massif the 5th 

l),fountain Divi'don and the 144th Jaeger 

Divil'ion held the corps' left wing to a 

junction with Generalleutllant Friedrich 

Wilhelm Hauck's prm'isional corps, 

Group HalicR. The latter held a quiet 

sector about eight miles southeast of the 

Pescara Rin,T 011 the Adriatic coast with 

the 305th and the 334th Infantry Di"i-

,lions and the II 4th Jaeger Division in 

reserve. In front of the Allied beachhead at Anzio la\ the Fourteenth Arm'.' 

with its five divisions divided lX't\\eell 

the I Parachute Cm,!)s and the LXXVi 

Panzer Cor/)s. One of these live divisions 

was located along the coast north\','est of 

Rome as a precaution against an AIii('d 

amphibious landing attempt. 

As a mobile strategic reserve under 

Army Group Cs control, Kesselring held 

• As the i 5th Pa11:1T Dh'ilUH/, this unit had been 

destroved ill Tunisia. It had been reconstituted as 

the 15th Prlll:.'r Grl'11adin Dip/sum in Sicily. 

!l The designation H u. D refers to ~n honorary 

tit Ie ~i\'t'll the division: Reick'l,,,en(Uiierdil!ision "Horil 

lind Deui,(hmeister.·· 
PREPARING FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 19 

the 3d and 90th Panzer Grenadin- Divisions 

and the 26th Panzer Division in the 

vicinitv of Rome, and, some thirtv miles 

to th~ north near Viterbo, th~ 29th 

Panzer GrenadieT Division. In northern 

Italy, serving mainly as a coast defense 

force, was Army Group von Zangen, consisting of the I62d (Turkomen) Infantry 

Division, the 356th Infantry Divi,ion, the 

278th Infantry Division, and the 188th 

Mountain Divi'iion, none of which were 

first-rate units. Except f(n' von Zangen's 

gmup, all of the reserve divisions were 

first- rate and could, if committed soon 

enough, have an important inf1uence 

011 the outcome of the fighting. Yet 

their disIX)sitions, partly determined by 

Kesseh'ing's reaction to Allied deception 

plans, made it unlikely that they could, 

or would, be able to reach the southern 

fmnt in time to inflllence the tide of 

battle. For the most part, however, 

Kesselring's veteran divisions were 10-

c,!ted in defensive zones well sited in 

relation to terrain that favored the 

defense. If properlY manned, the Gustav and Hitler Lines well merited Kesselring's confidence that the gateway to 

the Liri vallev and to Rome was reasonablv secure. 

Alexander~, ConcejJt 

To open the gate\yay, Alexander laid 

beh)re his army and corps commanders, 

on 22 February 1944, guidelines f{)r a 

(o-ordinated attack bv the British 

Eighth and the U.S. Fifth Armies. In 

the first battle f()r Rome, which had 

lasted from Jan uary to March, the 

American Fifth Armv had carried the 

burden of the mail) effort at Monte 

Cassino and along the Garigliano River. 

This time (',.cneral Alexander had decided that it would be the Eighth 

Army's responsibility to accomplish 

what the Fifth had bilcd to do, break 

through the enemy's defenses into the 

Liri valley and lead a drive to the line 

Civitavecchia-Viterbo-Terni north of 

Rome. 

On the Eighth Army's left, between 

the Liri River and the Tyrrhenian 

coast, the Fifth Armv was'to attack 

through the Aunlllci' Mountains and 

along the coast. That part of the Fifth 

Arnw in the Anzio beachhead was to 

burst fonh fwm the confines of the 

beachhead and push back [he German 

Fourteenth Ann)' in order to cut ofT and 

destroy the r[ght \\'ing of the Gennan 

Tenth Army as it feIl back from the main 

attack along the southern front. 9 

Behind this concept lay Gelleral 

Alexander's conviction, based upon unusuallv good intelligence of the cnclllY's 

stn'ngth and dispositions. that the Liri 

valin', at the f()ot of the western margin 

of the Central Apcnnines, and [he 

Anzio beachhead 011 the \\'estern coastal 

plain provided the oIlly salisfacton 

areas f()l' m<~jor offensiH' operations 

wherein he could effcCliveh utilize Allied air and armored supc"riorit \. The 

central sector facing the Liri valle\', 

which until March had been held b\ 

General Clark's Fifth Armv, \\as 110\\ 

assigned to General Le('~e's Eight h 

Army, \\hile Clark's Army was shifted 

to a' relatively narrow se~·tor bet \\een 

the Liri vallC): and the TyrrheIlian Sea. 

9 Memo, Alexander to Wilson, '2'2 Feb 44, Future 

OperaliollS in ilah AFHQ microfilm. Job IO-A, 

reel I-{, G-3 Plans/'20, ltaIv Opns Polin: A(;\ll' 

Appre(ialinn No. 1,22 Feh44, AFHQ lilm, Job 47-

B, reel 1."6-G, Phl9, Post Husk} Administration & 

Maintenance; Opn. Order #1, Hqs. AAI, 5 May 

1944, See also W.G.F, Jackson. Till' Ballli' lor Ital, 

(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 2'23, . 
20 

Clark also retained command of the 

Anzio beachhead. 

The source of the extraordinarily 

good intelligence that supported General Alexander's conviction arose from 

a fortuitous circumstance that had led 

eventually to the breaking of the Germans' major operational code. Since 

earlv 1940 the British had been deciph~ring and reading the Gennans' 

Enigma Code-the code by which all 

major command I'adio traffic was sent. 

The advantages this gave the Allies in 

the North African campaign moved 

General Alexander to remark in 1943 

that "the knowledge not onlv of the 

enemy's precise strength and disposition 

but also how, "hen, alld where he 

intends to carry out his operations has 

brought a new dimension into the 

prose<:ution of the war." Planning f()r 

the spring offensive, therefore, would 

take place under the most favorable 

circumstances for the Allied command. 

Unknown to the Cennans, every m<uor 

radio message to and ii-om the OKW 

and OKH to Kesselring's army group 

and his two field armies was deciphered 

within minutes of its transmission and 

then relayed via special liaison units, 

attached to army groups and field 

armies, to the commanders and the 

relativelv few officers OIl their staffs 

privy to 'the secret. 10 

After the f~lilure of all Allied ass~lUlt 

on Monte Cassino in Februarv, General 

Alexander had concluded' that he 

would have to develop a local superioritv of at least three to olle in inf~;lIltrv in 

oi'der to have a reasonable chance of 

In Quoted in F.W. Winterbotham, Til" Ultra S{'Crp/ 

(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1974). p. 187. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

breaking through the enemy's defenses. 

To achieve this superiority in the critical 

Liri valley sector, he had ordered major' 

regrouping of Allied forces on 5 

March. For ease in administration and 

supply, all British-equipped divisions, 

which included Dominion, Indian, and 

Polish units, would be brought into the 

Eighth Army, and all Americanequiplx'd divisions would remain in the 

Fifth Armv. Thinning out the eastern 

sector of the front from the Central 

Apennines to the Adriatic, Alexander 

gave responsibility for the entire Adriatic sector to the British £) Corps, 

under direct. command of Headquarters, AAI. 11 

While these changes were being 

made, thc Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (:\1ATAf) began, on 19 

"larch, a large-scale interdiction operation against German rail, road, and sea 

comIllunications throughout an area 

from the so-called Pisa-Rimini Line to 

the southern battlefront. Appropriately 

designated STRANGLE, the operation was 

designed to choke off the enemy's 

supplies during the period preceding 

the spring offensive. By the end of 

March all rail lines from Rome to the 

southern front were cut o fl. North of 

Rome rail traffic was generally unable 

to approadl closer than within 125 

miles of the capital. This program of 

interdiction was to be continued 

II Operations of British. Indian, and Dominion 

Forct's ill ltah. 3 September 1943 to :1 May 1945, 

Pan 11.1 he Campaign in Central Itah. 26 March 

to 10 August 1944, Sec. B, Eighth AmlY Advance to 

Rome. British Historical Section. Cenu';] Ylediterra· 

nean, ropY in Milita!'\' lliston Research Collection. 

Carlisle. 1\\.: Fifth Army History, Pan V, The Drive to 

Rom" (Florence, Ital\': L'lrnpronta Press, 1945). p.2. 
PREPARING FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 21 

URI VALLEY 

through the first day of DIADEM, the 

code name of the Allied offensive. 12 

A Cover Plan 

To conceal the large-scale shifting of 

divisions behind the Allied front, the 

AAI staff devised a cover and deception plan designated NUNTON. Its purpose was to confuse the enemy on the 

h.:ation of the f<mhcoming Allied of12 See Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. 

eds., "Army Air Forces in World War II." vol. III. 

Europe: Argument tv V-E Day (Chica~o: University of 

Chicago Press, 1951), p. 387 (hereafter cited as 

Craven and Cate, eds., AAF II/). 

fensive-to come either from the Anzio 

beachhead or from the southern 

front-in the hope that Kesselring in 

his uncertainty would be led to hold his 

reserves well back h-om the main front 

when the attack came. 1:1 

When in late March it became apparent that the efforts of the l\'ew Zealand 

corps at Cassino had already tipped off 

the Germans on the importance the 

Allies attached to the sector west of the 

Apennines, AAI modified its deception 

I" Operations of British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Part II, Sec. B. 
22 

plan somewhat. Henceii:>rth the plan 

would attempt to convince the enemy 

that the Allies intended to launch another amphibious operation, this time 

in the vicinitv of Civitavecchia, some 

forty miles n~rth of Rome. The surprise achieved by the Anzio operation 

suggested that the Germans would be 

specially alert i(:>I' any sign of a similar 

operation, and theref(lre more likely to 

be taken in by this deception than by 

indications of a major offensive from 

the beachhead area. The Germans, the 

Allied planners hoped, would therel(JlT 

vie\\' the opening of the spring offensive along the Garigliano and Rapido 

Rivers as a strong demonstration designed to draw their attention from the 

coastal flank. 1" The scenario for the 

cover plan called f(lr the two divisions 

of the 1 st Canadian Corps, then in 

Eighth Army resene, alld the 36th 

Infantry Division, ill Fifth Army reserve, to simulate hean radio traffic 

and take other mcasure~ to create the 

impression that they \\'ere engaged in 

amphibious training in the l\"aples-Salerno area. 

Di.lpositioll of the Allied Armies 

Foul weather and the normal delays 

attending the shifting of large numbe;'s 

of troops in mountainous terrain had 

deferred completion of the regroupment of the t\\O armies untii the elld of 

March. At the beginning of April the 

Eighth Armv's sector extended 75 miles 

1I0rrheast\\ard from the southernmost 

edge of the Liri valley, along a line 

" For text of plan. SCt· AAI OpIlS Plan ",3. I HApI' 

44. in Operations of the British. Indian. and 

Dominion Forces in Italy, Part II, Sec. A. Allied 

Strategy, App C-2, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

from the highest peak of the ~aielb, 

over the summit of the Gran Sasso 

massif of the Central Apennines, thence 

to the slopes of the hills overlooking the 

eastern coastal plain held by the British 

5 Corps. General Leese's striking force, 

the British 13 Corps, commanded by 

Lt. Gen. Sidney C. Kirkman, held the 

left of this lin~ astride the Liri valley 

with four divisions. In army reserve, 

prepared either to pass through or to 

enter the corps front, vIas Maj. Gen. 

E.L.\1. Burns' I Canadian Corps \\ith 

two infantry divisions and an armored 

brigade. T(~ the 13th Corps' right and 

assembled I(lr \I·hat was expected to be 

the final assault against Monte Cassino, 

was Lt. Gen. Wladvslaw Anders' 2 

Polish Corps, also controlling two infantn divisions and an armored brigadebut \\ith this difference, the Polish 

divisions contained only two brigades. 

The armored brigade was to support 

either division. The British 10 Corps, 

with the equivalent of two divisions, was 

llext in line. 

Holding a quiet front across the wild 

and desolate Central Apennines on the 

Eighth Armv's light \\ing, Lt. Gen. Sir 

RL. McCreery's 10 Corps included a 

miscellaneous group of units representing the equivalent of I(Hn independent 

brigades, an infantry and an armored 

division. On the Adriatic flank were 

v'derans of the Tunisian Campaign, the 

British 5 Corps \\ith T\\O infantry divisions and all armored brigade. This 

corps \\'as to serve as a containing l(lITe 

and be prepared to foHO\\' up any 

enemy \\'ithdrawal. 1 ~ 

The U.S. Fifth Annv held a relatively 

naITo\\ front extending 12 miles Ii'om a 

15 Alexander [)I'.I/J!l/I/t, p. 47. 
PREPARING FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 23 

GENERAL COULTER 

point just east. of t.he village of SCHlri 

on the Tyrrhenian coast. Curving 

nonhwanl as t3r 3S Tremensuoli. the 

front then rail eastward along a rallge 

of hills nonh of the Garigliano Rive r as 

Lir as the town of \1inturno. Fn)JJ1 

t.here th e front line co ntinued east 

through the village of Ru f(), non heast 

across the Ausente \'alley to a point just 

o;oudHvest of Castdt())"(e 1l:xnIt six miles 

northeast of Minturl1o, thence east. of 

the Monte M;-uo lIIassif and across the 

fOr\,"ard slopes of ~fonti Turlitto, juga, 

and Ornito to the Garigliano. It followed th a t rive r's cast bank to the 

interarmy boundary along the southern 

edge of the Liri valley. 

On the le ft of this frollt \,'as the U.S. 

11 Corps, commande d by ~j . Gen. 

Geoffrey Keyes, a cavalryman who had 

gained considerable expe rience in armor as de puty to Lt. Gen. George S. 

Patton, J r. , in North A frica. Keyes had 

assumed comm3nd of the I I Corps in 

Sicily. During April Keyes' corps CO J1 -

GE ERAL SLOAN 

sistc(\ 01 two newl\ arrived illblltn' 

divisiolls- the fF>lI; and HHth, co 111'-

mande d respective ly by Maj . Gells. 

john B. Coulter and john E. Sloan . 

The a rriv3l of these divisions ill Ital\" 

\yas, as General George C. \1 arsha ll 

re marked aftet· the \\'ar, "the great 

psychological turning-poi11l in the building of a baule\\"Orthy army." Iii These 

were the first. U.S. di visions to e llter 

comba t consisting largely of \\artilllc 

drahees. making t he coming oHellsive, 

at least the II Corps' part of it, the iirst 

rea l test of the C.S. Anl1v's \\ Irtim e 

training and replaccmem system. It \\'as 

particularly fitlin g that this test be llIade 

unde r Ge neral Clark's command, f()l ' IS 

G-3 and later as Chief of Statf of" the 

Army Ground Forces in 194~ he had 

pla y~d an important role in the creatioll 

of the system. Begi nning on 10 April 

t\\"o regiments of t he H5t.h Division 

assumed responsibility t()r the Ie It ~l l f" 

16 Ge nera l Marshall ln len'S. 25 Jill 49. in CM H 

fil es. 
24 

of the Minturno bridgehead, while one 

regiment of the 88th Division covered 

the remainder of the corps front to the 

left Ixmndary of the French-held Monte 

Juga bridgehead north of the Garigliann. 

The French Expeditionary Corps 

(FEC) on the II Corps' right had been 

formed in Italy during the previous 

winter. Armed and equipped in Korth 

Africa by the U.S. Armv, the FEC was 

under the command of General Alphonse J uin, Algerian-born graduate of 

St. Cvr, the French national military 

acade;ny. 17 During the winter fighting 

the French corps had incurred 7.836 

casualties in an attempt to envelop 

Monte Cassino from the north, Although the maneuver had failed to 

bring about the capture of that kev 

position, French mountain troops had 

amply demonstrated their skill and 

worth with the capture of Monte Belvedere and \10nte Abate, Allied commanders could expect that they v\'ould 

do equally well when bced once again 

with similar mountainous terrain, 

For the first half of April the 4th 

Moroccan \Iountain Diyision, rccentiv 

arrived from CorsiGl, held the entir~ 

corps front, while the 2d Moroccan 

Inbntry and 3d Algerian Infantrv Divisions rested or engaged in mountain 

training in the vicinity of Salerno. In 

the middle of the month the 2d Moroccan Division returned to the front to 

take over a part of tht' bridgehead 

fwm the 4th :'loroccan Division. In the 

second half of ApriL Juin's corps also 

17 See :'I1and Vigner3s, Rf'annmg Ihe French, THE 

UNITED STATES AR.'vIY 1:\ WORLD WAR II 

(Washingloll, 1'157), 101" Ihe background of the 

FEe. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

received the French 1st Motorized Infantry Division, which included many 

early Free French recruits, who after 

the fall of France had rallied to the 

banner of General Charles de Gaulle. 

During April three groups of Tabors, 

totaling about 12,000 men, arrived in 

Italv from North Africa, The Tabors--

uni'ts somewhat larger than battalion 

strength and made up of goums, or 

companies-were recruited from the 

mountain tribes of French ~orth Africa. Usually referred to as goumiers, 

the men were professional soldiers and 

skilled in mountain warbre, 18 

To control the Tabors, the First 

Goum Headquarters was attached to 

FEC on 13 ApriL By the beginning of 

May Juin's corps numbered 99,000 officers and men-a formidable organizatioll, Among the reinforcements were 

sufficient engineers to permit the release of American units previously attached to the FEC. After April only 

U,S, armor and artillerv units, the latter 

undel- the command (;f the 13th Field 

Artillery Brigade. would still be used in 

significant numbers in support of Juin's 

corps. I;, 

I" A group 01 Tdbors '\,lS the e'lui\aiem of a 

battalion; a gOllm tbe eqlliyalent of a company. A 

goumier was a Moroccan irregular soldier, usually 

recruited from Ibe Berber tribesmen of the Atlas 

mountains and under the command of French 

officers .llld noncommissioned officers, A Tabor 

lIslI.lll\' indud"d a he,ld'luarters, one hean weapons gOllm. and three goums with a total strength 01 

"bout 60 offlcers and ~CO's and 1'159 native :'\leO's 

and mCll, \\ith :!47 horses and mules, A group "as 

composed of a headquarters and three Tabors ""Jlh 

a total streng"! h of about 3,100" In Februan 1944 

the GOtllllS \Iorouains, undt'r the command of 

Brig. Gell" Augustine Guillaume, was composed of 

the 1st, 3d. and 4th Groups of Tabors, in all about 

10.000 lllerL 

HI Operating as the French Expeditionan' Corps' 

artlllerv as long as the corps remained in Italy, the 
PREPARINC FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 

G ENERAL KEYES 

I n preparation fill' the coming offensive, the Fifth Ann}' also received some 

slIlall but important reinfim:ements fill' 

mountain warfare. Two battalions of 

U.S. pack at"tillery (75-mm. p:.tck ho",it.ze rs) and two additional Itali an pack 

mule companies were assigned to the 

army. The veteran 36th Inbntry Division lay in army reserve, rec uperatillg 

from the bloody battles of the past 

winter. 

Sillce February, the L.S. VI Corps at 

Anzio had been commallded by Maj. 

Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, J L, former 

cOlllmander of the 3d In[lI1try Divisioll. 

13th Field Artillery Br i~pde . under Ihe nlmlTl3nd 

of Brig. Gen. Carl C. Hank. c\Tnluall y moved with 

the French units wh(,11 Ihe\' ktt Ita ly fi)r sotllhe rn 

France. during Operatio;l DRAGOON. From Ihe 

Mediterranea n 10 the Rhine , the brigade would 

function as the I French Corps' artillery with both 

French and American units under ilS COnirol. 

GENERAL CRITTENBERGER 

Truscott's co rps held the beac hh ead 

with five and one-half divisions: the 

British I st and :-lth, the U.S. 3d, 34th, 

and 45th In fantry Divisions, and Combat Command A ' (CCA) of the U.S. 1st 

Armored Division. In addition to these, 

Truscott had the 36t h Engineer Combat Regiment ano the I st Special Service Force, the Iau.e r an elite CanadianAmerican regiment-sized combat command composed of men trained as 

parac h utists, rangers. and commandos. 

Truscott had four of his inbntrv di\isiems in line and one in reserve ; along 

with the armored combat command. 

LL Gen. Willis D. Crirtenbcrgcr, (,()Jl1-

mander of the newly <IlTived IV Corps 

headquarters, was like his lClI()\\· U.S. 

corps commanders in Italy a f(mll e r 

cavalryman. An outstanding instnlCfol.' 

at the C.S. Army Command and GCIl-
eral Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, 

Crittenberger had also served as chief 

of staff of the I st Armored Division 

commanding general of the 2d Ar~ mored Division, and later commanding 

general of the I I Armored Corps. 

Crittenberger brought the IV Corps 

headquarters to Italy on 26 March, 

where for the next seven weeks it 

would remain in command of the 

coastal sector near Naples. Because of 

the relatively narrow army sector Clark 

would not commit the corps until June, 

when the VI Corps was withdrawlI to 

t~lke ,Pan in the Seventh Armv's operatIon 1Il southern France. 

Both Allied armies were multinational 

in their make-up. The C.S. Fifth Arrm 

reflected the w;lnilllc coalition of th~ 

Cnited States, Britain, and France. The 

British Eighth Annv \\as even more of 

a, polyglot assemblage. Serving under 

(,elleral Leese's cOll11nand were soldiers 

of sllch diverse nationalities as Polish, 

I\epalcse, Belgian, Creek, Svro-Lebanese, and Yugos\a,'. Added' to this 

variety wcre troops from the United 

Kingdoll1 and the other widespread 

members of the British COl1l1ll0n-

\\ealth-Canada, Ne\\ Zealand, South 

Africa, l\ewfiHllldbnd, India, and CnIon. There were also men from Basut;)-

land, Swaziland, Bechuanastan, as well 

as from the Sevchelles, Mauritius Rodriques, and W~~st Indian Islands.' As a 

recentlv announced cobelligerent, Italv 

also provided a few miscellaneou's 

units. ~(J 

The nunlx)weJ' strength of the Briti~h Eighth Army, in~luding the :J 

Corps, totaled some 265,371 officers 

and men. This was considerably smaller 

'" Alexander De,'fJat,h p, 4~ and App, E, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

t~an the 350,276 making up the U.S. 

Fifth Army and would help account fi)r 

the. somewhat different approaches to 

tactIcal problems on the part of the two 

army commanders. 21 

Planning the OfJemive 

The code name DIADEM given to 

the coming ofknsive of the AAI staff 

implied that it was expected to be the 

~Townillg touch to months of frustratll1g campaigning bv the Firth and 

Eighth Armies, resl~ctivelv, from Salerno and Calabria to the banks of the 

Rapido and the SanhTHl. Although the 

capture of Rome, the first of the two 

axis capitals, was one of DIADEM'S 

obvious strategic goals, the ofknsive's 

real purpose \\'as to keep as many 

German di"isions as possible engaged i{l 

Ital" as the Mediterranean theater's 

contribution to OVERLORD-the forthcoming in\'asion of norrhwestern 

France. J list bcfill'e the spring offensive 

began, Alex~lllder, in his order of the 

d;l\, \\ollid hint at this connection \\'ith 

t he words: "To us in Italv has been 

given the honor to strik~ the first 

blow." ~2 

General Alexander, with a record of 

distinguished service on the \\'estern 

front in \Yorld War I, shared the 

determination of all British authorities, 

from the Prime Minister on down, to 

avoid, if at all possible, "the costly 

"I Op('ralions of Brilish, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Part V, Sec. III; Fijth Arm\' History, 

Part V. App, B, Exan over-all, (present for dut~·) 

strength figures at allY given lime are difficult io 

determine, The ligurcs givcn arc thcrei()re nccessarilv approximate and give onlY a basis for comparison \\·ith clwmv strength ligtlH's which are also 

approxllnate, 

"" Alexander, Order of Ihe Dav, AAI, :\fav 1944. 
PREPARING FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 27 

frontal assaults which had characterized 

the campaigns of 1915-1918."2:1 It was 

logical for the Allied armies commander in Italy to opt for a strateg\' 

that would eschew the concentration of 

all his forces at one point for one 

massive onslaught against the enemy's 

lines. Instead the coming ofknsive was 

conceived of in terms of the campaign 

in l\:orth Afi'ica. Drawing upon a boxing analogy which he \\'(Htld fi'equenth 

employ in the months to come, General 

Alexander described the coming o!Tensive in terms of a one-two punch, with 

the Eight and Fifth armies thn)\\'ing the 

first punch on the southern fi'ont and 

the Fift h Army's VI Corps f()lIowing up 

with the second punch-a left hook 

from the Anzio beachhead. On the 

southern h'ont the Eighth Army \\'as to 

play the major role with a breakth[()ugh into the Liri valley, followed 

by an advance along the axis of Highway 6 to Valrnontone twenty miles 

southeast of Rome and a junction with 

the U.S. VI Corps attacking out of the 

beachhead. FrolII his reading of the 

Ultra messages Alexander knew that 

the Vaimontolle area was a potentially 

weak point in the Germans' defenses. 

The Fifth Army was, meanwhile, to 

turn the southern flank of the enemy's 

defenses opposite the Eighth Army by 

securing the Ausonia defile, five miles 

northwest of Castelforte, extending 

northward about three miles to the Liri 

valley, and then advancing four miles 

to the llorthwest, via Esperia, to the 

southern edge of the valley. 2~ 

2.1 John Ehrman, "Lloyd George and Churchill as 

War Ministers," pp. IOI-L~. in Transactio1/; oj thl' 

Royal HLltonral SO(ll'tv, Fifth Series, vol. II (London, 

1961). 

24 See General Alexander's notes for the conferGeneral Alexander evidently Intended for Valmontone rather than 

Rome to be the major tactical focal 

point of the spring offensive, as had 

been the case in the fIrst battle for 

Rome in January. Converging on Valmontone, the t\\'() Allied armies, Alexander believed, would trap and possibly 

destroy a major portion of the German 

Tenth Army. His plan to usc the Fifih 

Army resen'e, the 36th Inbntry Di\'ision,' either to reinforce the so'uthern 

fi'ont or, on short notice, to move to the 

beachhead suggests the imlx)rtance he 

attached to his "one-two punch" concepl. 2:; 

Planningfor O/Jerationl in thf Liri Valley 

For some time it had been apparent, 

not only to Alexander hut also the 

Eighth Army's stafl, that the Liri \alley 

offered the ollly terrain in the Allied 

sector where th;it Army's stqxriorit \' in 

artillery, armor, and aircraft could be 

exploited to best ad\'antage. l\[orCO"lT 

the valley offered the shortest and best 

road to central Italv and to Rome. 

Along the valley's southern edge runs 

the river which gives the valley its 

name. A tributary, the Gari, flows due 

south for nine Il~iles across the valley's 

entrance to join the Liri about a mile 

north of Sant'Ambrogio. A neck of 

land enclosed bv these t\\O rivers, 

shortly bef{)re the)' join some six miles 

south of Cassino to form the Garigliano, was called the Liri "aplxndix" by 

Allied staff officers. From the tip of the 

ellCC held at AAI headquarters Oil 2 April 1944, ill 

Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces 

in Italv. 3 Sep 43 to 2 Ma) 45, Part I, The 

Conquest of Southern Italy, App. B-1. 

2, Ibid. 
28 

appendix to the road junction of Ceprano, near the junction of the Liri and 

Sacco Rivers, the valley is about twenty 

miles in length. Forming a rather broad 

and open plain opposite the Eighth 

Army's front, the valley t,'Tadually narrows to the northwest, becoming undulating and well-wooded toward Ceprano. In the spring of 1944 the valley's fertile soil supported abundant 

crops, especially vineyards, their vegetation the more luxuriant because they 

were untended. ' 

Except for Highway 6, the RomaIlbuilt Via Casilina, which hugs the valley's northern wall, there were in 1944 

few roads in the valley suitable for 

modern militarv traffic: Communications were further hampered by the 

ability of the enemy in the flanking hills 

to observe all movement in the valley 

below. :\T umerous transverse gullies, th~ 

1110st important of which was the Forme 

d'Aquino, cut across the valley and 

would create additional problems as the 

Eighth Army advanced. 

Allied commanders had long agreed 

that the flanking high ground must 

first be seized before anv laq~e-scale 

operations could be under:taker~ in the 

Liri vallev. In a move General Clark 

had triecl during the winter, General 

Leese decided to send an attack into the 

foothills of the \ionte Cairo massif, of 

which Monte Cassino is the most prominent and best known feature, simultaneously with an attack across the Rapido to isolate and capture the town of 

Cassino. The \10nte M~~jo massif, the 

high ground south of the valley, was to 

be dealt with by the FEC, the Fifth 

Army's right flank corps. In keeping 

with British practice, Leese issued no 

operation order. Instead on II April he 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

simply gave his corps commanders a 

short directive, then elaborated his plan 

verbally in a series of command conferences between that date and D-day. 2(; 

Leese divided his attack into two 

phases, the first aimed at the Gustav 

Line and the second aimed at the Hitler 

Line. During the opening phase, the 

Polish corps was to isolate Monte Cassino from the north and northwest and 

thereby dominate Highway 6 to Etcilitate the advance of the 13 Corps, 

fighting its \\'ay south of the highway 

from the Rapido. Only after the latter 

corps had gained control of the highway were the Poles to attempt to storm 

and capture the monastery itself. While 

the Polish corps cut ofT the Germans 

defending Monte Cassino, the 13 Corps 

was to establish a bridgehead across the 

Rapido River just south of Cassino. 

Moving out fi'om the bridgehead, the 

corps was to isolate the town at the f()ot 

of Monastery Hill by cutting the highway and joining up with the Polish 

troops southwest of Cassino. Finally, 13 

Corps was to clear the town and open 

up the highway fi'om the front to the 

point of contact with the Polish corps, 

before advancing on the Hitler Line, 

the enemy's second line of defense in 

the Liri valley. 27 

In the attack's second phase the 

Polish corps was to advance f()Or miles 

westward across the Hanks of the 

26 Opnations of the British. Indian. and Domin· 

ion Forces in Italy, Part II, The Campaign in 

Central Itah. Unless otherwise indicated the f()lIowing section {s based upon this reference. 

27 The 2 Polish Corps had its origin in the 1st 

Carpathian Infantry Brigade which had served with 

distinction during 1941-42 in North Africa. Lt. 

Gen. W\achsiaw Anders, the corps' commander, 

had formed the Polish Army of the East after the 

Soviet Union had allowed the Poles to emigrate to 

Iran. 
PREPARING FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 29 

mountains north of the highway to the 

town of Piedimonte San Germano, the 

Hitler Line's northern anchor. The lO 

Corps was meanwhile to cover' the 

Poles' right flank and to feint in the 

direction of Atina, a road junction in 

the mountains about ten miles north of 

Cassino. The 10 Corps was also to be 

prepared to provide reinforcements to 

other units as the battle progressed. 

When the offensive began, the I 

Canadian Corps was to be prepared 

either to reinforce the :.mack if nee<:ssary 0/' to pass through the 13 Corps to 

exploit a breakthrough of the enemy's 

defenses. The 6th South African Armoured Division, its motor brigade detailed temp)!'arily to the 2d New Zealand Division in 10 Corps, vvas also in 

army reserve. 

To accomplish its tasks the 13 Corps 

had an armored and three infantrv 

divisions; the 2 Polish Corps, n"o in fan'-

try divisions and one armored brigade; 

and the 10 Corps, an infantry division, 

an Italian battle group (Gruppo Combattimentg) equivalent [0 about a regiment, 

an infantry brigade, and two armored 

car regiments. The Eighth Army had, 

therefore, an attack f()1'(.:e with the 

strength e(luivalent to about seven infantry and three armored divisions as 

opposed to the {()tir divisions (a parachute, a mountain, and two infantrv 

divisions) that the Tenlh Army had oPf~­

site the Eighth Army's front. This ratio 

was approximately the superiority 

which Alexander believed was necessary. 

To support its thrust into the Liri 

valley the Eighth Army had assembled 

1,060 guns of all types. About 300 of 

these were to fire in support of the 2 

Polish Corps in its assault on Monte 

Cassino. The remainder were sited in 

support of the 13 Corps sector. By way 

of comparison, the Germans were believed to have no more than 400 guns 

and rocket launchers supporting the 

units manning the Gustav Line in the 

valley. 

As the army's ;,Ittack developed, artillery recon naissance aircraft were to 

Gll: .. y out a daily average of twelve 

rnissions to provide almost continuous 

surveillance of the battle area. Once the 

offensive got under way the rnain air 

eft()rt during daylight wa~ to be directed against enemy artillery and mortar positions in the valley and in the 

Atina area north of Cassino; by night 

the aircraft wel"e to concentrate on the 

enemy line of communications. On the 

first day of the offensive tighter-bombers were to attack enemy command 

P)sts and all traffic observed behind the 

German lines. 

To direct this air support Eighth 

Army had established three miles 

southeast of Cassino on Monte Trocchio, over·looking the front, a static 

forward air control post knO\nl as 

Rover David. Fighter-bombers circling 

the general area were to call in at staled 

intervals and be assigned targets of 

opportunity, thus reducing to a minimum the time lag between a request 

for help and the response. Within the 

army the 13 Corps and the 2 Polish 

Corps were to have first priority on air 

suppm. This support would be shiheo 

to the 1 st Canadian Corps when it 

began' its exploitation role following 

the expected breakthrough of the enemv's first line of defense in the Liri 

valley. 

Developing the Fifth Anny Plan 

A chain of steep rugged peaks rising 

to heights from 3,000 to 5,000 teet, the 
30 

Aurunci Mountains facing the Fifth 

Annv extended in a northwest\vardly 

direction toward Rome and averaged 

fifteen miles in width. One side of the 

mountain chain is oounded by a narrow 

coastal corridor along the 'ryrrhenian 

Sea, the other by the relativelv broad 

Liri vallev. At th~ towns of G,~eta and 

Terracin~, respectively ten and twentysix miles from the mouth of the Garigliano River, the coastal corridor narrows 

to little more than the width of a road 

as the mountains drop abruptly to the 

sea. Elsewhere the high ground recedes 

more gradually and yields either to the 

flat, waterlogged Fondi and Pontine 

plains or to a fruitful coastal strip 

between Formia and Minturno. Inland 

are such formidable peaks as l'vlonte 

Petrella and its surrounding massif, 

whose steep sides tower hundreds of 

feet above the low-lying coastal plain. 

Yet even in these hills are to be seen 

fertile brms offering a \,,'ekome contrast to the bare rock that abounds 

else\\' here. 

Along the Fifth Annv's br len flank 

ran Highway 7, the Via Appia, the only 

really good road in the army's zone 

and its vital supply arterv. Crossing the 

Garigliano below Minturno, the highway p~lrallels the coast for about ten 

miles as far as Formia bef()re turning 

nordHvestward into the mountains to 

ltri and Fondi, respectively six and 

eighteen miles from Formia. After skirting the coastal marshes to a bottleneck 

at Terracina-a town straddling Highway 7 as it passes between the moulltains and the sea-the highway breaks 

out of the mountains onto the level 

Pontine plain and continues thirty-one 

miles to the town of Cisterna, m(;~or 

strongpoint of the German forces opCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

posing the Anzio beachhead. From 

there the road begins a gradual ascent 

of the southwestern flanks of the Alban 

Hills and thence to Rome, 

Within the Aurunci Mountains the 

wild. roadless Petrella massif presented 

the most f<mnidable terrain of all. Only 

a fe,,,, trails, created by generations ()f 

charcoal makers and shepherds, run 

along its steep slopes and through its 

narrow valleys. From the south and east 

access to th~ region by large military 

formations is virtually impossible. The 

coastal plain rises gTadually past isolated 

],vlonte Campese to the foot of the 

massie \\hich in turn rises sharply from 

the plain. East of the massif a steep 

escarpment overhangs the Ausonia corridor, through which ran a road from 

the coastal highway northward to the 

Liri valley, At the village of Spigno, on 

a shoulder of the escarpment, a trail 

ascended to the northwest , .. ith a 51 

percent grade f<)r the steepest quartermile and then curved north and west of 

\10nte Petl'ella f(x alxmt seven miles to 

a mountain basin called the Fraile. 

The massifs northern and ,,"'estern 

slopes are more accessible. A good mule 

trail led southwest from Esperia, four 

miles northwest of Ausonia, to the 

Fraile. approximately six miles away; 

and from the Itri-Pico road, a threemile trail, which the Germans had been 

improving, ran as tar as the Piano del 

Campo, a level upland plain about {()tIl' 

miles north of !trio While men and 

mules could penetl'ate to the key peak 

of the massif from several directions, 

motor movement was out of the question. A pOOl' mad cut northwest from 

the town of Castelforte to the town of 

Ausonia, north of which it joined a 

second-class road that followed Ausente 
PREPARING FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 31 

GENERALS BRANN (left) AND CLARK 

Creek from Sant' Ambrogio through Esperia to Pico and San Giovanni lncarico. From Pico there are two routes, 

one running northwest through Pastena and Ceccano and the other southwest through Lenola, Valle Corsa, and 

Amaseno. 

The German rear areas were well 

served by two lateral roads, one branching off' the coastal highway west of 

Minturno and following the Ausonia 

corridor northward some eighteen 

miles through the towns of Ausonia 

and San Giorgio a Liri to Cassino; the 

other, Highway 82, running northward 

from Itri twelve miles to Pico and on to 

the Liri valley. 

As unlikely and uninviting a picture 

as this terrain presented to the Fifth 

Army commanders and stan: to bold 

and innovative minds it would offer 

tactical and strategic opportunities as 

alluring as those more apparent ones in 

the Liri valley. This favorable development, when combined with the known 

German troop dispositions and the 

strong initiative shown by the Fifth 

Army commander within the Allied 

command structure in Italy, would have 

a far-reaching eHect on the course of 
the forthcoming spring offensive. 

As was British custom, Alexander's 

staff had drawn up the general order 

for Operation DIADEM in nothing like 

the minute detail usually found in 

American field orders. The British 

practice was to provide only broad 

operational guidelines for subordinate 

commanders. For American staffs and 

commanders such broad directives created problems. So much freedom of 

action did the British practice afford 

subordinate commanders that thev 

sometimes carried out an operation~l 

plan quite at variance with the senior 

commander's original intent. Clark, his 

staff, and his corps commanders enjoyed the same latitude in preparing 

Fifth Army's part in Operation DIADEM. 

While f<)llowing in principle the guidelines laid down in Alexander's order, 

the plan drawn up at the end of March 

by the Fifth Army operations officer, 

Brig. Gen. Donald W. Brann, provided 

room f()r significant deviations from the 

original concept. 2H 

In accordance wit h this concept 

Leese's Eighth Army was to make the 

main attack across the Rapido River to 

capture Cassino town and Monte Cassino and open up the Liri valley. The 

Fifth Army was to concentrate on an 

envelopme;lt of the Cassino-Rapido line 

from the left through the Aurunci 

\;fountains to help the Eighth Army 

accomplish its mission. Yet the Fifth 

Army staff saw in the envelopment 

maneuver an opportunity to greatly 

enhance the army's role in the offensive. Monte Majo, rather than Yfonte 

Cassino, might well become the key to a 

2M Memo, Gen Brann for Gen Clark, 24 Mar 44, 

Truscott Papers. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

breakthrough into the Liri valley. Clark, 

convinced that his neighbor on the 

right lacked sufficient aggressiveness to 

lead the Allied offensive up the Liri 

valley where the German defenses were 

strongest, was determined that Fifth 

Army should lead the way.29 

Instead of repeating the past winter's 

practice of costly frontal attacks, one 

that had cost the Fifth Army heavy 

casualties, Brann believed that the Germans' defenses in the Liri valley could 

best be unhinged by a flanking attack 

led by the FEC through the Aurunci 

Mountains south of the Liri. Thus far 

Brann's concept differed little from 

Alexander's. If as Brann envisioned, the 

U.S. II Corps, after first blocking the 

Formia corridor, would pass through 

the FEC and continue the attack on a 

narrow front toward Monte d'Oro, 

some seventeen miles northwest of 

Monte Majo, the possibility loomed 

large that the Fifth Army and not the 

Eighth Army would, as Clark expected, 

lead the way toward Rome. It seemed 

to Brann that the Eighth Army's primary role should be to maintain sufficient pressure against the defenses at 

the mouth of the Liri valley to prevent 

the enemy from reinf()rcing the mountain sector opposite the Fifth Army's 

right wing. 30 

At Fifth Army headquarters the G-3 

planning subsection, headed by Lt. Col. 

2" At the time of the original attempt to break 

into the Liri valley during the winter campaign, 

General Keves had urged that the mountain mass 

above Sant'Angelo and south of the valley be taken 

before an attempt was made to cross the Rapidc). At 

that time the suggestion was not accepted by 

General McCreery, the British 10 Corps commander. See Blumenson, SaleTrw to CasSi1W, p. 326 . 

.10 Memo, Brann for Clark, 24 Mar 44, Truscott 

Papers. 
PREPARINC FOR A :\lEW OFFENSIVE 33 

Abraham ~1. Lazar, worked out the 

details of Brann's plan. Lazar and his 

staff recognized that the main objective 

in the first phase of the attack shouid 

be Monte l\L~jo, the dominating fcature 

opposite the army's right wing ~md the 

southernmost of the two anchors of the 

German defenses across the Liri valley. 

After Monte Majo, the next objecti~'e 

on that wing would be \lonte d'Oro, 

\\hose summit would pr()\'iue observation (wer the second line of German 

defenses in the Liri valley. :31 

There \\ere several' achantages in 

concentrating on Monte M;~jo first, not 

the least of which was that German 

defenses there appeared to be less than 

formidable. Although the terrain \\as 

f()rbidding, it was just the tyIX the 4th 

Moroccan Mountain Division of the 

FEe had been trained to operate in. 

Once the French had occupied Monte 

\Lijo, they could exploit the excellellt 

obsen'ation frolll its summit over the 

Liri valley and the enemy's first line of 

defenses' there. The on~ m;~jor dr;l\\'-

back in the plan was obvious: a dearth 

of roads, which Ix)sed serious problems 

in supply and artillery support. The 

planners, however, believed that III ule 

pack trains and jeeps might suffice until 

roads and trails could be improved. :;~ 

Generals J uin and Keyes agreed in 

commenting on the drafi plan that the 

army's main effort should be made 

along the Monte \1ajo-Monte d'Om 

axis to outflank the enemy's Liri vallev 

positions. Yet bot h objected to the failure to provide fill' an advance over the 

central part of the Aurunci \1ountains, 

the Petrella massif~ and to the proposal 

:11 Filth Arl1l\ (;-:1 Plallllill~ Stud,. ~(i ~lar 44, 

:"IIi/d, 

that, once the Formia corridor had 

been sealed of{ the II Corps should 

pass through the FEe to continue the 

attack. J uin and Keyes both wanted to 

broaden the base of the Army's offensive to include a thrust ae'ross the 

Petrella massif either to open the 

coastal road (Highway 7) or to assist the 

French corps' advance toward \10111e 

d'Oro.:3:3 

Juin's chief of staff~ General Marcel 

Carpentier, conveyed this dissent to 

Brann, IXlinting out that the projected 

route of advance hum \lonte Majo to 

Monte d'Oro, one to two miles \\ide 

and served by a single road, \\'(1S too 

narrow to accommodate two corps, that 

a \\ider envelopment, including an attack through the Petrella massif as hI' 

as the Itri-Pico road, was necessary to 

outflank the enemy's deep defensive 

zones in the Liri valley. General Carpentier proposed, instead, that the FEe: 

1l100'e through the Aurunci Mountains, 

while the U.S. 11 Corps broke through 

the enemy's coastal defcnses, to 0Ix'n 

Highway 7. :l~ This modification would 

further enhance the role plaved by the 

Fin h Armv in the coming ofknsivc at 

the expen~e of Alexande~''s concept of 

subordinating everything to cxpediting 

the Eighth Army's thrust up the Liri 

\'alley. 

Tl1cse pn)Ix)sals reflected J uill 's conclusions after he re\'ie\\,cd the winter 

operations at Cassino. Only all outflanking maneuver through the mountains 

south of the Liri-an envelopment br 

"" Marl'chal Alphonse Juin, La Clltrl/lIlglll' d'II([/II' 

(Paris: Editions Crt'\' Victor, 19ti~), PI" 91-100, 

:H \1ar('(:'1 Carpentier, "Le corps expeditionnaire 

francais ell italie," RI'l'lU' de f)"/PlIII' '\'Ill/il/{a/I', Ill'\\ 

series (NoVt'lllbn I, 1945), 1', 579; JUill, La Cllm-

/)(1g11l'd'Ltfllil', 1'1',91-100. 
wider than that contemplated by either 

Alexander or Clark-would, J uin believed, f<)f'ce a German withdrawal in 

the Liri valley. The longer Juin studied 

the area in front of his corps the more 

convinced he becal1le that t he decisive 

objective for the first phase of the Fifth 

Armv's ofknsive should be the enemy's 

second lateral route of COl11m unications, 

the Itri-Pico road connecting the coastal 

highway ncar Formia with the Liri 

valley. By controlling this route the FEC 

would be able in the second phase to 

strike northward agaillst the deep flank 

and rear of the enemy forces in the 

valley, an envelopment so deep that the 

Germans would be te)rced to withdraw 

completely from the Liri vallev to avoid 

being traplxc! there. :!~) 

\'\'ith this objective in mind Juin 

recommended to Clark a double envelopment by the t\\'O Allied armies-the 

Fifih Army fi'om the south bv way of 

the AurUI~ci ;\Iountains and }~ico 'and 

the Eighth Army from the north by 

way of Atina, an important road junction nine miles north of Cassino. :11\ This 

approach was quite different from that 

originally outlined by General Alex-

~lIlder. To achieve the envelopment 

fi'om the south, Juin wanted to send his 

corps along the ~I()nte J uga-Pico axis, 

first breaking through the enemy positions at Monte Majo, then quickly exploiting along several ridges running 

northwest from i\lonte :Vlajo before 

clearing the area between Ausonia and 

Coreno to the north and the Colle di 

:\5 Jilin, La Camlmg"" d'llfllil', pp, 91-100, 

:l°,wi'moir,· rill Gl'/laal Jllill 1'1/ riall' dll -I Al'ril I Y+I 

lin /1'.1 /11 III rf,\ ojJrraliol/.l dll C.t:,F. dm/.I /1'.1 1110111,1 

,1l1rllllll. In,'''' ,Yr, 116, 11/ FFC .10111111" d" .HI/II/II' 

(annexes), I April-22 Juh 1944, vol. I, roll No, 10, 

Unless otherwise indicated, the following section is 

based upon this document. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Teto to t he south. The II Corps, 

meanwhile, would be clearing the lower 

Garigliano and opening the approach 

roads and assembly areas required for 

an exploitation through the Petrella 

massif. 

The FEC commander further cautioned against concentrating the Fifth 

Armv's efforts on frontal attacks astride 

the t\\O available roads in the arm\' 

zone-the narrow Ausonia-PontecorvoPico road and the coastal highway-fe>l' 

they were under enemy observation 

and covered by strong 'defenses. An 

advance along the roads to take the 

towns of Esperia and Formia \\'Ould, he 

warned, involve heavy fighting and "put 

us at the mercy of the enemy" regardless of Allied strength. J uin instead 

urged upon Clark a rapid push by two 

corps through the lightly defended 

moulltain sectors. This push would cut 

cnemy cOlllmunications and bypass defenses along the roads, thereby preparing the way fi)r later advances along 

them. 

To make the exploitation phase of 

the offensive across the roadless mountains, Juin expected to form a provisiOJ1a1 mountain corps consisting of the 

4th :'.1oroccan Mountain Division and 

the Tabors. This f()l'ce was to advance 

northwest ten miles fi'om Castel/i)rte to 

establish a strong base in the vicinity of 

:Vlonte d'Oro fimr miles south of Pontecorvo in the Liri yalley. From there the 

fi)rce could either attack the enemy's 

second linc of defense or, if the 'II 

Corps required help, turn south toward 

Itri and Highway 7. After Esperia had 

been cleared, thc 4th Moroccan :V1ountain Division, in company with another 

division, would attack the enemy's second linc of defense in the vici;lity of 
PREPARING FOR A J\;EW OFFENSIVE 

Pica. Gcncral Juin thus anticipatcd a 

wide envelopment of objectives, combincd with pressure along the Esperia 

road. 

Oncc cstablished around Pico, thc 

FEC could attack either t<mard Ceprano or Frosinone, important road 

junctions on Highway 6 ami seventeen 

and twenty-eight miles, respectively, 

west-northwest of Cassino. In Juin's 

opinion, his corps, if reinforced by a 

fourth division and relieved on the 

right by the Eighth Army's advance in 

the Liri valley, would be able to continue in the direction of Frosinone 

instead of vielding its Lone to the I I 

Corps as Brann L had originally proposed. Unalterably oPfx)sed to t he single axis concept, Juin pointed to thc 

confusion and lost time that would 

result if the II Corps attemptcd to 

relieve the FEC after it had reached the 

enemy's second line of defense. 

Instead J uin suggcsted that Keyes' 

corps cut the Ausonia-Formia road and 

take Spigno on the eastern edge of the 

Petrella massif. If Keyes used Spigno as 

a base for a thrust across the mountains, his corps could, in J uin 's opinion, 

bettcr assist the FEC advance toward 

the Germans' second linc of defense. In 

the coastal area the I I Corps should, 

Juin believed, fi)llow up the attack from 

Spigno by occupying and clearing 

Highway 7 and thereby opening up a 

supply route to support further advances in the mountains. 

Agreeing in principle \\"ith Juin's proposals, Keyes indicated that he would 

usc the 88th Division to makc the main 

eHim on his right. He would make a 

secondary effort with the 85th Division 

in the u')astal sector on the corps' left 

flank, 

Clark approved J uin 's and Keyes' 

recommendations, To Brann's plan fin" 

a breakthrough by the FEC over Monte 

Majo and the sealing off of the Formia 

con-idor by the II Corps, Clark added 

J uin's prorxJsals to broaden the base of 

the army's offensivc by making a t \\'0-

corps attack across the Petrella massif to 

cut the Itri-Pico road, the Germans' 

main lateral supply route, and to Illake 

a wider envelopment of their defl'llses 

in the Liri valley,:17 

While still embodying Alexander's 

concept of an envelopment of the Germans' Liri valley defenses, the Fifth 

Army operations plan, as eventually 

published, gave Clark's army a ELI' more 

significant role t han Alexander's guidelines had originally suggested, If Clark's 

forces broke through the l1Iountain 

sector south of the Liri on a two-corps 

£i"ont, as J uin and Keyes believed the\, 

would, a real possibility existed that the 

Fifth rather than the Eighth Army 

might lead the way to central Italy and 

Rome, 

This objective was of particular importancc to G"cncral Clark \\hose Fifth 

Army had lost an 0Plx)rtunitv to lead 

the way to Rome in JlIluarv when a 

combination of weather, terrain, and 

German resistance had halted the Allies 

in thc first battle fin" that city. Eighth 

Army was to play the role Fifth Arm\' 

had played then, but Clark was determined that his army would succeed this 

time, for the Eight h faced obstaclcs that 

had stalled the first dri\'e on Rome, 

\\"hile Fifth Army was no\\' concentrated 

on what had seemed to be the enemy's 

most vulnerable sector. 

:17 Interv, Mathews with Clark, 10-21 May 49, 

CMH, 
36 

Artillery and air plans in support of 

the Fifth Army called fi:)r isolating the 

battle area by interdicting roads and 

trails and destroying bridges with artillery and air bombardment. 38 Artillery 

fires were to remain normal until Hhour, when a 40-minute concentration, 

including counterbattery fire, was to be 

placed on known enemy positions and 

artillery. Fire missions for 240-mm. 

howitze'rs were to be carried out under 

corps' direction. The 240-mm. howitzers were to join medium 155-mm. guns 

in interdicting critical road junctions in 

the Itri and Pico areas. 

Besides the field artillery support, the 

Fifth Army would have reinforcing 

fires from the 8-inch guns of an American cruiser lying just offshore. These 

guns were to direct their fire against 

those targets in the coastal sector beyond the range of corps artillery. In the 

offensive's early phases the Na'vy was to 

fire interdiction missions in the Terracina area and against suitable targets 

such as the towns of Itri and Sperlonga, 

depots along the Itri-Pico road, 170-

mm. gun positions near Itri, and the 

highway between Itri and Formia. The 

naval guns were to be available on call 

at least until D plus 5 and were to fire 

a minimum of five missions of about 

100 rounds each on suitable firing days. 

Clark's modification of Alexander's 

operational concepts was manifested in 

yet another way-by an efli:)rt to revise 

air support priorities that Alexander 

had set up for the two armies. Since the 

AAI commander deemed Leese's 

Eighth Army to be making the main 

38 II Corps AAR, May-Jun 44; Fifth Army History, 

Part V, pp. 27-31. The following section is based 

upon these references unless otherwise indicated. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

effort, Alexander had divided the available air support between the two armies 

on a 70-30 ratio in favor of the Eighth 

Army. After the Eighth Army had 

initiated the second phase of the offensive by breaking through the enemy's 

defenses in the Liri valley, air su pport 

priority was to be shifted to the Fifth 

Army's VI Corps on the Anzio beachhead. Within the Allied armies, air control sections were to designate all targets. In co-ordination with the XII 

Tactical Air Command (T AC), the air 

sections were to determine the priority 

targets within each army's zone of operations. Convinced the major role in the 

eventual breakthrough on the southern 

front would be the Fifth rather than 

the Eighth Army's, Clark sought to 

persuade Alexander to split the available air support equally between the two 

armies. At a final meeting of army 

commanders on I May at Alexander's 

headquarters at Caserta-a meeting 

marked by bickering and mounting 

tension-Clark argued his point in 

vain. 3!J Alexander refused to alter the 

arrangement, insisting that there would 

be adequate air support for both armies. He even declined a mollifying 

suggestion from General Cannon, 

American commander of the XII T AC, 

that the zones of the two armies be 

treated as one front with aircraft free to 

attack targets in lx)th zones during the 

same mission. He would retain for 

himself, Alexander said, the decision to 

change the air support priorities. In any 

case he would allot air support in 

keeping with the developing situation. 40 

39 Clark Diary, 30 Apr 44; Interv, Mathews with 

Clark, 13 May 49, CMH; AAI Plan for Operation 

DIADEM, FO 1,5 Mav 44. 

40 Interv, Mathew; with Alexander, 10--15 Jan 49, 

CMH: AAI FO 1,5 May 44. 
PREPARll\C FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 37 

On one point there was general 

agreement: the offensive should begin 

at night in order to conceal movement 

of the French beyond the Garigliano 

and the British beyond the Rapido. 

Accordingly, H-hour was set fi)l' 2300, 

since the moon. fi)lll' days (i'om its last 

quarter, would ;10t I'ise l{ntil 2331. This 

would allow ff)r half an hOllr of prt'paratorv artillery fire before the inhmtrv 

beg;iIl to !Il·ove. In order to assllr~ 

adequate moonlight for French and 

British troop movements, Alexander 

had first selected 10 Mayas D-dav, {iH' 

it fell within the period of the i'ising 

moon. But when the Eighth Armv 

reported that it would not be ready on 

that day, Alexander postponed D-day 

twenlv-four hours. ~I 

At 'the I May conference, Ak:xander 

and his army commanders also agreed 

that the attack should be postponed in 

the event or threat of heavv rain. Any 

postponement, however, \\(;uk! be f();. 

ollly twenty-f(mr hours at a time, and, 

to make allowance fix allY adjustments 

a delay would entaiL would have to be 

decided bv 1000 on D-dav. ~2 

Bec;lUs~ Alexander decided not to 

designate an armv group reserve he 

rest;icted Clark's ~sc< of the 36th Division, the Fifth Armv reserve. Clark was 

to commit the 36th on Iv with Alexander's permission. l

:

l ' 

Both the decision on committing the 

36th Division and the timing of the 

41 ConI' min, I \Iay 44, AAI tiles. See al~() Fifth 

Army History, Part V, p. 23. Srandard Army Time 

(from 0200. 2 April 1944) was B Time, two hours 

ahead of Greenwich Standard Time (Z). 

42 Conf min, I Mav 44, AAI files. 

4., AAI 1'0 I. :1 !'viay 44: Lr Gt'll John Harding, 

AAI COS, Remarks at Fifth Army Commander" 

Conference, 5 May 44, Army Ren;rds Center, SL 

l~)uis, 1\-\0. 

Anzio attack, Alexander believed, 

should depend on the degree of progress the offen sive had made 011 the 

southern front. In anv case, the ;~6th 

Division was not to be ~ent to Anzio HOI' 

was the beachhead breakout attack to 

be launched until the tm) Allied armies 

had penetrated the enemy's first line of 

defense on the southenl front-the 

Gustav Line-and had demonstrated 

that they would need no additional 

strenf,>1h . tiH' an assault against the second line of defense, the H,itler Line. II 

Another bctor in the timing of the 

breakout fmm the beachhead was the 

status and disposition of Kesselring's 

reserve. Onlv after Allied intelligence 

had evidence that Kesselring had 

shifted his army group reserve to the 

support of the southern front was 

Truscott to strike. The attack from the 

beachhead was, in Alexander's view, 

"his most important weapon of opportunity, fo be launched "hen the situation ~vas fluid."4.) If this operation went 

according to plan, Alexander expected 

that the VI Corps' attack from the 

beachhead toward Valmontonc Oil 

Highway 6 would possibly block the 

route of withdrawal {(n' a large percentage of the German fc.)}·ces on the southern front and result in the destruction 

of the Tenth Anny's right wing. 41i 

Alexander was ;:n\'are during the last 

weeks bet/xe the offensive that Clark's 

strategic views differed sharply from his 

OW11. r\ evertheless, the Allied commander and his staff remained con44 luten. Mathe\\~ with Alexander, IO-lfi Jan 49, 

C:YtH. 

45 Harding, Remarks at Fifth Army Commanders 

ConI, 5 May 44. 

,,, lrllen: Mathews with Alexander, 10-15 Jan 49, 

CMH. 
vinced flut Leese's Eighth Army, after 

breaking through the German defenses 

in the Liri valley, would lead the way 

lip Higlm'ay {1 t<')ward Rome, The AA'I 

commander Ixlieved furthermore that 

at best the FEe's projected attack over 

the Aurunci \lountains would be a 

secondary and supporting eH()!,t, keeping pressure against the Germans in 

that area and preventing them from 

shifting troops to the point of main 

eff(>rt, the Liri valley, He did not count 

on the French colonial troops to break 

through readily on Monte :\1ajo or f()!' 

the II Corps to advance rapidly across 

the Petrella massif ~7 

Alexander's final operation order as 

published on :i (\lay still assigned to the 

Eighth Anm the major role in the 

offensive and sketched the Fifth Army's 

lI1ission in on" general terms, This 

ga\'e Clark and his commanders the 

flexibility they wanted in order to enhance tl~eir a~'n1\'s role as much as they 

\\ishecL Concerning the unspoken vet 

real question in e\'eryone's mind, 

namel", which army would take Rome, 

the o{'der remaine~l silen L Yet it was 

hard to see hO\\ it would be possible f(lI' 

an\' bl~! the Filth Army to oc first in 

R<;me, and it was Cbrk'~ understanding 

that Alexander expected that the prize 

\\ould fall to t he Americans,4H On the 

direction the breakout was to take, 

h()\\'ever, Alexander's order \\as quite 

clear. Attacking from the beachhead, 

the VI Corps \\as to Cllt Highway {1 in 

the vicinity of Valmontone, thereby 

blocking t1;e supply or \\ithdrawal o'f 

the enemy's Tmth Army on the southern front.' After the tw() portions of the 

" Ihid, 

'" AAI OpIlS 0 :\0, I, 5 \lay 44, ill Fifth Army 

H i,tory, Pan V, App, I, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Fifth Army linked up, the entire army 

was presumably to continue northwestward alongside the Eighth Army; f()J' 

the order outlining Operation DIADEM 

read that the Fifth Army \\'as to drive 

the enemy north of Ron~e, capture the 

Viterbo airfields fort\' miles to the 

north and the port o'f Ci\'itaw'cchia, 

then con t inue nort h\\'est\\ard up the 

narrow coastal plain, ~!' 

With the prospect of capturing Rome 

looming large in his mind, Clark displayed no inclination on the e\'c of 

DIADEM to worry about the availability 

of {()lTeS beYOl1<l the Tiber, something 

that American elllphasis on France, 

rather than Itah, would eventually call 

into question, As far as he \\as' concerned, the important thing was that 

for the first time in the Italian campaign the full resources of both Allied 

armies \\cre to be used in a co-ordinated effort, With an over-all Allied 

strength of twenty-fl\'e divisions as opposed to nineteen enemy divisions, superiority in artillery, overwhelming 

domination of the air, sufficient 1'('-

serves, and the troops rested and ready, 

the Allied cOllllllanders could vie\\ the 

prospects of the coming ofll'nsive \\'ith 

confidence. ~o 

'" Ibid, 

"" Of the 25 .'I.llied di\isiollS under Alexander's 

control, 17 wcre deploved on the main southern 

frOI1l, ,md opposing them on the same front the 

Germans had (i divisions, The l',S, \'[ Corps 

controlled six divisions on the An/io beachhead, 

and w'elT opposed I here bv eight (;erman divisions, 

On the Adriatic seclor, cast of the Central Apen· 

nines, the British Iud two divisions and the Cer· 

mails three, The Germans had one division in 

stratcg-ic re.'\tTYC and Olle in arnl~ rcscrYt:'. SOInt' 

writers point out that "hile the Allies had twcnt\· 

fi\'C divisions, the Germans had twenty·three, but 

reach the latter figure Iw adding in the four 

divisions in Arm.\' Group I'on Zanger! in northern 

Italy, units that w'ere not a\'ailahle tiJl' thc defense 

of the southern front. 
PREPARINC FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 

Cerman Prpparatiom 

In making preparations to meet an 

expected Allied offensive, the German 

armies in ltaJy \\ere left brgdy to their 

own resources. Since the increasing 

pressures agamst the front in Russia 

and the growing danger of a Cl'OSSChann~l invasion precluded any significant remforcement of Kesselring's command above the normal replacement 

flow, support from Hitler and the 

o KW \\:lS limited f(JI' the most part to 

exhortations to stand firm. The best the 

OKW could do for Kesselring \\as to 

postpone indefinitely the scheduled 

transfer from Italy t'o France of the 

Par(Jfhllte Panzer Di"'isior/ "Hermann Copring," a unit of the OK\\' resen'e 1(X'ated 

near Leghorn, well over 200 miles aW~l\ 

hum the southern front. ,-,] 

;\J.everthel.ess, .frolll \brch through 

Apnl 1944, m spite of the etI()rts of the 

~llied air forces through Operation 

STRANGLE to prevent German reinf()rcements from reaching t he front, Cerman 

troop strength and materiel in Italv had 

increas~d, though Illodesth'. Altl~ough no major units had moved into the 

t heater, the flow of replacel1lents and 

recovered \\'Olll1ded exceeded a casualty 

rate reduced by the April lull in th~ 

fighting, and the assigned strength of 

the German army units rose from 

330,572 on I \1ar~'h to 36:,),{) 16 on I 

\b\ 1944. ~2 

Cd Creiner and Schramm, cds" OKfI'lWFSt KTR 

pp, 47H-S(), This division hereafter will be r~lerred to as the Hrrmann Goering Di,/islI!n, 

~2 ~tr,ength Rpt, Stankp dn Fpldhl'Prfl, 2,~ Mav 44, 

OK It /(.tnna/ltab dfl lifl'rp,I/OrgmllwllOna/JIPilung 

(hereafter CIted as OKW/Org.Ahl,). KTB Anlagpn 5 

\Ia\ ~4-9 \Ia) 45, A stueh 01 Tpnlh and Fourlee'nth 

Armies war dlanes ehsdosed that the I April ligures 

shO\\n III the dOCUIllClltS CIted actuallv apph' to I 

\Ln, ,md thn are so quoted, All of the ligures 

, In addition to assigned strength, the 

Tenth and Fourteenth ArmiPs on I \bv 

1944 also had approximately 27,OO() 

men attached from the Lufh~affc and 

the Waffm-SS. One di"ision and miscellaneous small Luft \\affc ground units in 

von Zangen's group accounted fill' an 

estimated 20,000 more. Thus, on I \Ll\ 

1944 th,e to,tal German groun~l 

strength, IT1ciudlllg armY, SS, and Luftwaf:re ground Ullits, ~ssigned to the 

Italian theater numbered ~Ipproximateh 

412,000 men. But this time \\as scattered from the f'ronts south of' Rome to 

the Alpine passes br to the north. 

AIt hough most German units in I q44 

we~'e pl~,gued bv a shortage of' \\elltramed Junior oi1icers and noncommissioned officers, units in Italy had Yet to 

suf'fer seriously from a f,'l';)\\ing'manpower shortage af'flicting German 

forces elsewhere. Several expedients, 

suc:h as the "combing out" of merhead 

UllltS and using f()reign auxiliaries f(JI' 

housekeeping and labor duties, en~lblcd 

the C.;ermans to meet t heir man power 

reqUIrements. For these re~lsons, in 

carl\' I ~)44 OB Slleriwpst commanded 

f~)\Tes sUIX~I:io~' ill quality to the ~I\'erage 

German unit 111 other OK"V theaters of' 

operation. ;;;l 

\lineteen or the 23 di,;sions ill Kesselring's Army Croup C as of I ~b\' I ~j44 

were considered suitable fill' t hedekTlsive mis~ions they lIIight be required to 

accomplish. The German commanders 

deemed onl\' t\\O of' these divisions 

u,ed in this paragraph rckr to "assigned 'trcng1h"' 

,llld an'"t1~('rcfor(' S<lllle"hat higher thall "pre,ent 

lor duty fIgures, 

~):l Fo.r ? contel11porary cOlllparison between Tenth 

Army dl\'ISIOll' 'llld those of other CerIll'1ll theaters, 

,('e r np Rpt, 7 Apr 44, FahrhemerkungPIl dp,1 Hprrp.I 

OB Annpekommando TO (hereafter refcrrcd to as 

AOK !II, KIR 6, ,'III/figI'll I.IO-II,-J.i), 
40 

qualified f<)r any offensive miSSion, I I 

for limited attacks, 6 f<)l' sllstained defensive aClion, and 4 for small-scale 

defensive action. Thus approximately 

half of the divisions, an uIHlsually high 

proportion at that stage of the war, 

\\ere rated capable of some ofknsive 

action. ~4 

The relative quiet 011 Ihe IXlUlefronts 

in April had enabled Kesselring 10 

disengage several of his better divisions-among I hem the 26th Panzer and 

the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divislonl'-l(lI' IllOVel1}(::'1lt 10 t he rear f()r rest 

and rehabilitation. Toget her with the 

Hermann Goering Division and several 

other divisions of lesser quality that 

wcre training, fighting partisans. or 

guarding the coasts, these disengaged 

f(lrll1;ltiolls made up the general and 

theater reservcs available to Kesselring. 55 

In the disposition of his general 

resenes Kesselring had 10 consider 

three importal1l factors. First. the existence of two fronl s sout h of Rome made 

it desirable 10 place reserves so Ihat 

they could Ix quicklv shifted 10 either 

fronl. Second, thanks to dw Allied 

deception plan, so vulnerable did he 

regard the coastal sectors \lorth as well 

as south of Ihe Anzio Ixachhead that 

he believed a t1umlx~r 01 powerful and 

highly mobile units were necessary to 

back up the weak jimes guardillg that 

,.., Srarus Rpt lor I May 44, :iu.I/flwhl,,·urh/f' Ii", OB 

SUpr/W(,I/. I ]un 44. OKW/Org.ilh/. KTB f'N4. 

Since rhe location or these general reserves 

secmed 10 point to their cOlllr;litlllcnt on the 

sotllhcrn Ironl. some confusion arose later as to 

,dIet her thn \\cre ,11'1111 OJ anlll group ['esenes. 

Brit since in most cases Kesselring's or OK \,"s 

permi"ioll was n''luired lor the cOlllmitment elell 

01 units in corps reserve, the distimtio!l is unimportalll. 

CASSINO TO -rHE ALPS 

area 01 the coasL Finally. the possihilitv 

that the Allies might try to cut the ft~W 

roads Ixtween Rome and the southern 

front by means of an airhorne landing 

in the vicinitv of Frosinone, some fiftv 

miles southeast of Rome. required ~l 

division in that area. Although Kesselring made strenuous efforts to satisfy 

all thr'ee requirements, whatever success 

he achieved was hought at the cost of 

dividing some of his best divisions 

among t\\O or more widely separated 

groupS.56 

The Germans (karh had been taken 

in by the Allied deception plan. In the 

area selected b\' the Allies for their 

main dl()Jl-the Liri vallev-the enemy 

had underestimated AlIje~1 sl rengt h b) 

seven diVISions. For example, opposite 

the Xl V Panzer Corps in t he Allied 

bridge head beyond the Garigliano Gelleral Juin had managed to assemble 

f(Hlr times the l1umlxT of troops his 

adversaries had estimated to be under 

his command. On the 01 her hand, 

German intelligence credited the Allies 

with much larger resenes than the\' 

actuallv had and believed that three 

divisio;ls were in the SaIemo-'-Japles 

area engaged in landing exercises preparatory f()r another amphibious operation. Kesselring had disposed his j()rces 

on that asslimption. A minilllum number of I roops was in linc and se\eral 

reserve divisions were posilioned along 

the coast 10 counter expected landings. 

ThaI was 10 pn)\c a \ital bctor in the 

early battles of t he coming oftC-llsin'. 

\Vhilc some ground ('o111bal t mops in 

Ital, belollged to the Lufi\\;\ {ft\ as, for 

example. the Hermann Goering Di'l'i'iion, 

C;reill<T ;rlld S, hramm, eds .. OKWIWFSt, KTB, 

11(1), pp. 47~~HI: \IS # T-lb (We'tphal ft al). 

eMIl. 
PREPARING FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 

actual German air strengt h was negligible. Compared \\'ith the approximately 

4,000 operational aircraft the Allies 

could muster in Italy and on the nearby 

islands, the Luft\\afle had only 700 

operational aircraft in the central Mediterranean area. Of this number less 

than half \\'ere based in Italy.:;7 Of 

these only a small percentage would 

57 British Air Minis!n Pamphkt :!48. Thl' Hi\!' 

and FilII oj the Gam"rt Air Fora, 1<)]]-15 (London: 

Air Ministry [A.C.AS. I], 194H, pp. 265-71. 

4 J 

ever rise to challenge the overwhelming 

Allied air forces or to harass Allied 

ground movements. German air commanders were carefully husbanding 

their few aircraft for those occasions 

that might give some promise of success 

against a ne\\ Allied amphibious landing or, in conjunction with the f.,'Teater 

air strenf.,rth in Germanv and Francc, 

against the ex pected Allied ill\'asion 

attcmpt in northwestern Europe. ~)H 

:,H Ibid. 
CHAPTER III 

DIADEM'S First Day-II May 

Behind the Gennan Front 

An atmosphere of uncertainty prevailed Oil the German side of the front. 

Although German comnLlIHlcrs reminded one another dailv that an Allied attack could lX~h>1n at ;IIlY time, they 

had no specific irlfonnation, as lIas 

evidem hum the abscnce of most senior 

oUicers from the front \I'hcn the offensivc began. Only a fell" hours bcl()\"C it 

started , General von Vietinghoff, the 

Tfm th Ann)' commander, le fi f(H' Germany to receive a dccoration I(H' valor 

from the hands of his Fuehrer. About 

the same time, the chief of staff of the 

XIV Panzer CorjJs departed f(lr a \leek's 

home leave. T\I'o weeks earlier Generalmajor Siegfi'ied WestphaL Field \larshal Kesselring's ailing chief of stall 

had gone to (~Tmany on onvalescent 

leave: and General von Senger, the 

p~lnler corps cOIllIll,mder, was still ;Iwa\ 

on a 30-da)' home leave th;lt had begun 

ill mid-April. Thus the Allied ofknsive 

lias destined to strike a corps occupying 

a critical sector without its regular C01l1-

mander and chief of stall, an arlll\ 

minus its cOlllmanciing gene raL and all 

;Irlll), group without its chief or stall, an 

extraordinarv situation. I 

For the Germans the daylight hours 

on I I \1ay passed url e l'e ntful]Y ; no 

I Flrilt Flailt'\' (\-tS # R- )O ). The Ge nll" n Sitll alion 

in Ilal\, II \-Ll\-4 .June 44. copy in CMH (heredil'r <il vd ;IS MS #R-:,O [B"ilnJ), Allied kno\\lcd,l{t' 

"f Ih e Ge rlllall silu"lioll " 'as Ih ;lllks, in large 

measure. 10 Ihe inlerception ollhe Germa ll ElligllLI 

MAP 1 

prisoners IIcre uken and Allied artillen- lire lI'as sporadic, as it had bee ll 

1'01: se\'eLti cia \s. Ilea\'\' motor ll1o\'e -

ments in the Eighth Anm''s real' opposite the Tenth A rm/s left wing onl y 

Code , As a nl all(,), of LI(,( , lh,' Allies tirsl k;lrll eci 01 

Vit'(illghorrs ;Ihse n",' ;Iher inlercepling I r;lciio 

Illessage frolll Ke sse lring ordering \,il'lingh u ll I" 

relurn al olin' 10 his COIllIlLIIHI ill It;t!\" SeC' 

Willlerhothalll. rill' (jllm .'il'lll'l. PI" 114- 15, 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY-II MAY 43 

MONTE CASSINO (Allil'd IiiI'll'). 

confirmed the belief that the Allies had 

yet to complete preparations fiJI' their 

offensive. 

Monte Ca\5irw and the RaiJ/riD 

An hour bef(JI'C midnight on I I 1\:1<1\ 

the massed artillery of two Allied armies-I,060 guns o'n the Eighth Army 

front and 600 on the Fin h Armv'sopened tire from Cassino to the Tyrrhenian Sea. On the Fifih Annv {i'ont 

beyond the lower reaches of the' Garigliano the infantry di\isiolls of the C.S. 

II Corps and of the French Expeditionary Corps began mo\ing up the slopes 

of the hills leading to their objectives. 

Three-quarters of an hour later the 

Eighth Army opened its attack as the 

British 13 Corps moved t()\lard preselected crossing sites Oil the Rapido 

River. At 0 I 00, two hours after the 

Fifth Army had begun to move, the 

Polish 2 Corps attacked enemv positions 

on l\lonte Cassino. (Map 1) 

In the early hours of the offensive 

the t\\'o Polish'divisions-the 3d Carpathian and the 5th Kresowa-fought 

their separate ways across Monte Cassino's rocky flanks to capture two features: "The Phantom Ridge," sOllie 
44 

1,800 yards northwest of the abbey, and 

Point 593, high ground about 1,000 

yards northwest of the abbey. But the 

Germans, well-entrenched and long familiar with the ground, quickly recovered £i'om the preparatory artillery 

bombardment to inflict heavy casualties 

on the Polish troops. Ahel: daybreak 

exposed the attackers to enemy gunners, losses became so severe that the 

Poles were unable to withstand a series 

of counterattacks that began shortly 

after daylight. At 1400 on the 12th, 

General Anders, the corps commander, 

ordered his troops to withdra\\ during 

the night under cover of darkness to 

their line of departure northeast of 

~1()nte Cassino. Almost half of their 

number had been killed or \\ounded. 2 

Making the main attack in the valley 

below, General Kirkman's 13 Corps 

fought on through the night to establish a bridge head beyond the fogshrouded Rapido. General Kirkman 

had planned to establish a bridgehead 

west of the Rapido with the British 4th 

Division on the right and the 8th 

Indian Division on the left. After COIlsolidating a position bevond the Rapido, 

the 4th Division was to swing to the 

northwest to eflt.~ct a junction with the 

Polish mrps on Highway 6 at a point 

about three miles west of Cassino. 

On the left, the Indians \\'cre, after 

securing their bridgehead, to dear the 

so-called Liri Appendix, the tongue of 

laBd between the Rapido and Liri Rivers, then exploit northwestward to the 

Hitler Line. The 78th Division, in corps 

reserve, was to be prepared either to 

2 Operations of the British, Indian. and Dominion Forces in ltah. Part I!, The Campaign in 

Central Ital\'. l;nless otherwise illdic~lled Ihi, section 

is b:lsed UP(~11 this reference 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

cover the Indian division's left flank or 

to exploit through one of the assault 

divisions. Until the infantr\' had broken 

through the enemv's first line of defense,c the Gustav {ine, the armor (the 

6th Armoured Division and the I Sf 

Canadian Armoured Brigade, on whose 

superior numbers and firepower British 

commanders had placed great reliance) 

could be used only f(JI' fire support. 

At 2~H5, as the two inbntry divisions 

launched their assault boats, the river's 

swift CUITent swept many downstream 

and capsized others. Enemy automatic 

weapons fire, slashing through the 

dense smoke and ()g, caused numerous 

casualties and made control difficult. 

Fortunatelv the earlier counterbatterv 

fire had done its work well, for th~ 

assault troops encountered little enemy 

artillerv fire at the crossing sites. E\'en 

so, by' daybreak the corps Chad secured 

only a shallow bridgehead. 

Although the engineers began \\'Ork 

on bridges as soon as the infantry had 

reached the far bank, the 4th Division's 

bridgehead was too shallow to give the 

engineers the necessary cO\'er from ellernv small arllls fire, and at first light 

the' work was abandoned. In the 8th 

Indian Division's sector, ho\\'e\'er. ent,rineers managed to complete two pontoon bridges bv morning. With these in 

place, the Indians rushed rein forccments across 10 expand their bridgehead by late a fternoon into t he village 

of Sant'Angelo in Tiodiee, about two 

miles south of Cassino. 

The 13 Corps' gains bv nightfall 011 

the 12th were, nevertheless, disappoinring. Only 3.bout half of the objectives 

set fIX the offensive's first t\\'O hours 

wel'e in Allied hands. Yel something 

had been achieved. FOI' the first time 
DIADEM'S FIRST DA V-II MA V 45 

TERRAIN FACING THE U.S. II CORPS. Santa Maria In(antt' (iowa idi), Pulrhaina 

(rmtn /ort'ground), and Montt' Fammaa (barkground). 

the Allies had Sl',:ceeded in placing two 

vehicular bridges across the Rapido.:3 

Santa Maria Infante and the S-Ridge 

Unlike the Eighth Army, the Fifth 

Army, in DIADEM's tirst hours, had no 

deep and swift-flowing rive!" to cross 

nor, except in the French sector, high 

mountains to scale. Instead, the Americans would launch their phase of the 

Allied offensive £i'om assembly areas on 

the reverse slopes of a range of hills 

' Ibid. 

paralleling the Garigliano Rive r some 

two to three miles to the west. The 

French would actually have the advantage of attacking ii'om mountain positions west of the river that overlooked 

the German lines. For this favorable 

state of atbirs the Fifth Army was 

indebted to the success of the British 

divisions of the 10 Corps, which, in the 

previous January, had established a 

br'idgehead beyond the Garigliano extending from Monte Juga in the bend 

of the river southwest to Minturno, 

about tive miles away. 

By evening of I I' May the American 
4b 

assault units had moved into their assembly areas bctween the towns of 

Minturno and Tremonsuoli, a mile and 

a half to the wcst. An ovcrcast obscurcd 

the stars, and filg driftcd through the 

narrow valleys. All was in rcadiness. It 

was, noted the 88th Division's G--3, "a 

quiet night, nothing special to report."1 

Holding the 88th Division's objectives 

wcrc thc right flank regimcnt of Generalleutnant Wilhelm Raapke's 7Ist Light 

Infantry Division and the lefi flank regiment of Generalm~~jor Bernhard Steinmetz's 94th Infantry Division. The 88th 

Division's attack would thus strike the 

enemy along an interdi\'isional boundary, usually a wcak point in the {i·ont.;; 

)Jot only would the enemy be hit at a 

vulnerabl~ point, but the' II Corps' 

attack mlUld be backed up by massive 

artillery support. III additioll to organic 

artillery, the 85th and 88th Divisions 

would be supported by the 6th, 36th, 

and 77th Field Artillery Groups, controlling a total of nine firing battalions. Ii 

Corps artillery also \\as to execu te 

counterbatten missions and harassing 

and interdiction fire. The 36th Division 

artillery with more than three battalions 

was to'fire in direct support of the 85th 

Division, and the 6th Field Artillery 

Group, with t\\"o battalions, in direct 

support of the 88th Division. 

, II Corps G-3 Jnl, 11-12 \b\ ,H, 

c, l'nle,s otherwise indicated this account is based 

upon the official records of the H'ith ,md HHth 

Di,isions and those of the II Corps, supplemented 

h\' after·acrion intcl"\'iews \\'ith kcy participants b\ 

members of the Fift h Ann\' Historical Setlio!l. 

,; Directly under corps" control W'IS a battalion 

each of 240·mnL howittcrs and H·inch howittcrs, a 

battalion each of 1:,S·mIlL and ·1.'i·inch gUliS, four 

battalions of 155·mm. howitzers, and fi\'e battalions 

of IOS·mIlL h,,,, itzers. Fijth Army H il'tOry, Part \'. 

pp. ',6-57. Also sec II Corps Artillery AAR, 2S 

\lar-S .J ulle 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

In comparison, the Germans had 

about three battalions of light artillery 

in the Ausonia corridor west of the 

village of Santa Maria Infante and 

~lonte Bracchi, a mile to the northeast; 

three battalions of light and a battalion 

of medium artillery in the Formia corridor astride the co~stal highway; several 

batteries of dual-purposc 88-mm, guns 

ncar Itri and along the I tri-Sperlonga 

road-an equivalent total of six battalions of light and one battalion each of 

medium and heavy artillen. The enemy also had nu~erous seif:'propelled 

light caliber guns and not more than six 

rocket projectors. 7 

To counter firc from the enemy's 

long-range 170-mm. guns, corps artillery, during the night of 10 Ma\', 

moved a 155-mm, gun batten and a 

single 240-mm, howitzer across the Garigliano Rivcr and into prepared positions within 1,500 \'ards of the front. 

Throughout the I ith a hean smoke 

screcn concealed thesc nc\\' positions 

from cnem\' obscrvation. V\'hen the 

Americans ~gan thc prcliminal'\' bombardmcnt that night the\, \\'ere able to 

bring the 17()-mm. guns under effecti\'c 

countcrbatter\' fire, and so the enem\,'s 

heav\, artillc\:, \\as silent on thc fi;'st 

day (~f the off~nsi\'e, H 

From H-hour, or until the assault 

troops doscd with the enen1\, thc sixteen Amcrican battalions of light artillery were to firc Oil German frontline 

positions. Thcreafter the fire \\as to 

shift to cnemv command posts, resenes, and su pply routes. Although the 

greater weight of artillery fire su pport 

7 II Corps AI'I\ AAR, 2'i i\lar-'i .lUll 44: \IS # TIb (Westphal fI til.). 

H II Corps Arty AAR, 25 Mar-'i J un 44, 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY-II MAY 

3vaibble to Fifth Annv had been assigned to the FEC, the II Corps would 

h3ve, in addition to the fire support 

3lready described, considerable help 

available from lito 1 () May from 3n 

offshore cruiser firing 3gainst previously located targets.!) . 

As the American infantry began to 

advance toward the 94th Infantry Divi-

,lion's positions, the American ~rtillerv 

hammered the German front for an 

hour. Shells interrupted enemy comlllUnications, but had little effect on the 

German inbmry, deeply dug in. 

Making the m3in ef{(Ht of the 88th 

Division and, in cf'fect, the main effort 

of the II Corps, the 351st Infantry, 

commanded by Col. Arthur S. Champcny, moved toward the village of 

Santa M3ri3 Inbnte. After taking thc 

village and the adjacent high ground, 

the regiment was to attack across the 

Ausonia road and mount the Petrella 

escarpment. The 349th Inbntry, commanded bv Lt. Col. Joseph B. Cra\\-

ford, was to support this attack by 

taking Monte Bran'hi, overlooking 

Santa Maria Infante 3 mile to the 

northeast. Col. Jamcs C. Fry's 350th 

Infantry on thc light W3S to take Monte 

SS Cosma e Damian,1O a small hill mass 

just west of the town of Castclf()rtc, to 

advance and occupy Monte Rotondo 

and Monte Cerri, aix)Ut one and two 

miles, respectively, to the northwest, in 

order to protect the division flank. 

(MajJ /I) 

For men of the 350th Inbntrv 3Scending the slopes of Monte Ci3n'nelli, 

one of the scveral hills making up 

Monte Damiano, resistance was at first 

surprisingly light; but f()rty-five minutes 

" Ibid, 

10 Hereafter referred to as Monle Damiano, 

47 

after the attack began, when the leading battalion sought to continue beyond 

Monte Cianelli, heavy fire erupted from 

the village of Ventosa on the northern 

slope of the hill. It took repeated 

3ttacks, plus cOlllmitment of the battalion reserve comp3nv, tn gain Ventos~l 

by dawll. 

On the left, the 350th Infantry's 2d 

Bau3lion moved northward against Hill 

316, another summit in the Monte 

Dami3no hill mass. Shortly after midnight, when m3chine gun' fire stopped 

one of Company F's platoons, the platoon leader, S. Sgt. Charles W. Shea, 

continued f()r\\'ard alone to attack the 

enemy guns. Crawling up to one gun, 

hc tossed grenades into the position, 

f()rcing f(wr enemy soldiers to surrender, and then attacked a second, capturing its two-man crcw. Though a 

third gun took him under fire, he 

rushed it as well and killed all three 

Germans in the position. With these 

guns silenced, the 2d Battalion's 3tt3ck 

gathered momentum and soon reached 

the summit of Mount Damiano. I I 

.I ust before d3vlight the right flan k 

regiment of Ra3pkc's 71s/ Division 

launched a company-sized counterattack 

against the 2d Battalion on :\lonte 

Dami3no's southern slope, but the 

American inbntrymen held their 

ground. Since the 88th Division's commander, General Sloan, was anxious to 

3void exposing his right flank, he ordered Colonel Fry to halt his men Oil 

:\1onte Damiano until the French could 

take the high ground north of CastelfCJrte. 

II Shea received the firsl '''edal of ilOilOI' 

awarded in Ihe 88th Division, and \\as commissioned a 2d lieutenant. 
48 

Within thirteen hours after the bej.,>inning of the offensive, Fry's regiment 

had captured its first objective at a cost 

of two men killed and 55 wounded. 

This baptism of fire would prove to be 

the only real success along the entire II 

Corps front during the first twenty-f(JUr 

hours of the offensive. 

Nowhere across the American front 

on that first cby would the agonizing 

acljustment of a new and untried division to the challenge of combat be 

more vividlv illustrated than in the 

experience 0'1' men of the 35lst InElntrv as they attacked a well-em renched 

b;:lualion :)f the 94th Inlantry Division 

astride the road leading from \finturno 

to the regimental objective of Santa 

\!aria I nf~mte. At his headquarters in 

Minturno, the regimental commander, 

Colonel Champen)" had erected a sand 

table model of the terrain in order to 

familiarize his men with the ground 

ovn which they 'would soon fight. All 

unit commanders had reconnoitered 

the area fi'om the air and from wellsited observation points along the regimental front. One platoon leader commented that "never had an infantry 

outfit a better chance to study thOl:-

oughh the plan and terrain bef()I'e an 

attack." 12 

Although Champcm's patrols had 

probed the enemy's outposts nightly, 

the infantr\'lnen actualh knc\\ (ollsiderabh less about the disposition and 

strenbrth of the German deil'nscs thall 

thev did ;)ixmt the terrain. They had 

located several automatic \\eapOl{s emplacements, mine fields, and barbed 

wire obstacles but still lacked an ;tCCll-

'2 3'ilst Jnl' 5-3 Jnl, ]O-J2 :\1a\ +1. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

rate picture of the German positions. 

Possibly overoptimistic, Champeny expetted to capture Santa Maria Infante 

within two hours after the attack began. 

He directed his supply officer to be 

prepared to feed the men a hot breakfast in the village bef()re the v continued 

the advance toward the Petrella escarpment. 

Colonel Champen) selected the 2d 

Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Raymond E. Kendall, to lead the attack, 

while the 3d Battalion advanced in 

echelon to the right rear, and the 1st 

remained in reserve. From an assemblv 

area south of the cemetery about half; 

mile northwest of M inturno. Colonel 

Kendall planned to advance with two 

companies abreasl. One company 

would move along each side of the 

main road that leads from \1inturno via 

Santa :\1aria Infante to the road running through the Ausonia corridor 

from the coastal high\\a) to Ausonia, 

where the corridor narrows to a mile 

and a half defile bearing that name. 

The two companies were first to OCCUP\ 

twin knobs (wistfullv dubbed "Tits" b\ 

the inbnlrnnen) ~\hich flanked the 

road about '350 vards bevond the line 

of departure. th~n to continue astride 

the road into Santa .vfaria Inl3.nte. 

The road ran along the crest of a 

ridge some 125 vards wide connecting 

the base of a tI-iangular wedge of hills 

just south of the Ausonia defile \\'ith an 

apex at :\1onte Bracchi. From an Scurve near the cemeten t he road 

wound along the ridge f~)l- almost a 

mile until it reached the southern out-

'lkirts of Santa \faria InElme. where it 

f()rked. The right f()rk led northeast to 

a dead end at the village or Pulcherini, 

pen:hed high up the slope of :\fotHe 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY-II MAY 

Bracchi, while the left fork wound 

through the hamlet of Tame, a duster 

of houses about 400 yards west of Santa 

Maria Infante, and thence to a junction 

with the road running through the 

Ausonia corridor northward from the 

coast to Ausonia. 

Many spurs cutting the f1anks of the 

ridge provided the enemy \\ith excellent defensive positions against frontal 

attack. On one of the spurs, 700 yards 

southeast of Santa Maria Infante and 

overlooking a sunken road that traversed the slope, the Germans had developed a strongpoint, in a group of 

stone cottages, of well-sited and camouHaged machine guns and mortarsunfortunately not knowll to Champeny's men. in the early hours of the 

attack that position pmved a hxmidable 

and deadly challenge to the untried 

infantrymen. 

Abont 2230 the two assault companies, their movement masked by the 

roar of supporting artillery fire, moved 

beyond the ,\1imurno cemetery toward 

positions immediately in fwnt of the 

'rits. As the men advanced they laid 

'white tape to help maintain contact in 

the darkness. Apparently anticipating a 

short operation, many of the men discarded their combat packs along the 

wav. 

Company F on the left, commanded 

by Capt. Carl W. ~elson, ran into its 

first obstacle just beyond the cemetery; 

a string of concertina wire bll)('ked the 

way. Since the supporting artillery still 

kept the Germans under cover, it was a 

simple matter to cut the wire and 

continue to the base of the lett TiL 

There the company halted to await 

completion of the artillery preparation. 

Hardly had the friendlv tires ceased 

49 

when the leading platoons came under 

heavy small arms fire from an S-shaped 

ridg~ off to their lett in the zone of the 

neighboring 85th Division. Caught in 

the open under intense fire for the first 

time, the company {luickly dispersed 

into small one- or [wo-squad groups. 

Within thirty minutes after the jumpoff, Company Fs attack had degenerated into a series of poorly co-ordinated 

platoon and squad actions. One after 

another of the platoon radios broke 

down, the leaders lost contact with their 

men, and darkness and f()g shrouded 

the battlefield in a blanket of confusion 

that even bravery and good intentiolls 

were unable to penetrate. Early in the 

attack Captain l\:elSOI1 lost conllllllnication with his battalion commander and, 

aside from his command group, had 

contact at that point \\ith only one 

squad. At dawn he finally reg;lined 

control of his support and \\capons 

platoons, as well as an attached hea\'\' 

machine gun platoon. That part 0'1' 

Compam' F not ill touch with :\'elSOI1 

separated into three small isolated 

grou ps, each independenth' and fruitlessl,. seeking to press the attack, 

y{oving f(>rwanl at a trot, one group 

of approximately twent\' mell led by 

S. Sgt. Peter Pyenta soon encountered 1ll00'e barbed wire. As the men 

tried to bypass it, fire from automatic 

weapons emplaced west or the ridge 

road cut down half the group. Fighting 

back \\ith rifles and hand grenades, the 

survivors managed to sileJlce the enem\' 

guns. but with only nine mell len clIHi 

no infixmation available concerning the 

rest of the company, Sergeant Pyenta 

withdrew his men to a point about 150 

yards north of the Minturno cemeten. , ' 

1st Lt. Jack L. Panich, a platoon 
00 

leader, bred little better. Having Iilst 

control of all but olle of his squads, he 

continued to press forward west of the 

road until he came upon T. Sgt. Robert 

A. Casey, another platoon leader, who 

also had lost contact with most of his 

men. Consolidating their small f(lrCeS, 

Panich and Casey, with about ten men 

between them, continued to climb the 

slope of the ridge behind a stone wall 

that shielded them from machine gun 

fire coming from the crest. Spotting 

two of the enemy guns, most of the 

men took shelter in a large shell crater 

in order to provide covering fire while 

Lieutenant Panich along with fiHn men 

crawled toward the guns. Reaching an 

open communications trench, apparently connecting the machine gun positions with the crews' sleeping quarters, 

Panich and his mcn hurled grellades 

until their supply was exhausted. 

Still the German guns fired. The 

engagement \\as at an impasse until 

Panich, learning that Casey (in command of the covering f(H'ce) had been 

wounded, was prompted to withdra\\'. 

Leading his own and Sergeant Casey's 

men t(~ward the rear, th~ Lieuten~;nt 

came upon Sergeant Pyenta and his 

small group ncar the cemetery. They 

joined forces, and, carrying their 

wounded, both groups withdrew to the 

company's f()nner assembly area behind 

the cemeterv. 

A third group led by 1st Sgt. Paull\'. 

Eddv came under several short rounds 

of s~pporting artillery fire and ran into 

brief fire fights with individual enemy 

skirmishers along the road, but continued to advance until halted by machine 

gun fire, apparently from the same 

guns that had stopped the other two 

groups. Failing to silence the guns with 

rifle t,'Tenades, the infantrymen dug in. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

There they vainly awaited reinf(JI'Ccments until night came again on the 

12th, when they too withdrew to the 

vicinity of the ce;netery. 

Captain Nelson, with about 100 men 

he had assembled, had, in the meantime, managed to slip through the 

enemy's defenses west of the road more 

by accident than design. Screened by a 

stone terrace on the west slope of the 

ridge, I\'elson and his men continued to 

move t<Jrward, despite brief delays (KCasioned bv machine gun and mortar tire. 

i\'elson himself knocked out one machine gun position \\ith a rifle grenade, 

and his men captured two mortars and 

overran fifteen half-dressed enemv soldiers in their dugouts. By da\\'Tl (;f the 

12th, Nelson's small t(lrce had reached 

Tame, the cluster of houses about 400 

yards west of Santa Maria Infante. 

There i\'elson and his men established 

a strongpoint based on a culvert under 

the main road leading from Minturno 

to the Ausonia corridor. 

Company E experienced similar confusion and dispersion \\'hile advancing 

on the right of the road leading into 

Santa Maria InEmte from ylinturno. 

Two of the company's platoons, followed bv Colonel Kendall, the battalion 

coml11al~der, and his command t,'TOU p, 

climbed the forward slope at the right 

Tit and occupied t he crest against 

short-lived resistance. The platoon on 

the right advanced rapidh' through 

grain fields fiJI' about ISO yards to the 

sunken road traversing the slope of one 

of the spurs 'cutting the flank of the 

ridge. Crossing the road, the inbntrymen deployed as skirmishers and assaulted over the crest of the spur; but 

machine gun fire from both flanks 

drove them back to the shelter of the 

sunken road. 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY 11 MAY 

On the len two squads of the other 

platoon, which had lagged behind, also 

sprinted forward and gained the sunken road. Moving cautiously, the two 

squads continued to within seventy-five 

vards of a house near the crest of the 

spur, when a machine gun opened fire 

from the house and forced them to 

halt. 

The third squad. separated from the 

rest of the platoon. rall into mortar fire 

on the f()]'ward slope of the Tit. The 

men took cover until Capt. Robert K. 

Carlstone, the Company E commander, 

arrived and urged them t(j}'\\ard, Although wounded by a shell burst 

short Iv after his arrival, Carlstone refused' e'vacuation until he could alTange 

for supporting artillery fire and turn 

the company over to the weapons platoon leader, 1st Lt. Harold Y, ylcSwain. 

As :Y1cShain assumed command of 

O;mpany E, Colonel Kendall, disturbed 

at the company's lack of progress, arrived on the t(u'ward sloIx of the light 

Tit. Striding upright among men \\ho 

were crouching behind any shelter they 

could find, Colonel Kendall prodded a 

few of them good-naturedly with his 

swagger stick. "Corne on, you bastards," 

he called out, "vou'll never get to Rome 

this way:"~ 1:1 The verv presence of 

Kendall"':'-a tall, strappi;lg ligure-\Qs 

enough to get the men moving again, 

Calling for more artillery fire on the 

crest of the spur, Kendall ordered his 

reserve company forward to join Company E. 

Taking over direction of the attack, 

Lieutenant McS\~'ain led Company E's 

support platoon to the sunken road, 

where he established contact with the 

1:1 Sidnn T. "blht'ws, Fifth Army His Sec, 1944, 

Combat I";tCTvicw, C\II-I; 35 ht In! AAR. 

51 

platoon about 150 yards to his left,' But 

after a survev revealed a confused 

situation, he d~cided to reorganize his 

force before continuing. As the men 

waited under the intermittent glare of 

enemy flares, and as mortar fire and 

grena~les shattered the ground around 

them, the moon broke through the 

overcast to illuminate the hillside with a 

pale light. 

Learning that the attack had stalled. 

Colonel Kendall this time personally 

took command of the company. After 

requesting tanks to support the 2d 

Platoon advance along the main road, 

he himself led the 1st Platoon against 

the enemy's positions, apparently based 

upon houses on the crest of the spur. 

As the lead squad of the 1st Platoon 

clamlxred over a stone wall and started 

to move toward the westernmost of the 

three houses, machine gun fire cut 

down all but three ('1' the twelve I11cn. 

The three survivors sC'(lmbled back to 

the sunken mad. At the same time a 

second squad led by Kendall plodded 

up the slope toward the second house, 

the men firing as they advanced. Kendall successively fired every wcapon he 

could lav his hallds on-(I carbine, an 

M I, and a bazooka. When his third 

bazooka rocket struck the hOllse, he 

urged two of his men to charge the 

position. But again a machine gun 

opened fire, apparently from the 

house, Both men scrambled f()J' cover. 

At that point Kendall, calling on the 

rest of his men to f(}llow, dashed f()rward, He personally destroyed the enemy gun and killed two of its crew 

while the survivors fled across the crest 

of the hill. As Kendall paused for a 

moment to hurl a grenade into the 

position, another enemy machine gun 
52 

opened fire. Kendall fell mortally 

wounded, but as he did so he clutched 

the grenade to his body to prevent it 

from harming his companions. Kendall 

was dead, but the survivors of the 1st 

Platoon and a few men {i'om the 2d 

and 3d Platoons at last had a precarious 

f()othold on the spur. 14 

When word of the battalion commander's death reached M;;~j. Edwin 

Shull, the battalion executive officer, he 

assumed command and also moved 

forward to where most of Company E 

was dug in alxlVe and below the sunken 

road. After trying in vain to get the 

men moving again, Major Shull called 

for additional artillery fire on the objective and waited for new instructions 

from the regimental commander. 

Since the attack had opened up, 

Company £ had lost 1-\9 men killed or 

wounded, roughly half of its starting 

strength. One enemy machine gun on 

the spur had been destroyed, but the 

accurate fire of about nine others still 

kept most of the men huddled in the 

cover of the sunken road. 

The tank support requested by 

Kendall failed to arrive until 0300. 

when a platoon of five mediums from 

Company C of the supporting 760th 

Tank Battalion reached Company £'s 

!eh Hank. After a mine disabled the 

lead tank. the column halted behind the 

left Tit. An attempt 10 get the tanks 

moving again failed when the second 

tank also struck a minco A third efhHl 

to get the tanks forward callle to 

naught when another mine disabled yet 

a third tank. At 0:")00 Champeny re14 For this action Colonel Kendall was poslhu~ 

mousil awarded the DSC. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

quested division headquarters to send 

him another platoon of tanks. 

Until the additional armor arrived, 

Colonel Champeny ordered Company 

G (2d Battalion's reserve), assembling 

behind the right Tit in response to 

Kendall's earlier order, to reinforce 

Company E. Although Company E 

commander, 1st Lt. Theodore W. 

Koon. J 1'., led his men as far as the 

sunken road, ",.hen they tried to storm 

the enemy positions b~yond, machine 

gun fire from the westernmost house 

on the spur brought them to a halt. 

Lieutenant Noon nevertheless rallied 

his men and returned to the assault. 

With one platoon he sought to envelop 

the enemy from the left, but even 

though his men advanced to within 

thirty yards of the house, they too were 

f(m:~d to fall back to the sUl~ken road. 

Noon then tried to kn(xk out the gun 

himself. \Vith two of his men providing 

covering fire, he rushed the house. 

Hurling grenades and firing his pistol 

point-blank at the enemy position, Lieutenant Noon destroyed the gun, but not 

bef()re the two men covering him were 

killed. Noon then withdrew to the sunken road. 15 

As daylight neared it was evident that 

the 351st Inbntrv's attack had f:1iled to 

make significant headway toward Santa 

Maria I nbnle. About ninety men from 

Company F were on the 'outskirts of 

Tame but were confined to a sIllall 

perimeter around the ("uh'CIt and posed 

no serious threat to the Germans. Except for that group none of Champeny's units had been able to breach 

the defenses astride the Minturno road. 

Shortly bef(xe daybreak, to get the 

IC, For this anion 1\OOIl was awarded the nsc. 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY-II MAY 

stalled attack under wav, Colonel 

Champeny ordered his reseI:ve battalion 

(commanded by Maj. Charles P. Furr) 

to move along the wesr side of the 

Mintumo road, pass through Company 

F, and envelop Santa Maria Inbnte 

from the left. 

With Company K leading, Major 

Fun's battalion advanced beyond the 

left Tit, but there it came to' a halt in 

the bce of ubiquitous German machine 

gun fire. Furr then ordered Company I 

to swing further to the left in an effort 

to en velop the German defenses. He 

ordered Company K to regroup and 

support the envelopment with a renewed frontal assault. 

Inf(xmed that elements of rhe H5th 

Division on his left had by that time 

occupied the S-Ridge, Major Fun anticipated little difficulty from that direction. Yet hardly had Company I begun 

its maneuver when the tragic inaccuracy 

of the information became apparent. 

Machine guns from the S-Ridge joined 

with guns to the fronl, as well as a 

bypassed machine gun somewhere 

along the road to the battalion's right 

rear, to strike Fun's companies from 

three directions. Again the attack 

ground to a halt. 

The regimental commander realized 

at that point that until the enemy's 

positions on the S-Ridge were destroyed, any attempt to envelop the 

German defenses from the left was 

doomed to failure. The nature of the 

terrain and divisional boundaries precluded a wider envelopment maneuver 

from the left; therefore when Colonel 

Champeny asked permission to divert 

his attack to take the crest of S-Ridge 

his request was denied. A staff officer 

at division headquarters assured him 

53 

rhat the 338th Infantry of the neighlx)ring 85th Division would soon take 

the ridge. Unfortunately that regiment 

was having as much difficulty on the 

slopes of the S-Ridge as was rhe 351st 

bef(xe Santa Maria Infante. 

At that point Champeny called on his 

attached tank company to help smash a 

way up the Minturno road. Working 

throughout the rest of the night, the 

regimental mine platoon by daylight 

had succeeded in dearing I he road to a 

point just beyond the Tits. Around 

noon a second platoon of five tanks, 

advancing along the road, destroved 

two machine gun positions, but when 

the tanks tried to continue their advance, concealed antitank guns, firing 

from the outskirts of Santa Maria Inbnte, knocked out three and f(m:ed rhe 

others to withdraw behind the Tirs. 

Several hours later a third platoon of 

tanks also attempted to force its way 

further along the road, only to encounter a similar bte. Concentrated fire by 

the guns of the 9l3th Field Artillery 

Battalion on the suspected icx.-atioll of 

the German guns alxmt 700 yards east 

of the town likewise bilcd either to 

destroy the guns or to drive the Germans from their positions. 

At the culvert near Tame, meanwhile, the Germans at the first light of 

day on the 12rh discovered Captain 

Nelson's small f()l"ce and quickly surrounded it. Throughout the day a 

beleaguered Company F fought back, 

its ammunition rapidly dwindling. At 

one point enemy self-propelled guns, 

advancing along the road from Spigno 

toward Tame, pounded the company 

with point-blank fire. All appeared lost 

until American arlillery observers, soaring alx)Ve the battlefield in small obser-
54 

vation aircraft, slx)tted the German vehicles and, with well-directed fire {i-OIH 

the supporting artillerv battalion, destroyed two and drove the rest to cover. 

Although the immediate threat to 

Company F was thus removed, as the 

hours passed the siwariol1 of the besieged force at the culvert worsened. Bv 

nightbtll on the 12th j()(){i and ammunition were virtuallv exhausted, and 

Captain Nelson recei~ed an order from 

Major Shull to \\ithdraw after dark to 

the vicinity of the l\linturno cemeterv. 

Nelson a'greed to tn but doubte'd 

\\'hether he could do it. On that despairing note Nelson's radio leIl silent. 

Shortly ahcl' sundowll several enemy 

soldiers ;1pproached the culvert p()sitiol~ 

shouting "kamcrad." Not suspecting a 

ruse, :'\e\son's Illen scrambled from 

t heir shelter to accept their sLlrrendel'. 

Suddenly, from all sides German soldiers closed ill. Except t<)r fiye men 

\\'ho feigned death in their foxholes, 

the encircled Illen slllTeJl(iered. That 

action effectively liquidated [he 351st 

In Lmtn's only penetration of the German front. Despite heavy supporting 

fire-t he 913t h Field Artillery Battalion 

alone had fired 4,268 rouncls-t he enemy at nightbll on the 12th still held 

Santa :Ylaria InLlIIte. 

As w;}s evident from the German 

automatic weapons fire hom the SRidge that had plagued the troops of 

the :i51st Inbntry c1ul·jng the assault on 

Santa :'1aria lnbnte, men of General 

Coulter's 85th Division on the left \\ing 

of the II Corps also heed determined 

resistance. Corps had ordered Coulter 

to capture the high ground (}vedooking 

the Ausonia corridor on the corps' left 

\\ing. Immediate objectives were the SRidge, the southern extensioll of the 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ridge on which Santa Maria Infante was 

located: San Martino Hill, an isolated 

rise just north of the Capo d'Acqua 

Creek about 1 hree-quarters of a mile 

beyond the American forward positions: and the Domenico Ridge, rhe 

latter a group of low hills to the south 

of the Sail :'lartino kature overlooking 

the village of Scauri and the coastal 

highway. Control of the latter ridge 

would give the Americans terrain dominating the junction of the coastal highway and the road running through the 

Ausol1ia corridor, the enel1l\''s first lateral line of cOl11municatiOl;s and the 

road toward which the MinturnoSanta Maria Infante road led. 

On the 8:'1th Diyision \ left wing Col. 

Brookner W. Brady's 339th lnbntrv, 

attacking with three hattalions in line (in 

resene, a fourth attached from Co!. 

Oli\'er W. Hughes· 3~nth Infantrv), 

advanced to\\'ar~i Sail :'1artino Hill a;1d 

the Domenico Ridge. Antipersonnel 

mine fields and heavy fire from wellplaced enemv automatic \\'eapons made 

the going slow from the start. The best 

Erath"s infantr\'lnen could accomplish 

\\'as to win tenuous f()otholds on the 

100\'er slopes of their objectives. IIi 

On the 85th Di\'ision's right wing the 

338th lnbntn, commanded by Lt. Col. 

Alfred A. Saf~l\, was to capture the SRidge, whose tcrraccd sides were dotted 

with isolated stone cottages and an 

occasional grove of olive trees, \\ith the 

1<; During Ihis actioll 1st Ll. Robert T. W~lllgh of 

Company G led his platoon in an ;;ssault against siJo. 

eneIllY bunkers, Lieutenam Waugh adyanced alone 

;;gains! the Illst bunktT. thre\\' phosphorow, gre, 

nades into it. and thell killed the detenders as they 

;;trempted to fke, He repe,lted this pron:dure widl 

the remaining bunkers, For this .!Ilel subsequcllt 

gallantry ill dl(' offensive. Lieutenant Waugh "as 

3\\3rcled the 'vledal of HOllor. 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY-II MAY 

village of Solacciano perched on the 

ridge's seaward nose. Under cover of 

the artillery preparation, Safay's regiment began moving toward the S-Ridge 

at 2300 with two battalions abreast. 

The I st Battalion on the right, commanded bv Maj. Vernon A. Ostendorf, 

struck at Hills 109 and 131, the latter 

the most imposing height along the SRidge and the site of the machine guns 

that later were greatlv to plague the 

neighlxwing 351 st InL:lI1trv in the attack 

against Santa Maria InLtnte. For the 

first two hours the two lead companies 

ad vanced through oli ve groves and 

grain fields up the southern slopes of 

the S-Ridge until halted midway to 

their objectives by a combination of 

antipersonnel mines and automatic 

weapons fire. Although one platoon 

from each company briefly gained the 

crest, they were pinned down there by 

hea vy fire. Unable to get rein forcements forward and aware that the 

platoons could hardly hope to hold in 

the event of counterattack, the company commanders ordered withdrawal 

halfway down the forward slope. 

On Major Ostendorf's left, the 3d 

Battalion, commanded 1)\ Lt. Col. William Mikkelson, encount~red a growing 

volume of fire while advancing toward 

the village of Sobcciano and high 

ground just east of the village. Experiencing their first hostile fire, the two 

lead companies advanced cautiously 

and slowly throughout the night. At 

daylight the battalion reached the outskirts of Soiacciano where hea\')' automatic weapons fire f()rced a halt. During the day the 3d Battalion fought its 

way into the village to seize two houses, 

but even that limited gain came at a 

high price. By nightfall Mikkelson could 

muster only 200 effectives to defend his 

forward position at Solacciano. 

Like Colonel Champeny's men on the 

right, Colonel Saby's inbntry, in spite 

of heavy artillery fire support, had been 

stalled by well-entrenched automatic 

weapons fire. Because these weapons 

had neither been silenced nor wrested 

from the Germans, Safay's men had 

little more to show for their first day of 

battle on the slopes of S-Ridge than had 

Colonel Champeny's in their approach 

to Santa Maria Infante. 

The 349th Inbntrv, which General 

Sloan had held in res~rve on Hill I Wi, 

about 1,600 yards northeast of \linturno and overlooking the Ausente 

Cree k, had early on 12 Mav sent its 1st 

Battalion to oc~u py first phase objectives on the forward slope of the Casale 

Hill, some 1,200 yards southeast of 

Santa Maria Infante. There the battalion would remain until the afternoon of 

the 14th, when it again moved f()rward, 

this time to occupy Monte Bracchi by 

nightfall. 

Evervwhere the Germans had held. 

The fighting had hurt them severely, 

but as the first day ended this fact was 

hardlv discernible to the Americans. 

The massive artillery support of the 

I I Corps' attack had taken a sharp toll. 

When, f()r example, General Steinmetz, 

commander of the 94th Division, attempted to reinf()rce his troops on San 

Martino Hill with a company from his 

reserve, American artillery fire cut the 

company to pieces while the troops 

were assembling for their approach 

march. The heavy artillery fire had also 

played havoc with the enemy's line of 

communications between the division 

rear area and the front line, virtuallv 

isolating one from the other. Though 
that left w hat was essentially only a thin 

crust of resistance, it was one that 

proved remarkably tough in the face of 

renewed American assault the next day. 

With the coming of daylight on the 

12th, Allied fighter and medium 

fighter-bombers, according to plan, began a daylong attack against enemy 

headquarters, lines of communications, 

and supply dumps in an effort to 

complete the isolation of the battlefield 

begun earlier by Operation STRANGLE. 

Artillery spotter and control aircraft 

wcre especially effective throughout the 

day in locating enemy batteries and 

directing both friendly artillery and 

tactical bombers against them. Even 

Kesselring's and Vietinghoffs headquarters came under attack. Allied 

planes destroyed the Tenth Army field 

headquarters in the first hours of the 

offensive and severely damaged Army 

Grou/) C's command post ncar Frascati 

in the Alban Hills south of Rome. 1 i 

The Capture oj Monte Majo 

General Juin envisioned the role that 

his French Expeditionary Corps would 

plav in the early stages of the Allied 

offensive as participation in a series of 

three battles, to be fought in several 

phases and all aimed at eventually turning the enen1\"'s second major de'fensive 

line south of Rome, the Hitler Line. 

The first objective \\'as a breakthrough over the \10me \bjo llIassif to 

"in f()otholds on the massifs t\\'o parallel ridges. J uin expected his troops to 

capture ivlonte l\L~jo within the first five 

hours of the offensive. 'I '0 protect the 

right flank of this thrust, the French 

would, as a preliminary action, have to 

17 Cran'n and Cate. cds .. AAF III, p. 3R7. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

drive the Germans from relatively 

strong positions on the high ground 

overlooking the axis of attack. The high 

ground consisted of three terrain features-Cerasola Hill, Hill 739, and 

Monte Garofano--rising from a high 

plateau named :'v1assa di Ruggero. 18 

General J uin planned to exploit a 

breakthrough in the Monte :'v1ajo massif 

with drives along parallel northwestrunning ridges to seize the Ausonia 

defile at the northern end of the Ausonia corridor. With that defile in hand, 

Juin expected to turn his corps westward toward \lonte Fammera, northernmost summit of the Petrella massif. 

\1onte Fammera would provide the 

needed foothold f()r an advance deep 

into the massif. 

The objective of the second battle 

was to be a blocking action cast of the 

town of Esperia, and included the capture of the town and nearby Monte 

d'Oro, a dominant height overlooking 

the Liri valley. If successful this operation would sever communications between the XIV Pam.J'r Corps and the LI 

Mountain Corps, the latter opposing the 

British Eighth Army at Monte Cassino 

and in the Liri valley. 

In the third battle, Juin planned to 

send his forces first against Monti del 

Montrono and della Commundo, overlooking the road junction of Pontecorvo 

ill the Liri valley. From there he would 

be able to sen~l a column northwestward to envelop the town of Pico, 

another road junction on the Germans' 

second lateral route of communications 

between the Tvrrhenian coast and the / 

Liri valley. Meanwhile, a provisional 

1M C.E.F., i'-Ial 'W"ior, Mrmo;rrs <1u A"TiI (24 Apr 

44). IJ/{'!I' Xr. 117, The f"l\owing paragraphs are 

based upon this document. 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY- II MAY 

TERRAIN IN FRENCH CORPS SECTOR SHOWING CASTELFORTE AND MONTE MAJO 

(hackground), 

corps under Nr~j. Gen. Francois Sevez 

was to approach the to\,'n from th e 

southeast. 

Judging it to be best qualified for the 

demanding requirements of mountain 

warfare, General Juin selected Maj. 

Gen. Andre W. Dody's 2d Moroccan 

Division to spearhea d the thrust 

through the Monte \1 o massif. Gene ral Sevez's 4th Moroccan Mo unta in 

Division, recently arrived in Italy from 

occ upatio n duty on Corsica , was to 

attack on Dody's right but minus a 

substantial portion of its inbnrry, which 

J uin brig-aded with General Guilla lime's 

goumiers to form a provisional mountain corps unde r Gene ral Sevcz. C pon 

this task f()rce J uin placed the main 

burden of the drive west from Monte 

Fammera and t()\\'ard the enenw's second lateral communications r;)ad , a 

drive to be launched once Dodv's Moroccans had capt urcd the Auso'nia detile. In all three battles, enemy stmngpoints were to be bypassed wheneve r 

possible in orc\c r to maint~lin the momentum of the attack and to sustain 

and ex ploit the surprise that Juin expected to gain at \1onte M~jo . 

Juin's G-2 knew that the left. wing of 
XIV PZ CORPS 

• 

12 "'0 

MAP 2 

FEe 

C 11-13Mo), 1944 

APTURE OF MONTE MAJO 

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125:12 Nor 

cBb-;;: \~ ~." ioIolO"ud 

\ \, 

• I 

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@~ 4~Cf '" MIn........ 10""~ ...... 

5'" "0.0«0" ~ronl. 12 "' •• t ...... I."". 10 

H.r",,,,·nt,, ..... 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY II MAY 

Senger's XIV Panzrr Corps stretched 

from the Ausonia corridor across the 

Monte Majo massif into the Liri valley. 

In the mountain sector rhe corps fnmt 

was thinly held by the 7ist Division. 

under the cOl11t;land of General 

Raapke. This was a light inbntrv division with a strength of 10,000 men, 

supported bv eighty artillery pieces. a 

few Italian assault guns, and a dozen 

self-propelled antitank relativelv small t()rce \\' hen com pared with 

Juin's corps of approximately 90,000 

men. Some thirty miles to the rear 

Senger held about f()ltv tanks as part of 

his corps reserve. 

Interrogation of a German noncolllmissioned ofticer captured a week befixe the offensive revealed that a few 

miles behind the Gustav Lille Senger 

had directed preparation of a s\\itch 

position that he designated the Orange 

Line. Actually, existence of the li,\e 

proved later to have heen limited 

largely to operations maps. Extensive 

aerial reconnaissance also disclosed that 

the enemy had virtually no defenses 

along th<it part of th~ Hitler Line 

extending through the Aurunci Mountains southwest of the village of Sa nt' 

Oliva, about three miles south of the 

mad junction of Pontecorvo in the Liri 

valley. It appeared that Kesselring expected to rely upon the formidable 

mountains themselves as constituting a 

sufficient barrier. 

In dal'kness, ftll' the moon would not 

rise for another half hour, the inbntrvmen of the 2d Moroccan MountaIn 

Division heg-,l11 moving at 2300 011 11 

Mav from their assemhlv areas on 

Moilte Juga toward assault positions on 

the eastern slopes of the :vfollte M~jo 

massif: there to await completion of the 

I:xmlbardment of the enemy's poslllons 

in the f()rhidding heights br above. For 

the next half hour the Moroccans 

waited while shells from some 400 

guns, including those of the C.s. 13th 

Artillerv Brigade, smashed into the 

rocky slopes.11! 

A week earlier Allied regis! ration 

tires had prompted the German commander, General Raapke, to move most 

of his artillery into alternate positjons so 

that the Allied guns inflicted k>\\ losses 

on his batteries. Dispersed ill "ell-cO\-

ered dugouts alld too close to the 

French lines to be hit bv the ;lrtillery, 

Raapke's infarunmell ,~lso remaine'd 

virtually unscathed by the pl-epar:llOry 

fire. As Oil the II Coq)S front. the 

principal dket of t.he Allied fire was to 

disrupt wire communications and isolate 

scattered inf~mtry positions, 

During the first two hours of the 

attack, the ~foroccan inbntrymen 

f()ught their way to within 3()() vai-ds of 

the summit of Monte Ornito, a 2,O()Of(lot peak about two miles soulheasl of 

Monte ~1ajo. the division's objectivc. 

The l\foroccans had just reached thcir 

new positions when IOGII resenes of the 

7Ist Di,!i.lion's 19Ist Grfnadin Rl'f.(imI'll t 

counterattacked. (lHap 2) 

Failure of tilt:' artillery to make punishing inroads on the enemy inbntr,. all 

too soon became apparent. AI! hough by 

midmorning of the 12th a regiment of 

the 2d Moroccan Ytountain Division 

f()Ught its way to the crest of Monte 

Faito, a mile and a half southeast of 

'" In thi, account the aUlhor has drawn upon two 

sources: Sidne\ T, Malhews, "The Fn:lIlh in the 

Drive on Rom~:' prepared in CMH for puhlicarion 

in Fratamtl' d'Annl'.1 Frrm(o·AmPriminl', a special issue 

of the ReVILl' Hi.I/()riqUf dF /'/frmfl' (Paris, 1957); and 

.Iuin, La Cam/Jagrle d'/talil", pp. 101-12. 
60 

Monte Majo, with light losses, the 

troops were still over a mile short of 

Monte M~jo, which General Juin had 

confidently expected to take within the 

first five hours of the offensive. What 

\vas more important, German defenders had thwarted a supporting attack on 

the right aimed at the high gmundCerasola Hill, Hill 739, and Monte 

Garoiano--overlooking the route the 

:vIoroccans would have to take from 

Monte Faito to Monte \faio. 

Despite the f:lilure to take the high 

ground indispensable f()r a successful 

attack on Monte Majo, the division 

commander, General Dodv, tried to 

resume the advance toward" the objective. Yet hardly had the men begun to 

move when fire fi'om the heights on 

the right brought them to a halt. 

Still determined to press on, General 

Dody ordered a regrouping, but bef()re 

the men could move out again, a 

German battalion, reinic)I'ced by troops 

earlier driven off Monte Faiw, counterattacked. Only with the help of massed 

artillerv tire were the Moroccans able tu 

repulse the threat, but the anion left 

them too disorganized immediately to 

renew their attempt to lake Monte 

Majo. 

Although Generalmajor Friedrich 

WentzelL chief of staff and acting commander of the Tenth Army in General 

von Vietinghoff's absence,' and General 

der Artillerie Walter Hartmann, acting 

commandeI' of the XIV Panzer Corp~ in 

Senger's absence, inf(Jrmed Field Marshal Kesselring of the unexpected severity of the French attack against the 

Monte Majo sector-unexpected, because the Germans had no idea of the 

size of Juin's force assembled in the 

bend of the Garigliano-the army 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

group commander remained convinced 

that it was nothing more than a supporting operation for what he considered to be the main Allied eff()rt in the 

Liri valley. entil Kesselring determined 

that this was not so and that there was 

to be no amphibious landing on his 

Tyrrhenian flank, he would refuse to 

authorize commitment of reserves to 

shore up the 7ist InFantry Dhlision's 

sector. The best he would' do was to 

authorize the movement of two reserve 

battalions into supporting positions behind the 94th and 71th Di'visions' sectors. 

He retained f()}' himself, however, the 

right to say w hen either of the battalions might be committed. General 

Raapke, Kesselring insisted, should create additional reserves bv the familiar 

expedient of thinning o~t less threatened sectors. Hartmann saw no alternative, therefore, to ordering the 71 st 

Divi'iion commander to use his reserve 

battalion of panzer grenadiers, lL was 

that battalion whose counterattack had 

just thrown the Moroccans off balance. 20 

It seemed at this point that the 

French attack had stalled because of the 

same kind of resistance encountered bv 

the U.S. II Corps on their left and b} 

the British 13 Corps on their right. The 

failure to take the division objective as 

planned could be attributed directly to 

the failure to control the high ground 

on the right of the corps zone of 

operations. 

To revitalize the attack, General 

Dody proposed to the corps commander that he take advantage of the 

coming darkness to move on Monte 

\fajo without first clearing the high 

ground. General Juin rejected this pro20 MS # R~5() (Bailey), CMH, 
DIADEM'S FIRST DAY-II MAY 

posal, for he was convinced that even if 

Dody's troops managed to slip past the 

high ground during the night, the 

enemy would emerge at daylight to 

harass their flank. Instead J uin ordered 

Dody to employ his reserve regiment in 

a night attack to clear the high ground 

on the right, first against Cerasola Hill 

and then ag'dinst the other two hills in 

turn. Shortly after the attack began, 

Dodv's assault [(m:es were to move out 

onc~ again from Monte Faito toward 

Monte Maio. This, Juin insisted confidently, would carry the objective. 

General Juin's confidence permeated 

Dody's staff, and in a few hours the 

unit~ were in position to renew the 

attack. At 0320 on 13 May, all artillerv 

attached to Dody's divisio;l, except fe);' 

two battalions supporting the troops on 

Monte Faito, begdn to fire on Cerasola 

Hill. Forty minutes later, as the reserve 

regiment began to advance, the artillery 

fire shifted to Hill 739 and finally to 

Monte Garofano. At the last millute, 

before the Moroccan infantry began 

theil' ascent, a detachment of combat 

engineers rushed forward with bangalore torpedoes to blow gaps in barbed 

wire blocking the path of the advance. 

The artillery apparently did its job 

well, for, as the riflemen climbed the 

slope, German reaction was almost nonexistent. Reducing the few positions 

that had escaped the bombardment, the 

Moroccans moved quickly on to the 

next objective, Hill 739, and then to the 

third, Monte Garofano. Within two and 

a half hours the regiment had (xcupied 

all three objectives, capturing 150 enemy soldiers in the pnxess, and even 

advanced a few hundred yards farther 

to occupy yet another hill mass overlooking the village of Vallom<!jo in the 

61 

shado\v of Monte Majo. 

Success was not to be so readily 

achieved on the left, ,"'here the regiment making the 2d Moroccan's main 

eH()rt tried to get moving shortly after 

0400, first toward an intermediate objective, Monte Feuci, about midway between .Monte Faito and the o~jective, 

then on to Monte M~jo. Almost immediately the regiment ran into a counterattack by the 71 st Division's lone reserve 

battalion. Even though the Moroccans 

held, employing mortar and artillery 

fire with deadly effect to drive the 

C..ermans back, the action checked the 

French advance. 

Three more times before daylight 

and agdin at 0900 the German battalion 

tried to recapture Monte Faito with no 

success. Now the French, rather than 

the Germans, occupied the high 

ground on the right, which hampered 

the counterattacks from Monte Feuci 

just as. it had earlier hampered French 

efforts to attack toward that feature. 

French gunners, with the observation 

advantage that daylight brought, had 

turned the last counterattack into a 

costly failure. Broken by heavy casualties, the enemy battalion fell back in 

disorder. Covered by an artillery preparation, the Moroccan infantrymen 

reached the crest of Monte Fet~ci by 

1130; not a shot was fired against them. 

T'he destruction of Raapke's reserve 

battalion, after the heavy punishment 

the troops in the main line of resistance 

had already taken, meant that no 

means exist~d f()r holding the Monte 

Majo sector of the Gustav Line. As the 

French regrouped, a radio operator 

intercepted a German radio message 

saying: "Feuci has fallen. Accelerate the 

general withdrawaL" When a platoon-
62 

sized patrol left Monte Feud a few 

minutes later to test German defenses 

on Monte Majo, the results appeared to 

confirm the German message, for the 

patrol f()und not a German there. In 

late afternoon a bau.alion came f<xward 

to occupy the division objective and to 

raise on an improvised flagstaff a 

French tricolor large enough to be seen 

from Monte Cassino to the Tvrrhenian 

Sea. . 

Breaking through to \;lonte M~jo on 

13 Mav, the Moroccans had breached 

the G~stav Line at one of its deepest, 

albeit most weakly defended, points. 

The feat had unhinged the entire left 

wing of the XIV Panzer Cmps. It also 

had split General Raapke's 71st Division 

and opened the way for further advances along the parallel ridges running 

northwest toward Ausonia, San Giorgio, 

and Esperia and f()r a thrust across the 

Ausonia defile to Monte Fammera. 

\;Iost im\x)rtantly fin' the Eighth Army, 

it had put the FEC in a position to 

bring pressure against the right flank of 

the German defenses in the Liri vallev. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

It was to this latter threat that Field 

Marshal Kesselring now directed his 

attention. Kesselring at last realized that 

his southern front and not his Tvrrhenian flank between Rome and Ci~ltavecchia was the point of greatest danger. 

Accordingly, late on the 13th, he ordered the 90th Panzer Greruuiier Divi~ion 

to begin moving from its coast-watching 

position near the mouth of the Tiber 

southeastward to the southern front. 

Despite Allied air attacks against all 

enemy traffic, the last unit of the division ;nanaged to depart in the early 

hours of the 14th. Traveling mostly at 

night, the 200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was the first unit to reach the 

southern front, some seventy-five miles 

away, early on 14 May, As the regiment 

arrived it was committed on the 71 st 

Divi~ion's left in an effort to stem the 

French advance from Monte YL.ljo toward the town of San Giorgio on the 

southern edge of the Liri valley. 2 1 

2' Greiner and Schramm, eels., OKW/WFSI. KTB, 

I V (I), pp, 489-90, 
CHAPTER IV 

Collapse of the Gustav Line 

Despite the Allied command's longheld con viction that Monte Cassino 

would have to fall bef()re there could be 

any appreciable success in the Liri valley, it nm\' seemed, with the French 

bl:eakthrough of the Gustav Line, that 

Monte Majo instead of yfonte Cassino 

might be the key, not only to the Fifth 

Army's advance through the mountains 

south of the Liri but also to the Eighth 

Army's penetration of the enemy's defenses in the valley itself. ~ortheast of 

MOille Cassino the' 2 Polish Corps had 

withdrawn to its line of departure as of 

the night of 11 \fay, leaving the 1st 

Parachute Division still master of the 

ruined abbey and its neighboring 

ridges, but General Raapke had been 

forced to commit his last reserves in a 

vain attempt to prevent the FEC from 

taking :Y{onte \fajo. The threat to 

\fonte M~jo and the need to reinforce 

that sector during the night of 12 May 

doubtless had been a factor in the 

('~rman failure to prevent the British 

13 Corps from widening and deepening its foothold beyond the Rapido. 

T'hus by morning on the 13th the 

British 4th Division at last suu:eeded in 

bridging the riVCI'. With three pontoon 

bridges in operation-southeast of Cassino the 8th Indian Division had succeeded in building two the previous 

night-the 13 Corps soon had a secure 

bridgehead, varying in depth from 

1,000 to 2,500 yards. 

The Eighth Annv had accomplished 

what the Fifth Army had tailed to do 

during the winter ~ampaign: establish 

and reinforce a bridgehead beyond the 

Rapido. Although Monte Cassino remained in German hands, the 13 Corps 

had managed to construct bridges over 

which it could reinf()[(:e its units at will. 

Since the assault divisions had incurred 

considerable casualties, General Leese 

authorized the corps commander (General Kirkman) to commit his reserve 

division, the 78th, on 14 :\1av and at 

the same time warned Gener,;1 Anders 

(the 2 Polish Corps commander) to be 

prepared to resume his attack on 

Monte Cassino the next dav. The 78th 

Division was to move out' as soon as 

possible after da\vn in order to pass 

through the British and I ndian divisions south of Cassino and Highway 6 

and make contact with the Polish 

troops-hopefully, sometime on the 

15th-at a point 011 the highway southwest of !\[onte Cassino. 1 

While the 78th Division assembled 

east of the Rapido preparatory to crossing into the 4th Division's zone, the XII 

Tactical Air Command new 520 sorties 

in support of the British 4th and 

Indian 8th Divisions. In spite of dear 

weather and undisputed mastery of the 

skies, the strafing and bombing attacks 

failed to silence enemy batteries firing 

! Operations of British. Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italv. Pan II, Sec. B. Unless otherwise 

noted this and' the following scnion are based upon 

this reference. 
64 

from well-concealed posItions in the 

vicinity of Atina, approximately seven 

miles north of Monte Cassino. 

The artillery fire, plus stiffening resistance to efforts to expand the bridgehead, as well as the first indications of 

growing traffic congestion on the few 

available roads-a problem that would 

eventually harass the Eighth Army in 

the Liri valley almost as much as would 

the enemy-so delayed the 78th Division that it was unable to get into 

position to fulfill its exploitation role. 

Although the 4th British and 8th Indian Divisions continued to push ahead, 

it became clear by nightfall that the 

corps would be unable to reach the 

highway by the morning of the 15th. 

That prompted General Leese to postpone the Polish attack on Monte Cassino. The Eighth Army had penetrated 

the Gustav Line but had not broken 

thwugh. 

German Countermeasures 

I n preventing an Allied breakthrough in the Liri vallev on the 14th, 

the Germans had paid' a high price. 

That night Generalleutnant Bruno Ortncr, the commanding general of the 

44th Division, reported to the II Mountain Corps headquarters that because of 

hean losses and fragmentation of units 

within his division his front would have 

to be heavily reinforced or else he 

would have to withdra\\' into the Hitler 

(Senger) Line, at the latest during the 

night of I?) May.2 

In response, General Feuerstein, the 

corps commander, authorized neither 

course. The only m~jor reinfOl'Cement 

available in the corps area was the 90th 

'Ll lvttn Corps, ia KTB, !'ir. 2, 14 :Vby 44, U Min 

Corps Doc No. 55779/i. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Panzer Grenadier Division, but part of it 

had already been committed on the XIV 

Panzer Corps' left flank to reinforce the 

faltering 71st Infantt) Division. On the 

15th, however, Feuerstein ordered the 

361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the second of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Di'oi-

.'lion's two motorized infantry regiments, 

to lx>lster the defense of Ortner's front 

on the Pignataro sector, about three 

miles southwest of the town of Cassino 

on the Cassino .... San Giorgio road, but 

the regiment would arrive too late to 

prevent the Indian infantry, supported 

by armor, from capturing the village of 

Pignataro and breaking through the 

German lines about a half mile northwest of the town by midnight the same 

day.3 

Meanwhile, on the XIV Panzer Corps 

front opposite the Fifth Army, General Hartmann, the acting corps commander, prepared countermeasures 

against the U.S. II Corps. He despaired 

of restoring his front against the 

French, but remained confident that, at 

least for the present, he could continue 

to hold opposite the Americans. Although the American 85th Division had 

penetrated the 94th Division's front between the S-Ridge and the Domenico 

Ridge and had \\lon a f()othold in the 

village of Solacciano, Hartmann believed that those minor penetrations 

could be eliminated. It was therefore 

with some expectation of success that 

he ordered the 94th Division commander, General Steinmetz, t.o launch 

counterattacks to pinch them off. ~ 

;J ibid., 15 Mav 44; G.W.L. Nicholson, "Onida I 

Historv of the C~nadian Armv in the Second World 

War,'" vol. II. Til" Car/adia';', IT1 ita/,. i943-1'N5 

(Otta"a: Edmund Clothier, G. M. c.: 0.0., D.S.P .. 

1956), p. 406. 

I MS # R-50 (Bailev), C1>.IH. 
COLLAPSE OF THE GUSTAV LINE 

Less sanguine than the corps commander, General Steinmetz, on the 

night of 12 May, nevertheless counterattacked on his right wing, from the SRidge to the coastal corridor; but except for some slight gains on the Domenico ridge the Germans failed to 

regain the lost ground. Accurate concentrations of American artillery fire 

had broken up the counterattacks and 

forced them back with heavy casualties 

that Steinmetz could ill afford. The 94th 

Division commander now recognized 

that unless his troops could be reinforced before the next American onslaught, his thin, brittle front would soon 

crack. He had no alternative but to act 

on a suggestion General Hartmann had 

earlier given the 71 .It Di"ision commander: create his own reserves in the 

customary manner. In view of the 

strength of the Allied offensive across 

the entire corps front on 12 May, such 

a do-it-yourself scheme for obtaining 

needed reserves was patently the counsel of despair. 5 

The II Corps' Attack Renewed 

General Steinmetz's despair contrasted sharply with General Clark's 

reaction to the results of operations on 

his own front. Sensing a breakthrough 

by the Fifth Army, Clark was impatient 

with what he deemed to be a lack of 

aggressiveness and flexibility in the I I 

Corps' attack. That lack was particularly 

apparent when contrasted with the dan 

and drive shown by the FEC in its 

thrust into the Monte Majo massif. 

Though aware that the latter was composed of veteran, professional mountain 

troops, while 85th and 88th Divisions 

, Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKW/WPSt, KTB, 

pp.488-91. 

were mainly conscripts engaging In 

their first combat operation, in view of 

the strength concentrated by the II 

Corps before the enemy's positions at 

Santa Maria Infante, Clark believed that 

Sloan's 88th Division should have 

cleared the village by noon on 12 May. I; 

Contrary to the impression created 

by the stubborn enemy resistance, General Keyes (II Corps commander) believed, as did General Steinmetz, that 

the German front was near the breaking point. Convinced that one more 

effort would pierce the Gustav Line, 

Keyes called both of his division commanders to corps headquarters early on 

the 13th to plan for a continuation of 

the attack. 

The 88th Division commander, General Sloan, presented a reassuring picture of the situation on his right wing, 

w here the 350th I n fan try held the 

village of Ventosa and Hill 316, key 

points on the regimental objective of 

Monte Damiano. Troops from the 

350th Infantry were also building up 

on Monte Ceracoli, and infantry with a 

platoon of tanks in support had thrust 

north of that feature toward the Ausonia corridor. 7 

Unfortunately, progress on the 88th 

Division's right wing had far exceeded 

that on the left, which was one of the 

causes of Clark's concern. Along lx)th 

sides of the Minturno-Santa Maria Infante road the troops of the 351 st 

Infantry still faced strong opposition. 

Numerous strongpoints near the village of Pulcherini on the western slope 

of Monte Bracchi, on the Spur, at Santa 

Maria Infante, and on the S-Ridge 

"Clark Diary, 13 May 44. 

7Memo, Hq. II Corps, 13 May 44, sub: Conference 

of Corps and Division Commanders at 0730, in II 

Corps G-3 Jnl. 
southwest of Tame were holding up 

General Sloan's left wing as well as 

General Coulter's right. 

On the credit side, losses incurred bv 

the two divisions in the early hours of 

the otlensive had been quickly made up 

by replacements held in readiness in 

di\~sion rear areas. As an experiment, 

each division had been assigned sufficient overstrength to permit the creatioll of replacement detachments in 

support of each regiment. Having 

trained with their assigned unit, these 

men could be quickly integrated when 

replacements were needed, so that the 

two U.S. divisions were prepared to 

continue their attacks on 13 :\1ay with 

almost the same numbers as on the 

II th, the day the offensive began. 

Keyes continued to place the main 

burden of the renewed effort on 

Sloan's 88th Division, which W;IS to 

resume its attack during the afternoon 

of the 13th. The corps commander also 

shifted the interdivisional boundan 

slightly to the left to give the 88til 

Division, which was to continue its drive 

on Santa Maria Infante, the additional 

task of clearing the northern end of the 

S-Ridge (Hills 109, 128, and 126), but 

leaving Hill 131 in the 85th Division's 

sector. Thus, the division bore responsibilitv t(Jr eliminating the machine guns 

that had been so troublesome on the 

3:' 1 st Inbntry's left flank. Coulter's 

85th Division, meanwhile, was to consolidate its recently won positions at Solacciano and on the San Ylartino Hill and 

protect the corps' left flank by maintaining strong pressures on the Domenico Ridge. H 

In making plans at the division level 

H Ibid. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

to resume the attack, General Sloan 

decided to shift the boundary of Colonel Crawt(ml's 349th Infantry westward 

to include the sector of the' I st Battalion, 3?i 1st Infantry. This freed the 1st 

Battalion, still relatively fresh, to try to 

take Santa Maria Infante from the left 

flank. The battalion was to capture Hill 

109 on the S-Ridge, then swing northward along the ridge through Tame to 

envelop Santa Maria Infante from the 

northwest. While this battalion maneuvered on the left, the 2d and 3d 

Battalions, astride the Minturno road, 

were to maintain pressure by holding 

attacks against the Spur and Hill 103. 

On the len, Coulter's 85th Division was 

to help with a renewed attack by Colonel Sa fay's 338th Infantry against Hill 

131. 

Shortly after the conference, General 

Clark arrived at Keyes' command post. 

Concluding that the C..ermans had been 

thrown otl balance bv the magnitude of 

the Allied offensive, the Fifth Armv 

commander directed Keves to press his 

attack throughout the night, with the 

88th Division driving through Santa 

Maria Infante, crossing the Ausonia 

corridor, and capturing the village of 

Spigno on the edge of the Petrella 

massif preparatory to a thrust across 

the mountains, as the French were even 

then preparing to do from :\1onte 

M;~o. Back at his own headq uarters at 

Caserta that afternoon, Clark noted 

confidentlv in his diary that "we should 

have Spigno tonight." 9 

While the divisions prepared to renew their efforts on the afternoon of 

the 13th, three U.S. fighter-bombers 

attacked Santa Maria Infante, already 

" Clark Diary, 14 May 44. 
COLLAPSE OF THE GUSTAV LINE 

reduced to Cassino-like ruins. As if in 

response, the enemy made one of his 

rare air raids over Allied lines. At I ~)30 

three out of a flight of twenty-two FW190's eluded Allied air patrols and 

lx)mbed and strafed the 85th Division 

sector in the vicinity of Minturno-Tremons11oli, but dan~age was light and 

casualties few. 

Although the 351 st Infa.ntry COI11-

mander, Colonel Champeny, had designated 1630 as the jump-off hour, a 

slow approach march by t he I st Battalion to its line of departure at the base 

of the S-Ridge \,;as f()l1owed by a series 

of delays that for several hours jeopa.rdized the operation. Taking longer to 

launch its attack because it had a 

greater distance to move from an assembly area near the cemetery than 

had the other battalions, the I st Battalion also had difficulty in co-ordinating 

its plans with those of Colonel SaLlY'S 

338th Infmtry, which was preparing to 

auack Hill 131, the sOllthernmost knob 

of the S-Ridge. The battalion was further delayed when enemv mortar fire 

pinned d~)\\n the comma~der and several of his staff while they were on 

reconnaissance, separating them from 

their units and killing the heavy weapons company commander. Not until six 

hours after the time orihnnally set f()r 

the attack did the battalion at last begin 

to move toward Hill 109, 300 yards 

northwest of Hill 131. Learning (;f the 

I st Battalion's bilure to reach its line of 

departure on time, Champeny postponed the regimental attack first for 

half an hour, then f()r ;mof her thirty 

minutes, and finally I()r an additional 

hour. w ' 

'0 Unless otherwise indicated the /()Ilowing lanical 

narrative is based upon offirial records of the 8')lh 

and 88th Divisions and the II Corps, 

67 

en fortunately, word of I he postponements failed to reach the 2d Battalion, 

assembled east of the Minturno mad. 

Ordered to pin down the defenders of 

Santa Maria Inbnte by an attack 

against the Spur, the battalion moved 

oul as originally planned al 1630. As 

the lead companies approached the 

sunken ro;1d on the eastern slol~ of the 

Spur, where the attack on the 12th had 

halted, the Germans from the vicinity 

of Santa Maria Inf;mte and Pulcheririi 

brought down a heavy volume of artillen and small arms fire. The men 

ne~·ertheless reached the crest of the 

Spur, where continued heavy fire drove 

them to cover and prevented them 

from going further. 

On the left. in the 8Sth Division's 

sector, a tank-infantry team, composed 

of two platoons from Company I, 338th 

Infantry, and about ten tanks from 

Company C:, 7S6th Tank Battalion, 

with which Colonel Saby planned to 

cover the left flank of Colonel Champelly"S attack, also f~liled to get word of 

the fx)stponement. Tanks and infantry 

moved toward Hill 131 on the S-Ridgc, 

but the former were soon wallowing 

helplessly in a small gully at the {(jot of 

the hill. Unassisted, the two infantry 

platoons nevertheless quickly overran 

the enemy on Flill 131, capturing about 

{(my Germans but losing over half the 

American riflemen in the process. 

When the Germans struck back almost 

immediately with a sharp local counterattack, they f(HTed the survivors to Elll 

back to their original positions down 

the slope. By evening only sixteen men 

remained of the original inbntry {(In'e 

that had attacked Hill 131. 

When, after two hours, the I st Battalion, 351st Infantry, still failed to appear, Colonel Champeny, apparently 
68 

unaware of the 338th Infantry's setback 

on Hill 131, decided to wait no longer. 

He ordered the 3d Battalion to maintain its pressure against Hill 103 along 

the left side of the Minturno road in 

support of the 2d Battalion, already 

battling on the Spur. 

Beginning at 1825, the 2d Chemical 

Battalion and the 913th Field Artillery 

Battalion, assisted by guns of corps 

artillery, fired several hundred rounds 

of smoke, white phosphorous, and high 

explosives on the villages of Santa 

Maria Infante and Pulcherini. On the 

heels of this preparatory fire, the 3d 

Battalion's two fi)rward companies began to move toward Hill 103, alxmt 500 

yards west of the Spur. Company L was 

to pin down the enemy from the front, 

while Company 1 worked around the 

western slope to envelop the enemy 

from the crest. \1eanwhile, Company 

K was to provide supporting fire from 

positions just west of the road leading 

to Santa Maria Infante. 

As Company I attempted to begin its 

envelopment, 30 to 40 rounds of 88-

mm. fire tell into the battalion sector. 

Heavy and accurate mortar fire also 

blan keted the area, forcing the lead 

companies to fall back in disorder to 

their starting positions. Company K was 

down to half its strength, Company 1 

lost one-third of its efkctives, and Company L also incurred heavy losses. The 

battalion S--3 reported despairingly to 

the regimental commander: "Two years 

of t;aining [have] gone up in 

smoke .. , my men " about 

half of them-'almost all my leaders." 11 

Close on that misfortune, the longII Telephone Log, 351st !nfJnl, 13 Mav 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

delayed 1 st Battalion began assembling 

for its attack on Hill 109. The commander, Maj. I-Iarold MacV. Brown, 

decided on a frontal artack in a column 

of companies, with Company C leading 

the way. Once Company C reached the 

crest, the next company in line was to 

pass through and move northward 

along the crest to dear Hill 126 on the 

northern end of the ridge. 

Shortly after midnight, following a 

10-minute artillery preparation, men of 

Company C, advancing with two platoons f()rward, began to pick their way 

up the southern slope of Hill 109. 

IVIidway up the slope men of this 

company, as had other I st Battalion 

troops, carne under mortar and machine gun fire from Hill 13 I. Als<: like 

these other troops, they too beheved 

Hill 131 to be in friendly hands. The 

company commander (1st' Ll. Garvin C. 

MacyIakin) ordered his men to dig in 

where they were while he brought his 

reserve platoon f()n\'ard and surveyed 

the situation. 

During Mac.\fakin's absence his executive officer, assuming that the fire on 

his troops from Hill 131 was coming 

from American guns, disregarded the 

advice of fellow officers and set out 

alone toward the hill. Shouting repeatedly, "We're Americans, stop your fire!" 

he 'approached to within a few yards of 

the German positions. A short burst of 

enemy fire cut him down. 

To' Lieutenant .\1ac\Jakin it was obvious at this point that something had 

gone wrong with Colonel Safay's attack 

on the left. He decided to hold his men 

where they were until somebody had 

de ared Hill 13 I. 

Colont.'l Champeny, in turn, int()rmed his division headquarters that 
COLLAPSE OF THE GCSTAV LINE 

he was "catching hell from Hill 131," 

and requested permission to go into the 

85th Division's zone and dear it himself. Until the hill was taken, Champeny 

pointed out, his regiment simply would 

be unable to move. General Coulter, 

the 85th Division commander, denied 

permission, apparently wary of the hazards of violating unit boundaries in the 

darkness. Coulter declined even to approve neutralizing artillery fire against 

the hill, since the fire might endanger 

his own men on the forward slope of 

the S-Ridge. 

Colonel Champeny, convinced that 

he could not take Hill 109 and outflank 

Santa Maria Infante while Hill 131 

remained in enemy hands, ignored the 

refusal. He took it on himself to order 

Major Brown to seize the hill with the 

reserve company of his 1st Battalion. 12 

Lieutenant MacMakin of Company C 

had in the meantime brought up his 

reserve platoon. With the men of this 

platoon in position to cover the flank 

that faced Hill 131, he decided to try 

again to take Hill I O~. With two platoons abreast, MacMakm started up the 

hill. This time, to his surprise, hardly 

any German resistance developed. His 

men quickly gained the crest and found 

there only a small enemy rear guard, 

eager to s~rrender. 

Even as MacMakin's infantrymen deployed on Hill 109 and while it was still 

dark, Major Brown's reserve company 

started to climb Hill 131. There too the 

Americans were in for a surprise. The 

company encountered only scattered 

bursts of machine gun fire and reached 

the top of the hill with few losses. By 

12 Msg lIS, 132335, CO, 351st Inf, to CG, 8Sth 

Div, in 8Sth Div G-3 Jnl, 11-15 May 44, vol. 4, incl. 

7. 

that time the men found only empty 

dugouts, probably abandoned by a rear 

guard that had just slipped away unobserved in the darkness. The only Germans remaining were on the ~everse 

slope-they were dead, victims of the 

first day's artillery fire. 

TIu? Germans Fall Back on tlu? Right 

The unexpected ease with which the 

men of the 351 st Infantry's I st Battalion finally captured Hills 109 and 131 

was, without their knowing it, a direct 

dividend of the French breakthrough in 

the Monte M~j() sector on the afternoon of the 13th. As the French had 

widened their breach in the Gustav 

Line during the rest of the day and 

through the night, General Hartmann, 

the acting XIV Panzl'r CorjJs commander, ordered Steinmetz to pull back 

his left v. ing about a mile and to anchor 

it on Monte eivita, t\\'o miles northwest 

of Santa Maria Infante, where contact 

could be re-established with Raapke's 

battered 71st Dhlision. t:! 

During the night General Steinmetz 

withdrew across the Ausonia corridor, 

leaving a rear guar~ behind. In an 

effort to strengthen hiS center, he also 

pulled back his troops from the coastal 

salient on his right flank near Monte 

Scauri. Because neither Sloan nor Coulter hampered its movement, Steinmetz's 

division by morning had managed to 

establish itself i.n the Gustav Line's 

rearmost positions along the high 

ground extending from Monte Sc:auri 

northward to a point east of CastellonO1'alo along the crests of hills overlooking the Ausonia corridor from the west 

13 MS # R-50 (Bailey), CMH. Unless otherwise 

indicated this section is based upon this reference. 
70 

THE FEe DRIVE 

13-15 Moy 1944 

........... Olf'[CTlON OF ATTACK , 1,-1, .,A, ,..., ~ FEe POSI TIONS. ~ .... 

c:::;:>- COUNTER'TTACIC 

Con/OUf inlrlllol ;n """'$ 

,! ! , • f • , • , r r WilES 

(i ili"" 

10 0 

REMNANTS 

71 ST 

INFANTRY 

DIVISION 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

r""'" ~d Gp Taw. /' 61h Nor In! ( -

~-__ -- ('" ,.'.4IhGpTabo,. (~l"'9 \..101 Mar In! I2SJ 

MAP 3 

to the eastern slope of Monte Civita. 

From there Steinmetz's 9c/th Infrmtrv 

[)iI'i.lion linked up with the 71st [)h'isioJl's 

right flank. The French continued to 

widen their gap in the Monte Maio 

massif and advance toward San Giorgio 

on the southern flank of the Liri valley, 

while the Wtll In/ol/try [)i'pisioll, on the 

XIV p(l1IZFr Cmj),\' right flank, would try 

Ai. FinJtftmann 

to stabilize its front along the new line. 

(Ala/) 3) 

As the two Allied armies prepared to 

continue their offensive on the 14th, 

the Germans fCHllld control over their 

front line increasingly difficult to maintain because individual combat units, 

dispersed by Allied breakthrough and 

penetrations, had lost both leaders and 
COLLAPSE OF THE CUSTAV LINE 

communications. Steinmetz was sure 

that unless Kesselring released considerable reinforcements, his, Steinmetz's, division would be unable to achieve more 

than to hold the Americans briefly 

short of the Hitler Line (Smgl'T Ril'gl'l). 

A withdrawal into the second line of 

defense appeared inevitable and would 

most likely have to be set up by the 

night of 15 May.14 

The Fall of Santa Maria Infante 

The U.S. II Corps commander, General Keyes, meanwhile had learned 

from reconnaissance reports during the 

night of 13 May that the enemy had 

demolished a bridge on the road leading from Ausonia to the coast and the 

first lateral communications route behind the enemy front. That confirmed 

Keyes' suspici(;ns that Steinmetz was 

preparing to tall back to new positions 

west of the road. Keyes promptly directed Sloan to move his men as rapidly 

as possible into Santa Maria Infante 

and then on to occupy the Monte 

Bracchi, Rotondo, and Cerri, the high 

ground to the northeast of the village. 

A day earlier Clark had told Keyes to 

strike across the Ausonia corridor and 

seize Spigno as rapidly as possible. But 

the hard fighting and uncertainty as to 

the extent of the enemy withdrawal 

since the 11 th had left both troops and 

corps commander unprepared for a 

headlong pursuit of the enemy. Instead, Keyes ordered Sloan to send 

strong patrols into the corridor to locate 

the enemy. 15 (Map III) 

Before dawn on the 14th, the 349th 

H Llr. Gm Kdo LI Mtn Curps. la 4S4J44g.Kdos. 

14.".44 to AOK 10. in AOK 10 KTB NT. 6. Band V. 

Anlagm 723. 11-20 May 44. AOK 10. Doc. .~3271/8. 

" II Corps C~3 Jnl. 11-13 .\·Iav 44. 

71 

Infantry's I st Battalion advanced in a 

column of companies to occupy Monte 

Bracchi. Meeting little resistance and 

capturing only a few stragglers, the 

battalion gained the summit within 

eight hours. The remaining battalions 

of the regiment, in the meantime, 

moved up the Minturno road behind 

the 351 st Infantry into an assembly 

area southeast of Santa Maria Infante, 

whence they were prepared to exploit 

the capture of the village by advancing 

through the 351 st Infantry, across the 

Ausonia corridor, and onto the PetrelLi 

massif. If; 

While the 1 st Battalion of the 349t h 

Infantry scaled Monte Bracchi, the 3d 

Battalion of the 351st at last closed in 

on Santa Maria In[:ul(e, defended now 

by only a small rear guard. By early 

afternoon, after a house-to-house fight, 

the village was cleared. 

A small but nevertheless important 

role in the battle for Santa Maria 

Infante had been played by sixty h.:al 

Italian peasants \\ho had volulltcered 

to serve as carriers during the battle. Of 

these sixty, twenty-three had been killed 

by enemy fire and several \\"Oullded. Ii 

On the 88th Division's right flank, 

Colonel Fry's 350th Infantry had secured its i'nitial objectives 'from the 

Ausente Creek around to Castelf()I'te. 

After the adjacent French unit had 

cleared the north side of the Castelf()rte 

road, the regiment attacked on the 13t h 

from the vicinity of Monte Damiano to 

occupy Monte Rotondo. Although interrogation of prisoners had revealed 

th;.tt the o~jective was Iightlv held, rugged terrain and a particularly stubborn 

," Ibid .• II-Iti .\lav 44. 

17 WD Hist Di,. :5mall Unit ArtiorLI (Washinf(lol1. 

I 94h). p . .'77. 
72 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

AMERICAN TROOPS ENTERING THE RUINS OF SANTA MARIA INFANTE 

rear guard forced Colonel Fry's men 

into a 3-hour struggle be{()re they could 

occupy the height. lH 

Colonel Fry had thcn turned his 

attention to Monte Cerri, the regiment's 

second objective. Some 2,000 yards 

southwest of Monte Rotondo, ~lonte 

CelTi had been reported free or enemy 

by an earlier patrol. Fry gave the job of 

occupying the feature to a reservc company located 011 Monte Ceracoli, only a 

mile away from the objective. 

What f()llowcd poignantly illustrated 

the demoralizing effect that the sounds 

and rumors of battle can have on 

'" 88th Div (;,-2 Rpt :\0. 51, I4l300B :\by 44. in 

88th Div G-'~ Jnl, vol. :~, incl. 7: 1I Corps (;--3 Jill. 

:\lay 44. Lnless otherwise indicated the f(,!lowing is 

based upon the latter referellce. 

inexperienced troops waiting anxioush 

in reserve. vVhen thc regimental commander's order reached the company 

cOllllnander, he refused to move out 

with his unit. Promptly relieving him, 

Colonel Fn sent Maj. \lIitoll A. \latthews, his S--3, to take command of the 

com pall y. The men, \1<~jor ~1att hcws 

{()Und upon arrival on \fonte Ceracoli, 

were thoroughly demoralized. Matthc\\s 

explained to them that a patrol had 

reportcd the ol~jective abandoned; however, onlv one officer and one noncolIlmissione~l oHicer reluctantly agreed to 

t()llow him. Onlv after considerable urging and cajoling was Matthews able to 

pe-rsuade the men to advance. 

As the com pany neared \1onte Cerri, 

an I R-man Cennan rear guard opened 
COLLAPSE OF THE CUSTAV LINE 

fire, giving the lie to the patrol's optimistic report. Nevertheless, the company kept moving. It quickly gained the 

summit and dispersed the enemy rear 

guard at a cost of only t\\"o men slightly 

\vounded. This small success restored 

the company's morale. 

By early afternoon on 14 "lav, after 

alm()st th~ee days of lighting dlat had 

cost the 88th Division almost 2,000 

casualties, German withdra\\'al across 

the Ausonia corridor enabled the \yeary 

in fantryrnen to walk unopposed ont;) 

most of their objectives. After almost 

three days of infantry probes by two 

fresh divisions, supported by heavy and 

dec urate artillery fire and supplemented 

by \\ide-ranging fighter-bombers from 

which only darkness brought relief, the 

los~es among the defending German 

UIllts had been hean. That evening 

General Steinmetz reported that since 

the night of II :vlav his 94th Divmon 

had l;)st 40 perce;1t of its combat 

strength and could hardly hope to hold 

at length in the positions across the 

forward slopes of the Petrella massif 

and the coastal heights. He was COI1-

vinced that the Americans would soon 

move against Monte Civita and the 

villages of Castellonorata and Spigno, 

the three remaining key positions in 

that part of the XIV Panzer Corps sector 

of the Gustav Line opposite the Fifth 

Army. 1\1 

.\Ionte Civita was the first 0 f the ne\\' 

positions to be occupied by the Americans. General Sloan sent Fry's 350th 

InL-mtry toward Spigno and (:rawt()rd's 

349th Infantrv to take :Yfonte Civita, 

the nearest surnmit in the Petrella massif beyond the Ausonia corridor. Reach-

'" ~1S # R-50 (Bailey). C~fH. 

ing the base of Monte Civila by dark on 

the 14th, the regiment's f()rward battalion paused to rest. Resuming the attack 

that night, the Amer'ican inEmtrymen 

encountered little resistance as they occupied the south peak of the 1,800'-f()ot 

height by morning. There they surprised and captured 23 men from ~m 

artillery unit that was still firing on 

American positions in the valley below. 20 

Colonel Fry's 350th In[~ll1lrv meanwhile advanc~d on Spigno. Widelv dispersed, uncertain of enemy strength, 

Frv's regiment moved cautiously. Cpset 

at what seemed to be a lack of drive, 

the army commander, General Clark, 

threatened disciplinary action against 

whoever was responsible f()r the delay 

in capturing Spigno. General Keyes 

theref(xe sent the 351 st Infantn forwal'd to relieve the 3S0th Inf~U1try. 

Passing through Frv's lines on the 

morning of the 15th, the 351st Infantry 

attacked toward Spigno, capturing the 

town within a few hours.21 

Clark's thoughts now were already 

ranging Ln' beyond Spigno, for that 

morning he ordered Keyes 10 send the 

88th Diyisioll with all possible speed 

from Spigno directly west across the 

mountains toward Itri, nine miles awa\, 

and the road junction on the second of 

the enemy's tm) lateral communications 

routes, while Coulter's 85th Division 

f()lIo\Hxl t he withdrawal of that part of 

the 94th Division on the seaward side of 

the Aurunci Mountains. Echeloned to 

the lett rear, the 85th Division was to 

[()llow oniv as far as \lo11te Campese, 

the high ground about two miles west 

"0 349th In! Opns Rt:pon. ~LI\ 44. 

"' lhid.; II Corps G-:~ JIlL II-Hi Ma) 44. 
74 

of Castellonorato and overlooking thc 

coastal highway. 

Looking ahead to a breakout from 

the Anzio beachhead, Clark planned 

first to move the uncommitted 36th 

Division there within three days, then to 

shift the S5th Division and increments 

of the I I Corps headq uarters to Anzio 

as preliminaries to moving the en tire 

corps there. General Crittenberger's IV 

Corps, then at Pozzuoli on the coast just 

west of Naples, was to take over the II 

Corps sector. 2~ 

It was evident at this lx)int that Clark 

was still thinking in terms of making 

the m<uor breakthrough to the Anzio 

beachhead through the Aurunci Mountains sector rather than along the coastal 

corridor where the German defenses 

appeared more f()l'midable. Because of 

those defenses, lx)th Clark and Keves 

had rejected a frontal attack along the 

axis of the coastal road (High\\av 7) as 

too costlv. Keves directed Coulter instead to break'through to that part of 

the Gustav Line based upon the town 

of Castellonorato, on thc seaward fringe 

of the high ground, thereby outflanking thc strong fX)sitions on the coastal 

plain. To provide additional strength 

for that attack, Keves attached the 

349th InLintrv and'the 337th Field 

Artillerv Batt~lion to the S5th Division. ~;l 

Its buildings clustered beneath the 

ruins of an ancient f()rtress perched 

atop a steep hill, Castellonorato was the 

lone stronghold rcmaining in that part 

of the Gustav Line. Yet since German 

positions on Hill lOS, approximately a 

"Clark Dian. I') :-'lay 44; Fifth Am1\' C~3 Jnl. 

1')-16 :-'lay 44; Fifth Am;y 01 I H. I') :-'!a, 44. 

"'II Corps G--3Jnl, 11~16 May 44. . 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

mile and a half northwest of Solacciano, 

midway between Minturno and Castellonorato, dominated the route of approach to Castellonorato, General Coulter had first to dear the hill bef()re he 

could move against the town. 

During the morning of 14 May, the 

85th Division commander regrouped 

his regiments bef()re attacking Hill lOS 

in early afternoon. Holding the 339th 

Inbntry on the S-Ridge as a base of 

fire, he moved the 338th from the San 

Martino Hill to occupy the Cave 

d'Argilla, high ground about half a 

mile f::u-ther north, overlooking the approach to Hill lOS. To the 337th 

Infantrv, which except for one battalion 

had been in reserve since the beginning 

of the oHensive, he gave the mission of 

taking first Hill 108 and then Castellonmato. The attached 349th Inbntr" was 

to cover the attack by advancing o'n the 

right, \\ith the 337th Field Artillerv 

Battalion firing in su PfX))'t. ~4 

AU(uk on Castellonorato 

Colonel Hughes, commander of the 

337th Inbntrv, decided to employ a 

tank-inbntry team comfX)sed of the 2d 

Battalion \\ith t\\'() platoons of tanks, as 

Colonel SaLI\' had done the da\" bef(m' 

in his ill-bted attack on the division's 

right f1ank. After taking Hill 108, 

Hughes planned to use the armor to 

probc the cnemy's defenses bef()rc 

making a final thrust into Castellonorato. The 3d Batt alion was to follow 

doseh' in reserve, while the 1st Battalion J:emained attached to the 338th 

InbntIT. 

H 88th Di, Directive (s~d Sloan), 15 'via, 44; 8.~th 

Di, 1'0 6 (sgd Coulter). I.~ :-'!a, 44; II Corps G--3 

Periodic Rpt (s~d Col Butchers. G-<1), 15 :-'1a\ 44. 
COLLAPSE OF THE GUSTAV LINE 

Hardly had the auack on Hill 108 

jumped off on the afternoon of the 

14th when a hitch developed. As engineers tried to prepare a fording site for 

the tanks to cross a small stream near 

Capo d'Acqua, a hamlet about 2,200 

yards east of the o~iective, hea\'y fire 

from the vicinity of Castellonorato 

forced them to take cover. The tanks 

had to remain on the east bank where 

they could provide the inf~ultry with 

only long-range support. Even so, that 

support proved sufficient at the start, 

f()l' the infantrymen forded the creek 

and gained tl~e crest of the hill on 

which the hamlet was located against 

little opposition; but when the men 

tried to continue down the reverse 

slope, the story was different. Heavy 

machine gun fire drove them back 

across the crest. 

Here the attack was stalled f()l' several 

hours until engineers at last succeeded 

in preparing a crossing site for the 

tanks, ten of which immediatelv f()} ded 

the stream and joined the infantry to 

provide the impetus the attack needed. 

As the tanks rumbled down the reverse 

slope of Hill 108, part of the enemy 

surrendered while the rest fled toward 

Castellonorato. 

With the capture of Hill 108, the way 

was clear for Colonel Hughes' reserve 

battalion to make a final attack on the 

town, but the setbacks encountered earlier forced a postponement until the 

following morning. On the 15th, shortly 

before the assault on Castellonorato was 

to begin, aircraft from the XII T AC 

roared over the front. Beyond a bomb 

line laid down only a th~)Usand yards 

ahead of the infantry, a flight of six 

fighter-bombers struck the ol?jective. 

While smoke and dust hung heavily 

75 

over the town, Hughes' men quickly 

entered, but despite the aerial bombardment it still took several hours of 

street fighting to dear the place. By 

midnight Castellonorato was free of the 

enemy. 

While the 337th fought for CasteHonorato, a battalion from the 338th Infantry moved down from the Cave 

d'ArgiUa and (Juickly occupied Monte 

Penitro, situated over one mile to the 

west and overlooking the Ausonia corridor road a mile northeast of Highway 

7. Routing a small enemy detachment, 

the battalion also captured the village of 

Penitro and continued down the Ausonia road to Santa Croce, a hamlet 

located at the junction of the road with 

the coastal highway. The capture of 

Castellonorato, \ionte Penitro, and the 

Santa Croce road junction carried the 

85th Division-with it the II Corps-all 

the way through the Gustav Line on 

the seaward slope of the mountains. 

Thus outflanked, the enemy's defenses 

astride Highway 7 011 the ~oastal plain 

near Monte Scam'i were no longer 

tenable. 2" 

The Germans PrejJare To Withdrall' 

Recognizing the portent of this penetration for the entire German right 

wing, the acting XIV Panzer Corps commander, General Hartmann, issued the 

usual il~junctiolJ to General Steinmetz to 

contain the breach at all costs, at the 

same time reporting to the Tenth Arm} 

headq uarters that without rein f(HTements a dear American breakthrough, 

2, 337th In! Rpt of Opns, 14-15 1\1;1:' 44: 3381h 

In! Rpt of Opns, 14-15 \bv 44: 85th Dlv Rpt of 

Opns, 14-15 Mal 44. 
76 

comparable to that which had already 

taken place in the French sector, was 

inevitable. Hartmann urged either reinf()rcing the 94th Divi5ion. with a separate 

panzer grenadier regllnent that ":as 

patrolling the coast on the Gaeta penmsub or authorizing the corps to fall 

back about t\\O miles immediately to the 

Dora switch position. Despite those recommendations, General von Vietinghoff the armv commander, newly return~d from l{is leave, authorized nothing more than withdrawal during. th: 

night of 15 May of the 94th DWL5lon s 

artillerv. 21; 

\Vhile failing to obtain permission to 

withdra\\' all of the 94th Divilion, General Hartmann nevertheless sa\\' the 

authorization f()r artillery displacement 

as a harbinger of eventual approval. 

Relaying the instructions to Steinmetz, 

Hartmann hinted that orders f())' such a 

mO\'e would soon be f()l·thcoming. 

To support the crumbling front ami 

cover the expected general withdrawal, 

Steinmetz managed to assemble three 

inbntry companies h'om the now ~ntenable Monte Scauri salient, along WIth 

;1 platoon of heavy antitank guns from 

the vicinity of FOl'mia, five miles west of 

Scauri. Those units he rushed into 

positions southwest of C;~stellonor;l~o. 

Yet Steinmetz's center contmued to give 

way. A real danger began to loom that 

the Americans might overrun the Dora 

Line even bef()re the Germans could 

occupy it. For Steinmetz, the only 

bright spot was the arrival within his 

lines of survivors from a company that 

had f(mght out of an encirclement on 

Hill 79, south of San Martino Hill. 

21> MS # R-50 (Bailey), CMH, Unless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon this reference. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Keyes Reinforces Hi5 Left 

General Hartmann was not alone in 

recognizing the portents of the capture 

of Hill 108 and the fall of Castellonorato. General Keyes too realized their 

significance. He ~Iso realized th.at at this 

Ix)int the more favorable. terram of the 

mountain slopes overlookmg the coastal 

corridor rather than the inhospitable 

Aurunci Mountains offered the best 

0Plx)rtunity fiJI" exploiting the II Corps' 

success ill the Gustav Line. Accordingly, 

during the night of 15 May, Keyes gave 

first priority on artillery and armored 

support to the 85th Division, thereby 

transforming wh;lt \\'as to have been the 

secondary attack on the left into the 

main att:lCk. Thenceforth the momentum of the II Corps was directed along 

the axis of the Castellonorato-:Ybranob 

road, the btter \'illage located two and a 

half miles due \\'est of Castellonorato. 

Keyes hoped thereby to outf1al~k Formia, !iJur miles up the coastal highway, 

which controlled the road junction leading to the enemy's second line of: Jat.eral 

communications, Route 82. IndicatIons 

are that Keyes had not consulted Clark 

on this de~'ision, for the latter had 

authorized use of the 85th Di,ision only 

as far as Monte Campese, and Maranola lies a mile to the northwest and 

Formia over two miles to the southwest. 2i 

By earl, morning of 16 May, the 

Fre~ch Ex'peditionary Corps as well as 

the U.S. II Corps had broken through 

the Gustav Line between the Liri valle v 

and the Tyrrhenian Sea. Earlier, following its success against the 71 st Di~~'i?n at 

Monte Majo on the 13th, the FE~C, on 

27 Clark Dian', 15 !\fa\' 44, 
COLLAPSE OF THE GUST A V LINE 

the Fifth Army's right wing, had f()ught 

across the Ausonia corridor, captured 

the Ausonia defile leading into the Liri 

valley, and advanced over the northern 

half of the Petrella massif into the heart 

of the Aurunci Mountains. The net 

effect of the successful II Corps-FEC 

strike had been to outflank the strongest parts of the Gustav Line, those 

along the Tyrrhenian coast and in the 

Liri valley. 

A total of more than 3,000 casualties-I ,100 of which were incurred during the first forty-eight hours of the 

offensive by the 85th Division-surpassed the I I Corps' losses in the hard 

f<)light battle for Monte Cassino during 

the preceding winter campaign. The 

replacement system employed by l~Jth 

the 85th and 88th Divisions nevertheless enabled the corps to make up the 

losses quickly and maintain the momentum of the offensive.2H 

Progress in the Liri Valley 

The Eighth Army, meanwhile, had 

also begun to move. On the 14th 

General Leese had assembled the 1st 

Canadian Corps behind the 13 Corps' 

left wing preparatory to sending the 

Canadians across the Rapido to take 

part in the forthcoming exploitation 

toward the Hitler Line. Even as the 

U.S. II Corps was battering through the 

Gustav Line's last defenses on the night 

of 15 May, so too in the Liri valley the 

British 13 Corps broke through the last 

of the Gustav Line's positions. That 

"85th Div G-I Rpt of Opns. Mav 44; 88th Div 

LO Rpt to C~3. 15 May 44; 88th Div G-I Rpt of 

Opns. May 44. 

77 

night the Canadian corps began crossing the Rapido. 2~ 

The next day the 78th Division completed its passage of the 4th Division's 

lines and launched its long-delayed attack to cut Highway 6 southwest of 

Cassino. During the day the 78th Di\ision made such good progress that 

General Leese ordered the Polish corps 

on Monte Cassino to resume its postponed attack the following morning. 

Accordingly, early on the 17th, the 

British in the valley and the Poles in the 

mountains launched a pincers attack 

against the surviving enemy positions 

on Monte Cassino and in the town at its 

base. By afternoon the 78th Division 

had cut the highway southwest of 

Monte Cassino and the Poles and seized 

the Colle Sant'Angelo Ridge north of 

the abbey. Only two escape routesalong the Monte Cassin(}-Massa Albeneta Ridge and the flanks of the hills 

overlooking the highway-remained 

open. The Cassino position was now 

dearly untenable. Field Marshal Kesselring acknowledged this tact by ordering General Vietinghoff to withdraw 

from that position the 1st Parachute 

Dillisiurt. Within minutes after Kesselring's order was radioed to the Tmth 

Army on the night of the 17th, British 

Intelligence had deciphered the message and in turn radioed the welcome 

news to Churchill, Alexander, and the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff. :J() 

Throughout the day aircraft of the 

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces flew 

about 200 sorties in support of the 

'" Operations of British, Indian. and Dominion 

Forces in Italv. Part II, Sec. B. Unless otherwisc 

indicated the 'following section is based upon this 

refercllce. 

30 See Winterbotham. Thl! Ultra Seaet, p. 116. 
78 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

MONTE CASSINO MONASTERY SHORTLY AFTER ITs CAPTURE 

Polish attack on MOllte Cassino. Targets 

were enemy mortar and artillery positions in the vicinity of Villa Santa Lucia, 

Passa Corno, and Piedimonte Roccasecca (features north and west of "fonte 

Cassino), as well as the command posts 

of the 1st Parachute and 90th Panzer 

Grenadier Divi,ions and some troops assembling f()r a counterattack to cover 

the planned withdrawal of parachutists. 

The counterattack came that night 

from the neighborhood of the Villa 

Santa Lucia, a mountain village about 

two miles northwest of the abbey and 

was aimed at the Polish troops on the 

Colle Sant'Angeio Ridge. It enabled the 

Germans, as the Polish corps commander, General Anders, had feared, 

to withdraw over the remaining escape 

routes. Consequently, on the morning 

of the 18th, when a patrol li'om the 

12th Podolski Lancers, advancing along 

a ridge fi'om the Colle d'Onufrio southeast of the abbey, reached its o~jective, 

it found onlv thirty badlv wounded 

German soldiers \,iih several medical 

orderlies <Juietly <maiting capture in the 

massive ruins of the abbev. At 1020 the 

Polish lancers hoisted their standard 

over \lonte Cassino, thus ending the 

fourth in a series of battles for the 

height which had begun on 17 Januarv 

1944 when the U.S. 36th Infantry 

Division had {()LIght ils wav across the 

Rapido. 

With the capture of Monte M;uo by 

the French on 13 May, of Spigno and 

Castellonorato bv 1 he A mericans on 1 he 

\:")Ih, and, fin~lIv, on the 18th, of 

Monte Cassino bv ' the Poles, the Allies 

could claim a co;nplete collapse of the 

Gustav Line. General Leese's Eighth 

Army was now lx)ised to move against 

the towns of Pontecorvo, Aquino, and 
COLLAPSE OF THE GUSTAV LINE 

Piedimonte San Germano. strongpoints 

ill that sector of the Hitler Line astride 

the Liri vallev. Two days earlier General Clark's Fifth Army' h~ld begun its 

exploitation to the Hitler Line. That 

meant an advance ;lCr055 the Aurullci 

Mountains and the seaward slopes in 

order to reach that part of the enemv's 

second line of defense lying between 

the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Liri v;:lIlcy. 

The German Rea/lion 

From the very start of the Allied 

offensive. Field :VIarshal Kesselring, despite considerable efflH't on the P;U'l or 

his staff, had been unable to obtain an 

accurate picture of the situation on his 

southern front. He bitterly demanded 

that his senior commanders on that 

b'om, Vietinghoff and Senger, hastilv 

summoned from their leaves in Germany in response to the emergency, 

give him the needed inf(mnation. "It is 

intolerable," he fumed at one point, 

"that a division is engaged in combat 

for one and a half davs without knowing what is going on in its sector." 

Fighting a desperate defensive battle, 

the Tenth Army had captured only a few 

Allied prisoners while losing over 2,000 

of its own men as prisoners of war. 

Little wonder that German division 

commanders were unable to give their 

superiors a clear picture of the f()TCeS 

pressing against their positions.:n 

Not until the 14th had Vietinghoff 

determined that eleven and not six 

Allied divisions, as German imelligellce 

;H TeleC{)Il. Lt Col v. Ingelheim. lao OB Suedwe'l, 

to AOK 10. 0955, 15,1144, in AOK J() KTB Nr. 6, 

Band V. AnlaW'rl 725, Doc. 5327li8. Through intercepts of Enigma messages. the Allied command was 

well aware of the disarray at KcsseirinJ!;'s headquarters. See Winterbotharn. Thi' UII/([ SelTd, p. Ilfi. 

79 

offkel's had originallv believed, were 

trving to break through his {i·ont. He 

al~o ~uspected that Ale'xander was holding twelve additional divisions in readiness for exploitation of any penetration. :l2 

Shonly after the beginning of the 

offensive the Germans had identified at 

the front a number of Allied divisions 

previollsly presumed to be in rear 

areas. Yet they still believed ;IS bte ~IS 

the 14th that' the U.S. :~6lh lnbntry, 

Canadian 1st lnfantn, and South Afi:ican 6th Armoured 'Divisions were in 

the vicinity of Naples, possibly preparing f()I' ;mot her amphibious bnding. 

Field Marshal Alex;mder's deception 

plan had done ils work. OR S IIl'{hl'I'.\/'s 

(;'-2 also believed that on the island of 

Corsica one American and three 

French divisions were being held in 

readiness as a f(JI'ward echelon of a 

large strategic !'esene in 1\'onh Africa, 

earmarked li)l' landings either in southem France or on the Ligurian coast of 

Italy. When 011 15 May German agents 

in Bari reported an unusually large 

concentration of Allied ships in that 

port. concern arose briefly at Kesseh'-

ing's headquarters that the Allies might 

launch an ;unphibious ~Ittack against the 

Adriatic flank in l'o-ordination with ;, 

breakout attempt from the Anzio 

beach head. :l:l The shi ps actually were 

bringing in supplies for the British 

{(>nT'S in Italv. 

Because (')f this faultv estimate of 

Allied tmop disposition's, a problem 

that \YOldd plague the German COIllCOlllments Oil Inspection of Ll Min Corps Iw 

Tenth Arm, CIt'\C, 14 \lav 44, in AOK 10, la KTB 

Nr. 6, Barid V, Anlagen 719. 11-20 :'lien 44. AOK 10. 

Doc. 53:!71/H. 

"" Greiner and S(hr~lInlll. eds .. OKvVIIVF.')I, KTB, 

p.48Y. 
80 

mand in Italy throughout the campaign, Kesselring and his staff persistently worried about the possibility of an 

amphibious landing some\\'here ,)long 

the Tvrrhenian tlank. Partlv this concern \~'as the fruit of the Allied deception plan which deliberately sought to 

f()ster concern in the enemy. Consequently, during the first critic~11 days of 

the Allied offensive, Kesselring had 

been ullwilling to authorize more than 

piecemeal commitment of his reserves, 

and had I()rfeited his only opportunity 

t()r checking the Allied armies bct{)re 

their offensive aOluired :111 irresistible 

momentum. 

;\ot until 15 ;VIay did the Germans 

identifv the Canadia'J1 1st Inbntn Division and the South African 6th Armoured Division opposite the entrance 

to the Liri valle\'. Onlv then did Kesselring belatedly: realiie that the supposed Allied concentration in the vicinity of l'\aples no longer existed. His 

apprehension alleviated, on the 16th he 

ordered the 26th Panza DitJi~ion, as he 

had earlier the 90th Panzer Grenadipr 

Division, to move from the vicinity of 

Rome southeastward into the Tenth 

Armv's sector.:H Since Kesselring rated 

those divisions, together with the 29th 

Panzer Grenadier Dh!i:,ion, as a.mong his 

best, the shift illdicated an even l-"reClter 

awareness of the seriuLlsness of the 

Allied gains on the southern h·ont. Yet 

Kesselring hesitated to release control 

of the 26th Pa1lZ.rr Dh'lSioll to Vietinghofl, holding it instead as a part ;)f 

"" MS # R-f"O (Bailt;y), CMH. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Ann)! Grout) C's reserve even as the 

division began to move southward.:l5 

Over the next few days Army Group C 

alerted additional units-among them 

the 1027th Grenadier and 8th Grenadier 

Regimnlls of the 3d Panzer Grenadier 

Division-I(»)' movement to the Tenth 

Armv's sector. In the Tenth Annv VietingllOff ordered the 30'tll and' 334th 

Di'l'is/()/H on the army's Adriatic nallk to 

shift units to the Liri valley. Movement 

of those reillt()n:emcnts, l~()\\'evcr, was 

considerably delayed bv Allied air attacks. :l!i 

At Supreme Headquarters in German v, Hitler had on the 15th been 

brid~d 011 the renewed fighting 011 the 

distallt Italian hont. He immediately 

ordered the 16th SS Panzer Grfnadier 

Division to move from Germany to 

reinf()n:e the OKW reserves in \l(~rthern Italy, Yet like his commander in 

Italv, Hltler remained uncertain about 

<leu'lal Allied intentions there. He theref()re placed strong restrictions on the 

emplovmenl of the reserve units; they 

were to be used only in event of an 

Allied landing on the~ Ligurian coast, a 

IX)ssibility that the German command in 

Italy had already begun to discoulll. 

Such hesitant\' on the part of both the 

OK\V and Army Grou!} C itl reacting to 

the gathering moment UIll of the Allied 

offensive lx)ded ill /()r re-establishing a 

stabilized h'olll south of Rome, <IS in the 

previous "inter. 

Jbid. 

36 (;reiner and Schramm. eds" OKWIWFSt, KTB, 

p.490. 
CHAPTER V 

Breakthrough on the Southern Front 

The Eighth Army's Advaru:e In the Hitln 

Lint> 

With ooth Allied armies having broken through the Gustav Line, Field 

Marshal Alexander's next concern was 

to dose with and assault the Hitler 

Line, the enemy's second line of defense, '~fore ~he' Germans could dig in, 

The HItler Lme, especiallv in the Liri 

valley, was formidable and if fullv 

manned could be even more of al~ 

obstacle than the Gustav Line. 

The main defenses extended from 

the hill town of Piedimonte San Germano, about four miles west of Cassino 

at the northern edge of the Liri valin, 

in a westerly direction to the vicinity (')f 

A<juino, th~n turned southward p;~rallehng a secondary road fi)r two and a 

half miles as Ll.;· as Pontecorvo. Between Aq uino and Pontecorvo the defensive zone varied in depth {'mm 500 

to 1,000 yards. Supplementing some of 

the natural obstacles found on the 

valley floor, such as the Forme 

d'Aquino, a tributarv of the Liri, was a 

discontinuous antita~k ditch, created bv 

blowing craters that were rapidly filled 

by the high water table. There were 

also antitank mine fields with belts of 

barbed wire in the front and rear. 

Covered by fields of fire from automatic weapons, these wire belts would 

prese:1t a tough obstacle to engineers 

and mfantry seeking to clear paths 

through the mines ·for armor. Scattered 

along the !()J'\\'ard edge of the defensive 

zone were numerous prefabricated armored pillboxes, capable of holding two 

men and a light machine gun. The 

line's main defensive zone COflsistcd of 

an intricate system of reinforced concrete gun emplacements and satellite 

weapons pits, all linked by tunnels or 

communications trenches: Adding to 

antitank de lenses 'were nine PCln'ther 

tank turrets on concrete bases with 

underground living quarters for the 

crews. The turrets had a 360" traverse. 

and two or three mob!le antitank guns 

were echeloned to theIr flanks. A total 

of sixtv-two ant.itank guns, of which 

twenty-five \\'ere self-propelleci, were 

available. I?eep shelters, having (,OlllTCle 

roofs five mches thick and covered with 

uP, to twenty f(:et of earth, gave the 

d~fenders . excellent protection against 

cur and artdlerv bombardment. I 

As f()nnidable as the positions were 

they were weakened by the bilure of 

the Germans to dea;' fields of fire 

through lush, untended vegetation that 

had grown up since the spring. Yet a 

greater handicap was the lack of an 

adequate number of troops to man the 

positions. 

I MS # D-170 (Ruthe); :\(ap, 1;25,000, ')t"l/ungskarte Abschmu 90 Pz. Gren DlV. U A1tn CM'PS, KTB 

Anlagen, Taetzgkeilsbl'1'lcht der Abt, laiStopi. lOy30.v1.44; Situation map, 5-6 Apr 44. AOK 10 KTB 

Anla{.;f// VI. Lagpkarll'lI. I.lV-14.1V.44. ' 
82 

I n the Liri valley the H iller Line 

\'.'()Old be defended bv the 1st Parachute 

Division, in the Piedimonte San Germano area, and the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, which since the 16th had 

replaced the battered 44th Infantry Division, in the sector between Aquino and 

Pontecorvo, The parachute and inbntry 

divisions had already incurred heavy 

casualties in deft'nse (;f the Gustav Lin~. 

The latter di\ision, f()r example, now 

encompassed in addition to its organic 

units a motlel' collection of dismounted 

panzer troop~ as well as various engineer units, all pressed into service as 

infantrl'men. The sector of the Hitler 

Line s;)uth of the Liri valley between 

Ponlecorvo and Pico was h~ld by the 

recently committed 26th Panzer Division. 

Gen~ral Alexander hoped that the 

French Expeditionary Corps, advancing 

rapidly through the mountains overlooking the valley from the south, and 

the Polish corps, advancing along the 

tlanks of the mountains overlooking the 

valley from the north, might be able to 

turn the Hitler Line from the north 

and south and f()n:e the Germans to 

withdraw, as the\' had from the Gustav 

Line, thereby sp:u'ing the Eighth Army 

the necessity of making a set-piece 

frontal attack against the strongest sectors of the line in the vallev. 2 

lVIeanwhile, early on the 18th, General Leese, hoping to overwhelm the 

Germans bet.xe they r'Cached t he shelter of the Hitler Ij;le, sent the British 

78th Division hurrying seven miles west 

along Highway 6 to capture the town of 

Aquino, located on the near bank of 

2 Operations of the British. Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italv, Part II, Sec B. Unless otherwise 

indicated the f()lI~)\ving is based upon this reference. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the Forme d'A<Juino and on a secondarv road alxmt a mile and a half south 

of' the main highway The division 

reached the town in the afternoon and 

immediately attacked. But the Germans, 

veterans of the defense of Monte Cassino, had already occupied the Hitler 

Line positions and repulsed the attack 

with heavy fire. Reluctant to continue 

during the night, the British settled 

down to await armored support, plus a 

thrust by the I st Canadian Division 

toward P~mtec()rv(). (Mal' IV) 

Earlv 011 the 19th a ground fog 

offered welcome concealment to the 

attacking troops. The 78th Division got 

off to a good start, but unlike Joshua, 

Leese was unable to halt the sun in its 

course. When the sun burned the fog 

away the advancing troops found 

ther~~elves on open terrain with little 

cover and exposed to heavy and accurate fire from well-sited enemy antitank 

guns. The fire drove the acc()~npanying 

armor from the field and left the 

inf::mtrv alone to face heavy automatic 

weap<H;s and mortar fire. Under those 

conditions the intalHl'V was unable to 

continue and fell ba(:k to its line of 

departure. In the meantime, the 1st 

Canadian Di\ision's attack toward POIltecorvo stalled partly fi)I' lack of sufficient artillery support, which had been 

largely engaged in backing up the assault on Aquino. Traffic congestion, 

aggravated by a paucity of roads and 

trails, added to the problem. 

The failure of the initial assaults on 

Aquino and Pontecorvo dashed General 

Alexander's hope of out racing the Germans to their second line of defense. 

There now seemed no alternative to an 

all-out set-piece attack against the Hitler 

Line. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT 

The Fifth Army's Advaru:e to the Hitler Lim 

The terrain in the Fifth Army's zone 

was Elr more rugged than that in the 

Liri valle v, yet General Clark's troops 

experienc'ed less trouble than did G~neral Leese's in advancing to and c10smg 

with the Hitler Line. While few roads 

or trails crossed the Aurunci Mountains, neither did the mountains har~)r 

many enemy troops. Aerial reconnaIssance, supported by prisoner of war 

interrogations, had disclos.e,d such ,a 

dearth of enemy that the FIlth Army s 

two corps could' approach their tasks of 

crossing the wilderness of rock and 

scrub oak with considerable confidence. 

Their first goals were the road junctions of Itri and Pico, key points on the 

enemv's second lateral line of communiGitior{s (Route 82), and, in the case of 

Pico, a strongpoint in the Hitler Line, 

which, opposite the Fift.h Army, e.xtended some twenty miles from ItS 

anchor at Terracina on the Tyrrhenian 

coast northeastward across the mountains via Fondi to Pico, on the southern 

edge of the Liri valley. Capture of I.tri, 

the II Corps' objective, would give 

Keyes control over Highway 7 and the 

so~thern half of the enemy's second 

lateral route of communications. Th~ 

key to Itri was Monte Grande, a domIna'ting height just northwest of the 

town. Twelve miles north of Monte 

Grande lies Pico, the second important 

road junction and immediate goal, of 

the FEe. An integral part of the German defense system, Pico was a hinge 

of that part of the Hitler Line passing 

through Piedimonte, Aquino, and Pontecorvo. 

On 1.5 May Clark had directed 

Keyes, in co-ordination with J uin's drive 

across the Aur'unci Mountains, to send 

the II Corps as rapidly as possible to 

capture Itri and then attack the ~ector 

of the Hitler Line between Fonch and 

Terracina. Clark directed J uin to make 

his major effort against a se~tor of the 

enemy's defenses south of PICO, where 

Clark believed it to be the weakest 

opposite the Fifth Army front.:l 

Spigno, on the southern shoulder of 

the P'etrella massif, lay within the II 

Corps zone, but Keye.s agreed. Oil 16 

May to share the village With the 

French as a point of departure for the 

advance across the mountains. The 

steep, tortuous road leading across the 

escarpment to the villa!7c SOOl.1 became 

jammed with Amencan mfantry, 

French colonial troops, mules, and motor vehicles of many types, all winding 

westward through billowing clouds of 

dust. 4 

The II Corps was to advance in 

parallel columns: Slo;:n's 88th .Division 

through the Aurunn Mountams and, 

echeloned to the left, Coulter's 85th 

Division moving across the seaward 

slopes of the mountains toward Maranola and Formia, the latter on the coast 

alxmt seven miles southwcst of Castellonorato." General Sloan selected Colonel Champeny's 351 st Inbntry to I~ad 

the 88th Division across the l1l0untams. 

Champeny's route of march was acro~s 

the southern half of the Petrella massIf 

to Monte Sant'Angclo and Ruazzo, 

about threc and six miles, respectively, 

west of Spigno. 

:l Fifth Army (;,-3 Jnl, 15-1'1 ~by 44: Fifih Army 

History. Part V: pp. 09-72. 

, II Corps CG Dian. 161345B Mav 44.. ." 

'II Corps Directive, I 0 ~lay 44: II, Corps (~3 

Rept of Opns No. 237,.16 May 44; II ~,orps D~a~y, 

101345B May 44. All lt1 88th Dl\ (~3 Jnl, Ib-20 

May 44, vol. 3, incl. 7. 
84 

Guided by two local peasants, the two 

lead battalions started out early on the 

16th for Monte Sant'Angelo. - Moving 

rapidly, the battalions soon outdistanced 

their telephone lines, and even radios 

could function satisfactorily only after 

the setting up of intermediate relay 

stations on the mountaintops. By noon 

Champeny's infantrymen, encountering 

only scattered and light resistance, had 

reached Monte Sant'Angelo. Although 

the regimental commander wanted to 

pause there for a rest, an urgent radio 

message from corps prompted him to 

rush his men westward during the late 

afternoon toward their second o~jective, 

Monte Ruazzo. 6 

As the two battalions of the 351 st 

Infantrv moved toward Route 82, the 

Itri-Pie<; road, Senger, the XIV Panzer 

Corps commander, strengthened his positions along that road \vith a scratch 

f()rce of self-propelled guns and motorized infantrv, a force hardly able to do 

more than ~heck the Amel:icans briefly 

as they emerged from the mountains. 

On 17 May, as the seriousness of 

Senger's situatIon in the mountains became evident at Army Group C headquarters at Frascati, in the Alban Hills 

some ten miles south of Rome, Kesselring, still glancing anxiously over his 

shoulder at his coastal flank and the 

Anzio beachhead, finally decided to do 

something about the T;nlh Army's right 

wing. The C,erman commander authorized Vietinghoff to shift a reconnaissance battalion from the Liri valley to 

reinf(xce Steinmetz's hard-pressed' infantry in the Aurunci Mountains. "Otherwi~e," Kesselring remarked to the 

Tenth Army commander, "Steinmetz will 

n 88th Div G-3./nl, 16--20 May 44, vol. 3, incl. 7. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

not be able to get the situation in the 

mountains straightened out." 7 

On the morning of the 17th, Colonel 

Champeny's men gained the summit of 

Monte Ruazzo. Pausing only briefly, 

they resumed their advance in the late 

aft~rnoon toward Monte Grande, the 

high ground overlooking ILri. When 

early the next morning the Americans 

approached the Itri-Pico road, they ran 

head on into fire from a f(m:e of tanks 

and self-propelled guns hastily assembled by General Senger to defend the 

road. Surprised by the heavy fire, 

Champeny's men had no choice but to 

halt, fix their artillery was too far to the 

rear to be of help, Only when the 

regiment's reserve battalion arrived and 

artillery came within supporting distance could the 351st Infantry resume 

its advance. 8 ' 

Forward displacement of the 88th 

Division's artillery depended upon the 

progress of the neighlx)ring 85th Division advancing across the seaward 

slopes of the Aurunci ylountains, the 

only area where roads and trails were 

to be found over which the guns and 

their prime movers might pass. While 

General Sloan's division threaded its 

way over the mountains toward the ItriPic~ road, General Coulter's 85th Division advanced in two columns along the 

corps' left wing. One column moved 

astride the coastal highway toward Formia and the other, slightly ahead of the 

first, crossed the seaward slopes of the 

Aurunci Mountains toward Maranola, 

at the foot of Monte Campese and 

7 Telecon, OB AOK 10 with Kesselring, 2030B 17 

May 44, in AOK 10, la KTB Nr. 6, Band V, Anlagfll 

777,11-20 44,AOK 10, Doc 53271/1. 

R 88th Div Rpt 55, 181600B May 44, in 88th 

Div G-:11111, vol. 3, incl. 7. 
BREAKTHROUCH ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT 

VIEW OF lTRI 

about three miles west of Castellonorato. On the afternoon of the 17th the 

337th Infantry, 85th Division, after scaling Monte Campese, descended its 

northwestern ridge to take· Mar~mola 

before dusk. That move cut the only 

lateral road leading to Formia, about 

two miles to the southwest. \) 

Meanwhile, Juin's Moroccans and Algerians closed in on Pico. After crossing 

9 II Corps ~3 Rpt 237. 16 May 44 and 88th Div 

~2 Rpt 55. 181600B 'vlay 44, both in 88th Div G-3 

Jnl. 

the northern f1anks of the Aurunci 

Mountains from the Ausonia corridor 

on the 17th, the French reached the 

outskirts of Esperia, whence they overlooked the Liri valley. Early the next 

morning, as the Eighth Army began its 

race for the Hitler Line in the Liri 

valley, the Algerians swarmed out of 

the mountains and into Esperia, while 

elements of Ceneral Sevez's provisional 

mountain corps moved to within artillery range of Pico. In the mountains 

five miles west of Esperia, between 

Monte Faggeto and the Sierra del Lago, 
86 

some French units had actually made 

two slight penetrations of a lightly defended sector of the Hitler Line. 10 

It was no longer possible for the 

Germans to establish a line east of their 

second lateral communications road. 

Furthermore, most German troop 

movements in the rear had become 

almost as hazardous as those in the 

front. During daylight hours, flights of 

fighter-bombers of the XII T AC fredy 

roamed the skies, bombing and strafing 

virtually everything that moved behind 

the German lines, and depriving the 

enemy of the tactkal moblitv so vital to 

his d~fense. The Allied ai;nah, after 

completing the destruction of Itri, 

knocked out two bridges northeast of 

the town and one to the southwest of 

Pico. l ! 

As the Americans drew near Itri and 

Monte Grande and the Frem:h dosed 

in on Pico, Vietinghoffs chief of staff. 

General Wentzell, told General Westphal, Kesselring's chief of staff, that 

Raapke had reported that his 7Ist Division had only 100 inbntrv effectives 

left.12 Westphal promised a~l allocation 

of replacements as soon as possible, but 

it was too late. On the afternoon of the 

18th Kesselring himself belatedly recognized that loss of the XIV Panzer Carps' 

mountain sector was only a matter of 

hours away, which meant that Vietinghoff had to withdraw the Tenth Army's 

entire right wing or face envelopmcI1t. 

H' II Corps G-3 Periodic Rpl 258, 171 GOOB j\!ay 

44 and G-3 Pcriodk Rpl 259, I R 16008 \fa, ,H. 

bOlh in 88th DIV G-3 Jnl. yol. 3, indo 7: Juin, La 

f:mnIJllifn,' d'ltillil', pp. I I R--21. 

XII TAC. ISU M. 170600B :l.-Ia\ 44. in 881h 

.Jill, vol. 3. indo 7. ' 

12 Telccon. AOK I(} CIS wilh Cell Westphal. 

IHI210B :1.-1<1\ 44. in .1OK 10. I" KTB /Vr. 6. Band V. 

Alii. HOI, II-:W :l.-lay 44 . . 40K IU, Doc. .'>3271/8. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Pivoting on Pico, which ,vas to be held, 

that sector between Pico and Itri was to 

be withdrawn slowl\' west of the lateral 

road connecting the two towns, To 

reinforce the Tenth Arm,V's right flank, 

which could be exposed by the maneuver, Kesselring was forced a second 

time to dip into his reserves. He direct.ed the Fourteenth Army (ylackensen) 

to release to Vietinghoff the f()llowing 

day the 29th Panzer GTenadier Divi'iion 

from the Fourteenth Armv's reserveYl 

Like the recentlv committed 26th Panzer 

Division, this to(; was one of Army Group 

Col better units. 

