The Honor able Ar thur J . Tarnow , United States Dist rict Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 08a0768n.06 Filed: De cembe r 18, 2008 No. 06-4045 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. KEI TH W. DEWI TT, SR., Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E SO UT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO O P I N I O N

Before: M OORE an d GRIF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges; TARN OW, District Judge. * KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Def endant- Appellant Keith W. Dewitt, Sr. (“D ewitt”) p l eaded g uilty to conspirac y

to possess with intent to di stribute and to distribute more than one kilog ram of he roin and five kilogr ams of coca ine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b) (1)( A); money

launder ing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (B )(i) a nd 18 U.S.C. § 2; and makingfalse statements on a federa l income-ta x return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206. The d i s t r i c tc o u rts e n t e n c e d D e w i t t t o i mp r i s o n m e n t f o r l i f e , 2 4 0 m o n t h s , an d

3 6 m o n t h s , r e s p e c t i v e l y; the district court determined that the t erms would run concurre ntly

. On appe al, Dew itt arg ues that the dis tr ic t c ourt erred whe n it use d c on du c t of wh ic h h e ha d b e e n a c qu itt e d to de te rm ine his
se nte nc e , th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp ro perly used

jud ic ia l f

ind ing s o f f

a c t to e nh anc e his ov e ra ll2

offe nse leve l, and that his sentence is unreasona ble. We disag ree , and we AF F IRM t he sente nce imp os e d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACKG ROUND On September

10, 1998, Dewitt p l eaded not g uilty to all seven c ounts in the indictment

a g a ins t hi m. O n Jan

ua ry 20 , 2 00 0, a ft e r t

hree day s of

tr ia l, D e wi tt p le a de d guil ty to t hr e e c ounts
. De wi t t m o v e d t o w i t h dr aw h i s g u i l t y p l e a o n N o v e mb e r 7 , 2 0 0 0 ; t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt d e n i e d th is mot ion . B e fo re se nte nc ingDe wi tt, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ard e vid e nc e re g ard ingc on du c t th a t D e wi tt had bee n acquitted of

in state court; the district cour t f ound by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that De wi tt h a d c omm itt e d o ne mur de r and a be tte d ano the r. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d th a t D e wi tt
wo uld be se nte nc e d b a se d o n a

n o ff e ns e le ve l of

42 and a c ri min a l hi sto ry

of I , ma kin g the a pp lic a ble sentenc ing r ang e 360 months to life imprisonment. On J anuar y 29, 2004, the district court sente nced Dewitt to life in prison for c onsp i ra cy to possess with intent to di stribute more than one kilogr am of her oin and five kilog rams of c ocaine , 240 months in prison for money launder ing, a

nd 36 months in prison for makingfalse statements on a fe dera l income-tax return. On appe al, we r emande d to the district court for rese ntencingafte r United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Un ite d S tates v . D e witt , 145 F. App’x 980 (6th Cir. 2005). At the re sentenc ing hear ing, the district court addr essed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac tors and cited its previous dec isions

a dd re ssi ngDe wi tt’ s o bje c tio ns to t he pr e se nte nc e re po rt
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt re se nte nc e d D e wi tt t o the same te rms of i mprisonment under the a dvisory Guidelines. The district c ourt enter ed a f inal jud g me nt o n July 31 , 200 6; De wi tt fil e d a time ly no tic e of a pp e a l. We h a ve jur isd ic tio n o ve r t his appea l pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.We note that there is curre ntly an en ba nc ca se pending that involves the issue of whe ther 1 a district c ourt can proper ly consider acquitted conduct when deter mining an individual’s sentenc e. Un ite d S tat es v . W hite , No. 05-6596 (e n banc or al ar g ument J une 4, 2008). 3 II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review

