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RESOLVING THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 9, 2017

Serial No. 115–96

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

VACANT 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

KAREN BASS, California 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Yamamoto, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 6

Ms. Cheryl Anderson, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, 

U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................... 16

Mr. Mvemba Dizolele, professorial lecturer in African studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University ................................ 37

Mr. Fred Bauma, representative, La Lutte pour le Changement ........................ 46

Ms. Severine Autesserre, Ph.D., professor of political science, Barnard College, Columbia University ................................................................................... 53

Ms. Ida Sawyer, Central Africa director, Human Rights Watch ......................... 65

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Yamamoto: Prepared statement ...................................... 10

Ms. Cheryl Anderson: Prepared statement ........................................................... 18

Mr. Mvemba Dizolele: Prepared statement ........................................................... 40

Mr. Fred Bauma: Prepared statement ................................................................... 49

Ms. Severine Autesserre, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................... 55

Ms. Ida Sawyer: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 68

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 92

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 93

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: 

Material submitted for the record ...................................................................... 94

Prepared statement by His Excellency Francois Balumuene Nkuna, Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Congo .................................................... 102

Written responses from the Honorable Donald Yamamoto to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a 

Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin ................................. 105

(1)

RESOLVING THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The hearing will come to order, and welcome. And I 

think the committee is privileged to see our distinguished chairman, Ed Royce, joining us, chairman of the full committee. And I 

thank him for his leadership on Africa having once been chairman 

of this subcommittee. 

So great to see you, Ed, and thank you for your ongoing leadership and for yesterday’s important briefing with Nikki Haley, our 

Ambassador to the United Nations, and a major portion of that important briefing late in the afternoon was on the Democratic Republic of Congo. So thank you, Chairman Royce. 

The Democratic Republic of Congo was supposed to conduct elections 1 year ago this month in order to achieve the required transition of political power by December 19th. 

However, after years of stalling on making preparations for elections, the Government of the DRC failed to hold elections last year 

and relied on a constitutional provision that President Joseph 

Kabila could not step down until an election was held to select a 

replacement. 

Both Chairman Royce and I, Karen Bass, our ranking member, 

and others, have had ongoing meetings with DRC officials, including high-level people who have flown here to Washington. And time 

and time again, we have admonished them, urging them to stick 

to the schedule and hold these elections, and ensure that they are 

free and fair. 

The interpretation by President Joseph Kabila of the Constitution is an apparent contradiction to other constitutional provisions 

requiring elections to be held on time and limiting President Kabila 

to two terms. The Election Commission has just announced that 

elections cannot be held until sometime in late 2018. We were told 

by Ambassador Nikki Haley they are talking about December 2018, 

and how often have we seen those timelines slip? And then we 

would be in 2019. And I think Ambassador Haley made it very 

2

clear in yesterday’s briefing that there are an abundance of sanctions, almost like a sort of Damocles, that would hold over the 

heads of those who, again, would push to delay. And I think that 

is very real, and I hope it is very compelling pressure to ensure 

that they do exactly what they say they would do, because this is 

what the people of the DR Congo want: They want a free and fair 

election; they want to choose their next leader. 

Polling has indicated that the majority of the Congolese want 

Kabila’s government to end and be replaced by a transitional government until a new one can be elected. We don’t take sides, but 

we do want free and fair, and we want to make sure that the people’s will prevails. 

Enduring conflict hotspots in Eastern DRC has seen recent flareups. And I would note parenthetically, back in 2005, I traveled to 

Goma, along with my good friend and chief of staff, Greg Simpkins, 

and we saw, on the ground, and met many of the people who had 

been raped, many of the women who had been so horrifically sexually abused, but we also, like Africa Compassion, an organization 

that did wonderful work with helping to heal and to mitigate the 

damage of such abuse, saw that there were people on the ground, 

indigenous Congolese who cared so much that they were going the 

extra mile to make sure that the fighting stopped and also that 

there would be a way forward for those who had been abused. 

In two other regions, Kasai and Tanganyika province, the conflicts in Kasai and Tanganyika alone have caused the displacement 

of nearly 2 million people since mid 2016. This is in a country, 

where a war that seemed to never end, took the lives of some 4 

million people. 

Now we all focused, as we should, on Darfur and the loss of life 

there. The number of people that have lost their lives in DRC historically eclipses that, which is a terrible, terrible legacy. 

The DRC has one of the highest rates of human displacement in 

the world. Political unrest in urban centers, a string of large prison 

breaks and violent attacks in Kinshasa, the capital, by members of 

the religious sect that has declared itself in opposition to Kabila 

have further contributed to the worsening security of the conflict 

in Kasai, which reportedly was first sparked in 2016 by the murder 

of a judicial leader by state security forces and had become a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, featuring severe atrocities and widespread recruitment and abuse of children. 

Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict in Eastern DRC, at one time, 

saw violent activity by 2 million militia groups, and an out-of-control national army resulting in the systematic rape of about 50 

women and girls per hour. 

This hearing is intended to look at possible solutions to a political stalemate that could very well lead to further violence and upheaval in a large African country bordering on nine neighbors. It 

follows a successful resolution on DRC that I introduced that was 

passed by the House last year. Ranking Member Bass and I are introducing new legislation very soon. 

We understand that there is no easy solutions to the current crisis in DRC. A negotiated transition likely could be achieved if 

President Kabila were convinced that neither he nor his family 

would be prosecuted for human rights violations or corruption. 

3

However, that would reward them for abusing their citizens and 

plundering the country’s resources, and that is even if members of 

his government were not covered. 

A palace coup might take place in Kabila. This is not unknown 

in the DRC. Kabila’s father, Laurent, was assassinated in office in 

2001. Mobutu Seko, who the elder Kabila had himself overthrown 

in elected government in 1965. He was chased from power and fled 

into exile in 1997. 

However, a coup would not support international efforts to instill 

democratic practices in DRC, and could lead to protracted infighting and national chaos. We want an orderly, peaceful transition, 

and that’s what the international community led by the United 

States is asking and really demanding. 

The status quo, as detailed earlier, is already leading to growing 

violence, and will not lead to a peaceable solution the longer that 

transition is delayed. In fact, it is more likely that violence could 

escalate and spill over into neighboring countries, as did conflict in 

1967, 1997, and 1998 to 2003. 

Over the past year, we have heard many, many promises by the 

Government of the DRC about when the elections will be held. 

There have been several dates given to when voter registration 

would be completed during this past year. The current government 

timetable calls for voter registration to extend to the point at which 

elections couldn’t be held in the DRC until late 2018, with inauguration early in 2019. That would mean that Joseph Kabila could 

have an extra half term in office when the Constitution precluded 

him from going past December 2016. 

Consequently, we will, today, hear from the State Department on 

our Government’s diplomatic efforts to resolve the transition stalemate and the U.S. Agency for International Development on our 

Government’s programs on the ground to promote democracy and 

free and fair elections. 

Our second panel consists of scholars and activists who will give 

us their informed insights as to how we can break this political 

stalemate and prevent more bloodshed in the DRC. 

Again, no solution will be easy or without cost, but nonaction 

would even have a higher cost in terms of human lives. And that 

we must not tolerate. 

I would like to yield to my distinguished friend and colleague. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I will defer first to the ranking member. 

Ms. BASS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate that. Thank you for your leadership, for holding this 

hearing today. And I want to thank and welcome our distinguished 

witnesses today. 

You know what is so tragic is that we all know that DRC is potentially one of the richest countries on earth. We know that it has 

an abundance of deposits of copper, gold, diamonds, cobalt, and 

many other minerals. We know that the Congo River is the second 

largest river in the world and the most powerful river in Africa, 

which means that the country has enormous potential to generate 

hydroelectric power. And some scientists say that it could provide 

enough power for all of sub-Saharan electricity needs. 

4

Now, on the other side of this, we know the stark reality of living 

in DRC today. We know that it is one of the poorest countries in 

the world, ranking 176 out of 187 on the latest U.N. Human Development Index. More than half of the country lives in extreme poverty, and we know that there are 3.8 million internally-displaced 

persons. And we also know that there are parts of the DRC that 

are on the brink of hunger and famine. 

We shouldn’t forget that in March of this year, all of the humanitarian efforts, we had two U.N. investigators of American and 

Swedish nationality and their Congolese interpreter, who were 

found dead. They were there to investigate alleged large-scale violence, and alleged human rights violations by the Congolese army 

and local militia groups. 

So we know with the world’s most complex humanitarian crisis, 

the DRC has 7.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. 

But aid workers are finding it increasingly difficult to address the 

deteriorating situation in the DRC, and many face the risk of attacks and are unable to access areas in most need of humanitarian 

assistance. So the signs coming out of the DRC are not encouraging. 

The Congolese Government and the main opposition coalition 

reached a political agreement to organize a vote by the end of 2013, 

and Kabila committed to not run for a third term. However, yesterday, we met, as the chairman mentioned, we met with our U.N. 

Ambassador, Nikki Haley, who said that the DRC has announced 

that they will hold Presidential elections in December 2018. That 

seems like a ridiculously long time to wait, considering the elections were supposed to be held long ago. And I think, as you mentioned in your comments, that is just a way of really extending it 

into another term. 

But my concern is, is that even if it is genuine that there will 

be elections held in December 2018, I am not convinced that that 

does not mean that Kabila won’t be on the ballot until we hear definitively a public announcement that he will not seek a third term, 

and will not change the Constitution. And I believe, if I heard the 

Ambassador right, Mr. Chair, she did say that he said he wouldn’t 

change the Constitution, correct? 

Mr. SMITH. That is right. 

Ms. BASS. But I do not believe he has made the public statement 

that he will not be on the ballot, which, obviously, if he was on the 

ballot, that is a violation of the Constitution; however, we all know 

that sometimes, people find ways of saying they are not violating 

the Constitution, like in Burundi, it was just a different interpretation, and the world will not tolerate that. 

I was encouraged by the Ambassador yesterday making very 

strong statements that the United States will not be there in support of the country unless we do see a commitment for a peaceful 

transition. And with that, I yield to the other chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Look, I want to thank 

you, and I want to thank Ranking Member Karen Bass for the 

focus that both of you have kept on the DRC; and for the trips that 

both of you have taken to the DRC; the resolutions that the two 

of you have passed; the effort to, sort of, galvanize our attention 

on this tragedy, a tragedy like no other, as you mentioned when 

5

you talked about the millions and millions who have lost their lives 

there. And a lot of it is a governance issue with respect to a lack 

of rule of law. And that emanates, unfortunately, from Laurent and 

then to Joseph Kabila. 

I also want to thank Greg Simpkins for—back in 1997, Tom 

Sheehy and I, and a delegation from this committee, were in neighboring Angola meeting with Savimbi and dos Santos, with our Ambassador trying to broker peace there. And that night the Government of Mobutu was overthrown. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, you were there? 

Mr. ROYCE. We were there. And Greg was our interpreter, luckily, and we were able to take a plane into the airport in Kinshasa. 

And we met with the new government, that was 1 day new, and 

he was able to also communicate with Tshisekedi, who was being 

pushed aside. 

We didn’t find out all until a little later, we were able to track 

and follow Laurent Kabila, met with him in Harare in order to discuss this issue, the rule of law, the Constitution, the importance of 

elections. And we have struggled under the Kabilas now. I think 

we have made three trips, I have with Mr. Sheehy to Kinshasa, 

and we have met numerous times here or in New York. 

I have to give Ambassador Haley credit for, not just the commitment she got in terms of the December 23rd election next year, but 

also the benchmarks that are to be put in place, and the announcement on the part of Joseph Kabila, that there will be an election. 

Now, it falls on us and the international community. 

So this is really good news. We finally have an election calendar. 

And I think we have to welcome not only the announcement, but 

the sense among the people in Congo, when you see them in civil 

society asserting their rights to be part of this process, because 

they have felt the consequences more than anyone. 

And so, I think the State Department, the administration, and 

us on the committee, we have to monitor this progress. And if 

deemed insufficient, we must use every tool we have to pressure 

the government in Congo. Now is the time. If we do not address 

the political instability, then the violence and the unrest across 

that country, which has cost over 4 million lives so far, is only 

going to escalate. And as we watch people flee—and recently we 

have seen another 1 million try to escape the violence—when we 

see the 2 million that are displaced on our trips there, living in 

camps, we know that the humanitarian situation is dire and warrants our immediate attention, and the world’s immediate attention. And we really encourage the NGO communities, some of who 

are here today, because too many Congolese are suffering. 

So we look forward to the witnesses’ testimony today. And again, 

Chairman Smith, I thank you for this hearing. 

Mr. SMITH. Chairman Royce, thank you very much again for your 

long-standing, decades-long leadership. I really appreciate it. Dan 

Donovan, the gentleman from Staten Islands 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And since I am not a 

chairman or ranking member—and I learn so much more by listening and speaking. I just learned how long Greg has been here. I 

am going to yield my time so that Secretary Yamamoto and Administrator Anderson can have more time to testify. Thank you, sir. 

6

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I would like to now introduce 

our first panel, our two very distinguished public servants and 

leaders, beginning with Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, who serves 

as Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs in 

U.S. Department of State. 

He has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006, and where he was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy toward 20 countries in East 

and Central Africa. 

Ambassador Yamamoto was also our Ambassador to the Republic 

of Djibouti from 2000 to 2003, as well as to Ethiopia. He was the 

Deputy Director of East African affairs from 1998 to 2000. 

And without objection, your full resume and that of our distinguished other witness, Cheryl Anderson, will be made part of the 

record. 

Ms. Anderson is working as the Acting Assistant Administrator 

for the Bureau of African Affairs for USAID, the Agency for International Development. Ms. Anderson has more than 20 years of development experience, mostly in Africa. Since joining USAID as a 

foreign service officer, she has worked in USAID’s admissions in 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Sudan, and East Africa. 

Prior to joining USAID, Ms. Anderson worked as a program manager at Health Link Worldwide, and also served as a Peace Corps 

volunteer in Ghana. And she has also testified before our subcommittee. So both of you, welcome back and we look forward to 

your insights and recommendations. 

The floor is yours, Ambassador Yamamoto. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD YAMAMOTO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I ask for the longer version to be submitted for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. And thank you very much, Chairman 

Smith, and Ranking Member Bass and Chairman Royce. Thank 

you very much for this very important hearing today. 

Today’s hearing comes at a critical juncture for the DRC. And 

the country faces two starkly different, possible trajectories over 

the next 12 months, where we have Presidential elections on December 2018 and the DRC’s first peaceful democratic transfer of 

power. Or alternatively, where we see the absence of genuinely free 

and fair elections and a continuation of the current political impasse, we could see the DRC return to widespread violence and instability. Our immediate focus is to support the stability of the 

DRC through genuine free and fair elections that are credible and 

inclusive and lead to a peaceful democratic transfer of power. 

With the November 5th announcement of the DRC’s electoral 

commission by the CENI, the elections will be held in December 

2018. We have an opportunity to support the Congolese people 

achieve historic democratic transfer of power. However, this will require political will on behalf of the Government of the DRC to organize credible elections and commitment by the oppositions to parVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\110917\27515 SHIRL
7

ticipate through the democratic process, and continued engagement, pressure, and support from the international community, including the United States. 

Ambassador Haley’s October visit to the DRC sent a very clear 

powerful message to President Kabila and his government, that 

further delays and an unrealistic electoral calendar will be unacceptable. 

Ambassador Haley also told opposition party leaders that the 

United States does not support calls for unconstitutional change, 

and stressed the need for all actors to work within the framework 

of the DRC Constitution and the December 2016 Saint Sylvestre 

Agreement. 

The administration is building on the momentum provided by 

Ambassador Haley’s visit in the light of the CENI’s recently-announced electoral calendar to push all parties in the DRC to advance the electoral process. There is much at risk due to the DRC’s 

vast size, population, and strategic location, including nine international borders. Continued delays by the government in holding 

elections has increased tensions, undermined already weak, or in 

some regions of the country, nonexisting state authority, and risked 

increased violence, unrest and instability. 