'rheir confidence in the mountains as 

an obstacle to the Allied advance shattered, the Germans \\'ere also in for 

some surprises along the Tyrrhenian 

coast, where the 337th Infantry's capture of Maranola had outflanked their 

positions east of Formia. Thus the 

338th Int~ultTy, advancing astride Highway 7, was able to catch up with and 

eventually overtake its neighboring re6riment in the mountains on the right. 

The 338th Infantry captured Formia 

against only scattered resistance on the 

afternoon of the 18th and continued on 

to the important junction of the coastal 

highway with the Itri-Pico road. less 

than a mile away. There was no opposition. Acting on Kesselring's orders to 

Vietinghoff, General von Senger had 

alreadv ordered it withdrawal to a line 

extelHling about four miles southwest 

from Itri to Monte ~loneta. From that 

line, which was onlv a delaying position, 

the Germans were to till back to a line 

between Fondi and Terracina, the remaining strongpoints of the Hitler Line 

on the Tntlli Armv's right flank. Only a 

,:I \is # C-()(j4 (Kesselring). pp .. ~:~-'i.~. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT 87 

U.S. INFANTRY APPROACHING ITRI 

rear guard remained at Itri and on 

Monte Grande. 

T he withdrawal in the coastal cOITidor came none too soon, £()r the 88th 

Division's leading regiment the (35 1 st 

Infantry) was about to cut the last 

escape route along Hig-hway 7. During 

the afternoon and eve ning of the 18th 

the 35 1 st Infantrv's reserve battalion 

arrived be£ixe ltl-! and the 60 I st and 

697th Artille ry Battalions, moving up 

from Maranola, drew within range of 

the Germans even as they we re preparing to withdraw to their first delaying 

positions between ltri and :vtonte Moneta. 

At that point, Colonel Champen y's 

infantrymen, we ll supported by artillery, attacked a t dawn on th e 19th. 

Opposed only by a rear guard, the 

Americans easil y occupied Monte 

Grande bv midmorning. 14 

The fil st pack train ~ to reach Colonel 

Champeny's 35 1 st Regiment ill three 

days arrived afte r a 14-mile march 

ac~oss the mountain trails from Spigno. 

The ninety mules making up the train 

brought the weary inbnu-Y lllen their 

H Msg, l.eggill 6 to CG 88Lh Di\', 191 2 10B Mav 

44: Hq . 881 h Div Dircnive II> CO l.eal her, 1 H21 OOB 

\by 44. boLh ill H8th Div G--3 Jill, vol. 3. illci. 7. 

16--20 \1av 44. 
H8 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED AT ITRI 

first resupply of rations, ammUllltion, 

and signal equipment since they had 

begun their march on t he afternoon of 

the l:Jt h. I.') 

While the men cut the Itri-Pico road 

and dug in atop Monte Grande, advance patrols of Colonel Cra\\forc!'s 

34Yth Inbntry, which had moved up 

from Maranola during the night, entered Itri and f(Hll1d it leveled. Bv earlv 

afternoon on the I Yth the regiment 

I', \lsg. 3.~lst Int'to II Corps, 191945B \lay 44, 

ill HHth Div G-3 Jnl. m!. 3, inc!. 7. 

had captured or driven away a fe\\ 

Germans lurking in the ruins. 

All across the II Corps front the 

enemy was breaking contact and withdrawing to\\'ard the Hitler Line. Anticipating that the \\ithdrawal would lead 

Clark to consider the possibility of a 

linkup by the II Corps with the Anzio 

beachhead, General Keyes directed 

General Sloan to form "a task force 

consisting of a motorized inbntry battalioll, reinf()rced bv self-propelled artillery, tanks, and engineers. The force 

was to be prepared to capture Fondi, 
BREAKTHROUCH ON THE SOUTH~ERN FRONT 89 

seven miles northwest of Itri, and block 

a secondary route from the coast to the 

Liri vallev~the Lenola-Valle Corsa road 

~where it "passes through a narrow defile 

four miles north of Fondi-as preliminaries to an assault on the Hitler Line 

and a thrust to the beachhead. lfi 

Meanwhile, General Coulter had sent 

the 91 st Reconnaissance Squadron 

southwest along the coast to the 18th 

century Neapolitan seaside stronghold 

of Gaeta. Ranging freely and virtually 

unopposed, the squadron entered the 

port on the 19th. From Gaeta the f()rce 

pushed northwestward eight miles 

along coastal roads to enter Sperlonga 

the next day. 

As Gene~al Sloan assembled his mobile task f()rce f()r the drive on Fondi 

and possible exploitation toward the 

Anzio beachhead, General Clark 

weighed the choices before him. Only 

one dav earlier he had directed Keves 

to hold all but one regiment of O;ulter's division at Formia to await movement by sea to Anzio. Should the entire 

II Coq;s atlempt a breakthrough of the 

Hitler Line between Fondi and T erracina and then continue on to Anzio, or 

should Keyes merely close up to the 

line without attacking while Clark withdre\~\' the 85th Division and other elements of the II Corps for movement to 

the Anzio beachhead by water? 

Clark hesitated. On the 18th he had 

received a message from Alexander, 

who was understandablv concerned 

about the Eighth Army'~ progress in 

the Liri valley and uncertain just how 

vigorously the Germans would defend 

the Hitler Line. He ordered Clark to be 

16 Msg, Hq II Corps (5gd Col R.L.J. Butchers, II 

G-3) to 85th DiY, 191645B [\!ay 44, in 88th 

Jnl, vol. 3, indo 7, , 

prepared to change the axis of his 

army's advance to the north. He was to 

be ready to send the II Corps as well as 

the FEC tmvard the Ceprano road 

junction of Routes 6 and 82 in the Liri 

valley to threaten the German line of 

communications in the valley. Next day 

General Alexander became painfully 

aware about ho\\' staunchly the Germans would defend the Hitler Line. 

The British 78th Division \vas thrown 

back at Aquino and the French wcre 

halted bef()re Pico by elements of the 

26th Panzer Division, "which Kesselring 

had ordered to replace the battered 

71 sf DiVIsion on that part of the front. I, 

Although Clark shar'ed Alexander's 

uncertainty about how strongly the Germans would attempt to hold the Hitler 

Line, the Fifth Army cOIllmander Ullderstandably had les~ concern for the 

Eighth Army's problems in the Liri 

va lie V than for his own. Clark's attention . was focused on the Hitler Line 

between Fondi and Terracina. If the 11 

Corps were to link with thc beachhead, 

Keyes would have to break through 

soon. The Fihh Army staff had estimated that it would r~quire f(lUr days 

to move the 36th Division to Anzio bv 

sea and almost a week to shift the 8:')th 

Division and other parts of the 11 

Corps. Such a delay would afford the 

Germans a welcome respite. When, on 

thc 20th, the 91 st Reconnaissance 

&luadron, after having taken Gaeta the 

day bcforc. pwbed brusquely into 

Fondi and. bef()re retiring, f()lll1d the 

town weakly defended-no troops of 

the 291ft POri;:'('/' Grl'nadin iJi"l'is!(m 

destined f()r that part of the front had 

17 Mathews, "The French in the Drive on Rome," 

Fraternitr d'Armfs Franco-Arner;ca;np, pp, 133-34. 
90 

vet arrived--Clark had his answer. lIe 

decided, notwithstanding Alexander's 

concern f()r Eighth Army's difficulties 

in the Liri vaHey, to take advantage of 

the enemy's apparent weakness along 

the coastal flank and throw the weight 

of Keyes' corps into a drive up the 

narrow coastal corridor toward a junction with the beachhead. J uin's corps 

would, Clark believed, be sufficient to 

force the Germans to relax their defense opposite the Eighth Army. Ii! 

Breakthrough of the Hitler Line 

Clark's decision to disregard Alexander's operational concept was not the 

first time. nor would it be the last, that 

the American commander, taking advantage of rapidly changing opportunities, followed a course of action at 

variance with that originally envisioned 

hv Afexander. In this instance, after 

~ing advised hy Clark of the change, 

Alexander did not o~ject. He had held 

as loose a rein on Montgomery in the 

Western Desert. This was the Allied 

commander's stvle of command. It had 

brought success'to the Alexander-Montgomery team in North Africa, and 

Alexander expected that it would work 

in Italy with an eq uaBy independent 

subordinate. In any case, the Fifth 

Army was advancing toward the longsought junction with the Anzio beachhead, and the Eighth Armv was preparing to launch a major set-piece attack 

against the Hitler Line.1!l In preparai" Hqs, Fifth Army Opns lnstr 19. 18 May 44: 

Clark Diary. 20 \fay 44; Fifth Arm, Histor;, P;;n V, 

pp. 79--~O. 

'" Gen Clark's personal comments on \fS, Oct 

1973. in CMH files; ;-.JimIson. Alex, the Life 0/ 

Fi,'ld ,'.1l1r.,hnl, Earl AII'X{J)ulf'l of [",/1.1 (:-Jew York: 

Atheneum. 1(73), p. 160. 

CASSINO "T'O THE ALPS 

tion for that attack General Leese had 

shifted the burden from the British 13 

Corps (78 Division) to the 1st Canadian 

Corps, which was to make the main 

eff()rt in the sector immediately north 

of Pontecorvo. The former was to 

maintain pressure against Aquino and 

be prepared to advance abreast of the 

Canadians after the breakthrough. 

Alexander had selected the night of 

21 May, or early on the 22d, for the 

beginning of the attack, indicating that 

he expected the operation in the Liri 

valley to coincide with the beginnings of 

the U.s. VI Corps' breakout oflensive 

from the Anzio beachhead. 20 

Meanwhile, on the 19th the Polish 

corps, on the 13 Corps' right, had 

advanced four miles beyond Ylonte 

Cassino to capture an enemy strongpoint, the Villa Santa Lucia. From there 

the Poles prepared to continue their 

progress the next day toward the northern anchor of the Hitler Line at Piedimonte San Germano. 

Preparing for his imminent set-piece 

attack on the Hitler Line, General 

Leese brought t()rward units from his 

reserve. The 8th Indian Division, which 

had been relieved earlier by t he 1st 

Canadian Infantrv Division, began mo\'-

ing on the 19t'h from east of the 

R.:tpido to an assembly area IX' hind the 

Canadian corps' sector. Concurrently, 

the British 6th Armoured Division also 

departed the army reserve to t~lke part 

in the exploitation of the expected 

breakthrough of the Hitler Line. With 

t hose units under way, together with 

'" 0p"rations of Britbh. Indian. and Dominiull 

Fones in Itah-, Part lI, Sec. I), Lnlcss otlwn,isc 

indicated the 'f()!Iowing section is based upun this 

reference, See also :-Jicholsnn, The CanaJiiam In Italy, 

pp. 411~12. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT 91 

the normal supply traffic in support of 

the offensive, the few roads and trails 

behind the army front soon became 

congested with monumental and virtually uncontrollable traflic jams. 

Traffic control problems were not, 

however, peculiar to the Eighth Army. 

On the same day that General Keyes 

assembled his forces for an assault on 

the Hitler Line at a point between 

Fondi and Terracina, he directed the 

troops still on the mountains to move at 

once southward through Itri. That order precipitated a traffic jam near the 

Itri road junction of Routes 7 and 82, 

as the infantry from the 88th Division, 

descending the mountains on the 19th 

became intermingled with elements of 

the 88th Division's motorized task force 

assembling to move on Fondi. For 

almost eight hours a tangle of motor 

vehicles, pack trains, and troops blocked 

the main road and held Sloan's task 

force east of the Itri junction more 

effectively than the enemy could then 

have done. Not until the following 

morning was the snarl untangled. 21 

Once again, as in the early hours of 

the May offensive when the FEC's 

capture of Monte Majo had been the 

break that had loosened up the entire 

German defenses, the French were to 

be the first to break through the enemy 

line. On the 20th, despite heavy fog 

and stubborn resistance from elements 

of the 26th Panzer Division, the 3d 

Algerian Infantry Division, reinforced 

with armor, penetrated the Hitler Line 

southwest of Pico and drove the enemy 

from the heights overlooking the town 

21 Msg, 88th Div to Engrs, 192030B May 44; CO 

Recon Trp to LO, 200220B May 44; Msg, 85th Div 

(Capt Butner) to II Corps, 200215B May 44. All items 

in 88th Div G-3 Jn1, vol. 3, incl. 7. 

from the south. That evening the Algerians gained a foothold in the town 

itself. The Germans held off the attacking troops until the afternoon of the 

22d, but the pressure was too great. 

Fighting on throughout the night, the 

Algerians drove the last of the enemy 

from the town by morning of the 

23d. 22 

As Clark had foreseen, it would be 

the French breakthrough at Pico that 

would soon pay important dividends 

both in the Liri valley and on the 

Tyrrhenian flank, for in the attempt to 

hold Pico, Vietinghoff had been forced 

to bring up substantial parts of the 15th 

and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions from 

the Liri valley where they might have 

manned the Hitler Line against the 

Eighth Army. Moreover, Senger's 

preoccupation with the defense of Pico 

had prevented him from countering 

the threat posed by Keyes' I I Corps to 

that part of the Hitler Line between 

Fondi and Terracina. 2 :3 

In General Alexander's opinion, the 

critical stage of the spring offensive had 

been reached on the morning of 23 

May. The French had captured Pico, 

the hinge and vital connecting link 

between the sector of the Hitler Line 

that lay across the Liri valley and that 

still blocked the way to the II Corps' 

junction with the Anzio beachhead. 

Also on the 23d, the Eighth Army's 1st 

Canadian Corps was about to launch an 

all-out set-piece attack against the Pontecorvo sector of the Hitler Line, while 

on the coastal flank astride Highway 7 

the Fifth Army's II Corps was alx)Ut to 

22 Mathews, "The French in the Drive on Rome," 

pp. 134-35; Juin, I.a CamjJagnl' d'itabl', pp. 124-28. 

2:1 Mathews, "The French in the Drive on Rome," 

p. 134. 
92 

enter Terracina. And that same morning the Fifth Army's VI Corps had 

begun its long-awaited breakout offensive from the Anzio beachhead. 

For the assault on the Hitler Line the 

Eighth Army commander had assigned 

the 1 st Canadian Corps a sector extending northward from the Liri to a point 

near Aquino, which remained the objective of the British 13 Corps. General 

Leese's over-all concept envisioned a 

breakthrough of the Hitler Line by the 

Canadian corps at Pontecorvo, while 

the FEC, after capturing Pico, would 

thrust toward Ceprano to menace the 

enemy's line of communications in the 

upper Liri valley. The 5th Canadian 

Armoured Division was, in the meantime, to be prepared to ex ploit the 

breakthrough at Pontecorvo by an advance 'toward Ceprano. 24 

Behind a rolling barrage fired by 810 

guns, the Canadians launched their 

attack against Pontecorvo at dawn on 

the 23d. Taking cover in the deep 

shelters in the sector opposite the Canadians were four grenadier and two 

engineer battalions, as well as a field 

replacement battalion, all under the 

command of the 90th Panzer Grenadier 

Division. The 1 st ParG£hute Division, with 

two parachute infantry regiments in 

line, awaited the British 13 Corps' attack at Aquino. 

Meanwhile, the haze that had covered the valley in the morning had 

changed to rain, turning the battlefield, 

already pocked by heavy artillery fire, 

into a morass. Only after severe fight240peralions of British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Pan II, Sec. B; Nicholson, Thr 

Canadians in italy, pp, 4 I 4-25. Unless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon these references, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ing did the Canadians by nightfall at 

last blast a hole in the Hitler Line about 

a mile northeast of Pontecorvo. By 

daylight on the 24th the enemy was 

gone from the town. 

Casualties were heavy, especially in 

the 1 st Division's 2d Brigade, which led 

the attack. In the Allied attack a total of 

513 men were killed or wounded, yet 

the enemy incurred even heavier losses. 

The Canadians took 540 prisoners and 

estimated even a larger number to be 

killed or wounded. Only at Aquino did 

the Germans throughout the 23d and 

the 24th repulse all assaults against the 

Hitler Line, but thereby they denied 

the Eighth Army the only good road in 

the valley, Highway 6. 

While the 78th Division fought on at 

Aquino, the Canadian corps swept 

through Pontecorvo on the 24th. and by 

nightfall had advanced five miles beyond to the near bank of the Melfa 

River, a southward-flowing tributary of 

the Liri. That night the Canadians 

forced a crossing of the river. Ceprano, 

the goal of both the French and the 

Canadians, lay only five miles away. 

Meanwhile, throughout the 25th, the 

German delaying action at Aquino and 

Piedimonte San Germano continued to 

deny the Eighth Army use of Highway 

6. Thus blocked, the Canadian 5th 

Armoured Division and the British 6th 

Armoured Division, as well as all other 

traffic in support of the offensive, had 

to take the already overcrowded and 

rapidly deteriorating secondary ro~~s 

and trails in the valley, so that trafhc 

jams continued to cau~e delay and 

confusion as the Canadians Widened 

their bridgehead beyond the Melfa. 

Covered by a rare air strike the Germans, during the night of 25 May, took 
BREAKTHROUGH ON '[HE SOUTHERN FRONT 93 

advantage of the slow Allied advance to 

evacuate both Aquino and Piedimonte 

San Germano, but they failed to demolish two bridges in Aquino that the 

British were quick to use. 

After the fall of Piedimonte San 

Germano, the Polish corps was pinched 

out of line by the British 10 Corps, 

operating on the army's right flank. 

The latter continued to follow up the 

enemy's withdrawal, t he same assignment it had been executing since the 

beginning of the offensive. 

lUlution With till' BI'(lchhNld 

While the Eighth Army achieved its 

breakthrough in the Liri valley, in the 

mountains to the south of the vallev the 

U.S. Fifth Army continued its effo;ts to 

exploit the penetration of the Hitler 

Line made by the FEC on the Pico 

sector and to achieve a breakthrough 

with the I I Corps. C..eneral Clark, anxious to keep the enemy from withdrawing troops from the southern front in 

order to counter the VI Corps' breakout offensive from the beachhead, 

sought to maintain heavy pressure 

against the Germans in the mountains 

and in the Liri valley. lie directed 

General Juin on 22 M~y to exploit the 

imminent fall of Pico by a thrust against 

the southern flank of the Liri valley 

with a two-pronged drive northward 

toward Ceprano, a road junction on 

Highway 6 seven miles n0l1h of Pico, 

and northwestward via Valle Corsa to 

Castro dei Voisci to Pofi, some nine 

miles northwest of Pico. This phase of 

the Fifth Army's offensive began early 

the next day at the same time the 

breakout offensive began at Anzio. 

When, however, the Eighth Army began to show considerable progress in its 

attack on the Hitler Line in the Liri 

valley, the French drive shifted more 

toward the northwest in the direction of 

Castro dei Voisci in order to envelop 

the Germans opposing the Eighth 

Army. On the 24th Valle Corsa, five 

miles south of Castro dei Volsci, fell to 

the French and San Giovanni Incarico, 

on Route 82 four miles north of Pico, 

fell on the next day. Thereafter, the 

enemy fought only delaying actions in 

an attempt to hold open his routes of 

escape opposite the U.S. II Corps on 

the west and the Eighth Army on the 

east. 

The II Corps had still to contend 

with a ten-mile stretch of the Hitler 

Line overlooking the coastal highway 

between Fondi and Terracina. Except 

for strongpoints at both places, the 

Germans had developed few defenses 

in that sector and preferred, as in the 

mountains between Pico and Fondi, to 

rely primarily on the rugged terrain. 

Before joining up with the U.S. VI 

Corps in the Anzio beachhead, the II 

Corps would have to cross an area 

varying in width from ten to twenty 

miles, from an irregular coastline to 

the left flank of the FEC, three miles 

north of Fondi. The area extended 

northwest from the Itri-Pico road over 

thirty miles of desolate mountains, deep 

gorges, and marshy coastal plains to 

Sezze, an isolated village overlooking 

the beachhead from the Lepini Mountains to the northeast. 

South of Itri a hilly region four miles 

wide and ten miles long parallels the 

coast as far as Sperlonga, about seven 

miles east of Terracina. The hills fall 

away in the west into a triangle-shaped 

coastal marsh, which the Germans, by 
~)4 

flooding, had made even more of an 

obstacle. The base of the triangle 

stretches along the coast from Sperlonga to Terracina with an apex at 

Fondi. 

When General Sloan's 88th Division 

attacked Fondi, it f(mnd the town defended onlv bv survivors of General 

Steinmetz's 'battered 94th Infantry Division and the modest reinf(lrCements that 

Senger and VietinghofT had managed 

to scrape together locally. The t()rmidable 29th Panw' Grenadier DivisIOn, which 

Kesselring on th~ 19th had ordered 

sent to the Fondi area, still had not 

arrived because General von Mackensen, I he Fourteenth .1 rmy commander, 

had been slow to release the division. 

Facing an imminent Allied offensive 

from the Anzio beachhead, Mackensen 

was understandablv anxious to husband his remaining reserves. 

Once before, in October 194:3, one 

of Kesselring's army commanders (that 

time, Vietinghoff) had apparently 

dragged his heels in obeying orders to 

send the 16th Pan;:.l'r Di,'isiotl to repel 

the British landing at Tennoli. Then 

events had vindicated Vietinghoffs insubordination. 'Would events do the 

same f(.)1' Mackensen? 25 The traffic jam 

between lui and Fondi might have 

delayed General Sloan's forces long 

enough to have enabled the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division to OCCUPY the Terradna-Fondi sector bef()l'e the Americans 

attacked had not the men of Colonel 

Crawf(>rd's 349th InfanLly, preceded by 

elements of the 91st Reconnaissance 

Squadron, managed to slip by the bottleneck. 21) 'The advance owed much to 

"See BlumellSol1, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 190-91: 

1\15 # C-064 (Kessclrin!!;L 

'Ii 349th I nf RPI of Opns, May 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the presence of Brig, Gen. Paul W. 

Kendall, the 88th Division assistant 

commander, who had been acting as 

lft.'neral Sloan's alter ego: first with the 

350th Infantry during the fight for 

Monte Damiano 011 II and 12 ,\1av and 

later with the 351 st Infantry in t h{: dash 

from Spigno to Monte Grande. He 

would continue to act in this capacity as 

the 349th Infantry raced for Fondi. By 

noon on the 20th the regiment had 

come wit hin two miles of the town. 27 

Fondi-the ancient Roman Fundi, 

near where the Republic's legions under Quintus Fabius Maximus had 

checked Hannibal's army during the 

First Punic War-provided in Mav 

1944. as it had in the 3d centurv, B.c., 

a na~ural defensive position, this time 

guarding access to the enemy's third 

lateral line of cornmunicatioI1S leading 

northward across the mountains to the 

Liri vallev. Pillaged twice in the 16th 

centurv, the town was to fare somewhat 

better in the 20th, f<)r the very swiftness 

of the 349t.h Infantry's advance would 

carry the Americ·an infantrymen 

thro~gh the position be fore ~rman 

reinf<m:ements could dig in. 

A patrol of the 91st Reconnaissance 

Squadron having dnn\'Il heavy fire 

from Fondi early on the 20th, Lt. Col. 

Walter B. Yeager (commander of the 

349th Inf;:mtrv's 3d Battalion) was alen 

to the hazards of a frontal assault on 

the town. Leaving onlv a holding f(m:e 

south of Fondi, Yeager led his troops, 

accompanied by a platoon of tanks, off 

the main road and into the hills overlooking the town from the northeast. 

As Yeager had suspected, the local 

German commander, apparently antici-

" II Corps G-3J1I1. :'vIa)' 44. 
BREAKTHROCCH ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT 

pating an Allied thrust along the main 

road instead of through the mountains, 

had concentrated his meager defenses 

astride Highway 7. An assault down the 

slopes made quick work of the enemy 

garrison. 28 

Leaving a company to outpost the 

town, Yeager continued with the rest of 

his men toward Monte Passignano, just 

over a mile to the north. By evening 

the battalion was securely established on 

the high ground and hid settled down 

for a well-earned rest while patrols 

probed north and west in search of the 

foe. The swift blow at Fondi had cost 

the 349th Infantrv 6 dead and 13 

wounded, but in the process, the 3d 

Battalion had pierced the Hitler Line at 

one of the two remaining strongpoints 

within the II Corps sector and had 

denied to the enemy his last good 

lateral communications short of the 

Anzio beachhead. 29 

While the breakthrough at Fondi was 

the more decisive, a thrust by the 88th 

Division far into the mountains northeast of the town appeared more spectacular. Even as Yeager attacked Fondi 

on the 20th, Colonel Fry's 350th Infantry began what became a ten-mile 

march northwestward to Monte Alto, 

deep within enemy territory. There 

Fry's men overran scattered German 

p<;sitions, killing 40 enemy soldiers and 

taking 65 prisoners at a cost of 30 

American casualties, most of whom 

were wounded and evacuated over the 

diflicult mountain trails on litters borne 

by the German prisoners.:lO 

Fry's bold thrust created such a deep 

28 Ibid. 

2" H8th Div G-:-\ Jnl. vol. :-\, ind, 7: 349th lnf Rpl 

of Opm, \fay 44, 

30 350th InfJnl, May 44. 

salient within the TI'ilth Ann)'s right 

wing that it would take the rest of the 

Fifth Army three days to catch up. 

Until the rest of the 88th Division could 

cover Fry's flanks, he was dependent 

for supplies on an unprotected line of 

communications maintained by pack 

mule trains plodding over trackless 

mountain terrain. German patrols ambushed and destroyed one train of f()ltv 

animals and frequ~ntly harassed other~. 

To protect his line of communications, 

General Sloan on the 21 st sent the 

349th and 35lst Infantry Regiments 

along Fry's right flank, where they 

remained until the left flank of the FEC 

would draw abreast two days later. at 

Along the coastal flank, the 85th 

Division, with the 337th Regiment leading the way, continued to move toward 

Terracina. Finding the narrow coastal 

higlnvay frequently blocked by demolitions, the corps commander ordered 

General Coulter to mount a small-scale 

amphibious operation to bypass the 

obstacles in the hope of accelerating the 

advance. Keves had confidence in such 

a maneuver: since a similar tactic had 

had some success in the dosing days of 

the Sicilian campaign. 32 

Late in the afternoon 0 f the 21 st the 

1st Battalion, 338th Infantry, boarded a 

fleet of DCK W's at the port of Gaeta 

and moved parallel to the coast toward 

Terracina, but so choppy was the sea 

that the small armada eventually gave 

up and limped into port at Sperlonga, 

31 II Corps Opns Rpt, Ma'-~Jun 44. 

"" Fifth Armv G--3 Jnl, 21-22 May 44; 88th Diy 

G-$ Jnl, 16--20 May 44, vol. 3, imL 7; Paul L 

Schultz. Thr 85th DiVISIOn in World WaT II (Washington: The lnfantry Journal Press, 1959), p. 49; Msg. 

Harponl 3, 220445B May 44, in II Corps G-3 Jul, 

30 Apr-31 Mav 44, Unless otherwi,,· cited the 

follo\\ing section is based on the above sources, 
CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

AERIAL VIEW OF TERRACINA 

several miles short of Terracina. The ad 

hoc seaborne infantrymen had nothing 

to shmv fix their pains-and they were 

many--except a renewed appreciation 

f()r the terra firma they knew so well. 

Upon arrival at Sperionga most of 

the DUKW's were f()und to be unseaworthv. One sank and three others 

broke 'down on reaching shore' twelve 

others, the battalion c~)nHnan'der insisted, \vould never make it to Terracina. Abandoning the amphibious venture, the 1st Battalion moved inland to 

join the rest of the 338th Inhmtry in 

reserve south\vest of Fondi. 

Magnificently situated on an eminence of gleaming limestone, Terracina 

anchored the Hitler Line in the II 

Corps sector and appeared to be an 

ideal defensive IX)sition. From a high, 

finger-like ridge the mountains overlooking the town drop sharply into the 

sea. At several places cliffs overhang the 

main road, which runs along a narrow 

strip often less than a hundred yards 

wide betv,'een the mountains and the 

sea. An ancient Roman fortress town, 

Terracina marks the traditional lxwndary between southern and central Italy. 

Because the Germans considered 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE SOUT'HERN FRONT 97 

Terracina easily defensible from the 

landward side. they had concentrated 

their permanent' defensive \vorks 

against a seaborne attack, which after 

the Anzio landing had seemed the 

greater danger. The fiasco at Sperlonga, however, ended any threat from 

that quarter. ' 

'rhe 337th Infantry's I sl Battalion. 

advancing slowly along the heavily cratered and rnined coastal highwav, 

moved to within a mile of T;rraci~a 

~ef(xe machine gun and small arms 

fIre forced a halt. Again as at Fondi 

the Americans took <to the hills over~ 

looking the road. Leaving their artillerv 

support behind and marching across 

the seaward slopes, they gained high 

ground northeast of Terracina, the 

sumI~it of, Monte Sam'Angelo, on the 

lIlormng of the 22d.:l:; 

Establishing themselves near the 

ruins of a temple to Jupiter Auxur, the 

inLmtrvmen of the I st Battalion paused 

to northwestward across the Pontine Marshes toward the dim outline of 

the Alban Hills, the last major terrain 

feature south of Rome. If on tbat 

picturesque height any of the men 

chose to meditate upon the vanished 

glories of antiquity in their immediate 

vicinity, they were rudely cut short by 

heavy' fire {rom a battali~m of the 29t11 

Panzer GTenadier Division that had arrived belatedly during the night. Faced 

with an overwhelming volume of fire, 

Colonel Hughes withdrew his men to 

the base of Monte Sanr'Angeio where 

they were joined bv the 3d B;tta!ion, 

while anillerv, which had drawn to 

within supporting distance, opened fire 

,,;j Fifth Army G-3 Jnl, 21-22 May 44. Tel Msg 

from 11 Corps, 220515B May 44,lnl X5-22-12, 

on Terracina and the western slopes of 

Monte Sant'Angeio.:I'1 (i\Ja/, '/) 

Behind heavy preparatory artillery 

fire and with the newly arrived 3d 

Battalion in reserve, the 1 st Battalion 

returned to the attack during the afternoon of the 22d. This time the Germans contested every foot of the 

ground, but despite intense mortar fire 

from the hills northwest of Terracina, 

the men of the 337th InfantTY had by 

nightfall f(lUght their way ba~k to th~ 

top of Monte Sam'Angelo and moved 

down the reverse slope as far as a 

cemeterY a mile north of the LO\\I1. 

After thlrtv-six hours of virtuallv uninterrupted fighting, the I st Battalion. too 

exhausted to continue, was relieved 

after dark bv the 3d Battalion. Resuming the att~lCk, the 3d Battalion by 

midnight had infiltrated beyond the 

cemetery into the outskirts of Terracina.:l~ 

As the 337th Infantry prepared to 

renew the assault on Terracina on the 

23d, two battalions of the 338th Infantry advanced over Monte San Std;lI1o 

toward Monte Leano, fc)Ur miles northwest of the town, Their' mission was to 

block Highwav 7 where it ran along the 

f()ot of Monte Leano, thereby cutting 

the German route of withdrawal from 

Terracina. Threatened with encirclement, the German garrison in Terracina left behind a small rear guard and, 

during the night of 23 May, withdrew 

northwestward in the darkness. 

The Tenth Army IVith.draws 

To Kesselring and his staff the overall German situation in Italy \vas Lll' 

3' 337th InC 85th Div, Opns Rpl, :May 44, pp, 4-

5. 

3:, Ibid. 
98 

MAP 4 

Corttoct. morning, 

25 May 

rr"RHENIAN 

SEA 

from reassuring. In the Liri va lley, the 

Eighth Army had pie rced the Hitle r 

Line. The Fifth Army's two-pronged 

drive by the C.S. II Corps and the FEe 

toward the Anzio beachhead and upper 

reaches of the Liri va lley, res pectively, 

threatened to enve lop the e ntire le ft 

wing of Macke nse n's Fourteenth Army 

and the right wing of the Tenth Army. 

Furthermore, the Allied beachhead alCASSI NO TO THE ALPS 

II-VI CORPS LINK - UP 

22-25 Moy 1944 

mmnm ALLIED FAOHT, Z2 .. A. 

~,..., II""'EO f RONT, 25 MA. 

--...... PATROL 

® CON TA CT 

Contour interval i n m~/6rs ° 5 1411.£$ 

t' ~'~"~"~i +I-----rl I 5 0 5 " " OM[T£A$ 

M.Finn, ,,, ann. 

ready had begun to e rupt. The pending fa ll of Terracina would o pen the 

main coastal highway all the way to the 

beachhead, while the FEC-driving beyond Pi co toward Lenola, thiJ1een miles 

~ortheast of T e rrac ina a nd a ke y 

strongpoint Oil a road to Frosinone, on 

Highway 6 some fifty miles southeast of 

Rome-threatened to split the two German armies. Should the Germans fail to 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT 99 

halt the Fifth Army at either Terracina 

or at Lenola, a breakthrough to the 

beachhead and probably to the Caesar 

Line, the last German defensive IX)sition below Rome, was a certainty. 30 

At Supreme Headqua11ers (OKW) in 

Gcrmam', some officers recommended 

to Hitle;' that Kesselring be directed to 

abandon his front south of Rome, 

others that he employ all of his remaining air strength in an effort to hold his 

positions. One of the latter, General der 

Artillerie Walter Warlimont, deput' 

chief of the OK W operations staff, 

declared that bilure to commit the 

Luftwaffe would doom Kesselring's 

chances of holding Rome. Determined 

to husband remaining air power for the 

expected Allied invasion of northwestern France, lIitter refused to accept 

that reasoning. He chose instead to 

allow Kesselring to continue as he was 

doing: defend as long as possible on 

favorable terrain before hdling back 

under pressure to another line, all the 

while exacting as heavy a toll as possible 

from the attacking Allied forces, instructions known to Alexander and his 

army commanders through the deciphered Enigma messages. :l7 

The Americans, in the meantime, 

had launched their final thrust to the 

beachhead. Early on the 24th patrols of 

the 85th Division's 3:37th Infantrv entered Terracina, and in midmo~-ning 

Clark's chief of stafl reported, "Terracina is ours.":!B \\Thile General Coulter's 

engineers cleared the road through the 

36 Greiner and Schramm, c(\s., OKWlfVFSt. OKW, 

pp,491-92. 

"' ibid.; Wintnbotilam. The Ultra Serret. p. 117, 

3" 3371h Inf Opns Rpt. '"fay 44: Fifth Army 

Siln:ps, 11-30 '"Iay 44; \lsg. Gruenlhcl to Clark, 

Ref 167. 240925B :Vlay 44. 

town, a patrol from the gist Reconnaissance Squadron moved cautiously 

across the Pontine Marshes to the village of Borgo Grappo, where shortly 

after daylight on 25 Mav the troopers 

met an engineer patrol from the U.S. 

VI Corps. Two weeks after the beginning of the May offensive 011 the 

Rapido-Garigliano front and 125 days 

after the Allied landings at Anzio, the 

troops from the southern front, having 

successively broken through the Gustav 

and Hitler Lines, had linked with those 

from the beachhead. :llJ 

With the French capture of Pico and 

the Ix:ginning of the breakout of/('nsive 

from the Anzio beachhead on the 23d, 

and the f~lll of Pontecorvo to the Canadiems and of Terracina to the Americans on the 24th, Vietinghoffs Tenth 

Anny had no alternative to a full-scale 

withdrawal across the southern front. 

Beginning the night of the 25th, the LJ 

Mountain Corps, opposite the Eighth 

Armv, fdl back beyond the Melfa River 

and' withdrew from the Liri vallev 

northward along the several roads 

through the mountains that parallel 

Highway 6 to the north. Opposite the 

Fifth Army's II Corps and the FEe, the 

XIV Panzer Corps withdrew northward 

through the Ausonia Mountains into 

the Sacco River valley, which joins the 

Liri valley about three miles northeast 

of Pico. 

A combination of increasingly difficult terrain, congested roads, and a 

caution born of ,veariness and heavy 

casualties slowed the Eighth Arm/s 

pursuit, while the tremendous significance attached to the capture of Rome 

had its influence on the Filth Army's 

3" II Corps G-3 J nl, l\'iay 44. 
100 

next operations. Meanwhile, large quantities of supplies from Naples moved in 

long truck columns along Highways 6 

and 7 to support the final drive on 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Rome. Operation DIADEM was about to 

enter a new phase. 40 

4() Gen Clark's personal comments on MS, On 

1973, in eM H files. 
PART TWO 

BREAKOUT FROM THE 

BEACHHEAD 

From ... the general endeavour to attain a relative superiority, there 

follows another endeavour which must consequently be just as general in 

its nature: this is the .Iur/Jrisl' of the enemy. It lies more or less at the 

foundation of all undertakings, fill' without it the preponderance at the 

decisive point is not properly conceivable. 

CLAUSEWITZ, On War 

CHAPTER VI 

The Anzio Beachhead 

Italian LandI IIS. Gn1rlan Blood 

As the Allied f()rce used its strong 

right arm to punch its way. from .the 

southern front toward the Hitler Lme, 

the left arm, which for several weeks 

had been gathering strength within the 

confines of the Anzio beachhead, remained flexed for a sharp hook against 

General Mackensen's Fourteenth Army, 

keeping vigil over the beachh~ad. In 

accord \vith General Alexander s order 

of 5 May, the attack from the beachhead \\'a~ to be launched on 24-hours' 

notice at any time after D plus 4. The 

Allied annie's commander had reserved 

f()r himself the final decision as to the 

exact time. 1 It was to constitute the 

hoped-for fulfillme~t of. ~lexander's-:­

as well as Churchill s--ongmal strategIc 

concept behind Operations DIA~EM and 

SHINGLE, a one-two punch deSigned to 

trap and annihilate a large, p0l1ion of 

Kesselring's armies south of Ron~e before moving in to capture the capital (!f 

Mussolini's crumbling empire. ThiS 

strategy rested upon the premise that it 

was more profitable to destroy enemy 

units than to take ground. It would not 

be enough merely to push back enemy 

armies but to wipe thelll out to such an 

extent that they would have to, be 

replaced from other theaters to aVOid a 

rout. Yet the lure of Rome for all 

I Hq AAI. Opns 0 l, ') Mav 44. 

Allied commanders in haly threatened 

to undermine that premise. 2 

This strategy had yet to receive full 

acceptance within the Fifth Army, although the original mission in Operation SHINGLE had included a thrust 

from the beachhead to cut the XIV 

PanzPr Curl's' line of communications,:l 

As far as C...eneral Clark was concerned, 

tbe question of which direction, Truscott's corps was to take once It had 

broken out of the beachhead had yet to 

be answered, In any case, since it was a 

corps within Claik's army that was 

involved, Clark intended the decision to 

be his, not Alexander's. 

The question of the timing of the 

breakout offensive depended to a certain extent upon its direction; thus 

timing remained a subject ~f controversy and some confusion untIl the very 

eve of the offensive, although the formal order from Headquarters, AAI, on 

5 May had clearly stated, as noted 

earlier, that the decision on timing was 

to be Alexander's. 

The question of which direction the 

offensive was to take following the 

breakout had been a matter of contro2 B~igadier C. J. C. \lolo11Y, "Historv "Ithe 

Second World War," T"" ,\.1/'dilnmnmll IIlId MuMI/' 

Ea.I/, VO/llme V, Thl' Camp(JIg" ill Suil, IIlId Ihp 

Camp(ugn ill Ita/v, 3rd S"jJ/f'tIlbrr /9-1310 JlIIHllrrh 

19·N (i.ondon: Her MaJestv's StatIOIH'lv 0111('(', 

1973), p. 83:~. . ". 

" Marlin Blumenson, "General Lucas at Anno, Il1 

Command DeciSions (Washington, 1(60)' p. :lO I; 

Clark's comments on MS, in C\I H liles. 
104 

versy within Allied planning circles ever 

since January 1944, when the Allies had 

first come ashore at Anzio. The controversy had polarized about the persons 

of Alexander and Clark and stemmed 

largely from differing views on the role 

of the Anzio beachhead. From its very 

inception Clark had opposed the very 

concept of Anzio and during the planning stage had recommended dropping 

it. This view was also held by C .S. 

Army Chief of Staff General George C. 

Marshall. Thus Anzio was a British 

project, although carried out in large 

part by Americans. T'his anomaly may 

have had something to do with the later 

disagreement between Clark and Alexander:l 

General Alexander originally had envisioned the beachhead as a base for a 

thrust northwest along the axis of 

Highwav 7 into the Alban Hills, while 

th~ mai;l Allied forces drove the enemy 

from the southern front up the Li;'i 

valley into a tra p formed by the V I 

Corps athwart the enemv's line of communications in the Rome area. In developing plans to implement that concept early in 1944, General Clark had 

reversed the roles of the participating 

f()rces. He was then convinced that the 

VI Corps should be limited to pinning 

down the German Fourteenth Army opposite the beachhead, thereby preventing Kesselring from shifting reinf()rcements southward to assist the Tenth 

Army, which was then opposing the 

Fifth Army's attempt to break into the 

Liri valley.:; 

4 See Forrest C. Pogue. C{'IJrge C. Marshall, Organizer of Vi!lor~ (New York: Viking Press, 1973). p, 

:i3L 

'Ibid., pp. 326-27; ~1ark W. Clark, CalwlalRd Risk 

(I'iew York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 283-86. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Throughout the winter of 1943-1944 

the matter had been allowed to simmer 

quietiy, but with the coming of spring 

and revival of plans for a May offensive, the controversy had boiled again. 

Although Alexander had shifted his 

attention from the Alban Hills and 

Rome southeastward some twenty miles 

to Valmontone and Highway' 6, his 

original concept-trapping a major part 

of Vietinghof1's Tenth Army between a 

blocking f(m~e striking out from the 

beachhead and the main f()rce advancing from the southeast-remained unaltered. 

On the other hand, the Fifth Army 

commander's views had changed signifi~ 

cantly. In April, after Alexander had 

regrouped the two Allied armies, General Leese's Eighth Army rather than 

General Clark's Fifth stood bef<:)I'(:' the 

entrance to the Liri valley, leading 

Clark to wonder whether the British 

rather than the Americans rnight reach 

Rome first. The U.S. VI Corps, theret'()H:\ seemed to offer Clark a chance to 

counter this geographical advantage in 

a race for the Italian capital. If Truscott's VI Corps could break out of the 

beachhead and strike directly northward into the Alban Hills, the Americans might win that race. 1\loreover, in 

addition' to winning the race Clark was 

very much concerned about reaching 

Rome before the beginning of OVERLORD, as George ,vIars hall had frequentlv and pointedly urged him to do. 

General Clark, no longer considering 

the beachhead a holding action as he 

had during the winter, saw T'ruscott's 

corps a<; the potential spearhead of a 

Fifth Army drive on Rome. The Alban 

Hills had become in Clark's eves a 

gateway rather than a barrier to Rome. 
THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD 

Moreover, as long as the enemy held 

the hills in strength. a threat remained 

to the flank of any thrust from the 

beachhead in the direction of Valmontone and Highway 6. Clark believed 

that his forces should secure the Alban 

Hills before attempting to cut off the 

Tenth Army's right wing at Valmontone." 

General Clark, just as he had earlier 

modified Alexander's directive for the 

offensive along the southern front, now 

laid the groundwork for another, even 

more important unilateral change, this 

time in Alexander's guidelines for the 

VI Corps' breakout oHensive from the 

Anzio beachhead. Clark directed Truscott to prepare a plan for an offensive 

to be launched on f()rtv-eight hours' 

notice along one of femr possible axes: 

northwest\yard along the coastal corridor, across the Alban Hills directly 

toward Rome, northwestward through 

Cisterna to Valmontone on Highway 6, 

or eastward to Sezze in the Lepini 

Mountains, overlooking the beachhead 

from that direction. On 2 April, during 

a conference with his army commanders, General Alexander h~d opted for 

an attack toward Valmontone in the 

hope of cutting the enemy's line of 

communications with the main front. 

Yet Clark's instructions to Truscott had 

carefully a voided specifying a choice 

among the possible axes of attack from 

the beachhead, for General Clark failed 

to share the belief that significant numbers of Germans would be cut off by a 

thrust to Valmontone and Highway 6. 

Then: were, in Clark's opinion, just too 

many alternate routes of escape available to the Germans. Alexander's desire 

6 Clark's comments on MS. III CMH tiles. 

105 

for the thrust on Valmontone had, in 

Clark's view, been dictated mainly by an 

expectation that it would help to loosen 

up German resistance opposite the 

Eighth Army and enable the latter to 

accelerate its advance up the Liri-Sacco 

valley. For Clark that was insufficient to 

justify the risks to his Fifth Army 

inherent in Alexander's plan. 7 

On 5 May Alexander visited the VI 

Corps headquarters where Truscott laid 

before him the four alternate plans 

which the corps staff, as directed by 

Clark, had developed during the two 

preceding months. The plans went by 

the code names of GRASSHOPPER, BUFFALO, TURTLE, and CRAWDAD. 

GRASSHOPPER outlined an attack toward the east in the direction of Littoria-Sezze with the object of making 

contact with the Fifth Army's main 

force advancing northwestward. Only if 

troops on the southern front appeared 

to be bogged down and in need of help 

to achieve a junction with the beachhead was GRASSHOPPER to be mounted. 

Operation BUFFALO, which most closely 

corresponded to SHINGLE'S and DIADEM'S 

original strategic concepts, called for a 

thrust northeastward through Cisterna, 

Cori, and Artena to Valmontone. Its 

objective was to block Highway 6 and 

thereby cut off the retreat of the Tenth 

Army's right \\ing. The destruction of a 

significant part of the Tenth Army would 

open the road to Rome along Highwa\ 

6. Operation TURTLE called for an 

attack astride the Via Anziate (the Anzio-Rome road) and the Rome railroad, 

northward through Carroceto and 

Campoleone to a junction with High7 ibid. 
106 

GENERAL TRUSCOTT 

way 7 about a mile south of Lake 

Albano in the .Alban Hills. Operation 

CRAWDAD outh~ed a drive through 

Ardea, twelve mIles northwest of Anzio 

roughly paralleling the coast southwes~ of the Alban Hills. In terms of distance 

CRA WOAD afforded the shortest route t~ Rome, but the road network was less 

favorable than that offered by Highway 

7. After looking over the four cplans, 

General Alexander quickly dismissed all 

but BUFFALO. The drive on Valmont~me, .he declared, was the only operatIon lIkely to produce "worthwhile results." 8 

While BUFFALO was eminently suited 

to. Alexander's strategic concept, it conflICted. sharply w~th the idea taking 

shape m Clark s mmd. The Fifth Army 

commander had no faith in the pla~. 

When Truscott informed him of Alexander's visit and of his comments on 

'Truscott Personal Radios Sellt files. Feb-Jun 

1944. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the breakout plans, Clark immediately 

telephoned the Allied commander to 

express irritation over what he interpreted as an unwarranted interference 

with the Fifth Army's command channels. 9 Clark insisted that he wanted to 

keep his own plans flexible and not be 

tied to "pre-conceived ideas as to what 

exactly was to be done." ~~jecting Alexa~der s apparent assumption that Operat~on BUFFALO would trap a large part 

of the German Tenth Army, Clark added 

that he did not "believe we have too 

many chances to do that-the Boche is 

too smart." Clark agreed that Truscott 

should. give BUFFALO first priority in his 

operatlonal planning, but he insisted 

that the VI Corps commander should 

be free to contin ue to develop other 

plans as well. The Fifth Army commander declared with some lo~c that 

he had to be "prepared to meet anv 

eventuality" and keep his "mind free <;f 

any commitment before the battle 

started." 10 

Even before these exchanges Clark 

had become suspicious that there might 

be "interests brewing for the Eighth 

Army to take Rome." But as he was to 

note later, "We not only wanted the 

honor of capturing Rome, but we felt 

that we more than deserved it ... Mv 

own feeling was that nothing was going 

to stop us on our push toward the 

Italian capital. Not only did we intend 

to become the first army in fifteen 

centuries to seize Rome from the south, 

but we intended to see that the people 

back home knew that it was the Fifth 

• Clark Diarv, 8 May 44; Clark's comments on 

MS, in CMH files. 

In Clark Diary, 8. May 44; Sidney T. Mathews, 

"Clark's Decision to Drive on Rome," in Command 

Decisions (Washington, 1960), pp. 353-54. 
THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD 

Army that did the job and knew the 

price that had been paid fi)l' iL" These 

considerations were f()r Clark "important to an understanding of the behindthe-scenes differences of opinion that 

occurred in this period, Such controversies, he observed years later, were conceived in good f'aith as a result of 

honest differences of opinions about 

the best way to do the job,"!! Alexander, hmvever annoyed he may have 

been, generally kept his feelings to 

himself ]\;ot only did he not reproach 

Clark in his dispatches but even failed 

to mention their disagreemenL Such 

was the character of the Allied armies' 

commander. !2 

German Plans 

Fundamental differences over stI'ategy between Alexander and Clark concerning the direction the VI Corps' 

offensive was to take had a counterpart 

within the German command where 

opposing concepts, especially between 

Kesselring and Mackensen, the Fourteenth Army commander, exacerbated relations between the two men. Field 

Marshal Kesselring believed that the 

Allied f()H'es on the beachhead would 

attempt to break out in the direction of 

Valmontone in an elIort to cut High-

\vay 6 and sever the line of communicatio~s to the southern fmnL General von 

Mackensen, for his part, believed that 

once free of the beachhead, the VI 

Corps would advance into the Alban 

Hills along the axis of Highway 7, next 

to the coastal road, the most diI'ect road 

11 Clark, Calculal~d Risk, p. 352; Clark Diary, 5 

:-'1ay 44. 

" Nicolson, Ali?x, pp, 252-53. 

107 

to Rome. 1:, Thus did the Fourteenth 

Army commander anticipate the strategy 

even then taking form in Clark's mind. 

This disagreement between the army 

group and Fourteenth Arm'V commander~ 

was further complicated 'by Hitler's intervention in the development of strategic and tactical plans in Italy, about 

which he was deeply concerned even 

though far from the front, and even 

though Italy was a secondary theater. 

Anticipating the time when the Allies. 

would attempt to break out of the 

Anzin beachhead, Hitler as early as 

mid-March, had instructed Kesselring 

to study the possibility of employing the 

so-called false front tactic, which, Hitler 

recalled, the French and Germans had 

successfully used near Rheims in the 

last year of World War 1. More recently, the U.S. VI Corps had used it in 

repelling German counterattacks at Anzio in mid-February. This tactic may be 

described as l()llm\:s: just befi:n'e attacking forces began their preparatOIY aI1illery fire, the defenders would evacuate 

the forward positions for previously 

prepared positions in the rear of the 

main line of resistance. After the offensive had spent itself and the attackers 

\",'ere thrown off balance, the defenders' 

reserves, waiting securely in the rear, 

were to counterattack and destroy the 

f()e. . 

On 1 April Kesselring responded to 

Hitler's instructions with a plan of his 

own. He had already directed Mackensen, he said, to b~gin an extensive 

thinning of the Fourlemll! Army's f()rward battle positions and to dispose his 

defenses in greater depth. Forward poI" CMDS (Br). The German Operations at Anzio, 

22 January to :~l May 1944. 
108 

sItIons were to be held in strength 

sufficient only to compel the Allied 

forces to attack with all their heavy 

weapons. While the Allied attack wore 

itself out against numerous strongpoints 

arranged in depth throughout the main 

battle position, German losses would be 

held to a minimum. Even if the Allied 

forces penetrated the main line of resistance, there would still be time, Kesselring believed, to bring up his reserves f()f a counterattack. 

Taking a mildly critical view of Hitler's tactical suggestions, Kesselring 

pointed out an inherent weakness. How 

!:ould one determine early enough that 

a given Allied artillery bombardment 

presaged an offensive so that forward 

positions might be evacuated in time? 

To delay too long risked having those 

positions overrun and thereby exposing 

the main defenses; yet a premature 

withdrawal could mean loss of the 

entire main line of resistance. Moreover, Kesselring argued, it would be 

difficult to deceive the Allies for any 

length of time as to the real location of 

the main line of resistance. 

Hitler, too, was concerned about the 

possibility that Mackensen's secondary 

defenses might be destroyed by artillery 

when the Allied attack rolled over his 

forward positions. When the Fourteenth 

Army's chief of staff, Generalmajor 

Wolf-Ruediger Hauser, visited the 

Fuehrer's headquarters early in April, 

Hitler indicated that he wanted Mackensen to consider shifting his secondary 

position even farther to the rear. 

As finally drawn, Kesselring's defense 

plan represented a compromise with 

Hitler's concepts. It called for temporary evacuation of the forward areas 

and occupying previously prepared 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

blocking positions as soon as preparations for a full-scale Allied attack were 

identified, but only near the strongpoints of Aprilia (called "the Factory"), 

Cisterna, and Littoria, in the northern, 

central, and southern sectors, respectively. Defenders elsewhere were to 

hold in place. 

Although the Germans at first believed that waterlogged terrain would 

limit large-scale employment of armor 

in the beachhead until well into the 

spring of 1944, by March they had 

begun to suspect that another breakout 

offensive by the Allied forces would not 

be long in coming. As the ground 

began to dry out toward the end of 

April, expectations increased. 

Early in April the Fourteenth Army 

commander reported a significant increase in Allied artillery registration 

fires and frequent use of smoke over 

the port of Anzio and other Allied 

debarkation points. Anticipating that 

the activity possibly foreshadowed the 

expected offensive from the beachhead, 

Kesselring ordered the planned withdrawal, but when April passed with no 

such attack, he concluded that the Allied offensive would begin not in the 

beachhead but either on the southern 

front or possibly with another amphibious landing. He therefore ordered the 

Fourtl'l'nth Army's troops back to their 

original positions. 

The Terrain 

The Anzio beachhead sprawled over 

a large coastal plain which in Roman 

times had been a fertile farming region, 

but which through the centuries had 

become a vast malarial swamp. Reclaiming this pestilential region, known as 

the Pontine Marshes, had long been a 
THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD 

dream of Italian agronomists. In the 

decade immediately preceding the war 

much of the area had been partially 

drained and had become one of the 

agricultural show places of Mussolini's 

government. 

A complex grid of drainage canals 

and ditches cut the plain into a series of 

compartments, severely restricting crosscountry movement of military vehicles. 

The most formidable of the barriers 

were the 240-foot-wide Mussolini Canal 

and the Colletore delle Acqua Medie, 

or West Branch of the Mussolini Canal; 

the former flowed generally from north 

to south along the beachhead's right 

flank and the latter flowed southeastward from the direction of the Alban 

Hills to join the Mussolini Canal about 

seven miles from the coast. The 

smooth, sloping banks of these canals 

dropped into water that varied in depth 

from ten to twenty feet. Most of the 

smaller canals were from twenty to fifty 

feet wide. 

Approximately triangular in shape, 

the Anzio beachhead encompassed 

much of the plain west of the M ussolini 

Canal, generally better drained than 

that to the east of the canal. Except for 

the few roads along the tops of dikes, 

the region around Littoria, fifteen miles 

east of Anzio, had reverted to its ancient state, a virtually impassable marsh. 

From Terracina, at the southeastern 

edge of the plain, Highway 7 runs 

northwest for thirty miles to the town 

of Cisterna, fifteen miles inland and 

northeast from the port of Anzio. A 

section of the Naples-Rome railroad 

parallels the highway for a short distance before crossing the highway at 

Cisterna. The Allied beachhead lay 

109 

southwest of both the highway and the 

railroad. 

The apex of the triangle, whose base 

rested upon a 20-mile stretch of coastline, pointed like an arrowhead toward 

Cisterna. Around a large administrative 

building in the center of Cisterna, 

mostly in ruins as a result of months of 

artillery fire, the Germans had built a 

ring of mutually supporting strongpoints, which had become the hinge of 

their forward defensive lines. 

Inland from Cisterna the coastal 

plain narrows, rising to a gently rolling 

corridor about three miles wide and 

extending from Cisterna in a northnortheasterly direction fourteen miles to 

Valmontone on Highway 6, at the 

upper end of the Sacco River, a tributary of the Liri. Dotted with vineyards 

and orchards and cut by occasional 

wide, southward-running ravines, the 

corridor offers terrain generally favorable for military operations. Flanking to 

the southeast are the steep-sided Lepini 

Mountains, rising to heights of over 

3,000 feet. In the vicinity of the ancient 

fortress town of Cori, six miles northwest of Cisterna, the slopes of the 

mountains are covered by olive groves 

which give way on the higher elevations 

to bare rock and scrub oak. Footpaths 

and cart trails similar to those encountered by the II Corps in the Petrella 

massif offer the only access to that 

inhospitable region. 

Northwest of the corridor are lhe 

Alban Hills, whose highest summits are 

somew hat lower than those of the Lepini Mountains. Thousands of years 

ago this circular hill mass had been 

formed by a volcano. Two of the 

highest hills are the Rocca di Papa and 
110 

Monte Cavo, both rIsmg hundreds of 

feet above the crater floor. Over the 

years the southeastern rim of the crater 

eroded to form an elongated ridge 

about four miles in length, averaging 

2,000 feet in height. Rising like a wall 

behind the town of Velletri, l(x:ated at a 

point halfway up the ridge where Highway 7 leaves the coastal plain and 

enters the hills, the ridge bears the 

lyrical name of Monte Artemisio. From 

both Velletri and the ridge behind it 

the Germans had excellent observation 

over !xJth the beachhead and the corridor leading from Cisterna to Valmontone. 

Extending like fingers from the 

southern slopes of the Alban Hills and 

onto the coastal plain, steep-sided ridges 

formed by ancient lava flows ran past 

the towns of Velletri and Lanuvio, the 

latter located five miles to the west of 

the former. The sides of the ridges 

were covered with modest vineyards 

and groves of chestnut trees, but the 

crests were open and usually cultivated 

in a patchwork of grain fields. 

The Opposing Forces 

Reflecting the Huctuations imposed 

by attack and counterattack in the 

weeks since the landing at Anzio, the 

Allies' forward positions by mid-May 

traced a meandering line across the 

landscape. From the sea on the southwest they led to a ridge south of the 

Moletta River, thence to the AnzioAprilia-Albano road. From the road the 

front curved northeastward about five 

miles to the hamlet of Casale Carano, 

thence followed the Carano Canal for a 

short distance before turning southeast 

to parallel the Cisterna-CampoleoneRome railroad for some seven miles as 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

far as the west bank of the Mussolini 

Canal. At the canal the front turned 

south and followed its west bank for 

nine miles to the sea. Blocking the most 

likely avenues of enemy attack across 

the front were numerous mine fields 

emplaced by the Allied troops during 

the winter battles. 

Of the U.S. units on the beachhead 

in Februarv-the 3d and 45th Divisions, 

the 1st A'rmored Division's Combat 

Command A, the 1st Special Service 

Force (an American-Canadian regimental-sized force), the reinforced 509th 

Parachute Regiment, and the 6615th 

Ranger Force (three battalions)-only 

the paratroopers had left the beachhead by mid-May. The survivors of the 

ranger force had been integrated into 

the 1st Special Service Force. Those 

losses had been more than made up in 

late March by the arrival of the 34th 

Infantry Division, a veteran of the winter fighting at Cassino. On 28 March 

that division began relieving the 3d 

Division, which had been on the front 

for sixty-seven consecutive days. The 

1st Armored Division was also brought 

up to full strength with the arrival in 

April of CCB, its second combat command, and other elements of the diviSIOn. 

The British too had shifted some of 

their units. In early March the 5th 

Division had replaced the 56th, and the 

latter, together with some British commandos, left the beachhead. The 1 st 

Division remained, but its 24th Guards 

Brigade was relieved by the 18th 

Guards Brigade, the former moving to 

:-.Japles for rest and reorganization. 

By the bebrinning of April all Allied 

units had been brought to full strength. 

The VI Corps, including the two Brit-
THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD 

ish divisions, mustered a combat 

strength of approximately 90,000 men. 

As planning for the beachhead offensive got under way, Allied units were 

holding the front from left to right in 

the following order: the British 5th and 

1st Divisions, the U.S. 45th and 34th 

Divisions, and the 36th Engineer Regiment. In corps reserve were the 3d and 

36th Divisions (the latter having arrived 

on the beachhead by sea on 22 May), 

the I st Armored Division, and the 1st 

Special Service Force. 14 

The Germans too, after the repulse 

of their winter attack, had begun to 

regroup their forces. In mid-March a 

Jaeger division 15 was moved to the 

Adriatic coast to strengthen the front 

there, and the Hermann Goering Division 

was withdrawn to Tuscan bases near 

Leghorn for rest and reorganization. 

Al:xmt the same time, the 26th Panzer 

and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions had 

also been withdrawn from the Fourteenth Army into army group reserve m 

the Rome area. 16 

Facing the Allied beachhead were 

five divisions divided into two corps. 

From right to left there were in line the 

following units: the I Parachute Corps, 

commanding the 4th Parachute, 65th 

Infantry, and 3d Panzer Grenadier Divisions, and the LXXVI Panzer Corps with 

the 362d and 7 J 5th Infantry Divisions. 

The heavy winter fighting had left 

most of the divisions somewhat underH DA Hist Div. "American Forces in Action," 

.-/mil! Be(l(hhNld (22 jalll1arr-25 May /'144) (Washin~ton, 1 Y4 7), p. 106. 

IS "Jae~er" denotes a li~ht in fantry division as 

conlrasted \\ ith a standard infantry division. 

'6 GMDS (Sr), The German Operations at AllLio, 

22 January to 31 May 1944, pp. 94--95. Unless 

otherwise cited the foll()win~ is based upon this 

source. 

I II 

strength. Although General von Mackensen's army would never regain its 

February strength, replacements had 

continued to trickle in. By mid-April 

the Fourteenth Army had grown to 

70,400 men, still considerably less than 

the approximately 90,000 Allied soldiers assembled on the beachhead. 

The Fourteenth Army's artillery units, 

long-time targets of Allied air attacks, 

had also incurred heavy losses. Mackensen's artillery had been further plagued 

by chronic delays in the arrival of 

ammunition, delays occasioned more by 

shortages of transport than by lack of 

supply in dumps. Furthermore, most 

Allied guns lay beyond range of the 

self-propelled howitzers and dual-purpose antiaircraft guns which made up 

the bulk of the Fourteenth Armjl's artillery. Mackensen's artillery could fire 

effective counterbattery only with a few 

100-mm. guns, although Kesselring had 

promised that additional heavy pieces 

were on the way: twelve 210-mm. howitzers and seven batteries of 122-mm. 

guns from the OKW artillery reserve in 

France and a railway artillery battery of 

320-mm. guns from northern Italy. He 

also promised to increase ammunition 

allocations, although in view of German 

transportation problems that was hardly 

likely to come about. 

A llied Preparations 

As the Germans awaited the Allied 

blow, the leader of the force that was to 

make the main effort, General Truscott, commander of the U.S. VI Corps, 

still awaited a decision as to the direction his force was to take once breakout 

from the beachhead had been achieved. 

Yet despite General Clark's determination to keep the matter open, Truscott 
112 

focused his attention on the plan he 

deemed most likely to be adopted, the 

one General Alexander had favoredOperation BUFFALO. 

Vital to BUFFALO'S success, Truscott 

reasoned, were rapid capture of the 

enemy's main stronghold at Cisterna, 

and swift occupation of the town of 

Cori, halfway up the western slopes of 

the Lepini Mountains. Until those two 

objectives were in hand, the enemy 

would control the road network leading 

to BUFFALO'S objective, Valmontone on 

Highway 6. ' . 

On 6 May, the day followmg General 

Alexander's visit to VI Corps headquarters General Truscott outlined for his 

divi~ion commanders a two-phase attack 

designed to gain those o~jectives. In ~he 

first phase the corps was to drive 

northeastward to build up along the XY Line, a line forming a large arc two 

miles north and east of Cisterna and 

extending from Highway 7 as far as the 

main road from Cisterna to Corio I 7 In 

the second phase the corps was to 

capture Cori, then to advance northward via Guilianello toward Artena, a 

road junction about three miles south 

of Valmontone. From Artena the drive 

was to continue with a thrust to cut 

Highway 6, capture Valmontone, ~nd 

cut the Tmllz Army's Iille of communtcations. 

The armored strength of the V I 

Corps' offensive was to be provided by 

the I st Armored Division, commanded 

by Maj. Gen . Ernes( N. Harmon. a 

vi goro~s and able leader given t<~ bl~nt 

speaking. The I st Armored DIVISIon 

had fought in North Africa but, after 

17 VI Corps FO 25. 6 May 44. Cnless otherwise 

cited this section is based upon this source. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GENERAL HARMON 

the division landed on the 1 Lalian mainland in September 1943, mountainous 

terrain had denied it more than a 

minor role in the advance from Salerno 

to Cassino. During the winter. divisioll 

headquarters and CCA had joined the 

VI Corps in the Anzio heachhead, 

while CeB remained hehind with the I I 

Corps on the southern front in order to 

exploit a pn~jected Fifth Army hreakthrough into the Liri valley. In the end, 

CCE also had to come to AnZlo by sea. 

A so-called "heavy" armored division, 

one of three fi:mned in the U.s. Army 

before a decision to scale down the tank 

strength of armored divisions, the 1st 

Armored Division had a TO&E 

strength of 232 medium tan.ks ~nd 

14,620 officers and men, makmg It a 

formidable force with a tank strength a 

third again greater than a German 
THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD 

panzer division. In addition, the division had an attached tank destroyer 

battalion, an antiaircraft battalion, and, 

to supplement its three organic 105-

mm. (howitzer) self-propelled artillery 

battalions, the attached 69th Field Artillery Battalion of 105-mm. self-propelled 

howitzers. To supplement the division's 

armored infantry regiment for the offensive, General Truscott attached the 

l35th Infantry from the 34th Division. 

There were also two companies from 

the 83d Chemical Battalion, equipped 

with 4.2-inch mortars capable of firing 

smoke and high-explosive shells,18 one 

company each from the 109th Combat 

Engineer and self-propelled 636th 

Tank Destroyer Battalions, and a detachment of the 6617th Mine Clearing 

Company. 

General Harmon's division and the 

3d Infantry Division, formerly Truscott's own division , were to lead the 

breakout offensive. One of the U.S. 

~r':ly's oldest and most distinguished 

diVISions, the 3d had taken part in the 

North African and Sicilian campaigns. 

After Truscott had moved up to corps 

command, the division came under the 

command of Maj . Gen. John W. 

O'Daniel, whose rough features and 

barracks-yard voice had prompted the 

nickname "Iron Mike." 

For his part, General Harmon objected strongly to pairing an armored 

\" This monar had been developed from the 

Stokes Mortar of World War I and had first seen 

action during the Sicilian campaign in the summer 

of 1943. Aft er the Chemical Corps adapted the 

mortar to fire HE, it became an importa nt and 

useful infantry support weapon with a maximum 

range o f 4,397 yards. See Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles. and Rexll10 nd C. Cochrane. Thl' 

Chl'lltitll/ War/al'l' Sl'n 'i((': From Laimmlllr\' III Fil'itl, 

U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (W~s hington . 

1959). 

113 

GENERAL O'DANIEL 

and an infantry division for the breakout attempt. Better to follow the conventional pattern, he argued, of holding 

the armor in reserve as a tool for 

exploiting an infantry breakthrough. 

He confided that view to two staff 

officers of the Fifth Army's G-3 plans 

section who visited his headquarters on 

the eve of the offensive. Harmon told 

his visitors that he expected to lose 100 

tanks in the first thirty minutes of the 

offensive. It was, he declared, "a crazv 

idea."19 Actually, General Truscott n~~­

ognized that his decision to use t!.e 

armored division in the first stage of 

19 Inter\" Sidney T. Mathews with I.t Col T. .J. 

Conway (Chief, Plan s Subsection, G-3 , Hq Fifth 

Army , 16 Dec 44-May 45), 27 Jun 50, CM H. 
114 

the offensive ran counter to current 

armored doctrine, bur he saw the 

weight of the armor as affording the 

best possibility of breaking the longheld German positions in the Cisterna 

sector. 20 

Under Truscott's plan the I st Armored Division was, during the offensive's first phase, to advance from positions southwest of Cisterna along a line 

roughly parallel to Le Mole Canal to 

cut the railroad northwest of Cisterna, 

push on to Highway 7, then to the X-Y 

Line. In the second phase, the division 

was to move first to a phase line 

designated the 0-B Line, which crossed 

the corridor between the Alban Hills 

and the Lepini Mountains three miles 

south of Velletri. 'fhe division's left 

flank was to keep the Velletri-based 

enemy north of that line, while the rest 

of Harmon's troops were, on Truscott's 

order, to swing northeast and continue 

the drive on AI1ena and Valmontone. 

Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker's 36th Infantry Division was to move up from corps 

reserve to take Cori and to reinforce 

the armored division's attack on Allena. 

To the 3d Division, (',eneral Truscott 

gave the crucial task of first isolating, 

then capturing Cisterna. Cnlike Harmon, O'Daniel had complete confidence 

in the plans for the f()1lhcoming offensive and in the ability of his division to 

seize Cisterna and continue to the final 

o~iective. General O'Daniel's zeal may 

have been enhanced by an opp0I1unity 

to even a score with the enemy following a furi}e attempt by the division to 

storm Cisterna in January. 

While the 3d Division attacked the 

enemy's center, the division's right flank 

20 Interv. author with Truscott, Mar 62, CMH, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

was to be covered by Brig. Gen. Robert 

T. Frederick's American-Canadian 1st 

Special Service Force, advancing from 

positions just west of the Mussolini 

Canal to cut Highway 7 southeast of 

Cisterna and occupy that part of the XY Line in that sector. Thereafter, Frederick's men were to be prepared, on 

corps order, to seize the heights of 

Monte Arrestino, overlooking Cori 

from the south, then move northward 

across the Lepini Mountains to cut 

Highway 6 east of Valmontone. 

On the 1 st Armored Division's left, 

Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles' 45th 

Division, holding the sector between the 

Spaccasassi Canal and the Carano 

Canal, was to cover the left flank of the 

offensive bv an advance as far as the 

first phase 'line, which in Eagles' sector 

ran generally in a northerly direction 

just west of the village of Carano, some 

five miles southwest of Cisterna and on 

the bank of the Carano Canal. As the 

main attack moved on beyond Cisterna, 

the division ,.,·as to keep~the enemy in 

its zone occupied by vigorous patrolling. 

yfeam"hile, Maj. GeIl. Charles W. 

Ryder's 34th Division, holding the front 

across the corps center from I.e Mole 

Canal to the Nettuno-Cisterna road, 

was to screen the final preparations f()r 

the offensive and to assist in gapping 

American mine fields and barbed wire 

barriers for the attacking units. When 

relieved from that assignment. the division, less the regiment attached to the 

armor, was to regroup and prepare to 

relieve elements of either the 1st Armored Division or the 1st Special Service Force if either should be unable to 

continue the offensive after reaching 

the first phase line. 

General Truscott had also prepared a 
THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD 

deception plan, Operation HIPPO, designed to deceive the enemy as long as 

possible as to the offensive's true direction by a strong demonstration on the 

beachhead's far left flank a few hours 

before the breakout offensive began. 

The job of executing HIPPO fell to the 

British I st and 5th' Divisions, holding 

that sector of the beachhead perimeter 

from the Tyrrhenian coast northeastward to the left f1ank of the 45th 

Division. Since thev were to be withdra\\n after the capture of Rome, the 

two British divisions were to operate 

under direct control of the Fifth Ann\ 

\\'ithout an intervening corps com'-

mand. 21 

To support the offensive, the VI 

Corps asscmbled an impressive groupment of corps artillery: threc battalions 

of I :is-lIlm. hO\\it/t'l< a battalion of Hinch howit/.crs, and a batten of ~40-

mm. ho\\it/t'rs. Two Britisl; artillen 

rcgiments wert' also attached to corp~. 

Except till' a battalion of IOS-mrn. 110\\-

itzers that Truscott had attached to the 

I st Armored Division, corps artillen 

\\as to fire in general support of th~ 

offensive. Three battalions of 90-mm. 

antiaircraft artillery from the 35th Antiaircraft Artillen' Brigade were to be 

prepared to fire on ground targets. 

With a high muzzle velocity and flat 

trajecton, antiaircraft guns \\ould be 

particularlY useful against enemv armor 

and pillboxes. Finally, on I)-day, as had 

beell the case \\he,~ the offen'se began 

along the Carigliano, the guns of t \\0 

cruisers lying offshore were to engage 

prearranged targets opposite the British 

sect 0 r. 22 

21 Hq VI Corps AAR, 1-31 ."Iav 44. 

22 VI Corps FO 26, 6 May 44. 

I IS 

Several weeks before the anticipated 

date of the offensive, Truscott directed 

his corps artillery to begin a daily firing 

schedule designed to uncover the enemy's defensive fires and further mislead the Germans as to the actual stal1 

of the offensive. In view of the defensive strategy that Hitler had urged 

upon his commanders in Italy such 

deception was of paramount importance. But this, of course, was unknown 

to General Truscott. Each morning 

from different parts of the beachhead 

guns of various batteries opened a 

series of barrages, with their time, 

length, and method of firing frequently 

changed. At first the Germans replied 

with large-scale defensive fires, but after 

a time apparently concluded that the 

barrages were only another spendthrift 

American harassment and made little 

response. This assumption was destined 

to pay off with a delayed reaction \\'hen 

the Allied artillery preparation for the 

offensive actually began. 2:1 

Truscott's breakout was also to be 

supported bv aircraft from the XII 

TAC, flying from bases in the vicinity 

of Naples. Before the offensive, fighterbombers were to step up their operations against the enemy's line of communications, especially southeast of 

Rome. Long-range artillery positions 

and supply installations in the Alban 

Hills ncar Frascati and Albano as well 

as at Velletri and Valmontone were to 

be bombed and strafed almost daily.24 

Beginning at 0625 on D-day and 

continuing until 1930, fighter-bombers 

of the XII T AC were to fly twemy2:1 Lucian K. Truscott, Command iWissions (l\:ew 

York: L P. DUlloIl and Co., 1954), pp. 368--70. 

2' Hq, VI Corps FO 26, 6 :Vlay 44, Air annex. 
116 

eight preplanned missions, mostly 

against artillery positions and troop bivouacs. The airmen were also to provide 

fighter cover to protect ground forces 

from hostile air attack, even though for 

some time the Luftwaffe had been 

virtually driven from Italian skies. Once 

the ground forces began their offensive, 

seventy-two fighter-bombers were to attack enemy positions along the rail line 

extending northwest from Cisterna, 

then bomb and strafe enemy artillery in 

an effort to limit defensive fires in the 

offensive's early phases. Four fighterbombers were to attack the town of 

Cori, and a group of heavies was to hit 

Velletri and Sezze with demolition and 

fragmentation bombs. 25 

Fighter-bombers were to provide 

close support as the offensive continued, with a f()rward controller located 

at the VI Corps command post directing the aircraft to targets of opportunity. Aircraft flying prebriefed missions 

to specific targets were, upon entering 

the corps zone, to check in immediately 

with the fi:)lward air controller. If there 

were no emergency targets, the controller was to release the aircraft to go 

about assigned missions. Fighter-bombers were also to flv armed reconnaissance along Highw~ys 6 and 7 south of 

Rome and over the road network between the two high\\'avs. 26 

The freedom' of ~ovement long enjoyed by the Allies behind their shield 

of air supremacy was again demonstrated by the ease with which the Fifth 

Army, despite numerous small-scale enemy air attacks and harassing artillery 

25 Ibid, 

26 Ibid, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

fire, assembled over a period of several 

weeks sufficient supplies at Anzio to 

sustain the forthcoming offensive. Improvement of the VI Corps' counterbattery fires and antiaircraft defenses and 

the cumulative effect of the XII T AC's 

attacks against German artillery positions eventually reduced the effectiveness of enemy action against VI Corps' 

supply dumps to a negligible factor. 27 

During the winter most of the VI 

Corps' su pply problems had been 

caused by a chronic shortage of shipping. As the weather gradually improved and more craft became available, particularly small craft suitable for 

offshore unloading of Liberty ships, the 

problems eased. Transportation battalions were soon discharging five or six 

Liberty ships at a time. During March a 

peak volume of 157,274 tons was unloaded at the beachhead. 28 

By mid-May enough stocks to support the VI Corps and its attached units 

for forty days of offensive operations 

had been cached in dumps dispersed 

over the beachhead. The supplies were 

in addition to those usually maintained 

to support teo days of normal operations. To save time and personnel after 

the offensive got under way, several 

quartermaster truck companies were 

brought ashore, their vehicles fully 

loaded with ammunition. Once ashore, 

27 Wide dispersion of supply dumps helped account for the low loss rate. Of the nine million 

gallons of POL shipped to the beachhead, for 

example. less than 1 percent was lost to enemy 

action. See William M. Ross and Charles F. Romanus, The Quartrrmaster Corp,l: Opemtiom in the War 

Agaimt Germany, U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1965), pp. 96-1 i4. See also Fifth 

Army (;-4 Jnl, May 44, and DA Hist Div, Anzi" 

Bea(hhead, pp, 107-11. 

28 Fifth Army G--4 Jnl, May 44. 
THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD 

the trucks moved quickly into concealed 

positions to await D-day. 29 

Final Moves 

Before Truscott could determine the 

exact H-hour for the offensive, he first 

had to resolve the conflicting operational requirements of armored and 

infantry divisions. The infantry, being 

particularly vulnerable to small arms 

and mortar fire, quite naturally preferred to begin the attack bef!xe daylight. On the other hand, the armored 

division's tank gunners had to have 

enough daylight to see the cross-hairs in 

their gunsights. Since Truscott's staff 

believed that the infantry could substitute smoke for darkness and that the 

armored division could find no substitute for its requirements, H-hour was 

set for one hour after dawn. 30 

Getting the assault units undetected 

into positions close to their line of 

departure, about two or three miles 

south of the Cisterna-Rome railroad 

and bet\veen the Spaccasassi Creek and 

the M ussolini Creek, posed a special 

problem, for the Germans enjoyed superb observation of the entire beachhead area from their vantage JX)ints in 

the flanking hills and mountains. To 

solve the problem Allied staffs worked 

out detailed movement schedules for 

the infantry and artillery to be accomplished during the last' two nights before the offensive began. 31 Movement 

of the armor into forward assembly 

2" Ibid. 

30 VI Corps G-3 Jnl, May 44; Truscott Personal 

File; Imen, Mathews wilh Cen Harmon, 14 Dec 48. 

CMH. 

31 Truscott, Command Mi.ISiorlS, pp. ~~1:i7-68. 

I 17 

areas was accompanied by tying the 

movement to the artillery deception 

plan. ~or several weeks preceding the 

offenSive, as the artillery fired a daily 

barrage, the tanks, 'with no attempt at 

concealment, rumbled noisily toward 

the German lines, firing point-blank, 

then turning and scurrving to the rear. 

Noting that the tanks' always stopped 

short of their own infantry's forward 

positions, the Germans SOOil ceased to 

react to the maneuver. Each day, once 

th~ ground had begun to dry out in 

mid-May, a few of the tanks slipped off 

t?e ro~ds into previously prepared positions. [he tactIC was repeated until a 

substantial armored assault force had 

been assembled close behind the 

front. :12 

While the VI Corps made final preparations for the offensive, General 

Clark in his headquarters at Caserta 

remained concerned over the direction 

the offensive should take once the 

corps had broken out of the beachhead. 

On the morning of 19 ~ay, Truscott 

and members of his staff went at 

Clark's request to the army headquarters. There Clark raised the suggestion 

that BOFFALO'S initial objectives, Cisterna 

and Cori, be taken as planned, but 

then, instead of moving to Highway 6, 

the VI Corps might regroup and turn 

northwestward into the Alban Hills. 

Frederick's I st Special Service Force, in 

the meantime, could continue toward 

Artena and Valmontone, the original 

objectives of Operation BUFFALO. Only 

after Truscotr pointed out that Frederick's fiJrce alone was not strong enough 

for this task did Clark drop the sugges3' Monograph, "American Armor at Anzio," The 

Armored School, Ft. Knox, May 49, pp. 87-88. 
118 

tion. 33 Yet the suggestion reflected 

Clark's concern about what effect the 

enemy's presence on the Alban Hills 

might have on the VI Corps' advance 

toward Valmontone and Highway 6. 

During the conference Clark also informed Truscott that Alexander might 

order the breakout offensive to begin 

t\vo days later--{Jn the 21 st. Returning 

to the beachhead on the 19th, Truscott 

directed part of his corps and divisional 

artillery to begin displacing forward 

that night into their previously prepared positions. Until he received more 

definite word on the jump-off date, 

that was the only move he sanctioned. 34 

Alexander himself visited Clark's 

headquarters the next day. Poor 

weather predicted for the 21 st, Clark 

told him, might delay the VI Corps its 

needed tactical air su pport; he recommended postponing the offensive at 

least twenty-four, perhaps even fortyeight, hours. Anxious to have the 

breakout offensive coincide as closely as 

possible with the Eighth Army's ass'ault 

against the Hitler Line, Alexander readily agreed. When he radioed the ne\vs 

to Truscott, Clark indicated the possibility of a postponement to the 23d but 

promised final word by late afternoon 

of the 21 st. 35 

Postponing the offensive for even 

twenty-four hours created an awkward 

and a potentially dangerous situation 

for the VI Corps. The postponement 

meant that some units would have to 

remaIn In forward assembly areas 

"" Truscott, Command }\1i.I.llons. pp. 370-71; 

Clark's comments on MS, in CMH files. 

" Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 370-71; Fijih 

Army History, Part V, p. lOR. 

35 Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 352-53; Clark Diary, 

20 \.fay 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

longer than the forty-eight hours that 

Truscott intended, increasing the possibility that the Germans might detect 

their presence and conclude that an 

offensive was about to begin. 

The Germans, meanwhile, were apparently nervous. Throughout the 

nights of the 20th and 21 st the enemy 

increased his patrolling and artillery fire 

across the front. One patrol penetrated 

the 179th Infantry's outpost line in the 

45th Division sector on the corps' left 

flank but withdrew in the face of heavy 

mortar fire without taking a prisoner.:w 

At 1715 on the 2] st final word on 

the date of the offensive arrived at 

Truscott's headquarters. "Operation 

BUFFALO will be launched at 0630 hours 

on 23 May," Clark radioed. "'I will 

arrive at Advanced Command Post 

alx>ut noon on Monday [22 May].":17 

That night the VI Corps' combat 

units moved into their assigned assembly areas, while the 109th Engineer 

Battalion and the 34th Division's engineers began the tedious and hazardous 

work of clearing gaps through Allied 

mine fields. The front remained relatively quiet, disturbed only by occasional 

C'..erman shelling that killed three men 

at a road junction near the 3d Division 

headquarters and caused minor casualties in the 45th Division's area. 

By daylight on 22 May, all units had 

reached their jump-off positions. 

Throughout a lovely spring day that 

invited lounging in the sunshine, the 

troops instead crouched in dark dugouts, the ruins of farmhouses, and 

scattered groves of trees along the 

"6 VI Corps G-3 .Jnl, May 44 . 

. 17 \1sg, Clark to Truscott, 211705B '\1ay 44, 

Truscott Personal Radios Received files, Feb-.Jun 

44. 
THE A:'IJZIO BEACHHEAD 

drainage canals to avoid being seen by 

enemy observers. In the meantime, 

Clark, leaving his chief of staff in 

charge of the Fifth Army main headquarters at Caserta, moved to the 

beachhead with his staff, where the 

army commander established a command post in a tunnel beneath the Villa 

Borghest', located on a small hill overlooking Anzio haroor. 

General Clark confidently awaited the 

start of the offensive, yet ~s he did so 

he was troubled with" misgivings over 

what he termed his "political problems." 

Three considerations were uppermost 

in his mind: he wanted aoove all to be 

first in Rome and to be there bef()re 

the imminent invasion of northwestern 

Europe crowded the Italian campaign 

otT the front pages of the world's 

newspapers; he was also understandably 

anxious to avoid destruct.ive fighting 

within the hallowed city; and, finally, he 

was persuaded that to f()How the strategy Alexander preferred would deny 

the Fifth Army the first goal and quite 

possibly the second. 3H 

"" Clark. Calf/dated Risli, PI'. ~i51-52. 

1 19 

General Clark had by that time convinced himself that t~) follow Alexander's strategic concept was [XJintless. 

To do so, Clark believed, would shift 

the burden from the Eighth to the 

Fifth Armv which had alreadv incurred 

heavy casl~alties since the sp;ing offensive had begun. HI was determined that 

the Fifth Army was going to capture 

Rome," he later recalled, "and I was 

probably overly sensitive to indications 

that practically everybody else was 

trying to get into the act. These indications mounted rapidly in the next few 

davs, and I had my hands full." :39 Thus 

it ~\'as that Gener~l Clark's rejection of 

Alexander's strategic concepts for the 

beachhead offensive cast a threatening 

shadm... over Operation BUFFALO and, 

with it, Alexander's (and Churchill's) 

expectations of trapping a major part 

of the German Tenth Armv between the 

British Eighth and the D .S. Fifth Armies south of Rome. 

"" Ibid" p. 357: Clark's comments on MS, in CMH 

file,. 
CHAPTER VII 

The First Day 

While the Americans tried to rest 

during the night of 22 May, the British 

launched the diversionary attack from 

their positions on the beachhead's far 

left flank. Shortly after dark and closely 

following preparatory artillery fire, a 

brigade of the British 1 st Division 

lunged at the enemy's defenses west of 

the Anzio-Albano road. The British 

advanced only about 300 yards before 

automatic weapons and mortar fire 

forced a halt. Two hours later, a brigade of the 5th Division, supported by 

tanks, joined the fight with an attack 

along the coast toward the settlement of 

L'Americano. The fighting continued 

that night and next day until the brigades, after dark, returned to their 

starting positions. I 

General Clark arose at 0430, breakfasted in his van, then joined General 

Truscott in a f(Jnvard observation post 

where, surrounded by their staffs, the 

two commanders awaited the commencement of the corps artillery preparation. Beginning at H-hour minus 

thirtv minutes, the artillery fired for 

five 'minutes on the enemv"s main line 

of resistance across the entire front. For 

the next twentv-five minutes the divisional artillery 'joined in with fire directed against all known enemy gun 

positions. A heavy pall of smoke soon 

shrouded the landscape. Although a 

light rain cleared the air to a degree, 

IFifth Army History, Part V. p. IOH. 

visibility at dawn was limited to about 

300 yards. 2 

When the artillery fire lifted, Clark 

and his companions heard the rumble 

of engines as sixtv fighter-bombers 

from the XII TAC' appeared over the 

front on their wav to attack enemy 

positions about 3,O()O yards in front (;f 

the corps and along the railroad running northwest from Cisterna. Encountering heavy overcast in the target area, 

the aircraft turned about and attacked 

Cisterna, their alternate target. Leaving 

the enemy strongpoint shattered and 

burning, the bombers flew southeast to 

attack the towns of Littoria and Sezze as 

well. Although thc poor wcather conditions limited air activity, the XII TAC 

would manage to fly 72'2 sorties during 

the first day of the offensive.;] 

A General Hazard 

In actions along most of the VI 

Corps front on 23 May one weapon 

played a leading role in determining 

the course of the fighting-the mine 

(both Allied and German). Since the 

beginning of the Italian campaign, 

troops of both the U.S. Fifth and the 

British Eighth Armies had incurred 

numerous casualties both from enemy 

mines and their own-the latter when 

patrols, raiding parties, or advancing 

'Clark Diarv, 2:3 Mav 44. 

"VI Corps Cr--2 Jnl,' 23 Mav 44, Summary of Air 

Action; DA Hist Div, Amio BeachlIPad, p. 119; 

Craven and Cate, eels., AAF III, pp. 3H4-'lfi. 
THE FIRST DAY 

troops moved unwittingly into indiscriminately laid or poorly charted mine 

fields. Commanders at all echelons constantly sought to develop methods of 

eliminating losses from friendly mine 

fielris, but the basic problem remained, 

particularly in the Anzio beac hhead 

where, during the heavy German counterattacks in February and early March, 

the front lines had frequently fluctucHed. At the start of the breakout 

offensive, uncharted or poorly charted 

mine fields were destined to prove the 

single most harassing and disruptive 

battlefield obstacle, especially for the 

tanks of the 1st Armored Division. t 

Bearing in mind that ever since the 

division's earliest experience, mines 

rather than enemy antitank guns had 

thus been the tanks' greatest hazard, 

the division commander, General Harmon, had demanded maximum effort 

in locating and clearing lanes through 

all mine fields, enemy and friendly. 

The engineers proposed to do the job 

by blasting gaps through known or 

suspected mine fields with 400-foot 

lengths of steel pipe filled with explosive material-long, unwieldy contraptions \\'hich the engineers had named 

"Snakes." The Snakes were to be towed 

fon\'ard and then pushed into IX)sition 

bv tanks; once in place, thev would be 

d~tonated by machine gun' fire from 

the tanks. III tests the resulting explosions had produced IS-foot-wide gaps 

in mine fields and had detonated mines 

buried as deep as fi ve teet. ;, 

lllq l'lth AGp, A Military Encycloprdia. Based on 

Operatiun, in the Italian Campaign, 1943-45, 1'1'.311-

14. 

"There were important limitations to the usc of 

Snakes. Thn were useful only against minefields 

protecting prepared positions. If towed assembled 

tClr anY distance o"er rough ground, they broke up. 

121 

The (l"cision on whether to employ 

the Snakes, Harmon left to his combat 

command commanders. Col. Maurice 

W. Daniel of CCA opted for them, but 

Brig. Gen. Frank Allen, Jr., of CCB 

chose to depend upon mine detectors 

in the hands of his engineers. Allen was 

concerned lest a premature detonation 

of the Snakes by enemy fire spoil the 

clement of surprise. He wanted to hold 

his Snakes for the more extensive mine 

fields that he expected would be found 

near the railroad running northwestward from Cisterna. 6 

Harmon's Plan 

Truscott had assigned to Harmon's 

armor the comparatively open terram 

west of Cisterna on the 3d Division's 

left flank. The zone widened from 

aixmt three miles at the line of departure (two miles south of the railroad) to 

about nine miles along the first phase 

line, the X-Y Line six miles to the 

north. The Mole Canal, extending 

northward from the beachhead and at 

a near right angle to the railroad, 

divided the zone into approximately 

two equal parts, the canal actually being 

just inside eCA's fXmioI1. C..eneral Harmon assigned the left and slightly wider 

part to Colonel Daniel's CCA and the 

right, from the canal's east bank to the 

divisional boundary, to Allen's CCB. 

(Map V) 

General Harmon had devised f(u' his 

division a scheme of maneuver involving a three-phase attack with the two 

On the other hand, if moved un assembled into 

position, more time was required to assemble them 

than to cross mine fields by other means or to bypass them altogether. 

"Inten, ~lathews "ith Lt Col Robert R. Lir1\'iIle, 9 

~lay 50, CI\1H. 
122 

combat commands abreast. During the 

first phase, the combat commands were 

to pass through the 34th Division to 

occupy the line of the railroad three 

miles northwest of Cisterna; they were 

then to pause to allow the engineers to 

prepare crossings and open a path 

through the expected extensive mine 

fields. 

Both combat commands were to advance from the railroad to seize, first, a 

low ridge line about a quarter of a mile 

beyond, then fan out to occupy the X-Y 

Line. From that first phase line the 

division was to reconnoiter aggressively 

toward Giulianello and Velletri, respectively seven miles northwest and north 

of Cisterna, while getting ready to respond to a corps order to continue the 

offensive as far north as the second, or 

O-B phase line. From there the armor 

was to continue northward into the 

Vdletri gap toward the town of Altena, 

within three miles of Highway 6 and 

the goal of the attack's third phase. 7 So 

read the plans on paper, but in actual 

fact the bulk of the division was destined never to reach Highway o. Clark 

had other plans f()r it which he would 

not disclose until Cisterna had fallen. 

The assault echelon in each of the 

combat commands consisted of a battalion each of medium and light tanks, 2 

battalions of infantry-2 from the 6th 

Armored Infantry with CCB and 2 

from the 135th infantry supporting 

CCA-and 2 companies of tank destroyers. Each combat command had a 

battalion of medium tanks in reserve. 

Two ~rmored artillery battalions supported CCA and 3 supported CCB; 3 

'] st Armd Div FO 10, 19 \fay 44, and CCA and 

CCB FO's of same date. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

field artillery battalions and an antiaircraft battalion were in general support. 8 

Colonel Daniel had chosen the 3d 

Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, to 

lead the attack in his sector and General Allen the 13th Armored Regiment's 2d Battalion to lead in his. Each 

was to advance with two companies of 

tanks abreast, followed at a 200-yard 

interval by infantry accompanied by 

light tanks. The interval was designed 

to protect the infantry from enemy 

artillery fire, which most likely would be 

aimed at the medium tanks leading the 

attack. On the other hand, the 200-yard 

interval would keep the infantry dose 

enough to the armor to prevent bypassed enemy groups from attacking 

the tanks from the rear. (J 

The Attack Begins 

The weather on the 23d seemed to 

hlvor the American ground operations. 

Throughout the day a persistent haze, 

combined with an Allied smoke screen, 

would so limit observation from the 

hills overlooking the beachhead that 

German artillery would prove to be 

generally ineffective. The few German 

guns disclosing their presence were 

soon silenced by concentrations fired bv 

the 27th Field 'Artillery Battalion. Th~t 

battalion also helped Harmon's tanks to 

maintain their course over the hazcshrouded terrain bv firing at 20-minute 

intervals three rounds of red smoke 

aimed at a point a little over a mile 

beyond the front and in the center of 

th~ division sector. The remaining two 

"Ibid. 

"Ibid. 
THE FIRST DAY 

battalions of di vision artillery also 

placed supporting fires 1,300 yards 

ahead of the assault elements. As predetermined lines were reached, the artillery shifted its fires forward at the 

request of the assault commander. )0 

The British diversionary attacks on 

the 1st Armored Division's left helped 

cover the noise of Harmon's tanks as 

they began moving toward their line of 

departure shortly after midnight. Beginning at 0430 in CCA's sector, two 

engineer guides led f<)lIr tanks, each 

towing a 400-foot Snake into the two 

gaps prepared earlier through an 

American mine field along the line of 

departure. For over an hour engineers 

toiled in the darkness within the narrow 

confines of the gaps to connect the 

ul1wieldv lengths of pipe. Thirty minutes 

before H-hour (set f()l' (630) Daniel's 

tanks began pushing the Snakes 

through the gaps into their final positions. Several times enemy fire struck 

dangerously dose to both tanks and 

Snakes, but the Snakes failed to detonate. By H-hour they were in place in 

the enemy mine fields. 

As CC'A's tanks approached the line 

of departure, commanders of the leading tanks ordered their machine gunners to detonate the Snakes. Shattering 

explosions £()llowed, blasting wide paths 

through the mine fields. Other tanks 

moved through to push additional 

Snakes into position. As the smoke and 

dust from the second detonations 

drifi.ed through the air, Colonel Daniel's tanks advanced through two gaps 

IOUnless otherwise noted, the f()lIowing narrative 

is based on the offioal records of the 1st Armored 

Division and subordinate units and Oil (om bat 

interviews and small unit action reports prepared 

by Sidney T. Mathews. 

123 

25 feet wide and extending over 700 

feet imo the C~rman defenses. 

In the left half of CCA's sector two 

medium tank companies of the 3d 

Battalion, I st Armored Regiment, advanced along both sides of the Bove 

Canal, one of several canals paralleling 

the axis of advance. Following each 

company in dose support carne a platoon of tank destroyers and engineers. 

Company H led the 3d Battalion 

attack along the len side of the canal. 

In the van was a platoon of five tanks, 

with three volunteers from the 135th 

Infantry crouching atop each. Moving 

swiftly toward a slight rise about a, 

quarter of a mile beyond the line of 

departure, the platoon opened fire on 

the first of two enemy strongpoints. 

Apparently still stunned by the detonation of the Snakes and prevented by 

tank fire from manning their guns, 

fifteen surviving enemy soldiers quickly 

surrendered as the tank-riding infantrymen leaped to the ground and 

swarmed over their position. While the 

tanks moved on, the inf;;mtrymen hurried their prisoners to the rear along 

the shelter of the Bove Canal's steep 

banks. 'To the right of the canal, tanks 

from Company I employed similar tactics to destroy a second enemy strongpoint. 

With two strongpoims out of the 

wav, CCA's tanks rolled on toward the 

railroad embankment about a mile 

away. Two hundred yards behind them 

came the 1st Armored Regiment's 

light tanks. 

As CCA's mediums penetrated 

deeper into the German defenses, individual enemy infantrymen, al'med with 

the bazooka-like Panzerfaust, vainly attacked the leading vehicles. A tactical 
124 

formation developed by the armored 

division during the North African campaign was largely responsible for the 

enemy's failure. The tanks were echeloned so that only the lead tank was 

exposed to enemy fire. As soon as a 

German soldier fired a Panzerjaust, all 

of the tanks in the formation shot at 

the suspected position. Only a few of 

these encounters were needed to convince most German tank fighters to 

withhold their fire rather than risk 

certain death. In the few instances 

when a PanzerJaust found its target, the 

rockets exploded harmlessly against 

sandbags bracketed with steel rods to 

the front and sides of the hulls. 

On the right of the Bove Canal, 

Company I's medium tanks pushed 

ahead of the rest of the battalion. 

Assisted by the accompanying tank destroyers and fire from the supporting 

artillery battalion, the tanks silenced 

several antitank guns positioned in the 

shadow of the railroad embankment. 

By 1100 the company was within 200 

yards of the railroad, the first objective. 

As the company neared the railroad, 

the accompanying forward artillery observer spotted eight enemy tanks a 

thousand yards to the north, presumably assembling for a counterattack. 

Two artillery battalions, responding to 

his call with heavy concentrations, set 

two tanks afire and prompted the others to withdraw. The threat removed, 

Company I's tanks crossed the remaining 200 yards and at noon gained the 

railroad. Quite unexpectedly, the tankers found no mines, nor did they 

experience any diHiculty in negotiating 

the embankment's steep sides; moreover, antitank fire beyond the railroad 

was feebler than anticipated. By 1300 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

all of the company's tanks, followed by 

the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, had 

crossed the railroad and occupied high 

ground 500 yards to the north. 11 

Left of the Bove Canal mines prevented Company H from matching 

Company I's progress. After advancing 

about a thousand yards beyond the line 

of departure, Company H ran into an 

unsuspected enemy mine field. Four 

tanks were immediately disabled and a 

fifth returned to the re'ar with wounded 

crewmen. Continuing forward, the 

135th Infantry's 2d Battalion, with its 

bodyguard of light tanks, cut around 

the disabled medium tanks and crossed 

the mine fields, the light tanks inexplicably failing to set off explosions. Beyond the mine field, infantry and tanks 

confronted an enemy strongpoint. Supported by direct fire from the light 

tanks, infantrymen of Company E assaulted it with grenades and bayonets. 

With hands held high, twenty enemy 

soldiers poured from the position. 

No sooner were those prisoners hustled to the rear than the tank-infantry 

force ran into another belt of antipersonnel and antitank mines. While enemy small arms and mortar fire from 

somewhere to the front picked at the 

area, an engineer detachment hurried 

forward to clear a path. The field 

having been gapped by 1130, the infantry and light tanks resumed their advance to within 400 yards of the railroad. Concerned about likely enemy 

strength beyond the railroad, the infanIITechnical Sgt. Ernest H. Dervishian and Staff 

Sgt. George J. Hall of the attached l35th Infantry 

(34th Division) won the Medal of Honor during the 

fighting OIl the 23d fiJr "conspicuous gallantry and 

intrepidity at risk of life above and beyond the call 

of duty." 
THE FIRST DAY 

try commander halted his men to await 

arrival of the medium tanks that were 

still trying to extricate themselves from 

the first mine field. 

By early afternoon both wings of 

Colonel Daniel's CCA were either 

within striking distance of the railroad 

or had already crossed it and occupied 

a low ridge 500 yards to the north. At 

that point General Harmon directed 

Daniel to move the 135th Infantry's 2d 

Battalion up to the railroad on the 

division's left, where the battalion was to 

tie in with the 45th Division to cover 

the I st Armored Division's left f1ank 

while the main body of CCA crossed 

the railroad. 

While the armored regiment'S Companies H and I completed their crossings of the railroad and headed toward 

the ridge beyond, supporting artillery 

either kept the enemy at arm's length 

or cowering under cover. In the course 

of the move, Company H encountered 

only scattered resistance and quickly 

moved onto its rxHtion of the o~jective, 

but on the right, it was Company I's 

turn to fight. The tanks had to knock 

out several well-emplaced antitank guns 

before gaining the ridge. As the two 

in fantry battalions and t heir accompanying light tanks f()llowed to join the 

mediums on the high ground fix the 

night, division artillery dispersed an 

enemy force detected assembling in a 

draw a mile north of the railroad. 

General Harmon's left wing under 

Colonel Daniel's command had, by 

nightfall, gained its o~jectives with relatively few losses, but Allen's CCB, on 

the right, had fared less well. Antitank 

mines were the cause. Nowhere along 

the VI Corps front on that first day did 

mines take a greater toll than in CCB's 

125 

sector. The reason was that General 

Allen had decided to hold his Snakes in 

reserve; he depended instead upon 

infantrymen and engineers from the 

34th Division to clear gaps through 

known or suspected mine fields just 

beyond the line of departure. 

Assigned a sector flanked on the left 

by the Mole Canal and on the right by 

the Femminamorta Canal and divided 

by a third, the Santa Maria Canal, CCB 

was to breach the German defenses 

south of the railroad and seize part of 

the low ridge a quarter of a mile 

beyond. To make the assault, Lt. Col. 

James S. Simmerman's 2d Battalion, 

13th Armored Regiment, began to 

move from its assembly area shortly 

before H-hour. With Company 0 on 

the left of the Santa Maria Canal and 

Company F on the right, the battalion 

advanced along two unimproved roads 

toward the line of departure. As in 

CCA, behind the medium tank companies came the infantry, accompanied by 

light tanks. Following Company 0 was 

the 6th Armored Regiment's 3d Battalion accompanied by an attached platoon of light tanks: behind Company F 

came the same regiment's 1 st Battalion, 

also with a platoon of light tanks. 

Colonel Simmerman's battalion 

crossed the line of departure at the 

appointed time, but within half an hour 

exploding antitank mines disabled ten 

medium tanks-three from one company and seven from the other. The 

tanks had apparently run into an uncharted antitank mine field hastily laid 

by U.S. troops sometime during the 

hectic winter defense of the beachhead. 

Although the 34th Division's mineclearing detachments had labored 

through the night, often under harass-
I ~fj 

ing fire, to clear l)(lths throuuh the c ~ 

mine fields, they had missed this one, 

Under considerable pressure to keep 

t he attack moving, Colonel Simmerman 

decided not to delay until mine-clearing 

detachments could come forward to 

complete their job, nor did he call for 

Snakes. Instead. ill the hope that the 

mine field was not extensive and that 

the first explosions would be the last. he 

told the other tank commanders to 

keep moving bv maneuvering as closely 

as possible around the disabled vehicles. 

His hope ,\'as short-lived. As the second 

wave of tanks attempted to proceed 

they too ft,ll victim to mines. Simmerman at that point had no choice but to 

delay until mine-dearing detachments 

could come fi)("\\ard. 

When news of Simmerman's difIiculties reached General Allen, the CCB 

comma nde r chose to be Jieve, as had 

Simmerman at first, that the tanks had 

encountered no extensive mine field 

but only a fe\\ scattered mines. Anxious 

to hole" onto his Snakes t(lr possible use 

later, he authOl"ized sending them forward only after engineers' had determilled that the tanks had ill tael come 

on an extensive mine lield. It was 0915, 

almost three hours after the start of the 

allack, bef<lre the medium tanks began 

the arduous task of towing the UIlwielelly lengths of steel pipe forward 

and t hen pushing them imo position. 

\feanwhile, the two inEmtrv battalions had closed up I:x:hind the 'crippled 

tanks. In hope of maintaining the momentum of t he attack, the armored 

inhmtrymen following Company 0 bypassed the tanks and advanced to 

within a thousand yards of the railroad 

before tire from 'two enemy strongCASSINO TO THE AI.PS 

points forced a halt. The battalion 

commander, Ll. Col. Robert R. Linville. 

tried to get tank destroyers and towed 

57-111m. antitank guns forward to support al1 assault on the stwngpoints. But 

these were as vulnerable to antitank 

mines as were medium tanks. 

Following Companv F on the right, 

LI. Col. Lyle S. Deffenbaugh's inntntnmen (I Sf Battalion, 6th Armored Inbntry Regiment) also passed through the 

antitank mine field onl, to run into an 

antipersonnel mine field backed bv an 

enemy strongpoint that forced a' halt 

after an advance of onh- 500 yards. 

There the inEmtrvmen r~tnained until 

the engineers de<~red a path through 

the antitank Illinc fidd and cnabled the 

surviving mediulll tanks of Company F 

to come tlJr'wanl. First silencing a nest 

of enemy antitank gUllS that opencd 

fire from a dnl\\' to the right frollt, 

Company F's tanks churned through 

the antipersollnel mine field, and the 

inEwtr\' followed safdv in their tracks. 

Togetller tanks and inbntry eliminated 

the enemy strongpoint. \\,'itil the lllCdium tanks again leading, the allackers 

moved a few hundred yards doser to 

the railn )ad, only to be' stopped once 

again by a mine tiekl 1,200 yards short 

of their ol~ective. 

By midday CCB's left \\ing was 

within a quarter of a mile of the 

railroad, but the right still had more 

than half a mile to go. The gains had 

cost 23 medium tanks and seven lank 

destrovers. .\lost were recoverable, vet 

they \\:ere nevertheless lost to the atta~k. 

WI~ile the crews of eight tank recovery 

vehicles toiled through the afternoon 

and far into the night to move the 

disabled tanks to the l"ear for repair, 

the division commander (General llar-
THE FIRST DAY 

rnon) replaced CCB's losses with 

twentv-three tanks from his reserve. 

Til~le was running short if CCB was 

to reach the railroad before dark, as 

Harmon had insisted. Although General Allen gave his approval to using 

the Snakes if necessary to get the attack 

moving, so narrow and circuitous were 

the paths cleared through the first mine 

field that the tank crewmen almost 

despaired of getting through with the 

long, unwieldy steel pipes. 

As that slow process went on, the 

commander of Companr F, Capt. John 

Elliott, impatient at the deIavs, decided 

to try to bypass the second' mine field 

that blocked his tmks on the right wing 

ot CCll's auack. Sideslipping :')00 yards 

to the northeast, the company's tanks, 

f{)llowed by infantn, bv midafternoon 

finally located the field's eastern limits, 

but, before they could proceed, a concealed (',erman antitank gun knocked 

out the lead tank, \\-hile enemy artillerv 

tire t(HTed the Amer'ican inf~mtrvme;l 

to cover. Only afler Captain Elliott had 

sent a platoon to the rear of the 

troublesome antitank gun to silence it 

were tanks and infantrv able to continue. Thev reached the railroad as 

darkness \\'~s settling over the beachhead. While the tanks took cover for 

the night south of the railroad, the 

armored infantnmen crossed the railroad embankm~nt and outposted the 

high ground a few hundred yards 

beyond. . 

Colonel Linville's infantrvmen (:3d 

Battalion, 6th Armored I nt"antrv) Oil 

CCB's left wing meanwhile had' been 

unable to overcome the two enemy 

strongpoints south of the railroad. I\'{;t 

until late afternoon, when tank destrovers, towed antitank guns, and the pl~lI ') ,.., - I 

toon of light tanks that had originally 

accompanied the infantry came forward, did the attack on the positions 

begin (0 make headway. The strongpoint finally fell to a frontal assault 

launched by two infantrv companies, 

assisted by another enveloping from the 

left. Only then, as nightfall ('arne, \\'as 

the inbntry able to cross the railroad 

and outpost the ridge 500 yards to the 

north. 

For all the day's mishaps, the tanks 

and in bntry of the 1 st Armored Division's t\\O combat commands hv nightfall had fought their way across the 

railroad to their first ()~jel:ti\'e, the km 

ridge to the north. During the night 

both commands consolidated their positions while self-propelled supporting artillen' displaced f<)D\'ard. 

:'\ot sim:e the fighting for 1\lo11te 

Trocchio during January of 1944 had 

the division incurred so many casualties 

in one da\'. Of the total of i 73 casualties, 35 h,~d been killed, 1:17 wounded, 

and I \\'as missing in action. 12 

From the German view\Xlint, the 1st 

Armored Division's penetration had occurred \\'ithin the sector of the LXXVI 

Panzer Corps almost adjacent to (he 

houndarv with the I Parachute Corps. 

The armored attack pierced the main 

line of resistance on the right wing and 

center of the 362d Infantry Division to a 

depth of almost a mile. (As in sen'ral 

cases on the southern front when the 

Allied oflcnsi\'e had opened there, the 

beachhead offensive caught the ('0111-

'"9th "IRl'. Fifth Army Battle C",uaitil's, to Jun 

4:>. During the fighting Oil Ihe ~:\d. 2d 1.1. Thomas 

W, Fowler of the 1st Armored Diyi,sioll perl(ll'Illed 

\\ ith "collspicuOl" gallalltn and inlrl'pidll\ at "i,he 

of life "bo\l' aud bl'\ond the call of dun:' t()J 

whkh he \\'as subse'lut'll1h awarded the "ledal of 

HOllor. 
128 

mander of the 362d Di'uision away from 

his post, on leaH=' ill (;ermam, \"i~iting- a 

son badly wounded in Russia.) 13 CCA's 

thrust I{ad pushed back two understrength battalions of the 956th Infantry 

Regiment, \\ hile CCB's had done the 

same to the 954tll Infantry. On the 362d 

Di"i~ion 's left wing- south of Cisterna the 

third reg-iment, the 955th Infantry, the 

onh OIle with a battalion in reserve, 

had in the meantime achieved greater 

success in Llcing the attack of the U.S. 

3d Inf;mtrv Division, 

The Attack on CLIleriUl 

In striving to take the rubble-strewn 

strongpoint of Cisterna-vital to General Truscott's plans since the main 

roads leading- to Vellctri, Cori, and 

Valmontone passed through the to\\"nGeneral O'Daniel's 3d Division was to 

fix the defenders of Cisterna fi'Ontallv 

with one reg-iment while the othel- tw~) 

enveloped the objective from the right 

and left, after which t he center regiment was to penetrate the town. Once 

Cisterna was in hand, the division was 

to continue to Cori, there to anchor the 

VI Corps' right flank on the high 

ground behind the village, then turn 

north toward l1igh\\av 5 and Valmontone. General Frederick's CanadianAmerican 1st Special Sen'ice Force was 

to operate along- the division's right 

nank, 

In addition to the 362d f)il'il;()n's left 

regiment, located west of the main 

highway into Cisterna from the southwest, the 3d Division faced the right 

wing of the 715 th Divi~i(m, reinforced by 

a panzer grenadier regiment. Since that 

division held the line from the same 

J"\1S # (;-064 (Kesselring). 

CASSI\lO TO THE ALPS 

mad all the way around the eastern arc 

of the beachhe~d to the coast, its regiments were thinly spread. General 

O'Daniel's men [iCed ti.)ur enemy battalions on line, with approxin'lately 

three in reserve. 

Just as mines seriouslv deterred the 

1st Armored Division's attack, so they 

also posed a major hazard tl)r the 3d 

Division. Only on the division's right 

wing-, where the 15th Infantry under 

Col. Richard G. Thomas sought to 

en vclop Cisterna from the sout heast, 

\\ould mines cause no appreciable delay.14 

In making- a \\heeling maneuver to 

get behind Cisterna, Colonel Thomas 

recognized that his regiment would be 

turning away from General Frederick's 

1 st Special Service Force, on the 15th 

Infantry's right flank, and thus creating 

a gap between the two forces. To cover 

that gap Thomas f<mned a special task 

force around Company A, which he 

drew from his regimental reserve. Commanded by M<Uor Michael Paulick, the 

task f(H'Ce included a platoon each of 

medium and light tanks from the 751 st 

Tank Battalion and a section from the 

50 I st Tank Destrover Battalion. The 

f(m:e also included the reg-imental battle 

patrol. a platoon of machine guns, a 

section of mortars, a platoon from the 

cannon company, and a squad of engineers. Moving close along the right 

flank of the 2d Battalion, which h'as to 

constitute the regiment's right wing-, 

Paulick's task force was to cross the 

Cisterna Canal and drive northeastward 

"enless otherwise noted the tanicaJ narraH\',' is 

based upon official reconh of the :)d Division and 

its subordinate units, pin;, (ombal interviews and 

small unit anion narratives prepared by Sidll('\ I 

:'vfathews of the Fift h Armv Historical Sectioll, 
THE FIRST DAY 

to cut Highway 7, in the process taking 

several road junctions and clearing the 

Boschetta di \losca woods, the latter 

less (han a mile short of Highway 7. 

Striking swiftly at H-hour (0630) 

Company A with fire support from the 

attached tan ks and tank destroyers 

quickly enveloped and seized a bridge 

o\'er the Cisterna CanaL but even 

attempt to advance beyond the bridg~ 

brought down a hail of small arms fire 

frolll a group of houses somc (jO!) 

yards away along a road leading from 

the hamlet of Borgo Podgora into 

Cisterna. The company commander 

tried to set up a base of fire with one 

platoon and send a second to outflank 

the enenn position. but the German 

fire was too imense. When the attached 

tanks and tank destrovers tried to move 

against I he position, accurate fire from 

well-sited antitank guns knocked out 

t\\'o tanks and one (ank destrover. 

At that point I\fajor Paulick sought to 

break the impasse by sending his three 

suni\'ing tanks on a wide flanking 

maneuver ilHo the I sl Special SClyice 

Force's zone Oil the right. The necessary permission obtained, the tanks 

turned back to cross the Cisterna Canal 

until they \\cre well to the rear of the 

enen1\-h~'ld hOllses. Firing point-blank 

at the houses, the tanks enabled a 

platoon of Companv A to attack dIe 

position horn the front. L nable to 

\\"ithstand the fire, t he Germans withdrew as the inbntrv closed in. That 

resistance broken, t he main body of 

Task Force Paulick moved on with 'Iittle 

difficult, into the Boschetta di Mosca, 

there to dig in it)r the night "it hill half 

a mile of Highwav 7 southeast of 

Cisterna. 

After dark the regimental baule pa129 

trol sent three men to a road junction 

200 yards beyond the woods. The men 

reached the' junction just in time to 

observe a column of about SLxty German soldiers apparently on their '\\ay to 

establish a stmngpoint in the vicinitv of 

the woods. L'ndetected, the three men 

quick!; \\ithdrew to the main body of 

the battle patrol and set up an ambush. 

When the German column came within 

range, the entire battle patrol 0Ix-ned 

fire, killing 20 and capturing 37. 

Two of the 13th lnfantp:'s battalions 

meanwhile had launched tile regiment's 

main attack between the location of 

Task Force Paulick and Cisterna, with 

the 2d Battalion on the right making 

steady progress hum the stal1. While 

the ini"anllTll1en ;1cl\"anced toward the 

first objective, a wooden area about half 

a mile beyond the line of departure, the 

anached platooll of medium tanks encountered no antitank mines; from the 

fI rst the in fallt JY had e ffecti\'e dose-in 

fire support. " 

As the t mops neared the h'oods, the 

battalion commander, in a mancmer 

designed to draw fire and force the 

enemy to disclose his positions, sent 

Company F across an 0Ix'n field ;,)00 

yards east of the woods. At the same 

time, Company E. accompanied bv the 

tank platoon. made the main assault 

directly against the woods. At that point 

the tanks did run into mincs, but so 

dose [0 the woods that they were still 

able to support the inf~l11tl\ 6y fire. 

\\lith ammunition running ShOll and 

anxiolls to take a(hantage of the su pporting tank fire's keeping the enemv 

under cm"cr, Company E's commander 

ordered his men to fix ba\onets and 

charge, In one of the fe~\ verified 

bayonet assaults in American troops 
130 

dUI'ing V\'orld "Val' II, the Illen dashed 

into the woods and swarmed over the 

Gt'rman positions. They killed 15 of the 

enemy and captured 80, while an undetermined number broke from the 

far side of the woods and fled. Companv F, meanwhile, crossed the open 

field east of the \\oods to join Company 

E in rounding up enemy stragglers. 

The first objective taken, the battalion 

commander called for an anillery concentration on the area between the 

woods and the higlmav and committed 

his reserve. Company G, with orders to 

pass north of the woods ami capture a 

road junction 500 yards away on the 

Cisterna-Borgo Podgora mad. Meeting 

on'" light resistance, Company G 

reached the junction at 1800 and then 

turned east to the Cisterna Canal. there 

to capture more than a hundred Germans who had taken refuge hum artillery fire in deep dugouts along the side 

of the canal. Since those shelters were 

useless as fighting positions, the Germans had liule choice when U.S. inf~tntrV'men suddenly appeared but to sur~ 

render. 

Althou).ih Colonel Thomas had intended both his assault battalions to cut 

Highway 7 southeast of Cisterna l>ef()re 

dark, the opening moves of the 2d 

Battalion had taken too much time, and 

a lapse in communications between the 

battalion and regimental headquarters 

unposed a further delay. The battalion 

at last headed f()r the highway in late 

afternoon, but pmgress \\a5 so slow that 

darkness f()lInd the men still short of 

that o~jective. 

On the 15th Inf;:mtry's left win).i, the 

3d Battalion. in the meantime, had 

crossed the line of departure in a 

column of companies, with Company L 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

leading and taking advantage of rhe 

COHT of a shallow ditch about half a 

mile east of the American-held settlement of Isola Bella. The company's 

objective was a group of houses around 

which the Germans had developed a 

formidable strongpoint southwest of a 

road junction 700 yards away. As the 

men emerged from the ditch, a blast of 

small arms and mortar lire from the 

strongpoint forced them back. Only 

after a fire fight lasting several hours 

and with supporting fire from tank 

destroyers did Company L capture the 

positioll, and then but 40 eftenives 

remained of an original strent-,rth of 180 

men. Other enemy positions still 

blocked the way, and Company L \\as 

too depleted to continue. 

At nooll the battalion commander 

relieved Company L with what many in 

the 3d Division hoped would be a 

decisive innovation in infantry combata regimental "battle sled te~I11" towed 

by a platoon of medium tanks. The 

battle sled was C::eneral O'Danicl's idea. 

one in which he took special pride. It 

was an open-topped narrow steel tube 

mounted on flat runners and wide 

enough to carry one infantryman in a 

prone position. Serving as protection 

against shell fra).iments and small arms 

fil'e, the steel tubes were to transport 

infantrymen through enemy fire in 

what O'Daniel looked on as portable 

foxholes. Early in May, a battle sled 

team of sixty men had been organized 

in each of the division's three regiInents. I" 

With each of five tanks towing twelve 

"Donald (;, Taggert, cd., Hi,lloTY of thf Third 

Injantry Dil,ision in World I~'ar 1I (\Vashingtou: 

Infantry Journal Pre,s. 1\147), p, 14H. 
THE FIRST DAY I ~ I 

ISOLA BELLA. Cisterna and Alban hiLLI in background. 

battle sleds, the 3d Battalion, with Companies I and K f()I1()\\'ing, renewed its 

attack in earlv afternoon. The tanks 

had advanced only a short distance 

when they came U~lIl a drainage ditch 

too wide and too deep to negotiate. 

The men in the battle sleds had to 

dismount and continue the attack on 

f(lOt. Thus ended the first and, as it 

turned out, sole test of the division 

commander's proud innovation. The 

medium tanks that had towed the sleds 

nevertheless continued to support the 

in fantrvmen b\ fire. Progress \\as 

steady, 'yet it t;lok time t(; root the 

enem}' f;'om one strongpoint after another. Consequentlv, as darkness fell 

the 3d Battalion, like the 2d, \\as still 

well short of cutting Highwav i southeast of Cisterna. 

Whereas mines had caused the I :')th 

Infantn, Oil the 3d Di\'ision's right 

\\'ing, little trouble, thev \\ere much 

more of an obstacle ill the center, 

where the ith Infantr\', under Co\. 

Wile, H. Omohundro,' attacked. ~()t 

decis'ive, the milles nevertheless sen'ed 

to den\' the inbntry companies much 

of their needed tank sUPlxln ill frollt 

of Cisterna in \\hat General c)'Daniel 

expected \\ould be the hardest fighting 

on his dil'ision's front. 
CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GENERAL O'DANIEL'S BATTLE SLEDS 

In direct defense of the major 

stronghold of Cisterna, the Germans 

had constructed their most formidable 

de fenses, controlled from a regimental 

command post located in a wine cellar 

deep underneath a large building in the 

center of the town. Othe r cellars and 

nume rous tunnels honeycombed the 

ground beneath the to\\'I1, sheltering its 

garrison from the 3d Division's preparatory artillery fire and aerial tx)mbardme nlo When' those fir es ceased , the 

Germans quickly emerged to man firing positions from which they could 

contest every foot of ground. 

The 7th Infantry commander, Colonel Omohundro, was to send two battalions abreast in a northeasterly direction along the axis of the Isola BellaCisterna road to break throug h the 

enemy de fe nses south of Ciste rna and 

draw up to the town. That accomplished, Omohundro, on division order, 

was to send his reserve battalion to take 

the se ttleme nt of La Villa, on the 

railroad a mile northwest of Cisterna, 

and t hen seize a ridge just east of La 

Villa, cut Highway 7 in the vicinity of 

the Cisterna ceme tery, and occupy a 

portion of the X- Y phase line. The 

remainde r of the regiment wa s, on 

division order, to clear the Ge rmans 
THE FIRST DAY 

from the rubble of Cisterna. A company each from the 751 st Tank Battalion and the 60lst Tank Destroyer Battalion, as well as a battery from the 

10th Field Artillery Battalion (I 05-mm. 

howitzers, towed), were to be in direct 

support of the regiment throughout. 

No sooner had leading troops of the 

7th Infantry's 3d Battalion crossed their 

line of departure (about three miles 

southwest of Cisterna) at 0630 than 

automatic weapons fire from two positions about half a mile northeast of 

Isola Bella drove them to cover. Two 

and a half hours after the attack began 

the two advance companies were still, in 

the words of Omohundro's S~3, 

"pinned down." To that report General 

O'Daniel growled, "We have no such 

words in our vocabulary now." The 

division commander added threateningly in words meant more for Omohundro than his harried 5--3, "You're 

supposed to be at the railroad track 

by noon. You'll get a bonus if you 

do, something else if you don't." 16 

What Omohundro's infantrymen most 

needed at that point was (:Iose-in fire 

support, but an uncleared antitank 

mine field kept the attached medium 

tank platoon and a platoon of tank 

destroyers too far ~l\\'ay to have effect. 

To get the attack moving again a 

slo\\' , I~ainstaking, and costl') il\fan;ry 

advance in the face of ellemv fire 

seemed the ollly way. Taking ad";lIltage 

of every scrap of cover and concealment, especially numerous drainage 

ditches, the 3d Battalion, with Company 

L leading, laboriouslv started to move. It 

took the men three hours to advance 

one mile to within grenade-throwing 

'''3d Di, G-3 ./nl, 2309255 \Ia, 44. 

range of the enemy strongpoint that 

had held up the attack all morning. 

Unable or unwilling to resist once Company L got that dose, sixteen surviving 

Cermans raised their hands in surrender. Their capitulation enabled Company L to move quickl" onto its first 

objective, the Colle \1onaco, a i<m rise 

about a quarter of a mile northeast of 

Isola Bella, \\hile Company I in the 

meantime slipped around to the left to 

seize a nose of adjacent high ground 

500 yards a\\ay. Moving too tar to the 

\\('st, Company I encountered a storm 

of enemy fire that forced the men to 

take such cover as they could find. The 

battalion commander commItted Company K on Company I's right, but that 

move proved of little help after enemy 

fire killed first the company commander and then his executive oilicer. 

By midafternoon, the 3d Battalion had 

p~netrated the German position to a 

depth of almost a mile, but, in doing so, 

had incurred such hea\"\" casualties that 

the momentum of its att~ck was lost. 

On the 7th Inbntry's right \\ing, the 

2d Battalion had even less to sho\\ in its 

advance astride the Isola Bella~Cisterna 

road. Scheduled to jump off at H-hour. 

the battalion had to delay f()J' t\\ent\ 

minutes because of enemy' artillery fire. 

The assault companies, s{,pported bv a 

platoon of medium tanks, had advanced onlv 200 yards be\ond the 

shelter of a drainage ditch thilt marked 

the line of departure bcf()re small arms 

fire from t\\O strong points approximateh 600 yards a\\-;1\ drove the men 

to co·\·er. -ro get th~ attack moving 

again, tanks clme {()n\ard to deal \\ith 

those positions, but the maneuver collapsed \\·hen antitank mines disabled all 

of the tanks. The Company E com-· 
mander then decided to emdop one of 

the strongpoints bv sending an infantry 

platoon on a \\ide swing to the west. 

Advancing slowly in cover aff()rded by 

a drainage ditch, t he platoon, after t\\() 

hours of crawling through the ditch, 

approached to \\'ithin striking distance 

of the enemy. Assaulting the first 

strongpoint \\ith rifle fire and grenades, 

the men quicklv overran and destroyed 

it, but the eHi)rt left the platoon \\ith 

but eighteen men. 

:\leal1\\hile, Companv F, lighting east 

of the Isola Bella-Cisterna road, had a 

much easier experience. Attacking the 

other strongpoint, COlllpany F had the 

support of an attached platoon of tank 

destroyers that somehO\\' experienced 

no cliHicultv with mines. In onh fim\' 

minutes, C('n11pany F overcame the en'-

em), position. 

Regrouping his men, the 2d Battalioll 

cOlllmander called for more tanks to 

replace t hose lost earlier to mines, but 

the regiment had none to spare. without tank support, no recourse remained 

but to resume the attack with the 

firep(mer at hand, this time to\\'ard the 

Colle l\faraccio, a group of low hills 

about 1,300 yards north of the Colle 

:\;lonaco. Th~ t\\'O assault companies 

had advanced a quaner of a mile when 

heavy automatic \\capons fire f()J'Ced 

another halt. 

When word of the 7th Infantrv's 

continuing difficulties reached the di\'ision commander, he authorized additional artillerv support and a smoke 

screen behind which Omohundro's regiment \\as to try again bef<>re dark to 

break the impasse. While his regiment 

regrouped, Colonel Omohundro moved 

his reserve battalion into a blocking 

position east of Isola Bella. 

CASSIl\'O TO THE ALPS 

The new drive was to begin at 1645 

behind a 15-minute preparation tired 

\)\ f(Hlr battaliollS of artiIJen. As the 

fire lifted, the 2d Battalion 'began to 

ad vance. A pparen th' demoralized \n 

losses during the morning action, the 

adjacent 3d Battalion failed to move. 

\Vit h two companies abreast, the 2d 

Battalion advanced ;tiong both sides of 

the Isola Bella road. Although antitank 

mines again prevented t\\O surviving 

tanks and a platoon of tan k destroyers 

from accompanying the inbntrv, when 

(\\0 enemy tanks suddenl\ appeared 

several hundred yanls to the front, the 

American armor \\'as dose enough to 

bring the enemy vehicles under fire. 

One German tank burst illto flame alld 

the other withdre\\. That threat removed, the 2d Batt alion cont in ued to 

advance, although the commander \\';IS 

cOllcerned t hat unless t he 3d Battalion 

soon drew abreast, his leading companies might be cut oiT. By 2300 the lead 

companv was within 60() yards of Cisterna. 

The 3d Battalion in the meamime 

remailled throughout the alierlloon 011 

the Colle Monaco. At last convinced 

that the comlTlandel' was no longer able 

to control eit her himself or his unit, the 

executive oiticer, :\fbj. Lloyd B. Ramsey, assumed cOlllmand and made plans 

for a two-company attack to st;ll't 

shortly afin nightbll at 2100. When 

the armored support Ramsey requested 

failed to appear, he postponed the 

attack to 2130, but bef()re that hour 

arrived, enemy tanks mack a second 

appearance. L~ading a small inbnrry 

force, several German tallks approached to \\ithin 2.50 yards of Ramsey's right front. Although the tanks 

failed to attack, their presence was 
THE FIRST DAY 

enough to prompt Ramsey to cancel his 

plans and go on the defensive f()\' the 

night ". hilc awaiting rcin f<mement b\ 

the regimcnt's reserve battalion. By the 

end of the first da\, only the 2d 

Battalion of Omohund'ro's 7th Infantry 

had made any significant penctration of 

the encmy's defense, that to within fi()() 

yards of (~isterna. Antitank mine fields 

had severely limited the close-in fire 

support so 'dcsperately needed b\ the 

inLintry in thc first hours if the momentul~l of thc attack was to be maintained. :\10reover, the dav's gains kid 

been as cost h as they \\e;'e disaplxlinting. Of the 'regiment's more than 200 

casualties, 54 men had been killed. 

As with the 7th Infantry, antitank 

mines also affected progress ~lf the ~Oth 

Inbntrv, constituting the 3d Division's 

left wing and main effort alongside the 

I st Armored Division. This \\as the 

regimcnt comprising thc left pincer of 

Gcneral O'Daniel's enveloping mancuvel' to isolate Cisterna. The regiment 

was first to cut the railroad, then the 

high"'ay to the nort h"'est of t he to\~'n, 

and finall\ to move on Cori along \nth 

thc l?ith'lnfantn on the right. The 

sector assigned ex'tended at the . line of 

depart ure for 2,SOO \;II,ds astrIde the 

Femminamorta Canal but narrO\\'ed to 

aiX)lIl /-lOO yards at the railroad, a little 

over a mile ;I\\·a\. 

Like Colone'l Omohundro on his 

right, the regimental commander, Col. 

Lionel C. :\IcGarr, also planned to 

;lttack "ith two iXlttalions abreast. In 

direct support of each \\'as a platoon of 

the 7SIst Tank Battalion. The ;)()th 

Inbntn \\as further strengthened b\ 

;lttachl1lent of a company from the 

()O I st Tank Dest r()\er B;ltt;dion, \\hose 

vc hides \\ere to be em plmcd as self~ 

propelled assault guns. 

Believing t he enemy's defenses to be 

\\cakest opposite his left wing, Colonel 

:\1cGarr sought to ex ploit t his situation 

b\ choosing his most experienced commander, Lt. Col. V\'oodnl\\' V\'. Stromberg of the 2d Battalion, to Icad the 

eU<lrt there. Because the battalion's scctor was quite narrO\\, \1cGarr told 

Stromberg to attack in a column of 

companies, leapfrogging them periodicalh to keep the freshest f(ln\·ard. 

On the right, \\here the sector \\as 

much broader and the defenses apparenth stronger, :\1cGarr ordered the 3d 

Battalion to attack \\ith three companies 

abreast and atuched ;1 company frolll 

the 1st Battalion as a resene. He also 

pbced all of the attached tank destrovers and the regimental cannon Co\;lpall\ of IOS-mm. howitzers in direct 

SUPIXlrl. 

At 0630 CompanY G led Stromberg's 

2d Battalion in a column of companies 

west of the Femminamorta Canal and 

achanced t(mard Hill 77, about 1,200 

yards north"'est of Ponte ROllO, an 

~>Il(:>mv-held settlement at a road junction and bridge o\"er the canal a mile 

and ;1 half south\\'est of Cisterna. E\"en 

before the company crossed the line of 

departure, automatic \lcapons fire, 

punctuated \\ith shelling by mortars 

and ~Irtillen, forced the men to take 

cO\er in a n'earb\ drainage ditch. At the 

same time, mines halted the tanks too 

far frolll the action to be of much 

assistance. 

Since the drainage ditch led in the 

direct ion Co III pany G \I'anted to go, it 

pr()\ided a confined though adeq uate 

covered approach ;lIld enabled the inbntrYlllen to reach and ()\"elTLin Hill 

77. Then they Illo\"ed 300 yards IX\(lIld 
136 

to the fool of Hill 8 I. about 600 yards 

beyond the line of departure. Sinc~ that 

pu't Company G almost halfway to the 

railroad, Colonel Stromberg sent Company E to seize the hill. 

That accomplished with reasonable 

bcility, Stromberg directed Company F 

to de~troy a troublesome strongpoint on 

a knoll just east of Hill HI. By 0900, less 

than three hours after the attack began, 

that mission too was accomplished. Yet 

for all the relative case of the advance, 

Colonel Stnllnberg hesitated to COIltinue to the railroad without first dealing with several bypassed pockets of 

resistance. That both flanks were exposed also made him "'an of cont.inuing. It took much of the rest of the day 

for' Company G to clear the pockets of 

resistance, while Company E, from 

bl<x:king IX)sitiolls on Hills 81 and 

covered the battalion's l1anks. As time 

passed, Colonel Stromberg grew e\'er 

more apprehensin: about continuing 

alone to the railroad, particularh when 

reports revealed that Company G was 

down to 26 men and COlllpanv E to 40. 

On I\' Company F, last in line in the 

battalion column of companies, had 

incurred relative Iv ft,\\ casualties and 

was in a conditi'ol1 to continue the 

attack, 

Anxious that the 30th Inbnu'\ secure its objectives belem' morning, G·elleral O'Daniel authorized Colonel ~IcGatT to commit his resen'e battalion to 

ex ploit the 2d Battalion's limited success. 1 ' \Vith that assurance of' ~upport. 

Colonel Stromberg, as darkness settled 

over the battlefield. sent Compam F on 

IowaI'd the railroad. \Vhen the ('0111-

pan) reached a point only a hundt'ed 

\' \'1 Corps r;,-<I Jnl, :!31450B 1\LI\ 44, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

vanls h'om the railroad bridge over the 

Femminamorta Canal, interrninent 

small anns fire began to strike the 

column. Unable to locate the enem) 

positions in the cbrkness. the company 

dug in and settled down for the night. 

:'\lot until daylight came was the reserve 

battalion destined to reach the COIllpanv's position. 

On the 30th Infantn's I'ight wing. 

the 3d Battalion Illet little resistance at 

first, but that was befc)I'e the supporting 

tanks and tank destrovcrs bogged down 

in the mine fields. From that point 

resistance increased, so that b,' midafternoon the battalion had lost its momentlllll. As night fell the leading company. unable to keep pace with COIllpany F west of the canal. h~~d reached a 

point onl\ ~lb()llt half a 1l1lle north of 

the Ponte Rotto road junction, Shorth 

after dark the troops dug in \\here they 

were, placed concertina wire and mines 

across the road, and ,>cttlcd dO\\,I1 to 

await dawn. 

Thus, alt hough the armored half. of 

the VI COI'PS' attack had made cOllslderable progress toward seizing Ihe first 

(b,'s objectives on schedule, the inbnIn half (the 3d Division) had lagged. In 

sF~ite of abundanl artillen Sll pport. frequent harassment of the cncnn:S rear 

throughollt the c!;l\ by tactical :tlHTa/t, 

and, most importantly. the element of 

surprise th~tt Truscott had succeeded in 

maintaining until the ofIcl1sivc began, a 

\\ell dug-in enelllv had responded to 

the 3d Di,ision\ attack with considerable small arms lire and had held the 

inbntnmen to relatively modest gains. 

Some ~ndic;lIi()n of the cfh.'ctiveness of 

the ene[11\\ defensive tires could be 

seen ill I h~~ high losses incurred tn I he 

division on the !irst da\. Of a lotal of 
THE FIRST DAY 

1,626 casualties, 107 were killed in 

action, 642 wounded, 812 missing, and 

f)5 captured. IH 

Ar{ion on thp Cort)s' Flanhs 

ben as the I st Armored alld ~d 

IIlEtntrv Divisions ~lttacked in their sectors, C~neral Eagles' 4:")th Di\'isioll had 

bunched a limited objective attack to 

stabilize the VI Corps'left fbnk. While 

one regimellt made a vigorous ~le.!Ilon-. 

stration on the Elr left in the \KII1lt\ of 

the Anzio-Cam(Jolcolle railroad, the 

4:)th Division's other two regiments attacked ~dollg ~1f1 axis rUllning nonlmest 

of t he village of Carallo, a little mer 

five miles soutlm'est of Cisterlla. 

l\line fields, f()J"Illl1atelv, \vere not the 

problem here that they ~\cn: elsewhere. 

Both regimellts moved rapldlv to\\a]"(1 

objectives ~dong the road leacitng north-

\\(~st from CaL1l10 to the Cisterna-Rome 

railroad. The supporting tanks \\orked 

closelv \\ith the illbntn, the two ~lrms 

fightiIlg together as aSITIooth-\\orking 

team. Bv midafterI1oon, Col. Rolxrt L 

Dubne\\ 180th Infantrv, on the left, 

had re~lChed its objecti~es about one 

mile northwest of Carano aher overrunning a battalion of the 29th, Panzer 

Grenadier Re{.,riment and captllnng the 

battalion commander in his command 

post. Oil the lSOth lnbntn's right, ~he 

157th Infantry, commanded In Co\. 

John H. Chur~:h, attacked, to\\,~lrd eli,slant objectives along t he ratlro~ld allC~ III 

the process encountered a sharp (.erman riposte. 

IH 'Ilh \[Rl' Filih Anm Battle Casualties, IO/ull 

l~). i~\IH, ,\,' a result ,,! the lighting oil the ~3d 

threc Illelllbers of I he 3d Divisioll \\ere a\\arded Ihe 

\led,,1 of HOllor: Privates lsi Class Johll W, Dutko 

(poslhulllousIY). l'atri, k L. Kessler. alld HClln 

S, hauer. 

Alt hough General Eagles \\as unaware of it at the time, the quick lx~netration b\ his division serious" threatened the' left flank and rear of the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier Dh1isiun, com prising the 

left wing of the 1 Pm(le/lllli' ell/jJI. The 

panzer grenadier di\ision. COIl1I!lander 

reacted b\ counterattackmg \\Ith the 

onlv force at his disposal: I?) Tiger 

tanks from the 50Hlh Pam.i'r Battalion. I~j 

Abou t the time Colonel Dulanev's I 80t h 

Inbntn \\as digging in on it.s objectives, a force or Tigers various" estimated In American observers to n UIl1-

bel' bet\~cen lift een and t \\Tn t\- fou r 

attacked Colonel Ch urch 's Li7t h Illbntn. The Germall tanks pushed through 

()]le battalion ~1I1c1 opened fire Oil the 

rear of anol her. 

To coullter that threat, General 

Truscott ordered f()n\ard a battalion of 

armored illfantrv from the 1st Arlllored Division's resenc, but bef()re the 

illbntnmen could arrive, di\'isiol1 and 

corps ~lrtillen, including 8-illCh iJo\\itzers, responeled \\ith a devastatmg blast 

of shelling. It \\as too much tor ~he 

Cermans. The tanks \\ithdre\\, leavll1g 

behind several of their number as tbl11-

ing h lIlb. Ih nightfall, figl: ting had 

cost the division a total of 4:18 casualties, of \\hom 3() \\ere killed, I (i9 

wounded, ~) I captured, and 228 missing. 20 .. 

~leall\\hile, on the opposite flank of 

the American offensive, General Frederick's I st Special Sen'ice Force had 

begun its part of the ope.ration \\ith an 

advance by its 1st Regllllellt ttl\\'ard 

'" \IS # R-:)() (Bai\C,). C\IH, 

'" 'lih \IRl'. Fifth Arnl\ Battlc C,lsll,t1tics. IOJUll 

4'1. C\IH. For ,lnioll durillg Ihis tighl Tl'lhllKal 

Sgt. \'all l". B,lrfoot \\as a\\arded Ihl' \Iedal of 

HOllOr. 
Higlmay 7 and the railroad. Despite 

German small arms and machine gun 

fire, the lead rq.,>irnent quicklv ovelTan 

the enelllY's fiJlward positions and by 

noon had pushed across Highway 7 to 

\\ithin a thousand yards of the railroad. 

GeneLl1 Frederick held the regiment 

there to allow units of the neighboring 

15th Inbntn on the left to pull ahreast. 

The pause affi)rded the Germans 

time to assemble a counterattacking 

fi)rce of" tanks and inbntn bnond the 

railroad embankment. Shortly after 

dark, t\\dve \1ark IV tanks ~lI1d an 

estim~tted platoon of ellem\ infantry 

suddenly struck. Within an hour the 

Cermans had rolled through the 1st 

Special Service Force's out post line and 

threatened to break through to the 

rear. "All hell has broken loose up 

here:' Frederick's G-:) reported. 'The 

Germans han' unleashed event hing. 

They got timr or our \f-4's and three 

~f-l 0 tank destroyers. We need more 

:\;f-4's and TD's." Maj. \Villiam R. Rossen, the assistant corps G-3, promised 

to "see if \\e can get some stufl up light 

awav."~l 

Help arrived, but not betiJl'e part of 

one company had been cut ofT and 

captured. The rest of the regiment fell 

back about half a mile south of the 

high\\·;l\. Despite the earh gains, \\On 

largely b\· exploitation of the clements 

of shock and surprise, the Germans 

lacked the necessary reSCT\'e strength to 

uke advantage of their success and 

ullder hean artillen fire fell back 

nort h of the' Llilroad.· The "ithdLl\\al 

gave General Frederick an opportunity 

to regroup his battered fiJl"(e, reonup\ 

sOllie of the lost ground, and count his 

'I \"1 Corps G-3 Jnl. ~3-:!4 \Ll\ 44. 

CASSI;-";O TO THE ALPS 

losses. The I st Regiment had lost :)9 

men killed, oyer 100 wounded, alld 30 

captured. During the night, General 

Truscott , ill order to , gnvethe regnment , 

some respite fi'om its exertions th~lt day, 

ordered the 34th Di\1sion's 133d Infant n to send one battalion to relie\'e the 

I st Special Senice Force's 1st Regiment 

and outpost a lille north of the higlma\ 

and another to protect the flank along 

the \lussolini Canal. 

For Generalieutnant der Panzertruppen Traugott Hen, at the command 

post of his LXXV I Panzer CO/P", the 

situation map throughout 23 \1;1\ pro-

\ided little reasoll fiJI' satisbcrion despite the brief successes of the counterattacks against the American fbn ks. 

The stronghold of Cisterna ill the panzer corps center still held, hut the 

magnitude of the attack meant to General Hen that the Allies had indeed 

begun their ]ollg-a\\aited breakout of~ 

fellsiYe. "" . 

In response to pleas during the ;diernOOll from the commandcr of the 

hard-pressed 715th hzlantr), Dil'isioll, opposite the I st Special Senice Force, 

General Herr requested appr()\al Iw 

Fourteellth Arm)' headquarters to \\ithdr~l\\ the di\'ision's left \\ing about 

1,20() Llnls to the line of the railroad, 

\\hichsowheast of Cisrerna by Ix'\ond 

rhe highwa\. That m()\e \\ould cnable 

Hen to ancho\" his left fbnk on higher 

ground, the foorhills of the Lepini 

\lountains, alld est;lblish a stronger 

deft'min' line parallel to the Turhenian coast. 

III line \\ith that rc;lslJlling, \et un-

\\"illing to llIake the decision \\ithollf 

:!:! l'nlt'~ ... uthcn\'isc noted (~('nll,ln Illatcri.ti is 

based Upllll \!SS #', R-;,O (Bailn). 1'-1,\ alld "\-1 h 

(Wcstphall'i al.). alld C-Oli4 lKl'"clring). 
THE FI RST DA \' 

apprmal of higher authorit\,. General 

von \bckensen re\;l\cd t he proposal to 

Field \brshal Kesselring. along "ith the 

additional inielrlnation that t he Americans (the 1st Srx'Cial Service Force) had 

alread\ cut Highwa\ 7 southeast of 

Cisterna and the- railroad (I st Armored 

Di\ision) lIorth\\'est of the town. Still 

concerned about an Allied thrust 

against the German right flank along 

the coast. l-.lackensen also pointed out 

t hat a ppro\al of t he panzer corps comlIIander's pn)lx)sal \\ould release some 

troops to reinfenT(' t he Cisterna sector 

\\ hile ;l\oiding t he risk of \\Taken ing 

other parts of the ii'ont in a <Juest fell' 

reinfe )rCemel1t s. 

As in the case of the southern !i'ont. 

Kesselring \\ould sanet ion no \\ithdr;l\\al. Hold in place. the anm group 

commander directed. and stabilize the 

LXXVI Panzer CorjJs \\ith local reserw's. 

To pull back the left \\ing of Herr's 

corps might create a gap in the mountains north of Terracina ber\\'een the 

corps and the T!'Nth .inflY\ right flank, 

thereby enabling the L .S. Fifr h Anm to 

separate the two Germ;1l1 armies. :\e\\ 

positiollS along a line between Cisterna 

and Sezze, Kesselring bcliew~d. also 

\\'(Hlld be less economical in men and 

\\eapollS. and pulling back \Iould dell\ 

t he Fourteenth A rmy an opportunit, to 

mount further counterattacks against 

the American right flank in hope of 

pinching off the penetration of the 

anm's lines about the beachhead. 

Kesselring also dismissed \bckensen's 

COllcern for his right flank along the 

Ix~achhead's northwestern front; the attack there b, the British divisions, the 

field marsh:ll correctl\ believed, had 

been onlv a diversion'. He suggested. 

instead. that \bckensen shih elements 

I:Fl 

of the 92rl Infantry Di'l'ision fi'om the I 

Para(/zute Cor!)s sector soutll\\'anl to 

reinforce the central sector of the 

LXXVI PanZ1'r Corps ncar Cisterna. 

That Mackensen \Ias ull\\illing to do. 

The Fourteenth Ann)' commander ,,-as 

convinced that the ~:\lIlericans had ,et 

to reveal the direction of the lll;lin 

thrust from the beachhead, and that 

"hen it came it \\ould develop near his 

right wing in the Aprilia-Albano sector. 

the gate\\'a" into the Alban Hills. (Actually. (~ener;tl Clark was e\ell then 

cons;dering the possibility of shillillg 

the axis of Truscott's Ix'achhead onC.~nsive in that very direction.) Shifting 

troops to the Cisterna sector would, 

\bckensen reckoned, leave the Alba!lo 

gate\\av open. In am case, the Y2d 

Irz/rmtrv Division was his onh uncommitted di~'ision. Rece!ltlv fimned and onh 

panialh trained, he ;eganled it as u!lf~t 

fe)! intensi\'e fighting. 

In response to the I st Armored 

Di\'ision's pushing back the 362d Divi-

,lirH? 's right \\ing ocvond the raih\a y. the 

only action \Ltckensell took \las to 

direct General del' Fliegel' Alfred 

Schlelllm, cOlllmander of the I Para-

(hutt CorjJs, to transic.'r a panzer reconnaissance battalion from the \icinin of 

Albano to reinforce the 362d's r~ght. 

Until that battalion completed its lllO\'(' 

shortl\' after nightbll on the 23d. the 

LXXVI Panzer CorjJs would have to dra\l 

u pOll its 0\\'11 local resen'es. 

In the fight against both the 1st 

Armored Di\'ision and the :·kl lnbntn 

Division. the acting 362d DitrLsiorl CO!l;-

mander bv micbfternoon had alread\ 

committeeI' his last reserves: one ellgineer and tm) inbntn battalions. On 

the left, the commander of the 715th 

Infantr), Division had cOlllmitted his re-
140 

mallllllg infantn reserves and some 

tanks in the cminteratt;)ck against the 

I st Special Scrvice Forcc along Highw<l\' 

7. 

Both di\isions had incurred hean 

losses during the cla\. The 362r1 f)i'i'i~ 

,liOIl, bearing Ihe bruni of Ihe American 

attack, had losl 50 IXTceIll of its combat 

strength; 1\\'0 regiments of the 7I5th 

Di'(!i~ion had losl 40 percC'nt or Iheil"s. 

111 both division;., equipllleni losses. especialh ill antilank guns. had been 

correspondingl: hean. 

B\ early evening of the 2~)d. Field 

;\larshal Kesselring re;I1i,led thai. COIlIran to ~dl his ex pectatiOlls. the situatioll at the beachhead had laken a mosl 

unbvorable lum, The Allied oflellsi\e 

ilself. however. had Ix:cn no surprisc to 

him. Hc had been ('xpcning it for o\'cr 

a \\eek. Ihough he had IXTn uncertain 

as to Ihe exact liming. 

What had slIl'prised hilll \\as ;\Ltckcllsen's failure, with Ihe forces at Ilis 

dis posal. to contain t he breakout. The 

IX~nell'aliol1 b\ the lSI .\nnored Division into tlte J62d Di"i.,iull·S sector, 

Kesselring recognized. threatened Ihe 

Fourteenth Army's emire posil ion and also 

Ih31 of the Tmlh Ann). \\hosc slcm 

\\'ilhdra\\'al frolll till' southern front 

\\()uld lx~ jeopardized should the Fourteenth Army's frolll collapse, That evening Kesselring hinted to Viclinghofl, 

the Tl'nlh Arm)' commander. thai he 

should he (hin king a bout a \\'il Itd!,;J",al 

to the Caesar Lint' south of ROllle. 

Both Kesselring ;lIld ;\L!ckensell 

agreed that sOIlll'ho\\ HClT's LXXVI 

Panzer Cort)s had to Ix: ]'einl(HTed. blll 

Ihe\ differed as to hO\\' it should be 

dOlle. The arllH group COIIlIll;lIldcr 

dung to his convicl ion I kil t he corps 

fronl could be reinf(Hn:d in place hy 

CASSI:\O TO THE ALPS 

thinning out quiet sectors. In that \ein, 

he ordered ;\Llckensel1 to 111O\'e to the 

threatened sector all available antitank 

gun companies froll1 Ihe I Po/'{/rlllltl' 

emlll. Thai MackcnsclI did. but he still 

delayed trallsiernng olher units fmm 

Ihe I Parachute Cort),\ to the LXXVI 

Pan:.!'r Cmll.1 fronl In respollse to Kcsseh'illg's urging'. he did order lite I 

Pamrlllltl' Corps to assclllble .1 iusilier 

hal ulion in rhe Alban Hills ;IS .1 n:'s(:'I\C 

under ;11'111\ conI lUI li)r possible COIllmitment in Ihe Cistertl;1 SC( tor. ;\bckcllsen ;t!so directed a batulioll oithe 12th 

Pararhlltp Regiment to the central sector 

but counternl;Jnded the order ;lftCl 

Schlemm. the I Parachute Cmj}1 COllllll;uHkr. pla\cd UpOIl his /(>;11' t h;H I he 

British attack on Ihe llorthern ILlllk or 

the beachhead mighl iIlcre.l~e III 

'itrenglh and be slipplelllelltcd b\ ;111 

;lI1lphibiow, Lineling ;t1ong the CO;ISt. 

Conccrned lest the Allleric;lIl ;11'-

11I0l'cd IX'llet r;lIioll along the intcrcorps 

boul1(bn ll1rn thc left fbllk oi the I 

Pamdlll/1' CorjJs. ;\L\ckenscll directed 

SchleIllllI to \\ithdra\\' his corps during 

the nighl ollhe 23d. in accord with Ih(' 

anm's orihrin;t1 deklhc pbll, to ;1 sec-

()lJ(bn defense lil1e about lull ;1 lIlile 

bchincl his forward positiom, ;\1(';111-

\lhile. GeIler.tI I kIT, the [XXVI Pam .. 1'I' 

CmjJ.I (ol1llll.tndn, ;1\\ ait iIlg ;llIt Itoril \ to 

\\ithd!;I\\, wcnt ahead hopefully \\'ith 

plans to shift units frolll Ihe 715th n/7'II/Of/'S rebt i \eh quiet (ods!;]l Ibn k to 

bolster I he di\ision's front just cast of 

Cistcl'Ila. That ,ICtion. he IH ;,x·{1. \lould 

prevent the AlIllTiclIls fmm splitting 

the di\'isioll fmm the rest of the (Ol'I)S 

and pillning it ;Igainst either the CO;ISI 

or the Lepini l\Iount.lills. \j()lem'Cr, the 

All1el'ic;ms prelxlring to a~sault Terracina \\'oldd, if they broke through 
THE FIRST DAY 

therc, SOOIl threaten the division's rear. 

L IIlike Kesselring, \:f;tckcllsen st ill Ix'-

Iic\'cd that GentT~ll Clark intended ,I 

m;lin eHim ;dong the more direct road 

to Romc-that against the I PrLUulwtc 

C0/7Js-and that he might ,tlso bunch 

all ;ul1phibious landing in the ;trlm's 

rear. He also still looked \\ith decp 

COllCCrtl ;tt t he Brit ish division;. dose to 

the COdSt. Cntil the llIorning of' the 

24th, these mispbced concerns dcnied 

timel\' rein{(mt'tIlent of the centLli se(-

tor ;1I Cistern;!. the re;t\ f()cus of Gelleral Truscott's ofknsin', Thus, 1111-

kllO\\1l to Truscott ,11 the timc' the 

(o\'cr plan HIPPO had ;t{(olllplished 

14 J 

exauh what those who planncd it had 

illlended. 

The first <la\ of the bre;tkout Oftl'llsive had bcen costl\' f()! the Americans, 

and thne had be(,11 lIO breakthrough of 

the ellelll\ 's de/(>mcs. Yet decisivc ad-

\';1I1(CS h;ld Ix'en m;tde. and Gem' r;tI s 

Clark and lru'i(o\t, /(JIiO\\ing the d;l\ 's 

;tctioll Oil the operation 1I1~lpS in their 

(Ollll11;llld post. \\{Te satisfied. I Ltd thn 

becn ;mare of the gro\\ing dillerelKl's 

bet\H'C1l Field \l;trslui KC'isdring .1I1d 

Ceneral \011 \bckellscll onT defcnsc 

SILltt'g\, their 'i~ltisl.lCti()1l Illight h,I\(' 

het'll t'He'lI hJ1'l'~l1er. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Breakout From the Beachhead 

As Operation Bl'FFALO entered the 

second day, General H;lnllon's I st Armored Di~'ision prCJxlred to exploit its 

success heH))1d the railroad. His t\\O 

comb;1I CO"Il111;Jllds \\ere to cross High-

\\av 7 to occup\' the X-Y Line, or first 

ph~1se lille, ;lhout ;1 mill' ;lI1d a h;tlf 

1l0nhe;lst of the railroad. There;lher, 

on corps' order, the ;Ixes of the comlxlt 

comm;mds \\cre to di\'erge: Colollel 

Daniers CCA, on tl1t' left, \\;IS to turn 

north\\;lrd t()\\;lnl Velletri to occup\' 

the O-B. or second, phase line, sOllie 

l(lUr miles nortlmest of Cistern;l. ;md 

block the enemy belie\ed to be in the 

vicinit\' of Velletri; Allen's CCB, on the 

right' \\'as to swing northeast of Ciste~'na' in t he direct i'on of Gi uli;mello, ;1 

\ilbge seven miles be\()J]d Cistern;1 ;lI1d 

mid\\'a\' bet\\een \'clletri ;lI1d Corio to 

OCCUpY the 0-8 Line in th;lt sector. If 

;dl \\'ellt \\'ell General Allen's comm;lIld 

\\ollid become the ;tnllored spe;lrhe;ld 

of the dri\'e through the corridor toward V;dmontone ;lI1d High\\;1\ G, Operation BCFFAU)'S lIltim;lte objectin" 

;dxHlt thirteen miles ;I\\;I\,. I 

As t he ad \'; 111 ce res LlJ11ed ;11 O:");Hl on 

the 24th, Colonel Lilnille's 6th Armored InEmtn Regiment led the \\;1\ 

lilr CCB, \\'ith the 2d ;lIld 3d B;ltt;dions 

f( JI·\\ard. A com pam e;tch of Illedium 

I This 1l.1ITClli,C i" bClsed UpOIl off!( i.t1 lc(orrls oj 

the ht Armored Dilisioll; Sidney I, \lathclI,' \IS, 

"The He.1l hheCid Ofiensin';" ""~I published lIorb 

,,"h CiS 'LlggerJ, ed" Thf Hiltory 0/ the Third IIl/allt1)' 

nil'il/on III World War II, .1Ild George F, HOIl l'. The 

Hattie Hlstorl' 0/ the 1 It Armored DIl';,I;on, "Old honIII1P1" (W:"I;illh>1on: Comb:!t Forces Press, 1~lc)4), 

;lI1d light t;lI1ks supported e;lch batulion. Leading IXlth batt;dions \\cre t\\'O 

cOIllJxlIlies or dismounted ;trI11ored inbntnlllell, each supported b\' ;111 ;11-

t;lched 1ll;lchine gun section. 

Bet\\el'n the r;lilro;ld ;lIld Higlnuv 7, 

le;lciillg nortimest\\;lrd out of Cistern;I, 

t;tll reeds ;lIld dense brush c()\'ered the 

teruin, \\'hich, ncar the hig-}m;I\" beC;U11e increasingl\' cOllllxl rt menLlliled 1)\ 

gullies alld LI\'ines. :\'ot ullusll;d during 

the ;ld\,;lIlce through the dense \'egeution \Vas ;111 experience of ;1 cOIll)Xln\ 

cOlllmander from the ;'kl 8;ltt;tlion. Fol100\ing his pbtoons on foot, 1st Lt. 

\like Actoll almost bumped into ;111 

enelllv officer \\ho suddenh stepped 

out of;1 thicket. Acton and the Gerlll;1Il 

dre\\ their pistols at the S;lIl1e tillle. 

Acton's \\e;lpOIl jalllllll'd; thc Genlun 

fired but missed. A ,qllick-thinking rtlllner in LicLltl'lI;lIlt Actoll's headq u;lrters 

sectioll shot the Germ;1I1 officer. 

Progressing slO\\h to\\;1I'(1 the high-

\\av the t\\O b;ltt;tlions, often \\ithout 

plnsic;tl or \isual contxt, l(lIlght their 

\\,;1\ through or ;IJ'Ound small groups 01 

enem\ soldiers \\cll conce;tled in the 

reeds' and brush. To speed t he attack 

and dr;I\\' the eneJll\ out into the open, 

General Allen ord~red medium tanks 

from the 2d Batulion or Colonel Simmenn:m's 13th Armored Regiment to 

take t he lead. Fo\lO\\'ed closely h\ Lill-

\'ille's inbntr\' and klrassccl ollh by 

scattered ;lI1d' poorlv directed ;Irt;llen 

tire, Simmerman's unks mo\'ed northeast ward along ;1 n;1ITo\\' dirt road tlut 
BREAKOUT FRO:Yr THE BEACHHEAD 

provided the onh c1earcd corridor 

through the thick vegct;llion to within ;1 

hundred yards of Higll\\';lv 7. A platoon ;md ;111 infantn detachmcnt reIll;lined behind to mop up ;111\ bvp;lssecl enemy. 

In moving to \\'ithin ;lssault disunce 

of the higlma" CCll's tanks ;1IIc1 inbntn h;ld overrun the 954tll Infantry Reg)-

/II1'/It'S main battle position. The burden 

of def(~nse in the sector feIl thereafter 

UpOIl the men of the 362d Artillery 

Reg-iment, with the help of a few surv;-

VOl'S of the 954tll. As the \;Inks resumed 

their attack Germall ;lrtilleIY, deplmcd 

;t\ollg the \\est side of Highw;l\' 7, 

f(lught back at IXlillt-blank r;mge. The 

gUlls included HR.-mm. dual-purpose 

pieces that dcstrO\ed six tanks bd(lre 

the defenders fcll hICk Oil the artillen 

regiment's secondar\' firing position~. 

Vet the I st Armored Di vision's \;Inks 

overran t hosc positions too, before ;11l 

encmy panzer rec0I11Iaiss;lIlce batulion, 

which kid taken the entire night to 

movc hU11l the vicinit \' of Albano, could 

reinf(llTe the sector. . 

Bv noon the medium tanks "cre i11 

posi'tion Oil their objective, the X-V 

Line, a 10\\ ridge be\()nd Higlm;l\ 7. 

SClrceh h;ld the\' g;lined the objective 

\\hen antit;mk guns locatcd Oil high 

grou11d to the northwest ope11ed fire. 

In respo11se to ;1 call from Colonel 

Sil11mcnll;111 f(lr artillery Sllpport, the 

91 st Field Artillcn Batulion fired 130 

rollnds, knocking ;IUt at least olle piece 

;l1Id destrming a building cOllceali11g 

;mother. The artillery support \\;IS in a 

wa\' ;1 11Iixed blessing, sillce for t\\O 

hours short rounds fell intcrlllitte11th 

amollg the medi um \;In ks despite rc~­

pClted delll;l11ds bv Colonel Silll111Crm;1\1 tlut the firing ce;lse. Eventu;dh 

the gunners deterlllincd \\hieh piece 

\\;IS bully. 

A simibr crror ;llso tem pOLlrih' 

chccked Colollel Linville's 6th Armored 

InLtntrv following the tallks. When 

slll;tll ;mlls fire from enem\, IXlsitiolls 

on a knob overlooking the high\\'a\ 

from the e;lst pinned dO\\'1l the infantr\' 

just \\cst of the highway, short roullds 

from artillen t nillg to dislodge the 

enemy feIl ;l1nollg the Amcric11I illbntn. The rounds continued to bll even 

;dler the enenn h;ld ce;lsed firing and 

had ;t ppa ren th \\,it hdra\\I\. :\ ol un til 

140() did t he in bnllT reach the high-

\\;l\' ;l1ld proceed ;ICTOSS the ro;ld to join 

the ullks on CCll's objecti\c. 

H;lving crossed Higlma\ 7, CCll h;ld 

cut one of the two m~ljor nuds serving 

the Germans i11 Cistern;l. That accomplished-and with it \\hat appeared to 

be ;1 critical penctntion of the ene111v's J62d J)h'i.\i()/i-Ceneral Harmon 

passed on to General Allen the corps' 

order to proceed with the second ph;lse 

of the breakout offcnsi\e. Accordingh 

Gencr;11 Allen sought control of the 

remaining m;ld, tklt leading northeast-

\\ani to Corio He told LI. Co\. Fr;l1lk F. 

Carr to m()\e \\,ith his bal\;llion of light 

tanks to the high ground ;It the Colle di 

Torrechi;l, nClr a road junction some 

t\\·o miles l1orthe;lst of Cistern;1 merlooking the road to Corio At the same 

timc, Allen sent the 1~3th Armored 

Re gi III e n t' s l'CCOI11Ll i SS;\llce co m p;ln \ 

;illead to screen Carr's left fbnk and 

m;lint;lin cOl1t;lct \\ith demellts of Colonel D;l1lic\'s CCA, \\,hich \\ere eng;lged 

in f(lrcing \\klt l'enuined of the 362d 

[)h'i.\wlI's right \\illg beyond the l\[olc 

em a\. 

Clrr's light t;\1l ks g;\t hered q lIie kh in 

;\ll ,Issembl\ ;n(,;l just south of the 
144 

railroad, but soon ran into successive 

dclavs along the railroad embankment: 

first a mine field, then long-range 

artillery fire, and finally tanks of the 

combat command's res~rye crowding 

onto the same crossing site over the 

railroad. It took CalT's tanks two hours 

to reach Highway 7 and regroup in a 

v\'ooded area bevond. 

C ndel' cover of prealT~l\1ged artillery 

concentrations fired bv t he ~ll st Field 

Artillery Battalion, the tanks tumed 

eastward toward the Colle di Torrechia. 

Rolling toward that objective, the\' encountered little resistance as they overran a Tigel' tank, its 88-mIll. gUl{ in full 

working order. Faced with stich a 

swarm of light tanks, the German crew 

apparently decided against giving battle 

and escaped on f()()t into the underbrush. Soon after dark a battalion of 

armored in rantr\, joined the tanks to 

help hold the Colle di Torrechia, while 

a battalion of medium tanks took up 

positions about half a mile behind the 

advance elements to give depth to the 

defense. 

;\.:1eJ.llwhile, on the 1st Armored Division's left Colonel Daniel's CCA, advancing to the northwest astride Highway 7, experienced similar success. Such 

heavv losses had the 362d Division incurred that even \\<ith reinf()I-cement bv 

the panzer reconnaissance battalion th;t 

General von \1ackensen belatedly ordered transferred from the I Parachute 

Corps, the division could do no more 

than execute a lighting withdrawaL As 

night fell CCA's 81 st Reconnaissance 

Ballalion had reached a position within 

four miles of Velletri from which a 

sortie toward the town could be made 

the llext morning to determine hO\\< 

well defended it was. The 362d Dil'iCASSIl\;O TO THE ALPS 

.IIIITI'S front was split, with the troops in 

front of CisternJ. separated from the 

rest of the division. The stronghold of 

Cisterna now almost isolated, its defenders awaiting the inevitable-not 

passively, however, for there was still 

plenty of fight left in them, as the 

infantrymen of the 3d Division were 

soon to learn. 

While the advance of CCB's light 

tanks to the Colle di Torn'chia was ill 

effect a partial envelopment of the 

enem\ stronghold of Cisterna, the job 

of completing the envelopment of the 

town still belonged to General 

O'Daniel's 3d Division, whose 30th Infantry, closer to the town, was doing 

the job on the west, the 15th Inb.ntrv 

on the east. The 7th Inb.ntn in th~ 

division's center was to pm th~ enenw 

in Cisterna and bter reduce the to\\'I1. 

At the same time the regiment was to 

assist the 30th Infantry ill the envelopment. With its reserve battalion, the 7th 

Inbntr)' was to take the settlement of 

La Villa, a mile uorthwest of Cisterna, 

and cut Highway 7 in the vicinity of the 

Cisterna cemeterv. The battalion 

therebv would serve as a blocking force 

against the Germans in Cisterna lest 

they interfere with the 30th Infantrv's 

wh~eling movement to get in behi,;d 

the to\\I1, while at the same time aff()rding a stalting line for an attack to l~lke 

the Cisterna defenses in flank. 

At 0400 on the 24th, the 3d Division's artillery fired f()r litteen min utes 

in front of the 7th Infantry's left wing. 

Four hours btcr the artillery H~peated 

the performance. Meanwhile, the reserve battalion, the I st, had moved up 

in the darkness in rear of the positions 

gained in the first day's fighting. 

Following the second artillery prepa-
ration, the 1st Battalion began to advance in a column of companies and 

reached high ground within 400 yards 

of the railroad after experiencing nothing more disturbing than an occasional 

round of enemy shellfire. Yet when 

Company C, in the lead, started to 

ing to the railroad rifle and machine 

gun fire erupted from the edge of a 

wood close to La Villa. The battalion 

commander Lt Col. Frank M. Izenour, 

then committed another company in a 

flanking maneuver against this opposition, enabling Company C to get moving again behind the fire support of the 

battalion's 81-mm. mortars. Passing 

through a cut in the railroad embarkment in the face of only occasional 

German small arms fire, the company 

moved quickly into La Villa. In the 

hamlet the men searched in vain for a 

tunnel that he division G-2 believed 

led to Cisterna. 

continuation of the attack to cut 

Highway 7 and gain the Cisterna cemetery was delayed when a company of 

tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers 

that were to assist failed to arrive 

When at last seven tanks appeared 

Colonel Izenour ordered Company B 

to get on with the attack. As it turned 

out, not even those tanks were needed. 

In half an hour, by 1600 Company B 

and the tanks were astride Highway 7 

at the cemetery with no sign of the 

enemy 

Colonel McGarr’s 30th Infantry, in 

the meantime, had been building up to 

the railroad and the highway to the 

northwest to get into position for the 

enveloping maneuver. The advance involved a thrust by Company F, which 

had led the regiment’s attack on the 

move across flat, exposed ground leadfirst day to within a hundred yards of 

the railroad and by the fresh 1st 

Battalion, to which Company F was 

temporarily attached. 

At dawn on the 24th, Company F on 

the left and Company B on the right, 

each supported by a platoon of heavy 

machine guns, advanced toward a 

group of low hills. west of the Femmnamorta Canal that overlooked the 

railroad from the south. From the high 

ground the two companies would be 

able to cover the move of the rest of the 

1st Battalion across the railroad on the 

other side of the canal 

The 41st Field Artillery Battalion 

fired several concentrations before the 

infantry moved out, but the Germans 

responded to the new attack with automatic weapons and mortar fire from 

positions near a group of ruined stone 

houses atop two knobs south of the 

railroad. Rather than attempt what 

might have been a costly frontal attack 

against the positions, Company F swung 

far to the left in an outflanking maneuver. That move carried the western 

knob and enabled Company B to clear 

the eastern knob quickly. By 1100 

Company F and the entire 1st Battalion 

had closed up to the railroad. 

The 30th Infantry’s 3d Battalion, 

astride the Ponte Rotto road, found 

even easier going. Hearing movements 

before daylight in the vicinity of an 

enemy strongpoint along the Femminaduced that the Germans might be withdrawing. In an attempt to catch them 

before they got away, the company 

position, but too late. At the strongpoint Company L found only twentyfour enemy dead. Moving on to a 

morta Canal men of Company L dehastened along the canal toward the 

BREAKOCT FROM THE BEACHHEAD 

ration. the I st Battalion began fo adv;lIlce ill ;1 column of companies and 

reached high ground within 400 Ydrds 

of the railroad afler experiencing Ilothin u more dist urbing than an occasional 1"l , 

round of enemy shellfire. Yet when 

Company C, ill' the lead, started to 

move across flat, exposed ground leading to the r;lilroad, rifle and machine 

gun fire erupted from the edge of d 

\\ood close to La Vilb. The battalion 

commander, Lt. Co\. Frank :vI. Izenour, 

thell committed anot her company in a 

flanking maneuver against this OPTX)sirion, ellabling Compam C to get moving again lx-hind the fire sUPlx)rt of the 

battalion's 81-mm. mortars. Passing 

through a cut in the railmad embankment in the bee of only occasional 

German small arms fire. ihe company 

moved quickly into LI Villa. In the 

hamlet the men se;m:hed in vain f()r a 

tunllel that the division G-2 helieved 

led to Cisterna. 

Continuation of the attack to fut 

Hi<rhway 7 ~lIld gain the Cisterna ceme- t") / l 

terv was delayed when a company of 

tarlks and a l~lato()1l of tank destroyers 

th;lt \\ere to assist failed to arrive. 

\Vhell at List seven tan ks appeared, 

Colonel Izenour ordered Company B 

to get on \\ith the attack. As it turned 

out. not even those tanks were needed. 

In half an hour. by 1600, Company B 

and the tanks \\ere ast ride H igbwa\ 7 

at the cemetery with no sigl; of the 

enemy. 

Colonel :vkGalT's 30th Infantn, in 

the me;mtime, had lx-en huilding up to 

the railroad and the highway to the 

north\\'est to get into position t()r the 

ell\'duping maneuver. The advance iuvolved a thrust by Company F, which 

had led the regiment's allack on the 

first day to \\ithin a hundred yards of 

the railroad, and by t he fresh 1st 

B;Htalioll, to \\Im:h (;ompall\ F \\'as 

temlx)rarilv ~lttached. 

At (bWll Oil the 24th, COl11rXU1\ F 011 

the left and Comp;ul\ B on the "ight. 

each supported bv a platoon of hean 

machine guns. ath';mced to\\'aro a 

group of low hills, west of the FCIll 11l inalllorta Can~d, th~lI overlooked the 

railroad from the south. From the high 

ground the t \\ () companies would be 

able to covcr thc move of the rest of the 

I st Battalion across the railroad on the 

other side of the canal. 

The 41 st Field A.rtillery B;lIt;llion 

fired several concentrations bef()re the 

inbntrv moved Ollt. but the Germans 

resrxHl~led to the new attack with ;mtomatic weapons and mortar fire from 

positions ne;,r ;t group of ruined ,~tone 

houses atop two knobs south of the 

railroad. Rather than attempt what 

might have been a costh frontal a\t;lCk 

against the positions. Company F S\\'lmg 

f~lr to the left in an outflanking maneuver. That move carried the western 

knob and enabled Company B to clear 

the eastern knob quickly. B\ 1100 

Company F and the entire 1st Battalion 

had dosed up to the railroad. 

The 30th Infantry's 3d Battalion, 

astride the Ponte R(')\Io road, found 

even easier going. Hearing movemellts 

bd()re cbdight in the vicinin of an 

enemv strongpoint along the t'emlmn;\-

morta Canal, Illen of Com pam L deduced tbat the G{'rmans might be \\ithdrawing. III ;111 attempt to catch them 

before they ~ot away, the company 

hastened along the canal t()w~lrd the 

position, but too late. At the SII'Ollgpoiut Company L t(llmd onh twent\-

four enemy dLld. \foving on to a 
14(; 

second POSIlIOIl nC;lrby, the company 

fiHlI1d Ihat, too, ;Ibandolleci. 

In midahernooll, as The 1st Bartalioll 

prepared to (TOSS the r;lilroad ;lIld seize 

the hig-h g-round just be\Ond, the 3d 

Batt;llion made reach' to de\'ciop the 

envcioping- maneuyer by ;I(l\';mcing- to a 

road junction a mile and ;1 half Ilortheast of Cisterna Oil t he forward slopes 

of the Colle eli TOlTechia, not br from 

the objecti\'e of rhe lig-ht t;lIIks of 

Colonel Carr's battalion of the I st Armored Division's CCB, Indeed, had Hoi 

the inbnllT battalion incurred delays, 

the two t()~'ces mighl have arrived ~)11 

their adjacent objecti\'es at approximateh the same time, While rhe 3d 

Ballaiion's move cOllstituted the left 

arm in the envelopment of Cistern;l, it 

was <!Iso designed to put the 30th 

Inbntn in position to assist the 15th 

Infantr\' in a drive earl\' the next 

morning on Corio 

Althoug-h the 3d Bartalion, 30th Infant1'\', began to m()\c aboLll I63(), 

darkl~ess llad fallen \\ hen t he men 

crossed the highwav ;lIld passed 

through the cemeten, Cn\\'irringlv, the 

troops had cut across the rear oj a 

battalion of the 7th InEmtn just as that 

battalion launched an attack 011 Cisterna. As German mortar fire beg-an to 

fall, confusion in the cemetery increased. Untangling- t he two h)rces took 

considerable time, so that it \\'as dose to 

dadi!Yht ~t(Jre the 3d Battalion, 30th ,. t1 

Infantry, in an unopposed march 

through the darkness, could reach the 

road jUllction near the Colle eli TOlTechiao A pn~jected continuation of the 

attack at 0630 on the ~5th against Cori 

would have to be delayed. 

With the 3d Battalion thus dela\'ed, 

not until midnight did the 30th InbnCASSI\!O TO THE ALPS 

tn''s I st Battalion recei\'c an order to 

J(lllow. That battalion reached the objective soon ~lfter daylight. there to find 

preparations f(JI' mounting ;1l1 att;l<:k 011 

Cori hampered by persistent German 

shelling- apparentl\' directed ;n the light 

tanks of the 1 st Armored Didsioll's 

CCB assembled ne;lrb\' on ;ll1other lXlrl 

of the Colle <Ii T()lTe~hia. It would be 

late Oil the 25th bcf()re the 30th InbntiT could launch its drive on Corio 

Constituting the orhel' ann of the 

maneuver to envelop Cisterna, the 15t h 

Inbntrv in the meamimc had mounted 

an atta~:k with its 2d Ballaliol1 driving 

due north to cross Highway 7 ;l1ld the 

railroad, skirting Cistcrn~l to t he cast, 

and ddvancing to the Cisterna-COl'! 

road. While the ht B~lttali()n ;llld Task 

Force Paulick, dosing the gap bet \\cell 

the divisioll and t he 1st Spe(ill Service 

Force, remained along Hig-hwd\' 7 ill 

positions gained on the first da\', the 3d 

Battalion was to f()ll()\\ the 2d and ollce 

across I he railroad was to ~\\ing cast to 

occupy the lVlaschia S;ll1 Biagio, a 

wooded area a mile and a half east of 

Cisterna, thereby protecting the 2d Battalion's nan k. 

At 0730 Company G led the 2d 

Battalion's attack, advancing f~lirh readilv across Hig'lmdv 7 to the railroad 

despite bara~sing' machine g-Ul1 fire 

from somewhere ncar the railroad embankment. As the men started to cross 

the embankment, fire from small ~lrms 

and self-pmpelled guns in the outskirts 

of Cisterna dmve them lxlck. To get 

the attack moving again, the batl;llioll 

commander sent. Compam F along the 

shelter of the steep banks of t he San 

Biagio Canal, a small tributarv of the 

Cis~:ma Canal, to outflank th~~ enelllv 

from the riuht but German fire halted l':I -, 
BREAKOCT FRO.\1 THE BEACHHEAD 147 

that llI~llleu\'er too. ~ The 39th Field 

Artillen Battalion fired se\'cr~tl COf]celltLltioll; ill order to silence the ellelll\' 

fire but ;\ second tr\' ;It crossing the 

raih"o~ld met continued opposition.' 

During t he carl\' ;titernoon the IXlttalion comnundcr sidesliplx'd his comp;lnics to the right in ;1II Cff(lrt to a\'oid 

the fire coming fmm Cisterna. He ;t\so 

committed ~I third comlxlll\ ;lS prelude 

to a ne\\" ;lSS;lUlt. Pre\'ented b\' ;lIItit;mk 

fire /i'om bringing unks ;lIIcl LInk dest nners close enough to the r;lilroad 

embankment to gi\'e the inEmtn close 

support, he gained IXTlllission to 1lI0\"e 

the destrm(TS il1\o the 1st Special Senicc Force's sector on the right. Frolll 

there the destrO\ers tried to pbce 

flanking fire on the troublesollle enelll\ 

positions. but ;lg;lin the effect on the 

\'olume or enemy fire \\;lS lIegligible. 

A \isit in lIIicbfternoon to the I Sth 

lnblltn cOIIIIII;lI1d post In the di\'ision 

cOl11m;mdcr, Gencr;t\ O'DanieL brought 

,1 prolllise of ;lddition;ll ;lrtillen support 

to help get the ,lttxk llIo\'ing ag;lin; but 

,1 ne\\ ,lttelll pt short I\' bcfr )J'e night bll, 

this tillle supported 1)\ fi\'e artillery 

b,lltalions. lIIade no he;lc!\Ll\. Ollh 

;t/"ter ;lI1ot her hCl\\ artillery prep;ILltion did the inbntnlllcn fill;dh cross 

the r;lilro;ld ;lIId ;l(l\;;nce to the ~~dge of 

;l \\oocl ;lbout 700 \'ards to the northonh to Ix' f()J"(Td b~lCk ~()() \;mls b\' fire 

from slll;dl arllls ;ll1d t.lllks" B\' th;lt 

time cbrklless Iud bllell.:1 

Taking ;ld\,;llltage of the darkness, 

engineers built Limps on the steep sides 

'The illtrepid perforlllatH e of 1'\1. .I.IIIll" II. 

\!ilb. COlllP'ltl\ F. 'Sth Illblltn. durillg this attack 

\"" subscqucllth recoglli/t'd In the .lll.,rd of the 

\Icd,,1 of HOllO!. 

:\ For his rok ill the "tt,,,,, Sgt. Sd\ ester .\Iltobk. 

COll'!);Ill\ B. '.-lth Illblltn. lias ,,"arded the \k,b' 

of HOllOI' posthulllous"" 

of the railro;ld elllbankment so th;lt the 

tanks and t;ll1k destrmers might cross. 

After joining the ill LlI1tn, the t;]nk 

dcstrmers bd(lre cbdight OIl the ~:-lth 

knocked out the st ronglxlims th;u h;Hl 

lx'en holding up the ~d B;ltulioll f(»)' 

;tlmost t \\ellt y- f( Hll' hours. At t he first 

light of the ne\\ d;l\, the ~d Batt;llioll 

began to mo\'e again \\hile remn;lIlts of 

the clwm\'s 955 tit Re~i IIIl'lIt ret rea ted 

deeper into the ruillS of CistenLi. In 

CIl'h morning of the 2Sth the b;ltt;tlion 

re;lChed the C;lS;l \lollt;lini. ;1 bnll nell' 

the Cori m;ld alxn!l h;tlf a mile northe;lst 0 r Cistenl;l ;lI1d \\it hin hailing 

disunce of troops of the 30th Inbntn 

Oil the Colle di TOITechi;l. That ;lction 

cOlllpleted the encirclement of Cisterna. 

EYen ;IS the 3d Di\'ision's 1\\0 flank 

regiments \lcre getting on \I"ith that 

encirclement. the diyision cOl11m;ll1der. 

Geller;d O'D;lI1iel, deemed the ellenl\ 

so \\e;lkened t hat he had no need u) 

deby ddiycring the coujJ dl' ~ra(1' to 

CisLema itself. While the 7th Inblltn's 

~d Battalion, ;ltucking fmnr;dh clg;lillSt 

the Cisterna defenses, gained link 

ground during the second d,l\. 

<YDanid belincd th;!l, by hitting the 

enemy frolll the flan k position held b\ 

the regiment's 1 st Balt;tlion ;It the cemeten alongside Higl1\\;1\ 7. the 7th InLintr; might yet t;lke the to\\n in one 

quick thrust. He told the regillll'nLd 

COlli 1lI;1l1 der. Colonel Omohundro. to 

lise his :)d Batt;dion. That \\;IS the unit 

th;l1 Iud biled to f(lll()\\ orders Oil the 

first (Ll\. but the IxltUlion had ;1 lll'\I 

cOlllm;ll"ldcr, its f()rmer executiye officer, !\Lijor R;lIIlse\, ;lI1d ;1 quick, successful scizlIrc of Cisterna might fully 

restore the confidcncc of office),s ,1I1d 

lIIen ;dike. 

Colonel Omohundro pbnncd to Ix'-
14H CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

PATROL MOVINC THROUell CISTERNA 

gin t he assault Oil Cistcl'na \\'it h ;1 

re newcd front :tl :Ittack b\' thc 2d B:lllalion to scrw' ;IS :1 di\,(T~ioll , Once that 

:llIack began, supporting :Irtille n \\':IS to 

dcli\'(T ;i 30-minute b;lrLlge on the 

to\\'n, \\'he relqxlIl R:IIllS('\'s 3d H;lttaliol1 

,,'as to strike frorn the (cmctel"\" sout heas!\\ard dO\\I\ Highwa\ 7, A sl110ke 

screen \\'as to conceal t he start of t he 3d 

Battali()\1 's attack, 

While prepar:lliolls for the :ltI;lck 

\\'C rc under \\"Jr, a patrol reconnoirered 

from the cemeterY ;IS Ell' as Cisterna's 

western outskirts l;ut there cncolIIHered 

considerable machine gun and Il1or\ ;lr 

fire, Tbat response was t he first hint 

tklt the \O\\n might bc less readil)' 

taken th;\Il (~ l1 lI O'Dalliel h:ld believed, and t kIt t hc :1 d Fblt;tlion might 

I1;I\'C ;1 hard fight , something f()!' " 'hich 

that ullit the cl:tv Ix'fi)fT Iud sh()\\1\ 

little inclinatioll, 

The first hitch in OmOlll111dro's pbll 

developcd "hen the 2d Ibllalioll debyed its attack Ullt il ;1 support il1g pbtOOIl of LlI1k dcsrroH'rs could get f()r-

\nrc!. Scheduled to alt;lck ;It I Q30, rhc 

battalioll did not nto\e until shortly 

<ther r hc tallk dest rovc rs fi l1;tll\ ;Irriw:d 

at 2130. Since the 2d Battalion " 'as to 

arrack first , rhe 3d B;lttalion ;11 the 

cemetery also had to postpol1e it s artack, \\'hich mC;lnt there \muld ~X' 110 

flirt he r need f()r ;1 sllloke screcn : th(' 
BREAKOCT FROM THE BEACHHEAD 149 

7th Infantr\ \\'as to hit Cistern;) b\ 

night. 

This unforeseen deb\ was the second 

in a series of unf(lrtunate circul1lst;lllces 

that had begun e;trlier ill the (by when 

l\1ajor Ramsey, the 3d Battalion's Ile\\ 

commander, was wounded and e\';](I1-

aled to the rear. The cOIHm;mder of 

Ihe Weapons Com pam. Capt. Glenn E. 

Rathbun, took his place. At :2 145, wit h 

COllqXIlH K on the leli, Company D on 

the right, ,mel ComlxUl\ L in resene 

behind COl1lpal1~ 1, the battalion at la'll 

began to mme through the Cisterna 

cemeter\' toward a lin-e of deparlure 

.illSt hc\olld it. All attached tank pbtoon :md three tank destrm'ers \\ere in 

direct support. It \\;Li th~1I that the 

third in the series of mish;lps occurred: 

the unfortull;tte imCl'lIIingling ill the 

cc'l11ctery \\'ith the \e;lding battalion of 

!llC :1()th Inbntn ;l1ld the deb\ of 

sncral hours bl:fore the b.llulion.., 

could be separated alld control 

restored, 

Even more trouble ;\\\;lile(\ the lInfortunate :id Battalion, As thc lIIcn 

tinalh crossed thc lillc of dqxlrtllrc. 

hean ctWIlI\, shelling and sc\n:ll short 

rounds from L·.S. :lrtillen /('11 ;1I1l011g 

1 hClll. Tku Ie ft the Illen IXldh sluken. 

At (1;1\\11 on the :2:-lth the Ixtttalion \\,IS 

onh ~()() \;\l'ds beyond its line of departure, still abollt 700 \;mls short of the 

Iirsl buildings of Cistenu Whel1 Colonel Ol1lohundm onlelrd the battaliol1 

to renew the ;ru:wk, withering ;\Utolll:ttic 

\\C;IPOIlS fire stoPlx·d the lIIcn ;IS soon 

:IS they attempted 10 l11on:. C;lstlaltics 

were he;\\\" among them the commander of COIllIXII1\ K, the COIllP:II1\'s 

third cOIllIll;lllder ill four c!;l\s. The 

attack collapsed and wit h it Gener;t! 

O'Daniel's hope of quickh redeeming 

Ihe ixlltaiion. 

Paradoxicalh, the di\'crsi( lIlalT altac k 

iw the 2d Battalion into the bee of the 

lluin deft'nses at Cistern;1 had been 

making IX'ller progress. The battalioll 

;It firsl ran into stubborn resist;\I1ce 

from Germam concealed in a group of 

ruined houses Oil both side.., of the 

railro:td. Llch house had to be labori-

(lush reduced: but \\ith the help of well 

co-ordill;lled 11101'\;11' ~md .lrtillen fire, 

the men {(Hlghl through the nig i1t and 

gr~ldu;t1h \\orked their \\;1\ f(JI·\lard. 

\Vhcll ihe two leading ~()lIlj);lnics 

reached the railroad cmixlI1ktllent. Ihe\ 

called t()! supporting fires 10 lift, then 

rushed across at six points. We;ln from 

the night's fighting. the COll1jXlI1il'''' dug 

in jusl bCHHld lite embanklllent and 

Ie."s tkm ~()(l \'ard~ f!'Om the fringe of 

Cistern;!. The 2d Battalion's sliccess and 

I he 3d lbtlalioll's bilurc \\cre dc;.,t ined 

to dict:lle ;1 cil'llIgc ill pl.1Il fiH the final 

assault imo the (0\\'11. 

Actio/l on the Flankl 

.\s t he 3d Division ellcircled Cislenu 

Oil the 24th. the 133d Inl:inln. selTing 

:IS a "neen f()I' I he 1 sl S}X'ci.II Sen'icc 

Force Oil the di\i."ioll :lnd corps right. 

headed slO\\h nor! 11\\;I1'd. its right flank 

anchored on Ihl' :\lussolini C.llnL That 

night t he I st Special Senicc Force 

;Isselllbled behind thl' I:Bd Illbntn 

and prqx\I'('d 10 pass through its lines 

the ncxt l1lorning ill a Ihrust t()\\;lI·d 

:\lol1te Ancstil1(), ()\ l'rlookillg Cori 

{'rolll the SOIlI he;ls!. 

On the opposite fl.lllk. the 4:"lth Di\iSiOIl. ;tfkr g;lining its .lssigned objeClin'.., 

Oil the 23d, cOlltinlled to h;)ld it., 

posit ion Ilor! h\\cst of Carano. Y ('I .I~aill 
I.')() 

that \\'as to be no passi\(' operation, f(lI' 

;It dusk on the ~4th the Germans 

counteLltucked \\'ith a reinf(lI'Ced IXltt;t\ion supported 1)\ l;inks. \Io\ing 

south along the \\'est IXlIlk of the Car-

;1110 Can;t\, the enemy struck the right 

flank of the I HOth Inbntn's ~d Batt;t\-

ion ;lstride the C;ILlIlO J'·oad. Under 

co\er of hCln mortar ami artilkn fire 

;lIld t;lking ;lclvantage of lush \ege(;ttion, the enem\ inLimn crept to \\ithin 

100 \;mls of the Alllerican lines bef(}re 

being- discovered. Hurling f-,'Ten;ldes ;It 

the AllIericlIls, the (~ermans rushed 

f())"\\;lrd. During ensuing hand-to-hand 

fighting, the defcnders \\ere supported 

b\ eight batt;dions of ;utillen firing ;It 

the enemy's lines of communic;ltions. 

Althoughthc counteratLlck timed b;uk 

the IHOth Inblltn's front slightl\, the 

lost ground \\';IS reg;lincd In midnight, 

;lI1d patrols that night rqx)rted t hat the 

enemv Iud \\ithdLl\\n fi'())l1 the di\ision's iml11edi;tte front. 

While the U.S. 4:)th Di\ision lost ;lIld 

then regained gro ulld Oil t he Carano 

sector, the British :)th ;lIld I st Divisions 

on the beachhc;ld's \\estern fbnk along 

the coast yielded to coullleratt;teking 

enel11\ ullits h'om the 4th Paradll1te ;lIld 

65th Inj(mtT)' DiliisiuHS the slight gaillS 

made by the diversionary ;ltt;ICk on the 

23d. Falling back to their OJ"if-,rin;t\ li'Ollt, 

the British held. 

The German Re(1£tion 

The counterattacks mounted bv the I 

Parachute CorjJs during the ~4th reflected the emphasis \\hich the Fourteenth Arm}' commander, Gener;ll \on 

\1ackenser;, had placed since the beginnillg of the Allied breakout oHcmive 

on his right \\'ing bct\\ecn the Alban 

CASSI:"JO TO THE ALPS 

Hills and the Tnrheniall coast. The 

limited success of' the counterattxks in 

holding that sector of the Fourteenth 

Arm,>' front \\as the only encouDgement 

for \Ltckensen on the second (b\ of 

the Allied offensive. Yet, since it ;It bst 

Iud become undeniable th;lt the Allied 

main eU(}rt \\as at Cisterna, the limitcd 

successes on the paLlchute corps f1'ollt 

hardh brightened ;1 day tilled \\ith 

gloom. ~ 

Little time had l);Jsscd durillg the 

morning of 24 \by IJCf(}n' GencLd \'(m 

\bckensen discerlled th;tt the thrusts 

tn the Americm ;lrmor nortl1\\cst of 

(~istern;l and the inbntn on either side 

of the town \\ere ;lbollt to e!J·in' \\edges 

between the 362£1 Di-l'isioll ;llld it s t \\0 

neighboring divisions-the 3d PailZn 

Grnwdin D/vl~\ion on t he right alld the 

715tll Diziisiull on the left. The coLlntcrat(;lCks ;lgainst the C.S. 4:)th Di\'isioll 

and the t\\'O British di\isiolls \\cre expected to e;lse t he pressure some\\ lut 

on the right. Yet the extreme left \\illg 

of the 715tll Dh!isiutl \\;IS still behind the 

\ll1ssolini Can;t1 ;mcl unless ;t1IO\\cd to 

\\ithdLl\\ \L1S Iikel\ to be pinlled 

;lg~linst the Tnrheni;lll CO;ISt. 

- Field \Ltrshal Kesselring ;It bst 

agreed to pullillg IX1Ck the 715tll Dh!ision's left \\ing to the r;lilro;ld, which 

p;lrallels the coast approximately ten 

miles inlalld. To the ;lpprov;d, hO\\evcr, 

Kesselring ;tttdched t he proviso that ;111\ 

t()ITeS thereby fi'eed fi'om COIlUct \\ith 

the Americans were to reinf())'Ce the 

de fenders of Cistern;\. The proviso 

bore little relationship to the sit U;lt ion 

on r he ground, f()I' e\'en b\ nightbll of 

the 24th the AmericlIl ;ldv;lllces h;ld 

, l'nlcss othc]"wi,e illdic<lled, the C;'TI1l<lIl ,,«OUIlt 

i, b'lSed UPOIl \ISS#\ l'-Ib (W",tphalet at) and RI)() (Baile,), 
BREAKOUT FROM THE BEACHHEAD 101 

virtually severed contact bet\\'een the 

715th Division ;lIId the rest of the JXlI1-

zer corps. 

As pressure against the 715th Division 

increased during the afternoon of the 

24th, General \un l\bckensen made up 

his mind to exceed the ;llIt Iwrit v 

t,rranted bv Kesselring ;lIld \lithdra\l' th~ 

entire division to a seconcbn linc extending east\\'ard from Cister;l;l toward 

the Lepini \{ount;lins. \\'hen \bckensen le;lrned in bte afternoon tklt 

troops of the c.s. 3d Division \I'ere on 

t he fringe of Cisterna and that t he 1st 

Speci;.tl Service Force kid penetrated 

the 715th Division's center, he ;luthorized \I'ithdraw;i\ of the division ;lS soon 

as d;lrkness provided concealment b'olll 

Allied fighter-bomlx~rs. 

As the 715th Division began to \\ithdra\\ that night, the cOlllmander of the 

362d Division, Generalleutnant Heinz 

Greiner, returned to his command 

from his emergency le;lye in German). 

T;lking stock of the obviouslv critical 

situation, Greiner concluded that if the 

garrison of Cisterna was to h;lve any 

;'hance at escape he had to mount som~ 

kind of counteratt;tck. While harlx)ring 

no illusions about \\' hat a counteratt;lCk 

bv his depleted f())"(TS could accom plish, 

he nevcrtheless hOIX'd he might thnm 

the Americans off babnce long enough 

f()i' reinl())"(Tments to arrive b'om the 1 

Parachute Corps and till' the g;lrrison to 

slip out of Cistern;!. 

hen tlut bint hope h;ld dis;q)lX'ared 

\I'hen, in btl' ;dternoon, contingents of 

the C.S. 1st Armored Division plunged 

to\\;Il'd the Colle di Torrechi;!. Either 

abandon Cistern;! or lose ;til the men 

there, Greiner Ixlined, but Field Marshal Kesselring refused \lithdLI\\;d. 

(~elleral von \bckcnsen nevertheless 

\lellt be\'ond his authorit\' I()]' the second tim~ that cb\' aud t(;ld Greiner to 

pull the men back. When General Greiner th;1I afternoon tried to pass on the 

\I'ord, it \\;lS too hte. The garrison"s 

r;ldio had ceased to function. In Greiner's \lords, "Cisterna (mf11'()rtl't~ lIirht 

!NeIll" ("Cisterna no longer answered").5 

To the (;ennan command it \las n()\\ 

clear that onh the arrival of divisionsize reinforcements could pre\'ent a 

collapse of the FOllrtl'l'IIth Army's center. 

Three divisions from the arIm group 

resene alreach having departed to reinf(lIT(' the [mth Aml\' on the southern 

front, the Oil" major resen'e force 

remaining \las the HnlU([1I11 Coning 

1)h'I.I/lJII, \lhich Oil the 23d had begun a 

march south from the Ligurian coast, 

oycr F)() miles a\\a\. Having overestimated Allied amphibious capabilities, 

Kesselring and the German High Command had hesitated until the last minute before deciding to lise that division. 

As f(n' ;1 shih of f<»"l'es \I'ithin the 

Fourteenth Army, eyen after it \\·;\S dear 

that the Allied offensive \I';lS actually 

aimed at the left wing of the Lxxvi 

Panzer Corps, General YOn :\bckensen 

ordered onh piecellle;t\ transfer of 

sm;t!l units. Why shift ullits and im'itc 

trouble e!se\l'hc're \I'hen he \1;lS convinced his anm bcked sufficieilt l<lITes 

to accomplish its dctt~nsiye l1lission~ As 

bte ;IS I ~l :\1;1\ he h;ld bittcrh protested 

Kesselring's tClI1sl('r to the southern 

front of the 26th Pallzer ;md 29th PalIZa 

Grenadier Di'l'isionl b'om the ;trIll\ I-,'TOU p 

reserve, :1 reserve on \lhich \L!ckensell 

belieyed he had first claim ;md \Iit hOllt 

\\hich he .judged he h;ld no hOlx' of 

.-, Heilll (;reillcr. Glt .LD .. Kilmpf 1/111 ROIII---/lljerll() 

(Jill Po (Klirt \·'l\\itlckcl. YcrLlg. :\elLlrgl'lllllellll. 