“ W e r e v i e w

‘ a d i s t r i c t c o u r t ’ s l e g a l c on c lus ion s r e g ard ingthe Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s de novo ’ and ‘a district court’s fa ctual findings i n applying the SentencingGuidelines for clea r er ror.’ ” United States v. Kaminski , 5 0 1 F. 3 d 6 5 5 , 6 6 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Galv an , 453 F.3d 738, 739 (6th Cir. 2006)). B. Use of Acqui tte d Cond uct by Sentencing Jud ge B e fo re se nte nc ingDe wi tt, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ard te sti mony

that, on June 29 , 19 91 , D e wi tt ha d c omm itt e d o ne mur de r a nd a be tte d a no the r. Al tho ug h a

state jur y ha d ac qu itt e d De wi tt o f t he se char g es, the district cour

t found that the g overnme nt had prove d, by a prepondera nce of the evide nce, that Dewitt had c ommitt ed these crimes. The d istrict court there fore considere d this acquitted
c on du c t w he n d e te rm ini ngwh a t se nte nc e , with in the Gu ide lin e s rang e , to impo se on De wi tt. De wi tt argues that the district c ourt violated his Six th A mendment rig ht to jury trial and F ifth Amendment rig ht to due proce ss by using acquitted conduct to deter mine his sentenc e. The g overnme nt contends that the district court prope rly considere d this acquitted conduc t while setting D ewitt’s sentenc e. Un de r S ixth Ci rc uit

pr e c e de nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t vi olate D ewi tt’ s F if

th a nd Sixth Amendment rig hts by

consideringacquitted c onduct when f ashioning his sentence . This circuit has he ld “ that a

po st- Booke r

se nte nc ingc ourt

may c on sid e r e ve n ‘ a c qu itt ed c on du c t’ if it f ind s f a c ts supporting that conduct by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.” United States v. Me ndez , 498 F.3d 1 4 2 3 , 4 2 7 & n
. 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Brika , 487 F.3d 450, 458-60 (6th Cir.), c e rt.4

denied , — U.S. —, 128 S. C t. 341 ( 2 0 0 7 ))

. W e re v i ew f or cle ar e rror

the district court’s f

actua l finding that the g overnme nt proved the a cquitted conduc t by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Kaminski , 501 F.3d at 665. The district cour

t based its finding s on the testimony of three individuals: an ey ewitness and two Special Ag ents of t he I nterna l Revenue Service Criminal I nvestig ation Division. The district court found that the ey ewitness testi fied that, afte r brandishing a wea pon, firing a shot into the floor, and “te lling those pre sent to lie down .

. .,” Dewitt shot Washing ton, the ey ewitness’s friend, “in the ba c k o f t he he a d. ” Joint

Ap pe nd ix ( “ J.A. ” ) a t 74 (Jan. 20 , 2 00 4 D ist . Ct . O p. a t 27 ). Th e e y e wi tne ss testified that a n o t h er i n d i vidual near him was shot, but that he was not able to discern whe ther De wi tt or De w i t t ’ s c o mp an i o nf i r e d t h e s h o t
. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rts t a t e d t h a ti tw a s “ c o mp l e t e ly convince d that [t he eyewitness] testified truthfully .” J.A. at 75 (J an. 20, 2004 Dist. Ct. Op. at 28). One of the ag ents testified that Dewitt told the ag ent that Dewitt had been prese nt during the drug theft connected with the m urder s. The other ag ent t estified that Dewitt’s fing erpr ints were r ecove red at the murde r sce ne. J.A. at 75 (J an. 20, 2004 Dist. Ct. Op. at 28). Ba sed on these f

actua l findings, we conclude that it was not clea rly err oneous for

the district court to find, by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e, that De witt committ ed one mur der and abe tted another

. There fore , we hold that the di strict court did not err by considering acquitted c onduct that it had found by

a pre pondera

nce dur ing its sentenc ing de termination. C. Calculation of

Dewitt’s Advisory G uid elines Range De wi tt ar g ue s tha t the dis tr ic t court vio late d h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig hts by inc re a sin g his advisory Guidelines rang e “based upon fac tors such as possession of a we apon, lea dership role , and drugamount, which we re n o t ad mitted by [Dewitt] as par

t of the plea

ag ree ment in this case.”Dewitt’s re liance on Cunningham i s m i s place d. I n Cunningham , the Supreme Court 2 a dd re sse d Ca lif

or nia ’s ma nd

ato ry g uidelines, not an ad

v iso ry g uidelines sy stem simil ar to that curre ntl y us e d in the fe de ra l c ourt s p os t- Booke r . Cunningham , 5 4 9 U
. S
. a t 2 9 1