The administration’s focus now is on ensuring that the CENI and 

the government of the DRC implement the election calendar and 

do not undertake any actions that further postpone the long overdue elections. We believe there’s an opportunity for progress despite the challenges. A democratic transition of power, which can 

only come through genuine free and fair elections, is essential for 

the Congolese people, the African subregion and the U.S. strategic 

interests across the continent, including: Preventing wide-scale regional insecurity and instability, which have been a precursor to 

multistate wars and genocide; denying illegal armed groups, criminal networks, and international actors and regimes, such as North 

Korea and ISIS; and access to black markets to which trade and 

minerals and other natural resources; preventing the region from 

becoming a stateless zone that is impossible to monitor and responding to disease outbreaks such Ebola pandemics; and preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers and atrocities 

such as the rape of women and girls as a weapon of war. 

While elections alone will not solve DRC’s daunting challenges, 

they are critical to the country’s stability. We are prepared to work 

with our international partners to ensure that the electoral process 

is transparent, and conducted in accordance with international 

standards. 

It is important to understand this extremely complex country. 

The DRC is the size of the United States east of the Mississippi, 

with more than 80 million people, and almost no basic infrastructure. All nationally elected politicians, not just President Kabila, 

have now overstayed their elected terms in office. Opposition parties and civil society are understandably deeply distrustful of the 

CENI’s and the government’s commitment to elections. Restrictions 

on freedom of assembly as well as politically-motivated prosecution 

of opposition leaders, has significantly exacerbated tensions. Already weak and limited state authorities has become increasingly 

tenuous, and even absent in many areas, and some elements of the 

8

state security forces have committed human rights violations and 

abuses and mass atrocities. 

Numerous non-state armed groups also continue to operate in 

the DRC. The DRC is one of the world’s poorest countries, despite 

having enormous natural resources and wealth. 

Despite the complex environment, we know that genuinely free 

and fair elections can be held in 2018, and there is no question that 

the Congolese people deeply desire to choose a new leader through 

elections. The African Affairs Bureau of the State Department is 

working with our interagency partners to ensure concrete steps are 

implemented toward elections that are genuinely free, fair, credible, timely, and inclusive, and result in a peaceful democratic 

transfer of power. We are similarly coordinating closely with our 

international partners and regional states and multilateral institutions. Key elements of this approach include: With the announcement of the electoral calendar of December 2018, we are coordinating closely with our international partners to actively press the 

CENI and the DRC Government, to fully implement all required 

steps in the DRC’s electoral process. 

Second, we are actively pressing both the government and the 

opposition to operate within the framework of the Constitution and 

the December agreement to reject violence and calls for unconstitutional change. 

Third, we have actively pressed, both through public statements 

and private diplomatic engagements, the Government of the DRC 

to respect political freedom and rights and refrain from excessive 

and unlawful use of force. 

Next, we are coordinating our messaging and advocacy with key 

partners, including our European and regional partners. And finally, since June 2016, if we have imposed targeted sanctions on 

six current and former DRC Government officials, we remain prepared to impose additional targeted sanctions as developments 

warrant. 

While our immediate focus is on the electoral process, the DRC’s 

urgent and ongoing security and humanitarian needs also remain 

important priorities. Together with our international partners, the 

United States has striven to end the violence throughout the DRC, 

including specifically in the Kasais and the East. We are continuing to provide assistance in response to the humanitarian crisis, and to ensure that those responsible for abuses and atrocities 

are held accountable. We have worked with international partners 

to address the humanitarian needs of 3.8 million internally-displaced persons, over 620,000 Congolese refugees now living outside 

their country, and nearly 543,000 refugees for neighboring countries who are inside the DRC. We will continue to engage with the 

DRC Government, the U.N., and our international partners, in 

finding a long-term solution to bring about peace and stability. 

In conclusion, the stability of the DRC is a key administration 

objective in Africa, given the DRC’s significant economic, geopolitical and security-related importance. We need only recall the 

ramifications of the last DRC war from 1998 to 2002, to understand the enormous transnational negative impact of armed conflict and political crises in the Congo, and through free, fair, credible, inclusive elections, leading to of a peaceful democratic transfer 

9

of power are central to the DRC and the region’s long-term stability 

and development. There remain many challenges and risks to 

achieve these goals, but our engagement and commitment are unwavering. And thank you, and I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Yamamoto follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ms. Anderson. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CHERYL ANDERSON, ACTING ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. ANDERSON. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, Congressman Donovan. Thank you for inviting me to 

speak today about the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is always 

an honor to have an opportunity to discuss our work with supporters of Africa. And for me, it is a pleasure to be back testifying 

before this subcommittee. 

USAID has maintained a long-term relationship with the DRC 

and its people since the country became independent in 1960. With 

its vast mineral wealth, the country has tremendous opportunity 

for economic growth that could lift citizens out of poverty, and propel the country into middle-income status. Instead, protracted political uncertainty is fueling violence and instability, and prevents the 

realization of the country’s full potential. 

The reality is that the DRC is teetering on the brink of a crisis 

such as it has not seen since the formal end of the second Congo 

War in 2003. 

Due to the political crisis and continued electoral delays, the 

mandates of all elected DRC Government officials have officially 

expired. 

While an election alone will not solve the DRC’s many challenges, credible inclusive Presidential and legislative elections are 

critical to ensuring a peaceful transition of power, reducing the risk 

of widespread violence, and strengthening the country’s democratic 

institutions and economic development. 

We are pleased with the recent release of an electoral calendar, 

but voter registration, already months behind schedule, must be 

completed. Revised electoral laws have to be passed and funding 

has to be appropriated by the DRC Government to cover the cost 

of organizing national elections. 

Finally, the Government of the DRC needs to take immediate 

steps to allow civil society, journalists and citizens to express themselves, protect the human rights of its citizens and ensure that all 

political parties are afforded equitable access to the media, and 

that their rights to assemble peacefully are respected. 

Alongside other U.S. Government agencies, USAID remains committed to supporting the timely organization of peaceful, credible, 

and inclusive elections, that reflect the will of the Congolese people. 

We have provided approximately $37 million in election and political processes programming since 2013. This includes five components: Support for domestic election observation; civil and voter 

education; targeted technical assistance to the electoral commission, CENI; political party strengthening; and electoral justice. 

USAID’s election observation activity is implemented by the local 

Episcopal Justice and Peace Organization. This is the leading Congolese election observation organization. 

We are helping to build their capacity to train and deploy longand short-term domestic election observers in accordance with 

international standards. 

17

The civic and voter education program is helping more than 35 

different Congolese civil society organizations to inform citizens, 

and particularly women, youth and other traditionally 

marginalized groups, about the electoral process, their rights and 

role as voters, and the importance of peaceful participation in the 

elections. 

A grant to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 

provides technical assistance to the Electoral Commission, CENI, 

for operations, logistics, and effective use of information technology. 

USAID’s political party strengthening program provides training to 

10 political parties—five from the ruling majority, and five from 

the opposition—to better represent and respond to citizens’ concerns, and improve the internal management and organization of 

the parties. 

Finally, our human rights and electoral justice activity strengthens the capacity of national level justice actors, the courts, and civil 

society organizations to conduct legal education, provide legal services and monitor and respond to human rights violations, including 

electoral disputes. 

The stakes for the DRC and for its neighbors could not be higher. 

Again, we are encouraged by the announcement of an electoral calendar, but we will now need to see confidence-building measures 

to ensure that this timeline is respected and implemented, and all 

measures are taking for free, credible and peaceful elections. 

This includes an end to politically-motivated prosecutions, the release of political prisoners, and respect for the right of peaceful assembly and association, so that opposition parties and civil society 

organizations may hold peaceful public meetings without government interference or intimidation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, members of 

the subcommittee. I look forward to hearing your counsel and responding to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Anderson follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much, Ms. Anderson. 

To begin the questioning, I just want to make clear, especially for 

the C-SPAN audience that is following. Some of them might say, 

why are we can doing this? Why do we care whether or not a President follows his own Constitution, and whether or not he, having 

given commitments and being bound by that Constitution to two 

terms, why are we so concerned about it? And I think the seemingly esoteric concern about rule of law, which is important, is 

eclipsed by the potential for horrific conflict, loss of life that we are 

already seeing shaping up. 

We know when these elections, and when people from various 

parties, or even tribes as the Nuer and the Dinka in South Sudan, 

that the flare-ups are huge, large numbers are people are slaughtered, and women are raped and horribly abused as a result. So we 

are on the cusp of what could be, as you have pointed out in your 

testimonies, an incredible new flare-up of violence in a region, as 

you pointed out, Ms. Anderson, that is the size of Western Europe, 

with 100 million people approximately, a large country where the 

potential loss of life is very real. 

So my questions, first beginning with, again, the violence in the 

Kasai region, the number of internally displaced Congolese has 

surged to more than 3.8 million, while the number of suffering 

from acute food insecurity has reached 7.7 million. The U.N. has 

declared a level 3 humanitarian emergency in the DRC, putting it 

in on par with crises in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. 

And I am wondering if you could speak to how we are trying to 

mitigate this terrible humanitarian crisis that is festering before 

our eyes. Secondly, let me ask you, if you could: With regards to 

peacekeeping, I am the one who, as you might know, who authored 

the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, our landmark law that combats sex and labor trafficking, and subsequent laws as well. 

It is a passion of mine, it is a passion of this committee to stop 

all trafficking, because it is modern-day slavery. As we all know, 

the peacekeepers who are deployed to DR Congo early on, particularly during Ambassador Swing’s tenure in office, had a terrible 

record of bribing or taking gifts from young people, raping 13-yearolds. These are the peacekeepers from the U.N. We held several 

hearings on this subcommittee; Greg and I traveled to Goma, and 

met with the peacekeepers there and have raised it at the United 

Nations here in Washington and in country unceasingly. 

We understand that, and I have been tracking this, that the efforts are far better than they have ever been, but certainly not 

there yet. Peacekeepers who do commit crimes against Congolese, 

particularly women and girls, are not only sent back to their home 

countries, but there is a heavy admonishment by the U.N. They 

prosecute, put them behind bars, and to ensure that they are never 

redeployed to another peacekeeping mission ever again where they 

can recommit those crimes. 

If you could speak, if you would, to MONUSCO, whether or not 

it is practicing what we thought—Kofi Annan had called it the 

‘‘Zero Tolerance Policy.’’ I had one hearing where he said, ‘‘Zero 

Tolerance Policy in DR Congo, zero compliance.’’ Because it was so 

ineffectively being implemented. 

23

Notwithstanding the great efforts by Jane Holl Lute, an American who was in a key position there, had to fight for that, so if 

you could speak to that. And finally, let me ask you about the most 

credible, in my opinion, and reliable and effective interlocutors for 

peace reconciliation and free and fair elections, especially in the DR 

Congo, is the Catholic Church. 

Karen Bass and I were in South Sudan last May, and we met 

with Salva Kiir, the President, and had a very straightforward conversation with him, not all that happy, because of the terrible 

killings that are occurring there. He wouldn’t even meet with the 

faith-based consortium of leaders, bishops, clergy of all kinds, who 

really are the key to reconciliation. And now, we see potentially a 

deja vu of that in the DR Congo. How do we support the church 

in its efforts and all those who are trying to have free and fair elections, the amount of money? Who is it going to, if you would? And 

as Nikki Haley said yesterday, you know, if this road map for having this election does not happen, we won’t support the election. 

We are not going to support a fraud and a sham. So if you could 

speak to those three. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that is a 

long list of issues that we need to tackle. 

First is going to MONUSCO, and the peacekeeping operation. As 

you know, 63 percent of all U.N. Ops is in Africa. And what we 

have been firmly committed, especially with this new U.N. Security 

Secretary General, but, also, our own commitment to human rights; 

and also, to your legislation, Mr. Chairman, which has been supportive and very helpful, is that we that we look at MONUSCO 

and all U.N. operations, that they have taken this necessary and 

proper steps on SEA, the sexual exploitation, and ensure that those 

who have committed those violations are held accountable. We are 

doing it just not on MONUSCO, but MINUSMA and all the other 

organizations. 

The Missions Conduct and Disciplinary team in MONUSCO is 

currently composed of 23 personnel with offices in Kinshasa and 

four regional offices, and MONUSCO’s implementing strong preventative actions in training, et cetera, through risk assessment, 

military police deterrent patrols, enforcement of strict curfews, and 

out-of-bound regimes. And the SRSG, again, has taken a very 

strong and tough position on the SEA. 

The other issue too is, as you know, the United States and the 

State Department, we train peacekeeping troops of about over 

300,000. Part of that is human rights, the protection of human 

rights and the protection of SEA. 

Let me go into the other areas on the violence, is that 

MONUSCO’s main object and goal is to protect civilians, and, of 

course, we have had, from 2013, an intervention brigade, which is 

used to target groups like M23, and prevent other problems and 

militias from rising and creating issues. And so those are some 

helpful uses. 

But the other issue, too, is that we need to keep up a very consistent, persistent observation of the gross human rights abuses 

taking place in the DRC, not only just by militias and the FARDC 

troops, but by all groups. And we have to hold each person accountable. 

24

As you may recall, Mr. Chairman, that in June at the Human 

Rights Council, we supported the international experts being sent 

to Kasai to look at the gross human rights atrocities. And, of 

course, but not only looking at the atrocities, but also investigating 

the cases, particularly the death of Sharp and Catalan. This murder case will remain a priority for us to look at and to investigate. 

The other thing is, during Ambassador Haley’s visit to the DRC, 

she met with CENCO, and also the Catholic Church and other 

faith-based groups. We agree in strongly supporting the facilitation 

that the Catholic Church had arranged in the Saint Sylvestre 

Agreement of 2016. 

And as you know, faith-based groups have been a cornerstone 

pillar for a lot of our operations, not just in DRC, but throughout 

Ethiopia, East Africa, West, et cetera, because of their commitment 

and quality of work and low overhead costs. And let me turn to 

my——

Mr. SMITH. And on the peacekeeping, you did touch on that 

somewhat but——

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes. On the——

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Are you satisfied that they are protecting and the duty to protect is being followed and that——

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. The issue for the peacekeeping—it is 

not. And let’s be very clear, it is not. But the issue is the complexity of the DRC. By having a political impasse, it has 

emboldened a lot of the militias to conduct and engage in in very 

striking, gross human rights abuse. And one way to kind of rein 

in some of this abuse, is to have a coherent, free, fair, open election 

that are going to be executed and implemented in 2018. We have 

to hold those people accountable. 

And let me just kind of, if I can go off one tangent on three 

issues, and that is, that there are three requirements that we are 

going to be focused on: That is the technical aspects requirements, 

the other thing is the political requirements, and also the human 

rights requirements. And so the technical, obviously, is the electoral process, announcing and registering voters, ensuring that 

they are scrubbed, looking at the voter registration, looking at the 

candidates’ registrations. That is on the technical side. But on the 

political side is that what we are looking at, very carefully, is that 

the government, as well as the opposition, but the government has 

to give, have confidence-building measures. 

In other words, they cannot arrest political prisoners, they have 

to have open political space. They have to allow people to assemble 

and to discuss, and there has to be looking at and curbing at and 

addressing the excessive use of violence and force. So those are 

some of the issues, and that goes into the human rights issues we 

are looking at and trying to prevent and stop the excessive and 

gross human rights abuse. But let’s go on to the——

Ms. ANDERSON. Chairman Smith, you asked about the situation 

in the Kasais and then peacekeeping and then the churches. I 

would like to start with the situation in the Kasai provinces. 