I %H). p. :iO. 
containing the Allied offcnsin:. The 

presence of the 92d Ill/anfry Division, 

guarding the coast just south of the 

Tiber, \\'~IS of little consequence ~IS ;1 

resenT force for it \\;IS ;IS \'Ct ;I\l 

untried unit, composed brgeh of \1Iell 

still undergoing tLlining. At t h~1l point 

he doubted t hat he could even count 

on being gin:n the Hermann Goering 

Di"1'ilio/l, if and \\·hen it ;)ni\ed at the 

front sout h of Rome. li)r he strongl\ 

suspected that it too \\ould go to the 

Tenth Arm\,. To \bckensen, Field \brshal Kesielring's in;lhilit\ to halt the 

offensin' \US proof th,lt his belief th~1l 

it could be stopped \\.IS misguided 

optimism. Relations bet\\een the t\\·o 

German COlllnUIlC\crs h;\(1 become so 

strained ~IS to approach the breaking 

point. 

Thp Third Day 

Against (he backdrop of flllilin on 

the German side, all units of GeneLd 

Truscott's \' I Corps pLullled to rene\\' 

their ass~IlIIts on the third cb, of the 

offensive, 25 l\LIY, and exploit the impressi\e gains alread\ achieved-the 1st 

Special Senice Force to t;lke i\fonte 

Arrestino, the 3d Di\ision to t~lke Cisterna \\·hile at the S;Il11e time driving 

non he~lst\qrel on Cori, t he I st Armored Di\ision to pursue the drive on 

Velletri ~md northeas(\\';lrd to\\';Il'd V;dmontone via Cori and GiulianelIo, ;md 

the 45th Division to continue to anchor 

the left flank of the Al1lerican f(m:e. 

Throughout the night of 24 )\.1;1\ 

Ceneral Truscott shifted his units preparatory to continuing the offensive the 

next morning. To close a gap created 

by the diverging axes of t he I st Armored Di,ision's t\\·o combat comCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

m;mds, Truscott gave the 34th Division 

control of ;1 five-mile sector north of 

Cistern~1 Ixhind the ;mnOL \\'ith t\\O 

regiments, the division \\as to block ;\11\ 

;Ittempt by the ene\1l' to exploit o}xn 

space bet\\cen the ;lnllored columns 

;md permit the ;Irmor to move more 

freel\ in exploiting the German colbpse 

below Corio Durillg the night contingents of corps ;millcn began dispbcing 

fo\,\\ard to are;ls south ;md ,,'est of 

Is()la Bella in order (0 better Sllpport 

the continuation of the main atuck. 

On the extreme right fbnk of the 

corps the 36th Di\'ision engilleers, \\ho 

since the 23d had remained in corps 

resene, h;ld readied task forces to 

11l00'C south\\'ard to conUC( the II Corps 

adv;lI1cing from TerLlcilH Th;lt night 

the engineers crossecl the \Iussolini 

C;\I1;\1 and pushed do\\n along the 

coastal rO;lCi through territory recent" 

;llxlIldoned b, the 71 5th Dh'isioll, The 

link-up \\ilh the Americans from the 

G;I\'igli;l!lo front \\';IS to occur on the 

lllorning or the 25th. 

As the t\l'O fronts joined, the 1st 

Armored Division \\'as adv;mcing beyond the second phase Jine. Combat 

ConlIn;\lId A continued to !l1O\'e toward 

Velletri against steadily iJ1(Te~lsing resislance, A combination of rugged terr;lin, 

\\'ell-sited antitank guns, and ;1 counterattack led by \brk V t;\I1ks he lei the 

Americans 'four miles south of the 

to\\,n. The dar's fighting cost Colonel 

Daniel's combat command seyenteen 

tanks damaged or destroyed. 

On Daniel's right Gener;d H;mllon 

had in the meantime moved from 

reserve a task f(xce under Col. H;lmilton H. Ho\\'ze. The task force was 

composed of Lt, Co\. Bogardus S. 

Cairn's 3d Battalion, 13t h Armored 
BREAKOUT FRO\l THE BEACHHEAD 

Regilllent; the 2d B;lItalion, 6th Armored Inbntrv; the 3d B;lttalion, 13:->th 

Inbntry; CO;11panies Band D, 1st 

Armored Rq.,';ment; ;md Com panics B 

of the 63:it hand 70 I st T;mk Destrover 

Batt;tiions. Colonel Howze ;lssembled 

the unit during the night of 24 \bv 

ne;lr Torrechia \.'UOV;l ill readiness f(ll' 

;1Il a<!v;lIlcc to\\';lrd the rO;ld junction of 

Giuli;lIlello the f()I1()\\ing (bv. 

Striking ;tcross count ry, t hc mediulll 

t;tnks of Howze's task f(m'e In I ~)()O 

re;tched ;lI1d blocked the Cori-Giulianello road ;lbout 2,:i()() yards south of 

Giu\i;lIlello. \Nhen ;1Il inbntrv column 

;lrrived bte in the afternoon, tanks ;lI1d 

inElI1tn Ill()\ed together to de;lr the 

vilbge before (brk. \1e;ul\\'hile, Gcner;ti 

Allen's Combat COl11nund B prep;lred 

to ;lCCOI1lP;ll1\ and support the 3d Division's I:->th Inbntr\ ;lS it mO\'CC1 from 

t he Colle di Torr~chia t()\\';ml the vilbgc of Cori on the western slope of the 

I ppilli \fount;lins. 

Till' EnRmy Situation 

The I st Armored Divisioll's thrust up 

t hc Valllloll tOIlC corridor to Gi uliandlo 

Iud irrctriL";lbh sep;lLlIed the 362d 

;l\ld 715th Divisions. Llrge groups of the 

ellelllV, cut off ;md \\ithout effective 

contn;l, surrendered. Bv midctl\ on 25 

\bv, 2,640 prisoners kld passed 

through the Fifth Armv's cages at Anzio since the offensive began Oil the 

23d. The \XIletr;ltion also thrcltelled to 

cut off the left wing of the 715tll 

Division, attempting to \\'ithdra\\ along 

seconc\;lIT ro;lds ;lIld tr;lils sou!lm'est of 

the Lep~ni ~Iountains. The division, 

having exluusted its 11101'1;lr ;lInmunition ;md lost most of its mortars as \\ell 

;lS its light ;md he;ln n);lchine gUliS, 

lIas in desperate straits. COlltact \\ith 

the attachcd pallzer grenadier regimcnt, constituting the division's ccntcr, 

Iud been lost completeh'; co III III UII iCltions \\ith other subonlilute units \\ere 

little better. A IOO-man KWl/j)jgllljJjJt" 

comnunded 1)\ ;1II ;lrtillen b;ltlcn COIllm;mder, const'ituted t he division's right 

\\ing lIorth of the Cistcrn;l-Cori m;ld. 

Supporting the I\WI/ji/gllljJjJl' \\ere an 

;lrtilkn IXlttcn, firillg ;It point-bLlllk 

r;lIIge, ;lIId ;l pbtooll of HH-ml11. ;lIItiaircraft guns. On 2:-> \bv tlut \\;lS ;tll th;lI 

stood bet\\ccn the AlIlericlI1s ;lI1d 

Corio I; 

'I'm) inblltn b;llUlioIlS, unsupportcd 

1)\ he;lY\ \\ClpOnS, \I'ere <,c;lttered in 

klstV positions ill the hills to the north-

\\est of Corio A riflc COm\Xlll\ ;lI1d the 

he;lYl \lC;lPOIIS COIllP;lI1\, ;tll that ITIllaincd 0 f ;l Ixltt ;tiion on the di visioll 's 

left fbnk, h;lcl been ordered to reinf()rce t hcsc IXltt;llions, but it \I;lS doubtful \I het her the rein f()rccments \lould 

be either sufficient or ill time to check 

the onrush of the A lIIericlI1S. Also, 

tLlI1sf(>r of en'n those lIlodest forces 

\I'oldcl le;ll'e the \follte AlTestino sector 

held onlv 1)\ the equil';tiellt of three 

rifle COl1lIXlIIies. 

\fc;ll1l1hile, ;1I1 inbntn regimellt 

ii'olll the 92d hz/ant'!)' Division, guarding 

the coast just south of the mouth of the 

Tiber, had beell sent to reinfc))'Ce the 

715tll Di1'isioll. That regiment h;ld bcen 

last reported marching frol11 Giulianello 

to\\ard Corio \rithout motor transport, 

the regiment had had to leal'e behind 

its hean support \\'eapons ;md el'C\1 its 

field kitchens, and \I'as not expected to 

reach Cori until noon on the 25th. 

"\IS # R-:J() (B.liICl). rhe f()lh",illg .l<COUllt i, 

based Oil fhi, ,ourct', 
The Att(Jfk on Cori 

Although General O'Ibnicl, the 3d 

Division commander, had originally expected the 15th Inbntn to attack to-

\\anl Cori no bter th;1I1 (F)30 on the 

morning of 25 \b\, the I st and 3d 

Battalions (the Iatterha\'ing relieved the 

2d) reached their ;Issembh points ;t!ong 

the Cisterna-Cori road onlv b\ midmorning. The 3d Batt;di;m 'h;ld a 

i-,'Teater distance to move from its positions south of Cisterna, ;lI1d the line of 

march was made haz;lrdous b\ numerous antipersonnel mines. Tho~e bctors 

prevented the battalion b'om re;lching 

its line of departure before the 1st 

Battalion started for Cori ;\t 1000. 

With the regiment;t! b;lttic p;ltrol co\-

ering the ~xlttalion 's right fbn k, Compam' C led the wa\ to\\'anl Cori ;ICross 

the increasingh hilh ten;lin th;\I 

merged i-,'Lldu;t!lv into the slopes of the 

Lepini \loLlntains. On the left (north) 

of the Cistenu-Cori ro;ld moved the 3d 

B:lttalion of the l!'ith Inb11lr\. :\either 

iXltt;tiion encountered appre~'i;lble opposition. Reaching the fringe of Cori ;It 

t\\ilight, both b;ltta\iol1s sent patrols into 

the to\\n to probe the ruins of the 

village. Although the patrols flHmd no 

sign of the enemy, the battalion commander decided to await davlight betl H'e moving in. 

The !:")th Inrantn h;ld fllUnd no 

enemy in Cori becll;se the reinfl»'Cemellts b'om the 92d Di7lisior/ Iud nc\C!' 

arrived. The night of the 24th, as the 

rcgiment had marched ;t!ong the (~iuli­

;mel!o-Cori road, the men h;ld encountered clements of the 715th Division 

\\'ithdrawing in the opposite direction to 

escape being cut ofT by the Americ\II 

thrust to\\;lrd Corio German conlln;mdCASSI!\IO TO THE ALPS 

ers "ere un;lble to st raighten out the 

resulting confusion bef()re <bylight exposed the tTO\\ded rO;ld to the e\'l'S 0 f 

;1 pilot of a reconnaiss;lI1ce ;linTaft from 

the XII TAe. Calling fi)r assis\;\nce, the 

pilot soon Iud ;dl avaibble ;Iircraft 

bombing and stLlting the concentration 

of men and \'ehicles. 

The CajJturl' oj Ciltnna 

As the renninder of the 3d Inbntn 

Di\'ision ;Id\anced north ;\IId C;lst or 

Cistern;l, the 7th Inf.:lI1try, charged "ith 

the t;lsk of Liking the encm\ strongpoint, prep;lred to close in fi)r the kilL 

The bilure of the ;\tt;lck ;lg;linst the 

town's north tbnk on thc 24th ;\Ild the 

rebtin' success of the 2t! B;ltt;tiion's 

frontal adv;lIlce the s;lme (bv prompted 

the regimental comm;ll1der, Colonel 

Omohundro, to give the job of taking 

the town to the 2d Batulion. The 

com nun del', Lt. CoL Everett W. Duv;tlL 

started the ;Issignment b\ sending his 

reserve, Company F, around the right 

tbnk of the positions g;lined e;\I,lier just 

beyond t he railroad em ban kmcn t. 

Attacking bef()re (bylight on 2:") :\1;1\, 

Comp;\I1Y F <]uickh secured ;1 fi)othold 

in the south"estern p;lrt of the town. 

C pon ;lrriul of two Il\edium and eight 

light t;lI1ks from the 751st Tank B;ltulion to provide fire support, Duvall 

ordered the COI11IXII1\ to continue toward the center of town, \\'hile COIJl1);\11\ G cle;lred the em'lll\ from the 

southeastern section. Colonel Duv;tll illtentionalh sent the t \\0 com panics on 

divergellt ;IXCS lest in the dose <]u;lrters 

of the rubble-tilled streets one should 

fire upon the other. 

While COmp;lll\ G proceeded l11ethodically with ;1 t;lsk that amounted to 
HREA KO UT FROM T HE BEAC HHEA D 

DISARMI NC GERMA:-i PRISONERS AT CISTER]\;A 

mopping LIp, the m c n of' COIllP:111\ F 

pic ke d their \\, ~Iy sIOIIl" to\Llrd th e 

ce nte r o f t 011"1 1 ag~linst 111 :lchin e g un 

II1d 11Io rUr lire tInt g re ll' il1 inte nsity, 

The Genn:uls had pr ~l ed 1I1t:lt had 

a pp:lre nt h o nce bce n the tOlm lull fill' 

;t List-ditch d e fe n se. rill g in g it lI'ith 

:\I1tit ;\Ilk mincs :\IId c()H rillg :tll approaches lI'ith machine g un s protected 

by rubblc-coHTc d e ll1pLtce mc nts, On 

t Ite II cst side :1 lIell-sited ,ll1t it ln k gl ll1 

cOI'c red the e ntLIIICC to ;\l1 inne r court-

\';Ird, 

Des pit c sLippon of th e li g ltt :\I1c\ 

m edi um tallks, the :ltt :\C k :Ig:tinst the 

t01l1l kIll nudc lit tic he:lchL II'. :'\ot unt il 

bte aftcrnoon, \\'hc n :1 squ:lc! l1un:lged 

to e l1lpi:tcc :1 m:lc hinc gUll ;\l OP a ruin 

()\'c r\ookill g t hc CIl! r:II1CC to the cOllrtyard, did the siege take a turn Ii)}' the 

bett e r. From that position, the gu nnl'\' 

dnl\'e off the lTe\\' manning the troublesomc :ll1tiunk g un . A medium t:1Ilk 

i1l1111 cdi:\l c h Cll11 e l{lrll';lrcl. es tro\'l d 

the gun, :llId. \\'ith men of Comp:\I1I' F 

close be hind , rolle d through the e l1 -

tr;\l1ce into tlte town lull's inne r ('ounl a rd . All resist :lI1 ce collapsed. [n the 

gatltning tllili g ht of' tlt e 20th. three 

daIS :It'ter tlte bre:lkout one'mil(: Iud 

b eg' un , the Amcricln in LInt rl'lll e n 

s\\ ;trIl1ed into the ruins to rOllt Ollt the 

sU I'I'il'(lrs, illcludin g the COI11l11:II1<ier of 

thc 955111 I nj(mll)' R{>gill/fIlI. 

Th:lt nig ht Gener:d Trllscott co uld 

look b:\('k \\ith some s;\lisbcrion o n the 

capt lire of' Ciste rn:l :lI1d the immil1e nt 

bll oj' Cmi. On his right \\ll1g, the [st 
10(j 

Special Senice Force, h;l\ing g;\ined 

Monte Arrestino's rugged ;md desertcd 

summit, II'as poised fl)]' :\ driye :lCross 

the Lepini ~lountains to\I;mJ the upper 

Sacco yallcy :lIld Higlm:n 6. The objectives of Operation Bl"FFALO's second 

phase had been gained. T rllscolt 's V I 

Corps had broken out or a six-month 

confinement in the be;lchhead, :lIld 

BlTFFALo's ultimatc objective, Valmontone and High"a\ (), 1,1\ some ten miles 

,mal'. The Anzio beachhead no longer 

existed but had become instead the 

extended left flank of the U.S. Fifth 

Anm. Fifth Army's troops Ilcre much 

closer to Rome than Ilcre those of the 

British Eighth Anm, still some II)rtv 

miles southeast or Valmontone. 

German Countf'rmozles 

The sharp deterioration or Ann)' 

Crolll) C's situation lIas remarked ,it 

OKW as carll' ;IS the e\ening of the 

24th. The link-up of the Fifth Anm's 

nuin fl)rces and the beachhead, the 

Eighth Aml\''s stead\ :lch;lIlce in the 

Liri \alln, ;\Ild the VI Corps' bre;lkout 

at Cistern:l led the German High COI11-

m;md to conclude th;lt there lIas no 

altern:lti\e to "ithdr:l\\:d of the entire 

army group into the Caesar Linc. Earlv 

in April the Germ;ms h;ld st;lIted constructing that secollcbn deknse line 

bet"cen the Anzio beachhead ;wd 

Rome from the T nrheni;lIl C():lst nort h 

of Anzio, across the southern fbnks of 

the Alban Hills to High\\';l\ () ncar 

ValmontoI1e, thence ovcr the Ernici 

:YIountains to Sora on the AITZl.ano 

road. Dcspite the bct that IIIore than 

10,000 lulian Iaborcrs, under the direction of Gcrman :lrnn engineers, had 

worked on thc de fenses, the line was 

til' from finished. From Campo lemini, 

CASSI;'\IO TO THE ALPS 

on the Tyrrhenian UMSt ;lbout seventeen l11ile~ southwest of Rome, across 

the southern slopes of the Alban Hills 

as hI' ,lS the tom) of Llbico on I lighILI\' 6, some tIn) miles e;\st of VallllontOI~e, the line "as complete; but c1sc-

,,·here it "'as nothing more th;lI1 a 

penciled line on situ:ltion m:lJK 7 Gernun records refer to the Caesar Line as 

the C-Stellung, or C-Position; Allied 

st:t/Ts simph :lssumed the "C' stood I()) 

"Caesar"-:l logical deduction considcring its location. A second line, the 

Campagna Riegel, or switch position, by 

between the C-Stellung and Rome, but 

"'as of little signilic;mce. 

To screen the C;lesar Line, t he Germans had put up :m :limost cOlltilluous 

barbed "ire obstacle, which in some 

sectors attained ;\ depth of ninety fect. 

They had :liso pbced mines to block 

the most bvorable routes of appro;tch. 

While inbnt ry firing posit ions ;md shelters in the Caesar Line resembled those 

;liollg the Gust:l\' Line, k,,' dcft'nses 

"ere in such depth. In the opinion of 

GelleLli yon ~bckensen, the FourteCl/tli 

Annv commander, the C;l('sa) Lille "as 

suit~lble fill no more than ;1 debying 

action. H 

The Gerl11;lII Iligh Command oper~ltions st;dl neyertheless recommended to 

Hitler on the evening of the ~4th, elen 

before the bll of Cistern;l and the 

crossing of the ~Iclb RiYer \)\ contingents of the Eighth Anm, th;lt both 

German armies begin ;It least ;1 p;lrtial 

,,·ithdr:l\\·;t! into the ClCS:lI' Linc. The 

Fourteenth /Irmy's right "ing ILlS to remain in pbce ;lS Ell' as Cistern;\, "hilt, 

, MSS #\ C-()(j I (Mack("nscll 1'/ fll.) and D-21 I 

(Ressel). See ctlso Greiner and Schramm. ("ds., OKW/ 

WFSt, KTH, 1\' (I), pp. 480-H I. 

H Greiner and SdllClllllll, e,b., I \'( I), Pl'. 492-'14. 
BREAKOCT FROM THE BEACHHEAD 

the left "'ing (the LXXVI Panzer Cml)s), 

ill co-ordinat ion "'itll t he Tenth A nn\,',1 

right \\ing (the XIV PanzJ'f eml),I), withdrew gLldualh to g~lill ;IS much time ~IS 

possible f()!· the occupation ,md prqMrat ion of the lInimprO\ed portions of 

the line. The ()per~ltions staff ;t1so proposed th;lt the remn;lI1t'i of the 71.11 and 

94th 1n/antry Di-I.'isions be emplo\'ed in 

the Caesar Line as security detachments 

until Ihn could be 1)I:ought up to 

strength with replacements, In ;lclditioll 

to the Hermann Goering Dir,isiml which 

on the ~:)d had starte~1 shifting southward fWIIl its b,ISCS near Leghorn, the 

J56t/i In/rllllr..,- Dh!/11U1I was also to mm'c 

sout h frolll ihc yicinit \' of Genoa. fI 

During t hc rcgulill' noon sit uat iOI1 

briefing Oil tite 2:"ith. Hitler substanti;t1h 

;I«(cpted those propos;lls and, thanks to 

British Intelligence, the Allied ((lmmawl in I t;tl: W;\s soon priv\, to this 

decisioll. The ;m>;\ immedi;\leh north 

of the Alban Hills on both ~ides of 

Highway 6--in short, Operation Bt:FFALO's general ohjectin'-w:ls, Hitler 

and his advisers ;Igreed, t he most 

threatened sector. Th;lt \\;IS ex,lCth the 

conclusioll tlut Clark hoped th;\! the 

(;erm<!ns \\()uld reach, ]\fOl'C()\Tr, hi" 

(;,-2 had also illformcd him that the 

(;erJll<lIlS would altem pt to rein force 

\\ith the HITIII{(I1I1 GOl'/illK and 15nth 

hz/anti)' DiL!isiol/s. Both Clark ;md Kesselring, hO\\e\er, \\()uld UndtTcstilllate 

(he ;Jbilil\ oj Allied "jrcr;Jh to de\;l\ 

mo\ement of tho:-;e diyisiolls. 

"The biter di"lsio!1's pl,ICc I\.ts 10 he laken b\ the 

42'-{ Jrlf'{!fr DIl,I.,io/l. The 16th SS Ponoa Grl'llrulil'l' 

Drpi."mtl, 011 u{'cupatiol1 duty ill northern ILll\". WLl"i 

10 Iw bilktnl along the coastal region ";Jelled ]", 

Ihc two di"isiolls Ihough 1101 to be (Ollllllilled 10 a 

(o.!Sul de Icnsc role, A<ldlt IOlul di"isiolls frolll 

northern FlIrope IIl.'re 10 be lIloved into ItalY to 

re< ollsrillll<' rhl' Iheater\ strategic n'St"-H'S_ ' 

III allY case, Hitler insisted, the CaeSdr Line had to be held. Cncompleted 

sectors of the line \\(Te to he improyed 

at Ollce by using labor COl1llxlIIies, seCllrit\ dc{;]chllleJIIS, ;lI1d local inhabitants. 

DcI;l\ing anion in front of the lille was 

to be <limed ;\t inflining such cTippling 

losses th;lt the Allied f(H'Ces would lx' 

stopped e\'en bellm' re~lching I he line 

Such ;lll order hore little J'cbtiol1ship to 

the realil\' of the u<tical situation ~lI1d 

would !lot reach Army Group C lImil the 

;tiicrIloon of t he ~6t h, too late to do 

much ;lhout it. 

In the meantime. Kesselring ~\lId 

\bckenscIl Illrnec\ their ;\lIentioll to 

Gent'cd Hcn's battered LXXVI ParlzPr 

CrJljJI Oil the Four/('('I/tlt .11111.1'\ I~tltt'ring 

Icfr wing. The harried corps COIllmander had no knowledge of the eX;lct 

locitioll of the 715111 l)i-I'isiol/ bUI 

guessed I hat it might he sClttered 

;unong the tOWIIS of CorL ;\Orm;l, ;md 

Scne in the Lcpini \lount,lins. As lill' 

Greiner's 362d DivisiON, it \\;IS in hetter 

sh;lpc. One rcg'imenl h;ld beell destroyed ;It CisterlIa. Sun-j\'ors of the 

remaining I\\"() \\'ere withdrawing ill I he 

direction of Velletri and V;t\montollc. 10 

To Kesselring it was nidenl th,1\ a 

dangerous gap had opencd OIl Hen's 

li'OIll, and that Truscott's corps \\ould 

soon 1II00e through to t hr(\Hell f fighW;I\' 6 Ileal' Va111101l1011C, To close the 

gail Kesselring ordered the FOlllttenth 

Amn; cOJl1I11;mdlT to commit the H'COIln;liss;\Ilce b;\It;lliol1 of the He/monll Goering Div/sioll ;IS SOOIl ;IS it ,lrri \'cd. the 

batt;tiioll to sene as a blocking illiTe 

along ;\ !<H1r-lllile hU1l1 betweell LII'iano ;1\ the f()ot or the Alb;\Il Hills to .111 

anchor on \Iontc I1i"io, abollt Iwo miles 

'0 '.IS # R-:-)() (Bailn). I '1l1 .. s, othenl is .. indic.lled 

Ihe snlion i,s based UpOIl Ihis source, 
lion heast of Giuliancllo. Kes"clring ;t!so 

told :'.L\ckellsell to have p;ltrols of the 

362d Di-uisioll tn to re-establish con/;t(t 

with the 715tll Dr,Ji"ion. 

\bckelhen readily agreed tklt he 

might be able to close the g.lp wit h the 

ITCOIIll;liss;mce battalion, but pointed 

out t h.:1l it \\()uld be too t hinl\' spre.ld 

fOl- ;lll\ offellsive ;HtIOll. As for the 

362d [Jill/siot/, it \\as ;drc;Hh merextended and prob;lblv \\uulet he U1Llbk 

to lll;linuill contact wit h the 7151/t Dh'isiol/, e\'ell if 1);11 wls should succeed ill 

locating the division. \LKkellscl1 h;ld 

litt Ie conlldence t hat cit her l1W:ISU re 

could do much to stem the Amel'iclIl 

thrust towanl VdiIllontonc and High-

\\;1\ h. 

~LtckeIlSel1, neverthelcss. transmitted 

both orders to his p;llIzer corps COlllnUllder. \!e;Il1\\'hile, the corps \\as to 

est;lblish ;1 lle\\ defeIlse ba"ed Oil i()rmer ;lrtillery position~ south of Ihe 

Velletri-Giuli;lllello mad. That road had 

to be kept open if the Integrin of the 

LXXVI Panza COIP.I \\;lS to be m;linuined, vet evell a" rhe order \ldS givcll, 

the drmorcd spe;lrhcad of thc C.S. VI 

Corps had reached the fringe of 

(;iulianello. 

Turning to his right wing, :\bckellscn ordered Sthkmm to begin withdrawing his I Paradl11lf Corj)s iJlto the 

Cacsar Linc. The positiolls t helT \\crt' 

to be held ;It ;11l costs. i i 

As the situation on the FO/irlfl'llth 

,-/rmy\ kit \\ing deteriorated Oil the 

2;')th. Kt'ssclring directed \bckensclI to 

~hift additional ;mtit;\Ilk gUlls from the 

1 Parachute Corl)S to the LXXVI Pam.fT 

II usc AOK 14, 111 .vI. 147()!·J.j g.K (hf/', :2ti \1;1\ 

44. ill .iOK 11 III KTlj .\1, ], .1111. -/f>2. J -:11 \fa\' 44, 

A()K 1-1, ;W}')J/j. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Corps front. \bckcllSCll h,ld alre,l(h 

n;lllSfctTcd 48 hean- ant ilallk gUllS, 8 

88-mll1. gUllS, ;lIld ;lbout half of tile 

IMLKhute corps' remaining ;Iss;luh guns 

to the p,lI1zer corps. le;l\illg ollh I 

('0111 lXll l\' of antit;lI1k gUI1S ;lIld 1'1 assault 

gUllS in the p;tLtehutc corps, Of the 

; Oil Iii P({n:1'I Bollo/llit/ 's original 38 Tiger 

t;lIlks 0111\ 17 rClTuincd, ;J1ld those too 

had becn 'Illoycd to the p;ulZer corp:-" 

Ccncr;1I \'011 ~Ltckcl1sen decided t h;tl 

he could nuke llO furt her \\ it hdr;l\\;t)s 

fi'OIll the IXlr;lchurc corps \\it hout "t'I'iollsh \\'clkcnilw his right \\iIlO, I Ie still . ('-) ~ ,.., 

helic\ed, ,IS he h;ld "iltC(' thc beginning 

of thc Allied ollclIsi\e 011 tht' 23d, that 

t'velltu~tlh the Allied 1ll;lill Cn()rt \\;IS 

going to erupt .tgainst I h;l! right wing. 

The onh rcsern: lei I to the I Parrull1lle 

Cmj).I, ill ~1Il\' LISe. \\,IS the Ilc\\'h org;ll1-

lied 92r1lnjanlr)' Dhll~li()tI, \\ith ;1 CO;lst;tl 

defense lllissi(;n \\cst or ROllle: ,tlld 

bc(~Hl:-,e of the condition of the rO;lcis 

dnd the shoJl,lge of tLlIlsporL \Lwkell-

"Cll doubled whel her it \\ oliid be possible to shift the divisioll to Herr's front. 

All that \ bckel1scll could hope to ;Idd 

to oppose tIle AmeriLlll thrust toward 

VallllOl1tolle \\;IS 'he P;Il1ZtT re(ol1l1;tis-

'i;lI1ce haltalioll of the Hl'rlnann GUl'riwr h 

DIl'l:I-/ml dll(L if f(JlIIHL the disorganizcd 

remllant" of the 7151" DiL'isioN. 

General \on Vietinghoft, the Tellth 

A ,-my cOlllmander. \\ ;1,<; ;t\so (OnCCTIlCd 

,I\)<iut kl'eping open lIighw,l\ () 

thlOUgh Vahl10lltolll' ;IS long as I~)"sihie, lor, while he had othl'r routc" 

;I\;tibblc to him, the \',lllIlolltOIlt' junctioll \\,IS important fill' a wit hdr.I\\;t1 oj 

1 he Tm/h Arm)'\ right \\ing. I'he illtegrity of HeIT's corp" \\as thus \'it~d to 

\'iclillghoffs pbns ii)r extricatillg Seliger's corps /i'om the (omerging· Allied 
BREAKOCT FROM THE BEACHHEAD 

;mllics. \lcll1\\·hilc, the Tmt/t Arm\' continued to Llll IX1Ck to ;1 ])C\\ d(:];l\ing posH Ion ;tlIC hOl"ed on t he Sacco Ri\el" 

ncal" C;lst ro dei Volsci. 

PART THREE 

DRIVE TO ROME 

If I kllO\\ that the ellem\ can be attacked alld that Ill\ troops art' capable 

of attacking him, but do not realize that because of the conformatioll of 

the ground I should lIot attack, my chance of victory is but half. 

CHAPTER IX 

Stalemate Along the Caesar Line 

CLark's Decision 

On the ahernoon of' 24 \b\ Gcneral 

Clark asked Ceneral Truscott, "Haye 

yoU considered chanhTing the direction 

of' your attack to the nortll\\es[-[O\\anl 

Rome:" 

Gencral Truscott, \\hose attention 

\\'as still filCused on Vallllontone and 

Higlm;l\ G, rcplicd [hat he had, but 

only in the e\em that \lackensen 

shif'tcd a significant part of the still 

filnnicbble I Parachute CorjJs f'rom the 

~lban Hills into the Valmontone Gap, 

Smce such a concentration might dela\ 

the VI Corps long enough to allO\\ [h~' 

Germans to slip through Valmontonc, 

Truscott thought that undcr those cirCUll1st;ulCes "an ;Ittack to thc north\\cst 

might be the best \la\ to cut off the 

enem\ ",ithdr;l\\al nOl:th of thc Alban 

Hills," To mcet such a (ontingcnC\, his 

staff had kcpt plan Tl'KIU: CIIITCnt-an 

attack to [he nortl1\\cst dircctly t(mard 

Rome, I 

Clark's question \las filr Truscot t t hc 

first indicat ion sincc the mcet ing ;Il 

Anm headquarters a /('\1 days bd()\'c 

t l,~c breakout offensiye Ix~gan that the 

hfth Army comll1ander \\'as still seriOl~sh consi~lering modificat ion of OperatIon Bl:FFALO, Although Clark said 

l'rrll~l()tt. CI'IlII11(J/If/ ,\l/\\/()J/I, p. :)'7·1: IllltT\', ;}11-

lllOr"ill! (;t'IITrll"olt. I \Ltr(i~,C:--lIl. 

nothing further at the mOl11ellt. Truscott \\'as puzzled oyer Clark's apparen t 

desire to tinker \\ith an ojX'Lltion that 

seemed to be moying rapidly to a 

sllccessl'ul conclusion," ' 

In spite of Truscott's confidcnce in 

t~1C operatio,n" Clark continued to qucstlon the yahcht\ of \I hat he considered 

t~l ~)C Alex;\Il~ler's strategic concept. 

Seemg the attack to\\anl Valmontone as 

sim plY t he result of a "long-s(;lndlIlg , , , preconccin'd idea" promoted 

]w Alexander's chief of staff. Lt. Gen, 

Sir John Harding, General Clark belieyed it \\'as "based upon the false 

prcmise that if' High\\:l\ 6 \\ere cut at 

Valmontone a German ;Inll\ \\ould be 

annihilated," The l11any alternate mads 

leading nOltll\\ard out of the Sacco-Liri 

yalle\, hc belieycd, \l'Ould cnable the 

Trnth Army to bypass a trap at Val11lontone, Clark becal1le more and l1Iore 

con,\inced, that instead of continuing a 

lllalOl' effort to\\'ard Vall11ontone and 

Higll\\ay 6, he should be dri\ing 

stl';lIght for Rome,:l 

Clark's, conviction was strengthened 

I~y hiS estlmatc of the enerl1\'s dispositIons, According to C-2 reports, relll2 Imen, "lItlw! "itl! (;"11 J'rll'lot1, I \Iar li~, ill 

C\IH tiles: LI!, (;('11 T!lIs(()tt to C:--IH,:\ :\()\ IQIiI, 

ill <:\111 liles. 

"Clark Dian, ~I; \Ll\ ~~, 
164 CASSI:\IO TO THE ALPS 

AERIAL VIEW OF VALYlONTONE A:-;n HI<;lIWAY () 

nants of the J62d Dn'ilion had withdrawn from Cisterna into the sector 

betwccn V ellet ri and Valmontonc, and 

Kesselring had ordered the Hnmann 

Coering Di1,ilion into the Valmontone 

Gap. General Clark also suspected that 

Mackensen would shift units from the 

FourlNn/h Arlt/\,'.I right Hank toward 

Vaimontone, and would thereby signif~ 

icantly thin out the I Parachute Cor/II' 

defense in the Alban Hills. Earlier 

German actiollS along the Gustav Line, 

where forces had been transferred 

from thc mountains in order to buttress defenses athwart natural routes of 

advance, tended to support his reasoning.~ 

Evcn ir the VI Corps managed to 

break through to VaIIllontonc-\\hich 

Clark saw as unlikelv in vicw or the 

reported enemy buil~l-up there-Clark 

concluded that the lenf-,Tlhcning line of 

communications extending froln An/io 

to\\'anl Val1l1ontone \\ould Ix'Coll1c increasingly vulnerable to German femes 

in the Alban Hills. \Vit hout furt her stafl 

discussion on the subject, Clark decided 

to llIodif\' Operation Bl'FFALO signifi-

'Fifth ArlllY (,-:! .I"!' '>by 44, 
STALEMATE ALONC THE CAESAR U:\E 

cantl\ and turn the bulk of Truscott's 

corp~ north"Tst\\ard illto thc Alban 

Hills. ;, 

On 2:") :YLI\ Cbrk directed his G-3, 

Gcncral Brann, to inform Gcncral 

Truscott of the ne" objective. "We "ill 

capture Rome," Clark said confidcnth, " ... it i.s just a llIattcr of 

til1le.'; h 

Visiting his subordinate coml1landers 

on the llIorlling of 2:") \1,1\, and una-

",liT of the impending change in plan, 

Truscott "as pleased with \\·hat he sa\\. 

The 1st Armorcd J)i\ision "as \\ithin 

f( Hlr miles of V diet rio The :k! Di\'ision 

"as closing in on Cori. Frl'derick"s 1st 

Spccial Sen'ice Force \\as nearing the 

sUllIllIit of I\1Olltl' Arrestino on the VI 

Cmps' right flallk. All shared Truscott's 

coniidencl' that b\ the l'oII()\\'ing' morning the VI Corps' "\\ould be astride the 

(;LTman line of \\it hdr,ma! through 

Valmontonc." , 

Rl'I urning to his cOlllllland post 

,Ibow noon, Truscott tC:HlIld Gl'ncral 

BLlIln \\aiting f(JI' him. "'Thc Boss 

\Llnts \011 to 1c;1\'e thc 3d ini'antn 

Di\'isiOl; and the Speci;d Forc(' to block 

Higlm;l\ G," Brann said, ";l11d mount 

that ass,llllt \Oll discussed \\ith him to 

the north\\est as soon ;IS \OU can." H 

Truscott \\as dUllIbl()undcd. There 

\\;IS ,IS \et 110 illdication, he protested. 

that the l'ncm\ Iud signiticallth "("Ik-

(,lied his dl'il'nscs in the Alban Hills, 

Th;1I \\'IS. he insisted, t hc onh condition that \\ouldjllstih modihing Bn-

'1111(']\. \1"111('", "ilh 1.1 Col T . .J. COII""\. ':!7 

.1 1111 .-,Ii. 

';Fiflll .\rJm (.-:\ Jill. \Ia\ 44: (:I"rk Di",\. ,:!:-, 

\Ll\ll . 

j Trll"'C()tt, CunnI/out! .\11'1'1/(11/\, pp. T,"t-I:). 

< \,1 C()rp' C-:\ .Jill. ':!:)-':!7 \1:1\ 44. ('lIln 

':!:-,17·1OB \le" H. 

FAIn. \Jor. unlike Clark, did Truscott 

have c\·idence of an important l'nemv 

build-up in the Vall1lolltone area, exccpt i(lr all identification of rl'connaissame del1lcnt s of t he Hermann Goering 

Di·ui.lion. This \\as no tilllc. the corps 

commander argued, to shih the main 

eft(lrt of his attack to the northwest 

toward the 1 Paradwie CorjJs \\'hl'rl' the 

elWIII\ \\as still strong. The oilensin' 

should continue instead ",ith "'maxiilium pO\\cr into the Valmontonl' Gap 

to insure destruction of the German 

Annv."!! 

When Truscott said he \\antl'd to talk 

\I ith Clark bdo\(' aballdoning BUIFALO. Brallll said that \\as impossible. 

The Arm\ commander Iud left the 

heachhead and ",as out of' reach of 

radio. There \\,IS no point ;Irguing; the 

"Boss" had said attack to the northwest 

alld that \\as all order. Truscott told his 

statf to prepare to implelllellt the order. 10 

Later that afierIloon. apJXlrenth disturbed that his protcst might indicate 

an ulI\\illillglless to pursue the lIe\\ 

course. Truscott called Brann ~lI1d cxpressed ellthusi;ISIll t()J' the nc\\ plan. "1 

feel yen st rongh that \\e should do this 

thing. We should do it tomOlTO\\. \Ll\ 

lIot IX' able to get it organi/ed lx-t()J'C 

lIoon. 1 h;l\e prepaLltions going 

011 ... "1 I Yet despite th;1I turnabout, 

Truscott ;lCt u~tlh be lil'\'('d Cbrk's decision to bc basicdh \\Tong. He determined IIl'\Trtlll'less to carn it (Jut 

\\holehe~lIwdh, and he intendcd I(lr his 

di\isioll conllllallders to do the S'lIl1e. I~ 

!l "l'ru:-,(ott, C{}mmand .\1L\~lOn~, pp. 37:-)-/h. 

10 IIi/d. 

II \1 CIll']" C-:\ Jltl. :!.-,-':!7 \1.1\ 4·t. enll\ 

,:!,-, I 740B. 

" Iltlen. ;Illlltllr "ilh Tn",()". \LIt ti':!, C\IH. 
I titi 

The test came short I\" bef()re midnight \\' hen Truscott Illet \\it h his COI11-

manders ill the VI Corps command 

post to tell them of the change. It \\'as a 

gloom\ gathering, for rUlllors of the 

change had already reached the di\"isiollS. Although Truscott presented r he 

ne\\ pbn \\'irh zeal, he biled to challge 

the pre\"ailing mood. Gellerals Hannon 

alld O'Daniei were especialh bitter, {c)r 

they deemed the\' \\ere on thc threshold' of success. TI~e decision \\as unjustifiable, the\ argued, Ix'Cause their divisiolls \\ould soon be astride Higlm;1\ () 

;lI1d in possession of Vallllolltolle {i'om 

\\hich thc\" could make a rapid advance 

along the highw;!y to Rome. 1:\ 

Withour minimizing rhe problems inherellt in the change ill direction, Truscott cio<juenth defl'nded Clark's COIIcept. The (;erman TI'II/ft ,4rlll)''s retreat 

from the southern front ,Il1d Kcsselring's shift of rcscrYes froll\ the north, 

Truscorr declared, had led Clark to 

believe that "in the Valmontone Gap 

the going will gn)\\ increasingh more 

dini~ult.': ;\;01' \\~ould cutting I-lig'I1\\;1\ 6 

guarantee destrucrion of rhe Telltft 

Army, for the German troops could 

\\,it hd raw oyer alternate routes. AIt hough Truscott conceded t hat Allied 

fC)lTeS \\'Ould eventually have to break 

through the defcnses' at Valmoll tone, 

he endorsed Clark's theorY tkll an 

attack north\\'est\\'ard illto the Alban 

Hills \\'(Hlld enable the Fifth Army to 

outflank those defcnses and ol)cII' the 

road to Rome l\Iore quickly. "It is," 

Truscorr said stoutly, "an idea \\'ith 

\\'hich I am heartih in' accord." H 

1" \,1 Corps Di"isiou COllllllauders' \llTliug. ~c) 

\L1V 44, 

"Ibid,: IUlen, aUlhor "ilh C;ell l'rllslott, \Ltr 

62, C\II!, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

The VI Corps, Ceneral Truscott announced, \\'as to ;ltt;\Ck the next d;l\ on 

a three-mile front \\,ith t\\O di,isions 

abreast, the 34th ;lIld the 45th, to 

OCCUPy a general line be(\\'Cell C;UllPOleonc and L\I1I1 vio, respect i"d\" {CHI r 

and eight miles west of Vellctri. Since 

the divisions \\'ere to attack on a relativeh nalTo\\ front and ill somc dcpt h, 

the attack \\'()ltld be pO\\'Crful and capable of punching a hole in thc last 

cncIll\" dckllscs sOllth of Romc,I5 (.\10/1 

1'/) 

Thosc deil'nses, Trllscott cOlltinlled, 

\\ere manncd b\" S"hlcmIll's I 1)(II'f/rllII/e 

Clllj),---{omposcd of t he ~/ft PW({I/lllte , 

the 65/ft 111/(111/1)" and the 3d PIIII:I'I 

Grl'lllld/n /)/7'i,/();/" sigllificalltl\" \\cakened, Truscott's G-~ had assured him, 

b\' shifts to reill/(m-c the Cistcrna and 

Valll1olltone sectors. Elements ()f the 

3 3~/h 111/(111/1)' /)17'/I/(J/I had also been 

idelltified, al~d an additional battali()11 

of paratroopers could be expected; oth-

(T\\ise, bet\\cen Velletri and Campoleone to rhe sOllth\\('st there \\as ollh a 

"hodgepodge of units," milch like th;)se 

encountered \\hen the c()rps had first 

landed at Anlio. I\lore()\(T, the 362d 

nh'/'I/()II, which had defended the Cisterlla sector, \\'as belicycd to be yir! ualh 

destroycd, and the 715/h nh'il/oll ha~1 

IX'en s~·yereh hurt. I I; 

This btter estimate \\'as reasonably 

accu rate, Yer the anahst s overiooke~1 

the bet rhat even tho;lgh the 1 Parachute Corps lacked many tanks, assault 

guns, and antitank pieces, the corps' 

three divisions still represented a strollg 

\", VI Corps Di"isioll Commanders' \leel ing, ~:> 

\Ll\ 44, 

1" Ihid. 
STALEMATE ALONC THE CAESAR U!,\E Ihi 

and as yet uncommitted force, well 

entrenched in the only completed portion of the Caesar Line. 

\Joreover, the sit uatioH labeled a 

"hodgepodge of units" prevailed not to 

the southwest of Velletri, but more 

nearlv described that on the sector 

arOlll{d Valmontone. Even as the U.S. 

VI Corps began to shift its main attack 

fi'om the northeast to the north\lest, 

Ceneral O'Daniel's reinfilrced 3d Di\"ision continued to push t(m'anl Valmontone and Highway 6. That development 

so dist urbed Field \brshal Kesselring 

t hat he abandoned all plans fill' reinforcing the Tenth Army. Instead he 

began to send event hing he could bv 

his hands on-a rocket launcher unit 

from the :> :>~th Di"i.lioll, an infantrv 

regiment from the yO/it lJi"ilioN, and a;1 

antiaircraft artillen batlCI"I-t(>IIard 

Valmolltolle and Higl1\lav () to reinforcc thc FOllrl!'!'lIlh AnIlY's left lIing, 

and to cover the Tenlh Ann),'s right 

fbnk. 17 Until division-sized reinforcements might arrive, these I(>n'cs liCIT 

indeed a hodgepodge of ullits, and 

through most of the 27th liCIT all that 

stood between Truscott's VI Corps and 

il'S original ol~jecti ve. 

Buffalo Burin/-Almost 

By shihing the direction of the VI 

Corps offensive, Clark had of course 

altered Operation Bt'FFALO significantlv, 

but he had not com plcteh bu ricd it. 1 H 

A f<mc sizable cnough to justify Kesselring's concern continued in the direction of Highwav () and VallllontOl1e. 

" (;reillt'l' dlld SdllalIllIl, ("h" O!\WIWFSI, Krll, 

IV( I\. pp. 49:\-<)4. 

"S,T, ;"'laliIe\\s, "Th" Dri\(' Oil ROIIle." ill LomIflllllli [)n/I/()I/.I, p. :·\tiO. 

While General O'Daniel's 3d Division 

made up the bulk of this I(ll"('e, it also 

included Frederick's I st Special Sen'ice 

Force, operating on the right flank, as 

\\ell as Howze's armored task force on 

the left. Operation Bt:FFALO had been 

downgraded to a second an operation, 

and, if the enemv could bring in sufIicient 1())'Ce in time, might become essentiallv defensive rather than oflCnsive,I9 :ro be surc, Clark planned eventually to augment O'Daniers force \I"jth 

Keves' I I Corps aher it had com plctec\ 

its task ill the mountains to the south, 

but it lias questionable IIhethel' this 

augmentation could be made in time to 

accomplish Operation Bl"FFALO's stratq.,ric ol~jective, 

Led bl a battalion of the 15th InfantiT, the 3d Division at first encountered 

little opposition, It \Ias a mild \bv day 

and, since the enem\ had seeminglv 

vanished, the troops began to react to 

the balm\' \I"eather, so much that an 

irate division sufT officer lias prompted 

to upbraid his counterpart on the stafl 

of the olfending rq,ri men\. '"Todav your 

troops up there seem[ed] to be relaxing 

without helmets, arms, , , picking 

daisies, and enjoying the spring air. 

What do vou think-that the \I"ar is 

over?" ~o 

The vernal interlude lias rudely shatten'd that aficrnoon "hen a flight of 

American fighter-bombers, mistaking 

the 3d Division's columns I()!" f1eeing 

Cllel111 troops, attacked \I'itholl! \\'anlillg. About lile P-40's first bombed the 

columns, thell returned to straf(> the 

scattered inbntnmen, As the planes 

disappeared in the distallce, they Ieli 

I" Ibid. 

"03d Inl Di, C--:l Jill. :!iO:lOOB \1;" -t-t, Cobra :\ 

to Si:\, :lOlh IIlL 
I tiH 

behind oyer a hundred men killed or 

\\ounded and a IHunber of \'ehides 

destroyed. including scycral loaded \\ilh 

ammunition. 21 

The tragic mistake was especially 

costly to smaller units, stich as the 10th 

Fiel('j Anillen Rillalioll. Two battery 

cOll1m~lIl(lers '\\ere killed ~lI1d a third 

batten commander. I he COlllllllllllC<ltiolls officer. the assisranl and I hc 

antitank officcr \\(Jull<ied. ~~ Even as the 

units were caring fi)r their casualties, 

other Allied aircraft hOl1lbed Cori, 

which had been in American hands 

since earh lllorning, It took engineers 

fin~ hOllrs to clear a path through 

rubble blocking the main road in the 

tOWIl. ~:l 

The lllistaken bombing prompted the 

cii\ision cOl11l11;mcier, General O'Daniel, 

to substitute the 7th InLllltn fill' the 

I:-lth Infantry and to selJ(llhe 30th 

inbntn to cover the flanks, One IXlltalion of the ~10th Intllltn mOH::d llorth-

\\est wanl from Giulianello to screen the 

left and a second marched east\\,~lrd 

fmlll Giulianello 10 screen the right. 

Following a narrow twisting road to-

\\al'(l the \'illage of Rocca \faSSilll:t, the 

second battalion surprised and capt ured 

the village's garrison. a German inbntIT (om pall\', \feanw hile, the 7th III bntn pas'ied through the I :Jth and continued on toward Artena. where after 

dark the regiment halted in hills soul h-

\\'est of the toWl!, ~4 

Screening the 3d Di\1sion's len !lank, 

" Fijth Am,>' Hi"tm,>, Pan V, 

ee! .. Hillory O/Ihl' Third In/antry III H'orld War 

II, p, 173; 3d Di, G-<l Jill. 26191">58 ~I.l\ 44, 

"" 3d Oi, (;--:l Jill. 261 :):)5B \Ia\' 44: 10th FA Bn 

Opm Rpt. \Ia, 44, 

'" 10th FA Bn Opm Rpt. 44, 

"' 3d Di\' C~3 Jill. :!6 ~lay 

CASSIl\'O TO THE AI.PS 

Colonel Howze's task f()rce advanced 

that afternoon br oc\ond Giulianello, 

and as darkness appr;)ached one tank 

companv came to ~l halt \\ithin ROO 

yards of Higll\\ay 6, not far from 

Labico, a village about t\\'o miles non hwest of Valmontolle. When the tanks 

approached the highway. enemy antitank fire destroyed three and forced 

the remainder to f~lll back into cover. ~,-} 

Despite the setback, Gelleral O'Daniel 

\\as lllarkedl\' encouraged b\' the progress on tlte :.!()t h. ThaI c\'cning he 

obsened to the VI Corps ('ommal~](ln, 

"This al'ca is ven soli , .. , rill con-

\inted we could go into Rome, if \\(' 

had lIlore stntf up hcrc,"~j; Truscott 

shared O'Daniers optilllism and urged 

him to OCCUpY the Artell:J- Valmol1tol1l' 

area and cut the higll\\a\ bef()re da\,-

break. Willing to give O'Danici all additional tank battalion to do t he job. 

rruscolt reminded him, '"High\\';;\, /) 

must be .. , cut and the g'ap Ix't\\('('ll 

Arlena and the Alban Hills lIlust be 

kept d()s('c1."~; 

III gi\'ing H'llt to such optilllism and 

ambition, neither O'Daniei nor rrllS(olt 

\\as affording sufficient weight to a 

disturbing IXlrtent that had (i<.~\dOIX'd 

in late afternoon as the 7th In[UltIT 

approached Artena. The Germa;. 

troops pushed back by the men of the 

7th Infantr\' \\'ere from the recollnaissance battalloll of the Hermann Goering 

Division, General O'Daniel displayed a 

more realistic interpretation of the implication in that intelligence when in the 

evening he told Colonel Howze to 

"', Col Hamiltoll How/,e, ~IS "The Rome Operation" (hcre;;her ('ited as Howze \1S), 

',,, V I Corps G-3 Jnl. 2{:>-2H '\fa: 44, 

"' \'l Corp, G--:1 Jnl; 263:q OB \la, 44, 
STALEMATE AL()~(; THE CAESAR U:\E I()q 

withdraw his tank company near High-

\\;1\ fi ~Jt Labico and tic the cOIllpany in 

\\ith the task f(me's main position along 

the railroad \\'est of Artena. 

:\everthelcss, even if the presence of 

the enenl\ reconnaissance battalion did 

presage e:II'ly commitment of the entire 

Hemzann Coering Di'lIisiotl, ;1 chance still 

remained that the reinforced 3d Division III ig h t Yet ge t to Va I IlIon tone 

ahead of t he German rein f(lITelllen t s 

~\I1d, as Truscott had urged. close "t he 

gap bet\\cen Artcna and the Alban 

I-hils." If that could IX' accol\lplished. 

Oper~ltion BnFALo's origin;t\ goal 

might Ix parri;Jih .lchined despite General Clark's decision to shift the VI 

Corps' 1II;lin eff()rt lIortll\\;ml into the 

Alball Hills. 

Presence of the ellel\lV reconnaisS~\II('C battalion did indeed indicate that 

Field \brsh~d Kesselring \\as planning 

to commit the Hermann Coning Division 

;It ValmontoJlc, alt hough except I()r the 

reconn;liss;\Ilce battalion. he intended 

waiting until the entire di\'isioll arri\'ecl 

bef()re committing the rest of the division. Yet til;lt would be difficult to do, 

f()r, hard hit In Allied aircraft cn rollte, 

units of the division, orten \\ithout 

much of their hean equipment. 

trickled in. Alarmed at thc pace of 

the American ad\"\lI<(,. the di\'isioll 

commander, (;encralmajor \Nilhclm 

Schmall, took it on his own to reinforcc 

the rcconnaissance battalion \\ith the 

other units as they arriw'd. 

\Vhen \\'()rd of what \\'as happening 

reached ann\' group headquarters, Kesselring sent a sharply worded order to 

disengage the division immeckltely and 

hold it in an assembly area nort h of 

Valmontone. The order reached General Schmalz on the morning of the 

27th. Convinced t hat if he 1()lh)\\ed the 

order t h~ Americans \\ould q uickh cut 

Higl1\\ay 6. General Schmall ignorcd it. 

Kesselring, he belie\'t~d, ",;IS un;l\\are of 

the t rue sit llation <Ind, once he llnderstood it, \\'(Hlld t'ndorse SchmalL's decision. ~H 

In the meantime, Kcsselring apparenth catlle to the sallie conclusioll, I()r 

late;' in the lIlorning he relllo\'cd all 

restrictions on commitment of the Hermann Goering Dilli,lion. 'Ihe Fourteenth 

Annv commander, General \'On \Ltckensen: then ordered Schmall to counterattack at noon. Although Schlllall had 

issued such an order. he found AlI1criC;\I1 artillcn fi rc so punishing ;md the 

ground over which the ;mack had to 

\11o\'e so exposed that he later postponed t he at lac k until I ~)3(). hope ful 

that gathering darkness \\ould enhance 

the chance of success. l'ni()rtunateh f()r 

Schmal/s pbn l1otificltion of deb, 

biled to reaeh all units. ~!' 

That de\e\opment explains \\11\ the 

Germans bunched a \irtualh suicidal 

coul1teratt;\Ck that afternoon, Shorth' 

after noon, Colonel HO\\'le's out posts 

along the railroad \\est of Arrena rcported ",hat seemed to be enemy inbntry advancing through the \\ heat fields 

in full \'ie\\' of the AmeriCln positions. 

Doubting that the Germans \\ould ;letuallv be so i()olhard\', the men in the 

outposts asked if they lIlight possibh be 

Americans. ,. Hell, no, shoot them u p~" 

Colonel HO\\Ze himself bellowed into 

the phone. Leaving his command post. 

the task f())'Ce commander raced f())'-

\\,;Ird in his jeep "to get in on the 

" \IS # C-()~7b (Schlll"l, 'Illd I:krgengrUl'n). 

l-;illlatz ria Dh'isioll Hrrmalill G(}nilili ill Ita/il'lI. ~() 

\1ai-5 .Juin 44. C\IH, 

'" Ihid, 
170 

shO\I." \Nhen he reached his front line, 

HO\\le could scarcely believe his 

nt's. " ... the it'rrie~ \1 alking and 

crall' ling through the \Iheat on the 

hillsides onl\ 1,:")00 yards ;1\\a\." Here 

\I'as the long-expected Hr>rrnarm Guering 

Dh,isiofl "coming in to bee us." HO\\'Ze's 

tanks opened fire \\'ith devastating results. Gazing out o\'Cr the carnage, 

HOII'll' mused, "Wh\ over the hills in 

dadight? . . . ~tIlotl;er m\ster\.":;o 

The remainder of the Hermann Goering Division attacked at 1930, striking 

h;ird at Task Force Ho\\ze's left flank. 

Slipping through a wooded area on the 

left and firing from the shelter of the 

trees, a German self~propelled gun destnned t\\'o of Ho\\'ze's tanks. At the 

sam~> time, accurate artillery fire hit the 

American positions, falling' primarily on 

men of the I st Battalion, 6th Armored 

Inbntn, and perilously close to 

HOWIe's command post. Even as the 

infantr\'lllen sought cover, a "terrific 

pounding of 155's"-short rounds from 

their (mn supporting guns-hit their 

positions. As if to compound the confusion, a group of 160 replacements 

arrived just as the bombardment began. 

Bewildered and frightened, the men 

flung themselves to the ground; oyer 

half of them \\'ere killed or \lounded. 

The inbmtry battalion commander and 

all three of' his artillen observers exposed themselves selnes'sly at the radio 

transmitter in futile cll(JI·ts to halt the 

American fire, but they \\'ere killed 

during the barrage. Tak'ing advantage 

of the artillery fire and confusion 

among the Am~ricans, Schmalz's troops 

penetrated t he 6th Armored In fantrv's 

:\0 !!O\\'L(' ~IS, Lnless other\\'ise cited. the !(,lIo\\,-

ing is based upon this source, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

lines, but the surviving inbntn halted 

them short of a breakthrough. 

Uncler the circumstances, Colonel 

Ho\\'ze decided to refuse his embattled 

left bv \\'ithdrawing the company holding the flallk. After Ilight Gillie the 

company pulled back about 1,500 

yards, while the supporting artillerythe C .S. 91 st Armored Field Artillen 

Battalion and the British 24t h RO\;;1 

Artillen Field Regiment-hurled sal\() 

after salvo Ixvond the lines. In the bee 

of that fire, tl~e C~rl11ans desisted. Earh 

the f()lIO\I'ing morning HO\l'/e sent hiS 

inbntry back into the abandolled positions. 

I n the meantime, the 1St h I nEintn 

cady on the 27th had again taken th~ 

lead in the attack on Allena. Although 

the reb>i.ment entered the tO\ln b\ 0900, 

the men were unable to clear the last 

resistance until bte ;ifternoon, about 

three hours Ixi(JI'C the German strike 

against Task Force Ho\\'ze. The SUr\1\'-

ing Germans in Arlena \\'ithdn'\I a lIIile 

north to the Artena railroad station 

lI'here they hastily constructed field i()rtific~ltions hlocki,{g the lI'a\ to Valmontone--onh a tempting mile and a half 

a\\':1\. :ll 

Although the Hermann Guering Di(li-

.Iion's coullterattack had bikd to hold 

the ground gained on the 27th, and the 

Americans had taken Anena, the Germans had thrown O'Daniel's {(nce sufficiently off balance to f()n:e a postponement of the drive tOll'arci Valmontone 

and Highwa\ 6. Relieving Task Forcc 

HO\\'I.e, the 7th Infantrv attacked 

through the day of the 28'th-advancing over the same grain fields through 

which the Germans had attacked on the 

:li VI Corps (~3JIlI, 270900 "ud 2716]0 \"1\ j.1, 
STALEMATE ALONG THE CAESAR LINE 171 

27th-but gained only a few hundred 

yards before coming to a halt in the 

face of heavy enemy fire.:l2 

Late on the 28th the I st Battalion, 

6th Armored Inbntry, followed the 

next day by the 91 st Armored Field 

Artillery, withdrew from the task f()rce 

and returned to the 1st Armored DiviSiCHl, then preparing to join the drive 

on Rome through the Alban Hills. The 

remainder of Howze's task f(:H"ce then 

reverted to 3d Division reserve. By 

noon on the 29th General O'Daniel's 

troops held a line across the Valmontone corridor from the northeastern 

corner of the Alban Hills east to the 

Lepini YIountains. The right was held 

by General Frederick's 1 st Speci::li Service Force, the center of the line by the 

7th, and the left by the 30th Infantry, 

\\ith the 15th Inbntry in reserve. The 

91 st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron 

had moved up on the right to patrol 

the hills between the I st Special Service 

Force and the FEC, advancing through 

the Lepini Mountains toward Colleferro, some five miles east of Arten~l. :13 

At this point General Clark decided 

to halt the drive toward Valmontone 

briefly until General O'Daniel's troops 

could be reinforced, fiX, in his words, 

"Valmontone and the high ground to 

the north and to the west is so strongly 

held and in the enemy's main defense 

position that to send one division to the 

north alone would meet with disaster." :14 General Clark gave yet anot her 

reason for his decision. The thrust 

:l2 Taggert, ed., History of the Third Injantry Di"i,ion 

in World War/I, pp. 175-76. 

:1:1 Fifth Armv G-3 Jnl, 27-28 Mav 44: ;"Isg, 

Brann to Gruenther, 28 ;"1ay 44: Fifih Army Hi5tory, 

Pan V, pp. 121-22. 

:14 Clark Diary, 30 May 44. 

toward Valmontone had ex posed the 

VI Corps' right flank, and an enemy 

division-the 715th-was being it. As it 

turned out that decision, in reality, 

constituted no threat, for its remnants 

were even then desperately attempting 

to escape north\\ard before beillg 

trapped bct\\('en t he Americans and 

the French. 

In General J uin's corps, operating on 

the Fifth Army's right flank across the 

northwestern slopes of the Lepini 

Mountains, Clark had a strong fl)rce 

which, if used tx)ldly, might be able to 

cut the enemy's LOC-Highway 6-

several miles east of Valmontone. Recognizing this opportunin, and faced 

with the very real prospect of being 

pinched out of line by the U.S. VI 

Corps and the Eighth Army, Juin proposed on 28 May that his corps debouch from the mountains into the 

Sacco vallev. Thlls \\ould the French 

outflank th~ enemy east of Valmontone 

then drive toward Tiw)li in the Sabine 

Hills east of Rome. Alexander, unlike 

Clark, did not bvor such a maneuver, 

and forbade the French to cross the 

Sacco River. 3~ 

General Alexander objected mainly 

because he wanted to keep Highwav 6 

dear for the approaching Canadian 

Corps on the Eighth Army's left wing. 

Yet the Canadians, after taking Ceprano on the 27th and on the f(.>llowing 

day pushing on to the outskirts of Arce 

some forty miles southeast of Valmontone, would not reach Frosinone until 

the 31st. Meanwhile Juin sent his corps 

over the northern and northwestern 

: .. , Pierre Le GmT!, La Participation Fran(ai.l"f 11 La 

Call1pagn,, d·/tali!'. /9-1"3-1-1 (Paris: Imprimerie "-'ationale, 1969), pp. 124-2;;; Juin, La Call1/wgll!' 

d'/tali!', pp. 132-35. 
172 

slopes of the Lepini Mountains toward 

a junction with the U.S. VI Corps near 

Artena. The 4th Moroccan Mountain 

Division then relieved the U.S. 88th 

Infantry Division on a sector extending 

westward to Sezze. Alexander's concern 

for keeping Highway () free for Leese's 

army was obviously overly sanguine, f(x 

it was evident to both Clark and J uin 

that it would be some time before the 

Eighth Army drew abreast.:w 

Yet reinforcement of the diluted 

drive on Valmontone was destined to 

come from another quarter. On 25 

May General Keyes' I I Corps had made 

contact with the VI Corps near Sezze 

about twelve miles southeast of Cisterna. As for the FEC, denied permission to strike out directly for Ferentino 

and Highway 6, it would continue in a 

northeasterly direction through the Lepini Mountains along the axis of the 

Carpineto Roman(}-Colle Ferro road 

which connects with Highway 6 five 

miles east of Valmontone. Once the 

French had reached that point Clark 

hoped to persuade Alexander to shift 

the interarmy boundary northward to 

allow J uin and his corps to cover the 

Fifth Army's right flank north of the 

highway as that army's II O)rps advanced toward Rome along Highway () 

west of Valmontone.:37 

Meanwhile, back in London, Prime 

Minister Churchill, whose strategic concepts lxxe most heavily upon the unfolding campaign in Italy, fretted over 

the daily situation maps in the Cabinet 

War Room. As he saw it, unless the 

Americans soon captured Valmontone 

and cut Highway 6, the Tenth Army 

"" Ibid. 

37 Clark Diary, 26 and 28 May 44; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 356-61. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

might elude the trap the Amio offensive had been designed to spring. 

Whether that strategic grand design 

rested upon military realities or upon 

ministerial fancy, Churchill cabled Alexander on 28 May urging him to move 

sufficient armor "up to the northernmost spearhead directed against the 

Valmontone-Frosinone road [Highway 

6]. . . " To that Churchill added: "a 

cop [in the English school lx)y slang, to 

capture or nab a ball as in cricket] is 

much more important than Rome 

... the cop is the one thing that 

matters." :IH Later the same dav the 

Prime Minister expressed his gr;)\\ing 

concern in Yet another cable, which said 

in part: ".' .. the glory of this battle ... will be measured, not by the 

capture of Rome or the junction with 

the bridgehead [AllZio beachhead], but 

bv the number of (;erman divisions cut 

o'tl. I am sure," the British leader 

reminded his commander in Italy, "that 

vou will have revolved all this in your 

inind, and perhaps have alread, ~cted 

in this way. Nevertheless, I It'el that I 

ought to t~ll you that it is the cop that 

counts." 3!J 

Alexander sought, apparently in vain, 

to put his Prime Minister's mind at 

ease, but Clark's earlier decision to 

divert the bulk of Truscott's VI Corps 

to the northwest had already taken the 

matter out of Alexander's (and Churchill's) hands. Years later Churchill would 

observe: ". . . the Hermann Goering Division ... got to Valmontone first. 

The single American division sent by 

General Clark was stopped short of it 

:lH Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World 

War" series, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton 

Mifllin Company, lY51), p. fi07. 

3" Ibid. 
STALEMATE ALONe; THE CAESAR LINE 173 

and the escape road [Highway 6] remained open. That was very unfortunt "40 a e. 

"The most direct route to Rome" 

In line with the shift: of emphasis 

away from Valmontone toward ~ome, 

General Truscott had planned to Implement Clark's order by attacking with 

Rvder's 34th and Eagles' 45th Divisions 

o~ a three-mile front southwest of 

Velletri, to the Campoleone station. On 

the left, Eagles' division was to advance 

toward thee railroad station, while Ryder's division on the light approached 

Lanuvio. Harmon's 1st L Armored Di"ision was to maintain pressure against 

Velletri until relieved by Walker's 36th 

Division, then in corps reserve. Instead 

of relieving t~e. 3d Division nort? ,of 

Cisterna, as ongmally planned, the 36th 

Di"ision was to replace the armor so as 

to free it for exploitation of any enerI?Y 

soft spots uncovered be~ween LanuvlO 

and the Campoleone statum. 

Throughout the night of 25 May 

American infantrymen moved by truck 

or on foot over the roads southwest of 

Cisterna into assembly areas in preparation fix the offensive. "Considering the 

congested area and restricted road ne~:" 

the corps commander later observed: ,,<1 

more complicated plan would be difficult to conceive." When it became apparent early on the 26th that. th~ units, 

would be unable to reach their hnes of 

departure before daylight, General 

Truscott delayed the attack an hour, 

until 1000, then another hour to 

1100. 41 

4(, Ibid. 

4, Truscott. Command Missions. pp. :~n')-76: VI 

Corps G-3 JIll. 25-27 May 44. 

During the morning army headquarters confirmed General Clark's oral orders of the previous day. The. reason 

given was that "the overwhelmmg su~­

cess of the current battle makes It 

possible to continue Operation BuFALO with powerful forces and to 

launch a new attack along the most 

direct route to Rome."42 

Soon afterward, General Alexander 

visited the Fifth Army rear headquarters where General Gruenther, Clark's 

chief of staff, briefly explained the new 

plan. Alexander agreed that it seemed 

to be a good one. He also i~1(1 uire? 

whether Clark intended to contmue hiS 

drive toward Valmontone. Gruenther 

assured him that Clark "had the situation thoroughly in mind, and that he 

could depend upon [Clark] to exe~ute a 

vigorous plan with all the push m the 

world."4:l 

Whether Alexander was satisfied with 

the answer or whether he chose, in 

view of the limitations peculiar to this 

multinational command, to accept it 

with his usual good grace made little 

difference, fix he had been prese,nted 

with a fait accompli. The bulk of the 

C.S. VI Corps had alI'eadv bunched a 

new offensive across the southern 

slopes of the Alban Hills-in Gener~~~ 

Clark's words, "the gateway to Rome. 

While the two British divisions demonstrated west of the Anzio-Albano 

road in order to hold the Germans on 

that front, and the 1st Armored Di,,;-

sinn increased its pressure against Velletri, 228 guns began a 30-minute preparatory barrage at 1030, and the. 34th 

and 45th Divisions prepared to .Jump 

4' Fifth Anm 01 24.26 :\\,1\ +f. 4:1 Clark. Calculated Ri'k. PI'. :\;j 7-:\ H. 
li4 

ofl. H Attacking 3.t 1100 with two regiments abreast through rolling wheatfields east of A prilia, a road junction 

ten miles north of Anzio, the 45th 

Division encountered flanking automatic weapons fire from the direction 

of Aprilia, which lay in the British 

sector. For two hours the fire pinned 

down the troops, until a company of 

tanks came forward to silence the enemy guns. By nightfall the division had 

advanced a mile and 3. half and had 

netted some I iO enemy prisoners, including a battalion commander and 

three members of his staff The d3.Y's 

action cost the 45th Division a total of 

225 casualties, of whom 2 were killed, 

203 wounded, and 20 missing. ~5 

On the right the 34th Division advanced along the axis of the old Via 

Appia until its troops too were stopped 

by heavy machine gun fire. Supporting 

artillery fire eventually silenced the enemy guns, so that at the end of the day, 

the 34th Division was also about a mile 

and a half beyond its line of departure. 

The division paid for that modest success with a total of 118 casualties, of 

which 21 were killed and 94 

wounded. 46 

Both divisions were within two miles 

of their respective objectives, the Campoleone railroad station and Lanuvio, 

« Stone building-s concealing enemy g-uns and 

command installations were targets f()r the 240-rnm. 

howitzers and 155-mm. guns. Even four battalions 

of 90-mm. antiaircraft guns opened fire against 

terrestrial targets. See Fifth Army Hiltllry, Part V, p. 

123. 

"45th Div Opns Rpt, May 44; Fifth Armv History, 

Part V, pp. 123-24; 45th Div G-3 Jnl, 262250B 

and 270350B May 44; Analysis of Battle Casualty 

Reports, U.S. Fifth Army, June 45. 

." Although the artillery had played the primary 

role in destroying the enemy guns, the action of 1st 

Lt Beryl R. :-.Iewman (l33d Infantry), who singleCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

yet co-ordination between the t\\'o units 

had left much to be desired. Unfamiliar 

terrain and a virtually sleepless night of 

rapid marches from one sector to another help to explain it. Because of the 

bck of co-ordination, a wide gap had 

opened along the Cisterna-Cam poleone-Rome railroad, the interdivision 

boundary. In spite of eff(n-ls of reconnaissance companies from both divisions to close the gap, scattered and 

bypassed enemy detachments ('()ntinued 

to harass the inner flanks of the divisions f()r the next two days. 

The next morning both divisions renewed their eff()rts; but unknown to 

the Americans, the enemy had withdrawn during the night behind a screen 

of automatic weapons, backed by roving 

tanks and self-propelled guns. At 0615, 

behind a 15-min ute artillery preparation, the 45th Division attacked with 

two regiments forward. Not until early 

afternoon did any significant resistance 

develop. This came from a covey of 

German tanks located in a small \\oods 

beyond the Spaccasassi Canal, a southward-flowing drainage canal a thousand 

yards west of Carano. Armor supporting the attack quickly came forward, 

crossed the creek, and forced the Germans to withdraw. As darkness fell, the 

infantry joined the tanks and dug in for 

the night beyond the creek. 

The 34th Division also attacked on a 

two-regiment front. All went well until 

enemy guns located along a low ridge, 

extending from the Presciano Canal in 

handedly silenced three enemy machine guns, killed 

2 enemy, wounded 2, and took II prisoners, had 

much to do with it. For this Lieutenant Newman 

received the Medal of Honor. See 34th Div Rpt of 

Opns, May 44, and U.S. Fifth Army Battle Casualty 

Rpts, Jun 45. 
STALEMATE ALONe THE CAESAR LINE 17S 

the west to the Prefetti Canal in the 

east, broke up the assault. No sooner 

had the attack failed than the Germans 

launched a tank-supported counterattack. After beating back the enemy 

force, the Americans settled down for 

the night at the foot of the ridge. 

After two days of fighting, the main 

body of the VI Corps still was almost 

two miles short of Campoleone railroad 

station and the town of Lanuvio, the 

immediate objectives. Yet in spite of the 

slow progress, Truscott still believed the 

enemy front to be weakly held and 

alerted General Harmon to assem ble 

his armor for an attack through the 

45th Division's lines on the 29th. 

Walker's 36th Division had already relieved the armored division south of 

Velletri. 

Truscott Commits His Anrwr 

During the night of 28 May General 

Harmon assembled his armored division behind the VI Corps' left wing to 

exploit \;,'hat appeared to the corps 

commander to be a potentially soft spot 

in the enemy's defenses opposite the 

45th Division. The terrain there seemed 

to be favorable for the use of armor. 

To give Harmon a more extensive road 

net, Truscott, after co-ordinating with 

Fifth Army headquarters, shifted the 

corps' boundary slightly to the left into 

the British sector. At the same time, 

General Ryder's 34th Division, now 

screened on its right by the 36th Division, was to try once more to break 

through at Lanuvio, while General Eagles' 45th Division was to regroup and 

follow in the wake of Harmon's armor. 

That night General Eagles sent the 

179th Infantry into the line east of the 

Albano road to screen the armored 

division's preparations, and General Ryder prepared to launch the 135th Infantry, less one battalion, in a renewed 

attack against Lanuvio in the morning. 

Before dawn on the 29th the 1st 

Armored Division moved to a line of 

departure alxmt 1,200 yards south of 

Campoleone station, and at 1530 the 

division attacked. On its left was CCB, 

supported by the I80th Infantry, and 

on the right, CCA, supported by the 3d 

Battalion, 6th Armored Infantrv. Offshore a French cruiser lent additional 

support, its guns firing at targets in the 

vicinity of Albano. To a staff officer of 

the I80th Infantry observing Harmon's 

armored units as they rolled forward, 

the attack "looked like a corps review."47 

During the morning the armored 

units advanced easily against light resistance. CCB quickly cleared a rear guard 

from the Campoleone station and then 

continued northward along the sides of 

several scrub-covered gullies. After 

crossing the Albano road, CCA also 

wheeled northward. Early that afternoon, as the armor approached the 

outpost positions of the Caesar Line, 

opposition increased sharply. Heavy fire 

from enemy armor and artillery 

smashed against CCA's front and right 

flank, while at close range small detachments of enemy infantry armed with 

Panzerfausts ha'rassed the American 

tanks. The tanks, nevertheless, continued to advance, too br in fact, for they 

bypassed many strongpoints that held 

up the infantry. That happened, for 

example, when men of the 180th Infantry tried to follo\\ CCB's tanks into 

Campoleone station; enemy automatic 

"45th Diy G-3 .Jnl. 29l(BOB I\Ll\ 44; \,1 Corps 

G-3 Jnl, 290920B Ma\ 44. 
176 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

TANKS OF 1ST ARMORED DIVISION ASSEMBLING FOR ArrAcK NEAR LANUVIO 

weapons and artillery fire halted the 

accompanying foot soldiers.48 In CCA's 

zone a tank-supported counterattack 

stopped the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, and forced the battalion to fall 

back almost two miles, to a line a mile 

north of Campoleone station, there to 

hold for the night. Thus the enemy 

broke up the close partnership between 

infantry and armor that was vital in 

operations of this kind. 

The capture of the station seemed to 

be all that Harmon's armored division 

4" 1st Armd Div AAR, May 44; 180th In!" Opns 

Rpt, May 44. 

had to show f()r its efforts on the 29th, 

which cost the division 133 casualties: 

21 killed, 107 wounded, and 5 missing. 

In addition, enemy antitank fire destroyed 21 M-4 and 16 M-5 tanks. 

Unlike tanks damaged earlier by mines 

west of Cisterna, those hit by enemy 

guns and Panzerjausts were generally a 

total loss. 49 

The German Situation 

In reality, the 1 st Armored Division 

had accomplished more than was sug496th Armd Inf AAR. May 44; Fifth Army Battle 

Casualties, 10 J un 45. 
STALEMATE ALONG THE CAESAR LINE 177 

gested by the numerous burned-out 

hulks north of the Campoleone station. 

The attack had actually penetrated the 

65th DitlisiorJ's center northeast of the 

railroad to a depth of almost two miles 

on a 1,500-yard front. Early that afternoon Mackensen had inf()rmed Kesselring that the division was in a precarious situation. Casualties were severeover 400 killed and 150 taken pris-

(mer-and there remained only six assault guns, a Tiger tank, and a fe\\ 

heavy antitank guns with which to repel 

further attacks by an entire lJ .S. armored division. All that Kesselring 

could do to help was to attach the 

remaining antiaircraft artillery from 

army group reserve to the f Pamc/w{(' 

e(1)". That reserve amounted to about 

t(lUrtecn batteries, all of \\hich were to 

concentrate solelv on antitank fire. At 

the same time, 'the armv group commander ordered all available engineers 

to lay antitank mine fields in the path 

of the American armor. ~)Il 

Meanwhile, Mackensen had begun to 

round up additional antitank weapons, 

ordering' the 334th Division to send its 

antitank guns to the I Parachute Corps 

sector at once. JVlackensen also transferred to the corps the assault battalion 

of the army group weapons school as 

well as some antitank weapons from the 

92d Division, still in army group reserve. 

Yet few of these reinforcements managed to arrive on the 29th. Until they 

did the 65th Division had to rely for 

support upon a battalion of the lIth 

Parachute Regiment, backed up by several 

88-mm. antiaircraft guns. "I 

In spite of directives from both OKW 

and Field Marshal Kesselring to the 

" .. MS # R-50 (Bailey). 

5l Ibid, 

effect that the Caesar Line had to be 

held at all costs, and not sharing Army 

Group C's belief that Valmontone remained the focus of the C.S. Fifth 

Army's efforts, \·Iackensen had quietly 

directed the I Parachute Corps to reconnoiter a switch position just southeast of 

the Tiber. The reconnaissance was not, 

however, to include the city of Rome, 

for Mackensen hoped eventually to use 

Rome as a screen behind which his 

f()rces might retire to the north. 52 

Although the presence of three U.S. 

divisions in the attack against the Fourteenth Army's right wing west of Velletri 

since noon on the 26th \\'as known to 

Field Marshal Kesselring, only on the 

28th did he begin to have misgivings 

that the American thrust toward Valmontone was the main efTon and the 

attack toward the Alban Hills no more 

than a feint. The next day intercepted 

radio messages and front line reports 

identified the U.S. I st Armored Division on the Albano-Lanuvio front. Onl\' 

then did Kesselring conclude that the 

offensive toward Valmontone had become a secondary eil()l't. 5:3 

InfantTY Against Lanuvi{) 

The new direction taken bv the VI 

Corps' ofknsivc had corne as no surprise to General von wbckensen, the 

Fourteenth Army commander, for he had 

always assumed that the f«:>rees in the 

Anlin beachhead would eventualh' 

'" Be/phl, OB AOK 14, la Sr. 2164/·H Kdos, ~8 

\la\ 44, in ..10K J 4. III KTIl XI. ). Alii. I-:~ I 

Ma\ 44, AOK 14. Dot. Sr .. 590913. 

'" Ibid.: AOK 14. G--2 Rpt, Ie Sr. IO02!44 geh. 

Kdos, ~8 May 44, in AOK 14 Ie Rpts, I Apl'-ClO Jun 

44, AOK 14 Dor. Nr. 590212; AOK 14, C-2 Rpt, lr 

Nr. 2357144, 29 ~fay 44, in AOK 14, 1r iHorgen-1J, 

Tagesmeldungen, 1 Apr-30 JUIl 44. AOK 14 Dor. Nr, 

59092l1. 
178 

move in that direction. He had accordingly arranged his defense to the detriment of the Cisterna sector of his front 

but to the advantage of the Caesar Line 

against which General Truscott's forces 

were now moving. 54 

Although unfinished, the Caesar Line 

could cause an attacking force some 

trouble. Behind it numerous self-propelled guns ranged the roads, firing 

repeated volleys before moving to escape the inevitable counterbattery fires. 

South of Lanuvio and opposite the 34th 

Division were two particularly challenging enemy strongpoints, San Gennaro 

Hill and Villa Crocetta, on the crest of 

Hill 209. Before them was a series of 

fire trenches five to six feet deep with 

machine guns and mortars covering 

every route of approach. Barbed wire 

fronted the trenches. Even to draw 

within striking distance of these formidable obstacles the American infantrymen would first have to cross open 

wheat fields, then attack up steep slopes 

in the face of heavy fire. 55 

On the morning of the 29th the 34th 

Division's 168th Infantry prepared to 

assault those positions. At dawn, behind 

a 30-minute artillery barrage directed 

mainly at the fire trenches and wire, 

the I st and 2d battalions attacked, the 

former passing through the 3d Battalion, which was to remain in reserve. 

Two hours later Ryder observed that 

the assault had gone "pretty well on the 

left, slow on the right."·"o 

What had held up the right were 

three enemy tanks and a self-propelled 

gun on San Gennaro Hill. Fire from 

those weapons halted an attack from 

5< MS # R-50 (Bailey) . 

. >5 Fifth Army History, Part V, p. 127. 

'" VI Corps G-3 .lnl, 290820B May 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the southeast by the 2d Battalion's 

Company E, but the battalion's other 

two companies, unaware that Company 

E was pinned down, continued to struggle up the western slope of the objective. Reaching the railroad (the VelletriRome line) that crosses the forward 

slopes of Hill 209 and San Gennaro 

Hill, Company F turned eastward and, 

taking advantage of the shelter afforded by the railroad embankment, 

soon gained the crest of San Gennaro 

Hill. To the west and somewhat behind 

Company F, Company G moved cautiously along a dirt road just south of 

the railroad. 57 

Both companies at that point had 

dangerously exposed flan ks. At 1445 

some men from Company F straggled 

into Company G's area, saying that they 

had been driven from the San Gennaro 

Hill by a counterattack coming from 

vineyards on the eastern slope. At the 

same time, enemy fire from the rear 

began to hit Company G. The men 

nevertheless hurried forward to reinforce their companions on San Gennaro Hill. Sprinting through a hail of 

hand grenades and bursts of small arms 

fire, the men of Company G soon 

gained the crest, but before they could 

dig in properly on the exposed hilltop, 

heavy enemy mortar fire forced both 

Companies F and G to withdraw. The 

survivors of the two companies fought 

their way back down the hill through 

groups of infiltrating enemy soldiers. 

Shortly before dark the exhausted infantrymen reached the same gully in 

which they had spent the previous 

night. There they met the first arrivals 

'" VI Corps G-3 .lnl, 28--29 May 44; Fifth Army 

History, Part V, pp. 127-28. 
STALEMATE ALONG THE CAESAR LINE 179 

of the 3d Battalion, coming to relieve 

them. Because the men were tired and 

the hour late, the battalion commanders 

decided not to attempt to retake the hill 

that night. 5t! 

Meanwhile, on the left of the regimen tal sector, the 1 st Battalion had 

attacked the enemy defending the Villa 

Crocetta, about 1,200 yards southwest 

of San Gennaro Hill. Crawling through 

the grainfields on the forward slopes of 

Hills 203 and 216, the Americans 

reached a shallow ravine a few hundred 

yards southeast of the villa. When the 

men left: the ravine to make the final 

assault, enemy machine gun and mortar fire drove them back and held them 

there. Prevented by enemy fire from 

either continuing the assault or withdrawing from the ravine, the troops 

had to wait until three tanks and f(wr 

tank destroyers came forward to screen 

their withdrawal into a new assembly 

area, where they prepared to rene\~' 

their assault that afternoon. 5 !1 

Shortly before the attack on Villa 

Crocetta was to resume, General Truscott phoned the 34th Division command post to express his impatience 

with the delay in taking the division's 

o~jectives-San Gennaro Hill and the 

Villa Crocetta: General Ryder was forward with one of his regiments. When 

Ryder returned, the corps commander 

told a division staff officer, "tell him to 

crack this Lanuvio. It's holding up the 

whole thing." (;0 

In resuming the attack early that 

afternoon, the 1 st Battalion, 168th Infantry, was to try to envelop Villa 

'" Ibid, 

'" VI Corps G-3 Jnl, 290900B May 44; Fifth Anny 

History, Part V, p, 128. 

• HI VI Corps G-3 Jnl, 291205B May 44, 

Crocetta with tank-supported infantry. 

Bef()re Companies A and C began a 

frontal assault, Company B with accompanying tanks was to swing left of the 

Villa Crocetta as far as Hill 203 before 

turning right to envelop the objective 

from the west. The appearance of the 

supporting armor on Hill 209 directly 

behind Villa Crocetta \\'as to be the 

signal for Companies A and C to begin 

their attack from the southeast. (;1 

The enveloping company moved out 

as planned and quickly secured Hill 

203. Leaving a contingent of six men 

there, the company, still accompanied 

by tanks, moved dO\\'I1 a slope on the 

right, crossed a shallow gully, and 

rather than envelop Villa Crocetta by 

taking Hill 209, actually overran the 

villa, forcing the enemy to flee. 02 

Unknown to General RYder, the penetration at Villa Crocetta and the earlier 

abortive thrust on San Gennaro Hill 

had hit the Germans at a critical point, 

along the boundary between the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier and the 362d Infantry 

Divisions. Unless quickly contained, the 

thrusts might develop into a breakthrough of the Caesar Line southeast of 

Lanuvio. To forestall such a blow, 

Schlemm, the I Parachute Corps commander, ordered the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, the stronger of the two 

German units, to counterattack both 

American forces, the one which had 

taken Villa Crocetta ~U1d the one which 

had taken San Gennaro Hill but \\hich, 

apparently without German awareness, 

il had abandoned in the face of hean 

mortar fire. g;l 

"1 Fifth Army History. Part V. p, 128, 

6' Ibid,. p. 129. 

"" MS # R-50 (Baile\) . 
ISO 

Spearheaded by a rifle company, supported by tC)Ur self-propelled guns, the 

counterattack overwhelmed the six men 

on Hill 203 and carried the Germans to 

a point from which they could fire on 

the rear of Company B at Villa Crocetta. Concerned lest they be cut off, 

the men of Company B' withdrew to 

the original line of departure at the 

base of the hill. Having failed to observe the tanks, either at Villa Crocetta 

or on the original objective of Hill 209, 

Companies A and C had not begun 

their scheduled frontal attack on the 

villa. By nightfall the 16Sth Infantry's 

I st Battalion was back to where the 

men had started fi'om that morning. As 

if to add a final full measure to a day 

filled with frustration and disappointment, Anzio Annie, as the troops had 

nicknamed the German 2S0-mm. guns 

that fix long had harassed the beachhead, fired sixteen harassing rounds 

before retiring. Meanwhile the twodivision British fo~ice, its left flank resting on the coast, had t<)llowed up the 

German withdrawal and had kept 

abreast of the 45th and I st Armored 

Divisions on the right but had exeIted 

little pressure on the enemy. H4 

On the German side, General von 

Mackensen was pleased 'with the I Parachute Carps' defense; early that evening 

he notified Kesselring that Schlemm's 

counterattacks had eliminated both 

American penetrations, and that the 

Caesar Line remained firmly in Ger-

"4 Fijth Army Hislory. Pan V, p. 129: MS # R~.~() 

(Bailey). The Clcrion on the 29th "'CIS highlighted by 

the eXClmple Clnd sCleri/ice of CClp!' William Wylie 

Galt (168th Infantry) who personally killed f()rtv of 

the enemy bef()re falling mortallv wounded over 

the machine gun he hCld manned atop an armored 

tank destroyer. He WClS awarded the Medal of 

Honor posthumously. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

man hands. The local German commanders attributed their success in part 

to a delay on the part of the Americans 

in occupying and securing captured 

firing trenches and a failure to hold 

reserves in close supporting positions. 1)5 

In spite of the American setbacks 

between Campoleone and Lanuvio the 

VI Corps had made some gains from 

the 26th through the 29th. Yet in 

almost every case, the gains had been 

largely the result of voluntary German 

withdrawals. As Allied pressure 

mounted, the I Parachute Curps, pivoting 

on Velletri, had swung slowly back like 

a great gate toward high ground and 

the prepared positions of the Caesar 

Line. It appeared to Truscott at this 

point that the gate had been slammed 

shut against the Alban Hills. As night 

fell on the 29th the VI Corps' attempt 

to break through the Caesar Line on 

the most direct route to Rome seemed 

halted at every point. 

Th(, 1 st Armored Dh,is/()n '.1 A ttark 

ReinllllTl'd 

In spite of three days of frustrations 

General Truscott still counted on the 

fire power of General Harmon's armored division to blast open that gate. 

But to do it lx)th men agreed that the 

I st Armored Division had to have more 

infantry support. CCB was therefore 

reinforced with the I st Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry, and CCA with the 

2d Battalion, 135th Infantry. eCA also 

received the tanks of the I st Armored 

Regiment'S 2d Battalion. H.; Thus rein-

"' MS # R~50 (Bailey). 

Ii'; 1st Armd Div AAR. May 44: Fifth Army (;~3 

Jnl, The Advance on Rome. Unless otherwise cited 

the following section is based upon these references. 
STALEMATE ALONG THE CAESAR LINE 18 I 

forced, the armored division returned 

to the attack at 0630 on the 30th. Yet it 

soon became evident that the enemy 

had also taken advantage of the lull to 

garner strength, so much so that the 

reinf(xcing units even had to fight their 

way forward to join the armored units 

they were to support. The morning's 

operations again produced only negligible gains. 

Harmon tried again in mid-afternoon 

with an artillerv preparation f()llowed 

by attacks by both combat commands. 

In CCA's sector well-sited enemy antitank guns and self-propelled aitillery 

fired on every tank that moved. Under 

cover of this fire enemy infantry armed 

with Panzerfausts aga(n sJippe'd in to 

destroy several tanks. Beyond the Camp<>leone station, CCB's tanks and their 

supporting infantl'Y managed to stay 

together and advance as far as the 

Campoleone Canal (Fosso di Campoleone), a little over a mile awav, but 

they could go no fanher. Again the 

armor had achieved no breakthrough, 

and the division's casualties the second 

day were even heavier than on the 

fir~t-28 killed, 167 wounded, 16 missing. E(luipment losses were less but still 

heavy: 23 tanks destroyed and several 

others damaged. 

On the right of the armored division 

General Rvder's 34th Division also resumed its ~n(Jrts on the 30th to break 

the Caesal' Line in the vicinity of L'1;nuvio. Once again the inEmtry '/()llo\\"ed a 

heavy artillery preparation up the San 

Gennaro Ridge toward t.he battered 

Villa Crocetta. This time two of the six 

supp<)rting tank destroyers reached the 

crest of Hill 209 behind the villa, but 

enemv fire destroved one and the 

other,' after almost (')verrunning an enemy fire trench, withdrew amid a 

shower of hand grenades. The infantry 

briefly gained Hill 203 just below the 

Villa Crocetta only to be f(}rced back bv 

heavy mortar and machine gun fire. f)'7 

The only gains made on the 30th 

were by the British as they crossed the 

M()lett~ River, on the [;11' left flank. 

After repulsing a brief counterattack, 

they occupied Ardea, a road junction 

alxmt two miles bevond the river. Yet 

again this advanc'e was a result of 

German withdrawal into the Caesar 

Line. 

By nightfall on 30 \lav there 

emerged from the intricate patterns of 

blue and red lines and unit svmbols on 

the situation maps of every c(;mmander 

from corps to company one grim fact: 

General von \1ackensen had succeeded 

in slamming shut the gate on the VI 

Corps' drive to Rome over the southwestern flanks of the Alban Hills. Clark 

himself telephoned Truscott and his 

commanders to express his keen disappointment with their efl()rts. !;H 

Yet t he total Fifth Army situation was 

less bleak than it appear~d on the VI 

Corps front. For the past five days the 

U.S. II Corps and the French Expeditionary Corps, opp<)sed only bv the rear 

guards of the XIV Panzer Corps, had 

been moving through the Lepini \Iountains toward the Valmontone corridor. 

By nightfall on the 30th the 85th 

Division had reached the f(mner Anzio 

beachhead area, and the 88th Di\'ision, 

at this p<)int under control of the IY 

Corps, had reached Sezze, alxnlt thirteen miles southeast of Cisterna, Two 

days bef()re, at General Clark's direction 

,iT :Hth Diy G-:l, Jnl. ~I'I\ .f.f; \'1 Corps G-:l.ln!. ~8-:;() 1I.!a; .f4, 

Ii" Clark Dian. :,0 ~Ia\ .f.f, 
182 

General Keyes, the II Corps commander, had turned control of his 

corps zone and the 88th Division over 

to General Crittenbcrger's IV Corps for 

mopping up operations in the Lepini 

Mountains and, by early afternoon on 

the 29th, had assumed command of 

General O'Daniel's rcinforced 3d Inbntry Division in the vicinity of Altena. 

For the next threc days the 88th Division mopped up scattered encmy units 

in the southwestern half of the Lcpini 

Mountains while awaiting relief by elements of the FEe. Meanwhile, since the 

25th, the French had been advancing 

along two axes: the 4th Moroccan 

Mountain Division up the AmasenoCarpineto road to clear the northeastern half of the Lepini Mountains, and 

the 2d Moroccan Infantry Division 

south of the Sacco River. By the 30th 

both columns were headed toward Colleferro, a junction with the American 

fexces, and relief of the U.S. IV Corps 

in the Lepini Mountains. (H' 

Under those circumstances Gcneral 

Clark had grounds f(Jr believing that 

"onc or two more days of all-out attack" 

in the Lanuvio-Campoleone sector, 

combined with a new operation being 

planned by the 36th Division northeast 

of Velletri, "might crack the whole 

German position in the Alban Hills 

area .... If I don't crack this position in three or four days," Clark 

observed, "I may have to reorganize, 

wait fe)r the 8th Army and go at it with 

a coordinated attack by both armies "70 To the Fifth Army 

commander that was an unacceptable 

alternative. 

69 Fifth Army History, Part Y, pp. 134--37. 

,n Clark Diary, 30 May 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

I t was hardly a likely alternative in 

any case, for the Eighth Army's 1st 

Canadian Corps, after clearing Ceprano 

on the 27th, had been experiencing 

considerable difficulty in advancing astride Highway 6 toward the road junction of Frosinone, some ten miles to the 

northwest. One thousand yards south 

of Ceprano a 120-f()()t bridge had collapsed on thc 28th just as the engineers 

were about to declare it operational. 

For the ncxt twenty-fe>ur hours the 5th 

Canadian ArmoUl:ed Division, assembled along the highway to exploit Ceprano's bll, waited idly while the engineers hurriedly constructed a new 

bridge across the upper Liri. On the 

30th the armored division finally 

crossed the river and resumed th~ 

advancc. As the tanks moved beyond 

Ceprano, the terrain became inc'reasingly hilly, and ahead lay several tributaries of the Sacco, each a formidablc 

obstacle to armor. The Germans had 

destroyed every bridge over the rivcr 

and covered each crossing site with 

artillery and mines. Under those circumstances, Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns, the 

Canadian corps commander, brought 

forward the Canadian 1st Infantry Division to lead the way. By the evening of 

the 30th the fcxward elements of the 

Canadian infantry were within sight of 

Frosinone, yet still about twenty-five 

miles southeast of Valmontone. 71 

To the Canadian right a strong rear 

guard held up the British 13 Corps' 6th 

Armoured and 78th Infantry Divisions 

south of Arce, on the 27th, but on the 

28th the impasse was broken when the 

8th Indian Division made a wide flank71 Operations of British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Part II, Sec. B; Nicholson, The 

Canadians in Italy, pp. 439-46. 
STALEMATE ALO:'\JC THE CAESAR LINE 

ing maneuver through the mountains 

north and northeast of Arce and that 

night forced the Germans to yield their 

strong defensive positions. The next 

day the Indians occupied Arce without 

opposition and began a cautious advance along Highway 82 toward Sora. 

Enemy artillery, demolitions, and a narrow, winding mountain road would all 

combine to slow down the Indians for 

the next few davs. Meanwhile, the 

British 78th Divi'sion turned to the 

northwest and advanced north of and 

parallel to Highway 6 to cover and 

eventually pull abreast of the right 

flank of the Canadian corps as the 

Canadians led t he Eighth Army toward 

Frosinone. 72 

'2 :'Iiieho]son. The Canadians in Italy, pp. 439-46. 
CHAPTER X 

Breaking the Stalemate 

The operation being planned by the 

36th Division and which bolstered General Clark's confidence that the Caesar 

Line would soon be broken was triggered by a startling discovery during 

the night of 27 May. Reconnaissance 

patrols from the 36th Division, probing 

the dark slopes of Monte Artemisio, a 

four-mile-long ridge running from 

northeast to southwest and overlooking 

Velletri from about a mile to the north, 

had f()Und no sign of the enemy. Had 

they stumbled upon an undefended 

gap in the Caesar Line? 

There was indeed a gap. It lay along 

the boundary between the I Parachute 

and the LXXVI Panzer Corps. It was 

attributable to two developments: holding the left flank of the parachute 

corps, the 362d Division was responsible 

f()r the Velletri sector, but severe losses 

in the defense of Cisterna had left it 

few troops for defense of Monte Artemisio. Also the Hnmann GoninE{ Dh'ision, on the right flank of the adjacent 

panzer corps, had been drawn to the 

southwest in the direction of Valmontone by the American thrust toward 

Highway 6, so that contact between the 

362d and the Hl'rmann GOfrinE{ Divisiom 

had never been firmly established. 

When General Schmalz, commander of 

the Hl'nnrmn Gl!I'rinE{ Division, learned of 

the lack of contact, he sent patrols 

during the night of 27 May to try to 

reach the 362d Division. The patrols 

roamed across Monte Artemisio's southern slope f(n two miles behn'e at last 

finding troops of the 362d Divi~ion near 

a fork in the road just northeast of 

Velletri. 

Aware of the hazards of such a gap 

to the over-all defense of the Caesar 

Line, General Schmalz sent an engineer 

platoon to occupy the Castel d'Ariano, a 

ruin located on Monte Artemisio's crest 

three miles north of Velletri and two 

miles west of Lariano. A few hours later 

an officer-led patrol from Schmalz's 

division also occupied a group of 

houses at the hamlet of Menta, on the 

intercorps boundary. Yet those modest 

fexces represented no more than outposts and in no sense served to close 

the gap, for it was on that same night 

of 27 May that American patrols were 

active on Monte Artemisio and had 

nowhere encountered any German 

troops.l ' 

Reports of the situation on Monte 

Artemisio prompted General Herr, the 

panzer corps commander, to order 

Schmalz to send trucks immediately to 

the HNmann GONing Dh/i,lion's assembly 

area northwest of Valmontone to transport to Monte Artemisio two infantry 

battalions delayed during the long 

march from Leghorn. Herr also ordered the battered 715th Division, which 

had been withdrawn to the Tivoli area 

for renrganization, to send troops at 

1 MS # C-087b (Schmalz and Bergengruen), 

Einstatz der Division Hermann Goering in Italien, 

CMH. 
BREAKIN(; THE STALEMATE 

once to Schmalz's sector. Unfortunately 

f()r the Germans, neither the two infantry battalions nor the reinf()rcements 

from the 715th Division would arrive in 

time to close the breach. 2 

Not until the afternoon of the 29th, 

during a brief visit to the f()rward area 

of the parachute corps, did Field Marshal Kesselring learn of the gap. He 

immediately ordered Mackensen to 

close it. Mackensen passed along the 

field marshal's order, but he and his 

two corps commanders were satisfied 

that the job had already been done and 

took no further action. That night the 

army commander's report to army 

group made no mention of a gap on 

Monte Artemisio.:l 

The next day Kesselring learned how 

tenuous the link between the two corps 

actually was and telephoned Mackensen 

to express his displeasure. He brusquely 

pointed out that while one battalion 

might be sufficient to hold Monte Artemisio against probing attacks, an en: 

tire division could hardlv hold it if the 

Americans f()cused on that part of the 

front. Mackensen nevertheless stuck to 

his conviction that the gap had been 

satisfactorily closed and that Monte Artemisio's rugged terrain and steep sides 

would make up for the paucity of 

f()rces. 

Meanwhile, Mackensen had turned 

his attention to the northern flank of 

the Alban Hills between Lariano and 

Valmontone where, he rightly suspected, the Americans might soon attempt an outflanking maneuver. Indeed, General Keyes, the commander 

of the U.S. II Corps, which had just 

reached the Anzio area to take com2 MS # R-50 (Bailey). 

3 Ibid. 

IHf) 

mand of the f()rce in the Artena sector 

between the Alban Hills and Valmontone, was even then planning such a 

move. To block it, Mackensen directed 

Herr to have the HfTmrmn Conmg 

Divi~i()n attack at once in order to throw 

the Americans off balance, much as the 

division's reconnaissance battalion had 

done on the 20th. But the panzer corps 

commander was reluctant to commit 

the Hrrmrlllrl CONing Dit'i,lion to an\'-

thing so ambitious, because Schmalz's 

entire division had vet to arrive. Herr 

suggested instead th~t Schmalz concentrate what units he had on the panzer 

corps' right flank with a view merely 

toward reinforcing (;erman positions 

on the northern slope of the Alban 

Hills. Even as-unknown to the (;ermans-two regiments of the U.S. 36th 

Division began to climb Monte Artemisio the night of 30 Ma\', Mackensen 

reluctantly accepted Herr's counterproposal. 

Stratagem on Monte Artemisia 

The 36th Division commander, General Walker, had informed the VI 

Corps commander, General Truscott, 

on the afternoon of 28 May of the gap 

on Monte Artemisio. The following day 

Walker called Truscott's chief of staff: 

Brig. Gen. Don E. Carleton, to tell him 

that 36th Division patrols were on the 

feature's f()rward slopes seeking a favorable passage over Monte Artemisio, 

thereby outflanking Velletri from the 

northeast. Agreeing that this was a fine 

idea, Carleton noted that if it could be 

done, '"the Boche in there [Velletril 

would find themselves in a tough situation, and the town might just cave in." 4 

4 VI Corps G--3 Jnl. 2~29 :\1<1\ 44. 291530B :\1a\ 

44; Tel. CIS to C(;. 30th Di\'. 281851 B Ma\ 44, 
186 

Encouraged by Carleton's reaction, 

Walker summoned his staff officers to 

give them a planning concept that 

envisioned pinning down the enemy in 

Velletri with one regiment, the 141st, 

and with the 142d and 143d scaling 

Monte Artemisio. 5 The 142d was to 

establish roadblocks to close the northern escape routes from Vdletri, while 

the 143d, after assisting in the capture 

of Monte Artemisio, moved northward 

into the Alban Hills to seize Monte 

Cavo and the Rocca di Papa, two hills 

providing excellent observation over the 

entire area. 

For the plan to succeed, armor and 

artillery had to follow close behind the 

attacking infantry to help maintain 

roadblocks and protect the long flanks 

created by the thrust. Since there would 

also be a vulnerable line of communications extending eight miles over a ridge 

varying in height from t\H) to three 

thousand feet, and since no more than 

mere footpaths and a few cart trails led 

over the mountain, success of the entire 

venture would also depend upon rapid 

improvement of one of the trails to 

enable tracked vehicles and jeeps to 

ascend behind the infantry regiments. t; 

Here was a job for the engineers. 

After studying aerial photographs and 

reconnoitering several promising trails, 

the' 36th Division's engineers found a 

trail that apparently could be improved 

within a reasonable period. Meanwhile, 

Walker's infantry regiments had been 

making their preparations. On the 

'The 141st and 143d Infantry had incurred 

heavy casualties in January 1944 along the Rapido 

and 'again on Monte Cassino, See Blumenson, 

Salerno to Cassino, pp, 322-51, 367-78, 6 Col Oran C. Stovall, Div Eng, typescript account 

of operation. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

morning of the 30th, the 36th Division 

commander laid his completed plan of 

operations bef<ne the corps commander 

at the latter's command post. 7 

General Walker's plan was relatively 

simple. While the 141st Infantry engaged the Velletri garrison, the 142d 

Infantry, followed by the 143d, was to 

pass through the lines of the 141 st 

during the night of 30 Mav and 

scale Monte Artemisio. After reaching 

the ridge, the 142d Infantry was to 

move sOllthwestward to the Maschio 

dell'Artemisio, a knob two miles northwest of Velletri, while the 143d was to 

move northward along the ridge to 

capture the Maschio d' Ariano and Hill 

931, the two highest points at the 

northeastern end of the ridge. The 

141 st Infantrv was then to launch a frontal attack to 'capture Velletri and open 

Highway 7. H (MajJ 5) 

After questioning Walker's engineer 

closely as to the feasibility of improving 

an existing cart trail up Monte Artemisio, Truscott okayed the plan. He also 

placed the separate 36th Engineer Regiment in direct support of Walker's 

division. 9 

The 36th Division had acquired considerable but costly experience in 

mountain operations at night at the 

hard fought battle of San Pietro the 

previous January. That experience 

would serve the division well in the 

coming operation. Would it be another 

San Pietro? General Walker thought 

not. He noted in his diary: "Our operations for tonight and tomorrow have 

promise of being spectacular. We are 

7 Ibid; Walker Diary, 29-30 May 44. 

636th Div Rpt of Opns, May-Jun 44; Fifih Army 

History, Part Y, p. 142. 

"Truscott, Command MisswnI, p. 377, 
.' 

.. .. • 

"'11 ~ 0 A • • ---..... '" , . " I ....... _----

" ::g:", 

MAP' 

--• .---

r!!, 

t..9.J H,G.( Prchtl 

• 

A~'"O.' M"T£ '''DIn, o 'IIAY 

A"'"OlU.UTE '"0 NT, l JI,ul 

AXil 0' IIoO'o''''''C[ , OAT[ INDICATED 

MOVEM(NT TO fIlONT, NIGHT, 3 0 ..... y 

o I MILEIl 

1'\',\/",,', " I , 

o I IU lOWUtll' 
188 

taking chances. but h'e should succeed 

in a big way," General Clark clearly 

shared his subordinates' confidence. 1O 

About an hour before midnight, the 

142d Infantry, in a column of battalions 

with the 2d' Battalion leading, headed 

toward the dal'k outline of Monte Artemisio. Aided by a new moon that 

aH<)l'ded just enol;gh light to enable the 

troops to discern a trail, the leading 

company reached the base of the 

mountain at 0130. From there thev 

picked their way slow Iv through leaf)! 

vineyards covering the lower slopes, 

Just as dawn began to blank out the 

stars, the head of the column crossed 

an open field and began to climb a 

steeper slope. Seeing the summit looming before them, the men quickened 

theil' pace. At 0635 the leading squads 

scrambled onto the crest of Monte 

Artemisio, there to surprise and capture 

three artillery observers, one of whom 

was taking a 'bath, Not a shot ,vas fired. 

That fortunate state of affairs continued throughout the morning as the 

142d Infantry turned southwest along 

the ridge to\\'ard the 2,500-foot :\1aschio dell'Artemisio. II 

That afternoon Germans along the 

main road (Highway 7) leading west 

from Velletri spotted the Americans 

atop Monte Arternisio and opened fire 

with several self-propelled guns assembled in support of the defenders of 

Velletri. Despite that fire, mostly harassing, the 142d Infantry's leading battalion pressed on to reach the Maschio 

dell'Artemisio in earlv evening. From 

the crest the Americ~ns look~d down 

1(1 Walker Diary, 30 \1ay 44; Clark Diary, 30 May 

44. See Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 270-89, 

fi)!" detailed description of the San Pietro operation, 

11 142d Inf Rpl of Opns, ~1ay 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

on Velletri much as had advance 

guards of an Austrian army. under 

Prince von Lobkowitz, two centuries 

before when, instead of Germans, 

Spaniards under Don Carlos of Naples 

were defending Velletri; the Americans 

were not the first to have used this 

route to outflank the Velletri position. I~ 

That night the 142d Inhmtrv established roadblocks on two of the three 

roads left to the enemy troops in 

Velletri and by morning the town was 

virtually surrounded. Only one escape 

route (Highway 7) remained open to 

the Germans. When news of the 142d 

Infantry's success reached tbe Fifth 

Army headquarters, the frustration 

built up during the five days of virtual 

stalemate vanished and, in General 

Clark's words, "caused all of us to turn 

handsprings." I:J 

IVfeanwhile, the l43d Inhmtn had 

followed the 142d to the crest and then 

had turned right to cover that flank. 

Moving northeastward along the ridge 

toward Hill 931 and the Maschio 

d' Ariano, the men of the 143d encountered considerable sniper fire, but bv 

late afternoon had eliminated it. Onlv 

at the ruins of the Castel d' Ariano wa's 

it necessary to call upon artillery support to drive £i'om the ruins the engineer platoon from the Hamann (;oninK 

Division, which General Schmalz had 

committed the night of the 27th. By 

dark the entire Monte An.emisio ridge 

was in American hands. 14 

The next morning a party of artillery 

observers accompanying the 143d In12 See Spenser \\!'ilkimon, The Dejemt' of Piedmont, 

1742-48 (London: Oxford, 1927), pp. I ill ff. 

'3142d Inf Rpl of Opns, May-Jun 44; Walker 

Diary, 31 May-l Jun 44; Clark Diary, 31 May 44. 

14lnterv, \1alhews with Col paul D, Adams (CO 

143d lnt), 27 Apr 48. 
BREAKINC THE STALEMATE 

fantry were delighted to find that the 

summit of Maschio d' Ariano provided a 

200 0 field of observation from the east 

to the southwest. Below lay supply 

arteries of much of the Fourteenth Army, 

especially those supporting the LarianoValmontone sector. Scores of tempting 

enemy targets crawled across the landscape beneath them. The only problem 

was to obtain enough batteries to do the 

firing and observers to direct them. 

Calls immediately went back to division 

and corps f()J- ~very available artillerv 

observer to come f()rward to help. Soon 

"f()rward observers were sitting around 

on the Maschio d' Ariano like crows on 

a telephone line, having a field day." I:, 

"This was," General Truscott observed, "the turning point in our drive 

to the northwest." 11; 

The German Reaction 

~ot until the afternoon of the 31 st 

did the German Fourteenth Army headquarters become aware that the U.S. 

36th Division was on top of Monte 

Artemisio. Dismayed, General von 

Mackensen quickly directed a series of 

countermeasures to restore his front. 

He ordered his two corps commanders 

to contain and destroy the American 

penetration at whatever cost, even if 

the\' had to use their last man and 

weapon. Corps' boundaries were to be 

ignored, Mackensen declared, f<)r "in a 

situation of this kind, corps boundaries 

no longer have any meaning." 17 

In contrast to the earlier break-

'" 143d infOpns Rpt . .lun 44. 

\I; Truscott, Commarui Missions, p. 377. 

17 Berekl, AOK 14, la NT. 2338/44, g.Kdos, 31 May 

44, in AOK /.J, la KTB Nr. J, AlllaW' -IS7, 1-31 Mal 

44,AOK /.J, J)w. Nr. 5909//3. 

189 

through on the Cisterna sector, it was 

the LXXVI Panzer Corps' turn to help 

the I Parachute Corps. Mackensen directed Herr to backstop Schlemm's positions west of Monte Artemisio with an 

armored reconnaissance company 

which was to block a road leading 

northward from Monte Peschio, one of 

the several peaks on the Monte Artemisio ridge. Other armored reconnaissance detachments were to set up blocking positions along Highway 7 between 

Velletri and Lake Nemi. \1eanwhile, a 

grenadier battalion from Herr's panzer 

corps was to try to pinch off the 

American salient bv a counterattack 

directed against th~ 143d Infantry's 

positions on the northern end of the 

Monte Artemisio ridge. The corps commanders were to report the results of 

those measures to Mackensen by 0700 

the next day, 1 June. 18 . 

The Fourteenth Army commander, 

fully engaged in attempting to contain 

the penetration along the intercorps 

boundary, failed to inform Field \1arshal Kesselring of "hat had happened 

until late on the 31 st. When Kesselring 

learned of the 36th Division's presence 

on Monte Artemisio, he was furious. 

Had he been notified promptly, he 

declared, one or t\\"() battalions might 

have been able to handle the situation, 

but now the penetration had grown to 

such proportions that no reserves then 

available to army group would be able 

to seal it off. As Ell' as the army group 

commander was concerned, this was the 

last straw in his steadilv deteriorating 

relations with his suboi-dinate. I ~J Th~ 

" Ihid. 

'" BI'/I'h/I', OB SlIl'dm'.lt, la XI'. 5Y/.J!.J-I g.Kdo.l, 1 

.lun 44, in Hl'l'I"l'lgTllpj'" CIOB SW, V"I".I(liil'{ll'lIl'.I, la. 

Jan-Jun 44, HI'I'II'lgl"II/I/'" C, /)111. XI'. i5IJSIJ. 
190 

feeling was apparently mutual, f()J' General von Mackensen too had conduded 

that, figuratively speaking, the gap between him and the field marshal had 

become as large and menacing as that 

on Monte Artemisio. For the third 

time-there had been tm) other occasions in February-Mackensen placed 

his command at Kesselring's disposal. 

Having already obtained Hitler's permission to relieve Mackcnscn, Kesselring this time accepted Mackensen's 

request fin' relief. Five davs later Mackensen would leavc fin' Cermany, after 

relinquishing his command to Ceneral 

del' Panzertruppen Joachim Lemelsen.20 

The countermeasures ordered by 

Mackensen had been tactically sound 

but by 1 June impossible of fulfillment. 

His blunder had been less in delaying 

to notify Kesselring of \\hat had happened than in allowing the gap to 

develop in the first place. 

Exploiting the Penetrati(m 

The successful penetration by the 

36th Division on 31 \fay aided the 

other divisions of the VI Corps south of 

a line between Lanuvio and Campoleone, for it offered opportunities unforeseen during the past four days, a 

period which had been marked by 

grinding, costly, and frustrating fighting. 21 Seeing also a chance of outflanking the enemy in the Alban Hills, 

General Clark decided to shift the bur21' MSS #'s T-Ia and T-Ib (Westphal 1'1 a/.), 

CMH. 

21 On the 31st, Pvt. Furman L. Smith, 135th 

Infantry, 34th Division, single-handedly held off an 

enemy counterattack until he fell mortally 

wounded, his rifle still in his hands. He was 

awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

den of the drive on Rome to General 

Keyes' II Corps. This was the headquarters which two days earlier had 

assumed control of General O'Daniel's 

reinforced 3d Division, whose forces 

had been augmented by the arrival of 

the 85th Division. 

Acknowledging that the II Corps, in 

the vicinity of Valmontone, would soon 

be astrid~ Highway 6, Alexander, at 

Clark's request, a~justed the interarm), 

boundary to afford the Fifth Army 

exclusive' use of Highway 6 betwee;l 

Valmontone and Rome, as well as the 

hills overlooking the highway from thc 

north where Clark expected to employ 

the FEe. Thus Clark would be able to 

make the final drive on Rome with all 

three of the Fifth Army's corps along 

the axes of two main highways, 6 and 

7, instead of only along Highway 7, ali 

he had planned originally when sending Truscott's VI Corps into the Alban 

Hills. 22 

At the same time that Alexander was 

adjusting his interarmy boundary, Kesselring did the same. The German 

commander shifted the boundary of 

Vietinghoff's Tenth Army northwestward 

in order to give the FO/lrtl'l'nth Army's 

hard-pressed LXXVI Panzer Corps a narrower front. This Kesselring did by 

broadening the sector of the XIV PrmzN 

Cort)s and placing the 29th Pam1'/" Grl'1wdin Dil/i.lion, hitherto on the LXXVI 

Panza Corl)I' left flank, under the control of the f()rmer corps.2;\ 

Before the I I Corps could move on 

Rome, the corps had first to complete 

22 Alexander Despatch, p. 50. 

"Befehle, AOK XIV, la Nr. 2338/44 g.Kdos, 31 

May 44, in AOK XIV, la KTB Nr. 3, Anlage 487, 1-

31 May 44, AOK XIV Doc. Nr. 5909 I!3 . 
BREAKING THE STALEMATE 

Operation BUFFALO'S original mission: 

to block Highway 6, capture Valmontone, and secure the high ground north 

of the town as well as the northeastern 

slopes of the Alban Hills. Thereafter, 

on Clark's order, the corps was to 

pursue the enemy northwestward astride Highway (1 toward Rome and, at 

the same time, send mobile forces 

southeastward along the highway to fall 

upon the flank and rear of those 

enemy forces retreating bef()re the FEC 

and the British Eighth Army. Meanwhile, the FEC, having completed mopping up operations in the Lepini Moulltains, was to secure the high ground in 

the vicinity of Segni on the northern 

slopes of those mountains and then cut 

Flighway 6 near Colleferro l::d()re moving on northwest\\'ard to Cave and 

Palestrina, some ten miles away, to 

cover the II Corps' right flank and rear 

as it passed beyond Valmontone. Ultimate goal of the French 'was to seize a 

crossing of the Tiber east of Rome. 24 

Concurrently, the VI Corps was to 

attack along the axes of Highway 7 and 

the Via Anziate, the latter the main 

road running north from Anzio into 

the Alban Hills, to secure the southwestern half of the Alban Hills and cut 

the enemy's routes of withdnl\val 

through Rome before sending f()rces 

southwestward to pin the Germans 

against the Tiber southwest of the city. 

On the VI Corps' left flank the British 

I st and 5th Divisions, once again attached to Truscott's corps, were to 

f()lIow up the enemy withdrawal toward 

the Tiber and help destroy those en24 Hq, Fifth Army. 01 25. 31 May 44. See also 

Mathews, "The French in the Orive on Rome," 

Revue Historique de I'Armee, p. 139, 

191 

emy fc)rces trapped east of the river. 2,) 

The stage was at last set fe)l' the final 

drive on the Italian capital-a drive 

which was to become in eflect an intraarmy contest as to which corps-'Truscott's VIol' Keyes' II-would be first in 

Rome. On 31 May it had seemed to 

Clark that the odds favored Keyes, f()r, 

except for the 36th Division: all of 

Truscott's corps still faced the most 

heavily defended sector of the Caesar 

Line, that which stretched southwestward from Velletri to the sea. \:Ioreover, the terrain would give Keyes' 

corps an advantage, for in front of the 

II Corps stretched the most b,vorable 

ground that corps had faced since the 

beginning of the May offensive along 

the Garigliano. 

Between High\vay 6 and the Via 

Prenestina to the north lay a belt of 

slightly rolling and intensively cultivated 

fannland varying in width from three 

to five miles and extending all the \\'ay 

to Rome. Unlike the former beachhead 

south of Cisterna, the firm, dry soil, 

infrequently cut by lateral dr~inage 

ditches, promised excellent footing fi)}' 

tanks. Supplementing the main highwav. two excellent roads also ran 

thr~)Ugh the corps zone to Rome: to the 

north of Highway 6 the Via Prenestina, 

and to the south, the Via Tuscolana, 

although the latter served the VI Corps 

f()r part of its length. To Keves' troops 

these conditions represented a welcome 

respite from the craggy mountains and 

tortuous roads and trails encountered 

to the south, The onlv terrain obstacle 

of any consequence in the II Corps 

zone was the northern slopes of the 

Alban Hills, but the presence of the 

36th Division on Monte Artemisio 

" Hq, Fifth Army. 01 25, 31 Ntn H. 
19~ 

would prevent the ('~rmans from taking full advantage of that. 2H (Map VII) 

As General Clark adjusted his fiJrces 

f()J' continuing the drive on Rome, the 

British Eighth Army was still slugging 

its way up the Liri valley and beyond. 

During the afternoon of 31 May inbntry of the 1st Canadian Corps entered 

the imporrant road centel- of Fmsinone 

astride Highway 6 twenty-five miles 

southeast of Valmontone, while the 

British 13 Corps, having bypassed Arce 

to the southeast of Frosinone on Highway 82, pulled abreast on the right. 27 

'rhat meant that the Liri vallev lay 

behind the two corps. From that 'poil1t 

thev were to continue north\\estward 

up . the valley of the Sacco River past 

Valmontone toward Tivoli, eighteen 

miles cast of Rome. The 13 Corps was 

prepared to vary that route. should the 

annv commander, General Leese, deem 

it p~'opitious, in order to open additional mads leading generally northward through the Simbruini Mountains. 

The 10 Corps on the British right wing 

meanwhile was to continue to block 

passes in the Central A pennines to 

deny German intervention from the 

Adriatic front. 

In altering the interanny boundary 

north of Highway 6 to give the Fifth 

Armv greater freedom of movement 

. norti1\;est of Valmontone, General 

Alexander, having abandoned all hope 

of trapping the Tenth Army, added the 

proviso that if it became necessary f()r 

both Allied armies to make a joint 

assault on the Caesar Line, the original 

boundary would be reinstated. In that 

event, the Eighth Army would attack 

II Corps Opns Rpl. Mar--:/un 44. 

21 Operations of British. Indian. and Dominion 

Forces ill Italv. Pan II. Sec B. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

abreast of the Fifth Army on a narrow 

front, with the 1 st Canadian Corps 

astride Highway 6 and the British 13 

Corps along an adjacent route, the Via 

Prenestina. 

Once the Caesar Line \\as pierced 

and Rome fell, General Leese, the 

Eighth Army commander, planned to 

move the Canadian corps into army 

reserve, while the 13 Corps, passing 

east of Rome through Tivoli, was to 

lead the Army's advance northward. 

On the Eighth Army's far right the 10 

Corps too was to drive generally northward along Highway 82 through 

A veZZ'U1I). 

Preliminary' Moves 

To launch the new phase of the Fifth 

Armv's drive on Rome, the II Corps 

co1I111under, General Keves, had little 

time to prepare elaborate plans. The 

~~6th Division's presence on Monte Artemisio had apparently thrown the Germans off balance. It \\':1S important to 

moV(' quickly for the Germans had long 

since demonstrated all almost uncanny 

ability to recover rapidly from reverses. ~x 

Since the 36th Division's success on 

Monte Artemisio raised the possibilitv 

of quickly achieving a deep salient. 

Clark S<1\\' the need to act with disp..'1tch 

to protect the 36th Division's right flank 

and rear. Convinced that General Keves 

would need more strength than orIginally contemplated to accomplish that. 

he decided on the evening of the 31st 

to give the II Corps General Sloan's 

88th Division, which he had intended to 

hold in arm\' reserve. 29 

'" II Corps Opns Rpts. May-jul1 44. 

". Clark Dian. 31 Ma\ 44. 
BREAKING THE STALEMATE 

For the drive on Rome General 

Keyes thus would control the 85th and 

88th Divisions-the same ones with 

which he had broken the Gustav Line 

over two weeks before-plus the 3d 

Division, the 1 st Special Service Force, 

and Colonel Howze's armored task 

force, the units that had been operating 

in the Valmontone corridor under General Q'Daniel's command. This was a 

f()rce alxmt as f()rmidable as that commanded by VI Corps when Clark 

turned it toward the Alban Hills. 

Although General Keyes had no armored division, Howze's task f()rce represented a powerful exploitation force, 

since it consisted of the 13t h Armored 

Regiment (less one battalion), the 756th 

Tank Battalion, and several artillery, 

tank destroyer, engineer, and armored 

infantry units. Having rejoined the 

corps, the 91 st Reconnaissance Squadron drew the mission of screening the 

right flank, pending further advance of 

the French Expeditionary Corps. General Frederick's 1 st Special Service 

Force was also highly mobile, and each 

of the three infantry divisions had an 

attached medium tank battalion. 

Before attempting t~) break into the 

Valmontone gap, Keyes first had to 

secure his left flank on the northeastern 

slope of the Alban Hills, both f<)r his 

own protection and to cover the 36th 

Division's right flank. That was to be a 

responsibility of General Coulter's 85th 

Division (with the 349th Infantry attached from the 88th Division), which 

during the night of the 30th relieved a 

regiment of the 3d Division on the left 

wing of the corps in the vicinity of 

Lariano, midway between Anena and 

Velletri. The 85th Division was further 

reinforced with a company of tanks 

from Howze's task force. 30 

An hour and a half after midday on 

the 31 st, Coulter's infantrymen attacked 

across slopes dotted with thick chestnut 

and pine woods, terraced vineyards, 

and silvery-leaved olive trees. Advancing on either side of Lariano, the 1st 

and 3d Battalions, 337th Infantry, encountered little opposition. Bypassing 

the town, they occupied high ground to 

the northwest. The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, sent a reinf<)rced company in a 

frontal assault against the town. Although the German defenders employed considerable small arms fire, the 

town was in hand by nightLiII. During 

the night the I st Battalion continued 

over two miles beyond Lariano to reach 

the Maschio d'Ariano at the northern 

end of the Monte Artemisio ridge, 

there to relieve the 36th Division's 143d 

Infantry. 

The 337th Infantry's attack had dealt 

roughly with the battalions of the Hermar/n Goering J)j"i,liOl/, encin:ling a battaion of the 1st Pm,-::,('/' Grl'1lar/ier RI'giIrll'flt and driving back another from the 

2d P(IIIZ1'r Grl'lwr/il'l' Regiment. Under 

cover of a company-size counterattack 

supported by seven tanks, the encircled 

battalion escaped during the night. 

Nonetheless, the 85th Division managed 

to hold on as anchor of the left flank of 

the II Corps on Monte Artemisio.:11 

Keyes' Plan 

During the eyening of 31 \b\, Gel1-

eral Keves outlined to his di\·isiol1 COIll-

"" 337th In! Opns Rpt. :\lay 44: 33Hth In! Opns 

Rpt, May-Jun 44; 3d Inf Div Jnl, 31 May. 212100B 

May 44. 

'" \,1S # R-:;O (Hailey). CMH. 
194 

mandcrs his plan of attack to sccurc 

High\\av 6 in the \'icinity of Valmontone before bcginning thc drivc on 

ROlllc. Thc m~lin burdcn of thc dl()rt 

\\'as to be borne initiallv lw the 3d 

Division. This division \\~;s t(') capturc 

Valmontone bef()re continuing to the 

nonh\I'Cst to sccurc the corps' right 

flank on high ground in thc vicinil v of 

Palestrina. a fc\\ miles north of Valmontonc. \\'here the division \I'as to 

rcmain until relieved bv the FEe. With 

the flanks secured, the 88th Division, 

accompanied by Task Force H()\I/e. 

\\as to advance as Ell' as High\'~1\ 6. 

\\est of Valmontone, then turn north-

\\est\lard. :\2 To the division's left Coulter's 85th Division \\'as to cross the 

Alban Hills' northeast slopes to thc 

vicinity of Frascati, about ten milcs 

southeast of Romc. Thcrc~lfter, Coulter 

\\'as to bc prcpared, on corps' ordcr. to 

s\\'ing one regimcnt abruptlv to thc left 

to cut off thosc encmy troops opposing 

thc VI Corps. Once the FEC arrivcd to 

relicvc thc 3d Division and covcr thc II 

Corps' right flank and rcar north of 

Valmon tonc. Gcncral (),D~\l1 icl's division \\'as to ach'ance alongsidc the 88th 

Division to screen the corps' right flank. 

Thl' /I Cmi'.1 BI'[!:im To Mo(/(' 

Thc main linc of rcsistancc of thc 

Gcrman LXXVI Panur Corps, comprising the FOllrtl'l'rIth Army's left \\'ing, extendcd cast\lard from thc northeastcrn 

slope of thc Alban Hills to Higl1\\;1\ G 

at a point mid\\'a\, bet\\'ccn Valmontonc 

and Labico. and thcnce to a junction 

\Iith the XIV Panzer Curps on the Tenth 

:!2 II Corps AAR. Jun 44. The Rome Campaig-n. 

Unless otherwise indicated the following- is based 

upon this document. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Annfs right \\ing a It,\\, milcs east of 

Valmontone. \bnning the line from 

thc Alban Hills to the interanm bound-

~\n \I'ere t hc Hermann Guering Divisiun 

and rellln~\l1ts of the 334th and 71 5th 

Infantry DiI,isions. This f( me \\;\S morc 

imprcssivc on papcr than it \Ias in 

rcalitv. f()r thc onlv units actualh in Iinc 

\Iere t \10 underSlrCllh'1 h p~ll1zcr gTcn~\­

din rcgimcnts and a KamjJfgruf)pe, thc 

bttn made up of miscellancous artillcn 

units, most of \I'hich had lost thcir guns 

to persistcnt Allied aircraft. With thc 

cxccption of antitank \\'Capons, this 

force nevcrthcless possessed adequatc 

supporting arms alld sen'iccs. :\:\ 

Beginning at OSOO on I June the 

8Sth ~\Ild 3d Inbntn Divisions-the 

88th Division had vet to come into line 

in the corps' cen'ter-began moving 

to\lard their first objectives. Progress 

\\'as sl()\1 during thc morning. es)x'cidh 

in thc 3d Division sector. Onh afier 

refX~lIing scvcral tank-Icd counte{'attacks 

east of the Anena-ValllloJl(one road 

did the 13th lnbntn finally succeed. 

bte in the day, in ;\ciYancing t hc di\'ision's right as Ell' as High\,'av G. On the 

lel't. Colonel Ho\\zc's armored task 

force destroyed eight enemy antitank 

guns \\hile spearheading the 30th Inbntn''s attack. Task Force Ho\\/e in 

turn lost three tanks, and snipers took a 

heavy roll of tank commanders. To 

make mat tel's \\'orsc. darkness found 

both tanks and inbntlT still short of the 

high\';1\ north\\'Cst ;>1' Valmontone. 

Colonel H()\\Zc summed up the day's 

action by obsening. "Our attack ... \Ient damncd slo\\h." :\~ 

"" MS # C-64 (Kesselring-). CMH, 

:" 30th Inf ""an. Jun 44: HOWle MS, 
BREAKINC THE STALEMATE 

On the corps' left the :1:18th Inbntry 

of Coulter's 85th Diyision ran illto 

ent:my \\ell elllrenched along a steepsided raih\;l\, emhmkment just nort heast or Lariano. Aficr a hean fire fight 

the regiment drO\'e the Gerl1l~lIls hum 

their positiolls, then \\heeled slo\\'I\' 

northwestward in the direction of 

!\Ionte Ceraso, lilUr miles <I\\a\ on the 

northeastern rim of the Alb:m Hills. 

'When the maneUW,T opened a gap Oil 

the 338th Inbntn'\ right flank, Coulter 

quickly closed it with the ~H9th [nbllliT. :l~ 

.'\Ieall\\hile, a hattalion of the ;1;)7th 

Inf;mll'\" still on the .'\1aschio d'Ariano, 

the Iloi"lhern knob of the \Iollte Artemisio ridge, came under lire /i"om an 

enem\' fime th;lt had been hastih assembled in tile vicinit\ of a brill' one 

mile to the northeast. 'Apparclltl\, belatcdlv trying to restore contact Ix:t\\'ccn 

the FilII rt('olth A nll)' 's two corps, the 

elWI1I\, had infiltrated fmm the Ilorth 

through heavily wooded draws 10 isolate t he I st Batt alion COllllll;IIHi post 

and capture an entire platoon of Company D, Later in the day the battalion 

rallied and drove the enem\' off. The 

rest of the 33ith Inbntn' ad\anced 

bcf()re dark as Llr as \{onie Castellaccio, about t\\O miles to the north, thus 

providing the II Corps a secun: anchor 

jill' its left flank on high gmund overlooking Highway 6 from the south. ;H; 

Southeast of Valmontone General 

Frederick's I st Special Sen'icc Force 

reached Colle Ferro, a road junction a 

fe\\ miles southeast of Valmontol1c that 

'" 3491h In! Hist, Jun 44; 338th In! Jnl. 1 Jun 44, 

"" 337th Inl' Rpt of Opns, Jun 44; Ol'ders, AOK 

14, fa Nr, 2J59144, gIKri!!\, I Jun 44. in AOK 14, la 

KTB Nr, J, Anltll(" 4S4, 1-31 Mav 44. AOK /4, 0(1{, 

Nr, 59U91.1; Filth'Arm,' Hi,/!!t}" Part V, p, 146, 

19!) 

was important to the enelll\ troops 

withdrawing befi)re the FEC. Surprising 

the GCI'l1lans, Frederick's men fell upon 

their right !lank and took O\'e1' 200 

prisoners, thus yirtualh eliminating the 

enemy rear guard at that point. and 

assuring dear passage Ii)!' the 3d Algerian InEmtn Di\'ision, leading the FEC 

advance IowaI'd Higll\\,;t\' 6. ;l. 

Alt hough no breakt hmugh had developed, there were increasing signs 

\\ith each passing hour th;lt the enemy 

was gnm'ing progressi\'eiy \\caker. 

Later that afternoon outposts reported 

seeing a white f1ag fhing o\'er Valmol1-

tone and hearing I he sounds of hea\'\' 

molor traffic moving \\est\\,;trd. Observers ;tiso reported two big explosions, 

;Ipparently demolitions, in the vicinity 

of Cave 011 the Via Prenestina, midway 

between Genazzano and Palestrina.'" ' 

That night the cOlllllunc\er of the 

L')th InEliltn telephoned :)t\ Division 

headquarters ncar Giulianello, reporting the noisc of heavy motor tJ'anic 

across his front. "Wh\, don't YOU put 

mortar fire on it?" General O'Daniel 

replied \\ith some heat. "Get ;111 AT 

gun up there and plaster the hell out of 

e\'ernhing that comes along. You can 

block the road am place yOU want to, 

The important thing is to shoot evc)Y 

goddamn \ehicle that comes b\' 

there." ;l!, T\\'entv minutes bter the regimental commander telepholled again to 

sa\' that Company E had just finished 

shooting up three t rucklo;lds of enelll\ 

soldiers on the road. '"Good, Keep it 

up," O'Daniei replied, somewhat molli-

'" Fifth Army H1story, Part V, p, 146; \larlte\\,. 

"The French in the Drive on Rome." p. 139, 

'" II Corps G-3 Jill. 01 182).,)B J Ull H. 

"" :~d Inf Div G-:~ Jnl, 012310 Jun 44, 'I'd CO 

15th Ini'1O CG, 
196 

hed. "Don't let a single vehicle get 

through tonight-not one, understand~" ~II 

With Highwa, 6 cut Iw fire, e,en 

though not pl1\sicalh' blocked, the Germans were c1earh' in t)"()uble. As General Clark had 'noted \\hen arguing 

against General Alexander's preoccupation \\'ith Valmontone and Higlma\" 6, 

other roads were a,ailable f()r the German T('nth Ann)"s withdrawal; nevertheless, a combina'tion of the loss of Highwa\" 6 and a continued American adval~ce to the north \HHlld further restrict the TOlth A nn/s escape routes 

from the Sacco Valle\". Furthermore, if 

the left wing of Gel~eral \on \bckensen's Fuurteenth Arm)' collapsed, as appeared imminent, the Americans could 

hardly be stopped, and the I Parachute 

Cort)s would have to abandon its relatively strong Caesar Line positions in 

the Alban Hills. 

Early on I .June, evt"n as the C,S. II 

Corps had begun to move, Field Marshal 

Kesselring had told the T!'tlth A nnfs 

Chief of Staff, (~eneral Wentzell, to hasten the withdrawal of the 90th Pan:('/' 

Grr'tlflriin Dillilion from the Sacco valin to 

secure the high ground north of Valmontone around Palestrina. That \\as to 

be a preliminar\" to the entire XIV P(m:iT 

Cotl,.1 making a stand there. Ifth(~ American II Corps swung northwestward toward Rome, as seemed likely, the XIV 

PanzIT CllljJS \\()uld be in a position to 

harass the attackers' f1ank.~' 

If Kesselring's plan was to have an\" 

chance of success, the FlIllrtl'l'lith Armj''s 

left \\'ing had to hold cit her at Valn1<)n-

'" Ibid; 3d Di, C-3 Jnl, Silrcp, 020730 Jun 44, 

'1 Tclecon, AOK 10 CIA ,,/eol Beelitz. OB S/JI'dU'I'I/ 

Opns Off, 0 I I 1.~5 B .I un 44, in i/OK 10, la KTB 1\", 7, 

An/agl' 20, 1-5Jun44,i/OK 10Dol,N" 55291/2, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

tone or on the high ground at Palestrina until the 90th Panzer Grenadier 

Dizli5iun could arrive. To t hose Germans 

on t he scene there seemed to be little 

chance of that. Because of the Al1Ierican fire on HigJma\" 6, the position ;It 

Valmontone \\'as clearly untenable. 

Leaving only an I H-man ~'ear guard in 

the to\\n, the Germans withdrew to 

high ground, but the total strength 

then available fi)l' holding the nt"\ 

position \\as one inbntn battalioll supported bv f(Hlr Mark I V tanks, a smattering of assault guns and flak guns, 

and three light art illery batteries, I~ 

At dawn on 2 .June, General Ke\(~s' 

II Corps rene\\ed its attack, this timc 

with Gencral Sloan's HHth Di\'ision kl\'-

ing taken over the center of the corps, 

That the Germans had pulled back 

during the night bccame quickly apparent. A patrol of the 3d Di,ision's 30t h 

Infantry led the way illto Valrnontone 

and by I ()3() reported the to\,'n frec of 

the enem\,. To the Iell the 7th Inbntn 

occupied'Labico, on High\\a\ 6 t\\;) 

miles northwest of Valmontone, ;\I1d 

together the two regiments f()IIO\\cd thc 

retreating enem\, toward the high 

ground al"Ouncl Palestrina, f<HII' miles to 

the north. By nightbll both rcgiments 

had seizeel footholds 011 the high 

ground against only light resistance, l:l 

Two regiments of the HHt h Division 

meanwhile moved towarcl Gardella Hill, 

a point of high ground oH.Tlooking 

High\\';)y 6 about five miles nor! hwcst 

of Vall11ontone. Within a fe\\ hours the 

hill was occupied and the high\\'av cut. 

Two battalions of the 351 st In Emtr, 

then turned north\\'est astride the higl{-

'" \ISS #'s T-Li, T-Ib, 1'-1(' (vVestphal fl a/,) 

and (:-064 (Kesselring), 

'" II Corps C-3 Jnl, 021 030B .lun 44, 
BREAKING THE STALEMATE 197 

3D DIVISION INFANTRY ENTERING V ALMONTONE 

\\'ay and enltTec\ the road junction 

town of San Cesareo, seven miles north-

\\esl of Valmontone, Along the \\'<ly Ihe 

men counl ed 12 destron:d or abandoned 88-1Il1l1. gu ns and 14 ene 111 \' 

vehicles, The 85th Division on the left 

made similar progress, one regimenl 

('oming <Ibreasl of the 3:) I sl In Elnl)'\' 

near San Cesareo in later afternoon, 

anothe r occupyil1g \'lonl e Fiori, t\\O 

miles south of the [0\\'l1. H 

" II COl'll' AAR .lUll 44 . The II Co),ps [))'i\'l' Oil 

Romt', 

B\' 2 .I lInc the II Corps had gained 

('0111 rol of ;1 si:-;-mile Icng1 h of High\\a\' 

6 ;md. llIorc importanth. had compromised t he posit ions on t he high gl'Olllld 

ne;\I' Paft'sl rina \\hich the Gennans h;ld 

hOlx'd to hold pending the arri\'al of 

the 90th Pallzer G1'l'nadirr Division , Contlicting reports reaching Army Group C 

hCldqual'lers throughout the da\' 

served 10 ('ollceal Ihe full c:-;tent of the 

perillo the German plan to emplo\' 

thai division oe k'nsiw'h. but b\ nigh[-

fall Ficld \brshal Kesselring realilcd 

that more draslic sleps \\erc 11t'C(kd if 

\\hal \\';IS de \'c1oping as a full-scal e 
198 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

AMERICAN INFANTRYMEN ADVANCING ALONG HIGHWAY 6 TOWARD ROME 

bre;lkthrough at Valmontone \\'as to be 

contained. 4;' 

To General von Vietinghofl, COlllmander or the Tenth Army \\ithdr;l\Iing 

bdilre the British Eighth Army, Kesselring insisted that the XIV Panzn 

", Teiewll, AOK ]U CIS with Colollel Ikelit / , 08 

SUPllwfs/ OpllS Office r. 0 III :;r,B .Iun 44, in AOK IU, 

lu KTR Nr. 7, Anla{!;f 20 , 1-:, .Iun 44, AOK 10 Doc. 

Nr. 55291J2; Telecoll, CIS AOK ]U ",lOR 511('(lw(I/, 

Ol1220B .Iun 44 , AOK /0 Do(. NT. 5529112; :-ISS 

# T -I b (Westphal d fll.) and C-O(;4 (Kesscirinf!;). enless otherwise indit:aled this scnion is based upon 

t h("s(" referc nces. 

Cmps counterattack the Idi fbnk of the 

Fifth Anm's II Corps, no\l Ix'ginning 

to mo"c up High\\ay 6. Vielinghoff 

responded emphatically that he had 

neit her sufficient I mops nor amm unition fill' a countcratt;lCk of al1\ kind. 

The entire XIV Pam.1T emj).\, fill: e";llllpic, h;](1 onh ftHlrteen combat-reach 

tanks. Kesselring reluct;mth took him 

at his \nlrd and both commanders had 

to accept the bet that Rome would 

SOO]} be lost. During the night of 2 

June, Vietinghoff ordered his Tel/lh 

Army to break COIlt;lct \Iith the British 
BREAKING THE STALEMATE 

Eighth Army and retreat north\lard 

through the Simbruini \lollntains to 

the Aniene RiYlT e;lst of Rome. 

As the full-scale \lithdr~l\\al began, 

tension and sln'pless nights lx-gan to 

take their toll among t he senior German commanders. General yon Vietinghoff, \Iho f()r sevcral months had 

been rcpeatedly incapacitated by 

chronic illness, turncd oycr his COIllmand to his chief of staff, General 

Wcntzell, and Idi f(lI' hospitalization in 

northern Italy, A fe\I' hours bter Kcsselring's chie(of staff. General Westphal, 

collapsed from nlTVOUS exha ustion and 

\\as also cvacuatcd. 

The Trl/lh Ann)''s rclreat through thc 

mountains \Ias \lcll-collceived and skillfully executed, amply fulfilling Clark's 

earlier prediction that t hcrc \llTe just 

too many esclpe routes open to the 

Germans. Yet an cxamination of the 

map suggests that a combination of a 

more \'igorous f()llo\I-UP by thc Eighth 

Army of the Germans in the Liri 

valley', and a timely blockade of High-

\I'ay 6 betlleen hTentino and Valmontone by the Fifih Armv \Iould have 

made "ut retreat Ell' mOl:e costly. 

The VI Corps Begim To Move 

Since 26 \1:1)" the VI Corps, \Iest df 

the Alban Hills, had gained little 

ground and had incurred hC~l\y casualties in some of the hardest fighting 

since the previous \I'inter. Four of the 

five divisions (the 36th Division had 

been in corps reserve f(lI' much of the 

period and had sustained fl'\1 losscs 

during thc ascent of Montc Artemisio) 

had suffered a total of 2,H29 casualties, 

including 342 killed. Those \1'(Te losses 

comparable to, and in some instances, 

surpassing those incurred during the 

199 

breakout offensive from the beachhead, ~I; 

Tklt such a grim pattern of losses 

might still continue became evident on 

1 J line \1 hen the VI Corps rcsumed its 

efforts to break through the Caesar 

Li ne bct\leen Lan u vio an cl Cam poleone, On ~I t\lo-battalion front, thc 

179th Infantry led the 40th Division's 

advance astridc the Albano road, The 

attack had penetrated the lines of an 

enemy infantry school regimcnt, a rccent reinforcement to the 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Division, but the 179th Inbntn"s heavy losses caused considerable 

disorganization in that regiment. By 

noon one company could muster only 

an officer and thirty-five men, and the 

other companies \I~re little lx,tter off. 

The division commander, General Eagles, replaced the 179th \Iith the 180th 

Inbntn, so that the attack \I'as rcne\lcd 

in the 'afternoon, but the second re).,riment had no more success than the 

first. 47 

To the 4:Jth Division's right the 34th 

Division also rcsumed its efforts to 

capture the Villa Crocetta and the San 

Gennaro Ridge southeast of Lanuvio. 

Alier t\\'o hours of hard fighting, the 

168th Inbntry's 3d Battalion captured 

t\l'O hills on the ridge but \Ias still short 

of complete control of the feature. On 

thc 168th Inbntry's left, the frustrating 

chronicle of the previous \Ieek \\as 

repeatcd as a platoon of the 109th 

Engineers struggled to \I'ithin a stone's 

thnm of the Villa Crocetta before a 

curtain of automatic wcapons and mortar fire drove the men back dO\ln the 

"i See 9th Machine Records Unit Fifth Annv 

American Battle Casualties, 10 .Iun 45, CMH, ' 

"45th Div Opns Rpt, .Iun 44; VI Corps (;~3 

Periodic Rpt, Jun 44; MS # T~la (Westphall'f a/,), 
~()() 

hill through shattered olive groves to 

the line of departure. 411 

To the corps commander, General 

Truscott, it \\'~IS apparent that his best 

prospects for breaking through the 

Caesar Line lav with the 36th Division. 

Since occupying MOllte Artemisio bet()}'e davJight of the ~11 st, that division 

had gradualh extended its positions 

and had virtuallv surrounded Velletri. 

Onlv Higlm;ty 7 remained open as an 

escape route fin' the town's garrison, 

the suni\'ol's of General Greiner's 362d 

Inlantry Division. The 36th Division 

commander, Genel'al 'Walker, believed 

that the enenn. recognil.ing the hopelessness of the sitU;ltiol1, would soon 

abandon Velletri. 4 !' 

In realit\', bv edrlv afternooll of :j I 

\:bv, the I 'Par~hute 'Curps commander. 

General Schlemm, Iud indeed decided 

that nothing \\as to be gained bv prolonging the defense of Velletri, and 

accordingly had requested General von 

\:bckensen's permission to withdraw. 

The Fourteenth Ar'mV commander readilv 

assented. and that 'night. leaving behin~1 

a rear guard. Greiner withdrew his 

division along Highway 7 to\\,~lrd Lake 

~emi, about five miles to the northwest 

of Velleui :;0 

As night fell on I June, the 36th 

Division entel'ed Velletri, where the 

Amerkans captured 250 enemy soldiers 

at a cost of thirtv-f{Hlr casualties. \Vith 

Velletri's bll. it se~med unlikely that the 

Germans could long hold the' LmuvioCampoleone sector. .'il 

Yet despite the 36th Division's suc-

•• Filth Army History, Part V. p. 151. 

'" 36th Div Rp! of Opns, .\Iay-Jull 44, 

." MS # R-50 (Baile\). 

" 9th MRU, Fifth Arm\' American Battle Casualries, 10 JUIl 45; 36th Di\' Rpt of Opns, May-Jun 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

cess, Field Marshal Kesselring had not 

vet authorized Mackensen to withdra\\' 

fl'om the southern flanks of the Alban 

Hills. The anny grollp commander 

bdie\'ed that it was important, indeed 

vital. to the fi.>rtuncs of the German 

!<m.:es that the Fottrteenth Arm)' hold as 

long as possible in order to (:l1able the 

Tenth Army to make good its escape 

from the upper Liri-Sacco \'alky. If 

\:1ackensen \\'ere !lung back too quicklv 

on Rome the Allies might be able to 

separate the t\\O German anllies and 

seize the crossing sites of the Tiber 

north of Rome, :;z 

Consequently. \\'hen the 34th and 

45th Divisions resumed their efhnts Oil 

2 .J une. the Germans continlled to hold 

except at the Villa Cwcetta. which the 

34th Divisioll linallv seized. Elsewhere 

between LU1U\io :ll;d Campoicone. the 

VI Corp;; made little head\\;n. ,-):, 

General Clark made no senet of his 

keen disappointment at Truscott':-- billire to break thmugh west of Vellctri. "1 

want to take ground, but Ryder ~md 

Eagles haven't gone am place todav," 

Clark complained to Truscott's chief of 

staff: ;;~ Thev \\'ere engaged in a race 

against time, Clark added, ane! "my 

subordinates bil to I'ealize how dose 

the decision will be. If Kesselring manages to rein force his positions in the 

Alban Hills with the 1st Parachute Division and the 90th Panzer Grenadier before I get there. they may turn the tide."~)~) 

,'" Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Hope 

Nor Fear (:'\ew York: E, p, Dutton & Co .. Int., 

1964), p. 253, 

'" VI Corps (;-3 Jnl, 1-2 Jun 44. 021745B JUIl 

44, Tel, CG 45th Div to CG VI Corps, 

"ibid., 02 1 840B Jun 44; Tel. Fifth Army Adv CP 

to CG V 1 Corps, 

"Clark Diary. 2 .Iun 14, 
BREAKING THE STALEMATE 

Although upset by the lack of progress west of Velletri, Clark was em'ouJ'-

aged by the 36th Division's prospects at 

Velletri and on Monte Artemisio. "I f 

the 36th goes," Clark observed to Truscott, "I feel that there should be a 

breakthrough."~1i Clark's confidence in 

Walker's division was well placed, for 

while Truscott's other division commanders fumed in fi-tlstration throughout 2 June, the 36th Division began a 

methodical exploitation of its capture of 

Velletri. At dawn the 142d and 143d 

Inbntry Rehrimenrs led the \\'::tv from 

~Ionte Artemisio across rolling bnnland toward ~I()nte Ca\'o and Ron:a di 

Papa, which were f<)llr and a half miles 

away. Advancing along the only 

covered route of approach in its zone 

and taking fifty prisoners from the 

Rome Police Battalion, a scratch covering 

f(m:e hurriedly sent south Ii'om Rome, 

the 142d Inf~tntry, gained a position 

directlv east of ~fonte Ca\'o. To the 

right the 143d Inbntry occupied \ionle 

T~tno, a mile and a half northeast of 

;\Ionte Cwo, ;\1eanwhile, the 141 sl Infantry, which had captured Velletri, 

advanced into the hills just east of Lake 

Nemi.:>7 

The 36th Division's thrust opened 

Highway 7 as far as L~lke l\:emi and 

threatened the 362d Division:~ left flank 

with envelopment. Even the commitment of a battalion of t he 1099th 

Infantry Regiment from the 92d Grenadier 

Division, an untried unit in training 

along the coast near Rome, biled ro 

stem what at that point amounted to a 

breakt hrough along the I Parachute 

'n VI Corps C-:1 Jnl. 020815B. 0214158. and 

021840B Jun 44, Tds. Clark lo Truscott. 

'" 142d Inf Opns Rpt, Jun 44; 141st Inf :-':arr, 

Jun 44. 

201 

Corps' left flank. To amid envelopment, 

General Schlemm withdrew the 12th 

Parachute Regiment h'om his center and 

shined it to a sector extending northeast from Lake ~emi to the corps' left 

flank. Yet that unit, reduced bv combat 

losses to about the strength of' a battalion, could be expected to act as little 

more than a delaying f()rce. 

By nightbll on 2 June, Kesselring at 

last reluctantly acknowledged that the 

Fourteenth Armv too had no alternatiye 

to withdrawal-and authol'ized .\fackensen to begin pulling back his entire 

front, \\'ith the exception of the LII' 

right along the Tnrhenian coast where 

as yet the British di\'isions there had 

exerted little pressure. The I Parachute 

Corps' center and left were to \\ithdr~l\\' 

about a mile and a half, and the LXXVI 

Panzer Corps was to pull back its right 

wing two miles and its left one mile. 

Kesselring further directed Mackensen 

to bring forward all of his field replacement battalions and, if necessary, 

to draw upon all available military 

transport-even that being used to 

supply foodstuffs for the civilian population of Rome-to move the reinforcements to the front. 

That ~diel'noon C...ennan artillel'\' fire 

opposite the 34th and 43th Divisions' 

sector suddenly increased in \'o)ume 

and continued until dark. The fire 

served to mask the I Parachute Corps' 

preparations for a withdr~l\\al that 

night. As darkness fell an unan:ustomed quiet settled O\'er the VI Corps 

front as the Germans broke contact and 

withdrew to new positions .. j/! 

Suspecting thai a \\ithdra\\~d was taking place, General R\(ier, the 31th 

""AOK H, 10 XI', ,111'- NllIN. 2)ull H.AOK 1-1 

Dor. XI'. 590912/-14. ' 
Division commander, ordered his rq,rimental comm~lllders to send out st rong 

combat patmls that Ilight tow~lrd the 

enemy lines. Pat rols from the 168t h 

InEmtrv met no resistance as they elltered 1:~\I1uvio's dark ruins short Iv' after 

midnight. At first light Oil 3 June the 

regiment Ixgan to 11I00'e and b~ 090() 

had completed the occupatioll of the 

tOWIl. The rest of the 34th Division 

then advanced 011 both sides of LlI1uvio 

t()\\'ard Genzano, a road jUllction ",ith 

Higl1\\~l\ 7 three miles to the northwest 

\\·here the high\\'av skirts Lake ~emi. :;!I 

That was the oppor\un ity General 

Truscott had been waiting f(JI', t<) commit General Hannon's I st Armored 

Division as an exploitation f()\'(·e. Truscott planned to send the armor astride 

the Anzio road toward a junctioll with 

Highwav 7 at the town of Albano. 

Harmon, \\·ho had never reconciled 

himself to Clark's decision to shih the 

VI Corps (and his division) from the 

Valmontone sector, once again protested against his new mission. This 

:," VI Corps G-3 .Jnl, 3-4 .Jun 44; Fifth Arm.\· 

Hiltory, Part V, pp. 153-54. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

\\as, he declared, "a hell of ;1 place to 

put an armored division-on top of 

these mountains." Colonel Carleton, 

Truscott's chief of staff~ replied that 

that was where the corps commander 

had said Hannon would go, and that 

ended the mailer. (;0 

\leanwhilc, Truscott bv phone urged 

the 45th Division commander to get his 

men moving as soon as possible. The 

45th Division was to precede the armor 

toward Albano as far as the VdletriRome railroad northwest of Lanuvio, 

whereupon the armor was to pass 

through and, together with the 36th 

Division, lead the final drive to ROllle. (i1 

By t he evening of 2 J u11e both t he I I 

and VI Corps thus had broken through 

the Caesar Line. As CLl\nl broke over 

the Alban Hills on the 3d, both corps 

were poised to begin tl1(:' intra-anm 

race to determine which \HJUld be first 

into Rome. 

""VI Corps (;-3 Jnl. ()~15()()B .lUll 44. Tel. 

Cadetoll to Hannon. 

'" VI Corps G-3 Jnl. 3-4 JUIl 44; Fijth Army 

Hil/o1'.\'. Pan Y. pp. 153-:;4. 
CHAPTER XI 

The Fall ()f R()me 

The Gcrman High Command realized ollly too "ell that t he till of Rome 

\\ould I~a\'(~ reperclIssions br hc\ol1d 

the I tali~tIl thc;ttcr of \\al', alld that 

Allied propaganda \\Ollid takc full advantage of the capture of the first of 

the Axis c;lpit~lk From the Allied point 

of \'ic\\', a better prelude to the imminent ilH';tsiol1 of France could ~cal'Ceh 

ha\c IXTn desired. The Germans ha~l 

onh t\\'O choices: to cvacuate Rome or 

to ~lcfelld it street Iw street and house 

b\' hOllse. The jailer' course \\'mlld gain 

Kesselring a link- rime hllt \\ould Iea\'e 

the city in ruins and im"()kc the certain 

mndel'llnatioll of all Christendom. 1 

Since October 1943 1 he 0 KW planning stafl had been considering alternateh the possibility of either dedaring 

Rome an 0lx'l1 city, in t he event of an 

Allied landing near the Illouth of the 

Tiber. or of withdrawing the Ii'ollt to 

the endrons of the city and thereb, 

risking its destruction. On instrtrction's 

from the OK W chief of stall, the 

subject had been placed in abeyance 

that \\inter, since Hitler had ordered 

I he Bem hard Lille in southern I tal\' 

held under all circumstances. [n ~IllY 

case, the High Command bclie\'ed th:{r 

if the Allies landed Ileal' Rome. the 

local commanders \\'CHild han' 10 be 

g()\'erned by miliury necessity. 

As fi}\' the concept of Rome as an 

I Creiner and S(hramm. eds" UKWIWFSI, KTB. 

IV. pp, 499-,~04, Cnless otherwise indi(ated the 

f(,llowing- h based upon this source. 

open city, the only concession OK VV 

was then prepared to make was to 

order that all Illonuments of historical 

or artistic value, as well as occupied 

hospitals, he spared destruction. Simultaneously, the High Command <lbrreed 

to res~ct the Vatican's sovercignt\' and 

to place its territor\' off limits to all 

German militarY personnel. 

When the Allies landed at Anzio in 

January 1944 the question of Rome's 

status, should t he front approach the 

cit v, again became urgent. On 4 Februar}' Fi~ld l\Iarshal K~ssclring suhmitted 

to the OK W a list of measures to lx' 

accomplished ill the event he had to 

give up the city. The arm\' group 

commander recommended demolition 

of all bridges across the Tiber, all major 

electrical installations (except those required by the Vatican Cit,), and all 

industrial and rail facilities outside the 

city (except those having no militan 

role and serving only the ch'ilian population). Within the cit v , Kesselring proIx)sed demolition only of those industrial installations whose destruction 

could be accomplished without damage 

10 neighboring structures. After dearing the matter with the German Foreign Minister, OK W approved Kesselring's recommendations. but with Hitlel"s 0\\,11 proviso f()l'bidding destruction 

of the Tiber bridges within the city, f{)r 

many of them had considerable historical a~ld artistic merit. 

On II March in a note verbale f()}' 
204 

the German Ambassador to the Holv 

See, the Vatican reminded the German's 

of their earlier assurances to spare from 

the ravages of war the Vatican City and 

Rome's famed monuments. The immediate effi::'ct of these representations was 

a 13 :'vfarch order bv the Fourteenth 

Army, in whose zone 'of responsibility 

Rome lay, directing all military personnel, except medical detachments and 

quartermastel', bUlcher, and bakery 

units, to leave the city. German soldiers 

could enter Rome 'only with special 

passes, and the Vatican City, including 

St. Peter's Church, was placed off limits. 

All military convoys were f()rthwith to 

be detour~d 31'Ou;1(1 Rome. The German command hoped by these measures to remove all legitimate military 

targets from Rome and thereby gi ve it 

the status of an open (ity within the 

meaning of the Hague Convention. 

The next move came {i'om the Allied 

side with a public statement by President Roosevelt on 19 April, in response 

to a message from President de Valera 

of neutral Ireland, requesting ;:m Allied 

guarantee for the protection of the city 

of Rome. Roosevelt shrewdh' observed 

in his reply that onl} the fact'that Rome 

was in German hands had caused the 

question to be raised in the first pl~ce. 

Once the Germans had left Rome there 

would be no problem, {(n' the Allies 

could easily guarantee its saf(~ty. The 

fate of Rome, Roosevelt concluded, 

therefore lay in German, not in Allied, 

hands. This' equivocal reply left Rome's 

status still in doubt and the Allies tree 

to take whatever action the militaq 

situation demanded. 2 

2 y!sg OZ 2571, );, y!ay 44, A:VISSO to AFHQ 

SHAEF SGS 370.2/2. vol. II. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

There the matter rested until after 

the Allied offensive had begun in midMay. On 15 May the U.S. Department 

of State queried General Wilson, Allied 

Forces Commander, MeditelTanean, on 

whether to declare Rome an open city, 

subject to reservation of transit rights 

f()r both belligerents.:; Wilson n.'plied 

with a firm negative. The Allied commander, echoing Roosevelt's earlier 

statement, pointed out that at this stage 

of the war, when German airpower \\"as 

waning, such a declaration could be of 

advantage ollly to the enemv, since onh 

the Allies were in a position to altack 

Rome. After they had caplUl"ed the cit~ 

they would have adequate means of 

defending it. Rome offered f~Kilities 

essential to the contin uation of the 

campaign beyond the Tiber, and Wilson was determined not to allow his 

hands to be tied by any declaration 

respecting the use of these bcilities. 

The British chiefs of staff ah'Teed with 

Wilson's position and added that militan necessity alone must govern Allied 

policy toward Rome. If the Germans 

chose to defend the city, the Allies 

would "take appropriate measures to 

eject them."4 

Although unwilling to commit themselves, the Allies had frequently assured 

Vatican authorities that the City State 

would "be accorded the normal rights 

of a neutral and [would] be treated as 

an independent neutral state.";} Vatican 

property outside the cit)' state would be 

given the same diplomatic immunity 

:! lind. 

4Msg B 12688, AFHQ Adv CP to B/COS, 

0100/4/28, 19 May 44, SACS; Msg 2770, Air Ministry 

to AFHQSACS, Cable Log 26, ser. 28a . 

. ,Ltr. Hq AAI, 27 '\kn 44, SlIh; Onllp~ti()n ~nd 

Preseni;Jtion of Vatican alld Other Religious Propenil", AAI Plans Sec. 030017c119. 
THE FALL OF ROME 

accorded to Vatican authorities. Yet the 

Allied note contained an important 

qualification: during the f()rthcoming 

drive on Rome the diplomatic immunit, of Vatican property would "not be 

allowed to interfere with military operations," a principle that had gO\erned 

Allied operations at Monte Cassino, 

with ruinous consequences fi)1' the ancient monaster\'. The Hoh See could 

take slight com!i)}'t in these 'assurances. Ii 

Since these instructions, however, 

closely paralleled those rh;:u OK\\, had 

already given Kesselring, the Vatican 

City at least had statements from both 

sides that its neutrality would be respected, if at all possible. How effecti"e 

these assurances \\-ould be if all Rome 

were to become a battleground continued to trouble Vatican authorities, f<)I' 

as long as Rome's status depended 

upon "military necessity" there was little 

real security for the Vatican itself. 

~ot until 3 June, when advance 

detachments of the U.S. Fifth Armv 

drew within sight of Rome, did OKW 

authorize Kesselring to approach the 

Allies through the Vatican in an effort 

to obtain a joint agreement on declaring Rome an open city. This \\as in 

response to the field marshal's recommendations that, except fiJI' necessary 

services, there were under no circumstances to be military installations, troop 

billets, or troop movements within the 

('ity. There would be no demolitions, 

an~l electricity and water supply facilities would be maintained intact after 

the surrender of t hose still in German 

h;-1I1ds. Vatic:an authorities would be 

responsible fi)r seeing that these measures were carried out and ft)}, arranging 

Ii Ihid" 0300l4a128. 

205 

direct contacts between officers of the 

two belliger'ents to work out the final 

details for declaring Rome an open city. 

If the Allies failed to respond to German overtures, Kesselring was free to 

act according to military necessity. 

The AAI headquarter's not only ignored these overtures but via Allied 

radio called upon Romans to rise and 

join the battle to drive the Germans 

from Rome. Bv this time the call was 

both pointless a'nd rash, since within the 

city only isolated German units "ere 

desperately trying to reach the br bank 

of the Tiber bef()re the Americans. Am 

attempt Oil the part of the ci"iliail 

population t.o interfere might have led 

to destructive street fighting.' 

On the heels of this radio appeal 

General Clark sent a message to his 

commanders repeating eadier' Allied 

statements that if the Germans did not 

attempt to defend Rome there would 

be no combat within the city. The Fifth 

Army commander also declared that it 

was his "most urgent desire that Fifth 

Armv troops protect both public and 

private property in the city of Rome." 

While every eff<)I·t was to be made to 

prevent Aliied troops from firing into 

the city, "the deciding factor would be 

the enemv's dispositions and actions." If 

the Germans opposed "our advance by 

dispositions and fires that necessitate 

Fifth Army troops firing into the city of 

Rome, battalion commanders, and all 

higher commanders [were] authorized 

to take appropriate anion without delay 

to defeat the opposing enemv elements 

bv fire and movement." H 

'\IS# T-lb(Westpll,llrtal.,_ 

S II Corps G-3 Jnl, .Iun 4,1. Fifth Anll\ \Isg from 

Clark, :1 ./un 44_ 
~()() 

It was no\\' the Germans' turn to 

make a unilateral declaration, as had 

the Belgian and French authorities {()lit' 

veal's earlier when the battlefronts 

threatened to overwhelm their capitals, 

that Rome was an open city within the 

meaning of the first category implied in 

the Hague Convention. The Allied 

command had left them little choiceeither fight or get ouL Since Rome lay 

within the zone of militar\ opel'ations, 

such a declaration amounted, as ill the 

case of Brussels and Paris, to an "anticipaton' surrender" of the city. Theref()1'e. on the afternoon of 3 J 1I1le the 

OKW instructed Kesselring to hold his 

front south and southeast of Rome only 

long enough to permit evacuation of 

the city's en virons and withdrawal of 

the Foiuteenlh Arm)' bevond the Tiber, 

which 11O\\'s through R~1Il1e from north 

to south. Thereafter, he was authorized 

to withdr~l\\ the army north of Rome 

and \\'Cst of the Tiber to the next 

favorable defense line. \. That night 

Army Group C headquarters issued orders fiJI' the evacuation of Rome and 

the re-establishment of a new line north 

of the city and extending east and \\'est 

astride the vallev of the Tiber. 

The Race for Rome 

By daybreak Oil 3 JUlle, lx)th the II 

and the VI Corps were on the move. 

During the day the II Corps' left wing, 

made up of the 85th Division, with the 

337th Infantry on the right and the 

339th on the leh, crossed the northeastern flanks of the Alban Hills toward 

Frascati, Kesselring's f()I'mer headquarters. The 337th Inf~mtry led the way, 

"(;reinCl :md S,hramlll. eds" OKW!WFSt KTR, 

I\', pp, ;)OC}-()6: :\15 # T Ib (Westphal d aI,), 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

passing north of Rocca Priora and 

taking first :\Ionte Compatl'i, shortly 

thereafter, \lonte Porzio Catone. After 

a brief skirmish on the slopes of \ionte 

Compatri, the regiment counted thirtyeight prisoners who had been pressed 

into combat duty from the German 

Army cooks and bakers school near 

Rom~, Darkness found the regiment 

descellding the northern slopes of Ihe 

Alban Hills into Frascati, and the pnsoners heading to\\'ard the arnH''s cages 

at Anzio. 

In the corps' center, Company A of 

the HI st Armored Reconnaissance Battaion' f()llowed by tanks of HO\\7e\ 

task f()rce, led the 88th Division's ad-

\'aIKe along Highw;}v 6 at a lI\e- to 

seven-mile-an-hour pace, Hard-pressed 

to keep up, the infantry pulled abreast 

of the armor only aHer \\ell-concealed 

enemy antitank guns opened fire on 

the tanks just beyond Colonna, a railway station about three miles \lcst of 

Sa;1 Cesareo. The tanks huddled in 

defilade until the infantry deployed and 

joined them in a co-ordinated assault 

on the enemy's hastily occupied positions. In the bee of the American tankinEmtry attack the Germans soon abandoned 'their guns and fdl back along 

the highway· toward the suburbs of 

Rome. Throughout the afternoon the 

88th Division encountered gradualh increasing opposition from similar rear 

guard detachments covering the enemy 

withdrawal. IU 

By the end of the da\' the II Corps' 

two'leading divisions had scored impressive gains: south of Highway 6 the 

85th Division had pushed back the 

,0 13th Annd Regt AAR, Jun 44: 1st Annd Di\' 

G-3 Jnl, lun 44, 
THE FALL OF ROME 

enemy rear guard five miles to the line 

of Monte Compatri-Colonna, while to 

the north of the highway the 88th 

Division, after brushing aside a small 

delaying f(m:e south of Zagarolo, located on a secondary road just west of 

Palestrina, had advanced halfway to the 

village of Pallavincini, seven miles west 

of Palestrina. 

This setback in the vicinity of Zagar010 was especially worrisome to Field 

Marshal Kesselring, f()r, although he 

had alreadv reconciled himself to the 

loss of Ro'me, he was still intent on 

extricating his f(m:es located southeast 

of the city. The crossings of the Aniene 

River between Rome and Tivoli, rather 

than the city of Rome, was their best 

escape route, and to control these crossings he needed to delay the Allied 

f()rces between Palestrina and Zagarolo 

long enough to enable his f()rces to 

reach the Aniene first. To this end 

Kesselring diverted an assault gun battalion that yfackensen had ordered to 

Colonna on Highway 6 and sent it 

instead northward toward the viciuitv of 

Zagarolo. II ' 

During the day Allied aerial reconnaissance had reported considerable 

traHic streaming out of the Alban Hills 

in a northerly direction, apparently to-. 

ward the crossings of the Aniene. The 

night be fi n-e , the Fourteenth Army commander had ordered General Schlemm, 

commander of the f Parachute Corps, to 

withdraw the 11 th Parachutf' Regiment 

and the main body of the 4th Parachute 

Dil l isillu's artillery from the army's right 

wing to the left \vhere they were to 

11 MSS #', T-la, T-lb (Westphal et al.) and C064 (Kesselring), Unless otherwise cited the following is based upon these references. 

~()7 

cover the withdrawal to the Aniene. By 

0920 on 3 .I une one battalion of the 

parachute regiment had reached a road 

junction on the Via Tuscobna three 

miles northwest of Frascati, and a second took up positions at Due Toni, 

five miles west of a planned blocking 

point at Osteria Finocchio, until then 

held only by a detachment from the 

29th Fi£ld Replacement Battalion and sixty 

men from the 715th Dlvi~ion. But this 

f()rce was all that Mackensen had with 

which to cover that sector. Three additional rcserve battalions were too hlr 

a\\'av to be of much help: one, a 

battalion of the 334th Dh'iIW1/, lay thir-

(cell miles north of Tiyoli; a second. a 

long delayed battalion of the HI'I'/fUIIIII 

GlIl'rin~ [)i'uisiou, still lav at Smri, twent\ 

milt,s 'north of Rome; and a third, th~' 

26th Pauza nh'isimi's replacement battalion, was equally Ell' to the rear. Nor 

was the T('!Ith Army in a position to send 

n:infi)JTemel1ts to Mackel1Scll's aid. Its 

90th POIIZ('/' Grl'lwditr ni"ision, with 

which Kesselring had expected to shore 

lip the Flillrtl'l'lith Anny's left wing, had 

be('n thrown ofl balance bv Allied artillery fire after the ciivisioil '5 arrival ill 

th~ vicinity of (;enazzano, five miles 

northeast (')f Valmontolle. The division 

had, therefore, no choice but to remain 

Oil the dcli.'nsivc where it was and to 

concentrate on delaying the French 

('orps' attack southeast of Cave. To 

make matters worse, Tenth Ann,' had 

lost all contact with the divisioil that 

afternoon and had only the vaguest 

details omcerning the situation 011 its 

own right flank between Palestrina and 

Genazzano. 

As darkness fetl on 3 June, Field 

Marshal Kesselring, after studying the 

reports from his' army corrn~ar~del's, 
decided that only I~Jld measures could 

save the FO/lrlt'f'nlh Army's left wing from 

a collapse that would open up the way 

to the Aniene River crossings betv-,een 

Rome and Tivoli. The army group 

commander, theref()re, directed the 

Tl'nth Army's acting commander, Ceneral Wentzell, to turn his reserve division (the 15th Panzer Grenadier) over to 

General Mackensen f()r use on the 

LXXV1 Panzer Corps' sector. Kesselring 

hoped thereby to keep that wing strong 

enough to cover the corps' withdrawal 

northward from the Alban Hills to the 

Aniene and to prevent envelopment of 

rhe T('nlh Army's right flank. 12 

Actually, because of General Clark's 

concentration on the capture of Rome 

Ficld Marshal Kesselring's fears were 

groundless. In contrast with his earlier 

concern f(n' the enemy-occupied high 

ground overlooking his left flank as the 

VI Corps advanced toward Valmontone, this time the Fifth Army commander chose to ignore temporarily the 

Germans in the hills north of Highway 

6 as the II Corps moved along the 

highway toward Rome. To be sure, as 

quickly as possible Clark would move 

the French Corps up onto the II Corps' 

right flank as the latter wheeled left 

astride rhe axis of Highway 6 after 

capturing Palestrina and Zagarolo. 

Thercf())Oe, Juin's troops would provide 

a covering force to Keyes' long right 

flank as it passed south of the Aniene 

River. 

Consequently, during the night of 3 

June, with the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division providing a shield, General 

Mackensen managed to extricate Herr's 

LXXVI Panzer Corps as well as much of 

" Grt'iner and Schramm. cds,. OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

IV( I). p, 500. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Schlemm's 1 Parachute Corps from entrapment southeast of Rome. The battered 362d In/antry Divi~i(m, meanwhile, 

by means of a series of hard-f()Ught 

rear-guard actions, covered the "'ithdrawal of the remainder of the Fourteenth Army through the Alban Hills and 

bevond the Tiber. 

While the I I Corps' sweep astride 

Highway 6 north of the Alban Hills 

seemed to Clark's eyes most promising 

and to Kesselring's most threatening, 

the VI Corps had also begun to move 

directh-' into the Alban Hills. The 36th 

Infant~ov Division and the I st Armored 

DivisiOl; were to lead the wa\ toward 

Rome itself. Early on 3 June Harmon's 

armor assembled along the Via Anziate 

behind the 45th Division and prepared 

to pass through its ranks when the 

infantry division should reach the vicinity of 'Albano that evening. The 36th 

Division, on the corps' right, had 

moved beyond Velletri by noon to take 

first the village of Nemi and then to 

ad vance to the northwest as far as a 

road junction just east of Lake Albano. 

Nightfall «Hllld ~)(h the I st Armored 

and the 36th Infantrv Divisions bivouacked dose by Albal~o and prepared 

to continue their advance toward Rome 

the f()llo",ing morning-the armored 

division along Highway 7 and the infantry division along the Via Tuscolal1o 

by way of Frascati. Meanwhile, rhe 34th 

Division, in the corps' center, had 

moved along a secondary road south of 

and parallel to Highway 7 beyond 

Lanuvio to a sector south of Albano, 

where the division would remain until 

after the fall of Rome. On the corps' 

far left flank the British I st and 5th 

Divisions fi)llowed up the enemy withdrawal \,'est of Ardea with instructions 
THE FALL OF ROME 

to advance only as far as the near bank 

of the Tiber southwest of Rome. 1:1 

Echeloned considerably to the Fifth 

Army's right in the upPer reaches of 

the Sacco-Liri valley, the British Eighth 

Army prepared early on 3 June to 

launch a final attack aimed at driving 

the enemy beyond the Aniene and into 

the Umbria~ highlands east of the 

Tiber. That this could be quickly accomplished seemed reasonable, for between Highway 6 and the Subiaco road 

all that stood in the path of the army's 

1 st Canadian and British 13 Corps were 

the 26th Panzer and 305th Infantry Divisiam. These divisions, considerably understrength, held the XIV Panzer Corps' 

center and left along an east-west line 

extending from a point four miles west 

of Acuto along the Trivigliano-Genazzano road to a point one mile beyond 

the Subiaco road-actuallv the area between Highway 6 and thel 

Subiaco road. 

Yet two days would pass before the 

Eighth Army would reach the Aniene 

east of Rome and pull abreast of its 

neighbor on the left. Caution and 

traffic congestion caused by the presence of two armored divisions and their 

numerous trains of vphicles, as well as a 

skillfully executed retreat on the part of 

General von Senger and Etterlin's X/V 

Panzer Corps, accounted for much of the 

delay. I~ 

Even as the U.S. Fifth Army's II and 

VI Corps began to close in on Rome, 

the Eighth Army's 1 st Canadian Corps, 

13 VI Corps AAR. June 44; Fifth ,Army History, 

Part V, pp. 1.~3-54. 

14 Operations of British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Part II, Sec B. L:llless otherwise 

cited the h)lIowing is based upon this source. See 

also, G. A. Shepperd, TfIR Italian Campaign 1943-45, 

A Political and Military Rp-A.Isessment (!\ew York: 

Frederick A. Praeger, 19(8), p. 243. 

209 

after replacing the 1st Canadian Infantry Division with the 6th South African 

Armoured Division, attacked the 26th 

Panzer Division's positions between Paliano and Acuto. But the Germans managed to delay the armored division 

behind a screen of well-placed mines 

and demolitions long enough to break 

contact and slip away in the darkness. 

And the British 13 Corps on the Canadian's right did no better in closing with 

and overwhelming the enemy. In that 

corps too an armored division-the 

British 6th Armoured-had been 

moved into the van to begin a pursuit, 

since the Germans were believed to be 

on the point of breaking and running 

for it. With two brigades-the 1 st 

Guards and the 61 st-f()rward, the 

British 6th Armoured Division advanced north and west of Alan'i, {()!Ting back the enemy's outpost line. But 

here too enemy rear guards and demolitions caused frequent delays which 

allowed the Germans to escape through 

the mountains to the northwest. The 

next morning---4 June-the British 13 

Corps entered Trivigliano unopposed. 

At the same time, the 10th Rifle Brigade cleared Monte Justo, about half a 

mile to the east, while the 6th Armoured Division advanced f(Hlr miles 

northwest of Alatri without making 

contact with the Germans. 

The Ccntral Apennines against \\hich 

both Churchill and Alexander had 

hoped to pin the German Tenth Army, 

or at least a large part of it, were, in 

fact, not the seemingly impenetrable 

barriers they appeared to be on the 

map. Actually, through these mountains 

ran numerous roads and tracks over 

which an army could readily move and 

at the same time, easily I block with 
210 

modest rearguards. When combined 

with the Eighth Army's cautious advance, this geographic fact and the 

Germans' skillfull exploitation of it enabled the XIV PanzN Curt)l, on the rnllh 

A rillY's right wing to elude entrapment 

in the upper Liri-Sacco valley. During 

the past live davs the corps' engineers 

had kept the Subiaco road open, despite df<lrts of Allied bombers to close 

it. Allied aircraft had /()rced the (;ermans to limit their activities, including 

road man:hes, to the hours of darkness, 

vet the entire XIV Pam.('/' Corf!1 had 

;nanaged to break contact a.nd .reach 

the Anienc River in the VI(lIl1t\ of 

Tivoli \\ell ahead of the British Eighth Artn\,.l~) 

E<~rlier, on 3 June, many miles. 01 

winding mountain roads anc~ .an el.llslve 

enemy still separated the Bntlsh Eighth 

Arm): £i'om its goal: on the other h~m~l, 

the U.S. Fifth Army was almost wlthm 

sight of its objective: With every pass!ng 

hour the troops encountered a grO\'vI~lg 

number of signs indicating that ~he city 

of Rome was not far away. DUrIng the 

day hlmiliar characteristics of a large 

m~tropolitan area-a growing density 

of housing and an urban road and ~'aIl 

network-had greeted the adyancmg 

Americans, and from occasional high 

points the. troops could see a hazy 

panorama tha~ they gues~ed was. the 

city of Rome Itself, All of these signs 

and sights fueled a mounting anticipation. '\Then the reconnaissance patrols 

from the 88th Division caught their first 

glimpse of the Roman skyline, a w~~ve 

of excitement soon pervaded the entire 

Fifth Army, That aft.ernoon General 

Gruenther ~)bserved: 

" J:Kkson, T1!e Battle jar Iialy, pp. 24,1-44; Senger. 

Neither Hope nor Fear, p. 252, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

The CP has gone t~) hell. No one is doing 

any work here thiS afternoon. All sembl~nce of discipline has broken down. 

Although the G-3 War Room pu,rpose;ly 

shows only a moderately c~HlservatJve PICture, ever} pilot.' c\:eryone In f;~ct who .has come from AnZlo Slllce 1000 dus mOll1III g" 

has brought back a pair .of pants full, o~ 

ants with the result that tillS 11I1S11ppresslble 

wave of optimism and expectann' has 

swept through the headquarters. 16 

Perhaps because of Ultra's decipherment of messages between OKW and 

Kesselring's headquarters that R(?me 

would not be deiCnded, Clark reahzed 

that its fall was no", only hours away, 

Concerned that the Germans might 

demolish the Tiber bridges, General 

Clark saw his major tactical problem as 

that of securing these bridges intact to 

enable his army to pass through Rome 

without pause in pursuit of the enem\,. 

'The Fift h Army commander therefore 

ordered the I i and VI Corps commanders to fi:nm mobile task f()lTeS to 

make the dash into the city to secure 

the river crossings before the enem~ 

had an opportunity to destroy them. I, 

Clark's concern t<.)i' the bridges was 

groundless, for a few hours ~arlier 

Hitler had instructed Kesselnng ~o 

leave the bridges intact as the Germans 

withdrew north of the city. EYen as 

small detachments of Germans flmght 

on in the southern suburbs. the Fuehrer had declared t hat Rome ". . , because of its status as a place of culture 

must not become the scene of combat 

operations." 18 

'" Clark Diary. :~ June 44, 

"Winterhotham, The Ultra Serrft. pp, II i-I H; 

Fifth Anm 01 26. 4 JlIll 44. 

lk III' CIS SlIl'fhi'lst 10 (;crlllan FonT, ill hal\', 4 

.lUll 44.' 111'1'11" Gil/PIli' C, I" .\'1'. 287U,I. (;,J\.dm, ill 

cl()J\. 10. Ifl J\.Ff! .\'1', t, CiIl/\{IIIi,,,. ,/l1lagl' 12 .. 40k 

to, D'H, 'vr. 5327li2. 
THE FALL OF ROME 211 

GENERALS KEYES (left), CLARK, AND FREDERICK PAUSE DURING DRIVE ON ROME 

Entry Into Rome 

The tactical progress of the Fifth 

Army's many spearheads during the 

last few hours before the army entered 

Rome f~)rmed confusing patterns as the 

s,mall, hlgh~y mobile armor-infantry task 

f~)rces leadmg the two corps toward tht 

CIty ~arted b~ck and forth through the 

multItude , of roads and alleys veining 

[he Roman suburbs, Accompanying infantrymen and engineers generally 

rode 111 trucks or on the decks of tanks 

or tank destroyers, Then came the 

main body of the assault divisions, some 

truck-borne, some on {(lOt. The latter 

were to remain on the outskirts of [he 

city until the mobile task forces had 

secured ,the Tiber bridges, 1~ (Map 6) 

LeadIng the II Corps' advance to 

Rome along Highway 6 and the Via 

Prenestina ~ere two c~)lumns under [he 

command of the I st Special Service 

Force's General Frederick, Task Force 

Howze made up the first column the 

I s[ Special Service Force the second, To 

each column was attached a battalion 

'" II Corps Opns Rpt, )un 44; VI Corps AAR 

Jun 44. . ' 
CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GERMAN TROOPS WITHDRAWING FROM ROME 

from the 88th Division's 350th and 

351 st Infantry Regiments. On the -left 

of the corps' sector another task force, 

built upon the 338th Infantry, led the 

85th Division across the northern slope 

of the Alban Hills. On the corps' right 

the FEC had begun relief of the 3d 

Division's 15th Infantry in the vicinity 

of Palestrina. That regiment then rapidly leapfrogged the 7th, 30th, and 

349th Infantry Regiments to reach positions from which it could screen Frederick's right flank as his combined force 

passed south of Tivoli on the way to 

Rome. As successive French units relieved the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments these too moved f()r,,'ard to .10111 

the 15th Infantry. By the morning of 4 

June the entire 3d Division was deployed across the II Corps' right fbnk 

south of the Aniene River, "'hile the 

FEC deployed north of the Via Prenestina and northwest of Palestrina. 20 

At the same time two companies of 

the 1st Special Service Force, mounted 

in eight armored cars of the 81 st 

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion of 

Howze's task f{)rce, began moving along 

Highway 6 toward the suburb of Centocelie, three miles cast of Rome. When 

'" II Corps Opns Rpt. Jun 44, 
17 Tiber Ii 

"~88~m. 

'j[ 

14 "§., PIQua "., PopoIa 

i3 O IZ-ll. 85th Inf Diy, Elms 

L9~:?", 'BlPl ROME ~ 1$1 Specia' Service Force 

Cenl,al 

"ailf1lOd Sia lion 

7~ . ,,0 Piaua Vanuia 

~WA3 Or". Colon8U'" 

,? 7"'''""' 

~' " 

151 Armored DiY,Elms 

e,!> I> • 341h Inf Dlv, Elms 

• 

MAP 6 

FIFTH ARMY IN ROME 

4 June 1944 

o I "" LES 

L...U.·'-iIT,j,L,\\-iITi '",,/,',+I---""T' --, I 0 I KILO M(TUIS 

I PONTE O"kI MAGLIANA 

2 PONTE 5U81..ICIO 

3 PONTE PAlATINC) 

" PONTE f ABRICIO-CESTO 

5 PONTE GARIBALDI 

6 PONTE SISTO 

1 PONTE GIVSEPP1 ~AZZiN i 

B PONTE 01 FERRO 

9 POHTE VITTORIO EMANUELE 

10 POttlE SANT' ANGELO 

II PONTE UMBERTO 1 

12 PONTE CAVOUR 

13 PONTE MARGHERiTA 

14 PONTE del LllTORIO 

15 PONTE del RISORGIMENTO 

16 PONTE del CUCA d'AOSTA 

11 PONTE MILVtO 

R. Clfnton 
~14 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ENTERING TilE GATES OF ROME 

the Americans attempted to advance 

beyond CenrocelIe, fire from a Genllan 

parachute detachment, supported by 

self-propelled 150-mm. guns, brought 

them to a halt. The enemy guns, 

located in a series of strongpoints on a 

low ridge overlooking the town from 

the southwest, kmx:ked out two of the 

American tanks, as the column deployed and prepared to attack with a 

combined tank-inhntry force . 21 

While this action was raking place, 

the 88th Division's 88th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troup bypassed the developing fire fight to the north and sped 

21 Ibid. 

along the Via Prenestina toward Rome. 

A patrol hum this unit entered Rome 

at daybreak, but quickly wirhdl'c\\' to 

await the arrival of reinf()J'(~ el11ents before pressing on into the city to seize 

the bridges in the COl'pS zone. 22 Yie:lI1-

while, the I st Battalion of the 350th 

InLmtry, supported by a battery of 105-

mm. self-propelled howitzers of the 

338th Field Artillery Battalion, a company of tanks from the 752d Tank 

Battalion, and a company from the 

313th Engineer Battalion, had moved 

along Highway 6 toward Torrenova, 

two miles east of Centocelle, When the 

22 88th Div G-3 .Inl, 4.1Ull 44, 
THE FALL OF ROME 

battalion commander learned of the 

fire fight at Centocelle he too bypassed 

the town to reach a point overlooking 

the left flank of the Germans holding 

up Frederick's force. As the flanking 

force approached the enemy positions, 

it too was brought to a halt by heavy 

fire. Company C, in the lead, quickly 

detrucked and deployed as the rest ()l' 

the battalion, accompanied by trucks, 

worked its way around the left flank. 

Only after losing three additional tanks 

to enemy guns did the Americans finally force the Germans to withdraw by 

late afternoon. 2:1 

While a major part of Frederick's 

command fought on at Centocelle, at 

0615 Col. Alfred C. Marshall, Jr.'s 1st 

Regiment (1 st Special Service Force) 

attacked cross-country toward the Roman suburb of Tor Pignatara, about 

three miles southwest of Centocelle 

Clinging to the decks of the tanks of 

Colonel Cairn's 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, the men of Company 

H led the way. Colonel Marshall 

followed in Colonel Cairn's tank. General Frederick's command half-track 

brought up the rear of the command 

group with Companies I and C following. Until this column reached the 

outskirts of Rome the main obstacle was 

a (Towd of newspaper correspondents 

and an American field artillery battery 

in convoy. 2~ 

An hour later and one mile southeast 

of Tor Pignatara the column crossed 

the city limits of Rome. No sooner had 

the tanks leading the column passed the 

line than a well-concealed enemy anti23 350th Inf Hist, Jun 44; 351st InfJnl, 4Jun 44; 

FSSF 5--3 Jnl, 4 Jun 44. 

24 FSSF 5--3 Jnl, 4 Jun 44. 

215 

tank gun opened fire. The tank-riding 

infantrymen quickly threw themselves 

to the ground, and the cavalcade of 

newsmen, led by a British correspondent wearing a smart-looking trench 

coat, disappeared to the rear. As for 

the artillery convoy, it simply pulled off 

to the side of the road as the men took 

cover. 25 

The enemy gun destroyed two of 

Cairn's leading tanks before vanishing 

into the maze of streets and alleys. 

Moving on, the column met some civilians who warned them of mines and a 

German tank and infantry force lurking 

on the road ahead. Thus forewarned, 

Frederick sent Companies G and I to 

reconnoiter a bypass. Just as Frederick 

dispatched the two companies, Generals 

Clark and Keyes an'ived. 

General Frederick quickly explained 

to his visitors his plan of maneuver, 

which Clark approved, although emphasizing that he wanted the column to 

seize the Tiber bridges as quickly as 

possible. Accordingly, General Keyes 

ordered Cairn to take a platoon of 

tanks and move immediately into the 

city without waiting for Companies G 

and I to complete their reconnaissance. 

Before starting out, Cairn wisely sent 

word to the two companies to continue 

their efforts. He then led five tanks 

down the highway directly into the city. 

No sooner had Cairn's two leading 

tanks, one of them his own, rounded a 

bend in the road, about 100 yards from 

where he had halted, than enemy antitank guns-apparently the amb~sh of 

which the Italians had warned--openecl 

fire. The two tanks burst into flames. 

Hastily escaping their burning vehicles, 

" Ibid. 
216 

Cairn and the survlvmg crew members 

returned to their starting point. There 

Cairn requested permission to abandon 

the frontal attack and to continue his 

efforts to outflank the enemy. Keyes 

raised no objection. 26 

Company G of the maneuvering 

fexce had in the meantime outflanked 

the enemy and opened fire on the self· 

propelled guns that had stopped Cairn. 

Caught completely off guard, their 

guns still pointed down the road toward 

the American lines, the Germans lost 

nine armored vehicles bef()re the surviving vehicles turned and fled into the 

city.27 

Company I then joined Company H 

and marched northward cross-country 

to the suburb of AC<Jue Bollicante o~ 

the Via Prenestina. There they found 

Company G, which had arrived a\:xmt 

an hour ago, just in time to see an 

enemy f()rce of armored vehicles, apparently part of the force that had 

earlier defended Centocelle, withdrawing toward Rome. Company G's lead 

platoon had quickly set up an ambush 

on a high bank overlooking the road 

just as eight German tanks pulled out 

onto the Via Prenestina not fifty yards 

away. Excitedly the Americans swung 

their guns toward the targets, only to 

find that the guns would not depress 

far enough to hit the enemy vehicles. 

Nor, because of the steep bank, could 

the Germans elevate their own guns 

sufficiently to fire at Cairn's tanks. 

While Company G's tankers watched in 

dismay, the German tanks rolled right 

by them into the city. Company G, 

26 Interv, Mathews with Col Cairn, 24 Apr 50, 

CMH. 

27 Ibid. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

however, did manage to get off a few 

rounds at the rear of the enemy column as it disappeared around a curve 

in the road. 28 

As soon as the enemy vanished, a 

column under the command of Colonel 

Howze, including his own task force as 

well as the 1 st Special Service Force's 2d 

Regiment and a battalion b'om the 3d 

Regiment, arrived at Company G's position. 2~ Leaving most of his infantrymen 

in reserve, Howze prepared to send a 

small tank-infantry column into the city 

to capture the Tiber bridges in his 

zone. He set H-hour at 1500 but postponed it for thirty minutes to await the 

arrival of a battalion from the 1 st 

Special Service Force's 3d Regiment. At 

1530 Howze's column began to move, 

led by numerous tank-infantry patrols, 

each equipped with instructions in the 

Italian language calling upon Romans 

to lead his men to the Tiber bridges.:w 

Meanwhile, on Highway 6 Colonel 

Marshall and a battalion of his 1 st 

Regiment had also arrived at the Tor 

Pignatara. Concerned a\:x)ut one of the 

companies that had fallen behind, Colonel Marshall turned his command over 

to his executive officer, Major McFadden, and, accompanied by an enlisted man, set out on foot in search of 

the missing company. The two men 

had gone only about one hundred 

yards when enemy fire cut them down. 

Unaware of what had happened, McFadden and M~j. Edmund Mueller, the 

battalion commander, entered the city 

through the Tor Pignatara quarter. 

Close behind came a rifle company 

28 Ibid; Howze MS. 

29 Fifth Army History, Part V, p. 159. 

30 Howze MS. 
THE FALL OF ROME 217 

88TH DIVISION INFANTRY RIFLEMEN PASS BURNING TANK IN ROME 

commanded by Lt. William C. Sheldon. 

What followed appears to have been 

rather typical of the experiences of 

many of the small company-sized patrols infiltrating Rome that day. No 

sooner had Lieutenant Sheldon's men 

entered the city than they found a 

Mark IV tank blocking their way. Local 

partisans led them around the roadhlock by passing through a nearby 

convent. A few moments later the company emerged onto a street behind the 

roadblock only to find another enemy 

tank blocking the way. This time Sheldon led his men through a store and 

out the rear door onto the street behind the second tank.:lI 

Sheldon and his men advanced along 

a street leading further into the center 

of Rome until halted by machine gun 

fire from a high building overlooking 

an intersection. Leaving most of his 

men huddled in sheltering doorways, 

Sheldon and Mueller led a squad into 

the building opposite the machine gun 

position. Finding the elevator in order, 

the men rode it to the top floor, where 

the occupants of an apartment over31 Interv, Mathews with Mueller, 8 May 50, CMH. 
21H 

looking the enemy pOSItIon offered 

them a vantage point from their bedroom windows. Sheldon and his men 

quickly silenced the gun with a burst of 

fire, then paused to enjoy cool drinks 

and sausage proffered by their hosts. 

After a profuse exchange of thanks and 

farewells the men rode the elevator 

down to the street and rejoined the rest 

of the company. 32 

Moving on to a point near the railroad yards, Sheldon's company encountered a detachment of German infantrv 

and two self-propelled guns. Majo~o 

McFadden, deciding that the company 

was no match for this enemy force, 

withdrew with his men to the Tor 

Pignatara to await the arrival of the rest 

of the battalion. Major Mueller and his 

battalion command detachment, in the 

off chance that one of his companies 

had already entered the city by another 

street, continued on toward the Tiber. 

Waiting in the shelter of a house until 

twilight, Mueller and his small party 

slipped by the enemy in the darkness 

and made their way through the dark 

streets to the river. There, sure enough, 

they found a company from the 1st 

Special Service Force's 3d Regiment 

already in possession of one of the 

bridges. Major Mueller and his command group remained there until noon 

the following day and then rejoined his 

battalion, which, in the meantime, had 

started moving through the city to meet 

him.33 

The company Mueller had f(mnd on 

the bridge was part of Howze's column 

that had entered Rome at 1915. Moving to the center of the city, Howze's 

:l2 Ibid. 

33 Ibid. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

men had reached the Central Railroad 

Station at 2000. On the way, one 

company had turned off from the main 

column into the Piazza Venezia, where 

the troops overtook some enemy stragglers. Individual companies fanned out 

to occupy two of the four Tiber bridges 

north of the Ponte Margherita which 

crosses the river just west of the Piazza 

del Popolo. Echeloned to the right of 

Howze's column, a battalion of the 

351 st Infantry passed through the dark 

streets of the city to seize a bridge 

already occupied by a detachment from 

the I st Special Service Force. Y1istaking 

one another f()lo enemy in the darkness, 

the two units engaged in a brief fire 

fight. Bef()re the error was discovered 

one man had been killed and several 

wounded, among the latter General 

Frederick, who had just arrived at the 

bridge. Following this incident, the battalion turned northward to occupy the 

last vehicular bridge in the corps zone, 

the historic Ponte Milvio. Meanwhile, a 

battalion of the 350th Infantry had 

occupied the Ponte del Duca d'"Aosta, 

the next bridge downstream from the 

Ponte Milvio. :14 

As the task forces from the 88th 

Division, the 1 st Special Service Force, 

and Task Force Howze led the II 

Corps into Rome, the 3d and 85th 

Divisions advanced along the corps' 

right ancl left flanks, respectively. On 

the left flank the 85th Division's 338th 

Infantry, after having taken Frascati 

early in the day, continued toward 

Rome along the Via Tuscolana well in 

advance of the VI Corps' 36th Division. 

A small motorized task force from the 

:« FSSF AAR, .Iun 44; 351st Inf AAR, .Iun 44; 

FSSF and 350th and 3515t Inf S-3 ln1s. 5 .Iun 44; 

Howze MS. 
THE FALL OF ROME 

338th Infantry reached the city by 

0830. 35 On corps' order, General Coulter sent the 337th Infantry, on the 

division's right flank, southwest toward 

Highway 7 with the intention of cutting 

off those enemy opposing the neighboring VI Corps. The regiment reached 

the highway at 1700 only to find the 1st 

Armored Division blocking its way. The 

resulting traHic jam delayed both units 

for at least an hour. Meanwhile, a small 

task force from the 338th Infantry, 

after brushing aside an enemy rear 

guard on the outskirts of Rome, had 

entered the city to occupy the Ponte 

Cavour, the next bridge downstream 

from the Ponte Margherita. On the 

corps' right flank the 3d Division's 30th 

Infantry sent patrols through the northeastern quarters of the city to seize the 

railway bridge over the Aniene. By 

2300, 4 June, all bridges in the II 

Corps zone had been secured.:w 

In contrast with the helter-skelter 

entry of the II Corps' ad hoc task fixces 

into Rome, the VI Corps' approach and 

entry was more systematic, less confused, but somew hat slower. This methodical approach can most likely be 

attributed to a widespread caution and 

weariness throughout Truscott's corps, 

fostered by the bitter combat since 26 

May along the Caesar Line south of the 

Alban Hills. To dispel this mood and to 

spur a sense of competition within the 

corps, General Carleton, Truscott's 

chief of staff, sped the spearheads on 

their way with a challenging report that 

Keyes' corps, advancing in three separate columns, had already moved to 

35 85th Div G-3 Jnl, 4-5 Jun 44; FSSF G-3 Jnl, 4 

Jun 44. 