- 9 2. Pr ior to Cunningham , California state judge s wer e not f ree to c hoose a se ntence within a rang e of y ear s, but rathe r had to c hoose one of three sentenc es provided for a g iven offe nse. Id

. at 275. I n Cunningham , for e x ample, the sentencing judge had “to selec t 12 y ear s, nothing less and nothi ng more, unless he found fa cts allowing the impositi on of a se ntence of 6 or 16 y ear s.” Id

. at 292. The Supreme Court considere d the mid-rang e sentenc e to be the statutory maxi mum. Id . at 288-91. The Court held that i tw a s a v i o l a t i o no f

a d e f e n d an t ’ s S i x t h A m e n dm e n tr i g h t s t o a l l o w a j u d g e t o f

i n d f a c t s b y a preponde ranc e of t h e evidenc e and use them to impose a sentenc e beyond the state statutory maxi mum. Id. a t2 9 3
. H o w e v e r , w e h a v e h e ld tha t “ Cunningham makes c lear that an advisory sy stem of g uidelines and a preponde ranc e standa

rd do not implicate the Six th Amendment.” United States v. Schoe ninger , 254 F. App’ x 5 04, 508 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). Thus, the conce rn ra ise d in c a se s su c h a s Cunningham does not exist in Dewitt’s ca se for two rea sons: (1) the fe dera l se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s are a dv iso ry , n ot m and a tor y ; and (2 ) t he fe de ra l di str ic t cou

rt in D e wi tt’ s c a se was not using its fa ct-findingto impose a sentenc e that excee ded the statutory maxi mums for any of the off enses of conviction.
5 Dewitt B r. at 17. De witt arg ues t h at t he district cour t did not uti liz e the c orre ct appr oach f or calc ulating a

sentenc e; in Dewitt’s view, the district c ourt should ha ve (1) calc ulated the Guide lines rang e “ba sed on those fa cts admitted to by the defendant or supported by the j ury ’s verdict,” and the n (2 ) util ize d “ that ra

ng e , a lon g wi th t

he oth e r 3 55 3 f

a c tor s, to i mpo se a

re a so na ble se nte nc e .” De wi tt Br . at 17. Dew itt urge s us to consider Cun nin gh am v . Ca lif or nia , 549 U.S. 270 (2007), as suppor t for this approa ch. Thoug h Cunningham addre sses the Califo rnia state- court sy stem’s mandatory g uidelines regim e, De witt arg ues that the Court’s holding “undoubtedly applies to the F eder al Se nte nc ingsy ste m.” De wi tt Br . at 14. I n r e sp on se , th e g ov e rnme nt c on te nd s th a t no thi ngpr e ve nts 2

a dis tr ic t c ourt , p os t- Booke r , from findingfac ts by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e whe n calc ulating an advisory

Guidelines ra

ng e. We h a ve he ld t

hat “ dis tr ic t ju dg e s c an f

ind the fa c ts n e c e ssa

ry to cal c ulate the a

pp ro pr iate Gu ide lin e s r ang e us ingthe sa me pr e po nd e ra

nc e -o f- the -e vid e nc e sta

nd ard that g ov e rn e d p ri or

to6

Booke r .” U

n ite d S ta te s v . F e r g u s on , 45 6 F.3 d 6 60 , 6 65 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; see also United States v

. Jones , 489 F.3d 243, 250 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (“‘ [J ]udi cial fa ct-finding in sentencingproce eding s using