First of all, the widespread violence and human rights violations 

that we have seen there are totally unacceptable. This is against 

innocent civilians. We know that the violence has been subsiding, 

but that should not take our attention away from the fact that this 

25

is a very serious security and human rights and humanitarian situation in the Kasais with people starting to come back. We also 

have to make sure that we don’t lose sight of the fact that people 

need to be accountable for the abuses that we have seen. 

So the United States, along with our bilateral and multilateral 

partners, has been responding through efforts to end the violence 

and hold people responsible for the heinous acts. But also on the 

humanitarian side, we have been responding. We have scaled up 

our funding. It has been hard to operate, it had been previously 

hard to even get in there. As you mentioned, it can be very treacherous for humanitarian workers, but we did scale up a response for 

health and food security, as well as protection of children who are 

affected by the violence. And we airlifted 300 metric tons of blankets and cooking kits and other kinds of humanitarian supplies 

into the area in Kasai, Kasai-Central, Kasai-Oriental, and two 

other provinces there. 

In the whole country, this is just one part of the country, so there 

are different numbers out there. The ones that I have are that we 

have as many as 3.9 million internally-displaced people in DRC. 

And that is the most, that is the highest number for all of sub-Saharan Africa, and 600,000 refugees who have now left the DRC. 

In fiscal year 2017, the U.S. Government has provided a total of $190 million in humanitarian assistance across the country, and of 

that, $128 million is from USAID. And we also remain committed 

to providing humanitarian assistance to people who are in need, 

with, working with the U.N. and with our NGO partners. 

I won’t really speak on peacekeeping, except to say that in the 

area of gender-based violence, I think you are aware that USAID 

has been very engaged since 2002 in preventing and responding to 

gender-based violence. And on the Catholic Church and churches 

and faith-based organizations, definitely, these groups play such a 

critical role in the country in keeping peace and helping to ensure 

that people hold their government accountable, that they are involved in the election process, and also in providing services across 

the country to people. 

We have repeatedly endorsed the Catholic Church’s December 

31st agreement, and we continue to urge respect for that agreement. And I did mention earlier that we are working with the Episcopal Justice and Peace Organization on domestic election observation efforts. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Without objection, we are going to put 

the December 31st agreement into the record so all can see. Thank 

you for your testimony. 

I now yield to Ranking Member Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just a few questions. I wanted 

to get some specifics. Because when you are talking about—both of 

our witnesses—when you are talking about holding people accountable, I wanted to know how we do that? 

Ambassador Yamamoto, you were referring to, I think you talked 

about political, technical—you were talking about the confidencebuilding measures. And you said technical, political and human 

rights, is that what you were saying? So I wanted to know, you 

know, how we specifically go about that? I mean, I hear from people all the time of folks being arrested, and I don’t know what our 

26

role in that is, or when we see the violence taking place, especially 

government-initiated violence. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Let me give kind of one introductory remark and then go into the discussion. 

So since coming in as the Acting Assistant Secretary, I made a 

concerted effort to talk to all our partners and colleagues dealing 

with the DRC. And the issue is that we find it extremely unacceptable that the elections in the DRC has taken so long. And the instability that has given rise to militias and other groups because 

they have been emboldened by the lack of political uncertainty. 

We talked to the African Union, the FARDC and the European 

colleagues, the donors, and the issue comes in is that by holding 

Kabila and the opposition accountable, but mostly in this case, 

President Kabila, that he doesn’t have political space, to maneuver, 

to escape, to delay, but that he has held focus, that you will have 

elections. 

The other issue too, is I know we discussed with the opposition 

one of the areas was that they wanted to look at the transitional 

government. We said no, under the Constitution and under the 

Saint Sylvestre Agreement that Kabila will be there until the new 

President is elected. That means we will hold Kabila responsible 

and accountable to instituting, implementing the agreements, and 

according to the Constitution, the process for election of the President. 

Ms. BASS. Yeah, I just wonder what we specifically do. I mean, 

I understand we talked to AU, we talked to FARDC but, you know, 

what measures do we specifically take? 

Is there something we would hold back? What do we do? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I think on a broader scope by having 

the Africans and the Europeans committed and focused, that, you 

know, puts on President Kabila the onus that he has political 

stake, he has to implement, he has to be committed to doing this, 

and that there is no alternative or no ability to delay that process. 

Ms. BASS. Well, yes, although he has delayed it. 

So you mentioned also that there were sanctions that were prepared, and I was wondering what kind of sanctions. And then, you 

know, that we are looking at legislation, and I wanted to know 

what your thoughts were about that? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Everything has to be on the table. And 

as you know, we did implement targeted sanctions, OFAC sanctions on six specific individuals. And sanctions are on the table. 

Ms. BASS. And so if we target the specific individuals, what are 

we sanctioning them for? They can’t come to the United States? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. And their assets, they——

Ms. BASS. Do they have assets here? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Assets not only here, but in other countries. By doing it on the banking institutions, that helps restrict 

their operations. It is something similar that we have done in other 

countries and to other individuals. So that’s on the OFAC side. The 

other issue, too, is we can look at limiting their ability to come to 

the United States, through visa processes. We can also look 

through, with the United Nations and on U.N. sanctions, and also 

build on that through sanctions from the European Union as well. 

So it has to be a very concerted effort——

27

Ms. BASS. When we do sanctions like that on the individuals, because I know that some of these folks—I don’t know specifically 

about the group you are talking about, but some of them have children here——

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Ms. BASS [continuing]. Going to our universities. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Ms. BASS. Do our sanctions ever refer to that? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Sanction is only on the specific individual. 

Ms. BASS. It is not like on a family, per se? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. For instance, I mean, hypothetical, if an 

individual is thinking, because they have gotten ill-gotten assets, 

let’s say the Kleptocracy Act, then that obviously would affect the 

family members, because they can’t access the banking institutions 

and to get money out, because those are ill-gotten assets. 

Ms. BASS. Do we ever say their families can’t come here? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. It depends on if they have been targeted. 

Ms. BASS. Yeah, I understood on the financial part, but I was 

just—because I know that one of the strategies that is used is that 

their relatives are not in the countries. When all of the strife is 

happening, their individual families are protected. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes, and you raised a very good point, 

Congresswoman Bass, and that is something that we are discussing separately, but the issue comes in is family members—in 

one country where family members are living outside of the country benefiting from ill-gotten assets. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Those people as well——

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO [continuing]. Cannot access, not only the 

banking facilities, but also any of the benefits from those assets so 

they, too, will be under those sanctions. 

Ms. BASS. Because one thing that we do is that we allow folks 

to come here and buy real estate and all sorts of things. They are 

living well. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. And, again, the way we do the targeted 

sanction, it has to be very negotiated, it has to be looked at. We 

can’t go into who we are considering for sanctions, but just it is 

generally that everything is on the table for discussion, and the 

breadth and the depth of those sanctions. 

Ms. BASS. Now, on our end, do we have an Ambassador? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. We have not had one since December of 

last year. 

Ms. BASS. And is there one in the pipeline that just hasn’t been 

confirmed? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. There is one but I defer to the White 

House personnel system. And——

Ms. BASS. I understand that you defer for the specifics, but do 

you know if the person is waiting Senate confirmation? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I am not at liberty to say; it is, 

again——

Ms. BASS. It is a secret? 

28

Ambassador YAMAMOTO [continuing]. This would be for the 

White House personnel. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. You said that we are really looking at the case 

of the two murders. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Ms. BASS. And so I wanted to know what that meant? What are 

we doing? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. We have an American citizen——

Ms. BASS. One was an American. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. American. But that doesn’t matter because both of them were part, they are investigating the mass 

atrocities that have taken place. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Their work is important to us. As part 

of the process, we are coordinating looking at investigations, pushing the United Nations, pushing operations, pushing the DRC. 

Ms. BASS. Are they doing—Who is doing the investigation, by the 

way? Is the DRC doing it, or is it an international investigation 

or——

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. We have said everyone is going to be 

participating in the investigation, because this is a priority for the 

United States to look at who were involved in the murders, and to 

hold those people accountable. 

One thing is that we supported the U.N. Secretary General’s recent employment of Robert Petit of Canada to head a team that 

will assist in the national investigation into the deaths of Mr. 

Sharp and Ms. Catalan. And then, we are looking at other means 

and methods to help those investigations. 

Ms. BASS. Also on our end, I know that we were talking about 

the peacekeeping troops, but we pushed for a rather deep reduction 

in the troop levels. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Right. 

Ms. BASS. So how does that work? Because I think you were saying—was that you, Ms. Anderson? Were you talking about the real 

need for troops but yet we propose cutting them back? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Right. So Ambassador Haley, in her trip 

to the DRC, one of the issues was focusing on peacekeeping missions that are fit for purpose, and I think that was the key word, 

fit for purpose. And so if we look at MONUSCO, it is probably one 

of the largest and longest serving peacekeeping operations for the 

United Nations. And so the issue comes in, how do you make those 

more efficient, effective, targeted? 

On the one hand, yes, I know that Ambassador Haley had raised 

the issue of the Burundi refugee being killed by the FARDC troops, 

how did MONUSCO respond or not respond? How about the intervention battalion, Tanzania’s troops, et cetera, it is not enough to 

target and to go after all of the problems that are in——

Ms. BASS. I was just referencing, didn’t we ask for a reduction? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Ms. BASS. But yet, we said more were needed, so I didn’t understand why we asked for a reduction? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Okay. So I think right now currently, it 

is to assess the effectiveness of MONUSCO, looking at, do we have 

29

the right mission set and that it is fit for purpose, according to 

what Ambassador Haley——

Ms. BASS. I see. So there might be fewer, but you are saying it 

might be more specific. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Specific and targeted. 

Ms. BASS. And you were mentioning—and I believe this was Ms. 

Anderson—was mentioning the electoral assistance that we have 

provided over the years. You gave quite a span of years. And I was 

just wondering what we are doing now, specifically how much, and 

what does it mean that we provide electoral assistance? 

Ms. ANDERSON. I mentioned that we have been providing assistance since 2013 in preparation for this, this election that is coming 

up. So it is not just the 1 day of the election, but it is a process. 

And so, our $37 million in funding is for those five components that 

I mentioned. And a lot of it has been in process because we had 

been working on things like voter and civic education, so that the 

people know what to expect, how to get involved in elections, working with political parties. 

Ms. BASS. So just to understand kind of specifically, because I 

certainly——

Ms. ANDERSON. Sure. 

Ms. BASS [continuing]. Understand it in the abstract. But specifically, do we fund a U.S. NGO or DRC NGO that goes in villages 

and sits down and talks to people? Is that an example? And given 

that voter registration is really behind, are we doing anything, and 

if we are, specifically, if you can give an example of a project that 

we fund and what they do? 

Ms. ANDERSON. Sure. That is really important now because we 

have to keep adjusting. Now we have a date, so that that means 

that we can put a number of things into motion toward the date 

of the election. But I can talk about, for example, the civic and 

voter education component of our program. This is—we have invested $19 million in this program. It is implemented by Counterpart International, and they work with 

38——

Ms. BASS. Is that a U.S. company? 

Ms. ANDERSON. Yes. It is working with 38 different Congolese 

civil society organizations. That is how we are helping to build a 

local capacity so that those organizations, now, they inform the citizens. They work with the citizens to talk about the electoral process, what are your rights as a voter, what is your role as a voter, 

what do you need to do to get involved. And they also have a specific component on peaceful participation. 

Ms. BASS. Is it a consulting firm? 

Ms. ANDERSON. Counterpart International is a—I think it is a—

I may have to get back to you. It may be a not-for-profit organization. 

We have the four other components. I would like to mention the 

component on elections observation, and that is one of our few direct awards to a DRC-based organization with——

Ms. BASS. Is it NDI and IRI or that comes out of another—on our 

part? 

Ms. ANDERSON. We have—NDI is involved in the component of 

our assistance that we call political party training. 

30

Ms. BASS. And then you fund DRC group to do the observation? 

Ms. ANDERSON. Right. So they coordinate a number of Congolese 

groups to do the observation. And this is the Episcopal justice and 

peace organization in DRC. 

Ms. BASS. So given that now we know the election is December 

of next year, is more money needed? Or because these elections 

have been stalled, have you been holding onto the dollars in anticipation that one day we get a date? 

Ms. ANDERSON. Yes. We are hustling now to have a look at what 

we have, but we had extended our awards into 2018 and 2019. And 

at this point, I think we may have to make some adjustments to 

get us through that period through the period of the elections. But 

for the most part, we had done extensions to the programs to allow 

us to continue into 2018, potentially 2019. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ANDERSON. It is a long process, so it is not just the election. 

Ms. BASS. Especially when you don’t know——

Ms. ANDERSON. Yes. And then we hope that they stick to the 

date too. We have to hold them to that. 

Mr. SMITH. You know, as you realize unmet need, if you could 

advise our subcommittee—I know you’ll be advising hopefully the 

Appropriations Committee as well—so that we can try to meet that 

need. 

I yield to my good friend and colleague, Dan Donovan. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have one question for both of you. Maybe, Mr. Secretary, 

you can speak about the election process, and maybe, Ms. Anderson, you can talk about our humanitarian efforts. We are a passionate Nation, particularly when it comes to both democracies and 

humanitarian efforts. We are also a very compassionate Nation. 

How do we see our role, the United States’ role in the government 

of other countries? There is a lot of talk about other countries’ influence on our election process here in the United States. Now we 

are talking about maybe United States involvement in the elections 

in another country. 

I was just wondering how do we define our role or what do we 

see as proper, and for the humanitarian efforts, in a country I am 

not sure that they are cooperative with USAID’s efforts to help people, but we as a Nation reach out to those folks in the rest of the 

globe who are suffering, and sometimes their countries or their 

government might not appreciate our efforts and may see what we 

are trying to do in humanitarian environment as trying to influence their people in other ways. I was just wondering if you can 

just give me some background on that. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. So our role in the political process, we 

don’t take winners, losers, and we are not addressing or advocating 

for any candidate. What we are doing is that these are agreements, 

the Constitution of the DRC and the Saint-Sylvestre agreement of 

2016 negotiated by the Catholic church, which both the government 

and the opposition signed. What we are doing is holding both parties accountable and committed to what they had signed. 

And for 4 years I led peace talks and negotiations in the Congo, 

and everywhere I went, the United States stands as a symbol that 

we are going to work for what the people of Congo want, and they 

31

demand an election, a credible, free, fair, open election. And in that 

context, we are going to support the people of the Congo to say, 

yes, we are going to—we are behind you, we are going to hold the 

government and the opposition accountable to do these electoral 

processes in 2018. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Secretary, do we do that as a Nation? Are we 

doing that as a group as the United Nations? How do we do that? 

Does the United States stand alone in doing that or our partners 

at the U.N. assist in that as well? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes. We do that in the context of negotiations with the donor community, the United Nations, but also 

the African unions and also local communities within the Congo 

and also the various groups. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Secretary, Ms. Anderson, can you speak about 

our humanitarian efforts? 

Ms. ANDERSON. Yes. We always do our best to respond to humanitarian crises wherever they are. In the DRC, we have a very challenging environment. We work closely with the U.N., with other bilateral and multilateral development partners, with international 

and local NGOs. We always have to coordinate our efforts. We always encourage the government—we need their cooperation, and 

we always encourage them to do increasingly more to respond to 

humanitarian crises. This is a tough one in the DRC, and I can say 

that we—we are a major donor in humanitarian assistance in subSaharan Africa, and that includes the DRC. So many of the other 

players look to us to play a leading role. 

And I would just conclude by saying that, once again, this is a 

very challenging environment, and it is very difficult for us to kind 

of get ahead of this situation, as well as to decide what to do because it is a dangerous environment for our humanitarian work. 

Mr. DONOVAN. And when you say we are a great donor, is that 

just in financial resources? Is it in human resources? What is our 

actual presence there? 