"" 85th Div (;-3 Jnl. 4 Jun 44; FSSF (;-3 Jnl. 4 

Jun 44. 

219 

within three to five miles of Rome. 

"The II Corps' left flank has just 

crossed around us and will be in there 

befixe daylight undoubtedly," he announced.:17 Nevertheless, a weary GlUtion prevailed on the VI Corps sector as 

an advance party of the 1st Armored 

Division's CCA, which had spent the 

night on the outskirts of Albano, moved 

slowly into the town at dawn. As the 

rest of the command followed two 

hours later, Carleton again called Harmon's command post, saying: "This is 

an all-out pursuit, the enemy is running 

away from us-put on all steam." :18 

This Harmon proceeded to do. The 

resulting pell-mell dash by the entire 

armored division so crowded the roads 

in its zone of operations that by late 

afternoon a series of traffic jams had 

caused more delays than the scattered 

enemy resistance. By 1800 CCA's point 

moving along the Via Appia Nuova, the 

extension of Highway 7, had passed 

through the Porta San Giovanni, hard 

by St. John Lateran, into the inner city. 

Echeloned to the left, CCB met more 

resistance as it advanced five miles 

beyond Albano. During the morning 

the command's spearhead encountered 

strong enemy rear guards whose tactics 

of fire and run repeatedly forced the 

tanks and armored infantry to deploy 

and fight. But by 1330 Company A, 

13th Armored Regiment, finally managed to break free and, accompanied 

by a platoon of tank destroyers, advanced rapidly to the outskirts of 

Rome. The 6th Armored Infantry's 2d 

Battalion followed in half-tracks. EnterIng Rome from Highway 7 late th::>.t 

37 VI Corps G-3 Jnl. 040045B Jun 44, Tel. 

Carleton to Harmon. 

38 Ibid., 040700B Jun 44. 
220 

ROMANS LINE STREETS AS U .S. TANK 

DESTROYERS ROLL BY COLISEUM 

afternoon, the battalion moved rapidly 

through the city to seize the Ponte 

Palatino. The rest of the combat command skirted the city to the south to 

capture two major crossings . of the 

Tiber ju"t outside Rome. That mght the 

I st Armored Division secured all 

bridges in its sector and by 'd,aylight on 

the 5th had reached Rome s western 

limits. "Push on to Genoa, if you want 

to," Truscott exultantly radioed Harmon. 3!' 

The 36th Division, which throughout 

the day had advanced toward Rome 

along the Via Tuscolana, also entered 

the city that night. But because VI 

Corps had given Har~on's ar~o r 

priority on the roads, ~he mfantry dIvIsion was delayed while the armored 

!I" Ibid., 0506308 JUIl 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

division entered Rome. Shortly before 

midnight Walker's division too began, 

moving through the darkened maze of 

Roman streets. Although street and 

other lights were out, moonlight helped 

the troops pick their way ~hroug~ the 

unfamiliar city to those Tiber bndges 

already in the hands of Harmon's division ... As we moved along the dark 

streets," Walker observed, "we could 

hear the people at all the w.indows <;>f 

the high buildings clapp1l1g their 

hands." There was no other sound but 

the tramp of marching feet, and t~e 

low whine of truck motors. It was still 

dark when the procession crossed the 

Tiber. 

The following morning Romans 

emerged from their dwellings in large 

numbers to give the long colu~ns .of 

troops still passing through t?elr CIty 

the tumultuous, almost hysterIcal welcome so familiar to newsreel viewers of 

that time. But men who had actually 

captured Rome had passed through in 

darkness and near silence. 40 

By the morning of 5 June most of 

the Fifth Army had drawn up to the 

line of the Tiber along a 20-mile front 

from the river's mouth southwest of 

Rome to its junction with the . ~niene 

northeast of the city. The Bntlsh 1st 

and 5th Divisions were on the left, the 

U.S. VI and II Corps in the center, and 

on the right the FEe. Recently pinch ~ 

out of line by the II Corps, the F~C 

covered the army's right rear, pendmg 

the arrival of the British Eighth Army 

on the line of the Aniene east of Rome. 

On the VI Corps' sector southwest of 

Rome the 34th and 45th Divisions 

faced a bridgeless Tiber. In the south-

.11 Walker Diary, 4 JUIl 44 , pp. 40-42. 
THE FALL OF ROME 

ern half of the city the 1 st Armored 

and 36th Infantry Divisions had crossed 

the river and a'dvanced to the city's 

western outskirts. In the northeaste~n 

quarters of Rome the II Corps' 85th 

and 88th Divisions had also crossed the 

Tiber and moved to the edge of the 

city. The 1 st Special Service Force continued to guard the bridges, and the 3d 

Division lay along the Aniene, prepared 

to enter Rome as the garrison force. 

Moving up on the U.S. II Corps' right, 

juin's corps, after clearing Cave and 

Palestrina, advanced toward the Tiber 

east of Rome, The I st Motorized Infantly Division and the 3d Algerian Infantry Division mopped up the area east of 

Rome, preparatory to relief bv the 

British J 3 Corps. 41 

The Eighth Army's I Canadian and 

British 13 and 10 Corps were echeloned some distance to the southeast 

facing north toward the Prenestini and 

Simbruini ranges of the Apennines. 

The dispositions of General Leese's 

f()rces were as follows: on the left, the I 

Canadian Corps with the 6th South 

African Armoured Division along the 

Anagni-Baliano road; in the center, the 

13 Corps with the British 6th Armoured Division along the Alatri-Fiuggi 

road and the 8th Indian Division along 

the Alatri-Guarcino road; and, on the 

right, the 10 Corps with the 2d New 

Zealand Division forward, strung out 

along the Sora-Avezzano and Atina-Opi 

roads. On the, Adriatic sector the 5 

Corps came to life, as the Germans 

began shifting forces from that sector to 

the area west of the Apennines. 42 

.. Pierre Le Goyer., La Participation Fraru;aise it La 

Campagne d'ltalie 1943-44 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationaie, 1969), p. 129. 

42 Operations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, Pan II, Sec. D. 

221 

General Clark and his Fifth Armv 

had captured Rome two days befor~ 

the Allied landings in Normandy. But 

contra,y to Churchill's and Alexander's 

expectations, the German Tenth and a 

good part of the Fourteenth Army had 

escaped destTuction. Ever since that first 

week of June 1944 the question has 

been debated whether the glittering 

prize of Rome was an acceptable alternative to the destruction of the enemy's 

forces in the field-the c()nventio~al 

object in battle. 

Because Alexander in planning Operation D[AD~::'1 had the texts of all 

radio messages passing between Kesselring's headquarters and OKW shoniy 

after their transmission, thanks to the 

code breakers in Britain, he had considerable grounds for believing that his 

armies would achieve that object. 4:1 

Clark, on the other hand, believed that 

destruction of the enemy forces south 

of Rome was an impossible objective. 

The fact that the Tenth Army did indeed 

escape destruction without using Highway 6 tends to support Clark's position. 

Furthermore, when Clark recommended to Alexander that juin's corps 

be allowed to move on Ferentino in the 

Sacco valley, there to cut off the (;ermans, as Alexander had hoped that 

Truscott's corps would do at Valrnontone, the Allied commander had refused to do so. Yet Alexander still 

reported to Churchill on 4 june that 

there was not much doubt "that we 

have got a fair COp."H 

On the other hand, Alexander was to 

observe later that "If he (Clark) had 

succeeded in carrying out my plan the 

disaster to the enemy would have been 

43 Winterbotham, Trw Ultra Secret. p. I I R. 

H Nicholson. Alex. p, 254. 
much greater; indeed, most of the 

German forces would have been destroyed. True, the battle ended in a 

decisive victory for us, but it was not as 

complete as might have been .... I 

can only assume that the immediate 

lure of Rome for its publicity value 

persuaded Mark Clark ro switch the 

direcrion of his advance."~~' 

Other explanations have been offered to account for the bilure of the 

Allied armies to destroy more of the 

enemy's forces south of Rome. If the 

four Allied armored divisions in the 

theater had been equipped as mountain 

divisions like those of the French, it has 

been contended, they would have been 

able to follow the Germans more closelv 

through the mountains. In the LiI:i 

valley the Canadian and British armor~d divisions, with their vast columns 

of supporting vehicles, did more to slow 

down the Eighth Army's pursuit than 

the enemy.4(; Yet the difficulties encountered by the French mountain divisions after their breakthrough of the 

Gustav Line would indicate that divisions similarly organized and equipped 

would have had an equally difficult 

time pursuing the retreating enemy 

over narrow, easily blocked roads in the 

Apennines. 

In any case the drive for Rome, 

which, in a sense, had begun in September 1943, had finally come to an 

end. Rome had been essentially an 

Allied victory, though only Americans 

savored the flavor of a triumphal entry 

into the ancient capital. Yet it seemed 

not altogether unjust that this was so, 

~.-, John North, ed., Ml'mIJil'.l, Fil'/d Manlwl All'xand!'r oj Tunis, 1939-J5 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 

1962). 

4" Shepperd, The ltalian Campaign, p, 43. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

for the Fifth Army had paid for that 

prize with the longest casualty lists of 

any of the Allied forces. Since the 

beginning of Operation DIADEM on II 

May, 3,145 Americans had been killed 

in action, 13,704 wounded, and 1,082 

missing-a total of 17,931 casualties. 

During the twenty-four days of the May 

offensive, the Fifth Army had incurred 

one-third of its total losses in Italy since 

D-day at Salerno in the previous September. Yet on 4 June, thanks to a wellfunctioning replacement system, the 

Fifth Army's strength was at a peak that 

it had not reached before, nor would 

again-an effective strength of 369,356, 

which included 231,306 Americans, 

95,142 French (mostly Algerians and 

Moroccans), and 42,908 British. 

The French and British elements of 

Clark's army had also incurred relatively heavy losses during the drive on 

Rome. During the period from 1 April 

to 4 June, 520 British soldiers had been 

killed in action, 2,385 wounded, and 

450 missing. In proportion to their total 

strength, the French had suffered most 

heavily: 1,751 of the FEC had been 

killed in action, 7,912 wounded, and 

972 missing, for a total of 10,635 

casualties. 4i 

Although Operation DIADEM had 

given the Eighth Army the major role 

and the wider front, that army's casualties had been somewhat less than the 

U.S. Fifth Army's-II,639 as compared 

with 17 ,931. If~ however, the losses of 

the attached French and British units 

are added to the Fifth Army totals, the 

dis proportion becomes greater28,566---for the entire army, for the 

casualty figures for the Eighth Army 

included Dominion and Polish forces as 

" Fifth Army History, Part Y, pp. 16&-67. 
THE FALL OF ROME 

well as British. With the Eighth Army 

British contingents constituting the largest national elements, they quite logically had suffered the heaviest casualties-I,068 killed in action, 3,506 

wounded, and 208 missing. Dominion 

forces listed some 910 killed in action, 

3,063 wounded, and 118 missing. For 

the Polish corps the figure was 629 

killed in action, 2,044 wounded, and 93 

missing. Total Allied losses, therefore, 

amounted to 40,205 of all categories. 48 

For approximately the same period 

(10 May to 10 June) the two defending 

German armies had incurred a total of 

38,024 casualties. Of these the Tenth 

Army lost 8,672, as compared with the 

Fourtn'nth Army's 7,012. Of these 2,127 

were listed as' killed in action for both 

German armies. In addition to the 

casualties of the armies, Armee Abteilung 

von ZangPn, opposing the British 5 

Corps along the Adriatic, and Army 

Group C's headquarters listed a total of 

391 casualties of all types. The fact that 

within the Wehrmacht casualties were 

reported through two different channels, Personnel and Field Surgeon, 

probably accounts for a discrepancy 

between the totals given through the 

latter, 31,759, and the total of 38,024, 

given by the OKW War Diary.4!1 

An even more significant discrepancy 

exists between the 15,606 prisoners of 

48 Ibid.; Operations of the British, Indian, and 

Dominion Forces in italy, Part V; Nicholson, The 

Canadians in Italy, p. 452; Robin Kay, Official History 

of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45, vol. 

II, Italy, From Cassino to Trieste (Wellington, N.Z.: 

Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1967), p. 86. 

49 Verluste der Wehrmacht bis 1944, Organization des 

Vrrlustmfidewesens, HI I I 76a Monatsmfiilungen abo 

I. Il.43, photocopy in CMH; Ltr, Bundesarchiv 

(Militaran:hiv), 18.3.1970. Az.6992/.1essup to 

George Blau, CMH; Greiner and Schramm, eds., 

OKWIWFSt, KTB, IV(l), p. 514. 

223 

war the Allies claim to have captured 

during the period I April to 4 June 

1944 and the 6,122 listed by the Germans as missing in action. The difference of 9,484 between Allied claims of 

enemy captured and German records 

of men listed as missing in action can 

possibly be explained as follows. The 

German military command generally 

did not record losses among non-German personnel attached to the armed 

forces. Many of these men were Russian and Polish prisoners of war who, to 

escape the rigors of life in a prison 

camp, had volunteered to serve as 

auxiliaries with the German armed 

forces. Known as Hilfswillige, or, more 

familiarly, as HiWi's among the soldiers 

whom they supported, these men were 

usually dependable when on duty in 

rear areas but readily deserted when 

caught in difficult combat situations, as 

was frequently the case in the defense 

of Rome. Dressed in German uniform, 

the HiWi's were classified as POW's by 

the Allies. 50 

The feelings of many on the Allied 

side were perhaps best summed up in 

the following words of a British war 

correspondent. "Now, at last the victory 

had arrived. It was good that it should 

come, for it had been bravely contested 

and in the end brilliantly achieved. But 

it had been a long journey, and everyone was very weary. And too many had 

died."~l 

50 In addition to the personnel losses, the German 

armies reported as of 28 May, a large quantity of 

equipment lost or destroyed in battle. This included 

500 heavy and 1,600 light machine guns, 300 

artillery pieces, 60 rocket launchers, and 200 to 250 

tanks of all types (approximately half of the armor 

on hand in the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies). See 

Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKWIWFSt, KTB, 

IV(l), p. 514. 

"Christopher Buckley, Road to Rom!' (Lond()~: 

Hadder-Stoughton, 1945). 

PART FOUR 

ROME TO THE ARNO 

'The energy thrown into the first stage of the pursuit chiefly determines the 

value of the victory. 

CLAUSEWlTZ. On War 

CHAPTER XII 

Interlude in R()me 

The View From the Capitoline Hill 

As the u.s. Fifth Army moved 

through Rome, General Clark on t~e 

morning of 5 J une su~mone(! ~:s 

corps commanders a~ld sel1l<;)r staff offIcers to a conference m the city hall atop 

the Capitoline Hill. 1 Starting from the 

Excelsior Hotel where Clark had established his temporary command post, a 

procession of je~ps be~l:ing the largest 

assemblage of high ITIlhtary rank that 

the Romans had seen in many months, 

wound its way through jubilant thro~gs 

to the city hall, at that p?int occul;ned 

bv onlv a handful of anxIous functIon- a~ies. 2' 

The senior commanders gathered 

that morning on the historic hill with 

mixed emotions. Relief that the long 

drive on Rome had at last reached its 

goal and confidem:e that the enemy was 

at last on the run were somew hat 

overshadowed by an awareness that 

demands of ()the~ campaigns in other 

lands would soon obscure the Italian 

venture now so favorably underway. 

For it was the eve of OVERLORD, and 

I Clark. Calculated Risk, pp. 365-66. ... 

2 General Clark, accompanied by his chief of 

staff, General Gruenther, Brigadier Georges Beucler chief of the French Mission with the Fifth 

Ar~y. and Colonel Britten of the British increment, 

Fifth Army, Maj. Gen. Harry H. Johnson, com.-

mander of the Rome Garnson, and Brigadier E. E. 

Hume, Chief of Allied Military Government, entered Rome at approximately 8 a.m. on Monday, 5 

June. 

news of the Allied landing in Normandy would soon crowd ~ome and 

the Italian campaign off the fron~ pages 

of the world press and, most Importantly, the campaign would ~lrop to 

second place in Allied strategtc planning for the Mediterranean. 

On 22 May General Alexander h~d 

received assurance from General \\' 11-

son the Mediterranean theater commal~der, that the Allied armies in Italy 

would be given "overriding prior.ity in 

the allocation of resources" until the 

capture of Rome, but thereafter. emphasis within the theater \\:o~ld slllft to 

preparations fi:)r an amphibious operation to be undertaken no later than 

mid-September.:l .. 

This operation was to be eI~her :11 

close support of ground operatIons m 

Italy or against the coast. of southern 

France. The force reqUIred for the 

latter enterprise would p~'obably ~n~l.ude 

"three United States infantry dl\'1slons 

and all the French divisions at present 

in Allied armies Italv," After the capture of Rome, one US division \'I.'as to 

be relieved by 17 June, a French division bv the 24th, and three days later a 

second u.s. division; thereafter, the 

remaining formations at longer intervals, Also an "experienced U.S. Corps 

headq uarters" was to be rel!eved. as 

soon as possible. These instructIons WIth 

3 Alexander Despatch, pp. 51-52. 
228 

their uncertainties for the continued 

primacy of the Italian campaign in the 

Mediterranean took some of the edge 

off the victory celebrations in the several Allied headquarters, from Wilson's 

to Clark's, and influenced planning for 

operations beyond Rome. 

"rhree days after the Fifth Army's 

entry into Rome, General Wilson inft)l-med his superiors in London that 

the success of Operation DIADEM would 

permit him "to mount an amphibious 

operation on the scale of ANVIL with a 

target date of 15 August." A week later 

Wilson directed Alexander to withdraw 

the C.S. VI Corps headquarters and 

the 45th Division immediately, the 3d 

Division by 17 June, and the 36th 

Division by the 27th. The French were 

to begin ~\'ithdrawing one division on 

the 24th and a second in early July. 

At the same time, Alexander also 

received instructions from the Combined Chiefs in London to com plete 

destruction of the German forces in 

Italy south of the Pisa-Rimini Line, that 

is to say, south of the Arno River, with 

the forces remaining under his command. Until this had been done ''there 

should be no withdrawal from the 

battle of any Allied forces that are 

necessary for this purpose." These contradictorv instructions reflected the conflicting i':'huences at \,,'ork at Headquarters. Allied Armies I talv and at Allied 

Force Headquarters, Mediterranean. 

Alexander generally acted as a spokesman for Churchill's strategic views. 

General Wilson's headquarters. on the 

other hand, was dominated by the 

views of its largely American 'staff, 

headed by the deputy theater commander. General Devers, generally a 

spokesman for General Marshall's straCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

tegic views in that headquarters. 

Against this background of differing 

strategies and uncertainty the Allied 

commanders in Italy would undertake 

the pursuit of the G~rman armies north 

of Rome. 4 

Planning the Pursuit 

With the capture of Rome a wide 

gap had been opened in that part of 

Army Group C extending from Tivoli, 

fifteen miles east of Rome, southwest to 

the mouth of the Tiber. Scattered remnants of four German divisions were in 

the area but were too concerned with 

mere survival to even attempt to dose 

the gap. General Alexander determined 

to exploit the situation by sending the 

U.S. Fifth and British Eighth Armies as 

quickly as possible through the gap in 

the hope they would reach the Northern Apennines, some 170 miles northwest of Rome, before Kesselring could 

once again establish his armies in terrain even more favorable f()l' the defense than that of the Gustav line.:; 

In planning his pursuit of the German armies north of Rome, Alexander 

decided to contin ue the classical 

"oblique order" in which his own armies had approached the city following 

the junction of the southern front with 

the beachhead. The oblique order now, 

as then, found the Allied left wing, 

composed of the Fifth Army and one 

'Robert W. Coakln and Richard :VI. Leighton, 

Global Logislln and .~Iralr{f\': 19.f]~/5. UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 

1968), ch. XV; Msg. MEDCOS 125 AFHQ. Wilson 

to COS. 7 June 44, CCS 361/5 in ABC 384 Eur. 

Sec 9-A; Ehrman, Grand Slmlr.IO·, \'01. y, pp. 345-

67. 

'Opel'ations of British, Indian. and Dominion 

Forces in Italy. Pan II. Sec. D; Alexander D'-.'/!11I<·h, 

p.50. 
INTERLUDE IN ROME 

corps of the Eighth Army, advanced, in 

Alexander's words, "en potence." His 

right wing, made up of a second corps 

of Eighth Army and the 5 Corps, the 

latter under AAI control on the Adriatic coast, was held back. A third 

corps was in reserve. He expected 

thereby to execute a pursuit of the 

enemy forces by a holding attack 

against the still relatively strong Tenth 

Army in Kesselring's center and an allout attack against the weakened Fourteenth Army. Alexander counted on this 

move to complete that army's destruction and enable the U.S. Fifth Armv to 

outflank the German Tenth Army ~vest 

of the Tiber and possibly cut off its 

retreat. This had been Alexander's basic 

strategic concept south of Rome, and it 

had fallen short of realization. It remained to be seen whether it would 

succeed north of Rome. Ii 

In the Fifth Army zone of operations 

immediate goals were the capture of 

the small seaport of Civitavecchia, forty 

miles northwest of Rome, and Viterbo, 

site of an airfield complex forty miles 

north-northwest of Rome and thirty 

miles inland. 7 Possession of Viterbo 

would give the Allies forward bases 

from which aircraft of the MATAF 

could fly in close support of the advance to the Arno and MASAF bombers could attack cities in southern Germany. The swift capture and restoration of the port facilities at Civitavecchia 

were of even greater importance for 

ground operations, for with each passing day the Allied armies left their 

supply dumps farther to the rear, while 

gasoline consumption rates increased in 

6 Alexander Despatch, p. 48. 

7 See Hq, AAI 01 No. 1,5 May 44. 

229 

direct proportion to the distance of the 

armies from those dumps. For the 

Eighth Army the possession of the 

Adriatic port of Ancona, 130 miles 

northeast of Rome, was of equal importance. 

Although in May the Peninsula Base 

Section (PBS), the U.S. logistics command, had launched several ambitious 

pipeline construction projects, the pipelines were, by 5 June, still far from 

Rome. The 696th Engineer Company 

had extended a six-inch pipeline along 

Highway 6 at the rate of two miles per 

day, and had reached a dispensing 

point at Ceprano, fifty-four miles southeast of Rome. Another month would 

pass before the pipeline would reach 

Rome. Along Highway 7 on the Tyrrhenian coast a four-inch pipeline under construction by the 785th Engineer 

Petroleum Distribution Company would 

not be open at its distribution point at 

Terracina until 9 June. H 

Civitavecchia's eventual importance to 

the Allies as a petroleum distribution 

point lay in its role as the first port 

north of Naples, which since 1943 had 

been the Fifth Army's main supply 

base, capable of receiving small tankers. 

For some time Allied logisticians had 

planned to open a 100,000-barrel terminal at Civitavecchia, and construction 

units were poised close behind the 

advancing front to begin work as soon 

as the port was captured. In the meantime, lx)th Allied armies would depend 

upon growing numbers of trucks to 

H Lida Mayo, The Corps of Engineers: Operations 

in the War Against Germany, a volume in preparation for the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II series, MS ch. 12 (hereafter cited as Mayo 

MS), CMH. 
230 

haul the vital gasoline to sUPlx>rt their 

lengthening lines of communications. 

This increased requisition of motor 

transport would, in turn, reduce the 

number of trucks available to the engineers to haul pipeline construction material, thus delaying pipelines and completing a vicious circle which only the 

opening of additional ports along both 

the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic fbn ks 

could eliminate. 9 

Dependence upon motor tl-ansport 

became heavier through lack of alternative means of transport. Coastal shipping from Naples to Anzio had been 

practical as long as the front remained 

south of Rome, but with the advance to 

and beyond Rome the port of Anzio 

quickly lost its importance. Railroads 

offered little promise of resolving the 

problem since they had been svstematically destroyed by the Germans and 

Alli~d bombers. The long winter stalemate along the Gustav Line and on the 

Anzio beachhead had given the Germans plenty of time to demolish the 

two main rail lines between !\Japles and 

Rome--one passing through the Liri 

valley and the other running along the 

Tyrrhenian coast. In. addition to ripping up the ties, German demolition 

crews had also destroyed bridges, culverts, overpasses, and tunnels. Because 

of a shortage of manpower and construction materials railroad repairs took 

considerable time. Not until early june 

did the engineers, using (~aptured German material, complete a 237-f()ot railway bridge over the Garigliano at Min-

" Joseph Bykofskj· and Harold Larson, TIu: Tramportation Corps: Operations Overseas, UN ITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 

1957), pp. 211-32. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

tumo. Clearing the Monte Orso tunnel 

through the Ausoni Mountains just 

south of the former Anzio beachhead 

\\'as so difficult that this rail line was not 

opened as far as Cisterna station until 

20 july. Consequently, when Rome fell 

on 4 june, the Allies, especially the 

Eighth Army, were still dependent 

upon a railhead at Mignano, a hundred 

miles southeast of Rome, and on the 

dumps at the former Anzio beachhead 

supplied by coastal shipping from Naples. )(I 

The ability of the engineers rapidly 

to repair highways, bridges, and culverts thus had a considerable influence 

on the speed of the Allied pursuit. 

Along Highway I, running through the 

Fifth Army zone, bridges and culverts 

averaged ai:xlUt one per mile and all 

had been systematically destroyed bv 

the retreating Germans. Befi)re the end 

of June the I I08th Engineer Combat 

Group, supporting first the II and VI 

Corps, later the IV Corps, had repaired 

thirty-eight culverts and graded 176 

miles of roads. Fortunately, throughout 

Italy there was usually plenty of local 

material for road construction and repair. 11 

Until additional ports were opened 

on both coastal Hanks, Alexander could 

hardly support more than nine divisions in the field against Kesselring's 

army group. Thus a race for ports, 

especially in the Fifth Army zone, 

would soon become the strategic and 

tactical leitmotif of the Allied advance to 

the Arno. 

'0 Ibid.; Mayo MS, th. XV; Operations of the 

British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italv, Part 

II, Sec. D. " 

J 1 Mavo MS, tho XII. 
INTERLUDE IN ROME 

The German Situation 

The fighting south of Rome had 

damaged the Fourteenth Arm-y more severely than it had the Tenth -and conseq':lently it was more hard pressed as it 

withdrew beyond Rome before the U.S. 

Fif~h Army than was the Tenth Army, 

~hlch . had managed to escape virtually 

mtact mto the mountains and across the 

Aniene before the British Eighth Army. 

Aware that the Allied command would 

att.empt to exploit this situation by purSUIng the F.0urteenth Army so vigorously 

a~ to force It to expose the Tl'nth Arm-y's 

ng~t flank, Field Marshal Kesselri~lg 

deCIded to cover that flank with the 

Tiber River, which north of Rome 

flows generally in a southerly direction 

out of the U mbrian highlaI{ds. At the 

same time, he also needed to reinf()[ce 

the battered . Fourteenth Army so as to 

delay the Fifth Army's pursuit and 

thereby expose as little as possible of 

the Tenth Army's right flank. This would 

be almost impossible until Orvieto was 

reached. Between Rome and Orvieto a 

Tiber crossing some sixty miles north' of 

Rome, all bridges across the river had 

been destroyed either by Allied aircraft 

or by German engineers, acting with 

premature zeal. Thus fe)r the first sixtv 

miles beyond Rome the Allied armie's 

would be pursuing an enemv whose 

main ba.ttle strength lay east rather than 

west of the Tiber. That this would 

favor ~~e U.? Fifth Army rather than 

the BntIsh Eighth Army was as evident 

to Kesselring in his command post near 

Monte Soratte on Highway 3 some 

twenty-two miles north of Rome as it 

was to Allied commanders at their 5 

June conference on the Capitoline 

Hill. 12 

12 MS # C-064 (Kesselring). 

231 

Further adding to Kesselring's woes, 

for the first hundred miles north of 

Rome the terrain offered few defensive 

advantages. The peninsula broadens 

rapidly f{)r some eighty-five miles, until 

at the latitude of Lake Trasimeno it 

attains a width of about 140 miles. In 

this area the Central Apennines, after 

fir~t curving eastward, begin a wide 

swmg to the northwest to reach the sea 

north of Leghorn and the Arno River 

and become the Northern Apennines. 

In them Field Marshal Kesselring 

planned to establish a new winter line, 

the. Gotemtl'llung, or Cothic Line. along 

which he expected to make another 

stand as he had in the winter of 1943 

before Cassino and along the Rapido. 

The name of the line would evoke the 

l?resen~e of the Gothic kingdoms establIshed m Italy by Germanic tribes in the 

6th century A.D.la 

I f the German command in Italv 

could delay the Allied advance to th~ 

Arno and the Northern Apennines until autumn rains hampered cross-country movement, Kesselring might have a 

chance to turn the Gothic Line into 

another Gustav Line. This, then, became Kesselring's main tactical problem 

beyond Rome-to rebuild the shattered 

Fourteenth Army while at the same time 

~hecking the Allied pursuit and turning 

It once ag~iin into a slow, grinding 

advance as It had been from Salerno to 

Cassino and the Winter Line, and then 

to bring it to a halt for the winter along 

the Gothic Line. C 

.The Fourteenth Army on 6 June received a new commander as C;oCneralleumant Joachim Lemelsen replaced 

General von rvIackensen. Lemelsen 

.;{ Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB. 

IV(J), pp. 513-15. . 
232 

found his command in bad shape indeed. Since the major part of the 

LXXVI Panur Corl)s had escaped destruction southeast of Rome bv retreating northeastward over the Aniene in 

the vicinity of Tivoli into the Tenth 

Armv's zone, there was left to General 

Lernelsen only the I Pami."ll1ltf' C()rt)s and 

a provisional corps. Holding the Fourtemth Army's left wing, its flank resting 

on the Tiber, was the parachute corps. 

Consisting only of two battleworthy divisions, the 4th Parachute and 3d Ptmzer 

Grenadier Divisions, it was but a shadow 

of the corps that had held the Caesar 

Line so stubbornly in May. On the 

corps' right, or coastal, flank were remnants of the 65th and 92d Divisions, the 

latter a training unit (':;ginally engaged 

in coast-watching duties near the mouth 

of the Tiber. These two units had been 

grouped together under a provisional 

corps headquarters known as Grout) 

Goerlitz. The Hermann Goering, 362d, 

and 71 5th Divisions had either experienced such severe losses as to necessitate withdrawal from action for rest and 

reorganization or were with Herr's 

LXXVI Panzer Corps east of the Tiber 

and under Tenth Army control. 14 

The Tenth Army at that point commanded three army corps-the XIV 

and LXXVI Panzer and the LI Mountain 

Corps. In turn, these corps controlled 

among them the best divisions remaining in Army Group C. These included 

the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisians and the 1st Parachute, 5th Mountain, 

and 44th and 278th Infantry Divisions. 

On the Adriatic flank another provisional corps, Group Hauck, controlled 

14 AOK 14, fa KTB Ani. 3, 7 Jun 44, AOK 14, Doc. 

5909111; MS # C-064 (Kesselrin~). 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the I 14th Jaeger and 305th Infantry 

Divisions. Not yet hard pressed in that 

sector, these divisions could be expected 

eventually to provide reinforcements to 

the sectors west of the Tiber. In army 

group reserve near Orvieto were th~ 

26th Panzer and 20th Luftwaffe Field 

Divisions and the 162d Turkomen and 

356th Infantry Divisions. The Luftwaffe 

division had recently arrived from occupation duty in Denmark, and the 162d 

and 356th Divisions had been employed 

on coastal defense and antipal'lisan duties in northern Italv. 'rhe Turkomen 

division, of douhtfuf loyalty, was cornfX)sed of former Russi~n prisoners of 

war from Soviet Turkestan led bv German officers and noncommissior{ed officers.15 

Because of the difficulties of shifting 

units from east to west of the Tiber 

south of Orvieto, Kesselring, at least f(x 

the first week following the loss of 

Rome, would have no recourse but to 

reinforce his right wing (Fourteenth 

Army) with those troops already located 

west of the Tiber and within marching 

distance of the front. These were the 

divisions in army group reserve near 

Orvieto. Kesselring decided to leave the 

26th Panzer Division at Orvieto to defend that important crossing and to 

send first the 20th Luftwaffe Field Division and then the 162d Turkomen Division southward to reinforce the Fourteenth Army. He hoped thereby to slow 

up the Allied armies enough to permit 

him to regroup his forces in such a way 

as to permit the establishment of a 

series of temporary delaying positions 

south of the Arno River. For the next 

15 Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKWIWFSt, KTB, 

IV(l), pp. 514-15. 
INTERLUDE IN ROME 

two weeks this would become the dominant tactical theme within Army Group 

C; for in Kesselring's words, "On this 

everything depended." 16 

Two of the most important of these 

defensive lines he designated Dora and 

Frieda. The former began in the vicinity of Orbetello, located on coastal 

Highway 1 seventy miles northwest of 

Rome; from Orbetello it extended eastward, skirting Lake Bolsena's southern 

shore, thence to Narni on Highway 3 

forty miles north of Rome; it then 

extended twenty miles southeast to Rieti 

on Highway 4, eastward for thirty miles 

to L' Azuila, then skirted the southern 

edge of the wild and desolate Gran 

Sasso d'Italia, from which the Germans 

had earlier rescued a captive M ussolini, 

and finally extended eastward to the 

Adriatic coast. The Frieda Line, beginning near Piombino, thirty miles northwest of Grosseto, extended aix)ut thirtyfive miles northeastward to Radicondoli, 

thence to Lake Trasimeno, on to Perugia, an important road junction ten 

miles east of the lake, then twenty miles 

southeast to Foligno on Highway 3, and 

thence sixty miles east"vard across the 

Apennines to reach the coast near 

Porto Civitanova. 17 For the next two 

weeks Allied operations north of Rome 

would be concerned largely with reaching and breaking through these two 

lines. 

Rome in Allied Hands 

The capture of Rome marked not 

only the zenith of the Italian Campaign 

If'Ibid., pp. 513-15; Albert Kesselring, A Soldier's 

Record (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1954), 

p.247. 

17 Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, p. 247. 

233 

thus far but also an important turning 

point in the relatively brief history of 

the Kingdom of Italy.ls Not since September 1943, when the Germans had 

occupied Rome, had King Victor Emmanuel III, who had fled with his 

government to Bari in southern Italy, 

set foot in his t()rmer capital. I!I Several 

months before the Allies entered Rome, 

the King, his long association with Fascism having made him unacceptable 

either to the Allies or to the major 

Italian political factions, had yielded to 

Allied pressure and agreed to abdicate 

as soon as the Germans were driven 

from the city. Thereupon, with the 

approval of the Allied Control Commission (ACC), Marshal Pietro Badoglio's 

government had intended t(n the transfer of power to Crown Prince H umberto, as the Lieutenant General of the 

Realm. The old soldier Badoglio was 

then to resign, in anticipation of the 

Crown Prince's formation of a new 

government, which was to include the 

leaders of the Roman Committee of 

National Liberation (Comitati di Lih('mzione Naziorwle, CLN). 

As soon as the U.S. Fifth Army drew 

near Rome, however, the King began to 

have second thoughts and insisted that 

he should personally once again enter 

Rome as king. The Allied Control 

Commission (ACC), justifiably concerned aixmt Rome's reception of the 

18 The modern Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed 

in 1861, prior to the annexation of Venetia and 

Rome. 

19 Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil 

Affairs: Soldiers Become Gover1Wrs, UI\' ITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washinh>1on, 1964), 

pp. 454-61. Unless otherwise cited the f()llowing is 

based upon this source. See also Charles F. Delzell. 

Mwso/ini's Elll'mil'.l: Till' An/i-Fa.lris/ Rni.l/anrl' Partin 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 
234 

now discredited monarch, prevailed 

upon him to adhere to his original 

agreement. On 5 June, still far away in 

Bari, he signed the instrument transferring the royal powers to Crown Prince 

Humberto. 

While successful in disposing of the 

Italian King, the Allies were less so in 

fulfilling the second part of their planforming a new government under Badoglio. Many key Italian political leaders, it developed, refused to serve under Badoglio. All factions, including the 

Committee of National Liberation 

(CLN), agreed, however, to accept the 

73-year-old I vanoe Bonomi, President 

of the Committee of National Liberation and a prime minister in the preFascist years. In spite of the urgings by 

both the ACC and Bonomi, Marshal 

Badoglio refused to serve in this new 

government. 

When the Fifth Army's civil affairs 

officer, Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Hume, 

arrived in the city on 5 June to become 

military governor, he found the city 

controlled by a well-organized arm of 

the CLN. It was led by General Roberto 

Bencivengo, who promptly relinquished 

to the Allied representative the authority the committee had exercised since 

the Germans had begun to evacuate the 

city. It was not long, however, before 

the first warm glow of joyous cooperation with the Allied authorities, 

which had accompanied the liberation 

of Rome, gave way to bitter recriminations as the ACe attempted to bring 

some order to the chaotic food and 

housing situations. 

After formation of the new civil 

government, the Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), for military and administrative reasons, refused to authorCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ize Bonomi's government to move to 

Rome from Bari for well over a month 

following the city's capture. Even after 

the return of the Italian Government to 

Rome a lack of effective civil administration would continue to plague Allied 

authorities for the remainder of the 

campaIgn. 

The Allies had long since taken the 

position that the capture of Rome 

would be of greater political than military significance, and their occupation 

policies were therefore similar to those 

of the Germans. Although Rome's traditional position as the hub of the 

peninsula's transportation and communications network was to remain an 

important factor in operations, the AAI 

command decided not to establish advance base installations within the city. 

Military installations were limited to 

hospitals, transit camps, and a few 

military leave hotels. Moreover, the Vatican's neutrality was to be respected, 

with enemy nationals who had taken 

refuge there not to be disturbed. Rome 

was to remain, as it had been under the 

Germans, essentially an open city. 20 

There were other similarities too. 

The Allies were soon to complain bitterly, as had the German military authorities before them, that the Romans 

seemed indifferent to the great struggle 

being waged in their country, that they 

appeared more concerned about their 

own immediate interests than alx>ut the 

rehabilitation and reconstruction of It20 The city of Rome was to be garrisoned by the 

U.S. 3d Infantry Division with attached Allied units, 

including a battalion of British troops and a mixed 

battalion of French, with one company from each 

of the four divisions making up the French Expeditionary Corps. See Le Goyet, La Participation 

Fraru;aise a La Campagne d'ltalie, p. 129. 
INTERLUDE IN ROME 

aly.21 As General Clark moved through 

the streets to the plaudits of the Romans on the morning of 5 June, he 

might well have meditated momentarily 

upon the fickleness of a populace which 

had submitted so often to conquerors 

only eventually to turn against them. 

The city, with its agriculturally inadequate environs, was now cut off by the 

Allied victory from its traditional 

sources of food supply-still in German 

hands. Furthermore, lack of transportation facilities would greatly limit the 

amount of food that could be brought 

from the few agricultural areas in the 

south. The Allied cornucopia thus 

failed to produce the flood of food and 

clothing that the inhabitants had long 

expected. That only served to make the 

Romans even more restless and resentful over what thev considered to be 

their ill-deserved ~isfortune. Over the 

coming months they would show their 

disappointment in a sullen hostility to 

the Allied military authorities and in an 

unconcealed and virtually uncontrollable black market, flourishing ,\'ith the 

tacit consent of the civil authorities who 

21 Hq ACC Rpl f()r Jun 44. cited in Coles and 

Weinberg. p. 461. 

235 

refused to prosecute violators even after 

denunciations were made to them by 

the Allied Black Market Control Division.22 In the over-all conduct of the 

phase of the campaign that was about 

to begin, the Romans would prove to 

be as much of a burden to the Allies as 

they had been to the Germans. 

The capture of Rome had been the 

{(xus of Allied hopes and plans for so 

long that f(x many, ranging from private to general, the operations in the 

months follov"ing would appear to be a 

postscript to the Italian campaign. In a 

strategic sense perhaps they were, f()r 

after Rome and the Allied landings in 

northwestern France, the campaign 

sank to the level of a vast holding 

operation. But operationally considered, 

the eleven months between the fall of 

Rome and the surrender of the German armies \,,'ere anything but a postscript. In terms of ground gained, of 

battles fought and won, and casualties 

incurred, the second half of the Italian 

campaign must be considered as equal 

in importance to the first half. 

"Ibid.; Harold B. Lipsius. Chief. Rome Black 

Market Control Division, ACC Rpt for No\' 44, 

ACC files 10400/153179. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Pursuit North of Rome 

General Alexander's order of 5 May 

which had set the drive on Rome in 

motion had also designated the broad 

objectives for the next phase of the 

campaign. General Clark's Fifth Army 

was to pursue the enemy northwest of 

Rome to capture the Viterbo airfields 

and the fXJrt of Civitavecchia, thereafter 

to advance on Leghorn. General Leese's 

Eighth Army was to pursue the enemy 

in a northerly and northeasterly direction along the general axis Terni-Perugia, thereafter to advance on Florence 

and the Adriatic fXJrt of Ancona. 

On 7 June Alexander further refined 

these instructions. Both armies were to 

continue their advance "with all fXJssible 

speed"-the Fifth Army to advance 

toward the western half of the Northern Apennines, comprising a triangle 

connecting the cities of Pisa, Lucca, and 

Pistoia, and the Eighth Army toward 

an area enclosed by a triangle connecting the cities of Florence, Arezw, and 

Bibbiena. ,Both armies were to maintain 

close contact on their inner flanks, but 

not to wait ()r one another, and were 

to bypass strongpoints in hope of maintaining the momentum that had carried 

them to Rome and beyond. For Alexander, privy to Kesselring's situation 

and intentions, believed that if his armies could sustain that momentum they 

might have a second chance to outflank 

and destroy Vietinghoffs Tenth Army 

and breach the Gothic Line before the 

Germans had an opportunity to occupy 

it. 1 

Although traditional military wisdom 

at this point called for a headlong 

pursuit of the enemy to keep him from 

regrouping and re-forming his lines, 

Allied commanders for the next two 

weeks spent considerable time in shuffling units back and forth across the 

front. One reason is that plans for 

Operation ANVIL called for the Fifth 

Army to give up two of its four corpsthe U.S. VI and the French Expeditionary Corps. Other reasons were growing 

logistical problems and difficult terrain. 

Perhaps for these reasons General 

Clark chose not to base his planning 

upon the intelligence provided by the 

ULTRA interception and decipherment 

of radio traffic between OKW and 

Kesselring's headquarters. 

This decision at this fXJint was unfortunate. Heavy losses in lx)th men and 

materiel had rendered at least three of 

the Fourll'mlh Armv's divisions ineffective 

and reduced the remainder to half 

strength. Also, a wide gap had opened 

up between the Tenth and Fourteenth 

Armies. As his armies withdrew north of 

Rome, Kesselring intended to shift sufficient forces from the Tenth to the 

Fourteenth Army in an attempt to reinforce the latter and thereby close the 

1 Winterbotham, Tilt' Ultra Sf'rrpt, pp. 159-60; 

SAC Despatch. The Italian Campaign, 1 () May-12 

Aug 1944, typescript in CMH. 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 

gap. An aggressive Allied pursuit, however, would have doomed these measures. 

Because he was to lose Truscott's and 

Juin's corps within a few weeks, Clark 

decided to use them in the early phase 

of the pursuit beyond Rome even 

though both corps were exhausted. The 

FEC, which had been covering the 

Army's right flank, prepared to take 

over from the II Corps. After a period 

of rest, the latter was to relieve the 

French in time for their withdrawal 

from the Army. The VI Corps, meanwhile, was to continue in line until 

relieved by the I V Corps. 

Throughout the first day following 

Rome's capture, reconnaissance units 

ranged widely across the army's front to 

determine the extent of the enemy's 

withdrawal. Meanwhile, the 1st Armored and the 34th and 36th Infantry 

Divisions assembled in a bridgehead 

west of the Tiber. To maintain contact 

with the rapidly retreating Germans, 

Clark directed his corps commanders to 

form small, highly mobile task forces. 2 

After clearing Rome by nightfall on 5 

June, the Fifth Army continued to 

advance at first on a two-corps front in 

the same order in which it had entered 

Rome: on the left, Truscott's VI Corps 

moving in two columns, one along the 

axis of Highway 1 (the coastal highway 

running northwestward toward Civitavecchia) and a second initially along the 

axis of Highway 2, roughly paralleling 

the coastal road some ten miles inland; 

on the right, Keyes' II Corps advancing 

to take over Highway 2 about seven 

miles north of Rome and continuing 

east of Lake Bracciano north to Vi2 Hqs Fifth Army or 28, 6 Jun 1944. 

237 

terbo. The II Corps' right boundary 

was also the interarmy boundary and 

ran almost due north from a point four 

miles east of Rome, through Civita 

Castellana, thence to a point just west of 

Orte, forty miles north of Rome on the 

Tiber. (Map VIII) 

The farther the Fifth Army moved 

beyond Rome, ever lengthening supply 

lines wreaked an inevitable burden on 

the hardworking trucks and drivers and 

exacerbated gasoline shortages at the 

front that could be alleviated only by 

opening the port of Civitavecchia. Narrow, winding secondary roads and frequent demolition of culverts and 

bridges by the retreating enemy contributed to delays and limited the number of troops that might advance along 

the axis of a single road. 

Early on 6 June, General Harmon's 

1 st Armored Division, with Allen's CCB 

accompanying the 34th Division along 

the coastal highway toward Civitavecchia and CCA the 36th Division along 

Highway 2, took up the pursuit toward 

Viterbo. The 45th Division remained in 

corps reserve, while the British 1 and 5 

Divisions withdrew into AAI reserve as 

soon as the bulk of the Fifth Army 

moved beyond Rome. 3 Each combat 

command formed a mobile task force 

composed of a medium tank battalion, 

a motorized infantry battalion, and attached engineer and reconnaissance 

units, as well as a battalion of selfpropelled artillery. Because of difficulties involved in maneuvering and protecting the armor during the hours of 

darkness, motorized infantry led the 

way at night, armored units by day. 

As night fell on the 6th, CCB had 

"Ihid.: Fifth Army Hi.,tory, Pan vr, pp. 20-21. 
238 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

AERIAL VIEW OF CIVITAVECCHIA 

reached a point about seventeen miles 

southwest of Civitavecchia. Progress had 

been so rapid and resistance so light 

that Clark abandoned a plan to use the 

509th Parachute Infantry Battalion to 

block Highway 1 behind the retreating 

enemy. Meanwhile, the 34th Division's 

168th Infantry, mounted on trucks, 

consolidated gains and rounded up 

enemy stragglers bypassed by the tanks. 

Demolished bridges and culverts bore 

witness to the enemy's passage, but 

there was little physical contact with the 

foe. Throughout the night a motorized 

battalion of the 168th Infantry led the 

way, and by dawn on the 7th reached a 

point within three miles of Civitavecchiao Entering the port, the infantry 

cleared it by noon. 4 

In the meantime, the 34th Division 

commander, General Ryder, ordered 

Col. William Schildroth's 133d Infantry 

to take up the advance in trucks along 

the coast toward Tarquinia, about ten 

miles northwest of Civitavecchia. Allen's 

CCB, meanwhile, turned eastward to 

rejoin the rest of the 1st Armored 

Division south of Viterbo. Against little 

4 VI Corps Opns Rpt. Jun 44; 34th Div G-3 Jnl. 

5-7. 8--16 Jun 44. Unless otherwise indicated the 

following is based upon these sources. 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 

opposition, the 133d Infantry, as night 

fell, came within five miles of Tarquinia, but the next morning, 8 June, in 

hilly country just south of Tarquinia the 

regiment encountered the first elements 

of the 20th Luftwaffe Field Division, a 

unit that Kesselring had sent south 

from Orvieto to reinforce the Fourteenth 

Army. The enemy infantrymen had established themselves on the sides of a 

ravine overlooking the highway. Backed 

by mortars and artillery, they held until 

shortly before dark, when the Americans, using newly issued 57-mm. antitank guns as direct-fire weapons, 

blasted the positions. Instead of sending 

the 133d Infantry into Tarquinia that 

night, Ryder relieved it with an attached unit, Col. Rudolph W. Broedlow's 361st Regimental Combat Team, 

the first contingent of the 91 st Division 

to arrive in Italy. 

Early the next morning, the 9th, 

Truscott shifted the 36th Division, 

which had been advancing along the 

axis of Highway 2, from the VI Corps' 

right wing to relieve the weary 34th 

Division and take over the advance 

along the coastal highwClY. The 36th 

Division's place was taken by the 85th 

Division on the II Corps' left flank, 

which Clark had moved westward to 

include Highway 2. Ryder's division 

then retired into corps reserve in the 

vicinity of Civitavecchia. Two days later 

Crittenberger's IV Corps was to relieve 

the VI Corps and take command of the 

36th Division and the advance along 

the coastal flank. 

On the VI Corps' right wing Colonel 

Daniel's CCA, in the meantime, had 

advanced seven miles along Highway 2, 

then turned onto a good secondary 

road running through the corps zone 

239 

west of Lake Bracciano before rejoining 

the main highway north of the lake. 

Daniel divided his unit into three small 

task forces, each built around an infantry and a medium tank company. Leapfrogging the task forces, Daniel, by 

nightfall on the 7th, had pushed his 

column to within fourteen miles of 

Viterbo. Resuming the advance the 

next morning, CCA headed for the 

point where the secondary road rejoined Highway 2. There the Germans 

had assembled a relatively strong rear 

guard from the 3d Panzer Grenadier 

Division, which managed to delay Daniel's task force for three hours, long 

enough for the enemy to evacuate the 

adjacent town of Vetralla. From VetraIl a, Viterlx> lay only a tempting seven 

miles away but within the adjacent II 

Corps zone of operations. Not one to 

be overly respectful of corps' lxmndaries when opportunity beckoned, General Harmon, the 1st Armored Division 

commander, told Daniel to go on into 

Viterbo. Task Force C continued until 

halted by enemy rear guards at midnight a mile and a half south of the 

town. Later that night,. when it became 

evident that the enemy had withdrawn, 

the task force dashed unhindered into 

Viterlx). 

Since the beginning of the pursuit on 

the 6th, the II Corps front had been 

echeloned somewhat to the right rear 

of its neighbor, which was why Task 

Force C found no II Corps troops at 

Viterbo. After leaving the 3d Division 

behind to garrison Rome, Keyes selected the 85th and 88th Divisions to 

lead the II Corps along the axis of 

Highway 2 to the corps' objective, the 

road line Viterbo-Soriano-Orte. The VI 

Corps' units, which had been using the 
240 

same highway for the first hours of 

their advance north of Rome, had 

already turned off onto a secondary 

road that would carry them west of 

Lake Bracciano. The II Corps, advancing along the axis of Highway 2, would 

pass east of Lake Bracciano. 5 

Early on 6 June, the 85th Division, in 

a column of regiments with the 339th 

Infantry leading and elements of the 

117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron screening the front and flanks, led 

the II Corps up Highway 2 to take over 

the advance on Viterbo from the 36th 

Division. A tank battalion and a tank 

destroyer battalion, attached from Task 

Force Howze, accompanied the lead 

regiment. Leapfrogging his regiments 

and alternating his forward elements 

between motorized and dismounted infantry, the division commander, General Coulter, kept his columns moving 

so rapidly that by dark on 8 June they 

had advanced to within six miles of 

Viterbo. There Coulter learned that the 

1 st Armored Division's CCA was already advancing on the town, which the 

army commander, General Clark, reacting to a fait accompli, shifted into the VI 

Corps' zone. 

On Coulter's right, Sloan's 88th Division set out from Rome about the same 

time as its neighbor. Limited to secondary roads east of Highway 2, General 

Sloan deployed all three of his regiments. Their advance over these roads 

was more of a tactical march than an 

actual pursuit. Both to the front and on 

the right flank, a task force consisting 

of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron 

5 Fifth Army History, Pan VI, pp. 25-30. Unless 

otherwise cited the following is based upon this 

source. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

with a battalion each of tanks and tank 

destroyers screened the advance while 

the regiments followed. After the task 

force passed through Civita Castellana, 

45 miles north of Rome, which the 6th 

South African Armoured Division of 

the British 13 Corps had captured two 

days before, the continued advance of 

the South Africans pinched out the task 

force. 

At dawn on 9 June the French 

Expeditionary Corps began relieving 

the II Corps, whose zone of operations 

had been greatly reduced by the presence of the South African armor on 

Highway 3, temporarily assigned to use 

of the Eighth Army. By midmorning 

the 3d Algerian Infantry Division on 

the left and the 1 st Motorized Division 

on the right completed relief of the 

85th Division. Meanwhile, the 88th Division, pinched out by the South Africans, had also pulled out of the line. 

The Fifth Army front on 11 June 

thus described a wide arc extending 

westward from Viterbo to Tuscania, 

thence southwest to a point just north 

of Tarquinia on Highway 1. Thus far 

casualties had been exceptionally light, 

each division seldom exceeding a daily 

average of ten in all categories. 6 

Eighth Army Joins the Pursuit 

East of Rome, the Eighth Army on 6 

June crossed the Tiber and its tributary, 

the Aniene, on a two-corps front, the 

13th Corps on the left, the 10th Corps 

on the right. The former had the 6th 

South African and the 6th British Armoured Divisions, split a~ first by the 

" 9th MRU, Fifth Army Battle Casualties, 19 Jun 

45, CMH. 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 

southward-flowing Tiber; the latter had 

the 8th Indian and the 2d New Zealand 

Divisions. Under army group control, 

the 5 Corps was to follow a German 

withdrawal on the Adriatic flank. Operations there were to remain in low key 

in the hope that the Eighth Army's 

advance would prompt the Germans to 

yield the Adriatic port of Ancona without a fight. Failing that, General Alexander planned to use the 2 Polish 

Corps to take the port, 130 miles 

northeast of Rome. 7 

As with the Americans, shuffling of 

units helped delay the Eighth Army's 

advance, particularly on the left in the 

sector of the 13 Corps. Yet the necessity 

for the shifts was early demonstrated by 

the problems faced by the 6th South 

African Armoured Division, advancing, 

in effect, astride the Tiber River. Because the bridge to be used in the 

jump-off along Highway 3 was demolished, the division early on 6 June had 

to detour through the U.S. II Corps 

sector, losing several hours in the process. Reaching Civita Castellana, 25 miles 

to the north, as nightfall approached, 

the division faced the necessity of again 

crossing the river if pmgress was to 

continue along Highway 3 to Terni. 

The Tiber was as much of a barrier to 

intracorps movement in the attack as it 

was to the Germans on the defense. 

Furthermore, if the South Africans 

along Highway 3 and the 6th British 

Armoured Division east of the Tiber 

along Highway 4 continued to follow 

those routes, they would be moving 

away from their objective, the FlorenceArezzo-Bibbiena triangle. 

7 Operations of British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in italy, Part II, Sec. D. 

241 

The 13 Corps commander, General 

Kirkman, accordingly obtained approval 

to put his entire corps west of the 

Tiber, avoiding the necessity to cross 

and recross the river while at the same 

time orienting the corps more directly 

toward the objective by use of Highway 

71. The shift also avoided splitting the 

corps by another prominent terrain 

feature, Lake Trasimeno, which Highway 71 bypasses on the west. 

The shift left the 10 Corps alone in 

pursuit of the stronger German force, 

the Tenth Army, east of the Tiber. The 

goal of that corps would be to keep 

enough pressure on the Tenth Army to 

forestall Field Marshal Kesselring from 

transferring units to reinforce the Fourteenth Army west of the Tiber. 

KessPiring Outlines His Strategy 

Even as the U.S. Fifth Army passed 

through Civitaveccia and Viterbo, and 

the British Eighth Army closed in on 

Orte, Narni, Terni, and Rieti, Field 

Marshal Kesselring began to prepare 

his superiors for the eventual loss of all 

central Italy between Rome and the 

Arno. On 8 June he informed the 

OKW that he might be able to delay 

the Allied armies forward of the Gothic 

Line for only three more weeks, and 

for that long only if the Allies made no 

attempt to turn Army Group C's front 

with an amphibious landing on either 

the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic coasts, 

which Kesselring saw as a possibility at 

any time. 

Both the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies 

were to fight delaying actions while 

bringing reserves from the rear and 

flanks, closing newly opened gaps, and 

establishing firm contact along the inner wings of the two armies. Loss of 
242 

terrain was less important to Kesselring 

than overcoming the manpower losses 

suffered in the defeat south of Rome 

by rehabilitating severely mauled divisions. 8 

Compared with several delaying lines 

south of the Arno, the Gothic Line 

appeared on the map to offer a secure 

refuge for the German armies in the 

mountain fastness of the Northern 

Apennines, but in reality the line was 

far from complete. Construction of fortified positions in the relatively impregnable western sector, toward which 

the U.S. Fifth Army was advancing, 

had progressed satisfactorily, but little 

had been accomplished in the more 

vital and vulnerable central and eastern 

sectors, where the British Eighth 

Army's objectives lay. Although OKW 

had sent Field Marshal Kesselring additional engineer, fortification construction, and mountain battalions in order 

to complete the line before Army Group 

C withdrew beyond the Arno, the High 

Command "vas unable to afford him 

what he most needed-time. Kesselring 

could gain that only with his own skill 

and the steadfastness of his troops. 

While he was determined to hold the 

Allies as far south of the Arno as 

possible, unremitting pressure, especially against the Fourteenth Army on his 

right wing, delays in the arrival of 

reinforcements, and increasing difficulties in maintaining contact between his 

two armies across the barrier of the 

Tiber would, in Kesselring's opinion, 

leave little alternative to a fighting withdrawal. 

"Greiner and &:hramm, cds., OKWIWFSt, K7B, 

IV (I), pp, 513·,23, Kesselring's comments on Dn 

Fl'idwg In Italim, Part II, in CMH files. Unless 

otherwi;;e indicated the following section is based 

upon these references, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Hitler disagreed. Even as Kesselring 

prepared on 9 June to issue new strategic guidelines to his army commanders, Hitler ordered him to stand and 

fight. Three days later the Fuehrer's 

written instructions pointed out that 

since another seven months were 

needed to complete the Gothic Line, 

the army group commander, if forced 

fn:>m his first defensive position, the 

Dora Line, had to be prepared to 

stabilize his front on the Frieda Line, 

forty miles farther north, Hitler also 

insisted that Kesselring should quickly 

disabuse his troops of any notion of the 

existence of a secure haven in the 

Northern Apennines into which they 

might eventually withdraw. The Gothic 

Line offered no advantages, Hitler 

added, for combat conditions there 

were less favorable than those south of 

the Arno. Furthermore, the hazards of 

flanking amphibious operations by the 

Allies were even greater. As if further 

to downgrade the importance of the 

Gothic Line in the eyes' of both friend 

and foe, Hitler ordered the name of 

the line, with its historic connotations, 

changed. He reasoned that if the Allies 

managed to break through they ,,,,'ould 

seize upon the more pretentious name 

as ground for magnifying their victory 

claims. Kesselring renamed it the Green 

Line. 9 

Essentially, despite Hitler's insistence 

on a stand and fight strategy, it developed rather that under Kesselring's 

command the German armies in Italy 

adopted a 20th-century variation of the 

delaying strategy associated with the 

"Greiner and Schramm, eds" OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

IV(l), pp. 520-23, Since the Allies never adopted 

the new name, the text will continue to use the 

designation Gothic Line, 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 243 

GROSSETO AND TERRAIN TO THE EAST 

name of the Roman general Quintus 

Fabius Cunctator, who, during the 

Punic War of the 3d century, B.C., had 

worn down the Carthaginian armies by 

a series of delaying actions. How effective was the German adaptation of that 

strategy twenty-one centuries later remained to be seen. 

To the Trasimerw Line 

As both the Fifth and Eighth Armies 

completed their regrouping on 11 June, 

the Allied front extended from a point 

on the T yrrhenian coast about 20 miles 

northwest of Tarquinia, northeastward 

some thirty miles to the vicinity of 

Fontanile Montefiascone, thence in a 

southeasterly direction to Narni and 

Rieti, passing south of L' Aquila on the 

southern edge of the Gran Sasso, and 

on to Chieti and the Adriatic coast 

about seven miles south of Pescara. The 

Allied armies at that point were in 

contact with the first of the enemy's 

delaying lines north of Rome. 

On the Fifth Army's left, Crittenber-
244 

ger's IV Corps held a 30-mile front 

between the coast and the hills overlooking it from the east and, on the 

right, the FEGs front stretched across 

twenty miles of the U mbrian highlands 

dominating the Tiber valley from the 

west. The intercorps boundary extended in a northwesterly direction 

from Tuscania. 10 

General Crittenberger planned for 

the 36th Division to make the main 

effort along the axis of the coastal 

Highway I. To give Walker's division 

more punch, Crittenberger reinforced it 

with Broedlow's 361st Regimental Combat Team and the 753d Tank and 

636th Tank Destroyer Battalions. The 

1 1 7th Reconnaissance Squadron was to 

screen the corps front, with corps artillery to follow in general support. Two 

combat engineer regiments, the 36th 

and 39th, were also available. For the 

time bei.ng, the 34th Division was to 

remam m army reserve near Tarquinia. 11 

On the corps' right wing in the 

vicinity of Canino, eight miles southwest 

of Valentano, Crittenberger created a 

task force under the command of Brig. 

Gen. Rufus S. Ramey, with the mission 

of screening that flank and maintaining 

contact with the French Expeditionary 

Corps. The 1 st Armored Group headquarters and headquarters company 

formed the command group for Ramey's task force, which included the 

91 st Reconnaissance Squadron, the 3d 

Battalion of the 141 st Infantry, the 59th 

Field Artillery Battalion, an engineer 

battalion, and a medical company. 12 

10 IV Corps AAR, Jun-Jul 44. 

11 Fifth Army History, Part VI, pp. 32-35; IV Corps 

AAR, Jun 44. 

12 IV Corps AAR, Jun 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

The 36th Division's immediate objective was Grosseto, a provincial center 

approximately sixty miles northwest of 

Civitavecchia. Situated just north of the 

Ombrone River near the junction of 

Highways 1 and 73, Grosseto lies in the 

middle of a broad, flat valley formed by 

the Ombrone as it nears the sea. Almost fifteen miles wide, the valley is 

scored by a gridiron of small drainage 

ditches and canals. 

Six miles beyond the 36th Division's 

front and twenty-three miles south of 

Grosseto lay the town of Orbetello, 

located at the mainland end of a causeway linking the rocky peninsula of 

Monte Argentario and the port of San 

Stefano with the mainland. San Stefano 

was the first of a series of small ports 

beyond Civitavecchia dotting the Tyrrhenian coast as far as Leghorn. The 

Allied command, especially the Fifth 

Army, hoped that with San Stefano's 

large liquid storage facilities in Allied 

hands, it would help solve the growing 

fuel supply problems. The gasoline 

shortage had been aggravated a week 

earlier when fire in the Fifth Army 

dumps near Rome destroyed large 

quantities of fuel. 13 

The tactical problems to be solved by 

the 36th Division resembled those 

which had been faced by the 85th along 

the coastal highway south of Terracina 

during the drive to link up the southern front with the Anzio beachhead. 

Between Orbetello and Grosseto the 

Umbrian hills stretch almost to the 

coast and just east of Orbetello form a 

defile through which Highway 1 passes. 

1:\ Interv, Mathews with Lt Col Charles S. d'Orsa, 

10 May 48, CMH. Colonel d'Orsa was executive 

officer, fifth Army G-4, during th~ campaign. 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 

Since the defile had been incorporated 

into the enemy's Dora Line the Germans could rx; expected to' put up a 

stiff fight for the feature. 

Although the 361st Infantry had 

been held up for most of 10 June by 

fire from near the defile carrying Highway I through the Umbrian Hills, the 

141st Infantry-its 1st Battalion leading, 

followed by the 2d--encountered no 

opposition as it began moving up the 

highway shortly before dawn on the 

11 tho Yet just as the Americans had 

~gun to suspect that the enemy had 

withdrawn from the defile, out of the 

half-light of early morning heavy automatic weapons and artillery fire stabbed 

at the head of the column. The lead 

battalion quickly deployed off the road 

to set up a base of fire, while the next 

battalion in line turned off the main 

road to scale the high ground flanking 

the roadblock to the east. 

Full daylight found the 1st Battalion 

astride the highway, and the 2d Battalion well up the 700-foot Poggio Capalbiaccio, commanding the enemy's defenses; but during the morning two 

companies of ('..erman infantry, infiltrating through wheat fields eist of the 

feature, outflanked and overran the 2d 

Battalion's leading company and forced 

the Americans to fall back to the base 

of the hill. Not until the afternoon, and 

with the help of dh~sion artillery, was 

the battalion on Poggio Capalbiaccio 

a~le to resto~e its lines. That evening, 

rem forced With a battalion from the 

361st Infantry, the 2d Battalion once 

again started up the high ground. 

Throughout the night, fighting flared 

across the hillside, but dawn of the 12th 

found the 2d Battalion on top of 

Poggio Capalbiaccio and overlooking 

245 

the enemy roadblock along the coastal 

highway. 

This feat, in coJ!junction with a resumption of the 1st Battalion's attack 

along the highway during the afternoon 

of the 12th, was sufficient to force the 

Germans to yield the Orbetello defile 

and fall back' toward Grosetto. At that 

point General Walker relieved the 141 st 

Infantry with the 143d, which had been 

in reserve east of N unziatella. The 

141 st Infantry then shifted to the right 

to join Task Force Ramey and the 

regiment's 3d Battalion on that flank of 

the corps. 

That night engineers accompanied 

the infantry across the causeway to San 

Stefano, where the Americans found to 

their delight that the fuel storage facilities were still intact, than ks to Italian 

engineers who had failed to carry out 

German orders to destroy them. An 

Italian diver provided information concerning the location of underwater 

mines placed in deep moats surrounding the tanks. 

At San Stefano the Americans also 

discovered underground storage facilities for an additional 281,000 barrels of 

gasoline. 14 Yet before the first tanker 

could enter, the harbor had to be 

cleared of sunken ships and the docks 

repaired. That was difficult work under 

wartime conditions, so that not until 1 

July was the first tanker to dock, but 

the port soon became the main POL 

terminal for the Fifth Army.15 

While the 143d Infantry cleared Or14 Mayo MS, rh. XIV. 

,'5 Leo J. Meyer, MS, Strategy and Logistical 

HIstory: MTO, ch. XXXIX, "Extension of Communical.ions North of Rome" (hereafter cited as Mever 

MS), CMH; Interv, Mathews with d'Orsa, 10 Mav 

48. . 
246 

betello and occupied San Stefano, the 

142d Infantry, accom panied by tanks, 

crossed the hills on the division's right 

wing toward the village of Capalbio. 

The regiment brushed aside a weak 

counterattack by elements of the 162d 

TurkomRn Division to occupy the village 

before noon on the 11 tho That afternoon and throughout the next day the 

troops continued to advance-the infantry across the hills and the tanks 

through the narrow valleys-northwest 

to high ground just south of lateral 

Route 74. 16 

By the evening of 12 June, Walker's 

36th Division was within sight of the 

Albegna River, which parallels Route 74 

and enters the Tyrrhenian Sea five 

miles northwest of Orbetello. The general had planned crossings of the river 

that night, but it turned out that all 

bridges were destroyed and that the 

water was too deep for fording. Postponing the attack until morning, he put 

his engineers to work constructing footbridges in the darkness. Shortly before 

dawn on the 13th, the 142d Infantry, 

followed by the 143d on the left, began 

to cross. 

The 143d Infantry encountered little 

opposition until reaching the village of 

Bengodi on the banks of the smaller 

but deeper Osa River, three to four 

miles north of the Albegna. 17 Not so 

with the 142d Infantry on the right. As 

that regiment neared the village of 

Magliano, five miles north of the Albegna, heavy fire from that village and 

the hills to the north brought the men 

to a halt. They attem pted to outflank 

the village to the east, but resistance was 

I" IV Corps AAR, Jun 44; 36th Div Hist Rpt, Jun 

44. 

17 36th Div Hist Rpt, Jun 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

firm there as well. Nevertheless, by 

1500 the 2d Battalion, supported by 

tank and heavy artillery fire directed 

against the enemy in the hills to the 

north, managed to win a foothold in 

the outskirts of Magliano. During the 

rest of the afternoon and throughout 

the night the infantry inched into the 

village house by house and street by 

street. The village's fall opened a road 

along which the division could outflank 

Grosseto from the southeast, as it had 

done earlier at Orbetello. Throughout 

the afternoon the 142d infantry continued to move up until its leading battalions occupied high ground flanking the 

Magliano-Grosseto road. That night the 

361st infantry came forward to spell 

the 142d. 18 

Meanwhile, throughout the 14th, the 

143d Infantry continued to forge ahead 

astride the coastal highway. Attacking at 

dawn, the 2d and 3d Battalions required five hours to drive the enemy 

from the flanking high ground north 

of Bengodi, in the process capturing 

fifty prisoners and five artillery pieces. 

For the rest of the afternoon the two 

battalions advanced against slackening 

opposition, as the Germans, having lost 

Magliano, fell back across the corps 

front toward Grosseto. By dark the 

regiment had come within twelve miles 

of Grosseto and the Ombrone River. 19 

Moving before dawn on the 15th, a 

battalion on each side of the highway, 

the 143d Infantry encountered no resistance in occupying the high ground 

1 K Ibid. During the battle for Magliano, S. Sgt. 

Homer L. Wise's fearless and skillful leadership of 

his rille platoon enabled the 2d Battalion to seize its 

objective. For this action Sergeant Wise was 

awarded the Medal of Honor. 

19 IV Corps AAR, Jun 44. 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 

overlooking the Ombrone and in flanking the highway near Collecchio, a 

village six miles south of the river. As 

the men descended into the river valley 

and worked their way across the network of small streams and drainage 

ditches scoring the valley floor, sporadic 

machine gun and mortar fire picked at 

them, but there were few casualties. 

Locating a ford a mile east of the main 

road, the troops waited until dark before attempting to cross the river. 

Thereupon one battalion proceeded 

quickly into Grosseto. The Germans 

had already left. 20 

To the right of the 143d, the 361st 

Infantry operating south and west of 

Istia d'Ombrone, four miles northeast 

of Grosseto, had more trouble in crossing the river. Unable to locate a ford, 

engineers toiled through the night to 

construct a footbridge. When the men 

began crossing at daylight on the 16th, 

enemy artillery inflicted a number of 

casualties. It was early afternoon before 

all three battalions were across the river 

and astride high ground overlooking 

the valley from the northeast. 21 

On the division's right flank Task 

Force Ramey had been held up since 

early on the 14th by resolute defenders 

south of Triana, a small, walled town at 

a road junction twenty-two miles east of 

Grosseto. Instead of a direct confrontation, General Ramey concentrated on 

clearing the neighboring villages of 

Santa Caterina, Vallerona, and Roccalbegna. That so threatened the enemy's 

line of communications to the strongpoint at Triana that the town's garrison 

soon withdrew. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid.; Fifih Army History, Part VI, pp. 37-40. 

247 

On the morning of the 16th Ramey's 

men entered Triana. The fall first of 

Grosseto on the night of the 15th and 

then of Triana meant that the VI 

Corps was well past the Dora Line and 

two-thirds of the way to the Frieda 

Line. 

Early next day, 17 June, a 9,700-man 

French amphibious landing force attacked the island of Elba, seven miles 

off the coast. Composed of two regimental combat teams from the 9th 

Colonial Division and a commando battalion with a group of goumiers attached, all supported by an American 

air task force, with a British naval task 

force in general support, the French 

approached the island over a calm, fogshrouded sea from a base in nearby 

Corsica. Despite some early resistance 

by a 2,500-man enemy garrison, 550 of 

whom were Italian Fascist troops and 

the rest Germans, the French quickly 

established two secure beachheads. The 

next day virtually all resistance ceased. 

Other than to lx)ost French morale, the 

capture of Elba had little immediate 

significance for the Allies, yet for the 

Germans the operation again raised the 

specter of an Allied amphibious operation to the German rear and made 

Kesselring pause before committing his 

reserve, the 16th SS Panur Grpnadier 

Division. 22 

The IV Corps, meanwhile, continued 

to move nortl-rwestward, paralleling the 

coast beyond Grosseto. On the left wing 

along the coast, the 36th Division advanced on a IS-mile front to clear all 

22 The Allied intelligence officers had grossly 

overestimated the number of Italian troops on Elba; 

allied sources estimated 5,000 It"lian soldiers to be 

on the island. See SAC Despatch, 10 May-12 Aug 

44, pp. 37-40, and Greiner and Schramm, eds., 

OKW/WFSt, KTB, IV(I), pp. 524-25. 
248 

the high ground southeast of Route 73. 

On the right wing, Task Force Ramey, 

with the 141 st Infantry attached, cut 

Route 73 below the town of Rou"astrada, ten miles north of the coastal 

highway, there to await relief by the 1st 

Armored Division. 

In ten days the IV Corps had progressed but twenty-two miles on a 20-

mile front, a rate imposed by persistent 

German delaying action and one hardly 

characteristic of a rapid pursuit. Yet it 

then appeared that even firmer German resistance might be in the offing, 

possibly sufficient even to halt the pursuit; for as the corps prepared to cross 

Route 73, intelligence officers identified 

prisoners h'om the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. 23 

The French Advance to the Orcia 

A similar threat was developing on 

the Fifth Army's right wing, where 

General Juin's French Expeditionary 

Corps, since relieving the U.S. II Corps 

on I () June, had encountered steadily 

increasing resistance. In the meantime, 

the French had learned that they would 

soon be withdrawn from the hunt to 

prepare for the invasion of southern 

France. During the weeks to come, that 

knowledge would exercise, especially 

among the French officers of the North 

African legions, a strong psychological 

restraint over operations. Why die with 

the liberation of France dose at hand? 

The dash and spontaneity that had 

characterized FEC operations in the 

mountains south of Rome thus was 

missing. 24 

23 Fifth Army History, Part VI, pp. 38-41. 

24 Interv, Mathews with Gen Clark, 1948, CMH. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Finding his corps again operating 

over the worst terrain in the army 

sector, General J uin f()rmed an ad hoc 

pursuit corps headquarters to direct 

field operations. He placed Lt. Gen. 

Edgard R.M. de Larminat in command 

of a force that included Maj. Gen. 

Diego Brosset's I st Motorized (March) 

Division and Maj. Gen. de Goisland de 

Monsabert's 3d Algerian division, all 

still supported by the 13th U.S. Field 

Artillery Brigade and its attached battalions. 2~ 

The first objective was Route 74, the 

lateral road connecting Highways I and 

2 running east-west just north of Lake 

Bolsena, some nineteen miles north of 

the jump-off positions. Attacking on II 

June, even as the neighlx)ring IV Corps 

began to head toward Orbetello and 

Grosseto, the French gained Lake Bolsena on the 12th. It took another two 

days to come up to either side of the 

lake and to get beyond it, at the same 

time that the neighboring task force 

cleared Route 74 between Lake Bolsena 

and the sea. 

On the same day General Clark 

extended the FEe western boundary to 

dose a developing gap between the two 

corps. To cover the wider front, General de Larminat reinf()rced General de 

Monsabert's Algerian division with a 

task f()1'Ce that, in proceeding diagonallv 

to the northwest and roughly parallel to 

tl.e line of the coast, soon pinched out 

Task Force Ramey. 

By nightfall on 17 June the French 

had gained positions some fifteen miles 

beyond Lake Bolsena but f()r the next 

three days a combination of enemy 

resistance and worsening weather re~ 

25 Fifth Army History, Part VI, pp. 41-46. 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 

stricted progress to another ten miles. 

By the 20th the corps was nevertheless 

within striking distance of the Orcia 

River, a westward flowing tributary of 

the Ombrone. As the FEC prepared to 

assault the obstacle, Brosset's 1 st Motorized Division began to withdraw in 

anticipation of the invasion of southern 

France, while Maj. Gen Andre W. 

Dody's 2d Moroccan Infantry Division 

moved from corps reserve to take its 

place in line. 

The British Sector 

General Clark's concern that the British Eighth Army, facing a more capable 

German f<nce and more difficult terrain, would be unable to keep pace with 

the Fifth Army proved needless, f()l' 

General Leese's troops had maintained 

a momentum developed during the 

first \\eek of the pursuit beyond Rome. 

The Eighth Army continued to advance 

northward on a two-corps front, the 13 

Corps to the west of Lake Trasimeno 

via Highway 71, and the 10 Corps to 

the east of the lake. 21; 

After some delav due to the need to 

squeeze through' Viterbo's narro\\ 

streets at the same time the U.S. II 

Corps was trying to withdraw from the 

area, the 13 Corps by the evening of 13 

June had drawn to within f<lm miles of 

Orvieto, its first o~jective. A few days 

before, that move would have threatened to block the Germans' lateral 

communications from Terni and Todi 

through Orvieto to the sectors west of 

the Tiber; but Kesselring, too, having 

completed the regrouping, strength21i Operations of British. Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Part II, Sec. D. Unless otherwise 

indicated this ~ection is based upon this source, 

249 

ened the Fourtpf'nth Army's front and no 

longer needed that lateral route. 

The regrouping had begun on the 

12th with the transfer of Senger's XIV 

Panzer Corps headquarters from the 

Tenth to the Fourteenth Army sector, 

where the panzer corps took command 

of the 19th and 20th Luftwaffe Field 

Divisions on the coastal flank, pending 

the arrival of its former divisions-the 

26th Panzer and the 29th and 90th 

Panzer Grenadier Divisions from the Tenth 

A rmy zone. Since 13 June the panzer 

and the two panzer grenadier divisions 

had been located west of the Tiber, 

where they had been steadily braking 

the Fifth Army's forward movement. 

Whether the Tenth Army, shorn of those 

units, could continue to do the same to 

General Leese's Eighth Armv, \\'as a 

question about to be ans\\'ered as the 

Eighth Army, like the Fifth, prepared 

to dose with the Frieda Line. 

Orvieto no longer having meaning, 

the Germans, as the 13 Corps approached, began withdrawing into hills 

commanding the Paglia valley north of 

the town. By noon on 14 June the 6th 

South African Armoured Division had 

cleared t he town of the last of the 

German rear guards. 

East of the Tiber the 1 () Corps 

shifted its axis slightly west\\'ard from 

Rieti to Terni, for enemv mO\'ements, 

observed by reconnaiss<~nce aircraft, 

had indicated that Temi had become 

the f(lCUS of the regrouping of General 

Feuerstein's U Mountain Corps. For se\'-

eral days Feuerstein had received help 

in that task by terrain that had so 

canalized the 10 Corps' advance as to 

requii'e the British 6th Armoured Di\1-

sion to take five days to cover the thirt\' 

miles between Pass~l Corese and Ten~i 
250 

on Highway 4. As on the Fifth Army 

front, the British armor led the way 

during the day and the inbntry at 

night, and, similarly, demolitions 'covered by artillery and mortar fire caused 

most of the delays. The British armor 

did not reach the southern outskirts of 

Terni until 13 June, there to be held 

up for two days by a demolished bridge 

across a deep gorge just outside the 

town. The gorge at last bridged, the 

tan kers f(lUnd the enemy gone from 

Terni. 

Kesselring Reinjarces His Right Wing 

From the German viewpoint, despite 

the successive loss of Grosseto, Orvieto, 

and Terni, chances of restoring an 

intact hunt had improved considerably 

by mid-June. In addition to returning 

Senger's XIV Panzer Corps to the Fourteenth Army, Field Marshal Kesselring 

also brought the Hermann Goering Panzer Grenadier Parachute Division back into 

action, this time on the Tenth Arm·v's 

right flank north of Orvieto 0PPOSIrC 

the British 13 Corps. 

Undoubtedly, Field Marshal Kesselring's most significant accomplishment 

during the first ten days after the loss 

of Rome had been to prevent a breakthrough along the interarmy rx)undary 

and to reinforce the Fourteenth Army 

west of the Tiber. By mid-June the 

Fourteenth Army commander, General 

Lemelsen, couid muster nine divisions, 

with two others having been withdrawn 

f()r rest and reorganization. Although 

three of the nine critically needed relicf~ 

five of the remaining six were first-rate 

panzer and panzer grenadier divisions. 

Opposite those divisions the U.S. 

Fifth Army had, by mid-J une, six divisions and part of a seventh (the 91 st). 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

On the Eighth Army left wing the 

British 13 Corps controlled three di visions, making a total of about nine and 

a half divisions against the Fourteenth 

Annis nine, Even allowing f()r the fact 

that three of the nine were undersU'ength, the ratio of nine and a half to 

nine scarcely afforded a promise of a 

continued rapid Allied advance. 27 Opposite the equivalent of five divisions in 

the 10 Corps, on the Eighth Army right 

wing, the German situation was no 

more encouraging, for there General 

Vietinghoffs Tenth Army mustered eight 

divisions, divided between Herr's LXXVI 

Panzer Corps and Feuerstein's LI Mountain Corps. 

The ability of the Germans, despite 

harassment by a daily average of 1,000 

Allied air sorties, to shifi: m~jor units 

from one sector to another and to 

bring important reinf()rcements fi'om 

northern Italy to man the several delaying lines north of Rome had been 

largely responsible f()l' the failure of the 

two Allied armies to cut off and destroy 

significant parts of either of the t\r~) 

German armies. By maintaining maneuverability, the Germans were able to 

re-form along new lines even in the 

f~lCe of Allied pressure and penetration, 

forcing upon tbe Allies a form of 

pursuit that had corne to characterize 

Russian operations against the Germans 

on the Eastern Front. In the opinion of 

General von Senger und Enedin, onl\' 

if the Allies hati, as at Anzio, takeil 

~ldvantage of the Germans' long and 

vulnerable se~H\'ard Hanks to launch 

amphibious landings could that pattern 

have been broken. Unknown to the 

27 Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB. 

IV(\), pp. 520-21. 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 251 

GENERALS BRANN, CRITrENBERGER, AND MASCARENHAS 

Germans at the time, the shortage of 

landing craft prevented such operations. 28 

Both the specteJ" of Allied amphibious landings and the very real £act of 

partisan operations against German 

lines of communications bedeviled German commanders. The farther north 

the Germans retreated the more active 

became Italian partisan bands, many 

led by former Italian Army officers. As 

early as 13 June, Lemelsen's chief of 

staff had obtained army group author2. See Special Invesligalions and Inlerrogalion 

Repon, Operalion Lighlening USDlc/SII R 30/36, 

15 Mar 1947, CMH files, and Senger, Neilha Hope 

nor Fear, pp. 257-58. See also Greiner and 

Schramm, eds., OKWIWFSI, KTB, IV(I), p. 519. 

ity to punish acts of sabotage against 

the German armed forces and to take 

ten-fc)r-one reprisals against military-age 

members of the civilian population f()r 

every German soldier killed or 

wounded by partisans. By mid-June 

sabotage of the German lines of communications had nevertheless reached 

such proportions as to disrupt not only 

long-distance telephone cables, upon 

which the Germans had increasingly 

come to rely fc)r their communications 

because of Allied ail' attacks on military 

signal facilities, but also to immobilize 

even local telephone netwOl·ks. In the 

vicinity of Siena, some 115 miles' north 

of Rome, partisans also cut a vital 

lateral supply route leading from Gros-
252 

seto to Siena. Stung by these actions, 

the Germans were to take stern countermeasures in the weeks to come. 2!1 

The Eighth Army Closes With the Frieda 

Line 

As the British 10 Corps resumed its 

advance early on 15 June, the improved stance of German units soon 

became apparent. The British 6th ArmOUl'ed Division, leading the way, did 

manage to cross the Nera River over 

bridges recently completed at Terni 

and Narni during the last leg of an 

advance aimed at Perugia, ten miles 

east of Lake Trasimeno. However, Vietinghofl the Tenth Army commander, 

had selected Perugia, a major German 

supply base, as the hinge of his f()l'ward 

defensive zone east of the lake. Although the British armor was able to go 

twenty miles beyond the N era with little 

difficulty, unexpectedly strong resistance developed on the 16th southeast 

of Todi, midway between Temi and 

Perugia. To bypass it, the corps commander orde~'ed the Tiber bridged 

about three miles northwest of Todi so 

that progress could continue along the 

'vvest bank over terrain more favorable 

f()I' armor. The bridge completed early 

on the 17th, the 6th Armoured Division 

resumed its advance along both sides of 

the Tiber. Moving rapidly once again, 

the British by nightfall drew within six 

miles of Perugia,30 the goal assigned by 

2"AOK 14, la KTB Ani. J, 13 Jun 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 5909111; Ltr, R.R. Wadleigh, 2d Lt FA. l42d 

I nf. 16 J ul 44. to Lt Col H.E. Helsten. 2660 Hq Co 

M1CS (reel 41-A, G-3 Div. Sp Opns meso AFHQ 

microfilm). 

:In Five miles southeast of On'iew the Tiber 

makes a sharp bend to the northeast as far as Todi; 

from there it turns again northward to Perugia. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

General Leese in the first week of June; 

but as was soon evident, the corps had 

also closed with outposts of the Frieda 

Line. It took another three davs to 

conquer Perugia. After yielding th~ city, 

the Germans withdrew into their main 

defensive zone in hills north and nOl'thwest of the city. The next day, the 20th, 

in the face of the staunchest resistance 

since the fall of Rome, the advance 

ground to a halt just beyond Perugia. 

In the 13 Corps sector the 6th South 

African Armoured Division also ran 

into strong defenses along that part of 

the Frieda Line west of Lake Trasimeno. By the 16th several fresh enemy 

u~its, taking advantage of a range <;f 

hIlls southwest of Lake Trasimeno, held 

the armor at Chiusi, on Highway 71 

twenty-two miles north of Orvieto. Intelligence gleaned fmm prisoners indicated that the 334th Infantry Division lay 

west of the highway,' the '1 st Parachut~ 

Division astride the road, and the 356th 

Infantry Division to the east. 

Thus were signs increasing across the 

entire Eighth Army front that the enemy \\as determined to give battle 

along a line flanking Lake Trasimeno 

to the east and west. To add to the 

attacker's woes, heavy rains began failing on the evening :)f the 17th, transf()rming the countryside into a quagmire. By the 20th it \\as dear that the 

Germans could be dislodged onh' by a 

full-scale set-piece attack. c With the' 13 

Corps bogged down southwest of Lake 

T rasimeno and the 10 Corps unable to 

penetrate the hills north and west of 

Perugia, the Eighth Army's pursuit, like 

that of the Fifth Armv. aooeared to be 

at an end. " 

Conscious that the tempo of the 

advance west of the Apennines was 
PURSUIT NORTH OF ROME 253 

GENERALS LEESE (left) AND ANDERS 

insufficient to induce the Germans to 

yield the port city of Ancona on the 

Adriatic coast without a fight, General 

Alexander accordingly decided to step 

up operations in the Adriatic sector. On 

15 June he ordered General Anders' 2 

Polish Corps back into line to relieve 

the British 5 Corps, which since the fall 

of Rome had limited its operations to 

proceeding on the heels of the enemy 

withdrawal. The next day the Poles, 

with a brigade-size Italian Corps of 

Liberation attached on the left, began 

to move toward Ancona, 70 miles to the 

northwest. Over the next five days the 

advance carried 45 miles to and beyond 

the Chienti River and within 25 miles ~ 

of the goal of Ancona. 

The week's rapid progress had been 

made possible largely by an earlier 

German decision to fall back on the 

defenses of Ancona, which constituted 

that part of the Frieda Line east of the 

Apennines. Trying to renew the advance on the 22d, the Poles too were 

checked. Only with sizable reinforcements, General Anders concluded, 

would he be able to break the enemy's 

hold south of Ancona. Generals Alexander and Leese approved a two-week 
254 

pause to enable him to effect the 

buildup. :II 

The pursuit everywhere was nearing 

an end. At the time it had begun, 

General Alexander had assured General Wilson, the Mediterranean theater 

'" Operations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy. Part II. Sec. A. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

commander, that barring substantial 

German reinforcements, the Allies by 

the end of June would have reached ;. 

line extending £i'om Grosseto to Perugia. Even though three additional enemy divisions had entered the line, 

Ale'xandn had achieved that goal and a 

liule more. 
CHAITER XIV 

The Pursuit Ends 

Strategic Priorities: France or Italy 

As the Allied armies moved beyond 

Rome, the inter-Allied debate over 

Mediterranean strategy entered a second and more urgent phase. The first 

phase had ended when the American 

Chiefs of Staff reluctantly abandoned 

their plans for an Operation ANVIL 

timed to coincide with Operation OVERLORD. Now that OVERLORD had secured 

a firm toehold on northern France and 

Rome had fallen to the Allied spring 

oflensive in Italy, that old question of 

which theater-Italy or southern 

France-would offer the best opportunity to contain German troops and 

thereby assist General Eisenhower's armies in northern France had yet to be 

decided. 

Diversion of enemy f()rces from 

northern France was the bait that Alexander extended to his American colleagues in an efl()rt to make his own 

Italy-first strategy more palatable to 

men whose attention for several months 

had been fixed on southern France 

rather than on Italy. The primary object of the Italian campaign was, in 

Alexander's words, "to complete the 

destruction of the German armed 

forces in Italy and in the process to 

force the enemy to draw to the maximum on his reserves." I The greatest 

I See AAI Msg, MA 1364, 6 Jun 44, AAI to 

AFGQ, in Operations of British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, Part II, Sec. A, App. D-2. 

assistance the Allied forces in Italy 

could offer the invasion of northern 

France was to divert large numbers of 

German divisions from France. Alexander's intelligence officers believed 

that by 6 June the Germans had already committed an equivalent of six 

additional divisions in Italy; actually, 

they had moved only four. An additional six divisions were believed to be 

in the country but not yet committed, 

although only two of those were regarded as even approximating full combat effectiveness. In reality, the Germans after the loss of Rome had withdrawn five divisions for rest and reorganization in [he rear, while a sixth, the 

92d, was disbanded. 

At the time the Germans began to 

retreat beyond Rome, Field Marshal 

Kesselring controlled 24 divisions-19 

in his two armies, 2 in army group 

reserve, and 3 en route into Italy. Many 

wcre understrength or inexperienced. 

Two, for example, were made up of 

Air Force personnel from airport security battalions, including antiaircraft artillery and searchlight units. Another 

was composed of former prisonen of 

war from Soviet Cen tral Asia, ,,11 ile 

others, made up largely of overage and 

convalescent troops, ,,'ere suitable only 

for coastal defense or garrison duty.2 

2 Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKWIWFSt, KTB, 

IV(I), pp. 515-23. 
256 

Alexander concluded that by the time 

the Allied armies had fought their way 

to the Northern Apennines, Kesselring 

would have no more than the equivalent of ten fully combat-effective divisions with which to defend the Gothic 

Line. Yet Alexander believed that Kesselring would need at least twelve divisions for that task, and defense of his 

coastal flanks would require additional 

divisions of lesser caliber. Alexander 

believed the Germans would have to 

bring into Italy eight to ten fresh 

divisions from the nearby Western 

Front, rather than from' the hardpressed and more distant Eastern 

Front, which is what the Germans eventually did. Thus, so Alexander's argument ran, a vigorous continuation of 

the Allied offensive up the Italian peninsula could be expected to help the 

Allied drive across northern France and 

into Germanv.:\ 

Alexander' calculated that after reaching the approximate line of GrossetoPerugia (roughly, the Frieda l:ine), his 

armies during the second half of July 

would be prepared to mount a full-scale 

attack against the Gothic Line. That 

presupposed that Leghorn, the remaining port on the Tyrrhenian coast, and 

Ancona, on the Adriatic coast, would be 

in hand and providing necessary logistical backup for a 20-division force. Since 

those divisions would be full strength, 

they would be more than a match for 

twenty-four enemy divisions of lesser 

strength. 4 

Once past the Gothic Line, his armies, Alexander expected, would be 

3Ibid.; SAC Despatch, The Italian Campaign, 10 

May to 15 Aug 44. 

4 SAC Despatch. The Italian Campaign, 10 May 

to 15 Aug 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

able to continue without interruption to 

drive the Germans from the Northern 

Apennines, take Bologna, and, by late 

summer, establish in the Po Valley a 

base for operations directed most likely 

northeastward toward Austria and the 

mid-Danube basin, a long-time object of 

British strategic interest. ~ Airfields of 

great value to the Allied air forces in 

the western Mediterranean also could 

be secured, and the agricultural products of the Po Valley denied the enemy. 

These long-range predictions rested 

upon the assumption that the Allied 

ground and air forces then in Italy 

would remain; whereas on 12 June, 

only a week after Alexander had made 

them, General Wilson had informed 

him that the Allied Force Headquarters' American-dominated planning 

staff remained firmly wedded to the 

ANVIL operation, which would have to 

be mounted out of resources already in 

the ;\lediterranean theater. That meant 

giving up the U.S. VI Corps headquarters, the FEC, and three U.S. and two 

French divisions. Although the final 

decision on ANVIL was yet to be made, 

it was evident as early as mid-J une that 

planning for it at the theater level had 

advanced almost to the point of no 

return. 

When Wilson and Alexander met 

again on 17 June at Alexander's headquarters in Caserta, the two tried valiantly to salvage something of Alexander's proposed strategy. Since the 

5 Although Alexander's recommendations also irreluded a suggestion that operations might be 

mounted against 'France from the Po Valley, a 

glance at the terrain and a knowledge of British 

desires and intentions prompts the conclusion that 

this was only verbal dust to be thrown into the eyes 

of American advocates of Operation ANVIL (southern France). 
THE PURSU IT ENDS 

Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington no 

longer viewed the puqx)se of ANVIL as 

a diversion for C,.eneral Eisenhower's 

armies, now that those armies were 

securely established in France, Wilson 

introdticed a new variation of the diversion concept by observing that tbe Mediterranean theater's basic mission was to 

prevent the Germans {i'om reinf()}Ting 

armies in France. Alexander, in turn, 

elaborated on the theme by increasing 

his estimates of 6 June. If the Germans 

\\fished to retain the Po Valley, he 

maintained, they would have to reinforce their armies in Italy with ten to 

fifteen divisions by the end of June. 

Those reinf(H'cements, Alexander reasoned, would have to come from 

France rather than from the hardpressed Eastern Front or from the 

Balkans, long seething with partisan 

activity. If the Germans failed to reinforce, the Allied armies by mid-July 

would be in tbe Po Valley in a position 

to attack across the Adige River with 

ten to twelve divisions in mid-August 

and capture the Ljubljana Gap by the 

end of the month. " 

Although this restatement of British 

strategic aims f(mnd support among the 

air force and naval commanders also 

present at the meeting, it fbund none at 

all with Wilson's American deputy and 

planning chief, General Devers, who 

again pointed out that diversion of 

enemy forces from northern France, 

" Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 

1943-1944; Michael Howard, The Mediterranean 

Strategy in the Second World War (New York: Praeger, 

\968); Trumbull Higgins, Soft Underbelly: The Anglo· 

American Controversy Over the Italian Campaign, 1939-

45 (\iew York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 

These works discuss the consequences of the mili· 

tary versus the political-military aspects of American 

versus British decision making, 

257 

desirable though that might be, was no 

longer General Eisenhower's primary 

strategic requirement. The Supreme Allied Commander instead needed a major French fXm for bringing in American troops and supplies. Only ANVIL 

would satisfy that requirement. 

Later in the day the U.S. Army Chief 

of Staff, General Marshall, who had 

arrived in haly for an inspection trip 

fbllmving a visit to Eisenhower's London headquarters, added weight to 

what Devers had said. There were, 

Marshall noted, fortv to fifty divisions 

in the United States 'ready f~r commitment in France. Port f'acilities then 

available in northern France were insuf· 

ficient to handle such a large force and 

its logistical support, and to stage the 

divisions through the United Kingdom 

was impracticable. Eisenhower needed a 

m~jor French port-Marseillesthrough which the reinforcements 

could move directlv, Marshall added 

(undoubtedly with tl~e British interest in 

the Danube basin in mind) the fmther 

caveat that the divisions were, in any 

case, unavailable for service else\\'hel'e 

in the Mediterranean theater. 7 

As for Alexander's estimate that the 

Germans would fight to hold the Po 

Valley, Marshall believed they would 

opt instead for defending th~ Alpine 

passes. Alexander's projected offensive 

through the Northern Apennines and 

into the Po Valley thus would cause no 

diversion of enemy forces from anv 

front, east or west. ' 

, Never enthusiastic about a m~jor campaign in 

Italy. General Manhall had agreed to operations in 

southern Italy and a push toward Rome onl\' to gel 

a firm holding position while landing craft were 

being shifted from the Mediterranean to England 

for OVERLORD, See Pogue, George G. Marshall, 

Organizer of Victory, 1943-45, p, 295, 
258 

Acknowledging the validity of Marshall's argument, Wilson pointed out 

that with available resources he would 

be unable to mount ANVIL while at the 

same time pursuing a major offensive 

in Italy. That was the theme adopted 

by the advocates of Italy-first \e\·hen 

• .\I1ied commanders met two days later 

on 19 June to resume their discussions. 

This time the air commanders, Air 

Marshal Slessor and General Eaker, 

agreed with Wilson. Once the Allied 

armies reached the Northern Apennines and closed with the German 

defenses there, Eaker observed, a diversion of air power to support the attack 

on southern France would necessarily 

redU(:e the Italian campaign to a defensive action. Marshall countered with the 

observation that once the initial phase 

of Operation ANVIL was completed, 

Allied air power would be sufficient f()llx)th France and Italy. 

Marshall's argum~nts apparently carried some weight with Wilson, for on 

the 19th he threw his support to ANVIL 

on the condition that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff back Marshall's position 

on the paramount need for a major 

port in southern France. a The f()llowing day, in a cable to General Eisenhower in regard to future operations in 

the Mediterranean theater, he reiterated the familiar British position that 

unabated and undiminished continuation of Alexander's offensive would 

divert so many divisions from the path 

of Eisenhower's armies in northern 

France that the Germans would face 

prospects of defeat befl)re the end of 

the year. If, on the other hand, Eisen8 Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 

1943-44, p. 470. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

hower preferred to proceed with the 

invasion of southern France, Wilson 

cautioned that the operation could not 

be mounted before 15 August. This 

would, of course, prevent i:x)th an immediate diversion of enemy divisions 

from France and an immediate offensive by Alexander's armies against the 

Gothic Line, thereby giving the Germans a badly needed respite. 

The next da v the 21 st \-vord arrived 

from London Is'tating wl~at Wilson already knew from his conversations with 

Marshall, that Eisenhower remained 

firmlv committed to ANVIL. For the 

remainde,' of the month of June, Prime 

Minister Churchill would bombard 

President Roosevelt with frantic appeals 

to salvage something of British plans 

fix "a descent on the Isn-ian peninsula 

and a thrust against Vienna through 

the Ljubljana Gap"; but the President 

held firm in support of his military 

advisers. For all practical purposes 21 

June represented the passing of the 

point of no return for the ANVIL 

operation. Southern France it would be, 

and the campaign in Italy would have 

to suffer the consequences.!1 

In the end the dire eHects so many 

had predicted for the Italian campaign 

as a result of the decision in favor of 

ANVIL were short-lived and far less 

drastic than partisans of the Italy-first 

theme had imagined. Even the troop 

withdrawals in June and July tipped the 

balance only slightly against the Allies in 

Italy, and the situation would be fully 

"Ibid., pp. 472-75. In early August the British 

made a final eff()rt to persuade the Americans to 

either land ANVIL forces through Breton ports or 

permit them to remain in italy for an advance into 

the middle Danube Basin. On I August the code 

designation for Operation ANVIL was changed to 

Operation DRAGOON. 
THE PURSUIT ENDS 

re~ressed in October. By that time the 

Allies were destined to have five fresh 

divisions in Italy, while the Germans 

would have moved f(lUr divisions from 

I taly to serve on other fronts. III 

Breaking the Frieda Line 

By 21 June the Allied armies in Italy 

had. reached a line extending across th~ penmsub from a point on the Tyrrhenian coast, some 110 miles north~\'est of 

~ome,. to the Adriatic coast at a point 

fIve miles north of Pedaso. The general 

trend of the front remained, as' it had 

since the fall of Rome, with the Allied 

left advanced and the right refused. 

On the left the Fifth Army was some 

30 miles short of its interm~diate goal, 

I<~te~'al R(~llte 68, which, paralleling the 

LeClna River f(x I:) miles, connects the 

to.wn of Ceci~la on the coastal highway 

with the anCient Etruscan hill town of 

Volterra, 20 miles to the northeast, 

t~ence .another IS miles to a junction 

WIth Highway 2 not quite midway between Siena .and Florence. (Map IX) 

Key to the Fdt~l Army's program was 

the Tuscan Hills, a stretch of low, 

~'ollin~ terrain overlooking and parallelmg Highway I from the cast. Once the 

enemy had been cleared from those 

hills, the coastal corridor would provide 

an excellent route of advance. The 

crests are generally wooded and the 

lower, seaward-bcing slopes covered 

with orchards and vineyards. Since it 

was summer, the vegetation was in full 

leaf and aH(wded the Germans, operatmg under Allied-dominated skies, des-

, 111 For a detailed analysis of t his debate as it 

II1fluenced the campaign in southern France. see 

Robert Ross Smith. The Riviera to the Rhine, in 

preparatIOn for the series, UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, 

259 

perately needed concealment. East of 

the hills and about five miles inland, a 

graveled secondary road wound northward through a s~ries of stream valleys 

to a junction with lateral Route 68 

eight miles east of Cecina. ' 

About the latitude of Grosseto the 

trend of t he coastline becomes more 

n,orthwesterly, thus \\'idening the IV 

Corps front and enabling General Crittenberger to employ f()!, the first time 

two full divisions, the 36th Inbntrv and 

the I st Anno~'ed. Relining Ra;lle\''s 

task force,. whICh had been screening 

the corps nght flank, the 1st Armorecl 

Division was to clear the enemv from 

the hills overlooking the coastal c~)JTidor 

by movi.ng ~d~)l1g the axis of Highway 

439, \\I1i(~h JOll1ed lateral Route 68 five 

miles south\\'est of Volterra. 11 

Alt hough Critten berger, t he IV 

Corps commander, realized that the 

hillv terrain was less L1\urable f()!, arl~lor than that assigned the 36th Di\ision along the coast, he \\'anted to avoid 

t~e. I.oss of time inherent in shifting 

diVISions. He also beJie\'ed that the 

Germans would concentrate on defense 

of the coastal flank and depend, as they 

h~d in t~e past,. upon th~ more rugged 

hili terram to aid them m the interior. 

A hard-hitting armored division with 

sufficient fire power could be expected 

to force the enemy from the hills and 

enable General Harmon's tanks to so 

threaten the flank of the Germans in 

th.e coastal corridor as to prompt their 

Withdrawal. General Crittenberger, 

moreover, was aware that he soon was 

to lose the 36th Division and alerted 

General Ryder, commander of the 34th 

Division, to be prepared to relieve 

11 IV Corps AAR. Jun 44, 
260 

Walker's 36th Division within the 

week. I:! 

Learning of his latest assignment. 

General Harmon protested, as he had 

when his division had been committed 

in the Alban Hills south of Rome, that 

hill coumry was no place ft)r tanks. He 

nevertheless again threw himself into 

his task with characteristic enthusiasm, 

gruffness, and salubrious profanity. 'To 

provide Harmon with additional infantry needed to support armor in hilly 

terrain where numerous defended barriers and roadblocks might be expected 

on narrow, winding roads. Crittenberger attached to Harmon's division the 

361 st Infantry (less one battalion). 13 

Unfortunately,' those troops had never 

worked closely with armor, and the 

result would ~ less than ideal. 14 To the 

armor Crittenberger also attached the 

ISS-mm. guns of the 6th Armored 

Field Artillery Group, \\'hich were to 

provide reinforcing fires until the m:-

mored division had arrived at maxImum range, whereupon the group was 

to shift westward to join the rest of the 

corps artillery in general support of the 

infantry along the coast. J~ 

As the armor moved into the hills 

early on 21 june, Walker's 36th Division, less the attached 51 7th Parachute 

Infantry, continued along the coastal 

flank into a low range of hills between 

Highway 1 and the coast northwest of 

Grosseto. With the 142d Infantry on 

the left of the highway and the 143d 

Infantry on the right, the division en12 Interv, Mathews with Ladue, 17 JUIl 48, CMH; 

IV Corps AAR, Jan 44. 

13 Howe, Battle History of the 1 sf Armored Division. 

pp.354-55, 

14 IV Corps AAR, JUIl 44; Interv, ?\.fathews with 

Ladue, 17 J ul 48. 

" Interv, Mathews with Ladue, 17 Jul 48, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

countered only scattered resistance en 

route to the Cornia River, about 10 

miles away, In the process the advance 

would seal off a small peninsula and 

the little port of Piombino with valuable 

oil storage facilities. 

For all the lack of determined resistance, the infantry's advance was considerably delayed by heavy rains on 22 

june, but relief of Task Force Ramey 

during the day by the I st Armored 

Division provided additional strength to 

assist the infantry on the 23d, both the 

141 st Inhntry and the 51 7th Parachute 

Infantry. The paratroopers took ovel' 

the 36th Division's left flank along the 

coastal highway, while the 141st Infantry joined the 143d Infantry for the 

drive toward the Cornia River. By 

nightfall on the 24th the two regiments 

had crossed the river and partially 

sealed off the Piombino peninsula, but 

the rear guard of the 19th Luftwaffe 

Field Division, retreating along the coast, 

got away bef()re the last escape route 

could be cut. 

The next day, the 25th, marked the 

36th Division's last participation in the 

Italian campaign. After having been in 

action almost continuously since 28 May 

and having covered almost 240 road 

miles since the breakthrough of the 

Caesar Line at Monte Artemisio on I 

june, Walker's division pulled out of 

line in preparation for its role in southern France. 

As had the earlier capture of Civitavecchia and San Stefano, the capture of 

Piombino would soon help to relieve 

pressure on Allied supply lines. Located 

mid\'\1ay between Civitavecchia and 

Leghor~l, Piombino's harbor could handle twelve ships at a time. Like Civitavecchia, Piombino, with a prewar pop-
THE PURSUIT ENDS 

ulation of 10,000, required extensive 

rehabilitation, but by the end of June 

the port was able to accommodate 

several ships. During the next three 

months, 377,000 tons of cargo and 

1,477 vehicles were discharged and f()l'-

warded through the port, an amount 

almost twice that handled at Civitavecchia during the same period. In addition, 20,446 troops arrived there. 111 The 

port's main drawback was the absence 

of a rail connection with the main line 

running northward from Rome, so that 

all cargo had to be f()l'\varded by motor 

transport until mid-August when the 

Fifth Army engineers established a railhead nearby at Venturina. In addition 

to serving the Fifth Army, the port also 

received and forwarded a considerable 

part of the Eighth Army's ration and 

gasoline supplies pending capture of 

the Adriatic port of Ancona. Yet f()r all 

the help provided by the small ports, 

only Leghorn, Italy's third largest 

port-on 25 June still 40 miles northwest of the Fifth Army front~had 

facilities that could sustain a major Fifth 

Army offensive into the Northern 

Apennines, and the Eighth Army 

would have to have Ancona. 17 

Meanwhile, General Harmon's 1st 

Armored Division on June had 

begun its part in the drive toward 

lateral Route 68. Although the air line 

distance was only 40 miles, the division 

would have to travel 120 miles over 

narrow, winding secondary roads to 

reach its objective. Here were the Tuscan Hills with steep-sided ridges, averaging 1,500 to 2,000 feet in height. To 

II; Leo J. Meyer. MS, Strategy and Logistical 

History of the MeditelTanean Theater, ch. XXIX. 

eMH. 

17 Ihid 

261 

maintain firm contact 'with the French 

on his right, General Hannon ordered 

a preliminary move on the 21 st by the 

81 st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion to establish contact with an Algerian division on the French left. 

Hardly had the battalion begun to 

move when heavy artillery fire drove 

the men to cover. Only after nightfall 

was the battalion able to accomplish its 

objective. 

That artillery fire revealed the enemy's awareness of the armored division's presence opposite the XIV Panzer 

Corps. To forestall a possible breakthrough, the Fourteenth Army commander, General Lemelsen, had 

scraped together his remaining reserves 

and moved them into the corps sector. 18 

For the main attack General Harmon 

utilized two secondary roads: Highway 

439 on the left for CCB and Route n 

on the right for CCA. As during the 

first week following the fall of Rome, 

the combat commands were subdi\'ided 

into small task forces in order to facilitale using narrow side roads and trails 

to bypass demolitions and roadblocks 

on the main routes. III 

Hardly had the armor begun to roll 

when General Harmon decided he 

needed more strength on the line. In 

early afternoon he inserted Task Force 

Howze from his reserve into the center 

to follow another secondarv road. As it 

turned out, Task Force Howze made 

the day's longest advance: 5 miles. On 

the right, in the face of numerous 

obstacles covered by determined and 

accurate antitank fir~, CCA managed to 

IS AOK 14, la KTB. ;Vr. 3. 22 Jun 44, .10K N. 

59091/1. 

'" 1st Armd Div, AAR . .Iun 44. 
262 

gain only two miles. After losing heavily 

to an enemy ambush, CCB made even 

less progress. Over the next four days 

the rugged terrain and the enemy's 

roadblocks and demolitions continued 

to impose delays, but pushing forward 

doggedly, the division managed an average daily advance of five miles. 

Along the coastal flank, General Ryder's 34th Division, after relieving the 

36th Division on 26 june, had the 133d 

Infantry on the left astride the coastal 

highway, while in the center the attached japanese-American 442d Regimental Combat Team took the place of 

the 517th Parachute Infantry, also 

scheduled for southern France. The 

168th Infantry moved into position on 

the division's right. 20 

On the first day of the attack, the 

27th, the 34th Division moved to within 

15 mjles of the intermediate o~jective, 

lateral Route 68. Paralleling that road 

for some 20 miles, the little Cecina 

River was of itself a slight military 

obstacle, but when defended by an 

enemy \\ell established in a range of 

low hills beyond, it could become a 

f()rmidable obstacle. 

As the Fourteenth Army on Army Group 

C's right wing fell back toward the 

Cecina River and lateral Route 68, 

Kesselring prepared to occupy this terrain in strength by assigning to tlie XIV 

Panzer Corps the newly arrived 16th SS 

Panzer Grerwdier Division and the 19th 

Luftwaffe Field Division, the latter replacing the 20th Luftwaffe Field Division, 

which then moved to the Tenth Army. 

Kesselring also relieved the 162d Tllrkomm Di7lilion, which had been in action 

on the coastal flank almost continuously 

20 IV Corps AAR, Jun 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

since 8 june, with the veteran 26th 

Panzer Division, thus returning the panzer division to Senger's XIV Panzer 

Corps. Two full corps, controlling between them eight divisions in line, with 

one in reserve, at that point manned 

the Fourteenth Army front from the 

Tyrrhenian coast eastward f()r some 35 

miles to a boundary east of and parallel 

to Highway 2. Schlemm's parachute 

corps lay to the east and Senger's 

panzer corps to the west of that highway.21 

Increased German strength was soon 

apparent to both attacking American 

divisions, the 34th and the 1 st Armored. The 34th Division required an 

entire day to cover the six more miles 

toward Route 68 and the Cecina River 

and yet another to draw within two 

miles of the river. After dark, the 133d 

Infantry's Company K led the 3d Battalion in a dash for the river but in a 

maze of orchards and vineyards Lm 

into an ambush that f()rced the rest of 

the battalion to halt and wait until 

dawn before resuming the advance. 

That was the first indication of the 

presence of the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier 

Division. Although the bulk of the division lay in corps reserve near Leghorn, 

one of its regiments had entered the 

line. 22 

The I st Armored Division took four 

days to achieve a comparable advance, 

in the process crossing the upper 

reaches of the Cecina River w here the 

stream runs several miles south of 

21 Creiner and Schramm. cds., OKW/WFSt, OKW, 

I V (I), pp. 525-28. 

"' IV Corps AAR, Jun 44; 133d Inf Opns Rpt, 

Jun 44; (;erman Lagpkartl', Jun-Jul 44; Fifth Army 

G--2 Rpts, Jun-Jul 44. Unless otherwise indicated 

the following section is based upon these references. 
THE PURSUIT ENDS 

Route 68. As the division's combat 

commands approached the road on the 

30th, sharp resistance, mainly from the 

3d Panzer Grenadier Division and newly 

arrived elements of the 90th Panzer 

Grenadier Division, ensconced on the 

high ground along the road, brought 

the armor temporarily to a halt. 23 

Faced with evidence of German reinforcement, the 34th Division commander, General Rvder, decided to use 

his reserve, the 135rh Infantry, to swing 

to the east in an effort to envelop what 

appeared to be the strongest defenses 

along the coast south of the town of 

Cecina. The regiment was first to relieve the attached 442d Infantrv, then 

move along a ridge three miles'inland 

that overlooked the coastal corridor and 

prepare to cross the Cecina f<)tir miles 

east of the coastal highway. Unfortunately for Ryder's plan, the high 

ground overlooking that particular sector of the river line was held by the 

26th Panzer Division, a unit that had 

given good account of itself in the 

battles south of Rome. 

At dawn on the 30th, Company E 

led the I st Infantry's 2d Battalion 

across the river to establish a modest 

bridgehead, but when the battalion attempted to reinforce the bridgehead, 

heavy fire from the high ground 

pinned the men til the ground. A 

second effort, this time with armor 

support, came to grief when enemy 

antitank gunners destroyed all but two 

of a force of eleven Sherman tanks. 

The two surviving tanks withdrew under protective fire to the south bank, 

leaving only the beleaguered infantry 

2:' H()\\('. B({tt/I' Hill(lrr (1/ Ihl' 1.1/ Amlllrl'r/ nil'ilillll. 

pp.356-60, 

263 

clinging to the little bridgehead through 

I July. 

Early on 2 July, the battalion tried a 

third time to reinfime the bridgehead. 

This time heavy corps artillery support 

and close air support from fighter 

bombers hammered the enemy-held 

high ground and carried the day. By 

nightfall the entire regiment had successfullv crossed the Cecina and had 

begun to expand the bridgehead. 

Resistance along the coastal route 

south of the town of Cecina meanwhile 

continued to be strong. When the 3d 

Battalion, 133d Infantry, resumed its 

attack early on the 30th, Company I in 

the lead required most of the morning 

just to recover ground lost the day 

before. Shortly past noon an enemy 

counterattack almost cut off the company from the rest of the battalion. The 

company saved itself only by withdrawing aixmt 1,500 yards, thereby nullifying the gains of the forenoon. Heavy 

protective fires by supporting artillery 

finally brought the counterattack to a 

halt, but not before the enemy had 

destroyed two tanks and inflicted'sharp 

casualties. 

Since the 135th Infantry was still 

trying to secure its bridge head, General 

Ryder saw no alternative to pressing the 

frontal attack by the 133d Infantn 

against Cecina with ever greater vigor. 

That the regimental commander, Colonel Schildroth, prepared to do late that 

afternoon \\' hen he relieved t he weary 

3d Battalion with the I st Battalion, his 

reserve. Until darkness brought their 

operations to a halt, the I st and 2d 

Battalions edged slowly forward, capturing six enemy guns, yet biling to 

drive the enemy from his positions 

south of Cecina. 
264 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

AERIAL VIEW OF CECINA 

The Germans managed to hold, but 

the effort had cost them so many 

casualties, mostly from Allied artillery 

fire, that the Fourteenth Army commander, General Lemclscn, decided to 

withdraw the right wing of the XIV 

Panzer Corps approximately five miles. 

Since the ne,'" position was no stronger 

than the one at Cecina, l..emelsen saw it 

as only another delaying linc and told 

the XIV Panzer Corps commander to 

pull out the 29th Panze-r Grenadier Division on the night of 2 July and move it 

to an area along the Arno River aixmt 

seventeen miles west of Florence, there 

to constitute an army reserve in preparation for an eventual Allied attack 

against the linc of the Arno. 2~ 

Bef()re daylight on 1 July, men of the 

133d Infantry, unaware that the Germans were preparing to withdraw, returned to the attack. Five hours later 

the 2d Battalion was inside Cecina's 

southeastern outskirts, where t he men 

were checked briefly by stubborn rear 

guards. On the left the 1st Battalion got 

within 500 yards of the town, then carly 

the following morning finally cleared 

paths through mine fields and soon 

"AOK 14. la KTB Nr. -I, 1 .lui 44, AOK /-I, 

62241/ I. 
THE PURSUIT ENDS 

after daylight joined the 2d Battalion 

inside Cecina. 

By mid-morning the battle of Ce~ina 

was over, the costliest for an American 

unit since the fall of Rome. Carrying 

the main burden of the 34th Division's 

frontal attack, the 133d Infantry alone 

lost 16 officers and 388 enlisted men 

killed, wounded, or missing. 

The Capture of Volterra and Siena 

As the fight for Cecina proceed~~, 

General Harmon's 1 st Armored DIVIsion, operating 20 miles inland along 

upper reaches of the Cecina River, 

renewed its efforts to cut Route 68 and 

gain the high gn~und bey<.md. T~at 

CCB achieved dUrIng the mght of 30 

june, moving onto the high ground 

immediately north of the lateral road 

fi)llr miles southeast of Volterra. Enemy 

artillery fire halted Task Force Ho\~'ze 

t\\O miles south of the road., a refkctlon 

of the presence of reinfi>r(cments from 

the 90th PrlllZlT CrowdilT [)17 1/.\/Iln. Only 

after Harmon had moved. IIp the last of 

his reserves on 3 July \\as Howze's 

force able to drive the enemy back. In 

the meantime, seven miles to the southeast, CCA incurred numerous casualties 

in unsuccessful attempts to drive the 

enemv from a fortified village just 

south' of Route 68, Casole d'Elsa. The 

village fell on the 4th to CCA and its 

attached. 361 st In bntry after three days 

of fighting that cost the armored ~egiment six medium tanks, three lIght 

tanks and two tank destroyers. Over 

the ~ext few days the 88th Division 

began to relieve the armor, which withdre\\' into army reserve, and one of the 

fresh regiments, the 350th Infantry, 

completed the conquest of Route 68 on 

265 

8 july by capturing the walled town of 

Volterra. 25 

As the IV Corps was advancing to 

Route 68, General Juin's French Expeditionary Corps on the Fifth ArI?Y's 

right wing was drivin~ toward SIe~a 

astride Highway 2. )~~n had t~e 3d 

Algerian I nfantry DIVISIon on hIS left 

and, on his right, the 2d Moroccan 

Infantry Division. 

Starting to attack on 21 June, the 

French soon found themselves bogged 

do\\' n opposite the FilII r/(,I'/I/h A rm,Y 's 

left wing, one of the most heavily 

defended sectors of the German front. 

There General Schlemm's I Parachute 

Corps had deployed from east to west 

the 356th Grenadier Division, the 4th 

Parachute Division, a regiment of the 

26th Panzer Division, elements of the 

20th Luftwaffe Field Division, and a regiment of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. For the next five days, from 22 

through 26 june, this strong ene~y 

force held the French to a two-mIle 

advance. Not until 26 june, after the 

neighboring 1st Armored Division had 

outflanked L the enemy positions, did the 

Germans begin to withdraw and the 

French to make appreciable progress. 

As the acknowledged head of all 

French forces fighting on the side of 

the Allies, General de Gaulle had assured Pope Pius XII that French 

troops would spare t he histo.ri~· city of 

Siena. Consequently, as JUIIl s corps 

approached th~ city, the Frenc.h relied 

upon outflan klllg an d. bypa~sll~ g maneuvers to cut off the enemy Il1s1de the 

city. While these tactics delayed entry, 

they succeeded in fi:>rcing the Germans 

" Howe. Battle Histor), oj the 1st Armored Dil'isioll. 

pp.360-61. 
266 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GENERALS CLARK AND JUIN AT SIENA 

to evacuate the city so that \\' hen the 

first French troops entered at 0630 on 

3 July they fired not a shot and not a 

single historic monument was damaged. 2H 

General .luin immediately regrouped 

his fi)J°ces t() continue the advance, but 

with the capture of Siena much of the 

former elan of the French units had 

vanished. Even as they entered the city, 

General J uin received orders detaching 

,,; Ll" (;0Yl"l. La Partiripatirm Frtlllf((i.\(' " la Campagne d'ltalie, p, 168; Fifth Army History , Pan VI, pp, 

7~76, 

many of his units f()J0 senice with a 

newly formed I French Corps then 

assembling in the vicinity of ~aples f<)r 

the f<>rthcoming invasion of SOli them 

France. 27 

Beyond Siena, across a 15-mile ii'ont, 

J uin . deployed t\\'O divisions. the 2d 

Moroccan Infantrv and the 4th MOHKcan Mountain. The Germans, the Moroccans f()lmd, had turned road junctions near Colle di Val d'Elsa, 12 miles 

beyond Siena, and at Poggibonsi, 3 

miles farther north, into strongpoints, 

" Inten'. Matht'\ls \lirh Lulut'o Ii Jan 48, CMH, 
THE PURSUIT ENDS 

so that the French had to fight hard 

over the next four days before the 

enemy retired during the night of 6 

July from the first of the two strongpoints. Before daylight on 7 July, Colle 

di Val d'Elsa and the high ground 

overlooking the town were in French 

hands. That evening the French too 

crossed Route 68 and continued their 

advance over winding mountain roads 

toward Poggibonsi. 28 

Although thirty miles of rugged terrain remained to be crossed bef()re the 

Fifth Army would reach the south bank 

of the Arno, the worst of the terrain 

between Rome and the Arno at that 

point lay to the rear of Clark's army. As 

the French Expeditionary Corps prepared to continue its drive, Crittenberger's IV Corps, having moved about 

five miles beyond Route 68, prepared 

to close with the last German defenses 

south of Leghorn. 

The Eighth Army 

While the Fifth Army advanced to 

and beyond Route 68, the British 

Eighth Army had been operating on 

the wider of the two army fronts and 

over far more difficult terrain than had 

the Fifth Army. The front of the 

Eighth Army and the separate Polish 

corps meandered f(lr almost 200 miles 

through the fastness of the Central 

Apennines and the less mountainous 

but still challenging terrain flanking 

Lake Trasimeno. Yet because of a 

superior road net, only the 30-mile 

sector flanking the lake was of strategic 

importance. It was there that General 

Leese had concentrated his main 

strength, the 10 and 13 Corps, to the 

28 Ibid. 

267 

east and west of Lake Trasimeno respectively. Because the lake divided the 

two corps, it was evident that in their 

assault on the Trasimeno Line they 

would at first proceed independently 

along separate axes fifteen miles apart. 

Once the waters of the lake were 

behind, a broad range of hills that 

divided the Chiana valley from the 

upper reaches of the Tiber River still 

would divide them. There would be no 

firm contact until they reached Arezzo, 

20 miles north of the lake. The inability 

of each to influence the progTess of the 

other would be a contributing bctor to 

the success of the Germans over the 

next ten days (h'OlTI 20 through 30 

June) in holding the British to slow 

painstaking progress in some of the 

most difficult fighting encountered 

since crossing the Aniene and Tiber 

two weeks before. 2!J 

The Eighth Army's operational problems were further com plicated after the 

advance beyond Rome to the Trasimeno Line had left the army's railhead 

and main supply base- 200 ~iles to the 

rear. There were no ports on the 

Adriatic flank between Bari and Ancona. Although the Fifth Army's capture of the small ports on the Tyrrhenean coast helped to a degree to ease 

British supply diHiculties, especially in 

gasoline, the Eighth's long lines of communication would remain until Ancona 

could be opened. In view of the supply 

problems, the Eighth Army probably 

would have been unable to maintain 

additional divisions at the front even 

had they been available. 

29 Operations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, Part II, Sec. D. Unless otherwise 

indicated the foliowing section is based upon this 

reference. 
268 

General Leese. nevertheless, commanded a formidable and balanced 

f()rce with which to carry out General 

Alexander's directive to capture Arezzo. 

Ancona, and Florence as bases from 

which to mount an offensive against the 

C'J{)thic Line. On the army's left wing 

west of Lake Trasimeno General Kirkman's 13 Corps had an armored division, the 6th South African. and an 

infantry division. the British 78th, on 

line, and the Brit.ish 4th lnbntry Di\~­

sion in reserve. East of the lake General 

McCreery's 10 Corps included the British 6th Armoured and the 8th Indian 

Infantrv Divisions. An Italian reconnaissance ~quadron screened the corps 

right flank in the foothills of the Central Apennines. There was no corps 

reserve. 

The zone of the 13 Corps was bisected by a north-south belt of low, 

rolling hills overlooking two main roads 

on either flank-a secondarv road to be 

followed by the South Af~ican armor 

on the left, and Highway 71 to serve as 

the axis of advance of the 78th Division 

on the right. The roads ran northward 

along the edges of what in prehistoric 

times had been the bed of a large lake. 

of which remain onlv Lakes Trasimeno. 

Chiusi, and Montepukiano. the latter 

two located some five miles southwest 

of Trasimeno. While offering terrain 

far more favorable than that to the east 

of the lakes, the region was intensively 

cultivated, and lush summer vegetation 

would conceal the enemy from Allied 

reconnaissance aircraft. The tactical 

problem of the attacking troops would 

be to secure a bisecting belt of hills, in 

the center of the corps zone, from 

which the enemy dominated the routes 

of approach to the east and west. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Opposite the 13 Corps lay the I 

Parachute Carps with three divisions in 

line: the Hrrmmm CorrinK. 1st Part/-

chute, and 334th Infantry Divisions. Their 

positions consisted mainly of field hmificalions. similar to those encountered 

elsewhere in Italy and supported by 

antitank guns well-sited in forward positions and supplemented by mortars and 

rockets. Ground and aerial reconnaissance of these positions had convinced 

General Kirkman, the 13 Corps commander, that he would have to employ 

all of his available f()rces when on 20 

June he moved against the Trasimeno 

Line. While the 6th South African 

Armoured and the British 78th Int~lI1-

try Divisions advanced on either fbnk, 

the British 4th Division was to move 

along secondary roads in the center and 

clear the dominating hills. 

It took the 13 Corps eight days, until 

28 June, to reach a point not quite 

halfway up Lake Trasimeno's westel'n 

shoreline. That, nevertheless, put the 

corps ,veil inside the Frieda Line, presenting the Gel-mans with the possibility 

of an Allied breakthrough and pmmpting a slow withdra\val. The defensive 

battles along the Frieda Line had won 

for Field Marshal Kesselring an 8-day 

delay, but he paid a high price f(n- it, 

for t he Germans had lost 718 men as 

prisoners and probably more in dead 

and wounded. Over half the prisoners 

were from the 334th Division, which 

bore the brunt of the 78th Division's 

attack along Lake Trasimeno's western 

shore. Although some favorable defensive terrain remained short of the 

Northern Apennines, none would be as 

conducive to the defense as that which 

the Germans were forced to relinquish. 

Operating east of L.ike Trasimeno, 
THE PURSUIT ENDS 

General McCreery's 10 Corps made 

little progress beyond the dty of Perugia, some ten miles southeast of the 

lake. Since north of Perugia terrain was 

even more favorable to the enemy, 

General Leese, the Eighth Army commander, adopted a strategy that Alexander had employed earlier against 

strong defensive positions, advancing 

his left (I;) Corps) I'll I}()/mo' and denying his right (I () Corps). To that end, 

priority in men and matt'riel \\ould 

henceforth go (0 Kirkman's corps to 

reini(lrce its drive on Areao. which on 

28 June lay only 28 miles away. By the 

end of the first week in July McCreery's 

10 Corps would be reduced to the 

strength of a two-division holding f(lHT. 

the 4th and 10th Indian Divisions. 

While that was going on, the 13 

Corps continued to press forward 

through a zone of hilly terrain ten miles 

deep, of which the enemy took full 

advantage to fight a series of staunch 

delaying actions. On 4 .I uly the British 

6th Armoured Division, withdrawn 

from the 10 Corps, gave new weight to 

the 13 Corps attack. During the morning the British armor ran a ga.untlet of 

fire from a ridge overlooking Highway 

71 fi'om the east to capture the town of 

Castiglione Fiorentino, ten miles south 

of Arezzo, but from this point on, progress was slow, hampered by heavy rains 

and frequent demolitions, the lattel' 

covered by enemv mines and artillery 

fire, By the end of the day it had 

hecome clear that the Gernlans had 

reached another delaying position, from 

which they would have to be forcibly 

expelled, To the east the I Oth India~ 

Division of the 10 COl'PS had by 6 July 

advanced beyond Perugia to capture 

Umbertide, ten miles north of Perugia 

269 

and twenty-six southeast of Arezzo, but 

heavy ene'my fire brought the Indians 

to a halt just four miles bevond the 

town. 

Events had taken a similar course 

along the Adriatic flank, where, since 

2 I June, the Polish corps and the 

brigade-size I talian Corps of Liberation 

had reached a P( lint twelve milt·s beyond Porto Civitanova, the eastern anchor of the Trasimeno Line. The Poles 

continued their advance during the first 

week of July to capture a town ten 

miles south of Ancona, and the Italians 

to reach the outskirts of another. fifi:cen 

miles southwest of the port. Thereafter, 

all efforts to push ahead failed in the 

face of resistance as determined as that 

before Arezzo. 

Strategic Decisions 

Even as the Allied advance again 

came to a halt, this time just short of 

Leghorn, Arezzo, and Ancona, an ominous directive from the Allied Force 

Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater, 

reached General Alexander. Beginning 

on 5 July "an overriding priority fiJI' all 

resources in the MeditelTanean Theatel' 

as between the proposed assault on 

southern France and the battle [in Italy] 

is to be given the timner to the exte;lt 

necessary to complete a buildup of ten 

divisions in the south of France." ;l() 

Although hardly unexpected, the directive nevertheless came as something of 

a shock, seemingly the final blow to a 

long-cherished hope, mainly British, but 

shared by many in Clark's headquarters 

as well, that the Italian campaign I'ather 

than ANVIL would somehow remain the 

'" SAC Despatch, The Italian Campaign, 10 l\L\\ 

to 12 Aug44,p. 54, 
270 

major Allied operation In the Mediterranean. 

Not only the Allies but also the 

Germans proceeded to modify strategic 

guidelines that had determined their 

operations since the loss of Rome. Yet, 

unlike the Allies, the Germans were 

influenced more directly by events on 

the Italian battlefront during the preceding three weeks. The success of the 

British Eighth Army's ) 3 Corps w('st of 

L1.ke Trasimeno and of the u.s. Fifth 

Army's IV Corps along the Cecina 

River and Route 68, as well as the 

advance of the 2 Polish Corps along the 

Adriatic to within striking distance of 

Ancona, impelled Field Marshal Kesselring to summon his army commanders to a conference late on 1 July at his 

headquarters near Florence. There the 

German commander revealed that a 

growing shortage of both replacements 

and materiel t{)rced him to modify 

OKW's strategic guidelines calling for 

maximum resistance along successive 

lines. While such tactics had served to 

delay the Allies along the Frieda Line 

for ten days (20-30 June), it had cost 

the Germans heavily in men and equipment. In view of growing demands 

from other fronts, there was little likelihood that those losses would be made 

up soon. 

Instead of maximum resistance along 

successive lines, Kesselring said, the 

army group would try to hold along 

selected lines until the main forces had 

withdrawn to secondary, or switch, positions in sufficient strength to prevent a 

breakthrough. Along the first of those 

lines, there were three widely separated 

sectors of primary interest to the field 

marshal: Rosignano Solvay, 12 miles 

south of Leghorn: just north of CorCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

tona, covering the southern approaches 

to Arezzo; and along the M usone River, 

12 miles south of Ancona. Kesselring 

expected to check the Allies in those 

sectors as tong as his limited resources 

would allow bef()re falling back to a 

final delaying position along the Arno. 

That line ran from Pisa on the Ligurian 

coast along the Arno to Florence, 

thence over the mountains and along 

the north bank of the Metauro River to 

the Adriatic. Delays along those two 

lines \vould gain time to improve the 

(~othic Line positions in the Northern 

Apennines. It was as obvious to the 

German commander as to his Allied 

opposite, General Alexander, that befixe the Allied armies could mount a 

serious threat to the Gothic Line they 

first would have to secure and rehabilitate the ports of Leghorn and Ancona 

and would also need the communications centers of Arezzo and Florence. al 

If either commander needed further 

proof that his campaign had been relegated to a secondary position, that of a 

large-scale holding operation, the decisions required of them during the first 

week of July provided it. On the Allied 

side, the U.S. Fifth Army had been 

stripped of many of its best units to 

swell the ranks of the f()Res preparing 

to open another front in France, .vhile 

the German armies would have to get 

along without major replacements of 

men or equipment, to enable the Reich 

to reinf()}'ce other more critical fi:onts. 

The two decisions would, in effect, 

cancel one another out, so that when 

the Allies attacked yet another German 

line, they would find the situation in 

basically unchanged. --'----

'" AOK 14, /a KTB Nt. 4, 1 .lui 1944, AOK 14, 

Doc. 62241/1, 
CHAPTER XV 

End of the Campaign in Central Italy 

Mission 

In pursuing the essential task of 

<.:apturing the major (XHt of Leghorn. 

the wmmander of the IV Corps, General Crittenberger, was determined not 

to repeat the tacti<.:s employed in the 

battle t()r Cecina, which had dissipated 

the corps strength in a frontal attack 

with only a belated and relatively weak 

attempt 'to outf1ank the object~ve. Bv 

intervening early in the plarll1ing stag~ 

of the operation against Leghorn, the 

IV Corps commander expected to coordinate the frontal and flanking operations more closely. As at Cecina. Rvder's 

34th Inhmtrv D{vision was to can:\' the 

main burden'. 1 ' 

To give Ryder's division additional 

tire power, Crittenberger reinfi)rced it 

with the 442d Regimental Combat 

Team, the 804th Tank Destrover Battalion, and the 363d RegimetJt~1 Combat Team, the seumd of the 91 st 

Division's units to be assigned to the 

Fifth Army to gain combat experience. 

To the 363d Regimental Comb:1t Team 

Crittenberger gave the mission of outflanking Leghorn on the east and of 

threatening the enemy's route of withdrawal. That maneuver, he believed, 

would cause the enemy garrison, when 

t!le 34th Division appI:o~ched the port 

from the south and east, to abandon 

I IV Corps AAR, Jul 44: Intel'\', Mathews with 

Ladue, 17 .Iun 48. CMH, 

the o~jective rather than attempt a Iastditch stand. t 

The Tenain and the Plan 

Before Crittenberger could execute 

these plans his corps, from positions in 

the hills some six miles north of the 

Cecina River, had first to cross a 20-

mile stretch of terrain far more COlWOluted than that south of Cecilla. This 

was inf~mtry country and the inhmtrv, 

supported by artiller~. would have to do 

most of the fighting. From the line of 

the Cecina three natural routes of approach led toward Leghorn and the 

Arno valley. Four miles beyond Cecina 

Highway i returned to tl~e coast, ami 

from that (X)int wound along the edge 

of diffs dropping abruptly to the s~a. 

Before reaching Leghorn the highway 

connected seve'ral s~l1all coastal town~. 

the largest of \\'hich was Rosignano 

Solvay, seven miles north of Cecina and 

the site of a large chemical works. A 

secondary road, Route 206, led northward from the junction of Highway I 

and lateral Route 68 through a \'alley 

flanked on the left by the C(~astal range 

and on the right by a high ridge line. 

That road linked numerous villages and 

towns and passed through the largest 

community, Colle Salvetti, eighteen 

miles away on the southern edge of the 

Arno valley. A third, unnumbered 

2 IV Corps AAR, .luI 44. 
Map 7

1 

I 

I 

J 

THE ADVANCE ON LEGHORN 

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CK'I/D MM_ 

N C B.-..,.,..Jr 
END OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL ITALY 273 

route paralleled that road about five 

miles to the east on the eastern side of 

the ridge line. The unnumbered route 

led northward from a junction with 

lateral Route 68 via Riparhella, six miles 

northeast of Cn'ina, to a junction with 

Route 206 at Torretta, three miles 

south of Colle Salvetti. Crittenberger 

planned II) send the bulk ()f the 34th 

Division along the lauer two roads \\hile 

the 804th Tank Destrover Battalion and 

the 34th Cavalry Reco~naissance Troop 

held to the narrow coastal highway. a 

(Mal) 7) 

To the :Hth Division's right, the 88th 

Division (and later also the 91 st Division) 

was to move f()l'ward along the west 

bank of the Era River valley, which 

paralleled the coast seventeen miles inland. After the 91 st Division arrived, 

the 88th Division was to cross the Era 

and proceed up its east bank toward 

the Arno. Thirteen miles east of the 

Era the French Expeditionary Corps 

was to continue its drive on the Fifth 

Army's right flank through the Elsa 

valley until relieved just short of the 

Arno by the II Corps, which General 

Clark f()r several weeks had been holdmg m reserve. 

The terrain over which these several 

routes led favored the defense. Ridge 

lines on the flanks of the main routes 

of approach rose to peaks of over 1,500 

feet on the left and over 2,000 leet on 

the right, offering the Germans vantage 

points from \"hich they might rake the 

advancing columns with flanking fire. 

Seven miles north of Cecina and lateral 

Route 68 the reinf()rced 19th LuftwaJle 

Div~~ian prepared to make a stand just 

north of a lateral road which connected 

3 Ibid. 

the coastal highway with Route 206, the 

westernmost of the 34th Division's two 

main routes of approach. 

The town of Rosignano Marittimo, 

on a hilltop two and a half miles 

northeast of the junction of the lateral 

road with the coastal highway and the 

factory town of Rosignano Solvay, af· 

forded the enemy a commanding view 

of the terrain almost as far as Cecina. 

On the summit of the hill in the center 

of the town stood a massive stone castle 

whose thick walls had withstood besieging armies in centuries past. The location of the town and its buildings had 

prompted the Germans to make it the 

major strongpoint of their defenses 

south of Leghorn. 

Because of the terrain and the routes 

of approach, General Ryder planned to 

advance with three regiments abreastthe 135th Infantry on the left, the 

attached 442d Infantry in the center, 

and the 168th on the right. The 133d 

Infantry, which had borne the brunt of 

the battle for Cecina, would remain in 

reserve. On his left Hank, the 804th 

Tank Destroyer Batlalion, screened bv 

the 34th Reconnaissance Troop, was t~) 

advance along the nan'o\\', cliff.hanging 

coastal highway. On his right flank, 

Ryder would deploy the reconnaissance 

company of the 776th Tank Destrover 

Batt.llion to screen the 168th Inbnt~,v's 

flank and to maintain contact \\'ith the 

9Ist Division after it entered the line 

between the 34th and 88th Divisions. 

By evening of 2 July all units had 

I~eached their assigned assembly positIons and were prepared to launch the 

drive to Leghorn early the next mOnling. of 

4 34th Diy Opns Rpt. IUIl-Iu) 44. 
274 

Deployed on the high ground opposite the IV Corps front two enemy 

divisions of varying quality awaited th~ 

attack. On the Fowkmth Arm.)"s right 

flank, General von Senger's XIV Panzer 

Gcrrps was controlling the 19th LufrUJaffe 

and 26th Panzer Divisions, both of which 

had given such good account of themselves in the defense of the Cecina 

sector, but in so doing had suffered 

considerable losses. To the left and 

holding a comparatively narrow front 

was the 20th Lllltvlalli' Fir/d /)i1'isillll.~' 

Ad"(J1UF Toward Ll'g//(Jr/I 

At dawn on 3 July, the 135th and 

168th Infantry Regiments of the 34th 

Division began to advance across the 

flanking ridges: at the same time in the 

valley below, the 442d Infantrv attacked 

across a broader hunt. By eariy evening 

the lead company of the 135th Infantry's 3d Battalion had reached Rosignano Marittimo's southern outskirts. A 

few hours later the rest of the battalion 

arrived, but was halted just short of the 

town by mortar and artillery fire including some l70-mm. rou'nds irom 

enemy guns located behind a ridge 

northeast of Rosignano. Since it \vas too 

dark to continue the assault, the battalion organized three company-sized 

strongIX)ints and settled down for the 

night. Early the next morning the battalion began the difficult task of establishing a foothold in the town. For 

several hours the men inched f()rward 

through streets made gauntlets by the 

enemy's fir~ng small arms and hurling 

grenades from upper stories of the 

compact stone buildings lining the 

streets. After beating off a strong tank-

"Lagekarten, Anlagen 14 AOK, Jul 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

supported infantry counterattack, the 

3d Battalion by late afternoon had at 

last gained a f~)()thold in the southern 

third of the town. Despite reinf()rcement 

?y the rest of the parent 135th Infantry, 

It took three more days f()r the men to 

advance house by house through the rest 

of the town. It was late on 7 July bet()re 

the men reached the northern edge of 

the town, there to confront a stubborn 

rear guard holding scattered 

strongpoints in isolated houses along the 

fringe." ' 

The remaining regiments under 34th 

Division .cc:ntrol found the fighting 

equally difficult. The 442d Regimental 

Combat Team, astride the valley road 

in the center, and the 168th Infantry, 

along the eastern ridge overlooking the 

valley road, advanced in echelon t{) the 

right rear of the I :-35th Infantrv. Although on 4 July the corps comm'aneler 

attached the 363d Infantry to the 34th 

Division f()1' use on the 'I 68th 's right, 

the 442d and the 168th could do little 

more than consolidate their gains across 

a four-mile front. They accomplished 

that only after beating off several smallscale counterattacks by Germans infiltrating a proliferation of ravines and 

gullies. So painstaking was the advance 

that the 168th I nfantry required f(Hlr 

days to reach and dear the yillage of 

Castellino Marittimo, five miles due east 

of Rosignano Marittimo. 7 

For all the difficulties, capture of 

Rosignano Marittimo and Castellina 

Marittin:o meant that the infantrymen 

had dnven the enemy from the last 

favorable defensive terrain south of 

" IV. c";ps AAR . .lui 44; Fifth Army (;-3 Jnl and 

file. b-16 Jul 44. ]().~-3-2. Federal Remrds Center, Suitland, Md. 

, IV Corps AAR. Jul 44. 
END OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL ITALY 275 

Leghorn. That left the 135th Infantry 

fi-ee to move directly on the port while 

to the right the 34th Division's remaining regiments and attached units were 

to envelop the city from the east befcxe 

turning \vest toward the coast and 

north toward the Arno River and Pisa, 

site of the famous leaning tower. They 

would have help from Maj. Gen. William G. Livesay's 91st Division, committed fe)r the first time as an entire unit 

between Ryder's 34th and Sloan's 88th 

Divisions. At the same time attachment 

of the 363d Infantry to the 34th Division and the 361 st Infantry to the 1st 

Armored Division terminated. 

With two regiments forward-the 

362d on the right and the 363d on the 

left-the 91st Division launched its first 

attack as a division early on the 12th 

from assembly areas three miles south 

of a four-mile-wide sector between 

Chianni and Laiatico and about ten 

miles northeast of Rosignano Marittimo.8 On the 91 st Division's right the 

88th Division resumed its drive astride 

Route 439 near the Era River. Both 

divisions were heading for the Arno 

near the small industrial town of Pontedera, seventeen miles northeast of 

Leghorn. !) 

It would be only a matter of time 

before General Lemelsen's Fourteenth 

Army would have to begin a general 

withdrawal to the Arno. Hard pressed 

on the right wing, General von Senger's 

H On that date in severe fighting near Casaglia six 

miles south of the division's assembly areas, Sgt. 

Roy W. Harmon, Company C, 362d Inbntry. so 

distinguished himself in comb;H while his battalion 

led the regiment toward the Chianni-Laiatico line 

that he was posthumously awarded the Medal of 

Honor. 

"Fifth Army History. Part VI, pp. 85-90: IV Corps 

AAR, .luI 44. 

XIV Panzn emj).\ fell back toward Leghorn. The panzer corps' left wing experienced an equally serious reverse \\ ith 

the loss of Volterra on 8 July to the 

88th Division, which opened a wide gap 

in a sector occupied by the 90th Panzer 

Grenadier Division. With no available 

reserves to close the gap, General von 

Senger had no alternative but to withdraw across his entire corps front. That 

moVe fe)rced General Lemelsen to pull 

back the neighboring 1 Parachute Corps 

front as well. Even as the 91st Division 

during the night of 12 July prepared to 

attack, the Fourteenth Army broke contact 

across its entire front and fell back on 

the Arno.lo 

General Lemelsen was concerned not 

only with the persistent American 

ground advance but also with steppedup Allied naval activity. For a "'eek the 

Germans had been observing Allied 

naval units engaged in mine-clearing 

operations in the \\aters \\est of Leghorn and the mouth of the Arno \\est 

of Pisa. That activity rekindled both 

Kesselring's and Lem~'lsen's chronic apprehension of an amphibious operation 

aimed at envelopment of the Fourteenth 

Army's western, or Ligurian, flank. Lemelsen, accordingly, alerted Senger to 

the possibility of a landing bet,,'een 

Leghorn and Pisa. Thus concerned, 

however unrealistic the threat, it was 

unlikely that the Germans would attempt a protracted defense of Leghorn. 11 

Over the next few days as General 

Crittenberger's IV Corps advanced 

'''.'10K H, la KTB N/". -I. 8-12 .luI 44 . . N)/( H. 

DOL 622411l. 

" Opns Orders, .'10K 1-1. la N/". 3015/-1-1 g. /(du.l, 

1930 hn, 13 .luI 44, to Hqs, LXXVI pz Corps in AOK 

H, la KTB N/". -I .. 4111.713, AOK H. Dol. 62241/14. 

!\II'. 62241114. 
276 

a<TOSS its entire front, the corps commander's attention was f()Cused upon 

the columns operating southeast of 

Leghorn. The 168th Infantry and a 

newly recommitted 133d I nhmtrv made 

up the force attempting to e'nvelop 

Leghorn from that direction. The going 

for the 133rd Infantrv was relativelv 

easy. the regiment eme'rging from hills 

overlooking the Arno on 17 July; but 

the 168th Infantry had to fight barder 

f()I' comparable gains. As the regiment 

on the 17th reached the outskirts of the 

village of Fauglia, about ten miles due 

east of Leghorn. the Germans in their 

determination to cover their main 

f(m:es in a difficult withd"awal behind a 

bridgeless Arno mustered their remaining mortars and artillery and in the 

afternoon even managed a battalionsized counterattack supported by seven 

Tiger tanks. It took help from all 

available divisional anillerv for the 

168th to beat off the enemy f()rces, but 

then the regiment entered Fauglia and 

moved on five miles beyond to Colle 

Salvetti, the last major" town in the 

regimental zone of operations south of 

the Arno valIn'. Early the next morning 

a battalion of the 442d Regimental 

Combat Team to the 168th's left entered the village of Torrctta, t\\O miles 

\\('st ()f Fauglia; and by evening (,f the 

18th all thre.e regiments were sending 

patrols deep into the Arno valley in a 

vain efllHt to regain contact with the 

retreating Germans. 

The Capture of Leghorn 

As the enveloping maneuver against 

Leghorn proceeded, General Crittenberger became concerned about having 

only one regiment, the 135th Infantry, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

to assault the city frontallv. That circumstance prompted him ~gain to attach the 91st Division's 363d Infantrv to 

the 34th Division. In concert with' the 

135th Infantry, approaching Leghorn 

from the southeast, the 363d was to 

attack the city from the east. 12 

Both regirnents f()Und the going easv. 

Thev readily brushed aside a weak rear 

gual:dto en'ter Leghorn bef()re daylight 

on the 19th. Within the city the, met 

no resistance, f()r the enem'y gat:rison, 

concerned, as the American commander had hoped, with the columns 

investing the city from the east, had 

slipped away during the night. Meanwhile, to the south of Leghorn, the 

reconnaissance and tan k destroyer force 

driving along the coastal high'wa, had 

to co~tend ~\'ith nothing m~)re serious 

than destroyed culverts and 'fidelv scattered mines, and it entered th'e cit\" 

soon after daylight. Close behind cam~ 

the 442d Regimental Combat Team's 

IOOth Battalion to take up garrison 

dutv. 13 

Although the Germans had been 

forced to yield Leghorn earlier than 

they had planned, they managed to 

destroy the city's port f~icilities and 

partially block the harbor with sunken 

ships. All <tuay walls were demolished 

and the masonry toppled into the 

water. A number of ships \\'ere scuttled 

alongside piers and the harbor sown 

with mines. Allied bombing had earlier 

cut all rail lines and created ruins that 

blocked the streets in the port area. In 

their turn the C,.ermans had sown the 

ruins indiscriminatelv with thousands of 

12 Fifth Army History, ParI VI. p. 83. 

13 Fifth Army History. Part VI, pp. 83-84: Hist Red, 

34th Cav Rcn 'rIp, .lui 44: 8041h TD Bn AAR . .lui 

44. 
END OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL ITALY '277 

AERIAL VIEW OF LEGHORN 

mines and booby traps. Hundreds of 

American soldiers fell victim to these 

devices in the early weeks f()Uowing the 

fall of Leghorn. 14 

However monumental the task of 

putting the port of Leghorn in operation, it had to be done befi)re the Fifth 

Army could launch major operations 

beyond the Arno. Surveys of the damaged harbor by Army and Navy engineers indicated that at least thl'ee weeks 

would be needed to provide just two 

" Meyer MS, ch XXIX ; Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 

185. 

berths for Liberty ships. Barring unforeseen circumstances the engineers 

estimated that it \vould take (\'\'0 months 

before Leghorn could meet all the 

needs of the Fifth Army north of 

Rome. The first Liberty ships carrying 

engineering equipment and stevedoring 

gear arrived at Leghorn on 20 August 

but had to be unloaded by lighters. 

Drawing upon earlier experience in 

rehabilitating the port of Naples, Army 

engineers soon bridged over the vessels 

sunk alongsidt: the piers and extended 

the quays so that all hatches of cargo 

ships could be worked without revers-
278 

ing the vessel. By such expedients two 

Liberty ships were able to, dock on, 2? 

August only five \veeks after the CIty s 

capture. I;) 

TIll' Ca jJ/ /I rl' (II A ru ()/UI a lid A rl'zw 

Just as Leghorn, on the opposite 

coast, was vital for the Americans, so 

Ancona on the Adriatic coast remained 

a prerequisite for continued large-scale 

operations by the British Eighth Army. 

Having been halted early in July by 

firm resistance eight miles south of 

Ancona, General Anders' 2 Polish 

Corps prepared on 16 July to resume 

the drive fex that port. 

General Anders had two Polish divisions-the 3d Carpathian along the 

coast and the 5th Kn'sO\\a in the 

centlT-\\ith the brigade-sized Italian 

Corps of Liberation on the left. Like 

(;eneral Critten berger. (;eneral Anders 

hoped to envelop his objective rather 

than attack frontallv. Bv simulated concentrations and m'ovements of armor 

and other heavv equipment in the area 

of coastal High\\av 16, the 3d Carpathian Division' was to try to draw enemy 

attention a\\'av from the area of actual 

attack. the s(:ctor of the 5th Kresowa 

Division. With help of the 2d Armoured Brigade, the 5th was to attack 

along the axis Osimo-Agugliano in 

hope of turning the (;erman dcfl'nses 

from the \\est, then to exploit east\\ard 

as far as the coastal highway above 

Ancona. In the meantime. an attack 

northward bv the Italian corps \\'as to 

cover the division's left flank. The 

Desert Air Force (OAF), the Eighth 

15 Meyer MS, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Army's long-time air arm, \\'as to fly in 

general support. If; , 

During the night of 16 July four 

Polish infantry battalions and f(lUr armored regiments, the latter containing 

approximately 240 tanks, faced a 

front defended by an estimated three 

infantry battalions' of the 278th Division, 

plus some units of the 7Ist Division that 

had been reconstituted after heavy 

losses in :viay during the defense of the 

Gustav Line south of Rome. Because 

the Poles planned to rely on accurate 

close air support, they attacked at daylight on 17 July behind th~ fire of 

approximately 300 artillery pieces and 

aerial bombardment by the OAF. 

Early in the day some anxiety de\'eloped at Polish headquarters over the 

security of the left flank because of 

hesitati~)I1 and local withdra\\'als by the 

Italians. Yet that concern \\'as shortlived as the overwhelming weight of 

Allied firepower propelled the 5th Kresowa Division f()rward expeditiously in 

the center. By the end of the day the 

division and the tanks of the armored 

brigade had gained approximately f()ilr 

miles. The next dav the Poles drove the 

Germans beyond the Esino River, ten 

miles north\~'est of Osimo, and on the 

18th pursued the enemy beyond the 

river, completing the envelopment of 

Ancona. As the Carpathian Lancers of 

the 3d Carpathian Division pushed 

along the coastal highway to enter the 

city in early afternoon, they were virtually unopposed. 

Over the next \\'eek the Polish corps 

I" Operations of the British. Indian. and Dominion Forces in I talv. Part I I. Sec F. 2 Polish Corps 

Operations, Unle~s otherwise indicated the f()lIowing is based upon this reference, 
END OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL ITALY 279 

forced the enemy steadilv northward to 

place the port (;r Anco~a well beyond 

the range of German artillery and to 

give the Eighth Army a m~~jor t()l'ward 

supply base. No longer would British 

truck convoys have to make the long 

overland haul from Bari, over 260 

miles to the south. Fortunately fl-x the 

Allies, the Germans at Ancona had 

been unable to demolish the port as 

thoroughly as their confreres at Leghorn. On 23 July, only five days after 

the fall of Ancona, a British supply 

convoy steamed into the port. 17 

.v1eanwhile, br to the west beyond 

the Apennines, a major part o{ the 

British Eighth Army prepared to renew 

the drive against the communications 

center of Arezzo, a prerequisite to 

continuing on to Florence. Opposite the 

13 Corps, \\,hich fl.)}' several weeks had 

carried the main burden of the Eighth 

Army's' oHensive, were the same i()llI' 

German divisions that had earlier defended the Frieda or Trasimeno Line: 

the 15th Panzer Grenadier, the 334th 

lnjanlrv, tlu' lsi Pmru/m/(', and the Hf'rmann Corring Dhli"iolls-all under the 

command of General Herr's LXXVI 

Panza Cui's. 1 H "rhey were deployed 

along dominating heigltts b(,(\\'een 

Monte Castiglione Maggiore and Castello di Brolio, the latter (\\I:nty miles 

west of Arezzo. Evervwhere they enjoyed the advantage of' ()bs('rvatio~ and 

fields of fire. Onlv in the center, \\here 

infantrvmen of the 4th Division had 

captured the isolated hill Poggio 

17 Alexander Despatch, pp. 60-61. 

'" On II July, the 7/5111 Ill/atlll)' Dil';lifl/l began 

the relief of the Hrrmatlll Go('rinj( /)il'I'IOII. See IOlh 

Army KTB Nr. /0. II Ju144 . ..10K DOL 5299111. 

al'Omo, had the (;crmans given 

ground. 1!l 

Checked on the left by enemy fire on 

5 July, the 13 Corps at the outset hlilcd 

to appreciate the strength of the German positions. Several days were lost 

,,,,hile the leading brigades continued to 

probe in the belief that the positions 

could be penetrated through continued 

pressure "'ithout the necessity of a fullscale, set-piece attack. The bct that the 

6th Armoured Division on the right 

and the 4th Inbntry Division in the 

centel' contin ued to make some progress supported that belief, until on the 

7th those divisions too encountered the 

full strength of the German deft'llsi\e 

fires. On the corps right flank the tanks 

of the 26th Armoured Brigade, 6th 

Armoured Division, reached a point 

about a mile south of the junction of 

Highways 71 and 73 where thc\ had to 

halt, threc miles short of An'zzo. On 

the left the 6th South African Armoun.'d Division also ground to a halt. 

Although General Leese assumed 

that the 13 Corps would have to be 

reini()rced if a breakthrough to Arezzo 

was to be achieved, reini()l'cements 

were less readily obtainable than the\' 

had been in June. The 10 Corps, which 

had earlier provided additional units 

for its neighbor on the left, had only 

one division and an armored brigade to 

employ against the equivalent of two or 

three German divisions deployed, as 

were those opposite the 13 Corps, on 

good defensive terrain; and thus the 10 

Corps had first claim on reinforcements. General Leese met the claim by 

I" Operations of British, Indian. ,md Dominion 

Fones in Italv. Part II. Sec D. Unless "thenli,,' 

cited the /"lI,,;ving is based upon this reference. 
280 

ordering forward the 4th Indian Division, which had been undergoing three 

weeks of training in mountain warfare. 

By 10 July the Indians had taken their 

place in line to the left of their countrymen in the 10th Indian Division. 

Reinforcements {(n' the 13 Corps had 

to come from theater reserves which 

Alexander had earlier earmarked for 

participation in the offensive against the 

Gothic Line. That development meant 

that the 2d New Zealand Division, 

resting and training south of Rome, 

had to be committed earlier than 

planned. It took until 14 July f(n° that 

division to enter the line east of the 

Chiana Canal between the 4th Indian 

Infantry and the British 6th Armoured 

Divisions. 

With the division's arrival, the 13 

Corps commander, Kirkman, planned 

to attack at 0 I 00 on the 15th with the 

4th Infantry and 6th South African 

Armoured Divisions demonstrating actively on the left to conceal the main 

effort to be made by the New Zealanders and the British 6th Armoured Division on the right in an eff(H"t to take 

Arezzo from the west. The attack went 

slowly at first, the Germans even managing some local counterattacks while 

slowly yielding ground. Yet that night 

the Germans broke contact and with 

drew. Early on 16 July the British 6th 

Armoured Division's 26th Armoured 

Brigade descended into the upper 

Chiana valley west of Arezzo and rapidly closed on the city and crossings of 

the Arno some f(mr miles to the north. 

During the remainder of the day the 

New Zealanders and the British armor 

sped forward along the roads west and 

northwest of the objective. By evening 

they had crossed the Arno where it 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

flows westward for a short distance 

before turning northwestward toward 

Florence, 25 miles away. By dark on 16 

July the battle for Arezzo had ended 

and the advance on Florence was about 

to begin. 

The extended defense of Arezzo had 

given Field Marshal Kesselring alxmt all 

the time he could hope for-an additional ten days-for improving the 

Gothic Line and resting and reorganizing his f()J"Ces. That the respite came at 

a relatively low cost could be inferred 

from the fact that the 13 Corps 

counted only 165 prisoners during the 

ten-day flight. 

Despite the heavy operational demands of the Arezzo battle, the Eighth 

Army continued with its administrative 

preparations for the Gothic Line offensive. In the vicinity of Orte and Castellana at the end of the first week of July 

the army opened its first railheads 

north of Rome. Arezzo was soon to 

serve as the army's main communications center and roadhead f(n° operations in the Northern Apennines. Once 

that road head was open, the Eighth 

Army staff estimated, a force of thirteen and a half divisions, nine of which 

might be operationally employed, could 

be maintained north of Florence. 

Pause at the Arno 

As the U.S. Fifth Army drew lip to 

the Arno west of Florence, (;eneral 

Clark decided against crossing the river 

immediately in favor of a pause to rest 

and reorganize his troops and assemble 

supplies. One of the divisions most 

deserving of a rest was the 34th, in 

action with few respites since fighting in 

North Africa in 1943. The 45-mile 
END OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL ITALY 281 

advance from Piombino to Leghorn 

had only been the last of a gTueling 

battle experience that brought all ranks 

close to exhaustion. Even the division 

commander, General Ryder, was mentally and physically near exhaustion, so 

that on the 21 st General Clark replaced 

him with a younger man, M<~. Gen. 

Charles Bolte. It was a relief without 

prejudice, General Ryder going on to a 

corps command in the United States. 20 

For French units, meanwhile, time 

was to run out before they could reach 

the Arno. Acting under orders from 

the Allied command, General Clark 

directed that all French units be relieved and assembled near Naples bef()re the end of July. As specified by 

General Alexander, the British 13 

Corps upon departure of the French 

was to shift its left flank westward to 

embrace the f()rmer FEC sector, thus 

extending the interarmy boundary to a 

line generally paralleling the Elsa River. 

As the relief neared, the French fi'ont 

stabilized roughly ten miles short of the 

Amo. The FEe's zone passed to the 

British on 22 July, considerably narro\\-

ing the Fifth Army's sector. 

Although the French stopped short 

of the Amo, their contribution to the 

drive north of Rome was considerable. 

The Algerian and Moroccan divisions, 

filr example, had captured 2,080 prisoners. The French themselves incurred 

6,680 casualties, including 1,342 killed. 

As the 13 Corps relieved the French, 

the U.S. IV Corps prepared to clear the 

last enemy remaining south of the 

Arno between Leghorn and Pisa. That 

task could still pose problems. A battal-

'" Inlerv. Mathews with Ladue. 17 .Iun 48. CMH; 

34th Div AAR . .lui 44; Clark. (;(1/11"(11('(/ Ri.lk. p. 384. 

ion of the 363d Infantry, still attached 

to the 34th Division, ran into considerable resistance while fighting through 

much of the night to enter Marina di 

Pisa at the river's mouth before daylight 

on the 23d. And the 442d Regimental 

Combat Team and the 168th Inf~lI1try 

were delayed by the numerous canals 

scoring the broad valley. Engineers subject tIl harassing fire from north of the 

Arno had to construct numerous 

bridges, induding one over the 100-

f()()t-wide gap of the Canale Navigable, 

connecting the Amo \\ith the port of 

Leghorn. 

During the afternoon of 23 July, t\\O 

battalions of the 363d Inbntn occupied that part of Pisa lying south of the 

Arno. Finding all bridges destroyed, the 

men dug in along the south bank of 

the river while enemy guns and mortars poured in heavy fire. Since Pis a's 

famed Renaissance monuments, the 

Baptistry of SI. John with its Campenile-the leaning tower-were north of 

the river, they were unaffected. From 

somewhere north of the Arno 28()-mm. 

guns opened fire on Leghorn. Yet b\" 

evening the 34th Division and its attached units had occupied the entire 

south bank of the Arno from the sea to 

a. point about ten miles cast of Pisa. 

During the next two c\avs the 91 st and 

88th Divisions pulled up to the south 

bank on the IV Corps center and right 

flank, respectively. 

The Arno RinT flows through a 

broad valle\" at the f(lot of the Northern 

Apennines. From Arezzo, about f()rt\" 

miles southe~lst of Florence, it nO\\"s 

northward, \\,here the Sie\'e Rin'r joins 

ten miles east of Florence. TlllI~ enlarged, the Arno proceeds \,'est\\ard 

through Florence and Pisa f()t· ():') miles 
282 

before entering the Ligurian Sea at 

Marina di Pisa. The largest river in the 

Fifth Army's zone of operations, the 

Arno varied in width from 60 to 600 

feet, with an average of fi'om 200 to 

250 feet. The depth also varied greatly, 

ranging from only a few feet in periods 

of drought to over thirty feet at flood 

stage. In late summer, bef()re the autumn rains began, the river could be 

easily f()I'ded almost anywhere by {()ot 

troops and at numerous points by vehicles. Because of seasonal Hooding in 

spring and late autumn, levees from 20 

to 40 feet in height and SO to 100 feet 

wide flanked the river f()r much of its 

length. Between Pisa and the coast the 

banks were about ten feet high, rising 

to forty feet east of Pisa, then Etlling off 

to twenty feet near Florence. As the 

river ent~rs the coastal plain near Pisa, 

its valley widens to fifteen miles. 

Since the Arno in the midsummer of 

1944 represented no formidable military obstacle, General Clark's superiors 

both in Caserta and in Washington 

favored an immediate continuation of 

the advance beyond the river. General 

Alexander, in particular, was anxious to 

place the port of Leghorn beyond the 

range of enemy artillery as soon as 

possible. He urged the Fifth Army 

commander, if he f()Und the line of the 

Arno weakly held, to push on immediately to seize the heights of the :vIonte 

Pisano hill mass, 14 miles northeast of 

Leghorn and probable haven f{)r many 

of the guns harassing Leghorn. Extending from the Arno northwestward {()I' 

twelve miles to the banks of the Serchio 

River, the hill mass might also serve as 

a springboard for an advance on Pistoia, 20 miles to the northeast. Since the 

configuration of the terrain made the 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

sector from the city of Prato (ten miles 

northwest of Florence) westward to the 

Ligurian coast a single tactical entity, 

Alexander assigned Clark's Fifth Army 

responsibility f(H' all of it. After crossing 

the Arno, the Fifth Army would have 

as its objectives, after the Monte Pisano 

hill mass, the cities of Pistoia and Lucca, 

the latter about ten miles northwest of 

Pisa. 21 

If the Germans elected to hold along 

the coastal reaches of the Arno, Alexander suggested that Clark attempt instead to {{)rce a passage somewhere to 

the east between Pontedera, 17 miles 

northeast of Leghorn, and Ernpoli, 16 

miles farther east, and b'om there develop two thrusts, one on Pistoia and 

the other on Lucca. With those cities in 

hand, the Fifth Army would control a 

f{)Ur-lane autostrada running westward 

from Florence to the coastal highway, 

ten miles west of Lucca. That situation 

would give the Fifth Army an excellent 

lateral route over which troops might 

be shifted rapidly from one sector to 

another. 22 

Although General Alexander was 

aware that many of the Fifth Army's 

divisions needed rest and reorganization, he was also conscious that the 

Germans were in more serious straits 

and thus were unlikely to launch a 

major counteroffensive at any point 

along the river. This circumstance 

should enable Clark, Alexander believed, to assume the defensive on his 

left wing between Pontedera and the 

sea, thereby resting some of his divisions, while at the same time concen21 Ltr. Marshall to Devers, 17 .luI 44, CCS 603/4. 

in ABC 384, Eur Sex 9-A; Ltr, Alexander to Clark, 

19 .luI 44, Sub: Future Opns Hqs AAI, MA/A/470. 

22 Ltr, Alexander to Clark, 19 .luI 44. 
END OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL ITALY 283 

trating his fittest units on his right 

between Pontedera and Empoli filr the 

thrusts on Pistoia and Lucca. It \\as of 

"supreme importance," Alexander concluded, to go "all-out" to capture those 

two cities before Kesselring's armies 

could recover from the attrition of the 

past few weeks. 2:1 

Despite this attrition, Field Marshal 

Kesselring had actually achieved something of a defensive success in holding 

the Allied armies f(lr so long south of 

the Arno. Yet there was another reason 

for Allied delays, not of Kesslering's 

making: the shift of ground and air 

resources during July from Alexander's 

armies to those f(lrces preparing f(lr 

southern France. That shift had f()l'estalled any swift advance to and 

through the Northern Apennines, 

across the Po Valley, and into northeastern Italy. 

A swift advance across the Po thus 

obviated, no longer was it necessary to 

spare the bridges of the Po. In an 

effort to isolate the enemy in the 

Northern Apennines, Alexander decided to concentrate on disrupting the 

enemy's lines of communication across 

the Po. Thus Operation MALLORY MAJOR, which aimed at destruction of all 

bridges across the Po, in some respects 

reflected less the bright hopes of early 

summer than an admission of frustrated expectations attributable to the 

events and command decisions of late 

June or early July. 2~ 

Planning for MALLORY MAJOR had 

'3 Ibid. 

H Blockade: The Isolation of Italy from the Reich 

by the Mediterranean Tactical Ail: Force, 29 Aug 

44-1 May 45, Hqs MATAF, July 1945, The Albert 

F. Simpson Historical Research Center, CSAF Maxwell AFS, Ala. 

begun in early June shortly after the 

fall of Rome, after Allied intelligence 

had concluded that the destruction of 

bridges would cause greater disruption 

of enemy lines of communication than 

the repeated bombing of railroad marshalling yards. The plan was to concentrate bombers on the destruction of the 

six rail bridges across the Po and one 

across the Trebbia, a northward flowing 

tributary entering the Po at Piacenza, 

some 34 miles southeast of Milan. The 

operations were to be supplemented by 

destruction of either the Recco or the 

Zoaglia viaducts on the coastal highway 

a few miles east of Genoa, Italy's major 

commercial port, about 100 miles 

northwest of Leghorn. The plan was 

later modified to include all bridges 

across the Po. Yet in the first weeks 

after the capture of Rome, expectations 

that Allied armies would reach the Po 

Valley by later summer had prompted 

Alexander to shelve the plans. 2~ 

With the decision fill' Operation ANVIL, Alexander still hoped that his armies would be able to fi m'e a passage 

of the Northern Apennines befi»'C winter; but after Wilson's directive of 5 

July, he had abandoned all hope that 

they would be able to do so without 

pause. The AAI commander therefore 

f()Cused his thoughts on bringing the 

enemy to a decisive battle between the 

Apennines and a bridgeless ri\'er-thus 

a revived Operation :\1ALLORY MAJOR. 

On II July Allied Force Headquarters 

issued orders fin' the operation to begin 

the next day. 

" Operations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forct's in Italy. Part II, Sec A, Allied Strategy; 

Alexander Despatch, pp. 64-65. Cnless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon these rekrences. 
284 

Beginning on 12 July hundreds of 

medium bombers attacked the nineteen 

bridges from Piacenza eastward to the 

Adriatic, then turned westward to bomb 

the bridges as far west as Torre Beretti, 

50 miles west of Piacenza, By the 27th 

all bridges between Torre Beretti and 

the Adriatic were destroyed, virtuallv 

cutting off Kesselring's 'armies frol~ 

their supply bases in northern Italy, 

That would appear to have been the 

logical time f(>r ('...eneral Clark to have 

crossed the Arno River, drive on Pistoia 

and Lucca, and force the Germans back 

into the Gothic Line west of Florence, 

Instead, the Fifth Armv f(x almost a 

month after the completion of MALLORY MAJOR remained south of the 

river. 2() Except for a quick thrust in 

early August to seize Florence, so did 

the Eighth Army, Thus Kesselring 

gained more time for strengthening his 

defenses in the Northern Apennines 

and, even more important, to restore 

his sorely damaged lines of communication across the Po. Using pontoon 

bridges, ferries, pneumatic lines, and 

overhead cable lines, German engineers 

managed to keep enough supplies moving across the Po to maintain, though 

2" See ch. XVI. pp. 1-2, for explanation of 

Clark's decision to halt along the t\mo. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

not to increase, existing levels. The 

Germans also organized an adequate 

ferry service across the Po to supply 

Ferrara, their main communications 

hub behind the army group's left wing. 

By the end of July nineteen ferries 

were in service, ten of them capable of 

carrying twenty-four tons of cargo 

each. 27 

On 3 August traffic started moving 

again across several repaired bridges 

that had been knocked out in July by 

Allied aircraft. By 6 August the Brenner l'ailroad line vvas also back in 

operation. Four days later the main line 

from the Austrian Alps to the Ligurian 

coast-from Brenner, via Bologna, to 

Genoa-was again open and the rail 

line to Turin, seventy-five miles northwest of Genoa, rcstol:cd. On the f()Um\,-

ing day the rail line from Genoa into 

southern Fl'ance was also passable. 

While Operation MALLORY MA:JOR was a 

marked success in terms of bridges 

destroyed, failure to co-ordinate it 

closely with an Allied offensive against 

the Gothic Line meant that in the long 

run it had no more than a temporary 

harassing effect. 

27 Craven and Catc, eds .. AAF Ill, pp. 404-17: 

Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB. 

I V(I), pp, 542-43. 
CHAPTER XVI 

Along the Arno 

While General Clark's decision to 

pause along the Arno during the second half of July had forfeited the 

temporary advantages provided by Operation MALLORY MAJOR through destruction of the Po bridges, timing of 

the aerial operation had been Alexander's responsibility rather than 

Clark's. Furthermore, General Clark 

saw several compelling reasons for 

holding his army south of the river, 

most important of which was the condition of men and equipment. The ports 

of Civitavecchia, San Stefano, and 

Piombino were just beginning to take 

up some of the slack caused by leaving 

Naples and Anzio far to the rear, but 

the essential port of Leghorn had yet to 

begin to function. Moreover, in Clark's 

opinion, the demands of Operation 

ANVIL had already deprived his army 

of the reserves necessary to continue 

the advance beyond the Arno without a 

pause for rest and reorganization. I 

That was a theme to which the Fifth 

Army commander would frequently return. Since the Eighth Army would not 

reach the Arno between Pontassieve 

and Florence until the end of the 

month and would, like the Fifth Army, 

also have to pause and reorganize before continuing, MALLORY MAJOR'S brief 

opportunities were forfeited by the 

Eighth Army as well. 

That Crittenberger's IV Corps, at 

least, was desperately weary and in no 

I Clark Diary, 8Jul 44. 

condition to continue the advance beyond the Arno without pause there 

seemed little doubt. Everybody was 

near exhaustion and in desperate need 

of rest, although, as Alexander reminded Clark, no more so than the 

enemy. 

There were organizational changes 

too that required a pause. The 1 st 

Armored Division, then in corps reserve, had on 17 July also acquired a 

new commanding general, Maj. Gen. 

Vernon E. Prichard, former commander of an armored division in the 

United States. Like Ryder, General 

Harmon went home to assume command of a corps. Three days later the 

1st Armored Division undertook a thorough reorganization, one that had been 

postponed since September 1943, when 

the U.S. Army had adopted a new 

Table of Organization and Equipment 

for armored divisions. Although the 

new organization was an outgrowth of 

the 1st Armored Division's own experiences in the North African campaign, 

the division had been unable to reorganize in September, since part of the 

unit had been fighting in Italy and the 

rest was in Algeria preparing to move 

to Italy. In the months since Salerno 

some elements of the division had been 

in almost continuous contact with the 

enemy. As the Fifth Army pulled up to 

the Arno, the time to make the changes 

had come. 2 

2 Howe, The Battle History oj the 1 sl Armored 

Division, pp. 363-66. 
286 

The 1943 TOE had cut the strength 

of an armored division from 14,620 

men to 10,937, but because the 1st 

Armored Division had been understrength, less than a thousand had to be 

transferred. In essence, the reorganization eliminated one armored regiment 

as well as headquarters of the other 

two. In their stead were three separate 

tank battalions and three separate armored infantry battalions, which could 

be thrown together in various mixes 

with supporting units to form two combat commands, while new small headquarters, designated division trains, controlled the division reserve and supplies. 

The reorganization cut the number of 

medium tanks from 250 to 154. The 

basic reasons for the reductions were 

control and maneuverability, the old 

heavy division having proved ponderous. 3 

On 25 July headquarters of the II 

Corps, which had been in army reserve 

for the past few weeks, came forward 

on the army right flank to take control 

of the 85th, 88th, and 91 st Divisions. 

Clark, nevertheless, intended no extensive operations along the Arno since he 

planned to conserve Keyes' corps to 

carry the main burden of the army's 

offensive against the ('"othic Line norrh 

of the river. 4 

After the capture of Leghorn, Clark 

began to withdraw the Fifth Army's 

combat divisions to afford all a rest 

period off the line. To make that 

3 For detail see Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanlev 

Russell Connor, Army "Lineage series, Arm()r-Cm'~ 

airy, Part I, RrfJ1;/ar Army and Army Rrll·n1r (Washington, D.C., 1969). 

i Interv, Mathews with Ladue, 17 June 48. CMH; 

Chester G. Starr, ed., From Salfrno to thr Alps: A 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

eaSler, he turned over a lO-mile sector 

of the defensive line to four automatic 

weapons antiaircraft battalions converted into infantry, thereby releasing a 

battle-weary 34th Infantry Division. Infantry units in rest areas furnished 

mortars, machine guns, automatic rifles, 

and radios to equip the antiaircraft 

battalions for their new role. 'rank 

destroyers, tanks, and batteries of 3.7-

inch and 90-mm. antiaircraft guns provided heavy fire support. Brig. Gen. 

Cecil L. Rutledge, erstwhile commander 

of the 45th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, commanded what became known 

as Task Force 45. 

To make up for shortages in artillery 

and engineers in the Fifth Army caused 

by earlier withdrawals for ANVIL, Clark 

~rrowed from his British counterpart 

some sixty miscellaneous artillery pieces 

and two battalions of Royal Engineers. 

He also borrowed an amiaircraft artillery regiment, which he converted into 

infantry and assigned to Task Force 

45. 5 

Meanwhile, Clark began to regroup 

his army across a 30-mile front between 

the Ligurian coast southwest of Pisa 

and an interarmy boundary close to the 

Elsa River, which enters the Amo at a 

point four miles west of Empoli. Crittenberger's IV Corps held a 23-mile 

sector on the army left flank as far 

inland as the village of Capanne, five 

miles east of Pontedera. Keyes' II Corps 

held the remaining seven miles. Within 

His/ory 0/ Ihr Fifth Arm~, /943-45 (Washington: 

Infantry Journal Press, 1948), pp. 297-98. 

'Clark Diary, 17 Aug 44; fHih Arm)' History, Part 

VI, p. 99. A British AA regiment was the equivalent 

of a U.S. AA battalion. 
ALONG THE ARNO 

the IV Corps sector Task Force 45 held 

the coastal flank, and the newly reorganized 1 st Armored Division moved forward from reserve to take up a position 

on the right, while a regimental combat 

team of the 9lst Division held the 

narrow II Corps front. 

That disposition permitted the bulk 

of. the Fifth Army to rest, so that by 

mId-August Clark would have five divisions-four infantry and one armored-ready to resume the offensive 

while Task Force 45 would have re~ 

ceived sufficient infantry experience to 

be useful either as a follow-up or as a 

holding force . Two additional units 

were on their way to join the army: the 

Negro 92d Infantry Division and the 

Brazilian Expeditionary Force, the latter 

a division-size unit consisting of the lst, 

6th, and II th Regiment Combat Teams 

with attached supporting units. Because 

of limited training and relatively low 

strength, neither division was expected 

for the next few months to have more 

than a defensive capability. Even with 

the addition of those two units, the 

Fifth Army would have the equivalent 

of but seven divisions, only half as 

many as in May along the Garigliano 

River at the beginning of the drive to 

Rome. Reductions had also occurred in 

the number of corps artillery battalions, 

twenty-two as compared with thirtythree, and additional battalions were 

soon to be withdrawn for Operation 

ANVIL. For an army that had come to 

depend heavily upon massive artillery 

fire, that cutback was disturbing. 6 

By the end of July all French 

troops, the majority of which were 

.; AAI Order of Battle on withdrawal of ANVIL 

(ORAGOON) I()rmations, BIGOT-ANVIL a n . II to app 0-5. ,. 

287 

AMERICAN PATROL ENTERING PISA 

Moslem, had left the Fifth Army, but 

the arrival of the Brazilian troops in 

August would give the army's G-4 little 

relief from long-time problems of providing rations acceptable to men of 

several different nationalities with 

widely differing dietary customs and 

preferences. The Brazilian menu, for 

example, included considerably more 

sugar, lard, and salt than did the 

A~erican while excluding tomato juice, 

drIed beans of all types, and rice. 7 

The Germans meanwhile faced far 

more critical difficulties with their rations. Long plagued with short supplies, 

the Germans, as they withdrew northward, were forced increasingly to live 

off the land , and especially to draw 

upon the agricultural resources of the 

7 Fiflh Army HisI01), Part VI. p. 117. 
288 

fertile Po Valley. Furthermore, among 

the German troops the unaccustomed 

heat of a central Italian summer had 

caused considerable hardship from heat 

exhaustion and illness from tainted 

food. 8 

TIu! Eighth Army 

While the Fifth Army paused along 

the Arno west of Florence, the British 

Eighth Army continued to advance on 

a two-corps front over terrain as challenging as that encountered around 

Lake Trasimeno. Beyond Arezzo there 

loomed the Pratomagno mountain massif, a region of few roads or trails, 

stretching almost thirty miles northwestward and filling the fifteen-mile-wide 

area between two arms of the Arno 

where the river, flowing south from the 

Northern Apennines, makes a large 

loop north\vest of Arezzo befi)re flowing northwest toward Florence, turning 

again, and flowing westward to the sea. 

Two highways extended beyond Arezzo: Highway 71 northward along the 

east bank of the Arno to Bibbiena, 

located at the foot of the Northern 

Apennines at the junction with Highway 70, and Highway 69 northwestward along the west bank of the Arno 

as far as Inciso in Valdarno, whence the 

highway divided into two parts, one 

continuing west of the river to Florence 

and the second east of the Arno via 

Pontassieve to Florence. With the 10 

Corps following Highway 71 toward 

Bibbiena and the 13 Corps the valley of 

the middle Arno toward Florence, the 

two corps would again diverge, as they 

had south of Lake Trasimeno. 

R German military records frequently comment 

on these problems. . 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

By the end of July the 10 Corps' 4th 

Indian Division had reached the entrance of the upper Arno valley, and 

the 10th Indian Division had secured 

an area in the Sansepolcro plain; but 

there the divisions had to pause to 

regroup in order to sideslip to the west 

toward the Pratomagno massif.9 The 

13 Corps, meanwhile, continued toward 

Florence without pause. General Kirkman sent the 13 Corps down the Arno 

valley, with the British 6th Armoured 

Division making the main effort on the 

corps right astride the river. On the 

corps left the 6th South African Armoured Division continued its advance 

west of the Chianti Hills, and in the 

center the British 4th Division maintained contact between the two armored 

forces. If the enemy continued to withdraw north of Arezzo, Kirkman intended to hold the 2d New Zealand 

Division in corps reserve. Otherwise, he 

intended to commit the New Zealanders to reinforce his main effort. The 13 

Corps also had the 8th Indian Division, 

formerly with the I () Corps, as well as 

the British 25th Tank Brigade from the 

army reserve and the I st Army Artillery Group from the 5 Corps. I (I 

The corps got going on 16 July on a 

broad front northwest of Arezzo. In a 

quick thrust beyond the city the 6th 

Armoured Division's 26th Armoured 

Brigade seized intact the Ponte a Buriano, a bridge across the upper Arno six 

miles northwest of the citv, but the next 

day when the rest of dIe division attempted to cross, fire from high 

9 Operations of the British. Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy. Part II. Sec. D. Unless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon this source. 

u'Tank brigades, unlike armored brigades, were 

~esigned for attachment to infantry divisions. 
ALONG THE ARNO 

ground to the northwest so disrupted 

the column that the commander ordered a search for an alternate crossing. 

The search located a ford concealed 

from enemy observation and fire, but 

after only a few hours' use it deteriorated so badly that it had to be abandoned. 

There the British 6th Armoured Division' might have been forced to halt, 

except that the next day, the 17th, the 

6th South African Armoured Division 

gained the ridge of the Chianti Hills. 

From the high ground the South Africans were able to direct flanking fire 

against the Germans opposite the 4th 

Division in the corps center and on the 

eastern flanks of the hills. That forced 

the Germans to fall back far enough to 

enable the British armor to cross the 

Arno in strength and, by the 20th, to 

capture high ground near Castiglione 

Fibocchi. 

It was dear at that point to General 

Kirkman that the Germans intended to 

make a stand to block the middle Arno 

valley and the lower slopes of the 

Pratomagno massif east of the valley 

with Schlemm's I Parachute Corps, which 

had the 1st Parachute, 15th Panzer Grenadier, and 334th Divisions deployed opposite the 13 Corps right flank in the 

Arno valley. West of the valley the 

715th Light Infantry Division was in the 

process of relieving the Hermann Goering Division along a sector extending 

from the valley to the ridge line of the 

Chianti Hills. Having lost heavily in 

May at Anzio, the 715th Division had 

bee'n reinforced and reorganized with 

replacements from the Reich. Although 

most of the men lacked battle experience, they were deployed in terrain so 

devoid of roads as to favor the defend289 

ers. West of the Chianti Hills, between 

Highway 2 and Route 222, the Germans had deployed the 4th Parachute 

and 356th Divisions across a ten-mile 

sector opposite the South African armored division. 

After studying those dISpositions and 

reflecting on the slight progress made 

thus far in the Arno valley, General 

Kirkman decided that the best route to 

Florence lay west of the Chianti Hills 

on his left flank, which General Leese 

was about to extend to take over the 

FEC sector from the Fifth Army. On 

20 July he decided to shift the main 

effort to that flank and began moving 

there the 8th Indian Division and the 

New Zealand division fr'om his reserve. 

The 8th Indian Division, with the armor of the 1st Canadian Tank Brigade 

in support, was to operate on the corps 

left flank, while the New Zealanders 

were to pass through the FEe's 2d 

'Yloroccan Division early on the 22d 

and drive northward to~ard the Arno 

River crossings at Signa, five miles west 

of Florence. To the New Zealanders' 

right the South Africans were to advance astride Route 222 to Impruneta, 

five miles south of Florence. To the 

South African division's right and east 

of the Chianti Hills, the 4th Division, 

supported by the 25th Tank Brigade. 

was to advance toward Pontassieve and 

cross to the north bank of the Amo at 

Poggio Alberaccio, seven miles east of 

Florence. The British 6th Armoured 

Division \vas to continue to operate on 

the right flank. 

Thus regrouped, the 13 Corps resumed its advance on 21 July. For the 

next two weeks the corps battled its way 

through a series of well-sited and skillful1y defended positions to within seven 
290 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

AERIAL VIEW OF FLORENCE 

miles of the Arno west of Florence. 

Late on 2 August the New Zealanders 

fought to the top of La Poggiona, high 

ground five miles southwest of Florence 

overlooking Highway 2 from the west, 

the last remaining favorable defensive 

terrain south of Florence and west of 

the Chianti Hills. With that loss those 

enemy forces still east of the highway 

began to thin out. By the morning of 3 

August the Germans were in full retreat across the entire corps front. 

Along Highway 2 during the night of 

3 August the Imperial Light Horse of 

the 6th South African Armoured Division entered the southern portion of 

Florence and the next day reached the 

Arno. There the South Africans discovered that all of the Florentine bridges 

had been demolished except the picturesque Ponte Vecchio. Narrow and lined 

on either side with shops, the Ponte 

Vecchio was unsuitable for anything but 

foot traffic, and the Germans had 

blocked both ends with demolished 

buildings. West of the city the New 

Zealanders quickly closed up to the south 

bank of the Arno, and the 8th Indian 

Division secured the high ground above 

Montelupo, eleven miles west of the 
ALONG THE ARNO 

city. By nightfall of .5 Aug~st the 13 

Corps was in firm control of the south 

bank of the river from Montelupo 

eastward to Florence. 

The German Situation 

As the British approached Florence, 

Field Marshal Kesselring was conscious 

that with Leghorn, Arezzo, and Ancona 

already in Allied hands, all General 

Alexander needed to complete a system 

of logistical, communications, and operational bases from which to support 

and control an offensive into the 

Northern Apennines was Florence. The 

city and the Arno obvi(~usly ~onstit~ted 

an advantageous delaymg lme before 

the Apennines. On the other hand, 

there were important arguments for 

abandoning Florence and the Arno.. , 

'rhe main argument was Kesselring s 

desire to preserve, as h~ h~d Rome, the 

city of Florence and Its Irreplaceable 

artistic and other cultural treasures. To 

that end, the German commander had 

on 23 June designated Florence an 

open city and ordered his ar~y commanders to exclude all but mternal 

security personnel from th~ city. !h~t 

information was communIcated mdlrecdy through Vatican officials to the 

Allied command. Although General 

Alexander, as in the case of Rome, 

declined to issue a similar declaration, 

he was equally anxious to avoid fighting 

within the historic city. II 

"AOK 14, la NT. 4695144IGfh., 23 Jun 44, in AOK 

/4, la KTB Nr. 3, Ant. 611,1, 30 .Iun 44, AOK n, 

59091/4; MS # C-095c (Senger), CMH; Alexander 

Dl'spa/rh, pp. 60-61 An interesling eyewitness account as to how both sides treated the so-called 

open city may be found in Nicky Mariano, Forty 

Yfan with Bamson (New York: Knopf, 1966), Appendix: "A month with the Paratroopers in the 

front line." 

291 

Similarly, to fight along the Arno and 

at other delaying positions short of the 

Gothic Line was to endanger the worldrenowned artistic and architectural 

monuments of other Tuscan cities, such 

as Pisa, Lucca, and Pistoia. Even the city 

of Prato, a few miles northwest of 

Florence, contained important frescos 

by Fra Filippo Lippi. Moreover, stored 

in scores of villas and warehouses over 

the Tuscan countryside were priceless 

art treasures removed f()l' safe keeping 

from Florence's f~lmed Uffi7i Gallery. 

Should an all-out battle develop along 

the Arno, those too would be endangen~(L 12 , 

The argument posed for Field Marshal Kesselring a critical choice. If he 

allowed the Allied armies to assault the 

Gothic Line without first having to fight 

through a series of f()rward de.laving 

positions, he would run the risk of 

facing them in the Po Valle~ before the 

end of the year. He had given orders 

that Pisa a'nd Florence were to be 

spared, but at the same time he l1ad 

directed his army commanders to make 

the Allies fight fi:)r every gain bet,~'een 

the Arno and the Northern Apennmes. 

The orders were obviouslv inherently 

contradictory, since Florenc:e, especially, 

was the key to the Arno position. To 

yield the city would necessarily lead to a 

withdrawal all along the north bank of 

the river. la 

While the German commander 

weighed the pms and cons of holding 

the Amo position, his Allied opponents, 

despite Kesselring's unilateral ?edaration of Florence as an open City, harbored no doubts that he would contest, 

'2MS # C-095c (Senger), CMH, 

t"MS # C-064 (Kesselring), CMH; AOK 14, la 

KTB AnI, 4, 2 Aug 44, AOK 14. Doc, 6224111. 
292 

as he had done so often bef()re, every 

yard of defensible ground south of the 

city and possibly within it until f(m:ed 

to withdraw. Convinced that the Germans had yet to complete their defenses in the Northern Apennines, the 

Allied commanders believed that Kesselring still needed time and thus would 

attempt to hold along the Arno.14 

As the hont approached Florence, 

the Germans faced growing difficulties 

in keeping the civilian population of the 

city supplied with f()od, which had to be 

trucked from as far away as the Lombard plain, fifty miles to the north. 

The Fourteenth Army, in whose zone the 

city lay, was itself plagued by a shortage 

of transport to support its own operations and could spare few trucks to 

assist the hungry Florentines. I~ 

Under those circumstances it was not 

surprising that, as the front neared the 

city, the German garrison faced mounting hostility fi'om the population, but 

General Lemelsen prohibited any retaliation unless civilians engaged in hostile 

acts, such as guiding Allied troops over 

difficult terrain or informing them of 

the location of German positions. In 

such cases he did not shrink from 

authorizing strong punitive measures, 

including, in one case, reprisal by executing twenty-six civilians. IIi 

On 31 July, as the British 13 Corps 

approached Florence, Lemelsen ordered destruction of all bridges within 

or near the city except the Ponte VecI'Msg, FX 80724, Wilson to Troopers, 9 Aug 44, 

AFHQ Cable Log file (OUT), 0100/4/43. 

I'AOK 14, la KTB AnI. 4, 21 Jul 44, AOK 14, Doc. 

6224111. 

\f;lhid., 22 Jul 44; AOK 14, Opn. Order, la NT. 

304i 144 g. Kdos, 14 Jul 44, in la KTB AnI. 4, AnI. 

723, AOK 14, Doc 62241/4. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

chio, 17 While that bridge is picturesque, 

art historians judge that it has little 

artistic merit in comparison with some 

of the others that the Germans destroyed. A consideration in Lemelsen's 

mind may have been that its military 

value \\as as slight as its artistic worth. 

Meam\'hile, after British artillery fire 

destroyed the electric power lines'leading to Florence, conditions for the 

population worsened. All water supplies 

were cut off, thus further fanning a 

growing resentment to\\'ard the Germans, whom the Florentines, as the 

Romans bef()re them, regarded as the 

authors of all their misf()l,tunes. 18 

Evacuation of Florence 

Faced with the near hopeless task of 

supplying a densely populated urban 

area with the necessities of living, Kesselring decided on 2 August to abandon the city, employing paratroopers to 

cover the withdrawal of Schlem m 's I 

Parachute Corps. As the paratroopers 

fought with their backs to the Arno 

throughout 3 August, the furY of the 

battle threatened at times to engulf 

Florence, despite the mutual concern to 

spare the city. Allied artillery fire hit 

those quarters south of the river, and 

occasional long rounds smashed into 

the central city, hitting among other 

places the Piazza M useo I nstituto 

del'Arte and the Ponte della Vittoria, 

one of the bridges left standing in spite 

of Lemelsen's order. Allied aircraft:, 

flying close support missions, also fired 

into portions of the city on both sides 

of the Arno, I!) 

17AOK 14, la KTB NT. 4, 26 and 31 Jul 44, AOK 

14, Doc. 62241 II. 

IBibid., 31 Jul 44. 
ALONG THE ARNO 

The next day under strong pressure 

from the British, the Germans, having 

left combat outposts along the south 

bank, fell back beyond the Arno east 

and west of Florence. Under orders to 

make no stand within the city, the main 

l~Jdy of the paratroopers withdrew to 

the Mugnone Canal on the northwestern edge of the city. That was to serve 

only as a brief delaying position before 

withdrawal into the Heinrich Mountain 

Line, another delaying position located 

in the M ugello Hills f(Hlr miles north of 

Florence. 2o After first providing the 

Florentines with a two-day ration of 

bread, General Schlemm on 7 August 

withdrew the last of his troops. As the 

Germans left, local partisans swiftly occupied those quarters of the city south 

and east of the canal. 21 

The Ligurian Flank 

While Kesselring's attention had been 

understandably concentrated on his 

central sector in the vicinity of Florence 

during the first week of August, he 

nevertheless continued to cast anxious 

glances toward his Ligurian flank, 

which he had long considered a likely 

site for another Allied amphibious operation. Noting that some French units 

had been identified in northern France, 

he wondered if that meant that an 

attack against southern France was no 

longer contemplated. If not southern 

France, perhaps the Italian Riviera? As 

late as 10 August intelligence officers 

were giving equal weight to the fX)ssibility of landings in southern France and 

the Italian Riviera. 22 

I "Ibid., 3 Aug 44. 

2 "Ibid. , 4-6 Aug 44. 

2 IIbid. , 7 Aug 44. 

"Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

IV(I), pp. 507-12 

293 

Kesselring's apprehension increased 

on the 11 th when reports from German aerial reconnaissance disclosed the 

presence along the west coast of Corsica 

of two Allied convoys, totaling seventyfive ships. While the Germans believed 

most of that force was headed for 

southern France, some concern remained that at least part of it might 

attempt to land along the Ligurian 

coast where Marshal Rodolfo Graziani's 

Italo-German Ligurian Army garrisoned 

the coast of the Gulf of Genoa to the 

Fourteenth Army's left rear. As if to 

underscore the concern, Lemelsen and 

Graziani placed both of their commands on full alert, and Lemelsen 

moved a motorized battalion to Lucca, 

ten miles northeast of Pisa, as a security 

force against possible airborne or amphibious landings. 2:1 For the next fe,,' 

days the Germans waited tensely. Although a patrol captured several Americans from the 1 st Armored Division, 

their interrogation confirmed only the 

obvious fact that the armored division 

had returned to the front. 2~ The Germans also observed artillery strongpoints, heavy vehicular traffic, and the 

assembly of armor south and south"'est 

of the Arno. All seemed to point to a 

renewal of the Allied dri\'e northward. 25 

On 15 August Kesselring's long period of watchful waiting and wondering 

what the Allies were going to do with 

.... 

'"The Ligurian Army was actually more of a 

provisional corps headquarters than an army, somewhat similar to Armer Abteilung l'on langen, consist· 

ing of the fusilier battalion of the 34th Dh';s;un, the 

42 j(ll'gl'l' Dh';s;ml, the 3d and 4th Iialian Mo//nla;n 

Dh,;s;01lS. SeeAOK 14, la KTB Nr. 4, 12 Aug. 44,AOK 

14, Doc. 62241/1. 

2 4Ibid., 10 and 13 Aug. 44. 

25Ibid., 14 Aug. 44. 
294 

those troops assembling south of Rome 

ended when he learned of the U.S. 

Seventh Army's landing in southern 

France. Even then he expected that the 

Allies might yet attempt tactical landings between Genoa and La Spezia, the 

Italian naval base about fifty miles 

northwest of Leghorn. That was yet 

another example of Kesselring's obsession with the possibility of hostile amphibious operations against his flanks.21i 

Meanwhile, both sides continued to 

spar in the sectors flanking Florence, 

while the cit v itself was f<)r several days 

a no-man's-land, controlled by rovi~g 

partisan bands. Although German rear 

guards easily kept the partisans at bay 

along the Mugnone Canal, increasing 

difficulties in supplying minimum rations to the civilians in those suburban 

quarters still held by the Germans 

prompted General Lemelsen on 17 August to abandon the canal line. That 

night, Indian infantrymen, who had 

entered Florence on the 13th over the 

Ponte Vecchio, fanned out to take over 

the entire city.27 

The Cost 

With the occupation of Florence the 

campaign of central Italy, which had 

begun four months bef()re along the 

26Ibid., 15 Aug 44. 