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e sta

nd ard po st- Booke r does not violate either Fifth Ame ndment due p ro ce s s ri gh t s , o r t h e S i x t h Am en dm en tri gh tt o t ri al b y j u ry . ’” (q u o t i n g United States v. Gate s , 461 F.3d 703, 708 ( 6th Cir.), cert. de nied , — U.S. —, 127 S. Ct. 602 (2006)) ). Only fac ts that cause the sentenc e to exceed the statutory maxi mum must be “admitted by the def endant or proved to a

jury bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Booke r , 543 U.S. at 244. The dist rict court found that Dew itt had a base -off ense le vel of 36. The district court adde d 2 le ve ls b e c a

us e it f ound that D e wi tt p os se sse d a

fi re arm duri ngthe c on sp ir a c y and 4 le ve ls b e c a us e it f ound that D e wi tt p lay e d a

le a de rs hip ro le in t

he c on sp ir a c y . Ba se d on D e wi tt’ s a dju ste d- of fe ns e le ve l of 42 and De wi tt’ s c ri min a l hi sto ry le ve l of I , D e wi tt’ s G uideline s r ang e wa s 3 60 mon ths to life i mprisonment. The district cour t sentence d Dewitt to life imprisonment, the statutory -maxim um punishment for conspira cy to possess with intent to di stribute more than one kilogr am of he roin and five kilog rams of c ocaine . 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( A). The district court also sente nced D ewitt to the statutory -maxim um punishment on the other two cha rg es: 240 months for money launder ing a

nd 36 months for making false statements on a fede ral income -tax return. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)( 1)(B ); 26 U.S.C. § 7206. B e c a us e the se nte nc e imp os e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

do e s n ot e xce e d th e statut or y ma ximum s, we hold that the district court’s decision to enha nce D ewitt’s sentenc e base d on fac ts that the district court found by

a pre pondera

nce did not violate Dewitt’s Six th A mendment rig hts. See F erguson , 456 F.3d at 665. Thus, we concl u d e t h at t he district cour t did not err in ca lculating Dewitt’s Guidelines ra

ng e.7

D. Reasonableness of S entence De wi tt a rgue s th a t hi s se nte nc e is unr e a so na ble and that a less e r se nte nc e wo uld su ff ic e to meet the se ntencingg oals laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Under Gall v

. United States , — U.S. —, 12 8 S. Ct. 58 6, 59 7 ( 20 07 ), re a so na ble ne ss r e vie w h a s tw o c omp on e nts : Reg ardle ss of whethe r the sen t en ce imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines ra

ng e, the a

ppellate court must revie w the sente nce unde r an abuse- of-discr etion standard. I t must first ensure that the district court committed no s i gn i fi ca n tp ro ce d

u ra l erro r, s u ch as fa i l i n g t o ca l cu l at e ( o r i mp ro p er l y ca l cu l at i n g) the Guidelines ra

ng e, tr eating the Guide lines as mandator y , failing to consider the § 355 3( a ) fa c tor s, se le c tin g a se nte nc e ba se d on cle arl y e rr on e ou s f

a c ts, or fa ili ngto adequately

explain the chosen sentenc e—including an ex planation for a ny deviation fr om t he Gu ide lin e s r ang e . As sumin g that the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc ingde c isi on is proce durally sound, the appellate court should the n consider th e s ubstantive rea sonablene ss of the sentenc e i mp o s e d u n d e r a n a b u s e - o f

- d is c r etion standard. When conductingthis review, the court will , of course, t ake into ac count the totality of the circ umstances, including the extent of any varia nce from the Guidelines rang e. I f the sentenc e is within the Guidelines ra ng e, the a ppellate c ourt may , but is not required to, apply a pre sumption of reaso n ableness. Id. , at --- -, 127 S. Ct. 2456. But if the sentenc e is outside the Guidelines rang e, the court may not apply a pre sumption of unrea sonablene ss . I t may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due defe renc e to the district c ourt' s decision that the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, on a whole, justify the exten t o f t h e v aria