Ms. ANDERSON. We have—we have personnel on the ground who 

work on humanitarian assistance, and we work with local and 

other international organizations, especially the United Nations, to 

deliver humanitarian assistance in the form of food assistance, 

emergency health assistance, other types of relief supplies. And 

also one thing we work on is the protection of citizens, especially 

children in dangerous situations. 

Mr. DONOVAN. And my last question, do you find resistance in 

the DRC from the efforts that you have just described? 

Ms. ANDERSON. I would say that one of the biggest challenges is 

a question of the will of the government to move forward on its 

commitments. In the December 31 agreement and also their—the 

fact that we have such a dangerous environment that with violence 

and human rights violations makes it very hard for us to do our 

humanitarian work. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I thank you both. 

Mr. SMITH. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, 

Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this important meeting. It is interesting as a freshman 

32

member of this committee to sort of do the learning curve on Africa 

in particular, and certain trends have emerged in my observations. 

But first, let me thank our panelists, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 

Yamamoto’s service goes all the way back to oversight of the tragic 

events in Tiananmen Square, and Ms. Anderson served, and I will 

thank you for your service in the Peace Corps, putting a good face 

on America for the remainder of the world and I think an investment that a lot of my colleagues undervalue as it relates to return 

on investment (ROI) and the opinion of America that people across 

the world who might otherwise only get that opinion from mass 

media have, and that is so important, so thank you for that. 

I don’t want anybody to break out in laughter when I ask this 

question, but as we work toward hopefully free, fair, and transparent elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, what can we 

say we are doing to ensure that the Chinese influence over the 

electoral process doesn’t tilt the scales in the direction that would 

be to the benefit of the Chinese? And that is an open question. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman. You know, we have looked at the—in our coordination with 

the international community—and we do hold annual discussions 

with the Chinese specifically on what they are doing in Africa. And 

we are trying to steer not only China, but all these countries to 

play a helpful, supportive role. The other area too that we have 

concerns is, of course, the exploitation of resources in eastern 

Congo. 

Mr. GARRETT. That was my next question. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. That is the area that we have been 

working on very long and hard, is that the people of the Congo 

need to benefit from the resources. There has to be a rational process in whereby you develop these resources. And one of the things 

is that, you know, looking at your question, is that we do discuss 

the Chinese on a whole spectrum and aspect. And not just China; 

it is all the other countries that are involved, positively and negatively, in the DRC. 

Mr. GARRETT. Ms. Anderson, if you want to, and if you don’t 

want to, then I will keep going. 

Ms. ANDERSON. I guess I would just say, if you are referring to 

the elections and our involvement related to the Chinese, we are 

focusing on local capacity, and we are working so that the Congolese can be prepared to participate in their election and hold their 

own government accountable so that they can start to be able to 

find their own future. And that is the role that we are playing in 

the elections, and it is quite different from the Chinese. 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. And so that is something that is noteworthy 

here as we as Americans recognize that perhaps American, dare I 

say, overreach globally has manifested itself in ways that we didn’t 

anticipate, that there are certain types of aid that are greatly appreciated and others that are taken because they are aid, but that 

come with a backlash, if you will. There is a vacuum, I think, inherently created, and the Chinese are all too happy to fill it. Pardon me, I am going to do soliloquy for a second here. 

I have not spent a ton of time on the ground in Africa, but I did 

speak to a ranking member of a North African country wherein the 

entire presidential palace that I would say probably rivals the CanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\110917\27515 SHIRL
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non House Office Building in square footage was built by China. 

They built a palace. And when you get off the airport, and you 

served in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, which is a dynamic country 

where if we get it right, great things will happen, and if we don’t, 

tragic things will happen, you almost feel like you are in a Chinese 

annex. And the Chinese record of exploitation of individuals is apparent even from 2007 in the DRC as it relates to exploitation of 

child labor, as it relates to the monopolization of the mineral deposits in DRC in particular, which if properly levied, should make the 

DRC one of the most prosperous nations on the planet. The Chinese efforts are historically and demonstrably toward ensuring a 

Chinese access to things like tungsten and tantalum and coltan 

and cobalt that have manufacturing applications in anything from 

lithium-ion batteries to jet engine components. 

And I get it, except what we are trying to do is empower the people in the DRC to be the leaders to the people in the DRC, and 

without a combative tone, and understanding that there is a global 

economic struggle afoot and the Chinese are extraordinarily strong 

competitors therein, how do we ensure the power in Congo goes to 

the Congolese, that our monies that are spent aren’t converted by 

way of Chinese exploitation of stability that we helped create to enrich the Chinese at the expense, literally, of the poorest and weakest people in places like the DRC? I am asking for suggestions because I don’t know the answer. Understanding that we don’t want 

to take a combative stance, but my primary function on this committee is to the extent that it is relevant and possible for the 

United States to create a better circumstance for human rights to 

do so. How do we do that without empowering the Chinese to continue exploitative practices? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I think that is a very difficult question 

and a very complex situation. The issue is that we talk—it is not 

just the Chinese, but it is a lot of countries, outside countries, it 

is a lot of regional states as well that is exploiting those resources. 

And of course, our effort is to make sure that we monitor, we hold 

people accountable, and we look at how these resources are being 

distributed, and find mechanisms and ways that the people of the 

Congo can benefit from those resources. 

In our annual discussions—since your question is on China—that 

we do have—we are coming up to another annual discussions with 

China to see where they can play a helpful role. In the past, they 

have done an engineering battalion in south—in Sudan. They have 

done road construction to AID and U.S. projects. So looking and 

seeing where we can have areas of commonality and then areas 

where we do not is how do we make sure that it is beneficial to 

the people in Africa. 

Ms. BASS. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. GARRETT. Yes, absolutely. My colleague from California, Ms. 

Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. 

You know what, one of the things I wanted to say in terms of 

China’s involvement, I really want to see more involvement from 

our companies, you know. And one of the areas that I am really 

interested in is promoting our companies in the U.S. to get inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\110917\27515 SHIRL
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volved in infrastructure. China is famous for building roads in Africa, and it is a real mixed bag in terms of—what did you say? 

Mr. SMITH. Not so good roads. 

Ms. BASS. Exactly. Not so good roads. But, you know, we certainly know the quality of our companies. And so I would really 

like to work with you in the future in ways that we can establish 

partnerships to promote U.S. business involvement, because I am 

distressed by the Chinese involvement as well, but I think one answer to it is to step up ours. 

Mr. GARRETT. I think—I would thank the Congresswoman and 

sort of pile on there. We have spoken just a couple of times, and 

I would think originally with regard to oppressed minorities in Africa, and I look forward to working with the Congresswoman. It 

strikes me that the Chinese infrastructure created in Africa almost 

always heads from the natural resource to the ports. Go figure. But 

it is, at some level, a national security situation for our Nation as 

it relates to rare Earth minerals, et cetera. And, again, there is a 

role for this country to play in perpetuating basic human dignities 

and freedoms and expectations. We could spend another entire 

hearing on alleged abuses by U.N. peacekeeping forces. 

Mr. SMITH. And we have. Four of them. So it is a real problem. 

Mr. GARRETT. Well, it is tragic, right? To paraphrase President 

Reagan, I am from the U.N., and I am here to help, and it gets 

worse. And so that doesn’t mean we should throw up our hands 

and stop trying. But when we have people of your caliber with your 

experience, you know, again, within the appropriate role and purview of the U.S. Federal Government, we need to care about 

human beings across the world. And a prominent foreign leader 

said to me, look, if the Chinese will help us and there are strings 

attached, it is still help. And if we withdraw and create a vacuum, 

somebody is going to fill it. 

But the challenge here is how we are good stewards, work within 

the appropriate realm of what is federally allowable in this country, and then don’t subsidize bad outcomes. And that is what frustrates me. And in no way, shape, or form am I in an adversarial 

tone from you two fine people. It is that I want to hear—we have 

these hearings, we talk, it feels good, but what are the answers? 

And so I think Congresswoman Bass and I are on the same page 

there, but there are opportunities to be had. If a corporate entity 

wants to make money, that is fine, but if they help people while 

they are doing it, it is even better. And so how do we do that? How 

do we invest? How do we ensure that our investments aren’t undergirding those who are our geopolitical rivals, economically and potentially militarily? And how do we do so without victimizing people who have a 200-year history of being victimized by outsiders? 

Ms. BASS. Here, here. 

Mr. SMITH. Before we go to our next panel, just very briefly, I 

would point out that my good friend, on one trip to Kinshasa, I will 

never forget, I had dinner with—so did Greg—with a member of 

Parliament who also has a farm, and he said, I can grow anything. 

I really loved his attitude, and he showed me his farm. He can 

grow anything. I can’t get it to market. There is no roads. There 

is no bridges. There are very few. And the Chinese have come in 

and in a quid pro quo in a fleecing of DR Congo, which they have 

35

done elsewhere in Africa, they have gotten minerals, wood, all 

kinds of commodities at unbelievably discounted prices for those 

roads and bridges. 

We have the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It precludes, it holds 

accountable those who engage in bribery and other corrupt practices. China has no such law. So we know that corruption is a very 

serious issue here, and the Congolese are not getting anywhere 

near what they should be getting for what they give to China in 

exchange for those roads and bridges. So we need to do much more 

on trying to ensure that our friends and allies who are truly democracies with something like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act sell, 

but especially the United States. 

I do have one final question of many, but I will just finish with 

this. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman, if I can interrupt. I apologize. And 

thank you for yielding. 

The first thing we can do is tell the world that the Chinese are 

exploiting people. 

Mr. SMITH. Exactly. 

Mr. GARRETT. And again, I don’t have a problem with Chinese 

corporate entities, I don’t have a problem with them building the 

roads, but they are—′′fleecing’’ is a great word. 

Mr. SMITH. It is. And I say to my friend, we have had several 

hearings on that kind of corruption and that, really, exploitation of 

African resources on their way to Ghana. There are many, many 

countries. And unfortunately, it doesn’t get covered by the press. 

We hold these hearings. We put in resolutions. We get bills passed. 

And it is not even on page 15. So that is very discouraging, but we 

have got to do it anyway because we have got to do what is right. 

But I thank my friend for raising that. 

My question would be, the U.N. 2017 humanitarian plan is now 

running for this year at about 42 percent. My question is, are the 

U.N. needs assessment accurate? Do we believe that we have confidence that they have a real handle on what is needed to be done 

to mitigate disease, death, mortality from things like hunger and 

illnesses? And secondly, what does a near 60 percent underfunding 

of the U.N. for the DRC mission mean to women and children in 

vulnerable populations? 

Ms. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, we always have some involvement when the U.N. is doing their assessments because we are 

very engaged with them on a day-to-day basis. By the same token, 

we look at the assessments with a critical eye, based on our knowledge of the situation on the ground. And the reality is that often 

the requirements are much higher than what we all together can 

meet. So it means that we always have to prioritize. And that is 

what we are constantly doing, is prioritizing and looking at what 

we can provide, what is the highest priority that is really going to 

make the most difference. 

The United States will always be there for people in need. Our 

resources are not unlimited, so it is very important for us to 

prioritize, and that is why it is important for us to have a good assessment of what the situation is on the ground. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you. I would just point out that I have 

chaired hearings in the past, a number of them, about the mass exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\110917\27515 SHIRL
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odus of people from the Middle East. And once they got to refugee 

camps, usually in the auspices of the UNHCR, particularly those 

with longer stays found more gross underfunding, including the 

World Food Program, which massively cut their allocation, but it 

was order of magnitude about 40 percent of what the U.N. assessment was for those, and that is why they uprooted and left and 

flocked into Europe and elsewhere because they saw no future. 

There was no education opportunities and certainly there wasn’t 

enough food, clothing, and shelter to meet their very legitimate 

needs. 

So, you know, for the international community to go cheap on 

refugees and IDPs is a very bad bargain first and foremost for the 

victims, but secondly, because they are going to move somewhere 

else. They have to because they care for their families. And I thank 

you again for your great leadership and for your testimony today. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Just one quick comment. So we agree 

with you, Mr. Chairman, it is excellent. I want to make one comment on what Congresswoman Bass had said, and the point is that 

I don’t like to play defense, I like to play offense. And one of the 

offensive issues is, is that we need to get more American companies. And how do we encourage American companies, and the area, 

of course, is risk insurance and financing and other support. And 

our Embassies are supporting 100 percent, and we are looking at 

means and mechanism. So we are going to continue to do that, 

Madam Congressman. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now welcome our second panel beginning first with Mvemba Dizolele, who is a writer and foreign policy 

analyst and independent journalist, and a veteran of the United 

States Marine Corps. Mr. Dizolele was a grantee of the Pulitzer 

Center on Crisis Reporting and covered the 2006 historic elections 

in the Democratic Republic of Congo. With the Pulitzer Center he 

produced ‘‘Congo’s Bloody Coltan,’’ a documentary report on the relationship between the Congo conflict and the scramble for mineral 

resources. He served as an election monitor with the Carter Center 

in Congo in 2006 and again in 2011. He was also embedded with 

the U.N. peacekeepers and Congo’s District South Kivu province as 

a reporter. He has testified before various subcommittees in both 

chambers. And again, we welcome him here today. 

We will then hear from Mr. Fred Bauma, who is with an organization known in English as the Struggle for Change. This nonviolent, nonpartisan civil society movement was founded in June 

2012 in Goma, the capital of North Kivu in DRC. The movement 

campaigns for social justice and accountability in the DRC and encourages Congolese citizens to push for the promotion and respect 

for human rights. Mr. Bauma was arrested in March 2015 but was 

later released. He currently resides in the United States. 

We will then hear from Severine Autesserre, who is a professor 

of political science, specializing in international relations and African studies at Columbia University. She works on civil wars, 

peacekeeping, peace building, and humanitarian aid. Professor 

Autesserre’s latest research project has landed successful international contributions to local embodiment peace building. Her earVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\110917\27515 SHIRL
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lier research progress focused on violence and international intervention in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 

where she has traveled regularly since 2001. Her field work and 

analysis culminated in ‘‘The Trouble with Congo: Local Violence 

and the Failure of International Peacebuilding’’ published by Cambridge University Press in 2010. 

And then we will hear from Ida Sawyer, who is the Central Africa director for Human Rights Watch. She has been based in Congo 

since January 2008, first in Goma since 2011, and in the capital 

of Kinshasa. In August 2016, Congolese authorities barred Ms. 

Sawyer from continuing her work in the country following a series 

of human rights publications by Human Rights Watch on political 

repression. She is now based in Brussels where she oversees 

Human Rights Watch’s work in Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. Ms. 

Sawyer has conducted research across Congo and in areas of 

Northern Congo and in neighboring countries afflicted by the 

Lord’s Resistance Army, and her research has been integral to numerous human rights reports and has informed the world about 

what has been going on. 

If I could, Mr. Dizolele, if you could begin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MVEMBA DIZOLELE, PROFESSORIAL LECTURER IN AFRICAN STUDIES, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before you, Mr. 

Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, and the distinguished members. 

The views I express today are mine and mine alone. With your permission, sir, I would like to submit my remarks for the record. 

Over the years, I have proudly provided my analysis of developments in Congo to several subcommittees in both chambers of this 

august Congress. Today, however, I beg for your indulgence. I do 

not wish to speak as an academic, journalist, analyst, or fellow. I 

want to speak as a human being talking to other human beings. 

I would love to speak plainly, no academic speak, no diplomatic jargon. In other words, what I want to say is that Kabila must go. 

The responsibility for the suffering of the Congolese people rests 

with one man, Joseph Kabila, which he shares with a small and 

shrinking cadre of associates and family members. Over the last 16 

years, this group has captured the state with total impunity at the 

expense of the people. 