2'Ibid., 17 and 18 Aug 44; Operations of the 

British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italv, Palt 

II, Sec. D. ' 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Lil·i and the Garigliano Rivers, came to 

an end. The Allied drive from the 

Tiber to the Arno, while less costly than 

the major battles of the May oflensive 

south of Rome, had taken a heavy toll 

nevertheless. Beyond Rome the' U.S. 

Fifth Army capt~red over 16,000 Germans, while the British, Poles, and 

Italians added more than 7,000. The 

Germans listed their combat losses from 

mid-June to mid-August as 63,500 

killed, wounded, and missing. Between 

Rome and the Arno the U.S. Fifth 

Army toll \\'3S approximately 18,000 

casualties, the Eighth Army J6,()()O. 

The Allied total was about half that of 

the Germans, representing a much better ratio than during the drive on 

Rome. 2M 

On a clear day one could see from 

the Allied front' lines the distant outlines of the Northern Apennines 'where 

for months the Germans had been 

constructing defensive works even more 

formidable than those of the Gustav 

Line south of Rome. The withdrawals 

f()r southern France accomplished, the 

peninsula cleared up to the Amo, Allied commanders could tum full attention to the planning f(u an offensive 

aimed at breaking those defenses. 

2"Filth Arm)' History. Part VI. pp. 106 and 111; 9th 

MRU, Fifth Army American Batlle Casualties. 10 

Jun 45, CMH; V",.luste der Wehrmncht, H1I176a. CMH. 

Of the 17,939 casualties in the Fifth Army, American 

casualties totaled 11.259: 1,933 killed. 8.777 

wounded. 549 missing. 
PART FIVE 

THE GOTHIC LINE OFFENSIVE 

In studying ancient combat, it can be seen that it was almost always an 

attack from the flank or rear, a surprise action, that won battles, 

especially against the Romans. 

COWNEL ARDANT DU PICQ, Battle Studies: 

Ancient and Modem Battles. 

CHAPTER XVII 

Planning for the Offensive 

The Allied campaign in central Italy 

ovn, some of the hardest battles and 

the most challenging terrain of the war 

in \\estem Eu rope still faced Ceneral 

Alexander's armies as t hey prepared to 

attack in the :'\orthem Apennines. In 

the mon t hs to come the character 0 I' 

those mountains and the sogg\ plain of 

the Romagna, northeast of the AIX'nnines brgely \I'ithin a triangle f(»Omed 

by three major roads linking the cities 

of Rimini, KIH'llIla, and Elenla, would 

plaY an important role in determining 

the f(lI'1lll1es of /ioiend and fill' alike. 

The Terrain 

Extending from the Ligurian Alps 

just north of Genoa, Itah's major commenial port, the :'\orthnn Alx'11I1ines 

f()rm a great arc extending soUl heast-

\I'anl across t he peninsula, ;t/most as Ell' 

as the Adriatic coast soUlh of Rimini, 

bcf()J'C turning sOUlh\I'ard to become 

the Central Apennines, the rugged 

spine of the Italian peninsub. The 

northern face of the Apennines is 

frien elly, slopi n g grad ually an d ilwitingly tmlard the Lombard plain and 

the valley of the Po, while the southern 

bce is hostile, dropping sharply and 

f(>nnidabh into the Arno yalley and a 

narrow n;astal plain south of tfw llayal 

base of La Spelia, 4:') miles north\I'est of 

Leghorn. (Map X) 

Although the dominant alignment of 

the :'\orthnn Apennines is north\\'est to 

southeast, erosion by numerous transverse streams draining both slopes of 

the range has cut long and irregular 

spurs extending northeast and southwest and left isolated peaks along the 

highest ridges. The range's summits 

rise from an elevation of 300 feet 

along the edge of the Lombard plain 

to an average crest elevation of 3,000 

to 3,600 feet. Above the ridges some 

summits exceed 4,000 feet and in the 

western part of the range, 6,000 feet. 

The \Iater di\'ide of the AIX'nnines is 

not the crest line but instead a line of 

high ground crossed by seynal passes, 

all oyer 2,700 feet in eleyation. \Iost of 

the \Iatn courses nll1 rebti\dy parallel 

to one another, flowing either northeast 

into the Po Valley, or south into the 

Arno RiYer, or the' Ligurian Sea. Onh ;1 

fe\l, such as the Sieve, \Ihich f10ws 

almost due east through a yalley fifieen 

miles north of Florence, Elil to conf()rtn 

to the pattern. The deep \'alleys cut by 

t he mountain st reams, toget her \Iit h the 

irregular geology of the range, di\'ide 

the :'\orthern Apennines into countless 

compartments marked by broken 

ridges, spurs, and deep, pocket-shaped 

\'alleys providing a snies of excellent 

defensive positions. 

In contrast to the more hospitable 

and intensi\dy cultiyated hill countl,\, of 

central Italy \~est of the Central Alxnnines, the :'\orthern Apennines ;tfl()rd 

little opportunity for cross-countn or 

lateral mo\'ement by cit her \1 heeled or 
298 

tracked vehicles. In many areas in 1944, 

cart tracks or mule trails were the only 

routes between villages. As else\\" here in 

Italy, grain fields, vineyards, and olive 

groves were spread across the valleys, 

hills, and lower slopes of the mountains. 

On the upper slopes, where there had 

been little erosion, chestnut, scrub oak, 

and evergreen fiJI-ests abounded. Elsewhere centuries of erosion have exposed precipitous bare rock slopes. 

sheer cliffs, and razor-backed ridges. 

In late September the autumn rains 

often turn normally small mountain 

streams into torrents, flooding mads 

and washing out culverts and bridges. 

With the rains in the bll of 1944 came 

fog and mist swirling around the 

mountain peaks, filling the narrow valleys, and reducing visibility to zero. At 

the higher elevations snow began tilling 

in late October and in midwinter periodically blocked the passes. 

Just north of Florence the f()othills of 

the Northern Apennines extend to 

within a few miles of the Arno. West of 

the city the foothills curve northwestward, rising above a wide plain north of 

the river. Two spurs, extending southeast from the mountains, divide the 

plain into three parts. Fifteen miles west 

of Florence, from an elevation of 2,014 

feet, the Monte Albano ridge dominates 

the eastern half of the plain and, f()Llr 

miles northeast of Pisa, the 3,001-f(lOt 

Monte Pisano massif dominates the 

\vestern half. 

Numerous roads crossed the plain. A 

four-lane autostrada ran along its 

northern edge, connecting Florence 

with Pistoia and Lucca and the coastal 

road northwest of Pisa. A good secondary road network tied those towns with 

the fertile Tuscan countryside, crissCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

crossed by numerous drainage canals. 

Although in dry summer months the 

valley provided excellent terrain for 

military operations, the complex system 

of ditches and canals could be exploited 

as antitank obstacles. 

The main roads that traversed the 

mountain range f(lllowed the dominant 

northeast-southwest pattern of the 

spurs and stream lines. An exception 

was the Florence-Bologna highway 

which followed a north-south axis. 

From the Arno valley twelve all-weather 

roads crossed the Apennines to the 

Lombard plain and the Po Valley, but 

only five figured prominently in Allied 

planning fiX the offensive against the 

Gothic Line. Most of the others, especially those west of Pistoia, either 

crossed mountainous tenain unsuited 

f()r large-scale military operations or led 

to points of little strategic interest. In 

addition. several secondary roads that 

would figure later in tl~e offensive 

threaded across the mountains through 

narrow stream valleys to the Po Valley. 

Numerous curves, ;teep gradients, an'd 

narrow defiles made those roads a 

challenge even to peacetime motorists. 

Few bypasses of bridge crossings existed, and during heavy rains landslides 

fre(luentiy blocked the roads. 

Roads available to the Allies south of 

the Arno were fewer than those the 

Germans might use f()}' their support in 

the Po Valley, and heavy military traffic 

had left most in a bad state of repair. 

The U.S. Fifth Army's western sector 

had better lines or' communications 

than those occupied by the British 

Eighth Army east of the Central Apennines, and to compound the issue, in 

winter the few existing roads were 

more frequently covered with ice and 
PLANNING FOR THE OFFENSIVE 

snow than those west of the Apennines. 

The rail lines also favored the west 

coast. f()}' two of Italy's best railroads. 

both double-tracked, paralleled the 

coast west of the Apennines. If worked 

to capacity the lines could deliver an 

estimated 10,000 tons daily to j()rward 

railheads. On the east u;ast north of 

San Severo there was only a single-track 

line o\'er \\'hich a peak ca'pacity ~)f about 

3,000 tons per day could be delivered 

10 the railhead. 

On the German side of the mountains one of the tactically most useful 

roads in the Po Vallev and Lombard 

plain was Highway 9 (the old Via 

Emilia), which paralleled the northern 

base of the Apennines and ran from 

Rimini on the Adriatic northwestward 

to :vrilan, the industrial and population 

center of the region. The cities of 

Cesena, Forli, Bologna, Modena, Reggio, and Parma. all northern termini of 

J:oads crossing the Apennines, were 

located along the highway. The mad 

thus was an important bctor i()f enabling Kesselring to shift his f(m:es rapidly behind his front and keep supplies 

moving into the mountains. 

Air hough the valley'S excellent road 

and rail network gave the Germans 

shorter and better lines of Lommunications, Allied air superiority created serious problems, especially with the railroads. All of the frontier lines entering 

Italy, except those on the east ;md west 

coasts, crossed vulnerable Alpine passes 

and converged at the foot of the Alps 

at important junctions where tramc was 

rerouted for different pans of haly: 

Genoa, 'rurin, Milan. Verona, Trieste, 

and Mestre (rail terminal f()J' Venice). 

With the exception of Genoa, all of 

299 

these cities lay on an east-west trunk 

route ti'Om Turin to Trieste and had 

connections with the distrihution centers 

of Genoa and Bologna, which COil 

trolled most of the traffic from the 

north into peninsular Ital\'. Destruction 

of those junctions, or one of the railway 

bridges before the junctions, would 

have disrupted Italy's north-south as 

well as east-west rail traffic. The fact 

that the Italian railways had few loop 

lines f()r decentralizing the main traffic 

streams made them partiLularly vulnerable, although thus far the Germans 

and their north Italian allies had shown 

a remarkable ability to keep people and 

goods moving between the Alps and 

the Apennines. I 

Tit" Gothir Liru: 

In de\'eloping the Gothic Line in the 

Northern Apennines, the Germans had 

created a def(~nsive zone in umsiderable 

depth, The origins of the defenses 

aClUa\lv antedated the Italian campaign. 

In August 1943, before the Allied 

landings in southern Italy, Field Marshal Rommel, then Army Group B commander in northern Italy, had begun 

reconnaissance ii)!' defensive positiolls 

in the Northern Apennines, whence the 

Germans might withdraw in the e\'ent 

of an Allied invasion of ltah·. 2 

Reconnaissance f()J' the im~jected defensive zone continued throughout the 

1 See Part V, The Railroad Situation from Ihe 

beginning of January until the end of April 1945, 

Typescript Op.:ratioll LIGHTNING. Ref :-\1' LSDICI 

SllR 30156, 15 Mar 47, Special Interrogation Rpl. 

"!viS # B-268 (Beckel and Beelit~), The Italian 

Theater, 23 Augusl-2 September 1944, <:\1 H: 

Greiner and &.hral1l!ll, eds., OKH'IWFSI, KTB. 1\' 

(I), pp. 16-17, Lnless olherwise indicated Ihe 

Ii)lIowing is based upon these SO\ll'ces, 
300 

remaining months of 1943, but actual 

work began only in the f()llowing spring 

under a paramilitary German construction agency, Organization Todt, employing several thousand Italian civilians. From the vicinity of :Yfassa on the 

Ligurian coast about f()rty miles northwest of Leghorn, the Gothic Line extended eastward along the ridge line of 

the main Apennines chain to f()othills 

north of the Foglia River. From there 

the line ran along the crest of one of 

the range's many spurs to Pesaro on 

the Adriatic coast, some forty miles 

northwest of Ancona. The line covered 

a total air line distance of some 180 

miles. 

When Kesselring became senior' German commander in Italy, he turned 

attention a\vay from the Northern 

Apennines, in keeping with his plan to 

stand instead in the south. Until the 

spring of 1944 little of the Gothic Line 

existed except as pencil markings on 

maps in the German headquarters; but 

the rapid collapse of the front south of 

Rome in late May and early June, as 

well as instructions from the high command, finally prompted Kesselring to 

ref(Kus on the Northern Apennines. In 

early summer antitank defenses on the 

more exposed sectors of the pn~ected 

line were strengthened with mine fields 

and the civilian population was evacuated from a "dead zone" 20-kilometers 

deep in front of what would become 

the main line of resistance. Within that 

zone all roads, bridges, and communications facilities were either to be destroyed or prepared for demolition. 

After the U.S. Fifth Army broke 

through the Caesar Line in J un~, Hitler 

had ordered construction work on the 

Northern Apennines positions accelerCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ated. By July the western ponjon of the 

Gothic Line had been completed. That 

that segment was finished first was 

attributable not to the importance with 

\'\'hich the Germans viewed the western 

portion but to its relative unimportance, 

so that the positions there were less 

complex. A breakthrough in the west 

would be no real attraction to the Allies, 

the Germans reasoned, since it would 

cut off no large bodies of German 

troops fi'om their lines of communications with Germany. Moreover, few 

roads traversed the sector. The two 

most important, Highways 12 and 64, 

crossed the mountains, respectively, at 

Abetone Pass, about twenty-three miles 

northeast of Lucca, and' at Porretta, 

some seven miles north of Pistoia. The 

Serchio River valley north of Lucca, the 

Reno valley north of Pistoia, and the 

Arno-Savio valley, all penetrating deep 

into the region, were narrow and easily 

defended, thus unlikely avenues of Allied attack. ' 

The two most vulnerable sectors of 

the Apennines defensive zone were to 

be found in the central sector north of 

Florence, where the range is at its 

narrowest, and on the eastern sector 

south of Rimini, where the mountains 

fall away into low foothills and to a 

narrow coastal plain. In the central 

sector north of Florence, Highway 65 

linked that city with Bologna-55 miles 

away-across two passes, the Futa and 

the Radicosa; dnd a good secondary 

road from Florence via Firenzuola to 

Imola, in the Po Valley twenty miles 

southeast of Bologna', cross~d the 

mountains over II Giogo Pass. On the 

eastern sector the coastal corridor offered a wider choice of passage to the 

Po Valley. 
PLANNING FOR THE OFFENSIVE 

Although Kesselring had long regarded those two sectors as the most 

likely targets of an Allied of~nsive, 

construction on defensive works in both 

sectors fetl behind schedule until well 

into the summer of 1944. On the 

eastern sector, an inspection in July of 

antitank defenses between Monte Gridolfi:) and the Adriatic port of Pesaro 

disclosed serious deficiencies. Alt hough 

a complex ~eries of antitank mine fields 

had been planned, only 17,000 mines, 

mostly of Italian manufacture, were in 

place by mid-July. L()\\ brush-covered 

hills in that sector afforded excellent 

concealment and valleys and ravines at 

right angles to the 'line of defense 

provided covered routes of approach 

for troops coming {i'orrl the south, yet 

only one antitank position had been 

completed. With time running out, Kesselring decided to relv instead upon a 

combination of antitank emplacements 

within the main line of resistance and a 

mobile reserve of self-propelled antitank guns, a t1Ctic that had worked well 

in the Caesar Linc south of Rome. Yet 

it had one serious shortcoming: vulnerability to Allied airpo\\er. Since the 

Allies dominated the skies, shifting antitank guns or anything else during davlight was ah\'ays hazardous. Furthermore, about ISO 88-mm. guns would 

be needed and it was doubtful whether 

that many would be available in time.:l 

That this and other deficiencies were 

not corrected immediatelv was confirmed by a second inspe~tion of the 

line in early August. Many defenses in 

no way met requirements, and a nUlTIbel' of terrain features which permitted 

hostile observation deep into the defen-

"MS # C-095, (Senger), CMH. 

30) 

sive zone and which should have been 

incorporated into the main line of resistance were left undefended f()n\'ard 

of it. In many areas no fields of fire 

had been cleared and, in some cases, 

access roads constructed in order to 

build the defenses would actually aid 

the Allies in getting into German' positions. " 

Later in the month "'hen Kesselring 

himself inspected the vulnerable sectors 

of the line, he f()lInd that considerable 

late progress had been made, especially 

on the Adriatic fbnk, \\,hich earlier had 

bothered him so much. Yet as he 

pointed out to the Tenth Army COI11-

mander, Vietinghoff, the antitank 

ditches and \\,ire entanglements, most 

of which had been constructed far to 

the front of the main line of resistance, 

\\ould have been of more value if 

incorporated into the main defcnsi\'e 

zone so as to be a surprise to attacking 

troops. ~ 

The Germ;lI1s continued to improve 

the defenses during the last \\'eeks of 

August. On the Tenth Army front an 

Italo-German engineer force under 

army command completed positions in 

a so-called advance zone Warleld) of the 

Gothic Line, located along high ridges 

between northeastward flowing rivcrs, 

the Foglia and the Metauro. On the left 

f1ank engineers worked on a coastal 

defense position, the Galla Placidia 

Line, named by a whim of an imaginative German staff officer after the Bvzantine princess whose tomb \\'as <~n 

artistic treasure of nearby Ravenna. 

The line extended in a we'sterly direction from the Adriatic resort town of 

'AOK H, fa KTB Nr, ." 1 Au~, 44, AUK H, 

6224111 

oMS # C-064 (Kesselring), C~lH, 
302 

Cattolica, ten miles northeast of Pesaro, 

westward for ten miles to the eastern 

boundary of the neutral city-state of 

San Marino, whose neutrality Field 

Marshal Kesselring had instructed General Vietinghoff to respect. From the 

northwest corner of the miniature state, 

the line continued seven miles in a 

northwesterly direction through the 

town of Sogliano to the Savio River 

three miles to the west, thence along 

the Savio valley northeastward to the 

Adriatic ten miles south of Ravenna. 

Although the line was primarily intended as a defensive zone against an 

attack from the sea, in some sectors, 

especially between Cattolica and the 

Savio River, it could also be used as a 

switch position for the Gothic Line. 

That possibility was important, for although a switch position designated 

Green Line II had been reconnoitered 

about eight to ten miles behind the 

Gothic Line, little work had been accomplished on it. 6 

German Dispositiom 

Following withdrawal behind the 

Arno, and to deploy their units to best 

advantage, the Germans shifted some 

corps and divisions, especially in the 

sector held by Vietinghoffs Tenth Army 

and on Army Group C's flanks. On 8 

August the Tenth Army's two corps exchanged places in line. Feuerstein's LI 

Mountain Corps moved into the mountainous sector on the army right wing 

adjacent to the Fourteenth Army's I Parachute Corps, and Herr's LXXVI Panzer 

Corps moved to the Tenth Army's left 

flank where the low hills of the coastal 

corridor were better suited to the corps' 

"Col Horst Pretzell, Battle of Rimini, MS, CMH. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

long experience in operations with mobile f()rmations. 7 

In the mountains east of Florence the 

LI Mountain Corps commanded five divisions: the 7i5th, 334th, and 305th Divi-

.Iions awl the II 4th Jaeger Division; the 

44th Division was in corps reserve. Manning the LXXVI Panzer Corps front were 

three divisions: the 5th Mountain and 

the 7ist and 278th Divisionl. When the 

panzer corps fell back into the Gothic 

Line, it was to take control also of 

Group Witthoeft's 162d Turkomen and 

98th Divisions, in reserve positions 

guarding the coastal flank south and 

north of Rimini. Guarding the coastal 

regions at the head of the Adriatic 

northeast of Venice were the 94th Di,'i-

.lion at Udine and the i88th Reserve 

Divil'ion on the Istrian peninsula. The 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division and 1st 

Pararhute Di,lision were in army reserve 

on the Romagna Plain north of Highway 9. H 

To the Tenth Army's right, between 

Florence and Pisa, Lemelsen's Fourteenth 

Army still had two corps: Schlemm's I 

Parm'hutf from Florence to Empoli, and 

von Senger's XIV Panzer westward from 

Empoli to the sea. The parachute corps 

controlled the 4th Parru'hute and 356th 

and 362d Infantry Divisiom; the panzer 

corps, the 65th Infantry and 16th SS 

Panz.Pr Grenadier Divisiom. In army reserve near Bologna were the 29th Panzer Grenadier and 26th Panzl'r Diviliom, 

and along the coast fourteen miles 

northwest of Pisa, the 20th Luftwaffe 

Field Divi~ion. !I 

'AOK 10, Ka KTB, Ani. 8, Aug 44, AOK 10, Docs. 

61437/1 and 61437/2. 

Bibid. 

"AOK 14, la KTB Nr. 4, Aug 44, AOK 14, Doc. 

62241/1. 
PLANNING FOR THE OFFENSIVE 

Presence of the Ligurian Army under 

Italian Marshal Graziani along the coast 

farther north was testament to Kesselring's continuing concern for his vulnerable western flank. Created on 3 

August, this new army replaced the 

former Armn A hteilung 7'on Zangen, 

which earlier in the campaign had 

operated on the Adriatic flank of Army 

Grollt) C. Graziani's Ligurian Army consisted of two corps: Korps Ahteilung Lieh, 

a provisional corps headquarters-under the command of the 34th Dhlision 

commander, Generalleutnant Theobald 

Lieb-which, in addition to Lieb's division, also controlled the Italian Di7 1ision 

"San Mano," the 4th Mountain Battalion, 

and the Mittenll'ald Mountain War/are 

School Battalion. The second headquarters, Generalleutnant Ernst Schlemmer's 

LXXV In/antry Corj)l, originally created 

to guard the Franco-Italian frontier, 

commanded the 42d Jaf'ger and 5th 

Mountain Di7 lilion\ and the Italian Mountain Di7 1ision "Montf' Rosa." By midAugust Graziani's Ligurian Army had 

responsibility for the coastal defenses 

from the vicinity of the naval base of La 

Spezia northwestward past Genoa to the 

frontier. 10 

In mid-August, as the Allied forces 

began advancing up the Rhone Valley 

after DRA(;OON's successful landings on 

the Mediterranean ('oast of France, Field 

Marshal Kesselring shifted the 90th 

Panzer Grl'nadil'r Di7 1ilion to the ·FrancoItalian border to secure the Alpine 

passes there, for over those passes 

French armies under two Napoleons 

had invaded Italy to win control of 

IIiGeneralleutnanr Hans Roettig-er and Obcrstkutnanl von Cannstein, Feldzug in Ilalien, II Teil, Band 

I, Ka/Jita/ 6; Greiner and Schramm, cds., OKW/ 

WFSt, KTB, IV (I), pp. 537-38. 

303 

Lombardy on the battlefields of Marengo and Magenta. Yet in late August 

of 1944 Field Marshal Kesselring was 

more concerned about extricating from 

France two divisions-the 157th Mountain and the 148tll Rl'senll'-which OKW 

had transferred from Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz's Army Grou/) G to 

Army Group C. Early in September Kesselring would relieve the 90th P(Lnzrr 

Gnjnadirr Di7 1ision with the 5th Mountain 

Di7 1ision from the Tmth Army. The panzer grenadier division was then moved 

into Arm)' Grou/) C reserve along the 

Adriatic coast east of Venice. Until 

winter snows closed the passes from the 

Haute Savoie into the Italian Piedmont, 

the Germans would keep a watchful eye 

on the Franco-Italian frontier, for Kesselring believed that the Allies in France 

might be tempted to follow the ancient 

invasion trail and descend upon the 

Turin-Milan industrial complex of 

northwestern Italy. 11 

Changes in Allied Strategy 

Even as Kesselring's engineers rushed 

to put finishing touches to their defensive works in the Apennines, Field 

Marshal Alexander decided upon significant changes in his plan to break 

through the defenses. That decision 

was made on 4 August at a conference 

among the senior British commanders 

gather'ed in the shado\\" of a \\ing of a 

Dakota aircraft on the On'ieto airfield 

at Eighth Army headquarters. The proposal to change the eadier plans had 

come from the army's commander, 

"MS # C-064 (KesselrinK), CMH; Creiner and 

Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB, IV (I), pp. 583-

84. See also Smith, MS, Riviera to the Rhine, App. 

A, Operations Along the Franco-lt~llian Frontier. 
304 

General Leese, and "arose," as Field 

Marshal Alexander later described it, 

"from his [Leese's] judgment ,)f his 

army's capabilities and the manner in 

which it [the army] could best be 

employed." 12 

Alexander had originally planned fix 

the Fifth and Eighth Armies, their 

strength concentrated on contiguous 

wings, to launch a joint offensive by 

four army corps, controlling i(mrteen 

divisions, against the Gothic Line's central sector north of Florence. The armies were to attack simultaneously 

along parallel axes: the Eighth along 

the main routes between Florence and 

Bologna and the Fifth from either 

Lucca or Pistoia (preferably the latter) 

toward Modena, in the Po Valley 

twenty-five miles northwest of Bologna. 

Since Alexander doubted that Clark's 

forces would be strong enough to exploit much beyond Modena, and since 

the Eighth Army was the larger, the 

Allied armies commander had given 

Leese's army the task of exploiting to 

the Po. 

Yet as the pause along the Arno 

lengthened into weeks, General Leese 

became convinced that the geographically vulnerable Adriatic flank and not 

the central sector nOl"th of Florence 

would be the most £3. vorable point f(n" 

the main attack against the Gothic Line. 

Kesselring had reached a similar conclusion and had shifted the center of 

gravity of his army group to a 20-milewide sector on the Tenth Army's left 

wing. 13 

General Leese's argument ran some12SAC Despa[ch, 13 Aug-12 Dec 44; Alexander 

Despatch, pp. 65-66. Unless otherwise cited the 

!(lllowing is based upon these sources. 

13MS # T-Ib (Westphal et al.). CMH. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

thing like this: with the departure of 

the French Expeditionary Corps, units 

in the Allied armies trained and experienced in mountain warfare were few. 

An offensive concentrated not in the 

mountains but against the eastern flank 

of the Apennines chain, where the 

mountains give way to a low range of 

foothills overlooking a narrow coastal 

plain, would offer terrain better suited 

to the Eighth Army's mobile capabilities. There Leese also could better 

exploit the advantage of his superior 

firepower in support of a series of setpiece attacks against successive positions 

in the low hills between the Metauro 

and Foglia Rivers. Furthermore, a 

breakthrough in that sector would carry 

Allied troops more quickly onto the 

plain north of the Apennines than in 

the central sector north of Florence; 

and General Leese believed, erroneously, that Kesselring expected no 

major Allied effort in the east. An 

attack in the east would also reduce the 

forces needed f<:)r flank protection, for 

Clark's Fifth Army represented sufficient protection f<:)r the left flank of the 

main attack, and shifting eastward toward the coast would enable General 

Leese to rely on the coast itself f<:)r right 

flank protection, plus a small fleet of 

destroyers and gunboats. The new plan 

called for naval bombardment and 

small-scale amphibious assaults against 

the enemy's Adriatic flank. 1 ~ 

Although unstated at the time, the 

shift of the main offensive would also 

harmonize more closely with the strategic goals even then being persistently 

upheld in Allied councils by Prime 

14Alexander Despatch. pp. 65-66; SAC Despatch, 

Aug-Dec 44, pp. 5-6; Nicolson, Alex, p. 263. 
PLANNINC FOR THE OFFENSIVE 

Minister Churchill: a thrust from northeastern Italy through Slovenia, toward 

which Tito and his Yugoslav partisan 

army were moving, and into the valley 

of the mid-Danube, objective of the 

southern wing of the Red Army. Later 

in the month, after the Russians overran Rumania, the military logic of 

Churchill's arguments and Alexander's 

eastward shift of the locale of his main 

offensive would seem in British eyes 

compelling. 15 To what degree, if any, 

Churchill's views influenced, or indeed, 

determined Alexander's decision to 

change his original plans for the Gothic 

Line offensive, can, at best, only be 

inferred. 

In any case, Leese's argument appealed to Alexander, who readily accepted it. 1 £; Yet \\' hen he first submitted 

the new concept to the theater commander for approval, General Wilson's 

Joint Planning Staff, strongly influenced 

by General Devers, was less than enthusiastic. The stafe {(H' example, considered the naval and amphibious operations planned against the enemy's leh 

t1ank too ambitious. Neither the contiguration of the coast in the Ravenna 

area nor the resources available would 

permit significant operations along the 

coast. Only two gunboats with 6-inch 

guns could be made available to supplement a small destroyer t()I'ce already in 

l'Ehnnan, Grand Strategy, vo\. V, pp. 390-93. 

I"Whether, as has been suggested, onlv because 

of a tendencv to "see the other man's point of view" 

seems difficult to determine, f(lI' Alexander himself 

has written little about the decision other than to 

note his own concern "at the prospect of extensive 

operations in the mountains without mv best mountain troops, the French." Yet he had knm,'n fill' 

some time that these troops would not be available 

f(ll' the Gothic Line offensive. See Douglas Orgill, 

Tfu· Co/hir Lin/': Th/' Italian CamtJaign, Autumn, 1944 

(New York: W.W, Norton & Co., 19(7), p, 32. 

305 

the Adriatic. Nevertheless, since most 

operational requirements, including air 

support, seemed well within the theater's capabilities, Wilson approved the 

plan in principle, and on 6 August 

Alexander issued orders for preliminary operations designed to set the 

stage for the main offensive to be 

mounted from the right flank instead 

of the center. Yet right up to the eve of 

the offensive many doubts as to the 

plan's feasibility lingered on at Allied 

headquarters, especially among the 

American members of Wilson's Joint 

Planning Staff 17 

Preliminary Moves 

On the Eighth Army fi'ont the most 

important problem raised bv t he new 

plan was how to continue operations in 

such a way as to conceal the change 

from the Germans. For this reason 

General Leese directed General Anders, 

the II Polish Corps commander, to 

resume those operations northeast of 

Ancona that had been interrupted on 4 

August by a counterattack against the 

Polish bridge head across the Misa 

River. The Misa was the first of a series 

of parallel rivers-the Cesano, the Metauro, and the Foglia-which the 

Eighth Army would have to cross in the 

coastal corridor. Those rivers and the 

military problems of crossing them had 

been a bctor in Alexander's original 

decision to attack in the mountains, and 

changing the plan did nothing to make 

the problems go away. 18 

17SAC Despatch, Aug-Dec 44, pp. 5-6; Devers 

Diary, vol. II; Alexander Dl's/Ja/rli, pp. 65-66; 

Nicolson, All'x, pp. 263-64. 

IHOperations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, Part Ill, Sec. F, The 2 Polish 

Corps. 
306 

Holding the high ground north of 

the Misa was the 278th Infantry Division. 

Concern about how much longer that 

division could withstand pressures from 

the two-division Polish corps and suspicions that General Leese might even 

increase those pressures had been behind General Vietinghoffs shift of Heidrich's 1st Parachute Division from army 

reserve into backup positions behind 

the division. 

Leese meanwhile had assigned Anders' corps a twofold task: to clear the 

ground as far as the Foglia River and 

to screen the assembly of the two 

assault forces, the Canadian I st Corps 

and the British 5 Corps. With the 3d 

Carpathian Division on the right and 

the 5th Kresowa Division on the left, 

the Polish corps on the 9th began to 

expand the bridgehead beyond the 

Misa. Supported by generous allotments 

of artillery fire and aerial bombardment 

of enemy artillery positions by the Desert Air Force, the Polish corps by 

nightfall had cleared the five miles 

between the Misa and the Cesano Rivers and established modest bridgeheads 

beyond the Cesano, but most of those 

were lost the next day. The Polish 

troops could go no farther against wellorganized resistance along high ground 

overlooking the Cesano from the north. 

Yet the attack had achieved a considerable advantage in placing the main 

lateral highway south of the Misa River 

well beyond the range of German artillery, making it available to the two 

assault corps for their assembly f()I' the 

main offensive. 

Conference With Clark 

Until that point the discussion and 

the decision to change Alexander's origCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

inal strategy had been limited to the 

British half of the Allied command in 

Italy. General Clark still had to be 

consulted and his co-operation obtained. When General Alexander requested the Fifth Army commander to 

come to Leese's headquarters for a 

conference on the afternoon of 10 

August, he flew in with his chief of 

staff, General Gruenther, his G--3, General Brann, and Alexander's American 

deputy chief of stafl~ Brig. Gen. Lyman 

L. Lemnitzer. Already familiar with 

broad details of the new plan, Lemnitzer briefed Clark during the flight so 

that upon arrival Clark was no stranger 

to it. 1!J 

At General Leese's suggestion, the 

conference convened in a pleasant 

grove of trees near the headquarters. 

In that bucolic setting the senior Allied 

commanders and their chiefs of staff 

settled comfortably in the shade to hear 

General Alexander outline his new 

strategy. Essentially, he expanded on 

those arguments that Leese had used 

earlier. The heavy dissipation of Allied 

strength over the past few months, 

especially the U.S. Fifth Army's loss of 

two corps and several divisions to ANVIL-DRAGOON, Alexander declared, had 

greatly reduced the chances for success 

of a joint attack by both armies against 

the sector north of Florence. With the 

shift of the main attack from the central to the eastern sector on the Eighth 

Army's right flank, the U.S. Fifth 

Army, rather than attack as originally 

planned toward lx)th Pistoia and Lucca, 

was to move only against Pistoia, f()J' an 

attack against both o~jectives would 

I"Clark Diary, 10 Aug 44. Unless otherwise 

indicated, the following is based upon this re!erence. 
PLANNING FOR THE OFFENSIVE 

further dissipate Clark's already greatly 

reduced resources. 

Leese's Eighth Army was to make the 

main Allied effort beginning on 25 

August with a three-corps attack against 

the German left v,ing along the Adriatic, to be followed at a date to be 

determined by Alexander bv the Fifth 

Army's attack' against the ce~t1'al sector 

of the Gothic Line. Clark's attack would 

begin after Alexander had determined 

that Kesselring had weakened the central sector by shifting forces to check 

Leese's attack. The operation was to be, 

the Allied commander observed as he 

had when planning the offensive south 

of Rome, "a one-two punch." 

General Clark readily agreed that the 

new concept, especially on the matter of 

timing, seemed sound. He could easily 

hold C on his left flan k with the fe\~ 

f()rces he had there, even if the Pisano 

massif remained in enemy hands, and 

shift the rest to the centi'al sector ic)r 

the attack. His only concern was his 

right flank, where'the distance and 

possible lack of co-ordination between 

an American attack toward Pistoia and 

that of the British 13 Corps on the 

Eighth Army's left flank constituted, in 

Clark's opinion, a real hazard to the 

success of operations in the central 

sector. 

In raising the objection, Clark 

shrewdly saw an opportunity to trade 

off a shift of the Allies' main eftcH't 

from the center to the British-controlled right for Anglo-American unity 

of command in the center. He appeared to be intent upon reconstructing 

in his own sector the concept that 

Alexander had just abandoned for the 

army group. An effective operation 

against the enemy's center, even if 

307 

secondary, would req uire that both 

Clark's army and the British 13 Corps 

be under the operational control of one 

commander and that their axes of 

attack be along the shortest distance 

across the mountains, that is, from 

Florence to Bologna. 

While Clark outlined his reservations 

with his usual earnestness, Leese lay 

relaxed on the ground with his arm's 

akimbo behind his head. Turning to 

Clark, he oflered to meet his reservations by making McCreery, the 13 

Corps commander, a provisional group 

commander over both IO and 13 

Corps, which would enable Clark to 

deal with McCreery on equal terms and 

thus facilitate co-operation between the 

two. General Leese carefully avoided 

any mention of placing British troops 

once again under Fifth Army command. Yet that was exactly what Clark 

was after. 

Several minutes of verbal sparring 

f()lIowed, during which C..eneral Lees~ 

rose to his feet to argue vehemently 

that ultimate control of his division's 

had to remain with the Eighth Army. 

At that point, Alexander intervened. 

The debate, he said, really seemed to 

~ one of cold, logical miiitary reasonmg on Clark's part. versus strong psychological and sentimental reasoning on 

Leese's part, which, of course, was not 

to be ignored. Leese finally yielded. 

Thus again, as during the \\'il~t~r oftensive of 1943-44, an entire British corps, 

the 13 Corps, came under the Fifth 

Army's command. 

Clark agreed that the new strategy 

promised to be tar more efleclive than 

the old. The only remaining drawback 

as he saw it, was the additional delay 

that would be imposed upon the Fifth 
308 

Army's attack. The American commander felt keenly the growing pressure of criticism from others in the U.S. 

military establishment who had long 

opposed extension of military operations north of Rome. Almost a month 

had elapsed since the Fifth Army had 

arrived at the Arno, and every day that 

passed with no effort to continue the 

drive beyond the river increased the 

urgings from the partisans of DRAGOON 

that the Italian campaign be abandoned 

altogether. The Eighth Army, the theory had it, could take over the entire 

front while the Fifth Army moved to 

France. Foremost spokesman of that 

viewpoint in the Mediterranean theater 

was General Devers, who had been 

named commander-designate of the 6th 

Army Group to assume command in 

southern France. A long-time opponent 

of British strategy in the Mediterranean, he had frequently recommended 

to General Marshall that the Italian 

venture be dropped. That the campaign seemed to have bogged down at 

the Arno reinforced his argument. 20 

The Allied Plan 

On 13 August Alexander's headquarters distributed to the army commanders the plan for the Gothic Line offensive (Operation OLIVE) and three days 

later the final order. As during the 

spring offensive south of Rome, General Alexander envisioned turning the 

Tenth Army's flank, this time the left and 

this time with the Eighth Army rather 

than the Fifth. Controlling 1 1 divisions 

on a relatively narrow front, Leese's 

2HLtr, Gen Devers to General Marshall, 9 Aug 44, 

CCS 603116, in ABC 384, Eur, Sec. 9-A; See also 

Devers Diary, vol. II. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

army was to drive through the Rimini 

Gap, consisting of approximately 8 

miles of coastal plain between Rimini 

and the foothills of the Apennines. 

Once through the gap the Canadian 1 st 

Corps and the British 5 Corps were to 

deploy onto the Romagna Plain, a lowlying triangular-shaped area cut by 

many streams and drainage ditches and 

bounded on the south by Highway 9, 

on the east by Highwav 16, paralleling 

the coast between Rimini and Ravenna, 

and to the west by Highway 67, extending in a northeasterly direction from 

Forli on Highway 9 to Ravenna. From 

the Romagna the two corps were to 

launch a two-pronged drive to roll up 

the enemy's left flank toward Bologna 

and Ferrara. Meanwhile, the U.S. Fifth 

Army, with three corps controlling nine 

divisions on an extended front, was to 

move generally northward from Florence toward the Po Valley. Both armies 

were in time to converge on Bologna 

and then exploit toward the Po. Only 

light fexces, the British 10 Corps with 

the equivalent of one and a half divisions, were to operate in the mountainous terrain between the two armies. On 

the Fifth Army's left, between the central sector and the Ligurian Sea, the 

U.S. IV Corps with the equivalent of 

two divisions on line and one in reserve 

was considered to be strong enough to 

serve as a covering force. 21 

Alexander's resources no longer afforded the luxury of an army group 

reserve with which to influence the 

offensive at a critical point. Yet that 

seemed no serious problem at the time, 

for both of his armies were to fight 

essentially separate battles. Moreover, 

21 Alexander Despatch, pp. 65-66. 
PLANNING FOR THE OFFENSIVE 

each army had strong corps with which 

to lead the assaults and sufficient forces 

in reserve. In a very real sense Alexander looked on the Fifth Army as his 

army group reserve, since under his 

one-two punch strategy he was to withhold Clark's army until he decided 

upon the most opportune moment to 

strike the second blow. The Fifth Army 

was to be prepared to move on 24-

hours notice any time after D plus 

five. 22 

As had been the case south of Rome, 

there was also to be a deception plan 

with the Fifth Army playing the major 

role. Before the Eighth Army's attack, 

Clark's forces were to distract the enemy by simulating an imminent attack 

by both Allied armies along the 25-mile 

front flanking Florence. The fact that 

Alexander had originally planned to 

attack in that sector would lend credence to the deception. In preparation 

for attack along lines of the original 

plan, considerable shifting of troops 

and equipment had already taken place. 

As had Alexander's strategy south of 

Rome, the strategy in the new offensive 

would require the closest co-operation 

between the two Allied armies and their 

commanders. Otherwise, Kesselring 

would once again be able to extricate 

his forces as he had in June. 

Allied Regrouping 

Alexander's decision to shift the main 

attack necessitated large-scale movement 

of troops and equipment to the right 

flank. The movement began on 15 

August with long convoys of trucks and 

tracked vehicles passing eastward 

through Foligno, the main road junc22Ibid. 

tion on Highway 3, sixty miles southwest of Ancona. In eight days six 

thousand tanks, guns, and vehicles 

moved through the town. 

By the last week of August the 

Eighth Army was deployed across a 25-

mile front: from the coast inland, the 2 

Polish Corps, the brigade-sized Italian 

Corps of Liberation, the Canadian 1 st 

Corps, the British 5 Corps, and the 

British 10 Corps. The entire force 

totaled eleven divisions plus nine separate brigades.2:l 

Although Alexander's decision meant 

the scrapping of Clark's earlier plans 

based upon a joint effort with the 

Eighth Army in the central sector, the 

Fifth Army commander still wanted the 

II Corps to make the main attack on 

the army's front. After Kirkman's 13 

Corps had been assigned to the Fifth 

Army, Clark shifted the focus of his 

offensive eastward to a sector between 

Florence and Pontassieve, ten miles to 

the east, hoping thereby to facilitate cooperation between the American and 

British corps. He intended that those 

contingents of the 13 Corps within and 

east of Florence remain in place as a 

screening force for Keyes' II Corps 

until the Fifth Army offensive began, 

but when it became apparent that the 

Germans were withdrawing into the 

mountains to the north, Clark ordered 

Kirkman to cross the Arno and to 

regain contact. 

As the II Corps relieved those Eighth 

Army units west of Florence, Clark also 

extended the IV Corps right flank 

eastward to afford the II Corps an even 

narrower front for the attack. The shift 

230perations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, Part III, The Campaign in the 

Northern Apennines, Sec. B, The Eighth Arm\. 
310 

left Crittenberger's IV Corps holding a 

60-mile front with only the 1st Armored Division and the newly formed 

Task Force 45, but Clark reinforced the 

corps with the 6th South African Armoured Division from the 13 Corps. 

That left the 13 Corps with three 

divisions and a brigade-the British 1st 

Infantry and 6th Armoured Divisions, 

the 8th Indian Division, and the 1 st 

Canadian Army Tank Brigade. During 

the first phase of the offensive, Clark 

planned for Crittenberger's corps to 

simulate a crossing of the Arno, but 

only after the main effort was well 

under way was the corps actually to 

cross: the 1st Armored Division to drive 

the enemy from the Monte Pisano 

massif and the area eastward to Empoli, 

and the South Africans to occupy the 

high ground just beyond the river 

between Empoli and the intercorps 

boundary. 24 

Doubts on Both Fronts 

Although both the Fifth and Eighth 

Army commanders had enthusiastically 

endorsed the new concept for the 

Gothic Line offensive (Operation OLIVE), a noticeable feeling of uneasiness 

persisted at the Allied Force Headquarters in Caserta. Less than a week 

before the offensive was to begin, General Devers, the deputy theater commander, had been disturbed by the 

jitteriness he had observed at Wilson's 

headquarters, "especially among the 

junior officers on the British side." 25 

24Filth Anny History, Part VII, pp. 21-33; Hqs. 

AAI, Opns Order No.3, 16 Aug 44, AFHQ AG 

Sec. 0100/21/2845. 

25Devers Diary, 20 Aug 44. Devers failed to note 

that the American officers on the jPS had opposed 

the plan when first submitted to AFHQ. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

There seemed to be widespread concern that the Americans would soon be 

withdrawn from Italy, leaving the British Eighth Army with a task well beyond its capabilities. At General Clark's 

headquarters too, General Devers had 

noted little optimism. Matching concern 

of the British at AFHQ about American 

intentions was a widespread lack of 

confidence at the Fifth Army headquarters in the British, a concern that they 

would "not fight hard enough to make 

a go of it."26 That kind of mutual 

distrust hardly lx)ded well for the coming offensive. 

On the German side also arose a 

crisis of confidence. Why defend the 

Northern Apennines, some asked, 

when they might develop a line far 

shorter by withdrawing to the Alps 

between Switzerland and the Adriatic? 

Well entrenched in a similar line during 

World War I, the Germans and their 

Austrian allies had held the Allies at 

bay for several years, even launching a 

successful counteroffensive at Caporetto 

and driving the Italians back into the 

Po Valley. Withdrawal into those same 

alpine positions would, in the opinion 

of General Wentzell, the Tenth Armv's 

chief of staff, enable the Germans -to 

free three to four divisions. In a conversation with Colonel Beelitz, Kesselring's operations officer, early in August, 

General Wentzell let his frustrations 

show: 

There is no insight. All is lunacy. With 

one wing we are up in Finland, with the 

other down at Rhodes; in the center the 

enemy is in Germany. . . . It is incomprehensible. There is an old farmer's saying 

that in a emergency everybody rallies 

around the flag. We do not even think of 

2<; Ibid. 
PLANNING FOR THE OFFENSIVE 

this. The enemy is in Germany, the war is 

coming to an end, but we are still up at 

Murmansk. Instead of rallying around the 

flag the wings are extended who knows 

how far. I cannot understand it anymore. 27 

Wentzell's cry of despair found no 

echo among German commanders. 

Field Marshal Kesselring had his orders 

"AOK 10, /" KTB Nr. 8, 5-8 Aug 44, AOK 10, 

Doc. 61437/3. (Telephone conversations, 31 .lui and 

6 Aug 44.) 

311 

to hold indefinitely in the Gothic Line. 

Months of planning and preparation 

had gone into its construction, and 

veteran divisions were deployed within 

it. To the German rear lay the rich 

agricultural and industrial hinterland of 

northern Italy, the last stronghold of 

Mussolini's reconstituted Fascist Republic. The German armies in Italy quite 

obviously would stand and fight again, 

this time among the rocks and crags of 

the Northern Apennines. 
CHAPTER XVIII 

The Gothic Line Offensive Begins 

Alexander's shift of the main offensive from the central to the eastern 

sector created several logistical problems 

for the Eighth Army. In addition to 

combat divisions, considerable quantities 

of stores and ammunition that had 

already been amassed behind the central sector had to be moved eastward. 

That the Polish corps on the Adriatic 

flank, up to that tim~ maintained as an 

independent force, passed to Eighth 

Army control added another responsibility. To support the British :J Corps 

and the I st Canadian Cdrps, \\hich 

were to operate on the Adriatic nank, 

the Eighth Army early in August had 

taken over and expanded the Polish 

corps' line of communication, while the 

annr's original line of communication, 

supporting the central sector, was to be 

maintained to support the British 10 

and 13 Corps. 1 

The Fifth Army too had to realign 

and reorganize its lines of comm unication based on the newh captured port 

of Leghorn, to which the main part of 

the Peninsular Base Section (PBS) had 

moved. 2 Shortly after the capture of 

Leghorn on 19 July, engineers from 

PBS arrived to begin the hazardous task 

of removing approximately 25,000 

mines from the harbor and nearby 

ruins. A man-made harbor, capable (;f 

IOperations of the British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Pan III, Sec. B; SAC Despatch, 

Aug-Dec 44. 

':-'1ayo MS and Meyer M~. Unless otherwise 

noted the f()llowing is based upon these references. 

accommodating ships with a 25-foot 

draft, Leghorn had been the prewar 

Italian navy's main base and thus had 

abundant facilities for the storage and 

distribution of petroleum products. On 

3 September the first convoy of seven 

Liberty ships entered the harbor. As 

reconstruction proceeded, unloading 

was slow at first, only 4,242 tons of 

cargo during the first week of September, but in the last week of the month, 

those figures were to rise to 45,328 

long tons. The first tankers entered the 

port in mid-month, by which time 

storage ElCilities f()r 275,000 barrels of 

gasoline were ready. The amount of 

storage for fuel would eventually almost 

double. Throughout this period both 

American and British port battalions 

were assigned to Leghorn, each handling ships of their respective nationalities. :l 

While developing Leghorn as a major 

port, logisticians backing up the Fifth 

Armv could make onlv minimum use / , 

of Florence, the major communications 

center on the Fifth Army front. Both to 

conceal troop movements from the enemy and to protect the city's historical 

and cultural monuments, supply officers located most f~lcilities outside the 

city. A Class I dump, for example, 

containing a million rations, was established in an olive grove several miles 

south of the cit\', while a few miles 

hnther down the' road a million gallons 

"Byko[sh and Larson, The Transportation Corps: 

Operations Overseas, pp. 211-32. 
THE GOTHIC LINE OFFENSIVE BEGINS 313 

of gasoline were assembled in containers concealed in a vineyard. 4 

In the final weeks before the fall 

offensive, the Fifth Army's combat 

troops spent much of their time in rest 

areas behind the front, there to enjoy 

amenities so often missing at the front. 

Refrigerator vans brought in large supplies of fresh meats, butter, and eggs to 

supplement regular rations. Shower 

units enabled men to dispose of longaccumulated grime. Field laundries 

handled over two million pounds of 

wash. Clothing was replaced, repaired, 

salvaged. It would be a well-supplied, 

well-fed, freshly scrubbed army that 

would again take the field in September. 5 

Preliminary Operatiom 

Meanwhile, the 2 Polish Corps, 

which since 10 August had been halted 

along the Cesano River, prepared to 

resume its advance as a screen f()l' the 

assembly of the Eighth Army's two 

assault corps. The corps was to cross 

the Metauro River and establish bridgeheads to be used by the assault corps as 

jump-off points for the main offensive. 

Although little ground action had 

erupted since the Poles halted on the 

10th, fighter-bombers of the British 

Desert Air Force in a week had flown 

392 sorties against German troops in 

the main line of resistance and supporting artillery positions. 

For five days. beginning on 18 August the 3d Carpathian and 5th Kresowa Divisions ground steadily f()rward 

in the kind of fighting that had come to 

Gharacterize action on this part of the 

4Ross and Romanus, The Quartermaster Corps: 

Operations in the War Against Germany, pp.96-114. 

5Ibid. 

front. The Poles gradually pushed back 

the enemy's 278th Infantry Division beyond the Metauro River, and by the 

evening of 22 August both divisions 

had drawn up to the river. The Poles 

counted 300 enemy dead and took 273 

prisoners, but bridgeheads over the 

Metauro, to be exploited in the Eighth 

Army's main offensive, remained out of 

reach. Ii 

Leese's Plan 

Troops of the 1st Canadian and 

British 5 Corps moved on 24 August 

into assembly areas behind the Poles a 

little over a mile short of the Metauro. 

In hope of achieving surprise and making up for the lack of bridgeheads 

beyond the river, General Leese directed that the artillery remain silent 

until assaulting elements had crossed 

the river. The offensive was to begin an 

hour bef()re midnight on 25 August. 

General Leese's plan was quite simple. Both the I st Canadian and British 

5 Corps were to pass through positions 

of the 5th Kresowa Division on the left 

wing of the Polish corps. Once past the 

lines, the Polish division was to shih 

toward the coast and join the 3d Carpathian Division in a drive on the minor 

port of Pesaro, eastern anchor of the 

Gothic Line. There the Polish troops 

would be pinched out by the generally 

northwestward advance of the Canadians toward Rimini, while the 5 Corps 

protected the Canadian left by dearing 

a range of low hills. Farther west the 

British 10 Corps, with a strength of 

6 Operations of the British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Part III, Sec. F, 2 Polish Corps. 
314 

only 11/2 divisions, was to follow up the 

enemy withdrawal in the mountains. 7 

German Preparations 

Rather than withdraw voluntarily into 

the Gothic Line's main zone of resistance, the commander of the LXXVI 

Panzer Corps, General IIerr, had established his divisions along a series of 

ridges north of the Metauro whence he 

could better observe Allied movements 

and make up for the shortages of 

reconnaissance aircraft. Once he had 

determined that the main British offensive had begun, he intended to fall back 

in good order into the shelter of the 

Gothic Line. Yet Herr ran the risk of 

his units being overwhelmed before 

they could retire should the British 

achieve sufficient surprise. So confident 

were the Germans that they would have 

adequate warning that General von 

Vietinghoff, the Tenth Arm.v commander, and General Schlemm, the 1st 

Parachute Corps commander, went on 

leave beginning 24 August. g 

It remained to be seen whether General Leese could develop in the region 

of the little Metauro River the same 

kind of decisive victory that Roman 

legions of the Consul Nero in 207 B.C. 

had achieved against a Carthaginian 

army in winning the 2d Punic War in 

Italy. The Metauro river itself and a 

succession of parallel ridges and rivers 

between the Metauro and the Romagna 

Plain clearly would have an important 

bearing on the outcome. Thirty miles 

separated the Metauro from the Malct:-

10perations of the British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Part III, Sec. B. The Eighth Arrnythe Gothic Line and Rornagna Battles. 

"/10K 14, /(1 KTB Nr. 4,25 Aug 44. AOK 14 Doc. 

622411 I. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

chia River, marking the southern edge 

of the Romagna Plain, the Eighth 

Army's o~jective. Within that area Allied infantrymen and tankers whose 

task it was to cross the rivers and drive 

the Germans from the ridges beyond 

were to become obsessed with a kind of 

bitter refrain: "one more river, one 

more ridge." 

The Offensive Begins 

When the Eighth Army attacked on 

schedule an hour before midnight on 

25 August, the stratagem of artillery 

silence paid off. Both the 1 st Canadian 

and British 5 Corps crossed the yletauro against little resistance. An hour 

later as the troops prepared to push out 

from their bridgeheads, the massed 

guns of fifteen artillery battalions fired 

a covering barrage. By dawn on 26 

August all divisions were well beyond 

the river and advancing steadilv behind 

heavy artilley fire and C aerial bombardment directed mainly against enemy 

infantry. 9 

Throughout the day, planes of the 

Desert Air Force flew 664 sorties, 

mostly against Pesaro. Fighter-bombers 

also attacked enemy armor and artillery 

positions, while bombers hit coastal f())·-

tifications between Pesaro and Rimini as 

well as railroad marshaling yards to the 

north and northwest of Cesano, Budrio, 

and Rimini. Offshore two gunboats 

opened fire with 6-inch guns against 

enemy left flank IX)sitions. Even darkness brought the Germans little relief; 

that night, the 26th, and the next three, 

bombers continued to attack lines of 

communication around Rimini, Ra-

"Alexander DNpatth. p. 68. 
THE GOTHIC LINE OFFENSIVE BEGINS 315 

venna, Prato, and Bologna. 11l By nightfall on the 27th the Allied divisions had 

cleared all enemy south of the Arzilla 

River and prepared to continue five 

more miles to the northwest to reach 

the Foglia River, last of the waterlines 

before the main defenses of the Gothic 

Line. 

German Countermeasures 

The Allied offensive clearly had 

achieved tactical surprise. Reacting 

nervously to a report on 24 August of 

an Allied landing in the Ravenna area, 

Field Marshal Kesselring had canceled 

entrainment of the 3d Panzer Grenadier 

Division for movement to France and 

ordered a withdrawal of the 26th Panzer 

Division from army group reserve to 

become the Tmth Army's reserve. Even 

after the Germans learned later in the 

day that the basis for the landing 

reports was the exceptionally heavy air 

attack on Ravenna, Kesselring allowed 

the shift of the panzer division to the 

eastern sector to continue. But that was 

more a precaution than recognition that 

the offensive had begun. Not until 26 

August, after the Allied troops had 

reached the Arzilla River, did General 

Vietinghoff cut short his leave and 

hurry back to Tenth Army headquarters, 

where his staff briefed him on the 

developing situation. The long-awaited 

Allied offensive, General Vietinghoff 

discovered, had indeed begun. Vietinghoff immediately informed Kesselring of his conclusion. Believing the 

Allies had other surprises up their 

sleeve, Kesselring preferred to wait to 

see what those might be before deciding to react to what might be an 

10 Craven and Cate, eds., AAF III, pp. 443-44. 

opening or diversionary maneuver. II 

As additional reports of Allied advances along the Adriatic flank continued to reach Army Group C headquarters during the 28th, Field Marshal 

Kesselring at last concluded that General Alexander had indeed launched his 

main offensive. He authorized General 

Vietinghoff to withdraw Herr's LXXVI 

Panzer Corps into the Gothic Line behind the Foglia River and enlist from 

army reserve the 26th Panzer Division to 

back up the Gothic Line defenses in 

that sector. That night the Germans 

opposite the Eighth Army right wing 

began to fall back in some disorder into 

the Gothic Line. Opposite the Eighth 

Army's left wing, General Feuerstein's 

LI Mountain Corps withdrew into the 

mountains to conform with Herr's maneuver. 12 

The Assault 

Late on the 29th, across a 17-milewide front, the British and the Canadians reached the crests of the last hills 

overlooking the valley of Foglia. while 

patrols from the Polish corps entered 

the southern outskirts of Pesaro. That 

night the last of the German troops 

south of the Foglia retired. The next 

morning Allied patrols found that in 

many places the river was shallow 

enough for fording and that a hard 

gravel bottom was free of mines. A 

study of aerial photographs and other 

intelligence sources indicated that the 

main German defenses were on a ridge 

II AOK 14, la KTB Nr. 4, 25 Aug 44, AOK 14 Doc. 

6224111; AOK 10, la KTB Ani. 8, 27 Aug 44, AOK 

10 Doc. 6143711: Pretzell, Battle of Rimini, MS in 

CMH. 

12 AOK 10, la KTB Ani. 8, 28-2Y Aug 44, AOK 10 

Doc. 61437/1. 
paralleling the river about three miles 

to the north. Key strongpoints appeared to have been developed around 

the towns of Montecalvo, Monte Gridolfo, and Tomba di Pesaro. 

During the night of 30 August, the 

assault troops began crossing the river 

to move at dawn against the Gothic 

Line. First evidence of German reserves 

developed in the zone of the British 5 

Corps at Monte Gridolfo where armored infantry units from the 26th 

Panzer Division had occupied the town a 

short time before the British arrived. 

Poorly oriented in their new surroundings and exposed to the tremendous 

weight of Allied firepower, the armored 

infantrymen were unable to hold. 

That was the story almost everywhere. Outflanking the eastern anchor 

of the Gothic Line, Pesaro, the Polish 

corps Impelled the Germans in the 

town to withdraw on 2 September. The 

Canadian corps had, in the meantime, 

taken Tomba di Pesaro to open a gap 

between the 26th Panzer and 1st Parachute Divisions and on 3 September to 

advance ten miles and pinch out the 2 

Polish Corps against the coast. On the 

Canadians' left the 46th Division of the 

5 Corps kept pace. 

With the defenses of the Gothic Line 

behind, months of hard work by German engineers had gone for naught. It 

was hardly surprising that a feeling of an 

imminent and far-reaching breakthrough permeated Eighth Army headquarters. GeneralLeese ordered forward 

the 1st British Armoured Division to join 

the 5 Corps and prepare to follow up a 

German withdrawal. 

Early on that same day,2 September, 

General Vietinghoff sent his chief of 

staff, General Wentzell, to General 

Herr's headquarters to evaluate the 

situation on the Tenth Army's left wing. 

At the command post of the LXXVI 

Panzer Corps Wentzell found the situation even more alarming than he and 

others at the army headquarters had 

realized. After trying without success to 

reach army headquarters for approval 

to commit the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division to close the gap between the 1st 

Parachute and the 26th Panzer Divisions, 

Wentzell on his own authority ordered 

it done. General Herr in turn brought 

forward his corps reserve, the 98th 

Division, to help close a second gap that 

had developed between the 26th Panzer 

and 71st Divisions. Along the coastal 

sector held by the 1st Parachute Division, 

General Herr formed to the rear of the 

parachutists a blocking position made 

up of miscellaneous elements from the 

162d Turkomen Division, with two artillery battalions in support.13 

By that time it was nevertheless 

doubtful whether those moves would be 

sufficient to enable Herr's corps to 

hold, for they ate up the last of his 

reserve. Fighting for over a week 

against greatly superior Allied forces, 

the troops of the LXXVI Panzer Corps 

were close to exhaustion. The corps 

commander knew that for additional 

reinforcement he would have to depend upon General Vietinghoff’s ability 

to persuade Kesselring to shift units 

from the army group center, where the 

Allies as yet had made no move.14 

The Coriano Ridge 

The line General Herr was attempt13 Ibid., 2–3 Sep 44. 

14 Ibid.; MS # T–1b (Westphal et al.), CMH. 

The Germans Reinforce Their Line

316 

paralleling the river about three miles 

to the north. Key strongpoints appeared to have been developed around 

the towns of Montecalvo, Monte Gridolfo, and Tomba di Pesaro. 

During the night of 30 August, the 

assault troops began crossing the river 

to move at dawn against the Gothic 

Line. First evidence of German reserves 

developed in the zone of the British 5 

Corps at Monte Gridolfo where armored infantry units from the 26th 

Panzer Division had occupied the town a 

short time before the British arrived. 

Poorly oriented in their new surroundings and exposed to the tremendous 

weight of Allied firepower, the armored 

infantrymen were unable to hold. 

That was the story almost everyw here. Outflanking the eastern anchor 

of the Gothic Line, Pesaro, the Polish 

corps Impelled the Germans in the 

town to withdraw on 2 September. The 

Canadian corps had, in the meantime, 

taken Tomba di Pesaro to open a gap 

between the 26th Panzer and 1st Parachute Divisions and on 3 September to 

advance ten miles and pinch out the 2 

Polish Corps against the coast. On the 

Canadians' left the 46th Division of the 

5 Corps kept pace. 

With the defenses of the Gothic Line 

behind, months of hard work by German engineers had gone f()r naught. It 

was hardly surprising that a fl>eling of an 

imminent and far-reaching breakthrough permeated Eighth Army headquarters. General Leese ordered forward 

the 1st British Armoured Division to join 

the 5 Corps and prepare to f<)llow up a 

German withdrawal. 

Early on that same day, 2 September, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

General Vietinghoff sent his chief of 

staff, General Wentzell, to General 

Herr's headquarters to evaluate the 

situation on the TPnth Army's left wing. 

At the command post of the LXXVI 

Panzer Corps Wentzell found the situation even more alarming than he and 

others at the army headquarters had 

realized. After trying without success to 

reach army headquarters for approval 

to commit the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division to close the gap between the 1st 

Parachute and the 26th Panzer Divisions, 

Wentzell on his own authority ordered 

it done. General Herr in turn brought 

forward his corps reserve, the 98th 

Division, to help close a second gap that 

had developed between the 26th Panzer 

and 71st Divisions. Along the coastal 

sector held by the 1st Parachute Division, 

General Herr formed to the rear of the 

parachutists a blocking position made 

up of miscellaneous elements from the 

162d Turkomen Division, with two artillery battalions in support. 13 

By that time it was nevertheless 

doubtful whether those moves would be 

sufficient to enable Herr's corps to 

hold, for they ate up the last of his 

reserve. Fighting for over a week 

against greatly superior Allied forces, 

the troops of the LXXVI Panzer Corps 

were close to exhaustion. The corps 

commander knew that for additional 

reinforcement he would have to depend upon General Vietinghoffs abilit)! 

to persuade Kesselring to shift units 

from the army group center, where the 

Allies as yet had made no move. Ii 

The Coriarw Ridge 

The line General Herr was attempt-

'''Ibid., 2-3 Sep 44. 

"Ibid.; MS # T-Ib (Westphal rt aI.), CMH. 
THE GOTHIC LINE OFFENSIVE BEGINS 317 

ing to hold ran along the Coria no 

Ridge, which constituted the more 

prominent of two remaining hill features short of the Eighth Army's objective of the Romagna. When during the 

afternoon of 2 September the Canadian 

corps burst from a small bridgehead 

beyond the Conca River in the direction 

of the ridge, expectations at General 

Leese's headquarters of an imminent 

breakthrough burgeoned. Yet mixed in 

with reports of progress were disquieting indication:: of growing resistance. 

To beat back a tank-led counterattack, 

for example, the Canadians asked assistance from the 46th Infantry Division of 

the 5 Corps, whose troops crossed the 

intercorps boundary to help drive the 

enemy from high ground overlooking 

the Canadians' left flank. In the center 

and on the left wing of the 5 Corps the 

56th Division and the 4th Indian Division had throughout been moving with 

considerably less speed aganst the enemy located in the Apennine f()othills, 

and were becoming echeloned farther 

and farther to the left rear. 

These setbacks were nonetheless insufficient to justify failure to try to turn 

what was clearly a deep salient in the 

enemy lines into a breakthrough, and 

General Leese ordered the British 1 st 

Armoured Division into action. The armored division was to seize what apr>eared to be the keystone of the Coriano position, the village of Coriano. 

Everything turned upon the timely 

arrival of the armor, yet when the 

division left its assembly area south of 

the Foglia, everything seemed to conspire against achieving that goal. The 

footing on the rain-soaked trails leading 

to the front was so poor that a score of 

vehicles broke down, and the rest, 

grinding forward much of the way in 

low gear, failed to reach the south bank 

of the Conca River until late on 3 

September. It was midmorning of the 

next day before the first tanks began 

passing through the ranks of the 46th 

Infantry Division. 

Even then the armor had to extemporize, because the 46th Division had 

not yet captured the planned jump-off 

line in a village just over two miles short 

of the Cm'iano Ridge. By now the 

wcary tankers had fought for five hours 

just to reach their starting line and by 

the time the move against the ridge 

began, the sun was in their eyes and 

be hind defending German gunners. As 

night fell, the assault lx)gged down a 

mile short of the Coria no Ridge, while 

fire from the ridge also brought troops 

of the adjacent I st Canadian Corps to a 

halt. The delays had given the Germans 

time to bring up tanks and assault guns, 

and the moment when breakthrough 

might have been achieved-if indeed 

such a possibility had cver existed-had 

passed. 15 

For three more days repeated efforts 

to gain the ridge got no place, partly 

because of the German commitment of 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division in the 

gap between the 1st Parachute and 26th 

Panzer Divisions and of an infantry 

division, the 356th, and partly because 

the rains came. Starting on 3 September while the British armor was moving 

from its assembly area, rain fell off and 

on for a week. Flash floods washed out 

tactical bridges along inland roads, leaving only the coastal highway as an 

artery for supporting those troops be-

"Operations of the British. Indian. and Dominion Forces in Italv. Part III. Sec. B. 
318 

yond the Foglia River. Until the flooding receded, operations on the Eighth 

Army front sloshed to a halt. While 

waiting for a break in the weather, 

General Leese could only ponder a 

resumption of his offensive toward 

Rimini and the Po Valley, and locate 

some 8,000 replacements for the casualties incurred since the offensive began 

on 25 August. German losses for the 

same period were approximately a 

thousand less. 16 

The Eighth Army's offensive had 

penetrated the Gothic Line but had 

fallen short of a breakthrough to the 

Romagna. The Germans had paid the 

penalty of early setbacks almost always 

exacted by surprise, but by shifting 

reinforcements-an infantry division 

and the 26th Panzer and 29th Panzer 

Greruu1ier Di'uisions-they had prevented 

disaster. Yet those shifts, however essential from the German viewpoint, fitted 

in perfectly with General Alexander's 

concept of a one-two punch. The time 

was approaching for Clark's Fifth Army 

to execute a Ie ft hook against the 

German defenses in the central sector. 

The Fifth Army-Plans and Regrouping 

The Fifth Army was to launch a twophase attack against the Gothic Line 

north of Florence. During the first 

phase Clark planned for Keyes' II 

Corps to attack through the left half of 

the zone of the British 13 Corps to 

seize a line of hills some eight miles 

north of Florence, just short of the 

valley of the Sieve River. The 13 Corps 

was to assist on the right. In the second 

phase, the II Corps was to attack across 

'" Ibid., App. G: Valwlf'dn W"hrmachl bis 1944, 

MurtaiJmf'idungm ab lYlJ.43, Hl/176a, CMH. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the Sieve and advance astride Highway 

65, with the 13 Corps following several 

miles to the east of Highway 65 astride 

Route 6521, the Borgo-San LorenzoImola road. Meanwhile, west of Florence on the left of the II Corps, the IV 

Corps was to simulate a crossing of the 

Arno and be prepared to follow up an 

enemy withdrawal. 17 

The weakest point topographically in 

the Gothic Line in the Fifth Army's 

zone of operations was along Highway 

65, which crosses the Apennines at 

1,200-foot Futa Pass, about twenty miles / 

north of Florence. That fact was as 

apparent to German engineers as to the 

Fifth Army planners: the strongest 

man-made defenses were there, consisting of concrete pillooxes, gun emplacements, and troop shelters. In an outpost line were numerous fire trenches, 

barbed wire obstacles, antitank ditches, 

and mine fields. A ridge two miles 

south of the pass and the high ground 

flanking it were similarly fortified. 

Strong defenses also covered a secondary route paralleling Highway 65 several miles to the west, the Prato-Bologna road, on Highway 6620, and at a 

similar distance to the east, II Giogo 

Pass, which carried Route 6524 across 

the mountains to Firenzuola. 

The sudden German withdrawal during the latter days of August northward 

from Florence toward the Gothic Line 

obviated the planned first phase of the 

Fifth Army's offensive. Once the British 

in the Adriatic sector had begun to 

attack on 25 August, the German Fourteenth Army commander, General Lemelsen, had fully expected something to 

17 Hqs Fifth Army. Opns Instrs 32, 17 Aug 44. 

in Fifth ,4rmy History, Part VII, Annex 1 (;. 
THE GOTHIC LINE OFFENSIVE BEGINS 319 

happen on his front. Kesselring's order 

to Lemelsen to pull back came on 29 

August, and the withdrawal began two 

days later. 18 

IV Curt)S Cro,\S{'S thl' Arnu 

In ordering the British 13 Corps to 

f()llow up the German withdrawal, General Clark, in effect, canceled the first 

phase of his planned offensive, no 

doubt gratified that he would be spared 

hard fighting on the approaches to the 

Apennines. He also ordered the IV 

Corps to cross the Arno and advance as 

far as the (':.rerman withdrawal permitted. 

When patrols during the night of 31 

.~ugust found no enemy along the 

nver, General Crittenberger ordered 

his f(m:es to cross soon after daylight. III 

As the 1 st Armored Division: i~ the 

center, with the 92d Division's 370th 

Regimental Combat Team attached, set 

out in midmorning, at only one point 

was there opposition and that only 

scattered small arms fire from less tha;1 

determined rear guards. The armor 

headed for the first of the two hill 

masses dominating the plain north of 

the Arno, the Monte Pisano massif~ and 

the city of Lucca at the foot of the 

mountains ten miles northeast of Pisa. 

That afternoon the 6th South African Armoured Division began crossing 

the river on the right 'wing of the IV 

Corps, aiming at the other hill mass on 

the Arno plain, the Monte Albano 

Ridge, and to the city of Pistoia, sixteen 

miles to the north. The South Africans 

encountered some long-range artillery 

"Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKWIWRSt, KTB, 

IV( 1). pp. 550-5 I; AOK 14, fa KTB, Ani. 4, I Sep 

44,AOK 14, Doc. 62241iL 

19IV Corps Rpt of Opns, Sep 44. Unless otherwise noted the following is based upon this refercnce. 

fire but found no enemy troops. General Rutledge'S erstwhile antiaircraft battalions turned infantry, Task Force 45, 

also cro~sed ~he river to occupy that 

part of Plsa lymg on the north bank. 

For the troops the advance was a 

pleasant interlude, an unanticipated respite from the rigors of fighting. They 

moved easily as if on autumn maneuvers through countryside dotted with 

ocher-colored villages set amid ripening 

grain fields, orchards, and vineyards. 

On 3 September when approaching the 

four-lane autostrada running along the 

base of the Apennines, the South Africans came upon some mines, demolitions, and scattered artillery fire, while 

the 1 st Armored Division also f()und 

demolitions and an occasional smattering of small arms fire. That night 

enemy aircraft, making a rare appearance, bombed two crossing points on 

the Arno but did little damage and 

caused no casualties. 

On the next day, the 4th, indications 

developed that t1~e unobstructed road 

marches might soon come to an end, 

but there still was no regular pattern to 

the enemy's resistance. Here, where the 

Germans might have turned to fight 

back sharply, they were nowhere to be 

seen. Southwest of Pisroia, the South 

Afi'icans brushed aside half-hearted resistance to come within a mile of the 

autostrada, but a strong enemy rear 

guard denied a reconnaissance company of the I st Armored Division entry 

to a town alongside the autostrada eight 

miles east of Lucca until late afternoon 

when the enemv withdrew. Farther 

west the II th Ar~ored Infantrv Battalion crossed the autostrada agail~st slight 

opposition, and on the division's left 

wing the attached 370th Infantry, near-
320 

ing the autostrada just south of Lucca, 

met with some small arms and artillery 

fire. Continuing beyond Pisa, a patrol 

of Task Force 45 that crossed the little 

Serchio River was pinned down by 

heavy fire and succeeded in pulling 

back only after nightfalL 

Nevertheless, by 5 September the IV 

Corps had occupied three of its four 

objectives: the Monte Pisano massif on 

the left, the Monte Albano Ridge on 

the right, and the walled city of Lucca, 

while Pistoia remained in enemy hands. 

When on the 6th heavy rain~ began, 

soon washing out tactical bridges spanning the Arno, General Crittenberger 

accepted growing evidence that the 

Germans had withdrawn as far as they 

intended and ordered a halt. He directed a general regrouping along a 

line running from the Serchio River 

through Lucca to the Monte Pisano 

massif: thence along the autostrada to 

the Monte Albano Ridge. Here the 

corps would hold until ordered to resume its advance in keeping \\ith progress of the II Corps in the assault on 

the Gothic Line. 

Having already established a bridgehead north of the Arno, the 13 Corps 

meanwhile had simply pushed forward 

in keeping with the rale of German 

withdrawal. That rate was considerably 

less precipitate than in front of the rv 

Corps, for the apparent recognition of 

the importance of Highway 65 to any 

thrust against the Gothic Line made the 

Germans fall back slowly. By 4 September patrol contacts provided no indication of further enemy withdrawal, so 

the line of the 13 Corps stabilized 

roughly as an extension of that of the 

IV Corps from five to ten miles north 

of the Arno. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Between the two corps, apparently as 

a preliminary to the planned passage of 

the II Corps through the 13 Corps, 

General Clark had assigned a narrow 

sector to the I I Corps. The 442d 

Regimental Combat Team followed up 

the German withdra'wal there until relieved the night of 2 September by a 

regiment of the 88th Division. The 

442d was heading f()r southern France. 

As these moves proceeded, General 

Clark took another look at his plan of 

attack on the Gothic Line. Word had 

just reached him through British Intelligence that Hitler had ordered Kesselring to concentrate his defense astride 

Highway 65 at the Futa Pass. The same 

message had also disclosed that the 

interanny boundary between the Tenth 

and Four/pentli Armies, and generally the 

weakest point in the enemy front, lay 

some six miles east of the Futa Pass at 

II Giogo Pass. Military logic suggested 

that the main effort could be more 

profitably made at the latter pass. A 

breakthrough at II Giogo Pass would 

outflank the strong defenses at the Futa 

Pass and most likely force a German 

withdravllal there. From Firenzuola, five 

miles beyond II Giogo Pass, he mighT 

proceed either up Highway 65 through 

the Radicosa Pass to Bologna or along a 

secondary road northeash-vard to Imola. 

Furthermore, by shifting his main ef· 

fort to the right wing, the Fifth Anrn 

commander might achieve better coordination with the supporting attack of 

the British 13 Corps.2H 

The II Corps commander, General 

Keyes, planned to advance toward the 

Gothic Line with the 34th and 91 st 

20 See Winterbotham. Tit, Ultm Serr,f, p. 160. 
THE GOTHIC LINE OFFENSIVE BEGINS 321 

Divisions on either side of Highway 65 

in what could appear to the Germans as 

merely a continuation of the follow-up 

of ~rman withdrawal. It would also 

give an impression of a main eff()rt at 

the Futa Pass. Yet once the 91 st Division on the right came into comact with 

the main defenses of the Gothic Line, 

the 85th Division was to pass through 

and make the main effort against II 

Giogo Pass. Keyes' reserve, the 88th 

Division, was to be prepared to pass 

through either the 91 st Division along 

Highway 65 or the 85th Division. To 

meet special supply problems to be 

expected in the mountains, the corps 

had nine Italian pack mule companies, 

each with 2bO mules. 

Despite problems posed by heavy 

rains and flooding, the Fifth Army by 7 

September was ready, a\vaiting only the 

signal from General Alexander. "The 

fate of the Fifth Army," General Clark 

confided to his diary, 'was "tied up with 

that of the Eighth Army." Clark assumed that Alexander would delay the 

Fifth Army's attack umil C.eneral Leese 

could get a renewed effort going 

against the troublesome Coriano Ridge, 

whereupon Clark would be prepared to 

attack "about 48 hours later."21 "We are 

all set," wrote Clark, "for the thrust 

over the mountains toward Bologna. It 

is hard to wait, for we are ready and 

eager to go. General Alexander is holding the lanyard, and when he pulls it 

we will be able to jump off with less 

than 24 hours' notice."22 

General Alexander was indeed about 

ready to pull the lanyard. On 8 September he visited Leese's headquarters 

21 Clark Diary. 7 Sep 44, 

22 Ibid. 

to get a closer look at the stalemate at 

the Coriano Ridge. It would take two 

or three more days, he deduced, for 

Leese to get his stalled offensive moving 

again. :\1eanwhile, Kesselring had apparently shifted as much strength to his 

Adriatic flank as he could afford so that 

there was no point in delaying the Fifth 

Army's attack in hope of further shifts. 

Indeed, attack by the Fifth Army might 

loosen up the front opposite Leese's 

army. He told C..eneral Clark to begin 

his offensive on 10 September, with the 

Eighth Army to renew its attack two 

days later.2:

1 

The German Situation 

Of the three diviSIOns that Field 

Marshal Kesselring had shIfted to meet 

the Eighth Army's offensive, only one, 

the 356th, had been drawn from the 

F(YUrteenth Army in from of Clark's Fifth 

Army. Even so, committing the 26th 

Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division from the Tmth Armis 

reserve had tied up two units that 

might otherwise have been used in the 

central sector. Pulling out even one 

division seriouslv weakened the defenses, for it left the I Parachute Corps 

only one division, the 4th Parachute, 

with which to cover both the Futa and 

II Giogo Passes in front of the U.S. II 

Corps, and the LI Mountain Corps only 

one division, the 715 th, to oppose the 

British 13 Corps. Almost on the eve of 

the Fifth Army's attack, Lemelsen's 

Fourteenth Army incurred another loss 

with departure of the 16th SS Panzer 

Grenadier DitJision on orders from OKW 

to France. 24 

2:\ Alexander Dfspatch, p. 69, 

2' AOK 14, la KTB Nr. 4, 6-9 Sep 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 622411 I, 
322 

Even had there been no threat of a 

Fifth Army offensive, General Lemelsen would have been disturbed by the 

shortage of troops, for partisan activity 

in the FuurlRmth Annv's rear was increasing, particularly between the Ligurian 

coast and Highway 9, Anny Group C's 

main lateral line of communication. 

Almost every day some partisan band 

demolished a railroad, a bridge, a highway. To ,)rovide vitally needed security, 

Lemelsen transferred to the rear one 

battalion from each division in the less 

threatened XIV Panzer Corps opposite 

the V.S. IV CorpS.25 

In addition to harassment by paltisans, the Germans were plagued by 

Allied bombers and fighters. Medium 

bombers again struck the Po River 

crossings to destroy bridges repaired 

since Operation MALLORY MJ\JOR in 

July. They also attempted to seal off 

the industrial area of northwestern Italy 

from the front by lx)mbing five railroad 

bridges. Fighter-bombers harassed 

roads and rail lines on both sides of the 

PO.21; 

On 9 September the mediums, in an 

effort to isolate the immediate battle 

area planned for the Fifth Army, 

shifted their attacks to railroad lines 

'5Ibid. 

•• Craven and Cate, eds., AAF III, pp. 445-46. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

leading into Bologna. By nightfall the 

next day they had cut all four main 

lines.27 

Meanwhile, the bulk of the fighterbombers hit the Gothic Line itself. 

Beginning on 9 September and continuing through the 20th, when weather 

would restrict operations, fighter-lx)mbers would fly an average of 240 sorties 

daily against bivouac areas, command 

}X>sts, and supply depots in the vicinity 

of FUla and II Giogo Passes. For three 

days, beginning on the 9th, mediums 

joined the attack, flying 339 sorties 

against barracks, supply points, and gun 

positions between the front and Bologna.2x 

As the 4th Parachute and 715th Diztisions resumed their withdrawal into the 

main Gothic Line defenses, General 

Lemelsen grew increasingly disturbed 

over his chances of holding the line. On 

9 September his chief of staff requested 

Kesselring to transfer at least one depleted division from the Tenth Armv to 

replace the departing 16th SS Panzer 

Grenadier Division. Although Kesselring 

agreed, he added that he saw no reason 

for immediate concern, for in his opinion, the Fourteenth Anny faced no immediate attack. 29 

27 Ibid. 

'K Ibid. 

29 AOK 14, Ia KTB Nr. 4, 6-9 Sep 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 62241/1. 
CHAPTER XIX 

Battle for the Pass 

The Approach 

With the 34th Division on the left 

and the 91 st Division to the right of 

Highway 65, General Keyes' I I Corps 

on 10 September began to adv~nce. on 

a IS-mile front from a line of hIlls eIght 

miles north of Florence toward the 

Sieve River, four miles away. To the 

right of the American corps the 1 st 

Division of the British 13 Corps moved 

astride the Florence-Borgo-San Lorenzo road toward the Sieve. Since patrols had determined that the enemy 

had already departed, the fil'st day's 

operation was little more than an approach march. Long columns of infantrv moved in relative silence through 

n~rro\\' vallevs and along crooked 

ridges. Ahead, shrouded in the blue 

haze of earlv autumn, were the shadowy outline~ of the Northern Apennines, on whose slopes a watchful enemy lay concealed in hundreds of w:llcamouflaged firing trenches, gun pits, 

and concrete bunkers. That night the 

Allied troops crossed the easily fordable 

Sieve unopposed. I 

Elsewhere other troops of the Fifth 

Army also stirred. On the coastal flank 

111 Corps AAR, Sep 44: Sidnev T. Mathews, 

"Breakthrough at Monte Altuzzo," in Charles B. 

MacDonald and Sidney T. ;vfathews, Three Battles: 

Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1952): 

Chester G. Starr, From Salerno to the Alps (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), pp. 311-24. 

Unless otherwise cited the following sections are 

based upon these sources. 

of General Crittenberger's IV Corps, 

Task Force 45 followed up the enemy's 

\· ... ithdrawal fourteen miles beyond the 

Arno to the vicinity of the prewar 

beach resort of Viareggio. Inland the 

1 st Armored Division and the 6th 

South African Armoured Division continued abreast on broad fronts. Nowhere were the Germans in evidence. 

Occupying Pistoia, abandoned by the 

enemy: the South Africans pushed on 

into the hills north of the city, 

On the 11 th the I I Corps continued 

its approach march, but as the day 

\H)re on, indications grew that an alert 

enemy waited not far ahead. ~n occasional burst of long-range machme gun 

fire; a cluster of exploding mortar 

shells that sent forward-patrols scurrying for cover; an isolated explosion 

revealing a hidden mine field. The 

troops \\~ere obviously nearing an outpost line somewhere in low hill~ fronting dominating peaks overlookmg the 

Futa and II Giogo Passes. 

Plans arui Terrain 

Commanded since mid-1943 by 49· 

year-old General Livesay, the 91 st Di· 

vision after crossing the Sieve veered 

away from Highway 65 to follow the 

secondary road, Route 6524, toward 

the main objective of the II Corps, II 

Giogo Pass. 

Under General Keyes' plan, once the 

91 st Division had fully developed the 
324 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

IL GroGO PASS 

enemy's outpost line, General Coulter's 

85th Division was to relieve those elements of the 91 st Division east of 

Highway 65. The two divisions then 

were to move against the two terrain 

features commanding II Giogo Pass. 

These were the 3,000-foot Monticelli 

massif on the left of the pass and the 

equally high Monte Altuzzo on the 

right. General Keyes had also directed 

General Livesay to deploy one of his 

regiments west of Monticelli in conjunction with a holding attack toward 

the Futa Pass by General Bolte's 34th 

Division astride Highway 65. In addition to taking the key height of Monte 

Altuzzo, the 85th Division was also to 

seize neighboring Monte Verruca and 

other heights to the east adjoining the 

sector of the British 13 Corps. (Map XI) 

To defend II Giogo Pass the Germans had constructed their G-othic Line 

positions so as to take full advantage of 

a watershed 3,000 feet high. On the 

forward slopes, streams flowing southward into the Sieve River had cut a 

series of sharp irregular parallel ridges 

and ravines. Except where rocky outcrops and cliffs provided no foothold 

for vegetation, stunted pines and scat-
BATTLE FOR THE PASS 

tered patches of brush covered the 

narrow ridges, while lower slopes were 

generally well concealed by thick b'Toves 

of chestnut and pine. 

As \-vas so often the case in the Italian 

Campaign, the nature of the terrain 

would impose strict limitations on the 

tactical choices open to the various 

commanders. Route 6524, for example, 

had to serve as a line of communication 

for both the 85th and 91 st Divisions. At 

best the road resembled a two-lane, 

asphalt-covered American country road. 

Since its many sharp curves were under 

direct observation of gunners on the 

slopes of Monticelli and Monte Altuzzo, 

those portions close to the front would 

be unable to sustain much daylight 

traffic until heights flanking the II 

Giogo Pass were in hand. 

The Monticelli massif southwest of 

the pass consists of a long, steep backbone ridge with a concave southern 

slope. Slightly higher than Monticelli, 

Monte Altuzzo is a conical peak with a 

main north-south ridge extending 

southward for 2,500 yards from its 

summit. Numerous narrow wooded 

draws cut the slopes of the ridge and 

offered covered routes of approach for 

attacking troops. 

II Glogo Pass had indeed been well 

chosen for die American main effort, 

for General Lemelsen, the Fourteenth 

Army commander, and Field Marshal 

Kesselring shared a conviction that the 

Americans would concentrate on the 

Futa Pass and the principal crossing of 

the Apennines, Highway 65. Although 

the 4th Parachute Division of Schlemm's I 

Parachute Corps was responsible for defense of both passes, two of its regiments focused on the Futa Pass, leaving 

only one, the 12th Parachute Regiment, to 

325 

hold II Giogo Pass, including both Monticelli and Monte Altuzzo, plus the 

other heights eastward to a lxmndary 

with the 715th Division of the Ll Mountain Corps. Reduced by heavy losses 

during the fighting south of Rome to a 

small cadre of combat-experienced 

troops, the 4th Parachute Division had 

been fleshed out in recent weeks by 

inexperienced replacements, many of 

whom had yet to fire live ammunition. 

Two other divisions to the west opposite the 34th U.S. Division and the 6th 

South African Armoured Division were 

responsible for sectors of the Gothic 

Line averaging ten miles each, so that 

there was little possibility of drawing on 

them for reserves in the main battle. 

General Schlemm's corps reserve consisted of only two battalions of the 

Grerwdier Lehr Brigade. 2 

Along that sector of the C"othic Line 

about to feel the main weight of the 

Fifth Army's assault, the attacking 

f()rces would enjoy a three-to-one superiority over the defenders. Before II 

Giogo Pass General Keyes had concentrated half of his infantry strength, and 

each of the attacking divisions would 

have the support of an entire corps 

artillery group. Given those conditions, 

the Americans had every right to view 

the task ahead with confidence, in spite 

of the mountainous and forbidding 

terrain pocked with well-camouflaged 

positions manned by a foe with orders 

to defend to the last bullet. 

First Contacts 

During the afternoon of the 12th, 

Col. W.F. Magill's 363d Infantry led the 

'AOK 14, fa KTB Nr. 4. 6-8 Sep 44, DOL 

62241/1. See also Fifth Army Hislory. Part VII, pp. 

53-54 and 72. 
326 

91 st Division toward II Giogo Pass. 

Although the volume of enemy fire was 

steadily increasing, the 91 st Division 

thus far had run into only sporadic 

opposition, prompting General Keyes to 

delay ordering forward General Coulter's 85th Division. The absence of 

determined resistance reinforced a 

widely held opinion in the 91 st Division 

headquarters that the o~jective was only 

lightly manned. Colonel Magill, fi)r his 

part, thought his regiment could seize 

both Monticelli and Monte Altuzzo 

without help from the 85th Division. 

Late in the day Colonel Magill sent a 

battalion against each of the two objectives. Faced by the heaviest fire yet 

encountered north of the Amo and 

advancing in growing darkness over 

unfamiliar ground against defenses that 

would eventually absorb the efforts of 

two divisions, neither battalion understandably made much headway. That 

night local counterattacks drove one 

company back along the main road. 

Radio communication in the convoluted 

terrain was poor, and deployed on 

slopes with few features recognizable on 

maps, Colonel Magill's troops were unable to advise their commanders of their 

exact whereabouts. About all that was 

certain as daylight came on the 13th 

was that the advances had come to a 

halt and that both Monticelli and Monte 

Altuzzo were still the province of the 

12th Parachute Regiment. Until the location of the forward formations could be 

pinpointed, their presence was bound 

to inhibit the use of supporting artillery 

fire. 3 

3363d Inf Jnl and Opns Rpt, Sep 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

The Attack on the Monticelli Ridge 

The principal objective of General 

Livesay's 91 st Division, Monticelli, was 

in effect a ridge line, forming -a huge 

amphitheater whose two wings extended south from the main east-west 

divide. The west wing is Monte Calvi, a 

smooth dome-shaped hill. Monticelli itself is a long, steep-sided 3,OOO-foot 

ridge running in a northwest-southeasterly direction and forming the cast 

wing ot the amphitheater overlooking II 

Giogo Pass. Stretching southward from 

the main ridge are two spurs, below 

which Route 6524 runs through II 

Giogo Pass. Between those spurs are 

two deep, steep-sided ravines offering 

the only covered routes of approach to 

the upper slopes. On Monticelli's northwestern arms, scrub brush and a grove 

of chestnut trees near the hamlet of 

Borgo offered the only concealment. 

Narrow foot trails led to Borgo from 

the mountain's lower slopes, but beyond 

Borgo there were no trails, and the 

steep upper slopes would make supply 

and evacuation of wounded extremely 

difficult.! 

So cleverly concealed were the Gothic 

Line defenses that they were almost 

invisible to the approaching troops. 

Many had been constructed of reinforced concrete or blasted into the rock. 

Roofed with three feet of logs and 

earth, each JX)sition could accommodate 

five men. In front of the defenses the 

Germans had strung at IOO-yard intervals bands of barbed wire a foot high 

'Capt. Lloyd J. Inman, Inf., The Operation of 

Company B, 363d Infantry, in the Attack on 

Monucelli, Study, The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga. Unless otherwise indicated the f()lIowing 

is based upon this source. . 
BATTLE FOR THE PASS 

CAPTURE OF MONTE ALTUZZO 

AND MONTI CELLI 16-'8 September 1944 

- --- . .6"".1[0 ..... IS Of ArrI.CK,'1 UP 

________ AlI..ltO •• 11 or 'TTAe~ • .., .IEP 

~ 

,....-----.... AU lEO ~OSlTtOHI • • 1 UP 

EHEIII YML .. 

- ----.. ENEWY WOVfW[MT, 1I-f1 SE~ 

Conlo", Inl.rtlllltn mll'rl 

&fO , 0 ~OY·"'DS 

501~o~i~~lt~iLi-+i'-4I----------~1 I o !WOMETE". 

MAP 8 

and twenty-five feet deep. They had 

also placed mines in the two ravines 

leading to the upper slopes, for they 

too saw the ravines as logical routes of 

a pproac h. On . the reve rse slope the 

Germans had built la rge dugouts extending seventy-five feet or more into 

the mounta in, capable of accommodating up to twenty men, and 300 yards 

north of the Monticelli rid!2;e they had 

blasted a 50-man shelter out of the 

solid meL-' 

327 

f 

l! 

2~Gr Lehr Brig 

~) 

) 

( 

\ , 

+ 

H C ero_.Jr 

On 13 September two battalions of 

the 363d Infantry began to climb toward Monticelli's western ridge. Heavy 

and accurate enemy mortar concentrations, punctuated by machine gun fire , 

soon slowed the advance and caused so 

many cas ualties that the regimental 

commander committed his resel've. The 

"g ist Oiv Opns Rpt. Sep 44. 
328 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ARTILLERY BATTERY IN ACTION 

pattern of the fighting for II Giogo Pass 

was set that first day on the slopes of 

l~Jth Monticelli and Monte Altuzzo and 

those less towering crests to right and 

left. 6 (Map 8) 

The terrain and the nature of the 

enemy's defenses, the men soon discovered, would permit no grand over-thetop assault by co-ordinated f()rmations. 

Of a mighty attacking army numbering 

over 262,000 men, those who would 

"Maj. John Brock, Int'., Operations of the 3ti3d 

Infantry at Monticelli, Monograph, The Infantry 

School, Ft. Benning, Ga. The following section is 

based upon this source. 

bear the brunt of the fighting at critical 

points sometimes constituted a platoon 

or less, seldom more than a company 

or two. Little clusters of men struggled 

doggedly up rocky ravines and draws 

separated by narrow fingers of f()rested 

ridges, isolated, climbing laboriously 

squad by squad, fighting their way 

forward yard by yard, often not even 

knowing the location of the closest 

friendly unit. Only a massive fire support, provided by the artillery of division, corps, and army, by the tubes of 

tanks and tank destroyers firing in 

battery in the manner of artillery, and 
BATTLE FOR THE PASS 

by fighter-bombers, gave to the many 

isolated firefights any real unity; but it 

was that very unity, however difficult to 

discern, that was in the end to decide 

the battle. 

The experience of Company B, 363d 

Infimtry, commanded by Capt. Uoyd J. 

Inman, was indicative of the kind of 

fighting that characterized the struggle 

for II Giogo Pass. As the 363d Infantry 

renewed the attack on 14 September, 

Captain Inman's company was to lead 

one of two attacking battalions behind a 

rolling barrage fired by the 34th Field 

Artillery Battalion. The initial objective 

was the hamlet of Borgo on Monticelli's 

southwestern slope. From there the 

company was to gain the crest of the 

western ridge and push on to the 

summit. 

A platoon of heavy machine guns 

from Company 0 was to support the 

attack with overhead fire from positions 

on one of the lower ridges extending 

southeastward from the Monticelli hill 

mass. When those fires became masked, 

the platoon was to displace forward one 

section at a time. Starting 20 minutes 

bef(xe the ground attack, the supporting artillery and SI-mm. mortars were 

to fire twenty minutes of preparatory 

fire against predetermined targets. 

Thereafter the artillery was to shift its 

fires to the base of the mountain, then 

commence a rolling barrage, lifting it 

100 yards per minute as Company B's 

leading platoons followed at a distance 

of a hundred yards. 

At 1400 Company B, with Technical 

Sgt. Charles J. Murphy's I st Platoon on 

the lefl and 1st Lt. Bruno Rossellini's 

2d Platoon on the right, crossed the 

line of departure. Off to the right 

Company C began to move. For the 

329 

first half hour all seemed to go well as 

Captain Inman's men filed slowly up 

narrow trails. Suddenly a voice claiming 

to be that of the Company C commander broke into the battalion's SCR300 channel, complaining bitterly that 

friendly artillery fire was falling on his 

troops. Although both Captain Inman 

and his artillery forward observer could 

see from their observation post that that 

was not the case, thev were unable to 

con vince the artillery battalion commander, who immediately halted the 

barrage. It \\'as obviously an enemy 

ruse. No sooner had the barrage lifted 

than Germans who had been taking 

shelter in the innermost recesses of 

their dugouts returned to their guns 

and opened fire on Company B's forward platoons. 

Yet in spite of that fire men of the 

two platoons, using every fold and 

wrinkle of the ground for cover, managed to reach Borgo and by nightfall 

had moved beyond the hamlet ai:xmt a 

third of the way up the mountain. 

There grazing machine gun fire at 

relatively close range stopped them. In 

the deepening twilight it \vas impossible 

to locate well-camouflaged enemy positions. With ammunition running low 

and casualties heavy, Captain Inman 

ordered his men to dig in for the night. 

In the darkness the wounded made 

their way or were caITied to the rear, 

while p~rters struggled forward with 

ammunition and rations. 

Determined to locate the !{tlns that 

had stopped his company, Captain Inman sent 1st Lt. John C. Kearton and 

six volunteers from the 3d Platoon in 

search of the enemy positions. Concealed by darkness, the seven inched up 

the mountainside until halted by barbed 
330 

wire. Suspecting that the goal was near, 

Lieutenant Kearton wormed his wav 

through twenty-five yards of barbed 

wire to the base of an enemv bunker 

before hand grenades drove him back. 

Satisfied that he had «HInd the exact 

location of the enemy machine guns, 

Kearton \vithdrew with his men to 

report his find to his company commander. 

The following morning-IS September-as soon as it was light enough to 

observe, lnman called in artillery fire 

on the enemy position. Firing a few 

rounds to acUust f()r range, the Company B forward observer brought in 

the fires of a battery of 15S-mm. guns, 

partially destroying the enemy gun emplacement and breaching the wire entanglements before it. Hardlv had the 

firing stopped when Lieuten~nt Rosselini and ten of his men assaulted the 

bunker and f(}rced five dazed occupants 

to surrender. Accompanied by Sergeant 

Murphy's I st Platoon, the rest of Rosselini's men came fi:)J'\vard and both platoons deployed beyond the captured 

enemy position. 

In that isolated little action, Company 

B had scored the first important breach 

in the defenses of Monticelli and the 

first in that sector of the Gothic Line. 

Although flanking units had failed to 

keep pace, the company pushed 

doggedly on toward the crest of the 

Monticelli ridge, but with both flanks 

exposed casualties were heavy, among 

them the company executive officer 

and the forward observers for both 

artillery and SI-mm. mortars. 

By ISOO \1urphy's and Rosselini's 

platoons nevertheless reached the comparative safety of a low embankment a 

few yards from the crest of the ridge. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Only a foot high on the left where 

Sergeant Murphy's platoon sought 

cover, the embankment gradually increased in height as it extended to the 

right at a slight angle to the crest until, 

in Rosselini's sector, it reached a height 

of three feet. Sergeant Murphy realized 

that his platoon, huddled behind the 

lowest part of the embankment, had to 

move quickly or else risk certain discovery by the enemy. Ordering his men to 

fix bayonets, Murphy led them in an 

assault up the last fifty yards to the 

crest of the ridge. There they routed 

enemy soldiers from two dugouts and 

took five prisoners. Pinned down by 

heavy flanking fire hum the right and 

the right front, Rosselini's platoon remained in {he shelter of the embankment. 

Captain Inman and his radio operator followed Murphy to the crest and 

immediately began adjusting artillerv 

fire on groups of enemy soldiers withdrawing down the reverse slope. When 

ivlurphy drew his 'company commander's attention to a blTOUp of Germans to the right, apparently assembling fl)}' a counterattack, Inman called 

for artillel'v fire but hardlv had he 

asked for 'the S~IJ)port whdn enemy 

machine gun fire damaged his radio 

and drove him and the radio operator 

to cover. 

Company B had reached its objective, 

the northwestern end of the Monticelli 

ridge, but enemy fire had reduced the 

company strength to about seventy men 

and again ammunition was running 

low. Committing his 3d Platoon to 

extend and cover his right flank, Inman 

ordered his men to dig in and deft~nd 

in place. The attached machine gun 

platoon, following the assault plato(~ms, 
BATTLE FOR THE PASS 

had already come forward and began 

to set up firing positions along the edge 

of the embankment just below the crest 

while Captain Inman signaled his battalion headquarters for a new radio battery, ammunition, and reinforcements. 

The men were still digging in when 

a pproximately a score of Ge rmans 

launched a small counterattack against 

Se rgeant Murphy's position s on the 

company's left Hank on the northweste rn end of the ridge. In a ppa r e nt 

response to Captain Inman's call for 

reinfixcements, a 17-man de tachment 

from Company A, consisting of riHemen and a light machine gun section 

unde r 1st Lt. Ross A. Notaro, arrived 

just in time to help repulse the enemy 

thrust. An hour late r ano the r small 

group of Germans mounted a second 

counte rattack, but by that time Lieutenant Notaro and his men were we ll dug 

in on Murphy's left and ha lte d the 

move bef()J'e it could gain momentum. 

Ea rly that evening the Ge rmans 

mounted their third and heaviest counte rattack. Following a mortar and artillery barrage , the enemy scrambled over 

the ridge and heade d again toward 

Company B's left flank. Inman called 

for previously registered defensive fires 

from the Sl-mm. mortars, the regimenta l cannon company, and supporting 

artille ry. As the counterattacking Germans neared his foxholes, Inman adjusted the fires so closely that occasional 

rounds fell within the compa ny's perimeter. Although the Ame ricans suffered 

no casualties, the tire took a heavy toll 

of the Germans, some of whom were so 

near that when hit the ir mome ntum 

carried them into the Ame rican positions. Anticipating hand-to-hand fightin g, Inman ordered his men to fix 

331 

CARRYING S UPPLIES TO MOUNTAIN POSITIONS 

bayonets, but the artillery barrage insured that no Ii ve enemy got inside the 

perimeter. 

Individual soldiers using their own 

weapons aggressively and courageously 

also played a major role in checking the 

counte rattack. On the company's fa r 

left fl ank Lieute nant Notaro's de tachment was particularly hard pressed, but 

suddenly, Sgt. Joseph D. Higdon, Jr., 

section leade r of the light machin e 

guns, leaped to his feet and, cradling a 

light machine gun in his arms, ran 

toward the enemy, firing as he we nt. 

That bold and unexpected action se nt 

the Ge rmans fleeing back dO\\I1 the 

reverse slope. Seve rely wounded, Sergeant Higdon tried to retum to his own 

position but collapsed thirty yards short 

of it. When his companions reached 

him, he was dead. 
332 

The counterattacks halted, Company 

B, despite severe casualties, continued 

to hold on the western end of the 

Monticelli ridge. To conserve his company's dwindling strength, Captain Inman consolidated his force, pulling back 

Murphy's platoon from its exposed position and placing it nearer Rosselini's 

platoon, but Notaro and his small detachment remained for the night in 

their exposed positions on the left. 

Throughout the night, by the light of 

German flares, the two sides exchanged 

small arms fire arid hand grenades. 

At dawn on the 16th, men whom 

Inman had sent back during the night 

for supplies returned with ammunition 

and a new battery for the company 

radio, which despite three bullet holes 

in its chassis had continued to function. 

As yet no battalion carrying party had 

reached the company. Although two 

attached litter bearer teams worked all 

night trying to evacuate the wounded, 

morning found some wounded still in 

the company area. The large number 

of casualties. and a long trek over 

rugged terrain to the battalion dressing 

station had been more than the two 

teams could handle. 

Meanwhile, to Company B's right, 

Company C, after breaching a mine 

field and overcoming an enemy position bypassed earlier by Inman's company, had reached a point within 200 

yards of Company B, while on the left, 

Company G, attached from the 2d 

Battalion, took up position to Company 

B's left rear. That was the situation 

when soon after daylight a sudden 

burst of enemy small arms fire struck 

and wounded Captain Inman. Command of Company B passed to Lieutenant Rosselini. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

The coming of daylight revealed that 

during the night the Germans had 

moved into the positions on the left 

flank held previously by Sergeant M urphy's platoon. That made Lieutenant 

Notaro's detachment on the extreme 

left flank even more vulnerable than 

before and also jeopardized Murphy's 

platoon. Reduced to 17 men, Sergeant 

Murphy gained reinforcements by integrating into his defenses seven men of 

a mortar section that had fired all its 

ammunition. 

Throughout the 16th and well into 

the following day, the Germans attacked again and again against Company B's vulnerable left flank in desperate attempts to regain control of the 

ridge. Yet somehow the little band of 

Americans held. The successful defense 

owed much to Pfe. Oscar G. Johnson, 

one of the seven mortarmen that Sergeant Murphy had deployed as riflemen. Standing at times to get a better 

view of the enemy, Private Johnson 

directed a steady stream of fire at each 

of the counterattacks. During lulls in 

the fighting he crawled around the area 

gathering up all available weapons and 

ammunition from the dead and 

wounded and then returned to his own 

position to resume firing. When weapons malfunctioned, he cannibalized 

those he had collected for replacement 

parts. By the afternoon of the 16th 

Johnson was the only man left in his 

squad alive or unwounded. Nevertheless, he continued to fight through the 

night, beating back several attempts to 

infiltrate his position. Twice the intense 

fire drove back or wounded men sent 

to help him. Not until the next morning did help finally arrive. For his 

steadfast defense of Company B's left 
BATTLE FOR THE PASS 333 

CAPTURED GERMAN POSITION IN GoTHIC LINE 

flank Private Johnson later received the 

Medal of Honor. 7 

E~rly on 1.7 September two enemy 

soldiers carryrng a white f1ag emerged 

from an emplacement a hundred yards 

away. Ordering his men to cease fire, 

Lieutenant Rosselini went forward to 

meet them. Identifying himself as comma!1di~g officer of the paratroopers 

defendmg that sector of Monticelli, one 

'. See TIw Me~al of Honor of tlw United States Army 

(WashIngton: Government Pnnting Office 1948) p.343. c' ,. , 

of the Germans requested a truce so 

that the wounded of both sides might 

?e evacuat~d. ~osselini immediately got 

Il1 touch WIth hiS battalion headquarters 

for a decision, but before he received 

an answer, two dozen German soldiers, 

app.arently unaware of the purpose of 

their commander's parley ,,·ith the 

Americans, came down the slope and 

gave themselves up. Seeing his men 

surrender, the officer too submitted. 

That obviated any need for a truce. 

Although the surrender took some of 

the pressure off Company S, reduced 
334 

85TH DIVISION TROOPS ON MT. VERRUCA 

at that point to 50 men, heavy fire still 

prevented Rosselini and his men from 

clearing and occupying all of the Monticelli ridge in their sector. That afternoon after making plans with Capt. 

Edward J. Conley, commander of the 

neighboring Company G, t()r a final 

assault to sweep the ridge, Lieutenant 

Rosselini was returning to his command 

post when enemy fire cut him down. 

Since Rosselini had been Company B's 

last surviving officer, Captain Conley 

absorbed the remnants of Company B 

in his own command. 

For four days all the 363d Infantry'S 

rifle companies had at one time or another been drawn into the fighting, yet 

the Germans still held Monticelli's summit. From there they could fire not 

only on men of the 363d Infantry but 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

could pour flanking fire on men of the 

85th Division struggling slowly up the 

slopes of Monte Altuzzo. 8 

After holding the 3d Battalion in 

reserve for three days, Colonel Magill 

had committed it during the afternoon 

of the 16th to move up the eastern 

slope of the Monticelli ridge, only to see 

the battalion seriously disrupted by 

heavy enemy fire, minefields, and the 

broken terrain. By dawn on the 17th 

the battalion was so thoroughly disorganized that the division commander 

himself, General Livesay, felt impelled 

to go to the battalion command post in 

an effort to restore control and morale. 

Yet so reduced in strength were the 

other two battalions that the 3d remained the only hope for responding 

to pressure from the II Corps commander, General Keyes, to get on with 

the task of securing Monticelli's crest. 

A rolling artillery barrage again was 

to precede the assault. Just at dawn, 

Company K, commanded by Capt. William B. Fulton, led off while an anxious 

General Livesay waited in the background. Because the hard-pressed 

troops on Monticelli's western ridge 

could cover Company K's left flank , the 

task was easier than that faced earlier 

by Company B. Within half an hour 

after the jump-off Captain Fulton's 

company was within 600 yards of the 

summit but receiving heavy fire. Not 

until midafternoon of the 17th was 

tension in Colonel Magill's command 

post eased with word that Fulton and 

six of his men, including a radio opera8 36lst Inf Regt Hist, Sep 44; 363d In!' Hist, Sep 

44. Unless o the rwise indicated the following is 

based upon these re ferences. 
BATTLE FOR THE PASS 

tor, were at the top of the summit. An 

hour later the rest of Fulton's company 

and of the 3d Battalion also made it. 

Taking advantage of the excellent 

observation atop Monticelli, Fulton directed artillery tire that broke up a 

series of counterattacks while the rest of 

the regiment gradually consolidated its 

grip on the mountain. After nightfall, 

as wounded were still being evacuated, 

a company of the 361st Infantry, which 

had been attacking west of Monticelli, 

arrived to dear the enemy from Monticelli's western crest, where the intrepid 

Private Johnson was still holding almost 

single handedly what had once been 

Company B's left Hank. Denied the 

honor of reaching Monticelli's summit, 

Company B had nevertheless played 

the key role in the breakthrough, for 

the company's determined advance up 

the mountain's western ridge and its 

dogged defense had made possible the 

3d Battalion's final and successful assault on the summit. 

More than 150 enemy dead were to 

be counted in Company B's sector 

along with at least 40 attributable to 

Private Johnson'S steadfast defense of 

the company's left flank; the company 

also took 40 enemy prisoners. Company 

B lost 14 men killed and 126 wounded. 

By 18 September the 'western height 

overlooking II Giogo Pass was firmly in 

American hands, while in the meantime 

just to the east of Highway 6524 the 

85th Division's 338th Infantry had 

reached the top of Monte Altuzzo after 

a five-day tight similar to that experienced by the 363d Infantry. Farther to 

the east, the 339th Infantry had by 

noon of the 17th captured the neighboring peak of Monte Verucca and 

during the afternoon the 337th Infan335 

try on the corps right flank occupied 

Monte Pratone. 9 

Once the 363d Infantry had captured the summit of Monticelli, the 

361st Infantry followed enemy withdrawal onto the hills west of Monticelli. 

Meanwhile, slightly farther to the west, 

a two-regiment containing attack had 

carried the 34th Division to within 

striking distance of the Futa Pass. By 

fostering the illusion that the Futa Pass 

was the t(:>cus of the Fifth Army offensive, as noted earlier, the 34th Division 

had assured that no enemy t(xces from 

that sector would be shifted to II Giogo 

Pass. That ruse undoubtedly contributed to the breakthrough at II Giogo 

Pass. 10 

East of II Giogo Pass and the II 

Corps sector the British 13 Corps, constltutmg the Fihh Army right wing, had 

played a similar role by pinning down 

enemy troops that might otherwise have 

been shifted westward to oppose the 

army's main eHurt. As were units west 

of the pass, the British corps was 

echeloned to the rear of the 1 I Corps. 

The flank units nevertheless had advanced sufficiently to afford favorable 

jump-off positions t()r exploiting what 

amounted to a breakthrough of the 

Gothic Line seven miles wide astride II 

Giogo Pass, and troops on the Fifth 

Army's extreme west wing had drawn 

up to the line. 

The six-day tight had taken an inevitable toll of the three assault divisions of 

" See Mathews, "Breakthrough at \ionte Altuzzo," 

in Three Battlrs for a detailed account of the 

breakthrough operation in the 85th Division sector. 

III In the course of the attack, 2d Lt. Thomas ":. 

Wigle, Company K, 135th Infantry, distinguished 

himself in action on 14 September on Monte 

Frassino, He was posthumously awarded the Medal 

of Honor. 
336 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

LOOKING NORTH FROM FUTA PASS 

the II Corps: a total of 2,731 casualties. 

Yet those could be considered light in 

view of the results achieved. German 

losses, although unrecorded, were unquestionably far greater. While the isolated, fierce little engagements at dose 

quarters between opposing infantrymen 

on the steep slopes and mountail]tops 

were costly to lx>th sides, the Germans 

lost considerably more men to American supporting fires. Hardly any of the 

little batch of reinforcements moving 

into the line got through unscathed. 

From the first the Germans had been 

faced with a dilemma. So great was the 

pressure exerted by General Bolte's 

34th Di vision in w hat was actually a 

holding attack against the Futa Pass that 

German commanders never divined 

that the main effort was directed 

against II Giogo Pass. The Fourteenth 

Army commander, General Lemelsen, 

and the I Parachute Corps commander, 

General Schlemm, saw the main effort 

extending across a nine-mile front encompassing ooth passes. Yet even had 

they discerned the American plan from 

the start, they could have done little 
BATTLE FOR THE PASS 

about it. Once the 4th Parachute Division 

had committed every possible man to 

the fight as inhmtry-antitank gunners, 

engineers, even men of an untrustworthy Lithuanian Labor Battalion-all that 

was left were the two battalions of the 

Grenadier Lehr Brigade. Although Field 

Marshal Kesselring on 15 September 

authorized commitment of those battalions to help defend II Giogo Pass, he 

stipulated that they had to be released 

three davs later to rcinf<HTc the Ad- / 

datic front. 11 

In thus displaying greater concern 

for the Adriatic front, Kesselring revealed a recognition that a breakthrough by the British Eighth Army 

might have a more far-reaching eflect 

than one by the American Fifth Army. 

11 AOK 14, fa KTB, 12-18 Scp 44, AOK 14, Doc 

6224111. 

337 

There were other pOSitIOns in the 

mountains that still might be used to 

delay the Fifth Army, but a breakthrough by the Britis}i might outflank 

the entire German army group. 

That the German command recognized that American penetration at II 

Giogo Pass was inevitable became apparent in early evening of 17 September when General Lemclsen ordered 

the I Parachute Corps to abandon the 

Gothic Line and fall back to build a 

new defense in the heights north of 

Firenzuola. 12 That move meant that 

General Clark's plan had succeeded. A 

breakthrough at II Giogo Pass had 

indeed outflanked the more utilitarian 

Futa Pass and prompted German withdrawal from the Futa Pass. 

,2 Ibid. 
CHAPTER XX 

A Diversionary Operation 

Having breached the Gothic Line, 

Allied commanders were confident that 

they would soon sweep a broken and 

defeated enemy into the Po Valley. 

They were soon to learn that, to the 

contrary, heavy fighting still lay ahead. 

Even before the Fifth Army had begun 

its assault on II Giogo Pass, the Eighth 

Army got its first bitter taste of what lay 

ahead as the army attempted to exploit 

its penetration of the Gothic Line on 

the Adriatic flank. 

Since the start of the Eighth Army's 

phase of the offensive on 25 August, 

the Germans, skillfully defending along 

a series of ridges extending in a northeasterly direction from the Apennines, had exacted for each ridge a 

heavy toll in Allied personnel and materiel. Yet General Leese still had a 

reserve of uncommitted units: the British 4th and the 2d New Zealand Divisions and the 3d Greek Mountain and 

British 25th Tank Brigades. He also 

had ample reserve stocks with which to 

replenish materiel losses. 

The Eighth Army nevertheless continued to be plagued by the superior 

armor and firepower of German tanks. 

Even the introduction of ammunition 

that increased the firepower of the 

British tanks failed to compensate for 

their deficiencies vis-a-vis the heavier 

armor and more powerful guns of the 

German Panther. During the lull after 

the futile attempt to take the Coriano 

Ridge, Eighth Army logistical staffs had 

made strenuous efforts to bring forward new heavy British Churchill tanks, 

which were just beginning to arrive in 

Italy. At the same time, new 76-mm. 

U.S. Sherman tanks and I05-mm. self· 

propelled guns were arriving from the 

United States. Although U.S. units had 

priority on deliveries, the British 1'Cceived some of the new equipment. 

However, it would take considerable 

time to f()rward replacements to units 

still in dose contact with the enemy. 

When the heavy rains of the first 

week in September and a determined 

enemy had brought the Eighth Army 

to a halt before the Coria no Ridge, the 

army was still eight miles short of the 

Marecchia River, which marks the 

southern boundary of the Romagna 

Plain for which the British were striving. Ahead of the army lay three more 

of the northeastward extending ridges 

or spurs that had been serving the 

Germans as alternate lines of defense: 

the Ripabianca, a mile north of the 

Coriano Ridge, covering the crossings 

of the Formica Creek; the San Patrignano, from which the enemy could 

dominate the crossings of the Marano, 

two miles beyond the Formica; and two 

miles farther, the San Fortunato Ridge 

overlooking the Ausa River. Eighth 

Army aerial reconnaissance indicated 

that the enemy had developed fieldworks only on the latter ridge and thus 
A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 

could be expected to conduct only 

delaying operations on the Ripabianca 

and the San Patrignano Ridges. 1 

To the fieldworks along the San 

Fortunato Ridge the Germans had 

given the designation, the Rimini Line. 

The positions included dug-in tank turrets reminiscent of the fortifications of 

the Hitler Line in the Liri valley. 

Because the Rimini Line was the last 

possible defensive position short of the 

Romagna plain, the Germans could be 

expected to defend it stubornly. 

Leese's Plan 

Since 8 September General Leese 

had shifted the burden of operations to 

the 5 Corps on his left f1ank, in order 

to permit the I st Canadian Corps to 

rest and regroup, for he planned to use 

the latter to make the main assault on 

the Coriano Ridge, the key to Rimini. 

Extending northeastward for five miles, 

from the village of San Savino to a 

point on the coast five miles southeast 

of Rimini and near the fishing village 

of Riccione. the Coriano Ridge (overed 

the southern approaches to Rimini. To 

assist the Canadian corps, Ge neral 

Leese had reinforced it with three of 

his f()lir reserve units; the British 4th 

Division, 3d Greek Mountain Brigade, 

and British 25th Tank Brigade. The 

fourth, the 2d New Zealand Division, 

was to remain in reserve with the 2 

Polish Corps. 

On 9 September the Eighth Army 

commander outlined a revised plan of 

'Operations of British, Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Part III, Sec. B, The Eighth Army 

and the Gothic Line and Romagna Battles. Unless 

otherwise noted the f{)llowing is based upon this 

source. 

339 

operations designed to carry the army 

northward thirty miles beyond Rimini 

to Ravenna and provide control of the 

Romagna Plain. From there General 

Leese expected to be able to turn the 

(;erman Tenth Arm)"s left f1ank and roll 

it up toward Bol(;gna and to make a 

junction with Clark's Fifth Army. 

In the first phase of the re"ised plan 

Leese intended both the British 5 Corps 

and I st Canadian Corps to converge 

upon the Coriano Ridge-the British 

from the left and the Canadians frontally. During the lull General Leese had 

reversed the operational roles of the 

British 5 and I st Canadian Corps. The 

5 Corps was to work its way around the 

western flank of the ridge to divert 

enemy attention from preparations 

being made by the Canadian corps to 

make the major assault against its eastern extremity. The 700 guns that had 

signaled the opening of the Gothic Line 

offensive on 25 August were to fire in 

support of the 5 Corps' three infantry 

divisions as they advanced beyond the 

Conca River toward the town of Croce, 

five miles southwest of Coriano, while 

the 1 st Canadian Corps' 5th Canadian 

and British I st Armoured Divisions 

were to exploit capture of the ridge and 

secure bridge heads over the Marano 

River. During the third phase the 

Eighth Army (the I st Canadian Corps 

then leading the way) was to cross the 

Marecchia and deploy onto the Romagna Plain. The 1st Canadian Corps 

commander, General Burns, planned at 

that time to employ either the 2d New 

Zealand Division or the 5th Canadian 

Armoured Division as an exploiting 

force. To help the main effort by the 

Canadians, General Leese impressed 

upon the 5 Corps commander, General 
340 

Sir Charles Allfrey, the importance of 

maintaining enough pressure in his 

sector to prevent the enemy from shifting forces to check the Canadian thrust 

on the coastal flank. 2 

Resuming the Ojfensive 

Even as the Fifth Army's I I Corps on 

12 September began its assault against 

the Gothic Line north of Florence, the 

Bri~ish 5 and 1 st Canadian CorpstheIr way prepared by the fires of tbe 

700 guns supplemented by an offsbore 

naval force of gunboats and destroyers 

and by hundreds of sorties by bombers 

of: !he .DAF-resumed the Eighth Army 

offenSIve on the Adriatic flank. Although priority on air support had 

been shItted to the central sector to 

support the Fiftb Army, the Eighth 

Army still had the full support of the 

DAF. On 13 September that consisted 

of more. than 500 tons of bombs during 

900 sortIes, 700 of \,vhich were flown in 

close support of ground operations. 

Helped by that firepower, the Cana-

?ian infantry and armor managed durmg the first day to establish a secure 

foothold on the Coriano Ridge just 

south of the town of Coriano. 

Throughout the 13th and on into the 

night, troops of the Irish Regiment of 

Canada drove a battalion of the 29th 

Panzer Division from the town, house by 

house. Many of the defenders \\'ithdre,~' 

~nly to fali into the hands of troops 

from the British 5 Corps' 4th Division, 

coming up on the left of the ridge. 

"General Leese had earlier placed the New Zealand division and, the :3d Greek Mountain Brigade 

under, the CanadIan corps for planning purposes, 

See NICholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 532-35, 

unless otherwise indicated the following is based 

upon this reference. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Without pausing to consolidate their 

newly-won positions, the Canadians hastily tackled their next objective, marking 

the second phase. By evening of the 

14th they had reached the south bank 

of the Marano River, two miles northwest of the Coriano Ridge, and during 

the night established several bridge':. 

heads beyond the river. 

Despite having to relinquish the Coriano Ridge, General Herr, LXXVI Panzer 

Corps commander, still maintained the 

integrity of his front by withdrawing his 

troops to delaying positions along the 

San Patrignano Ridge, midway Ix~tween 

the Marano and Ausa Rivers. There the 

Germans delayed the Canadians 

throughout the 1'5th and gained time to 

ir:1prove fi<;ldworks along the Rimini 

line, espeCIally those on the San Fortunato Ridge, two miles north of the 

Ausa. As at Corianu, the Germans 

turned the village of San Fortunato into 

a strongpoint. South of the Ausa River 

and three miles from the San Fortunato 

strongpoint, the Germans developed a 

second strongpoint around the monastery of San Martino, situated on a small 

knoll overlooking Route 16, the coastal 

road leading to Rimini from the southeast. Well-concealed artillery in defilade 

behind the San Fortunato Ridge supported the positions.:J 

Si.nce the main highway and raihvay 

servmg the coastal flank and connecting 

with the major routes across the Romagna Plain had to be cleared bef()re any 

large-scale operation could be undel:-

taken beyond the Marecchia River, 

General Burns directed his attention to 

3AOK 10, Ia KTB Ani. 8, 17-18 Sep ,14. AOK 10 

Doc. 61437/1; Horst Pretzel! MS. The Banle of 

Rimini, in CMH files, ' 
A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 

the San Martino strongpoint. As the 

Canadian armor and infantry approached on the 16th, defending troopers of the 1st Parachute Division, veterans 

of the Cassino battle many months 

before, disappeared into well-prepared 

bunkers and called down heavy artillery 

fire immediately in front of their lines. 

Caught in the open plain between the 

Marano and the Ausa, the Canadians 

had to fall back to their starting IX)int, 

the bridgeheads over the Marano. 

The action was costly. Instead of 

renewing the assault immediately, 

Burns spent the next day regrouping 

and reorganizing. Trusting to darkness 

to conceal the next assault, he attacked 

again during the night of the 17th. A 

diffused light, created by beams from 

searchlights on the reverse slope of the 

Coriano Ridge thrown against lowhanging clouds, helped troop commanders maintain control. Yet so well 

registered were the German guns on 

open ground over which the attackers 

had to pass that the darkness was but a 

small handicap. The fire left the Canadians "sweating and bleeding on the 

low ground" south of the Ausa River. t 

For all the damage inflicted by German artillery, the two successive Canadian assaults had taken a sharp toll 

amQng the defenders. Lacking replacements, the German commanders realized that they would soon have to yield 

the positions south of Rimini, regardless 

of whether artillery SUPIX)It remained 

intact. 5 

Along the entire Pisa-Rimini line the 

battle of attrition, for such it had 

become, had reached a climax. The 

'Nicholson. The Canadians in ftaly, pp. 550--51. 

'AOK 10, fa KTB Ani. NT. 8, 17-19 Sept. 44. AOK 

10 Doc. Nr. 6143711. 

341 

U.S. II Corps had broken through II 

Giogo Pass across a seven-mile front on 

the 18th, and the next day the neighI~Jring British 13 Corps stood on the 

threshold of a breakthrough of both 

the Casaglia and San Godenzo Passes, 

on the Faenza and Forli roads. Along 

the Adriatic front, as well as in the 

Apennines, the Allies had pushed back 

~)th flanks of the Tenth Army, so that, 

to General Vietinghoff; the army's front 

resembled a dangerously bent bow. 

Doubting that the bow could bend 

much further without breaking, the 

Tenth Army commander urged Kesselring to allow him to relieve tension by 

withdrawing in the center. With units 

thus made available, Vietinghoff expected to shore up the army flanks. 

Although Kesselring agreed in principle, he told Vietinghoff that an authorization to withdraw would be given only 

if the situation grew worse. That afforded little consolation for the Tenth 

Army commander. 6 

As it turned out, neither Kesselring 

nor Vietinghoff had long to wait for 

the situation to \\'orsen. During the 

night of the 19th the 1st Canadian 

Corps, behind a heavy bombardment 

from land, sea, and air, crossed the 

Ausa River and stormed the slopes of 

the San Fortunato Ridge to seize Villa 

Belvedere, a large country mansion 

only 600 yards from the village of San 

Fortunato and command center of the 

enemy strongpoint. Bypassed by the 

successful Canadian assault to the west, 

the paratroopers abandoned the San 

Martino position and slipped away. 

Again it seemed as if the ~)w would 

snap and the Canadians break through, 

';Jhid,,19Sep44, 
342 

but again the elements were destined to 

intervene. In a heavy rain the Germans 

broke contact and withdrew beyond the 

Marecchia, some four miles away. 

Bogged down by muddy roads an'd 

halted by swollen streams, the Canadian 

armor was unable to exploit the capture 

of the San Fortunato Ridge. 7 

The Capture of Rimini 

Over the next forty-eight hours the 

waters of the flood-swollen Marecchia 

and its muddy flood plain became more 

effective barriers to Allied forces than 

anything the Germans were capable of 

throwing in their path. The loss of the 

San Fortunato Ridge and the San Martino strongpoint, last German defenses 

south of Rirnini, meant nevertheless 

that General Herr ~ould no longer 

expect to hold the CIty. On the 19th 

Kesselring authorized Vietinghoff to 

withdraw Herr's left wing beyond the 

Marecchia and evacuate Rimini the next 

night. In doing so, the Tenth Armv 

commander, perhaps moved by the 

aura of history which permeated the 

peninsula, elected to forfeit some of the 

flooded Marecchia's tactical advantages 

by spa~ing the only remaining bridge 

across It, a 1,900-year-old stone structure built during the reign of Emperor 

Tiberius but still usable in 20th century 

warfare. " 

As troops of the 3d Greek Mountain 

Brigade, operating on the coastal flank 

of the Canadian corps, prepared to 

enter Rimini's outskirts, the men could 

hear through the darkness the sound of 

heavy explosions as the Germans aban-

'Nicholson, The Canadians In Italy. pp. 556-57. 

"Ibid., p. 558; AOK 10, la KTB Ani. 8, 21 Sep 44, 

AOK 10, Doc. 63437/1. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

doned the citv. Earlv on the 21 st a 

motorized pat~ol fron:. the Greek brigade entered. By 0800 the Greeks had 

reached the main square to raise their 

battle standard over the town hall. 9 

Seventy-five percent of the city lay in 

ruins, but among the surviving structures stood the Triumphal Arch of 

Augustus built in 27 RC. With multiple 

bridges soon spanning the Marecchia, 

the Canadians the next day deployed 

onto Highway 9 and the Romagna 

Plain, "the plains so long hoped for and 

so fiercely fought for ... [whose] 

clogging mud and brimming water~ 

courses" would soon confront the 

Eighth Army with obstacles as challenging as the mountains and ridges. 10 

By 21 September the Eighth Army, 

having covered over thirty miles in 

twenty-six days, hardly a pell-mell pursuit, was well established in the eastern 

terminus of the Pisa-Rimini line. Operation OLIVE, which General Alexander 

had outlined to his army commanders 

in early August, had been completed 

but far behind schedule. After the fall 

of Rome in early June Allied commanders had confidently expected to 

reach that line by the end of July, but, 

in the months since then, the transfer 

of much Allied strength to other fronts 

with higher priority as well as a series 

of skillful enemy defenses had caused 

both the Fifth and Eighth Armies to lag 

behind p}'(~ected timetables. To make 

matters worse, the heavy rains soaking 

the low-lying plains in the Eighth Army 

sector would soon turn to ice and snow 

in the Apennines where the Fifth Army 

"Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 558. The 

Gl'eeks gallantly requested the Canadians to furnish 

a Canadian flag to be flown alongside their O\<;IJ. 

10 Alexander Despatch, pp. 7!J-71. 
A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 343 

GENERALS CLARK AND KEYES STUDY THE II CORPS SITUATION MAP NEAR FJRENZUOLA, SEPTEMBER 1944. 

was resolutely fighting from one mountain to another. 

T()1l'{/rd I nwla 

Even as the Eighth Army crossed the 

Marecchia and deployed onto the Romagna Plain, Clark's Fifth Army moved 

through II Giogo Pass and prepared to 

exploit its capture. Keyes' II Corps soon 

(Tossed the Santerno River and advanced to the road junction at Firenzuola, five miles north of the pass. The 

once formidable defenses of the Futa 

Pass, thus outflanked, lay five miles to 

the southwest, so that not only High\\ay 

65 but also Highway 6528, a secondary 

road five miles to the east that led from 

Firenzuola down the valley of the Santerno to Imola on Highway 9 in the Po 

Valley, would soon be open. 

The situation offel-ed General Clark 

a choice between t\\'o courses of action: 

either to concentrate, as originally 

planned, all of the I I Corps' efforts 

along the axis of Highway 65 toward 

Bologna via the Radicosa Pass, seven 

miles beyond the Futa Pass, or divert a 
344 

portion of the corps northeastward toward Imola. The breakthrough at II 

Giogo in itself pointed to a change in 

that it suggested a very real weakness 

along the boundary between the Tenlh 

and Fourteenth Armies, which roughly 

followed the Firenzuola-Imola road. A 

rapid descent into the Po Valley in the 

vicinity of Imola, General Clark deduced, might take advantage of that 

weakness and assist the Eighth Army's 

operations along Highway 9 where 

General Leese's troops were at that 

point heavily engaged seventeen miles 

northwest of Rimini. Once established 

in Imola, the Fifth Army units could, 

Clark believed, "dispatch forces as far to 

the east as possible to gain contact with 

the rear of the German elements, demolish roads and cover other Fifth 

Army units that must be immediately 

sent out to take positions across the 

main highways to prevent the withdrawal of German forces." General 

Clark's projected plan envisioned eventual debouchment into the Po Valley at 

Imola of at least two American divisions, heavily reinforced with tanks and 

artillery, although the size of the f()rce 

would depend upon the condition of 

the road. II 

As it turned out, the condition of the 

Santerno valley road was to be the 

determining factor. Route 6528 was an 

inferior road, capable in the autumn of 

1944, Clark soon learned, of serving as 

a line of communication for not more 

than one division under combat conditions. Although Clark told General 

Keyes to divert a division toward Imola, 

Bologna and not Imola remained the II 

11 Clark Diary, 21 Sep 44; Jackson, The Battle of 

Italy, p. 276. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Corps' main objective. The bulk of the 

II Corps-the 34th, 91 st, and 85th 

Divisions-would continue along the 

axis of Highway 65 via the Radicosa 

Pass. As a possible reinforcement to 

exploit beyond Imola should the lone 

division moving along Route 6528 get 

there quickly, he shifted the 1st Armored Division's CCA from the IV 

Corps to army control. 

In turn, General Keyes selected Brigadier General Kendall's 88th Division, 

which since early September had been 

in corps reserve, to undertake the drive 

to Imola. Kendall was to attack early on 

21 September through the right wing 

of Coulter's 85th Division. Attached to 

the 88th Division for the operation 

were the 760th Tank Battalion and a 

company each of the 805th Tank Destroyer and 84th Chemical Battalions. 

Because of the paucity of roads and 

trails in the region, Keyes also gave the 

division two and a half pack-mule companies. 12 

The 88th Division's left flank was to 

tie in with the right flank of the 85th 

Division, west of and parallel to the 

Imola road. The 88th Division would 

advance at first on a three-mile front 

that would widen to five miles at the 

critical point just before descent into the 

Po Valley. The remainder of Keyes' 

forces-the 85th, 91 st, and 34th Divisions, in that order from a point just 

east of Highway 65 westward to the 

Prato-Bologna highway-was to bypass 

the Futa Pass, if possible, and concentrate on capturing the Radicosa Pass. 

The 91st Division's 363d Infantry 

12 Fifth Army History, Part VII, pp. 89-91. Unless 

otherwise indicated the following is based upon this 

source. 
A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 

would, in the meantime, deal with any 

enemy troops still left around the outflanked Futa Pass. 

For all the promise afforded by the 

Santerno valley and Route 6528 as a 

route over which the Fifth Army might 

come more quickly to the aid of British 

forces east of Cesena, the mountainous 

terrain flanking the valley soon proved 

to be the most formidable the 88th 

Division had yet faced in the Italian 

Campaign. For over half of the thirty 

miles between Firenzuola and Imola the 

black-topped road followed the winding 

Santerno River through a narrow gorge 

flanked by high mountains with steep 

slopes cut by narrow ravines through 

which small streams descended to the 

river. As far as the village of Castel del 

Rio, ten miles northeast of Firenzuola, 

and a road junction beyond it, the last 

important road junction before Imola, 

only a few trails led from the main 

road into the mountains. 

Since passage through the Santerno 

valley hinged upon control of Castel del 

Rio, General Kendall, who had been in 

command of the division since July 

when an ailing General Sloan had returned to the United States, focused 

from the first on taking the village and 

nearby road junction. That feat depended on gaining the flanking high 

ground, a task which he assigned to 

Colonel Fry's 350th Infantry and to 

Colonel Crawford's 349th Infantry. The 

high ground in hand, Kendall planned 

to send Colonel Champeny's 35lst Infantry down the main road to Castel 

del Rio. 13 

13 88th Division Opns Rpt and Jnl, Sep 44. 

Unless otherwise indicated the following is based 

upon this source. 

345 

Battle For the Mountains 

During the night of 20 September, 

Colonel Fry's and Colonel Crawford's 

regiments moved through the 85th Division right wing from an assembly area 

near Monte Altuzzo. At dawn on the 

21st the two regiments, in columns of 

battalions, began advancing over narrow mountain trails generally toward 

Castel del Rio, ten miles away. An 

intermittent misty rain, interspersed 

with patches of fog, made movement 

difficult and at times hazardous for 

men, mules, and vehicles. Under those 

conditions it was particularly fortunate 

that neither regiment encountered significant resistance. Indeed, the two regiments forged so far ahead of the 

British I st Division, the adjacent unit of 

the 13 Corps, as to expose the 88th 

Division's right flank. That night an 

infiltrating enemy patrol taking advantage of the gap surprised and captured 

an entire battalion command post. 

Despite that incident Colonel Fry's 

troops, by the 23d, had captured Monte 

della Croce, three miles southeast of 

Castel del Rio, and to the left Colonel 

Crawford's regiment held Monte la 

Fine, three miles west of the village. 

Those successes prompted General 

Kendall to release Colonel Champeny's 

351 st Infantry and send it down the 

main road with the mission of bypassing Castel del Rio and taking the 

road junction beyond the village. Dawn 

on the 24th found all three of the 88th 

Division's regiments deployed across a 

five-mile front from Monte La Fine to 

Monte della Croce. (Map XII) 

The Tenth Army left flank had been 

pushed back to within fifteen miles of 

the Po Valley, yet there had been no 
346 

breakthrough. Despite the American 

success, the enemy still held Castel del 

Rio and some of the high ground 

flanking the village and appeared determined to hold. Until the high ground 

was cleared there could be little additional progress toward Imola. 

Just how determined were the Germans began to become apparent on the 

afternoon of the 24th when the 350th 

Infantry's 3d Battalion, from positions 

on Monte della Croce, two miles east of 

Route 6528, attempted to occupy 

Monte Acuto, 1,200 yards to the north. 

For the first time since the operation 

had begun three days before, heavy fire 

forced the men to ground. As the 

fighting intensified, Colonel Fry moved 

his command post onto Monte della 

Croce for better control of his forward 

units in the rugged terrain. Although 

General Kendall pressed for speedier 

progress, a chill and damp darkness 

found the 3d Battalion still well short of 

its objective. Litter bearers, hampered 

by uncertain footing on the rain-soaked 

mountain trails, could scarcely keep up 

with the battle's casualties. 14 

The Germans Reinforce 

The unexpected stiffening of the 

enemy defense resulted from General 

Lemelsen having persuaded Field Marshal Kesselring to shore up an admittedly weak sector astride the interarmy 

boundary, where, since 19 September, 

contact between the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies had been limited to radio 

and telephone. The left wing of the 

Fourteenth Army was in a particularly 

" 350th Inf Opns Rpt. Sep 44; 88th Div Opns 

Rpt, Sep 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

difficult situation. For a week it had 

borne the full weight of the Fifth Army 

offensive, which, in the words of Lemelsen, the Fourteenth Army commander, had "sucked the army dry of 

available reserves." Unless Army Group C 

provided reinforcements to the I Parachute Corps on the Fourteenth Army's left 

wing, that corps would have to yield 

more ground. 15 

No doubt remained that all or part 

of three German divisions then manning the parachute corps front were 

insufficient to hold much longer against 

the U.S. Fifth Army's offensive. The 

334th Division held the right wing west 

of Highway 65; in the center was the 

4th Parachute Di'uisiorl, hard hit in defending II Ciogo Pass; and astride the 

Imola road, bearing the brunt of the 

88th Division's attack, were clements of 

the 362d Divi~ion, which Lemclsen had 

shifted from the XlV Panzl'r Cmj)s. All 

three divisions were sorely in need of 

rest and replacements. Iii 

The situation was serious enough to 

convince Kesselring to authorize transfer of two additional divisions from the 

Tenth Army to the Fourteenth Army. For 

the Tenth Army their loss at that time 

would not be critical, for the divisions 

were to come from the relatively quiet 

mountainous sector of the II Mountain 

Corps opposite the British 10 Corps on 

the Eighth Army's left wing. The two, 

the 715th Infantry and 44th Reich5grenadier Divisions, began moving westward 

between 19 and 21 September. Meanwhile, Kesselring extended the left 

flank of the parachute corps eastward 

" AOK 14, la KTB AnI. 4, 20--21 Sep 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 62241/1. 

16 Ibid. 
A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 347 

GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED NEAR CASTEL DEL RIO 

in an effort to close the gap between 

the Fourteenth and Tenth Armies. 17 

Those measures, however, had come 

too late to prevent the American 88th 

Division from thrusting seven miles 

north-northeastward from Firenzuola to 

capture the heights of Monte la Fine 

and Monte della Croce. By 25 September the 351 st Intantry had pushed to 

17 Ibid. A ve te ran of the Stalin grad and Cassino 

battles, the 44th Division was made up large ly of 

Austrian le vies. In recent months it had been 

brought up to strength with re placements from 

German y. The 715th Division h ad expe rienced 

heavy losses the previous May and June in the 

battles for the Anzio beachhead . 

within two and a half miles south of 

Castel del Rio to take the village of 

Moraduccio. Meanwhile, a battalion 

each from the 362d and 44th Reichsgrenadier Divisions were in place on the 

summits of hills overlooking the village 

from the north. 18 

On the same day, General Keyes 

widened the neighboring 85th Division's 

front two miles to include Monte la 

Fine, thereby relieving Colonel Crawford's regiment of responsibility for that 

feature and slightly narrowing the 88th 

'SAOK 14, la KTB Ani. 5, 26 Se p 44, AOK 14, 

Doc . 622411 I. 
348 

Division's front. The corps commander's action underlined for the division commander the determination at 

both corps and army that his troops 

reach their objective quickly. General 

Kendall that afternoon sent General 

Ramey, his assistant division commander, to Colonel Fry's command 

post to emphasize the importance attached to a rapid descent into the Po 

Valley before the Germans could move 

sufficient reinforcements to parry the 

thrust. In short, keep moving. 

Possibly in reaction to the command 

pressure, the 350th Infantry the next 

day captured not only Monte Acut? but 

also Monte del Puntale on the mtercorps boundary, which would facilitate 

contact with the British I st Division. 

West of the Imola road Colonel 

Crawford's 349th Infantry captured 

Monte Pratolungo, then moved a mile 

northward to take another height west 

of Castel del Rio. With so much of the 

flanking high ground in American 

hands, the Germans had no choice but 

to abandon Castel del Rio. On their 

heels, troops of the 35lst Infantry 

moved into the village. 19 

An even more impressive gain developed the next day when men of. Lt. 

Col. Corbett Williamson's 2d Battahon, 

350th Infantry, moved two miles beyond Monte Acuto to Monte Carnavale, 

there to surprise an enemy company 

digging in on the reverse slope. I?riving 

the Germans from the mountam, the 

battalion continued toward Monte Battaglia, a mile and a half to the northeast. Passing the night short of the 

objective, the men on the next day, the 

27th, encountered a group of partisans 

'"88th Div Opns Rpt, Sep 44; Fifth Anny History, 

Part VB, pp. 93-94. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

MONTE BKITAGLlA 

who claimed to be already in possession 

of Monte Battaglia. Guided by the 

partisans along a n~rrow mule trail, the 

battalion saw no eVldence of the enemy 

other than sporadic artillery fire. 

Reaching Battaglia's crest in midafternoon, Colonel Williamson established his command post on the reverse 

slope. Because he was well in front of 

the rest of the division, he posted only 

one company on the summit and deployed the rest to cove~ a. long and 

tenuous line of commumcations to the 

regimental command po~t. Whil~ a few 

of the partisans remamed wlth the 

Americans, the others vanished into the 

mountains, presumably to harass the 

enemy. From the II Corps commander 

came the message, "Well done," to 

which General Kendall and Colonel Fry 

added their congratulations. Of the 
A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 

high ground in the vicinity of Castel del 

Rio, there remained to the enemy only 

Monte Capello, two miles west of 

Monte Battaglia. 

The surprising ease with which the 

2d Battalion, 350th Infantry, had occupied Monte Battaglia quickly proved 

deceptive. Hardly had Williamson's battalion consolidated its positions than the 

Germans, supported by mortar and 

artillery fire, launched two successive 

counterattacks. By dark both were repulsed, but through the night enemy 

artillery fire continued to pick at the 

American positions. 

The gains of the past two days had 

extended the gap between the 350th 

Infantry and the adjacent unit of the 

British 1 st Division. Dismounted tank 

crews of the 760th Tank Battalion, 

which since the 21st had been engaged 

in covering the II Corps right flank, 

tried unsuccessfully to close the gap, 

which by nightfall on the 27th had 

grown to almost 5 miles. To close it and 

assure the integrity of the 350th Infantry's supply lines, General Keyes had to 

draw upon two armored infantry battalions of the 1 st Armored Division's 

CCA, made available from the Fifth 

Army reserve. 

However vulnerable the open flank, 

the Germans were unable to take advantage of it. Except for Monte Capello; the Americans at that point held 

all the dominating heights around the 

Castel del Rio road junction, and from 

Monte Battaglia northward the ground 

descended as the Santerno threaded its 

way to the Po Valley. In the German 

rear, partisan units, such as the one that 

had led the way to Monte Battaglia, 

increased the tempo of their harassment with each passing day, briefly 

349 

knocking out communications between 

the parachute corps and Fourteenth Army 

headquarters. Everything seemed to favor the notion that the admittedly diversionary operation might produce an 

Allied breakthrough to the Po Valley, a 

view widely held at Clark's headquarters. 20 

Meanwhile, the main effQrt of the II 

Corps had made gratifying, though less 

dramatic, progress. There the 34th, 

85th, and 91st Divisions had gained an 

average of six miles to close with the 

high ground flanking the Radicosa 

Pass. To the east of the II Corps sector, 

the British 13 Corps' 1 st Division, 8th 

Indian Division, and British 6th Armoured Division, all echeloned to the 

southeast of the I I Corps, pressed on at 

a somewhat slower pace toward Castel 

Bolognese and Faenza, four and nine 

miles respectively southeast of Imola. 21 

Like the Eighth Army, the Fifth 

Army seemed again to be on the 

threshold of a breakthrough, but the 

change in the weather that had brought 

the Eighth Army to a halt was to have a 

similar effect on the Fifth Army. For 

several days rain and fog grounded 

virtually all Allied aircraft, especially the 

ubiquitous artillery spotter planes, and 

sharply limited the effectiveness of Allied artillery fire. The I Parachute Corps 

and Fourteenth Army commanders, as 

had their colleagues on the Adriatic 

flank, quickly took advantage of the 

fortuitous break in the weather to reinforce their front. 22 

2°Clark Diary, 21 Sep 44. 

"Ibid. 

22AOK 14, Ia KTB AnI. 5, 28 Sep 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 622411 I. 
350 

The Defense of Battle Mountain 

With a battalion each atop Monte 

Carnevale and Monte Battaglia, or "Battle Mountain" as the troops called it, 

Colonel Fry's 350th Infantry remained 

slightly ahead of the rest of the 88th 

Division. To the left, about a mile 

beyond Castel del Rio, Colonel Champeny's 351 st Infantry had been stalled 

for several days, and for the next two 

would try in vain to drive the Germans 

from Monte Capello, two miles northeast of the road junction. Farther to the 

left, a mile west of Castel del Rio, 

Colonel Crawford's 349th Infantry had 

no more success in its efforts to push 

forward. 23 

To Colonel Fry the 2,345-foot Monte 

Battaglia seemed at first an excellent 

position; its northwestern slopes and 

those of a northeastward extending 

spur, the directions from which the 

enemy might be expected to counterattack, were quite steep. Yet there were 

some disturbing features. Deeply indented by ravines and gullies, a grasscovered eastern slope seemed to invite 

the inftltration tactics at which the enemy was so adept. Monte Battaglia'S 

treeless summit offered little cover or 

concealment; holes and trenches hacked 

out of the thin soil and an ancient ruin 

afforded the only shelter from either 

the elements or enemy fire. Almost 

from the moment of arrival on the 

summit, Colonel Williamson's men had 

spent their time between enemy artillery barrages and counterattacks in digging dugouts and fire trenches. Each 

passing hour made it clearer to Colonel 

Fry how difficult Monte Battaglia might 

23 350th Inf S-3 Jnl, Sep 44. Unless otherwise 

cited the following is based upon this source. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

MEN, MULES, MUD 

prove to hold. Well ahead of the other 

regiments and leading the remaining 

battalions of the 350th Infantry, the 2d 

Battalion was exposed to fire from 

three sides. Supplies and reinforcements could reach the men only over 

the narrow mule trail along a steepsided ridge connecting Monte Battaglia 

and Monte Carnevale. To insure use of 

that trail, Colonel Fry had to deploy his 

other two battalions along it, enabling 

the 2d Battalion to concentrate on the 

summit. This left him little with which 

to reinforce if the 2d Battalion got into 

trouble. Rain and fog closing in on the 

high ground increased the likelihood of 

enemy infiltration and made footing on 

the steep trail doubly hazardous. 

Hardly had Colonel Fry on 28 September completed moving his command post forward-to within 400 

yards of Monte Battaglia-when a mes-
A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 

sage from Colonel Williamson atop 

Monte Battaglia told of a "terrific counterattack" and a situation that was "desperate." It was the work of troops of 

the 44th Reichsgrenadier Division, rf/och 

und Dputsrhmpisttr], a competent unit 

composed largely of Austrian levies. 

Supported by intense concentrations of 

artillery fire, the grenadiers struck in 

approximately regimental strength from 

three directions. The worst of it appeared to hit Company G, whose commander, Capt. Robert E. Roeder, led 

his men in a desperate hand-to-hand 

struggle against Germans swarming 

over the positions. When Roeder fell, 

seriously wounded, his men carried him 

to his command post in the shelter of 

the ancient ruin. After allowing an aid 

man to dress his wounds, Captain Roeder dragged himself to the entrance of 

the old building. Bracing himself in a 

sitting position, he picked up a rifle 

from a nearby fallen soldier and 

opened fire on attacking Germans closing in on his position. He killed two 

Germans before a fragment from a 

mortar shell cut him down. Encouraged 

by their captain's example, the men of 

Company G rallied to drive the enemy 

off the summit and back down Monte 

Battaglia's slopes. 24 

With reinforcement from a company 

of another battalion sent forward by 

Colonel Fry, the 2d Battalion by 1700 

had beaten trdck the counterattack, but 

throughout the night German artillery 

fired intermittently on Colonel Williamson's positions. Although painful to the 

men undergoing it, the fire could in no 

way compare with that put out by 

24 Captain Roeder was posthumously awarded 

the Medal of Honor. 

351 

American guns. The number of enemy 

rounds falling on Monte Battaglia 

rarely exceeded 200 a day or a maximum of 400 rounds for the entire 

regimental sector. On the other hand, 

on I October, when clear skies permitted artillery spotter aircraft to fly, the 

339th Field Artillery Battalion alone 

fired 3,398 rounds. 

Fighting erupted again on Monte 

Battaglia on 30 September, when Germans carrying flame throwers and pole 

charges with which to burn and blast 

paths through the American defenses 

again stormed up the mountain. For a 

second time they penetrated the 2d 

Battalion's perimeter and briefly occupied the ruins of the summit, but as 

before, Williamson's men rallied to 

drive the enemy back down the mountain. By that time the position of the 

men on Monte Battaglia had improved 

through achievements of adjacent units. 

On the 30th the 351st Infantry at last 

captured nearby Monte Capello, and 

elements of the British I st Division 

came up on the 88th Division's right 

flank. 

The lmola Drive Abandoned 

Despite the 88th Division's improved 

position, the thrust represented nothing 

more than a narrow salient achieved at 

considerable cost. Still, if General Clark 

should choose to pour in fresh troops 

to expand the salient into a breakthrough to Imola and Highway 9, it 

could pose a genuine threat to the 

Germans. Nevertheless, the Fifth Armv 

commander still saw the Firenzuol;-

Imola road as incapable of carrying the 

increased traffic reinforcements would 

generate. Nor had the thrust shown 

any indications of softening resistance 
352 

in front of the Eighth Army, at that 

point apparently checke.d by ~~t~rmined German defenders m the VlCInIty 

of Faenza. In view of that situation and 

of the limited capability of the single 

road, General Clark had no desire to 

divert strength from his main effort. 

What he apparently did not know was 

that the German command was unable 

to afford more troops to throw against 

the salient, and those that had been 

doing the fighting were close to collapse. 25 

The 88th Division having run into 

what appeared to be serious opposition 

and reinforcements having been ruled 

out, General Clark abandoned the secondarv drive on Imola. He now took 

steps ~imed at eventual shift of the left 

flank of General Kirkman's 13 Corps 

westward to take over the Santerno 

valley sector and enable General Keyes 

to concentrate on the capture of Bologna. The first step was to at~~ch the 

1st Guards Brigade of the BfltISh 6th 

Armoured Division, on the 13 Corps 

right flank, to the British 1st Division to 

relieve the 350th Infantry on Monte 

Battaglia. Later the U.S. 88th Division 

was to be relieved by the British 78th 

Division from the Eighth Army sector, 

while the British 6th Armoured Division took its place on the Adriatic flank. 

The 88th Division was then to join the 

other divisions of the II Corps in the 

drive toward Bologna astride Highway 

65. 

Meanwhile, Colonel Fry had received 

word that relief for his men on Monte 

Battaglia was on the way. If all we?t 

well, the British might be able to begm 

25 AOK 14, fa KTB Ani. Nr. 5, 3-7 Oct 44, AOK 

14, Doc Nr. 65922/1. 

CASSI~O TO THE ALPS 

replacing the 350th In~antry the. following night. The promIse of relIef had 

come none too soon for the 2d Battalion: all officers of Company G had 

either been killed or wounded and the 

company was down to 0I1:ly ~fty men; 

Companies E and F were In little better 

shape. 

Although relief was in sight, the 2d 

Battalion's ordeal was yet to end. Early 

on 1 October enemy artillery again 

began falling on Monte Battaglia. After 

twenty min utes the artillery lifted, and 

out of the semidarkness the Germans 

once again attacked up fog-shrouded 

slopes. This time, however, the sun 

soon burned off the t(Jg, and a clear 

sky enabled artillery spotter planes to 

take to the air to direct defensive fires. 

With that support the 2d Battalion by 

midday was able to repel the counterattack and send some 40 enemy prisoners 

reanvard. Shortly after midday officers 

from the Welsh Guards (lst Guards 

Brigade) arrived at Colonel Fry'~ command post to make a reconnaIssance 

before relieving the 350th Infantry. 26 

With the arrival of the British advance party, the defenders of Monte 

Battaglia had reason to expect they 

would be off the mountain within 

twenty-four hours, but that was not to 

be. Despite aerial bombardment and 

counterbatterv fire, enemy artillery continued to sh~1l the summit, seriously 

interfering with movement of inc~mling 

troops of the I st Guards BrIgade. 

Three days would pass before the relief 

was completed and the last of the 

Americans trudged wearily down the 

trail from Monte Battaglia. Before the 

26 350th Inf Opns Rpt. Oct 44. 
A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION 

last men departed on 5 October, the 

Germans delivered yet another counterattack, but this time the relieving British 

troops joined in repulsing it. 27 

Reflecting not only the fighting on 

Monte Battaglia but also that in the hills 

west and north of Castel del Rio, where 

since the 28th the 349th and 35 I st 

Regiments had attempted with scant 

success to extend their gains beyond 

Castel del Rio, losses 'were high. Since 

General Kendall's division had re-entered the line on 2 I September until 

the last man left on 5 October, the 88th 

Division's three regiments incurred 

2, I 05 casualties. That was almost as 

many as the entire II Corps had 

sustained during the six-day breakthrough offensive against II Giogo Pass 

and the Gothic Line. Losses were high 

too from injury and sickness attributed 

to the rugged terrain and inclement 

weather. Fortunately, the Fifth Army 

replacement pool system, so effective 

since the beginning of the campaign, 

still functioned well. Within a few days 

replacements and hospital returnees 

brought the 88th Division's regiments 

back up to strength.28 

The Germans Take Stock 

On the German side, a week after 

the British I st Guards relieved the 88th 

Division, the 98th Division, recently 

transferred from the Tenth Army, replaced the 44th Reichsgrenadier Division. 

Although the 98th Division earlier had 

suffered considerable casualties during 

the battle for the Rimini Line, the 

division absorbed some replacements 

during about two weeks out of line. 

2J Ibid. 

28 Fifth Army History, Part VII, p. 97. 

353 

'rhe division's low combat capability 

nevertheless remained of concern to 

General Lemelsen, the Fourteenth Army 

commander. Fortunately for Lemelsen 

and the 98th Division, General Clark's 

decision to concentrate his operations 

along Highway 65 promised some relief 

for the Fourteenth Army's hard-pressed 

left flank. The 44th Reichsgrenadier Division, meanwhile, was moved into army 

reserve. 29 

As evidence accumulated at Lemelsen's headquarters that Clark had abandoned the thrust toward Imola, the 

Fourteenth Army commander concluded 

that the Allied command had shifted 

the focus of its offensive from the 

Adriatic flank to the central sector 

south of Bologna, and that as a result, 

pressure from the Eighth Army might 

ease to some degree. Field Marshal 

Kesselring, f()r his part, was not so sure. 

He soon realized that Clark had sufficient strength within his own army to 

mount a major effort ag-ainst Bologna 

without any drawing upon the Eighth 

Army. 30 

Shift Back to Highway 65 

Kesselring was right in any case, but 

particularly so because in blocking the 

road to Imola the Germans had gravely 

jeopardized their chances at the Radicosa Pass. There three prominent 

peaks, :Monti Bastione and Oggioli west 

of the pass and Monte Canda to the 

east, were potentially formidable defensive positions. Higher than the summits 

in the Gothic Line, they also presented 

generally bare, treeless slopes. Yet two 

29 AOK 14, la KTB AnI. Nr. 5, 7 Ocl 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 65922/2. 

3(j Ibid. 
354 

of the three enemy divisions defending 

the pass-the 334th and 362d Infantry 

Divisiom (the 4th Parm'hutf Division was 

the third)-had taken considerable 

losses when contingents of the divisions 

had shifted hastily eastward to help 

shore up the defenses of the Imola 

sector. Thus when the three divisions 

making the American main eff()rt-the 

34th advancing on Monte Bastione, the 

91 st on Monte Oggioli, and the 85th on 

Monte Canda---converged on the Radicosa Pass, General Schlemm, whose I 

Parachute Corps controlled the sector, 

saw no alternative to withdrawal. Taking advantage of the fog and rain, 

which there as elsewhere enveloped the 

front, the Germans broke contact on 28 

September and fell back along the axis 

of Highway 65 to establish a new line 

based on the village of Monghidoro, 

three, miles north of the pass, 

During the night the 91 st Division 

occupied the Radicosa Pass without opposition, and for the rest of the day, on 

the 29th, two regiments pushed about 

two miles north of the pass through a 

thick fog that reduced visibility to a few 

yards, To the flanks the 34th and 85th 

Divisions kept pace in their sectors. All 

three divisions patrolled, as actively as 

the persistent fog would allow, in an 

effort to locate the enemy's new line 

and determine its strenf{th. 31 

31 Fifth Army History, Part VII, pp. 100-102; 

Starr, From Salerno to the Alps, pp. 138--40. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

By the end of September the Fifth 

Army's objective of Bologna lay a 

tempting twenty-four miles north of the 

forward positions of the I I Corps astride Highway 65, and on a clear day 

the British troops atop Monte Battaglia 

could see the Po Valley only about ten 

miles away. Yet for all the strategic 

position of the II Corps, the rest of the 

Fifth Army was less well situated. To 

the right, the British 13 Corps, after 

taking over the Santerno valley sector 

from the U.S. 88th Division, held a 17-

mile front, wider than at the start of 

the offensive and so extended that the 

corps' three divisions could make only 

limited advances. The same could be 

said of General Crittenberger's IV 

Corps with a 50-mile front. Already 

thinly spread, the corps had been weakened more when General Clark had 

withdrawn part of the 1 st Armored 

Division into Army reserve. Although 

the IV Corps had been pushing ahead 

gradually, so that with the exception of 

Task Force 45 along the coast all units 

by the end of September had passed 

through the Gothic Line, the pace was 

too slow to prevent Field Marshal Kesselring from shifting units from the XIV 

Panzer Corps to reinforce more threatened sectors opposite the U.S. II Corps. 

With the approach of winter weather, 

the IV Corps in the coming months 

could hardly be expected to pick up the 

pace. 
IN THE NORTHERN APENNINES 

However highly we must esteem courage and firmness in war, and 

however little prospect there is of victory to him who cannot resolve to 

seek it by exertion of all his powers, there still is a point beyond which 

perserverance can on Iv be termed desperate folly, and therefore can 

meet with no approbation from any critic. . .. 

CU,USEWIT71 On War 

CHAPTER XXI 

From Ridge to Ridge 

In mid-September, while the Fifth 

and Eighth Armies were battling 

through the Gothic Line, the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff met in Quebec for a 

second time in order to prepare plans 

for what was then thought to be the 

final phase of the war against Germany. 

The Americans, believing that Eisenhower's armies in northwestern France 

stood on the threshold of victory over 

the Germans, were at that point inclined to lend a more sympathetic ear 

to British pleas for bringing the campaign in Italy to a successful conclusion. 

General Marshall took pains to reassure 

his British counterpart, Imperial Chief 

of Staff General Sir Alan Brooke, that 

the U.S. Fifth Army would not be 

withdrawn "until General Wilson had 

completed the campaign then under 

way to defeat [KesselringJ." The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff therefore gave tacit 

support to British proposals for transAdriatic operations designed to outflank the Germans in the Po Valley. 

Landing craft that had been employed 

earlier in the landings in southern 

France would be made available for an 

amphibious operation against the Istrian peninsula; but since that same 

shipping would soon be needed for the 

Pacific, the Americans placed a time 

limit on its availability. For that reason, 

SACMED (General Wilson) had to 

make up his mind hy 10 October 

whether to undertake an amphibious 

assault in the Adriatic. 1 

Heartened by the turn in the fortune 

of strategies long deferred in the Mediterranean, Churchill summoned Wilson 

and Alexander to meet with him on 8 

October during a brief stopover at 

Naples en route to Moscow for a 

conference with Stalin. At Naples the 

British made a preliminary survey of 

ways to take advantage of the American 

offer to support a trans-Adriatic amphibious operation. The survey disclosed two possible courses of action: a 

seaborne attack on the Istrian peninsula, including the capture of Trieste; 

or a landing south of Fiume followed 

by a thrust northward toward that city. 

Which to choose, the conferees agreed, 

would depend upon the situation in 

Yugoslavia and the state of Allied resources in the Mediterranean Theater. 

In Yugoslavia the military situation 

was unclear. German Army Group E, 

commanded by Generalfeldmarschall 

Maximillian von Weichs and consisting 

of about 240,000 men divided among 

15 German, Bulgarian, Croatian, and 

Cossack divisions, had withdrawn from 

Greece to hold tern porarily along the 

line of the Athens-Salonika-Belgrade 

railroad. Opposing the Germans and 

their allies were approximately 180,000 

1 Madoff, Strategic Planning far Coalition Warfare, 

1943-1944, pp. 510-11. 
358 

guerrillas, mostly under the leadership 

of Marshal Tito.2 

As f()r Allied resources, the situation 

was equally obscure and full of drawbacks, such as a growing shortage of 

infantry replacements and the rather 

short time limit the Americans had 

placed on the use of the sealift in the 

Mediterranean Theater. Wilson was 

asked to undertake a study concerning 

the feasibility of an amphibious operation in the light of those factors and 

report his conclusions and recommendations as soon as possible to the CCS 

in London. 3 

Two days later Wilson submitted a 

report that offered little comfort to the 

advocates (Churchill and Alexander 

being those most prominent) of amphibious operations on the Adriatic 

flank. For the next few months there 

seemed, in Wilson's view, little likelihood that the Allied armies in Italy 

could contribute directlv to the outcome 

of the campaign in n'orthwestern Europe. It seemed more likely that a 

Russian drive into Hungary would have 

a far greater chance of forcing Kesseling's withdrawal from northern Italy 

than anything Alexander's armies might 

accomplish in the immediate future. 

Moreover, a Russian advance would 

very probably cause the Germans to 

withdraw from the Balkans as well and 

leave Tito's partisans in control of the 

Dalmatian coast. 

2 DA Pamphlet 20-243, Aug 51, German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans, 1941-44; Earl F. 

Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the 

East, Army Historical Series (Washington, 1968), p. 

367. 

"Ehrman. Grand Strategy. vol. VI, pp. 37-51. 

Unless otherwise cited the following is based upon 

this source. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

If current Allied operations in Italy 

continued at their existing pc'lce through 

November, not until December at the 

earliest could troops be withdrawn from 

the front to prepare for a seaborne 

assault. In Wilson's view, an amphibious 

operation against the Istrian peninsula 

was thus out of the question before 

early ~pring of 1945. To mount an 

assault ,ven at that time, Wilson believed, we dd require reinforcements in 

the form of three fresh Allied divisions 

before the end of 1944; for unless the 

Russians forced Kesselring to withdraw 

during the winter, the Allies would 

have to husband existing strength in 

Italy in order to mount a spring offensive. As originally planned, an amphibious operation against Istria was to be 

accomplished with one airborne and 

two seaborne divisions in the assault 

phase and a fourth division in the 

follow-up. 

As for the second course of actionlanding south of Fiume followed by an 

overland advance on that city-it would 

depend largely upon German movements in Yugoslavia over the next few 

months. Even without an airoorne division, that operation would nevertheless 

need the same amount of assault shipping, although possibly somewhat less 

than an assault against Istria. 

Wilson's rather cautious forecast was 

enough to convince the CCS that hope 

for a trans-Adriatic amphibious assault 

had to be abandoned. In the event the 

Germans failed to capitulate before the 

end of the year, Eisenhower would 

need all of his divisions for a major 

offensive in early 1945. November and 

December would therefore be crucial 

months, during which the enemy had 

to be kept fully engaged on all fronts. 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

It was thus vital that the armies in Italy 

maintain strong pressure against Kesselring "and that," in the words of the 

CCS, "could be done only by continuing 

to fight hard in the peninsula itself." 

Under those circumstances, troops 

hardly were to be spared from the 

main battlefront for a major amphibious assault. 

In taking their position, the CCS 

concluded "that the overland offensive 

in Italy should be relentlessly pursued 

until the major offensive in northwestern Europe had been launched, probably at the end of December." They 

recommended that the American sealift 

be retained no longer in the Mediterranean and that no additional divisions 

be moved into the theater. The latter 

point was driven home with additional 

force two days later when President 

Roosevelt personally intervened to reject a request from Churchill to divert 

to Italy two, or possibly three, American 

divisions about to leave the United 

States for Europe. 

There the matter might have rested 

but for the Prime Minister's return to 

the fray on 21 October. On that date, 

during a stopover on return from Moscow, Churchill once again conferred 

with his commanders in Naples. The 

British Prime Minister's appetite for a 

mid-Danube or Balkan venture apparently had been whetted by the Red 

Army's recent successes in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and, only the day 

before the meeting, by the capture, 

with the assistance of Tito's partisans, 

of Belgrade. Henceforth the Yugoslav 

partisans, their ranks swelled to over 

200,000, would fight as organized units 

alongside the Red Army, and Tito and 

359 

his partisans would no longer be as 

dependent as before upon Allied aid.~ 

Acting on Churchill's instructions, Wilson proposed to the CCS on 24 October that as soon as the U.S. Fifth Army 

had captured Bologna, the Allied armies would pass to the defensive along 

or near the La Spezia-Bologna-Ravenna line. Alexander then could withdraw from the front up to six divisions 

with which to mount an amphibious 

operation or an administrative landing 

along the Dalmatian coast, depending 

upon the degree of control over the 

area then exercised by Tito's partisans. 

Once the Allied landing force had 

established a beachhead at Zara, three 

or four divisions could pass through to 

begin, during the first week of February, 1945, an overland advance on 

Fiume and Trieste. After the divisions 

captured Fiume, Wilson projected increasing the Allied force in Yugoslavia 

to six divisions and with them continuing northward to cut Kesselring's line of 

communications with Austria and 

Weichs' Army Group E in the Balkans. 

At the same time, Allied air forces in 

Italy, with assistance of a partisan uprising, would cut the German escape 

routes across the Alps, while the remaining Allied forces in Italy crossed 

the Po Valley. In order to preserve at 

least the threat of trans-Adriatic operations, Wilson requested permission to 

keep in the Mediterranean for the 

time being amphibious shipping for at 

least one division. Meanwhile, Wilson 

suggested switching the major air effort from Italy to harass the remaining 

Germans out of Yugoslavia. 

4 DA Pamphlet 20-243; Ziemke, Stalingrad to 

Berlin, p. 367. 
360 

Unfortunately for the expectations of 

Alexander and his staff, that plan 

found no more favor with the CCS 

than had the former. Actually, the 

plan's failure to provide either for a full 

engagement of Kesselring's armies during December and January, or even a 

compensating threat to his lines of 

communications, cost the Mediterranean command its major support 

within Allied planning circles. Churchill 

too was deeply disappointed by Wilson's 

apparent inability to undertake operations across the Adriatic before the end 

of 1944. On 30 October the Prime 

Minister observed that "one of the 

absurd things in all the plans which are 

submitted by the Mediterranean Command is the idea that if they move in 

February they will be in time to affect 

anything." 5 

The Prime Minister at that point 

somewhat reluctantly threw his support 

to the Imperial Chief of Staffs proposal 

that the Allies limit themselves bevond 

the Adriatic to increasing their sup)X)rt 

to the Yugoslav partisans. Since Wilson's plan to move on Trieste in February 1945 would be too late to provide 

the necessary support for Eisenhower's 

offensive in northwestern Europe, 

SACMED should, in Churchill' s opinion, give up this plan unless 'somehow 

he, Wilson, could mount it before the 

end of the year, and that was manifestly 

imrx)ssible. On the 31st, the JCS concurred in the British proposal and 

added a recommendarion that Wilson 

be directed to make Bologna his immediate o~jective. Once having reached 

the line La Spezia-Bologna-Ravenna, 

the Allied armies should continue to 

5 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. VI, p. 51. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

maintain pressure on Kesselring's armies in order to keep as many Germans as possible tied down in northern 

Italy. 

The German high command, for its 

pan, had a reasonably good notion of 

Allied capabilities and limitations in the 

Mediterranean. Allied schemes for 

trans-Adriatic operations were known to 

the Germans, but had not been taken 

seriously. Since the British intervention 

in the Greek civil war in October, the 

WFSt (Armed Forces Operations Staff) believed that Allied forces in the Mediterranean area lacked the strength to 

support landings either at Fiume or 

Trieste while at the same time supporting the Greeks and maintaining an 

active front in northern Italy. There 

was also a question whether either the 

Russians or Tito's partisans, after their 

capture of Belgrade on 20 October, 

would still welcome large-scale Allied 

operations in Yugoslavia and, even 

more doubtful, in the mid-Danube region, which the capitulation of Rumania 

in August and of Bulgaria in September had placed in the Red Army's zone 

of operations. Indeed, the German intelligence officers had accumulated considerable evidence indicating that they 

would not be welcome. 6 

Oblivious to the strategic debates and 

analyses in Allied and German planning 

circles throughout October, the combat 

troops on both sides attacked and counterattacked in the foggy mountain valleys and ridges of the Apennines and in 

the flooded plain of the Romagna 

where September had sloshed to an 

end with brimming water courses and 

washed-out roads vying with enemy fire 

Il Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKWfWFSt, KTB, 

IV(l), pp. 566--67. 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

as obstacles to Allied progress. On the 

Fifth Army's front Keyes' II Corps had 

passed through the Radicosa Pass on 

the heels of a withdrawing enemy. and 

its four infantry divisions prepared to 

close the twenty miles separating them 

from Bologna and the Po Valley. On 

the Army's right flank the British 13 

Corps had assisted its neighbor, as the 

fall offensive moved into October, by 

taking over several miles on the right of 

the II Corps to give the latter a narrower front on which to concentrate its 

strength. '1'0 the II Corps' left Crittenberger's IV Corps had continued, 

through a series of limited-objective 

operations, to try to hold enemy divisiems on its front and thereby prevent 

Kesselring from shifting troops eastward to oppose the II Corps. Yet all 

those efforts had had only limited success, for the flanking units were themselves holding wide sectors with minimum forces and were unable to apply 

much pressure. 

Although September had seen both 

the Fifth and Eighth Armies make 

impressive gains by breaking through 

the Gothic Line and driving. respectively, to within sight of the Po Valley 

and moving northwestward along Highway 9, some seventeen miles from 

Rimini to a point just east of Cesena, 

both were still far from their original 

goals of destroying the Tenth Army 

south of the Po and pushing the Fourteenth Army north of the river. The 

worsening weather· and attrition of the 

September battles made it seem, at least 

to General Alexander, that those goals 

could not be gained in the near future. 

On 21 September Alexander informed the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that, although the Allied 

361 

armies in Italy had inflicted severe 

losses on the enemy, Allied losses also 

had been heavy. The Allied commander added that the nature of the 

terrain in the mountains as well as in 

the Romagna Plain necessitated a threeto-one superiority in troop strength for 

successful offensive operations. Since 

his armies were not likely to achieve 

that ratio in the foresee~ble future, 

General Alexander believed that decisive victory in Italy was no longer 

possible befixe the end of the year-a 

conclusion that the U.S. Army's Chief 

of Staff, General Marshall, had reached 

in August. Five days later Alexander 

returned to the same theme in a message to the theater commander, observing that "the trouble is that my forces 

are too weak relative to the enemy, to 

force a breakthrough and so dose the 

two pincers. The advance of both armies is too slow to achieve decisive 

results unless the Germans break, and 

there is no sign of that." 7 

Shortages of replacements had been 

felt first among Eighth Army units. 

The Greek 3d Mountain Brigade. 

which had captured Rimini, had been 

withdrawn from the front for eventual 

movement to Greece for use in a civil 

war then wracking that recently liberated countrv. An Indian division was 

also to be ~vithdrawn by the end of 

October for shipment to the Allied 

Southeast Asia Command. There was 

little likelihood that replacements for 

those units would be forthcoming, for 

Allied strategic attention, especially that 

of the Americans, was focused on 

northwestern Europe, so that Alex7 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. VI, p. 37; SAC 

Despatch, 13 Aug-I 2 Dec 44, p, 34. 
362 

ander had little choice but to somehow 

raise the needed manpower through 

reorganization of his own command. 

As part of the reorganization, he 

reduced the British I st Armoured Division to nonoperational status and transferred its infantry to the British 56th 

Division to bring it up to strength. 

Some help was also coming from outside Eighth Army resources. Two infantry brigades, recruited among refugee 

Poles, joined the 2 Polish Corps, adding approximately ten thousand men to 

Eighth Army ranks. In October, Clark 

finally wrung from a reluctant War 

Department 3,000 American infantrymen. Originally scheduled as replacements for northwestern Europe, they 

arrived too late to take part in the 

fighting during that month. General 

Marshall also repeated his earlier assurances that all U.S. troops then present 

in Italy would remain until the enemy 

had been defeated. That at last laid to 

rest the chronic concern at Alexander's 

and Leese's headquarters that the U.S. 

Fifth Army might be moved from Italy 

and the British left to carry the campaign alone. 8 

In spite of reinforcements for the 

Polish corps, American replacements, 

and assurances that U.S. troops would 

remain in Italy, General Alexander continued to be skeptical about the prospects for his armies. Their great autumn offensive, he reported to General 

Wilson on 2 October, was "a slow and 

costly process, and my fears are now 

that we may not be just quite strong 

enough to carry it through. I am 

reinforcing [Clark's] Fifth Army by giv8 SAC Despatch, 13 Aug-12 Dec 44, p. 34; Fifth 

Army History, Part VII, p. 163. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ing them the [British] 78th Division for 

13 Corps. It is my last remaining fully 

fresh division" 9 

Welcome though the 78th Division 

was to General Clark, a lone division 

could not suffice to alleviate the Fifth 

Army's chronic shortage of infantry 

replacements, a shortage made increasingly acute with the attrition of each 

passing day of combat and worsening 

weather. During the first week of October the II Corps' four infantry divisions 

had endured a daily average of 550 

casualties over and above returns to 

units from hospitals. At that rate those 

four divisions, upon which rested the 

burden of continuing the Fifth Army's 

fall offensive, could maintain their T/O 

strength only through 10 October. 

Without additional replacements, the 

infantry strength of the divisions would 

be reduced by approximately 500 men 

for each day of fighting after that date. 

Under those circumstances the offensive would eventually have to come to a 

halt short of its goal. 10 

Keyes' Plan 

In spite of the discouraging estimates, 

Allied commanders saw no alternative 

to maintaining pressure against the 

Germans on all fronts. General Clark 

therefore ordered the II Corps to resume a full-scale effort along the axis of 

Highway 65 toward the village of 

Monghidoro, about three and a half 

miles north of Radicosa Pass. 

North of the pass the terrain would 

be similar to that already encountered 

by the 88th Division in the Santerno 

valley. The drainage patterns of the 

9 SAC Des patch, 13 Aug-12 Dec 44, p. 46. 

10 Clark Diary, 6 Oct 44. 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

streams flanking the highway tend generally northward, with the main ridge 

lines paralleling the streams. Tributary 

streams and major transverse ridges cut 

across those patterns at intervals of 

three to four miles. Monghidoro, to 

which the Germans had withdrawn on 

28 September, lay on the first of those 

ridge lines beyond the Radicosa Pass. 

Four miles to the north of Monghidoro 

the Germans had prepared a second 

and even stronger defensive zone along 

an east-west ridge line running through 

the village of Loiano. Work on similar 

defenses had also begun on two other 

ridge lines at Livergnano and Pianoro, 

ten and f(wrteen miles, respectively, 

north of the Radicosa Pa&'i. To the II 

Corps commander, General Keyes, it 

appeared likely that the enemy would 

attempt to hold each ridge line until 

forced to withdraw, thereby forcing the 

Americans to pause and regroup before 

launching a set-piece attack against each 

of the positions. II 

General Keyes planned to employ all 

four of his infantry divisions. Since that 

left him no reserve, he instructed each 

division commander to hold out a regir:nent and r.otate his three regiments in 

line approximately once every fIve days. 

The corps commander had developed 

tha~ plan to permit launching of coordmated attacks against the successive 

enemy defensive lines at intervals corresponding to the five-day rotation sys-

~em. Thus, despite the shortages of 

mfantry replacements, each phase of 

the offens~ve would be led by relatively 

fresh regiments returning to action 

after a period of rest in reserve. 

11 II Corps G-3 Jnl and AAR, Oct 44, Unless 

otherwise indicated the following is based upon 

these sou rees. 

363 

During the first phase, the 85th and 

91 st Divisions were to make the main 

effort east of Highway 65 with the 

focus in the 85th Division's zone. General Coulter's 85th Division was to attack on a four-mile front whose left 

flank rested upon the Idice River [a 

mile east of Highway 65] and whose 

right flank rested upon the Sillaro 

Creek, some five miles east of the 

highway. From positions just north of 

the Radicosa Pass, General Livesay's 

91 st Division was to advance on a fourmile front astride the highway. To 

livesay's left, General Bolte's 34th Division was assigned a secondary role to 

cover the corps left flank along the 

Setta Creek six miles west of the highway. West of the Santerno valley on the 

corps right flank, General Kendall's 

88th Division was to cover that flank 

and maintain contact with elements of 

the British 13 Corps in the Santerno 

valley. 

To further secure the Hanks of the 

Fifth Army's main effort and enable 

Keyes to concentrate solely upon the 

Bologna sector, Clark removed the 6th 

South African Armoured Division from 

IV Corps control and placed it, together with CCB of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, under arm v control. 

That change would enable Cl'ark to coordinate the reinf(Jrced division's advance more closely with that of the II 

Corps. Furthermore, the move of the 

British 78th Division from the Eighth 

Army to the 13 Corps would enable 

that division eventually to take over the 

U.S. 88th Division's sector in the Santerno valley. 

As Keyes prepared to resume the 

drive to Bologna, he was to find some . 

of his logistical problems somewhat eas-
364 

ier to solve; gasoline, for example, 

would be more readily available. By 3 

October, Fifth Army engineers had 

completed a 4-inch pipeline as far as 

Pontedera, eighteen miles east of Leghorn. During the rest of the month the 

engineers extended the line thirty-six 

miles farther to the northeast to Sesto, 

and from there it would be extended 

during November to the Futa Pass, 

some twenty miles away.12 

/I emj)S RI'SUmf.\ ILl Ari-(l(IT/IF 

Hard on the heels of a heavy artillery 

preparation, the U.S. 11 Corps at 0600 

on 1 October attacked across a ten-mile 

front. For the first hours low clouds 

and f()g concealed all troop movements, 

but later in the morning the sun broke 

through and gave both ground and airborne artillery observers excellent visibility. After a week of inactivity, aircraft 

of the tactical air command also returned to the battle. (Map XIII) 

The 4th Parachute and 362d Grenadier 

Divisions of the I Parachute Carps took 

the main shock of the American attack 

along the defensive line hinged on the 

village of Monghidoro. Both divisions 

had sustained heavy losses during the 

earlier battles in defense of the Gothic 

Line, but they held their ground until 

the night of 4 October. Then under 

cover of darkness thev broke contact 

and fell back four miles to the parachute corps' next planned defensive 

position, based on a ridge running 

approximately east-west through 

Loiano. 13 

The next day, the 5th, General Clark 

12Mayo MS, Chapter XV. 

'3AOK 14, fa KTB Ani. 5, 4-5 Oct 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 65922/1. 

CASSINO TO 'rHE ALPS 

flew to the 9Ist Division's headquarters, 

then located in Monghidoro, where he 

expressed his pleasure over the 91 st 

Division's performance. Well might he 

have been pleased, for from MonghidOl'O he caught his first glimpse of the 

Po Valley and the snow-covered Alps 

beyond. His goal was at last in sight, 

however long it yet might take to get 

there. 14 

Although Schlemm's parachute corps 

had held Keyes to a four-mile gain in 

as many days, the Germans had paid a 

high price. The Americans captured 

858 men, and several times that number fell to American fire. But being on 

the defensive, the Germans could expect their losses to diminish as they fell 

back into successively stronger positions. 

During the first four days of the 

attack beyond the Radicosa Pass, U.S. 

casualties had increased over the previous week to a total of 1,734. To that 

total, worsening weather, rugged terrain, and fatigue added an equal number of nonbattle casualties. Yet unless 

these figures increased markedly, the II 

C(.>rps staff calcu.lated that the corps still 

rlllght debouch mto the Po Valley and 

capture Bologna before the \;inter 

snows began. 

As the II Corps offensive began its 

second phase early on 5 October, the 

f?Cus shifted from Livesay's 9Ist Division to Coulter's 85th, which was to 

exp~oit a salient that had developed 

dunng the first phase along a ridge 

between the Idice and Sillaro Rivers. 

The division bumped almost immediately into a strong defense based on 

Hill 578, highest point in the Monterenzio hill mass, five miles east of Liv-

"Clark. Calculated Risk, p. 396. 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

ergnano on Highway 65. Corps intelligence officers identified the defenders 

as elements of the 362d and 65th 

lrifantry Divisions supported by the 98th 

Infantry Division's I 17th Infantry Regiment. 

Only on the 85th Division's left, near 

the'Idice River, were significant gains 

made. There the 338th Infantry drew 

within striking distance of Monte delle 

Formiche, the highest ground on the 

enemy's third line of defense, an eastwest ~scarpment running through the 

village of Livergnano on Highway 65 

eight miles north of Monghidoro. 

Meanwhile, along Highway 65, Livesay's 91 st Division moved against the 

village of Loiano, three and a half miles 

north of Monghidoro. With General 

Keyes' approval General Livesay temporarily modified the plan for rotating 

regiments and kept all three on line in 

order to mount a stronger assault until 

Loiano was taken. 

Overcast skies grounded fighter 

Ix>mbers and most artillery s}X)tter aircraft as the 91 st Division attacked at 

dawn on 5 October behind a 12-minute 

artillery concentration of a thousand 

rounds. Thirty minutes later the 362d 

Infantry's 2d Battalion entered Loiano, 

where 'Company L led the battalion 

house by house through the shattered 

village. One tank was lost to enemy fire, 

and that afternoon the assault company 

called for additional artillery fire to beat 

off a vigorous counterattack; but by 

nightfall the battalion had established 

an outpost line beyond the village and 

the 363d Infantry moved into reserve 

for its delayed rest. 15 

1591st Div Opns Rpt. Oct 44. Unless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon this source, 

365 

Before proceeding against the enemy's next defensive line, the 91 st Division had to deal with a secondary 

delaying position two miles beyond 

Loiano based on a height, Monte Castellari, that constituted in effect an 

outpost for the next major defensive 

line. Hoping to surprise contingents of 

the 4th Parachute Division on the height, 

the 362d Infantry early on 7 October attacked without a~tillery preparation. Although the terrain was fairly open, 

frequent spells of rain and fog had the 

effect of isolating the attacking companies and subjecting them to a deadly 

mosaic of unsuPIXHted fire fights. So 

poor was visibility that not until the 

second day was a lone observation 

aircraft able to get into the air. Nevertheless, using data obtained from shellbursts, partisan reports, and previously 

collected photo intelligence, supporting 

artillery fired a daily average of 4,500 

rounds. Although unobserved, the fire 

apparently had effect, for early on 9 

October patrols from the I st Battalion· 

managed to emplace rope ladders on 

Monte Castellari and reach its crest 

without serious opposition. Within a 

few hours the Americans had occupied 

the last high ground between Loiano 

and Livergnano, the latter the hinge of 

the enemy's next defensive zone, four 

miles bev(;nd Loiano. 

Since' 5 October the center of the 

corps front had advanced alx>ut three 

miles, a rate slower than during the 

first phase of the operation. Although 

casualties remained high, they totaled 

some 300 less than during the first four 

days of the month. Furthermore, eviderlCe was accumulating that the Germans too were having serious manpower problems. 
366 

The Livergnarw Escarpment 

The Germans were indeed in a difficult situation, for Schlemm's I Parachute 

Corps had sustained considerable ~osses 

during its withdrawal from Monghidoro 

to the Livergnano escarpment. Kesselring could no longer dose his eyes to the 

fact that Lemelsen's Fourteenth Army was 

facing a major offensive, directed 

against the sector south of Bolog~a. 

Although Lemelsen h~d mana.ged while 

falling back to keep his front Intact, the 

cumulative effect of combat losses was 

telling. If the Allied offensive continued 

undiminished, the situation of the Fourteenth Army's I Parachute Corps w~mld 

soon become critical and that of the 

Tenth Army's LXXVI Panzer Corps, slowly 

falling back before the Eighth Army on 

the Romagna Plain, was little bett~~ .. In 

a series of visits to corps and dIVISion 

command posts, Kesselring emphasized 

the importance ~)f d7fense. in dept~, 

rather than continuation of the tradItional and costly tactic of trying to cling 

to the main line of resistance through a 

succession of counterattacks. If a first 

counterattack failed, withdrawal to the 

next defensive position was to fc)1l0w. 16 

Fortunately for the German.s, by 

moving into positions along the LIve.rgnano escarpment, they were ~cupy~ng 

the strongest natural d~fen~lve hne 

since departing the GothiC Line. The 

escarpment extended eastward. a.bo~t 

ten miles, from the MonterUInICI hill 

mass in the 34th Division's zone to 

Monte delle Formiche and the Monterenzio hill mass in front of the 85th 

Division, and ended at Monte delle 

Tombe and the Gesso Ridge on the II 

'"AOK 14, fa KTB Ant, Nr. 5, 8-9 Oct. 44, AOK 

14, Doc Nr. 65922/1. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Corps right flank in the 88th Division's 

zone. 

Because the escarpment was particularlv forbidding in the central sector 

fla~king Highway 65, General Key~s 

decided to continue to place the mam 

emphasis of his offensi~e. ~ast, of the 

highway in the 85th plVlsI~m s zone,: 

The 9Ist Division astnde HIghway 6::> 

before Livergnano and the 88th Division in the western edge of the Santernn valley were both to main,tain 

pressure to prevent the enemy from 

shifting troops to oppose the ~5th. 17 . 

The 85th Division's immediate obJective was bald-crested 2,092-foot Monte 

delle Formiche, atop which s,tood a 

tower affording observation as far west 

as Highway 65 and eastward across the 

Idice valley. As at Livergnano, an almost perpendicular escarpment blocked 

the southern and southeastern approaches to the objective, with only a 

narrow trail that passed through a 

wooded ravine near the hamlet of Casa 

del Monte on the southwestern slope to 

provide a gradual route of ascent. Intel-. 

ligence had identified the elements of 

three enemy divisions, the 94th, 362~, 

and 65th Infantry Divi<,~ions: deEloyed~ In 

the vicinity of the obJectIve. I he 8::>th 

Division commander, General Coulter, 

planned to employ the 338th. Infantry, 

assisted on the Ie ft by a battahon of the 

363d Infantry, attached from the 

neighhxing 91st Division. 

At 0800 on 10 October the 338th 

Infantry's 2d Battalion attacke~ to":ard 

Casa del Monte. For the first tIme In a 

"II Corps tJ-3, Jnl, Oct 44; 85th Dill G-3 Jnl & 

file, Oct 44; 88th Dill G-3 Jnl & file, Ocr. 44. Unless 

otherwise indicated the fottowing sections are based 

upon these sources, 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

week, clear skies enabled tactical aircraft 

and corps and division artillery to support the attack fully. With the way 

cleared by overwhelming firepower, 

Company E encountered little resistance 

in scaling the escarpment through the 

ravine to enter Casa del Monte in early 

afternoon; but then the Germans counterattacked, cutting off part of the 

company and driving the remainder 

from the hamlet. While Company E 

fought to retake Casa del Monte, Company G came through the ravine, 

swung to the right and by late afternoon had worked up the slopes of 

Monte delle Formiche to occupy the 

crest and capture 53 Germans in the 

vicinity of a small chapel on top of the 

mountain. Company F arrived in time 

to help repulse an enemy attempt to 

regain the position. At that point a 

fresh battalion took over to continue 

the advance, but so staunchly did the 

Germans contest every foot of ground 

that three days later the battalion was 

still only a mile beyond Monte delle 

Formiche. 

On the eastern side of the Idice 

valley the 337th Infantry, with a battalion of the 338th Infantry attached, 

fought up Hill 578, the highest point in 

the Monterenzio hill mass. It was midday on 13 October before the objective 

and 23 prisoners were in hand. Shortly 

thereafter the battalion captured the 

hamlet of Poggiolo, a thousand yards 

northeast of Hill 578. As the 339th 

Infantry relieved the 337th, German 

resistance stiffened. As on the western 

side of the valley, the 339th Infantry 

could push forward no more than a 

mile. Having established a firm foothold on the escarpment, the 85th Division could go no farther. 

367 

Meanwhile, after the British 78th 

Division relieved the 88th Division in 

the Santerno valley, General Keyes 

shifted the axis of the 88th Division's 

attack to the northwest, paralleling that 

of the 85th Division. Encountering increasing resistance in the new sector, 

the division commander, General Kendall, brought forward his reserve regiment, the 350th Infantry. That regie 

ment's attack early on the 10th got off 

to a good start but soon ran into 

difficulty. For the better part of three 

days neither of the two attacking battalions made any headway until the night 

of the 13th after a patrol located a gap 

in the enemy's defenses. Passing 

through the gap, one battalion crossed 

the little Sillaro River and by the 15th 

had advanced over a mile beyond it. 

That unhinged the opposition holding 

up the other battalion. As the Germans 

fell back in some disarray, both battalions were able to pull abreast of the 

forward positions of the 85th Division 

just beyond Monte delle Formiche. 

The 85th Division's limited success at 

Monte delle Formiche probably could 

be attributed in part to the 91 st Division's feat in holding the enemy on the 

Livergnano sector astride Highway 65. 

It was there that the Germans had 

expected the Americans to make their 

main effort and had concentrated most 

of their strength. An escarpment 3 

miles long and nearly 1,800 feet high 

made the position all the more imposing, but there were two openings 

through that wall, one at the village of 

Livergnano where Highway 65 passed, 

and another a wooded ravine over a 

mile east of the highway near the 

hamlet of Bigallo. It was to those two 

openings that General Livesay, the 91st 
368 

Division commander, turned his attention. ls 

To make the attack, General Livesay 

selected the 361 st Infantry. Because of 

the enemy's strong position, he planned 

to employ all three battalions in line; 

the 1 st on the left to launch a holding 

attack against Livergnano, the 2d to 

pass through the ravine near Bigallo 

and gain a foot hood on the escarpment, the 3d on the right to cover that 

flank and tie in with the 85th Division's 

337th Infantry, attacking Monte delle 

Formiche. After gaining the escarpment 

near Bigallo, the 2d Battlion was to 

turn westward to cut in behind the 

enemy defending Livergnano, while at 

the same time the 1 st Battalion 

launched a frontal attack against the 

town. Because of sharply compartmented terrain, each of the battalions 

would have to operate pretty much on 

its own. 

As the 1 st Battalion prepared to 

make its holding attack against Livergnano early on 9 October, the Germans 

countered with an attack of their own, 

throwing the battalion off balance and 

off schedule. Although the Americans 

soon drove the enemy back into the 

town, the operation was delayed until 

midmorning. Since the 2d Battalion 

had already begun its apprQach march 

to the Bigallo ravine, it was vital for the 

1st Battalion to make up in vigor what 

it had lost in time. That may have 

explained why the 3d Platoon of Capt. 

Chatlain Sigman's Company K, without 

waiting for artillery support, boldly 

stormed into Livergnano only to be 

driven to cover by heavy enemy fire. 

1"91st Div Opns Jnl, Oct 44. Unless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon this source. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Instead of scattering pell mell, the entire platoon except for ten men dashed 

for cover into the largest building in the 

town, a four-story house. The other ten 

men took cover in a nearby pigsty. 

After dark Captain Sigman led the rest 

of his company into Livergnano and set 

up a defense in the four-story house. 19 

Just before dawn the Germans, apparently having pinpointed the company's location, attacked the building 

but were repulsed. In mid-morning 

they came back, accompanied by two 

tanks. Opening fire, the tanks blasted 

gaping holes in the walls. As the tanks 

lifted their fire, the German infantry 

stormed the ruins to overrun and capture Sigman's entire company, except 

for the ten men still hidden in the 

pigsty. That night those men managed 

to slip back to American lines with the 

story of what had happened to the rest 

of Company K. 

The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, fared 

better in its efforts to pass through the 

ravine near Bigallo and reach the top 

of the escarpment. As the men of 

Companies E and G prepared to move, 

a heavy ground fog rolled in. Their 

approach well concealed, the two companies passed through the ravine early 

on the 9th and gained the escarpment 

without opposition. As the men prepared to continue to Hill 592, which 

overlooked the highway and Livergnano, the providential fog began to 

disperse. They had gone no more than 

500 yards when heavy fire from the 

flanks pinned them to the ground. 

The two companies had come to a 

halt in what resembled a tilted saucer 

I"See Robert A. Robbins, The 9151 Division in 

World Wnr /I (Washington, 1947), pp. 175-180 (a 

war correspondent's account of the action). 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

surrounded on three sides by enemyheld high ground, which included Hill 

592 and the village of Santa Maria di 

Zena on the slopes of Monte delle 

Formiche, not yet occupied by the 

neighboring 85th Division. Throughout 

the day of 10 October the Germans 

poured small arms, mortar, and artillery fire at the companies. Although the 

battalion commander tried to get the 

attack moving again by committing his 

reserve, Company F, that company by 

nightfall had still to get beyond the 

hamlet of Bigallo at the foot of the 

escarpment. With one company presumably lost in Livergnano, two pinned 

down on the plateau above the escarpment, and a fourth stalled in Bigallo, 

the 361 st Infantry plainly was in trouble. The only bright spot was that the 

85th Division captured Monte delle 

Formiche to spare Companies E and G 

from enemy fire from at least that 

direction. 

Early on the 11 th fighter-bombers 

and corps artillery began pounding Livergnano's northern outskirts, apparent 

keystone of the enemy defenses, but 

when the stalled companies tried to 

resume their advance, resistance was 

much the same as before. In the hope 

of breaking the stalemate, General Livesay late in the day decided on an 

envelopment on a wider scale by sending the 1 st Battalion, 361 st Infantry, 

farther to the northwest of Livergnano 

and the 363d Infantry, which had 

reached the base of the escarpment, to 

the northeast. Those maneuvers, he 

hoped, would force the enemy to release his grip on the high ground 

overlooking Livergnano. 

All the while, the situation of Companies E and G atop the escarpment 

369 

continued to deteriorate. Even though 

Company F also at last reached the top 

of the escarpment, most of the men 

had to be employed in supplying the 

other two companies and evacuating 

their wounded. Evacuation was a 12-

hour ordeal for both wounded and 

carriers over a path too steep and 

narrow for litters; instead, relays of 

men carried the wounded down the 

steep draw on their backs. Even an 

unimpeded company runner required 

four hours to make the trip. 

Concerned that the 91 st Division's 

lack of success at Livergnano was at 

least part of the reason that the 85th 

Division had stalled just beyond Monte 

delle Formiche, General Clark late in 

the day personally intervened to order 

General Livesay to reinforce the companies on the escarpment that night. 

Spurred by command pressure that 

increased as it moved down the chain 

of command, the 363d Infantry's Companies A and C began shortly after 

dark on the 11 th to climb laboriously 

up the escarpment. They made it 

around dawn, to be followed later in 

the morning by the same regiment's 3d 

Battalion. West of Livergnano, the 1st 

Battalion, 361st Infantry, had at the 

same time launched its wide flanking 

attack, but only one platoon managed 

to scale the escarpment and then had to 

fall back in the face of an enemy 

counterattack. 

The stubbornness and success of the 

enemy's defense of the Livergnano sector owed much to the arrival on the 

scene of the 65th Infantry Division, a 

relatively fresh unit that General Lemelsen had shifted from the XIV Panzer 

Corps sector opposite the U.S. IV Corps. 

Shortly after the II Corps began its 
370 

attack, the 65th lnfantry Division had 

entered the line in the center of the 

parachute corps sector between the 4th 

Parachute and 362d Divisions. 20 

Some dramatic intervention, bringing 

substantially greater weight of firepower, was needed if the enemy was to 

be blasted from his strong positions 

along the Livergnano escarpment. A 

fortuitous break in the weather made 

that possible. After having been 

grounded f()r much of a \veek, observation aircrafr and fighter-bombers returned to the air in large numbers on 

the 12th, and for the next f()tir days 

Fifth Army artillerymen er~joyed their 

first extended period of observed fire 

since the breakthrough of the Gothic 

line on 17 September. Between 12 and 

14 October, for example, the 91st Division artillery fired over 24,000 rounds. 

Other divisions in the II Oups enjoyed 

similar support. 