nce. T he fa ct that the appe llate cour t might re asonably

have conclude d that a diffe rent sente nce w as appr opriate is ins ufficie nt to justi fy reve rsal of the dis tr ic t c ourt
. Dewitt’s argument that the district court improper ly calc ulated his Guidelines ra ng e wa s addre ssed above. A s Dew i t t ra i s es no other a rg uments that his sentence was proc edura lly unrea sonable, we now consider

the substantive re asonable ness of De witt’s sentence

. Dewitt arg ues t hat “a sentenc e of less than life imprisonment was c erta inly sufficie nt to meet the statutory

g oals of sente ncing .” De witt Br. at 19. Dewitt contends that he merits a lesser se ntence beca use: (1) he enter ed a guilty plea a fter a

fewday s of trial; (2) he did not have a substantialWe n ote that a lth ou g h it is a dmi ra ble that De wi tt ha s take n ste ps to be tte r him se lf sin c e his 3 conviction, Six th Circ uit pr ece dent does not per mit the dist rict cour

t to consider this conduct whe n it r e se nte nc e d D e wi tt p os t- Booke r . United St ates v. Erpe nbeck , 532 F.3d 423, 434 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (“‘ Th e go al of the [ Booke r ] re m an d i s t o d et erm i n e i f, at t h e t i m e o f s en t en ci n g, t h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge would have imposed a

differ ent sentenc e in the absence of m andator y g uidelines. Post-sentencing events or c onduct simply are not releva

nt to that inquiry .’” ( quoti n g Un ited States v. W orley , 453 F .3 d 7 06 , 7 09 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) (a lte ratio n in or ig ina l) ). We a

re bo un d b y

thi s p ri or pr e c e de nt. 8 criminal history ; and (3) in the ei ght y ear s betwee n his guilty plea a nd rese ntencinghe obtained “numer ous cer

tificates of

acc omplishm ent and tra ining.” Dewitt B r. at 19. 3 This circuit has c hosen t o hold that within-Guidelines sentenc es ar e pre sumed to be
rea sonable. U.S. v. Vonne r , 516 F.3d 382, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2008). This presumption is rebuttable, but we ca nnot ove rturn a district court’s sente ncing deter mination solely

beca use we believe a

nother sentenc e would be a

ppropriate

. Id. ; Ga ll , 1 28 S. Ct . at 59 7. Gi ve n h is of fe ns e le ve l of 42 an d h is criminal history

level o f I , De wi tt’s Guidelines rang e wa s 360 months to l ife imprisonment. The district court sentenc ed De witt within t hat ra ng e, and his sentenc e is theref ore pr esumed re asonable

. We conclude that Dewitt has no t re b utted the pre sumption t hat his within-Guidelines sentenc e is rea sonable. When it rese ntence d Dewitt, the district cour t enumerated the evide nce that led it to determine Dewitt’s sentenc e, and the di strict court e x plained how its sentenc e would ac hieve the se nte nc ingfa c tor s con ta ine d in 18 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt re c og nize d th a t D e wi tt did not have a s ubstantial criminal backg round, but deter mined that Dewitt’s extensive participation in distributi ng drug s and De witt’s involvement with violence led the district court to conc lude that a sente nce of

life imprisonment was nec essar y . Given the de fer ential standar d of re view, we cannot
c o n c lu d e th a t D e w itt’ s s e n te n c e is s u b s ta n ti v e ly u n r e a s o n a

b le

. A c c o r d in g ly , w e mu s t a ffirm the district court’s sente nce.9 III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the se nte nc e imp os e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt
.10

TARNOW, Distric t Judge. I concur beca use of pr ece dent, not beca use of Constitutional principle. The Constituti onal principle is that a pe rson may only be sente nced ba s ed o n admitted conduct or

if a jury has found guilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. That is, l i b er t y m ay n ot be exti ng uished without due proce ss of law. Her e, the District Court used both c onduct w h er e defenda nt was ac quitted and conduc t
n e i t h e r a dm i t t e d n o r f o u n d b y a j u r y. Howeve r, the pre cede nt cited compels my concur renc e.