A series of reports, including those from the Carter Center, the 

Panama Papers, the Lumumba Papers, the Paradise Papers, 

Bloomberg News, and the Congo Research Group have documented 

and exposed the wide extent to which DRC’s natural and financial 

resources, estimated in billions of dollars, have been diverted to 

benefit this small group. 

The Kabila regime has been characterized by three things: 

Looting, plunder, and deadly violence. We have tolerated this for 

too long. It is time for a new leadership. Again, Kabila must go. 

Kabila’s biography is a Cinderella story with a bloody twist. 

Kabila, having grown outside Congo, showed up in Congo for the 

first time at the age of 26 during the war that eventually vanquished the late President Mobutu Sese Seko. When his father took 

38

over a year later, he made his son a two-star general and appointed him chief of staff of the armed forces, the ground forces, 

that is. Four years later, after his father was assassinated, the 

younger Kabila became President. 

The Congolese disapproved. Most of the Congolese at least disapproved of the father-to-son succession, but the international community fully embraced him with total diplomatic, financial, and political support. 

Donors initiated a number of projects to help Kabila end the war 

that he inherited from his father. This initiative included Sun City 

Accord, the Transition, the Constitutional Referendum, and the 

2006 election. On the security front, the world raised the largest 

peacekeeping force—or peacekeeping mission to help Kabila buy 

time and build an army. The World Bank remitted the debt at the 

tune of about $13 billion, again, to help him start a new economy. 

And then the World Bank also wrote a new mining code, but eventually Kabila will misuse that mining code to trade his power for 

financial and political gains. 

So we were really determined, the world that is, to make Kabila 

a success, and nothing could derail what he had started. We then 

arrested his main opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, to get him out of 

the way so that Kabila will succeed. Unfortunately, Kabila did not 

succeed. He himself set out to undermine the political gain and the 

democratic gain of the country. Despite the legitimacy that he had 

achieved, he wanted to change the constitution, eventually leading 

the country in 2011 in highly contested and botched elections. 

So despite this goodwill, Kabila has not succeeded. Since then 

the country has gone from crisis to crisis to crisis. When we confront Kabila and his associates about the abysmal record, they typically blame everyone and everything, from the weather, the political position, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, the youth, the United 

States, and the militias. Everybody except themselves. Nobody ever 

takes responsibility for actions in DRC, and the government definitely never fires anyone, and nobody ever resigns. 

So even by the standards of Central Africa’s dysfunctional states, 

the Kinshasa regime stands alone in its mediocrity. Unlike his 

peers in the region, Kabila has no political base and is so unpopular that he cannot face his fellow citizens and explain why he 

should stay in power. Every time he has made an attempt to stay 

longer, he has faced stiff resistance from the population, so his government has decided to simply not fund and organize the elections. 

His action has only emboldened the Congolese to demand that he 

leaves office. 

So I believe that we should not be, as the government seems to 

propose today, blissfully naive about the decision that we will be 

holding the election next year by December. The record stands for 

itself. It has been 16 years. I don’t have to go further into this. But 

I just want to say that, internally, Kabila has no good options. He 

has tried everything: Subvert the Constitution, kill protestors, jail 

everyone. The international community has helped him. He has 

failed. The only option that he has is to rely on military force and 

bloody repression. We have already seen too much of that. 

39

So at this point, in fact, the Congolese see him as an illegal, illegitimate, and unconstitutional President, which he is. They are already referring to him as the former President. So should we. 

Outside DRC, Kabila and his associates are spending lots of 

money to launder his image and fend off the pressure. They have 

hired Mer Security and Communication Systems, an Israeli firm, 

to represent their interests in Washington, DC, for nearly $6 million. This is in a country where civil servants, nurses and doctors 

are on strike because they are not being paid, nurses and doctors, 

yet the government is spending over $6 million in lobbying efforts. 

A year after Kabila’s mandate expired, we tried to give him another year. That is way, way too long that anybody practical should 

accept. It is unacceptable. Kabila must go. The longer he stays in 

office, the greater the risk for violence and instability. 

My recommendation is that this body and the Government of the 

United States should impose sanctions on Kabila and his family 

and his inner circle, who have been imposing sanctions on people 

who are totally irrelevant: Generals, ministers of information. That 

is not going to work. Kabila is the obstacle. He should be held accountable. 

We have spoken to Kabila for a long time at the highest level of 

this Government of the United States. President Obama, Secretary 

Kerry, Secretary Clinton, Senator Russ Feingold, Tom Perriello, 

they have all engaged Kabila in the nicest of ways that most dictators would have wished for, and he is not adjusted. 

We should impose sanctions on Corneille Nangaa, the head of the 

Independent National Electoral Commission. His delaying tactics 

fuel the tensions and pose even a greater risk for stability. Many 

of you have met Corneille Nangaa. He is really convinced in his 

own bubble that what he is saying makes sense, but all of us know 

that what he says most of the time is incoherent and nonsensical. 

In fact, Corneille Nangaa has retained a lobby firm, Reset Public 

Asset, LLC, to represent him in Washington, DC, for a monthly fee 

of $30,500, to represent him ahead of an electoral commission. The 

Madison Group, LLC, represents the Independent National Election Commission for a fee of $25,000. This is a red flag. 

The message here is that the Electoral Commission and its President care more about what the U.S. Government thinks or does, 

while showing utter contempt for the Congolese opinion. While 

they almost never meet the Congolese opposition to update them 

on the electoral process, they are spending millions of taxpayer dollars both in the U.S. and in Congo on frequent travels and on expensive lobbying efforts in Washington, DC. This again is unacceptable. Corneille Nangaa should be held accountable. He should be 

put on the sanction list. 

The U.S. Congress, this august body, has been holding hearings 

for DRC for years to little effect on the ground. I feel that we are 

all accomplices, and unless we act, these hearings will remain but 

abstract academic discussions. Your committee, your subcommittee 

has been considering legislation on DRC for 6 months. Now is the 

time to show resolve and roll out that legislation forcefully and 

more strong—much more stronger. 

I think I will stop here and wait for Q&A. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dizolele follows:]

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Mr. GARRETT [presiding]. Thank you. I was reading your bio, and 

I think that you probably speak more languages than the rest of 

the room combined, which is unusual for a Marine. I was an Army 

guy. So thank you. 

Without objection, the full remarks of all witnesses will be entered into the record without request, but I thank you for that. And 

we have votes coming up relatively quickly, but I want to get everyone’s testimony in if we can, so I would ask you all to continue. 

And, Mr. Bauma, we would welcome your comments. 

STATEMENT OF MR. FRED BAUMA, REPRESENTATIVE, LA 

LUTTE POUR LE CHANGEMENT 

Mr. BAUMA. Thank you, Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to speak about my country, the 

DRC. I hope to share some insights that you will find valuable. 

On Monday, October 30, Jotham Kasigwa, Justave Kambale, 

Jean Louis Kikandi, and Remy Mulwana, and Obedi Mumbere, all 

under 20 years old of age, were shot by Congolese National Police 

and the military police while demonstrating peacefully in Goma. 

Those demonstrations were called by the Civil Society Coalition, including the Struggle for Change (LUCHA). 

The aim of these demonstrations was to call President Kabila to 

resign as a consequence of his failure to organize the elections, and 

to respect the timelines in our Constitution. It should concern the 

United States that this violent crackdown on peaceful protestors 

took place so blatantly within the week after Ambassador Nikki 

Haley visited the DRC. 

Violent repressions of demonstrators calling for timely free and 

fair elections have escalated as Kabila’s willing to show contempt 

of the constitutionally mandated term limit has become increasingly obvious. I have personally experienced this repression when 

I spend over 17 months in jail for exercising my basic constitutional rights. But my story, unfortunately, is not unique. 

Since September 2016, almost 150 peaceful demonstrators have 

been killed, while hundreds more have been arrested or kidnapped 

by security forces, and many of them remain in jail. Government 

officials, including mayors and heads of police in some cities, has 

been recruiting gangs ironically called antigang or some other 

name like Bana Mura. Those groups are deployed to arrest and 

sometimes arbitrarily arrest civil society activists and members of 

the opposition. 

These groups have been responsible for severe human rights violations in many places in DRC, and work tightly with the national 

police and the Congolese intelligence service. At the same time, 

journalists are harassed and media outlets are shut down. According to a new report by Journalistes en Danger, an independent 

watchdog, the Congolese Government and the security forces are 

responsible for over 83 percent of attacks against the media over 

the last years. 

Even while facing repression, Congolese people are repeatedly 

demonstrating with the same message: The need for a peaceful 

transition by the end of this year as stipulated by the CENCO 

agreement. As Mvemba said, Kabila must go. 

47

The political repression is an only small part of the overall 

human rights and humanitarian crisis effective—that affect millions of Congolese people. Over 4.5 million of internationally displaced persons, including 1.5 million in Kasai region alone wherein 

international agencies have documented more than 30,000 refugees 

to Angola, 80 mass graves, and over 5,000 civilians killed, and hundreds of schools destroyed. In the east of Congo, the regions of 

Beni, Bukavu, Uvira, Tanganyika, and Ituri have been the theatre 

of the surge in massacres and intercommunal violence. 

This grim situation is tightly linked to the political crisis originated by Kabila’s unwillingness to organize elections and his attempt to overstay his power in violation of both Constitution and 

the CENCO-sponsored agreement. This agreement granted the government one additional year to organize the elections and create 

conditions for a peaceful transition of power. The political uncertainty is causing trouble that potentially may undermine the peace 

and security in, not only DRC, but also the region. 

While poverty and misery are increasing significantly and the 

country is collapsing—and the economy of the country is collapsing, 

President Kabila, his family, and his inner circle are known to 

have built a rich empire through illicit means. According to reports 

of different organizations, including the Congo Research Group, 

Enough Project, Global Witness, the Carter Center, and more recently the Paradise Papers, Joseph Kabila, his family, and both his 

civilian and military entourage are involved in massive looting of 

natural resources, corruption, money laundering, potentially implicating terrorist groups. These activities include some individuals 

and companies linked to U.S. citizens and the U.S. financial system 

that the U.S. Treasury could target. 

By refusing to respect the Constitution, by choosing to oppress 

and dismantle the opposition of political parties instead of implementing in good faith the CENCO agreement, Joseph Kabila has 

undermined the trust and the credibility necessary for any dialogue. Fool play on the part of President Kabila is so blatant that 

it will be a total waste of time to push yet for another round of negotiations between Kabila and his opposition. 

The routine of endless and now useless dialogues can no longer 

be considered as the only path to sustainable solution on the Congo 

crisis. Further, this government has demonstrated again and again 

that the electoral calendars are a delay tactic, an empty promise 

used to divert attention for the fact that the government has no intention to organize the election that will remove Kabila from 

power. This delay tactic is the best way to ensure that the election 

will not be held and that if and when they are, they will be rushed 

in the manner that they will neither be free or fair. 

This is a dangerous path for Congo and one that I hope the U.S. 

also wants to avoid. The only sustainable solution lies in the immediate resignation of Kabila from the office and his replacement by 

a respected civilian or team that will organize the election. 

We the people of DRC are not seeking for pity or charity from 

the U.S. We are seeking your support in our efforts to prevent DRC 

for falling once again under a dictatorship. We are prepared to oppose by all peaceful means to a President who has violated rule of 

law as defined by our Constitution. 

48

There are steps that the U.S. Government can take to push for 

election and democratic transition with a peaceful transfer of 

power: The U.S. should impose direct targeted sanctions against 

Kabila and his inner circle responsible for human rights violations, 

money laundering, corruption, and sabotage of the political and 

electoral process. 

The U.S. should require the U.N. and the MONUSCO to stop any 

kind of support to the Congolese security service, including the 

Congolese army and the police, who are the main perpetrators of 

human rights violations. Any unconditional support by MONUSCO 

to the army or the police is akin to support institutions responsible 

for massive atrocities and human rights violations. Instead, the 

U.S. Government should work with the U.N. Security Council to 

make MONUSCO’s mandate more effective and precise, allowing it 

to protect civilians from any form of danger, including the one from 

the government officials. 

The U.S. should state without any ambiguity that they will not 

back any electoral process that will not end in free and fair elections, organized by a truly independent commission, with a credible 

voter register, and in an environment where all participants are 

free to organize and conduct campaigns and rallies, and have access to media, including public media, where civil society has a 

voice where media and judiciary are free and independent. None of 

these criteria are met by the Congolese Government, neither by the 

current CENI. 

Finally, the U.S. and international partners, particularly African 

union, should push Kabila to resign, to allow the return to the Constitution, and honor the CENCO deal, and vacate the office by the 

end of this year. Any contact with Kabila should aim to effecting 

his resignation so to allow the return to constitutional order. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope that this 

committee and the U.S. citizens understand our hunger for peace, 

for democracy, for liberty, for dignity, and for happiness. I hope 

that you understand, as did the U.S. Founders, that whenever any 

form of government becomes destructive to its end, as it is dictated 

in DRC, it is not only the most sacred right of the people to abolish 

it, it is our indispensable duty. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bauma follows:]

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Mr. SMITH [presiding]. Mr. Bauma, thank you so very much. 

We do have a vote on the floor, recorded vote on H.R. 2201, the 

Micro Offering Safe Harbor Act. We will take a very, very brief recess, subject to the call of the chair, and then we will reconvene 

our hearing. And I apologize for the delay. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The hearing will resume.

Ms. Bass will be returning very shortly for the hearing. 

Let me ask Dr. Autesserre if she could provide her testimony. 

And is that the right pronunciation, Doctor? 

Ms. AUTESSERRE. Almost, yes. Thank you so much. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. Put on your microphone, please. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SEVERINE AUTESSERRE, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Ms. AUTESSERRE. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith, Ranking 

Member Bass, members of the subcommittee, for organizing this 

hearing and for inviting me. My name is Severine Autesserre. I am 

an author and researcher and a professor of political science at 

Barnard College, Columbia University. 

Over the past 2 years, activists, journalists, diplomats, and politicians have focused mostly on the political crisis around general 

elections and on the struggle for power in Kinshasa. We are so preoccupied with the upcoming elections that we are diverting our attention away from the many other issues that are causing violence 

in Congo, and we are wasting the opportunity to tackle these other 

issues. 

Based on 18 years of research on peacebuilding, including several 

years living and working in Congo, I believe, and I will show you 

in my statement, that there is a better way to help resolve the Congolese conflict. Congress should revise its approach to the Congolese crisis by recognizing that there are many other causes of violence beyond the electoral political issue and by acknowledging that 

democracy and peace do not always go together. 

The two most important measures Congress can take are to increase the United States’ support to local and bottom-up 

peacebuilding and to put local actors in the driver’s seat. 

The delay in holding elections is only one among the many issues 

that fuel the ongoing violence in Congo. And importantly, local conflicts at the village or district level also fuel extensive violence. 

So to be clear, yes, national and international leaders regularly 

manipulate local armed groups, including for electoral purposes. 

But at the same time, local combatants use national and regional 

tensions as a way to pursue their own specific, local goals. For instance, in North and South Kivu, villagers regularly ally with national leaders and with foreign militias to get control over neighboring land. As a result, Congo needs bottom-up peacebuilding in 

addition to the current top-down approach. And the words ‘‘in addition to’’ are very important. I am not saying that we should replace 

the current Kinshasa-centered, election-focused strategies with 

local peacebuilding measures. Instead, what I am saying is that we 

should add local peacebuilding to the set of options that we currently use to resolve the Congolese conflict. This means increasing 

54

the United States’ support—financial support, logistic support, and 

technical support—to local peacebuilding. 

We should also recognize that democracy and peace do not always go together. In fact, the push toward rapid elections has 

fueled violence in many other war and postwar environments. So, 

of course, President Kabila should go, and of course Congolese people deserve elections and democracy. But in the short term, there 

may be a choice to make between the two goals of democracy and 

peace. And foreign activists and diplomats and foreign politicians 

should not be the ones to make this choice. Ordinary Congolese 

people should. 