Medium and heavY bombers of the 

MAT AF and ~1ASAF also moved to 

the attack, joining forces to launch an 

aerial assault code-named PANCAKE 

against enemy defenses in the Bologna 

sector. As the skies began to clear, B26's from the 42d T AC Wing bombed 

bridges and a factory in the enemy rear 

area. On the 12th, 177 B-25's dropped 

over a thousand 500-pound bombs on 

German supply dumps and barracks 

areas, while 698 heavy bombers 

dropped over a thousand tons of 

lx)mbs on ten enemy targets. Between 

the 11th and 13th, the XXII T AC flew 

880 sorties in support of ground 

troops. 21 

2°AOK 14, fa KTB Ani. 5, 9-11 Oct 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 659221 I. 

21ln early October the X II T AC's operational 

strength was increased by addition of the 27th and 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Behind the impressive artillery fire 

and air support, General Livesay's 91 st 

Division at last began to extend its 

precarious foothold on the escarpment. 

On 13 October the 1 st Battalion, 361 st 

Infantry, finally scaled the escarpment 

to complete the wide outflanking maneuver of Livergnano from the west, 

and on the following day, the 2d 

Battalion took Hill 592, outflanked the 

town from the east, and proceeded 

westward to reach Highway 65 in the 

afternoon at a point just north of 

Livergnano. As might have been expected, the enemy abandoned the 

town. 22 

To provide a fresher force for bearing the brunt of the continuing drive 

on Bologna, then only ten miles away, 

General Keyes directed lJCneral Bolte's 

34th Division to begin taking over a 

portion of the front just east of Highway 65 then occupied by a regiment 

each of the 85th and 91 st Divisions. In 

anticipation of the shift, Keyes earlier 

had provided lJCneral Bolte with the 

I st Armored Division's CCA, which 

enabled the 34th Division to begin the 

shift even while continuing a relatively 

low key attack with one regiment 

against the Monterumici hill mass about 

two miles west of Highway 65, an 

extension of the Livergnano escarpment. By nightfall on the 15th the 34th 

Division was in position in the corps 

center to lead the fourth phase of the 

offensive, scheduled to begin the next 

morning. 23 

79th Fighter Groups. On J 9 October the command 

was officially redesignated the XXII Tactical Air 

Command (XXII TAC). See Craven & Cate. eds .. 

AAF 1II, pp. 450-54. 

229Ist Div Opns Rpt, Oct 44. 

23Fifih Army History. Part VII, pp. 137-39. 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

Action on the Flnnks 

While the II Corps was extending 

and widening its salient south of Bologna during the first two weeks of 

October, the roles of its flanking units--

the 6th South African Armoured Division on the left shoulder and the 

British 13 Corps on the right shoulder 

of the salient-increased in importance. 

As evidence of enemy build-up opposite 

the nose of the salient accumulated, 

General Clark deemed it vital that enemy units elsewhere be tied down to 

prevent further shifts to the defense of 

Bologna. 

After taking over the bulk of the 

Santerno valley sector from the American 88th Division, the British 78th 

Division had continued to move graduallv northward. Elsewhere on the ) 3 

Q;rps front the British 6th Armoured 

Division's 1st Guards Brigade in the 

Monte Battaglia sector, the British 1st 

Division astride Highway 934 (running 

down the Senio valley toward Castel 

Bolognese in the Po Valley), and the 

8th Indian Division operating astride 

Highway 6521, which follows the Lamone valley to Faenza on Highway 9, 

made scant progress. Reduced by detachments to only one b~rigade, the 

British armored division could do little 

more than cover the 13 Corps' right 

flank and maintain a tenuous contact 

with the Eighth Army's 10 Corps. The 

13 Corps commander, General Kirkman, had been forced to draw so 

heavily on his less important right flank 

to reinforce his left that the armored 

units in the mountains on the right 

could do little more than follow up 

enemy withdrawals. 

To the II Corps' left the 6th South 

371 

African Armoured Division under Fifth 

Army control held a five-mile sector 

from the Setta Creek, on the corps' left 

boundary, westward to the Reno River, 

right ixmndary of the IV Corps. Advancing mainly astride Highway 6620, 

about two miles west of the Seua Creek, 

the South Africans kept the 34th Division left flank well covered during the 

first half of October. On the 13th they 

launched a set-piece attack to gain 

control of a ridge between the Setta 

Creek and the Reno River, the key to 

which was Monte Stanco, a 2,200-foot 

summit at the midpoint of the ridge. 

Well supported by corps and army 

artillery, the division made its heaviest 

attack since the desert campaign of E1 

Alamein. By nightfall Monte Stanco was 

in hand, along with more than a 

hundred prisoners from both the 94th 

Greruulier and the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. A relatively modest gain, 

the capture of Monte Stanco nevertheless opened up the eastern portion of 

Route 6424, a lateral road connecting 

Highways 64 and 6620 so that trucks 

no longer had to make the long haul 

over a tortuous secondary road. The 

division's right was at that point securely tied in along the Setta Creek 

with the U.S. 1 st Armored Division's 

CCA, holding the 34th Division's former sector on the II Corps left flank. 

On the South African division's left 

flank the attached 1 st Armored Division's CCB maintained contact with the 

U.S. IV Corps along the Reno River. 

Holding a 50-mile front extending 

from the Reno valley to the coast just 

north of Viareggio, the IV Corps during the first half of October had the 

mission of covering the Fifth Army's 

vital supply line from the port of 
372 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

INDIAN INFANTRY IN NORTHERN APENNINES 

Leghorn to the central sector north of 

Florence, and tying down enemy units 

that otherwise might move against the 

II Corps. That was all the corps could 

hope to accomplish, for after losing the 

6th South African Armoured Division 

and the 1st Armored Division's CCB to 

army control, the corps had a strength 

of little more than a reinforced division. 

The Persannel Problem 

In mid-October the prospect loomed 

ever larger that un redeemed battle 

losses would ultimately bring both the 

Fifth and Eighth armies to a halt. 

During the six days from 10 through 

15 October, for example, the four 

infantry divisions of the II Corps sustained 2,491 casualties. When combined 

with even larger losses of the first nine 

days of the month, the prospects for 

the future were disturbing. While some 

of the losses could be made up by men 

returning to duty from hospitals and by 

replacements trickling into the theater, 

the theater's replacement pool that had 

served so well since the beginning of 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

the Italian campaign was for the first 

time showing signs of depletion. If 

losses continued at their current rate 

and the replacement pool was not replenished, Clark warned Alexander, the 

Fifth Army's offensive toward Bologna 

and the Po Valley would fall short of its 

goal. 24 

As for the Eighth Army, the battles 

to turn the Gothic Line, break into the 

Romagna Plain, capture Rimini, and 

push beyond had been, in the words of 

General McCreery, the new Eighth 

Army commander, "as bitter as at Alamein and Cassino." A total of 14,000 

combat casualties since the beginning of 

the Gothic Line offensive bore witness 

to the truth of his observation. 25 Yet 

after the capture of Rimini the Eighth 

Army's losses had declined sharply, 

while American losses had increased 

(13,082 American and 2,451 British). 

Even as General Clark launched the 

third phase of his attack toward Bologna on 10 October, British Prime 

Minister Churchill made his appeal to 

his American ally for "two, or better 

still, three" American divisions with 

which to sustain the Italian campaign. 26 

General Marshall's negative response to 

the plea rested upon the same str~tegic 

principle that had supported hls espousal of Operation ANVIL in early 

1944. Northwestern Europe and not 

the Mediterranean was the main theater 

of operations, and a "diversion of divi-

"Clark Diary, 15 Oct 44. 

2; Alexander, Despatch, p. 71. On I October Gen-. 

eral Sir Oliver Leese had handed over command of 

the Eighth Army to General Sir Richard L. McCreery, former commander of 10 Corps. General 

Leese then departed to command British forces in 

Burma. 

2·SHAEF Diary, Bk. XIII, 10 Oct 44, pp. 1775-

76, Msg. PM to Eisenhower for Marshall. 

6TH SoUTH AFRICAN ARMORED DlvlSlON TANKS ASSEMBLED FOR ATTACK 

sions to Italy would withhold needed 

fresh troops from southern France 

while committing those forces to the 

high attrition of an indecisive wint~r 

campaign in Italy." In any case, In 

Marshall's opinion, additional men 

would no longer affect the outcome of 

the Italian campaign in \ 944, for by 

mid-October the time had alread y 

passed when the Allied armies ~ould 

drive the Germans from the penmsula 

and cross the Alpine passes along the 

Italo-German frontier, already blocked 

with snow. 27 No matter what successes 

Alexander scored before the end of 

1944, the strategic picture in the Mediterranean at that stage of the war 

would not, in Marshall's opinion, be 

altered. Yet campaigns, like other human enterprises, once undertaken, 

often claim their advocates long after 

27ibid., 17 Oct 44, Msg. Marshall to Eisenhower. 
374 

the undertaking has served its purpose. 

That was the case in Italy. 

Unrealistic Strategies 

Against this somber background and 

in spite of General Marshall's pronouncement, the Allied command in 

Italy, in a mood reminiscent of that of 

army commanders on the western front 

during World War I, prepared in midOctober to have one more try at capturing Ravenna and Bologna. General 

Alexander's plan called for the Fifth 

Army, after debouching from the 

mountains, to join with the Eighth 

Army in encircling and destroying the 

elusive Tenth Army. The hope was utterly fi:>rlorn. Neither south of Rome, 

during the pursuit to the Arno, nor 

following the breakthrough of the 

Gothic Line had the t\",O Allied armies 

succeeded in so disorganizing the enemy as to cut off and destroy any 

significant portion of the German 

armed forces. In mid-October, f()llowing several weeks of minor advances 

won at the expense of numerous casualties and at the end of ever-lengthening supply lines, that possibility seemed 

even less likely than before. 

By that time not only Allied but also 

C..erman strategy in northern Italy had 

come to assume an air of unreality. 

Instead of \vithdrawing to the line of 

the Alps, a superb natural defensive 

barrier from which the Austro-German 

armies had kept the Allies at bay 

through much of World War I, the 

German high command continued to 

employ in defense of northern Italy 

many units whose presence on other 

fronts, while not sufficient in themselves 

to turn the tide of battle, could at least 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

have won for the Germans needed tnne 

to extricate their armies. Hitler's determination to keep alive Mussolini's 

shadow republic and to maintain a grip 

on the admittedly large agricultural and 

industrial potential of the Po Valley 

seems to have been among the reasons 

for Kesselring's back-to-the-waU defense 

in the Apennines and along the swollen 

rivers of the Romagna Plain. As with 

the Allies, there was also possibly the 

additional factor, as already noted, that 

campaigns often tend to develop their 

own partisans; the German armed 

forces too had their Mediterranean taction. 

Falling back on what surely seemed 

to the Allied commanders an interminable series of defensive positions, Kesselring's strategic and tactical problems 

presented him with fewer difficulties 

than those of his Allied counterparts. 

But he had other problems, among 

them the unexpected loss of one of his 

army commanders. In mid-Ocotober 

General Lemelsen, his Fourteenth Army 

commander, became ill and was evacuated to a hospital. To take command of 

the Fourteenth Army until his recovery, 

Kesselring selected the XIV Panzer Corps 

commander, General von Senger und 

Etterlin. 28 

Taking stock of the situation, Senger 

compared the situation on the Bologna 

sector to a thick doth incessantly jabbed 

by a spear. For a time the cloth's 

elasticity would prevent the spear from 

breaking through, but eventually the 

doth would give way.29 

To prevent the fabric of the Bologna 

sector from being pierced, von Senger 

28AOK 14, fa KTB Ani. 5, 14 Oct 44. AOK 14, 

Doc. 65922/2. 

29Senger, Neither Hope nor Fear, p. 276. 
FROM RIDGE TO RIDGE 

promptly reinforced with the 16th SS 

Panzer Grenadier and 94th Divisions from 

his own corps, where those units had 

been engaged defending against the 

attacks of the South African armoured 

division. On 15 October the two German divisions entered the line south of 

Bologna, thereby increasing to six divisions the German forces opposing the 

U.S. II Corps. When General Clark's 

G-2 informed him that, in addition to 

those two divisions, the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier and the 90th Division were also 

375 

on their way from the Tenth to the 

Fourteenth Army sector, the Fifth Army 

commander noted despairingly in his 

diary, "this seems more than we can 

stand." Clark might also have added a 

dictum attributed to the elder von 

Moltke: no plan survives contact with 

the enemy. 30 

30AOK 14 1a KTB Ani. 5, 14-15 Oct 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 6592211; Clark Diary, 17 Oct 44. See also 

Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers, (New York, 

1964), p. 24. 
CHAITER XXII 

Toward a Winter Stalemate 

The Eighth Army Advance W the Ronco 

However gloomy General Clark's assessment on L 17 October of his army's 

situation, he could take some comfort 

in a decision by the Eighth Army 

commander two days earlier to reinforce his army's left wing south of 

Highway 9. Deducing that the foothills 

of the Apennines offered better operational terrain than the waterlogged 

plain and flooded rivers north. of the 

highway, General McCreery deCided t.o 

relieve the British 10 Corps on his 

left-which had the 1st Armoured Division in line with the 4th Indian Division 

in reserve-with the relatively fresh 2 

Polish Corps, controlling the 3d Carpathian and 5th Kresowa Divisions. After 

several weeks in army reserve, the Polish corps could be expected to add 

considerable strength to the advance on 

the better drained ground south of the 

highway where the Britis.h.5 Corps and 

its 10th Indian and British 46th and 

56th Divisions were currently operating. 

The I st Canadian Corps, with an armored and two infantry divisions, continued to hold the remainder of the 

Eighth Army's front from Highway 9 to 

th~ coast, seven miles to the northeast. 1 

Starting from the vicinity of Galeata, 

twenty miles southwest of Cesena, t~e 

Polish corps' two divisions proceeded In 

a northerly direction along ~wo roa~s 

running through the Rabbi and BII SAC Despatch, Aug-Dec 44. Unless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon thiS source, 

dente river valleys toward Highway 9, 

just east of For,li .. E~en as General Clark 

made his pessimistic assessment on 17 

October, the 5th Kresowa Division led 

the 2 Polish Corps in a night attack 

from Galeata toward Montegrosso, a 

2, I OO-foot peak three miles north of 

Galeata dominating the area between 

the two river valleys. Realizing that an 

Allied success at Montegrosso would 

threaten to turn the front east of 

Cesena opposite the Canadian corps 

and British 5 Corps, the Germans 

fought stubl~)rnly. Polish troops nevertheless drove the last of the Germans 

from Montegrosso on 21 October and 

cleared the way for an advance by ~h~ 

3d Carpathian and 5th Kresowa DlVlsions toward Forli, on Highway 9. Even 

so it took the Poles five days to cover 

th~ six miles from Montegrosso to the 

town of Preddapio Nuova, on the banks, 

of the Rabbi River nine miles south of 

Forli. Although the Polish troops swept 

into the townL 

without opposition on the 

26th, a strong German counterattack 

forced them to yield it later, so that not 

until the next day was the town retaken 

and secured. That was as far as the 

Polish corps could advance for the rest 

of the month. 

Even as the Poles had moved against 

Montegrosso, the British 5 Corps to the 

right, from a line just, beyond the 

Rubicone River some 7 miles southwest 

of Cesena attacked toward Cesena and 

the Savio River flowing west of ~he 

town in a northerly direction. Astride 
TOWARD A WINTER ST ALEMA TE 

Highway 9, the Carleton and York 

Regiments of the 3d Infantry Brigade 

on the Canadian corps left flank also 

moved towards Cesena. On 19 October 

the 5 Corps' 46th Division entered the 

town from the south, while the Canadians came in from the southwest. There 

was no opposition, for the LXXVI Panzer Corps was already withdrawing beyond the Savio. The next day the 

British 4th Division relieved the British 

46th Division to make an assault crossing of the Savio, but long-range enemy 

artillery prevented British engineers 

from bridging the river until the 23d. 

In the meantime, the 4th Division held 

its bridgehead while the Canadians 

pulled up along the east bank of the 

Savio. During the same period, the 

remainder of the Canadian corps, including the 2d New Zealand Division, 

advanced to the Savio north of Cesena 

and on the 20th captured the seaport 

of Cesenatico, nine miles northeast of 

Cesena. 

On 23 October the British 4th Division crossed the Savio over recently 

completed bridges south of Cesena to 

begin an advance toward the Ronco 

River, nine miles to the northwest. 

Reaching the river late on the 25th, the 

British waited until dark before crossing 

in assault boats to establish bridgeheads 

on the west bank; but German counterattacks over the next two days forced 

the British to retire to the east bank. 

From then until the end of the month, 

the 4th Division lay there, while heavy 

rains washed out bridges and roads to 

the rear, disrupting lines of communication. 

To the 4th Division's left and on 

somewhat higher ground, the 10th Indian Division had somewhat more to 

377 

show for its efforts. After crossing the 

Savio on the 20th, the Indians swung 

northwestward toward Meldola on the 

Ronco River some six miles south of 

Forli. Since the high water had swept 

down to the plain below, the Indian 

division was able to ford the Ronco 

near Magliano, two miles north of 

Meldola. Unlike their neighbors on the 

right, the Indians retained their bridgehead beyond the Ronco. On the 26th, 

they widened their bridgehead to include the town of Meldola, where resistance continued until Indian successes 

on high ground to the north forced the 

Germans on the 30th to abandon their 

last foothold in the town. 

After capturing the port of Cesenatico on 20 October, the Canadian Corps 

pushed on for the next three days 

along the coastal road (Highway 16) as 

far as the Savio and the town of the 

same name, located near where the 

river enters the sea. That advance outflanked defenses northeast of Cesena 

and hastened the enemy's withdrawal 

toward the Ronco, seven miles to the 

northwest. 

As the Eighth Army's three corps 

pulled up to the Ronco, General McCreery decided that the time had come 

to relieve the 1 st Canadian Corps, 

which had been in contact with the 

enemy since the beginning of the 

Gothic Line offensive on 25 August. 

The relief took place on 28 October 

just short of the Ronco River by Porter 

Force, the task fcxce commanded by Lt. 

Col. A. M. Horsbrugh Porter and composed of the 27th Lancers and 3d 

Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance 

Regiments, supported by some armor 

as well as by Canadian artillery and 

engineers. The task f()rce's mission was 
378 

to demonstrate vigorously along the 

Ronco to conceal withdrawal of the 

Canadians. 2 

The next day the British 5 Corps 

began extending its right flank northeastward as far as the coast to take over 

the Canadians' former zone of operations. That would ultimately give the 5 

Corps a 20-mile sector, with the 4th 

British and 10th Indian Divisions and 

Porter Force in line. The 2d New Zealand Division, in the meantime, moved 

into 5 Corps reserve. Since the Germans were only too anxious to keep the 

Ronco between themselves and the Allied forces, the relief of the Canadian 

corps apparently went undetected. 

The end of October found the 

Eighth Army with three instead of fo~r 

corps in contact and at a standstIll 

across a 30-mile front extending from 

the Adriatic coast about eight miles 

south of Ravenna, southwestward along 

the Ronco, to within sight of Forli on 

Highway 9 and ten miles south:-v.est of 

Faenza, longtime goal of the BrItIsh 13 

Corps, operating on the U.S. Fifth 

Army's right wing. . 

The state of the weary CanadIan 

corps was symptomatic of the Eighth 

Army's plight. General McCreery no 

longer had fresh formatio~s. t.o throw 

into battle. Of his reserve dIVISIons, the 

British 1st Armoured and the 56th 

were non-operational because of lack of 

replacements, the 4th Indian Division 

was scheduled to .leave shortly for 

Greece, and the 46th Division had just 

been relieved from the line. Instead of 

armor exploiting across the Romagna 

Plain as envisioned in the plan for 

Operation OLIVE, the Eighth Army's 

2 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 596. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

push from the Marecchia to the Ronco 

had been a frustrating trial by mud 

from one brimming water course to 

another. 

The II Corps' Plan 

General Clark's Fifth Army meanwhile continued its equally frustrating 

ordeal in the high mountains of t~e 

Northern Apennines. There the malO 

terrain problems continued to be the 

dearth of roads and trails and a seemingly endless series of ridges and rx:aks 

dominating narrow valleys. Agamst 

three peaks making up a ridge exte?ding from Monte Adone (three mIles 

northwest of Livergnano) via Monte 

Belmonte in the center to Monte 

Grande (eight miles northeast of the 

village), General Keyes, the II Corps 

commander, focused his attention. He 

planned to attack the mo~ntains in 

turn, starting on the 16th wIth M~nte 

Belmonte two miles northeast of HIghway 65 overlooking the Zena .Crt;ek 

valley; then Monte Grande, ?ommatI~g 

a narrow valley leading to HIghway 9 m 

the vicinity of Castel San Pietro; ~nd 

finally Monte Adone, just west of HIghway 65. 

General Keyes planned to employ 

against Monte Belmonte Genera~ Bolte's 

34th Division, yet to play a majOr r?le 

in operations of the II Corps. WIth 

Monte Belmonte occupied, the division 

was to continue down the Idice valley to 

cut Highway 9 southeast ~f Bol~g~a. 

The division was to have hrst prIOrIty 

on artillery and tactical air. 3 

Since other divisions of the corps had 

3 II Corps Opn Rpt, Oct-Nov 44; Fifth Army 

History, Part VII, pp. 149--51. Unless otherWise cited 

the following sections are based on these sources. 
TOW ARD A WINTER ST ALEMA TE 

already borne so much of the battle, 

General Keyes had little choice other 

than to employ the 34th Division, even 

though that move boded ill for the 

success of the new phase of the offensive. The division was, in General 

Clark's opinion, "diseased," suffering 

from the chronic malaise of battle weariness. Overseas for two and a half years 

and veterans of some of the hardest 

fighting since the previous winter, surviving old-timers in the division had 

long been clamoring to go home, and 

replacements soon sank into a similar 

state of low morale. Yet the 34th Division, even without the detached 135th 

Infantry, was still numerically strong. 4 

Artillery of the adjacent 85th and 

91st Divisions was to support the 34th 

Division until Monte Belmonte was captured, whereupon emphasis was to shift 

to the 88th Division for an attack 

against Monte Grande, thence to the 

9-1 st Division and the third objective, 

Monte Adone. In the last attack the 1st 

Armored Division, on the 91st's immediate left, was to assist by a holding 

attack on the left flank of the corps. 

General Bolte planned to attack with 

his remaining two regiments abreast. 

On the right and holding the widest 

portion of the division sector, the 168th 

Infantry, in a daylight operation, with a 

company of the 757th Tank Battalion 

in support, was to lead the attack 

astride a broad ridge forming a divide 

between the lena Creek and the Idice 

River. The regiment'S objective was 

Monte della Vigna, a 1,512-foot knob a 

little over a mile north of Monte della 

Formiche and a mile and a half south 

4 Clark Diary, 16 Oct 44. See also General Keyes' 

report on 34th Division cited in Truscott, Command 

Missions, pp. 461-62. 

379 

of the division's objective, Monte Belmonte. General Bolte expected that 

timely capture of Monte della Vigna 

would assist a later attack planned for 

the 133d Infantry. Assigned a narrower 

sector for greater concentration of firepower, that regiment was to make the 

main attack against Monte Belmonte by 

night. 

As the II Corps completed preparations to make the last thrust toward 

Highway 9 and the Po Valley, both 

Generals Clark and Keyes looked to 

Kirkman's British 13 Corps to continue 

its role of tying down the 334th, 715th, 

and 305th Infantry Divisions. That was 

about all Kirkman's corps was capable 

of. Its right flank remained virtually 

stationary below Route 67, where rugged terrain and modest combat 

strength permitted little movement, and 

its left wing was being constantly extended northward to keep pace with 

the 88th Division and to cover the I I 

Corps' right flank. 

The II Corps' Attack Renewed 

From a line of departure about a half 

mile north of Monte della Formiche, 

the 168th Infantry, with three battalions 

abreast, attacked at 0500 on 16 October. Hardly had the attack begun when 

a German antitank gun disabled the 

lead tank of the supporting company 

from the 757th Tank Battalion. The 

disabled tank blocked the narrow road 

and prevented other tanks from coming forward, breaking up the closely 

knit tank-infantry team upon which 

battlefield successes had come to depend. A heavy volume of enemy mortar and small arms fire prevented the 

infantry from continuing alone. By 

nightfall only the regiment's 2d Battal-
380 

ion had managed any penetration of 

the enemy's positions. 

While that fight raged, men of the 

133d Infantry assembled for their night 

attack. As the battalions moved into 

assembly areas late in the afternoon, 

fighter-bombers of the XII T AC 

dropped hundreds of high explosive 

and newly-introduced napalm bombs in 

a saturation assault against Monte Belmonte. The aircraft flew 137 sorties 

and dropped 72 tons of high explosive 

bombs and 94 napalm fire bombs 

against known enemy JX)sitions on and 

near the objective. Shortly after the 

aerial attack, all guns of the supJX)rting 

corps artillery opened fire. 

As darkness fell over the shattered 

terrain, searchlights of antiaircraft units 

illuminated the sky to provide artificial 

moonlight. At 2000 the 133d Infantry 

attacked in a column of battalions with 

the 2d leading. Hardly had the first 

men crossed the line of departure when 

a heavy mortar and artillery concentration fell on one company, disorganizing 

the platoons and causing several casualties, among them the company commander. The battalion commander 

shifted that company to become his 

reserve. 5 

That was to be the enemy's sole 

interference that night. By dawn on the 

17th Company G had almost reached 

the crest of Hill 40 I, the southernmost 

spur of the Monte Belmonte ridge, 

without physical contact with the enemy. Then suddenly, out of a thick fog 

that had enveloped the objective, the 

Germans counterattacked. Overrunning 

Company G, the enemy inflicted numerous casualties and captured four 

, 133d Inf Opns Rpt, Oct. 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

officers and over a score of enlisted 

men. The counterattack also cut off the 

commander of Company E and twenty 

of his men, who would have to wait for 

nightfall before infiltrating back to the 

2d Battalion command post. When 

night came all survivors fell back to 

reorganize in a small ravine on Monte 

Belmonte's southwestern slope. Meanwhile, to the left rear, the 1st Battalion 

had gained a little over a mile to reach 

the village of Zena, near which a bridge 

crossed the Zena Creek, while the 3d 

Battalion came to within supporting 

distance on the 2d Battalion's right. Ii 

Reports of the 133d Infantry's setback on Monte Belmonte's fogshrouded slopes reached General Clark 

shortly after he learned of the arrival of 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division opposite the II Corps and of the coming 

commitment of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division. The Fifth Army commander telephoned General Alexander 

that night to complain bitterly that his 

army would soon reach the limits of its 

endurance unless the Eighth could siphon off some of the enemy's strength. 

The appeal was in vain, for the Eighth 

Army already was fully committed. 

The combined pressures of the Allied 

forces was insufficient to force the 

Germans to relax their grip on the 

ridges and summits south of Bologna, 

as became clear when at dawn on 18 

October the 34th Division's 133d Infantry renewed the assault on Monte Belmonte. Again the regiment attacked in 

a column of battalions, with the 2d still 

leading. Because of persistent fog and 

rugged terrain, the battalions had about 

as much difficulty determining their 

" Ibid. 
TOWARD A WINTER ST ALEMA TE 

own locations as those of the elusive 

enemy. Under these circumstances, the 

133d Infantry's experienced commander, Colonel Braun, decided in 

mid-afternoon to halt, to reorganize, 

and to replenish supplies before renewing the attack after nightfall. 7 

For the renewed assault, Colonel 

Braun committed the 1 st Battalion, 

which since the morning of the 18th 

had been in reserve near the Zena 

bridge. To cover the regiment's left 

flank, the I st Battalion was to seize high 

ground north of Zena, while the 2d 

and 3d Battalions continued toward 

Monte Belmonte. 

Hardly had nightfall come when the 

enemy revealed that he had used the 

interval to reinforce his positions. A 

heavy mortar and artillery barrage hit 

two companies of the 3d Battalion, 

whereupon enemy tanks moved to 

within 100 yards of the lead battalions 

to deliver point-blank fire. Plagued by 

mud and poor trails, Braun's own supporting tanks and tank destroyers were 

too far to the rear to be of any 

assistance, and enemy guns matched 

the artillery supporting the regiment 

round for round. In the face of that 

kind of opposition, General Bolte on 20 

October directed both the 133d and 

168th Regiments to halt in place and 

regroup, the latter having at last completed dearing the enemy from Monte 

della Vigna but too late to be of much 

help to the 133d Infantry. 

On the 34th Division's left, the 91 st 

Division had also encountered heavy 

enemy fire-the heaviest since September-as that division attacked along the 

7 133d Inf Opns Rpt. Oct 44. Unless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon this source. 

381 

axis of Highway 65 to assist the operation against Monte Belmonte. In General Livesay's sector much of the fire 

seemed to be aimed at the Livergnano 

bottleneck with the purpose of blocking 

the flow of supplies along the highway. 

By nightfall on 19 October the 91 st 

Division had managed to advance only 

three miles beyond Livergnano. West of 

the high\\'ay enemy forces in the vicinity of Monte Adone, two miles northwest of Livergnano, also checked General Prichard's I st Armored Division. 

The enemy's success in thwarting all 

three divisions comprising the left wing 

of the 11 Corps was all the more 

disturbing because of gathering evidence that either the enemy's J 6th SS 

or 29th Panzer Grenadier D'ivision was 

approaching or already in the area. 

Lacking reserves, General Keyes 

deemed he had little choice but to 

order the three divisions to assume 

what he called "an aggressive defense."H 

Progress on the I I Corps right wing 

meanwhile showed greater promise. 

There General Coulter's 85th Division 

had moved rapidly along a ridge east of 

the Idice Valley and on the 19th captured Monte Fano, one of the spurs of 

a ridge three miles northeast of Monte 

della Formiche. From that position the 

division was in a favorable position to 

assist General Kendall's 88th Division 

on the right during its forthcoming 

operation against Monte Grande, three 

miles to the northeast. 

German Countermeasures 

The growing resistance the II Corps 

had encountered since 17 October 

" Fifth Army History, Part V Ill. pp. 11).1)-1)6. 
382 

stemmed largely from Field Marshal 

Kesselring's calculated risk (taken in 

mid-October) to thin out Senger's XIV 

Panzer Corps, opposite the IV Corps, by 

shifting major combat units to the sector opposite the U.S. II Corps. For the 

time being the Tenth Army reserve 

would have to be prepared to support 

the remaining sectors of Army Group C's 

front. !l 

Underlying Kesselring's decision was 

the belief that the most immediate 

threat to the integrity of the front lay in 

the Bologna sector, where an Allied 

breakthrough would menace the rear 

of that part of the Tenth Army falling 

back northwestward along the axis of 

Highway 9. In the Bologna sector itself 

the greatest hazard was a deteriorating 

situation east of Highway 65, especially 

along the interarmy boundary where, 

for the past few weeks, contact between 

the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies had 

been only intermittent. 10 

It had also not escaped Kesselring's 

attention that on the Bologna sector 

American operations for a month had 

been carried out by the same four 

divisions. Since their cum ulative losses 

had undoubtedly been heavy, the German commander confidently expected 

that if his troops could only hold out a 

bit longer, tfle Fifth Army offensive 

would soon lose momentum. II 

Since the beginning of October the 

16th 55 Panzer Grenadier Division (its 

departure f(Jr France delayed) and the 

65th, 94th, and 334th Divisions had been 

moving from the XIV Panzer Corps to 

the I Parachute Corps south of Bologna. 

"AOK 14, 1a KTB AnI. 5, 17 Oct 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 6592211. 

10 Ibid., 18 Oct 44. 

11 Ibid., 190ct44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

From the Tenth Army had come the 29th 

Panzer Grenmiier Division, while the 90th 

Panzer Grenadier Division had already 

been ordered from Italy's northwestern 

Alpine frontier and could be expected 

to arrive in the central sector by 22 

October. 12 

While those changes were taking 

place, Senger (in Lemelsen's absence 

still acting commander of the FOllrtel'nth 

Army) had also shifted all available artillery from his panzer corps to support 

the ~ologna sector. Only one battery 

remamed to protect the Abetone Pass 

on Highway 12 that runs from Lucca in 

the Arno valley to Modena on Highway 

9. That fact caused neither Kesselring 

nor Senger concern, for they were well 

aware of the IV Corps' weaknesses and 

were confident that, in the off chance 

that the IV Corps should spring to life, 

the XIV Panzer Corps could afford to 

yield considerable ground bef()re reaching terrain critical to the integrity of the 

Fourteenth Army's front. 1:3 

New Plans for II Corps 

On 19 October General Clark determined to make a third attempt to break 

through to Highway 9, this time on 

Keyes' right wing southeast of Bologna 

where the operations of the 85th and 

88th Divisions--the Castor and Pollux 

of the Fifth Army-had uncovered a 

weak point. Clark' also hoped to f(m:e 

the Fourteenth Army commander to 

spread his f()rces over a wider front by 

stepping up efforts by the IV and 13 

Corps on the II Corps flanks. Meanwhile, Ceneral Lemelsen had returned 

from the hospital to resume command 

12 Ibid., 17 Oct 44. 

1:1 MS # C-064 (Kesselring). 
TOWARD A WINTER STALEMATE 

of his army, and Senger reverted to his 

corps command. 

In accordance with Clark's instructions Keyes worked out a three-phase 

operation with Kendall's 88th instead of 

Bolte's 34th Division making the main 

effort in the first phase-this time to 

capture Monte Grande, three miles east 

of Monte Fano and only six miles 

southwest of Castel San Pietro on Highway 9. Reinforced by the 85th Division's 

337th Infantry, the 88th Division was to 

attack on the night of 20 October. In 

the second phase Kirkman's 13 Corps 

was again to shift westward to take over 

Monte Grande while the 88th Division 

reverted to corps reserve for a welldeserved rest. The 34th Division, in the 

meantime, was to continue its efforts to 

capture Monte Belmonte, and the 91 st 

Division was to improve its positions 

east of the Savenna Creek. 14 In the 

third phase, emphasis was to shift back 

to the corps left wing as the 91 st 

Division attacked Monte Adone, two 

miles northwest of Livergnano, and 

continued on to Pianoro, four miles 

north of Livergnano and only eight 

miles from Bologna. With Monte 

Adone in hand, Keyes expected the 

harassing artillery fire on Livergnano 

and Highway 65 to cease and permit a 

concentration of arms and men along 

the highway for a final drive on Bologna. 

Thus far the II Corps had failed to 

take any of the three objectives Clark 

had designated on the 15th. In hope of 

breaking the impasse by conquest of 

Monte Grande, General Keyes during 

the night of 19 October assembled all 

the firepower available, including 

14 II Corps Opns Rpt, Oct 44. 

383 

tactical aircraft that hammered at the 

enemy positions in and around Monte 

Grande throughout the day. Taking off 

at IS-minute intervals, fighter-bombers 

of the XXII T AC flew 158 sorties and 

dropped tons of napalm and high 

explosives on targets marked by divisional artillery with colored smoke. Beginning at 1700, the 88th Division's 

artillery, reinforced by two medium 

batteries each from the 248th and 

178th Field Artillery Battalions, as well 

as seven light batteries and a medium 

battery from the 85th Division, began 

preparatory fires. The guns fired steadily for an hour against 42 selected 

targets while 23 supporting tanks and 

destroyers fired harassing missions 

against targets north and east of Monte 

Grande. That made fix a total of 8,400 

rounds fired in one hour. As that fire 

ceased, corps artillery took up the chorus with an extensive counterbattery 

program against all known enemy gun 

positions. In hope of stimulating the 

division commander's zeal, General 

Clark on the eve of the attack visited 

the 88th Division's command post to 

assure Brigadier General Kendall that 

his second star of rank was waiting atop 

Monte Grande. 15 

Morale heightened by the vast display 

of firepower, the infantrymen of the 

349th Inf~mtry set out in darkness and 

through a driving rainstorm toward 

Monte Grande and Monte Cerrere, the 

latter the high point of a spur a 

thousand yards southeast of Monte 

Grande. On the left, Company A, commanded by 1st Lt. John Ernser, met no 

resistance as it led the 1st Battalion up 

15 88th Div Opns Rpt, Oct 44. Clark, Calculated 

Risk, p. 400. 
384 

Monte Cerrere. The approach concealed by the heavy downpour and 

darkness, Ernser's men shortly before 

dawn quietly surrounded a large building on the crest, believed to be the 

hiding place of any surviving enemy 

soldiers. When daylight revealed the 

American presence, eleven haggard 

Germans filed out of the building with 

hands high in surrender. 16 

On the right, the 2d Battalion meanwhile made the main attack against 

Monte Grande. Under fire from the 

time of crossing the line of departure a 

mile south of the objective, C,ompany G 

three hours after midnight nevertheless 

oq:upied Hill 581, an intermediate 

knob just south of Monte Grande. 

From there the company was able to 

cover the advance of Companies E and 

F as they in turn came up on the left to 

assault the main o~jective. As the companies advanced, supporting artillery 

fire continued to crash onto the enemy's positions on the mountainside 

and his line of communications. 

The effectiveness of that close fire 

support was amply demonstrated when 

at first light Company F's 1st Platoon 

leader, 1st Lt. Jack S. Parker, led his 

men onto l\fonte Grande's summit without firing a shot. The rest of the 

company followed to move quickly over 

the crest and occupy the northern 

slope, while Company E dug in on the 

reverse slope. As the inevitable counterattack ensued in no more than platoon 

strength, the Americans handily repulsed it, killing four of the enemy and 

scattering the rest back down the northern slopes of Monte Grande. 

16349th Inf Jnl and file. Unless otherwise rited 

the f<)llowing se(:tion is based upon this source. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

By midday on the 20th the 349th 

Infantry's thrusts on Monte Grande 

and Monte Cerrere had driven a deep 

salient into the 1 Parachute Corps from 

southeast of Bologna and advanced the 

Fifth Army's front to its closest point 

yet to the city. That afternoon General 

Kendall, his second star assured, widened the salient by sending the 350th 

Infantry, assisted by the 85th Division's 

339th Infantry, against Montecuccoli on 

a ridge extending westward from 

Monte Grande into the 85th Division's 

sector. That objective soon fell to the 

3.50th Infantrv, whose 2d Battalion 

shortly after da;'k secured the village of 

Farneto, a mile west of Monte Grande. 

Over the next two davs General Kendall moved the attached 337th Infantrv 

up on the 350th Infantry's left to tak~ 

over that part of the 350th Infantry's 

sector west of Farneto, leaving the 

349th and 350th Regiments with narrower fronts tc)r exploiting north from 

Monte Grande. 

General Clark underscored the first 

real success the II Corps had achieved 

since mid-October by visiting the 349th 

Infantry's command post, where he 

personally congratulated Colonel Crawford and his men. With the example of 

Monte Battaglia still fresh in mind, 

Clark cautioned Crawford to be prepared to defend against almost certain 

German eHurts to retake the height. 

Clark's disappointment with the 34th 

Division's failure to take Monte Belmonte was as acute as his delight with 

the 88th Division's triumph on Monte 

Grande. Thus far, every efI4xt bv the 

34th Division either to drive the e~emv 

from Monte Belmonte or to proceed 

along the ridge south of Zena Creek 

had failed. There were, moreover, omi-
TOWARD A WINTER STALEMATE 

nollS signs of enemy buildup opposite 

the II Corps' left wing west of Highway 

65. 

Since the current offensive had taken 

only one of three planned objectives, 

Clark decided to forego taking Monte 

Belmonte and Monte Adone and instead to concentrate strength on the 

corps right, where the enemy seemed 

to be weakest. On 22 October Clark 

directed Keyes to advance his right 

wing as far as Monte Castelazzo, some 

three miles to the northeast of Monte 

Grande, to a general line extending 

from Monte Castelazzo in the 88th 

Division's zone of operation northwestward three miles to Ribiano Hill in the 

85th Division's zone. Those two heights, 

three and four miles respectively, southwest of Castel San Pietro on Highway 9, 

represented the enemy's last possible 

defensive positions short of that highway and the Lombard plain. If Keyes' 

corps could occupy those features before the end of the month, the Fifth 

Army might yet be able to debouch 

onto the plain before winter's snows 

prevented further operations in the 

Northern Apennines. Clark meanwhile 

instructed Kirkman to assist Keyes' 

thrust beyond Monte Grande by massing at least four brigades 0 f the 13 

Corps west of the Santerno River and 

by taking Monte Spaduro and a line of 

hills southwest of the Sillaro to increase 

pressure along the road between Castel 

del Rio and Imola. 

In preparation for this final effort, 

Keyes instructed the 34th and 91 st 

Divisions and 1st Armored Division to 

regroup to enable the 91st Division to 

withdraw two regiments into corps reserve, which Keyes might draw upon to 

repel a possible spoiling attack against 

385 

the II Corps left flank. If no spoiling 

attack developed the reserve of six 

battalions might be used to exploit the 

expected capture of Monte Castelazzo 

and Ribiano Hill. Three divisions were 

to make only holding attacks, to include 

continuing efforts by the 34th Division 

to take Monte Belmonte. 

Shortly after dark on 22 October, the 

85th and 88th Divisions began the new 

main effort toward high ground northeast of the three heights of Monte 

Grande, Monte Fano, and Monte Cerrere that the divisions had previously 

captured. Coulter's 85th Division on the 

left wing was to take Hill 459, a mile 

northeast of Monte Fano. Kendall's 

88th Division on the right was to capture Hill 568, about a thousand yards 

northeast of Monte Grande. Control of 

Hill 568 would enable Kendall to dominate Montecalderaro, a hamlet at the 

junction of two secondary roads leading 

to Highway 9, about five miles away. 

From the hill Kendall was to send a 

force a mile and a half to the northeast 

to occupy high ground overlooking the 

hamlet of Vedriano within a mile of the 

division's final objective, Monte Castelazzo. A second force, moving northeast 

from Monte Cerrere, was to cover the 

division's right flank along the Sillaro 

River. 

Since Colonel Crawford's 349th Infantry had just taken Monte Grande 

and Colonel Fry's 350th had seen considerable action since the heavy fighting 

on Monte Battaglia earlier in the 

month, Kendall selected Colonel Champeny's 351st Infantry to lead the attack 

toward Hill 568. Crossing the line of 

departure on Monte Grande's forward 

slope shortly after nightfall, the 351 st 

Infantry's 3d Battalion slipped through 
386 

the fog and darkness to reach the 

objective before the enemy awoke to 

what was happening. By 0730 on the 

23d the battalion had rounded up 

twenty-eight Germans and sent them to 

the rear as prisoners. Hill 568 was in 

hand. 17 

Meanwhile, the f()g that had helped 

the Americans gain Hill 568 concealed 

the arrival of first units of the 90th 

Panzer Grenadier Divi'ii()n. Two counterattacks followed, but by 1015 both had 

been repulsed, and Hill 568 remained 

in American hands. IS 

The unexpected show of enemy 

strength nevertheless disturbed Col~mel 

Champeny, who decided to contmue 

the attack with a fresh unit, the 2d 

Battalion, while the 3d defended Hill 

568. That night the 2d Battalion, in a 

column of companies with Company G 

leading, set out for Vedriano, a mile 

and a half to the northeast. Evading 

harassing fire from t\\'o bypassed enemy strongpoints, the company entered 

the village early on the 24th. Forty 

Germans surrendered, including two 

offIcers, but when the other companies 

sought to join Company G in the village 

fire from the now alerted defenders of 

the two strongpoints stopped them outside. 19 

That hindrance meant that Company 

G alone would have to defend Vedriano against almost certain enemy efforts to retake it. The company seemed 

at first to be quite capable of doing the 

job, for after repulsing one small counterattack during the forenoon, Company G's commander reported that 

everything was under control. Yet soon 

17 351st Illr. Jill alld file, Oc144. 

.8 AOK 10, fa KTB Ani. 9,23-24 OCI 44, AOK 10, 

Doc N r. 634261 J. 

• 9 35 J st InfJnl and file, Oct. 44. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

thereafter an intercepted German radio 

message, expressing concern over Vedriano's loss and noting that the village 

was a vital Ix)int in the German defenses, struck an ominous note, 

In early afternoon the regimental 

executive ~fficer, Colonel Yeager, telephoned Colonel Champeny from the 

2d Battalion command }X)st that Company G in Vedriano had just received a 

German parliamentary. As events unfolded, the Germans claimed to have 

surrounded Vedriano, but they would 

allow Company G to withdraw in exchange for the 40 prisoners captured 

that morning. Colonel Champeny brusquely rejected the offer and began 

planning to relieve the bele~guered 

company with his reserve battahon supported by tanks. Companies E and F at 

the same time continued their efforts to 

reach Company G. 'ractical aircraft also 

flew over the area to bomb and strafe 

the enemy's }X)sition. 

While all that was going on, Company G's radio went off the air. An 

intercepted German radio message revealed the company's fate. Vedriano 

had been retaken and 80 Americans 

captured. 

From the 1 st Battalion in reserve on 

Monte Grande, Colonel Champeny 

brought forward a company to assist 

Companies E and F in their efforts to 

retake Vedriano; but intense small 

arms artillerv, and mortar fire brought 

all three co~panies to ground at the 

western base of the hill mass on which 

Vedriano stood, As withering fire produced numerous casualties, Charnpeny 

reluctantly accepted that the enemy had 

so reinforced that his regiment unassisted would be unahle to regain the 

village . 
TOWARD A WINTER STALEMATE 

Kesselring Hospitalized 

The vigorous enemy reaction at Vedriano stemmed largely from two factors: the arrival during the night of 22 

October of the 90th Panzer Grenadier 

Division and the shifting of the Tenth 

Army's boundary westward to bring the 

I Parachute Corps under that army's 

control. The latter move put the army 

group's two most active fronts under a 

single commander and through the 

remaining days of October facilitated 

the German defense. 20 

After overseeing the boundary 

change, Field Marshal Kesselring left by 

auto during the evening of 23 October 

for a conference with General Vietinghoff, the Tenth Army commander. Traveling under blackout conditions through 

heavy fog over roads crowded by military traffic, the field marshal's car collided with a towed artillery piece. 

Gravely injured, Kesselring was taken to 

the nearest field hospital and later 

transferred to a general hospital at 

Ferrara, where he was to remain for 

several months. 21 

Kesselring's abrupt departure necessitated further command changes. On 27 

October General Vietinghoff took over 

Kesselring's place in command of Army 

Group C. General Lemelsen then moved 

over from his Fourteenth Army command 

to take over the Tenth Army, while von 

Senger und Etterlin again moved from 

the XIV Panzer Corps to command the 

Fourteenth Army. 22 

20 AOK 14, la KTB Ani. 5, 24 Oct 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 6922/1. Effective the evening of 25 October, 

XIV Panzer Corps took over the sector formerly held 

by LI Mountain Corps, which then assumed control 

of the panzer corps' former sector on the Fourteenth 

Army's front. 

2I AOK 10, KTB Ani. 9, 23 Oct 44, AOK 10, Doc. 

6345/1. 

22 Ibid., 27 Oct 44. 

387 

The Attack Continues 

While those changes occurred on the 

German side, General Kendall prepared to resume the effort to retake 

Vedriano. Throughout the 25th, the 

351 st Infantry's I st and 2d Battalions 

assembled west of Vedriano, while from 

Hill 568 Colonel Champeny's tanks and 

tank destroyers, together with division 

artillery, shelled the enemy in the hope of 

softening up the o~jective fex a night 

assault by the I st Battalion. Early that 

evening, with the 2d Battalion covering 

the left flank, the I st Battalion moved 

against Vedriano, Company A advancing astride a road directly toward the 

village, Company B trying to outflank it 

from the west. Company C remained in 

reserve. 2:1 

Company B managed to work its way 

halfway up the western slope of the hill 

before heavy machine gun fire forced a 

halt. Most of the company, made up 

largely of recent replacements, scattered, leaving behind only a handful of 

veterans, some of w hom joined forces 

with a company of the 2d Battalion 

while others drifted over to Company 

A, which also came to a halt short of 

the objective. 

Out of an early morning fog on the 

26th, the Germans counterattacked. 

Overwhelming one of the companies of 

the 2d Battalion and the handful of 

survivors of Company B that had 

joined the company, the enemy slipped 

away into the mist with their prisoners 

before anybody could come to the 

rescue. Only one man escaped capture. 

Except for the 3d Battalion's success 

on Hill 568, Colonel Champeny had 

little other than severe losses to show 

23 35lst InfJnl and file, Oct 44. Unless otherwise 

cited the following is based on this source. 
388 CASSI NO TO THE ALPS 

effect, severed the line of communications of General Kendall's 88th Division 

and forced General Keyes to cancel 

plans for the 91st Division's 362d Infan-

• try to pass through the 88th Division's 

~1Ft~~rrI~~~':;'- 349th Infantry for an advance down 

~ the Sillaro valley. The washouts spelled 

TRUCK CROSSING A STEEL TRUSS 

BAILEY BRIDGE IN APENNINES 

f()r his drive toward Monte Castclazzo. 

Three riOe companies had been severely crippled, while the enemy still 

held Vedriano. Furthermore, adjacent 

units had fared no better. Crawford's 

349th Infa ntry had been unable to 

advance much beyond Monte Cerrerc 

and the 85th Division's 337th Infantry 

had its hands full merely holding ont~) 

its newly won position just north of Hill 

568. Four miles southeast of Monte 

Grande troops of the British 13 Corps 

had taken Monte Spaduro on the night 

of 23 October but had been un able to 

ad vance farther down the Santerno 

valley. 

Durin g the morning of th e 26th, 

torrential rains began to fall. Within a 

few ho urs rising waters had washed out 

three bridges across the Sillaro. T hat, in 

trouble f()r all the troops, for only small 

amounts of am munition and r ation s 

could be hand-carried across hastily 

constructed footbridges. From there 

jeeps could carry the supplies as far as 

Monte Grande , but the last moves 

would have to be by pack mules. Under 

the circumstances little possibility existed 

of maintaining a volume of logistical 

support sufficient to sustain the offensive toward Caste l San Pietro a nd 

Highway 9. That afternoon, after obtaining Gene ral Clark's approval, General Keyes directed Coulter and Kendall to withdraw their troops to defensible ground and dig in. 

The sudden de luge of rain caused 

similar difficulties f(")l' the Germans. In 

the I Parachute Corps sector rising waters 

in the Idice Rive r valley on 27 October 

collapsed a dam nea r the village of 

Budrio, ten miles northeast of Bologna, 

flooding a wide area behind the German lines. For the next three days all 

work on defensive positions came to a 

standstill while German engineers and 

Italian civilians toiled day and night to 

divert the Hood waters and repair the 

dam. Othe r streams washed out bridges 

and isol ated units. For a full \\'ee k 

troops on both sides would be able to 

pay less attentio n to fighting each other 

than to repairin g the ra vages of 

\'\'eather. 24 

14 AOK 10, f a KTB An!. 9, 27 Oct 44, AOK 1{), 

Doc. 63426/ I. 
TOWARD A WINTER STALEMATE 

An effective combination of determined enemy defenders, adverse 

weather, and irreplaceable personnel 

losses had brought the II Corps to a 

halt on the northern slopes of the 

Apennines 'vvithin sight of the Po Valley, which during rare intervals of clear 

weather weary American infantry could 

glimpse just over four miles away. From 

the beginning of the offensive on 10 

September until 26 October, the four 

inhmtry divisions that bore the main 

burden of the offensive had incurred 

15,716 casualties, most of them in the 

combat arms. Of those, 5,026 were 

from the 88th Division, ,vhich had 

fought so hard, but in vain, for Vedriano. At about the same time that Keyes 

ordered Kendall to go on the defensive, 

the 88th Division commander had reported that his division \,,:as understrength by 1,243 officers and men. 

The already strained theater replacement pool would be hard put to make 

up such shortages. Furthermore, the 

long periods of cold, rainy weather had 

sapped the strength of the combat 

troops and brought a steady increase in 

non battle casualties; indeed respiratory 

diseases, trench foot, and psychiatric 

disorders had exacted a heavier toll 

than had enemy fire. Even so, the battle 

casualtv rate had been higher than for 

any c';mparable period ~ince the Salerno landings in September 1943. Allied commanders generally agreed that 

the Fifth Army's replacement system 

would soon break down with this casualty rate. 25 

Compounding the difficulties, signifi2:> Fifth Army Histary. Part VII, pp, 163-64; 

Charles M, Wiltse, ThF Mpdical Sl'T1Iil'pS in lilp ,'Y[pdi/prraman (Washington, 1965), p. 427; Devers Diary, 19 

October 1944, in CMH, 

389 

cant shortages developed toward the 

end of October in artillery ammunition, 

forcing General Clark to imIX)se especially severe restrictions on the use of 

medium caliber artillery ammunition. 

Heavy caliber ammunition was less of a 

problem, f()l' early in the month the II 

Corps had lost its last two heavy battalions to the campaign in southern 

France, and the Fifth Army's remaining 

heavy artillery was in the artached British 13 Corps. 26 

Washed-out bridges might be rebuilt 

and weary units reformed after a few 

days' rest, but what could not be quickly 

restored was the diminished offensive 

IX)wer of four infantry divisions, understrength and exhausted after more than 

six weeks of almost uninterrupted combat. The predictions Clark had made 

on two occasions in early and midOctober that the Fifth Army's offensive 

could not be maintained beyond the 

end of the month without additional 

infantry replacements appeared now to 

have been fulfilled. 27 To make matters 

worse, the Eighth Army advance along 

the axis of Highway 9 had bogged 

down along the Ronco River at about 

the same time as Clark's army came to 

a halt southeast of Bologna. As General 

Clark was later to observe, "We didn't 

fully realize it then, but we had failed in 

our race to reach the Po Valley befi.>re 

winter set in. Our strength was not 

enough to get across the final barrier to 

which the enemy clung."28 

As October came to an end, the II 

Corps settled down into defensive IX)si26 Fifth Army History, Part VII, pp, 165 and 2:>8-

59. 

27 Clark Diary, 6 and 15 October 1944, 

28 Clark, Calculated Risk, p, 40 I. 
390 

tions encompassing Monte Grande and 

Monte Belmonte that afforded control 

of the commanding heights east of 

Highway 65. Monte Belmonte finally 

had fallen to the I33d Infantry after 

loss of Monte Grande and Hill 568 

prompted German withdrawal. West of 

the highway control of the heights was 

reversed, for the Germans still held 

Monte Adone and the Monterumici hill 

mass. 

To the west the positions of the II 

Corps tied in with those of the 6th 

South African Armoured Division, under Fifth Army control. Throughout 

the month the South Africans, reinforced by the I st Armored Division's 

CCB, had covered the left flank while 

the 13 Corps' 78th Division covered the 

right. Given the limited strength of 

those units and the unfavorable terrain 

over which they had to operate, they 

could do little more than try to keep up 

enough pressure to prevent the enemy 

from shifting units from their fronts to 

reinforce the sector opposite the II 

Corps. Since most, if not all, of the 

German units moving to halt the II 

Corps had come either from the Tenlh 

Army opposite the Eighth Army, or the 

XIV Panzer Corps opposite the U.S. IV 

Corps, they apparently fulfilled their 

mISSIon. 

Operations on tlu? IV Corps Front 

Still holding an elongated 50-mile 

front, extending from Forte dei Marmi 

on the ligurian coa,st to a line just short 

of the Reno River in the east, General 

Crittenberger's IV Corps had two general missions: protecting the Fifth 

Army's left flank and organizing and 

training the two recently arrived diviCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

sions-the Brazilian Expeditionary 

Force's 1 st Division, commanded by 

Maj. Gen. J. B. Mascarenhas de Morales, and the American 92d Division. 

As part of that training, regimental size 

combat teams were to participate during October in limited-objective type 

operations. 

The operations began on 6 October 

when the BEF's 6th Regimental Combat 

Team attacked a sector held by the 

Italian Monte Rosa Alpine Division. Crossing the Lima Creek at Bagni di Lucca, 

12 miles north of Lucca, the Brazilians 

advanced northward up the Serchio 

valley for eight miles against light resistance. Showing little eagerness to stand 

and fight, the Italians fell back slowly 

into the high mountain fastness they 

knew so well. On the II th the Brazilians captured the town of Barga, and at 

the end of the month the operation 

came to an end. 29 

At the same time, Maj. Gen. Edward 

M. Almond's Task Force 92 began an 

attack on the coastal flank to afford 

combat experience for a contingent of 

the 92d Division. The task force consisted of the 92d Division's 370th Regimental Combat Team and the 2d Armored Group made up of the 434th 

and 435th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions, converted into infantry and supported by the 751st Tank Battalion and 

the 849th Tank Destroyer Battalion. 

The mission was a limited objective 

attack toward the town of Massa, six 

miles northwest of Forte dei Marmi, but 

rather than launch a frontal attack 

against the still intact Gothic Line de29 J. B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, The Brazilian 

Expeditionary Force Uy Its Commander, 2d Ed., Rio de 

Janeiro, 1965, pp. 57-73. 
TOWARD A WINTER STALEMATE 

fenses south of Massa, General Almond 

decided first to seize Monte Cauala and 

Monte Castiglione, overlooking the 

coastal corridor from the east. 30 

In a driving rain on 6 October the 

two antiaircraft battalions first launched 

a diversionary attack along the coastal 

plain but managed only to reach the 

outskirts of Querceta, a mile from their 

starting point at Forte dei Marmi. In 

the mountains overlooking the coastal 

plain the 370th Infantry, plagued as 

were all units of the 92d Division with a 

long-standing malaise growing from 

mutual distrust between main Iv white 

officers and black enlisted me~, made 

only slight progress on Monte Cauala's 

slopes. After several days of desultory 

fighting during which the 370th Inhmtry twice won and twice lost its objective, the regiment at last regained 

Monte Cauala's summit on the 12th 

and held. After C..cneral Almond called 

off the attack on 23 October, the sector 

settled down to relative inactivity for the 

next month and a half: .11 

The Offensive Is Halted 

Although the \-"'eather that had 

helped bring the Allied ground forces 

to a halt had also impeded operations 

of the supporting tactical air force, 

aerial strikes against enemy lines of 

communications had continued 

throughout October. During the month 

MA T AF dropped 4,500 tons of bombs, 

claimed 44 bridges destroyed and another 83 damaged, rail lines cut in 240 

places, and a large number of locomo-

"" Filth ifrm .. History, Part VII. pp. 172 and 178; 

Ulysses Lee. The Employment of Negro Troops, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

(Washinglon, 1966). pp. 544-51. 

"'Ibid. 

391 

tives and rolling stock destroyed. In the 

same period, MASAF dropped 2,500 

tons of bombs on strategic targets 

throughout northern Italy, including 

the Alpine passes. As for the Luftwaffe, 

there was virtually no sign. Except for 

occasional foravs over Allied lines bv 

not more than two or three aircraft, th~ 

German Air Force had vanished from 

the skies of Italy. 

Yet Allied domination of the air 

could not disguise the stalemate on the 

ground. In tacit recognition of that fact, 

General Wilson directed the Allied armies in Italy to halt their offensive on 

27 October with little chance that the 

situation would change before winter. 

Operations in northwestern Europe had 

first call on replacements, and a worldwide shortage of ammunition among 

the Allies meant Italy with its low 

strategic priority would suffer most. 

Chronic personnel and ammunition 

shortages, as well as the onset of winter 

weather in the mountains, the 

SACMED informed the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, would prevent the Allied armies from carrying offensive operations on the Italian front beyond the 

line Ravenna-Bologna-La Spezia, and if 

that line were not reached by midNovember, the Allied offensive might 

have to be brought to a halt short of 

even that objective. That report hardly 

could have filled the hearts of the 

Combined Chiefs with dismay, for even 

though La Spezia, Bologna, and Ravenna remained in German hands, the 

Allied armies in Italy had already gone 

beyond the goal set for them at the 

Teheran Conference in November 

1943: the Pisa-Rimini line. 32 

32 SAC Despalch. Aug-Dec 44. p. 48; Matloff. 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-44, p. 

353. 
392 

Another factor ameliorated the failure to reach the Po Valley before 

winter set in: a serious food shortage in 

the Allied-occupied regions of Italy that 

threatened the civil population with the 

prospect of near starvation. Having to 

feed the population of the yet unconquered regions of northern Italy as well 

would have further stretched already 

inadequate foodstocks. 

As early as July, General Wilson, at 

the suggestion of the Allied Control 

Commission, had taken note of the 

growing seriousness of the f(lod situation by announcing his intention to 

increase the daily bread ration from 

200 to 300 grams per person. When 

that increase was projected to include 

the regions of northern Italy still under 

German control, it became clear to 

Allied planners that the grain import 

program would have to be heavily 

augmented, even though the area norCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

mally exported f(lod. Since under the 

most favorable conditions the Italian 

harvest would provide only 160 grams 

of the requirement, imports of over a 

million and a half tons would have 

been needed to meet the 300-gram goal 

for all haly, and a world-wide shortage 

of both wheat and shipping made that 

an impossible task. :1:1 

Under those circumstances the Combined Chiefs saw the failure of General 

Alexander's armies to occupy northern 

Italy, with its heavily fXlpulated industrial region, as something short of regrettable. The Allied command could 

take some comfort in the fact that the 

enemy would have to draw upon its 

own limited resources to sustain the 

region through the winter. 

33 Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45, pp. 773-779. 
CHAPTER XXIII 

Stalemate in the Mountains and on 

the Plain 

Alfxandl'r Df'vl'/oj),\ Hi\ Stralf'g)' 

By the end of October it seemed 

unlikely that the Allied armies would 

wrest control of the Po Valley from the 

Germans before winter set in. Except 

on the Adriatic flank, the Allies still 

faced the enemy in the Apennines. The 

Eighth Army had been checked along 

the Ronco River, and south of Bologna 

the Fifth Army had been ordered to go 

onto the defeitsive. For the latter there 

loomed the uninviting prospect of yet 

another winter in the mountains. 

Yet the situation. oddly enough, best 

served t he overall Allied strategy fi)r 

the Italian Theater-that of containing 

the maximum number of German divisions. For to hold in their present 

positions, the Germans would have ~o 

use all of the divisions presently 111 

northern Italy. If driven from these 

positions, the German armies would fall 

back first to the Po, then the Adige, 

river lines. These formidable natural 

obstacles could be held with considerably fewer troops than the existing line 

in the Apennines and along the Ronco. 

Divisions spared by more favorable defensive lines then could be released to 

other more threatened fronts. Thus, 

instead of the Allies containing the 

Germans, the latter would be containing the Allies. . 

Looking forward to resumption of a 

full-scale offensive in the spring, General Alexander hoped to avoid such a 

rever-sal of roles by reviving his earlier 

concept of a trans-Adriatic ?peration by 

the Eighth Army. He envIsioned s~ch 

an operation as a large-scale turnmg 

maneuver to outflank the German 

forces in northern Italy and to open ~p 

the road into the mid-Danube baSIn 

and possibly reach Vienna before the 

Russians. l 

According to General Alexander's 

calculations, the Germans should be 

able to hold the line of the Adige with 

eleven divisions, and the U.S. Fifth 

Annv would be adequate to fully engage'them. This would free the Eight~ 

Army f()r operations across the A?natie. Belg:rade h~d fallen ~(~ th.e RUSSla;lS 

and theIr partIs~n ,auxlha!'les on 20 

October, and THo's partisans were 

clearing the Dalmatian coast of the 

enemy. General Alexander believed he 

would soon be able to occupy the 

Yugoslav ports of Zadar, Split, and 

Sibenik with light forces. In Fe!:>ruary, 

as part of the final Allied offenSive, the 

Eighth Army could pass. through ~hese 

ports and advance rapIdly .on FlUme 

and Ljubljana and thence mto I()\~er 

Austria. Thus would Alexander brmg 

the Germans to decisive battle on 

1 Alexander Despatch. pp. 76-78; Operations of 

the British. Indian. and Dominion Forces In Italy. 

Pan Ill, Sec. B. pp, 62-97, Cnle5s otherwise 

indicated the f()lIowing is based upon these sources. 
394 

ground of his choosing rather than 

along fortified river lines, such as the 

Po or the Adige. Important to the 

realization of this strategy, however, 

would be the early capture of Bologna, 

needed as a base for the Fifth Army's 

operations against the Po and the Adige 

lines, and the capture of Ravenna, 

required as a base, along with Ancona 

and Rimini, for the Eighth Army's 

trans-Adriatic operations. Thus it was, 

that instead of settling down into defensive positions at the end of October, the 

two Allied armies would prepare for or 

continue offensive operations in their 

respective sectors for another month. 

As his armies paused in the mountains and on the plain, General Alexander presented to Generals Clark and 

McCreery his plan for the capture of 

Bologna and Ravenna. The Eighth 

Army Ie ft wing was to move first, 

crossing the Ronco and capturing Forti, 

four miles to the northwest. This feat 

would open up Route 67 between florence and Forli and improve lateral 

communications between the two armies. At the same time, the Eighth 

Army right wing was also to continue 

astride Highway 16 (the coastal road) 

to capture Ravenna, the northeastern 

terminus of Route 67. These operations 

on the Eighth Army's front could be 

expected to siphon off enemy strength 

from before the U.S. Fifth Army, 

which, in the meantime, was to withdraw units from the line to rest and 

prepare for resumption of the drive on 

Bologna. On army group order, General Clark was to return these units to 

the line as secretly as possible to make 

what was expected to be the final effort 

to capture Bologna before winter set in. 

On 29 October, at a conference with 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

his two army commanders at army 

group headquarters, General Alexander 

agreed to extend the cut-off date for 

the forthcoming operations from 15 

November to 15 December. This would 

give Clark more time to rest his exhausted divisions, and McCreery more 

time to take Forli and Ravenna. General Alexander's only caveat-but an 

important one-was that the operations 

were to be undertaken only if the 

weather \'\'ere favorable and if they (the 

two armies) had "a good chance of 

success."2 

The Capture of Forli 

For the ForIi operation, General 

McCreery planned to employ only two 

of his four corps, the British 5 and the 

Polish 2. The remaining corps, the 

Canadian 1 st Corps and the British 10 

\'vould be given an opportunity to rest, 

the former eventually to be used 

against Ravenna and the latter to be 

moved before the end of the year to 

Greece, together with the British 4th 

and 46th Divisions and the Indian 4th 

Division, to enhance the British role in 

the escalating civil strife in that recently 

liberated country. 

Since 27 October, through a series of 

limited-objective operations, the 5 Corps 

had managed to improve its position 

along the Ronco. The most important 

of these, on 31 October, had been the 

4th Division's crossing of the river east 

of Forli and the 10th Indian Division's 

crossing of the Ronco at ~leIdola, six 

miles southeast of ForIi. The latter 

division, after crossing the river, turned 

northwest and made its way as far as 

Collina, halfway to Forli. On 2 Novem2 Alexander Despatch, p. 76. 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 395 

ber the British 46th Division came 

forward to relieve the Indian division 

and to join the 4th Division in a final 

converging assault on Forii from the 

southeast and the east. (Since both 

British divisions were slated eventually 

for duty in Greece, McCreery wanted 

to make full use of them before their 

relief.) 

On the 5 Corps' left in the Apennines foothills south of Highway 9, the 

2 Polish Corps, meanwhile, prepared 

to resume its advance in the direction 

of Faenza, thirteen miles northwest of 

Preddapio Nuova where the corps had 

halted on 27 October. General McCreery had assigned the Poles the task 

of clearing high ground south of the 

highway between Forli and Faenza, 

eight and a half miles northwest of 

Forli. 

A period of clear, cold weather 

moved into the area on 6 November, 

and the fighter~bombers of the DAF 

emerged in force to support the Eighth 

Army across its entire front. As the 

bombs rained down on the enemy lines, 

the 4th Division initiated the 5 Corps' 

main attack from the vicinity of Carpena, just southeast of the Forli airport, 

a little over two miles from the city. On 

the division's left, the 46th Division 

attacked from a point aixmt two miles 

south of Forli. As a diversion to these 

two operations, a brigade from corps 

reserves, the 56th Division, launched a 

holding attack along Highway 9. Southwest of the 5 Corps the Polish 5th 

Kresowa Division had reached Monte 

Maggiore and the village of San Zeno 

in Volpinara, two and a half miles 

northwest of Predappio Nuova. This 

advance outflanked the Forli sector to 

the south and gravely threatened the 

integrity of the German defense of 

Forli. Now threatened on three sides, 

the Germans in Forb broke contact and 

withdrew during the night of 8 November to the line of the Montone River 

where it turns northward some three 

miles northwest of the city. The 4th 

Division entered Forli early on the 9th. 

When the British attempted to exploit beyond the city, however, they 

were checked briefly by the Germans 

who, in the meantime, had established 

themselves behind the flooded Montone. Nevertheless, by the 12th the 

British managed to cross the river at 

Ladino, four miles southwest of Forii. 

Two days later they overran Villagrappa two miles northwest of the 

bridgehead. But by the 16th growing 

enemy resistance had brought the 5 

Corps' advance to a halt seven miles 

southeast of Faenza, the corps' next 

objective. 

Forb and the high ground immediately southwest of it were now in Allied 

hands. This had been an important 

gain for the Eighth Army. Located at 

the junction of Highway 9 and Highway 67, Forli, in Eighth Army control, 

would open up the Florence-Forli road 

and thereby facilitate lateral communications with the Fifth Army. 

Meanwhile, six miles northeast of 

Forb, the 5 Corps' flanking unit, the 

12th Lancers, aided by local partisans, 

had routed the Germans from Coccolia, 

their last stronghold along the Ronco 

on 15 November. Eight miles northeast 

of Coccolia, Task Force Porter, which 

held the former Canadian sector, occupied the Ravenna airport, despite local 

flooding caused by the enemy's opening 

the flood-gates of the Uiumi Uniti 

Canal. With the line of the Ronco 
396 

breached at three places, the Germans 

northeast of Forli would have no choice 

but to fall back on the ~10ntone, which 

parallels the Ronco two to three miles 

to the west and forms the last possible 

defense line before Ravenna. 

Since Eighth Army's growing threat 

to Ravenna might cause the Germans to 

shift units from the Faenza sector to 

protect their northeastern f1ank, McCreery decided to take advantage of 

this shift by mounting a set-piece attack 

on Faenza. On the west bank of the 

Lamone River, ten miles northwest of 

Forli, Faenza, an ancient center of 

ceramic manufacturing, still lay unscathed behind its 15th century ramparts when on 18 November General 

McCreery issued his orders for an 

attack on the city. As they had during 

the operation against Forli, the 5 Corps' 

4th and 46th Divisions would avoid a 

£juntal assault on the city and attempt 

to invest it from the Apennines foothills 

to the south. On the corps' left flank 

this maneuver was extended as the 2 

Polish Corps' 3d Carpathian Division 

sent patrols as far as Modigliana, ten 

miles southwest of Faenza where contact was made with the Fifth Army's 13 

Corps. As before, the 4th and 46th 

Divisions were to make a converging 

attack, the former advancing south of 

Highway 9 and the latter astride the 

highway. On the 5 Corps' right a holding attack would be set in motion by 

the 10th I ndian Division, which had, 

meanwhile, replaced the 12th Lancers. 

For the present the British 56th Division remained in corps reserve. 

By 21 November the 5 Corps had 

completed preparations fi:n' the assault 

on Faenza. On that day clear skies 

permitted 500 aircraft, including meCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

dium bombers, to roar into the air 

above the front to bomb and strafe 

enemy positions on the Faenza sector 

over the next two days. Shortly before 

the divisions began to move corps artillery opened fire across the front. 

In spite of this firepower the Germans clung to the line of the Montone 

until nightfall on the 23d. Under the 

concealment of darkness thev broke 

contact and fell back three mile~, first to 

the line of the Marzeno, then an additional three miles to the Lamone. 

On the 25th the 5 Corps pulled up 

to the Lamone on a broad front. The 

next day heavy rain began to fall, 

flooding the river and tributary 

streams. Despite the fact that southwest 

and northeast of Faenza the 4th and 

46th Divisions were now within easy 

assault distance of the city they could 

do little until the weather cleared and 

the rains abated. In the interval the 

corps commander, l:.eneral Keightley, 

relieved the 4th Division with the 2d 

New Zealand, which, after several 

weeks in reserve, would be comparatively fresh for the next phase of the 

offensive. 

Meanwhile, to 5 Corps' left, General 

Anders' Polish corps had made good 

progress on the 16th in the valley of 

the Marzeno southwest of Faenza. 

Capturing Montefortino, the high 

ground northeast of Modigliana, the 

5th Kresowa Division lost it to a counterattack on the following night. On the 

18th the 3d Carpathian Division relieved the 5th Kresowa Division and 

went on to recapture Montefortino on 

the 21 st. On the Polish corps' left a 

screening force entered Modigliana un 

the 15th. Over the next nine davs this 

force patrolled beyond Modigli~na as 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 397 

far as the upper Lamone. On the 24th 

the patrols probed to within six miles 

southwest of Faenza. 

Reorganization and Planning em the Fifth 

Army's Front 

While the Eighth Army's 5. Corps 

and Polish corps fought. thel~ way 

northwestward from one rIver Ime to 

the next, the U.S. Fifth Army's commander Clark, had taken advantage of 

the No~ember respite to rest his divisions, assemble supplies, and prepare 

for a resumption of the U.S. II Corps' 

offensive toward Bologna and the Po 

Valley. Kendall's 88th Division ~as the 

first to be withdrawn. To do thIS Clark 

on 2 November once again shifted the 

left boundary of Kirkman's 13 Corps to 

the northwest, this time to take over 

Monte Grande and Monte Cerrere 

from Kendall. This further thinned out 

the 13 Corps' front and made it difficult for that corps to give the Eighth 

Army's drive on Faenza much support. 

On the other hand, the shift further 

narrowed the II Corps front, thereby 

increasing its impact ~hen the att~ck 

resumed. Clark also Imposed stnct 

rationing of artillery ammunition 

throughout his army to build up stocks 

for resuming the offensive in December. Finally, the November hiatus enabled the Fifth Army to integrate replacements who had arrived too late for 

the October battle. 3 

Following their relief, the ,troops of 

the 88th Division enjoyed a few weeks 

rest before returning to the lines on 22 

November to relieve the 85th Division 

3 Clark Diary, 27 Oct 44, citing Ltr, Alexander to 

Clark, and latter's comments thereon; Fifth Army 

Histmy, Part VI, p. 175f[ 

and elements of the 34th Division. The 

remainder of the 34th and all of the 1 st 

Armored Division then took over the 

91st Division's sector so that unit could 

join the 85th Division in corps reserve, 

where both divisions were to prepare 

themselves to make the main effort in 

the forthcoming offensive. 

On 4 :'IJovember the I V Corps resumed command of the 6th South 

African Armoured Division and its attached units. At the same time in the 

coastal sector north of Viareggio, General Almond's 92d Infantry Division, 

under army control, replaced Task 

Force 92. 

During November additional units 

continued to arrive in the Fifth Army. 

General J. B. Mascarenhas de Morales 

Brazilian Expeditionary Forc~ was 

brought up to division strength wl~h the 

arrival of the I st and II th Infantry 

Regiments and the 92d Infantry Divisio~'s ranks were swelled by the attachment of a fourth regiment-the separate 366th In fan try':...an d the 758th 

Light Tank Batt~Ii(~n. In addition to 

these units, 5,000 mfantry replacements 

arrived in Italy and were quickly integrated into th~ seve~al combat, ?ivisions. 

In spite of these arnvals the FIfth Army 

was, by the end of ~ovember, still 

7,O()O understrength III the combat 

arms, mainly infantry. 

Considerable juggling and. re~rganization had to be done to mamtam the 

army's artillery stren~h. Although lhe 

8th Antiaircraft ArtIllery Group had 

been transferred to the Seventh Army 

during November, the loss was ,partl.y 

made up by retain~ng seve,ral mactlvated antiaircraft artIllery umts and reequipping them with self-propelled 105-

mm. howitzers to form the 1 l25th 
398 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion. 

Some of the heavy artillery taken away 

were partially replaced by the attachment to I I Corps of a battery of the 

British 54th Super-Heavy (8-inch) Gun 

Regiment. 

As the time set for the I I Corps' 

renewed assault on Bologna drew near, 

General Clark began to wonder 

whether it would ever take place. Early 

in November, before the CCS finally 

laid to rest Alexander's plans for a 

trans-Adriatic operation, Clark had become convinced that the British, eager 

for a morale-lifting victory, would, in 

spite of mutually agreed upon plans for 

a double-pronged offensive against Bologna, concentrate instead on preparations for the Balkan venture and leave 

the U.S. Fifth Army alone in opposing 

the bulk of the German forces in Italy. 4 

This was indeed Alexander's intention, 

but at that time he considered the Fifth 

Army fully adequate for the task. 

Chronically suspicious of British intentions, Clark also tended to overestimate enemy strength in Italy. Instead 

of the eleven divisions he assumed 

Vietinghoff had on the Tmlh Army's 

front, the Germans actually had only 

ten, most of them greatly understrength. These divisions, moreover, 

were not. massed opposite the U.S. II 

Corps' front, as Clark believed, but 

rather were spread out opposite the II 

and 13 Corps fronts, as well as that of 

the Eighth Army's.5 General Clark was 

also worried whether the forthcoming 

drive on Bologna would have sufficient 

tactical air support. What the Fifth 

Army commander had in mind was 

4 Clark Diary, 5 Nov 44. 

5 Clark Diary, 30 Oct 44. See also AOK 14 and 

AOK 10, fa KTB's. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

something approaching the massive carpet bombing that had paved the way 

for the breakout of General Omar 

Bradley's First Army at St. Lo, France, 

in July. Then a series of blunders and 

misunderstandings had caused over 900 

casualties among the American ground 

troops and had wrung from General 

Eisenhower the declaration that he 

would never again employ heavy bombers in a tactical role. 6 

General Cannon, the senior Allied air 

officer in Italy, shared these misgivings, 

for he was mindful of even greater 

technical difficulties in Italy where winter weather and mountainous terrain 

would present serious challenges to airmen attempting to provide close support for ground operations. General 

Clark, however, was willing to accept 

such risks and insisted that the Fifth 

Army's renewed offensive, scheduled 

for ~arly December, receive close and 

continuous support from strategic as 

well as tactical tx)mbers. General Cannon reluctantly agreed. 7 

Outside Influences on Strategy 

Meanwhile, events had taken place 

elsewhere in Europe that would help 

keep Allied attention in Italy focused 

upon the front in the Apennines and 

the Po Valley rather than on the tu 

shores of the Adriatic. By the third 

week in November the Germans had 

6 He would do so, however, in Operation QUEEN 

during the Siegfried Line campaign. See Charles B. 

MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington, 1963). For an account of Operation COBRA at 

St. Lo see Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit 

(Washington, 1961), pp. 22~38. Both are volumes 

of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

See also Clark Diary, 30 Oct 44. 

7 Clark Diary, 30 Oct 44. 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 399 

regained control over the western half 

of Yugoslavia. This meant, barring an 

advance by the Red Army beyond 

Budapest, that the Germans would 

probably continue to defend their present front in northern Italy well forward 

of the Austrian frontier. In addition to 

restored German control in western 

Yugoslavia, Tito's partisans, now fighting alongside the Red Army, had indicated that additional Allied personnel 

would no longer be welcome in 

Dalmatia. H 

Therefore, on 22 November, Wilson 

reported to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff in London "that recent developments obliged him now to concentrate 

primarily on the campaign in Italy." He 

proposed to Alexander that the Allied 

armies " ... exploit to the limit of 

[their] resources with the object of 

destroying or containing the maximum 

enemy forces remaining in the peninsula." The once-vaunted trans-Adriatic 

venture would then be reduced to a 

mere threat, possibly mounted from an 

Allied air base at Zara and designed 

simply to contain those Germans still in 

Yugoslavia. The assault shipping Wilson 

had requested in October was now no 

longer needed in the Mediterranean. 

SACMED's recommendations found favor with the CCS who agreed to provide Wilson with a new directive concerning future operations. 9 

Command Changes 

As planning for the joint offensive 

neared completion, the entire Allied 

command picture changed. On 25 No8 SACMED Despatch, Aug-Dec 44; Ehrman, Grand 

Strategy, Vol. VI, pp. 5~56. 

9 SACMED Despatch, Aug-Dec 44. 

vember Clark received word that he 

had been selected to command the 

Allied Armies in Italy, now redesignated the 15th Army Group. This 

change in command had been occasioned by the untimely passing of Sir 

John Dill, head of the British Military 

Mission in Washington. SACMED, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, had 

been selected to take Dill's place in 

Washington, and Field Marshal Alexander would move into the position of 

theater commander. Clark's place at 

Fifth Army would be taken by General 

Truscott, who since mid-August had 

been in command of VI Corps in 

France. Another important change reflected the needs of inter-Allied relations. Unlike Alexander's, Clark's new 

headquarters was to be tactical only. 

This would permit Eighth Army to 

deal directly with AFHQ (Alexander's 

headquarters) for administrative matters, rather than clearing through Army 

Group. These changes, however, were 

not to become eHective until mid-December. 10 

Alexander's Orders 

On 28 November, Alexander issued 

orders for resumption of the joint offensive in early December. The Eighth 

Army, with its 1st Canadian Corps once 

again in line and with supplies adequate 

for another three or four weeks of 

offensive operations, depending upon 

the intensity of the fighting, was to 

continue its current operations aimed at 

capturing Ravenna in the northeast and 

10 In Clark's diary, 23 Nov 44, the date given for 

the change in command is 16 December; Alexander 

Despatch, p. 78, gives it as 12 December 1944. Clark, 

Calculated Risk, pp. 404-05. 
400 

Faenza ill t.he northwest and at driving 

toward a junction with the Fifth Ann\' 

near Imola bv 7 December. Thereafiel: 

the Eighth i\rmy's main thrust was t(; 

turn slightly northwest along the I molaBudrio axis-Budrio hing eight miles 

northeast of Bologna. A subsidiary 

thrust was to be directed northwestward 

beyond Ravenna in the dil'ection of 

Fe;Tara, if favorable opportunities beckoned in that direction. 11 

The appearance of the Eighth Armv 

before Imola was to be Fifth Anm's 

signal to begin its phase of the joint 

off(~l1Sive toward Bologna. On the Fifth 

Army's right flank, General Kirkman's 

13 Corps had been stretched so thin by 

frequent westward shifts of its left flank 

to take over more and more of the II 

Corps' sector, that it was unlikely that 

the 13 Corps could provide as much 

help to the Eighth Army's ad\"ance 

along Highwav 9 as General Alexander 

had expected when outlining his original plan. 

In the Fifth Army's center, Keves' II 

Corps was to continue to mak'e the 

army's main effort, this time along the 

axis of Highway 65. The Fifth Army's 

participation in the December offensive 

was to begin on Alexander's order 

anvtime after 7 December and on three 

davs' notice. Evervthing, hO\\'e\'er, 

wo~t1d depend upon' the ~\'eather. The 

coming of severe winter storms was 

expected to restrict oper'ations to the 

main roads, and unless ground and 

weather conditions were favorable, 

Alexander declared there would be no 

offensive. 

II Hq AAI Opns 0 "lo. I, 28 "lov 44, 03 OOil)/55 , 

Unle" otherwise indicated the follm\'ing section is 

based upon this r('/(>rcl1cc. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

The Desert Air Force was once again 

to support the December offensive. 

Since the beginning of the campaign in 

l\'orth Africa this f()lTe had been the 

Eighth Army's constant companion and 

would fly again in its support. The 

XXII Tactical Air Command would 

support the Fifth Army. In response to 

General Clark's insistence, General CannOll had agreed to the use of hea\"\' as 

well as medium bombers in direct ~upport of the ground f(m:es. 

An Allied Dnwtive 

Meanwhile, 011 2 December, Wilson 

recci\'ed from the CCS the long-awaited 

direni\'e that would go\'ern the Opel'<ltions of the Allied Armies in Itah' until 

the spring of 1945. After stating that 

no major Allied forces (other than 

those British units already earmarked 

f()r Creece) were to be int'roduced into 

the Balkans, the directive spelled out 

once and for all that the first and 

immediate mission of Alexander's armies "should be to capt ure Bologna, 

then to secure the general lint' Raycnna-Bologna-La Spezia and thereafter 

continue operations with a \ie\\ to 

containing Kesselring's arImo \Vithdrawal of f()n:cs from 'the line' for rest, 

rehabilitation, and rotation should be 

consistent with thc above mission." 12 

Although the Ilew directi\"c ruled out 

large-scale trans-Adriatic operations, it 

had left olx'll the door f()r the introduction of light forces through those 

Dalmatian r~')l"ts still in partisan hands 

"in order to harass, and exert pressure 

and attrition on the Germans \\'ithdrawing from Yugosl,nia." But in \ie\\ of 

the changed attitude of Tito's partisans 

Ehrman, Gralld Stratl',I.f\'. \'oJ. \'\, p, 'i{), 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 401 

toward the Allies, this seemed a remote 

possibility. The directive further fanned 

within Alexander's headquarters faint 

sparks of hope for operations other 

than on the main front; forces and 

resources made available as a result of 

withdrawals from the line were to "constitute a strategic reserve well placed to 

reinforce the effort against Kesselring 

and facilitate the rotation of tired units 

to be available for prompt employment in 

other operations as the changing situation 

permits. " 1 3 

Whether or not this slight nod toward the now vanished British designs 

f()f Balkan ventures satisfied General 

Alexander is diflicult to determine. In 

any case, until spring returned to the 

battlefields of Europe such operations 

would be, at the most, limited to local 

offensives and possible counteroffensives. 

The Eighth Army's Advance Continues 

Inasmuch as the CCS directive was 

consistent with Alexander's operational 

plan for early December, he made no 

changes in Eighth Army's phase of the 

attack, scheduled to be resumed on 2 

December. Since intelligence reports 

had indicated that in order to hold the 

threatened Faenza sector, the Germans 

had thinned out their defenses in the 

northeastern coastal flank, McCreery 

had decided to replace with the 1st 

Canadian Corps the relatively weak 

Porter Force, a task force that had 

relieved the Canadians late in October. 

Operating on the coastal flank, the 

Canadians were to attack across the 

Montone River, which joins the Ronco 

13 Ibid. Italics supplied. 

a mile south of Ravenna. After establishing a bridgehead near San Pancrazio, five miles southwest of Ravenna, 

and capturing Godo, three miles northwest of the crossing, the corps was to 

continue its advance in three columnsthe first to turn northeastward to cut in 

behind Ravenna; the second to cut 

Highway 16 north of Mezzano, five 

mile~ north of Codo; and the third to 

advance on Russi, three miles southwest 

of Godo, and cross the Lamone 

River. 14 

While the 1 st Canadian Corps took 

its place on the Eighth Army's right 

wing, in the center the British 5 Corps, 

having secured Forli, prepared to resume its advance on Faenza. To take 

advantage of the well-drained ground 

in hills south of Highway 9 and to 

a void a frontal attack over the soggy 

terrain north of the highway, the corps 

was first to seize the high ground near 

Pideura, four miles southwest of 

Faenza, then bypass the city and take 

Castel Bolognese, five miles beyond. 

The 2 Polish Corps on the Eighth 

Army's left flank was meanwhile to 

conform to the 5 Corps' advance. 

As General Alexander had stipulated, 

the resumption of operations would 

depend upon the weather, for as already indicated, the Allies were relying 

greatly upon the support of their air 

force. Fortunately, the skies ,,,,ere clear 

on 2 December, as the aircraft of the 

DAF bombed and strafed the enemy 

across the front. On the ground the 

Canadian corps advanced to the northnorthwest in the face of heavy resist-

"Operations of British, Indian and Dominion 

Forces in Italy. Pt. III, Sec B. Unless otherwise 

ind;'~ated the following is based on this source. 
402 

ance. Two days later the Canadian 5th 

Armored Division rolled into Codo and 

further tightened the noose around 

Ravenna by cutting Highway 16 six 

miles to the northwest. 

Inasmuch as a partisan uprising had 

already driven the Germans from the 

city, the Canadians had little difficulty 

entering on 4 December. This event 

marked the first appearance on the 

Allied front of a major, well-organized 

partisan unit, for hitherto partisans had 

played only a peripheral role but 

would hencefCxth take a more active 

part in operations. With Ravenna's capture, the 900-man Communist-led 28th 

Garibaldi Brigade took a place in the 

Eighth Army's ranks somewhat comparable to that of a Regular unit, receiving logistical support in the form of 

ammunition, food, and clothing 

through army supply channels. For the 

balance of the winter the brigade would 

hold a quiet sector of the army's front 

but would eventually take an active part 

in the spring offensive to the Po. 

Unlike Rimini, Ravenna offered the 

Eighth Army no logistical advantages 

other than to provide some shelter for 

the winter months. Centuries earlier 

Ravenna had been an important seaport, but in 1944 it was connected to a 

harbor only by a canal. Shallow and 

heavily mined, the harbor was ignored 

by the Eighth Army, which depended 

instead on a recently opened railhead at 

Cesena, seven miles west of Rimini. The 

army's logistical system would be improved even further when a pipeline 

and oil storage facilities were completed 

on 10 December as far as ForIimpopoli, 

six miles beyond Cesena. These developments eliminated much of the long 

truck haul from Ortona, far to the 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

army's rear, and greatly shortened and 

simplified the army's line of communications. 

Elsewhere on the Canadian Corps 

sector the Canadian 1st Infantry Division, on the 5th Armored Division's left, 

encountered stronger resistance on 4 

December as it moved toward Russi, 

eight miles southwest of Ravenna. Bypassing the town, the Canadian infantry 

rushed to reach the Lamone, two miles 

to the west where they were halted by 

the Germans dug in along the far bank. 

The next day, however, the Canadians 

managed to establish a precarious 

bridgehead across the river. 

Southwest of the Ravenna sector the 

2d New Zealand and the British 46th 

Infantry Divisions began the first phase 

of an outflanking maneuver against the 

Faenza sector. During the night of 2 

December the New Zealanders feinted 

toward the Lamone to hold the enemy 

on that sector, while four miles south of 

Faenza in the Quartolo San Ruffilo area 

the British division established a bridgehead across the river. On the following 

day, however, the Germans checked all 

attempts by the British to enlarge the 

bridgehead in the direction of the Pideura Ridge, two miles to the west and 

covering the southern approaches to 

the city. 

On the 46th Division's left, the Polish 

corps supported the 5 Corps' attack on 

Faenza by clearing the Marradi-Faenza 

road as far as the town of Strada, 

twelve miles southwest of Faenza. After 

crossing the upper reaches of the Lamone on 5 December, the Polish infantry advanced two miles to the west, 

where they captured the village of 

Montecchio on Monte San Rinaldo and 

all the high ground to the south of it, 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 403 

thereby securing the left flank of the 

Eighth Anny's offensive. 

German Reactions 

The acting Army Group C commander, General Vietinghoff, had believed that he could hold the Canadians 

south of Ravenna at least temporarily. 

But the partisan uprising, which had 

seized control of the city, upset his 

calculations and forced him to request 

permission from OKW to fall back in 

the Ravenna sector to avoid the necessity of drawing reserves from the Bologna sector, where the Americans 

could be expected to resume their 

offensive at any time. In spite of his 

earlier orders to the army group to 

h~ld in place in northeastern Italy, 

HItler now reluctantly authorized Vietinghoff to withdraw the Tenth Army to 

a line northwest of Ravenna to prevent 

that army's right wing from being cut 

off. 15 

Although willing to authorize a withdrawal in the northeast, the German 

leader was adamant about holding in 

place on the Faenza sector. As Herr's 

panzer corps dug in along the west 

bank of the Lamone, Hitler personally 

intervened on 7 December to order 

Vietinghoff to stand fast at Faenza and 

to yield no ground there. To help Army 

Group C in. this effort OKW promised 

to send 2,600 replacements to Italy. On 

9 December, first the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, then the 98th Infantry Division appeared on the LXXVI Panzer 

Corps' front to back up the Fuehrer's 

order. As the British widened and 

eventually joined their bridgeheads west 

of the Lamone on the II th, Hitler 

15 Greiner and Schramm, eds .• OKW WFSt, KTB, 

IVO), pp. 570-76. Unless otherwise indicated the 

following section is based upon this source. 

modified his original order by authorizing Vietinghoff to fall back slightly, but 

cautioned against a temptation to withdraw into the illusive security of the socalled Genghis Khan switch position, 

which ran northeast from Bologna 

thirty miles to Lake Comacchio on the 

Adriatic coast. 

Attack on Faenw Resumed 

Even before Hitler ordered his 

troops to defend Faenza at all costs, the 

British 5 Corps had encountered growing resistance as it attempted to turn 

the successive enemy defense lines bv 

advancing northwestward through th~ 

Apennines foothills south of Highway 

9. In addition to increasing resistance, 

broken countrv and a lack of roads 

made it hard for the 46th Division to 

maneuver in trying to clear the Pideura 

Ridge. And for a few days high water 

made the bridges over the Lamone 

impassable. Consequently, it was not 

until 7 December that the' British finally 

cleared the enemy from Pideura village. 

The Germans, in the meantime, having 

received Hitler's order to hold in place, 

stubbornly defended high ground to 

the north of Pideura. Poor weather 

which restricted tactical air SUPfX)ft ove; 

the battle area, even enabled the Germans to launch several local counterattacks, thereby preventing the British 

from exploiting Pideura's capture. 

There was another factor limiting the 

momentum of the British advance--the 

necessity to pull units out of line to be 

sent to Greece. Although all counterattacks were thrown back with considerable loss to the enemy, Major General C. 

F. Keightley, the 5 Corps commander, 

was forced to halt his attack to pull Ule 

Greece-bound 46th Division out of the 
404 

linc. This f()rccd him to I'cgroup his 

remaining dh'isions across the corps' 

sector. Rcgrouping was completed by 

\4 December, as two rclativelv fresh 

units, the 10th Indian and 2'd l\'e\\ 

Zealand Divisions, moved into the 

bridgeheads across the Lamone. The 

Indian division assembled in the left 

half of the bridgehead and the l\'ew 

Zealand division in the right and along 

the line of the river ('£1st of Faenza. 

l\'orth of the city lay the 5 Corps 

reserve-the 56th Division, no", committed to a quiet water-logged sector 

cast of the Lamone. 

While General Keightley regrouped 

his corps, the 2 Polish Corps' 5th 

Kresowa Division advanced beyond Brisighella onto the high ground seyen 

miles southwest of Faenza. When patrols reached the Sintria River, three 

miles northwest of Brisighella, they 

£(lUnd that high watel' made the river 

un f(Jrdable. 

Taking advantage of concealment offered by darkness, the 5 COI'PS, in the 

meantime, launched its assault on 

Faenza during the night of 14 December. To support the assault General 

Keightley had massed mote than 400 

guns to cover the advance of the ;"\ew 

Zealanders from the southwest and the 

Indians from the east of the city. On 

the 5 Corps' left the Polish troops 

crossed the flooded Sintria and dosed 

up to the Sellio River, two miles to the 

west. Faced now with the prospect of 

being trapped in Faenza, the German 

garrison withdtew to the northwest, 

where they re-established themseh'es 

along the Senio, three miles a\\a)'. On 

the heels of the retreating Germans the 

43d Motorized Indian Infantry Brigade 

(10 Indian Division) rolled into the 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

city. Bv dawn on the following day the 

Indians had established two small 

bridgeheads across the Senio at a point 

west of Faenza. 

Bef()re the line of the Senio could be 

f(H'Ced ill anv strength, a bridge carrying Highway 9 aCl~)ss the L~mone ~lt 

Faenza had first to be I'ebuilr. But 

north of the city opposite the 56th 

Division, the Germans still held positions where flooded fields enabled them 

to take their time about withdrawing in 

the sector. From these positions enemy 

fil'e made completion of the bridge 

impossible until the Germans finally 

withdrew on the 22d. While the engineers worked on the bridge, the .7 

Corps tried consolidating its positions ill 

and around Faenza. Meanwhile the 

Eighth Army's advance along High\\ay 

9 had come virtually to a halt. 

On Eighth Army's coastal flank, the 

I st Canadian Corps encountered less 

trouble reaching the Senio in its sector. 

After having consolidated its positions 

beyond Ravenna and along the cast 

bailk of the Lamone River, the Canadians patrolled northward toward the 

Comacchio Lagoon, a large coastal body 

of water nine miles north of Ravenna. 

On II December the Canadians established two large bridgeheads over the 

Lamone, following on the 12th with a 

third, six miles n0l1hwest of Ravenna 

near Mezzano on Highway 16. After 

linking all three bridgeheads, the Canadians advanced against relatively little 

opposition toward Bagnacavallo, six 

miles southwest of Mezzano, as the 

Germans, with the Canadians f<)llowing 

closely, fdl back to the next river line, 

the Senio, five miles west of the Lamone nver. 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 40S 

The Fifth Army Plans and Wait5 

All this time, other than reorganIzation of units, resting of weary men, and 

planning for coming operations, the 

only activity on the Fifth Army sector 

had taken place on the flanks. To the 

right, the British 13 Corps helped 

Eighth Army's operations south of 

Highway 9 through pressure against 

the enemy opposite its sector. The 8th 

Indian Division, on the corps' right 

flank, proceeded along the MarradiFaenza road, following the valley of the 

upper Lamone toward BrisighelIa, 

seven miles southwest of Faenza. On 

the 13 Corps' center, the British 6th 

Armoured Division pushed 5 miles beyond Castel del Rio along the Santerno 

valley ro~d to capture the village of 

Fontanehce on 30 November. This 

brought the British armor to within ten 

miles or Imola. Ol~ the corps' left wing, 

the BrItISh I st Infantry was less f{)rtunate, for not only did it make no gains 

but during the night of the 28th was 

driven from Monte Castellera near 

Monte Grande by troops from the 1st 

Parachute Division. 

There was far less action in the west, 

on the Fifth Army's left flank, where 

some Brazilian units received their baptism of fire. This was a brief set-piece 

operation on the Bombiana-Marano 

sector by the 6th Regimental Combat 

Team of the BEF. Thereafter that 

sector too settled down to sporadic 

patrolling, as was the case elsewhere on 

the army's front. 

During this period Army and Corps 

headquarters, however, bustled with activity as planning for resumption of the 

drive on Bologna continued. Much of 

the Fifth Army's earlier crippling personnel shortages had largely been replenished. Enough replacements had 

arrived to bring the divisions up to full 

strength. The 91 st Division had returned to the front on 3 December. 

Keyes' II Corps now had four divisions 

on line; from left to right, the 1st 

Armored, the 91st, the 34th, and the 

88th Infantrv Divisions. The 85th Division lay in 'corps reserve, enjoying a 

well-deserved respite from combat. 16 

To reach Bologna, Clark planned a 

thre:-phase attack astride Highway 65. 

Durmg the first two phases Keyes' 

corps was to clear the enemy from' the 

high ground in the vicinity of Pianoro, 

eight miles south of Bologna. In the last 

phase the corps was to sweep down 

from the last of the Apennines into the 

Po Valley and capture Bologna. While 

the II Corps advanced along Highway 

65, Crittenberger's IV Corps was to 

maintain pressure against the enemy by 

continuing the series of limited objective 

operations initiated earlier by the Brazilians on the Bombiana-Marano sector. 

On the right. of the II Corps, Kirkman's 

13 Corps was to continue to exert 

pressure down the Santerno and Lamone valleys against the flank of the 

LXXVI Panzer Corps, opposing 5 Corps 

on Highway 9. 

The Fifth Army was ready to move, 

but the Eighth Army had not yet 

reached the objectives that Alexander 

had set for it on Highway 9, and Allied 

meteorologists were unable to forecast 

the necessary minimum of three days 

of good flying weather to assure Cla~k 

of the dose air support he so strongly 

desired. On 7 December, therefore. 

C..eneral Alexander, instead of giving 

,. Fifth Army History, Part VIII, pp, 12-16. unless 

otherwise indicated the following is based upon this 

citation, 
406 

the signal for Fifth Army to attack, 

announced the first in a series of 

postponements of the Fifth Army's offensive. Despite plans and revision of 

plans, followed by preparations and 

alerts, postponement followed postponement. 

Were these postponements necessary? 

Was Alexander's decision not to unleash Clark's Fifth Army militarily valid 

or unduly cautious? Both Allied armies 

had broken through the Gothic Line on 

their respective sectors. In the mountains the U.S. II Corps lay within nine 

miles of the center of Bologna and five 

miles from Highway 9. And the attached British 13 Corps was within ten 

miles of Imola. In the plain the Eighth 

Army's three corps had reached the 

east bank of the Senio and at one point 

were within seven miles of Imola. Furthermore, the enemy divisions had been 

weakened by considerable casualties. 

Might not one last mighty effort by 

both Allied armies have carried them 

through to Bologna and the Po Valley 

on a broad front? Possibly. But the 

offensive that had been under way 

since August on the Eighth Army's 

front and since September on the 

Fifth's had left the troops near exhaustion by the beginning of December. 

Faced with the need to rest the weary 

divisions, Alexander had no choice bU:t 

to call the offensive to a halt. I 7 

For the rest of the year most of the 

Fifth Army's front remained dormant. 

The Allied command believed that the 

German armies in Italy would adopt a 

similar posture. But when the Germans 

in northwestern Europe precipitated a 

large-scale counteroffensive against Ei17 Nicholson, A/"x, p. 266. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

sen hower's forces in the Ardennes 

General Alexander had to revise hi~ earlier assumptions. He concluded that 

if the enemy undertook a similar enterprise in the Italian theater, the likeliest 

to be attacked would be the weaker of 

the two Allied armies-the Fifth Army. 

The logical location of an attack on that 

army's front would, of course, be that 

sector held either by the Brazilian Expeditionary Force or the newly arrived 

and largely untested 92d Infantry Division, both on the Army's left flank. 

In mid-December major changes of 

command took place among the senior 

Allied commanders in the theater. C:-eneral Alexander, promoted to Field Marshal, took over General Wilson's headquarters as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED), 

whereupon General Clark moved up to 

take command of the Allied Armies 

Italy; and General Truscott returned 

from his command in France to head 

the Fifth Army. The problem of how to 

deal with a possible enemy counterattack on the Italian front now passed to 

Alexander's successors. 

One of the first papers to reach 

General Truscott's desk was an intelligence report of a buildup of enemy 

forces opposite the Fifth Army's left 

flank in IV Corps' sector. The 148th 

Infantry Division and two Italian units. 

the Monte Rosa and San Marco Marine 

Divisions, had been reported in the La 

Spezia area, and there were some indications that the 157th Mountain Division 

might be moving into the sector as 

well. There was also some evidence 

that the Germans might take advanta~e. of the lull on the central front by 

shIftmg the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier, 

the 26th Panzer, or the 5th Mountain 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 407 

Division to their Ligurian flank. Moreover, aerial reconnaissance had confirmed partisan and prisoner of war 

reports that bridges and roads destroyed earlier in the upper Serchio 

Valley had been repaired. Even as the 

vital Allied port of Antwerp seemed to 

be the ultimate objective of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

so now it seemed to the Fifth Army's 

intelligence officers that the port of 

Leghorn might become the objective 

of a similar operation in the northern 

Apennines on the Fifth Army's left 

flank. 

Such speculations seemed not without 

substance, for at the beginning of December all that stood in the way of 

a German thrust toward Leghorn was 

General Almond's relatively inexperienced 92d Infantry Division, holding a 

6-mile-wide front from the coast inland 

to the village of Barga in the upper 

Serchio valley. This division, made up 

entirely of Negro enlisted men, with 

officers from both races, had been 

activated at Fort McClellan, Alabama, in 

October 1942, from a cadre of officers 

and men drawn from the 93d Infantry 

Division, the first Negro combat division to be organized in World War 11. 18 

Since its activation, the 92d Division's 

ranks had been characterized by unusually high percentage of poorly educated men. At the end of January 1944, 

the division's General Classification Test 

score percentages disclosed that none of 

18 See Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, for the 

details on the division's training and organization 

difficulties. See also Paul Goodman, A Fragment of 

Victory, a special monograph (hereafter cited as 

Goodman Monograph), written at the Army War 

College, Carlisle, Pa., 1952; and IG file on 92d Div. 

Unless otherwise indicated the following section is 

based upon these sources. 

the enlisted men assigned was in Class 

I, 10 percent were in Class II, IS 

percent in Class III, 41 percent in Class 

IV, and 21 percent in Class V. Thirteen 

percent had received no score at all 

because they were illiterate and unable 

to take the test. Obviously the men of 

the 92d Division had come into the 

Army with far fewer educational and 

cultural opportunities and from homes 

with significantly lower socio-economic 

status than men in other combat divisions. This situation was widely known 

throughout the army and, even before 

December 1944, had given the division 

a reputation as an undesirable assignment for white officers. 

Only one of the division's regiments, 

the 370th, had seen any action, that as 

part of Task Force 92. Although the 

division commander, General Almond, 

had nothing but praise for his unit's 

artillery, communications, supply, medical service, and transportation troops, 

he was less enthusiastic about the performance of the combat infantry, which 

had shown little steadiness in its first 

encounter with the enemy. The very 

limited battle experience gained by the 

370th Infantry since October had, in 

Almond's opinion, "been no compensation for the loss of key leaders incurred." On 18 October the second of 

the regiments, the 371 st Infantry, had 

arrived at Leghorn and relieved the 

370th Infantry on 31 October. After 

the 36Sth Infantry had completed its 

deployment on 8 November, the 92d 

Division took over a 6-mile front in the 

Serchi6 valley on the I I Corps' left 

flank. 

I t was hardly surprising, therefore, 

that one of General Truscott's first 

decisions as Fifth Army commander 
408 

was to shift additional units to IV Corps 

where they would be in position to back 

up the 92d Division as a precaution 

against an enemy counteroffensive. On 

23 December Truscott attached the 

85th Division's 339th Infantry to IV 

Corps. At the same time, he shifted the 

85th Division's 337th Infantry from II 

Corps reserve and two brigades of the 

8th Indian Division from 13 Corps 

reserve to back-up positions in the IV 

Corps' rear. Meanwhile, Truscott also 

returned the 92d Division to army 

control. He also detached from II 

Corps the 84th Chemical Battalion, the 

755th and 760th Tank Battalions, two 

I55-mm. howitzer and one I55-mm. 

gun U.S. Field Artillery battalions, and 

two regiments (battalions) of British 5.5-

inch guns and sent them to IV Corps 

in the vicinity of Lucca. By 25 December both Indian brigades had closed 

into reserve position near Lucca. The 

85th Division's remaining regiment, the 

338th Infantry, remained in II Corps 

reserve to help repel any counteroffensive directed against either the 1st Armored Division's or the 9Ist Division's 

sectors. 

A German Counterattack 

General Truscott's precautionary 

moves were well justified, for the Fourteenth Army, then under the command 

of General del' Infanterie Kurt von 

Tippelskirch, had on its own initiative 

made plans to deliver on 26 December, 

a limited objective attack under the 

code Operation WINTERGEWITTER 

(Winter Thunderstorm). The primary 

purpose of this operation was to relieve 

pressure on the Italian Alpine division, 

Monte Rosa, which had been engaged 

earlier by the Brazilian Expeditionary 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Force in the Serchio valley. The LI 

Mountain Corps, which had replaced the 

XIV Panzer Corps on the Fourteenth 

Army's right wing, had assembled a 

miscellaneous group of units for Operation WINTERGEWITTER. They included a battalion each from the 148th 

In/aniry Division's 285th and 286th InFmtry Regiments, the Alpine Training Battalion (Mittenwald) (a school battalion from 

the German mountain warfare school at 

Mittenwald), and the 4th Alpine Battalion. The mountain units were first-rate 

troops. A motorized artillery battalion 

of the 51st Artillery Regiment and one 

heavy and two light battalions of the 

1048th Artillery Regiment were to provide 

fire support for the operation. The 

mission of this force was to initiate a 

limited objective operation against the 

U.S. 92d Division with the intent of 

destroying its effectiveness for further 

offensive operations. This was an ironic 

twist, for, in the eyes of its own commander, the division already lacked a 

capacity for such operations. 19 

The euphoria of Christmas Day at 

the snow-covered front had just begun 

to fade when, early on the 26th, Operation WINTERGEWITTER broke over 

the Serchio valley. Behind a screen of 

mortar and artillery fire, the Germans 

attacked along the slopes flanking the 

valley. West of the river, from the 

vicinity of Castelnuovo, twenty miles 

north of Lucca, the enemy struck, simultaneously, the 1st Battalion of the 

370th Infantry, located near the village 

of Molazzana four miles south of Castelnuovo, and the 2d Battalion, in the 

village of Calomini, a mile south of 

19 AOK 14, 1a KTB AnI. 5, 11-27 Dec 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 659221 I. 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 409 

Molazzana. East of the Serchio, the 

enemy attack also hit ouqX)sts of the 

366th Infantry's 2d Battalion, attached 

to the 370th Infantry and garrl'iOning 

the villages of Sommocolonia, Bebbio, 

and Tiglio-all lying just east of Molazzana. 20 

feinting first at the American positions west of the Serchio the 2d Battalion 

of the 285th Infantry Regiment advanced 

from one to two miles to capture the 

villages of Calomini and Gallicano early 

in the day. Some hint that the thrust 

west of the valley might be a mere feint 

became apparent when the Germans 

recoiled quickly in the face of a weak 

American counterattack in that area. 21 

Operation WINTERGEWITTER's 

main effort was actually concentrated 

east of the Serchio, where the 286tll 

Infantry Regiment's 2d Battalion overran 

the area west of Barga, a mile and a 

half . south of So mmocolonia , and beat 

back several American counterattacks 

launched from Barga. After bitter 

house-to-house fighting, the 4th Alpine 

Battalion finally drove the Americans 

from Somm(;colonia northeast of 

Barga, and to the northwest occupied 

the high ground at Monte Vano. To 

the grenadiers' east the Mittenwald Battalion captured the village of Tiglio. 22 

When General Crittenberger, the IV 

Corps commander, learned of the Ger20 The 366th Infantry, a separate all-Negro regiment, had been assigned to the 15th Air Force 

from 6 May to 19 November 1944, during which 

time the regiment had been used to guard airfields. 

Assigned to the Fifth Army on 19 November, the 

regiment was attached to the 92d Division until 25 

February 1945. See Fifth Armv History, Part VII, p. 

17. 

21 AOK 14, Ia KTB AnI. 5, 26 Dec 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 65922/1. 

22 Ibid. 

man attack, he immediately moved the 

two Indian brigades into backstop positions behind the 92d Division. Sharing 

the corps commander's concern for that 

division's steadfastness and uncertain of 

enemy intentions, General Truscott also 

detached Prichard's 1st Armored Division from I I Corps and moved it 

westward to the vicinity of Lucca. The 

34th Division's 135th Infantry followed 

to take up a reserve position near 

Viareggio.23 

By the afternoon of the 26th C..erman 

successes seemed to threaten a breakthrough on the 92d Division's Serchio 

valley front. The threat was especially 

evident east of the valley where Company G of the 366th Infantry had 

fallen back in disarray, opening up a 

500-yard g'<tp through which the enemy 

troops rushed toward the village of 

Barga. 24 Despite steadfast resistance by 

a handful of heroic men, the village fell 

to the Germans on the f()llowing morning. Continuing their attack throughout 

the 27th, the Germans pushed a fe" .. 

miles beyond Barga, then concluded. 

the operation by mopping up the area 

between the village and the Serchio 

River. Since their mission had been 

accomplished, and they had not intended to advance any further, they 

now began to withdraw, leaving, for the 

next few days, only a screening force in 

contact with U.S. IV Corps. 25 

In the meantime, the 8th Indian 

Division's 19th Brigade had been 

moved five miles northwest of Bagni di 

Lucca to establish a line to the 92d 

23 Fifth Army History, Part VIII, pp. 17-19. 

2. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 62-67: 

Goodman Monograph, p. 76. 

ze, AOK 14, Ia KTB Ani. 5. 27 Dec 44, AOK 14. 

Doc 65922/1. 
410 

Division's rear; the line extended from 

Coreglia Antelminelli in the northeast, 

southwest four miles to San Fomano, a 

mile south of the Serchio River and 

about four miles south of Barga. During the night of the 26th the disorganized survivors of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 370th Infantry passed 

through the Indians' lines on their way 

to the rear, where the men believed 

they might find safety from enemy fire. 

After rounding up these men, General 

Almond had them moved west of the 

Serchio, where they took up positions 

on the Indians' left and to the rear of 

the 370th Infantrv's I st Battalion. Late 

that same night the Indian patrols ran 

into the German screening force. 2;; 

The skies were clear and bright on 

the 27th as the aircraft of the XXI I 

T AC appeared over the front to pound 

the withdrawing enemy troops. For the 

next four days, the supporting aircraft 

flew a total of 1,330 sorties while the 

two Indian brigades, driving the screening force before them, deared Barga 

on the 29th and Sommocolonia the 

following day. As the year 1944 drew to 

a close, the Indians met little resistance 

as they retook in turn Gallicano, Bebbio, and Molazzana to recover virtually 

all of the ground lost to the enemy 

since the 26th. 2i 

Contrary to the Fifth Army G-2's 

belief, Operation WINTERGEWIITER 

had no connection with the Ardennes 

offensive. As a matter of fact, after the 

operation in the Serchio valley had run 

its course, Hitler's chief of staff cautioned the Army Group C commander 

26 Lee, Emplo)ment oj Negro Troops; Goodman 

Monograph; Fifth Arm~ History, Part VII, pp. 17-18. 

27 Fifth Army History, Part VIII, pp. 17-18. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

not to undertake such operations in the 

future without prior approval from 

supreme headquarters. 28 

The Fifth Army command was not 

alone in being somewhat puzzled over 

enemy objectives in the Serchio valleythe C..erman supreme command itself 

had questioned the operation-but 

C..eneral von Tippelskirch, acting Fourteenth Army commander, harbored no 

doubts as to its desirability and purpose. 

The brief offensive had, in his opinion, 

improved troop morale by giving his 

men a needed victory over the Americans. Moreover, the 'units participating 

had received valuable training and combat experience. Most importantly, the 

U.S. Fifth Army had been forced to 

withdraw troop~ from the critical II 

Corps' sector south of Bologna in order 

to support the sagging Serchio valley 

sector. 29 Both General von Tippelskirch 

and his superiors would have been even 

more pleased had they known that 

Operation WINTERGEWITTER had 

also thrown the Fifth Army off balance 

to such an extent as to co~tribute to a 

f<)llrth and, what proved to be, a final 

postponement, until spring, of the assault on Bologna. 30 

The Stalemate 

Not only on the Fifth Army's front, 

but also on the Eighth Army's, all 

military operations now carne to a halt. 

Although the Germans had been driven 

from Ravenna on 4 December, from 

Faenza on the 16th, and Bagnacavallo, 

28 Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

IV (I), p. 569. 

29 AOK 14, fa KTB Ani. 5, 31 Dec 44, AOK 14, 

Doc. 6592211. 

30 Msg 06006, Hq 15th Army Croup to At'HQ, 

28 Dec 44, MOSTEL 44, 010014126. 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 411 

two miles to the northeast, on the 21 st, 

these were to be the Eighth Army's last 

significant advances in 1944. The Lamone River had been crossed on a 

broad front, but three miles beyond it 

the Germans had re-established themselves along the west bank of the Senio. 

In spite of these limited successes, time 

had run out on the Eighth Army's 

operations for 1944. Imola and the 

Santerno River, necessary springboards 

for a co-ordinated assault on Bologna 

by. both armies, still lay well behind 

enemy lines. The weather had meanwhile worsened, grounding aircraft and 

making it impossible even for tracked 

vehicles to operate off hard-surfaced 

roads. Although the ground had begun 

to freeze, it was not yet firm enough to 

support armor. Once again a change in 

the weather would deprive the Eighth 

Army of the advantages of its superiority in armor and airpower. Commenting on this fact before leaving to take 

up his new post in Washington, Wilson 

had observed that "the terrain and 

weather were all in [Kesselring's] favor; 

these discounted our superiority in armor and restricted the use which could 

be made of our powerful Air Forces, 

thus bringing the enemy's resources in 

the battle area to a level more comparable to our own." 31 

There were other factors operating 

to reduce Allied strength and to bring 

the opposing armies more into balance 

during the winter of 1944-45. Before 

the end of the year the Eighth Army 

would lose a corps headquarters and 

three divisions to the growing civil strife 

in Greece. And, in February, a decision 

that had been debated since September 

31 SAC Despatch, Aug-Dec 44, p. 58. 

and finally had been made in January 

would be implemented, as the 1 st Canadian Corps and its two divisions left to 

join other Canadian forces in northwestern Europe. Under these circumstances, there was little the Eighth 

Army could do but to dig in along the 

Senio and there await the coming of 

spring and perhaps better days for the 

fortunes of Allied arms in Italy. 32 

The failure of the two Allied armies 

to reach the Lombardy plain had 

placed them at some disadvantage, 

when compared with the Germans, who 

had in Highway 9 an excellent lateral 

road with relatively short distances between it and their front lines. The 

Allies had no comparable lateral road 

network. In some instances forward 

units on the Fifth Army's front lay 

eighty miles from a railhead or advance 

base, and usually the last thirty miles to 

the front could be traversed only by 

jeeps for the stretch and generally 

ended with mule trains or back-packing 

by the men themselves. 

Although the Allies, anticipating 

mountain operations, had assembled 

and organized considerable mule transport, the operational demands during 

November and December far exceeded 

anything foreseen. A school to train 

additional muleteers had been established by the Allied armies at Orvieto, 

after efforts to recruit them from 

among the civilian population had been 

less than satisfactory. But as the Fifth 

Army settled down for another winter 

in the mountains, the supply of both 

men and animals never quite kept up 

with the demands of combat troops, for 

mud and cold would take a high toll. 

32 Alexander Despatch, pp. 76-78. 
412 

ITALIAN MULE TRAIN TRANSPORTING 

SUPPLIES TO THE FRONT 

General Truscott had meanwhile informed his corps commanders on the 

28th that all troops were to remai.n on a 

nine-day alert pending resumptI~n of 

offensive operations. General ~nttenberger's IV Corps was to contmue. to 

cover the army's lines of commUnIcations between the central front south of 

Bologna and the base at Leghorn, while 

General Keyes' I I Corps wa~ to be 

prepared to move on short notIce, and 

General Kirkman's 13 Corps was to 

maintain pressure in the Santerno valley along the Imola road .and assist, if 

possible, any further EIghth Army 

movement along Highway 9. General 

Prichard's 1st Armored Division was to . 33 remain at Lucca m army reserve. 

"" 1 ruscott, Command Missions, pp. 456-68. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

This dogged optimism could not be 

long maintained, ~owever, i~ the face 

of the present reality of a wmter stalemate. General Clark, after conferring 

on 30 December with his army commanders, did cling for awhile to his 

determination that Bologna must be 

captured that winter, and refused t? 

abandon the offensive until ammUnItion stocks were rebuilt. But he, too, 

finally capitulated to reality a week 

later, when at a meeting with Field 

Marshal Alexander at the 15th Army 

Group headquarters in Florence, .Clark 

at last acknowledged that resumptIon of 

the Bologna offensive was no longer 

feasible before spring. The two men, 

therefore, agreed that the Fifth and 

Eighth Armies were to remain on the 

defensive while building up strength for 

a spring offensive, tentatively scheduled 

to begin on I April. 34 . 

Despite two months of plannmg and 

shifting of units, the Fifth Army's front 

line would remain for the rest of the 

winter approximately where it had 

come to a halt in late October. An 

enemy counterattack in the west had 

forced Truscott to thin out the II 

Corps' front in order to strengthen the 

IV Corps' sector. The 17th Indian 

Brigade had taken over the support 

tasks formerly accom plished by the 8th 

Indian Division (less 17th Brigade) 

which returned to the 13 Corps. East of 

the Sen'hio, Task Force 45 (the retread 

antiaircraft artillerymen who had become infantryrpen) and the Brazilian 

Expeditionary Force sectors remained 

unchanged, and the 6th South African 

Armoured Division held its old sector 

:!4 Msg FX 81059, AFHQ to Br COS, 8 Jan 45, 

MEDCOS 228, 0100/4/671. 
STALEMATE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND ON THE PLAIN 413 

GENERAL CLARK VISITS BRITISH 13 CORPS SECTOR WITH GENERAL KIRKMAN, 

DECEMBER 1944 

between the II and IV Corps and 

under Fifth Army control. The 1st 

Armored Division and the 85th Division 

moved over to the IV Corps' zone, 

where they were to rest and prepare 

for the spring offensive. The 34th 

Division withdrew into II Corps reserve, 

while the gIst and 88th Divisions took 

over the entire II Corps front. 35 

Even as the Allies abandoned for the 

winter their plans for resumption of 

offensive operations against Bologna, 

35 Fifth Army History, Part VII, p. 19. 

the Germans also reduced their forces, 

defending that sector with a force far 

below the October strength of nine 

divisions. Since 15 December, only four 

understrength divisions--the 65th and 

362d Infantry and the 42d Rifle and 1st 

Parachute Divisions, all under the XIV 

Panzer Corps-remained on the front 

south of Bologna. Secure in their belief 

that a winter stalemate had settled over 

the front, the Germans had no immediate concern for that city. 36 

36 MS # G-095 (Senger), CMH. 
CHAPTER XXIV 

Through the Winter 

Sustaining the Armies 

Except for three re.latively bri~f: limited-objective operatIons, one In the 

Eighth Army and two in the Fifth, most 

of the front from sea to sea during the 

final winter of the war lay dormant 

beneath a coat of snow and ice. Even 

the wide-ranging and largely unchallenged Allied air ann was grounded 

much of the time as frequent fog or 

storm covered much of th~ country. 

Yet deep in the rear .a:<:as of ~oth 

armies the countless actlvltles reqmred 

to keep modern field armies alive. a~d 

functioning continued at an undlmmished pace. . The numerous rear echelon Units of 

both Allied armies had three main 

tasks: to sustain and nourish their 

forces, repair and salvage equipment, 

and assemble and forward supplies for 

the pending spring offensive. lbe U.S. 

Army Transportation ~~rps, for exaIll- pIe moved vast quantltles of supphes 

fro~ port to depot; army signal u~lits 

manned switchboards, often handlmg 

as much daily traffic as a small city, and 

maintained fi vast nenvork of telephone 

and radio communications; and quartermaster units employed thousands of 

Italian civilians to repair and manufacture nonstandard items of winter clothing. Except for those abundant reserves 

of civilian manpower, there were few 

other indigenous resources in the ~llied-occupied zone of Italy from whiCh 

to draw to maintain the armies. 1 

The V.S. Fifth Army was sustained 

largely by a 5,OOO-mile supply line 

extending from the United States across 

the Atlantic, the western Mediterranean, and miles of rugged Italian terrain. Convoys of freighters brought 

their cargoes from the United States to 

the Peninsular Base Section at either 

Naples or Leghorn, the latter having 

become after mid-November the army's 

main supply base in Italy. From the 

ports transportation corps units moved 

the supplies to dumps located in the 

vicinity of Lucca, Pistoia, and Florence, 

with shipments from Naples moving by 

rail. After March 1945 the service was 

extended from Leghorn to Florence. 

Important though the railroads were 

for long distances, the burden of short 

haul movement of supplies fell largely 

to motor transport. From the major 

dumps in the Arno valley long truck 

convoys moved day and night up and 

down fifty miles of steep, winding 

mountain roads to deliver supplies to 

the fonvard elements of the II Corps. 

From there jeeps, and in the end, 

mules and men took over. During the 

winter 15 Italian pack mule companies 

with an approximate strength of 3,875 

animals operated in support of the 

Fifth Army. 

IFifth Army History, Part VIII, pp. 21-51. Unless 

otherwise noted the following section is based upon 

this reference. 
THROUGH THE WINTER 

The unsung heroes of the supply 

operations were the engineer, transportation, and quartermaster units. Transportation units kept traffic moving over 

roads that engineers not only kept open 

but even managed to improve for the 

heavy traffic scheduled for future operations. Thousands of Italian civilians 

helped. In addition to providing 

warmer clothing and improved rations, 

the quartermaster units operated and 

maintained rest centers in the Arno 

valley, including centers at historic Florence and at Montecatini, where the 

troops could enjoy the therapeutic 

properties of sulphur springs long 

famed among European upper classes. 

Soft beds were among the amenities 

that a fashionable watering place could 

offer, even in wartime. 

Even at the front life became more 

endurable. An army-wide campaign to 

winterize living quarters, made }X)ssible 

by a static front, gave the infantrymen a 

few more creature comforts. Although 

men actually manning the forward positions remained in foxholes, they made 

them as comfortable as human ingenuity could devise. In support and reserve 

positions troops constructed snug dugouts, and in some cases enjoyed the 

comparative comforts of pyramidal 

tents eq uipped with oil- or lignite-burning stoves. For evacuation hospitals, 

Nissen huts and other prefabricated 

buildings replaced the tents. The men 

would spend the winter in as comfortable circumstances as possible fix a field 

army in a war-devastated land. 

Strengthening the Army 

The winter lull also afforded Allied 

commanders an opportunity to rein415 

f()rce their armies. On 27 December, 

about the time the Germans made their 

brief f()ray into the Serchio valley, the 

first units of the U.S. 10th Mountain 

Division, under the command of Maj. 

Gen. George P. Hays, landed in Italy, 

and within two weeks the entire division 

was ashore. 2 In late March the Japanese-American 442d Infantry, with attached units, returned from France, 

where the regiment had served since 

September of the preceding year. At 

the same time the Legnano Combat 

Group, an Italian infantry unit of about 

brigade strength, one of five trained 

and equipped by the British, was assigned to the Fifth Army. The remaining four Italian combat groups composed of veteran soldiers of the old 

Italian army, joined the Eighth Army. 

There were also a number of Italian 

engineer, quartermaster, and medical 

units assigned or attached to various 

Allied commands. 3 

Also in March the 536th and 527th 

Field Artillery Battalions, both equipped 

with powerful 8-inch howitzers, arrived 

from the United States. Those were 

later joined by the 530th Field Artillery 

Battalion (I55-mm. guns), the 765th 

and 766th Field Artillery Battalions 

(I 55-mm. howitzers), and headquarters 

of the 428th Field Artillery Group. In 

addition there also arrived the 679th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion, equipped 

2Fifth Army History, Part VIII, pp. 72-73 and 91-

93; Alexander's Rpt to the CCS, The Italian 

Campaign, 12 Dec 44 to 2 May 45, p. 24; Opns 

Instructions No.2, Hq. Fifth U.S. Army, 9 Jan 45, 

annex F. to above. Unless otherwise indicated the 

following section is based on these references. 

3See Coakley and Leighton, Global LogistiC-' and 

Strategy, 1943-45, pp. 716-720, for details concerning Allied use of Italian manpower following the 

Italian surrender in September 1943. 
416 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

MOTOR TRANSPORT IN NORTHERN APENNINES 

with towed 3-inch guns. To those 

American units were added a section (4 

guns) of the British I 1/54 Super Heavy 

Regiment and a 240-mm. howitzer unit. 

Further reinforcements came from the 

15th South African Field Artillery Regiment and from the III th Field Regiment, the latter recently returned from 

duty with the Yugoslav partisans. 

To ease supply and administration all 

attached British artillery units, except 

the heavy artillery, were placed under 

the operational control of IV Corps. 

The four guns of the 11/54 Super 

Heavy Regiment remained with II 

Corps in the Highway 65 sector. To 

make a more equitable distribution of 

heavy artillery for the spring offensive, 

Clark would later transfer the British 

61st Heavy Regiment (7.2-inch howitzers and 155-mm. guns) from the II 

Corps to Eighth Army. 

The need to build ammunition reserves, a factor in the decision to postpone resumption of the offensive until 

spring, was, with the increase in artillery 

units, all the more essential. From November in the Fifth Army and January 
THROUGH THE WINTER 

in the Eighth, severe restrictions were 

placed on the use of artillery to enable 

both armies to begin accumulating la;ge 

stocks of ammunition. With the arnval 

of regular shipments from the United 

States, ammunition dumps in both 

army areas were by March at last filled 

to overflowing. Regular depots, operated by the Peninsular Base Section in 

the vicinity of Pistoia and Leghorn, 

could store no more ammunition, necessitating the retention of 20,000 additional tons at Naples. The U.S. II Corps 

also had built up large stocks in forward areas. By the first of March 

ammunition stocks were so large that 

daily allotments per gun were increased 

about one-third throughout the Fifth 

Army to make room for subsequent 

shipments. By the end of March supplies of ammunition in the Fifth Army 

had reached the 60-day reserve level 

authorized by the War Department. 4 

Regrouping tlu Army 

In addition to maintaining and 

strengthening the Fifth Army, General 

Truscott regrouped his divisions in order to rest the troops and reorganize 

and train units for the ~pring offensive. 

The process went on throughout the 

month of January in the Fifth Army. 

Most of the units that had been detached from the I I Corps in December 

to reinforce against the German counterattack in the Serchio valley were 

returned to the central sector including 

the 135th Regimental Combat Team 

from Viareggio to its parent division, 

the 34th, and the entire 85th Division. 

'Fijil! Army HiI/lJry, Pan VIII, pp. 30-32. 

417 

SOLDIERS RELAXING DURING LULL IN BATTLE 

The 92d Division's 365th Regimental 

Combat Team, which had been attached tern porarily to the II Corps as 

additional relief for the infantry divisions east of Highway 65, moved back 

to control of its parent division in the 

Serchio valley sector, formerly held by 

the 8th Indian Division. The Indian 

division then moved into a corps rest 

area near Pisa. The 10th Mountain 

Division's 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment, the first unit of that division to 

arrive, was attached to the IV Corps 

and relieved the 434th and 900th AA 

Battalions and the British 39th Light 

AA Regiment in the division-sized Task 

Force 45's sector northwest of Pistoia. 

In turn, the two American antiaircraft 

battalions, functioning since the previous autumn as infantry, became part 

of a newly formed 473d Infantry Regi-
418 

ment.;; By 28 January the 10th Mountain Division's other two regiments had 

arrived and joined the first regiment in 

the Reno valley on the IV Corps' right 

wing where the division was attached to 

Task Force 45. At that point the IV 

Corps front was held from left to right 

by the 92d Division, Task Force 45, 

ir~duding the 10th Mountain Division, 

and the division-sized Brazilian Expeditionary Force, with the 8th Indian Division constituting a reserve. (Map XlV) 

Similar shifts of major units also took 

place on the II Corps front. Early in 

January the 85th Division began relieving the British I st Division in the 

Monte Grande area on the left flank of 

the 13 Corps, thus extending the right 

flank of the II Corps eastward. With 

the return of the British 13 Corps 

to the operational control of the Eighth 

Army on 18 January, the Fifth Army's 

new boundary paralleled the Firenzuola-Imola road two miles to the east 

as far as a point opposite Castel del Rio, 

where it turned northward to skirt the 

eastern edge of Monte Grande and 

reach Highway 9 at Castel San Pietro, 

seven miles northwest of Imola. The 

British I st Division, formerly under 13 

Corps, came under control of Allied 

Force Headquarters and eventually was 

transferred to the Middle East. 'rhat 

left the 13 Corps in control of only the 

The separate 473d Infantry Regiment, activated on 

14 January 1945 at Montecatini was formed from the 

434th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) 

Battalion, the 435th Antiaircraft Artillery (A W) Battalion, and the 900th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion. Headquarters and Headquarters Company of 

the 2d Armored Group constituted the Headquarters 

and Headquarters Company of the newly formed 

473d Infantry Regiment. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

British 6th Armoured and 78th Infantry Divisions. 6 

During the month a round robin of 

relief of one division by another gave 

all a brief rest out of the line. At the 

end of January the II Corps held its 

sector from left to right with the South 

African 6th Armoured Division and the 

88th, 34th, and 85th Infantry Divisions, 

the latter on the right flank adjacent to 

the British 13 Corps. The 91st Division 

lay in II Corps reserve; the 1 st Armoured Division and the 8th Indian 

Division were in Army reserve. 

Eliminating Enemy Bridgeheads on the 

Eighth Arm.Y Front 

The British Eighth Army commander, General McCreery, meanwhile 

was similarly turning his attention to 

strengthening and tidying his front, 

which except for two potentially troublesome enemy bridgeheads, lay along 

the east bank of the Senio River. Cessation of the army's offensive in midDecember had left the 714th Jaeger 

Division in }X)ssession of a bridgehead 

some five miles northwest of Ravenna, 

while the 278th Infantry Division held a 

second bridgehead to the southwest of 

the first, between the towns of Cotignola and Franarola. Eliminating those 

bridgeheads was to occupy the Eighth 

Army for the next few days. 7 

"The 17th Indian Brigade, since December holding the extreme right of the Fifth Army's line, was 

in the meantime moved to Pisa, where it rejoined its 

parent, the 8th Indian Division, in reserve. 

'Nicholson, The Canadians in ItaLy, ]943-45, pp. 

644-51; Operations of the British, Indian, and 

Dominion Forces in Italy, PL Ill. Sec. B. Lnless 

otherwise indicated the following section is based 

lIpon these sources. 
THROUGH THE WINTER 

The first of the two bridgeheads lay 

opposite the Canadian Corps and could 

be used as a springboard for a counterattack on Ravenna, while the second 

and smaller of the bridgeheads lay 

opposite the British 5 Corps. Less of a 

threat than the first, the second had 

thus far been tenaciously defended, and 

the existence of both extended the 

length of the front and the troops 

needed to hold it. General McCreery 

determined to eliminate the two bridgeheads as soon as the frozen earth 

afforded firm footing for tanks and the 

weather enabled tactical aircraft to go 

aloft. 

The opportunity came on the morning of 2 January when a period of 

clear, cold weather set in. Along the 

Adriatic flank the Canadian 5th Armoured Division moved against the 

bridgehead north of Ravenna by way of 

a dry river bed, making use of dikes for 

a covered route of approach. The town 

of Conventello fell during the first 

morning and despite a small German 

counterattack, the armor on the third 

day crossed a canal to gain access to the 

rest of the area still held by the Germans south of the Reno River. By 

evening of 5 January almost all the 

territory was under Canadian control. 

The Italian Cremona Battle Group subsequently assumed responsibility for the 

sector. 

Meanwhile, on 3 January the British 

5 Corps attacked the other bridgehead 

and took only two days to eliminate it. 

By the end of the first week in January 

the Eighth Army was drawn up along 

the east bank of the Senio from the 

mountains to the sea. At the same time 

General McCreery withdrew the headquarters of the Polish corps for a 

419 

period of rest, its former sec~or passing 

to the British 5 Corps. Until the final 

offensive began in April McCreery 

made no significant changes on a generally inactive front. 

German Dispositians 

In spite of the relative inactivity ?f 

the winter months, the German, as did 

the Allies, experienced steady attrition through combat as well as noncombat causes, which the Arm:'Y Group C's 

replacement system would never be 

able to make good. In January, for 

example, losses totaled 13,526, of which 

1,299 were killed, 3,132 wounded, 

1,417 missing, and 7,678 sick from 

various causes, mostly respiratory ailments. Yet during the month only 

5,600 replacements arrived in northern 

Italy from the Reich. Among the returnees to Army Group C in January was 

Field Marshal Kesselring, who, after a 

short convalescent leave, arrived on 15 

January to resume command of t?e 

German forces in Italy. General Vletinghoff, who had commanded the 

army group during his absence, left to 

take command of an army group on 

the Baltic front. 8 

In January the Germans took adv~ntage of poor flying .weat?~~ for. Allied 

aircraft to move entire divIsions In and 

out of northern Italy. First to depart, 

the 356th Infantry Division, moving to a 

beleaguered Hungarian front, managed 

HGreiner and Schramm, eds., OKWIWFSt, KTB, 

pp. 1396ff. Lemelsen remained in command of 

Tenth Army until 17 February, when he replaced 

Tippelskirch in command of the Fourteenth Army. 

Herr, the LXXVI Panzer Corps commander, then 

took Lemelsen's place in command of the Tenth 

Army. Unless otherwise cited the following sectiun is 

based on the above source. 
420 

to traverse the Brenner Pass by rail 

without incident. At the end of t'ebruarv the 16th SS Panzer Greruulier Division 

left for the same sector, while several 

companies of mountain troops moved 

to the western front. To take the place 

of the two departing divisions, the 278th 

Infantry Division arrived from Belgium, 

where it had organized the previous 

year, and the 710th Infantry Division 

arrived from occupation duty in Denmark. 

As both Allied armies in Italv closed 

up to positions from which a 'co-ordinated attack might be launched against 

Bologna, General Vietinghoff, then still 

Army Group C commander, reacted by 

shifting the Tenth Army boundary westward from the Santerno to the Reno 

valley, thus bringing von Senger's XIV 

Panzer Corps into the T entlt Arm.'Y and 

uniting under one command the most 

active battle fronts. That move brought 

the number of corps operating under 

the Tenth Army to five: the lXXIII and 

XCVII Corps with four divisions between 

them, guarding the Adriatic flank and 

the coastal areas of the Gulf of Venice 

to the Istrian peninsula; Herr's [XXVI 

Panzer Corps with four divisions, holding 

a relatively narrow sector from, Bagnacavallo, ten miles northeast of Faenza, 

to a point just south of Highway 9; and 

Schlemm's I Parachute Corps with six 

divisions east of Highway 65 and Senger's XIV Panzer Corps with four divisions west of the highway, the two 

jointly holding the critical Bologna sector. To the Tenth Army's right the 

Fourteenth Army commanded two corps, 

the U Mountain Corps with two German 

and two Italian divisions, and the Corps 

Lombardia with the equivalent of two 

Italian divisions and elements of a C'Jt:rCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

man division. The Army Group Liguria, 

commanded by Mussolini's Defense 

Minister Rodolfo Graziani, held the 

coastal defenses of the Gulf of Genoa to 

the Fourteenth Army's right rear with 

three German divisions and one Italian 

division. Two divisions each were in 

Tenth Army and Army Group C reserve. 

Scattered throughout the Army Group 

rear areas were several miscellaneous 

units, mostly non-German, including 

Italian police units totaling about a 

hundred thousand men. They were of 

little value other than for local security.9 

Although the C'Jt:rman commanders 

foresaw no major Allied military operations in Italy before the spring, they 

\Vere less certain of whether the Allies 

might attempt limited objective attacks 

during the winter. While Field Marshal 

Kesselring assumed that Allied commanders \""anted to rest their troops, he 

also believed they wanted to prevent 

him from doing the same. Thus the 

Eighth Army's attacks to eliminate the 

German bridgeheads over the Senio 

River in January came as no real 

surprise. Nor did limited attacks by the 

U.S. Fifth Army in February. What was 

surprising was the timing and strength 

of the attacks. 10 

Operation Fourth Term 

As early as 28 December, as an 

aftermath of the limited German operations in the Serchio valley, General 

"SrhfmatiSlhl' Krlfgsghfdtrung, Stand 26.1.45. (;en. 

St. d H/Op. Abc Ill. MS # C-064 (Kesselring); Dil' 

HOl'hlTI'n Dil'llStellm £la Dnils( lim Wdlrmru-ht, 1933-

45 (Munkh: lnstitut fuel' Zeitgeschichtc. 1953); 

Greiner and Schramm. eds .. OKWIWFSt. KTB, pp. 

1399-1400; Alexandcr. Rpt to the CCS, Th" italian 

Campwgn, pp. 17-18. 

'°!vIS # C-064 (Kesselring). 
THROUGH THE WINTER 

LIGURIAN 

SEA 

OPERATION FOURTH TERM 

THE SERCHIO SECTOR 

4 -11 FebruClry 194 5 

I 0 

11"/1'1'11 i{jlli 

I 0 I 

I MILES 

I 

I KILOME TERS 

421 

I 

I 

I 

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I 

I 

I 

I 

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,.. ~~ 

\ ~m ____ ,. It f'" 

t'"'" 366<-1 

8-11 February 1945 

,....., ~,........ LI NE OF DEPARTURE TF 1 

ENEMY "AIN LINE OF RESISTANCE 

DIRECTIO OF ATTACK 

.------ DIRECTION OF RETREAT 

.. • DIRECTION OF COUNTERATUCK 

N.,. SJlMNlu.f'lt", 11" (1 lor i" .. , 

eM/OUr 1n1t",1t11 In M.'.'s I 0 , " ILES L.. 1~1~I!lipiii ~lknTI------r--~· I I 0 I KILO"ETERS 

MAP 9 

Truscott told the I V Corps commander, General Crittenberger, to get 

ready to clear the vaUey as far north as 

Castelnuovo and the coastal area as far 

as La Spezia. II After reflecting upon a 

shortage of combat-worthy units available for the drive and the fact that the 

Gothic Line defenses in that area were 

stiU intact, General Truscott two weeks 

later lowered his sights considerably. At 

II Hqs Fifth Army. Opns Instr No. 38. 28 Dec 44. 

in Fifth Anny History. Part VIII. ann I. 

that point he called for only limited 

attacks "in order to improve positions," 

particularly in the sector of the 92d 

Division. 12 

In response, General Almond and his 

staff of the 92d Division planned a twophase operation given the code name 

FOURTH TERM. The first phase, a diversion for the second, was to take the 

division up the Serchio vaUey as far as 

I2Hqs Fifth Army. Opns Instr No.2. 9 Jan 45. 

Fifth Anny History. Part VIII. ann 2. 
422 

the Lama di Sotto Ridge, four miles 

northwest of Tiglio. Then the main 

attack was to be aimed at securing the 

Strettoia Hill mass, about three miles 

northeast of Forte dei Marmi, overlooking both the coastal corridor and the 

approaches to the town of Massa, five 

miles north of Forte dei Marmi. Captu.re of the hill mass could be expected 

to open up the coastal roads as far as 

Massa and bring corps and division 

artillery within range of Italian naval 

guns at La Spezia. 13 

The Serchio valley operation began 

on 4 February as the 365th Infantry set 

out along a ridge east of the Serchio, 

while the attached 366th Infantry kept 

abreast west of the river. (Map 9) All 

went well at first as the 366th occupied 

the village of Gallicano, and the 365th 

pushed far ahead to reach the foot of 

its o~jective, the Lama di SoW) ridge. 

After only token resistance, opposing 

Italian units simply melted away into 

the mountains. Then over the next two 

days, as the 366th Infantry moved into 

the next village of Calomini and the 

365th moved onto the ridge itself to 

capture the village of Lama, signs developed that German units had begun to 

replace the faltering Italians. A counterattack during the night of 7 February 

by a battalion of the 148th Division's 

286th Iryfantry Regiment confirmed the 

fact. Striking at troops of the U. S. 

365th Infantry east of Serchio, the 

Germans forced them to withdraw 

from Lama and back down the slope of 

the ridge to within three-quarters of a 

mile of the original starting point of the 

13Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 568-72; 

Goodman Monograph, pp. 92-114. Unless otherwise noted the following is based upon these 

sources. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

operation. To maintain contact, the 

366th Infantry withdrew a similar distance. When the Germans made no 

effort to press their advantage, both 

sides contented themselves with eyeing 

each other warily. A diversionary operation, the attack in the Serchio valley had 

gained little ground in the end but had 

at least demonstrated that the two inexperienced American regiments could 

attack and seize high ground against 

moderate resistance, even though they 

failed to hold it. 

The 92d Division's real test came in 

the coastal corridor to the west where 

General Almond planned for the division's 370th Infantry to capture the 

Strettoia Hills, three peaks three miles 

inland overlooking the coastal corridor. 

The regiment's three battalions were to 

leapfrog in turn from one hill to the 

next in hope of maintaining momentum while at the same time providing a 

defense in depth against counterattack. 

On the right flank the 371 st Infantry 

was to keep abreast, while on the 

coastal flatlands a tank-infantry task 

force built around the 366th Infantry's 

3d Battalion was to cross the Cinquale 

Canal between the coastal highway and 

the sea four miles south of Massa. 

Early on 8 February, as the limited 

offensive began, Generals Truscott and 

Crittenberger, along with General Almond, watched from an observation 

post in the hills northeast of Forte dei 

Marmi. Unfortunately, from the very 

beginning the plan began to fall apart. 

After covering only 800 yards, the 

371st Infantry stumbled into an enemy 

mine field and came to a halt, thereby 

exposing the 370th Infantry's right 

flank. Supported by aircraft of the 86th 

Fighter Squadron, the leading battalion 
THROUGH THE WINTER 423 

AREA NORTH OF CINQUALE CANAL, 92D DIVISION ZoNE 

of the 370th Infantry nevertheless continued to press ahead a nd by late 

afternoon had occupied its initial objective. Hardly had the men dug in when 

a shattering barrage of mortar fire 

signaled a sharp counterattack. The 

Germans quickly overran the forward 

company and forced the second to 

withdraw down the eastern slopes of 

the Strettoia Hills. Units of another 

battalion proceeding according to plan 

to leapfrog to the next peak, ran into 

men falling back under enemy fire. In 

the resulting confusion the attack broke 

down completely. At dawn on the third 

day an urgent message to the battalions 

from the regimental command post 

disclosed the regiment'S plight: "We 

have no reserve except our command 

post . . . It is very important that we 

let nothing stop us from getting every 

available man together. Search all 

houses and places for stragglers. We 

can expect pressure today and be ready 

for it. Report every hour on progres's 

and number of men rounded Up." 14 

['Goodman Monograph, pp. 102-03. 
424 

That pattern of failure was repeated 

on the narrow coastal plain to the left 

of the Strettoia Hills. After three days 

of costly but inconclusive fighting a task 

force composed of the 366th Infantry's 

3d Battalion with attached armor and 

engineers failed to get beyond the shallow Cinquale Canal. Large caliber naval 

guns firing from the Italian coastal 

defenses at Punta Bianca ten miles 

northwest of the canal contributed to 

the failure. 

So widespread were disorganization 

and straggling throughout the 92d Division and its attachments that further 

attempts to continue the operation 

seemed futile. General Almond canceled it on the third day, the II tho The 

limited thrust had cost the 92d Division 

47 officers and 659 enlisted men killed, 

wounded, and missing, among them 

two battalion commanders and many of 

the more capable company grade officers. That had been a high price to pay 

for 145 enemy captured and virtually 

no ground gain. Combined with the 

shortcomings demonstrated earlier in 

the reverse in the Serchio valley, the 

disproportionately high losses among 

officers and the rampant straggling 

convinced General Truscott that he 

would be unable to count on the division as then constituted for further 

offensive action. 

A F arecast of Spring 

A week after the ill-fated operation 

by the 92d Division, General Crittenberger's IV Corps began the second of its 

mid-winter limited offensives, one designed to win bettet positions for starting the spring offensive, which was no 

longer to focus, as it had earlier, on 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

capture of Bologna. With the passing of 

cold weather the city's attraction as 

winter quarters also would pass, and no 

longer was Bologna needed as a communications center for exploitation into 

the Po Valley. Allied commanders had 

come to think beyond a deliberate 

thrust into the valley~to wide-sweeping 

movements by both the Fifth and 

Eighth Armies aimed at encircling not 

only Bologna but also entire German 

armies. 15 

General Crittenberger had selected 

for the major role in the limited operation his only fresh, untried division, the 

recently ar~'ived 10th Mountain Division. Because of specialized mountain 

training and comparatively light organic 

artillery~there were only three battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers as contrasted with the three battalions of 105-

mm. howitzers and one of ISS-nun. 

howitzers in the standard infantry division-commanders in other theaters 

had declined the division's services, but 

the specialized training enhanced the 

division's attractiveness to an army engaged in mountain warfare. 16 

Activated in the summer of 1943 at 

Camp Hale, Colorado, the 10th Mountain Division included the 85th, 86th, 

and 87th Mountain Infantry Regiments. 

With its 75-mm. pack howitzer artillery 

support and few motor vehides, the 

division resembled a German Jaeger or 

light infantry division. In sharp contrast 

to the unfc)l"tunate 92d Division, or, f()r 

that matter, almost any other U.S. division, the ranks of the 10th Mountain 

Division contained a high percentage of 

l' Alexander. Report to the CCS. pp. 32-33. 

16 Interv, Sidney T. Mathews with Gen. Marshall, 

25 .luI 49. CMH: Truscott, Command Mi.ISions, p. 

464. 
THROUGH THE WINTER 

~.7 ~ •• I .• 

MAPlO 

college-trained men, including winter 

sports enthusiasts and members of 

mountain climbing and skiing clubs, 

most of whom had volunteered for 

service with the division through an 

unorthodox recruitment campaign conducted by the civilian National Ski 

Patrol System. 

The division commander, General 

Hays, had come favorably to General 

Marshall's attention during World War 

I when during a heavy artillery barrage 

Hays had ridden on horseback through 

enemy fire to locate targets for his 

425 

OPERATION ENCORE 19 F~bruory· 5 Mo"h 1945 

--- P.,USEI. INE1, 2 .. '(D 

-- P~A5t lU.' 2., S ""t.A 

.......--- AXIS 0 ' ATU.CIC 

Conlcu, t"','tlt1lln ",,'.rs 

o ,', I I 0 

I ! MILES 

'I ! 

Z li(lLOI!,I[T£RS 

1t.ClinfDn 

artillery. For this actIon Hays had received the Medal of Honor. In World 

War II Marshall had transferred him 

from command of the 2d Division 

artillery in France to command of the 

mountain division just before its departure for Italy. Truscott would later rate 

him as one of his ablest battle leaders. 17 

Plans for the new offensive--code 

named Operation ENcoRE-were initiated at army instead of corps level. 

Truscott's intention was to secure high 

l7Truscott, Command Missions, p. 465. 
426 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

SKI PATROL, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION 

ground dominating a ten-mile section 

of Highway 64. Averaging about 3,800 

feet in height, the objective consisted of 

a series of mountain peaks and ridges 

aixmt five miles west of the highway. 

From it the Germans had excellent 

observation over a large section of 

Highway 64 and into the American 

positions east of the Reno River. In 

American hands, the terrain would provide observation almost as far as the Po 

Valley, about twenty miles away. North 

of Vergato the terrain, though still 

mountainous, descends gradually toward Highway 9 and the Lombardy 

Plain. Inherent in General Truscott's 

concept {cx the limited objective operation was the possibility of an eventual 

westward shih of the main axis of the 

Fifth Army's spring offensive into the 

Po Valley. IS 

In early February the 10th Mountain 

Division held positions in the valley of 

the Silla River not far from its confluence with the Reno River, through 

1BOpns Instr No.4, Hq Fifth Army, 16 Feb 45, in 

Fifth Army History, Part VIII, ann. I. 
THROUGH THE WINTER 427 

APENNINES, IV CORPS SECTOR 

whose valley Highway 64, one of the 

two main routes leading to Bologna on 

the Fifth Army's front, runs. (Mal) J 0) 

Dominating the region were two ridges 

whose highest peaks rose between three 

thousand to nearly five thousand feet. 

Known to American troops as the Riva 

Ridge, the first of the two overlooked 

the mountain division's left flank and 

dominated routes of approach to the 

second: the Monte Belvedere-Monte 

della Torraccia Ridge. 

The Riva Ridge paralleled the left 

flank of the division's zone of operations for four miles. The side of the 

ridge facing the division was a cliff, 

rising in some places almost 1,500 feet 

above the valley floor. Since the ridge 

would have to be cleared before the 

main attack could move toward Monte 

Belvedere, the mountain troops would 

have to scale that cliff. Once the Monte 

Belvedere-Monte della Torraccia ridge 

was in hand, the division was to open a 

second phase of the attack to continue 

northeastward about four miles and 
428 

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION BEING BROUGHT 

FORWARD, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION 

occupy a series of lower ridges from 

which roads descended into the Po 

Valley. 19 

General Hays had secretly assembled 

his troops some two to three miles 

south and east of the two ridges. 20 To 

the right was the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, holding with its three regiments a three-mile sector between the 

mountain division's right flank and the 

Reno River. The Brazilians were to 

cover the mountain division's right 

flank. To make up for the mountain 

division's lack of heavy fire support, 

'"Fifth Army History, Part VIII, pp. 78-88; IV 

Corps Opns Rpt, Feb 45; 10th Mountain Division 

G-3 Jnl and file, regimental jnls and historical 

narratives, Unless otherwise cited the following is 

based upon these references. 

20 Arrival of the division in the theater was not 

announced to the Allied press until 23 Feb 45. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

General Crittenberger attached the 

I75th Field Artillery Battalion with 105-

mm. howitzers, the 84th Chemical (4.2-

inch) Mortar Battalion, two tank destroyer battalions, and a tank battalion. 

For the men of the 10th Mountain 

Division, crossing the snow-covered 

ground would be especially difficult 

because of limited concealment provided by nothing more than scattered 

clumps of stunted trees. Vehicular 

movement also would be difficult because the few roads and trails crossing 

the area were narrow and in poor 

condition. The burden of transport 

would fall mainly upon pack mules, 

full-tracked "Weasels," and jeeps. Tanks 

could, by skillful handling, be brought 

forward in small groups as far as the 

village of Querciola, a little more than a 

mile southwest of Monte Belvedere. 

Through interrogation of enemy 

prisoners, the mountain division's G-2 

had determined that the peaks and 

ridges opposite both the mountain division and the Brazilians were lightly held 

by troops of the 232d Infantry Division, 

with all three regiments in line across 

an I8-mile front. Originally intended 

only for rear area duty, most of the 

division's troops were either older men 

or convalescents intercepted en route to 

their former units on the Eastern front. 

In reserve were a fusilier battalion and 

elements of a mountain battalion. 21 

Into the Mountains 

I n the bitter cold, as darkness settled 

over the valley below Monte Belvedere, 

teams of picked rock climbers slung 

"Order of Battle of the German Army (Washington: 

Military Intelligence Division, War Department, 

1945), pp. 210-11. 
THROUGH THE WINTER 

coils of ropes over their shoulders and 

hung clusters of pitons and snap links 

to their belts. For long months these 

men had trained in the Rocky Mountains for just this kind of action-scaling 

the face of 1,500 Riva Ridge. Setting 

out soon after dark on 18 February, a 

climbing team from each of the three 

rifle companies of the 86th Mountain 

Infantry's I st Battalion and another 

from the 2d Battalion was to prepare 

the way. Climbing in the darkness, the 

men drove steel pitons into the rock, 

hooked snap links to them, then fastened ropes to the snap links to provide 

fixed hand lines for the main body of 

climbers to follow. 

When the climbing teams reached 

the rim of the ridge, they signaled to 

the main body of the 1 st Battalion, 86th 

Infantry, in the valley below. The battalion set out in a column of companies 

toward the base of Riva Ridge, each 

company to take a different route up 

the cliff to a series of peaks along the 

ridge. Aided by the ropes, the men 

scaled the cliff without difficultv. Before 

dawn, virtually the entire batt~lion had 

reached the top undetected. 

The mountain infantry may have 

been aided by the fact that even as the 

men were working their way up, the 

232d Fusilier Battalion was relieving a 

battalion of the J 044th Infantry Regiment 

on the ridge. Discovering the Americans with the coming of daylight, the 

enemy managed to mount three minor 

counterattacks, but the mountain infantry repulsed them without much trouble. As indications of enemy withdrawal 

developed in the afternoon, a patrol 

probed along the ridge, encountering 

only a seven-man enemy detachment. 

Three were captured, four killed. By 

429 

the end of the day the entire ridge was 

secured. 

The division's left flank protected by 

capture of the Riva Ridge, troops of the 

85th and 87th Mountain Infantry Regiments set out that night in silence for a 

forward assembly area at the base of 

the Monte Belvedere-Monte della Torraccia hill mass. Eschewing an artillety 

preparation in hope of achieving surprise, the regiments attacked an hour 

before midnight. While the 85th Mountain Infantry moved frontally against 

Monte Belvedere and adjacent Monte 

Gorgolesco, the 87th moved up the 

western slopes toward a trio of villages 

lying between Belvedere and the Riva 

Ridge, and from there was to proceed 

to the Valpiana Ridge, northwestern 

spur of Monte Belvedere. Gaining the 

Valpiana Ridge would have the effect 

of outflanking defenses on the crest of 

Monte Belvedere. 

Dispensing with an artillery preparation apparently paid off, for men of the 

87th Mountain Infantry were virtually 

atop the enemy's outposts before they 

met resistance. From a line of bunkers, 

machine gun positions, and fortified 

houses, the Germans fought back sporadically, while extensive minefields created further hitches. Both leading battalions nevertheless made steady progress, so that within a few hours the 

Valpiana Ridge and two of the three 

villages 'were in hand. 

The story was much the same with 

the 85th Mountain Infantry in the 

frontal drive against the two heights. At 

ylonte Belvedere the first resistance 

developed 300 yards short of the summit, but during the next three hours 

the mountain infantrymen fought their 

way to the top. Others had a similar 
430 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

MONTE BELVEDERE MASSIF FROM LIZZANO, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION SECTOR 

experience on Monte Gorgolesco. Protecting the division's right flank, a battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry 

occupied a village on Monte Gorgolesco's northeastern slope. 

As the advance continued northeastward toward the last peak of the hill 

mass, Monte della Torraccia, the mountain division's artillery and its supporting guns came into play, with counterbattery fire that partially neutralized 

enemy guns. With the coming of daylight, L-5 artillery spotter aircraft adjusted fires with marked accuracy while 

also directing fighter-bombers to targets, some within 600 yards of the 

American positions. During the first 

two days British Spitfires and U.S. P47's flew a total of 412 sorties in 

support of the attack. 

Despite the artillery and aerial support, the enemy early on the 21 st 

managed a counterattack by a reinforced battalion against the 3d Battalion, 85th Mountain Infantry, on Monte 

Belvedere. The counterattacking force 

represented first commitment of troops 

of the 714th 1aq~er Division, which by 
THROUGH THE WINTER 431 

EVACUATING CASUALTIES OVER MOUNTAIN TRAIL 

chance had been en route from the 

Adriatic flank to the Monte Belvedere 

sector even before the 10th Mountain 

Division's attack had begun. Reinforcing 

were portions of a battalion of the 

l043d Infantry Regiment, the 232d Division's local reserve. Although the Germans failed to regain any of the lost 

ground the counterattack prompted a 

temporary pause in the American advance toward Monte della Torraccia. 

Meanwhile the troops of the Brazilian 

Expeditionary Force entered the fight 

to protect the 10th Mountain Division's 

right flank by seizing Monte Castello, 

about a mile southeast of Monte della 

Torraccia. Unknown to the Brazilians, 

the American drive toward Monte della 

Torraccia had precipitated an enemy 

withdrawal from Monte Castello. Behind a IS-minute artillery preparation, 

the Brazilian 1st Regiment converged 

on the objective from south and southwest and quickly gained the summit. 

Soon after nightfall the last resistance 

from a small rear guard ceased. 

The counterattack on Monte Belvedere at an end and the Brazilians 

moving on Monte Castello, the 85th 

Mountain Infantry during early after-
432 

noon of the 21 st renewed the drive fi)r 

Monte della Torraccia. A fresh battalion, the 2d, led the way and quickly 

discovered that the Germans intended 

to make a fight of it. In the heavy 

combat that followed, casualties were 

high, including the 2d Battalion commander and his heavy weapons company commander. Three salvos from 

enemy artillery fire were particularly 

devastating until counterbattery fire silenced the guns. Throughout the night 

and well into the next day the battalion 

clung to positions 400 yards short of 

the objective, unable to push farther. 

By late afternoon of the 22d the battalion was down to some 400 effectives 

and was low on ammunition, food, 

and water. The battalion's condition 

prompted General Hays to relieve the 

85th Mountain Infantry with the 86th. 

During the afternoon of the 23d the 

3d Battalion, 86th Mountain Infantry, 

came forward to make the final assault 

against the crest of Monte della Torraccia. As the battalion began to attack the 

next morning, tactical aircraft strafed 

and bombed hedgerows sheltering and 

concealing enemy gunners. Company I 

was atop the objective within an hour, 

and by early afternoon an of Monte 

della Torraccia and ridges north and 

northeast of it were in friendly hands. 

Although a battalion of German mountain troops from the 232d Division's 

reserve counterattacked vigorously, the 

3d Battalion with strong artillery support held fast. By nightfall the entire 

complex of heights from the Riva 

Ridge to Monte Castello was firmly in 

hand. 

In a first full-scale battle action, men 

of the 10th Mountain Division had 

fought with courage and determination, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

wresting a stretch of rugged terrain 

from the enemy at a cost of just over 

900 casualties, of which 203 were killed. 

However deplorable any losses at all, 

that was hardly an alarming figure for 

a first engagement. Field Marshal Kesselring would later call the division 

"outstandingly efficient." 22 From General Crittenberger came the message: 

". . . you have done a wonderful job. 

All eyes are on you. You are carrying 

the ball." That was a statement that 

General Truscott could heartily endorse, for carrying the ball was exactly 

what he expected the division to do 

when the army's offensive resumed in 

the spring. 2:1 

Til,' Sl'cond Phasl' 

For the next step of the limited 

objective operation, the 10th Mountain 

Division and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force were to advance on a more 

northeasterly axis, generally toward the 

road junction town of Vergato, on 

Highway 64, twelve miles northeast of 

Monte Belvedere. The objective was 

another line of hill crests or peaks 

roughly 4 miles to the north and 

northeast of the positions gained in the 

first phase, whence the terrain the rest 

of the way to the Po Valley was downhill. The peaks would serve as the 

jump-off line in this sector for the 

spring offensive. From west to east, 

they were Monte Grande d' Aiano, 

Monte della Spe, Monte della Castellana, and Monte Valbura. 

Although scheduled to begin on 1 

March, the drive had to be postponed 

for two days because of poor weather. 

22 MS #C-064 (Kesselring). 

23 lOth Mtn Div Opns Rpt and .Inl, Feb 45. 
THROUGH THE WINTER 

It produced few surprises. Again General Hays employed two regiments 

abreast-the 86th Mountain Infantry 

on the left, the 87th on the right-while 

the Brazilians kept pace with the mountain infantry to protect the right flank. 

As before troops of the 232d Infantry 

and 71 4th Jaeger Divisions fi)ught back 

from every crest and village until f.:>rced 

out by the combined force of artillery, 

air, a~d aggressive foot troops. Where 

tank destroyers could negotiate the rugged terrain, they proved of particular 

value, especially when the Germans 

holed up in thick-walled stone houses. 

Almost inevitably the Germans counterattacked, but in no case were they 

successfuL 

In two days-3 and 4 March-the 

two assault regiments took all intermediate heights and also captured Monte 

Grande d'Aiano, whereupon early on 5 

:'vlarch General Hays sent his third 

regiment, the 85th, to seize Monte della 

Spe and Monte della Castellano. Despite the heaviest defensive fires of the 

three-day drive, the I st Battalion by late 

afternoon stood on top the summit of 

Monte della Spe. The 2d Battalion, 

meanwhile, encountered such heavy 

fire on the slopes of Monte della Castellana that the men had to withdraw and 

take another approach, but the second 

try carried the position. 

. Those heavy defensive fires on 5 

March were th~ first indication that the 

Germans were attempting to reinf()rce 

the sector. Aware of heavy losses in 

both defending divisions during the 

first phase of the American drive, Field 

Marshal Kesselring had been intending 

to replace the two with a fresh division, 

but the second phase opened before he 

could accom plish it. The renewed 

433 

thrust disturbed Kesselring. Was this 

the beginning of a major offensive 

aimed at encircling Bologna from the 

west? 

Unable to determine for sure, Kesselring deemed he could ill afford to 

take a chance. He saw no choice but to 

rush his major reserve, the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division, then undergoing reorganization, to the threatened sector. 

It was, he observed. "a grim decision 

[but] unfortunately . . . absolutelv unavoidable."24 How~ver limited the'scope 

of the operation from the American 

viewpoint, the Germans saw it as a 

serious threat. The fight appeared to 

have developed into "a battle for possession of the gateway into the Po 

Valley at both the operationally and 

tactically most unfavorable point." 25 

Shortly before midnight on 5 March 

the J 5th Panz!'r Grl'nadia RI'Kimrnt. 

first contingent of the 29th Panzer GrenadieT Division to arrive, mounted the 

first in a series of four counterattacks 

against the 1st Battalion, 87th Mountain 

Infantry, on Monte della Spe, the apex 

of the American salient. Although the 

German infantrymen actually penetrated the battalion's positions at one 

point, the Americans drove them back 

in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. When 

the fourth counterattack failed, the 

Germans backed off and contented 

themselves with harassing artillery fire. 

Truscott Halts the Attack 

Anxious lest Kesselring become so 

alarmed that he would develop defensive positions astride Highway 64 as 

formidable as those on Highway 65, 

24 MS # C-064 (Kesselring), p. 149. 

25 Ibid. 
434 

Truscott ordered the IV Corps to halt 

in place. The objectives of the limited 

offensive were in hand in any case. At a 

cost of another r~49 casualties, including 

106 killed, the mountain division had 

brought the right wing of the 1 V Corps 

abreast of the II Corps and in control 

of excellent jump-off positions for the 

spring offensive. 26 •• 

Over the next few days the BraZilIans 

26 10th Mt Div AAR. Mar 45. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

shifted position to the 10th Mountain 

Division's left, while the mountain 

troops extended their control to embrace two additional features on the 

right, Monte Valbura and a second 

Monte Belvedere. The 10th Mountain 

Division now held a six-mile front between Monte Grande d' Aiano and 

Highway 64, the favorable jump-off 

point they had been seeking for an 

offensive down the Reno valley and 

Highway 64. 
PART SEVEN 

THE LAST OFFENSIVE 

Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle; an army 

destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning. 

SUN Tzu. TII(, Alt oj War 

The commander in war must work in a medium which his eyes cannot 

see; which his best dedu(tive powers cannot always fathom; and with 

which because of constant changes he can rarely become completely 

familiar. 

CL;\USEWITZ, On Wor 

CHAITERXXV 

Strategies and Plans 

German Strategic Problems 

Except for the setback dealt the U.S. 

92d Division on the westernmost sector 

of the Italian front, the German command could take little comfort from the 

last winter of the campaign except in 

that the front was still intact. At a 

s~pe~ficial glance, the overall military 

situation of the Germans in the west 

including Italy, did not appear hope~ less. There had been, to be sure, a 

threatening penetration of the western 

front in the vicinity of Aachen in the 

Rhineland, but elsewhere the German 

armies. still held the Allies at bay from 

the North Sea to Switzerland. In northern Italy, except for the newly won 

positions of the U.S. IV Corps on the 

h~gh ground west of the upper Reno 

River, Army Group C still maintained an 

unbroken defensive line from the Romagna Plain to the Tyrrhenian Sea. Yet 

in fact Germany's military situation was 

deteriorating rapidly. In late August 

1944 Rumania had capitulated to the 

Russians, and in early September of the 

same year Bulgaria had followed. Only 

German arms prevented a third allyHungary-from collapsing before the 

Red Army. 

After mid-January 1945 the time had 

passed when divisions from the Italian 

front could be used to influence decisively the course of the war on other 

fronts. Although in January and February Kesselring had moved four divisions out of Italy to other fronts, by 

Ma~ch the railn~ads leading out of the 

pemnsula were m such poor condition 

that it would have taken months to 

move additional divisions, even if they 

had been available. For the Germans 

the time had long since passed fi)r a 

strategic withdrawal from Italy. 1 

On 8 March Hitler summoned Kesselring to Berlin to tell him that he was 

to leave Italy to command the Western 

Front where, following the failure of 

the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944, Allied armies under General Eisenh~wer were pressing the Germans back mto the Reich itself. When 

asked whom he would recommend as 

hi~ s~ccessor in Italy, Kesselring named 

Vletmgho.ff.. When . Hitler readily 

agreed, Vletmghoff, smce January in 

command of Army Group Kurland on the 

Baltic front, returned to Italy· and the 

command of Army Group C. 

Kesselring was less successful in ob-

~aining the Fuehrer's agreement to givmg the new army group commander 

~ore flexibility in th~ conduct of operatiOns when the Alhes resumed their 

off~n~i.ve in the spring. That lack of 

flexlblhty had long acerbated relations 

. ' Yet in late March I ~45 Stalin was to complain 

bitterly to hiS western alhes that covert negotiations 

between the Amencans and Germans in Switzerland 

were a smoke screen to permit German troop 

movements to take place. See Herbert Feis, Church· 

zit, Roospvfit, Stalin: The War They Waged and the 

Pma They SouKht (Princeton, 1957), pp. 588-89. 
438 

between Army Group C and OKW and 

was to hang like a heavy cloud over the 

army group headquarters as Vietinghoff prepared plans for defensive measures to be taken w hen the Allied armies 

resumed the offensive. 2 

In early February OK W had informed Kesselring that under no circumstances was he to abandon major 

portions of his front voluntarily. To 

that directive he replied that, while he 

had no such intention, he would like to 

be free to pull back in certain sectors 

even in advance of an Allied attack 

when an attack appeared imminent, for 

he lacked the manpower to hold every 

sector of the front in its present location against heavy Allied pressure. Kesselring observed that had he been given 

that kind of freedom prior to the U.S. 

10th Mountain Division's recent attack 

at Monte Belvedere, he might have 

been spared the necessity of committing 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division from 

his army group reserve. Yet the most 

OKW would grant was permission to 

fall back only in those sectors against 

which a large-scale Allied operation was 

already under way.:l 

That concession hardly afforded the 

field marshal or his successor much 

strategic flexibility. If the Allied spring 

offensive forced Kesselring to abandon 

his positions in the Apennines, he saw 

no alternative to fighting a series of 

delaying actions along each of the many 

river lines as he withdrew into the Alps. 

Although the German high com2 Greiner and Schramm, ed., OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

IV(2), 1394-99; MS # C-064 (Kesselring), pp. 123-

30; Jodi Diary, 9 Mar 45. 

"Greiner and Schramm, ed., OKW/WFSt, IV(2), 

p. 1394. Unless otherwise cited the following is 

from this soun:e. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

mand at first frowned on the plan, 

Kesselring 'remained convinced that as 

long as he was commander-in-chief in 

Italy, he could, as he so frequently had 

done in the past, obtain the Fuehrer's 

approval to disengage before the situation became catastrophic. While Army 

Group C's commander had no intention 

of ordering an immediate large-scale 

withdrawal, neither did he intend to 

fight the decisive battle for northern 

Italy along the river lines south of the 

Reno, since to do that would stake the 

future of the entire campaign on one 

card, a card that offered him little 

chance of saving his armies from destruction. Regardless of the high command's views, Kesselring believed his 

only choice to be the plan he had 

developed: withdrawal under pressure 

of an Allied offensive while fighting 

delaying actions along a succession of 

favorable defensive positions based on 

those river lines. That defensive strategy had worked well in the past and 

could, if followed, make the last offensive costly for the Allied armies. 

On 22 February, however, a directive 

from the Fuehrer dashed Kesselring's 

hopes for even that much freedom of 

action, Hitler acknowledged that although Army Group C's over-all strength 

was admittedly weak, the solution lay 

not in Kesselring's plan but rather in 

deployment in greater depth in the 

sector facing the greatest threat. While 

Hitler would raise no objection to 

planned withdrawals to stronger positions in the face of a large-scale Allied 

offensive, he would never consent to 

voluntary withdrawals by means of a 

series of delaying actions. That, Hitler 

believed, would destroy the morale of 

the troops. On the eve of the Allied 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

offensive Hitler was destined to reiterate his antipathy to voluntary withdrawals when he refused to authorize Army 

Group C to implement Operation 

HERBSTNEBEL, a long-standing plan 

for large-scale withdrawal to prepared 

defensive positions along the line of the 

Ticino and Po Rivers. That refusal, 

observed the Fourteenth Army's chief of 

staff, was tantamount to a death sentence for the army group in Italy. 4 

Those differences failed to dampen 

either Vietinghoffs or Kesselring's optimism and obvious loyalty to their Fuehrer. Yet there were senior officers 

within the German command structure 

in northern Italy who took quite a 

different view of the Reich's military 

situation and agreed with the judgment 

of the Fourteenth Army's chief of staff. As 

exchanges between the OKW and Army 

Group C over strategic and tactical plans 

for meeting the anticipated Allied of .. 

fensive gradually assumed an air of 

unreality, several senior SS officers in 

Italy took advantage of their unique 

position within the Reich's military hierarchy to establish covert contacts with 

Allied agents. On 21' February, the day 

before the Fuehrer's directive binding 

the German armies in Italy to a stultified strategy was received at Kesselring's 

headquarters, an Italian businessman, 

Baron Luigi Parrilli, an intimate of SS 

General Karl Wolff~ senior SS officer in 

command of the security forces, arrived 

in Zurich to make contact with American intelligence agents. 

Within the German forces in northern Italy perhaps no one group had a 

, MS # T-lb (Westphall'l al.), Feldzug in Italil'n, Jl 

Teil, Kapi/"l Iia Ww AlnJ'fhr hump//' der 14. Armff im 

u. n()l'fdlich des Apl'uuin im Fr1i.ljahr 1945 (Wolf .. 

Rudiger Hauer, Gen Maj a.D.). 

439 

better picture of military and civilian 

morale than did the SS police and 

security units. It was thus natural that 

they had a more pessimistic and yet 

more realistic picture of the over-all 

situation than did manv of their counterparts in the Army \~ hose eyes were 

f(xused more specifically on the battlefronts. Yet in the weeks to come what 

amounted to their incipient treason 

would have no influence on the course 

of battle. Most commanders and the 

rank and file of the German armies in 

Italy \~.:ould remain steadfastly at their 

posts until ordered to withdraw or until 

the tide of battle oven"helmed them. 

The German armies in Italy faced a 

more immediate problem: a rapidly 

deteriorating transportation system 

without which a modern field army 

cannot operate. A general shortage of 

vehicles of all types and a shortage of 

motor fuel, complicated by a wideranging Allied aerial interdiction of 

road and rail traffic, was largely responsible. 

To keep essential military traffic 

moving, the Germans had commandeered hundreds of civilian passenger 

cars, trucks. and buses. For several 

months even oxen had been employed 

to move heavy equipment, including 

artillery. In many motor convoys every 

third truck was employed to tow two 

others. Substitute fuels such as methane 

gas, fairly abundant in many areas of 

the Po Valley, were inadequate for 

combat vehicles, but were widely used 

to power administrative vehicles. Such 

fuels as alcohol and benzol were mixed 

with gasoline and diesel oil on a one-tothree ratio in order to stretch limited 

fuel supplies. A few small oil wells in 

northern Italy, some producing as little 
440 

SS GENERAL WOLFF 

as 1,000 gallons a day, contributed 

small amounts of fuel. 5 

Even winter failed to give the Germans the respite from Allied aerial 

harassment they so sorely needed. Although snow secured the Army Group C 

flank in the western Alps and hampered military operations in the Apennines, it failed to halt air attacks against 

the German lines of communications. 

In December alone there were 900 

major breaks in those lines, only fifty of 

which had not been repaired by the 

beginning of the year. Only through 

careful organization of motor transport 

and husbanding of dwindling resources 

had the Germans in Italy been able to 

keep their logistical system from colla psing before the end of 1944. Ii 

Up until the end of the year, 50,000 

tons of supplies per month, mostly coal 

-, MS # T-I b (Westphal I't al.), Pari II, Fl"ldwg ill 

/latinl; Fifth Army His/ory, IX, 12- 13. 

H MS # C-064 (Kesselring)_ 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

shipments, arrived in Italy from Germany, but after January 1945 all coal 

shipments came to a halt. That impelled the Germans to make intensive 

efforts to achieve complete self-sufficiency for their armies in northern 

Italy. Those efforts, in turn, placed the 

economy of the region under severe 

inflationary pressures and caused increased unrest among the population. 

Food shortages and widespread unemployment in flicted considerable hardship. 

A shortage-almost a dearth-of reconnaissance aircraft had long made it 

difficult for the Germans to obtain 

intelligence on Allied intentions. For 

almost a year the Germans had been 

unable to make anywhere near adequate aerial reconnaissance, which contributed to making it difficult to see 

through Allied deception plans. 7 

Late in March Allied intelligence 

learned through the Enigma Code that 

those plans were apparently succeeding, 

for it seemed that the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division had been moved from 

the Bologna sector, where it had been 

in army group reserve, to overwatch 

the Adriatic coast northeast of Venice. 

Aware that enemy fuel stocks were low, 

the Allies believed that only a conviction 

on the part of the German command 

that an actual threat existed on the 

Adriatic flank could have prompted 

such a move. 8 

From the German point of view 

there seemed to be considerable 

grounds for giving credence to num~rous indications of a forthcoming AllIed 

amphibious operation north of the 

7/hid. 

• Alexander, Report to the CCS, The Italian 

Campaign , pp. 37-41. 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

mouth of the Po. By early April Tito's 

partisans had reached Senj, only thirty 

miles southeast of Fiume, a major Italian port on the northeastern corner of 

the Istrian peninsula. To the Germans 

it seemed logical that to take advantage 

of this development the Allies might 

land somewhere to the west of the 

peninsula and thrust overland to effect 

a junction with the Yugoslavs and together advance via Ljubljana toward 

Vienna. Inasmuch as the Red Army 

also threatened that city, that course of 

action seemed an even more likely 

possibility. 9 

In an effort to counter the threat, the 

German high command in early April 

extended Army Group C's long eastern 

flank northward to include the Austrian 

provinces of Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg, and the western half of Styria 

and Carinthia. Because of that added 

responsibility, Army Group C's eastern 

boundary was withdrawn westward an 

average of twenty miles from the prewar !talo-Yugoslav frontier to the line 

of the Isonzo River, which flows southward through the easternmost Italian 

province of Gorizia to enter the gulf of 

Trieste some twelve miles west of that 

city. Since the partisans under Tito's 

leadership had long claimed the Isonzo 

as the legitimate postwar frontier between the countries-it had been the 

pre-World War I boundary between the 

Austrian Empire and Italy-the German action had, perhaps deliberately, 

cast an apple of discord into the midst 

of Allied councils. As a result of the 

boundary shift between Vietinghoffs 

Army Group C and von Weich's Army 

Group E, the XCVII Corps with two 

9 MS # T-lb (Westpbal et at.). vol. 2, part II. 

441 

divisions passed to command of Army 

Group E.1O 

On the eve of the Allied offensive 

Vietinghoffs command included 26 divisions of all types, of which 21 were 

German and five Italian. Sixteen were 

actually deployed across the front from 

the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian Sea. The 

remainder were either in reserve or on 

coastal defense or rear area security 

duty. The Tenth Army, since February 

commanded by General Herr, continued to hold the army group's left wing 

with two corps: the LXXVI Panzer Corps 

with four divisions and the I Parachute 

Corps, also with four. 11 

Two of the best of the divisions of 

the I Parachute Corps, the 4th Parachute 

and the 26th Panzer, were astride Highway 9, which the Germans still considered to be the most likely approach to 

Bologna from the southeast. The sector 

in the A pennines foothills was held by 

the 1 st Parachute Division opposite the 

13 Corps Monte Grande sector, and the 

278th Division opposed the 10 Corps. 

Defending the Tenth Army's front that 

would eventually bear the brunt of the 

Eighth Army's offensive, the LXXVI 

Panzer Corps employed the 42d Jaeger 

(Light Infantry), the 362d Infantry Division, defender of Cisterna at Anzio the 

previous spring, and the 98th Volksgrenadier Divisions. Since those divisions occupied positions on which they had 

been working since January, they could 

expect to be fairly well sheltered from 

all but direct hits by artillery fire or 

aerial bombs. All, however, had incurred heavy losses during the fighting 

10 Ibid. Unless otherwise indicated the f()llowing 

section is based upon this source. 

II Greiner and Schramm, ed., OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

IV(2), 1400. 
442 

of the previous autumn and winter in 

the mountains and were still considerably understrength, as, indeed, were all 

German combat divisions in the last 

months of the war. A fourth division, 

the 162d Turkoml'Tl, was deployed along 

the Comacchio Lagoon's northeastern 

edge and on a spit separating the 

lagoon from the sea. 12 

The front opposite the Fifth Army 

was held by Lemelsen's Fourteenth Army, 

with two corps deployed across a front 

extending approximately 50 miles 

southwestward from the Idice valley 

southeast of Bologna to the Serchio 

valley. The LI Mountain Corps held the 

western half with the 232d Reseroe Division, made up largely of older men and 

convalescents; the 714th(l14th) Jaeger 

Division, composed largely of ethnic 

Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, 

and Alsace; and the 334th Infantry Division, which had taken heavy casualties 

while bearing the brunt of the Fifth 

Army's drive through the Futa Pass in 

October. Senger und Etterlin's XIV Panzer Corps, long a familiar antagonist of 

the Fifth Army, held the remainder 

with the 94th Division, since the fighting 

south of Rome a frequent, if somewhat 

battered, opponent of the Fifth Army; 

the 8th Mountain Division; and the 65th 

Division, also long engaged on the Italian front. Since the beginning of April 

the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division had 

been assembled in army reserve behind 

the panzer corps sector and northwest 

of Bologna. 

Except fix the 8th Mountain Division, 

which had over 3,000 combat infantrymen, all divisions were understrength in 

12 Heinz Greiner, GL T, a.D., Kampf um Rom, 

Inferno am Po, pp. 150-58. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

front-line soldiers. The 714th [114th] 

Jaeger Division was in the worst condition with only 984 combat infantry as of 

the end of March 1945; the other 

divisions were in somewhat better condition with strength ranging from 1,766 

to 2,542. 

From those figures it is evident that 

Lemelsen had concentrated his strength 

south of Bologna on the XIV Panzer 

Corps sector and opposite the U.S. II 

Corps rather than the U.S. IV Corps. 

The Italo-German Ligurian Army, under 

the command of Marshal Graziani, 

composed mostly of fortress and coastal 

defense units, was deployed along the 

gulf of Genoa as far as the FrancoItalian frontier. 13 

The German Defenses 

The German front line from sea to 

sea simply represented the line along 

which the Allied offensive had ground 

to a halt during the winter. Only on the 

western coastal plain did it still embrace 

portions of the Gothic Line. 

Opposite the Eighth Army German 

defenses were in considerable depth to 

protect Bologna from an attack coming 

from the southeast. They were based 

upon a series of river lines, beginning 

with the Senio, then the Santerno, the 

Sillaro, a switch position along the Sellustra, and, finally, the so-called 

Genghis Khan Line, based on the Idice 

River and anchored in the east in the 

flooded plain west of the Comacchio 

Lagoon. At their northern extremities 

those river lines were linked to another 

line of defense based on a stretch of the 

Reno River that flowed eastward from 

13 Records of German Field Commands, Arnn 

Groups, HpeTPsgTuppe C, Microfilm Roll T -311', 

National Archives, Captured Records Division. 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

a great bend twelve miles southwest of 

Ferrara. The latter line gave some 

depth to the defenses of the line of the 

lower Po and was an essential element 

of the German defensive system. The 

Germans saw it as the pivot upon which 

the central and western sectors of their 

front had to swing toward the lines of 

the Po and the Adige Rivers and the 

northeastern passes leading into l.>Crmany. 

Throughout the winter months over 

5000 German engineer troops and additional thousands of civilian laborers 

toiled at preparing field works alo.ng 

the Po and the Adige Rivers. The l~ne 

along the Adige was reinforce? w~th 

naval gun batteries from the LIgurian 

coast while the line of the Po was 

conti~ued \vestward along the Ticino 

River to cover the withdrawal of Marshal Graziani's Ligurian Army on the 

German \\'estern flank. 

Behind those two defensive linesthe Po and the Adige-the Germans 

developed yet another line, a s~)~called 

Voralpenstellung (the forward posItIon of 

the Alps). Extending east and west of 

Lake Garda, that line represented an 

outwork of the almost impregnable bastion of the Alps. In a mann~r so~ewhat similar to the way the nver hnes 

southeast of Bologna ,;ere tied in with 

the Reno, the river lines of the Brenta, 

Piave, Tagliamento, an.d Isonzo, all 

flowing from the Alps lI1 a gene~a~ly 

southerly direction toward the Adnatlc, 

were tied in with the Voralpenstellung. 

Those lines were intended to cover a 

possible withdrawal by the German 

forces northeastward toward the Ljub!jana Gap. 14 

14 Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

IV(2),1389-1400. 

443 

Allied Strategy and Plans 

As Field Marshal Alexander and his 

staff studied the situation map at the 

Mediterranean theater headquarters 

showing those defenses and, thanks to 

decipherment of the German code, an 

accurate picture of the enemy's troop 

dispositions, they considere~ the. possibility that the Germans mIght Ignore 

those lines and withdrm,v from northern 

haly directly into a so-called "National 

Redoubt." That consideration arose 

from an idea that earlier had gained 

some acceptance within SHAEF and 

among some Allied commanders. The 

idea ~ested upon an assumption that 

Hitler and the survivors of his legions 

might fall back into an Alpine defense 

zone extending from Salzburg and Klagenfurt in the east to' the Swiss frontier 

in the west and including the cities of 

Innsbruck, Bolzano, Landeck, and Bregenz. There the fanatical remnants of 

the Third Reich might attempt a lastditch stand of indefinite duration. Although British intelligence circles, to 

which Alexander was privy, remained 

skeptical of the redoubt's existence, no 

commander could afford to ignore the 

possibility. 

There were some within the Allied 

command in Italy who believed that 

Marshal Kesselring had no alternative, 

other than outright surrender, to retreat into the Alps. There the Germans 

might find refuge in former Austrian 

fortifications that had survived World 

War 1. Constructed along the former 

Austro-ltalian frontier, many had been 

left intact by the Italians and could 

prove quite formidable if manned. 1.5 

-,-, For details on the National Redoubt, see Rod· 

ney G. Minott, The Fortress That Never Was, the Myth 

of Hitler's Bavarian Stronghold (Toronto & New 

York: Rinehart & Winston, 1964}. 
444 

As planning proceeded for the spring 

offensive, the same divergent strategies 

that underlay the Anglo-American controversy over ANVIL again came to the 

surface. As they had since the beginning of the Italian campaign, the British continued to look upon the peninsula as a promising road into eastern 

Europe and the mid-Danube basin. The 

Americans, for their part, still regarded 

the Italian campaign as a sideshow to 

the main drama moving to a denouement on the plains of northwestern 

Europe. For the closing months of the 

Italian campaign, the Americans would 

continue to think, as their President 

had once reminded Churchill during 

the ANVIL debates, in terms of the 

shortest distance between two pointsin short, a drive aimed directly at the 

Alps. A direct thrust northward via 

Bologna, Verona, and Lake Garda to 

the Brenner Pass ,,,,ould trap those still 

considerable enemv forces left in northwestern Italy and' afford entry to the 

National Redoubt before the enemv 

had an opportunity to get set there. ; 

Thinking in terms of the post-war 

balance of power in Europe, the British 

continued to focus much of their attention on northeastern Italy. Even if there 

should be no drive into the mid-Danube basin, a thrust to the northeast still 

might thwart long-held Yugoslav ambitions to acquire territory along Italy's 

northeastern frontier. The Italian pons 

of Trieste, Fiume, and Pola lay within 

the region coveted by Marshal Tito and 

his communist-oriented partisans, and 

the British were determined to keep the 

ports out of communist hands lest they 

become naval bases from v,:hich a Soviet 

fleet might dominate the Adriatic. For 

several months the British had been 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

intervening actively in the civil war in 

Greece in an effort to keep that strategic Mediterranean land from falling 

into communist hands, and loss of 

Trieste and control of the Adriatic 

would jeopardize that effort. Furthermore, the British would need the port 

of Trieste to support the occupation 

forces they eventually expected to deploy in Austria. The requirements of 

British strategy in the Mediterranean 

area in general, and the Italian theater 

in particular, were, as they had been 

since the beginning of the war, considerably more comprehensive and complicated than those of the Americans. 

Inter-Allied differences were further 

complicated when early in the planning 

for the spring offensive it became evident that changes in command had also 

altered attitudes and relationships 

among command and staff at the three 

major Allied headquarters in Italy. Formerly, Alexander and his Eighth Army 

commander had tended to think along 

similar lines in developing their operational concepts, especially during planning f(H' the offensive south of Rome 

and for the Gothic Line, while Clark as 

Fifth Army commander sometimes 

found himself a lone dissenter in the 

triumvirate. When Clark moved up to 

become the 15th Army Group commander in mid-December, that close 

identity of views that had so long 

characterized relations between that 

headquarters and the Eighth Anpy 

soon carne to an end. Clark and the 

staff that accompanied him from the 

Fifth Army continued to see their former command as the dominant partner 

in the Italian enterprise and to view the 

Fifth Army's role in the forthcoming 

offensive as essentially a continuation of 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

that played during the long quiescent 

Bologna offensive. 

Yet Truscott, Clark's successor in 

command of the Fifth Army, would 

soon demonstrate that he too was as 

determined to develop his own operational concepts independently of Clark 

as the latter had been vi~ a vis Alexander. Thus Clark would, as before, 

frequently find himself holding a minority viewpoint-although, as army 

group commander, the prevailing 

one-in Allied planning councils. As 

planning progressed at the several 

headquarters, he would on occasion be 

forced to compromise long-held views 

to make allowance for the particular 

operational concepts being developed at 

his two army headquarters. The plan 

that would eventually emerge from the 

15th Army Group headquarters would 

represent a rather loosely worded compromise allowing the two army commanders to carry out cherished operational concepts that Clark had initially 

opposed. 

Indications that that would happen 

surfaced even as Field Marshal Alexander and his staff turned to the task 

of laying out characteristically broad 

operational guidelines for the coming 

offensive. As Alexander and his staff 

considered the zone of operations that 

lay between them and the distant Alps, 

they concluded that by occupying the 

historic "Venetian Quadrilateral"-Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnano--

the Allies had a good chance of destroying many of the German forces in 

northern Italy and of quickly reaching 

the northeastern frontier and the 

Alps.ls 

16 The Venetian Quadrilateral comprising those 

four fortress cities had been until 1866 the key to 

445 

Thirty miles southeast of the Quadrilateral and defending the approaches to 

it, the northward-flowing Reno River 

made a sharp bend to the east and, 

passing southeast of Ferrara, entered 

the sea south of the Comacchio Lagoon. It was along the northwardflowing tributaries of that section of the 

Reno that the Germans had constructed 

their defensive positions east of Bologna. If the Allies could cross the Reno 

near its mouth, those successive lines 

might be turned with relative ease by 

an advance northwestward along the 

Reno's northern bank. That would afford a good chance of trapping a major 

part of the Tenth Army south of the 

Reno as it flowed to the southeast and 

of preventing the Germans from using 

the Reno as another defensive line to 

cover a withdrawal to the Po and the 

Quadrilateral. 

Uninterrupted by large water courses 

and endowed with an excellent road 

system, the plain north of the Reno also 

offered the Eighth Army favorable terrain for maneuver. Since the key to the 

area lay not in the Fifth Army's mne 

of operations south of Bologn~ but in 

the Eighth Army's, Alexander and his 

staff no longer focused attention on 

Bologna. In the Allied theater 

commander's words, " ... we were 

. . . no longer thinking merely 

of the capture of Bologna, nor, indeed. 

of any objective on the ground, but of 

more wide-sweep'ing movements which 

would encircle as many of the Germans 

as possible between the converging 

blows of the two armies." Drawing 

Austrian military control of northern Italy. It was in 

a sense an outwork of a bastion formed bv the 

mountains of the Tyrol and divided northern' Italy 

strategically into two parts, east and west. 
446 

frequently upon earlier experience on 

the arid plains of North Africa, General 

Alexander had never lost his enthusiasm fi)r the "wide-sweeping movement" 

and the "double-fisted" blow. 17 

Since the U.S. Fifth Army's IV Corps 

occupied favorable positions west of the 

Reno as it flows northeast toward the 

great bend southwest of Ferrara, the 

Fifth Army might serve as the left fist 

of the maneuver. The Americans might 

advance along the axis of Highway 64 

and, remaining west of the highway 

and river, debouch into the Lombard 

plain west of Bologna, thereby avoiding 

the defenses south of the city. Once in 

the valley the Fifth Army could fulfill 

the goal of cutting off enemy forces in 

the northwest by driving directly toward 

the Alps along the Ostiglia-Verona axis 

(Highway 12). As for the right fist, the 

Eighth Army after crossing the Reno as 

close to its mouth as possible could 

advance along the axis of Highway 16 

to Padua, thence via Highway 14 into 

northeastern Italy and the frontier, as 

well as join with the Americans to cut 

off those enemy forces defending Bologna to the east and the area south of 

the PO.18 

A prerequisite to the success of Allied 

plans was that the Germans continue to 

defend in place. Yet both Alexander 

and Clark were aware of the possibility 

that the Germans might at any time 

break contact and fall back beyond the 

Po into their suspected Alpine redoubt. 

That remained a source of nagging 

concern with Clark throughout the 

planning period, for such a maneuver 

would adversely affect American stra17 Alexander's Report to the CCS, The Italian 

Campaign, p. 32. Nicolson, Alex, p. 277. 

18 Ibid. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

tegic goals more than those of the 

British. Alexander, at least, was confident that wide-ranging Allied aerial 

reconnaissance and partisan informers 

would provide sufficient early warning 

of any withdrawal. Thus Allied planning proceeded on the assumption that 

the Germans would continue to fall 

back only under overwhelming pressure. 19 

That Alexander's broad operational 

concepts were somewhat different from 

those taking form in General Clark's 

mind would become apparent when in 

early January the army group commander began a series of planning 

conferences with his two army commanders. The first took place on 8 

January when McCreery met with Clark 

at the latter's headquarters in Florence. 

McCreery arrived convinced that, inasmuch as the integrity of the northeast 

Italian frontiers vis-a-vis communist ambitions was as significant a challenge as 

defeating the German armies in Italy, 

the Eighth Army should be the vehicle 

for the main Allied effort and as such 

have first claim on Allied resources in 

the theater. Moreover, despite a chronic 

shortage of replacements and transfer 

of troops to Greece, the Eighth Army 

in January was still the larger of th~ 

two Allied armies. In spite of McCreery's arguments, which Clark agreed 

had some merit, the army group commander maintained long-held private 

reservations about the Eighth Army. 

Long convinced that the British could 

not be depended upon "to carry the 

ball," he was determined not to yield to 

McCreery as Clark believed Alexander 

19 Ibid.; Intervs, Sidney T. Mathews wiGen Clark 

10-2 I May 48, Pt. I. 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 447 

THE LAST HEIGHTS BEFORE BOLOGNA 

had done in the case of Leese on the 

eve of the Gothic Line offensive in 

August. :0 

On 12 February Clark presented to 

his commanders his own operational 

concept for the offensive with instructions to prepare plans for its implementation. The army group commander's 

plan essentially followed the same pattern that Alexander had outlined for 

the fall offensive. The main axis of the 

15th Army Group's offensive would be 

along a line extending from Bologna to 

20 Clark Diary, 19 Jan 45. 

Verona in order to cut in two the 

German forces north of the Apennines. 

The offensive was to be divided into 

three phases: the first to capture the 

area in and around Bologna; the second to advance to the Po and prepare a 

set-piece attack against that enemy line; 

and the third to cross the Po and 

advance on Verona, the capture of 

which was expected to seal the main 

escape route out of Italy to the northeast for those enemy forces still in 

northwestern Italy. At the same time, a 

so-called Venetian Line along the Adige 

River was to be attacked. If the enemy 
448 

failed to defend that line, both armies 

were to cross the Adige and continue 

without pause-the Fifth to the Alps 

and northwestern Italy, the Eighth to 

Trieste and the northeastern frontier. 21 

Inherent in Clark's concept was that the 

Fifth Army would at first throw its 

main effort against the formidable enemy defenses astride Highway 65 south 

of Bologna and take the city while the 

Eighth Army resumed its methodical 

advance northwestward astride Highway 9 toward Bologna. 

The 15th Army Group Operations Plan 

Taking into account the differing 

views of the two army commanders, the 

army group commander's staff prepared a detailed three-phase plan that 

General Clark presented at a conference at his headquarters on 18 March. 

During the first phase, the Eighth 

Army in a secondary role was to cross 

the Senio and push on to establish 

bridgeheads beyond the Santerno. Until 

the Santerno was crossed, all available 

air support, including heavy bombers, 

was to be allotted the Eighth Army. 

Thereafter priority would shift to the 

Fifth Army, which was to make the 

main effort by advancing into the Po 

Valley either to capture or isolate Bologna. The wording would leave Truscott free to bypass the city, if he wished, 

and downgraded the earlier priorities 

that Clark had placed on its capture. 

Emphasis in the second phase was to be 

placed, as both Alexander and McCreery had argued, on encircling major 

enemy forces south of the Po, rather 

than on Clark's earlier emphasis on a 

2I 15th AGp. Opns Instr. No.3, 12 Feb 45, ann. 

A; Truscott, Command Missions, p. 480. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

rapid thrust through the enemy's center 

to divide the enemy and develop the 

line first of the Po and then of the 

Adige. 22 

If the major goals of the first two 

phases were realized, those of the third 

would be relatively easy: to cross the Po, 

capture Verona, and develop the line of 

the Adige, which, if major enemy forces 

were destroyed south of the Po, probably would be lightly defended. As Clark 

saw it, the Eighth Army's role in the 

third phase was primarily to assist the 

Fifth Army in trapping the enemy 

south of the Po. Following establishment of bridgeheads over the Santerno, 

the Eighth Army was to continue to 

advance in two columns, one in the 

direction of the Bastia Bridge and the 

other toward Budrio. The former, a 

crossing of the Reno, lay three miles 

south of Argenta, while Budrio was 

located nine miles northeast of Bologna. 

Clark expected Budrio to draw McCreery northwestward in the direction 

most advantageous to the Fifth Anpy. 