And this leads to my last point. Local people have far more relevant knowledge, skills, capacity, contacts, and means to resolve 

their own predicaments than we usually believe, and more than 

provincial, national, or international actors will ever have. When 

you look at things that have actually worked in Congo, you see that 

certain local, ordinary citizens have managed to create islands of 

peace—literal islands of peace—in the Kivus. Others have decreased tensions in Ituri, and yet others, like Fred Bauma sitting 

next to me, have created a wide democratic movement at the grassroots. 

The usual international approach is to ignore these kinds of local 

initiatives. Instead, we should support, fund, and protect these 

local initiatives so that we reinforce them. And I published a book 

on how to do that. The book is called ‘‘Peaceland.’’ To summarize 

it in just one sentence, we need to build on local expertise, and we 

need to involve in the design and planning of international efforts 

not only the elite based in Kinshasa, but also local leaders, intended beneficiaries, and ordinary citizens. 

So to wrap up, we can help Congo establish sustainable peace 

and functioning democracy, but to do that we have to look beyond 

elections and also support the other peacebuilding priorities. We 

also have to build much more on the expertise and capacity of Congolese people—ordinary Congolese people—and support bottom-up 

peacebuilding much more extensively. 

Thank you so much. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Autesserre follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for your testimony. 

Ms. Sawyer? 

STATEMENT OF MS. IDA SAWYER, CENTRAL AFRICA 

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Ms. SAWYER. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members 

of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify. I appreciate your ongoing and bipartisan interest in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

As you know, President Kabila’s constitutionally mandated twoterm limit ended in December 2016. Yet he has used one contrivance after another to delay elections, while plunging the country 

into a web of security, humanitarian, political, and economic crises 

that have had devastating consequences for the Congolese people 

and risk destabilizing the volatile subregion. 

During U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley’s recent visit 

to Congo, she pressed Kabila to hold elections before the end of 

2018. Clearly in response, Congo’s Electoral Commission, the 

CENI, published a new calendar setting December 23, 2018, as the 

date for Presidential elections. The silver lining here is that the 

CENI’s response shows the considerable influence the U.S. Government continues to have in Kinshasa. Haley’s visit and strong messaging signaled renewed high level U.S. engagement on Congo. It 

showed Congolese Government officials that, not only does Congress continue to be seized by the political crisis in Congo, but that 

the Trump administration is also watching very closely. 

Yet at the same time, the message that elections only need to be 

held before the end of 2018 was seen by many Congolese as giving 

a free pass for Kabila to continue his delaying tactics and stay in 

power another year, despite his lack of constitutional legitimacy. 

Congolese officials have blatantly disregarded previous election calendars, while Kabila and his ruling coalition have largely ignored 

the main terms of the New Year’s Eve agreement signed last year. 

Kabila should be stepping down by the end of this year. By unilaterally extending the timeframe, the U.S. runs the risk of losing 

credibility among key actors in Congo. Yet if the U.S. is willing and 

able to use its influence now to ensure fair elections that reflect the 

will of the Congolese people, it could rebuild any lost legitimacy. 

The question now is how far will the U.S. go? 

Senior U.S. officials delivered messages similar to those of Ambassador Haley as the end of Kabila’s two-term limit approached 

in 2016. When that deadline passed, U.S. officials pressed Kabila 

to organize elections by the end of 2017. Since then, Kabila instead 

entrenched his hold on power through corruption and repression. 

Congolese Government and security force officers went so far as to 

implement a deliberate strategy of chaos through orchestrated violence, especially in the southern Kasai region, where up to 5,000 

people have been killed since August 2016. Nearly 90 mass graves 

are scattered across the region, 600 schools have been attacked or 

destroyed, and 1.4 million people displaced from their homes, including 30,000 who fled to neighboring Angola. 

In March, two U.N. investigators, Michael J. Sharp, an American 

from Kansas, and Zaida Catalan, a Swedish and Chilean citizen, 

were killed while investigating violence in the region. Human 

66

Rights Watch investigations suggest government responsibility for 

the double murder. 

Predictably, government and CENI officials have cited the violence in the Kasais as one of the main excuses for why elections 

could not be held this year. Kabila’s refusal to relinquish the presidency can partly be explained by the considerable fortune he and 

his family have amassed during his tenure and the millions of dollars in mining revenue that have gone missing. Such corruption 

has helped leave the government bereft of funds to meet the basic 

needs of an impoverished population. Hundreds of government employees went on strike in recent months, including hospital workers 

who hadn’t been paid since 2016. This comes amid a national cholera epidemic and impending famine threatening millions of Congolese. 

Meanwhile, brutal repression has continued unabated, as Fred 

described. Security forces shot dead more than 170 people during 

protests in 2015 and 2016. Earlier this year, security forces killed 

90 people in a crackdown against a political religious sect. During 

a protest in Goma just on October 30, security forces killed five 

people, including an 11-year-old boy. Hundreds of opposition leaders, activists, and journalists have been jailed. In July, unidentified 

armed men shot and nearly killed a judge, who refused to hand 

down a ruling against an opposition leader. 

These actions are very much at the heart of how Kabila and his 

coterie seek to overcome the political crisis, by using all available 

institutional authorities to squash, silence, and flat out eliminate 

any opposition to his efforts to hold on to power. 

More protests are planned in the coming days and weeks. Citizens movements, human rights activists, and opposition leaders 

have denounced the new electoral calendar as a fantasy and 

shameful maneuver by Kabila to stay in power indefinitely. They 

have urged the Congolese people to mobilize. They have proposed 

a citizens’ transition, without Kabila, led by individuals who could 

not be candidates to allow for the organization of credible elections. 

There is a real risk of increased violence in the coming months. 

As things now stand, the U.S., including Congress, cannot afford 

to take its eyes off Congo. There is too much at stake. First, Congress should hold the executive branch to account and make sure 

the administration is not being fooled by empty promises. Kabila 

has given no clear signals that he intends to leave power, while the 

repression, violence, and corruption have become so pervasive 

across institutions and security forces that it is nearly impossible 

to imagine credible, peaceful elections being organized with Kabila 

still President. 

While there is no easy path forward, a short citizens’ transition 

without Kabila is probably the best way to ensure good elections. 

To get there, the U.S. should work closely with regional and international partners to press Kabila to step down, and share concerns 

about Kabila’s physical security after he leaves office are addressed 

and actively support consultations to determine the management of 

a post-Kabila transition. 

We also urge Congress and the U.S. administration to support 

the following: Expand targeted sanctions on Kabila’s family members and close financial associates, including those involved in seriVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\110917\27515 SHIRL
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ous corruption to quash peaceful dissent or otherwise maintain 

Kabila’s rule. Previous sanctions against senior security force and 

government officials have had an impact and appear to have helped 

change behavior and affect the calculus of some top officials. Yet 

additional sanctions are needed to show Kabila himself that there 

are real consequences for the ongoing violence and election delays. 

Publicly denounce the repression. Call for the immediate release 

of all political prisoners and for all politically motivated charges 

against opposition leaders and activists to be dropped. 

And three, continue support in this challenging environment for 

the U.N. peacekeeping mission. 

We also hope you will continue to press for an independent investigation into the murders of the U.N. experts Sharp and Catalan 

and to help ensure that those most responsible are held to account. 

Efforts to date are far from adequate. A failure to do so would send 

the message that those responsible for such a heinous crime can escape justice, risking future lives, not only in Congo, but across the 

world where U.S. and the U.N. have deployed experts. 

The U.S. has important influence in Congo and can help prevent 

more bloodshed, but time is running out. Strong, courageous positions and actions are needed to demonstrate that the U.S. is on the 

side of the Congolese people and their aspiration for a democratic, 

rights-respecting, and accountable government. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sawyer follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ms. Sawyer, thank you very much as well. 

Let me just ask a few opening questions about the imposition of 

sanctions now is something that you clearly have indicated. And, 

of course, in his testimony as well, Dr.Dizolele made a very strong 

appeal. As a matter of fact, the first recommendation is to impose 

sanctions on Joseph Kabila, his family, and his inner circle. 

I know that the administration is very, very serious about this 

course. They hope it doesn’t come to it, but my sense, and gleaning 

from your testimony, it should be done now. 

By way of background, I am the author of the Belarus Democracy 

Act. I remember, on this panel—I have been on this panel since the 

early 1980s—when we voted on sanctions against South Africa, 

which I supported, and strongly supported, because apartheid is an 

abomination. Thankfully, it is in a dust heap of history but there 

was always concern about the impact it would have on unintended 

victims who then would get hurt by those broad-based sanctions. 

When I did the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, which became 

the template for the Magnitsky Act, the whole idea was to single 

out the bad actors, starting often with the President, in that case 

it was Lukashenko, the President of that country, and his henchmen and people who were benefiting. And we put visa bans on 

them, and we also said, you can’t do business here. 

And I was the House sponsor of the Magnitsky Act here, and it 

became an amendment, became law, and is a very useful tool. And 

I am glad that we have it, but the tool needs to be utilized. So the 

big question is not that if it will be done, and we have legislation 

I am going to be introducing, joined by my good friend Karen Bass, 

that really admonishes the administration to do just that. Delay is 

denial. Unless we see very significant progress that this is really 

going to happen, it is going to happen—hopefully it would have 

happened sooner. I think December 28 is unconscionably long, to 

wait more than a year. So I just want to ask all of you right up 

front if there’s any downside to doing it right now. 

For example, Nikki Haley has said, and she told us yesterday, 

and it was said, we would not provide funding for the election if 

there were problems, if it was delayed again. And that perhaps 

could unwittingly, incentivize Kabila to say, ‘‘Okay, I am out of 

here. I am going to stay President for life.’’ Of course, the wrath 

of sanctions from not just the U.S., but the EU and others would 

then come tumbling down upon him, at least that would be the 

hope. 

So I just want to make sure that we fully understand the possible consequences. I think sanctions are needed. If you don’t use 

them, it becomes something in the toolbox that dictators and people 

who want to be Presidents for life turn around and say, no worry 

here, there is not going to be a sanction now or into the future. 

So I think they need to be used very prudently and very effectively. And again, as you said, Professor Dizolele, you want it now. 

So if you go speak to the positive and the negative on that, and 

you have done a little bit in your testimony, and I appreciate it, 

but I think it would be good to get it very clear, should these be 

done today? 

Yes, Professor. 

75

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two things really. I 

think now is the time of imposing the sanctions. In fact, they are 

long overdue. I mean, sanctions should have been in place, or the 

threat of sanctions should have been in place in 2016, in January, 

because all the signs had been there. 

We are talking here about targeted sanction to one specific group 

of people. We are not saying that the entire country of DRC should 

be on the embargo from the U.S. This has worked in the past. 

President Mobutu, in his last days, faced similar situations. 

So back then, the U.S. led the charge, along with the Europeans, 

sanctions were imposed on him. Mobutu had been a strategic partner of this country, had received the Legion of Merit, one of the 

highest honors the U.S. can bestow on a military officer. But when 

the time came to let go, we did let go. We put sanctions on him, 

on his assets, on his children, children who were studying overseas, 

one of his sons was studying in Canada. Canada followed suit, denied him visa. He could not go back to study. It was very effective 

in that way. His associates faced the same situation. 

Today, if we are blissfully naive to accept that Kabila will hold 

elections in December of next year, then we have not learned anything over the last 16 years, and the joke is on us. By that I mean 

Kabila only understands the language of force. His people have 

said so so many times. They have said that we came through force. 

If you want us to leave, we will only leave through force. 

One force is sanction. Again, it is just to target specifically them. 

The children go to school here. They have come to your offices with 

their expensive suits and expensive bags to tell you why they 

should stay, and most of the time that is not founded in any logic. 

So I think we should not be catering to them. 

In fact, one thing I want to say, the idea that if they do not act 

a certain way, the international community will not engage, that 

is music to their ears, because that is exactly what they—that is 

the perfect scenario. Nobody gets involve. Let me play the field the 

way I want. 

So we should avoid, actually, aligning ourselves behind that position. It is a very weak position from Kabila’s perspective. 

Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. BAUMA. I would like to add something to what Mr. Dizolele 

is saying. I think the problem of DRC is not only—the group Kabila 

and all the autocratic system around him is not only seeking the 

power for the sake of power. I think it is the way for them to get 

rich, to get access to resources, and to use them in different ways. 

And I think the other thing is that the same resources are finally 

used to oppress people. And the recent research shows that, for example, with Blanco, that they had paid, I think, $750 million to the 

system, which could have been enough to organize election, even if 

the election is very expensive. 

So I think, as Mvemba said, that sanctions should be applied and 

should be applied now. And those sanctions—the fact is that the 

inner circle of Kabila is made of people who are all businessmen. 

They are officials, the civilian people, his family, all of them have 

very deep link in mineral resources or any kind of business. 

So I think the efficient way is not only to target them in the way 

of banning travels or something like that, but be able to touch their 

76

resources where they can really feel it. And if they can stay in 

power but without protecting their financial assets, I think the interest of staying in power will lose its essence. 

So I think it is important to target them now, but more important to target them where it is really valued, where it is important 

to touch, not only general target. 

Ms. AUTESSERRE. Thank you, Chairman Smith. I am going to add 

two points. The first one is that if sanctions are used, they should 

really be used as part of a much broader legislative program. 

Sanctions may help. It is not 100 percent sure, but it may help, 

but clearly it won’t be enough. So it should really go with support 

for peacebuilding, for human rights, and for basically what Honorable Yamamoto was saying: The human rights and the political 

side of the organization of elections. 

The other thing, the other point is that sanctions should not only 

be linked to the electoral issue or to the fact of whether or not 

those in power are going to leave power, but also to the broader 

problems, meaning that they should be linked to the respect for 

human rights and to an end of human rights violations and to an 

end to violence as well. This is really important. 

Ms. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I fully agree that targeted sanctions should be applied now. We should not wait any 

longer. The fact that a calendar was announced does not mean that 

we are necessarily having elections, and we have seen the repression, the violence, the massive human rights violations continue 

unabated with complete accountability. So a strong signal should 

be sent. And targeted sanctions is a very clear tool that you have 

available to send that signal. 

We have also seen how the targeted sanctions, which have already been applied, have had an impact. They have rattled the political class, the senior security force officers. These are individuals 

who travel regularly to Europe, to the United States. They do their 

shopping abroad, their medical appointments abroad. Many of 

them have homes overseas. Their children study in the U.S. or Europe. They have bank accounts in U.S. dollars. They are personally 

very affected by these targeted sanctions. And many of them, since 

the sanctions started, you know, they are coming to us, to others, 

asking what can they do to avoid being on the list, or if they have 

already been targeted, how they can get off the list. 

So it has an impact, but so far, Kabila’s inner circle, his close 

family members, his financial associates, they haven’t been affected. So I think now is the time to go further up and show Kabila 

himself that the consequences are real. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. I would just remind, and for the 

record, point out that the President has this authority. It is very 

clear and it is compelling. We reiterated in the bill that we are 

going to be reducing very shortly, that the President in his Executive Order 13413, as amended by Executive Order 13671, shall impose the sanctions described in section C within 60 days of the date 

of enactment of this Act against any high-level individuals responsible for undermining democratic processes and institutions in the 

DRC and the entities they own or control, including senior DRC 

Government officials, their international commercial facilitators 

with offshore companies, and complicit family members and associVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\110917\27515 SHIRL
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ates. It shall also impose sanctions described in our bill, which we 

have yet to introduce, we have a draft now we are working on, describes in subsection D, and it goes on from there. 

But we are going to be looking for bold and demonstrative actions. I mean, talk is cheap, particularly here in Washington, and 

we have got to make sure it is backed up by something that is 

more significant, like a sanction. And I can tell you—because I was 

just in Minsk for a parliamentary assembly of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, I am the co-chair of the Helsinki Commission—Lukashenko has released the political prisoners over the 

years, and there may be just one left. Maybe two, we are not sure. 

But the point is, sanctions work, but they have to be applied. 

So let me ask a question, Ms. Sawyer, maybe start with you. I 

asked the previous panel, obviously the two distinguished witnesses from the administration, and spoke to the issue of the 3.8 

million, and there may be other estimates but ballpark, of internally displaced people, which is a catastrophic event anywhere in 

the world, the DR Congo especially, but certainly 3.8 million displaced. They are refugees within their own borders, and that is a 

terrible, terrible situation. 

The acute food insecurity has reached 7.7 million. Again, there 

may be higher estimates for that. But that means hunger, famine, 

low birthweight babies, stunting, and a whole host of other deleterious effects on the most vulnerable: Women and children. 

You pointed out in your testimony, Ms. Sawyer, that in the Kasai 

region, 5,000 people have been killed since August 2016. And you 

point out the impact that has had in your testimony on schools. Six 

hundred schools have been attacked or destroyed, as you testified. 

One-point-four million displaced from their homes in this area, including 33,000 who fled to neighboring Angola, so they are obviously refugees. 

You make a very, very important point. Predictably, government 

officials have cited the violence in the Kasai as one of the main excuses for why elections were not held in 2017. Seemingly, and 

maybe you could speak to this, incentivizing the use of violence to 

impose martial law, which means killing people in the streets. And 

so maybe you can speak to that. And that is a perverse outcome. 

Rather than getting to the election, it is in the government’s interest to do these kinds of things and others. 

Maybe you might want to speak to that. 

Ms. SAWYER. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So we at Human 

Rights Watch, we have interviewed numerous security force officers 

in Congo, who have told us about a deliberate strategy of chaos. So 

effectively, orchestrating violence, either by security forces or government-backed militias, instigating local level conflicts to create 

more violence, and then with these horrific humanitarian consequences that we saw in the Kasais, and then later that is used 

as an excuse: We can’t organize elections. We can’t do voter registrations in the Kasais because we are dealing with this terrorist 

threat from this militia group in this area. 

We see also in the east, there is a lot of government manipulation of armed groups there. In Kinshasa and Kongo Central province in south western Congo, reports of manipulation of the Bundu 

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pression, another excuse to delay elections. So it is—as you said, 

it is very perverse, and it is just another sign that there is no—

we have not seen any signs of a real intention by the part of Kabila 

to organize elections and step down. 

Mr. SMITH. Would the other panelists want to speak to, as you 

coined it, the deliberate strategy of chaos fomented by the government? 

Yes, Professor. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Yes. Mr. Chairman, in fact, this is one of my 

greatest fears in terms of delaying till 2018, because what is happening in Kasai is obviously part of this larger strategy of chaos. 

If we were to wait until 2018, I am willing to bet on my honor that 

we will see more flashpoint and zones of conflict in the next 3 

months. That might even be longer. We don’t know where they are 

going to pop up, but they are most likely to happen. 

Going from crisis to crisis is one of the favorite pastimes of the 

Kabila regime. In fact, a good friend of mine who used to work in 

the system likes to say, ‘‘The boss is a specialist in rotten situations.’’ In other words, they like these kind of situations. So waiting 

until 2018 poses a serious risk for this. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. BAUMA. I think in term of violence as a strategy, people like 

to focus on Kasai because, of course, over this year, Kasai was the 

main region where there was a lot of violence. But I think now 

there are other regions where violence is, once again, used as a 

strategy. So I feel like the focus on Kasai has at least made the 

government official feel like it is becoming a lot of pressure on 

them. 

And now we see that in Benin, for example, the violence restart 

again after almost 1 year of stability. We see that in Uvira in 

South Kivu, without the help of MONUSCO, Uvira would have 

been under the control of some armed group. Some of them have 

worked with the governments in the past. We see that in 

Tanganyika or in Ituri, the same thing has started and started 

again. 

So I think the strategy of violence works very well in DRC. And 

I would not be astonished to see that, in January or in February 

or in April, that another region, another Kasai is created somewhere, maybe in Bakongo or in Equateur, and be used as a reason 

to postpone the election once again. 

And I have to say that there will always be a reason that seems 

to be a good reason to postpone the elections. Last year it was, we 

had an agreement, now we will have election at the end of the 

year, everybody is okay. Today is, we have a calendar, we can have 

election next year. Next year, we will have some other reason. And 

the U.S. and other countries will say, ‘‘Well, we can support election for 2019.’’ And unless we understand that this, all these are 

tactics for delayed election, we will never have election. 

We have to understand what Kabila and his government want, 

really, and they will never organize the election that will end up 

removing him from power. They may organize violence and other 

kinds of humanitarian crisis, but not election. 

Ms. AUTESSERRE. To emphasize something that Mr. Bauma said, 

I think that it is really important to keep in mind that, yes, you 

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have manipulation of violence, an instigation of violence linked to 

the electoral issues, but a lot of the violence is also unrelated to 

electoral issues. You have regional tensions between Rwanda, 

Congo, Burundi, et cetera. You also have local conflicts over land, 

over traditional power of who is going to be the highest-ranked individual, family, ethnic group in a specific area. And this sometimes relates to the electoral issue and sometimes it doesn’t. 

So when we are thinking about ending the humanitarian crisis 

that you described, and ending the violence, we have to focus, yes, 

on the electoral issue, but also on all of these other issues at the 

same time. 

Mr. SMITH. Please, Dr.Autesserre, you talked about the biggest 

takeaway from your own book, which I think was, to bottom-line 

it so well, I think is very helpful to the subcommittee, to build on 

local expertise. I think there is an underestimation, and I think 

you really have eloquently spoken to that, that local expertise is excluded by design or by just inability to appreciate what is available. 

Is USAID tapping into that local expertise? And secondly—and 

all of you might want to speak to this as well—the role of the faith 

community, the Catholic Church, not just in elections, but also in 

reconciliation and, of course, the provision of humanitarian aid, 

which is an important. Faith-based entities do provide, very efficaciously, food, clothing, and shelter, and medicines. I mean, I have 

been in countries all over the world. The secular groups do it great, 

but so do the faith-based, and they often really get an army of volunteers mobilized, which is one of their assets. 

But if you could speak to that. And while you are answering it, 

the role of the church in the elections—which you might recall I 

asked of the earlier panel—in making sure that violence gets 

tamped down, hopefully eliminated, while they move toward a credible free and fair election. 

Doctor? 

Ms. AUTESSERRE. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith. I think 

regarding USAID, they are doing better than they were doing 10 

or 15 years ago, in terms of tapping into local capacity. But it is 

still clearly not enough. The way USAID works is still: We are here 

in DC, and we know what is best for people we are trying to help. 

So we know what is best for people in Congo and other parts of 

the world, and therefore we design programs here in DC. 

And then when we involve Congolese people, it is going to be 

only at the stage of implementation. So people who are on the 

ground in Congo will only have to do things that have been decided——

Mr. SMITH. On that point, is that because indigenous NGOs don’t 

have the capacity to write those proposals or the NGO community 

in general not including the locals in a way that makes them full 

partners? 

Ms. AUTESSERRE. I don’t think so. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Ms. AUTESSERRE. I think it is mostly because it is not only 

USAID, it is most nongovernmental, international organizations. I 

think that outsiders——

Mr. SMITH. So it is a systemic problem throughout the whole humanitarian response. 

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Ms. AUTESSERRE. Exactly. Exactly. We think that outsiders know 

better and we think that outsiders have the answers. And the way 

to help is to build on outsiders’ knowledge. What I am saying is 

that there is—I mean, look at who is sitting next to me—there is 

local capacity. There are people who have the knowledge, the expertise, and who could help design the international programs. It 

is just that the standard operating procedure is not to ask them. 

And it is to decide things by ourselves here in national capitals and 

then go in the country and implement them on the ground. 

As to the role of the church, it is very difficult, I think, to talk 

about the Catholic Church in general in Congo, because to me, I 

have seen members of the Catholic Church, including bishops, that 

are high-ranking members actually fuel violence, have discourses 

that fuel violence, that are full of hatred against a specific community. I have seen that in Goma, I have seen that in Bakavu, I have 

seen that in one-on-one meetings with these people. And I have 

also met priests who are in a village in the middle of nowhere and 

who are the main reason why you have peace in that village or why 

you have some response to the humanitarian needs in that village. 

So we have to be very careful, I think, not to think about the 

Catholic Church as a whole, you know, an entity, but really to 

think whether specific individuals within the Catholic Church are 

the kind of individuals who we want to support or whether they 

are the kind of people we should actually be staying clear of. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, on that point, it is my experience that the 

church plays a very decisive peacemaking role. If you have names 

of people who are doing something contrary to that, I would ask 

that you provide that to the committee. 

I remember going back to the very old days of El Salvador when 

there was civil war with the Duarte government and the FMLN. 

I traveled down there frequently. And it was Catholic Church that 

was doing the human rights work and humanitarian work in a way 

that provided a bridge to two disparate groups that had nothing in 

common. That is a very serious charge, if that is true. 

We work with a number of bishops and others throughout all of 

Africa, who, in my experience—and Greg and I do meet with them 

every time we travel, and with pastors that they do provide—in essence, not just Catholic, it is also the other wonderful faiths that 

are out there, Muslim and Christian alike, who are playing very 

positive roles. So any names you have, please provide that for us. 

Would others like—oh, I am sorry. Yes. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just want to nuance 

a couple points. 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. The Congolese want a change. They want a couple 

things. One is to respect the rule of law. They did go to a referendum in 2005 to have this Constitution. So they are not idealists to believe that once President Kabila leaves, everything will 

become a paradise on earth. But what they are really interested in 

is to respect the sacrifices of the people who fought for this change 

so that the President steps down, let another Congolese, man or 

woman, emerge and take it to the next level. 

All the problems that Dr.Autesserre has mentioned are part of 

an extension of the failed regime that is leading the country. So the 

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hope is that as a new regime, a new leadership comes in, some of 

those key issues of provision of services, including security and 

health and education and others, will be addressed with the new 

leadership. So that is what people are fighting for. 

In that case, then, the election becomes very critical. In other 

words, we will never get there, even to start, if we are always going 

around and around. We wasted 16 years since the—I mean, the 

generation, the kids who were born when Mobuto fled are now at 

university, you know. Fred was 10 years old when Mobuto fled—

7. Okay. So the young man here was 7 years old when Mobuto fled, 

and now he is speaking for his country and we are still talking 

about the same thing. 

So this is the time that is very decisive to cut that golden knot. 

And that is the importance of having this transition become a reality as soon as possible. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. If you would like to add. 

Mr. BAUMA. I would like to add to what Severine said at the beginning about the local capacities and the peacebuilding. And one 

thing is that I think the way some expert or some ex-pats come 

with their solution and the way they understand, for example, 

peace or stability, is like the minimum level of it that Congolese 

people cannot accept. 

You know, like when, for example, the U.N. talk about peace, is 

like if we can live in the city where we will not have some trouble 

within a week, it is good enough. And for people who have lived 

in a conflict, in the violence for very long period, there is some low 

standard of peace that we will not accept anymore. And we are not 

looking for something minimal. We are looking for something that 

may be sustainable. 

And I think Congolese people have even said we have some solutions to our own problems. And I think it may be, the best way 

may be to work on the solution that Congolese people are suggesting to their own problem. And instead of bringing some imported solution, which works in offices in DC, in USAID, or other 

NGOs, and where local actors will just have the role to implement 

them in circumstances or things like that. 

I think there is so many groups, small groups, maybe less 

known, who have very creative ways to address conflict, to mobilize 

communities, to organize communities in their region that needs 

attention for USAID and other U.S. best groups. And it is important to listen to them, to understand how they do, and to support 

them, instead of coming and give them what they should have done 

while they are the one who knows what they want. 

And what Mvemba said about election is, that is true. There is 

so many crises in DRC, but I think with time, and this is also related on what I say, that minimal peace that we will not accept 

anymore. The fact of saying, well, we have to make sure there is 

a kind of stable country and then sort of small problem and small 

problem, but the root cause is—seems to be related on the problem 

of leadership in the country. And I think the election is just one 

way to do it, but it is the first way to do it. And I think in terms 

of long-term process, the civic education, the process of creating another kind of citizenship, citizen, is the main point. 

82

I think the election should be understand that the point where 

we start to bring, to build a different country, a different system. 

And what for us, LUCHA, for example, we believe is that we will 

make all possible to have peaceful transition, but we are sure that 

the process will take so long, the process of having the democracy 

and the country as we would like to see it, will take so long. And 

we continue to work on it and to make sure even the next President, we will be able to hold him accountable, and the next one. 

And we will oppose to any other President who will do the same 

thing as Kabila. 

So the election is not like a panacea for us, but it is a key point. 

It is something which has to happen in order to allow us to see the 

future as we would like to see. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask with regards to U.N. issues. Your assessment of the U.N. peacekeeping deployment, MONUSCO, are their 

rules of engagement robust enough? Is the number of personnel deployed adequate or is there a need for more? 

Ambassador Haley made a very important point yesterday on 

how important it is that women be much more included in those 

deployments, particularly since sexual violence is so rampant. And 

on the zero tolerance policy for trafficking, again, I have had four 

congressional hearings alone on DR Congo. And previous terrible 

exploitation by peacekeepers of young children and women. We 

went there, we argued with them, went to Goma, as I said before, 

and right now, we are thinking of putting together another trip to 

go back to DR Congo hopefully by the end of this year, if not early 

next year, on a myriad of issues, starting with the elections. 

So your thoughts on those three things. And then second, if you 

don’t mind jotting this down for your answer, I mentioned earlier 

about the assessment done by the U.N. for how much humanitarian aid is needed. There were about 42 percent for 2017, which 

is paltry compared to the need. 

I did ask the administration witnesses if they have confidence in 

those assessments, and my sense is that they do. They may be a 

little bit highball or lowball, who knows, but it is order of magnitude, correct? What does that kind of 60 percent underfunding 

for at-risk people do to those vulnerable people? I mean, in terms 

of food, security and the like. 

And finally, last Congress, I was the House sponsor of the Global 

Food Security Act, which was signed into law, and that legislation 

was largely drafted by Piero Tozzi sitting to my right, our general 

counsel; and Greg Simpkins, was an important focus on really 

making sure that the food insecurity systemic problem globally, especially in Africa, is addressed aggressively. It also put an emphasis on the first 1,000 days, from conception to the second birthday. 

Now, DR Congo has signed up to the U.N. program for the first 

1,000 days, which is, in my opinion, the most transformative program ever, ever put together. If you ensure that from the moment 

of conception to that second birthday, both mother and child have 

food and supplementation, it mitigates maternal mortality and 

morbidity, as well as child mortality and morbidity. Stunting goes 

away, if it is properly applied, and things like neonatal deaths and 

the like, which is rampant throughout Africa, are lessened as well. 

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Of particular point for me, on one area, I have written three laws 

on combatting the issue of autism in America, including the original, but also the most recent Autism Cares Act of 2012. One of the 

biggest takeaways from the NIH-funded projects, the peer-reviewed 

studies found, that when a woman gets folic acid in the first month 

of her pregnancy, the incidence of autism drops by 40 percent. That 

is absolutely radically revolutionary in terms of every woman of 

childbearing age should have folic acid to lessen this growing developmental disability pandemic that has consumed the world. 

In America, one out of every 68 individuals around the spectrum 

for autism in the world. It is very similar, as far as we can tell, 

although the studies have not been as robust, but we think there 

are at least 70 million people in the world around the spectrum for 

autism. And in Africa, according to the World Health Organization, 

we are talking about ‘‘tens of millions.’’