Only if he appeared to be making good 

progress in that direction was he to 

launch an amphibious operation across 

the Comacchio Lagoon. If therehy he 

managed to outf1ank the Argenta Gap, 

which Clark doubted he would be able 

to do, the two commanders would then 

decide whether to redirect the army's 

main effort in a more northerly direction toward Ferrara, as McCreery had 

originally planned ang desired. Only 

then would Budrio and the entrapment 

of major enemy forces between Budrio 

and Bologna be relegated to the status 

of secondary objectives. In short, if all 

"Hq 15th AGp, Opns Instr. No.4, 24 Mar 45, 

in Fifth Army History, Part IX, ann. B. 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

went well along the Santerno, McCreery 

would be given an opportunity to make 

his right hook against the Argenta Gap, 

which the British envisioned as the first 

major step on the road to Trieste. 23 

In the matter of the selection of Dday for the offensive, General Clark 

insisted, despite objections from McCreery, on 10 April. Clark's meteorologists had assured him that by mid-April 

the ground in the Po Valley would be 

firm enough for tracked and wheeled 

vehicles; and even though the winter 

had been bitterly cold, there had been 

less snow than usual at higher elevations, thus lessening the danger of 

flooding in lower reaches of the rivers 

during April. Clark was also concerned 

lest the Red Army marching up the 

Danube and the U.S. Seventh Army 

advancing through southern Germany 

should reach Austria's alpine frontier 

before the 15th Army Group should 

get there. After the long, arduous advance northward from Cassino, Clark 

was determined to be in on the kill 

when the war ended and not be left 

bogged down either in the northern 

Apennines or in the Po Valley. 2~ 

General McCreery objected to the 

April date because L VT's (Landing Vehicle, Tracked, called by the British 

"Fantails" or "Buffaloes") that he .hoped 

to use in an amphibious right hook 

over the Comau'hio Lagoon had yet to 

arrive, and he doubted whether enough 

vehicles would be on hand and crews 

trained to operate them before May. 

When in mid-March it appeared that 

enough vehicles and crews would be 

available in early April to lift at least 

'" Ibid. 

24 Clark Diary. 2 Mar 45. 

449 

one infantry brigade, he agreed to the 

10 April date. 25 

The 15th Army Group Commander's 

operational guidelines left General 

Truscott somewhat greater freedom to 

realize his own operational concepts 

than they had General McCreery. For 

example, Clark had downgraded the 

isolation or capture of Bologna to a 

secondary mission. Truscott was to debouch into the Po Valley, presumably 

west of Bologna. Once in the valley, the 

army was to exploit rapidly toward the 

Po as well as toward a junction with the 

Eighth Army in the vicinity of Bondeno 

to complete the encirclement of enemy 

forces in the central sector. Clark's 

failure to insist upon the axis of Highway 65 represented a significant concession to Truscott's views that the sector 

west of Highway 64 "was most promising for breaking through the German 

positions and into the Po valley." The 

Fifth Army commander was determined, he recalled later, to retain that 

concept in his plans and "did not want 

Clark, because of his predilection for 

PIANORO (Highway 65), to interpose a 

restriction which would make it impossible. I had not forgotten the change of 

direction in the breakout from Anzio."26 

Truscott also drew the assignment of 

launching a preliminary attack. Before 

the Fifth Army moved, the 92d Division was to capture Massa and exploit 

via Carrara toward the naval base at La 

Spezia. That, Truscott expected, would 

draw some enemy strength from the 

central front toward the west, thereby 

easing the task of the IV and II Corps. 

25 Ibid. 

26 Truscott. Command Missions, pp. 478-79. 
450 

The Eighth Army's Plan 

As General McCreery and his staff 

studied the situation after the Eighth 

Army had closed to the line of the 

Senio in J~nuary, they realized that they 

had a chOIce of one or two axes for that 

ar.my's main effort. The first, along 

HIghway 9, fitted in well with General 

Clark's strategic concepts and led directly to Bologna. The second led 13 

miles northwestward along Highway 16, 

to Argenta. If the main effort were 

ma~e along the Argenta axis it would 

avoId the numerous defended river 

lines that lay east of Bologna and would 

enable the army to outflank the eastwest stretch of the Reno upon which 

those lines were anchored, but there 

was a major disadvantage to that axis: 

much of it lay under water. The Germans had blown the dykes and dismantled numerous pumping stations, 

thereby flooding all but a narrow readill-defended cor.ridor (the A;genta 

Gap) thn.mgh whICh ran Highway 16, 

and the Immediate vicinity of Argenta 

itself. 

The disadvantage called for extraordinary measures and saw the genesis of 

the British plan to use L VT's to outflank the corridor by moving across the 

Comacchio Lagoon and its adjacent 

flooded lowlan~s. That idea had long 

appealed to Eighth Army engineers, 

but for long they had lacked the necessary topographic data, such as the 

depth of the water and soil conditions 

of the bottom and shore line. The 

in~ormatio~, it developed, could be supp!Ied by fnendly Italian fishermen slippmg through British lines. 27 

. 27 Operati~ms of the British, Indian, and DominIon Forces In Italy, Part IV, Campaign in Lombardy. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

For such an operation to succeed the 

enemy had to be kept ignorant of the 

presence of the L VT's and induced to 

commiLhis reserves to another sector 

before the amp~ibious move began. To 

do that, the ~Ighth Army devised a 

cover plan deSIgned to suggest to the 

Germans that the main Allied effort 

w<:>uld again be made along the axis of 

J:Ilghway 9, w.hiJe a secondary operatIOn, an amphIbious landing, would be 

laun~he? north of the Po in the gulf of 

Vemce m a manner somewhat reminiscent of the Anzio landing south of 

Rome. Concealing the presence of the 

~ VT's .from . the e~emy presented few 

ImmedI~te dI~ficultles since only a few 

had arnved m Italy, and their crews 

would be trained on Lake Trasimeno 

far to the south. 

After t~e withdrawal in February of 

the Canadian corps and its two divisions 

to northern Europe, General McCreery 

had extended the right flank of the 5 

Corps to take ~)Ver responsibility for the 

former CanadIan sector on the Adriatic 

flank. With one armored and five infan~ry divisions, Maj. Gen. C. F. Keightley s corps was by far the largest of the 

ar~y's .four corps and thus a logical 

chOICe for the. aSSIgnment. Manning the 

sector from ng?~ to left from Highway 

9 were the Bntlsh 56th Division, with 

the 24th Guards, the 9th Armoured 

the 2d Commando, and the Italian 28th 

Garibaldi Brigades attached. Next in 

line were the Italian Cremona Battle 

Group, the 8th Indian, the 78th British 

and the 2d New Zealand Divisions. Th~ 21st Tank, 4th New Zealand, and 2d 

Armoured .. Brigades were in corps reserve awaItmg an opportunity for armored exploitation. The units had recently been reinforced with several 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

items of new equipment, including 

modified flame-throwing Churchill 

tanks (Crocodiles), armored infantry 

carriers (Kangaroos), and regular medium tanks modified for use in stream 

crossings. 28 

The 2 Polish Corps, with two infantry divisions-the 3d Carpathian and 

5th Kresowa-and the equivalent of 

one armored division-the 2d Polish 

Armoured and 7th Armoured Brigades 

and the 43d Lorried Gurkha Brigadeheld the sector astride Highway 9 near 

Faenza. For a brief period at Eighth 

Army headquarters after it got news of 

the Yalta agreements that determined 

the future of Poland, there had been 

some concern that the Polish forces in 

their despair might decide to sit out the 

last offensive. For a time General Anders considered giving up his command 

and requesting that the western Allies 

accept him and his corps as prisoners of 

war rather than accept the Yalta decision. How to replace the Polish corps 

was for a time of serious concern to 

Clark. Only after consulting with the 

Polish government in exile in London 

did Anders finally decide to stick it out 

until victory. 29 

The Eighth Army's two remaining 

corps, 10 and 13, controlled between 

them the equivalent of only two divisions and held that part of the army 

front still in the mountains south of 

Highway 9. Along a sector extending 

from the upper Senio to south of 

Imola, the 10 Corps, recently returned 

from Greece, had only the Jewish He28 Ibid, Sec. B, The Final Offensive. Unless otherwise indicated the following sections are based upon 

this reference. 

29 Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 421-22. 

451 

bron Brigade and Italian Friuli Battle 

Group. The 13 Corps held the remainder of the Eighth Army front to the 

Monte Grande sector with the 10th 

Indian Division and the Italian Folgore 

Battle Group. 

Salient features of McCreery's battle 

plan included a two-pronged attack 

toward the north and northwest. The 

first and main attack was to be made by 

the 5 Corps in the direction of Lugo, 

two miles west of the Senio and nine 

miles north of Faenza on Highway 9. 

With Lugo in hand, the corps was to 

drive on Massa Lombarda, four miles 

to the west, before turning northward 

toward the Bastia Bridge and Argenta. 

The former was the key to the Argenta 

Gap. Spanning the lower Reno thirteen 

miles west of the Comacchio Lagoon, 

the Bastia Bridge represented the most 

desirable crossing point of the Reno 

opposite the 5 Corps right wing. Once 

a crossing had been made there the line 

of the lower Reno would be turned, 

thereby permitting the 5 Corps to move 

along the river's north bank to turn the 

successive enemy river lines anchored 

on that stretch of the Reno. 

Preceding the 5 Corps attack, the 

56th Division was to launch a series of 

preliminary operations to gain control 

of a wedge of flooded lowland at the 

southeastern corner of the Comacchio 

Lagoon and several small islands in the 

middle of the lagoon, as well as to clear 

the enemy from a spit of land separating the lagoon from the sea. If those 

operations succeeded, the corps would 

gain control of the lagoon and of 

favorable sites along its western shore 

from which to mount attacks against 

the seaward flank of the Argenta Gap. 

The enemy's attention might thereby be 
452 

drawn away from the main sector opposite Lugo and the Bastia Bridge. 

In preparation for the main attack, 

McCreery planned to concentrate six 

divisions behind his center, from a 

bend of the Senio near Lugo where the 

river turns toward the northeast to, but 

exclusive of, Highway 9. The sector had 

the advantage of several good crossing 

sites, and the highway along which the 

Germans had concentrated at least two 

of their best divisions, the 4th Parachute 

and 26th Panzer, might be avoided. 

Once the attacking divisions had 

crossed the San terno , about five miles 

beyond the Senio, they were to turn in 

a more northerly direction toward Argenta. By holding the enemy in place 

and drawing units away from the 

coastal flank, the maneuver was expected to assist those forces making an 

amphibious right hook against the Argenta Gap. 

The 5 Corps operation ag-ainst Lugo 

was to be made by two divisions: the 

8th Indian, passing to the right, and 

the 2d New Zealand, to the left of the 

town. By D plus 2 both divisions were 

expected to have established a large 

bridgehead beyond the Santerno near 

Massa Lombarda. At that point the 

78th Division, having moved beyond 

Lugo, was to relieve the Indian division, 

then continue the attack toward the 

Bastia Bridge. While that was in progress, a brigade of the 56th Division, 

transported in L VT's, was to cross the 

flooded plain as far as the Menate 

pumping station, on the Comacchio 

Lagoon's shore eleven miles east of the 

Bastia Bridge. The New Zealand division, meanwhile, was either to cover the 

78th Division's left or, in co-operation 

with the Polish corps, to advance westCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ward toward Budrio, seventeen miles 

northwest of Massa Lombarda, depending upon the success of the thrust in 

the direction of the Bastia Bridge. The 

8th Indian Division and the Cremona 

Battle Group were to round up bypassed enemy forces before passing into 

5 Corps reserve. 

The 2 Polish Corps to the left of the 

5 Corps was to form the second prong 

of the Eighth Army's offensive. First 

Polish objectives beyond the Santerno 

were the towns of Medicina, eighteen 

miles northwest of Faenza, and Castel 

San Pietro, a similar distance from the 

Polish front on Highway 9. Eventually 

the Polish corps was expected to coordinate closely with the U.S. Fifth 

Army's II Corps in the capture or 

isolation of Bologna, and in the event 

the 5 Corps failed to break through the 

Argenta Gap, to keep open General 

McCreery's option for switching the axis 

of his main effort toward Budrio. 

If McCreery's plans succeeded, he 

intended to continue his offensive in 

two separate battles: the first, a battle of 

annihilation against the enemy south of 

the Po, the second an exploitation as 

far as Ferrara. Both were to be f()llowed by pursuits, the first beyond the 

Po and the Adige and the second along 

the south bank of the Po to prevent 

enemy forces still south of the river 

from reaching it. 

On the other hand, if the 5 Corps 

had difficulty in forcing the Argenta 

Gap, the 13 Corps headquarters was to 

come around from the army's left flank 

to take control of those divisions fighting the first of the two battles in the 

direction of Budrio. That would leave 

the 5 Corps free to concentrate on the 

Argenta sector. Once the corps broke 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

through there, the 10 Corps headquarters was to come around from the left 

to take control of a special engineer 

task force. Passing through the gap in 

the wake of the 5 Corps, the 10 Corps 

was to move up on the right to prepare 

f(')f the first crossings of the PO.:lH 

Developing the Fifth Army's Plan 

Bv the end of March, Truscott had 

just ~ ab(~ut complet.ed regrouping his 

forces for the sprmg offenSive. The 

British 13 Corps having been returned 

earlier to Eighth Army control, the 

Fifth Army was left with a somew hat 

narrower front. Crittenberger's IV 

Corps continued to hold the widest 

segment, 50 miles from the ~eno to the 

sea. Within the IV Corps, Cnttenberger 

extended the sector of the 92d Division 

and its attached units, the 473d and 

442d Regiments, as far as the Cutigliano valley, where the 365th Infantry, 

detached from the division, held an 

independent command in the former 

sector of Task Force 45. East of the 

365th Infantry lay the 1st Brazilian 

Division (BEF), occupying a mountainous sector stretching northeastward 

from the Riva Ridge past Monte Belvedere to the U.S. 10th Mountain Division's left boundary west of Pietra Colora. With the ex~eption of a narrow 

sector held by the 8Ist Cavalry Re~onnaissam:e Squadron on the corps ng?t 

flank south of Vergato, Hays' mountam 

division held the remainder of the IV 

Corps front. 

Dispositions within the II Corps reflected Keyes' plan again to use the 

85th and 88th Divisions to spearhead 

"" W.G.F. Jackson, Tlu' Battk jor ltaly (New York, 

1967), pp. 303-04. 

453 

the renewed drive to Bologna and the 

Po Valley. The 1st Armored Division, 

with the 9Ist Reconnaissance Squadron 

attached, held a five-mile sector on the 

left wing just east of the . Reno. River. 

The 34th Division lay astnde HIghway 

65 in the center. On 'the right wing the 

91 st Division and attached Legnano 

Battle Group occupied positions in the 

Idice valley and on Monte Belm~).nte. 

Three divisions--the 6th South Afncan 

Armoured and 85th and 88th Infantry-were assembled in rear areas for 

r~st and training. 

In contrast to Clark, Truscott had 

long ceased to focus his attention on 

Bologna. He intended instead to co~­

centrate the Fifth Army's main effort m 

the IV Corps sector west of Highway 

64 between the Samoggia and the Reno 

Rivers. An advance on that axis by the 

IV Corps would, he expected, outflank 

from the west the admittedly strong 

defenses south of Bologna. When the 

IV Corps debouched into the valley, .the 

II Corps west of Bologna would Sidestep to the left from ~he axis of Highway 65 to that of Highway 64. Once 

out of the mountains, the two corps 

would advance abreast from Modena 

northward toward the Po, the IV Corps 

capturing Ostiglia, v,:here Highway 12 

crossed the river, and the II Corps, 

Bondeno, eighteen miles to the southeast near where the Panaro joins the 

Po. There contact was to be made with 

the Eighth Army advancing from Ferrara, thus completing the encirclement 

of German forces still within the bend 

of the Reno. 

After crossing the Po at Ostiglia, the 

IV Corps was to advance as far as 

Verona and then to Lake Garda, and, if 

things went well, cut off those enemy 
454 

forces still in northwest Italy. In cooperation with the Eighth Army's drive 

to the northeast, the II Corps was to 

cross the Po and advance to the Adige. 

Meanwhile, the 92d Division on the 

army's left flank, operating directly under the Fifth Army, was to continue its 

advance along the Ligurian coast to 

Genoa, Italy's major seaport, and 

thence northwestward to an eventual 

link-up with French forces along the 

Franco-Italian frontier. 31 

The Fifth Army's Operation BIG 

GAME was designed to create the illusion that the I I Corps was moving 

eastward to join the Eighth Army in 

making the main Allied effort along the 

Adriatic flank and that the IV Corps 

would take over the Fifth Army's entire 

front. Dummy radio nets were established for some units, and radio silence 

imposed upon others. While most of 

the movement was simulated, some 

units, their divisional markings removed 

from personnel and equipment, actually 

shifted but only within the army sector. 32 

To avoid having to divide air support 

equally between the two armies, Clark 

instructed Truscott to delay his phase 

of the offensive until about D plus 3 

when the Eighth Army would have 

crossed the Santerno River. Thus the 

full weight of the tactical and strategic 

air forces could be thrown in support 

first of the Eighth Army on the right, 

then of the Fifth Army on the left. 

Truscott developed a similar scheme 

for allotting air support between his two 

corps. Attacking first, Crittenberger's 

31 Hq, U.S. Fifth Army, Opns lnstr. No.7, I Apr 

45, in Fifth Army History, Part IX, ann. E.; Truscott, 

Command Decisions, pp. 478-79. 

32 Ibid., IX, 26. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

IV Corps would at first receive the 

Fifth Army's entire allotment of airpower, then 36 hours later all air 

support was to be shifted to su pport of 

Keyes' 11 Corps. Staggering the army's 

attack in that manner also had the 

advantage of placing greater firepower 

alternately behind each of the two army 

corps rather than dividing it between 

them as McCreery had done with the 

Eighth Army. While assigning one of 

the Fifth Army's two armored divisions 

to each corps, Truscott nevertheless 

managed to assure a concentrated armored thrust by positioning both divisions side by side on the interior wings 

of the corps: the U.S. 1st Armored 

Division on the I V Corps' right and the 

South African 6th Armoured on the II 

Corps' left. :!;; 

Within the Fifth Army's· main wne of 

operations opposite the IV and I I 

Corps only two highways, 64 and 65, 

led through the 12-mile belt of remaining mountainous terrain between the 

front and the Po Valley. Long favored 

by Clark, Highway 65 offered the most 

direct approach. Except for two rugged 

peaks, Monte Sole and Monte Adone, 

rising above north-south running ridge 

lines bordering the Setta valley between 

Highway 65 and the Reno River to the 

west, the terrain was favorable and 

permitted movement and support of up 

to five divisions. The main disadvantage 

of Highway 65 lay in that the Germans 

had concentrated their strongest positions astride it in defense of the southern approaches to Bologna. A major 

offensive along that route might involve 

330pns Instr. No.7, I Apr 45, Hq Fifth Army, 

in Fifth Army History, Part IX, ann. E. Unless 

otherwise indicated the following sections are based 

upon this source. 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

a repeat of the costly experience of the 

previous winter. 34 

Highway 64, on the other hand, held 

out the possibility of enveloping Bologna from the southwest instead of 

assaulting the defenses frontally. That 

route too would permit passage of up 

to five divisions. Following the course of 

the Reno River, the highway was defiladed from the west for much of its 

length through the mountains by a 15-

mile ridge paralleling the highway from 

Monte Belvedere to Monte Pigna, f<)Ur 

miles northwest of Vergato, a heavily 

fortified road juction just north of 

American lines. An advance along 

Highway 64 would require a simultaneous effort to clear the remainder of 

that ridge line as well as Monte Sole, 

which overlooked the highway some 

five miles to the norrheast of Vergato. 

The Plan 

By mid-March all but a few of the 

min~r details of a greatly modified 

Operation PIANORO, newly designated 

Operation CRAFTSMAN, had been completed. CRAFTSMAN outlined an attack 

with two corps abreast; the IV Corps 

attacking first on D plus 3 and the II 

Corps on army command on 24-hour 

notice. From a line just south of Vergato, Crittenberger's corps was to advance northeasterly on a lO-mile front, 

bounded by the Samoggia River in the 

west and the Reno in the east. The IV 

Corps was expected to delx)Uch into the 

Po Valley in the vicinity of Bazzano, 

some thirteen miles west of Bologna. 

Deployed essentially along the same line 

where the winter offensive had come to 

34 Fifth Army History, IX, 21-22; Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 477-78. 

455 

a halt, Keyes' II Corps was to advance 

at first directly toward Bologna along 

the axis of Highway 65, but after the 

IV Corps had captured the road junction of Praduro, on Highway 64 some 

fifteen miles north of Vergato, most of 

the II Corps was to shift westward to 

the axis of Highway 64, so that the two 

corps would debouch abreast into the 

Po Valley ,vest of Bologna. Only a 

minor effort was to be made frontally 

against Bologna, mainly to hold th~ 

enemy there in place.:15 

For purposes of control, Truscott 

designated three phase lines-Green, 

Brown, and Black. During the Green 

phase, Crittenberger was to send the 

10th Mountain Division toward Monte 

Pigna and Monte Mantino, two miles 

northeast of Monte Pigna, and the 1 st 

Armored Division along the axis of 

Highway 64 against Verga to and Monte 

Pero, a mile northwest of town. The IV 

Corps left flank was to be covered by 

the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and 

the 365th and 371 st Regiments, detached from the 92d Division. Those 

units were to follow up any enemy 

withdrawal along the axis of Highway 

12, roughly paralleling Highway 64 

some fifteen miles to the west. The 

order for the II Corps to attack \\'as to 

be given when the IV Corps reached 

the Green Line. 

Once the offensive was under way, 

Truscott planned to form a mobile 

reserve of his armored divisions with 

which to exploit the most promising 

opportunities. When his troops reached 

the Po Valley, he intended to create, 

Operation Craftsman, Fifth Army Opns. InSlr. 

#7. 1 April 1945. See also Truscott. Command 

Mi.lSir!11s, p. 482. Unless otherwise indicated the 

I()llowing sections are based on these references. 
456 

from the mobile reserve, infantry-armor 

task forces to lead the dash first for the 

Panaro, then the Po. 

In the Brown phase the two corps 

were to advance abreast: the IV Corps 

continuing in a northeasterly direction 

west of Highway 64, the II Corps 

capturing Monte Sole, Monterumici, 

and Monte Adone, the high ground 

between Highways 64 and 65. Truscott 

believed that his counterpart, General 

Lemelsen, would have to weaken these 

otherwise formidable positions to deal 

with the IV Corps advance west of 

Highway 64. On the II Corps right 

flank, the Italian Combat Group Legnano was to patrol aggressively and 

maintain contact with the British 13 

Corps on the Eighth Army's left. 

At the beginning of the Black phase, 

the 85th Division from the Army reserve was to pass through the 1st 

Armored Division and come under II 

Corps control. That would be made 

possible by a shift in the corps boundary from just east of Highway 64 to 

four miles west of the highway south of 

Praduro. During that phase the armored exploitation force was to begin 

assembling: the I st Armored Division 

just west of Vergato and the South 

African armored division to the southeast of the town. Truscott planned to 

employ both divisions to exploit an 

expected breakthrough west of the 

highway, thrusting into the Po Valley as 

far as the Panaro River 22 miles northwest of Bologna. The American armored division was to operate in the 

direc;tion of Modena, on Highway 9, 22 

miles northwest of Bologna, and the 

South African northeastward in the 

direction of the Eighth Army's left 

flank and Bondeno, on the Panaro 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

River 27 miles north of Bologna. It was 

expected that the Fifth and Eighth 

Armies would link up at Bondeno. 

There was to be no artillery preparation, in hope of surprise. Instead, the 

army was to fire a 20-day program of 

gradually increasing intensity, building 

to a crescendo during the final week 

preceding D-day, a procedure bearing 

some similarities to the Anzio breakout 

offensive. To support the program 

Truscott authorized an increase of 

328,090 rounds over the basic rate for 

the 20-day period preceding the offensive. Stocks assembled in depots during 

the winter and early spring were more 

than adequate. 

To support an exploitation beyond 

the Po, Truscott's G-4 planned on 

building up a I5-day stock of all classes 

of supply in the Bologna area as soon 

as the city had been captured. Reserve 

rations, sufficient to feed 400,000 prisoners f<)r thirty days, were also stocked 

in anticipation of large-scale enemy surrenders, although captured enemy 

stocks were to be used first. 

As the time for the beginning of the 

spring offensive drew near, Allied commanders could look with considerable 

satisfaction on their overwhelming domination of the skies, both over the 

battlefront and the enemy-occupied regions north to the Alps. In no other 

arm did the Allied armies have such 

complete superiority, for the once powerful Luftwaffe had all but vanished 

from the skies of Europe. Except fex 

scattered concentrations of antiaircraft 

batteries defending a few vital targets, 

the Germans in the spring of 1945 had 

virtually nothing with which to fend off 

Allied aircraft. As a result, the XXII 

T AC, which during March had concen-
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 

trated on communications targets, had 

by the end of the month virtually run 

out of suitable targets in northern Italy. 

At the same time, the heavy bombers of 

the Strategic Air Force (MASAF) had 

also run out of targets outside of Italy. 

This meant that, in addition to the 

aircraft of the XXII T AC, the B-17's 

and B-24's of the MASAF would be 

free for close support of the spring 

offensive, as Clark had long insisted. 36 

The staggered nature of the ground 

attack meant that the Eighth Army 

offensive would be supported by a 

greater mass of airpower than ever 

before in the Italian campaign. On the 

afternoon of D-day 800 heavy bombers 

employing 175,000 20-pound fragmentation l~Jmbs were to lay a lethal carpet 

on enemy artillery and reserve positions 

in front of each of the two assaulting 

corps. More specifically, from 1350 to 

1420 the bombers were to attack a twosquare-mile L-shaped area in front of 

the 5 Corps and west of Lugo. At the 

same time, 120 medium day bombers 

were to attack three gun areas opposite 

the Polish sector, and an additional 48 

medium bombers a gun area opposite 

the 5 Corps. That assignment completed, 500 fighter-bombers of the DAF 

and 200 of the XXII TAG, normally 

flying in support of the U.S. Fifth 

Army, were between 1520 and 1930 to 

attack a total of 56 hostile batteries and 

64 strong~)ints, mortar ~)sitions, and 

command posts across the enemy front. 

Any traffic on roads ihto the battle area 

was to be strafed. During the same 

period, on the 5 Corps front, there was 

to be a series of five 42-minute "falsealarm" bombardments by artillery and 

"" Craven and Cate, eds., AAF Ill, 482-83; Truscott, p. 483. 

457 

mortars. Between each there was to be 

a 10-minute interval during which 

fighter-bombers were to attack dose-in 

targets along the western f100dbanks of 

the Senio. At H-hour, after the final 

artillery bombardment, the aircraft 

were to fly a dummy run along the 

flood banks. From 1830 to 1930 the 

fighter-bombers would also attack the 

f100dbanks in front of the Polish mrps. 

Even H-hour and darkness would bring 

the enemy no respite, for from 2030 to 

0400 on D-day and D plus 1, counterbattery fires were to be integrated with 

attacks by 100 light night bombers, 

while 100 heavy night bombers were to 

attack Santerno defenses identified by 

artillery night marker shells. On D plus 

I, from 1100 to 1230, 800 heavy bombers were to saturate with fragmentation 

bombs a 10'/2-ITIilc-square target area 

just beyond the Santerno. 

The magnitude of the planned air 

support is apparent from the total 

numbers of bombs-148,556-and 

over-all tonnages-I 6, 924.:17 Similar 

tonnages were planned for the Fifth 

Army's attack, but because of the 

mountainous terrain there was to be no 

carpet pattern to the bombing. 

Allied Preponderance in Material and 

Manpower 

Not only were the Allied armies to 

possess overwhelming air support but 

also a two-to-one preponderance over 

the enemy in artillery, including towed 

antitank guns, enemy infantry cannon, 

and Nebelwerfers. A similar ratio existed in combat infantrymen, and an 

even greater ratio--three-to-one-in ar-

'" Operations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, IV, Sec. B, Eighth Army-the 

Final Offensive. 
458 

mor, including self-propelled antitank 

assault guns. The Eighth Army, for 

example, had 1.017 artillery pieces in 

support of the two assault corps and an 

additional 256 pieces in support of the 

two holding corps, for a total of 1,273 

pieces. Compared with the 187 field 

and medium guns and 36 Nebelwerfers 

that the Germans had deployed in 

positions from which they might engage 

the Eighth Army's attack, the advantage 

was almost as impressive as that enjoyed 

in the air. Similar ratios also existed in 

the Fifth Army.38 

Although both Allied armies contained a similar number of divisions, 

the Fifth Army's divisions had much 

larger assigned overstrengths and far 

larger replacement pools from which to 

draw than the Eighth Army's. Of the 

nine divisions and the equivalent of a 

tenth in the Fifth Army, there were six 

American infantry divisions, one Brazilian infantry division, two armored divisions ()n~~ South African and one 

American), and miscellaneous American 

and Italian units to the equivalent of a 

division. As advancements on future 

replacements, more than 7,000 officers 

and enlisted men had been assigned as 

overages to those divisioTls to enable the 

men to receive some training and experience bdi)re the offensive began. In 

addition, there awaited in replacement 

depots in Italy 21,000 white officers 

and enlisted men, 2,000 black replacements fi)r the 92d Division, 5,000 replacements f()r the Brazilian Ex peditionarv Force, and 1,200 Nisei fi)r the 

Japant~se-American 442d Infantry Regin1ent. :I!' 

Not only did the Germans face an 

overwhelrn'ing force at the front, but. 

"" Ibid. 

"" Fifth Armv History, IX, 4. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

behind German lines there lurked in 

northwestern and northeastern Italy, as 

well as in the Apennines, approximately 

50,000 partisans, organized into companies, battalions, and brigades, poised 

and ready to strike at the enemy's rear 

areas w}{enever the Allied cOl~mand 

gave the word. Allied sUPJX)rt of the 

Italian resistance movement had begun 

shortly after its sJXmtaneous inception 

in September 1943, following the Italian surrender and the Allied landings 

in southern Italy. Since then a total of 

about 2,400 tO~lS of military supplies 

had reached partisan bands either by 

air drop or by covert landings along the 

coasts. Five hundred tons had been 

delivered during March alone. When 

the autumn offensive had begun in 

August 1944, a combination of steppedup Allied assistance and a wave of 

enthusiasm, caused by an ill-founded 

anticipation of early' liberation, had 

prompted an estimated 130,000 men to 

flock to the guerrilla standards, but 

during the long winter months, after 

the Allied offensive bogged down, discouragement and vigorous enemy 

counteraction reduced the number of 

partisans to approximately 50,000 by 

spring of 1945. Those men, however, 

represented a hard core, or cadre, 

capable of rapid expansion should the 

Germans be forced into a large-scale 

retreat. At the time of the spring 

offensive there were some 200 Allied 

personnel divided into sixty mission 

teams in contact with and assisting the 

partisan formations behind the enemy 

lines. 40 

". AFHQ (;-3 Memo to COS, 24 Jan 45, sub: 

Appnxiatiol1 by C-3 of Future Support and E.mployment of Italian Resistance, in AFHQ Records 

file, Microfilm Reel 38A, Federal Rewrds Center; 

Fifth Army Hillory, IX, 12. 
CHAPTER XXVI 

Breakthrough on the Eighth Army 

Front 

In the East 

The first of the two preliminary 

operations scheduled f()r each of the 

coas~al flanks began on the night of I 

ApI'll when a flotilla of LVT's carrying 

the British 2d Commando Brigade set 

out across the Comacchio Lagoon's 

shallow waters on the Eighth Army's 

Adriatic flank. That operation was to be tl~e first of .a. series of three designed to 

glVe the ~ntJsh f()l'ces advance positions 

f:om whICh t~) cover an amphibious 

nght hook agamst Argenta. 

The lagoon's waters were indeed 

shallow-too shallow, for shortly after 

launching, all of the LVT's mired down 

in a muddy bottom. Only after the 

troops transferred to storm boats were 

the lightened vehicles pulled free. The 

assault then continued in the boats 

against t,he spit of land separating the 

lagoon from the sea. I Despite a shallower draft, many of those craft ran 

aground as well, some as far as a 

thousand yards from the landing site; 

but all troops were able to wade ashore, 

albeit in some instances through kneedeep mud. ' 

Surprisingly, those mishaps failed to 

arouse the small garrison of Turkomenian troops on the spit. Catching the 

I The assault boats were light-weight. shallowdraft craft powered by outboard motors. used 

primarily for river crossings. 

enemy completely by surprise, the brigade by 4 April had pressed over five 

miles north to clear the spit as En as 

Porto Garibaldi, a small fishing village 

off the lagoon's northeastern corner 

yielding some 800 prisoners. The nex~ day. a squadron of the Special Boat 

Service, a small amphibious force, completed. the second action by quickly 

capturIng a group of small islands in 

the center of the lagoon. 

In the meantime, the 2d Commando 

Brigade and its newly acquired sector 

passed under the control of the British 

56th Division. On 6 April that division 

launched the third and last of the 

actions near the mouth of the Reno to 

capture the wedge of ground at the 

Comacchio Lagoon's southwestern corner, appropriately designated "the 

Wedg~.~' . In spite. of strong opposition, 

the dlHslon by mghtfall of the second 

day had cleared that area and captured 

another 700 prisoners. That time the 

LVTs peri()rmed perfectly, easilv crossing the flooded ?elds and pu(ting to 

rest concern raised bv the earlier 

gr<,>undings in the operation against the 

SpIt. In no great force, British troops 

were nevertheless established on the 

north bank of the Reno. 

In the West 

Meanwhile, some 120 miles to the 

west on the Fifth Army's Ligurian 
460 

flank, the 92d Division jumped off on 5 

April in a second preliminary operation. Appropriately named Operation 

SECOND WIND, it was aimed at the 

capture of Massa, on the south bank of 

the Frigido River, five miles northwest 

of the division front and the last enemy-held strongpoint of the old Gothic 

Line. 

Since the ill-starred Operation 

FOURTH TERM of the previous winter, 

the 92d Division had been reorganized. 

Two of its former regiments (the 365th 

and 371st) had been detached to cover 

the long left flank of the IV Corps. By 

shifts within the division, Almond had 

gathered together the best men of the 

three original regiments into the 370th 

Infantry, commanded by Col. Raymond 

G. Sherman. To take the place of the 

detached regiments, Truscott attached 

the Japanese-American 442d Regimental Combat Team, under the command 

of Lt. Col. Virgil R. Miller, and Col. 

William P. Yarborough's 473d Infantry, 

the unit made up of former antiaircraft 

artillerymen. Thus the 92d Division at 

that point was a vastly different unit 

from the one which had performed so 

unfortunately during the previous winter. 2 

This time Almond decided to risk no 

repetition of the abortive operation 

across the Cinquale Canal on the coastal 

plain. Rather would the division's main 

efl()rt be made across the high ground 

overlooking the plain from the east. 

The 370th Infantry was to cross the 

flanks of the Strettoia Hills to the east 

2 Fifth Army History, Part IX, pp. 35-43; Goodman 

Monograph, pp. 129--46; Thomas D. Murphy, Ambassadors in Arms (Honolulu, 1954), pp. 263-67. 

Unless otherwise indicated the following sections 

are based upon those sources. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

while the 442d Infantry operated on 

the right over the higher summits just 

below the jagged peaks of the Apuan 

Alps, where the 371 st had f(mght in 

February. The 473d I nfantry was at 

first h) remain in the Serchio valley on 

the division's right flank. By gaining 

control of the high ground as far as 

Massa, Almond expected to force the 

enemy to yield the o~jective without a 

costly frontal attack. The question yet to 

be answered was how would the reconstituted 370th Infantry perfi)rm over 

the same terrain that had been the 

scene of the regiment's debacle in Operation FOURTH TERM. 

Early on 5 April planes lx)mbarded 

enemy positions, including the naval 

guns at Punta Bianca, followed by a 10-

minute artillery preparation aided by 

British destroyers offshore. The two 

regiments on the left wing attacked 

from a line of departure five miles 

southeast of Massa astride the coastal 

highway. Getting off to a good start, 

the 370th Infantry's leading company 

covered more than two miles to occupy 

a height halfway to the objective of 

Massa, but when the enemy counterattacked, as was his custom, the company 

and its supporting armor yielded most 

of the gain. Undaunted, the regimental 

commander, Colonel Sherman, reorganized and attacked again; but to no 

avail, for mediocre leadership and endemic straggling persisted. For the next 

few days the 370th Infantry continued 

to lag behind the 442d on-the right. 3 

3 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 485. In the 

reorganization of the 370th Infantry Regiment, 

white officers replaced all black company commanders, in spite of the fact that there were in the 

division a number of black officers with superior 

ratings. The effect upon the blacks, officers and 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE EIGHTH ARMY FRONT 461 

The 370th's lagging at first had little 

effect on the progress of the 442d 

Infantry. After passing through the 

37Ist Infantry's lines on Monte Cauala, 

three miles northeast of the mouth of 

the Cinquale Canal, the 442d led by the 

100th Battalion pushed fonvard about a 

mile and a half in a wide flanking 

attack against 2,800-foot Monte Fragolita, three miles southeast of Massa. By 

nightfall on the 5th, the JapaneseAmericans had driven the enemy not 

only from Monte Fragolita but also 

from several surrounding heights. 4 For 

the next two days the regiment pursued 

a retreating enemy over narrow mountain trails made even more treacherous 

by rain and fog and captured 3,000-

foot Monte Belvedere, two miles northeast of Massa. 

As the Japanese-Americans pressed 

forward, Almond relieved the lagging 

370th Infantry with the 473d, which he 

brought from the Serchio valley. The 

370th then took up positions to protect 

the division's right flank. The 442d 

men alike, was to create an impression of a 

continuing lack of confidence in the fighting qualities of blacks. That helped explain the continued 

poor performance of the 370th Infantry. (See "'otes 

on Interview with Truman K. Gibson, Civilian aide 

to Sec. War, by Bell L Wiley, 30 May 1945, DA 

CMH files.) 

• The sacrifice and teamwork inherent in this 

bold and successful maneuver was exemplified by 

Pfc. Sadao S. Munemori, who, after his squad 

leader had heen wounded, took command. Leading 

the 5q uad in several assaults against troublesome 

machine gun positions and silencing two with hand 

grenades, Private Munemori sought shelter in a 

shell crater already occupied by two of his men. 

Just as Munemori reached the crater an enemy 

grenade struck his helmet and bounced unexploded 

to the ground. Without hesitation he threw himself 

on the missile, taking its full blast with his body, 

thereby losing his life but saving the lives of his 

comrades. Munemori posthumously received the 

Medal of Honor. See Medal of Honor, p. 359. 

Infantry having outflanked Massa from 

the east, Almond believed he needed a 

more aggressive unit to team with that 

regiment and make a frontal assault on 

the town, for the enemy showed no 

inclination to yield it without a fight. 

The antiaircraft artillerymen turned infantrymen would not disappoint him: 

they pushed steadily northward astride 

Highway I through extensive mine 

fields, artillery, and mortar fire to reach 

the outskirts of Massa by midday on the 

9th. Supported by tanks of the 758th 

and 760th Tank Battalions, the 473d 

Infantry prepared to assault the town 

the next morning; but the enemy, 

already outflanked, at last chose to slip 

away during the night. The Americans 

occupied the town on the n;torning of 

the 10th. The same day, northeast of 

Massa, the 442d Infantry forded the 

Frigido River to capture Monte Bruguana, two and a half miles north of 

Massa, then continued another two 

miles carlyon the II th to occupy the 

famed marble quarry of Carrara. 

By that time increasing difficulties in 

supplying the forward troops as well as 

growing enemy resistance, including 

long-range harassing fire, especially 

against the 473d Infantry in the coastal 

corridor from the Italian coastal batteries at Punta Bianca, near the naval base 

of La Spezia, indicated that the relatively swift advances would soon come 

to an end. For the next week, until 19 

April, the 92d Division would be 

brought to a virtual standstill by enemy 

forces well dug-in just behind the Carrione Creek, seven miles north of Carrara. 

Operation SECOND WIND had nevertheless served its purpose, for in order 

to check the division's advance beyond 
462 

Carrara, the enemy had been f<')rced to 

dip into his main reserves. In spite of 

harassment from Allied aircraft and 

severe fuel shortages, a regiment of the 

90th Panzer Grenadier Division managed 

to move in sufficient strength from its 

reserve position in the vicinity of Modena to the Ligurian flank to help bring 

the 92d Division's advance to a halt. Yet 

that meant that General Vietinghoff 

had committed an irreplaceable part of 

his reserves against what was only a 

diversionary effort. He had taken the 

risk because he considered himself still 

bound by the long-standing OKW order to yield no part of the Winter 

Line.;' 

Well-designed Allied deception plans 

and the two preliminary attacks had 

succeeded in drawing off at least a part 

of the German reserves. Anticipating an 

Anzio-type amphibious operation somew here along the Adriatic coast north of 

the mouth of the Po, Vietinghoff had 

earlier shifted half of his army group 

reserve, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, to watch that flank, separated by 

several river lines from what was soon 

to become the main battle area. Then 

he had sent a regiment of the remaining half of his army group reserve, the 

90th Panzer Grenadier Division, to shore 

up his Ligurian flank. Thus when the 

Eighth Army attacked on 9 April in the 

first of two blows against Vietinghoffs 

Army Group C, a major part of the 

enemy's reserve would be ill-positioned 

to reinforce the main arena. 

German Indecision 

Shortly before the Eighth Army 

opened its offensive against the Tenth 

5 MS # T-lb (Westphal et at.), CMH; Truscott, 

Command Missions, p. 485. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Army, General Herr, whose troops had 

been on alert since the beginning of 

April, recommended to General Vietinghoff the adoption of a tactic employed by both the Germans and the 

French on the western front in World 

War I. Known to the Germans as the 

"false front maneuver," the tactic called 

for withdrawal under the cover of an 

artillery barrage as close as possible to 

the actual beginning of the attack by 

the opposing side. If the Tenth Army 

withdrew from the Senio to the Santerno in that manner, the Eighth 

Army's attack would strike thin air, and 

quite likely be thrown off balance, 

which was exactly what Clark and McCreery feared might happen. If it did, 

the Eighth Army would be forced to 

pause to reorganize. Because the Fifth 

Army's entry into the battle was tied to 

the Eighth Army's advance, the entire 

Allied plan might be jeopardized. 

The tactic appealed to Vietinghoff, 

who readily gave his assent, despite the 

fact that a voluntary withdrawal ran 

counter to OKW's directive to stand fast 

and fall back only under overw helming 

pressure. Because of the directive, he 

first had to obtain authorization from 

OKW. Although Hitler had considered 

employing the same tactic a year earlier 

on the eve of the U.S. VI Corps 

breakout from the Anzio beachhead, he 

refused to permit his commander in 

Italy to use it. 6 

Deprived of the one opportunity that 

might have provided an extended lease 

on life, the German armies in northern 

Italy had no choice but to brace themselves to meet the Allied onslaught in 

place. Herr nevertheless ordered a cov6 MS # T-lb (Westphal et at.), Feldzug in ltalien. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE EIGHTH ARMY FRONT 463 

ering barrage fired during the night of 

6 April to conceal a thinning of the 

sectors held by the 98th Division of the 

LXXVI Panzer Corps and the 26th Panzer 

Division of the I Parachute Corps along 

the line of the Senio, Anticipating that 

the Eighth Army's main attack would 

fall upon the intercorps boundary, 

Herr believed that the Allies might be 

checked briefly at the Santerno if the 

main resistance were encountered between the two rivers instead of along 

the line of the Senio, In spite of OKW's 

orders, he decided to employ an attenuated version of the false front tactic. 

What he had not reckoned on was that 

his maneuver would result in exposing 

the shifting German troops to the massive carpet bombing attack that was to 

precede the Eighth Army's offensive, 7 

Tlu' Eighth A nny A ttruk 

Shortly after midday on the 9th 

General Clark and his chief of staff: 

General Gruenther, left 15th Army 

Group headquarters near Florence on a 

short flight to an airfield at Forli, on 

Highway 9 southeast of Faenza. From 

there the American officers motored to 

Faenza, where the Eighth Army commander joined them, then continued a 

few miles west of the town to an 

observation fXJst in a farmhouse with a 

fine view of the front some 2,000 yards 

away. Assembled were the commanding 

generals of the MASAF, the Twelfth 

Air Force, the XXII TAC, and the 

DAF, come to witness the first mighty 

blow in the fruition of weeks of planning by their respective staffs--the most 

impressive aerial bombardment of a 

campaign already marked by such awe7 Ibid. 

some spectacles as the destruction from 

the air of the Abbev of Monte Cassino. 8 

\1eanw hile, sev'eral formations of 

heavy bombers had taken off from 

airfields in central Italv and flown 

northward parallel to the Adriatic coast, 

as if pursuing a normal long-range 

mission north of the Alps. Reaching tbe 

latitude of Cesenatico, seventeen miles 

east of Forli, they turned westward over 

the Italian mainland. Passing relentlessly and in seemingly endless procession over the enemy's main defensive 

zone parallel to the Senio River, the 

heavy bombers began releasing their 

bombs. For the next two days 1 !67~j 

heavy bombers completely ~arpeted 

specific target areas between the Senio 

and the Santerno. During the same 

period some 624 m.edium bombers, in 

close co-ordination with the heavy 

bombers, first attacked enemy defenses 

and troop concentrations along both 

sides of Highway 9, between the two 

rivers, then turned to the area opposite 

the 5 Corps, astride Highway 16 northwest of Ravenna. After the heavy aircraft com pIe ted their tasks on the 9th, 

fighter-bombers of the DAF and XXII 

T AC launched their planned close-support missions, while the ground troops, 

supported by over a thousand pieces of 

artillery and hundreds of tanks, began 

moving toward the banks of the Senio 

just as the sun disappeared below the 

western horizon.!' 

H-hour had been set for 1930 to 

spare the tank gunners the ordeal of a 

setting sun in their gun sights and to 

give the infantrymen the advantage of 

the concealment of dusk, heightened by 

• Clark Diary, 9 April 45; See also Blumenson. 

Salerno to Cassino, p. 411 n. 

9 Craven and Cate, eds., AAF 111, pp. 484-85. 
464 

billowing clouds of dust raised by the 

bombers. The dust also had the effect 

of making it difficult for the tactical 

aircraft to find many of their closesupport targets. Just before the infantrymen began to advance from assembly areas 200 yards east of the Senio, 

several flights of fighter-bombers 

roared across the army front in dummy 

runs in an effort to convince the enemy 

to remain under cover while infantry 

and armor moved toward the crossing 

sites along the east bank of the river. 

First came f1amethrowing Churchills, 

searing the far bank with fiery jets of 

napalm, then the assault infantry bearing assault boats and kapok bridges to 

provide men and equipment a way 

across the river. (Map XV) In spite of 

the massive aerial bombardment and 

flaming napalm, some German automatic weapons opened fire from positions along the western flood bank of 

the Senio, but supporting artillery and 

mortars silenced the enemy gunners 

and enabled the Allied infantrymen to 

launch their small boats and push their 

assault bridges into place. 10 

After eight hours of almost continuous bombardment from the air and the 

ground, that the enemy could resist at 

all was a tribute to the courage and 

discipline of the German infantryman. 

Yet resist he did from well-prepared 

positions worked on throughout the 

winter. As was often the case, heavy 

Allied bombardment did less damage to 

front-line positions than to communications to the rear, though that forced the 

Germans to fight independent and 

10 Operations of the British. Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy. Part IV, Sec. B. Unless otherwise indicated the following sections are based upon 

that reference. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

unco-ordinated small unit actions all 

along the front. Under those conditions 

resistance could only be short-lived. 

More than 1,300 prisoners rounded up 

by the 5 Corps during the first twentyfour hours reflected, in part, the degree 

of disorganization among the enemy 

units caused in large measure by disruption of their communications. 

The main assault on the Eighth 

Army's right wing, made by the 2d 

New Zealand and the 8th Indian Divisions of the 5 Corps, established bridgeheads beyond the Senio during the 

night. Dawn on the 10th found contingents of both divisions firmly established in their new bridgeheads, and by 

evening the New Zealanders had 

pushed three miles beyond the Senio to 

gain the east bank of the Santerno. 

Encountering somewhat greater resistance, the Indians came within a mile of 

the Santerno in their sector. 

Although the attack by the 2 Polish 

Corps between Highways 9 and 16 

began about the same time as that of 

the 5 Corps, the Polish units ran into 

considerably stronger resistance, for opposite them lay the relatively fresh 

battalions of the crack 26th Panzer Division. It took two brigades of the 3d 

Carpathian Division until the morning 

of the 10th to establish a bridgehead 

beyond the Senio. Yet the attack gathered momentum during the day, and 

by evening a strongpoint at Solarolo on 

the Lugo Canal, two and a half miles 

west of the Senio and five miles northwest of Faenza, had fallen, although the 

Santerno still lay three miles to the 

west. 

During the first twenty-four hours of 

the offensive the enemy's 98th and 362d 

Divisions bore the full brunt of the 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE EIGHTH ARMY FRONT 465 

attack. The 362d Division did manage a 

counterattack south of Lugo against the 

Allied right wing; but the purpose 

appeared to be only to enable the 

division to extricate itself from positions 

at the bend of the Senio, southeast of 

Lugo, before abandoning Lugo itself 

later in the day. By evening of the 10th, 

across a three and a half-mile front, 

both German divisions had withdrawn 

to the Santerno. The next day continued pressure finally forced them back 

across the river, uncovering the left 

flank of the 26th Panzer Division, which 

also withdrew behind the Santerno. 

South of Highway 9 in the foothills of 

the Apennines the 4th Parachute Division 

of the I Parachute Corps also began 

withdrawing to confirm to the retrograde movements on its left. 11 

By morning of 12 April, both the 

British 5 Corps and the 2 Polish Corps 

had established shallow bridgeheads beyond the Santerno. That afternoon the 

2d New Zealand Division burst from its 

beachhead and advanced two miles beyond the river to capture the town of 

Massa Lombarda, while on the flanks of 

that thrust the Indians and the Poles 

continued to strengthen and deepen 

their bridgeheads. 

While that encouraging progress developed, the British 56th Division on 

the Eighth Army's right wing launched 

the first of a series of amphibious 

attacks from the "Wedge," won during 

the preliminary operation, to expand 

positions north of the mouth of the 

Reno. Carried by a flotilla of Fantails, 

an infantry brigade landed near the 

hamlet of Menate, three miles beyond 

II MS # T-Ib (Westphal et a/.); Greiner and 

Schramm, eds., OKW/WFSt, KTB, IV(I), pp. 160-

65. 

the mouth of the Reno and seven miles 

northeast of (he Bas(ia Bridge. No( 

expecting an attack from that direction, 

the enemy was taken by surprise. 

Within a few hours both Menate and 

Longastrino, three miles to its south, 

were in British hands. Simultaneously, a 

second brigade pushed westward along 

the north bank of the Reno to link up 

with the first. The (wo brigades soon 

joined to open a route over which 

armor and artillery could advance along 

dikes paralleling the Reno's northern 

bank to lend additional weight to the 

attack. Yet at the same time resistance 

stiffened as the defending 42d Jaeger 

Division-threatened also by envelopment on the right by Allied advances 

beyond Massa Lombarda-f(mght desperately to withdraw from a salient 

created by the 56th Division's thrust at 

Alfonsine, near where Highway 16 

crossed the Senio ten miles southeast of 

the Bastia Bridge. 

Breakthrough at the Argenta Gap 

The crossing of the Santerno in the 

west and the outflanking of the line of 

the Reno to the east marked completion of the first phase of the Eighth 

Army's offensive. General McCreery believed nevertheless that (he situation 

had yet to develop sufficiently to enable 

him to decide whether to concentrate 

on a westerly thrust toward Budrio or 

on a northerly drive toward Argenta. 

Deciding to force the issue, McCreery 

brought forward the British 78th Division. Passing through the 8th Indian 

Division's bridgehead, the 78th Division 

moved northward along the Santerno's 

west bank in the general direction of 

the Bastia Bridge, while the 56th Divi-
466 

sion prepared to move on Bastia from 

the east. The 78th Division's left flank 

was to be covered by the 2d Commando Brigade, advancing in Fantails 

across flooded fields south of Argenta. 

To the right of the 56th Division the 

24th Guards Brigade prepared to 

launch yet another Fantail-borne 

assault, setting out across the flooded 

lowlands toward the Chiesa del Bante, 

three miles northeast of Argenta. 

One Allied division advancing frontally on the Bastia Bridge and another 

outflanking it from the east over 

flooded areas hitherto regarded impassable convinced both Vietinghoff and 

Herr that the Eighth Army no longer 

intended a major amphibious operation 

north of the mouth of the Po. That 

prompted the army group commander 

to relieve the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division from its pointless vigil and 

commit it to defense of the Argenta 

Gap. 12 

After only a brief check at the village 

of Conselice, five miles north of Massa 

Lombarda, the 78th Division reached 

the Reno River and captured the Bastia 

Bridge early on the 14th before the 

retreating 42d Jaeger Division could demolish it. Yet when the British attempted to expand their bridgehead, 

they found the Jaegers well-entrenched 

within the village of Bastia. Southeast of 

the Bastia sector the Jaegers also 

checked the 56th Division's second amphibious operation, launched on the 

morning of the 13th, short of its goal. 

Despite those local defensive successes, it was obvious from the loss of 

the Bastia Bridge that the check would 

be brief. Once more General VietingI2 MS # T-Ib (Westphal et a/.). 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

hoff recommended to OKW limited 

withdrawals in less threatened sectors in 

order to obtain reinforcements to prevent a breakthrough on Herr's left 

wing. After pointing to the courage and 

steadfastness of the embattled troops 

attempting to hold the Argenta Gap, 

Vietinghoff called the Supreme Command's attention to the imminent threat 

of an Allied breakthrough into the Po 

Valley, which if successful would endanger the "entire east flank of the [Army 

Group C] front. . . If we do not succeed in stopping the enemy at the 

northwestern corner of Lake Comacchio (the Comacchio Lagoon)," the 

army group commander continued, "a 

breakthrough into the Po Valley will be 

inevitable. All necessary forces to stop 

this move must be available at once. 

They can only be taken from the I 

Parachute Corps sector and only if the 

salient [at Imola] is reduced by a fighting withdrawal." Any other solution, 

Vietinghoff went on, could bring only 

temporary relief and raised the specter 

of entrapment. 13 

As filr the Genghis Khan positions 

along the Idice River, the last before 

Bologna, Vietinghoff observed that they 

"will likewise not be defended for any 

length of time, since, as far as can be 

judged by this headquarters, neither 

new units nor replacements of personnel and materiel, particularly gasoline, 

can be supplied in sufficient quantities." 

Even that estimate was optimistic, for 

the Eighth Army had already penetrated the line several days before. 

13 Cable, OB Army Group C to OKW, 14 Apr 45, 

quoted in Operations of the British, Indian, and 

Dominion Forces in Italy, Part IV. Sec. G, Ann. F. 

Unless otherwise indicated the f()llowing section is 

based on that source. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE EIGHTH ARMY FRONT 467 

Despite OKW's earlier rejection of a 

large-scale withdrawal to the Po, Vietinghoff again returned to the theme, 

stating: 

If the Supreme Command of the Army 

Forces contmues to maintain its intention 

of keeping the Anglo-Americans as far and 

as long as possible from the borders of the 

Reich, its aim can only be achieved if we 

defeat the known intentions of our enemies, the annihilation of the German armies. This can be done only if we avoid 

decisive battles by retreating, if necessary, 

to our prepared Ticino-Po defense positions. This decision must be made soon in 

order to allow for the necessary and difficult moves from the western Alps and 

from the Ligurian coast. As these moves 

will require at least two weeks, we must act 

quickly in order to prevent the enemy 

from reaching the Po on our eastern flank. 

This means that Tenth Army would have to 

hold its sector at least two' weeks after the 

commencement of our withdrawal from 

the western and alpine sectors of the army 

group's front. This is considered the only 

way in which the north Italian areas, so 

important to our war industry, can be 

preserved for the German Army until the 

day of our decisive battle. 

Without waiting for OK W's reply, 

Vietinghoff risked Hitler's opprobrium 

by withdrawing the I Parachute Corps 

from the Imola salient and pulling it 

back into the Genghis Khan Line. 

Meanwhile, he continued to reini(m:e 

the Argenta Gap as best he could. 

Vietinghoff had little time to lose, for 

Keightley's 5 Corps was dosing in on 

the gap and McCreery, deciding to 

strengthen his center, started shifting 

the British 13 Corps with its 10th 

Indian Division from the army right 

wing to a sector between the 2 Polish 

Corps and the British 5 Corps. Unaware of that decision but anticipating it 

as likely, General Herr ordered the 

entire 29th Panzer Grenadier Division to 

the defense of Argenta and the 278th 

Volksgrenadier Division from the I Parachute Corps to the LXXVI Panzer Corps, 

where the volksgrenadier division was 

to relieve the 98th Di'vision, reduced by 

casualties to the size of a battle group. 

He then pulled the 26th Panzer Division 

from the line opposite the 2 Polish 

Corps to provide a mobile reserve fOf 

the Reno line. 14 

By 15 April the 278th Division had 

taken over from the 98th Division the 

sector astride the Medicina-yfassa Lombarda railroad; but the change came 

too late to do more than momentarily 

check the momentum of the New Zealanders' thrust from their bridgehead 

over the Sillaro. South of that sector the 

4th Parachute Division also briefly held 

up those elements of the Polish' corps 

advancing astride Highway 9. Brief 

though it was, that rear guard action 

nevertheless enabled the I Parachute 

Corps to withdraw those forces still in 

the Imola salient to the temporary-but 

as it turned out, illusory-security of 

the Genghis Khan Line. 

Confronted by elements of the 29th 

Panzer Grenadier Division instead of battered survivors of the 42d Jaeger and 

362d Divisions, General Keightley decided to throw in everything that the 

relatively narrow Argenta sector could 

accommodate. All three of his separate 

infantry brigades were to continue their 

efforts to outflank Argenta: the first to 

drive northeastward toward Portomaggiore, a second to pass directly east of 

Argenta, and a third to assist the 78th 

Division in reducing the strongpoint at 

Bastia village. The 2d Commando Bri14 MS # T-lb (Westphal ei ai,). 
468 

gade was at the same time to continue 

its advance southwest of Argenta. 

General der Panzertruppen Gerhard 

Graf von Schwerin, new commander of 

the LXXVI Panzer Corps, had in the 

meantime pressed deployment of the 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division in the 

Argenta Gap; but it was too late. Because the northward advance of the 

British 78th Division was threatening 

collapse of the central sector, held by 

the 362d Division, which would uncover 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division's right 

flank, von Schwerin formed survivors 

of the 42d Jaeger and 362d Divisions into 

two battle groups with orders to hold 

until early on the 16th. Although 

forced to yield Bastia village on the 

15th, the 42d Jaeger by its stubborn 

defense gave the 29th Panzer Grenadiers 

some time to dig in north of the 

Marina Canal, about a mile and a half 

south of Argenta. To enable von 

Schwerin to extricate remaining units of 

his LXXVI Panzer Corps still south of the 

Reno, the panzer grenadiers had to hold 

that line for at least twenty-four hours, 

for once Allied forces took the Argenta 

Gap, they would be in a position to 

move rapidly northwestward along the 

Reno's north bank, turn successive river 

lines, and expedite the advance of those 

divisions attacking astride Highway 9. 

By the evening of 16 April the 

British 78th Division struck the line of 

the Marina Canal on the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division's right flank. Although the panzer grenadiers fought 

gamely, the leading British battalion 

managed early on the 17th to secure a 

small bridgehead. The Marina Canal 

line had not held quite as long as von 

Schwerin had hoped it would, but the 

rear guard action nevertheless enabled 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

him to straighten out his front south of 

the Reno preparatory to withdrawing to 

the Reno itself. 

While supporting artillery guided by 

wide-ranging observation aircraft 

pinned down those troops still deployed 

along the Marina Canal line, tactical 

aircraft of the DAF again took to the 

air at dawn on the 17th to strike at 

anything that dared move north of 

Argenta. During the morning the 78th 

Division burst out of the bridgehead 

and passed east of Argenta, while a 

brigade of the British 56th Division, 

mounted in Fantails, moved up on the 

right across the flooded lowlands to the 

near bank of the Marina Canal southeast of Argenta. To the 78th Division's 

left the 2d Commando Brigade, also in 

Fantails, crossed a flooded area west of 

the Reno to pull abreast of the center. 

Those advances so stretched the enemy's defenses that two fresh battalions 

of the 78th Division reached Argenta 

without difficulty, one bypassing it on 

the right, the other moving directly into 

the town. While the lead battalion 

cleared the last German from Argenta, 

a second brigade of the 78th Division 

came forward, and early afternoon of 

the 18th found two of the division's 

brigades advancing northwest of Argenta along Highway 16. As Vietinghoff had warned OKW four days 

earlier, a breakthrough of the Argenta 

Gap threatened to turn the line of the 

Reno. 

OKW's reply to Vietinghoffs message 

of the 14th warning of that threat 

arrived at Army Group C headquarters 

on the 17th even as the threat became a 

reality. Although the reply bore Generaloberst Alfred JodI's signature, the 

order was Hitler's: 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE EIGHTH ARMY FRONT 469 

All further proposals for a change in the 

present war strategy will be discontinued. I 

wish to point out particularly that under 

no circumstances must troops or commanders be allowed to waver or to adopt a 

defeatist attitude as a result of such ideas 

apparentlv held by your headquarters. 

Where a~y sue h danger is likely, the 

sharpest countermeasures must be employed. The Fuehrer expects. now, as before, the utmost steadfastness In the fulfillmellt of your present mission, to defend 

every inch of the north Italian areas entrusted to your command. I desire to point 

out the serious consequences for all those 

higher commanders, unit commanders, or 

staff officers, who do not carry out the 

Fuehrer's orders to the last word. 15 

More than draconian orders and 

thinlv veiled threats were needed to 

check the momentum of the Eighth 

Army's offensive. While the 78th and 

56th Divisions pushed through the Argenta Gap on the right, in the center 

and on the armv's left the 2d New 

Zealand Division 'of the 5 Corps, the 

1& Cable No.2, 17 Apr 45, OKW to OB Army 

Group C. in Operations of the British, Indian. and 

Dominion Forces in Italy. Pan IV, Sec. G. Ann. F. 

10th Indian Division of the 13 Corps, 

and the Carpathian and Kresowa Divisions of the 2 Polish Corps advanced 

along the Medicina-Budrio axis and 

Highway 9. The main burden of defense there fell upon the 4th Parachute 

Division, f()r the 278th Division had been 

steadily falling back before the New 

Zealanders ever since arriving in the 

sector on the 15th. The parachutists 

gradually fell back to the line of the 

Gaiano Canal, about midway between 

Medicina and Budrio and a ;'1ile and a 

half beyond Castel San Pietro on Highway 9. By the 18th, the 2 Polish and 

British 13 Corps had dosed up to the 

canal, some five miles east of the Idice 

River, which formed the Genghis Khan 

Line in that sector. Although the Tenth 

Army commander hoped to delay the 

Eighth Army's advance there long 

enough to allow his forces to reach the 

line of the Po in good order, the end of 

the battles south of the Po was by 18 

April in sight. Meanwhile, just four 

days before, the U.S. Fifth Army had 

latinched its phase of the spring offenSIve. 
CHAPTER XXVII 

Breakthrough on the Fifth Army's 

Front 

Originally scheduled for 12 April, DDay for the Fifth Army's phase of the 

spring offensive was postponed when 

heavy fog rolled in over the airfields 

and forced cancellation of all flights. 

When meteorologists could forecast no 

clearing for the next day, Truscott set 

D-Day for the 14th, H-hour for 0600. 

Before dawn on the 14th the army 

commander and members of his staff 

sat anxiously drinking coffee and smoking in their headquarters at Traversa 

while awaiting the latest weather reports. Presently telephones began to 

ring. All air bases repeated the same 

story: fog-shrouded runways. Truscott 

telephoned his IV Corps commander, 

General Crittenberger, to tell him to 

delay his attack but to be prepared to 

move on an hour's notice. The officers 

in the headquarters tent then settled 

back glumly over more coffee and 

cigarettes. 

Only a few minutes passed before a 

call from the air base near Grosseto 

revealed that the fog might be lifting 

there. Again more coffee and cigarettes 

while calls went out to other bases. 

Then at 0800 Grosseto reported the 

end of the runway visible. Fighterbombers were taking off. Elated, Truscott telephoned Crittenberger: "The attack is on for 0900." Messages from 

other air bases reporting clearing 

weather confirmed the decision. For the 

critical first day of attack the IV Corps 

would be assured of air support. 1 

Precisely at 0830 wave after wave of 

heavy bombers droned over the mountains from the south. For the next forty 

minutes the sky was filled with 

hundreds of aircraft dumping thousands of tons of high explosive, fragmentation, and napalm bombs on the 

enemy's positions. Eventually, over four 

days, some 2,052 heavy lx>mbers flew, 

first in support of the IV Corps, then 

of the II Corps. That number exceeded 

the 1,673 heavy bombers that had 

supported the Eighth Army's attack 

four days before: all in all, "the beginning of the most sustained heavy 

bomber close support effort ever undertaken in the Mediterranean."2 

As the heavy bombers completed 

their first day's missions, medium and 

fighter-bombers of the XXII T AC, engaged since the 10th in operations 

against enemy communications and 

supply depots, appeared over the front 

to attack the enemy's main line of 

resistance. The aircraft flew over 459 

sorties, mostly in flights of four planes 

each against gun positions, strongpoints, 

troop areas, and other defensive works 

[ Truscott, Command Missions, p. 486. 

2 Craven and Cate, eds., AAF III, pp. 486-87; 

Fifth Army History, Part IX, pp. 91-92; IV Corps 

History, pp. 614-15. Unless otherwise indicated the 

following is based upon those references. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE FIFTH ARMY'S FRONT 471 

immediately opposite the IV Corps 

front. Many of the sorties were napalm 

attacks against the 10th Mountain Division's first objective of Monte Pigna, 

four miles northwest of Vergato, the 

latter at the junction of Highway 64 

and the lateral road connecting the 

highway with the Panaro valley ten 

miles to the west. 

No sooner had the aircraft completed 

their missions than supporting artillery 

opened fire at 0910. For thirty-five 

minutes over 2,000 pieces, ranging 

from the 10th Mountain Division's 75-

mm. pack howitzers to the Fifth Army's 

8-inch howitzers, fired a devastating 

barrage. The smoke and dust raised by 

the massive aerial and artillery bombardment turned the morning into a 

gray twilight, whereupon the mountain 

division's infantrymen began moving to 

a line of departure on the forward 

slopes of Monte della Spe, just northeast of Castel d' Aiano overlooking the 

northernmost of two lateral roads connecting Vergato with Castel d' Aiano 

and a secondary road that was to be the 

axis of advance for the division in 

carrying "the brunt of the attack to the 

Po Valley-and beyond.":l (Map XVI) 

With all three regiments moving 

abreast, the division's immediate goal 

was a mountain mass extending northeastward for about seven miles from 

the 2,500-foot Rocca Roffeno massif in 

the southwest through Monte Pigna 

and terminating at Monte Mantino and 

Monte Mosca, the latter overlooking 

both the Lavino and Reno river valleys.4 

Capture of the Roffeno feature 

3 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 487. 

4 10th Mtn Div Rpt of Opns, Apr-May 45. 

would provide early control of the 

lateral road running west-northwest 

from Vergato and thence down the 

Samoggia valley to Modena. Most importantly, with the massif in American 

hands the mountain infantry would be 

able to turn the flank of the 94th 

Infantry Division, which with the 334th 

Infantry Division was holding that sector 

of the Fourteenth Army front between the 

Samoggia and the Reno Rivers. The 

Roffeno massif was, observed the 94th 

Division's operations officer, the Achilles 

heel of that sector. 5 

Although both German divisions had 

prepared positions capable of withstanding all but direct hits by heavy 

artillery and aerial bombs, both were 

understrength. Each had three grenadier regiments of only two battalions 

each, and neither had more than company-sized local reserves. Reinforcements could come only from the Fourteenth Army's reserves, i.e., the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division southwest of Bologna, but one regiment of that unit 

had already moved to the west to 

reinforce the Ligurian flank. 

Artillery support for the sector held 

by the two divisions totaled only 240 

pieces of all types, hardly a match for 

the 381 pieces that the U.S. IV Corps 

alone controlled, not to mention artillery under Fifth Army control. Furthermore, the American phase of the offensive would occur approximately along 

the intercorps boundary between the LI 

Mountain Corps on the west and the XIV 

Panzer Corps on the east, traditionally a 

weak point. The 334th Division, in 

whose sector lay the Roffeno massif, 

5 MS # T-Ib (Westphal et al.). Unless otherwise 

cited the following section is based on that source. 
472 

was the left flank unit of the mountain 

corps, and the 94th Division the right 

flank unit of the panzer corps. 

As the aerial and artillery bombardment ceased, the 85th Mountain Infantry on the 10th Mountain Division's left 

moved down into the Pra del Bianco 

basin, a small bowl-shaped valley just 

northeast of Castel d'Aiano. Across the 

flanks of the hills overlooking the basin 

from the west the Germans had constructed an intricate system of bunkers 

and covered gun emplacements. Yet in 

the basin itself outposts were manned 

only at night so that men of the 85th 

Mountain Infantry had no difficulty 

bypassing them in the half light of early 

morning. Widespread antipersonnel 

and antitank mine fields along the 

basin's western edge were another matter. In addition to causing numerous 

casualties among the infantrymen, the 

mines also prevented the 75lst Tank 

and 70 I st Tank Destroyer Battalions 

from staying close to the mountain 

infantrymen and providing support 

against well-sited enemy automatic 

weapons overlooking the basin. The 

mine fields thus enabled the Germans 

to gain time to man their weapons 

within the main line of resistance. With 

a surprisingly heavy volume of fire, 

considering the bombing and artillery 

that had preceded the attack, they were 

able to check the advance just short of 

the crest of the hills overlooking the 

basin. 

Although the 85th Mountain Infantry's commander, Col. Raymond C. 

Barlow, called for artillerv fire to 

counter the enemy's mortars' and artillery beyond the range of his infantry, 

credit for finally silencing the enemy's 

automatic weapons was attributable to 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the mountain infantrymen themselves, 

stubbornly fighting their way forward 

despite the fire. One man, for example, 

Pfe. John D. Magrath of Company G, 

armed only with a rifle, charged an 

enemy machine gun position, killing 

two enemy soldiers and wounding three 

others and capturing their machine 

gun. Arming himself with the captured 

piece, Magrath continued across an 

open field to neutralize two more machine guns. Circling behind still another, he destroyed it from the rear. 

Noticing a fourth position, Magrath 

opened fire on it, killing two and 

wounding three of the enemy. Meanwhile the men of Company G followed 

Magrath, to occupy the ground he had 

cleared. Volunteering to check on casualties, Magrath fell mortally wounded. 

He was posthumously awarded the 

Medal of Honor. 6 

As the men of the 2d Battalion 

inched forward, the 3d Battalion surprisingly met little resistance and moved 

quickly to the crest of Hill 860, part of 

the high ground overlooking the basin. 

From that vantage point the battalion, 

with sUpJX>rt from guns of the 604th 

Field Artillery Battalion, tired on the 

enemy flank, thereby relieving some of 

the pressure on the 2d Battalion. Soon 

after noon two additional crests along 

the high ground were in hand, and the 

two battalions turned northeastward 

along the ridge line to clear the rest. 7 

Meanwhile, at 0945, the 87th Mountain Infantry, under CoL David M. 

Fowler, crossed a line of departure on 

Monte Spicchione's forward slopes. In a 

column of battalions, the regiment trav6 Medal of Honor, pp. 359-60. 

7 10th Mtn Div Opns RpL Apr-May 45. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE FIFTH ARMY'S FRONT 473 

ersed the lateral road leading northeast 

from Castel d' Aiano to enter the village 

of Serra Sarzana, a mile to the northeast of Castel d' Aiano and two miles 

southeast of Monte Pigna, one of the 

major features of the Roffeno massif. 

When the mountain infantry attem pted 

to continue, heavy enemy artillery fire 

forced them to shelter in the ruins of 

the village, while from the high ground 

to the west, not at that point cleared by 

the 85th Mountain Infantry, enemy 

machine guns probed with fire . Only 

when that fire ceased, probably as a 

result of the regiment's advance, was 

the I st Battalion able to lead the way 

into the neighboring village of Torre 

Iussi. While the battalion fought 

through the village house by house, 

Colonel Fowler sent the 2d Battalion to 

bypass the village and capture Hill 903, 

high ground overlooking Torre Iussi. 

The maneuver was sufficient to convince the Germans that to fight any 

longer invited envelopment. They 

promptly withdrew from both village 

and hill. 

On the 10th Mountain Division's 

right wing the 86th Mountain Infantry, 

under Col. Clarence Tomlinson, attacked with the 2d Battalion forward 

toward the northern slope of the Rocca 

Ro ffe no. Those men too came under 

heavy fire from the enemy on Hill 903, 

but once that feature fell to the 87th 

Mountain Infantry, men of the 86th 

Mountain Infantry were able to scale a 

nearby height and by late afternoon 

take the height of Rocca Roffeno. 

Continued resistance and the coming 

of darkness nevertheless prevented further advance. Yet unknown to the men 

of the 10th Mountain Division, they 

had opened a serious breach between 

MOUNTAIN INFANTRY IN TOLE AREA 

the 334th and 94th Divisions. Any further American advance to the northeast, the Germans feared, would outflank the 94th Division. In an effort to 

prevent that, the 94th Division commander, General Steinmetz, rushed forward his reserve battalion to close the 

gap. It was too late. The plight of the 

defenders of the Rocca Roffeno position became evident that night via a 

radio message from the survivors: "Fire 

on our position .... " Then the radio 

fell silent. 8 

The Americans, meanwhile, had settled down on their newly-won ground 

to await the customary counterattack, 

but none came. Instead only sporadic 

artillery fire and occasional flares indicated that an enemy still waited in the 

8 MS II T-lb (Westphal et a/.), Part II, Die 94th 

Grenadier Division. 
474 

dark hills and valleys to the north. Key 

ground had been won, but the first day 

had been costlv, with 553 mountain 

infantrymen killed, wounded, or missing. Although the Americans had a 

foothold on the Roffeno massif, Monte 

Pigna still remained in enemy hands. 

At dawn on 15 April a 20-minute 

artillery barrage, including the guns of 

supporting tanks and tank destroyers, 

opened the second day of the IV Corps 

attack. Twenty minutes later the leading 

battalions of the 87th Mountain Infantry moved out from Torre Iussi and 

Hill 903 toward Monte Pigna about a 

mile to the north. Resistance was spotty, 

and just over an hour later the Americans were on the crest preparing to 

continue their advance northward toward the town of Tole, four miles 

northwest of Vergato commanding a 

network of secondary roads leading 

into the Samoggia and lavino valleys. 

About the same time, the 86th 

Mountain Infantry in the center began 

moving from Rocca Roffeno toward the 

hamlet of Amore, a battered collection 

of stone cottages a thousand yards to 

the north. There too resistance was 

weak. Passing through Amore in midmorning, the men continued along a 

ridge terminating at Monte Mantino 

and just as darkness fell occupied that 

height without opposition. 

The situation was far different on the 

division's left flank where the 85th 

Mountain Infantry, advancing from the 

high ground overlooking the Pra del 

Bianco toward Monte Righetti, two and 

a half miles west of Monte Pigna, ran 

into such heavy resistance that the 

division commander thought it prudent 

to bring forward a special unit for flank 

protection, the 10th Mountain Infantry 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Antitank Battalion, formed from the 

antitank companies of the division's 

three regiments. Noting the contrast 

with fading resistance on the right, the 

corps commander, General Crittenbe1'-

gel', directed a shift of the division's 

main effort to the right. 

The enemy commander in that sector, General Steinmetz of the 94th Infantry Division, was fully aware that his 

front was crumbling. Having requested 

XIV Panzer Corps headquarters in vain 

for permission to withdraw his left 

flank regiments, he decided on the 16th 

to take matters into his own hands. 

That afternoon he ordered the troops 

on his center and left to fall back 

during the night to new positions. But 

he had waited dangerously long, for the 

Americans had already cut the few 

roads leading from that sector. Steinmetz's troops had to withdraw crosscountry in the darkness over mountainous terrain, abandoning much of their 

heavy equipment along the way and 

falling prey to harassing American artillery fire. So cut up was the division's 

left flank battalion as to become virtually useless. 

The 10th Mountain Division was on 

the verge of a breakthrough of the 

enemy front between the Samoggia and 

Lavino Rivers, and progress over the 

next three days confirmed it. As the 

94th Infantry Division continued to withdraw behind smoke screens and artillerv fire, the 86th and 87th Mountain 

Infantry Regiments, moving in column 

of battalions following a 20-minute artillery barrage, jumped off at 0620 on the 

16th. Despite the efforts of a determined rear guard, the 86th Mountain 

Infantry in the early afternbon occupied hills just north of Monte Mantino, 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE FIFTH ARMY'S FRONT 475 

GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION 

then with the help of tanks from the 

751st Tank Battalion advanced another 

four miles to the hamlet of Montepastore. Meanwhile, the 87th Mountain 

Infantry advanced via Tole toward 

Monte Croce and Monte Mosca, the 

latter five miles northeast of Monte 

Pigna and the last high point along the 

eastern ridge line. Progress over the 

next two days was just as steady, so that 

by nightfall on the 18th the troops of 

the 10th Mountain Division had almost 

reached the edge of the mountains 

overlooking Highway 9 and the plain. 

Five days of attack had cost 1,283 

casualties, and the surviving infantrymen were close to exhaustion. Of the 

first men to enter the village of Montepastore, an officer of the 86th Mountain Infantry observed that they were 

"incredibly weary . . . . Wherever the 

men dropped their packs they fell 

asleep. They slept in barns, cowstalls, 

bedrooms, any place they could find. 

After a rest [they] l(x)ked for food and 

found chickens, onions, some captured 
476 

German cheese and bologna. Fires 

sprang up al~ over. to:vn, and soon 

[they) were eatl~g theIr first "t:lod, other 

than K-rations, m four days .. 

Droves of German prisoners meanwhile streamed back to the division 

rear. A not uncommon sight was one 

weary American infantryman shepherding ~ column of 40 to 50 <;<lually weary 

Germans. Among the prIsoners were 

the staff and commanding officer of 

the 2d Battalion, 361 st Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment, thus confirming .rumors circulating among the AmerIcans for the 

past two days that the. 90th Panzer 

Grenadier Division was on ItS way to the 

front opposite the IV Corps. On the 

same day, elements of the 190th Reconnaissance ~ Battalion and the 200th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment of the same ~ivision 

were also identified. Thus did the 

Americans learn of Vietinghoff's decision to commit his remaining reserve to 

plug the widening gap in the Fou,rteenth 

Army front between the SamoggIa and 

the Lavino Rivers. 10 

As the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division 

came fixward, the Germans began to 

fall back slowly toward a so-called Michelstellung, an ~ast-west switch P?sition 

passing through Monte San MIChele, 

some five miles north of Montepastore. 

Last of the prepared positions in, the 

hills south of the Po Valley, the Mlchelstellung was less a continuous li?e tha~ a 

series of lightly held strongpolt:ts. Like 

the Americans, the German Infantry 

would reach the new IX)sitions in a state 

of virtual exhaustion. 

9 IV Corps History, p. 623; 9th \1Rt:, BailIe 

Casualty Reports of Fifth Army, 10 Jun 45. 

10 MS # T-Ib (Westphal et a/.),Part II, annex to 

Ch Ila. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Armor-join\ tltl' Batt/I' 

While the 10th Mountain Division 

pushed rapidly over th~ mou~tain 

ridges in its zone of operatIons, UI1lt~ to 

the left and right were a?:ancI.n~ 

abreast. On the left the BrazIlian diVIsion occupied the village of Mon~ese 

and surrounding hills three mIles 

northwest of Castel d'Aiano, while on 

the right General Prichard's I st A~­

mored Division, beginning on 14 April 

soon after the mountain division's attack started, moved against Vergato 

and the hills to the northwest of that 

town.11 

On the armored division's right wing, 

on the heels of TOT fired by the 105-

mm. guns of the 27th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion, dismounted c~valrymen of the 8Ist Cavalry ReconnaIssance 

Squadron stormed an enemy strongpoint at Vergato. Within two hours the 

Americans had fought through the 

town's southern outskirts to occupy 

what remained of the railroad station, 

while so occupied was the enemy in 

defending Vergato that the 14th Armored Infantry Battalion encountered 

little resistance in coming up on the 

cavalrymen's lefl: to attack the village of 

Suzzano, two miles to the northwest. 

Following repeated bombardment by 

planes of the XXII TAC and ~upporting artillery and armor, tank-mfantry 

teams moved rapidly into Suzzano late 

on the 15th. The next day men of the 

11 th Armored Infantry Battalion 

passed through to capture Monte 

Mosca, three miles to the northeast. 

II Howe, Ball(,' Histllry IIj tli" 1st Armond Dil'II/O/l, 

pp. 407-08; Fijth Arm\' 'Hillon', Part IX" pp', 50-51; 

IV Corps AAR, Apr 45, lin less otherWIse cited lhe 

!ill!<lI\ ing sc(·tions arc based upon these rderences. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE FIFTH ARMY'S FRONT 477 

The only real opposition was in the 

ruins of Vergato. In the smoldering 

town the Germans fought through the 

night, and only with the coming of 

daylight on the 15th and arrival of a 

trio of tanks and an armored bulldozer 

were the men of the 81 st Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Squadron able to get on 

with a systematic clearing of the ruins, 

house by house. Another night passed 

before resistance was completely eliminated. 

Over the next two days-16 and 17 

April-men of the armored division 

made systematic advances in several 

columns. By nightfall of the 17th the 

81 st Cavalry had reached a point nearly 

five miles beyond Vergato, while the 

6th Armored Infantry Battalion passed 

beyond Monte Mosca to capture Monte 

d'Avigo, three miles to the northeast. A 

30-minute artillery preparation discouraged meaningful resistance by a reinforced German company. To the right 

the II th Armored Infantry Battalion 

gained Monte Milano overlooking the 

Reno valley. 

On the left the Brazilians, on the 

right the armor had come abreast of 

the 10th Mountain Division. On the IV 

Corps front all was going well. 

The II Corps Attruks 

Not so on the II Corps front, filr 

there the advance toward Bologna 

seemed at first agonizingly reminiscent 

of the fighting in November 1944 in 

the same area. The problem lay not 

only in the difficult terrain, but in the 

fact that there the enemy had concentrated his strongest defenses. Yet in the 

conviction that Keyes' corps would face 

greater challenges than its neighbor 

west of Highway 64, General Truscott 

had placed the majority of his divisions 

under the II Corps between Highway 

64 in the west and Highway 65 in the 

east. 

The Germans had developed their 

defense on the central sector south of 

Bologna around four clearly defined 

geographic features. The first-and 

most important in terms of Truscott's 

intention to concentrate his main effort 

in the Reno valley-was Monte Sole, six 

miles northeast of Vergato midway between the Reno River and Setta Creek. 

The capture of Monte Sole, together 

with the IV Corps' operations west of 

the Reno valley, would open the way 

for an advance to the Praduro road 

junction on Highway 64 where the 

Setta enters the Reno. The second and 

third features were Monterumici and 

Monte Adone, overlooking Highway 65 

from the west, and a series of hills just 

north of Monte Belmonte, overlooking 

the same stretch of Highway 65 from 

the east. Clearing the enemy from the 

high ground would permit an advance 

to the town of Pianoro, the fourth 

feature, on Highway 65 only eight miles 

from Bologna. Possession of Pianoro 

would enable Keyes to put considerable 

pressure on the enemy's defenses south 

of Bologna. 

Extensive reconnaissance had disclosed that the strongpoints developed 

around those four features were mutually supporting. That being the case, 

it was evident to Keyes that the capture 

of one would not necessarily lead to a 

breakthrough, so that it would be necessary to attack simultaneously across 

the entire corps sector. That, Keyes 

hoped, would prevent the enemy from 

shifting local reserves from one threatened point to another. With the enemy 

pinned down, Keyes would be free to 
478 

exploit his vast superiority in man}X)wer 

and materiel to concentrate sufficient 

strength at one point to achieve a 

breakthrough. 12 

To defend south of Bologna, General 

Lemelsen had assembled slightly more 

than four divisions. Although that constituted more units than the U.S. II 

Corps controlled, in terms of manpower the Germans were far inferior. 

Opposite the inter-army boundary to 

the I I Corps right lay the J st Parachute 

Division, then the 305th Infantry, followed by the 65th Infantry and 8th 

Mountain Divisions, with part of the 94th 

Di'uision opposite the II Corps left. The 

65th Infantry and the 8th Mountain Divisions were especially well positioned between the Reno River and Highway 65, 

the main route through the sector. 13 

The four divisions of the II Corps 

held a IS-mile front running northeasterly from the Reno River eastward to a 

ridge line about two miles east of the 

Idice River. The 6th South African 

Armoured Division was in position opposite Monte Sole across the high 

ground between the Reno and the Setta 

Creek. Next in line was the 88th Division facing Monterumici. The 91 st Division stood astride Highway 65 facing 

Monte Adone and the high ground 

flanking Pianoro. East of the highway 

was the 34th Division, whose objectives 

were the Savizzano and Gorgognano 

ridges northeast of Monte Belmonte. 

The Italian Legnano Combat Group on 

the far right flank was to demonstrate 

12 II Corps AAR. 1 Apr-2 May 45; Starr, From 

Salerno to the Alps, pp. 410-12; Fifth Army History, 

Part IX, pp. 50-87; Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 

488--89. Unless othelWise indicated, the following is 

based upon those references. 

• 3 MS # T-Ib (Westphal et at.). 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

but not attack w hen the I I Corps' phase 

of the offensive began. 

As Keyes prepared for that phase, 

the full weight of available air support 

shifted to his corps. On 15 April, the 

afternoon preceding the attack, 765 

heavy bombers attacked targets along 

Ix)th highways between the front and 

Bologna. Medium bombers followed to 

attack installations and troop assembly 

areas in the vicinity of Praduro. The 

next day the heavy bombers repeated 

their attacks, while the medium bombers shifted to the enemy's lines of 

communications in the vicinity of Bologna. Meanwhile, in late afternoon of 

the 15th, 120 fighter-bombers in "aves 

of four to eight aircraft continuously 

attacked the enemy in the Monte Sole 

sector. Just before dusk fighter-Ix)mbers 

turned their attention to other strongpoints across the corps front, dropping 

tons of flaming napalm on known 

enemy emplacements and illuminating 

the darkening landscape with pillars of 

fire. In addition to the aerial bombardment, 548 artillery pieces fired counterbattery and antipersonnel barrages immediately prior to the first moves by 

the ground forces. To all that the 

Germans replied only \veakly: only just 

over a thousand rounds of enemy artillery fell across the entire II Corps front 

during the first two days of the attack. 

On 15 April, while smoke and dust 

from the bombs and shells hung heavily 

over the rugged terrain or drifted into 

the narrow valleys, the 6th South African Armoured Division and the 88th 

Division on the corps left wing attacked 

soon after nightfall. Four and a half 

hours later, at 0300 on 16 April, the 

91 st and 34th Divisions launched their 

operations on the corps right wing . 
BREAKTHROUCH ON THE FIFTH ARMY'S FRONT 479 

The preliminary aerial and artillery 

barrages had sent the Germans scurrying deep into their bunkers, but as was 

soon apparent to the attackers, they 

quickly reoccupied their gun positions. 

German fire, supplemented by mine 

fields and the difficult terrain, limited 

the 88th, 91 st, and 34th Divisions to 

slow, costly advances, so familiar to the 

veterans of the previous autumn's operations. Only on the left flank could 

Keyes report success: there the South 

Africans, in a series of gallant assaults, 

su pported by a devastating 35,000 

rounds of artillery, before daylight on 

the 16th captured Monte Sole. 

On the second day, as the German 

defenses west of Highway 65 began to 

waver, the 88th Division finally drove 

the last enemy from Monterumici. The 

Germans continued nevertheless to 

hold firm astride Highway 65. Only on 

the third day did signs develop that the 

enemy's defenses were about to crumble there as we II, as the 91 st and 34th 

Divisions cleared the high ground 

flanking the highway. The IV Corps, 

meanwhile, continued to widen its penetration west of the Reno and Highway 

64, and the Eighth Army's Polish corps 

threatened Bologna from the southeast. 

Isolation oJ the German sector south of 

Bologna seemed imminent. 

Sensing that a breakthrough was at 

hand, General Truscott decided the 

time had come to shift the weight of his 

army's attack and the intercorps boundary westward. By so doing he would 

place the important Praduro road junction and eventually Highway 64 and 

the Reno River within the zone of 

operations of the II Corps. The latter 

was then to make the army's main drive 

to the Po. 

Anticipating the army commander's 

decision, General Keyes had already 

begun moving his divisions westward. 

He first shifted the 88th Division to the 

corps left flank between the 6th South 

African Armoured Division and the 

Reno River. Again the 88th was to leam 

up with the 85th Division, which on the 

16th had begun to move from reserve 

positions on the Arno to an assembly 

area in the vicinity of Vergato. There 

the division prepared the next day to 

relieve the I st Armored Division west 

of the Reno. Although Truscott had 

originally planned to assign the 85th 

Division to Keyes, he gave it instead to 

Crittenberger for use on the 10th 

Mountain Division's right flank, where 

the progress of the preceding four days 

had suggested an important enemy 

weakness. 

As the 85th Division completed relief 

of the I st Armored Division, the armor 

moved to positions along the Panaro 

River, ten miles to the west, where the 

terrain was more favorable for armored 

operations. The armor could also cover 

the extended left flank of the 10th 

Mountain Division, which was to become the spearhead of the Fifth Army's 

offensive. To fill the gap created by 

shifting the 88th Division to the left: 

flan k, the 91 st and 34th Divisions also 

sideslipped westward. That move 

served to widen the relatively inactive 

sector of the Legnano Group and set 

Highway 65 as the boundary between 

the Italians and the 34th Division. The 

regrouping completed, Truscott expected that the next two days would 

produce a break out fi'om the mountains onto the Lombardy (Po) plain. 

Breakthrough to the Plain 

At 0930 on the 18th the 10th Mountain and the 85th Divisions led off the 
480 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

INFANTRYMEN ENTERING Po VALLEY 

renewed IV Corps attack. From the 

first the 85th Division on the right 

experienced no contest. Trying to withdraw, the Germans had become so 

disorganized that they found it difficult 

to make a stand anywhere. By nightfall 

of the first day the two leading regiments of the 85th Division had advanced five miles to hills north of the 

village of Piano di Venola, halfway 

between Vergato and Praduro. 

Men of the 10th Mountain Division 

had slower going at first. In early 

afternoon the Germans fought back 

with heavy artillery and mortar fire, 

prompting the front-running 85th 

Mountain Infantry to hold up for the 

night short of the initial objective of 

Mongiorgio. Yet as the mountain infantrymen determined early on the second day, the 19th, that spurt of resistance was but a screen for continuing 

enemy withdrawal. When the 85th 

Mountain Infantry took the lead in a 

drive to Monte San Michele, a dominating height northeast of Mongiorgio and 

key to a position the Germans had 

hoped to hold at length-the Michelstel-
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE FIFTH ARMY'S FRONT 481 

34TH DIVISION INFANTRYMEN PAUSE IN BOLOGNA 

lung-the German defense collapsed. 

Around noon Monte San Michele was 

in hand and a request went back for 

every available tank and tank destroyer 

to join the attack, for the enemy withdrawal had become a rout. The leading 

troops stopped for the night three miles 

beyond Monte San Michele but only to 

allow supporting troops and reserves to 

catch up. To the left a battalion of the 

87th Mountain Infantry occupied another height, Monte San Pietro, again 

in the face of virtually no opposition. 

General Truscott's hope for a breakthrough onto the plain in two days had 

fallen short but not by much. Debouchment was bound to come on the 20th. 

The 1st Armored Division meanwhile 

had one combat command ready to 

attack on the 18th up the valley of the 

Samoggia to protect the left flank of 

the corps. The next day the remainder 

of the division joined the drive. That 

was fortunate, for in a desperate effort 

to stop a breakthrough onto the plain, 

the Germans threw in tanks of the 90th 

Panzer Grenadier Division. As tank 

fought tank, the advance of the Ameri-
482 

can armor was restricted, but the desperate effort to prevent a breakthrough 

had come too late. With the 1st Armored Division obviously capable of 

handling the nuisance on the flank, the 

10th Mountain and 85th Divisions had 

no cause for concern. 

At long last, on 20 April, the bitter 

struggle to break out of the northern 

Apennines finally reached a climax. 

Fighting was still intense on occasion, as 

at the village of Pradalbino where the 

Germans made a determined stand, 

culminating in a bitter house-to-house 

struggle with the 87th Mountain Infantry. Yet that and other attempted 

stands were futile. In mid-afternoon the 

86th Mountain Infantry broke across 

the arrow-like concrete ribbon that was 

Highway 9 in the vicinity of Ponte 

Samoggia, ten miles northwest of Bolog-na, while men of the 88th Division 

crossed the intercorps boundary athwart the axis of the II Corps advance in 

their eagerness to reach the flat country 

of the Lombardy plain beckoning 

ahead. In the resulting confusion the 

latter division became "the bottom of a 

gigantic T trying to punch through a 

top which was the 10th and 85th 

divisions." 14 The situation however was 

soon straightened out by having the 

88th Division's units "relieve in place all 

85th Division units as they were overtaken." 15 

The II Corps immediately south of 

Bologna had in the meantime also 

begun to move. The 6th South African 

Armoured Division throughout maintained close contact with the right flank 

14 John P. Delaney, Tllr Blur DrJlil, in Italy 

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 

203-04. 

" Ibid. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

of the IV Corps, on the 20th gaining 

the town of Casalecchio alongside the 

88th Division at Riale, while that night 

troops of a battalion of the 34th Division's 133d Infantry clambered aboard 

tanks of the 752d Tank Battalion and 

set out in darkness along Highway 65 

fi)r Bologna. Proceeding cautiously, the 

little force nevertheless reported entering the city at 0851 the next morning. 

All but a few German stragglers had 

departed. 

Progress on the Flanks 

To the east and northeast of Bologna 

the Polish corps also participated in the 

general advance, pushing back the enemy along a series of stream lines to 

within ten miles of Bologna, while 

southwest of Budrio the Poles crossed 

the Quaderno River midway between 

Medicina and Bologna to pinch out the 

10 Corps and take over the Eighth 

Army's left flank. Early on the 21st the 

Poles entered Bologna to join the U.S. 

34th Division and the Italian Legnano 

Group in occupying the city.16 

On the Eighth Army's right flank 

General Keightley of the 5 Corps committed the British 6th Armoured Division in pursuit of a retreating enemy 

along the axis of Highway 16. B~ ~O 

April the division had pushed to wI~hm 

ten miles of Ferrara. West of the hIghway the 10th Indian Divis~on o~tflanked Budrio to the east whIle a mIle 

north of the town the New Zealand 

division established a bridgehead beyond the Idice. Those advances had 

carried the entire corps through the 

16 Operations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, Part IV. 
BREAKTHROUGH ON T'HE FIFTH ARMY'S FRONT 483 

Genghis Khan Line, breaching the last 

defenses south of the Po. 

On the western side of the peninsula 

the U.S. 92d Division had also resumed 

an advance that had been limited since 

the 14th to relatively modest gains by 

several battalion-strength counterattacks 

by the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division's 

36Jsl Panzer Grnuuiier Regiment. On the 

17th, the U.S. 473d Infantry advanced 

astride the coastal road, Highway I, 

crossed the Parmignola Canal, and 

closed in on Sarzana, near the junction 

of the coastal road with Highway 62 ten 

miles east of the naval base of La 

Spezia. To the regiment's right the 

Japanese-American 442d Infantry tried 

repeatedly, but in vain, to break 

through defenses running north and 

south from the mountain strongpoint 

of Fosdinovo, five miles northeast of 

Sarzana. 17 

The reinforcements from the 90th 

Panzer Grenadier Division, however, were 

never intended to stop the Americans 

indefinitely but only to cover a slow 

German withdrawal into Sarzana and 

La Spezia. Coastal batteries, firing from 

Punta Bianca, three miles south of La 

Spezia, harassed the Allied-held towns 

of Massa and Carrara and the routes of 

approaches passing through them. In 

spite of frequent attempts by tank destroyers, fighter-bombers, and even an 

8-inch howitzer to silence the guns, 

those on the eastern side of the peninsula continued to fire until the 19th, 

when, presumably, the Germans destroyed them just before withdrawing. 

The guns on the western side, however, 

continued to fire for another day, until 

17 Fifth Army History, Part IX, pp. 42-43; Goodman Monograph. pp. 162-63. 

the enemy, faced with the necessity for 

a rapid withdrawal, because of the 

Allied breakthrough on the central 

front on both sides of Bologna, abandoned the batteries to the 92d Division.18 

The 20th of April thus marked the 

turning point in the Allied spring of· 

fensive across the entire front. From 

that point the operation was to become 

a pursuit with fighter-bombers of the 

MAT AF flying in close support of 

wide-ranging Allied columns fanning 

out across the Lombardy plain. The 

aerial harassment, which would soon 

make of the Po River as much of a 

barrier to the retreating Germans as 

they had hoped it would be to the 

Allies, represented the culmination of 

11,902 Allied sorties of all types, flown 

over the battle area since 14 April. The 

six days since the Fifth Army's phase of 

the Allied offensive had begun had 

witnessed the greatest single week's air 

support effort of the entire Italian 

campaign and was a fitting climax to 

the long months of Allied air operations in the theater. 19 

Meanwhile, five days earlier, the U.S. 

6th Army Group under Lt. Gen. Jacob 

L. Devers, operating north of the Alps, 

had begun moving south and southwest 

into western Austria toward the AustroItalian frontier. On 15 April the 

SHAEF commander, General Eisenhower, had issued an order sending 

General Devers' army group, which 

included the First French Army and 

the U.S. Seventh Army, through Bavaria and into western Austria toward 

an eventual link-up with the Allied 

18 Goodman "'fonograph, pp. 162-63. 

,. Ibid.; Craven and Cate, eds., AAF III, pp. 486-

89. 
484 

armies in Italy. At the same time, 

Eisenhower sent Patton's Third Army 

southeastward down the Danube Valley 

into Austria for eventual link-up with 

the Russians advancing from Vienna. 

Thus, from three directions an Allied 

ring was closing around the German 

armies in the southwest, forcing them 

into an Alpine fastness from which 

there was no escape-and no hope of 

survival. 20 

Hitler's Strategic Decisions 

For the C.»ermans, 20 April had also 

been a turning point. Until that time 

the Tenth Army's I Parachute and LXXVI 

Panzer Corps had managed, except for 

the Argenta Gap, to keep their fronts 

intact while skillfully withdrawing 

northeastward beyond the Reno. Once 

again it seemed as if the elusive Tenth 

Army would escape the Eighth Army's 

grasp. But the failure of the Fourteenth 

Army's XIV Panzer Corps to prevent a 

breakthrough west of Bologna, first by 

the U.S. IV Corps and then by the U.S. 

II Corps, threatened to open a gap 

between the two German armies and 

jeopardize the ability of the Tenth Army 

to continue its retrograde movement. 

Faced at that point with a threat to the 

integrity of his entire army group, 

General von Vietinghoff, even without 

obtaining authorization from OKW, ordered the long-deferred Operation 

HERBSTNEBEL into effect on the 

night of 20 April. As he did so, he 

20 SCAF 281, FWD in SHAEF, Post OVERLORD 

Planning File, 381. IV. See also. The Last Offensive. 

by Charles B. MacDonald, Wash, D.C., 1973, pp. 

433-42, for the account of the Allied sweep from 

the Danube to the Alps. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

dutifully reported his decision to his 

Fuehrer, together with congratulations 

on Hitler's birthday.21, 

It had been an'ything but a happy 

birthday for the Fuehrer, for on that 

very day Hitler had ordered his headquarters to disperse. Command of the 

western front was to pass to a northern 

group under Grand Admiral Karl 

Doenitz, with his headquarters at flensburg on the Baltic, and a southern 

group under Field Marshal Kesselring, 

with headquarters near Berchtesgaden. 

The Fuehrer and the remainder of 

OKW were to continue to command 

the eastern fronts from the Reichschancellery bunker in Berlin. 

Hitler had actually made the decision 

to divide his headquarters nine days 

earlier, when it became clear that the 

advance of the Allied armies on all 

fronts made it virtually impossible to 

continue direction of the war from a 

central headquarters. When the Russians crossed the Oder River on the 

20th, Hitler realized that he could delav 

no longer and ordered the norther~ 

and southern sections of the OKW to 

depart at once. The motor convoy 

carrying the headquarters that was to 

operate under Kesselring left the Air 

Defense School barracks at Wannsee on 

the outskirts of Berlin on 20 April and 

arrived at Berchtesgaden on the 23d. It 

would be under the command of the 

latter headquarters that the German 

forces in southwestern Europe, includ21 Greiner and Schramm, eds,. OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

IV(2), pp. 1438-39; Cable No.3, 20 Apr 45. 

Vietinghoff to the Fuehrer. reprinted in Operations 

of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in 

Italy, Part IV, Sec. G, App, F; Walter Warlimont. 

Inside Hitler's Headquarters. 1939-45 (New York: 

Progress. 1964), p. 513. 
BREAKfHROUGH ON THE FIFcT'H ARMY'S FRON'I' 485 

ing Army Group C, would fight their last 

battles, 22 

Implicit in Hitler's decision to disperse OKW was a change in his strategy-if such it can be described. In the 

weeks immediately preceding the decision the German leader had clung 

stubbornly to the hope that his armies 

in the west and south could somehow 

hold the American and British armies 

at bay long enough for the German 

forces on the eastern front to check the 

Russians and possibly persuade the 

Western Allies to join forces with the 

Germans to turn back the Red tide 

threatening to spill into central Europe. 

The Russian crossing of the Oder 

changed all that, prompting the Fuehrer to abandon all hope of persuading 

the Western Allies to turn against the 

Russians. The German armies in the 

west and south were instead to hold out 

long enough to permit those retreating 

before the Russians in the east to reach 

the zones of the Western Allies and 

thereby avoid mass surrenders to the 

Red Army. 

That strategy, or procedure, quickly 

became the leitmotif of Kesselring's operations, but not of Vietinghoffs. For 

within Army Group C's headquarters 

there soon surfaced a conflict between 

the partisans of Hitler's strategy of 

desperation and those who had 

adopted an attitude of sauve qui peut, 

convinced that continued resistance in 

Italy or, for that matter, anywhere else, 

no longer served a valid purpose. That 

conflict would help explain the con2' Greiner and Schramm, eds., OKWIWFSt, KTB, 

IV(2), pp. 1438-39; Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 513. 

fused moves and countermoves that 

were to take place within Army Group C 

headquarters in the dosing days of the 

campaign in Italy. 23 

The Byzantine atmosphere at the 

German headquarters in Italy would 

become murkier with the maturing of 

covert surrender negotiations between 

the senior SS commander in Italy, 

General Wolff, and the head of the 

American OSS apparatus in Switzerland, Allen Dulles. Under way since 

early March, those negotiations, like the 

military operations on the battlefront, 

had also taken a sharp turn on 20 

April. For on that date the Allied 

Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered Field 

Marshal Alexander and Mr. Dulles to 

terminate the negotiations. "You 

should," the CCS informed the Allied 

commander, "consider the matter as 

dosed and so inform the Russians."24 

After 20 April a crushing military victory over the Germans seemed in sight, 

not only in Italy but on all battlefronts. 

To the Allied High Command there 

seemed little to be gained in accepting a 

capitulation in one of the war's secondary theaters of operations at the risk of 

alienating one of the major Allied governments-the Soviet Union. 

23 In his commentary on the OKW War Diary, 

Percy Ernst Schramm observed that in the last 

mon'ths of the war Hitler's H •• .leadership had 

become more and more an 'Illusionsstrategie: outlined in red and blue markings on situation maps 

but having no relationship to reality, even if executed." (OKW, KTB, LV[I], 1944-45, p. 32j. 

24 Msg WX 70553, CCOS to Alexander. 20 Apr 

45, AFHQ OIOO/llcl58. For a narrative of the 

negotiations between Dulles and Wolff, see Chapter 

XXX. It seems doubtful whether these instructions 

were known to Hitler at the time he made his 

change of strategy on the 20th. 

PART EIGHT 

PURSUIT TO THE ALPS 

Now, in the combat all action is directed to the destruction of the enemy, 

or rather of his fighting powers, for this lies in the conception of combat. 

The destruction of the enemy's fighting power is, therefore, always the 

means to attain the object of combat. 

CLAUSEWITZ, On War 

CHAPTER XXVIII 

Race for the Po 

As Allied forces debouched onto the 

Lombardy plain and the Cermans began to withdraw in keeping with Operation HERBSTNEBEL, one terrain feature dominated the thinking on both 

sides: the Po River. Allied commanders 

still hoped to trap sizeable contingents 

of the Cerman forces south of the 

river, while if the Germans were to 

survive as a fighting fCJr(:e in northern 

Italv, they had somehow to get their 

heavy equipment, artillery, transport, 

and troops beyond the river. 

From turbulent beginnings in the 

Alps of northwestern Italy, the Po 

meanders for 250 miles in a series of 

great bends dotted with numerous islands and sand bars. finally to enter the 

Adriatic through a large delta twenty 

miles northeast of the Comacchio Lagoon. Halfway in its course the river 

increases from 1,000 feet upstream 

from Ferrara to four time that width at 

a point north of Parma, sixty miles to 

the west, with the actual wet gap varying between 400 and 1,500 feet. Both 

east and west. of that stretch the wet 

gap was considerably narrower but still 

too wide to be spanned by field-type 

military bridges. There was another 

difficulty: the danger of flooding. 

Along almost the river's entire length 

stood a vast system of dikes, rising 15 to 

25 feet above the level of the surrounding countryside and in places bringing 

the water level to a point higher than 

the valley floor. If the river were high, 

breaching the dikes could cause widespread flooding and make the Po a 

more formidable barrier. 

Traversing generally flat terrain, the 

best highways in Italy crossed the Po 

Valley, and most secondary roads were 

graveled and well drained, affording 

alternate routes to almost any point. 

Thus, other than fighting delaymg actions along watercourses crossin~ the 

axes of advance, the fleeing enemy 

could do little to block his pursuers. 

German difficulties were further compounded by seemingly omnipresent Allied aircraft. Every day Allied planes 

swept the length of the river to attack 

both crossing sites and the troops and 

equipment streaming toward the Po. 

Before the spring offensive the Fifth 

Army engineers had made thorough 

aerial and map reconnaissances of that 

part of the Po crossing the axis of the 

army's advance. From those surveys the 

engineers had determined that the best 

crossing sites within the army's zone lay 

along a 20-mile stretch of the river 

between Borgoforte on Highway 62 

(the Parma-Mantua road) eastward to 

Ostiglia on Highway 12. Midway between those two points lay the San 

Benedetto crossing site. The western 

half, between San Benedetto and Borgo forte, appeared to be more favorable 

than the eastern, where a large marshy 

area near Ostiglia would constrict military operations. 1 

ISee Mayo MS, The Corps of Engineers: Operations in the War Against Germany. 
490 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

AERIAL VIEW OF Po RIVER CROSSING 

The engineers had selected twelve 

likely sites for assault crossings, an equal 

number of sites for ferry crossings, and 

nine possible sites lex floating bridges. 

Most im portantly, nearly all sites were 

suitable for all three types of rivercrossing operations. Expecting that 

Keyes' II Corps would reach the Po 

first, General Truscott had placed the 

39th Engineer Group of that corps in 

charge of preparing the river crossings, 

but when late on 22 April it appeared 

likely that Crittenberger's IV Corps 

would reach the Po first, Truscott 

shifted most of the engineers to the IV 

Corps. 2 

Well aware of the tactical problems of 

withdrawing across a broad river while 

under attack from air and ground, the 

Germans months before had begun 

preparations for re-crossing the Po. 

Their engineers had selected several 

favorable crossing sites, understandably 

the same ones later picked by Allied 

engineers. At each site they had cached 

the necessary materiel, including large 

"Ibid. 
RACE FOR THE PO 491 

GERMAN EQUIPMENT DESTROYED ALONG Po 

and small ferry boats suitable f()r use 

with any of three possible water levels, 

for during early spring and summer 

the Po in this was un predictable . Yet as 

had so often been the case in the Italian 

campaign, nature would intervene to 

upset carefully made preparations. 3 

Despite the heavy snows of the previous winter, spring of 1945 f(mnd the 

Po at its lowest level in half a century. 

Although that condition removed the 

danger of flooding, it left the water too 

3MS # T-lb (Westphal et al.). Unless otherwise 

indicated the following is based upon this reference. 

shallow for larger ferries on which the 

Germans had counted for transporting 

their heavy equipment and vehicles. 

Often running aground, the ferries 

became easy targets for Allied fighterbombers, leaving the Germans no 

choice but to use smaller, shallower 

draft ferries with greatly reduced carrying capacity. That inevitably meant 

abandoning much heavy equipment 

south of the river. 

Plans for withdrawing behind the Po 

were further jeopardized when many 

Germ;m engineer units, originally detailed to operate the crossing points, 
492 

were committed as combat troops to 

reinforce rear guard operations. Deprived of engineer assistance, unit commanders frequently had no choice but 

to improvise on the spot. 

Moreover, by 21 April it appeared 

already too late for many of the German units even to reach the Po, let 

alone to cross it. One such unit was the 

ill-starred 94th Infantry Division. That 

night its commander, General Steinmetz, received orders from the XIV 

Panzer Corps to assemble survivors of his 

division in the vicinity of Mirandola on 

Highway 12 about midway between 

Modena and the Po River crossing 

point at Ostiglia. At Mirandola the 94th 

Division was' to prepare a delaying position, but even as the hapless Steinmetz 

was reporting to corps headquarters to 

receive the order, the U.S. 88th Division entered Mirandola. The 94th Division's survivors, generally in small detachments, made their way to the Po as 

best they could. Meanwhile, the division's operations officer was wounded 

and captured while making reconnaissance for crossing the river, and Steinmetz himself was cut off from his 

troops. Lacking essential signal equipment to control the di visions of the 

corps, General von Senger und Etterlin 

saw no alternative but to dismiss his 

headquarters staff with orders to reassemble at Legnano on the Adige some 

ten miles to the north. Thus it was that 

early on 23 April the corps commander 

and his staff joined the precipitate flight 

across the Po. 4 

Imminent German collapse was 

dearly evident at U.S. Fifth Army headquarters. As early as 21 April Truscott's 

4MS # C-095e (Senger). 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

G-2 had noted in his journal that "no 

front line in the formal sense exists."'" 

Truscott planned at that point to thrust 

virtually his entire army into the gap 

caused by the disintegration of the XIV 

Panzer Corps. Crittenberger's IV Corps 

was to seize crossing sites along a 20-

mile stretch of the Po extending from 

Borgoforte on Highway 62, just seven 

miles south of Mantua, eastward to 

Ostiglia on Highway 12, twenty-seven 

miles south of Verona; while Keyes' II 

Corps on the right was to capture 

additional sites on a narrower sector 

extending from Ostiglia to Se rm ide , ten 

miles to the east. 6 (See Map XVI.) 

The Pursuit 

The IV Corps continued to lead the 

way. In the center, Hays' 10th Mountain Division progressed rapidly 

throughout 21 April against only scattered resistance. To take advantage of 

the situation, Hays formed a tankinfantry task force composed of a battalion each of the 85th and 86th Mountain Infantry Regiments, the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, an engineer company, a light tank company, 

and a tank destroyer platoon, all under 

the assistant division commander, Brig. 

Gen. Robinson E. Duff. The task force 

reached the Bomporto bridge on the 

Panaro River at dusk. Although the 

Germans had prepared the bridge for 

demolition, the task force captured it 

intact. In the 85th Division sector, the 

leading regiment also seized intact the 

bridge over the Panaro at Camposanto, 

near where over a centurv before a I 

SHq Fifth Army G-2 Rpt, 21-22 Apr 45, G-2 Jnl. 

105-2.2. 

6Fifth Army OI 9, 19 Apr 45. 
RACE FOR THE PO 

12,000-man Austrian-Piedmontese army 

under Field Marshal Count Abersberg 

von Traun fought to the draw a 

15,000-man Spanish army under General Don Juan, Count de Gages. 7 There 

was no chance of a draw in the current 

cam paign as the two American corps 

swept almost unimpeded over the 

broad Po Valley. If the corps could 

maintain their rate of advance for the 

next twenty-four hours, Generals Critten berger and Keyes assured the army 

commander, both would be drawn up 

along the south bank of the Po by the 

23d. 8 

The 1st Armored Division, however, 

advancing as a covering force along the 

IV Corps left flank, encountered considerable resistance, as the II Mountain 

Carps began to swing back like a great 

gate toward the northwest. After the 

collapse of the panzer corps front, that 

was the only course of action open to 

General Lemelsen, the Fourteenth Army 

commander. To the armored division's 

right rear the Brazilian division, choosing not to press the Germans too 

closely, followed up the enemy withdrawal, while the 34th Division temporarily garrisoned Bologna. 9 

At dawn on 22 April, after having 

crossed the Panaro at Bomporto the 

previous day, Task Force Duff, its tanks 

and tank destroyers leading the way, 

resumed the march northward. What 

followed was typical of the enemy's 

many small delaying actions that day, 

although few others were as effective in 

gaining time for the Germans. Since the 

task force had run into little opposition 

'See Spenser Wilkinson, The Defense of Piedmont, 

1842-1848, A Prelude to the Study of Napoleon (Oxford, 1927), pp. 73-81, for details of that battle. 

"IV & II Corps AAR, Apr-May 45. 

"Ibid.; IV Corps History. 

493 

during the past twenty-four hours, 

General Duff relaxed flank security in 

order to accelerate a dash for the 

crossing point at Ostiglia, some thirty 

miles away. The task force was thus an 

easy mark for an enemy ambush just 

beyond Bomporto. Allowing half of the 

column to pass, the Germans opened 

fire on the tanks and tank destroyers in 

the middle of the column with panzerfausts, destroying and damaging several 

vehicles. Infantry following in trucks 

quickly dismounted and deployed. Although the enemy detachment was dispersed within an hour, that meant that 

much more time for enemy forces to 

escape across the PO.IO 

Determined to reach the Po by nightfall, General Duff roamed the column 

like an anxious sheep dog, hurrying the 

men and vehicles through occasional 

small arms fire from isolated enemy 

rear guards firing one last volley before 

vanishing into a maze of roads, trails, 

and villages. About an hour before 

Task Force Duff reached San Benedetto, the main crossing point in the 

10th Mountain Division's sector, an antitank mine exploded near General 

Duffs jeep, seriously wounding him. 

The division commander, General 

Hays, came forward to take command 

of the spearhead. By 1800 San Benedetto was in hand, while the remainder 

of the mountain division arrived during 

the night and deployed along the south 

bank of the Po in preparation for 

crossing the next day. II 

While Hays' division drew up to the 

Po, Prichard's armored division, with 

two combat commands forward, adIOIV Corps History. 

II 10th Mtn Div AAR, n.pr 45; IV Corps AAR, 

Apr-May 45. 
494 

vanced throughout the 22d along the 

mountain division's left flank, but at a 

somewhat slower pace. That afternoon 

CCA on the right bypassed Modena, 23 

miles north,·vest of Bologna, and 

crossed the Secchia River just beyond 

the city. With its tank battalion leading 

the way throughout the night, the combat command reached the Po on the 

morning of the 23d at the town of 

Guastalla. Throughout the 22d resistance met by CCB, moving up on the 

left, so delayed it that it reached the Po 

several hours after its neighlx)L 12 

In the II Corps sector, the 88th 

Division led the drive to the Po, primarily because other units constituting the 

right wing of the corps encountered 

relatively strong delaying positions 

manned by contingents of the I Parachute Corps. Troops of the 1st and 4th 

Parachute Divisions made a particularly 

strong stand along the Panaro River, 

which cut diagonally across the zone of 

advance, thus delaying the 6th South 

African Armoured and the 9Ist Infantry Divisions. The 88th Division g'dined 

the Po late on 23 April, reaching the 

river at a point where thousands of 

Germans were assembling in hope of 

crossing to the north bank. A mammoth haul over the next two days of 

11,000 prisoners, including the 362d 

Infantry Division's Maj. Gen. Friedrich 

von Schellwitz, the first German division commander captured during the 

campaign, surrendered to the troops of 

the 88th Division. 13 

On the Eighth Army's front also 

breakthrough and pursuit were the 

order of the day. There, however, the 

12\V & II Corps AAR's, Apr-May 45; Howe, The 

Battle History of the 1 st Armored Divisian, p. 419. 

13Starr, From Salerno to the Alps. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

general northwestward orientation of 

the British drive meant that General 

McCreery would be unable to use his 

entire force, for a main eHort by the 5 

British Corps nort.hwestward from Argenta toward Ferrara and juncture with 

the Americans of the II Corps would 

soon pinch out both the 13 British 

Corps and General Anders' 2 Polish Corps.l~ 

Next to reaching the Po, the basic 

objective of the main effort. was to trap 

the I Parachute Corps. That task fdl 

primarily to the British 6th Armoured 

Division, which on 21 April had lunged 

forward to Passo Segni, nine miles 

south of Ferrara, to establish a bridgehead over a lateral canal hetween the 

Reno and a southeastward flowing arm 

of the Po. After hurling back a series of 

small but vigorous counterattacks, the 

armor burst from the bridgehead to 

rush forward another seven miles to 

Poggio Renatico, eight miles southwest 

of Ferrara, there to close the last escape 

route for survivors of the 278th Infantry 

Division, until then acting as the left 

flank pivot for withdrawal of the I 

Parachute Corps. That action forced the 

parachutists to continue their withdrawal toward the northwest and assured a complete break hetween the 

paratroopers and the LXXVI Pam ..a 

Corps. 

Even northwesterly withdrawal ,vas 

soon denied. The next day, the 22d, 

the British armor drove on to Bondeno, only a few miles from the Po, 

and on the 23d not only reached the 

river but linked with the 6th South 

African Armoured Division of the U.S. 

II Corps at the village of Finale. For 

"Operations of the British, Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, Part IV, Sec. B. 
RACE FOR THE PO 

many of the Germans of the I Parachute 

Carps the village's name signified their 

fate. While the cordon thrown up by 

the two Allied armored divisions was 

sieve-like, it nevertheless served to trap 

thousands of Germans, and many escaped only by the expedient of swimming the sprawling Po. 

On the same day, the 23d, the 8th 

Indian Division gained the Po three 

miles north of Ferrara. By mid-day all 

organized resistance on the Eighth 

Army's front west of that point had 

ceased, but farther east the LXXVI 

Panzer Carps was still south of the river, 

remnants of its 26th Panzer and 29th 

Panzer Grenadier Divisions still posing 

problems for the British infantry. Yet 

the position of the units of the LXXVI 

Panzer Corps was less than enviable, for 

they were in effect hemmed in south of 

the Po between strong British formations on the west and the Adriatic coast 

on the east. About the only way for 

them to get across the river was to 

abandon everything and swim for it. 

Crossing the Po 

By 22 April engineers of the IV 

Corps had already brought forward 

fifty 12-man assault boats for an early 

morning crossing by the 87th Mountain 

Infantry's 1st Battalion. It was to be the 

first major river crossing by any contingent of the mountain division, and the 

troops had received little amphibious 

training. 15 

In view of the nature of the opposition, that made little difference. Just 

before the crossing was to begin enemy 

20-mm. and 88-mm. guns opened fire 

15 10th Mtn Div AAR, Apr-May 45. Unless otherwise cited the following is based upon this source. 

495 

from the north bank, causing some 

casualties among troops assembled for 

the operation and delaying it, but supporting artillery located the enemy guns 

and drove them off. When the engineers propelled the assault boats across 

the river, not a man was lost. 

On the far bank the assault troops 

found little but abandoned weapons 

emplacements. Only an hour had 

passed before the 1st Battalion reported 

the beachhead secure and ready to 

receive the remaining battalions. After 

nightfall, as engineers worked to build a 

ponton bridge, the rest of the 10th 

Mountain Division crossed the river, so 

that at daylight on the 24th all but the 

division's heavy equipment was deployed north of the Po. 

About the time the mountain infantry began crossing the river, a regiment 

of the 85th Division reached the Po on 

the IV Corps right flank, while the 1st 

Armored Division continued to cover 

the west flank. His "wildest hopes" 

exceeded by the bold thrust to the Po, 

General Truscott prepared to take advantage of it by bringing up the 34th 

Division from garrison duties at Bologna to free part of the armor to 

exploit the crossing of the Po. Combat 

Command A then moved eastward to 

San Benedetto to join the 10th Mountain and 85th Divisions in a dash to the 

Adige River and Verona, whose capture would further restrict the avenues 

of escape still left to those German 

forces in the western half of Italy. 

Meanwhile, Combat Command Band 

the 81 st Reconnaissance Squadron assembled near Reggio, midway between 

Modena and Parma, to assist the 1 st 

Brazilian Infantry Division in rounding 

up the remnants of the LI Mountain 
496 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

AMERICAN TROOPS STORM AsHORE ArrER ASSAULT CROSSING OF Po RIVER 

Corps trapped between the A pennines 

and the PO.16 

As demonstrated by the hordes of 

Germans eager to surrender, by the 

debris of a once-proud German Army 

that choked the roads leading to the Po, 

and by the easy crossing of the river by 

the 10th Mountain Division, no need 

remained for any formal set-piece attack to get across the Po. With that in 

16 Truscou, Command Missions, pp. 439-95; II 

Corps AAR, Apr-May 45; IV Corps AAR, AprMay 45. 

mind, General Truscott ordered all divisions to cross on their own as quickly 

as possible. 

Close alongside the mountain division, the 85th Division began crossing 

on 24 April, and by noon of the 25th 

the IV Corps had a treadway bridge in 

operation, followed four hours later by 

the opening of a ponton bridge. Having relinquished engineers, assault 

boats, and brIdging equipment to the 

IV Corps, units of the II Corps had to 

improvise . A regiment of the 88th 

Division stole a march on 24 April by 
RACE FOR THE PO 497 

PLACING A STEEL TREADWAY BRIDGE ACROSS THE Po 

sending a detail of men and then an 

entire battalion across the ruins of a 

railroad bridge. Others followed in captured rubber assault boats, while men 

of another regiment shuttled across in a 

fe\".' DUKW's and Alligators. The next 

dav, the 25th, both the 91 st Division 

and the 6th South African Armoured 

Division also crossed in DUKW's and 

on makeshift rafts and barges. Nowhere 

was the opposition more than token. 

On the Eighth Army front, as troops 

of the 5 British Corps gained the Po 

after having pinched out other contingents of the Eighth Army, General 

McCreery moved to readjust his formations to bring other corps headquarters 

back into action. A first step was to 

transfer the 6th British Armoured Division from the left wing of the 5 Corps 

to the 13 Corps to afford a second 

corps at least limited frontage along the 

Po. Having anticipated a set-piece attack 

in order to get across the river, McCreery had formed a "Special Po Task 

Force" to make the attempt under the 

aegis of the 10 Corps, but the extent 

and rapidity of the enemy's disintegra-
49H 

tion and a sudden serious illness of the 

I () Corps commander changed that 

plan. 17 Splitting the task f()rce between 

the Sand 13 Corps, McCreery told 

I~Jth to take the river on the run. 

Meanwhile, the commander of the 

enemy's LXXVI Panzer Corps, General 

von Schwerin, whose troops still maintained a semblance of organization in 

what was in effect a bridgehead south 

of the Po, came to the conclusion that 

nothing could save his corps. As long 

ago as the preceding summer in 1\'01'-

mandy and then in September along 

Germany's western frontier, von 

Schwerin had evidenced disenchantment with the war and conviction that 

continued fighting merely deepened his 

country's misery; he had survived Hitler's wrath only because he was a 

respected member of the old German 

17 The commander, Ll. Cell . .J. L T. Hawkes-

\\ orth, died a few days later. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

nobility. At this point all was so patently 

lost that he instructed his troopsincluding men of the 26th Panzer and 

29th Panzer Grerwdier Divisions-to abcll1-

don tanks, artillery, and other heavy 

equipment and make fin' the river to 

try to swim to safety. General von 

Schwerin himself surrendered the next 

morning, 25 April, to the British. IH 

Contingents of both the 5 and 13 

Corps crossed the Po on 24 April 

against no opposition. A race for the 

next likely l'nemv delaying position, the 

Adige River, was on, but from. all 

indications the Germans had nothmg 

left with which to make a stand at the 

Adige or anvwhere else. L , 

IH Operations 01 the British, Indian, and Domillion Forces in Italv, Part IV, Sec. B. See also 

;"facDollald, Till' Sil',~/ri('(II)/I(' Crllll/migll, pp. 81-8~, 

and Blulllenson, Hrmkll III 111111 PlIl'llIil, pp. 46~-(i:l. 

lor details of VOll ScI,\\ erin's earlier disagn'('nH'llts 

\\ ith his superiors on the battldield. 
CHAPTER XXIX 

To the Alps 

The Fifth Army's immediate goal 

beyond the Po, 27 miles away, was the 

fabled city of Verona astride the Adige 

River on the main road to Trento, the 

Alps, and the Brenner Pass. The swiftly 

flowing Adige River was at this point 

300 to 500 feet wide, potentially a 

fixmidable obstacle. Even so, the possibility of a sturdy German defense here 

or elsewhere gave Allied commanders 

little pause, for the enemy's final collapse was obviously imminent. 

As the 10th Mountain Division led 

the IV Corps and the Fifth Army 

across the Po on 23 April, Truscott 

assigned his two corps commanders 

missions that aimed at reaching the 

Alps and clearing northern Italy of the 

enemy. General Keyes' II Corps, after 

crossing the Po at Ostiglia, was to 

continue as the Fifth Army's right wing 

along the axis of Highway 12 to occupy 

the south bank of the Adige between 

Verona and LehJTlano, 20 miles to the 

southeast. General Crittenberger's assignment was more complex. He was to 

send three divisions of the IV Corps 

northward along the axis San Benedetto-Mantua-Verona, with Verona 

and its airfield in the suburb of Villafranca, ten miles to the southwest, as 

initial objectives. At the same time, the 

IV Corps commander was to round up 

the enemy forces in northwestern Italy. 

That job he was to accomplish by 

sending tank-infantry task forces to the 

Po Valley'S northern edge, thence 

northwestward along the base of the 

Alpine foothills to block exits from the 

Po Valley leading to the Italian lakes 

region and the Swiss frontier. General 

Crittenberger was also to send the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and the 34th 

Division northwest\vard astride Highway 9 along the southern reaches of the 

valley to seal the II Mountain Corps and 

its three divisions in the Apennines. 1 

In that assignment the BEF and the 

34th Division were to be assisted by the 

92d Division on the Fifth Army's left 

flank unit, which by 23 April had 

passed through the last of the Gothic 

Line defenses along the Ligurian (Oast 

and sent columns northwestward and 

northeastward. One consisting of two 

infantry regiments raced along the 

coastal highway toward the port of 

Genoa 35 miles away, while the other 

composed of one regiment moved 

along Highways 62 and 63 on the heels 

of the 148th Infantry and the I talia 

Bersaglieri Divisions as they withdrew 

from the mountains toward Highway 9 

and into the trap to be f()rmed by the 

Brazilians and the 34th Division. 

For the main drive to the Adige, 

General Crittenberger again called on 

General Hays' mountain division to lead 

the. way. Screened on the left by the 

9Ist Reconnaissance Squadron, the 10th 

Mountain Division was to bypass Mantua and cut the highway connecting 

Verona with Lake Garda. On the right 

'Fifth Army History. Part IX, pp. 108-22; II Corps 

AAR, Apr-May 1945. Unless otherwise indicated 

the following is based upon these references. 
500 

General Coulter's 85th Division was to 

strike direnly for Verona. To provide 

armored support for the drive, the 1st 

Armored Division's CCA was to cross 

the Po at San Benedetto, while the rest 

of the armored division turned to the 

northwest to support the thrust toward 

Milan and other populated centers of 

the upper Po Valley. 

Raceferr Verona 

As before, General Hays decided on 

a mobile task force to lead the mountain division's advance. By chance he 

obtained for it a new commander to 

replace the wounded General Duff. An 

old friend of General Hays, Col. William O. Darby, who earlier had commanded a Ranger unit in Italy but had 

since been reassigned to a staff job in 

Washington , appeared at Hays' command post in mid-April as an escort 

officer for several War Department 

dignitaries. Much to Darby's pleasure, 

General Hays persuaded Generals 

Truscott and Clark to request Darby'S 

assignment as assistant division commander. When the War Department 

acquiesced, Task Force Darby came into 

being. :1 

The task force consisted of the 86th 

Mountain Infantry, the 13th Tank Battalion from the 1st Armored Division's 

CCA, a company each of light tanks 

and tank destroyers, three battalions of 

field artillery, and small engineer and 

medical units. The tank battalion was to 

spearhead the column, while light tanks 

and tank destroyers were dispersed 

along its length to provide protection or 

to fall out along the way to establish 

2 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 493; Clark. Calculated Risk, p. 435. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

COLONEL DARBY 

roadblocks on the flanks. Hays motorized his own command post to bring up 

the rear of the task force, followed in 

turn by the 85th and 87th Mountain 

Infantry Regiments to mop up bypassed enemy troops. :\ 

When the task force could move 

depended on getting a bridge over the 

Po to enable tanks, tank destroyers, and 

artillery to cross. That was not to be 

available until the afternoon of the 

25th. Meanwhile, beginning on the 

24th, the 85th Mountain Infantry 

probed the northern limits of the division's bridgehead without making contact with the enemy. Concluding that 

the Germans had withdrawn, General 

Hays, not waiting fix Col. Darby's task 

fixce, sent the regiment off in pursuit. 

The 85th Mountain Infantry's 1st 

" 10th Mountain Division AAR, Apr-May 1945. 
TO THE ALPS 

Battalion started out early on the 25th 

for the Villafranca airport some 20 

miles away. Because there were innumerable mines to clear from roads, 

culverts, and bridges, it took the head 

of the column an hour to move the first 

five miles, but from that point the pace 

(Iuickened. Around 0900 the column 

entered Mantua, found Italian partisans 

already in control, and passing quickly 

through continued heading i()r the airport. With no more mines to clear, the 

column covered the 15 miles in less 

than an hour. Quickly dispersing a 

small German rear guard detachment, 

the hattalion set up a defensive perimeter to await the tanks and artillery of 

Task Force Darby. 

On the mountain infantry's right, 

General Coulter's 85th Division, after 

crossing the Po early on the 24th, also 

set out in the direction of Verona at 

about the same time. Proceeding warily, 

two forward regiments reached the vicinity of the Villafranca airport around 

dusk, there to bivouac for the night. At 

dawn the division continued to move 

cautiously in a column of regiments for 

Verona, seven miles away. This, however, proved unnecessary because the 

troops soon discovered that other 

Americans, men of the 88th Division, 

were already in control of the city. 

Unlike the 85th Division's cautious 

approach in its belated assault on Verona, the 88th had won the race by a 

headlong pursuit. Its commander, General Kendall, had instructed his troops 

not to wait for heavy equipment to cross 

the Po but to strike out boldly for the 

city. Early on the 25th the 351st Infantry, its 2d Battalion leading the way 

along Highway 12, left the Po bridgehead at Ostiglia. Using any transporta501 

tion they could lay hands on-captured 

trucks, jeeps, even bicycles-the men 

raced pel! mell, undeterred either by 

rear guards or mines, for Verona, 

about 30 miles away. Late that afternoon five light tanks and seven tank 

destroyers, the first to cross on a newly 

completed ponton bridge, caught up 

with the forward troops to form a small 

tank-infantry assault force to lead the 

way into Verona. Although resistance 

was spotty, some squads and platoons 

occasionally h;,td to engage in sharp fire 

fights until enemy delaying detachments could salve their consciences with 

a show of resistance before surrendering. 

The worst setback ironically came not 

from the enemy but from 'Allied aircraft. As the column paused on the 

outskirts of Verona, two Allied planes 

attacked, apparently in the belief that a 

small force so distant from other Allied 

units had to be German. Despite identification panels prominently displayed 

and frantic efforts by a radio operator 

to reach air-ground control, the aircraft 

strafed the column repeatedly with cannon and machine guns. Before the 

aircraft finally flew away, five men of a 

radio crew were killed and several jeeps 

destroyed. 4 

The 2d Battalion's task force entered 

Verona at 2210, 16 hours after leaving 

the Po bridgehead. Within the hour the 

remainder of the regiment arrived to 

help clear the city. Only from contingents of the 4th Parachute Division holed 

up in Verona's ruined railroad station 

was there any real defense attempted, 

• John P. Delaney. The Blue Devils in Jlal), If 

History of the 88th Infantry Division in World War If 

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pr. 

211-12. 
S02 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

giST RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON MOVES THROUGH VERONA RAILROAD STATION 

and by daylight on 26 April that was at 

an end. 

Clearing the Po Valley 

As troops of the 88th Division 

cleared Verona, Colonel Darby's task 

force came forward after crossing the 

Po, passed west of the city, and turned 

toward Lake Garda to begin an advance 

along its-eastern shore toward Trento 

and the Brenner Pass. At the same 

time, General Crittenberger detached 

the I st Armored Division's CCA from 

the task force and sent the combat 

command northwestward in the direction of Brescia, Bergamo, and Como to 

close along the way the remaining escape routes from the Lombardy Plain 

to the Swiss frontier. At the same time 

the 85th Division passed through Verona to clear hills beyond the Adige 

before continuing toward the Alpine 

foothills. To the east the 88th and 91 st 

Divisions of the II Corps, with the 6th 

South African Armoured Division 

screening on the right, dosed up to the 

Adige between Verona and Legnano 

and that afternoon the t\\'o infantry 

divisions crossed without opposition. 

Beyond the river a brigade of the 
TO THE ALPS 

South African armoured division 

screened their Hank while the rest of 

the armor remained south of the river 

until the bridgehead could be expanded. 

Elsewhere the 34th Division, the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, and the 1st 

Armored Division's CCB, all under IV 

Corps control, rounded up those Germans still south of the Po in northwestern Italy. The 34th Division, with the 

Brazilians on the left, continued along 

the axis of Highway 9. Two of the 92d 

Division's regiments, the 371 st and the 

365th, attached to corps and army 

respectively, had other tasks: the first to 

advance northward on Modena along 

the axis of Highway 12, the second to 

guard the swelling numbers of prisoners streaming into stockades in the 

rear. 

On the Ligurian flank the attached 

473d Infantry led the 92d Division's 

continued thrust along the coastal highway toward Genoa. Encountering only 

scattered opposition along the way, the 

regiment entered the city early on the 

27th. There as no resistance, for 

Genoa's 4,OOO-man garrison had surrendered to partisans the day before. 

Only a small detachment of ('3Crman 

marines, dug in on a hill top overlooking the harbor, held out until the 

Americans arrived, when the marines 

too laid down their arms. By 0930 on 

27 April the ancient port city was in 

American hands. 

Like the advance of most of the Fifth 

Army's units to the Adige, that of the 

Eighth Army resembled less a combat 

operation than a tactical march. Aside 

from the fact that the Eighth Army was 

moving into the gap between the I 

Parachute Carps and the LXXVI Panzer 

503 

CROSSING THE AmGE 

Corps, the surrender of the panzer 

corps commander, General von 

Schwerin, and his order to his troops to 

abandon their equipment and swim fix 

their lives further insured that there 

would be no real fight north of the Po. 

Having crossed the Po without opposition during the night of 24 April, two 

divisions of the 13 Corps on the Eighth 

Army's left pushed somewhat cautiously 

toward the Adige, 10 miles away. The 

2d New Zealand Division made it in 

late afternoon of the 26th, followed 

shortly by the 6th South African Armoured Division. Some 250 Italian volunteers dropped by parachute in small 

groups throughout the Eighth Army's 

zone in an effort to add to German 

confusion. 

Having crossed the Po without opposition the night of the 24th, the 8th 

Indian Division of the 5 Corps also 
504 

headed toward the Adige, assisted by 

the 56th Division, after brushing aside a 

brief flurry of resistance in crossing just 

before noon on the 25th. By early 

evening of the 26th both divisions were 

on the Adige: the night before, the 

Italian Cremona Combat Group had 

crossed the Po on the Eighth Army's 

right and with the aid of partisans had 

cleared the countryside near the coast. 

When, on the 27th, units of both the 

5 and 13 Corps crossed the Adige with 

no difficulty, the last m~jor river barrier 

in both army zones in northern Italy lay 

behind. All that now remained, Allied 

commanders believed, was to receive 

the surrender of a defeated enemy, but 

that was not how it was to be.' The 

fighting yet to be done would in no way 

affect the outcome of the long campaign, but it continued nonetheless to 

exact a bitter toll of dead and wounded 

men. The fighting was all the more 

frustrating and the casualties all the 

more tragic because they came at a time 

w hen the end was clearly in sight. 

Army Group C's Situation 

East of Lake Garda the enemy had 

only two routes of escape: one, opposite 

the Eighth Army, led northeastward 

toward southeastern Germany and Yugoslavia; the other, opposite the Fifth 

Army, led northward along the shore 

of Lake Garda and the axis of Highway 

12 toward the Brenner and Reschen 

passes into Austria. What was left of 

General Herr's Tenth Army, following 

the surrender of von Schwerin's LXXVI 

Panzer Corps, would in the next few 

days attempt to retreat along the first 

route, which was the objective of Marshal Tito's partisans; and von Senger's 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

XIV Panzer Corps-all that was left of 

Lemelsen's Fourteenth Army east of Lake 

Garda-would withdraw along the second toward the rugged terrain of the 

Austrian Arlberg, which was the objective of the U.S. Seventh and the French 

First Armies driving through southern 

Germany. The German situation thus 

was utterly desperate. 

Yet for the German commander, 

General von Vietinghoff, and his army 

group headquarters, a choice-however 

dismal-still remained: he could fall 

back through the zone of the Tenth 

Army or of the Fourteenth. Vietinghoff 

chose the latter and the zone of the XIV 

Panzer Corps, for only there existed the 

slightest chance of maintaining for a 

few days longer at least some semblance 

of resistance. Moreover, the French and 

Americans coming in the back door of 

that route were somehwat more predictable adversaries than the Yugoslav 

partisans and their Red Army allies. 

Through the last week of April the 

Army Group C command post would 

relocate successively along the axis of 

Highway 12.:' 

On 24 April General von Senger and 

his panzer corps staff had set out in 

search of the peripatetic army headquarters fex new orders. Coming upon 

General Lemelsen at Ala, some 23 miles 

north of Verona, Senger learned that 

the Fourteenth Army commander wanted 

the XIV Panzer Corps to defend the 

sector between Lake Garda and Highway 12. The next day von Senger 

established his own headquarters at Ala 

after Lemelsen moved on to the north. 

During the next two days small 

3 MS # C-95e (Senger), CMH; MS # T-Ib 

(Westphal et aL.). 
TO THE ALPS 

groups of officers and enlisted men 

straggled into von Senger's headquarters, among them elements of a signal 

battalion with critically needed communications equipment and wire. By the 

evening of 26 April, XlV Panzer Corps 

headquarters was again operational, but 

all that it controlled were three Kampf 

gruppen, made up of the consolidated 

remnants of four divisions, all together 

not more than 2,000 men. This small 

force was to hold a 20-mile sector 

extending from the Pasubio pass, southeast of Ala on Highway 46, westward to 

Lake Garda. Since the pre-World War I 

Austro-Italian frontier had run approximately along that line, some of the old 

border fortifications could be used. Assigning Group Klotz to the right, Group 

Steinmetz to the center, and Group 

Schricker to the left, General von Senger 

prepared to fight his last battle. As 

General von Vietinghoff outlined it, the 

objective was to gain time so that the 

capitulation of Army Group C woud 

coincide as closely as possible with that 

of Army Group G north of the Alps and 

Army Group E withdrawing through 

Croatia to the Julian Alps. {; 

The plan was Vietinghoffs, the strategy Kesselring's. Since 27 April the 

former commander of German forces 

in Italy had been commander-in-chief 

of all German forces in southwestern 

Europe, including Army Groups C, G, 

and E. Kesselring meant for all three 

army groups to fall back on the Alpine 

massif, there to hold out long enough 

to allow those forces retreating before 

the Russians to reach the American and 

British armies and surrender not to the 

6 MS # T-lb (Westphaletal.). 

505 

dreaded Russians but to the Western 

Allies. 7 

Victory on the Flanks 

As German forces retreated toward 

the Alps, Allied headquarters issued a 

call for a general uprising throughout 

northern Italy. In most towns and cities 

of Lombardy neo-Fascist authority had 

all but ceased to exist, in any case. 

Town after town fell under partisan 

control, often days before the arrival of 

the Allied forces. In many places the 

Allied advance involved much less fighting than it did a series of enthusiastic 

civic receptions. 

The 88th Division on 28 April entered Vicenza, northeast of Verona, to 

find that city already held by partisans. 

Passing quickly through crowded 

streets, the division continued its march 

toward the valleys of the Brenta and 

Piave Rivers, flowing southward h'om 

the Alps to enter the Adriatic near 

Venice. On the 30th, Truscott shifted 

the 85th Division fium the IV to the II 

Corps where it deployed alongside the 

88th, which was to advance up the 

Brenta while the 85th moved up the 

Piave to an eventual junction on 4 May 

with the U.S. Seventh Army. The two 

divisions thus would end the campaign 

in Italy as they had begun it twelve 

months before, moving fe:mvard side by 

side. 

To the right of those two divisions in 

the corps center the 91 st Division ad7 Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, p. 87. Although 

Kesselring's strategy had nothing to do with a socalled National Redoubt, it tends to lend credence 

to that myth among Allied commanders. For a 

discussion of the National Redoubt and final operations in Germany and Austria see MacDonald, The 

Last Offensive. 
506 

AMERICAN INFANTRY ENTER VICENZA 

vanced astride Highway 53 to cross the 

Brenta on the 29th and the next day to 

race 25 miles eastward to Treviso, just 

north of Venice. The 6th South African 

Armoured Division stayed roughly 

abreast on the corps right flank. As 

April came to an end, both divisions 

had reached the limits of their assigned 

zones. While the 91 st Division rounded 

up scattered enemy units, the South 

Africans assembled southwest of Treviso in preparation for a move far to the 

west to garrison the city of Milan. 

In the southern reaches of the Po 

Valley, units of the IV Corps continued 

their assignment of rounding up a 

beaten enemy. In capturing in succession the cities of Parma, Fidenza, and 

Piacenza, the 34th Division cut off the 

line of withdrawal to the northeast of a 

major part of Marshal Graziani's Ligurian Army. Only the 232d Grenadier DiviCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

sion managed to slip past. Assembling in 

a bend of the Po south of Cremona, 

the grenadiers defended their bridgehead long enough to allow some troops 

to cross the river, but most opted for 

surrender. 8 

Marshal Graziani himself took refuge 

in an SS-held strongpoint near Cernobbio on Lake Como, some 27 miles 

north of Milan, while his headquarters 

personnel, left under Graziani's German deputy, Generalmajor Max Pemsei, f()Ught through converging partisan 

units to reach Lecco on Lake Como's 

southeastern arm. Surrounded there by 

partisans but unwilling to surrender to 

irregulars, Pemsel held out until 28 

April, when the U.S. I st Armored 

Division's CCA arrived. 9 

The next day tanks of the American 

armored division entered Milan, already 

in the trigger-happy hands of excited 

partisans. Anxious to be clear of the 

turbulent city, General Prichard quickly 

hustled his troops through to assume 

positions to the north and east and 

block all routes to the Alpine frontier. 

On the same day, General Truscott 

shifted the 34th Division and the Italian 

Combat Group Legnano northward to 

Brescia, midway between Milan and 

Verona, to strengthen control of the 

northern exits from the Po Valley. 

Meanwhile, to the west, the 442d Infantry, operating under the command of 

the 92d Division, raced some 40 miles 

across the Lombard plain to capture 

Alessandria and a 3,000-man garrison. 

Two days later the Japanese-Americans 

took Turin, 50 miles farther west. The 

8 MS # T-Ib (Westphal et al.}. 

9 AFHQ Cable, Nicholson to Bern for 110, 30 

Apr 45, in AFHQ SAC Negotiations, Vol. 11, 0100/ 

4. 
TO THE ALPS 

473d Infantry went forward along the 

coastal highway twenty miles beyond 

Genoa and made contact with elements 

of the French 1 st March Infantry Division, Army Detachment of the Alps, at 

Savona, over 60 miles east of the 

Franco-Italian frontier crossing at Monaco. That penetration by French troops 

was matched 65 miles to the northwest 

when on 1 May troops of the French 

27th Alpine Division made contact with 

the 442d Infantry at Turin. At that 

point the commander of the 6th Army 

Group, General Devers, under whose 

command the French divisions operated, ordered the French to cease all 

offensive operations in northwestern Italy. General Devers may possibly have 

been unaware of the extent of French 

territorial claims in the region dating 

back to the military campaigns of the 

18th century. 

The Last Engagements 

With the Po Valley's northern exits 

closed, enemy forces west of Lake 

Garda had no alternative but surrender, which they began to do on a large 

scale on 29 April. That was pretty 

much the case in northeastern Italy as 

well but not on a narrow sector east of 

Lake Garda where the. 10th Mountain 

Division's Task Force Darby moved 

along the lake's eastern shore toward 

final defensive positions of the Fourteenth Army's XIV Panzer Corps. 

Because there had been little fighting 

in the Fifth Army zone since 18 April, 

men of the 10th Mountain Division 

started out on the 28th with little doubt 

that the enemy would merely continue 

his withdrawal. That was figuring without knowledge of the three Kampfgrup507 

PARTISANS BEFORE THE CATHEDRAL OF 

MILAN 

pen still left in the XIV Panzer Corps and 

the line they had established running 

from Highway 46 in the east across 

Highway 12 to a western anchor at the 

town of Riva at the northern end of the 

lake. 

General Hays did anticipate that as a 

delaying tactic the enemy might attempt 

to block the eastern shore road where it 

passed through several tunnels. With 

that threat in mind, he arranged for 

several companies of DUKW's to cruise 

on the lake slightly to the rear of his 

infantry, ready to transport infantry in 

attempts to outflank and bypass enemy 

roadblocks. It was a wise precaution, for 

on the first afternoon the 86th Mountain Infantry, the lead element in Task 

Force Darby's column, ran head-on into 

heavy automatic weapons fire at the 
!)08 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

ENGINEERS REPAIRING APPROACH TO TUNNEL, LAKE GARDA 

first of a series of tunnels located about 

five miles south of Torbole. 1o (Map 11) 

In spite of the enemy fire, the lead 

battalion of the column with fire support from accompanying tanks cautiously worked toward the tunnel. As 

the Americans approached, the Germans set off demolitions, collapsing the 

entrance to the tunnel and effectively 

blocking the road. To continue the 

assault along the road was out of the 

10 86th Mtn. Inf. AAR, Apr-May 45. Unless 

otherwise cited the following is based upon this 

document. 

question. Early that afternoon a rifle 

company clambered into the DUKW's 

and moved out onto a lake whipped by 

strong winds. From the far shore enemy guns opened fire, killing two men 

al~)ard the craft and wounding several 

others. Although the enemy gunners 

persisted, the DUKW's scurried along 

the shore to outflank the demolished 

tunnel with no further losses. 

As General Hays expected, the outflanking maneuver forced enemy withdrawal, but as the Germans fell back, 

they demolished bridges and blocked 

other tunnels. By midafternoon the 2d 
THE LAST BATTLE 

10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION TAKES LAKE GARDA 

2.7 April-l May 194!1 

if AI-\, lIED AXIS OF' AOVANC.E. OAT[ INOICAT[ D 

•• • • • • • • • GERW'N LINE or DEfENSE 

)-( TUNNEL. GERMAN $TAOHGPOINT 

- ---- AMPHIBIOuS OPERATIONS 

NOTE : rast F(),ctJ Ourby was composldDf 111# 86th 11#9; 

and Dssign,1i di.,iJ;on units. 

Con four Inl.rvol in mtJ/~,s 

I 0 2 4 WILES 

!t ~"~II,~\i~I\I~--~~~-TI!L-~--L---~1 

o l 4. KILOMETERS 

MAP 11 
510 

Battalion had bypassed four tunnels 

and was about to attack a fifth when a 

demolition charge exploded prematurely, killing about fifteen of Jhe enemy detachment defending the tunnel. 

Taking advantage of the resulting confusion, the American infantrymen 

rushed foward to capture the po~itjon. 

As one tunnel after another was outflanked and captured, engineers cleared 

them of debris to open the road to 

vehicular traffic. 

As the 86th Mountain Infantry advanced along the east shore, General 

Hays sent the 85th Mountain Infantry 

across the lake in DUKW's to occupy 

the town of Gargnano, reputed hiding 

place of ranking Italian officials. Finding neither Italian officials nor German 

soldiers, the regiment continued along 

the western side of the lake toward Riva 

and eventual junction with Task force 

Darby. Hays meanwhile sent his third 

regiment, the 87th Mountain Infantry, 

over a narrow mountain road five miles 

east of the lake to outflank the enemy's 

main positions from the east. ; 

Early on the 29th, as the 86th Mountain I~fantry, continuing as Task Force 

Darby's lead element, approached the 

last of the tunnels and the anchor of 

the German defenses at the northern 

end of the lake, resistance stiffened. 

Just as the mountain infantry statted to 

pass through the tunnel, German guns 

began firing from the vicinity of Riva. 

One round exploded just inside the 

northern end of the tunnel, killing four 

Americans and wounding fifty. The 

regiment quickly took to the DUKW's 

to bypass the tunnel, and soon after 

midday patrols entered the town of 

Torbole. Along with Riva at the northern end of the lake, that and the 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

adjacent town of Nago constituted the 

main strongpoints of the enemy's last 

defensive position. 

Signs of German determination became increasingly evident when German tanks and self-propelled artillery, 

located northeast of Torbole, forced the 

86th Mountain Infantry to pull its forward battalions out of that town. 

Darby's men then had no choice but to 

wait for supIX)rting artillery before attempting to retake it. When the artillery 

arrived two hours later to silence the 

enemy guns, the 3d Battalion pushed 

back into the town and by midnight 

reported it cleared of Germans. 

Still the Germans refused to cede the 

town. Shortly after midnight they counterattacked with the support of tanks. 

Seeing no need to take heavy losses 

with the end of the war obviously at 

hand, General Hays ordered his tr~ops again to withdraw. Only after the regimental and battalion commanders assured him the men could hold without 

appreciable risk did he rescind the 

order. 

Having bypassed Torbole on the 

right, the 1 st Battalion after 14 hours of 

painstaking slipping and sliding over 

rain-swept shale slopes. scaling diffs, 

and threading through narrow ravines, 

had come to within a mile of Nago. 

close enough to launch an assault 

against it. Because the assault would 

have to be made through a narrow 

ravine whose northern exit lay under 

German guns, the battalion commander 

delayed until darkness. 

At dusk, passing in single file 

through the ravine, men of Company B 

had moved to within 200 yards of Nago 

without attntcting enemy fire when an 

attack came suddenly from an unex-
TO THE ALPS 

peeled direction: the air. A single ;;Hrcraft-its nationalitv was never deterIllincd-~h:()ppe.d eight ,mtlpersonnd 

bombs, klllmg 1:IIlC men and wounding 

several 01 hers. Shocked b\ I he incidenl 

the company commande; withdrew hi~ men into Ihe hills to spend the rest of 

tI.le night on. a (old, \\ct, windswcpt 

ndge ()verlookmg the objecti\('. 

As it turned out, no fight had to be 

made for Nago. Ammunition virtuallv 

exhau:ted, the German garrison during 

the nIght of 29 April withdrew. The 

next m()rn~ng when Company B returned calltJollsh to Ihe narrow ravine 

patrols pushing ahead reported Ihl: 

!Own abandoned.'fhal afternoon the 

H6th MOllntain Inbtntrv's reserve hattali( ~n o(cllpied Riva without a fight. The 

(.('rmans had abandoned the cntire 

line. 

.Other than to send patrols to determille the extent of the enemv withdrawal, Colonel Darby chose to tlOld his 

troops in place fiJI' the rest of the dav, 

During the afternoon he and Lt. O;L 

Robert L Cook, who had recentlv 

assumed command of the 86th Mou~­

tain Infanlry, strolled to a broad promenade along Lake Garda to discuss 

plans feH' taking up the pursuit the next 

day, While they talked, a single attillery 

shell, presumably the enemy's parting 

shot fmm somewhere north of Riva, 

burst in the air above them. Cook and 

another officer standing nearby were 

wounded, an enlisted man was killed, 

and Colonel Darby fell mortally 

wounded. Carried into his command 

post, he died f<my-five minutes later, 

The stubborn and futile last-ditch 

defense of Torbole and Nago and the 

round that killed Darby and one of his 

men were the enemY's'last defiant ges-

:> 1 1 

lure,S. By last lig~t on 30 April all 

survIvors were tlccmg toward Trento 

Bolzano, and the Alpi~e frontier. ' 

The Eighth Army Crosses the Adige 

Task Force Darby'S cxp:;rience was in 

marked, contrast to that on the Eighth 

Army front, where, as alreadv noted, 

the 5 and 13 Corps had cr()~sed the 

Adige. Because of long lines of commut:~cation and shortage L of transport, the 

EIghth Army could maintain no more 

than two di visions beyond the river, but 

:.h,at tu,rr:~d out to be enough. As the 

;)6th DIVISion of the 5 Corps and the 2d 

New Zealand, Divisior: of the 13 Corps 

uussed the nver, resIstance was almost 

nonexistent. As one division set out fe)r 

Venice, some thirty-five miles to the 

northeast, and the other for :\1estre 

Venice's mainland neighbor, and there~ aftet' for the port of Trieste at the head 

of the Adriatic, they onlv encZmntered 

small groups of el;emy' soldiers \\'ho 

app:;ared only too \\'illi~g to surrender. 

On the 29th the 56th Division entered 

Venice and the 2d New Zealand Di"isinn captured Padua. 11 

General Clark had originalh decided 

that the Eighth Arm\' alor;e would 

occupy all of northeaste~'n Itah, but the 

army's logistical difficulties' and the 

need for a large force in case of friction 

\\'it~ the Y~~?slavs in the disputed 

tern tory of I neste and Venezia Giulia 

prompted him to change his mind. To 

make room fe))' an additional division 

within the Eighth Arm\,'s zone, he 

11 Operatiolls of the British. Indian, and Domin, 

Ion Forces in Itah'. Part IY. Sec. B. L'nless other, 

wise cited the following j, based upon this rdl'r, 

e!lce. 
shifted the interarmy boundary westward and on 1 Mav' altered his lon<;- I ~ 

standing practice of not placing American units under British command. Attaching the U.S. 91 st Division to the 

Eighth Army, while leaving responsibility for the division's SUpport with the 

Fifth Army, he strengthened the sectoI' 

while imposing no additional logistical 

burden upon the Eighth Army. 

That same dav the 2d New Zealand 

Division sped aiong the coastal road 

leading to "T'rieste to make contact in 

the afternoon with Yugoslav partisans 

17 miles northwest of the city. Pausing 

for the night, the New Zealanders entered Trieste in the afternoon of 2 May 

to accept the surrender of a German 

garrison that had refused earlier demands for capitulation by the Yugoslav 

partisans. Meanwhile, with the port of 

Venice available, General NIcereery felt 

free to commit additional forces. He 

sent the British 6th Armoured Division 

in two columns into the foothills of the 

Dolomites, one toward Udine and the 

other toward Belluno. 

Since the beginning of the spring 

offensive, the t",o Allied armies in Italv 

had taken 145,000 prisoners from th~ 

Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. Their scattered survivors were either surrendering en masse or withdrawing in small 

groups toward the only exits still open 

to the Cerman forces in Italv, the 

Brenner and Reschen passes. Cr~ziani's 

ltalo-Cerman Li[!;urial1 Arm)' had surrendered to Criuenberger's IV Corps, and 

the I talian marshal, M ussolini's last deCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

feme minister, was himself in Fifth 

Ann\' custody. 

O~lv in the western Alps, in the 

Aosta 'and Susa valleys, and along the 

Gulf of Genoa, where French forces t)y 

their thrust into Italian territory gave 

signs of having designs on it, and at 

Trieste in the Venezia Giulia region of 

northeastern Italy, where Yugoslav partisans seemed bent on a similar enterprise, were there douds on an otherwise bright horizon on I May. On a 

personal note, the day was also General 

Clark's forty-ninth birthdav. 12 

Next day company-size' patrols £i'om 

the 86th Mountain Infantrv moved five 

miles along the Riva-'Trento road 

through a landscape bright with blossoming orchards and greening vineyards to occupy the town of An.:o in 

midmorning, then continued northward 

to occupy by noon a succession of 

villages a few miks closer to Trento. :-..in 

enemy were to be seen. Meanwhile, 

patrols from the 85th Mountain Inf~lI1-

try fanned out in search of enemy 

st~agglers in hills overlooking Riva fro~1 

the west. Only a few were {()Und, each 

pathetically eager to surrender to regular military formations rather than to 

Italian partisans. 

Late that afternoon radios of the 

10th Mountain Division picked up a 

signal from the BBC announcing unconditional surrender of the German 

armies in Italy. That gave substance to 

rumors of an enemy capitulation that 

f.x over a week had been in the air. 

'" Clark Diary, I May 45. 
CHAPTER XXX 

The Capitulation 

The campaign in Italy would -end as 

it had begun in early September 1943-

with weeks of intrigue and behind-thescenes negotiations. Known only to a 

small group of senior commanders and 

staff officers on both sides, covert COI1-

tacts to bring about a separate surrender of the German forces in Italy had 

been under way since February. 

They began late in January when an 

Italian businessman, Baron Parrilli, a 

former head of the Fascist inf()rmation 

bureau in Belgium, applied for a Swiss 

visa to travel to Switzerland for the 

avowed purpose of visiting a long-time 

friend, Dr. Max Husmann, director of 

an exclusive private school on the outskirts of Lucerne. Only after Professor 

Husmann had posted a bond of ten 

thousand Swiss francs as guarantee that 

Parrilli would make no attempt to remain in Switzerland was the baron able 

to obtain a visa. 1 

In Switzerland Parrilli inf()rmed his 

host that the Germans were reported to 

have prepared large-scale demolition 

plans which, if carried out, would make 

an economic' desert of northern Italy. 

I Col Max Waibel, GSC, Swiss Army, The Secret 

Negotiations Concerning the Suaender of the German Armed Forces in Italy, 21 February to 2 May 

1945, MS (hereafter cited as Waibel MS), CMH. 

Also Office of Strategic Services Memoranda file on 

same subject, I\ational Archives, Washington, D.C., 

John Kimche, Spying for Peace (London: . Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961) pp. 126ff; Allen W. 

Dulles, The Secret Surrender (I'-':ew York: Harper and 

Row, 1966). Cnless otherwise cited the following is 

based upon these references. 

Such a catastrophe might be averted, 

the baron suggested, for there were in 

Italy high-ranking German officers opposed to the plans and willing to discuss 

the problem with responsible officials 

on the Allied side. Although Parrilli 

mentioned no names, he did assert that 

there were certain well-placed SS officers in Italy who had hopes of persuading the Allies to join forces with the 

Germans to keep the Russians out of 

Europe. 

Although Professor Husmann saw no 

possibility of meaningful contacts with 

the western allies on that basis, the 

possibility of somehow averting the destruction of northern Italy was compelling. He telephoned an old friend, Col. 

Max Waibel, chief of the Italian section 

of Swiss Army intelligence, reaching 

him at St. Moritz where Waibel had 

gone for a winter vacation. To Colonel 

Waibel Husmann's information was serious enough to prompt him to cut 

short his holiday and return to Zurich 

the following da}" 

As Parrilli and Waibel talked, Waibel 

revealed that he had heard a somewhat 

similar story from other sources. In 

answer to the colonel's questions as to 

Parrilli's sources of information, the 

baron gave the names of no highranking German officers-only that of 

SS Obersturmfuehrer Guido Zimmer of 

the Milan office of the foreign intelligence branch of the R{'lrhs,irhcrhf'it.,/zaujJtam! (RSHA). Like Husmann, Waibel 

dismissed the idea that the Americans 
514 

and the British would negotiate at the 

expense of their Russian ally. Yet the 

situation, in Waibel's words, "seemed to 

open vast perspectives," and he declared himself willing to act as an 

intermediary . 

On the evening of 25 February, 

Colonel Waibel and his assistant, Dr. 

Bernhard Mayr von Baldegg, met Allen 

Dulles, ostensibly an official of the 

American Embas;y but in reality chief 

of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 

intelligence network for Central Europe, and his assistant, Dr. Gern von 

Gaevernitz, at Husmann's villa near 

Lucerne. Knowing nothing about 

Baron Parrilli, Dulles approa~hed the 

matter with caution, but he sanctioned 

Waibel's sounding out the German un-

?fficially on his own responsibility. Only 

If the Germans gave evidence of genuine sincerity about ending the war in 

Italy would Dulles enter the picture. 2 

The Widening Circle 

Two days after the Waibel-Dulles 

meeting and after arranging with Professor Husmann for a secret password 

to permit less formal arrangements for 

re-entry into Switzerland, Baron Parrilli 

returned to Italy. Meanwhile, Obersturmfuehrer Zimmer reported to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Karl Wolff, highest SS and 

Police Commissioner with the German 

Forces in Italy, and Rudolf Rahn German Ambas~ador to the neo-Fascist 

Republic, on the results of Parrilli's first 

mission. According to Rahn, Wolff was 

eager to make contact with the Allies. 

He selected SS Starulartenfuehrer Eugen 

2 The Germans had known of Dulles' presence 

and mission since the previous autumn. See Walter 

Hagen, Die Geheime Front (Wien, 1950), p. 455. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Dollmann, Wolffs liaison officer at Kesselring's headquarters, to lay the 

groundwork for possible negotiati~)t1s. 

Wolff had formerly been Heinrich 

Himmler's adjutant and confidant. In 

his capacity as senior SS official in Italy, 

he reported directly to Himmler and 

thus eI"U0yed a command channel to the 

highest levels independent of the DB 

Suedwest, Field Marshal Kesselring. 

After mid-1944 Wolff was also designated General Plenipotentiary of the 

:I\rmed Forces in Italy, a strategic post 

m the channel between the OKW and 

Mussolini's neo-Fascist Republic. 3 

Ambassador Rahn for his part was 

11(: .stranger to covert negotiations by 

rmhtary leaders behind the backs of 

their civilian counterparts, for when he 

had first arrived in Rome to present his 

credentials in September 1943, members of the Italian high command were 

busily putting the finishing touches to 

secret operations designed to get Italy 

o.ut of the war. Even so, in negotiations 

aimed at ending hostilities with the 

Allies the key role from the beginning 

apparently belonged to Wolff. 4 

From the end of February to the first 

week in April the circle slo~ly widened 

on the German side to include, in 

addition to Wolff and his confidants, General von Vietinghoff and his 

chief of staff, Generalleutnant Hans 

Roettiger, and on the Allied side Field 

M~rshal Alexander's military representatives, Generals T.S. Airey (British) 

3 Rudolf Rahn, Ruheloses Leben (Dusseldorf, 1949), 

p.282. 

4 Details of these negotiations are to be found in 

the AFHQ CROSSWORD Cable file, 0100/4, AFHQ 

SACS, Negotiations for German Surrender in Italy, 

Feb-Apr 1945 (Waibel MS). See also Dulles, The 

Secret Surrender. 
THE CAPITULATION 

and Lyman Lemnitzer. Nonetheless 

outside that circle there were others les~ favorably disposed to the negotiations. 

Both Heinrich Himmler and his deputy, Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, had begun to suspect the nature of Wolffs 

Swiss contacts. Reaching Soviet agents, 

news of the contacts had also aroused 

latent suspicions among the Soviet leaders that their western partners were 

surreptitiously dealing with the Germans. :0 allay the suspicions the western. allIes began in mid-March to keep 

theIr eastern allies informed of the 

conversations with Wolffs agents. 5 

German Reseroations 

C?n 9 April Parrilli, accompanied by 

MaJ Max .Wenner, Wolffs adjutant, 

went to Chlasso on the Italo-Swiss frontier with a message from General 

Wolff. The message asked "an honorable capitulation," including permission 

for the German forces to withdraw into 

Germany with military honor and for 

Army Group C to maintain a modest 

contingent "as a future instrument of 

order inside Germany." That had been 

the German Army's role f{)llowing the 

Armistice in 1918 and reflected ~neral 

von Vietinghoffs influence on the 

draf~in.g of the message. 6 

Vlet1Oghoffs request accorded with a 

s~ldierly honor and tradition largely 

alIen to Wolff and his SS associates. 

• For details of Russian reaction and Allied response see Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Hou.ghton-Mifflin Publishing Co. , 

1953), p. 446; WIlham D. Leahy, 1 Was There (New 

York: WhIttlesey House, 1950), pp. 334-35; Feis, 

ChurrhzLI, RO(JSfVl'it, Stalin. See also 0010014, AFHQ 

SACS, NegotIatIons for German Surrender in Italy, 

Vols. 1-4. 

• See Harry R .. Rudin, Armistil'f' 1911f (New Haven; Yale UnIversity Press, 1944), pp, 395ff. 

515 

GENERAL VON VIETINGHOFF 

Although Wolff and the men dose to 

him had all sworn fealty to the Fuehrer 

as head of state, they, unlike Vietinghoff, would have little compunction in 

betraying the Fuehrer and deserting his 

ally, Mussolini. Opportunists to the 

co:e, they were anxious to save anyth10g that could yet be salvaged, including their lives and fortunes. 

Th~ terms requested by Vietinghoff 

were 10 any event foredoomed, for they 

ran counter to the Allied political and 

military decision to extirpate German 

military traditions and institutions. Surrender, it had been agreed, was to be 

unconditional and, unlike 1918, no 

German forces would be allowed to 

march back to their fatherland in military formation. 

Baron Parrilli nevertheless urged his 

Allied contact not to reject Vietinghoffs 

request out of hand, for as a soldier of 

the old school the general would no 

doubt contin ue to fight rather than act 

contrary to what he deemed his military 
516 

code. Wolff himself pointed out in his 

message that while he believed he could 

keep his promise to deliver northern 

Italy to the Allies by 16 April, Vietinghoffs insistence upon points of military 

honor constituted a serious obstacle. 7 

Concern~d lest the Germans might 

~ attel~ptmg to draw out the negotiations, Field Marshal Alexander refused 

to give Wolff and his colleagues anv-

~hing in writing. He instruct~d Dulles 

Instead to tell the Germans that a draft 

copy of the capitulation would be 

handed the German plenipotentaries 

only after their arrival at Allied headquarters fully empowered to act in 

Vietinghoffs behalf. With that reply in 

hand, Parrilli returned on 10 April to 

Wolfrs headquarters at Fasano. After 

hearing the baron's report Dulles and 

Gaevernitz concluded that the German 

commanders in Italy would actually 

capitulate only after Army Group Chad 

been effectivelv cut off fmm communication with the Reich. At that point 

even the most fanatical units would 

have no alternative to surrender. 

The next day, 16 April, two days 

after the Fifth Army had launched its 

phase of the final offensive, Zimmer 

arrived at Chiasso, where he informed 

the Swiss agents who acted as liaison 

with Dulles that Himmler had been 

pressuring Wolff to come to Berlin. 

Wolff, Zimmer added, urged the Allies 

not to "make useless sacrifices with their 

intensified offensives," for a surrender 

was imminent. Although Dulles transmitted that informatio~ to Allied head7 General von Schwerin, I(lllowing his surrender 

on 2.~ April, said that Vietinghoff "will continue to 

obey the Fuehrer's orders as long as a telephone 

line exists between his headquarters and OKW." 

See Operations of British. Indian, and Dominion 

Forces in Italy, Pt. IV, Sec. G, App, B, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

quarters at Caserta, Alexander dismissed it, convinced that it was only an 

attempt to relieve the mounting pressure of Allied operations against the 

German f()rces or to delay the progress 

of the offensive. One bit of inf()rmation 

that did invite the Allied commander's 

consideration was that OK W had 

placed the territory east of the Isonzo 

River under Generaloberst Alexander 

Loehr's heterogeneous German-CroatCossack Army Gro1lp E, then withdrawing before Tito's partisans and the 

Russians. That meant that the Trieste 

area, lying east of the Isonzo, would 

not be included in any surrender of 

Arm)' Groul) C. The est~blishment of a 

new interarm\ boundarv also raised 

the possibility,' the Allies 'believed, that 

OKW might use Loehr, who had had 

no part in the surrender negotiations, 

to pressure Vietinghoff into not surrendering- prematureh'. In reality, 

Vieting-hoff had already' taken precautions ag-ainst that possibility bv directing 

his air commander, General Erich Ritter 

von Pohl, who had been infonned of 

the covert contacts, to move troops 

under his command west of the Isonzo 

in order to cover Ann)' GroliP C's rear. 

Pohl also sent anillen to the Alpine 

passes east of the Brenner Pass to block 

movements b,' either Yug-oslav partisans 

or (;ennan units opposed to a capitulation. 

The labyrinthine maneu\"erings 

within the German command were a~'­

tually of no more than minor interest to 

Field Marshal Alexander. With the 

Eighth Army's phase of the spring 

offensive favorably under way and the 

Fifth Armv about to unleash the second 

phase, the' Allied commander was confident that no matter what the Germans 
THE CAPITC'LATION 

did, their defeat was only a matter of 

weeks. Thus, he caution~d Dulles and 

his representatives to avoid giving the 

Germans an impression that the Allies 

were negotiating; the Allied commander's sole interest was in arranging 

for safe passage of enemy parliamentaries to his headquarters "with full powers 

to arrange details of unconditional military surrender." 8 

Parrilli meanwhile arrived at Chiasso 

on 17 April \vith the disturbing news 

that, at Himmler's insistence, Wolff had 

finally gone to Berlin for a faCe-la-face 

confrontation with Hitler and the 

Reichsfuehrer SS. Two days later 

Wolff, proving an exception to the rule 

that those summoned peremptorily to 

the Fuehrer's headquarters rarely came 

back, returned to Italy "with assurances 

that nothing had be~n compromised. 

As the general explained to Dulles 

through his intermediaries, he had convinced Hitler that the discussions with 

the Allies had been only a ploy to gain 

time and divide the Allied coalition. 

Apparently satisfied, the Fuehrer ordered him back to his post with no 

restrictions other than to f( >rbid travel 

to Switzerland. 

Preparations for a Cease-Fire 

Aware that his movements would be 

carefully watched from Berlin, Wolff 

nevertheless continued to try to talk his 

colleagues into reaching an' immediate 

cease-fire agreement. Impelled by a 

grmving sense of urgency, he met on 

22 April with Vietinghoff, Pohl, Rahn, 

8 :'vlsg. AG\VAR for CCS from Alexander 

SACMED. ref. no. FX-59004, 12 Apr 45. In 0100/ 

4. AFHQ SACS, Gen McNamey's Papers Concerning Negotiations for German Surrender in Italy. 

Mar-Apr 45 (l27-1~~2SP), ser. 412. 

517 

and Franz Hofer at army group headquarters, then located at Recoaro. Gauleiter of the Tyrol, and a confidant of 

Kaltenbrunner, Himmler's deputy, 

Hofer affected an extremely defeatist 

position in an effort to dra'w out the 

conferees so that he could later betray 

them to Kaltenbrunner. The war wa~ 

lost, Hofer declared, and further fighting would produce senseless slaughter. 

If Hitler himself should come to the 

Tyrol and order a last-ditch resistance 

in the Alpine Redoubt, Hofer added, 

he would place the Fuehrer in a sanitorium. It took the conferees little time to 

agree that the tempo of contacts with 

the Allied agents in Switzerland should 

be stepped up. 

As prepared by Rahn, guidelines for 

final negotiations specified that from 

that point Army Group C was to act 

independently and, in particular, no 

orders originating from Himmler were 

to be f()lIowed. All present bound themselves on their word of honor to support the effort to bring the fighting in 

northern Italy to the earliest possible 

end. 

Von Vietinghoff then wrote out instructions for his representative, Oberstleutnant Victor von Schweinitz, "to 

conduct negotiations [with Allied au-

~horities] within the meaning of my 

lI1structions ... [and] to sign binding 

agreements in my name.·'~1 He inserted 

the phrase "within the meaning of my 

instructions" to help ensure that von 

Schweinitz would do everything possible 

to secure honorable conditions for the 

troops. 

As senior political representative, 

Hofer sought to look out for his own 

9 Waibel MS. p. 69. 
518 

interest by insisting that certain political 

questions concerning the Tyrol and 

upper Austria also be included in the 

instructions, possibly a reflecton of a 

strong undercurrent of Austrian separatism which was surfacing among Nazi 

functionaries from that part of the 

Reich. In any event, Hofer's efforts 

were futile, for Wolff was determined 

to ignore them. 10 

Unknown to the German emissaries 

as they prepared to set out for the 

Swiss frontier, the climate fex negotiations on the Allied side had changed. 

Convinced by SACMED's reports that 

the German command in Italy had no 

real intention of surrendering on terms 

acceptable to the Allies, the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff directed Field Marshal 

Alexander on 20 April to tell Dulles to 

break off contact with the Germans. He 

was to "regard the whole matter as 

being closed" and so inform the Russians through the Allied mission in 

Moscow. II 

On 22 April Baron Parrilli arrived at 

Chiasso with word that General Wolff, 

accompanied by his aide, Major Wenner, and Oberstleutnant von Schweinitz, 

entrusted with full powers to conduct 

surrender negotiations in Vietinghoffs 

name, were on their way to the frontier 

and would arrive the next day. For 

Dulles that posed a dilemma. Three 

enemy plenipotentiaries were on their 

way to surrender the German armies in 

Italy, yet Alexander and Dulles were 

under unequivocal orders to cease all 

contacts with them. 

10 Ibid., Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, p. 289. 

11 Msg. U.S. Mission. Moscow, from Alexander, 

ref. ;\10. F-63542. 21 Apr 45, in 0100/4, AFHQ 

SACS. (',en l\.f;:;\Iarney. Papers Concerning Negotiations for German Surrender in Italy, Mar-Apr 45. 

(I28-132SP}, seT. 412. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

The Swiss intermediaries, Major Waibel and Professor Husmann, under no 

such restrictions, meanwhile prepared 

to meet the Germans at the frontier. 

Although aware of the Allied decision 

to end negotiations, they decided 

against telling the Germans of it as did 

Dulles himself, for he could have inf~)I'med them by secret radio. 

Learning on the morning of 23 April 

that Wolff and his party had arrived, 

Waibel and Husmann hastened to 

Chiasso, making part of the trip by 

train because snow still blocked the St. 

Gotthard Pass. They had to hurry in 

order to pick up the Germans and 

return in time to catch the last train of 

the day through the St. Gotthard tunnel and bring the Germans to Waibel's 

home near Lucerne, for under the 

circumstances they could hardly be 

lodged in a public hotel. 12 

Waibel and Husmann f()Und Parrilli, 

Wolff, and his party waiting f()r them. 

Still reluctant to reveal the Allied order 

to break off negotiations lest the news 

throw Wolff into the arms of the bitterenders in Italy, Waibel nevertheless 

considered that it had to be done. 

Choosing his words carefully, in an 

attempt to prepare Wolff for the blow, 

he explained that there had been some 

difficulties on the Allied side and that 

Dulles had been instructed temporarily 

to break off contact with Wolff. 

Waibel quickly added that he would 

use his influence to get the talks started 

again. Meanwhile, he invited them to 

come to his country home, Villa Doerrenbach near Lucerne, and there await 

12 Waihel MS. The following section is based 

upon this source. 
THE CAPITULATION 

the results of his efforts. When Wolff 

and his companions wearily accepted 

the invitation, Waibel telephoned Dulles 

to ask him to come to Lucerne that 

evening. Although Dulles agreed to 

meet with Waibel, he IX)inted out that 

he would be unable to see Wolff. 

Sure enough, about the same time 

that Waibel and his companions arrived 

£i'om Chiasso, Dulles, accom panied by 

Gaevernitz, drove to Lucerne from 

Bern. Calling on Dulles at his hotel, 

Waibel laid before him Vietinghoffs 

written statement naming von Schweinitz as his plenipotentiary. Dated 22 

April and written on the official stationery of Dn Ohnlw/I'h/.I/ta/Ja SIIFd71'I'.I{ lind 

der Heeresgruppe C, the document stated 

that von Schweinitz was emIX)\\'ered to 

conduct and conclude binding agreements "within the framework of the 

instructions which I have given him." 

The document bore von Vietinghoffs 

signature. 

In Dulles' view the statement of authoritv contained in the document 

chang~d matters, for no such authority 

had entered into earlier negotiations. 

Dulles cabled Caserta for new instructions, and Alexander, in turn, cabled 

the CCS that enemy officers had appeared in Switzerland with full IX)wers 

to act for the German commander-inchief in Italy in bringing about an 

unconditional surrender. 

Wolff and the two plenipotentaries 

meanwhile waited restlessly at Villa 

Doerrenbach. Early on 24 April, not 

quite 24 hours after their arrival, word 

arrived from Caserta via Bern that 

while Alexander awaited a reply to his 

request to the CCS, Dulles was free to 

refer the matter to higher political 

authority, which prompted General 

519 

Wolff to observe wryly to Husmann 

that he himself was acting without his 

superiors' permission. Indeed, he was in 

Switzerland in defiance of them. Because of the delay Wenner and von 

Schweinitz at that IX)int were ready to 

abandon the project and return to Italy, 

but Wolff would not permit them to do 

SO.I:l 

During a luncheon conference later 

that day, Waibel, Husmann, and Wolff 

agreed that without waiting fi.)r Dulles' 

reply, Wolff should return to his headquarters where he could keep watch 

over the situation and, if necessary, try 

unilaterally to bring about a cessation of 

hostilities. Although Waibel doubted 

whether that was practicable, he 

thought it worth trying, even if it 

brought about only a partial end to the 

fighting. 

Bef()re leaving the villa Wolff gave 

Wenner full authority in writing to sign 

binding agreements in the name of the 

highest SS and Police Commallder and 

General Plenipotentiary of the Wehrmacht in Italy. At Waibel's insistence he 

deleted the words "to negotiate." Accompanied by Husmann, Wolff on 25 

April returned to Chiasso. 

General Wolff had motored only 

four miles from Chiasso when bands of 

partisans fi.)rced him to take refuge in 

an SS command post in the Villa 

Locatelli near Cernobbio on the shores 

of Lake Como, to await the arrival of a 

military convoy. There Wolff f(lUnd 

several neo-Fascist dignitaries, among 

them Mussolini's defense minister, Marshal Graziani, and the Italian Air Force 

1:1 Waibel MS; Msg. Alexander to AGWAR I"r 

CCS, ref. no. FX65020, 24 April 45, 0100/4 AFHQ 

SACS. 
520 

commander, General Ruggero Bonomi. 

Learning of Wolffs plans, they readily 

authorized him to surrender their 

forces. Meanwhile, the hoped-for convoy never came. 

Deterred by partisans and the Allied 

offensive, General Wolff was able only 

through intervention of the Swiss intermediaries and an American agent serving with the partisans to return to the 

frontier, where Major Waibel met 

him. Since the circumstances made it 

impossible to go directly from Chiasso 

to Army Group C's headquarters at Balzano, Waibel arranged for Wolff and 

Guido Zimmer, who had joined Wolff, 

to return to Balzano by way of Austria. 

Just as Wolff was leaving Switzerland 

on the 27th he learned that Dulles had 

received word lifting the ban on contacts with the Germans. 14 

VieringhoH and his senior COIImanders gathered in Bolzano on the 

afternoon of 28 April at his headquarters to hear Wolff's report. What Wolff 

had to say \\as brief and to the point. 

Schweinitz and Wenner, acting as plenipotentiaries fiJr Vietinghoff and Wolff, 

\\ere on their wav to Caserta, perhaps 

were already there. Although Wolff 

had not even bothered to mention 

Hofer's political conditions to Allied 

representatives in Switzerland, vet he 

told his colleagues that he had done so 

but that the Allies had refused to 

consider them. 15 

Expressing keen disappointment at 

that news but still determined to retrieve something for his pains, Gauleiter 

Hofer insisted that Vietinghoff place 

14 Msg.Alexander to Military Mission to Dean and 

Archer, ref. !\Io. FX66435, April 45, file 0100/4 

AFHQ SACS. 

15 Waibel MS; CROSSWORD Cable File. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

him in control of all military units in 

the Tyrol, which, in effect, would give 

him control of most of the f(Jrces still 

under Vietinghoffs command. The 

army group commander's immediate 

and violent reaction to the demand 

revealed a widening gap between the 

military and political authorities in the 

southwestern theater. At that point Vietinghoffs chief of staff, Roettiger, who 

thus far had been quietly biding his 

time, became spokesman f(Jr the opposition to Hofer and his fdlow die-hards 

in the German camp. The Gauleiter's 

demands, Roettiger said, were completely out of line with the military 

situation. After five hours of fruitless 

discussion turning on that point, the 

conferees dispersed to await the return 

of Schweinitz and Wenner. Hi 

Although Hofer found himself in a 

minority at army group headquarters, 

he still had a powerful ally in Field 

Marshal Kesselring. Having hosted a 

meeting with Kesselring, Vietinghoff, 

and Rahn at his estate near Innsbruck 

on the 27th, Hofer knew as well as the 

others that Kesselring at that time had 

flatly rejected a capitulation in northern 

Italy. It was also well known how 

harshly the field marshal had dealt "ith 

officers involved in an abortive uprising 

near Munich the day before. 17 

Kesselring's reaction had puzzled 

Wolff, who only a few days earlier had 

sent one of his staff, SS Standartenfuehrer 

Dollmann, to the field marshal's headquarters on the Western Front to sound 

16 Memo, Wolff. in CROSSWORD Cable File. 

l' Ihid. This was a premature attempt on the part 

of the garrison at a cantonment to seize control of 

Munich and order a cease-fire prior to the arrival 

of Allied forces. The officers involved had b('en 

summarily executed. 
THE CAPITVLA TION 

him out concerning surrender in Italy. 

The field marshal. according to Do 11-

mann, had at that time declared that he 

would raise no o~iections to the capitulation of Arm"V Group C, although he 

himself could' take no active part in it 

until the Fuehrer's death should release 

him from his soldier's oath. (It is possible, of course, that Dollmann interpreted Kesselring's rema:~~ in. such a 

way as to encourage Wolf t II1 hiS enterprise.) 

The field marshal's seeming change 

of heart and unyielding stand apparently arose from his own estimate of 

the military situation. A premature surrender o( Vietinghoffs Army Gmup C, 

Kesselring believed,would create an untenable situation fix General Schulz's 

Army Group G, still fighting north ()f ~he 

Alps, and Loehr's Army Group E, fallmg 

back bef<)re the Russians and Yugoslavs 

through Croatia to the lsonzo. A surrender in Italy, he believed, wo uld also 

adversely affect troops still fighting in 

Berlin a'nd along the Eastern Front. To 

that line of reasoning none of the 

umferees at the earlier Innsbruck meeting had raised objections. IS 

Recalling that conference strengthened Hofer in his conviction that in the 

developing confrontation with \Volff 

and Roettiger, Kesselring would be on 

his side. Without consulting either Vietinghoff or Wolff, Hofer telephoned 

Kesselring to give what Wolff would 

later describe as "a dangerous stab III 

the back" to the military command in 

northern Italy. Thus i~ the last {()UI' 

days of Ami)) Gmup C's existence the 

bmtasticallv unrealistic political hopes of 

the Kaltenhrunner-Hofer faction joined 

18 Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, p. 341. 

521 

with the Doenitz-Kesselring faction. 

Their strategy represented a desperate, 

hope of saving as much as possible of 

the German armed forces from capture 

by the Red Army and their east European partisan allies.I!1 

The Surreruler at CaseTta 

However much dilficultv Wolft's 

plans for a separate peace had encountered within the German command 

structure, these plans \\ere moving 

smoothlv toward realization. Late on 

the 28t1~, an airplane bearing the two 

German plenipotentiaries and Dulles' 

assistant, voll Gaevernitz, arrived at Casena. where thev \\ere met by (;elleral 

Lemnitzer and (;eneral Airev. who had 

taken pan in the earlier conversations 

with the (:ermans in Switzerland, The 

part\' then drove to a camp especiallv 

prepared ti n' the visitors in a secluded 

(orner of the palace grounds at Caserta.20 

Late that evening Lt. Gen. Sir William D. Morgan, since December 19~4 

Alexander's chief of staff, together mth 

representatives of the Allied air {(IRes 

and naval commands, met with the 

Germans. This time there \\'as none of 

the outwardly informal, sometimes cordial convers~tion marking the clandestine sessions in Switzerland. It \\as a 

meeting of conquero.r and conquered; 

for as fa I' as the Alhed command was 

concerned, the sole purpose of Caserta 

was to receive an unconditional militan 

surrender and instruct the deteatec{ 

annv in the steps ti.>l' an orderly capitulation. After receiving the German 

'" Waibel MS; CROSSWORD Cable File. 

"n Sec AFHQ SACS filt.' 0100/4; WaiiJcl ~IS: 

Dulles. Till' Snrd ')llIro/(/I'I'. Lnless otherWIse ('lIed 

rhe 1<.lIml'ing section is based on these sources. 
:- ') ') .)- - CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES SJ(;N SURRENDER DOCUMENT 

emissaries, General Morgan handed 

them three copies of the instrument' of 

surrender and told them to withdraw 

to their quarters to study it. 

Three hours later General Morgan 

summoned the Germans 10 a second 

conference. For the first time a representative of the Russian armed f<))'(.:es, 

M~j. Gen. Aleksey Pavlovich Kislenko, 

Soviet delegate to the Allied Control 

Commission in Rome , was present as an 

observer. Morgan opened the meeting 

by asking the Germans to state whether 

the general instrument of surrender 

was acceptable. After some hesitation 

they agreed that it \· ... as. Assured that 

all who surrendered would be treated 

as prisoners of war, von Schweinitz 

also asked assurance that Germans 

would be interned in Italv rather than 

be transferred to either (~reat Britain 

or to the United States. Allied representatives refused such assurance. 

Sch\\'einitz hliled to bring up Victillghoff's desire, expressed earlier, that the 

German tmops be allowed to retain belts 

and bavonels and march back into CermallY ,~s in 1918. 
THE CAPITULATION 

The Cermans did ask that all officers and military police be permitted 

to retain side arms in order to maintain 

discipline durin!2; the interim between 

cease-fire and internment. Conceding 

that some units might refuse to accept 

the cease-fire order, Morgan acceded to 

that request. 21 He also agreed to let 

Schweinitz, before signing the surrender terms, radio them and the results 

of the discussions to Vietinghoff, who 

could then indicate a time for cessation 

of hostilities. 

Following the meeting, General Lemnitzer and Dr. von Gaevernitz accompanied the Germans to their quarters, 

where the four spent most of the rest 

of the night discussing technical details 

of the appendices to the surrender 

document, point by point. By 0400 on 

29 April they had drafted a mutually 

acceptable cable for transmission to Vietinghoff via Dulles' office in Switzerland. 

The message, which reached Bern 

later that morning, was garbled by 

atmospheric conditions so that Vietinghoffs headquarters did not receive 

a clear text. Anxious to forward a 

complete and ungarbled version of the 

surrender terms to Vietinghoff as soon 

as possible, Dulles decided to parachute 

a member of his staff near the German 

headquarters at Bolzano. By the time 

plans had been completed and an aircraft obtained, it was already too late in 

the day. 

When neither an acknowledgement 

21 General Clark, apparently unaware of the 

concession, was incensed that von Senger had 

surrendered while wearing his side arm. He ordered the German general to remove it. Von 

Senger did so, throwing the weapon and belt to the 

ground. Clark ordered a guard to retrieve it for his 

souvenir collection. See Cau:ulatrd Risk, p. 440. 

523 

nor a reply came from Army Group C's 

headquarters, Wenner, General Wolffs 

representative, who had been instructed 

to sign a surrender document no matter what the terms, indicated his willingness to do so. Schweinitz for his part 

refused to proceed without word from 

Vietinghoff and at the same time continued to argue for a promise of internment of German troops in Italy. Not 

until late in the morning of the 29th 

did Schweinitz finally agree to sign 

without waiting for Vietinghoffs reply. 

Even then he insisted that he was 

exceeding his instructions. 

At 1400 that afternoon the two German emissaries entered Morgan's office 

to sign the surrender document. Both 

Schweinitz and Wenner appeared 

somewhat ill at ea5e in the glare of 

floodlights, popping of flash bulbs, and 

whirring of movie cameras. Quickly 

recovering their composure, they 

turned to face a room filled with highranking Allied officers gathered to witness the ceremony. General Morgan 

stepped forward to ask formally if the 

two were prepared to sign an instrument of surrender on behalf of their 

respective commanders. When they replied affirmatively, an aide to General 

Morgan placed five copies of the document before them. 

Breaking an awkward silence that 

followed, Schweinitz-speaking in German, although he was able to discourse 

fluently in English-reiterated that in 

signing without guarantees concerning 

internment of German prisoners of war 

in Italy, he would be exceeding his 

authority. Nevertheless, he declared, he 

would sign on his own reponsibility and 

on the assumption that his superiors 

would approve, although he could give 
CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GENERAL MORGAN RECEIVES GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES 

no absolute assurance t.o that effect. 

The mild caveat failed to deter Morgan, 

who replied that he was prepared to 

accept the signature under that condition. In reality, Schweinitz's declaration 

was no more than an empty gesture, 

for the Germans in Italy had no alternative to surrender. 

Shortly after 1400, 29 April, Schweinitz and Wenner signed the document, 

which sti pulated that the capitulation 

was to be unconditional and that hostilities were to cease, beginning at noon, 

GMT, on Wednesday, 2 May 1945. 

The Germans thus had four days to get 

word of the capitulation to their 

troops. 22 

Became of difficulties in radio communications and the need for security, 

the text of the surrender document had 

to go to von Vietinghoff as soon as 

possible. Immediately following the surrender ceremony, the German emissaries, accompanied by von Gaevernitz 

and an American staff officer, headed 

to Switzerland. The emissaries went on 

to Bolzano. They got there late in the 

" See Carland and Sm.-th. S;rilr tllII/liI,' S" .... nld,'!" 

of Ila/l'. pp. 43:;-:;:;2. 
THE CAPITULATION 

evening of 30 April. Thirty-one hours 

had el~psed since the two officers had 

left Caserta; onlv 36 remained before 

the cease-tire wa~ to take effect. 

Amly Group C's Last Hours 

Armv Group C, Schweinitz and Wenner discovered upon reaching Bolzano, 

was no longer under von Vietinghoffs 

command. Hofer having by tel~pho~e 

charged von Vietinghot:r and ?IS chIef 

of staff, General RoettIger, wIth treas<mable contact with the Allies, Kesselring had relieved both officers and 

placed Army Gmu!} C ~nder th:, Ar:"? 

Group G commander, ,(,eneral ,Fr~cdnch 

Schulz. Kesselring referred SS (.eneral 

Wolft's case to the chief of the RSHA, 

Dr. Kaltenbrunner, for disciplinary action. Kaltenbrunner had, in the meantime, left Berlin to take refuge in upper 

Austria, where he was engaged in a 

wild and hopeless effort to take oYer 

surrender negotiations and arrange, 

through conservative clerical circles, a , . :n separate peace tor Austna .. 

At noon on the 30th General Schulz 

and his chief of statl General Wentzell, 

had arrived to assume command of 

Army Group C. Von Vie.tinghoff immediately turned over hIS command to 

Schulz, but Roettiger, unwilling ~o ~bal~­

don the scene, decided to remam m hIS 

office for a day or so, osten~ibly to 

"orient" his successor. Determmed to 

carry out Kesselring's int~nt. for Army 

Group C to continue to ~eslst m hoJX: of 

gaining time for o~her forces else:vhere 

to elude the RUSSians, General Schulz 

ordered all subordinate units to fight 

on. 

2:1 AFHQ SAC Negotiations, tile 0100/4, Vol. II, 

Msg l:Iern to AFHQ, 30 April 4[). 

525 

The situation on I May was such that 

the order was manifestly impossible to 

execute. In northwestern Italy virtually 

all resistance had already ceased and 

north of lake Garda and in the Brenta 

and Piave valleys the remnants of the 

two German armies were backed up 

against the Alps. . 

At that pomt Roettlger emerged as 

the key figure in an attel~pt to force 

Kesselring to abandon hiS plan and 

JX:rmit the capitulation to take place. at 

the appointed hour. Instead of allowmg 

von Schweinitz and Wenner to report 

directly to the new army group commander, Roettiger had them brou~~t to 

his own quarters were they were JOmed 

by General Wolff and 55 5tandarter,ifuehrer Dollmann. All agreed that wIthout 

Kesselring's auth(~rization neither 

Schulz nor Wentzell would order the 

cease-fire. If there was to be an immediate cease-fire, there was no alternative, Roettiger and Wolff. agreed, to 

taking Schulz and Wentzell mto custody 

and themselves issuing a cease-fire order. 

Events at Army Group C headquarters 

thus acquired the character of op~ra 

boufJe. To prevent word from readll~g 

Kesselring, Roettiger and Wolff, WIth 

the co-operation of the army group 

intelligence officer, blocked all communications between Bolzano and the 

Reich. Moving rapidly, they thereu~m 

seized Schulz and Wentzell soon after 

daylight on I May and confined them 

to their quarters under house arrest. 

In de facto command of Army Group 

C, Roettiger issued the cease-fire. order, 

but he had failed to reckon WIth the 

hold that military protocol and tradition 

still had on his fellow officers. When 

two of the army commanders, Lemel-
526 

sen and Herr, learned that Schulz and 

Wentzell were under house arrest, they 

refused to implement Roettiger's orders 

even though they had agreed in principle with the decision to surrender. That 

left Roettiger with no choice but to 

release Schulz and Wentzell and attempt to win them over by argument. 

At Wolffs insistence, Schulz called a 

meeting of all the senior commanders 

for 1800 at army group headquarters, 

which Roettiger and Vietinghoff would 

be allowed to attend. 

While that bizarre drama was being I 

played out, the XIV Panzer Corps commander, General von Senger, had 

moved with his corps staff to Mattarello, three miles south of Trento. 

There, "in a pretty country house with 

a baroque garden and a wide view into 

the Adige valley," he awaited word of 

the capitulation. 24 

That afternoon Senger received a call 

from Lemelsen asking him to take his 

place at the army command post because he had just been summoned to a 

meeting at army group headquarters. 

Arriving at army headquarters that evening, von Senger learned details of the 

capitulation that had been signed at 

Caserta on the 29th and that Lemelsen 

and Herr, as well as General Pohl, the 

air force commander in Italy, and SS 

Obergruppenfuehrer Wolf£: had all concurred in the action. 25 

In the meantime, a teletype message 

from Admiral Doenitz reached Army 

Group C headquarters, telling of the 

Fuehrer's death in Berlin and announcing that, in accordance with the Fuehrer's will, Doenitz was Chief of State 

2' MS # C-095f (Senger). 

25 Ibid. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

and Commander-in-Chief of the 

Armed Forces. Doenitz's message also 

ordered the German armies to continue 

to fight against the Western Allies so 

long as they interfered with the battle 

against Bolshevism. 20 

In view of that order-{)r exhortation-Schulz hesitated to support the 

pro-capitulation faction at army group 

headquarters. Yet from the two army 

commanders he learned that they no 

longer considered their armies capable 

of meaningful resistance, so that continuation of the war in Italy no longer 

made sense. Wolff and Pohl added that 

with partisans already in control of wide 

areas of German-occupied Italy, the 

political situation there was equally 

hopeless. Even so Schulz merelv agreed 

to pass that information on to Kesselring; he still refused to issue a ceasefire order without the field marshal's 

approval. 

Unaware of the machinations within 

the German command and concerned 

that the emissaries might not have 

reached Bolzano, Field Marshal Alexander, meanwhile, in another message 

to von Vietinghoff demanded an unequivocal answer to whether he accepted 

the terms of surrender and whether his 

force would cease fire at the agreed 

time. The message arrived at Army 

Group C at 2130 on I May. Its stern 

tone convinced even Schulz that a final 

decision could no longer be defeITed. 27 

After advising the Allied commander 

that a decision would be made within 

the hour, Schulz telephone Kesscl-

"" Records of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of 

the German Police, ~ficrolilm T -175, Roll # 225. 

"7 Msg Alexander to AGW AR f{lJ' CCS, 2 :\1av 45, 

AFHQ SACS, file 0100/4. 
THE CAPITULATION 

ring's headquarters only to learn aftcr 

he finally got through that hc field 

marshal was at the front and that his 

chief of staff was unwilling to make a 

decision. Wolff then got on the telephone and angrily insisted that since all 

\\'cre agreed that further resistance \\as 

futile, one of Army GrollP C's senior 

commanders should be given authority 

to issue the cease-fin.' order. To that the 

chief of staff lamely replied that he 

would lay the matter before the field 

marshal ~\'hen the latter returned that 

night. 

When by 2200 no word had been 

received from Kesselring's headquarters, Lemelsen and Herr at last agreed 

to issue the orders on their own responsibility. Later that night Lemelsen telephoned von Senger to tell him to order 

a cease-fire as of 1400 on the 2d-two 

hours later than the time agreed upon 

at Caserta-and to halt all troop movements except those necessary for supply. Von Senger immediately transmitted the orders to the II Mountain and 

the XIV Panzer Corps, as well as to the I 

Parachute Corps, which in the confusion 

of the past week had come under the 

control of the Fourteenth Army.28 The 

Tenth Army's LXXVI Panzer Corps having 

surrendered a week before, Herr had 

little trouble communicating the orders 

to the few troops still under his command. 

While there were no objections or 

demands for explanation from any of 

the corps headquarters, it soon became 

evident at army group headquarters 

that many younger officers were determined to fight on. To avoid a showdown with the young zealots, Wolff, 

Pohl, and the two army commanders 

2. MS # C-095f (Senger), CMH. 

527 

GENERAL LEMELSEN AND COWNEL VON 

SCHWEINITZ 

took refuge in Wolffs headquarters 

where the SS general had prudently 

assembled seven tanks and 350 SS 

troops. 

They acted just in time, f()r at 0115 

on 2 Mayan order arrived from Kesselring for the arrest of Roettiger, von 

Schweinitz, and von Vietinghoff. Although the order made no mention of 

the army commanders, both Herr and 

Lemelsen found it prudent to depart 

for the relative security of their own 

headquarters. A similar order from 

Kesselring's air officer for the arrest of 

General Pohl reached Pohl's adjutant, 

who quietly ignored it. 

Before the arrests could be carried 

out, Kesselring telephoned Wolff in his 

barricaded headquarters and upbraided 

him for attempting to usurp his, Kesselring's, authority as commander of the 
CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GENERAL HERR LEAVES BaLZANO FOR SURRENDER 

southwestern theater. For t\\'o hours the 

two officers argued bitterly until connections became bad, whereupon the 

chiefs of staff of the two commanders 

resumed the argument. Toward the 

end of the marathon and sometimes 

acrimoniolls debate, even Schull joined 

in, su pporting Wolff's contention that 

since further resistance was impossible 

Kesselring would only be agreeing to a 

fait accompli. 

Not until 0430 on ~ Mav did Kesselring finallv agree to autho~l_e Schull to 

issl~e a ce~se~tire order-limited to the 

sphere of command of DB Suedwest. 

Wolff then sent \mrd of Kesselring's 

acceptance of the '''\Tinen and ycrbal 

conditions of the Armistice Agreement" 

to Alexander ,,-ith a request that public 

announcement be withheld for forl\-

eight hours. The Allied commander 

agreed to relay the request to his 

superiors but insisted that Wolff ,,-as "to 

carry out your agreement to cease 

hostilities Oil Ill\ front at 12 Iloon G\[T 

today [2 \[;1\].'; 2!1 The Germans, <Iticr a 

two-hour deby, broadcast cease-tire 01'-

'" \Is)!; Alexander to AGWAR lor CCS. ref. :\0_ 

FX-ti~)~~.j. ~ \1;1\ -L>. in AFHQ SACS. \Ic:\arllt'\ 

Ii Ie OIOO/-l_ 
THE CAPITULATION 

ders to their troops at 1400. When the 

Allied command picked up their broadcast, Alexander announced the ceasefire four and a half hours later at 

1830. 30 

Field Marshal Kesselring meanwhile 

placed himself at Grand Admiral Karl 

Doenitz's disposal for "this arbitrary and 

punishable action."31 At the same time, 

he asked Doenitz's authority to arrange 

for surrender of the remaining two 

army groups, G and E. Alhough the 

Admiral approved Kesselring's action in 

regard to Army Group C, he refused to 

authorize capitulation of the two other 

army groups. 

Back at headquarters of the XIV 

Panzer Corps on the morning of 2 May, 

General von Senger, explaining the 

surrender, fully emphasized that Kesselring 'had approved it, for the field 

marshal's name still enjoyed considerable prestige among the officers and 

men. "It was," von Senger noted in his 

diary, "a tragic moment, the complete 

defeat and the imminent surrender 

after a fight lasting six years, tragic 

even for those who [like himself] had 

foreseen it for a long time."32 

At Army Group C's behest von Senger 

then left to head a mission to the Allied 

15th Army Group headquarters at Florence to arrange for implementation of 

the surrender agreement. Under the 

escort of Brig. Gen. David L Ruffner, 

deputy commander of the 10th Mountain Division, and a British colonel, von 

Senger and a small party that included 

von Schweinitz traveled south along 

:In Msg Alexander to AGW AR f(.f CCS. Ref. No. 

FX-694 1 7, 2 May 45. AFHQ SACS. M{Narney tile 

OlOOI4. 

31 Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, p. 342. 

32 MS # C-095f (Senger), CMH. 

529 

Lake Garda's eastern shore, taking to 

the windswept waters in DUKW's to 

bypass the damaged tunnels, and at 

about 2100 arrived cold and wet at the 

10th Mountain Division's command 

post. Transferring to staff cars and 

exchanging General Ruffner for General Hays, the party set out for Verona, 

where they spent the night, then flew to 

Clark's headquarters at Florence. 

At 1030 on 4 May the German 

commander appeared before his longtime adversary in the van that Clark 

used as an office. 33 Von Senger presented a gaunt and haggard appearance. Saluting Clark and other senior 

American commanders crowded into 

the little van, he reported formally in 

English that as General von Victinghoff's representative he had come to 

receive his instructions consistent with 

the terms of surrender signed at Caserta, Did he have full authority to 

implement the terms of unconditional 

surrender, Clark asked. Von Senger 

replied that he had. Handing him 

detailed instructions for the surrender, 

Clark told him to withdraw with General Gruenther and other members of 

Clark's staff for full explanation of 

these instructions. 

During the conference with 

Gruenther, von Senger and his staff 

pointed out that until the Allied forces 

arrived in the German-held areas, 

armed bands of partisans roaming the 

countryside would make it difficult, if 

not impossible, for the Germans to lav 

down their arms and at the same time 

protect their supply deIXJts, which b" 

the terms of surrender were to be 

33 Clark Diary, 4 May 1945. elliess othenvis" 

noted the following is based upon this reference. 
530 CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

GENERAL VON SENGER SURRENDERS TO GENERAL CLARK AT FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP 

HEADQUARTERS 

turned over to the Allied forces and not 

to irregulars. That was a crucial point, 

for General Clark was anxious to prevent additional arms from falling into 

the hands of Communist-controlled 

partisans who constituted one of the 

largest and most active groups in the 

Italian resistance. :14 

The problem was deemed serious 

enough to reter back to Clark. What 

von Senger essentially wanted was for 

the Allied commander to restrain the 

34 MS # C-095f (Senger). 

partisan bands. That Clark agreed to 

do, although he noted that, having just 

given them a "signal to go in for the 

kill," it would be pretty hard to squelch 

all that ardor through radio messages.:35 

The best solution would be to get the 

American troops as quickly as possible 

into those areas still occupied by the 

Germans. 

This had to be carefully arranged, 

for to rush American troops into German-occupied areas before all German 

35 Clark Diary, 4 May 45. 
THE CAPITULATION 531 

GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM GENERAL GRUENTHER 

units had gotten word of the surrender 

was to invite possible bloodshed. General Truswtt had thus held Keyes' II 

Corps in place since early on 2 May to 

allow the German command in the area 

east of Lake Garda and in the Piave 

and Brenta valleys ample time to get 

word of the cease-fire to all units, many 

isolated and lacking regular military 

communications with their headquarters. Some German units took advantage of the delay to attempt escape 

through the Alpine passes into Austria, 

in spite of a standfast order. Aerial 

reconnaissance reported over a thousand horse-drawn vehicles and more 

than 500 motor vehicles mixed ,,"ith 

civilian traffic passing through Bolzano 

in the direction of the Brenner pass. 

Deterred by poor weather conditions 

and reluctant to cause further bloodshed, Allied pilots made no effort to 

attack the columns. 

Satisfied by 3 May that all German 

units had J"eceived the cease-tiJ"e order, 

Truscott let Keyes' II Corps resume 

roundup operations. Northeast of Lake 

Carda the 85th and 88th Divisions sent 

small task forces up the Piave and 

Brenta valleys toward the Austrian 
PRISONERS OF WAR ASSEMBLE AT FOOT 

OF ALPS 

frontier. Early on 4 May the 339th 

Infantry nossed the fronti~T near Dobbiaco, f()rty miles east of the Brenner 

pass, and ,; few hours later a reconnaissance unit from the 349th Infantry met 

troops from the Seventh ArmY\ VI 

Corps at Vipiteno, nine miles to the 

south of the Brenner. Later in the day, 

th~ 338th Infantry, advancing astride 

Highway 12, reached the frontier at the 

Brenner pass. The next dav, 5 Mav, the 

10th Mountain Division, lfter p~ssing 

through Bolzano, turned northwestward via Merano and reached the Austrian frontier over the Reschen pass. 

Just beyond the pass, at the Austrian 

village of Nauders, the mountain infantrymen made their first contact with 

those German troops retreating before 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the U.S. Seventh Army. Aware that the 

Seventh Army had already received a 

surrender delegation from Army Group 

G, ~;eneral Hays halted his men just 

outSide Nau~ers. On 6 May. f()llowing 

surrender of Army GroujJ G at noon, 

elements of the 10th Mountain Division 

continued north"ard to establish contact \"ith troops of the Seventh Army's 

VI Corps, Truscott's former co~­

mand. :

II; 

In northwestern Italy throughout 3 

May the divisions of the IV Corps-the 

I st Armored and the 34th, 91 st, and 

92d Infantry Divisions-had continued 

to accept the capitulation of isolated 

enemy units that had not yet received 

word of the general surrender. Faced 

with a choice of surrendering to the 

French, the Americans, or partisans, 

most of the Germans gave themselves 

up readily, even eagerly, to the Americans. 

Meanwhile, on I May, the Eighth 

Army had contacted Tito's panisans at 

Montfa!cone, about 17 miles northwest 

of Trieste. Although for many months 

an uneasy confrontation \\'ould remain 

between the Western Allies and the 

Yugoslavs along the Isonzo and at 

Trieste, northeastern Italy rapidly settled down to welcome though tense 

peace .. By 6 May the occupation of all 

Italy from the Straits of Ylessina to the 

Alps had been completed. The eastern, 

\\'estern, and northern frontiers were 

closed, with all major exits under Allied 

control. 

. In spit~ of the protracted negotiatIons, which had reached a point of 

dramatic tension through frequent co\"-

crt comings and goings across interna-

"'; Seumlh Army Report of Operation" pp. 8:)6-61. 
88TH DIVISION IN ALPINE PASS 
534 

tional frontiers, the end came in Italy, 

as it would in northern Europe, only 

after the German forces, defeated in 

the field, had been backed into corners 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

of Europe from which there was neither escape nor hope of survival. Only 

then did the Germans finally lay down 

their arms. 
CHAPTER XXXI 

An Assessment 

In the evaluation of the Italian campaign three questions must be asked: 

What were its objectives, or rather what 

was the campaign's place in Allied 

grand strategy? Did the campaign 

achieve its objectives or fulfill its intended role in that strategy? Finally, 

were those oqjectives worth the cost and 

effort expended? Or, from another 

vielvpoint, could those objectives have 

been achieved at less cost? In each case 

the student of military history is faced 

with a bewildering variety of answers. 

Judgments of the campaign range all 

the wav from a harsh characterization 

as "tacti<:allv the most absurd and strategically th~ most senseless campaign of 

the whole war," to the more benign, 

"without Italy [the Italian campaign] 

OVERLORD might have bogged down as 

had Anzio and Cassino." I 

At the QUADRANT Conference in late 

summer of 1943 the Allied chiefs of 

staff decided, among other things, that 

military operations in Italy would aim at 

holding the maximum number of German divisions as far away as possible 

from what was expected to be the main 

scene of operations in northwestern 

France. Measuring how well that objective was accomplished is clouded by the 

fact that assessing comparative strength 

on the basis of mere si7~ gives a false 

picture. The value of a division as a 

I See J.F.C. Fuller, The Serond World War, 1939-

45: A Strategical and Tartiml lhllorv (New York: 

Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947), p. 265; and Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 45:)-56. 

fighting force, never constant, depends 

on such imponderables as the nature of 

the fighting morale and on a varietv of 

purely loc~l considerations as mucll as 

on numerical strength, mobility, firepower, and equipment. In the absence 

of other measurable criteria, however, a 

comparison of the number of available 

divisions is the only feasible means of 

arriving at even a r~)llgh approximation 

of relative strength. 2 

At one time or another in the Italian 

campaign the Allies employed a total of 

30 divisions. When separate brigades 

and attached Italian units, mainly combat groups, are reckoned in their divisional equivalents, the total comes to 

about 33. The Germans committed 36, 

of which 3 were Italian and I Russian. 

Since at the time of the Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943, the 

Germans had only six divisions, then 

south of Naples, the Allies appear to 

have drawn some 30 enemv divisions 

from other more critic~l fronts. 

Though on the surface it seems that 

the same could be said of the 30 Allied 

divisions engaged on the peninsula, in 

I'eality there was a marked difference. 

Most' of the Allied divisions were already in the MeditelTanean area-indeed, one of the reasons underlying a 

cam paign in Italy \\'as to utilize the 

resources which had already been assembled in North Africa and Sicily. 

'AFHQ, G-2, 11 Nov 1944, Review of Enenn 

Strength in haliall Combat Zone as of 7 No\' 1944. 

0100111 E177, 
536 

Because of limited port capacity in the 

United Kingdom, the divisions in Italy 

could have been moved there only by 

delaying the arrival of divisions from 

the United States. But such a move ,vas 

not \varranted. By remaining in Italy 

rather than shifting to an as yet inactive 

front, the American forces played a 

worthwhile role. The Germans, on the 

other hand, kept divisions in Italy that 

could have been deployed along relativelv short interior lines on either the 

west~rn or eastern fronts, which in lXJth 

cases had critical need for additional 

forces. 

Thev failed to send such forces even 

during' the two major crises in the war 

in northwestern Europe: they pulled no 

division-size units from Italv to lx)lster 

either their defenses against OVERLORD 

or their counteroffensive in the Ardennes, although in preparation for the 

latter Field Marshal Walter Model did 

ask for three or four panzer divisioDs 

from other theaters. Hitler refused the 

request, even though at the time the 

excellent 26th Panzer Division lay in 

army group reserve in the Po Valley. 

All Field Marshal Model got were two 

third-rate Volksgrenadier Divisions from 

within the Reich itself. 3 Not until the 

Red Army drove to the approaches of 

Budapest in March 1945 did the Germans move any divisional-size unit from 

Italy to reinforce another front. 

A question arises, nevertheless, 

whether the Allies could have contained 

just as many German divisions if they 

had managed to bring the campaign to 

a halt along any of a number of 

satisfactory holding positions in Italy3 See Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the 

Bulge, U.S. ARMY 1:-1 WORLD WAR II (Washington, \965), p. 671. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

the Naples-Foggia area, for example. 

Naples provided a large enough port 

through which sufficient forces could 

have been supported to hold southern 

Italy, including the Foggia airfield complex. Strategic bombers flying from 

those fields could reach enemy targets 

in southern Germany, Austria, northern Italy, and the Balkan peninsula. 

The city of Rome and the Viterbo 

airfield complex, some 20 miles north 

of Rome, would have been another 

position from which the Allied armies 

could have maintained a satisfactory 

holding operation. Rome would have 

been an adequate communications center for all of southern Italy, and from 

the Viterbo airfields Allied bombers 

could have reached even more enemv 

targets than from Foggia. ' 

In the Northern Apennines the Allied armies had their last opportunity to 

halt while still containing large numbers 

of enemy divisions in Italy with relatiw'lv fe\~ Allied divisions. 'For bevond 

the Apennines the countrv widens' and 

also beyond the Apennin~s lies the Po 

and finally the Alps. The latter offered 

naturally strong positions which the 

Cermans could themselves have held 

quite economically, so that it would 

have been the Germans who would 

have contained the Allies along that 

line. It made no strategic sense h; drive 

the (;ermans from the Apennines and 

into the Alps unless the Allies had 

sufIicient strength to break through the 

Alpine defense line and into the midDanube basin and southern Germany. 

An alternative strategy would have been 

to trap the Germans south of the Po by 

an aerial assault on bridge and ferry 

sites, then to encircle and destroy the 

enemy armies on the Lombard plain. 
AN ASSESSMENT 

Another course, one advocated by some 

senior American officers, would have 

been to leave a minimum of troops in 

Italy holding the most favorable defensive position and shift the remainder to 

southern France. 

Until the last offensive in May 1945, 

the Allies, of course, adopted none of 

those possibilities. Instead, following the 

capture of Rome, Alexander's armies 

conducted a desultory pursuit to the 

Arno, restricted by the decision already 

made to shift two army corps and 

several divisions from the Fifth Army 

for operations in southern France. 

When the Allies finally made an effort 

to drive the enemy from the Northern 

Apennines with an offensive against the 

vaunted Gothic Line, Alexander's armies managed to break through but 

soon bogged down in a campaign of 

attrition against a series of enemy positions, each alxmt as strong as the other. 

In late autumn of 1944 in the midst of 

this frustration the British command 

shifted several divisions from the 

Eighth Army to reinforce a British 

operation to shore up the Greek government in its civil war with communist 

partisans. And just before the spring 

offensive in 1945, the Allied command 

further weakened the Eighth Army by 

moving several Canadian divisions with 

a corps headquarters to northwestern 

Europe. Not surprising then that only 

two of the major Fifth Army offensives-the drive on Rome in May 1944 

and the spring offensive into the Po 

Valley in April 1945-went according 

to plan. On the other hand, throughout 

the entire campaign the Germans were 

able to go on the offensive on an armywide scale only twice-at Salerno and 

Anzio--and they failed lx)th times. 

537 

After the Allied armies became established on the Italian mainland in September 1943, Churchill, who resented 

the American tactic of limiting strategic 

choices in the Mediterranean to only 

one of two possibilities----either southern 

France or Italy-sought to enhance the 

status of the latter and so keep alive 

both strategic choices. At British insistence in Februarv 1944 the Americans 

agreed to delay ANVIL and concentrate 

on pushing the campaign in Italy at 

least as far as the capture of Rome. ~ 

That goal achieved in earl\, June 1944, 

the British became even more preoccupied with the potential of the Italian 

campaign, preferring to employ available resources in the Mediterranean 

theater for a thrust into northern Italy 

and an advance, via Venezia Ciulia, 

through the Julian Alps, Ljub!jana Cap, 

and into the mid-Danube basin, there 

to join f()rces with (or possibly confront) 

the Russian troops advancing toward 

that region.;' With the exception of 

Gen. Devers, senior Allied commanders 

in Italy, possibly recalling the success of 

the Napoleonic armies in northern Italv, shared this view. Y ct w hat was 

p<;ssiblc for lightly equipped 18th and 

mid-19th century armies was not feasible for the he~V\' f()rmations of the 

mid-20th century, which, given the 

global requirements of Allied strategY', 

\\ere beyond Allied capabilities. (; 

Stalin, Roosevelt, and de Gaulle, on 

the other hand, opposed the mid-Danubian venture, each for his own reasons. 

, Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, p. 361. app. "ii, 

Isma,,'s memo to P.~1. 28 Apr 44. 

"Ibid., pp. 347-356; Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Commarul, C.S. AR\fY 1:\ WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1954), p. 218. 

.; Sec Le COH'I, La Parti, ilJ!ltiu/I FUII1l ai.II' II /a 

Campagne d'ltalie, pp. 189--91. 
538 

Stalin, because he had long since staked 

out the Balkans, including the Danube 

basin, as a Russian zone of influence. 

Roosevelt, with the prospects of major 

operations still looming in the Far East, 

was intent on driving directly into the 

heart of the Reich and getting the war 

in Europe over with as quickly and 

cheaply as possible. As for de Gaulle, 

the political situation in France itself led 

him to focus his attention there rather 

than seek further glory for French 

arms in foreign parts. He was determined that troops loyal to him participate in the liberation of French territory, particularly in the south of France 

where well-organized Vichyites and a 

Communist-dominated resistance might 

attempt to block his efforts to gain 

control of France. 7 

Able to buttress their own views with 

such formidable support, Marshall and 

Eisenhower never yielded to British 

blandishment or argument. In their 

eyes France remained the decisive theater, and any attempt to enhance the 

status of the Italian campaign ViS-{l-vis 

that in northwestern Europe the American command saw as an attempt to 

change a grand strategy already agreed 

to at the QUADRANT Conference. 8 

Eventually the American (and majority) view prevailed. Alexander, Clark, 

and J uin reconciled themselves to the 

campaign's secondary role in the Mediterranean, Alexander observing in the 

process that the success of the Allied 

armies in Italy hencef(>rth would have 

to be judged not upon ground gained, 

for that was vital neither to the Allies 

nor the Germans, but rather "in terms 

7 Ibid. 

S Ehrman, Grand Strategy, pp. 349-50. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

of its [the campaign's] effect upon the 

war as a whole."!' 

Thus bringing to battle the maximum number of German divisions and 

denying their use on other, more critical fronts, would from that point constitute the sole mission of the Allied 

armies in Italy. Actually, as far as the 

Americans were concerned, that had 

always been the mission, certainly since 

the QUADRANT Conference of 1943. In 

American eyes the British had finally 

been brought around to recognition of 

a long-standing reality. 

Again, whether this strategy was the 

right one has been the subject of bitter 

debate since the war. Americans have 

contended that it was the correct strategy while the British have generally 

taken the opposite view. 10 The campaign should have accorded equal status with the one in northwestern Europe, they have argued. Also, according 

to these British analysts, Alexander's 

armies in the summer of 1944 should 

have been kept intact for a drive northward to the Po Valley, thence through 

the Alps to the mid-Danube basin. 

That, they claim, would have placed the 

postwar line of demarcation between 

the west and the Russian-dominated 

states of Europe much further east than 

as finally drawn. 11 

Whatever the validity of that line of 

reasoning, its weakness lies primarily in 

failure to take into account the logistical 

limitations, particularly the chronic 

9 Quoted in The Battle for Italy, by W.C.F. Jackson, 

New York, 1967, p. 317. 

10 Two distinguished British historians of the 

Second World War, however, have argued that the 

strategic mission was essentially correct. See Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vols. V & VI, and Howard, The 

Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. 

II See Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 37~72. 
AN ASSESSMENT 

shortage of shipping that plagued the 

Allies in the Mediterranean. Under that 

handicap, it is hardly likely that during 

the winter of 1944-45 the Allies could 

have supported such a large-scale advance. No valid grounds seem to exist, 

furthermore, filr believing that the Allied armies could have crossed the Alps 

and deployed into the mid-Danube region before the late spring of 1945. By 

that time the Soviet forces had already 

seized Vienna and lay astride the midDanube basin, so that an Allied presence would have served no useful purpose. As one British historian has observed, "an effective case has still to be 

made out that there could have been 

any more rapid or economical way of 

winning the war" than that adopted by 

the Allies in western Europe. 12 

German Strategy 

The Germans too had their difficulties in developing a meaningful and 

viable Mediterranean and Italian strategy. After the Italians, in an expansion 

of the war contrary to Germany's overall strategic interests and without any 

fixed plan, became hopelessly bogged 

down in an ill-conceived Balkan venture, the Mediterranean soon became 

for the Germans a theater "'of fateful 

importance for the conduct of the 

war."];\ 

As for the Italian campaign, after 

Allied landings on the mainland, military wisdom dictated a step by step 

withdrawal up the peninsula to the 

12 Howard. The Alediterranean Strategy, p, 71. See 

also Le Goyet, La Partiripation Frrtnfai.\I' 1I la Cam-

/J<lff'U' rfltalif', pp, 189-91. , 1'. Concluding Remarks on the Mediterranean 

Campaign, by Albert Kesselring MS # C-OI4, 

typescript in C~fH files. 

539 

Alps, where, during World War I, a 

relatively small Austro-German force 

had held a larger Allied force at bay for 

three years. Instead, Hitler elected to 

hold all of the peninsula, even as he 

had done in the Balkans, including the 

off-shore islands in the eastern Mediterranean, which for several years tied 

clown large numbers of German troops 

to no purpose. 14 

Once the Allies had regained control 

of the western Mediterranean and ably 

demonstrated this fact through three 

successive amphibious operationsHUSKY, AVALANCHE, and SHINGLE-the 

Germans had no alternative but to 

assume that the Allies could mount a 

third or even a fourth amphibious 

assault elsewhere along either the Ligurian or Adriatic coast and shaped their 

strategy accordingly. The ANVllJDRAGOON landings in August 1944 only 

confirmed the Germans in their assumption. Until the last Allied offensive 

in 1945 was well advanced, the German 

command in Italy continued to divert 

important reserves to watch over what 

had long since become nonexistent 

threats to their coastal flanks. Thus did 

the German High Command play into 

Allied hands and tie down in the 

Mediterranean-both in the Balkans 

and in Italy-German divisions of high 

fighting quality at a time when they 

were urgently needed on other fronts, 

especially after June 1944 in northwestern France. 

Architect of the strategy to defend all 

of Italy, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring 

by virtue of his personality and skill 

largely determined the stubborn nature 

of the German defense. Tagged with 

" Ibid, 
540 

the sobriquet "Smiling AI," Kesselring 

throughout the long campaign maintained, in spite of every ground for 

despair, that indomitable optimism so 

important to a commander of troops. 

Brilliant soldier that he was, however, 

his optimism never blinded him to the 

realities of the battlefield. 15 

In support of his strategy, the German commander argued that to have 

evacuated the peninsula without a fight 

and withdrawn to the line of the Alps 

would not have allowed the Germans to 

release a significant number of troops 

for other fronts. In view of the defensive potential of the alpine terrain, that 

argument seems a tenuous one. A 

possibly more valid argument is that 

abandonment of the peninsula would 

have given the Allies untrammeled 

freedom of movement either in the 

direction of France or of the Balkans. 

Here again, at least as far as France was 

concerned, the Allied command of the 

western Mediterranean had already 

made it possible to invade souther;l 

France whenever desired. As for the 

Balkans peninsula, it turned out that 

except for British intervention in 

Greece following German withdrawal 

from that country, the Allies chose to 

do little in the' area other than to 

supply Tito's partisans with arms, ammunition, and foodstuffs. 

The argument that to yield the Italian peninsula would mean the sacrifice 

of an indispensably deep battle zone 

and unleash the air war on Austria and 

southern Germany ignores the fact of 

Allied control of the Foggia airfields 

and later those in Sardinia and Corsica. 

15 B.H. Liddell-Han, Why Don', We Learn From 

History? (New York; 1971), p. 25. 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Those fields had already opened up all 

of Italy and the southern regions of the 

Reich to Allied aerial attack. Nevertheless, Kesselring never lost his conviction 

that the Italian campaign "was not only 

justified but even imperative, and the 

problem one of simply doing whatever 

seemed best f<)r one's own theater irrespective of the general strategic plan." III 

A marked parochialism characterized 

the approaches of lx)th sides to Mediterraean strategy in general and the 

Italian campaign in particular. Both the 

Allied and the German commands became so locked into their respective 

campaigns that they appeared incapable 

of turning away from their own operation maps long enough to reflect upon 

just what part the continuation of operations in the peninsula played in the 

overall strategic plan of their respecrive 

high commands. 

The Commanders 

In contrast \""ith Allied operations in 

northern Europe, those in the Mediterranean theater were under overall 

British command. The American strategic viewpoint, however, was represented by Devers, the theater commander's deputy, and by Lemnitzer, 

Alexander's deputy chief of staff. Clark, 

on the other hand, was eventually to 

become an advocate of the British belief 

in the primacy of the Italian campaign 

in the Mediterranean. 

Clark saw no need for the landing in 

southern France in August of 1944. 

American and French divisions withdrawn from the Fifth Army for that 

purpose could, he claimed, have been 

16 Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, p. 267. 
AN ASSESSMEKT 

cmploycd to lx,lter advantage ill italY. 

Aft hough in the ;J(I\'<Incc hum ROlllc to 

the Arno tlte Fifth Arnn''s narrow front 

would havc pcnnitled Ihe t'lIlplo\lIlt'1l1 

of no more divisions than Clark alream 

had ill Itah', ht' Iw\crtheles<; (()lIteIHle~1 

that the di\'isions given up could have 

IX'CII llsed to alternate wiLh thosc ill line 

to afford his \yean troops much 

nccdcd rest. That \\ould ha\c ellahled 

the Fifth Anm, he argued. to maintain 

thc 1II0melltuIlI of the pursuit and 

drive the CerlllallS lIIore rapidh' fmlll 

celli ral Ital\'. As f()l GemTal \larshall's 

posit iOIl t hat I he port of \larseilks \\as 

needed for hlll11c1ing additional di\isiolls illto France for Eisenh()\\'('r's lise, 

Clark later obsel\nl that the pon could 

haw' IX'Cll capt ur('(\ jll"t as readily In 

sendillg troops ill(o southern France 

from nort h\\cstcrl1 Ital" Had the 1II0-

IlIClltUlII of the Allicdsplillg ofkmiw' 

b(,(,11 slIstained IX'\()lld ROllle, the Fitt h 

Anll\, he claillled, \\ould ha\'e h('clI ill 

a posit ion to do so In the clld of J uk 

HH1. 

lhc Alexander-Clark cntentc Oil 

stratcgy did not, ho\\'e\'cr, extend to 

tactical matlers, Yl'I ditlerell(cs ill this 

area, \I'hile chronic lIenT threatcllcd to 

ruptllre the dose \\orking relatiomhip 

))ct\\('('11 Allicd Ar111ies headqllarter., 

and the L.S. Fifth Anm. rhe relatiollship het\lcen Alexandcl' and Clark resembled tlw 011e hell\{'cn Alexander 

ami \lontgoll1cn in the :\onh Alric;lI\ 

c;lIl1paign, during \\'hich Alexander 

g;I\(' his talented suhordinate \1 hat \Ia~ 

almost talltamoullt to frce rein ill the 

cOllduct of miliLln ()jxTatiolls and cxercised ollh a gellcraL albeit dccisiH', 

control mcr strategic planning. That 

\1 as Alexandcr's stde of (ommaIHI-a 

stde \\ hich 1I11douhtedh hel,x'd anoUIH 

!J41 

f()r the sun ess of Allied coalit ion \\<lrhtre in the Italian campaign. 

Inter-Allied tactical disagreements 

during the (ourse of the campaign 

arose mainl\ frolll a British derermillalion 10 aVOid a rClx'litioll of the largescale frontal atlacb (\'pied of World 

\\'ar L whose ('llOrmOUS costs Britain 

cOllld no longer afford to pay. Those 

dilkTcl1cCS cal11e to a head in \1(1\ alte! 

Truscott's VI Co IpS had brokcn flcc of 

thc Anzio beachhcad and prepared f(n 

t he final driw Oil ROl11c. 

Operation Bl'FFALo, based upon 

Alexander's prcdilectioll for the \\ idcswinging out flanking mancu\cr-Ihe 

Ollc-t\\O boxillg pUJl(h, the phrasc so 

ortell Ilscd bv A!c:-:andcl-assull1ed that 

the ll1;tncU\cr would entrap large numbers of CIlt'III\ troops sOlllh of Rome. 

Wit h attention 1()(llSed Oil ROllle, Clark 

had objected to that assumption (and 

the plan) Oil the grounds that there 

Il'ere just too mall\ «yellues of' csclpe 

«\;tibble to the CI\CIllY fi)! a thrusL from 

the Ixachhcad to High\\ ,1\ (i to cut otf 

major (;cnnan llllit~ ill the Liri-Sa((() 

\alln. Furthermore. Clark n'ganlcd 

Truscott's V I Corps as insufficicllt h 

strollg to (ut and dfectin'h block the 

highway ill thc first place. F\('11 aher 

t he bulk of Truscott's COIpS had I urncd 

northward illto the Alban Hills, hO\I-

('\cr, Gelleral O'Daniel succeeded ill 

(lllting the higlmd\, cn'lI if onh \\ith 

a It illen fi rc. 

Earlier Clalk had rciused ,\lcxander's requcst Ihat ell'mcllh or Ihc 

Fihh Anl1\ slip behind Ihe Germans 

opposing t he Eight h A 11m alld I herein 

\Iea kCII I he ('ne 111\ . s resisl a lI(e I () I he 

British <l(haIHT lip the l.iri \all('\, 

obsening thai Allicd aerial recol1naissa\)( (' had SIJO\IIl I hal I he el1elll\ had 
ahcad, \\'1I1I<ll"a\\,1I thc bulk of his 

f()['('es {rom the valle\' and Ihat ver\, fC>\\ 

Germans would Ix' traplx'd b\ S(';lding 

Ihe Fifth Anm. or a major part of it, 

t()\\ard the Liri, That argumcnt was 

similar to the one Clark was to use laler 

againsl 0lxTatioll BUFALo, The Illost 

that Clark had bcen willing to ah'Tce to 

was 10 send I he FEe t()\\'ard (:epr<l110. 

e\'en though he was cOIl\'inced, apparenlly cOlTcctl\" that k\\ ('nCIll\ twop" 

would Ix' trapped bv the move, 

While acknowledging thaI Ihe Eighth 

Arrm had a tough assignment in the 

Liri valle\' and that Alexander's reqllt'sl 

thus had some ,justification, Clark intimated hoth ill his wartime diary and in 

postwar interviews that, in his ~'iC\\, the 

Eighth Army was simplY Hot t rving as 

hard as it should, For that, Clark was 

inclined to hlame what he called poor 

leadership, although the Ikitish had to 

\\ork within f;tr greater manpowcr restrictions than did the Americans and 

\\ere therefore more chaIT about casuaIt ies, 

Underlying III uch of Clark's reluctance to divert part of his Fifth Army to 

assist the Eighth Army's advance was a 

determinat ion not to share wit h others 

the glorv of the capture of the first 01' 

the Axis capitals. After being told the 

approximate date of the ~ormand\' 

invasion, General Clark was anxiolls to 

take Rome before the im;Ision captured 

world attention. 

Even though both Fn'nch and British 

wanted to he ill on the capture of 

Rmne, Clark was determined to make it 

exclusively an American sho", So 

strong was his determination not to 

allow hIS allies to share in the capture 

that, he revealed in a postwar intervicw, 

he told Alexander he would, if ordered 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

to permit the Eighth Arm\' to participate, lIot only refuse but would fire on 

any Eighth Army troops who tried to 

do so. At any rate, in keeping wit h a 

IOIl,y-standillg telldencv to go along \\'it h ("<) ( ,( I.. 

the desires of his morc assertin_' subordinates, Alexander did back do\\ll, and 

Clark had his Roman triumph, 17 

Allied Tactics 

Except h)r invaluable air artillen control techniques and refinelllcnts in the 

lise of the tank-inbntlT tcam, tile Allics 

developed ft'W laclieal- illnm<ltiolls durillg the campaign, Thn usualh ITsorted to the frontal assault, f()J' despite 

Alexdnde!"s panialit\ 1'01 the wides\\eepillg outf1anking llIanClIHT, the 

rugged, sharply compartmentcd Italian 

terrain imposed upon ()perati()n~ characteristics reminiscent of \Yorld \Var 

I-slo\\', grinding, costl\ batt Ics of alt rilion-and undoubtedh helped accoullt 

f(n' Ke:-;sclring's success in holding the 

Allies to a IOllg, sIO\\' advance up the 

pClllnsula. 

In the rare installces when the Allic!>' 

did resort to less con\'elltional tactics, 

such as several skill full\' devised deception plans and an o{'(:asional unorthodox lISC of troops and equiplllent, as 

during the final off ell si \'(: in the Po 

Vaile\', the results were rewarding, 

Field '~Iarshal Alexander's reliance <:n 

deception, I()r cxample, on scveral occasions drew German reserves hlr out of 

posit ion, These tactics were aided 1>:\ 

the intelligence that callie from breaking t he German (ode and by t he bet 

that enemv commanders lacked n:collnaissancc 'aircraft to detcct large-scale 

1 I l1l",r\' , Nlathn\~ "ith Cell, Clark, IH Ma\ 1'l4H, 

111 eM H fi"'~, 
AI\; ASSESSl\IEI\;T 

Allied troop nlmClllcnts prcceding an 

operation, This pr()\cd cspecialh \'aillable ill OperatioJl DlADEM ill the spring 

of 1944 and Operation Oun, ill the 

alii limn of I he same veal, III t he same 

\\<lY the t:ighth ArJl1~ imaginali\'(: lise 

of' amphibi~)lls-trackcd (Fantails) vehides as in lTossing I he flooded plains 

ncar t he mouth of t he Reno to outflank 

a \CIT hlllllidabic enelllv positioll ill the 

Arge;1ta Gap. helped assure success ill 

I he carlv slage,; of I he final ollensiw', 

That lactic was matched ill illgelluitv b\ 

the Filih An11\\ Clllpl()\ll1cnt of mount aill troops to' \II()\'e across nl),!,).!;l'd It'lrain so rapidl\ as 10 confound the 

Gt'rmans, \\ho did not eXlx'ct sllch an 

Allied ll1o\'e, ['he (OI1Scqll('ll\ surprise, 

IlHKh like that ach ievee! rn the FEC 

o\cr similar tenaill ill t h(~ Aurullci 

lHolllilains a \car bef(lI'c. rcsulled in a 

breakthrough 'into the Po Valle\, 

Althou).!;h tactical innovations were 

fl'\\, the Italian campaign did sec the 

development alld testillg ot se\C'ral 

technical inllo\'ations tllat later were to 

pr()\'{~ their \\'or! h in l1orth"estel'n 

Europe, AJllong these \\cre artificial 

harbors (Mulberries), first emplmed 

during the landings in Sicily and later 

vital in the :\orman<h im;tsion, and 

highh specialized airbonle dircction of 

anillcry fire bv spotter aircraft. 1 H 

Another tcchnical illll()\atiol1 was the 

proximity fuze fill' artilkn shdk Lmg 

used ill antiaircraft fire, it \\as first 

released for ground usc in the Ardennes Coul1tc)'()fknsin' (in Dncmber 

1944) and \\as also cl1lplmed ill Itah ill 

the latter stages of the campaign. Still 

<Inother, r;ldar-din:cted bomhing 

" Ali hough the (;,Tmam had heen the first 10 

u,,· Ih",,'. thn "Trt' ullable t() t'ominne to do ", 

,tffer io,"lIIg (Ol'H!',,) "I thl' skies to the Alii,· .. , 

through darkness and OH'nasl. slriplx'd 

Ihe (,IICill\ of his onh remaining Pl'OteeliOIl from Allied ael'ial harasslllcllt. 

In situat ions \\ hcre pract icable, Allied 

gmund forces dllTtin'h emplon:d offshore 11<1\'£11 gunfire support requiring a 

hig-h degree of illlel'sC'n'icc co-on/illatlon, 

An assessmcnt of the roll' of air-

»O\\e1' in I he CIIIl paign lead~ to rlw 

conclusion that, ",hile it "as helpfuL it 

was nol dccisin:. either in close support 

of groulld operations or in tactical 

interdiction and isolation of the Ixmlefield, as in Operation STRA1':CLF.. General Clark. lor Ol1e. pointcd out thai air 

force claims I hat dose air ,>uppon 

\\()uld assist t he taking of objcniH's at 

lillie cost to grouud forces was not 

demonstrated al :\Iollte Cassino,l!l 

Th(' S llrrnuier Xegotiation, 

In the timing \\eeks of rhe \\<11' the 

Germall High Command. or "hal remained of it, sought grimly to (l\oid 

large-scale capitulation to the Russians, 

On I his eft'lrt hung I he Ene of on:r 

I\m millioll German soldiers, including 

Arm_'i Grouj) E in Croatia and Army 

Groups South and emter in C/cchoslovakia. (Trapped alollg the Baltic and 

already lost to the Russians \\,('1'(' the 

:!:'W,()()O-mall Annv Kurlond and the 

150,OOO-lI1an A ;-mv ()st-Pn'Il\\('iI,) 

Aware thal Sm'iel suspicions had alread\ ix:en aroused by Ihe protractcd 

<Ind {m'crt negotialions Icadill).!; 10 the 

German capitulatioll ill Itah and bY oltrepeated a\tempts by the CO 111 11101 I i{)(:' 

to di\ide t ht' Allies. I he Bril ish and I he 

Amcricans poillled oUl lo t he Russians 

Ihat a German surn:llder ill Ital\' \\a~ 

\" l!lten, \Luhe"" ,,;Ih Cl"l. Clark, \\)~:!l :-Ln 

\ 94i1, ill C\lH flks, 
little different from a separatc German 

surrcnder on the Russian front. as, fi)}' 

example, at Stalingrad, 

At the S~lme timc, the \\Tslem Allies 

sought furt her to avoid fricrion Iw 

cmphasizing that where feasible, surrender III e\Tn instancc had to he 

Illade to represclltali\cs of all the major 

Allies. In the end, ho\\ewr, the (~rlllallS succeeded in extricat ing I he bul k 

of t heir foret'S frolll I ht' Eastern Front, 

with the exception of Ann)' Gnm!) Cell/er, 

by sllrrcndering I hem 10 the w('stern 

Allies. 

The German surrender in Itah sct a 

paucTn fiJI' a series 01 piecclllcal s'uITt'ndeI'S to the British and Alllericans. On 

:! \la\, the same day that Vielinghoff 

capitulated, Grossadmiral [)(wniu sent 

emissaries to Fidd \Lt rsha I \Ionl gomen\.; headq uaners "il h an offer to 

surrender to the British Ihe Gerlllan 

fonTS relll<lllllllg ill nort h",est ern Gerlll<lll\, Denmark, and r he (~'rlllall i.~­

lands. I'm) days later. General Ei~ellhower told \:lolltgollHT\ to accepl the 

oiler in llluch the sallle \\'<\\ as Alexander had reacted 10 the ()ff~T in Itah. 

On I he same cia\. , 4 \1<1\, elllissaries 

from I he GCTman j 9/h Arm~ to General 

Patch's C.S. Seventh Arm': !wadqU<lI'-

IlTS near' \IUllich Off(Ted to ~U1Tell(lcr 

what would eventually include all of 

Army GroujJ G in sOlli Iwl'll Germ<lll\. 

Three days later t he filial (~erlllan 

surrender took place at Rheillls and on 

9 .\I<1Y the lelelllOIl\ \\a~ restaged ill 

Berlin for the bellefit or t he Russian s. ~Il 

,,, For dt'tails ot Ih .. 't'\'cral ,ulTo,,"'rs see P"l4lH·. 

Til,. Sup'l'ml' C"mmflllri. pp. 4HO n; l\1adlollald, Fh,. 

IJl.l/ OjjNI.I/z'I'. Charner XXIX; Till' .)1'1'1'1I11i .1lml'. 

FIr/mIl (1/ O/"'l'I1ilOll." pp. Will-I;;): S, hramlll. KTIl! 

()KJ1', Vol. IV (;>J. pp, J4iH ff. 

CASSI~O TO THE ALPS 

Rightlv regarded as a secondary OJ 

subsidiary 0lwration, t he Italian Gllllpaign in terms of the 1I1111llxT of mcn 

ill volved, casllalt ies, ground gained, and 

materiel consumed was lloIlet helt'ss a 

lllajor undertaking. Allied times ill ItalY advanced 1,140 miles by mad from 

Cape Pessal'O 011 Siciks s;nllhcnlJllOSr 

tip 10 the Brenner 'Pass on ltah's 

Alpine bOlltin. Froll\ the tilst landings 

on the mainland in Seplembn 194;1. 

Ihn traveled 4HO airline miles, about 

the sallie distance co\ered in Eisenhower's armies frolll :'\unnancl" to the 

EllX'. Because of the \\inding roads thaI 

vein llluch of the !tabn peninsula. the 

actual grollnd distance "as or course 

Illuch longer. III the ;tcl\al1ce the t\\() 

Allied armies crossed some of the tlIost 

challenging terrain in Eul'O!X', alternating bcl\\cen hot and hUlllid plains, 

fiJl'Cstcd lIloulltains, and high, rocky, 

;llmost pathless sllmmits. The \\eath~'r 

ranged rolll the oppressiH' SUlllmer 

heat of I he \1cditerrallean littoral 10 the 

almost antic cold of the Central and 

l\onhern Apenllilles. During the campaign the Allied limes completed filll!' 

assault landings and r hlee m'lJor olkllslves. 

Counting both sides, approximately a 

million lllen \\cre at Olle time or ;tnOlhtT invol\ed. Allied strell"lh ranged '"' , from 400.0()() to ;-l{)OJ)O() l11e 11 , tlte Fifth 

Army frolll a high of :)70,000 Illell (\( 

the time 01 thc capl ure of Rome ill 

J lIlle 1 q44 \0 a Im\ of :2t1(),OOO at the 

beginning of the tillal off(:nsiyc ill April 

194:). (;ennall slrength g-clltTalh \\as 

SOIllCW hal lo\\er, declinillg more or less 

steadily throughout the campaign as thc 

man power sit ual ion in the Reich gTe\\ 

deslx'rate. 

Enemy losses, mainly men taken pris-
A;\; ASSESSl\IE:\T 

oner. were much higher than Allied. 

From September 1943 to Mav 1945 the 

two Allied armies incurred 312.000 casualties of all types, 188,746 of them bv 

the Fifth ;\nm 21 

(;ennall Gls~ialties f()r the campaign 

totaled 434,646, of which 48,067 \\ere 

killed and 214,048 missing. Ceneralh 

«m.·ed to vield the )-.,JTound j()ught over, 

the Ccrmalls \\ere ullable to determille 

how mallY of t he missing had been 

killed, although the JX'nentage pmhabh was high. 2~ 

"Compared 1(, 71;1;.:0'94 Allred, a'lIalliD ill 

norrh\\eSr,TTl Emopc. of \\ hleh ATIleriT aTl (<l"'alfln 

\,,'1,· ,'.ill;,h:!H. Scc \i.rd)onald. rill' 1.11,1 01/0'"'''' 

ChalJl('! XX. 

" I'h .. "Iii, ial (;nm<ln sounn t", h.lllk lo,,('s, 

/J"i [f('!"tnfut:. ()hnH.lllflfliliUt/u dr' }{n'!i'\, (~t'll. Sf.d. Hi 

Org. AhL, :o'ti Apr 4:;. Iish ollh (;isualri", for Ih,' 

"nm C"uah;,', for Iht" li'o/ll'll SS, til<' 1.11/1"'1111'. 

alld Ih .. /\/I",l!.ll/Irllllll· arc llll.llailabk hUI \\ould 

'OIh(ilutv ;1 IllUl h ,mailer pen "Illagl' Sinn' Ih(' bulk 

(It (~t'rrllall fonT." in ltah \\a" arln\", 

When the (;('rman'> laid dO\\ll their 

arms, I he longest sustained Allied ClIllpaign of World War II came to an end, 

A total of 602 days had passed from 

the landings in Itah on 9 Septelllber 

1943 to the capillliation on 2 \1<1\ 1945. 

Each ci<n had StTnH:d an ('(emitl. as 

many a· \eteran of the Llmpaign on 

both sides has testified. Almost ahl<t\s 

at a foot-slogger's pace-a pare rcildCl'ed all tile mOle interminable b\ the 

infr(,()ll('llt exhilaration of pursllit-aml 

seemingh al\\<I\s approaching preClpitOllS heights controlled b\ a \1 ell-collcealed enelm. Allied t roo ps. uncleI' a 

broiling sun or in numbing cold. had 

slcmh pushed ahead. :\O\lhere on the 

far-Hung battlefronts could the end 

han' brought more relief than to those 

\Iho t<llIght the prolonged tight ill a 

(TueL bitter campaign that all too oftell 

'ieemed to be going 110\\ here. 

u.s. Army 

:'\lone 

General of the Annv 

General ' 

Lieutenant General 

;\1<~j()r General 

Brigadier General 

l\'one 

Colonel 

Lieutenant Colonel 

M~j()r 

Captain 

Captain (Cavalrv) 

First Lieutenant 

Second Lieutenant 

Appendix A 

Table of Equivalent Ranks 

Gt'rrTU'ln Arm,), and 

Air Fon:e 

Reichsrnarschall 

GClleralfeldma I'SC hall 

Generaloberst 

General del' lnbllterie 

Artillerie 

Gcbirgstruppen 

Kavallerie 

:'\I ae hriehtent ruppen 

Pan ze rt J'U ppen 

Pioniere 

Luftwaffe 

Fliegel' 

Fallsehinntruppen 

Fiaka11iUerie 

Luftnachrichtentruppen 

Generalleutnant 

Generalmajor 

,\; one 

Oberst 

Obcrstleutnant 

Major 

Hauptmann 

Rittmeister 

Obcrleutnant 

Leutnant 

German Wallen-55 

:\' one 

Reichsf'uehrer-SS 

Oherst gruppen fuehrer 

Obcrgl'uppenfuehrer 

Gruppenfuehrer 

Brigadefuehrer 

Obel'fuehrer 

Standarten fue hrer 

Obersturmbann fuc hrer 

Sturmbannfuehrer 

Haupsturmfuehrer 

Obersturmfuehrer 

L'ntel'stul'm fue hrer 
Note on Sources 

The main body of records upon 

which this volume is based is to be 

found in the Modern Military Records 

Division of the National Archives in 

Washington. They consist fcx the most 

part of monthly after-action reports 

together with supporting documents 

such as staff journals, message files, 

telephone logs, and periodic reports. 

The after-action reports are narrative 

summaries of operations prepared by 

every unit from army down to regiment 

and separate battalion. Varying in quality from unit to unit, they must be 

checked against the accompanying journals and message files; nevertheless, 

these reports provide a valuable framework in fitting information contained in 

the supporting document-Dften frag--

mentary-into place. 

For operations above the army level, 

records of Allied Force Headquarters 

(AFHQ), consisting of a vast collection 

of reports, messages, planning papers, 

and correspondence, are an important 

primary source. They are to be found 

on microfilm at the Modern Military 

Records Division. 

The National Archives Records Service is also the repository for microfilm 

of captured German records; the originals, including maps, having been returned to Germany. An index, The 

Guide to German Records Microfilmed at 

Alexandria, Virginia, consists of many 

volumes. 

The most useful of the German 

records are the War Diaries (KTB) of 

the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. In 

addition to daily summaries of operations, the diaries contain messages and 

transcripts of telephone conversations 

between commanders. These transcripts, especially, offer valuable insights 

into the thinking of senior German 

commanders in Italy, for in most cases 

they, unlike American telephone logs, 

are not summaries but are complete 

and candid. The wealth of the army 

records in large measure makes up f()r 

the fact that those of Army Group Care 

missing, probably lost in the war. 

The War Diary of the German high 

command has been published as Kriegstagesbuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab), edited by 

Helmuth Greiner and Percy Ernst 

Schramm, Vols. 1-4, Frankfurt alMain, 

1961. Volume IV, parts 1 and 2, are 

most useful for the Italian cam paign. 

Unfortunately, the diary for the last 

month of the war is missing. 

Unofficial Records (Allied) 

Three American generals-Devers, 

Clark, and Walker-made their wartime diaries available to the author. 

General Clark lent that part of his diary 

relating to the campaign from May 

1944 to May 1945, while the other two 

diaries are on file in the Center of 

Military History. The diaries include 

observations, comments, summaries of 

meetings, and correspondence dictated, 

generally on a daily basis, to each 

individual's aide de camp, who actually 

kept the diary. Frequently there are 

candid comments on events and personalities not to be found elsewhere in 

the record. 

Also on file in the Center of Military 
NOTE ON SOURCES 

History are numerous interviews with 

key p~rticipants in the Italian campaign 

in two broad categories: combat and 

after-action. The first were conducted 

by professional historians on the staff of 

the Fifth Army Historical Detachment 

during or shortly after a military operation; the second were generally made 

after the war by historians of the 

Center of Military History. The combat 

interviews, as to be expected, add color 

to the oflicial record and give historians 

a better feel for the operation and the 

individual soldier's reactions to it. The 

postwar interviews also helped round 

out the narrative with insights and 

recollections not often found in the 

official record. 

In addition to the un published records, the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean, and the commander of 

the Allied armies in Italy published 

reports for submission to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. They are essentially 

operational summaries and should, of 

course, be checked against the unpublished official records. 

Although the records of the headquarters of the British Eighth Army 

and its subordinate units have not been 

available to the author, the British Historical Section, Central Mediterranean, 

prepared a multivolume narrative covering all aspects of the Eighth Army's 

operations during the Italian campaign. 

In manuscript f(xm, the narrative represents a large-scale preliminary collection of studies fix a subsequent official 

history. Entitled "Operations of British, 

Indian, and Dominion Forces in Italy, 

3 September 1943-2 May 1945," this 

manuscript is in the U.S. Army Military 

History Research Collection, Carlisle 

Barracks, Pa. 

549 

In the postwar period several of the 

U.S. Army's combat arms schools, most 

notably the Infantry School, published 

studies prepared by students, usually 

company grade officers, who played 

key roles in combat operations. The 

studies are primarily useful for detail 

generally at or below the regimental 

level. 

G--3 Section, Headquarters, 15th 

Army Group, published shortly after 

the cessation of hostilities a \\'Ork entitled A Military Encyclopedia, Based on 

Opl'mtionl in thl' Italian Campaign, 1943-

45. Printed in a limited edition, it 

contains detailed information concerning all arms and the technical services 

as they related to Fifth Army operations. 

Unofficial Records (German) 

Soon after the war, the Historical 

Division, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, undertook a project 

whereby captured German officers 

turned out a series of historical studies 

embracing virtually every phase of German military operations during World 

War II. The results of the project, 

\\"hich continued for about a decade, 

are catalogued in The Guide to Foreign 

Militar)' Studil's, 1945-54, published under the auspices of the Historical Division, Headquarters, United States 

Army, Europe. The guide includes a 

comprehensive subject index and may 

be consulted either at the National 

Archives or the Center of Military History. Among the narrati\"e studi~s is a 

lengthy manuscript in two volumes entitled Feldzug in ltalien (MS T-Ia and Ib) 

prepared by senior commanders and 

staff officers of the German armies in 

Italy. When used in co-ordination \\"ith 
550 

the War Diary of the Obl'Tkommando dl'T 

Wehrmacht, the studies are extremely 

useful accounts of operations from the 

German point of view. 

Additional studies, based largely 

upon those prepared by the German 

officers and upon interviews with the 

officers themselves, were produced by 

staff historians with the Foreign Military 

Studies Section of the Center of Military History. Grouped in a so-called RSeries, they total 165, but only a few 

are concerned with the campaign in 

Italy. 

Published Works 

Also available are a large number of 

published works covering the entire 

&'lmut of ~ilitary and diplomatic operatIons relatmg to the Allied campaign in 

the Mediterranean and in Italy. The 

following is a partial list of those consulted in the preparation of this volume: 

Official Histories, U.S. 

The United States Army in World War II 

The War Department 

Leighton, Richard M. and Coakley, 

Robert W. Global Logistir.1 and Stratl'gy, 

1943-45 (Washington, 1969). -

. ~atloff, Maurice. Stratl'gic Planning 

jor C()ahtlOn War/fin', 1943-44 (Washington, 1959). 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

Blumenson, Martin. Salnno to Cassin() 

(Washington, 1969). 

Howe, George F. Northwest Africa: 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Smyth, Howard McGraw. Sirilv and thl' 

Sllrrl'lldn ojlt(/~V (Washington, 19(5). 

The European Theater of Operations 

MacDonald, Charles B. Thl' Last OF 

jl'mivl' (Washington, J 973). 

The Technical Services 

Kleber, Brooks E. and Birdsell, Dale. 

TIzI' Chl'miral War/arl' SITuia, Chl'mirals i1l 

Combat (Washington, J 9(5). 

Ross, William F. and Romanus, 

Charles F. The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany (Washington, J 9(5). 

Special Studies 

Lee, Ulysses. Tlu' EmjJlo)lmmi oj NI'f.,'HI 

Troops (Washington, 19(6)-. . , 

MacDonald, Charles B. and Mathews, 

Sidney T. Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, 

and Schmidt (Washington, 1952). 

. Weinberg, Albert K. Civil Affairs: SoldIers Become Governors (Washington, 

1964). 

American Forces in Action Series (available on microfilm). 

Tilt, Fi/th Army at thl' Wintn Lin!' (15 

Nov 43-15 Jan 44) (Washington, 1945). 

Small Unit Artiom (Washington, 1946). 

Anzio BI'alhhl'ad (22 Jan-25 May 

1944) (Washington, 1947): 

The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II 

Craven, Wesley Frank and Cates, 

James Lea, ~~ds. Vol. III, EumjJl': Argummt to V--:E Day O.anuary 1944-May 

J 945) (ChICago: Ul1Ivcrsity of Chicago 

Press, 195 J). 

Official Histories, Allied 

Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washing- Nicholson, Lt. Col. G.W.L. The CanaLt. Col. Albert N. and dians in Italy, 1943-45. OFFICIAL 

HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN 

ton, 1957). 

Garland, 
NOTE ON SOURCES 

ARMY IN THE SECOND WORLD 

WAR, Vol. II (Ottawa: Queen's 

Printer, 1956). 

Kay, Robin. From Cassino to Trif.llf. 

NEW ZEALAND IN THE SECOND 

W 0 R L D WAR (I 939-45), V 01. II 

(Wellington, N .Z.: Historical Publications Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, 

19(7). 

Pal, Dharm. The Campaign in Italy, 

1943-45. OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 

THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES IN 

THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 193~ 

45 (New Delhi. Combined Inter-Services Historical Section [India and 

Pakistan], 19(0). 

Ehrman, john. Grand Stratfgy. Vol. V, 

Aug. 1943-SejJl. 1944. Vol. VI, OIl 

I 944-Aug. 1945. Butler, j.R.M., ed. 

HISTORY OF THE SECOND 

WORLD WAR, UNITED KINGDOM 

SERIES (London: Her Majesty's 

Stationery Office, 1956). 

Molony, Brigadier e.J.e. Thl' M('(lillTrrwmn and M iddlc f,'asl. V 01. V, Thl' 

CamjJaign in Si(i~)' and Ihl' Cmn/mign in 

Ila(v, SI'jJl. 1943-MaTl'h 1944. HISTORY 

OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 

(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1973). 

I.e Goyet, Col. Pierre. Ministere des 

Armees, Etat-Major de L'Armce de 

Terre, Serv.ice Historique. La Parlili/mtum Franfalsl' A La Camj}(lgnl' D'ltalil' 

(1943-1946) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 19(9). 

Unit Histories 

Fifth Army History, Vols. I-IX. Published shortly after the war and covering the period from the army's activation to the end of the war in Italy in 

May 1945, this history was prepared by 

551 

members of the Fifth Army's Historical 

Section, initially under the direction of 

Col. john D. Forsythe, later succeeded 

by Lt. Col. Chester G. Starr. In a sense, 

the history resembles a large-scale afteraction report. When consulted along 

with journals and message files, it is a 

very useful source. 

The best of the division unit histories 

are: 

Howe, George F. The Battle History of 

the 1st Armored Division (Washington, 

1954). 

Taggart, Donald G., ed. ThP History oj 

thl' 3d Infrmlry Di,/ision in World Wa;' II 

(Washington, 1947). 

Others, varying in quality, are: 

B"()hmler, Rudolf. Fa I/srhirmj(lfgfl', 

Bildhll(h II. Chronik (Bad Nauheim: 

Podzun-Verlag, 1961). 

Delaney, john P. Thl' Blw' DI'l/ils ill 

Italy, A Hi.llm)' oj thl' 881h Infrmll)' Dh/isimi ill World War II (Washington: Infantry journal Press, 1947). 

Heargoll, Capitaine. La Vir/oi/'(\ .IOW 

LI' S({{11f dfS TroiS Croissants. Vol. I, LfS 

Pfinfs, fill's Gloirf df la 3fmf D.l.A. f1l 

/talif (Algerie, 1946). 

De Moraes, Marshal J. B. Mascarenhas. The Brazilian EX/Jfdilionary Forrl'. 

Hv lis Commander, trans. from 2d Editi'on, Revised and Enlarged (Rio de 

janeiro, 1965). 

Robbins, Maj. Robert A. Thf' 91s1 111-

ja III /')' Di,/i.lioll ill World War II 

(Washington, 1947). 

Schultz, Paul, L. Thf' 85th Di"i.lioll ill 

World War II (Washington, 1949). 

Strootman. Capt. Ralph E. Hi'llil)' II/ 

111i' 363d Ill/al/tl)" 0111' Rl'gillll'llt II/thl' 91st 

Di,/ilioll ill World War II (Washington, 

1947). ' 

Published Works, General 

Adelman, Robert H. and Walton, 
552 

Col. George. Thl' /)nli/'I Brigadl' (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1966). 

Carpentier, Gen. Marcel. lA's Fonl'~ 

AI/iI's I'U /taliI': La CamjJagru' d'ltalil'. 

Editions Berger-Levrault (Paris, 1949). 

Churchill, Winston S. C/ulillg thl' Rillg 

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1951). 

Clark, Mark W. Calrulatl'd Risk (Ne\\' 

York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). 

Dulles, Allen W. Thl' Sl'rrl't SllITmdn 

(Ne\\' York: Harper and Row, 1966). 

Greiner, Heinz GIt.a.D. Kamp/ am 

Rom, Inji'rno am Po, Die Wehrmacht im 

Kampf, Band 44 (Neckargemund: Kurt 

Vowinckel Verlag, 1968). 

Higgins, Trumbull. Sojt Undl'rbdly, 

Thl' A nglo-A maim 1/ Cm/tro7'lT,I)' O,ln thl' 

Italian CamjJaign, 1939-1945 (New York: 

The Macmillan Company, 1958). 

Howard, Michael. Thl' Ml'ditl'lT{I//('(/1/ 

Stratl'l.,,")' ill thl' S('(olld World War (Ne\\ 

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968). 

Jackson, W.G.F. Thl' Battlt' lor Italy 

(New York: Harper and Ro\\, 1967). 

Jackson, W.e.F. Thl' Battll' lor Roml' 

(Ne\\' York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 

1969). 

Kesselring, Albert GencralfeldmarCASSINO TO THE ALPS 

schall a.D. Kl'lll'lrin{.;, A Soldia',1 R('(ord 

(New York: William Morro\\ & Company, 1954). 

Nicholson, Nigel. A It,x, Thl' Lifl' oj 

Fil'ld Man/wI, Earl AIt'xanda 0/ Tllni.1 

(New York: Atheneum, 1973). 

Orgill, Douglas. Thl' Gothir Lint" Thl' 

Italian CamjJai{.;rI, Autumn 1944 (New 

York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967). 

Scrivener, Jane. Imiril' Rmnl' 71'ith thl' 

Gtrlrlanl (New York: The Macmillan 

Company, 1945). 

Shepperd, G.A. TlIR Italian CamjJaign, 

1943--45, A Politiml al/d Militar)' RI'-

(/111'11 /til' lit (N ew Yo r k: Fn'de ri(', k A. 

Praeger, 19(8). 

Truscott, Lucian K. Command A1issio//.1 

(New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1959). 

Westphal, Siegfried. Hl'n II/ Fl'IlI'ln, 

(/1/.1 dl'n Pa/linn/ dl's 8ta/illhl'js ,'on Romml'l, KI',I,ll'lring, lind RIlIlri.I(nlt. (Bonn: 

Athenaum-Verlag, 1950). 

Winterbotham, F.W. Thl' Ultra 8('(rl't 

(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 

1974),p.187. 

References to additional published 

works \\ill be hamd in the footnotes of 

this volume. 
AAF 

AAI 

AAR 

Abn 

ACC 

ACMF 

ACotS 

Admin 

AFHQ 

AG 

AGp 

Armd 

AOK 

Bd 

CCA 

CCB 

CCS 

CG 

CinC 

CotS 

CLN 

Comd 

Comdr 

Corresp 

COS 

CMH 

CP 

DA 

DAF 

DCofS 

DSC 

DUKW 

E.ngr 

ETOUSA 

Exec 

ExecO 

FA 

FO 

Army Air Forces 

Allied Armies, Italy 

After action re}X)rt 

Airborne 

Glossary 

Allied Control Commission 

Allied Central Mediterranean Forces 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

Administrative 

Allied Force Headquarters 

Adjutant General 

Army group 

Armored; armoured 

Armee Oberkommando (Army High Command) 

Board 

Combat Command A 

Combat Command B 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Commanding general 

Commander in Chief 

Chief of Staff 

Comitate di Liberazione Nazionale (Committee of National Liberation) 

Command 

Commander 

Correspondence 

(British) Chiefs of Staff 

Center of Military History 

Command post 

Department of the Anny 

(British) Desert Air Force 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Distinguished Service Cross 

21/2 ton, 6 X 6 amphibious truck 

Engineer 

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Anny 

Executive 

Executive officer 

Field Artillery 

Field order 
554 

FEC 

G-2 

G-3 

G-4 

Hiwis 

Incl 

Inf 

Instr 

Intel 

Interv 

JCS 

JPS 

KTB 

LVT 

MAAF 

MACAF 

MATAF 

MASAF 

Maim 

Min 

Msg 

Mtg 

MTOUSA 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

French Expeditionary Corps 

intelligence section of division or higher staff 

Operations section of division or higher staff 

Logistics and supply section of division or higher staff 

(Hilf~willige) Russian and Polish prisoners volunteering for service 

with Gennan forces 

Inclosure 

In 6m try 

Instruction 

Intelligence 

Interview 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Staff Planners 

Kriegstagebuch (War Diary) 

Landing vehicle, tracked 

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces 

Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force 

Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force 

Mediterranean Strategic Air Force 

Maintenance 

Minutes 

Message 

Meeting 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

OBSW Oberbefehlshaber Suedwest (Headquarters, Commander In Chief, 

01 

OKH 

OKL 

OKW 

OPD 

Opn 

OSS 

PBS 

Prcht 

RAF 

Regt 

Southwest) 

Operations instructions 

Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) 

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force High Command) 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command) 

Operations Division, War DepaItment General StafT 

Operation 

Office of Strategic Services 

Peninsula Base Section 

Parachute 

Royal Air Force 

Regiment 
GLOSSARY 

Rep 

RN 

SACMED 

SHAEF 

5-2 

5-3 

Sec 

Sitrep 

SOS 

Teleconv 

TF 

WFSt 

Rcprcsen tative 

Royal Navy 

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces 

Military intelligence section of regimental or lower staff level 

Operations and training section of regimental or lower staff level 

Section 

Situation report 

Services of Supply 

Telephone conversion 

Task force 

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Anned Forces Operations Staff) 

555 
ANVIL 

AVALANCHE 

CROSSWORD 

DIADEM 

DRAGOON 

ENCORE 

FOURTH TERM 

HERB S TNEBEL 

HUSKY 

NUNTON 

OLIVE 

OVERLORD 

QUADRANT 

SEXTANT-EUREKA 

SHINGLE 

STRANGLE 

TRIDENT 

WINTERGEWITTER 

Code Names 

Early plan for invasion of southern France 

Allied amphibious assault near Salerno to capture Naples, 9 September 1943 

Covert operation leading to German surrender, 2 May 

1944 

Allied offensive in Italy, II May 1944 

Allied invasion of southeastern Mediterranean coast of 

France, 15 August 1944; name changed on 27 July 

1944 from ANVIL 

IV Corps limited objective operation against Monte 

Belvedere, February 1945 

IV Corps limited objective operation in Serchio Valley, 

February 1945 

German operational plan f()r withdrawal beyond the Po 

river 

Allied invasion of southeastern Sicily, 10 July 1943 

Allied cover and deception plan, March 1944 

Allied Gothic Line offensive, September 1944 

Allied cross-Channel invasion of continent of Europe on 

the Normandy coast of France, D-day, 6 June 1944 

U.S.-British conference at Quebec, August 1943 

Allied conferences at Cairo and Teheran, NovemberDecember 1943 

Amphibious operation ·at Anzio, 22 January 1944 

Allied air operation to interrupt and destroy enemy 

road, rail, and sea communications in Italy, MarchMay 1944 

U.S.-British conference at Washington, May 1943 

German limited objective counterattack against U.S. IV 

Corps, 26 December 1944 
Basic Military Map Symbols * 

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within 

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply 

point. 

Military Units-Identification 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Armored Command 

Army Air Forces. 

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery 

Cavalry, Horse 

Cavalry, Mechanized. 

Chemical Warfare Service 

Coast Artillery 

Engineers 

Infantry 

Medical Corps 

Ordnance Department. 

Quartermaster Corps 

Signal Corps . 

Tank Destroyer .. 

Transportation Corps. 

Veterinary Corps 

~ 

1<:::)1 

1

001 

8 

o 

~ 

m 

EE 

m 

C8J 

EB 

[K] 

[]] 

m 

ITol 

[:mJ 

IS2J 

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing 

symbol with the arm or service symbol: 

Airborne Artillery 

Airborne Infantry 

in use during the World ,Var II p<'riod, see 

from which these are taken. 
Size Symbols 

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or 

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying 

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization: 

S('ction. •• 

Platoon ••• 

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight I 

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron. I I 

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) I I I 

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force 

Wing X 

Division or Command of an Air Force. XX 

Corps or Air Force XXX 

Army.. XXXX 

Group of Armies XXXXX 

EXAMPLES 

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the 

unit designation; that to the right. the designation of the parent 

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below 

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines: 

Company A, 137th Infantry .... . .......... A~137 

8th Field Artillery Battalion. 

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division. 

Observation Post, 23d Infantry. 

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division 

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry 

Weapons 

Machine gun 

Gun. 

Gun battery 

Howitzer or Mortar. 

Tank 

Self-propelled gun 

8 6 

AI~II 1.1.1 

8 23 

~5 137 

-111-

136 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The following volumes have been published or are in press: 

The War Department 

Chief of Staj): Prewar Plans and Preparations 

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 

Global LObristics and Strategy: 1940-1943 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 

The Army and Economic Mobilization 

The Arm)' and IndustriallvIanpower 

The Army Ground Forces 

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops 

The Procurement and Training or Ground Combat Troops 

The Army Service Forces 

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces 

The \,yestern Hemisphere 

The Ji'ramwork of Hemisphere Defense 

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts 

The War in the Pacific 

The l.''all of the Philippines 

Guadalcanal: The First Offimsive 

Victory in Papua 

CARTWHEE,'L: The Reduction of Rabaul 

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls 

Campaign in the lvIarianas 

The APtJr'fJach to the Philippines 

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines 

Triumph in the Philippines 

Okinawa: The Last Battle 

Strategy and Command: The hrst Two l'ears 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West 

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy 

Salerno to Cassino 

Cassino to the lllp.5 

The European Theater of Operations 

Cross-Channel Attack 

Breakout and Pursuit 

The Lorraine Campaign 

The Siegfried Liw! Campaign 

The A.rdennes: Battlt! or the Bulge 

The Last Offensive 

The Supreme Command 
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I 

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II 

The Middle East Theater 

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia 

The China-Burma-India Theater 

Stilwell's Mission to China 

Stilwell's Command Problems 

Time Runs Out in CBI 

The Technical Services 

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizingfor War 

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field 

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat 

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment 

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against japan 

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany 

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States 

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior 

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor 

Theaters 

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations 

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War 

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply 

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront 

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I 

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II 

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against japan 

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany 

The Signal Corps: The Emergency 

The Signal Corps: The Test 

The Signal Corps: The Outcome 

The Transportation Corps: Res/Jonsibilities, Orp;anization, and Operations 

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply 

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas 

Special Studies 

Chronology: 1941-1945 

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945 

Rearming the french 

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt 

The Women's Army Corps 

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors 

Buying Aircrafl: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces 

The Employment of Negro Troops 

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb 

Pictorial Record 

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against ja/Jan 


Index 

Abbe\' of Monte Cassino. Sf'!' Monte Cassino abbe\. 

Ahetone Pass: :'100, 3!:l2 

Acque Bollicante: 216 

Acton, 1st Lt. Mike: 142 

Acuto: 209 

Adige River 257, 393-94, 443, 447-48, 452-54, 

492,495,498-99,502-04,511,526 

Aguigliano: 278 

Air, Allied: 41, 258. Sff also Anzio heachhead; 

MALLORY MAJOR; STRASGLE. 

DIADEM: 19, 27, 44-45 

Gothic Line operations; 299, 314, 322, 34(), 370, 

38~ 383, 391, 396,398, 401, 410 

heav}' bombers and carpet bombing: 398, 400, 

463, 470 

radar-directed bombing: 543 

support of final offensive: 411, 448, 454, 457, 

463-64,470,478,483 

Air commands and f()rces, Allied 

British Desert Air Force; II, 313-14, :HO, 395, 

400-40 I, 457, 463, 468, 

Eighth U.S. Air Force; II 

Fifteenth U.S. Air Force: II, 409n 

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF); II, 77 

Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force: I I 

Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force 

(MASAF): 11,229,370,391. 457, 463 

Mediterranean Allied 'ractical Air Force (MATAF): II, 20, 229, :'170, 391, 483 

Twelfth U.S. Air Force: II, 463 

U.S. Strategic Air Force: II 

XII Tactical Air Command: 36, 63, 75, 86, 115-

16,121,154, 370n, 380 

XXII Tactical Air Command: 370, 370n, 383, 

400,410,456-57,463,470 

42d Tactical Air Command Wing: 370 

27th Fighter Group: 370n 

79th Fighter Group: 370n 

86th Fighter Squadron: 422 

Air, German: 41,67,93,319,542. Sff at.\o (;erman 

commands and forces, Luftwaffe. 

Airev, General T.S.: 514, 521 

Ala: . 504-05 

Alatri: 209, 221 

Alban Hills: 14-15,30,109-10 

Allied attack plans and operations: 97, 104-07, 

114-15, 117-18, 139, 163, 165-66, 168-69, 

171, 173, 177, 180-82, 186, 190-91, 193-95, 

199,202,212,219,541 

German defense of: 5{), 140, 150, 156-57, 164-

66, 185, 196,200, 207-()8 

Albano: 115,139,143,175.177,199.202,208.219 

Albegna River: 246 

Alcssandria: 506 

Alexander. Field Marshal Sir Harold R.L.C.: 9, 9n. 

20,26, 77, 399, 406, 443. 446. 538, 541-42 

destructioll of German forces as campaign priority; 27, 37, 103-07, 112, 119. W:1, 171-7:'1, 192. 

196,209,221, 255-5H. 256n 

DIADEM: 14, 19-20. 27, 29. 32-33. 35-3H, HI-H2, 

89-91.99, 103, 146. 190 

MALLORY MAJOR: 283, 2H5 

need for ports and communication centers: 230, 

24 L 253. 270, 291 

northern Italy encirclement strategy: 444-46. 448 

"one-two punch" strategy: 27, 31. 103. 307. 309, 

318,446.541 

plans for capture of Bologna; 394, 398-400. 405-

()6.412 

pursuit and Gothic Line attack: 228. 236. 254. 

280-83,303-09,312.315.318.321. 342, 3GI62, 373-74. 380. 392 

southern France landing: 227-28. 269 

surrender negotiations: 485. 514, 516-19, 521. 

526.528-29.544 

trans-Adriatic amphibious plans: ;)57-58, 360, 

39:{, 398-99, 401 

working relationship with Clark: 90, 107, 173. 

541 

Alfonsine: 465 

Allen, Brig. Gen. Frank. Jr.: 121-22. 125-27. 142-

43. 153 

Allfrev, (;eneral Sir Charles: 340 

Allied commands and !,)rces 

Allied Armies in Ita!; (AAl): 3, 9, 9n, 21, 26, 

103, 205, 234, 237, 3~J9, 406 

Allied Black Market Control Division: 235 

Allied Central ;"fediterranean Force: 9n 

Allied Control Commission (ACe): 233-:H. :{92, 

522 

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ): 228, 2:H, 

256,269.283,305, 3j(), 399, 418 

Allied Forces in Italy: 9n 

Allied Forces in North Africa: 9 

6th Army Group: 308, 483. 507 

15th Army Group: 9n. 399, 444-45. 447. 449, 

529 

18th Army Group: 9n 

Almond. Maj. Gen. Edward M.: 390-91, 397, 407-

08,410,421-22,424.460-61 

Alps: 6.297.310,374. 43H, 440, 443. 445-46. 460, 

484, 504-05. 536-3H 

A maseno: 31, 182 

Amore: 474 
564 

Amphibious operations: 6, 95-96, 227, 257n, 544. 

See allO ANVIL-DRAGOON. 

Adriatic flank and mid-Danube plans: 304-05, 

357-59, 393-94, 398, 401 

capture of Elba: 247 

Comacchio Lagoon: 448-52,459,465,468 

German precautions against: 18, 22, 40-41, 60, 

79-80,97, 108, 140-41, 151,203,241-42,247, 

250--51, 275, 293-94, 315,440-41, 462, 466, 

539 

Anagni-Baliano road: 221 

Ancona: 229,236,241,253,256,261,267,269-70, 

278-79,291,305, 394 

Anders, Lt. Gen. Wladyslaw: 22, 28n, 44, 63, 78, 

253, 278, 305, 451. See also Polish ",rces. 

Aniene River: 199, 207-10, 212, 219-21, 232, 240, 

267 

Antolak, Sgt.Sylvester: 147n 

ANVIL-DRAGOON: 5-6, 25n, 26, 227-28, 236, 255-

56, 256n, 257-58, 258n, 269-70, 283, 286--87, 

293-94,303,306,308,320,357,373,444,537, 

539-41 

Anzio: 153, 230, 285 

Anzio-Aprilia-Albano road: 110, 120, 173, 175, 199, 

202 

Anzio beachhead. See also U.S. Army commands 

and forces, VI Corps. 

air support for breakout: 36, 115-16, 118, 120, 

132,136 

artillery support for breakout: I 15, 120, 122-23, 

132,134, 136--37 

breakout operations and Cerman reaction: 136--

41, 150-52 

breakout planning: 19-22, 27, 37-38, 74, 90, 

103-07,117-19 

initial landing: 3, 22, 97, 99, 104, 166, 203, 250, 

535, 537 

main Fifth Armv link-up with breakout f(,rces: 

88-91,98-99,152,156,172,244 

mines: 110,114, 118, 120-21, 12111, 123-31, 133-

36, 176 

situation before DIADEM: 4, 12, 18, 25, 30, 40, 84, 

107-11,230 

Aosta vallev: 512 

Aprilia ("the Factorv"): I 08, I :~9, 174 

Aquino: 18,78,81-83,89-90,93 

Arce: 171, 182-83, 192 

Arco: 512 

Ardea: 106, 181, 208 

Ardennes counteroffensive: 406-07, 410, 437, 536, 

543 

Arezzo: 236,241,267,269-70,279-81,288,291 

Argenta: 451-52, 459, 465-69, 484, 494 

Argenta Cap: 448-52, 543 

Armor: 19,411 

antitank gun, 57-mm.: 293 

ill Anzio breakout: I 10, I 13-14, I 18, 120-21, 

123-31, 133-36, 176 

"battle sled" concept: 130-31 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Armor-C(>lltinued 

Churchill (Crocodile) tanks: 338, 451, 464 

employment in mountain terrain: 202, 260 

German tank design superiority: 338 

Sherman tanks: 338 

Table of Organization and Equipment f"r C.S. 

divisions: 113, 285-86 

tank-infantry team: 542 

Arno River: 13, 228, 297-98 

Allied advance to: 267,271,273,275-76,280-82, 

284-85, 288-94, 537 

Allied crossings: 280,289,309-10,318--20 

German defense: 231, 233, 242, 264, 270, 2i 5, 

282-83, 302, 308, 323 

Arno-Savio vallev: 300 

Artena: 105,112,114,117,122,168-72,182,185, 

193-94 

Artillerv, Allied. See also Anzio beachhead. 

airbo'rne direction of fire: 542-43 

DIADEM: 27,29,36,43, 46n, 46-47, 59, 189 

final offensive: 458, 463-64, 471, 478-79 

Gothic Line attack: 314,339-40,365,370,383 

proximitv fuze: 543 

self-propelled I 05-mm. guns: 338 

Artillen, German: 16-17,29,46,59,97,111-12, 

47i 

Arzilla River: 315 

Atina: 17,29,34,64,221 

Aurunci I\lountains: 18-19, 30, 32-34. 38, 59, 73-

74, 76, 79, 83-85, 543 

Ausa River: 338, 340-41 

Ausente Creek: 23, 30, 55, 71 

Ausonia corridor: 27, 30, 34-35, 46-50, 54, 56--57, 

62,65-66,69,71,73,75,77,85 

Ausonia Mountains: 99, 230 

Austria: 256,359,393,441,444,483-84,525, 54() 

AVALANCHE: 539 

Avezzano: 156, 192 

Badoglio, Marshal Pietro: 233-34 

Bagnacavallo: 404, 41 n, 420 

Bagni di Lucca: 390, 409 

Baldegg, Bernhard MaH von: 514 

Balkans: 5, 7, 9, 257-58, 302, 357-58, 400, 538--40 

Baltic front: 419, 543 

Banks, Brig. Cen. Carl c.: 25n 

Barfoot, T. Sgl. Van T.: 137n 

Barga: 390, 407, 409-1 ° 

Bari: 233-34, 267, 279 

Barlow, Co\. Ravmond c.: 472 

Bastia: 451-52,465-68 

Bazzano: 455 

Bebbio: 409-1 () 

Beelitz, Co\. Dietrich: 31 () 

Belgrade: 359-60, 39:~ 

Belluno: 512 

Belmonte: 17 

Bencivengo, Ceneral Roberto: 234 

Benevento: 13 
INDEX 

Bengodi: 246 

Berchtesgaden: 484 

Bergamo: 502 

Berlin: 484, 517, 521, 526, 544 

Bern: 519, 523 

Bernhard Line: 203 

Beuchler, Brigadier Georges: 227n 

Bibbiena: 236, 241, 288 

Bidente River: 376 

BIG GAME: 454 

Bigallo: 367-69 

Blaskowitz, Generaloberst Johannes: 303 

B~ogna: 299, 307,433 

final offensive: 440--5ti, 461, 471, 477-79, 482-

84, 493-95 

initial attack towards: 315, 320, 322, 373-75, 378, 

382,389,391, 405-0ti, 410-13, 420-27 

plans for capture of: 256, 304, 308, 320, 339, 

343-44, 352, 354, 359-61. 3ti3-64, 394, 397, 

400 

Bolte, Maj. Cen. Charles: 281, 379, 381 

Bolzano: 443, 511, 520, 523-26, 531-32 

Bombiano-Marano sector: 405 

Bomporto: 492-93 

Bondeno: 453, 456, 494 

Bonomi, Ivanoe: 234 

Bonomi, General Ruggero: 520 

Borgo: 318, 326, 329 

Borgo Grappo: 99 

Borgo Podgora: 129 

Borgoforte: 489, 492 

Boschetta di Mosca: 129 

Bove Canal: 123-24 

Bradley, General Omar: 398 

Brady, Col. Brookner W.: 54 

Brann, Brig. Gen. Donald W.: 10, 32-33, 35, Iti5, 

306 

Braun, Col. Gustav: 381 

Brazilian Expeditionary Force: 287, 405-06, 408, 

412,418,428,458,499,503 

attack to the Po Valley: 431-34,455,476-77,493 

1st Division: 390,453,495 

1st Infantry Regiment: 397,431 

II th Infantry Regiment: 397 

Bregenz: 443 

Brenner-Genoa railroad: 284 

Brenner Pass: 420, 444, 499, 502, 504, 512, 516, 

531-32,544 

Brenta River: 443, 505-06, 525, 531 

Brescia: 502, 506 

Brisghella: 403, 405 

British Army commands and forces 

Eighth Army: 3, 9, 373n, 399, 542 . .'Iff ([lll) Leese 

Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver; McCreery, Lt. Gen. Si; 

R. L. 

amphIbIOus operations on Adriatic front: 

393-94, 459, 543 

casualties: 222-23, 294, 318, 372-73 

DIADEM: 19-20, 22, 26-29, 32-38, 42, 45, 56, 

32-64,77, 104-06 

565 

British Armv commands and /()[ces-Continued 

Eighth Armv-Continued 

drive to Rome: 119, 191-92, 198-99,209-10, 

220-21 

Gothic Line attack on Adriatic flank: 280, 

298, 303-10, 314-18, 321, 336-40, 342-44, 

349,351,353,357 

Hitler Line and Liri valley: Hi, 78, 82, 89-93, 

98-99,118-19,156.171.182-83.222, 

541-42 

Po to the Alps: 424, 441-42, 444-4ti, 448, 

450--54, 456-58, 462-66. 469-70, 482. 484, 

494-95,497.503-04,507,512,516 

Po Valley plans and winter operations: 361. 

373n, 374, 376-78, 380, 389-90, 393-97, 

399. 401-06 

pursuit north of Rome: 228-31, 236. 240-43. 

249-50, 252, 261, 267. 270, 278-79, 284-

85, 288-89 

winter stalemate along the Senio: 410-12. 

414,416-20. 

Royal Engineers: 286 

5 Corps 

DIADEM: 20, 22, 26, 221. 223, 229, 241, 253. 

288 

final offensive: 405-53, 457, 463-65, 467, 

469,482,494.497-98,503,511 

Gothic Line and Adriatic flank: 306, 308-09. 

312-14. 316-17. 339-40. 376-78, 394-97. 

401-05.419 

10 Corps: 4,17; 32n. 45, 373n. 

Arno and Gothic Line: 288. 307-09, 313, 

346,371,376,394 

DIADEM: 22, 29. 93, 192, 221 

final offensive: 441,451-53,482,497-98 

pursuit north of Rome: 240-41, 249-50. 252, 

267-69. 279 

13 Corps 

DIADEM: 22, 28-29, 43-44, 60, 63, 77, 90, 92. 

183, 192,209,221 

final offensive: 441, 451-53. 467, 469, 494, 

497-98,503.511 

Gothic Line and Po Valley: 307, 309-10, 312. 

318-21, 323-24, 335, 341, 345, 349. 352, 

354, 361-63, 371, 378-79, 383, 389-90, 

396-98,400,405-06,408,412,418 

pursuit north of Rome: 240-41, 249-50, 252, 

267-70.279-81,288-89,291-92 

1st Armoured Division: 316-17 339 362, 376. 

378,418 ' , 

6th Armoured Division: 44 

Gothic Line and final offensive: 310, 349, 

352,371,405,418,482,494,497,512 

Hitler Line: 90,92, 182,209. 221-22 

pursuit north of Rome: 240-41. 249, 252, 

268-69, 279-80, 288-89 

1st Division 

advance to Rome and pursuit beyond: 208. 

220, 237 
566 

British Annr commands and /eJl'Ccs-Continued 

1st Division-Continued 

Anzio beachhead breakout: 25, III, 115, 

120,150, 173, 180,201 

Gothic Line and Adriatic flank: 310, 323, 

345,348-49,351-52,371,405,418 

4th Division 

Adriatic flank: 268, 279, 288-89, 338-40, 

377-78, 394-96 

Rapido River crossing: 44, 63-64, 77 

5th Division: 25, 110-11, 115, 120, 150, 173, 180, 

201,208,220,237 

46th Division: 316-17,376-78,394-96,402-03 

56th Division: 110, 317, 362, 376, 378, 395-96, 

404,450-51 

Adriatic flank final offensive: 465, 469, 504, 

511 

amphibious operations: 452, 459, 466, 468 

78th Division 

advance to Highway 6: 44,63-64,77,82,88-

90, 92, 182-83 

final offensive: 418, 450, 452, 465-69 

pursuit north of Rome: 268, 362-63, 367, 

371,390 

7th Armoured Brigade: 451 

9th Armoured Brigade: 450 

26th Armoured Brigade: 279-80, 288-89 

I st Army Artillery Group: 288-89 

2d Commando Brigade: 450, 459, 466-68 

24th Field Regiment: 170 

Illth Field Regiment: 416 

1st Guards Brigade: 209,352-53,371 

18th Guards Brigade: 110 

24th Guards Brigade: 110, 450, 466 

61 st Cuards Brigade: 209 

.~4th Cun Regiment: :-198 

tilst HeaVY Regiment: 416 

3d Infantry Brigade: 377 

12th Lancers Regiment: 395-96 

27th Lancers Regiment: 377 

39th Light AA Regiment: 417 

10th Rifle Brigade: 209 

II/54 Super Heavy Regiment: 416 

21 st Tank Brigade: 450 

25th Tank Brigade: 288-89,338-39 

Task Force Porter: 377-78,395,401 

British Chiefs of Staff: 4, 8, II, 204 

British Military Mission in Washington: 399 

Britten, Col. George V.: 227n 

Broedlow, Col. Rudolph W.: 239,244 

Brooke, General Sir Alan: 5, 357 

Brosset, Maj. Gen. Diego: 248-49 

Brown, Maj. Harold MacV.: 68-69 

Budapest: 399, 536 

Budrio: 314, 388, 400, 448, 452, 465, 482 

BUFFALO: 105-06, 112, 117-19, 142, 156-57, 163-

65,167,169,173,191,541-42 

Bulgaria: 360,437 

Burns, Lt. Gen. ELM.: 22, 182,339-40 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Caesar Line 

Allied attack and breakthrough: 175, 181, 192, 

199-200,202,219,260,300-301 

German defense of: 99, 140, 156-58, 167, 177-

80,184, 191, 196,232 

Cairn, Lt. Col. Bogardus 5.: 152,215-16 

Calomini: 408-09, 422 

Campagna RiPKfl: 156 

Campo Iemini: 156 

Campoleone: 105, 166, 180, 182, 190, 199-200 

Campoleone Canal: 181 

Campoleone station: 137,173-77 

Camposanto: 482 

Canadian Army forces: 26, 222, 411, 450 

1st Canadia~ Corps 

attack to Rome: 22,29, 77, 90-92, 99, 171, 

182, 192, 209, 221 

Gothic Line attack on Adriatic front: 306, 

308-09, 312-14, 316--17, 339-41, 376-77, 

394,399,401-02,404 

1st Canadian Division: 79-80, 82, 90, 92, 182, 

209, 402 

5th Canadian Armoured Division: 92, 182, 339, 

401-02,411,419 

I st Canadian Armoured Brigade: 44, 289, 310 

3d Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment: 377 

Irish Regiment of Canada: 340 

Canadian-U.S. force. Srf U.S.-Canadian 1st Special 

Service Force. 

Canale Navigable: 281 

Canino: 244 

Cannon, Maj. Gen. John K.: II, 36, 398, 400 

Capalbio: 246 

Capanne: 286 

Capo d'Acqua: 54, 75 

Carano: 110, 114, 137, 149-50, 174 

Carleton, Brig. Gen. Don E.: 185-86,200,202,219 

Carlstone, Capt. Robert K.: 51 

Carpena: 395 

Carpentier, General Marcel: 33 

Carpineto Romano-Colle Ferro road: 172 

Carr, Lt. Col. Frank F.: 143-44, 146 

Carrara: 461-62, 483 

Carrione Creek: 461 

Canoceto: 105 

Casa del Monte: 366-67 

Casaglia Pass: 341 

Casale Carano: I 10 

Casale Hill: 55 

Casalecchio: 482 

Caserta: 36,66, 117, 119, 256, 310, 516, 519-21, 

525-27, .~29 

Casey, 1'. Sgt. Robert A.: 50 

Casole d'Elsa: 265 

Cassino: 4, 16n, 17-18,21,28-29, :-11-33, 43, 63-

64, 77, 110, 231, 341, 346n, 373, 5:-15 

Castel d'Aiano: 471-73, 476 

Castel d' Ariano: 184, 188 
INDEX 

Castel Bolognese: 349,371,401 

Castel del Rio: 345, 347-50, 353, 385, 405, 418 

Castel San Pietro: 378, 388, 418, 452, 469 

Castelforte: 16,23,27,30,34,47,71 

Castellana: 280 

Castellina Marittimo: 274 

Castello di Brolio: 279 

Castellonorato: 69, 73-76, 78, 83, 85 

Castelnuovo: 408, 421 

Castiglione Fibocchi: 289 

Castiglione Fiorentino: 269 

Castro dei Volsci: 93, 159 

Casualties, summary of: 222-23, 294, 318, 419, 

544--45, 545n ' 

Cattolica: 302 

Cave: 191, 195,207,221 

Cave d'Argilla: 74--75 

Ceccano: 31 

Cecina: 259,263-65,271-74 

Centocelle: 212,214--16 

Central Apennines: 3, 13-14, 209, 231, 267-68, 

297-98 

Ceprano: 28, 35, 89, 92-93, 171, 182, 229, 542 

Cerasola Hill: 56, 60-61 

Cernobbio: 506, 519 

Cesano: 305, 313-14 

Cesena: 299,345,361,376--77,402 

Cesenatico: 377,463 

Champeny, Col. Arthur S.: 47-49, 52-53, 67-69, 

83-84, 345, 350, 385-87 

Chiana valley: 267,280 

Chianni: 275 

Chianti Hills: 288--90 

Chiasso: 515-20 

Chienti River: 253 

Chiesa del Bante: 466 

Chieti: 243 

Chiusi: 252, 268 

Church, Col. John H.: 137 

Churchill, Winston S.: 5, 9, 77 

and Adriatic amphibious assault: 357-60 

appeal for more U.S. troops: 359, 373 

and Mediterranean strategy: II, 27, 103, 119, 

172,209,221,228,258,305,444,537 

Cinquale Canal: 422-24, 460-61 

Cisterna: 4, 30, 105, 108-10. 114, 117, 120-22, 

128--57,164,166,173,176,178,184,189,230, 

441 

Cisterna-Campoleone-Rome railroad: 110, 116--17, 

120-22, 124--27, 132-33, 135-39, 142, 144--47, 

149, 173-77 

Cisterna Canal: 128--30, 135, 146 

Civita Castellana: 237, 240-41 

Civitavecchia: 19, 22, 38, 62, 229, 236--38, 241, 244, 

260, 285 

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.: 9-10, 23, 28, 31, 104, 

157, 512, 543. See also Allied commands and 

forces, 15th Army Group; U.S. Army commands and forces, Fifth Army. 

567 

Clark, Lt. Cen. Mark W.-Continued 

Anzio beachhead breakout: 65-66, 73-74, 76, 83, 

88-91,93,103-07, 112, 117-20, 196, 199 

attack towards Rome: 122, 139, 141, 163-67, 169, 

171-73, 181-82, 184, 188, 190-93, 200-202, 

208,449 

as commander of 15th Arnn Croup: 399, 406, 

444-65 . 

DIADEM planning: 34--37,221 

evaluation of command: 538, 540-42 

Fifth Army capture of Rome: 32, 38, 103-07, 

119, 164-65, 182, 205, 208, 210, 215, 227, 

227n, 228, 235, 541-42 

Gothic Line and Po Valley advance: 306-10, 318-

21, 337, 343--44, 349, '351-52, 354, 362, 364, 

369, 371, 373, 375-76, 379--80, 383-85, 388-

89,412,447,449 

Po Valley to the Alps: 394, 397-98, 400-40 I, 405, 

447,449--51,453-54,457,462-63,500,511 

pursuit north of Rome: 227, 231, 236--40,' 248-

49, 273, 280, 282, 285-87 

southern France landing: 281,540-41 

surrender operations: 523n, 529-30 

working relationship with Alexander: 90, 107, 

173,541 

COBRA: 398n 

Coccolia: 395 

Colle Maraccio: 134 

Colle Monaco: 133-34 

Colle d'Onufrio: 78 

Colle Salvetti: 271, 273, 276 

Colle Sant'Angelo Ridge: 77-7H 

Colle di Teto: 34 

Colle di Torrechia: 143-44, 14(;-47. 151, 153 

Colle di Val d'EIsa: 26h-67 

Collecchio: 246 

Colleferro: 171,182, 191, 195 

Colletore delle Acqua Medie: 109 

Collina: 394 

Colonna: 206--07 

Comacchio Lagoon: 403-04, 442, 445, 448-49, 450-

52, 459, 466, 489 

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS): 4--5, II, 228, 258, 

357-60, 391-92,398-99, 400-401, 485, 519, 

535 

Committee of National Liberation (e( N): 233-34 

Como: 502, 506, 519 

Conca River: 317, 339 

Conlev, Capt. Edward J.: 334 

Conselice: 466 

Conventello: 419 

Cook, Lt. Col. Robert L.: 511 

Coreglia Antelminelli: 410 

Coreno: 34 

Cori: 105,109,112,114,116-17,128,135,142--43, 

146-47,149,152-55, 157, 165, 168 

Coriano: 317, 321, 338--41 

Cornia River: 260 

Corsica: 5,24,57,79,247,293, 540 
568 

Cortona: 270 

Cotignola: 418 

Coulter, Maj. Cen. john B.: 23, 65, 69, 74, 89, 95, 

219,240,388 

CRAFTSMAN: 455 

CRAWDAD: 105-06 

Crawford, Lt. Col. Joseph S.: 47, titi, 94, 345, 348, 

350, 384-85, 388 

Cremona: 506 

Crittenberger, Lt. Cen. Willis D.: 2.~-26. Sff atl() 

U.S. Army commands and ()rces, IV Corps. 

attack towards the Po: 319--20,409,421-22,424, 

428, 432 

capture of Leghorn: 271, 27ti, 278 

final offensive: 470, 474, 479, 493, 499, ,~02 

pursuit north 01 Rome: 244, 259-tiO 

Croce: 339 

Cross-Channel attack: 4-6, II, 2ti, 39, 41, 99, 104, 

119, 203, 221, 227, 235, 255, 257-58, 535-36, 

538,541-43 

Cunningham, Admiral Sir John: II 

Cutigliano vallev: 453 

Czechoslovakia: 359, 543 

Daniel, Col. Maurice W.: 121-23, 125, 142-44, 1.~2, 

239 

Danube basin: 5, 25ti-57, 258n, 305, 404,536-<-19 

Darby, Co\. William 0.: 500-502,507,5\0-1 I 

De Gaulle, General Charles: 24, 265, 537-38 

De Larminat, Lt. Cen. Edgard R.M.: 248 

De Monsabert, Maj. Gen. de Goisland: 248 

De Valera, Eamon: 204 

Deception plans: 309, 335-36, 440, 450, 454, 542. 

.'iff a/so HIPPO; NUNTON. 

Deffenbaugh, Lt. Col. Lyle S.: 126 

Denmark: 232, 544 

Dervishian, T. Sgt. Ernest H.: 124n 

Devers, Lt. Cen. jacob L.: 9, 228, 257, 305, 308, 

310,483,507,537,540 

DIADEM: 3, 21, 26, 29, 32, 36-:-18, 45, 6:-1, 75, 77, 

100, 103,105,221-23,228,543 

Dill, Sir John: 399 

Dobbiaco: 532 

D()(h, Maj. Gen. Andre W.: 57, ti~, 249 

Doenitz, Grand Admiral Karl: 484, 521, 526, 529, 

544 

Dollmann, SS Standartenluehrer Eugen: 514, 520-

21,525 

Domenico Ridge: 54, 64-66 

Dora Line: 76, 233, 242, 245, 247 

D'Orsa, Lt. Co\. Charles S.: 244n 

DRAGOON . .'iff ANVIL-DRAGOON. 

Due Torri: 207 

Duff, Brig. Gen. Robinson E.: 492-93,500 

DUKW's: 95-96,497,507-08,510 

Dulaney, Co\. Robert L.: 1:-17 

Dulles,'Allen: 485,514, 514n, 516-21, 523 

Dutko, PIc. John W.: 137n 

Duvall, Lt. Col. Everett W.: 154 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Eagles, Maj. Cen. William W.: 114, 137, 175, 199-

201 

Eaker, Lt. Cen. Ira C.: 11,258 

Eddy, 1st Sgt. Paul ;\I.: 50 

Eisenhower, General Dwight D.: 4, 8-10, 257-58, 

358, 360, 398, 483-84, 538, 544 

EI Alamein: 371, 373 

Elba: 247, 247n 

Elliott, Capt. John: 127 

Elsa vallev: 273, 281, 286 

Empoli: 282-8:-1,302,310 

ENCORE: 425 

Enigma Code: 20, 27, 42n, 79n, 99n, 210, 23ti, 320, 

440, 443, 542 

Era River: 273, 275 

Ernici Mountains: 156 

Ernser, 1st Lt. john: 383-84 

Esino River: 278 

Esperia: 27, 30, 34, 56, 62, 85 

Faenza: 297,341,349,352,371,378,395-97,400-

404,410, 452,4ti3 

"False front" tactic: 107-08, 115, 462-63 

Fantails. SrI' LVTs. 

Farneto: 384 

Fasano: 516 

Fauglia: 276 

Femminamorta Canal: 125, 135-36, 145 

Ferentino: 172, 199, 221 

Ferrara: 284,308,400,448,452,482,489,494-95 

Feuerstein, General der (;ebirgslruppen Valentin: 

18,64, 249--50 

Fidenza: 506 

Finale: 494 

Firenzuola: 300,318,320,337,343,345,347,418 

Fiume: 357-60, 393, 441, 444 

Flensburg: 484 

Florence: 23ti, 241, 259, 268, 270, 279-82, 284-85, 

288-94,300, :-102, 304, :-107, 309, 312, 315, 318, 

340,414-15,463,529 

Foggia: 4, 536, 540 

Foglio River: 300-:-101,304-06,315,317-18 

Foligno: 233, 309 

Fondi: 30, 83, 86, 88-89, 9 I, 93-95, 97 

Fontanelice: 405 

Fontanile !\1ontefiascone: 243 

Forli: 299,341, :-176, :-178, 394-96, 401, 463 

Forme d'Aquino: 28,81-82 

Formia: :-10, 32-34, 36, 46, 76, 83-86, 89 

Formica Creek: 338 

Formlimpopoli: 402 

Forte dei Marmi: 390-91, 422 

Fosdinovo: 483 

FOURTH TERM: 421, 4tiO 

Fowler, Col. David ~I.: 472-73 

Fowler, 2d Lt. Thomas W.: 127n 

Fraile basin: 30 

Franarola: 418 

Frascati: 56, 84, 115, 194, 206-08, 218 
INDEX 

Frederick, Brig. Gen. Robert T.: 114. 117, 137-38. 

211-12,215,218 

French commands and I()rces: 24n, 34, 79, 222 

First Army: 483, 504 

I Corps: 25n, 200 

Expeditionary Corps: 17, 24, 281, 305n. S,op (1/.'" 

Juin, General Alphonse. 

DtADEM: 28, 32-35, 37-38, 40, 43, 45, 47, 

56-64,60,69,71,76-78 

Hitler Line penetration: 82-83, 85-86, 89-

93, 95, 98-99, 542-43 

Lepini Mountains to Rome: 171-72, 181-82, 

190,193-95,212,220-2I,234n 

pursuit north of Rome: 240, 244, 248-49, 

265-07, 273 

and southern France invasion: 228, 236-37. 

250,260.281.287,289 

3d Algerian lnfantrv Division: 24, 91, 195,221, 

240,248,265,281 

27th Alpine Division: 507 

9th Colonial Division: 247 

2d Moroccan lnfantn Division: 24. 57, 59-62, 

182,249.265-66,289 

4th Moroccan Mountain Division: 24, 33-:~4. S7. 

172,182,266,281 

1st Motorized (March) Division: 24, 221. 240, 

248-49, 507 

French government: 538 

Frieda Line: 233, 242, 247, 249, 252-53, 2S6, 268, 

270. 279 

Frigido River: 461 

Frosinone: :35,40,98,171, 182-B3, 192 

Fry, Col. James C.: 47-48. 72, 95, 34S46, 348, 

3S0-52, 38S 

FIU,hra RiPf("" SI'P Hitler Line. 

Fuhon, Capt. William B.: 335 

Furr, Maj. Charles P.: 53 

Futa Pass: 300, 318, 320-25, 336-37. 343-45. 364, 

442 

Gaeta: 30, 76, 89. 9S 

Gaevernitz. Gero von: 514. 516, S19, 521. 523-24 

Gaiano Canal: 469 

Galeata: 376 

Galla Placidia Line: 301 

Gallicano: 409-10, 422 

Gah, Capt. William Wylie: 180n 

Gardella Hill: 196 

Gargnano: 510 

Gari River: 16, 16n, 27 

Garigliano River: 14, 16, 27, 230 

British bridgehead be}(lIld: 4-5, 17.40, 4S, 287 

DIADEM: 3,22-24,30,34,37,43,46,60,99, 145, 

191. 294 

Genazzano: 207 

Genghis Khan Line: 403, 442, 466-67, 469, 483 

Genoa: 220, 283-84, 293-94, 297, 299, 303, 420. 

4S4,499, 503, S07 

Genzano: 2()2 

German commands and forces 

Luillolle f1: 12 

Luftwaffe: 12, 12n, 39-41. 99.116,391. 456 

Naval Command, Italv: 12 

569 

OB 5ufdwesl: II, 12~, 39, 79, 514, 519, 528 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW): 8, 12, 12n, 

514 

capitulation operations: 516 

control of reserve forces: 40n, 80, III. 151. 

403 

headquarters dispersed: 484-8S 

messages deciphered by British: 20,210,221, 

236 

and Rome as an open city: 203-06, 210 

withdrawal operations: 99. IS6, 177, 206. 

241-42,270,438-39 

Oberlwmmando des Heeres (OKH): 8, 12, 12n, 20 

Reichssicherhl'ithauptaml (RSHA): 513. 52S 

Waflen-55: 12,39,439 

Wehrmacht!uehrung'tab (WFSt); 7-8, 12, 12n, 360 

Army Group B: 299 

Army Group C: 56, 103, 223. 5N al.lf) Kesselring, 

Ceneralfeldmarschall Albert; Vietinghoff, (;eneraloberst Heinrich (;ottfried von. 

command of: 12, 18,387,419-20,437 

defense south of Rome: 37, 39, 80, 84, 86, 

156-57,177,197 

final defense and capitulation: 462, 466, 468, 

48S, 504-0S, S15-I7, SI9-2I, 523.525-27, 

529 

Gothic Line and Po Valley: 302-03, 315, 322. 

346,382,403,420,437-41 

messages deciphered by British: 20, 79n, 210 

Rome evacuation and "ithdra"al: 206, 210, 

228,230,232-33,241-42,262 

Arm)' GroupE. 357, 3S9, 441. S05, 516, 521. 543 

Army Group G. 303,505,521,525, S32, 544 

Arm)' Group Center: S43-44 

Arm, Group South: 543 

Army Group 1'011 Zal1gen: 12, 19, 38n, 39, 223, 

293n, 303 

T(,l1lh .1r1l1l': 29, :\9, 39n, 56. S"" "/.10 1.l'llwlscn. 

Ceneraf del' PalllCrlrUppen Joachim; Vielingholt, Celleraloberst Heinrich (;oufril'd \'011. 

Allied plans to trap south of Rome: 19, 27, 

37-38,42. 104-06, 112, 119, 16,1 

command of: 12, 18, 208, 232, 387, 419n 

defense on the southern front: 75,77, 79-80, 

84, 86. 9S, 98-99, 104. 139-40, IS I-52 

final defense and capitulation: 462,467, 469, 

484, S04, 512 

Cothic Linl' and Po Valley: 301-04, 308, :HO. 

315-16, 320-22. :\39, 341, 344-47, :~5:\, 

361, :~66, :n4-75, 382, 387. 390, 3%, 40:1, 

420, HI. 445 

withdra"ai from southern front: 157, IS9, 

166-67, 172, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198-200, 

207-08,210,221. 223, 223n, 229, 231, 

236,241, 249-S0, 262 
570 

Cerman commands and fc)rces-Continued 

Fourtfenth Army. Sff also Lemelsen, General 

Panzertruppen Joachim; Mackensen, Generaloberst Eberhard von. 

Anzio breakout: 19, 98, 103-04, 107-08, 

139-40,150-151,167,169,177-78 

Arno valley and (;othic Line: 302, 320-22, 

344, 347, 349, 353, 361, 366, 375, 382, 

408,410,420,439,442 

Caesar Line: 156-58, 189-90, 194-96, 200-

201 

command of: 12,231,374,387,408, 419n 

defense north of Rome: 231, 261-62, 265, 

274-75, 292-93 

DIADEM defense strength: 18, 39, 39n, 86, 

III 

fmal defense and capitulation: 471, 476, 484, 

493, 504, 507, 512, 527 

withdrawal from Rome: 204, 206-08, 221, 

223, 223n, 229, 231-32, 236, 239, 241-42, 

249-50 

Ninetl'mth Arm)': 544 

Arm~ Kurland:' 437,543 

Arm)· ()st-Prew,lfn: 543 

LXXIII Corps: 420 

LXXV Corps: 303 

LXXVII Cmps: 12 

XCVII Corp,l: 420,441 

LI Mountain Corp,l: 18, 56, 64, 99, 232, 249-50. 

Sff allo Feuerstein, General der Cebirgstruppen 

Valentin. 

Arno and Gothic Line: 302, 315, 321, 325, 

346, 387n, 408, 420, 442 

final deknse: 471, 493, 495, 499, 527 

XIV Panza Corps: 18, 18n, 42, 60. SI'f allo Senger 

und Etterlin, Generalleutnant Fridolin von. 

defense north of Rome: 232, 249-50, 261-

62, 264, 274-75 

final defense: 471, 474, 484, 492, .~04-0.~, 

507, 526-27, 529 

Gothic l.ine and Po Valley: 302, 322, 346, 

354,369,382,387,390,408,413,420,442 

Gustav and Hitler Lines: 40, 56, 59, 62, 64, 

69--70, 73, 75, 84, 86, 103 

Liri valley withdrawal: 99, 157-58, 181, 190, 

194-96, 198, 209--10 

[XXVI Panzfr Corps: 18, Ill, 138, 419n. Ser allo 

Herr, Ceneralleutnant der Panzertruppen 

Traugott; Schwerin, C;eneral der Panzertruppen Gerhard eraf von. 

Anzio breakout: 127,138-40, 151 

Arno and Gothic Line: 302, 314-16, 36G, 

377,403,405,420,441 

Caesar Line: 157, 184-85, 189--90, 194-95, 

201,208,232,250,279 

final defense: 463, 467-68, 484, 494-95, 498, 

503-04, 527 

I Pauu,hute Corps. SrI' also Schlemm, Ceneral der 

Flieger Alfred, 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

(;erman commands and forces-Continued 

I PaI'(Jrhutr Corpl-Continued 

Anzio breakout: 18, III, 127, 137, 139-41, 

144,150-51 

Arno valley and Gothic Line: 289, 292, 302, 

321, 325, 337, 346, 349, 354, 364, 366, 

382, 384, 387-88, 420, 441 

Caesar Line: 158, 163-67, 177-80, 184-85, 

189, 196,200-201,207-08,232,262, 265, 

268, 275 

final defense: 463,465-67,484, 494-95, 503, 

527 

Group Goerlitz: 232 

Group HaU/,k: 18, 232 

Group Klotz: 505, 507 

Group Srhrirkl'T: 505, 507 

GTlJUp Steinmftz: 505, 507 

Croup Willhofft: 302 

Hamann COl'Ting Dh,ision: 39, 39n, 40-41, Ill, 

151-52,157-58 

Caesar Line: 164-65, 168-70, 172-73, 184-

85,188,193-94,207,232 

defense north of Rome: 250, 268, 2i9, 289 

34th Di"ilion: 293n, 303 

44th Dh'isi!m: 232 

65th Di"ision: III, 150, 166, 177,232, 302, 365-

66,369-70,382,413,442,478 

71st Dh'ision: 18,46-47,59--62,64-65,69--70,76, 

86,89,157,278,302,316 

92d Dil'i,ion: 1:,9.152-54.158,177,201,232,255 

!Nth f)il'i,ioll,' 18, 157 

Amo and Po Valley: 302,366,371,375,382 

final defense: 442,471-74, 478, 492 

Gusta\ Line: 4!i-48. 55, 60. 64-65, 69-73, 

7:;-7!i, 84. 94 

98th Dh'isioll: 302, 316, 353, 365, 403, 441. 463-

64,467 

148th Dil,ilion: 303,406,408,422,499 

232d Di"isioll: 428, 431-33, 442, 506 

275th Dil,ilion: 306 

278th Dil'ision: 19, 232, 278, 302, 313, 418, 420. 

441,467,469,494 

305th Dil'ilion: 18,80,209,232,302,379.478 

334th Di"ision: 18 

Caesar Line: 80, 166-67, 177, 194, 207, 2.~2 

Po Vall,,\: 3:;4.379. :182, 442, 471. 473 

Trasimeno Line and Arno defense: 268, 279, 

289, 302, 346 

356th Dil'ilion: 19. 157, 232. 2:;2, 265. 289. 302, 

317, :121, 419 

362d Di.,'ision 

Anzio breakout: I II, 127-28, 139-40, 143-

44,150-51,153,157-58, Iti4, 166 

Amo anI Po \'alle\: :,02. :,4!i-47, :,:;4, 3h4-

6!i, :170, 41 :', 441 

Caesar Line: 179, 184, 200-20 I. 208. 232 

final defense: 4!i4-!i5. 4!i7-!i8. 494 

ilOtli f)il'i,ioll: 420 
INDEX 

German commands and ((liTes-Continued 

715th Di1';'lioll 

Anzio breakout: III, 128, 138-39, 150-54, 

157-58 

Amo and Gothic Line: 289, 302, 321-22, 

325, 346,347n, 379 

Caesar Line and Rome defense: 166, 171, 

184-85, 194, 207. 232 

42d Jaeger Division: 157n, 293n, 303, 441. 465-68 

1141h Jaeger Dil·ision: 18. 232, 302 

144th Jaeger Dipision: 18 

714th Jaeger Division: 418, 430, 433, 442 

19th Luliwal/e Field Dipision: 249, 260. 262. 273-

74 

20th Lu/ill'alle Field Division: 232, 239, 249, 262. 

265, 274, 302 

5th Mountain Division: 18. 232, 302-03. 406-07 

8th Mountain Dil'ision: 442, 478 

157th Mountain Division: 303. 406 

188th Mountain Division: 19 

15th Panzer Division: 18n 

16th Panzer Division: 94 

26th Panzer Division: 19, 40, 80, I II. 151. 536 

Amo and Gothic Line: 302. 315-18, 321, 

406, 441. 452 

final defense: 463-65, 467. 495. 498 

Hitler Line: 82,86,89.91 

Rome defense and withdrawal: 207, 209, 

232, 249, 262. 265, 274 

3d Panzer Grenadier Division: 19, 80, III, 137. 

150.166.179,199,232.239.315 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division: 18, 18n, 91. 208, 

279. 289, 302 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division: 19, 40. 80. 86, 89. 

94,97,151 

Amo and Po Valley: 264-65, 302, 316-18, 

321,340, 375. 38(~82, 433. 438. 440 

final defense: 462, 466-68.495, 498 

Rome withdrawal defense: 111,190,232,249 

90th Panzer Grenadier Division: 19, 40, 62. 80, 232 

Alban Hills: 196-97,200,207,249,263,265 

Amo and Gothic Line: 275, 303, 375, 380, 

382, 386-87, 403. 442 

final defense: 462.471,476.481.483 

Hitler and Caesar Lines: 64, 78, 82, 91-92, 

167 

1st Parachute Division 

Amo and Po Valley: 289.302,306.316-17, 

341,405,413.441.478,494 

defense north of Rome: 232. 252. 268, 279 

Monte Cassino withdrawal: 18, 68, 77-78. 82, 

92, 200 

4th Parachute Division: III, 150. 166. 207. 232, 

265 

Amo and Po Valley: 289,302.321-22,325, 

337,346,354.364-65,370,441,452 

final defense: 465,467.469.494,501 

44th Reichsgrenadier Divi,ion: 18, 18n. 64, 82. 232, 

302. 346n, 346-47, 351. 353 

Cerman commands and forces-Continued 

188th Reseme Division: 302 

42d Rille Dil';lioll: 413 

571 

16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division: 80, 157n, 247-

48, 262, 302. 321-22. 371, 375, 381-82, 406, 

420 

162d Turkomen Division: 19, 232, 246, 262, 302, 

316,442.459 

51st Artillery Regzment: 408 

362d Artille,)' Regiment: 143 

1048th Artillery Regiment: 408 

29th Field Replacement Ballalion: 207 

232d FUlilier Balla/ion: 429 

Grenadier Lehr Brigade: 325. 336 

8th Grenadier Regiment: 80 

191st Grenadier Regiment: 59 

1027th Grenadier Regiment: 80 

117th In/antry Regiment: 365 

285th In/antry Regiment: 408-09 

286th In/antry Regiment: 408-09, 422 

954th In/antry Regiment: 128. 143 

955th In/antry Regiment: 128.147. 155 

956th In/antry Regiment: 128 

1043d In/antry Regiment: 431 

1044th In/antry Regiment: 429 

1099th In/antry Regiment: 201 

Millenll'ald Mountain War/tITe School Bllllalion: 303, 

408-09 

4th Mountain Balllllion: 303, 408-09 

508th Panzer Batta/ion: 138, 158 

1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 193 

2d Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 193 

15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 433 

29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 137 

200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 62.476 

361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 64,476,483 

11 th Parachute Regiment: 177, 207 

12th Parachute Regzment: 140,201.325-26 

Rome Police Battalion: 201 

190th RI'(O/llla;I\{lIIrf Balla/ioll: 476 

Cesso Ridge: 3(;(; 

Ciulianello: 112, 122. 142, 152-53, 158, 168, 195 

Codo: 401-02 

Gorgognano: 478 

Gotenstellung. See Gothic Line. 

Gothic Line: 231, 242n 

Allied attack plans: 236, 241. 256, 258, 268, 280, 

284,298,304-05,307-08.310 

breakthrough: 286, 316, 320-22. 330. 335, 337-

40, 353-54. 361, 364, 370. 373, 406, 447, 499, 

537 

German plans and fortifications: 231-32. 242. 

210,280,284,291,299--302,311,314-16,318, 

322,325-26.366,390,421.442,460 

Coums. Sf!' Tabors. 

Gran Sasso d'ltalia: 13. 22, 233, 243 

GRASSHOPPER: 105 

Graziani, Marshal Rudolfo: 293, 303, 420. 442-43, 

506.512,519 
57'2 

Greece: 357, 360--61, 378, 394-95, 400, 403, 411, 

444, 446, 540 

Greek 3d Mountain Brigade: 338-39, 340n, 342, 

361 

Greiner, Generalleutnant Heinz: 151, 157, 200 

Grosseto: 233, 244-48, 250-52, 254, 256, 259-60, 

470 

Gruenther, Maj. Gen. Alfred M.: 9, 99, 173, 210, 

227n, 306,463, 529 

Guastalla: 494 

Guillaume, Brig. Gen. Augustine: 24n, 57 

Gustav Line 

assault on and breakthrough: 28, 37, 44, 59, 61-

65,69,73-78, 81-82, 99, 222 

terrain and fortifications: 16-19,29,69, 156, 164, 

228, 230-31, 278, 294 

Hague Convention: 204, 206 

Hall, S. Sgt. George J.: 124n 

Harding, Sir John: 163 

Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N.: 112-14, 121, 125-

27, 143, 152, 166, 175, 180-81, 202, 219-20, 

239, 260-61, 265, 285 

Harmon, Sgt. Roy W.: 275n 

Hartmann, General der Artillerie Walter: 60, 64-

65, 69, 75-76 

Hauck, Generalleutnant Friedrich Wilhelm: 18 

Hauser, Generalmajor Wolf-Ruediger: 108 

Hawkesworth, Lt. Gen. J.L.T.: 498n 

Hays, Maj. Gen. George P.: 415, 425, 428, 432-33, 

474,492-93,499--500,507-08,510,529,532 

Heidrich, Generalmajor Richard: 306 

Heinrich Mountain Line: 293 

HERBSTNEBEL: 439, 484, 489 

Herr, Gencralleutnant der Panzertruppen Traugott: 138, 419n, 441. Sff a/\{) German COIllmands and forces, TI'II/II Ami)'; LXXVI Pallzn 

Corp.l. 

Anzio breakout and Caesar Line: 138-40, 157-58, 

184-85, 189, 208 

Rome to the Alps: 232, 250, 314, 316, 340, 342, 

462-63, 466-67, 469, 526-27 

Hewitt, Admiral H. Kent: II 

Higdon, Sgt.Joseph D.,Jr.: 331 

Highway I: 230, 233, 237-38, 240, 244-46, 248, 

259-60,271,461,483 

Highway 2: 237, 239--40, 248, 259, 262, 265, 289-

90 

Highway 3: 233, 240-41, 309 

Highway 4: 233, 241, 250 

Highway 6: 100, 109, 221, 541 

advance to Rome: 206-09, 211-12, 214, 216 

attack plans: 27-29,35,37-38, 104-07, 112, 114, 

116-18,122,128,163,191 

Eighth Army attack on: 44, 77, 82, 92, 172, 182-

83,192 

Fifth Army attack on: 89, 93, 98, 142, 156-58, 

165-73, 184, 190, 194-99 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Highway 7: 30, 75, 100, 109-10,219,229 

attack on: 8fi-87, 91, 95, 97, 129-32, 138-40, 

142-48, 188-91, 200-202 

attack plallS: 33-:~5, 74, 83, 104, 106-07, 112, 

114, I Hi, 186, 190 

Highway 9: 299, 308, 322, 411, 426 

final offensive: 448, 450-52, 464, 467-69, 475, 

482, 499, 503 

initial attack on: 344,351,361,376-79,382,389, 

395-96,400-401,403-06,412 

Highwav 12: 300, 382, 446, 489, 492, 503-04, 507, 

532 

Highway 14: 446 

Highway 16: 278, 308, 377, 394, 401-02, 404, 446, 

450, 464-65, 468, 482 

Highway 46: 507 

Highway 53: 506 

Highwav 62: 483,489,492,499 

Highway 63: 499 

Highway 64: 300, 371, 426-27, 432-34, 446, 454-

55,477,479 

Highway 65: 298, 300 

attack on: 362-63, 365-67, 370, 381-83, 385, 

390-400,433,479,482 

plans fc)r attack on: 318, 320-21, 324-25, 343-44, 

352-54, 405, 448-49, 454-55, 477-78 

Highway 67: 308, 395 

Highway 69: 288 

Highway 70: 288 

Highway 71: 241, 249, 252, 268-69, 279, 288 

Highway 82: 31, 183, 192 

Highway 439: 261 

Highway 934: 371 

Highway 6521: 371 

Highway 6620: 318,371 

Hill 77: 135-36 

Hill 79: 76 

Hill 81: 136 

Hill 103: 66,68 

Hill 105: 55 

Hill 108: 74-76 

Hill 109: 55, 66-69 

Hill 126: 66, 68 

Hill 128: 66 

Hill 131: 55, 66-69 

Hill 203: 179-81 

Hill 209: 179-81 

Hill 216: 179 

Hill 316: 47,65 

Hill 401: 380 

Hill 459: 385 

Hill 568: 385-88, 3~) 

Hill 578: 363, 367 

Hill 581: 384 

Hill 592: 368-70 

Hill 739: 56, 60-61 

Hill 860: 472 

Hill 903: 473-74 

Hill 931: 186,188 
INDEX 

Himmler, Heinrich: 514--17 

HIPPO: 115, 117, 141 

Hitler: 12n 

and "false front" tactic at Anzio: 107-08, 115, 462 

final days: 443,484-85,517,526 

f()rbids destruction of Tiber brid~es: 203, 210 

and Cothic Line construction and defense: 300, 

320, 374 

and Italian campai~n strate~\: 6--8, 39, 80, 99, 

156--57,203, 242, 403, 410,438-39,462,469, 

485, 536, 539 

and senior commanders: 42, 190, 437, 439, 498, 

515,521 

Hitler Line 

Ei~hth Army attack: 44, 77-78, 85, 92, 98 

Fifth Army attack: 86,91-93,95,99 

fortifications of: 17-19, 59, 81-83, 96, 339 

German withdrawal to: 64, 71, 88--89 

plans for attack on: 28--29, 34--35, 56, 82, 89-91 

Hofer, Franz: 517-18, 520--21, 525 

Howze, Col. Hamilton: 152-53, 169-70, 194, 216. 

See also U.S. Army commands and forces, Task 

Force Howze. 

Hughes, Col. Oliver W.: 54, 74--75,97 

Humberto, Crown Prince: 233-34 

Hume, Brig. Gen. Edgar E.: 227n, 234 

Hungary: 358-59,419,437 

HUSKY: 539 

Husmann, Max: 513,518-19 

Idice River: 363-67, 378--79, 381, 388, 442, 466, 

478,482 

II (;io~o Pass: 300, 318, 320-29, 33.~-38, 341, 344, 

346, 353 

Imola: 300, 320, 343-46, 351-53, 385, 400, 405-06, 

411-12,418,451,466--67 

Impruneta: 289 

Inciso in Valdarno: 288 

Indian Army forces: 20, 26 

4th Indian Division: 269,280,288, 317, 376, 378, 

394 

8th Indian Division: 44, 63-64, 90, 182, 221, 241, 

268,288-90,310, 349, 371, 405, 408--10, 412, 

417-18, 418n, 450, 452, 464-65, 495, 503 

10th Indian Division: 269,280,288,376--78,394-

96,404,451,467,469,482 

17th Indian Brigade: 412, 418n 

19th Indian Brigade: 409 

43d Indian Bri~ade: 404, 451 

Inman, Capt. Lloyd J.: 329-32 

Innsbruck: 443, 520-21 

Isola Bella: 130,133-34,152 

Isonzo River: 441, 443, 516, 521, 532 

Istia d'Ombrone: 247 

Italian forces (Allied): 26,415 

Corps of Liberation: 253, 269, 278, 309 

Cremona Battle Group: 419, 450, 452, 504 

Folgore Battle Group: 451 

Friuli Battle Group: 451 

I talian forces (Allied)-Continued 

Gruppo Combattimento: 29 

573 

Legnano Combat Croup: 415, 453, 456, 478-79, 

482, 506 

28th Garibaldi Brigade: 402,450 

Italian forces (Cerman Army): 247n 

Army Group Liguria: 420 

Ligurian Army: 293, 293n, 303, 442-43, 506, 512 

Corps Lomhardia: 420 

ftalia Bersaglieri Division: 499 

Monte Rosa Mountain Division: 303,390,406,408 

San Marco Division: 303, 406 

Italian ~overnment: 3,233-34,514,519 

Italian Riviera: 293 

Itri: 18, 30-31, 33-36, 46, 73, 83-84, 86-89, 91, 93-

94 

izenour, Lt. Col. Frank M.: 145 

jewish Hebron Brigade: 451 

.Jodi, Ceneraloberst Alfred: 468 

johnson, Maj. Gen. Harry H.: 227n 

Johnson, Pic, Oscar C.: 333-35 

joint Chiefs of Staff OCS): 4, 6, 77, 255, 257, 357 

juin, General Alphonse: 24, 33-35, 56--57, 59-61, 

83, 93, 171-72, 248, 266, 538. See a/.\o French 

commands and forces, Expeditionary Corps. 

Kaltenbrunner, Ernst: 515,517,521,525 

Kangaroos: 451 

Kearton, lSi LI. John c.: 330 

Keightley, Maj. Cen. C.F.: 396,403-04,450. See also 

British Army commands and forces, 5 Corps. 

Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm: 12n 

Kendall, Maj. Gen. Paul W.: 94, 345-46, 348, 367, 

383-84, 387-89 

Kendall, Lt. Col. Raymond E.: 48, 50--52, 52n 

Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Albert: 6-7, 11-

12, 12n, 40n, 387,419,437,484,5\4. Sec a/lo 

German commands and forces, OB SUedll'fs/; 

Armv Group C. 

Anzio breakout: 37, 139-40, 150-52, 157-58 

assessment as a commander: 539-40, 542 

Caesar Line: 140, 164, 166-07, 169, 177, 180, 

185, 189-90, 196-20 I 

concern about Allied airborne and amphibious 

operations: 60, 79-80, 107,241,251,275,293-

94 

final defense and capitulation: 443, 485, .~05, 

520-21, 525-26, 528-29 

(;othic Line: 300-303, 307, 309, 311, 315-16, 

3\9-22, 325, 337, 346, 341-42, 353-54, 357-

61,366, :182, 411 

Gustav and Hitler Lines: 17, 19,59-60,62, 71, 

77,79,84,86,89,94,97,99, 104 

problems with his commanders and with Hitler: 

42, 42n, 94, UJ7-08, 139-41, 151-52 169 177 

185, 189-90, 525, 527 ' . , , 

reaction to Allied deception plans: 18--19, 21, 40, 

79-80,139 
574 

Kesselring. (;eneralfeldmarschall Alhert--

Continued 

winter stalemate operations: 420, 432-33, 438-39. 

443 

withdrawal through Rome to the Arno: 203. 205-

08. 210. 228. 230-33. 236. 239, 241-42. 249, 

255.262. 268. 270, 283-84, 291-92 

Kessler, Pfe. Patrick 1..: 137n 

Keyes, Maj, Gen. Geoffrey: 23, 32n. 33, 35, 71, 73-

74, 76, 83, 88-89. 95. Spp allV V,S. Army 

commands and forces, II Corps. ' 

attack in the Alhan Hills to Rome: 65-66, 182, 

185,192-94.215-16,239 

Gothic Line: 320-21. 323-25. 334. 344. 347-48. 

352.363-67,370, 378-79. 381, 383. 385.388-

89.477-79,493 

Kirkman, Lt. Gen. Sidney C.: 22,44.63.241,268. 

280, 288-89, 309, 385. Sep also British Army 

commands and fOITes. 13 Corps. . 

Klagenfurt: 443 

Lahico: 156,168-69,194. 196 

Ladino: 395 

Laiatico: 275 

Lake Boisena: 233. 248 

Lake Garda: 443-44, 453. 499. 502, 504-05, 507, 

511,525,529,531 

Lake Nemi: 189, 200-202 

Lake Trasimeno: 231, 233, 241. 249, 252. 267-68. 

270,288,450 

l.ama: 422 

Lama di Sollo Ridge: 422 

1.' Americano: 120 

Lamone River: 371. 396-97. 401-05, 411 

Landeck: 443 

Lanuvio: 110. 166. 173-75, 177. 179-82. 190. 199-

200. 202. 208 

l.a Poggiana: 290 

Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B.: 9 

La Spezia: 294. 297, 303. 406, 421-22. 449, 461, 

483 

La Spezia-Bologna-Rayenna line: 359-60. 391, 400 

La Villa: 132,144-45 

Lavino River: 471,474,476 

L'Azuila: 23~{ 

Lecco: 506 

l.eese. Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver: 9, 28, :{73n. 444. 447 

SPf also British Armv commands and forces. 

Eighth Army, ' 

Arno and Gothic Line: 289,303-08. 310-18, ~~21. 

338-39 

DIADEM: 63, 77. 82, 90. 92.192 

l.ake Trasimeno Line: 252-53, 267-69. 279 

Leghorn: 184,261.273.281-82 

capture of: 267,269.274-77.286.291 

plans filr attack on: 236.256.270-71 

port facilities and operations: 276.279,285, 312, 

372, 407, 41~ 414. 417 

Legnano: 445.492.499.502 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Lemelsen, General der Panzertruppen Joachim: 

190,231.251,275.292-94,374,382,387, 

419n. Spp at", (;erman commands and forces. 

]pn/II Arm,,,, f'oIJr/prn/h Amn, 

defense souih of the Arno: 261. 264, 275 

(;othic Line: 318-19,322,325.33637,346,353, 

366. 369 

Po Valley defense and capitulation: 456. 478, 

493. 525-27 

Lemnitler, Brig, Gen. l.vman L: 306. 515. 521. 

523, 540 

Lenola: 31. 89. 99 

Lepini Mountains: 93, 105, 109-10, 112, 1\4, 138. 

140, 151. 153-54, 156-57, 171-72, 181-82. 191 

Lieb. Generalleutnant Theohald: 303 

Lima Creek: 390 

Linville, LI. Col. Robert R,: 126-n, 142 -43 

Liri River: 14, 18-19. 27-28, 33, 44, 63, 92, 109, 

294 

Uri valle\': 4. 32n, 64. Ser also Gustav Line~ Hitler 

Line 

attack to open: 63. 70, 77-78, 80, 85, 89, 91-93. 

98-99. 156, 192. 199.222 

German defense of: 40. 59, 62. 82, 94 

and Rome: 14. 19-20. 22-23, 27-:38, 40. 56. 104-

OS. 112 

Littoria: 105, 108-09. 120 

Livergnano: 363-70. 381, 383 

Uvesav. Maj. Gen, William (;.: 275. 323-24. 334, 

365. 367-69 

Ljubljana Cap: 257-58. :~93. 441. 443. 537 

Lloyd, Air Vice ~larshal Sir Hugh p,: 11 

Loehr, Generalohers! Alexander: 516, 521 

Logistics, Allied: 9.5,\8-39 

ammunition supph: 389.391.397.412.410-17 

Anzio beachhead supply build-up: 110-17 

final offensive suppll huild-up: 414-15. 456-57 

gasoline and oil supph: 116n, 229-30. 402, 244-

45,312.364 

port operations: 229-30. 245. 260-61. 267, 276 

79,285,312.543 

Logistics. (~rman: 20. I I I. 188. 439-40 

Loiano: 363-65 

Lombard plain: 292. 297-99. 385. 426. 446. 479. 

482-83.489.502.506.536 

Longasrrino: 465 

Lucca: 236, 282-84. 291, 293. 298. :~04. 306, 319-

20.408-09.412.414 

I.ucerne: 51:~-\4. 518-19 

Lugo: 451-52 

Lugo Canal: 4t)4-65 

LVTs: 449-50, 452. 459. 465-66. 468. 543 

Mac Arthur. General Douglas: .~ 

McCreen. l.t. (;en, Sir R.L.: 22. 32n. :{07. :~73. 

373~, 376-77. 394-96. 401. 418-19. 446. 448-

52.454.462.465.467.494.497. 512, SI'P (II\{) 

British Arm\' commands and forces. Eighth 

Arm\': 10 C()~pS, 
INDEX 

McGarr, Col. Lionel c.: 135-36, 145 

Mackensen, Generaloberst Eberhard von: 12, 86, 

94, 107-08, 139--41, 144, 150-52, 156-58, 163-

54, 169, 177-78, 181, 185, 189-90, 200-201, 

207-08, 231. Sef al.\o German commands and 

forces, Four/em/h Arm\,. 

MacMakin, 1st LI. Garvin' c.: 68-69 

McSwain, 1st LI. Harold V.: 51 

Magill, Col. W.F.: 325-26, 334 

Magliano: 246, 377 

Magrath, Pfe. John D.: 472 

MALLORY MAJOR: 283-84, 285, 322 

Mantua: 445,492,499,501 

Marano River: 338-41 

Maranola: 76, 83-88 

Marecchia River: 314, 338-40, 342-43, 378 

Marina Canal: 468 

Marina di Pisa: 281-82 

Marradi-Faenza road: 402, 405 

Marseilles: 257,541 

Marshall, Col. Alfred C., Jr.: 215-15 

Marshall, General George c.: 23, 104-05, 228, 257-

58, 257n, 308, 357, 361-62, 373-74, 424, 538, 

541 

Marzeno River: 396 

Mascarenhas de Morales, Maj. Gen. J.B.: 390,397 

Maschia San Biagio: 146 

Maschio d' Ariano: 186, 188, 193, 195 

Maschio dell' Artemisio: 186, 188 

Massa: 300, 390, 422, 449, 460-61, 483 

Massa Lombarda: 451-52,465-66 

Mattarello: 526 

Matthews, Maj. Milton A.: 72 

Medicina: 452, 467, 469, 482 

Medola: 377,394 

Meendsen-Bohlken, Vice Admiral Wilhelm: 12 

Melfa River: 92, 99, 155 

Menate: 465 

Merano: 532 

Mestre: 299,511 

Metauro River: 270, 30 I, 304-05, 313-14 

Mezzano: 40 I, 404 

Michelstellung: 476,480 

Mignano: 230 

Mikkelson, LI. Col. William: 55 

Milan: 283, 299, 303, 500, 506, 513 

Miller, LI. Col. Virgil R.: 450 

Mills, Pvl. James H.: 147n 

Minturno: 4, 16, 23-24, 30, 45-46, 48-50, 52-55, 

66-67 

Mirandola: 492 

Misa River: 305-06 

Model, Field Marshal Walter: 535 

Modena: 299,304,453,456,462,471,492,494-95, 

503 

Modigliana: 396 

Molazzana: 408-10 

Mole Canal: 114,121,125,143 

Moletta River: 110, 181 

Monaco: 507 

Monghidoro: 354, 362-65 

Mongiorgio: 480 

Monte Abate: 24 

Monte Acuto: 346, 348 

575 

Monte Adone: 378-79, 381, 383, 385, 390, 454, 

456, 477-78 

Monte Albano: 298, 319--20 

Monte Alto: 95 

Monte Altuzzo: 324-28, 334-35, 345 

Monte Arrestino: 114, 149, 151-53, 156, 165 

Monte Artemisio: 110, 184-86, 188-93, 195, 199-

201,260 

Monte d' A vigo: 477 

Monte Bastione: 353-54 

Monte Battaglia: 348-54, 371, 384-85 

Monte Belmonte: 378-81,383-85,390,453,477-78 

Monte Belvedere: 24, 427-32, 434, 438, 453, 455, 

461 

Monte Bracchi: 46-49, 55, 65, 71 

Monte Bruguana: 461 

Monte Cairo: 14,16,18,28 

Monte Calvi: 326 

Monte Campese: 30, 73, 75, 84-85 

Monte Canda: 353-54 

Monte Capello: 348-51 

Monte Carnevale: 348-50 

Monte Cassino: 3-4, 14, 16-18, 205 

failure to capture: 19--20, 24, 77-78, 82, 186n, 

543 

final assault on: 22, 28-29, 32, 43-44, 56, 63-64, 

77-78, 90 

Monte Cassino abbey: 3, 28, 44, 63, 77-78, 205, 463 

Monte Castelazzo: 385, 388 

Monte Castellaccio: 195 

Monte della Castellana: 432-33 

Monte Castellari: 365 

Monte Castellera: 405 

Monte Castello: 431-32 

Monte Castiglione Maggiore: 279 

Monte Cauala: 391,461 

Monte Cavo: 110, 186,201 

Monte Ceracoli: 65, 72 

Monte Cerrere: 383-85, 388, 397 

Monte Cerri: 47, 71-72 

Monte Ciannelli: 47 

Monte Civita: 59--70,73 

Monte della Commundo: 56 

Monte Compatri: 206-07 

Monte Croce: 475 

Monte della Croce: 345-46 

Monte Damiano: 47, 56n, 65, 71, 94 

Monte Faggeto: 85 

Monte Faito: 59--61 

Monte Fammera: 56-57,62 

Monte Fano: 381, 385 

Monte Feuci: 61-62 
576 

Monte la Fine: 345,347 

Monte Fiori: 197 

Monte della Formiche: 365-67,369,378,381 

Monte Fragolita: 461 

Monte Frassino: 335n 

Monte Garofano: 56,60-61 

Monte Gorgolesco: 429-30 

Monte Grande: 83-84, 86-88, 94, 378-79, 381, 

383-86,388,390,397,418,441,451 

Monte Grande d'Aiano: 432-34 

Monte Gridolfo: 301,316 

Monte lIirio: 157 

Monte Juga: 23-24, 34, 45, 59 

Monte Justo: 209 

Monte Leano: 97 

Monte Maggiore: 395 

Monte Majo massif: 14, 16, 23, 28, 32-35, 38, 56-

57, 59-63, 65-66, 69-70, 76, 78, 91 

Monte Mantino: 455,471,474 

Monte Milano: 477 

Monte Moneta: 86--87 

Monte del Montrono: 56 

Monte Mosca: 471,475-77 

Monte Oggioli: 353-54 

Monte Ornito: 23, 59 

Monte d'Oro: 32-34, 56 

Monte Orso tunnel: 230 

Monte Penitro: 75 

Monte Pero: 455 

Monte Petrella massif: 18,30,33-35,38,47-48,52, 

56,66,71,73,77,83,109 

Monte Pigna: 454-55, 471, 473-75 

Monte Pisano: 282, 298, 307, 310, 319-20 

Monte Porzio Catone: 206 

Monte Pratolungo: 348 

Monte del Puntale: 348 

Monte Righetti: 474 

Monte Rotondo: 47, 71-72 

Monte Ruazzo: 83-84 

Monte San Michele: 476, 480-BI 

Monte San Pietro: 481 

Monte San Rinaldo: 402 

Monte San Stefano: 97 

Monte Sant'Angelo: 83-84,97, 105 

Monte Scauri: 69, 75-76 

Monte Sole: 454-56,477-79 

Monte Spaduro: 385, 388 

Monte della Spe: 432-33, 471 

Monte Spicchione: 472 

Monte Stanco: 371 

Monte Tano: 20 I 

Monte delle Tombe: 366 

Monte della Torraccia: 427,429-32 

Monte Trocchio: 29, 127 

Monte Turlitto: 23 

Monte Valbura: 432, 434 

Monte Verruca: 324 

Monte della Vigna: 378,381 

Monte Vano: 409 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Montecalderaro: 385 

Montecalvo: 316 

Montecatini: 415, 418n 

Montecchio: 402 

Montecuccoli: 384 

Montefortino: 396 

Montegrosso: 376 

Montelupo: 290-91 

Montepastore: 475-76 

Monterenzio hill mass: 364, 366--67 

Monterumici hill mass: 366,370,390,456,477-79 

Montese: 476 

Montfalcone: 532 

Montgomery, General Sir Bernard L.: 90,541,544 

Monticelli: 324-335 

Montone River: 395-96, 40 I 

Morgan, Lt. Gen. Sir William D.: 521-24 

Mountain warfare: 14, 17, 25, 305n, 543. Sa a/so 

French commands and forces, Expeditionary 

Corps; U.S. Army commands and forces, 10th 

Mountain Division. 

Mueller, Maj. Edmund: 216-18 

Mugello Hills: 293 

Mugnone Canal: 293-94 

Mule trains: 25-26,33,321,411,414,428 

Munemori, Pfe. Sadao S.: 461n 

Munich: 520 

Murphy, T. Sgt. Charles J.: 329-31 

Musone River: 270 

Mussolini, Benito: 3, 109,374,512,515,519 

Mussolini Canal: 4, 109-10, 114, 117, 138, 149-50, 

152 

Nago: 510-11 

Naples: 79-80, 100, 110-11, 115, 229-30, 277, 285, 

414,417,536 

Narni: 233,241,243,252 

National Redoubt: 443-44,446, 505n, 517 

Nauders: 532 

Naval support, Allied: 11,36,47, 115,304-05,340, 

460, 543 

Negro units: 287,407, 409n, 460-61n. See a/so U.S. 

Army commands and forces, 92d Infantn 

Division: 366th Infantn Regiment. 

Nelson, Capt. Carl W.: 49-50, 54 

Nemi: 208 

Nera River: 252 

New Zealand Arm, t()rces: 21, 26 

2d New Zealand Division: 29, 221. 241. 280, 288-

90, 338-39, 340n, 377-78, 396, 402, 404, 450, 

452,464,469,482,503,511-12 

4th New Zealand Brigade: 450 

Newman, 1st Lt. Ben'l R.: 174n 

Noon, 1st Lt. Theod~)re W., Jr.: 52, 52n 

Norma: 157 

North African campaign: 9n, 20, 22-23, 27. 90, 

112-13,124,280,406 

Northern Apennines. See a/.lo Gothic Line. 
INDEX 

Northern Apennines--Continued 

as Allied strategic objective: 236, 256-57, 261, 

283,291,308,536 

terrain and defenses: 268, 281, 284, 294, 297-

300, 310--11, 438, 440-41 

Notaro, 1st 1.1. Ross A,: 331-33 

Nt:NToN: 21-22,40,79 

O'Daniel, Maj. Gen, John W,: 113-14, 130-31, 133, 

135-36, 147-49, 154, 166--69. 195-96, 541 

Oder River: 484-85 

Office of Strategic Services (OSS): 485, 514 

OLIVE: 308. 310. 342. 378, 543 

Ombrone River: 244. 246-47, 249 

Omohundro. Col. Wiley H,: 131-35,147-49 

Orbetello: 233, 244-46. 248 

Orcia RiVer: 249 

Orte: 237. 239. 241, 280 

Ortner. Generalleutnant Bruno: 64 

Ortona: 16,402 

Orvieto: 231-32.239. 249--50. 252. 252n. 303. 411 

Osa River: 246 

Osimo: 278 

Ostendorf, Maj, Vernon A,: 55 

Osteria Finocchio: 207 

Ostiglia: 446. 453, 489. 492-93. 499. 50 I 

OVERLORD, See Cross-Channel attack, 

Padua: 446.511 

Paglia valley: 249 

Palestrina: 191.194-97.207-08.212.221 

Paliano: 209 

Pallavincini: 207 

Panaro River: 456. 479. 492-94 

PANCAKE: 370 

Panich. 1st Lt, Jack L.: 49--50 

Parker, 1st LI. Jack S,: 384 

Parma: 299,489,495,506 

Parmignola Canal: 482 

Parrilli, Baron Luigi: 439, 513-18 

Partisans 

Italian: 12.40.71,217,251,294.348,359.403. 

458,501. 503--D5. 512. 529--30 

Yugoslav: 9, 257, 305. 358-60, 39:3. 399-400. 

416,441,444, 5U4, 512. 516. 521. 532. 540 

Passa Como: 78 

Passo Segni: 494 

Pastena: 31 

Pasubio Pass: 505 

Patch, General Alexander M.: 544 

Patton, LI. Gen. George S" Jr.: 23. 484 

Paulick. Maj, Michael: 128-29, 146 

Pemse!. Generalmajor Max: 506 

Peninsular Base Section (PBS): 312,414,417 

Perugia: 233, 236. 252, 252n. 254. 256, 269 

Pesaro: 300--30J, 313, 315-16 

Pescara: 13-14, 243 

Peschiera: 445 

~acenza: 283-84, 506 

Piano di Venola: 480 

~anoro: 363,383.405,477-78 

PIANORO: 449. 4,'>5 

~ave River: 443, 505, 525. 531 

577 

Pico: 30-31. 34-35, 56. 83. 85-86. 89. 91-93. 98-99 

Piedimonte San (;ermano: 18, 29, 79, 81-82. 90. 

92-93 

Piedmonte Roccasecca: 78 

Piedura: 401-03 

Pignataro: 64 

Piombino: 233. 260. 281. 285 

Pisa: 236. 270, 275, 281-82, 286, 291. 298, 302, 

319--20.417,418n 

Pisa-Rimini Line: 6. 20, 228, 391 

Pistoia: 236. 282. 284. 291, 298. 304, 306--07, 319--

20, 323, 414, 417 

Po River: 283-85, 322 

German defense line: 393-94, 439, 443, 445, 

447-48.452,467.536 

German withdrawal and Allied crossings: 453-54. 

483. 489--98, 500--503, 506 

Po Vallev: 6--7, 256n. 297, 374 

as Ali'ied objective: 256-58, 283, 338, 392-93, 

398,405,538,543 

final offensive on: 433, 449, 454-56, 466, 489. 

499,506,537 

Pon: 93 

Poggibonsi: 266 

Poggio Alberaccio: 289 

Poggio al'Omo: 279 

Poggio Capalbiaccio: 245 

Poggio Renatico: 494 

Poggiolo: 367 

Pohl, General Erich Ritter von: 516-17, 526--27 

Pola: 444 

Polish forces: 20, 26 

Polish Army of the East: 28n 

2d Polish Corps: 22, 28n, 222-23, 364 

Adriatic flank advance: 82, 90, 93, 241, 253, 

267, 269--70, 278 

final assault on Monte Cassino: 22, 28-29, 

43-44,63-64,77-78 

final offensive: 451-52, 457, 464-65, 467, 

469,482,494 

Gothic Line: 306--09. 312-13, 316, 339. 376, 

394-97,401-02.404,419 

3d Carpathian Division: 43, 278, 306, 313, 373, 

396,451,464,469 

5th Kresowa Division: 43, 278, 306, 313, 376, 

395-96,404,451,469 

2d Polish Armoured Brigade: 278, 450--51 

1st Carpathian Infantry Brigade: 20n 

12th Podolski Lancers: 78 

Pontassieve: 285, 289, 309 

Ponte a Buriano: 288 

Ponte Cavour: 219 

Ponte de! Duca d' Aosta: 218 

Pome Margherita: 219 
578 

Ponte Milvio: 218 

Ponte Palatino: 220 

Ponte Rotto: 135-36, 145 

Ponte Vecchio: 290, 292, 294 

Pontecorvo: 18, 34, 56, 59, 78, 81-83, 90-92, 99 

Pontedera: 275, 282-83, 364 

Pontine Marshes: 14, 30, 97, 99, 108 

Pope Pius Xll: 265 

Porretta: 300 

Porta San Giovanni: 219 

Porter, Lt. Col. A.M. Horsbrugh: 377-78,395,401 

Porto Civitanova: 233, 269 

Porto Garibaldi: 459 

Portomaggiore: 467 

Pozzuoli: 74 

Pra del Bianco: 472,474 

Pradalbino: 482 

Praduro road: 455, 477-80 

Prato: 282, 291, 315 

Prato-Bologna road: 318, 344 

Pratomagno massif: 288-89 

Preddapio Nuova: 376,395 

Prefetti Canal: 175 

Prenestini Mountains: 221 

Presciano Canal: 174 

Prichard, Maj. Gen. Vernon E.: 285, 506 

Pukherini: 48,65,67-68 

Punta Bianca: 424, 460-61, 483 

Pyenta, S. Sgt. Peter: 49-50 

Quaderno River: 482 

QUADRANT Conference: 5, 535, 538 

Quartolo San Ruflilo: 402 

QUEEN: 398n 

Querceta: 391 

Querciola: 428 

Raapke, Generalleutnant Wilhelm: 46, 59-60, 62-

63, 69, 86 

Rabbi River: 376 

Radicondoli: 233 

Radicosa Pass: 300, 320, 343-44, 349, 353-54, 361-

64 

Rahn, Rudolf: 514,517,520 

Ramey, Brig. Gen. Rufus S.: 244--45, 247-48, 259-

60, 348 

Ramsey, Maj. Lloyd B.: 134--35,147-49 

Rapido River: 3,5, 14--16, 16n, 22, 26, 28,32,37, 

43-45,63,77-78,90,99, 186n, 231 

Rathbun, Capt. Glenn E.: 149 

Ravenna: 297, 301, 305, 308, 314-15, 339, 374, 

391,394--96,399-404,410,418-19 

Recco viaduct: 283 

Recoaro: 517 

Reggio: 299, 495 

Reno valley: 300,371, 390,418,419-20,426,428, 

434, 437-38, 442-48, 450-55, 459, 465-ti8, 

471,477-79,494,543 

Reschen Pass: 512, 532 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Rheims: 544 

Riale: 482 

Ribiano Hill: 385 

Riccione: 339 

Rieti: 233, 241, 243, 249 

Rimini: 297,299-300,302,308,313-14,318,339-

42,344,361,373,394,402 

Rimini Line: 339-42, 353 

Ripabianca Ridge: 338-39 

Riparbella: 273 

Riva: 507,510-12 

Riva Ridge: 427,429,432,453 

Rocca Massima: 168 

Rocca di Papa: 109, IH6, 201 

Rocca Priora: 206 

Rocca Roffeno: 471,473-74 

Roccalbegna: 247 

Roccastrada: 248 

Roeder, Capt. Robert E.: 351, 351 n 

Roettiger, Generalleutnant Hans: 514,520-21,525-

27 

Romagna Plain: 297, 302, 308, 314, 317, 338-40, 

342-43, 36(~61, 366, 373-74, 378 

Rome: 177, 198. See also Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.; 

Tiber River. 

declared an open city: 203-06, 210, 234, 291 

Fifth Army drive on: 156,168,171-73,180,190-

96,202"':210,537 

Fifth Army entry: 211-22, 227-28, 237 

garrison troops and military government: 233, 

234n, 234--35, 239 

German occupation of: 3, 233-34 

plan for attack: 14--15, 19, 27, 30, 32, 35, 38, 

104--07, 163-66 

significance of capture: 4--6, 26, 99, 103, 106, 

208, 234--35, 536-37, 542 

Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin: 299 

Ronco River: 377-78, 389, 393-96, 40 I 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 204, 258, 359, 444, 537-38 

Rosignano Marittimo: 273-74 

Rosignano Solya\: 270-71, 273 

Rossellini, 1st l.t. Bruno: :129-34 

Rossen, Maj. William R.: 131:l 

Route 16: 340 

Route 67: 379, :194 

Route ti8: 259,261-63, 2ti5, 21i7. 270-71. 273 

Route 73: 244, 24H, 26 I, 279 

Route 74: 246, 248 

Route 82: 7G, 83-84, 89, 91, 93 

Route 20ti: 344, 345 

Route 222: 289 

Route ti424: 371 

Route ti521: 311:l 

Route 6524: 318, 323, 32.~-26 

Route ti528: 343-46 

Rubicone River: 37ti 

Ruffner, Brig. Cen. David L.: 529 

Rufo: 23 

Rumania: 305,360,437 
INDEX 

Russi: 401-02 

Russian Armv: 4, 8, 39, 250, 257, 305, 358-60, 393, 

399, 437, 441, 449, 484-85, 504-05, 516, 521, 

525-26, 536-37, 539 

Rutledge, Brig. Gen. Cecil L.: 286, 319 

Ryder, Maj. Gen. Charles W.: 114, 175, 178-79, 

200-201,238-39,259,263,273,281,285 

S-Ridge: 53-55, 64-67, 69, 74 

Sabatini Mountains: 15 

Sacco River: 28,99,109,159,171,182 

Sacco valley: 99,105,156,171,192,196,200,221 

Sacco-Liri ~alley: 163,209-10,541-42 

Safay, Lt. Col. Alfred A.: 54-55,66-67,74 

St. Gotthard Pass: 518 

St. Moritz: 513 

Salerno: 3,24,26,112,222,231,285,537 

Salzburg: 443 

Samoggia River: 455,471,474,476,481-82 

San Benedetto: 489, 493, 495, 499-500 

San Biagio Canal: 146 

San Cesareo: 197, 206 

San Fomano: 410 

San Fortunato Ridge: 338-42 

San Gennaro Hill: 178-81, 199 

San Giorgio: 31, 62, 70 

San Giovanni Incarico: 31, 93 

San Godenzo Pass: 341 

San Marino: 302 

San Martino Hill: 54-55, 66, 74, 76 

San Martino monastery: 340-42 

San Pancrazio: 40 I 

San Patrignano Ridge: 338-40 

San Pietro: 186 

San Savino: 339 

San Stefano: 244-46, 260, 285 

San Zeno in Volpinara: 39.~ 

Sangro River: 5, 15, 26 

Sansepolcro plain: 288 

Santa Caterina: 247 

Santa Croce: 75 

Santa Maria Canal: 125 

Santa Maria Infante: 46-50, 52-55, \)5-69, 71 

Santa Maria di Zena: 369 

Sant'Angelo in Teodiee: 44 

Santerno River valley: 343-45, 349, 352, 354, 362-

63, 366-67, 371, 385, 388, 405, 411-12, 420, 

442, 448-49, 452, 454, 457, 462-65 

Sardinia: 5, 540 

Sarzana: 483 

Savenna Creek: 383 

Savio River: 302, 377 

Savizzano: 478 

Savona: 507 

Sea uri: 23, 54, 76 

Schauer, Pfc. Henry: 137n 

Schellwitz, Maj. Gen. Friedrich von: 494 

Schildroth, Col. William: 238, 263 

579 

Schlemm, General der Flieger Alfred: 139-40, 158, 

166, 179-80, 189, 200-20 I, 207-08, 262, 265, 

293, 314, 336, 354. Sf( also German commands 

and forces, I Parachute Corps. 

Schlemmer, Generalleutnant Ernst: 303 

Schmalz, Generalmajor Wilhelm: 160-70, 184-85, 

188 . 

Schulz, General Friedrich: 521, 525-26, 528 

Schweinitz, Oberstleutnant Victor von: 517-20, 

522-25, 527, 529 

Schwerin, General der Panzertruppen (;erhard 

Grafvon: 468, 498, 498n, 503, 516n 

Secchia River: 494 

SECOND WIND: 460-61 

Sellustra River: 442 

Senger und Etterlin, Generalleutnant Fridolin von: 

18, 18n, 42,59-60,79,84,86,91,94,158,209, 

250,262,274-75,374,382-83,387,492,504-

05, 523n, 526-27, 529-30. Sf( also German 

commands and t()rces, XIV Panzrr Corps. 

SenKer RieKe!: 18n, 71. Sre al\{) Hitler Line. 

Senio River: 404,406,411,418-20,442,448,451-

52, 462-65 

Senj: 441 

Serchio River valley: 282, 300, 320, :190, 407-10, 

412,415,417,420-22,424,460-61 

Sernide: 492 

Serra Sarzana: 473 

Servio River: 376 

Sesto: 3\)4 

Sella Creek: 363,371,477-78 

Sevez, Maj. Gen. Franc;ois: 57, 85 

SEXTANT-EuREKA Conference: 6 

Sezze: 105, 116, 120, 139,157,172, IRI 

Shea, Sgt. Charles W.: 47, 47n 

Sheldon, Lt. William G.: 217-18 

Sherman, Col. Raymond G.: 460 

SHINGLE: 103, 105, 539 

Shull, Maj. Edwin: 52, 54 

Sibenik: 393 

Sicilian campaign: 3-4, 9n, 23, 95, 113, 543-44 

Siena: 251, 259, 265-66 

Sierra del Lago: 85 

Sieve River: 281,297,318,323-24 

Sigman, Capt. Chatlain: 368 

Signa: 289 

Sill a River: 426 

Sillaro River: 363-64, 367, 385, 38R, 442, 467 

Simhruini Mountains: 192, 199, 221 

Simmerman, Lt. Col. .lames S.: 125-26, 142-43 

Sintria River: 403 

Slesser, Air Marshal Sir John: 11,258 

Sloan, Maj. Gen. John F.: 23,47,55,65-67,71,83, 

88-89,94-95,345,501 

Smith, Pvt. Furman L.: 190n 

Smith, Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell: 10 

Snakes. Sf'e Anzio beachhead, mines. 

Sogliana: 302 

Solacciano: 55, 64, 66, 74 
580 

Solarolo: 464 

Sommocolonia: 409-10 

Sora: 156,183,221 

Soriano: 239 

South African forces: 26 

6th South African Armoured Division 

DIADEM: 29, 79-80, 209, 221 

final offensive: 453-56, 478-79, 482, 494, 

497, 502-03, 506 

pursuit north of Rome and Gothic Line 

attack: 240-41, 249, 252, 268, 279-80, 

288-90, 310, 319, 323, 325, 363, 371-72, 

375,390,397,412,418 

15th South African Field Artillerv Regiment: 416 

Southern France landing. See ANVIL-DRAGOON. 

Spaatz, LI. Gen. Carl: II 

Spaccasassi Creek: II 4, 117, 174 

Sperlonga: 36, 89, 93-97 

Spigno: 30, 35, 53, 66, 71, 73, 78, 83, 94 

Split: 393 

Stalin: 357, 437n, 537-38 

Stalingrad: 544 

Steinmetz, Generalmajor Bernhard: 46, 55, 64-65, 

69-71,73,75-76,84,94,473-74,492 

Strada: 402 

STRANGLE: 20, 39, 56, 230, 543 

Strategy, Allied: 4-6, 227, 229, 255-58, 269-70, 373 

Anzio breakout controversy: 104-07 

assessment of Italian campaign: 221-22,535-40 

and the Balkans: 357-60, 400, 444 

final phase of Italian campaign: 444-49 

Gothic Line and Po Valley: 303-10,391-94 

Strategy, German: 6-8. See also Hitler, Adolf; Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Albert. 

after loss of Rome: 270 

assessment of Italian campaign: 536,539-40 

final phase of Italian campaign: 360, 374, 438-

39. 

Strettoia Hills: 422-24, 460 

Stromberg, 1.1. Col. Woodrow W.: 135-3G 

Subiaco road: 209-10 

Surrender 

covert German-American negotiations: 437n, 439, 

485,513-21,543 

linal capitulation in Italy: 512,521-34, 544 

Susa valley: 512 

Sutri: 20i 

Suvano: 476 

Tabors: 24, 24n, 34. See also French commands and 

forces. 

Tagliamento River: 443 

Tame: 49-50, 52-53 

Tarquinia: 238-40, 243-44 

Teheran Conference: 391 

Termoli: 94 

Terni: 19, 236, 241, 249-50, 252 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Terracina: 18,30,36,83,86,89,91-99, 109, 139, 

140, 152,229,244 

Thomas, Col. Richard G.: 128, 130, 195 

Tiber River: 13-15, 62 

bridges: 203, 210-11, 215-16, 218, 220 

German withdrawal: 206, 208-09, 228-29, 231-

32,242 

plans and crossing operations: 191,200,208-09, 

220-21,231,237,240-41,249-50, 252,252n, 

267 

Ticino River: 439, 443, 467 

Tiglio: 409 

Tippelskirch, General der Inbmterie Kurt Yon: 408, 

410,419n 

Tito, Marshal. S"" Partisans, Yugoslav. 

Tivoli: 171,184,192, 207-Oil, 210, 212, 228, 232 

Todi: 249, 252, 252n 

Tole: 474-75 

Tomba di Pesaro: 3 16 

Tomlinson, Col. Clarence: 473 

Tor Pignatara: 215-16,218 

Torbole: 508, 5 I 0-I I 

Torre Beretti: 284 

Torre I ussi: 473-74 

Torretta: 273, 276 

Trasimeno Line: 267-69, 279 

Traversa: 470 

Trebbia River: 283 

Tremonsuoli: 23,46,67 

Trento: 499. 502. 511-12,526 

Tre\'iso: 50ti 

Trieste: 299. 357. 359-60, 444. 448-49. 511-12. 

516.532 

Truscott. :\Iaj. Cen. Lucian K .. Jr.: 25. 399. 406, 

445. Sff "/Ili U.S. Arm\' commands and forces, 

Fifth Arm\': VI Corps .. 

Amio breakout planning: 105-06. 112-15. I 17-

19. 121. 128.136. 141 

attack northwest to Rome: 163. 165-66. 168-69. 

172-73. 175.220 

Caesar I.ine breakthrough: 179-81. 185-86. 188-

89. 200-202 

Po to the Alps: 490. 492. 499-500. 505-06. 531 

Po Valin operations: 448.453-56.490.492.499-

500. 505-oti .. ~31 

winter stalemate: 407-09. 412. 417. 421-22. 424-

26. 432-34 

Turin: 284. 303, 506-07 

'I VRTLE: 105-06. 163 

Twining. ;"Iaj. Cen. !\;athan F.' I I 

THol: 517- I 8. 520 

Udine: 302. 512 

Uiumi Cniti Canal: :~95 

Umbertide: 269 

L'mbrian highlands: 209.23 1.244-45 

U.S. Arm\' commands and forces 

Army Ground Forces: 9. 23 

Eun;pean Theater of Operations: 9 
INDEX 

U.S. Army commands and forces-Continued 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations: 9 

North African Theater of Operations: 9 

Third Army: 484 

Fifth Arm;: 3-4, 9, 14, 17, 26, 32, 63, 541-43. 

Srr al\O Clark, Lt. Cen. Mark W.; Truscott, Maj. 

Gen. Lucian K., Jr. 

advance to Rome and capture: 156, 166, 

171-72, 181-82, 190-92, 199, 202, 205, 

208-11,220-21,227,231, 2:H, 300 

Anzio breakout and link-up attack: 79, 83, 

89-90, 93, 95, 98-99, 103-06, 112, 115, 

156 

Bologna and Po Valley: 361-62, 370-71, 374, 

376, 378, 382, 390 

casualties: 222, 294, 372, 389, 545 

DIADEM: 19-20, 22, 25-28, 30--38, 43, 45, 63-

65, 73, 76 

engineer operations: 261, 277, 364, 442, 

489-90, 496 

Gothic Line attack: 318, 320-23, 325, 335, 

337-40, 342-46, 349, 354, 357, 359 

Po Valley to the Alps: 424, 426, 432, 442, 

444-446, 448-49, 453-59, 462, 469-71, 

492,495,499,503, 511-12, 516, 532, 537 

pursuit from Rome to the Arno: 229-31, 

236-37, 240--45, 248-50, 252, 259, 267, 

270,273,277,280-82 

reorganization for Gothic Line attack: 284-

88,298,304,306-10,312-13 

replacement system: 222, 353, 362, 373-74, 

389, 397, 405, 458 

troops withdrawn I()r ANVIL-DRAGOON: 236, 

285,287,306,537,540 

winter stalemate south of Bologna: 393-94, 

396-98,400,405-08,410-15,417--18,420 

Seventh Army: 26, 294, 397, 449, 483, 504-05, 

542, 544 

II Corps: 9, 23, 230. Srr a/so Keyes, Maj. Gen. 

Geoffrey. 

advance to Rome: 172, 190--98,202,206-12, 

218-21 

casualties: 77, 335, 353, 362, 372 

DIADEM: 24, 32-35, 38, 112 

fmal offensive: 452-56, 470, 477-79, 482, 

484,490,494,496,499,502,505,531 

Gothic Line: 309, 318, 320--21, 323, 335, 341, 

343-44,349,352-54,361-66,369-72, 375, 

378-85,388-90,397-98,400,405-10,412-

13 

Gustav Line breakthrough: 43, 46n, 46-47, 

54-55,59-60,64-65,74-77,109 

Hitler Line attack and beachhead link-up: 83, 

88-91,93,95--96,98-99,152,167,182 

pursuit north of Rome: 237, 239-41, 248-49, 

273-75, 286-87 

winter stalemate: 414, 416-18, 434, 442 

IV Corps: 25-26, 74, 182, 230. See a/so Crittenberger, Lt. Gen. Willis D. 

U.S. Army commands and forces-Continued 

IV Corps-Continued 

581 

final offensive: 460, 470-72, 474, 476-77, 

479-80, 482, 484, 490, 492-93, 495-96, 

499, 503, 505--06 

Frieda Line attack: 237, 239, 244, 247-48, 

259, 265, 267, 270 

Gothic Line attack: 344, 354, 361, 363-64, 

369,371,382,390,397,405--09,412-13 

Leghorn capture and advance to the Arno: 

271, 273, 281, 285--87, 308, 310, 318-19, 

322-23 

plans for final offensive: 437, 442, 446, 449, 

453-56 

winter stalemate: 416-18,421,424,433-34 

VI Corps: 3, 25, 166, 230. See al\() Truscott, Maj. 

Gen. Lucian K,. Jr. 

Anzio breakout plans: 27, 36-38, 90, 103-

107, 111-12,115-18,128 

breakout from Anzio beachhead: 92--93, 99, 

120,125, 152, 156-58,208,221,541 

drive to Rome: 107, 139, 164-66, 171-73, 

175,177-78,180-81,190-91,193-94,199-

200,202,206,208--09,218-20 

post-Rome operations: 237,239-40,247 

southern France invasion: 26, 228, 236, 256, 

399, 532 

1st Armored Division. See a/so Harmon, Maj. Gen. 

Ernest N.: Prichard, Maj. Gen. Vernon E. 

Anzio breakout: 110-15, 121-28, 127n, 135, 

137,139,142--44,146,151-53,165 

drive on Rome: 171, 173, 175-77, 180--81, 

202,208,219-21 

fmal offensive: 453-56, 476-77, 479, 481-82, 

493,495,500,506,532 

pursuit north of Rome: 237-39, 259-62, 265, 

275, 287, 293, 310, 319, 323, 354, 379, 

381,385,397,405,408-09,412-13 

Table of Organization and Equipment: 112, 

285-86 

1st Armored Regiment: 122--23,125, 180,183 

Combat Command A: 25, 110, 112, 121-28, 

142-44, 152, 175-76, 180-81,219,237, 

239-40, 261, 265, 344, 349, 370--72, 494-

95, 500, 502, 506 

Combat Command B: 110,112, 121-22, 1~5--

28, 142-44, 146, 152-53, 175-76, 180-~1, 

219, 237-38, 261-62, 265, 363, 371, 3,90, 

494-95, 503 

3d Infantry Division: 25, 110-11, 113. See a/.lo 

O'Daniel, Maj. Gen. John W. 

Anzio breakout and capture of Cisterna: 114, 

118, 121, 128, 130, 135-37, 139, 144, 147, 

149,151-52,154 

attack to block Highway 6: 165, 167-69, 171, 

173,182,190,193-95 

final advance on Rome: 212, 218-19, 221, 

234n, 239 

withdrawn I()r southern France invasion: 228 
582 

C,S. Army commands and /()r<..es-Continued 

:~cI Infa'mrv Division-Continued 

7th In'tamry Regiment: 131-35,144-49,154-

55,168. 17n-71, 196,212-13 

15th Infantry Regiment: 128-30, 135. 138, 

144, 146-47, 147n. 153-54, 167-68, 170-

71, 194-95, 212 

30th Infantry Regiment: 135-36, 144-47, 

149,168,171. 194, 196,212 

10th Mountain Division: 415, 425, 428n 

final offensive: 455. 471-77, 479-80, 482, 

492-93,495-96,499,507.512,529,532 

Reno valley offensive: 417, 426, 428-34, 438 

85th Mountain Infantry Regiment: 424, 429 

33,472-74,480,492,510,512 

86th Mountain Infantry Regiment: 417, 424. 

429-30, 432-33, 473-75, 492, 500, 507, 

510-12 

87th Mountain Infantry Regiment: 424, 429, 

433,472-75,481-82,495,500,510 

34th Infantrv Division: 34, 110-11. 114, S" also 

Ryder, Maj. Gen, Charles W. 

Anzio hreakout: 118, 125, 128. 152 

attack through Caesar Line: 166, 173-74. 

178-79, 181, 199-20 I, 208, 220 

linal offensive: 453, 478-79, 482, 493, 499, 

503, 506, 532 

Cothic Line: 320, 323-25, 336, 344, 349, 354, 

3611, :nO-71, 378-80, 383-85, 389, :{97, 

405,413,417-18 

pursuit north of Rome: 237-39, 244, 259, 

262-63,265,271.273-76, 2S0-SI, 286 

133d Infantry Regiment: 138, 149, 174n, 

238-39, 262-65, 273, 276, 379-SI, 39(), 

4S2 

135th Infantry Regiment: I 13, 122-25, 124n, 

1[)3, 175, ISO, 190n, 263. 273-76, 335n, 

379-S0,409,417 

16Sth Infantry Regiment: I 78-S0, 180n. 199, 

202,238,262,273-74.276.281. 379. 381 

36th Infantn' Division: 78-79, S" a/,ll) Walker, 

Maj. Gen, Fred L 

advance through Rome: 202. 208, 21S, 220-

21,237.239-40,244.246-47.259-60,262 

Anzio breakout: 22. 25. 27. 37. 46. 74, S9, 

111. 114,152,173,175 

capture of Monte Artemisio: IS2. I 84-S6, 

188-93, 199-202 

withdrawn for southern France invasion: 

228, 259-60 

141st Infantry Regiment: 186. IS61l, 201, 

244-45, 248. 260 

142d Infantry Regiment: 186, 188. ~!O 1. 2411, 

2110 

143d Infantry Regiment: 186. 186n. 188-89, 

193,201,245-47,260 

45th Infantrv Division: 25, 11Il-11, 237 . .'lei' a/so 

Eagles, MaJ' Gen, William W. 

Anzio breakout: 114-15. 118, 125, 137, 149-

50. 152 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

l),S. Army commands and forces--Continued 

45th lnt'alltrv Division Continued 

drive on Rome: 166, 173-75, 180, 199-202, 

208, 220 

withdra\\n for southern France invasion: 228 

157th Infantry Regiment: 137 

I 79th Infamry Regiment: 118, 175, 199 

180th Infantry Regiment: 137, 150, 175-76, 

199 

85th Infantry Division: 23. See a/so Coulter, Maj, 

Cen.John B. 

DIADEM to Anzio: 35, 46, 49, 54, 64-67, 69, 

73-77.83-84,89,95,99,181,190 

drive w Rome: 193-95, 197,206,212,218-

19,221 

final offensive: 45:~, 456, 479-80, 482, 492. 

495-96, 501l-501, 505, 531 

(;othic Line: 321, 324-25. 334-35, 344-45, 

~H7, 349, 352, 354, 363-70. 379. 381-85, 

:189. :~97, 405. 408, 413, 417-18 

pursuit north of Rome: 239-40, 244, 286 

337th Infantry Regiment: 54. 74-75. 8S-86, 

95. 97, 99, 193, 195, 206. 219, 335, 367-

68,383-84,388,408 

338th Infantry Regiment: 53-55, 66-69, 74-

75.86,95-97, 195,212,218-19.335.365-

67, 408, 532 

339th In!i1l1trv Regiment: 54, 54n" 74, 206. 

24(), 335. 367, 384, 408, 532 

88th Infantr\' Division: 23. See also Sloan. Maj. 

Gen. John F. 

drive to Rome: 192, 194, 196, 206-07, 210, 

212,218,221 

final offensive: 41S. 453, 478-79, 482, 492. 

494,496.501-02,505,531 

Gothic Line: 320-21, 344-45, 347. 350-51. 

353-fJ4, 362-63, 366-67, 371. 379. 381-85, 

388-89,397,405,413 

Gustav Line: 24,35,46-47, 47n. 65-66, 71. 

73,77 

Hitler Line: 1'13-84.87,91,94, 172, 181-82 

pursuit north of Rome: 239-40, 265, 273. 

275,281,286 

349th Infantn Regiment: 47, 55. 66. 71, 73-

74, 88. 94-95. 195. 212, 345. 34S, 350, 

353. 383-85, 388, 532 

350th Infantry Regiment: 47-4S. 65, 71-73, 

94-95.212.214.218,265,345-46,348-52, 

367.384-85 

351s1 Infantn Regiment: 47-55, 65-69. 71. 

73,83-84,87-88,94-95.196-97.212.218, 

345, 347-48, 35(l-51. 353. 385-87, 501 

91s1 Infantn Division 

tinal offensive: 453. 478-79, 494, 497, 502. 

505-06,512,532 

Gothic Line: 32(l-21, 323, 325-26. 344, 349, 

354, 363-67, 309-70. 379, 381. 383, 385, 

389,397,405,408,413,418 

pursuit north of Rome: 239, 271. 273, 275. 

281. 286-87 
INDEX 

U.S. Arm\' commands and forces-Continued 

91 st Inf~ntr\ Division-Continued 

361st Ii-J.fantry Regiment: 239, 244-47, 260, 

265, 275, 334-35, 368-70 

362d Infantry Regiment: 275, 275n, 365, 388 

363d Infantry Regiment: 271. 274-76, 281. 

325-35, 344, 365-66, 369 

92d Infantry Division: 287, 397, 409n, 418, 506, 

See also Almond, Maj, Gen. Edward M. 

assessment of: 406-09 

final offensive to Genoa: 449, 453-55, 458, 

460-62, 483, 499, 503, 532 

FOURTH TERM: 421-24,437 

365th Infantry Regiment: 407,417,422,453, 

455,460,503 

370th Infantry Regiment: 319, 390-91, 407-

10, 422-23,46(}-61. 460-61 n 

371st Infantry Regiment: 407, 422, 455, 460-

61,503 

93d Infantry Division: 407 

95th Infantry Division: II 

35th Antiair~raft Brigade: 115 

45th Antiaircraft Brigade: 286. SN a/.lo L.S. 

Army commands and forces, Task Force 45, 

8th An'tiaircraft Group: 397 

434th Antiaircraft Battalion: 390, 417 

435th Antiaircraft Battalion: 390, 418n 

532d Antiaircraft Battalion: 418n 

900th Antiaircraft Battalion: 417, 418n 

1st Armored Group: 244 

2d Armored Group: 390, 418n 

13th Armored Regiment: 122, 125-26, 142-43, 

152,193,215-16,219 

27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion: 122, 476 

91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion: 143-44, 

170-71 . 

I I 25th Armored Field Artillerv Battalion: 397-98 

6th Armored Infantry Regi~ent: 122, 125-27. 

142-43.153,170-71,175-76,180.219.477 

11th Armored Infantry Battalion: 319. 476 

14th Armored Infantrv Baltation: 476 

81st Armored Recon:naissa~ce Battalion: 144, 

206,212,261,453.476-77.495 

34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: 273 

91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: 89. 94, 

99.171,193,240,244,453,492,499 

I I 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron: 240. 

244 

88th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop: 214 

2d Chemical Battalion: 68 

83d Chemical Baualtion: 113 

84th Chemical Battalion: 344, 408, 428 

109th Engineer Battalion: 113, 118, 199 

313th Engineer Battalion: 214 

696th Engineer Company: 229 

1108th Engineer Combat Group: 230 

36th Engineer Combat Regiment: 25. II J, 186. 

244 

39th Engineer Combat Regiment: 244, 490 

13th Field Artillery Brigade: 24, 25n, 59, 248 

L.S. Army command, and forces-Continued 

6th FiektArtillery Group: 46,260 

36th Field Artillery Group: 46 

77th Field Artillery Group: 46 

428th Field Artillery Group: 415 

10th Field Artillery Battalion: 133, 168 

34th Field Artillery Battalion: 329 

39th Field A rtillery Battalion: 147 

41st Field Artillery Battalion: 145 

59th Field Artillery Battalion: 244 

69th Field A rtillery Battalion: 113 

175th Field Artille'ry Battalion: 428 

178th Field Artillery Battalion: 383 

248th Field Artiller}' Battalion: 383 

337th Field Artillerv Battalion: 74 

338th Field Aniller~ Battalion: 214 

339th Field Artillery Battalion: 351 

527th Field Aniller~· Battalion: 415 

530th Field Artillery Battalion: 415 

536th Field Artillery Battalion: 415 

60lst Field Artillery Battalion: 87 

604th Field Artillery Battalion: 472 

697th Field Artillery Battalion: 87 

765th Field Artillery Battalion: 415 

766th Field Artillery Battalion: 415 

913th Field Artillery Battalion: 53-54,68 

583 

366th Infantry Regiment: 397, 409, 409n. 422, 

424 

442d Infantry Regiment: 262-63. 271, 273-74, 

276,281,320,415,453,458,460-61,483,507 

473d Infantry Regiment: 417, 418n, 453, 460-fil. 

483, 503, 506 .... 07 

IOOth Infantry Battalion: 276, 461 

6617th Mine Clearing Company: 113 

509th Parachute Infantry: 110. 238 

51 7th Parachute Infantry: 260, 262 

785th Petroleum Distrib;nion Company: 229 

6615th Ranger Force: I 10 

13th Tank Battalion: 50() 

751st Tank Battalion: 128-29. 133, 135, 154,390. 

472, 475 

752d Tank Battalion: 214,482 

753d Tank Battalion: 244 

755th Tank Battalion: 408 

756th Tank Battalion: 67. 193 

757th Tank Battalion: 379 

7f>8th Tank Battalion: 397,461 

760th Tank Battalion: 52-53,344,349.408,461 

fiOlst Tank De~troyer Battalion: 128-29. 133. 135 

635th Tank Destroyer Battalion: 153 

636th Tank Destroyer Battalion: /13. 244 

679th Tank Destroyer Battalion: 415 

70lst Tank Destroyer Battalion: 153,473 

776th Tank Destroyer Battalion: 273 

804th Tank Destrover Battalion: 271, 273 

805th Tank Destro~er Battalion: 344 

849th Tank Destro~er Battalion: 390 

'T'ask Force 45: 286-87,310, 319-2(), 323, 354, 

412,417-18,453 

Task Force 92: 390, 397, 407 
584 

U.S. Army commands and f()rees-Continued 

Task Force Darby: 500--502,507,510--11 

Task Force Howze: 152-53, 167-71, 193-94,206, 

211-12,216,218,240,261,265 

Task Force Ramey: 245,247-48,259--60 

U.S.-Canadian I st Special Service Force: 25, 110-

11,114-15,117,128 

Anzio breakout: 129, 137-40, 146-47, 149, 151-

52,155-56,165,167,171 

drive to Rome: 193, 195, 211-12, 215-16, 218, 

221 

Valle Corsa: 31, 93 

Vallerona: 247 

Vallomajo: 61 

Valmontone: 27, 37-38, 104-07, 110, 112, 114, 

115-18,128,142,152-53, I 56-5<J, 163-7:1, 

177,181-82,184-85,189-92, I <J4-99, 202, 

207-08,221 

Valmontone Gap: 163-66, 193 

Valpiana Ridge: 429 

Vatican City: 203-05, 234, 291 

Vedriano: 385-8<J 

Velletri: 110, 115, 122, 128, 142, 144, 152, 165-67, 

173-7.~, 180, 184-86, 188-89, 200-20 I, 208 

Velletri-Rome railroad: 178,202 

Venetian Line: 447 

Venetian Quadrilateral: 445, 445n 

Vem'7ia Giulia: 511, 537 

Venice: 302-03,440,511-12 

Ventosa: 47,65 

Venturina: 261 

Vergato: 426,432,454-56,471,474,476-77, 47<J80 

Verona: 299, 444-48, 492, 495, 499--502, 504, 506, 

529 

Vetralla: 239 

Via Anziate: 106,191,208 

Via Appia Nuova: 219 

Via Prenestina: 191-92, 195,211-12,216 

Via Tuscolana: 191, 207-08, 218, 220 

Viareggio: 323,371,397, 40<J, 417 

Vicenza: 505 

Victor Emmanuel III: 234-35 

V~nna: 258,393,441,484, 539 

Vietinghoff, Generaloberst Heinrich Gottfried von: 

12, 42, 42n, 60, 387, 403, 419-20, 516n, 525, 

527. See also German commands and forces, 

Army Group C; Tenth Army. 

defense south of Rome: 76,77,79,84,86,91,94, 

99, 140, 158, 198--99 

final defense and capitulation: 484-85, 504-05, 

514-17,519--20,522-24,526,529,544 

Gothic Line and Adriatic flank: 252, 30 I, 306, 

314-16, 341-42, 403, 4:18--39, 441, 462, 466--

68, 476 

CASSINO TO THE ALPS 

Villa Belvedere: 341 

Villa Borghese: 119 

Villa Crocetta: 178--81, 199--200 

Villa Doerrenbach: 518--19 

Villa Locatelli: 519 

Villa Santa Lucia: 77-78,90 

Villafranca airfield: 499, 50 I 

Villagrappa: 395 

Vipiteno: 532 

Viterbo: 19,237,239--41,249,536 

Viterbo airfields: 38, 229, 236 

Volterra: 259, 265, 275 

Voralpenltel/ung: 443 

WaiLcI, Col. Max: 513-14,518--20 

Walker, Maj. Gen. Fred L.: 114, 185-86, 188,200-

201,220,245 

Wannsee: 484 

Warlimont, General der Artillerie Walter: 8n, 99 

Waugh, 1st Lt. Robert T.: 54n 

Weichs, Generalfeldmarschall Maximillian von: 357 

359 

Wenner, Maj. Max: 515, 518--20, 523-25 

Wentzell, Generalmajor Friedrich: 60, 86, 196, 19<J, 

208,310-11,316,525-26 

Westphal, Generalmajor Siegfried: 42, 86, I <J9 

Wigle, 2d Lt. Thomas W.: 335n 

Williamson, Lt. Col. Corbett: 348--51 

Wilson, General Sir Henr\" Maitland: 8, II, 204, 

254,310,362, 399, 40~ 411 

A!<IVIL-DRAGOON: 227-28, 256--58 

Po Valle v advance: 391-92, 400 

trans-Adriatic assault plans: 305, 357-60, 400 

Winter Line: 231, 462 

WISTFRCEWITTFR: 408-10 

Wise, S. Sgt. Homl'l' l.: 24Gn 

Wolff, General Karl: 439, 485, 514-21, 523, 525-28 

Yalta agreements: 4,~ I 

Yarborough, Col. William P.: 460 

Yeager, Lt. Col. Walter E.: 94-95, 386 

Yugoslavia: 357-60, 393, 399-400, 441, 444 

Zadar: 393 

Zagarolo: 2()7-()8 

Zangen, General der Infanterie Gustav von: 12 

Zara: :159, 399 

Zen a Creek: 378-81. 384 

Zimmer, SS Oberst urmfuehrer Cuido: 513, 5 Iti, 

52() 

Zoaglia via<iu«: 283 

Zurich: 4:19, 51:1 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 331-886 
r Y RRHENIAN 

SEA 

JUMPOFF 

11 Ma y 1944 

ALLIED FRONT , II M/IV 1944 

ELEVATIONS IN MET ERS 

o 200 600- ;;; '0"' 0"0 --C!,;;;,.... 00"',.."'!!O A8 0VE 

'0 0 ' 0 20. ',", L ..... ' ..... , ..... , Ie' H'n''rrI' '-rlI-----,---L' ---, ___ ...l' Ii III i ]( l i i 10 0 10 20 KILO METER S 

H C Br"'/~r ,Jr 

11 

MAP I 
( 

/ 

/ 

, 

Gulf of Ga.to 

o L V~Fran rt' 

\ 

I 

" " " " " 

o 

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( 7 

""='==::::=-->i'~= = 

I' 

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ATTACK ON SANTA MARIA INFANTE 

35151 INFANTRY 

,......,,......,,......, , 

[:::;C> o 

0 

11-12 May 1944 

uS FR ONT, II MAY 

AX! S OF U S ATlACI(, FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING , 12 MAY 

GEflMAN COUNT [ RAT TACK, 12 MAY 

GER M AN STRON G POINTS 

[ LFVlI.TlON S IN;";;'.;.' ;;;'";;';... ___ -. 

" ><; 1;; iOO '" I!lO AN D ABOvE 

\ 

\ 

'000 '00 0 '000 YAROS 

I I , , , , , , , , 

I I , , , , I I I 1000 ' 00 0 1000 "If: TERS 

MAP II 
, 

~ 

, • 

• , 

• 

~ 

R C[inior. 

Monte 

Sont, Ange lo 

1404. 

XIV 

PA N Z E R 

CORPS 

Sant o 

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Monte 

Scauri 

" 1/ 

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1/ " .y 

II 

<:<:=5==::;;;;;;~ d-i=::;;;;~" =======;?== ====~ Monte 

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= 

Monte 

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Monte 

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Monte Damiano 

~350 

COLLAPSE OF THE GUSTAV LINE 

II CORPS 

13 -15 May 1944 

U.S ATTACK , FORWARD POSI TIONS , EVEN ING, 13 ~AY 

U.S. AXIS OF ADVANCE , DATE INDICATEO 

GUSTAV lINE,MORNIN G, 13 MAY 

- - - GUSTAV LI NE , EVEN ING. 14 MAY 

ELEVATIONS IN METERS 

a '00 200 '00 700 1000 AND .118011 £ 

'12 0 1/2 I MILES 

1 i i , , i i I I}Z '12 0 

'--L-1-r~~-+------~----~--T--------_i 

I KILOM[TEAS 

MAP III 
I 

/ 

TYRRHeNIAN seA 

R Q; lintor, 

4 # 

" " # 

" " 

" )' 

, 

" , 

" " " " " E!l. Vollecor.sa 

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">:J) 

;>",,1"9 

o 

In. 

( Monle Foggeto 

M0UNTAlNS 

as of 15 May 

Compl'Sl' 

9ULF OF 9AerA 

APPROACH AND BREAKTHROUGH , 

THE HITLER LINE 

15 - 23 May 1944 

ApPII AfE FII ONT, I<'GI<T, ,<I IoI .U 

--- ApPROX . Iot U( FRONT, ", Wtn, 19 MU 

< A. ,s OF .l.OYAl'I CE , ,5-19 MAl 

<: AXIS OF A OVA JoI CE , 2:0 Z3 N AY 

~,.... ~ H iTlER LI NE 

( 

o 

" ",1',',1 II l ~ " ' LES ! ! 

, 0 ~ KllO "' ET(RS 

MAP I V 
" " " " " " " 

It( Ir.fI ~rr.Qn r. 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

" " " 

PO .O(; O "OO(; O"II 

• " • " " " " " " " " " " ~~"" 

CAPTURE OF CISTERNA 

23 - 25 Moy 1944 

,.-,,...... FRONT LINE. MOII",ING, 21 MAY 

••••• LIMIT OF .o, OV.t.NCE NIGln, 2' MAY 

LIM IT OF "'DV.u~CE, NIGHT, 2. Mlt,y 

- - .. ARMOREO AX IS OF .I.DVlNC[ 

--.. l",fANTRY " XIS OF .lDVANCE 

ELEVATIONS IN METERS 

, '" 

MAP V 
" " " " " " " " '" '" '" " " " " '" '" 

# 

" " " 

" " 

~ <-

" " " 

" " ~ 

Ardec 

~4 

l.' Am'''(Qno 

o 

r'l'RRHENIAN 5£A 

SHIFTING THE ATTACK 

25 - 26 May 1944 

II.~PAO.I~AH FRONT, "'ORNING,l~ MAY 

,...,~,.., APPROXIUATE FIIONT, MORNING,l6/'Ur 

~ 

BLOC~ING PO$ITION 

A.'$ OF A()VANC[, 25 "'AV 

:::== + EXPEtTE,P AXIS OF AOV"NCE. l6 MAY 

BOUJ<lOARY CIIANGES EFFECTIVE 26 MAY 

CAESAR LINE 

ELEv ... TIONS IN METERS 

o 100 200 300 500 100 AND ABOVE 

o 

' t 

''1'. I , 0 

2 3 MILES ! ! 

i 

3 KILOMETERS 

" 

" 

" 

" "'" 

~3{ 1 , 

, 

\ 

\ 

, 

MAP VI 
ROME 

TYRRHENIAN 

SEA 

H C 8r~ "'6r ,Jr 

", , 

\ 

\ 

\ 

,.----..... ,,; -., .,,_.' " ~~ " \ , - \ ... , 

.. ~ , 

\ 

, 

I 

TENTH All.• MY ," 

, 

, • 

--, 

\ 

\ 

I 

, 

I 

,..., Po/fono , 

\ 

\ 

\ 

~29 

LEPINI 

MOU NTAINS 

-, 

) 

" ............ ............ 

----

0 

, 

THE DRIVE FOR ROME 

31 Moy-4June 1944 

•••••••• 

... 

~ --- • 

+----

ALLIED FRONT, N IGHT ,31 101 A'I' 

ALLIED FRONT. NIGHT ,:5 JUNE 

CAES.6R LI NE 

GERMAN FRON T,NIGHT,3IM A'!' 

PO''''' OF CON TACT, 2 JUNE 

DIRECTION OF ATTACK 

ROUTE OF ATT ACK 

AXIS OF ADVANCE 

AK IS OF RETREAT 

ELE VAT IONS I N METERS 

200 '00 .00 1100 1.00 AND AB ovE 

0 2 , , !5 MILES 

111111'1111 ii hl'i1i 1 

1 1 

I 1 

, 0 , 

" 

5 KILOMETERS 

" " 

--

" 

•••••••••• 

" 

-- ----

MAP VII 
Pier soll 

'-./ 

XIV'> 

PURSUIT FROM ROME TO THE 

TRASIMENO LINE 5·20 June 194 4 

000000 B~ IOGE I<['O [V[.w.G,5 JlJN 

•••••• ~'"0~' '' U( ""DNl, NI)O",l1 JUN 

.... - - ROuTE 0 ' "'" OIlEO .o. I)V &N C[ 

<:r==:::::. A~ S o~ ' N'ANT", "VANCE 

.....-t- - - Al l$ 0' ''''' 0 111 [0 AOVANCE 'r--

S C~" "'N STIION" _OI NTS 

[LEVU,!),.; S , .... [H"S 

I) 10 " 'lES 

'--'-t-, ...... ' -11----,--'--,' --~, o 10~llO .. [TERS 

PZ CORPS 

xx 

!8J162 

xx 

!8J20LW 

TYRRHENIAN 

SEA 

"'I' 

(' LXXVI PZ CORP 

CORPS 

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//-----------....... " ~]O CORPS AREA OF OPERATIONS ) 

\ 11 JOn / 

" ..- '- _ ...-"'\ 

MAP VIII 
LIGURIAN 

SEA 

FROM THE TRASIMENO 

LINE TO THE ARNO RIVER 

21 June-5 Auoult1944 

1---- FAONT LINE,21 JUN 

••••••• FOAWI.AD POSITIONS, DATE INDICATED 

FAONT LINE, 23 JUL 

I<F:::::: AlliS OF INFANTRY AOVANC[ 

-- AK IS OF ARMORED ADVANCE 

OIAEC TION OF GEAMAN AETREAT , 

2l JUL -$AUG 

lLlYU,ON$ 'N " UUS 

o L[S 

--"-r.+'~,+I---'--"i o "u\.ooouus 

FOURTEENTH 

Monje P,tgng 

PZ CORPS 

o 

Aglig/iana o 

FALL OF 17- 18 Jul~ 1944 __ F~OtoT II (,!6~U~ 

1.." Of' AOYAll e(, 

~ ·"~UL 

tLrYAT,QN' ,N .. tTr~t 

LJ 

zoo .NO AtoYl 

MAP IX 
LIGURIAN 

SEA 

L 

~ BR 

~FIFTH aEIGHTH 8R 

THE APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE 

CONCEPT OF OPERATION OLIVE 

'0 

, 

25 AUGUST 1944 

GO'''IC LI NE 

ARNO AIV EA LINE 

• PL ANNED A)( IS OF MAtN ATTACK 

, P L ANNED .)(15 OF SECONDARY AT TACK 

EL E VATIONS IH "'ETEAS 

0 . 00 .00 1000 14 00 AND AeOV E 

0 '0 20 MIlES , ' I' d ".;", o',j i i i i 

'0 0 ' 0 20 iUlOMET [A S 

ADRIATIC SEA 

MAP X 
II CORPS TACK ON THE GOTH!C 

AT 0-18 September 194 4 

I 10 SEP FRONT LINE, 

FRONT LINE, 18 SEP 

~,.....~ ALLIED AXIS OF AOVANCE 

=~-=:::;;> T VE MOVE • AOMINISTRA I 

---~L'EVATIONS IN METERS ~_--. 

LINE 

o 300 600 

, 0 1 

900 , 

i 

12:00 AND ABOVE 

ILES i I 1,,"1''''1 ["\rlio 

H C. Brewer, Jr 

I 1 

i 

, , ~ I( ILO/ot ETERS 

s 

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1\\ '-. i 

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OU EENTH ~ TEN'9Y 

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, 

MAP XI 
1 I II " I o 

, , , '," i' i' i' '0 1 

R..CJirdon 

I P R 

MAP XII 
'" BOH/GNA 

ti 

II 

q " q 

, 

, 

q 

, • " 

q 

, 

Ii 

, 

, 

, 

, 

I 

MAP XIII 
II 

o 

L IBURIAN 

SEA 

THE WiNTER LiNE 

3 1 JANUARY 1945 

~,....,.., FRONT LINE 

E lEVATlOHS IN METER S 

'00 .00 1000 1400 ANO ABOV E 

" I 

20MILES 

I 

(i "i iii I 10 10 

AD ItIA riC 

ZOKILOMETERS 

SEA 

MAP XIV 
BREAKTHROUGH INTO THE PO VALLEY 

IV AND I I GORPS 

14 -21 April1945 

,....,....,.... FRONT LlN E ,I'IAPR 

.. A XI S OF" ADVANCE 

........ F ORWARD POS ITIONS, MORNING, 2 1 APR 

ELEVATIONS IN "' E" '~,-_ ....... r--- m

• ~I-

... _._--'- L-._~ 

H. C. Brewer, Jr. 

o ZOO 400 600 800 ANO ABOVE 

, 0 

!. " i"lil/iIA! , 0 

, 

I i 

, 

i 4 MIL ES i 

4 KILOMET ER S 

MAP XV 
,...- \ 

, / 

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""<.; <--. ~ ) ;' ~ 

~ I 'v ,---- ... r / , '- \ c. 

j 

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(1 :VI 

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) EMNANTS TE NTH ARMY " 

GilL F 

o F 

V £ N I 

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THE SPRING OFFENSIVE 

9April-2 May 19 45 

,...,--~ FRONT LINE , B[GIHHIHG SPRING OFf'E NSIVE 

AX IS OF ADVAN CE . FIF TM U. S . AA"" ~ 

: AX IS OF ADVANCE, EIGHT H 8R ARM" 

" ;" ii"""'" P OAI VEA LIN E P OSITIONS, DATE INDICATE D 

ELEVATIONS IN IoI£T£1I5 

o 300 600 900 1200 "' '' 1J ABOVE 

10 0 10 20 MILE S 

LL' LJ' '41-ri1"'C+' ,,' .,' t----.--.LI -, __ --.JI i l i li ii l I I l O 0 10 20 KILOMETERS 

MAP XVI