So obviously, a country of approximately 100 million people will 

have huge numbers of autistic children, suffering parents, no early 

intervention, and all the other processes that helps to help those 

children. Folic acid, first 1,000 days, are just a few of a number of 

initiatives that could make all the difference in the world in the life 

of a child and of a mother. And again, maternal mortality, which 

I take a backseat to no one in trying to stop it every time we can, 

obviously we all know one of the greatest answers for that is to 

have a venue where the woman gets skilled birth attendance and 

access to safe blood, which is another issue. 

My own daughter-in-law, when she had one of our grandsons, 

had a very serious problem with hemorrhaging in a Princeton hospital, and I had to go to other hospitals to get enough blood at her 

blood type. Those situations have become catastrophic in a twinkling of an eye and a snap of a finger. So safe blood and all of that 

is part of what our response should be. 

And I like what you said, Mr. Bauma, that the problems preceding the election will continue after the election, obviously. This 

is not a panacea. So I think your point is very well taken here. But, 

again, the U.N. responses, I hope you jotted down some of those 

things, so we can get a comprehensive answer. We have to know, 

is the U.N. getting it right? Are we doing what we can do on all 

of these various issues? 

Okay. Start from right to left. 

Ms. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would start by saying 

that U.N. peacekeepers in Congo do absolutely critical work protecting civilians. And their presence across the country has saved 

countless lives, and we can’t imagine how much worse it would be 

if MONUSCO was not present and if the peacekeepers weren’t 

there to respond to threats, protect civilians, help displaced people, 

help people go to the market safely. So their presence is absolutely 

critical, and there is nothing happening on the ground now to indicate that we should start cutting back MONUSCO or that their 

presence is no longer——

Mr. SMITH. Again, my suggestion wouldn’t be to cut back. It 

would be to make right——

Ms. SAWYER. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. And, again, on the rules of engagement, while you 

are answering. 

84

Ms. SAWYER. Yes. I just wanted to start by saying that they are 

critical, but that said, I think they could do much more to make 

their presence more effective. 

The rules of engagement, their mandate is very strong but it is 

often not—not the same across the board, how that is implemented. 

And different contributing countries will interpret their rules of engagement in a different way. And some are willing to be more robust than others to protect civilians and how they interpret their 

mandate. 

And I think we have a difficult contradiction within the peacekeeping mandate in that they are there to protect civilians, but 

also support the Congolese Government and security forces. And 

they are often conducting joint military operations with these 

forces or supporting them on their military operations against 

armed groups. But this is the most abusive force in the country 

that they are supporting, so that is often a contradiction. 

There is a strong human rights due diligence policy where U.N. 

peacekeepers are not supposed to be providing any support to Congolese army, officers, or soldiers who have serious human rights 

records. They should cut support if these abuses are taking place. 

But that is not applied as well across the board as it could be, so 

I think more can be done there. 

And regarding the political situation, the political crisis, I think 

much more could be done by MONUSCO peacekeepers to protect 

peaceful protesters and to deploy robustly alongside protests, alongside protestors. And that could be an important deterrent to Congolese security forces who have a tendency to fire on these peaceful 

protestors. 

In terms of the zero tolerance policy for trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse, I think we have seen some improvements in 

recent years in trying to address these issues more quickly and 

more effectively, but there, again, much more can be done. And a 

lot of that is also with the—at the host, the troop contributing 

countries. So back home, these troops need to be held accountable 

and there often isn’t followup. And the U.N. can do their investigation in Congo, but back in the capital from where these troops come 

from, there often isn’t enough followup to ensure that they are actually held accountable in a court of law. So more could be done 

there. 

On the humanitarian aid and what the underfunding means for 

vulnerable people, the consequences are huge. You have hundreds 

of thousands of people displaced from their homes. That means 

that they are often not going to school. Children are out of school. 

They don’t have the healthcare they need. They often don’t have 

access to the food that they need. And that has all of the medical 

consequences. But then also, it is a generation of kids who aren’t 

getting an education, that makes them more vulnerable to being 

recruited into armed groups. And then you just see the cycles of violence and impunity and abuse continue. So it is critical that these 

humanitarian needs are addressed, and they are enormous. 

I think I will leave the other questions to other——

Mr. SMITH. If you could, just one final question. On the U.N. civilian personnel, you mentioned the peacekeepers with zero tolerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\110917\27515 SHIRL
85

ance. What is your sense on the U.N. civilian personnel sexually 

exploiting others? 

Ms. SAWYER. I would first just like to say that among the civilian 

personnel, that the human rights office is doing absolutely critical 

work in Congo, the U.N. Human Rights team, as part of the 

MONUSCO mission, and they are a strong office deployed across 

the country. And they are documenting abuses, publicly denouncing 

the abuses, meeting with authorities, pressing for change. And it 

is really, I would say, a model in Congo, from one of the best U.N. 

Human Rights teams that are deployed around the world, and 

that’s something that should continue. 

On their political offices, I think they could be doing more in 

terms of their good offices to press the government to abide by 

their commitments, to put more pressure on the authorities, but 

that role is critical and could be enhanced. 

For sexual exploitation and abuse by civilian peacekeepers, I 

don’t have specific information on that, but I don’t have information about particular concerns either. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Doctor Autesserre? 

Ms. AUTESSERRE. Thank you so much. I am going to second what 

Ida Sawyer said regarding the presence of United Nations peacekeepers, which is absolutely essential. In many villages in eastern 

Congo, the United Nations peacekeepers are the only people who 

are protecting the population from horrific human rights abuses by 

all kinds of armed groups. And so it is really, really important to 

keep them on site. 

Now, regarding whether the way they are working currently 

works, I think that there are two ways that they should revise the 

overall approach. The idea is not to get rid of the peacekeeping 

mission, but to make it more effective, as I understand that you 

want to do. 

The first thing is that, currently, they use what I call the topdown approach, meaning that they are trying to resolve the conflict 

and to build peace by working with the government, working with 

the elite in Kinshasa, working on high-level state reconstruction, 

and all of these very abstract things, which is important, but they 

are not focusing enough on supporting local bottom-up initiatives, 

the kind of initiatives that Fred Bauma mentioned, and that I 

mentioned as well. So I think that they should do much more to 

support local peacebuilding initiatives. And again, not arriving and 

saying, we are going to go in a village and we are going to resolve 

conflicts in that village, because they have no legitimacy and no expertise to do that, but really support the local actors who know how 

to resolve their own problems. So that is the first thing, supporting 

local, bottom-up peacebuilding. 

The second one is, again, to put local actors in the driver’s seat. 

Because the way the United Nations peacekeeping mission works 

is like what we were talking about with USAID. They decide at the 

U.N. headquarters in New York, in Geneva, sometimes in 

Kinshasa, they decide how they are going to resolve the Congolese 

conflict. And then the decision trickles down, trickles down, and by 

the time it reaches Congolese people, the Congolese people are just 

implementing strategies that have been decided elsewhere. And the 

86

decision doesn’t even include a lot of people who have extensive 

country knowledge. People who have been involved in Congolese efforts for 15, 20 years, there are very, very, very few in decisionmaking power. So we end up with strategies that are very wellmeaning, but that don’t really address the problems on the ground. 

So that is why I think that we should really revise this way of 

working and build much more on the expertise not only of local 

people, but also of people who know something about Congo and 

who already are within the United Nations’ system—but because 

of the way human resources work at the U.N., they end up working 

in Timor-Leste or in Sudan or in another part of the world. So really building more on local capacity and on country expertise. 

On your question regarding the consequences of underfunding 

humanitarian aid, I have a couple of statistics in my written statement that I think really illustrate what that means. So it is a 

United Nations statistic. It says that 77 percent of Congolese citizens live on less than $2 per day, less than $2 per day. The life 

expectancy is less than 60 years. More than 42 percent of children 

under the age of 5 suffer from malnutrition. And less than 25 percent of Congolese people go further than primary school in their 

studies. 

So it really means that if there is a way to increase the funding 

to the humanitarian support in Congo and to the development support, that would be absolutely essential, but at the same time, we 

should keep in mind that humanitarian aid means addressing the 

consequences of the problems, and especially the consequences of 

the violence. So we should also prioritize peacebuilding so that we 

finally address the causes of this enormous humanitarian crisis. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I agree with a lot of 

what has been said, the performance of the Human Rights office, 

their presence being critical, but I also have a lot of issues. 

I think we need to reduce the U.N. mandate in scope and time. 

This is part of the entire problem we have. The expectations and 

priorities are now perverted. The entire social contract is perverted. 

People expect things of the U.N. as opposed of their own government. They expect the security to be delivered by foreign troops 

that are just trying to survive themselves. 

And this underscores the failure of the Kabila regime; the U.S. 

has poured in billions of dollars literally to support Congo. And if 

we continue to think of the U.N. as part of the salvation, then we 

are in deep trouble. We are going on 20 years of U.N. presence in 

Congo, and there is no military rising anywhere on the Congolese 

side. 

Mr. SMITH. Can I just ask you on that point, if you don’t mind 

the interruption? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Again, as those U.N. figures would suggest, 42 percent of the kids underage suffer malnutrition, people are living on 

$2 a day, 77 percent. Many of us would always like to see aid as 

a bridge to the point of self-sufficiency. But the concern among 

many of us, certainly me, is pulling vulnerable people off life support. 

Your point is very well taken. This is what the government ought 

to be all about, and Kabila has failed miserably. But that said, how 

87

do you, in the interim—almost like an ambulance coming to the 

rescue, an EMT making sure that you get to the point of surviving—get to the point of hopefully flourishing. Your point is well 

taken. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. I respect it, but I would be concerned that there 

needs to be this bridge of humanitarian assistance. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Yes. So I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the human 

rights branch of the U.N. should be fully funded and be made 

stronger because of the condition we are in, specialized unit of the 

U.N., UNICEF, the food program. Those are not MONUSCO programs. Those are specialized U.N. missions that are playing tremendous role in Congo, and they need more support. 

But that is different from looking at the U.N. as MONUSCO. So 

I think the nuances are very important, because if we are talking 

about security, it is one thing in terms of armed security and others. If we are talking about human securities, security place, this 

is what you are referring to, people on life support and others, we 

need to buttress that. 

So our challenge is how do we buttress those programs, whether 

it is the integration of women who have been raped, the support 

they need, the followup, with the entire notion of having 17,000 

troops that are serving as an extension of a failed system that is 

in Kinshasa, which, by the way, received as much as it can get to 

build its own military to support it. That is undermining the entire 

emergence of the Congolese state. So something that we need to—

we should not conflate U.N. presence with MONUSCO, because 

that has become a problem as well. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. BAUMA. Yeah. I think Mvemba made a very good point. I 

mean, the difference between the MONUSCO and the other U.N. 

agencies, which are doing a good job, like OCHA or UNICEF. 

I would like to focus a little bit on MONUSCO. And I also think 

that in MONUSCO, the Human Rights bureau of MONUSCO 

should receive a lot of fund to allow it to work properly, because 

I think they are doing really amazing job. But the rest of 

MONUSCO, although I have to recognize that the situation may 

have been worse if they weren’t there, but there are many things 

that has to be questioned on how MONUSCO works. 

And I think there is a lot of—for example, there is a lot of entities in MONUSCO that, in my opinion, are not effective at all. 

Like, we have—and if you have the opportunity to travel in Congo, 

and if you came in Goma or in Beni, it will be important to have 

a position of people on how they see the MONUSCO and how they 

evaluate it. In some places in the region of Beni, there was a lot 

of killings, not far from the MONUSCO camp. And in many circumstances, the MONUSCO, after a certain time, they can’t go out. 

I don’t know if it is their internal policy of MONUSCO, but they—

although they have equipment, they have guns and they have all 

means to protect civilians, I don’t know if it is the problem of the 

mandate, but I think they are ineffective. And especially some 

units, the Indian, the Pakistani, or the Nepalese unit, which are 

ineffective. 

88

I think it is very important, if MONUSCO is to be maintained, 

to rethink how it is composed, what kind of troop it is composed, 

and what kind of specific mandate they have. We can’t accept to 

have 20,000 troops that will not react, and when people are killed 

or when people are beaten by the police, they are just there observing, taking note. I think this is not how we understand civilian protection. I think if someone has to be saved, a life has to be saved, 

is at the time—if the life of someone has to be saved, they have 

to react immediately, not write a report in order to protect the life 

of other people when they can protect life of people in the present 

time. 

I remember in 2013, I think, when Goma was about to fall in the 

M23, there was a lot of MONUSCO troops that said, well, we can 

assure you that Goma will not fall. And I was in Goma at that 

time. And I remember how they start changing how they were saying, and say, ‘‘Well, the primary responsibility of protecting the civilian is from the government.’’ Which is a little bit funny because, 

if MONUSCO is in DRC, it means that somehow the government 

wasn’t able to play its role, because if the government was effective, we could not need MONUSCO. 

So I think the way MONUSCO is funded, what kind of troop 

MONUSCO—what kind of troop in MONUSCO have to be rethink. 

And some countries should be courageous enough to send their 

troop in the MONUSCO. Because I think also the problem is that 

some countries which have maybe more effective troops don’t send 

them in a country like DRC. Maybe they have another priority, 

Iraq or some country like that. And the consequence is that we 

have a force which is ineffective. 

The other thing with MONUSCO, I think their relation with 

Congolese security forces, and I mentioned this in my testimony, I 

think that kind of support should be stopped, because it is unbelievable to say the police using the fuel of MONUSCO coming and 

arrest peaceful demonstration or beat peaceful demonstration with 

money, with resources given by MONUSCO. And I pointed this out 

many times with MONUSCO officials in DRC, and I think it is 

time to stop that kind of cooperation with MONUSCO and the Congolese security forces, unless we want to agree openly that we are 

supporting human right violations and mass atrocities via 

MONUSCO. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you for that insight and for your opinion. 

I would just note for the record and I think, you know, we speak 

so often of all of you are very well versed on what MONUSCO is, 

but for those who may not, MONUSCO is a U.N. organization civilization mission in the DRC. It is the world’s largest U.N. peacekeeping operation with about 17,900 uniform personnel as of August 31. And when you look at the size and the number of people 

living in the DR Congo, I mean, that is a little more than a division 

of military capacity. 

That is why I asked about whether or not there are sufficient 

numbers of deployed people are there to meet the need, and since 

we are dealing with an escalating crisis, it is not diminishing. Like 

you, I am very fearful that it is going to get far worse, and staging 

a growing peacekeeping deployment can’t be done overnight. It 

does take time. 

89

So I would note for the record too that the U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 2348, which was done in 2017, tasks MONUSCO with 

two strategic priorities: One, protection of civilians; and two, support to the implementation of the December 31, 2016, agreement 

and the electoral process. 

Before we conclude, is there anything else any of our distinguished witnesses would like to add? Yes. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just 

want to thank your committee, your subcommittee, for your support and continuous interest in DRC. 

I think we have traveled a long way. We have traveled deep into 

darkness and misery in terms of DRC. I think we have one more 

opportunity to end this misery for the people of DRC. The people 

of DRC have suffered enough. They have committed themselves to 

sacrifice themselves. We have seen this through various protests, 

various processes. If you tell DRC people tomorrow we are going 

to have a dialogue for peace, they will come, but they have also run 

out of strategic patience, to use a phrase that is fashionable these 

days. And we don’t know; if we do not act, we might see a coup 

d’etat. We might see people take up weapons. So we should not lull 

ourselves into things will be exactly the way we are thinking. It is 

very serious, and I think there is a cadre of people who are standing as an obstacle to this. 

And again I reiterate: Kabila must go. We need to consider serious diplo sanctions on his family and his associates. Corneille 

Nangaa is standing in the way of having an election. We are not 

children. They shouldn’t be playing with us. They shouldn’t be 

playing with you. The future of the country is at stake. Thank you 

very much, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. And in those words, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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The previous document is not reprinted here in its entirety but may be found at: 

http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=106613

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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