The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: 

Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2006 (January 2006)

List of Briefing Slides 

Introduction 

Figure 1-1a Updated: Past and Projected Spending for Defense 

Figure 1-1b: CBO=s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for 

Defense 

Figure 1-2: Spending for Defense as a Share of Gross Domestic Product 

Figure 2-1 Updated: Spending for Operation and Support, by Functional Category 

Figure 2-2 Updated: Spending for Operation and Support, by Military Department 

Figure 2-3a Updated: Spending for Operation and Support, by Account 

Figure 2-3b: CBO=s Transformational Alternative: Spending for Operation and 

Support 

Figure 2-4 Updated: Spending for Operating Forces, by Military Department 

Figure 2-5 Updated: Spending for the Military Medical System, by Category 

Figure 3-1a Updated: Spending for Investment, by Budget Account and Weapon Type 

Figure 3-1b: CBO=s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for 

Investment 

Figure 3-2 Updated: Spending for Investment, by Military Department 

Figure 3-3a Updated: Past and Projected Spending for Army Investment 

Figure 3-3b: CBO=s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for 

Army Investment 

Figure 3-4a Updated: Procurement of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under DoD=s Current 

Plans 

Figure 3-4b: Procurement of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under CBO=s 

Evolutionary Alternative 

Figure 3-4c: Procurement of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-5a Updated: Age and Inventory of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under DoD=s 

Current Plans 

Figure 3-5b: Age and Inventory of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under CBO=s 

Evolutionary Alternative 

Figure 3-5c: Age and Inventory of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-6a Updated: Procurement of Army Helicopters Under DoD=s Current Plans 
The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: 

Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2006 

List of Briefing Slides (continued) 

Figure 3-6b: Procurement of Army Helicopters Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-6c: Procurement of Army Helicopters Under CBO=s Transformational 

Alternative 

Figure 3-7a Updated: Age and Inventory of Army Helicopters Under DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-7b: Age and Inventory of Army Helicopters Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-7c: Age and Inventory of Army Helicopters Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-9a Updated: Past and Projected Spending for Navy and Marine Corps Investment 

Figure 3-9b: CBO=s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for 

Navy and Marine Corps Investment 

Figure 3-10a Updated: Procurement of Battle Force Ships Under DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-10b: Procurement of Battle Force Ships Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-10c: Procurement of Battle Force Ships Under CBO=s Transformational 

Alternative 

Figure 3-11a Updated: Age and Inventory of Battle Force Ships Under DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-11b: Age and Inventory of Battle Force Ships Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-11c: Age and Inventory of Battle Force Ships Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-12a Updated: Procurement of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under DoD=s Current 

Plans 

Figure 3-12b: Procurement of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO=s 

Evolutionary Alternative 

Figure 3-12c: Procurement of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-13a Updated: Age and Inventory of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under DoD=s 

Current Plans 

Figure 3-13b: Age and Inventory of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO=s 

Evolutionary Alternative 
The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: 

Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2006 

List of Briefing Slides (continued) 

Figure 3-13c: Age and Inventory of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-14a Updated: Procurement of Marine Corps Helicopters Under DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-14b: Procurement of Marine Corps Helicopters Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-14c: Procurement of Marine Corps Helicopters Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-15a Updated: Age and Inventory of Marine Corps Helicopters Under DoD=s Current 

Plans 

Figure 3-15b: Age and Inventory of Marine Corps Helicopters Under CBO=s 

Evolutionary Alternative 

Figure 3-15c: Age and Inventory of Marine Corps Helicopters Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-16 Updated: Procurement of Marine Corps Ground Combat Vehicles Under DoD=s 

Current Plans and CBO=s Alternatives 

Figure 3-17 Updated: Age and Inventory of Marine Corps Ground Combat Vehicles Under 

DoD=s Current Plans and CBO=s Alternatives 

Figure 3-19a Updated: Past and Projected Spending for Air Force Investment 

Figure 3-19b: CBO=s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for 

Air Force Investment 

Figure 3-20a Updated: Procurement of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under DoD=s 

Current Plans 

Figure 3-20b: Procurement of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO=s 

Evolutionary Alternative 

Figure 3-20c: Procurement of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-21a Updated: Age and Inventory of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under 

DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-21b: Age and Inventory of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under 

CBO=s Evolutionary Alternative 

Figure 3-21c: Age and Inventory of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under 

CBO=s Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-22a Updated: Procurement of Air Force Bombers Under DoD=s Current Plans 
The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: 

Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2006 

List of Briefing Slides (continued) 

Figure 3-22b: Procurement of Air Force Bombers Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-22c: Procurement of Air Force Bombers Under CBO=s Transformational 

Alternative 

Figure 3-23a Updated: Age and Inventory of Air Force Bombers Under DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-23b: Age and Inventory of Air Force Bombers Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-23c: Age and Inventory of Air Force Bombers Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-24 Updated: Procurement of Air Force Airlifters Under DoD=s Current Plans and 

CBO=s Alternatives 

Figure 3-25 Updated: Age and Inventory of Air Force Airlifters Under DoD=s Current Plans 

and CBO=s Alternatives 

Figure 3-26a Updated: Procurement of Air Force Tankers Under DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-26b: Procurement of Air Force Tankers Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-26c: Procurement of Air Force Tankers Under CBO=s Transformational 

Alternative 

Figure 3-27a Updated: Age and Inventory of Air Force Tankers Under DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-27b: Age and Inventory of Air Force Tankers Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 

Figure 3-27c: Age and Inventory of Air Force Tankers Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Figure 3-29a Updated: Past and Projected Spending for Defense Agency Investment 

Figure 3-29b: CBO=s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for 

Defense Agency Investment 

Figure 3-30a Updated: Past and Projected Spending for Missile Defense Investment 

Figure 3-30b: CBO=s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for 

Missile Defense Investment 

Figure 3-31a Updated: Procurement Versus Steady-State Levels Under DoD=s Current Plans 

Figure 3-31b: Procurement Versus Steady-State Levels Under CBO=s Evolutionary 

Alternative 
The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: 

Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2006 

List of Briefing Slides (continued) 

Figure 3-31c: Procurement Versus Steady-State Levels Under CBO=s 

Transformational Alternative 

Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations 
1

The Long-Term Implications of Current 

Defense Plans and Alternatives:

Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2006

Congressional Budget Office

Congress of the United States

 This presentation updates the analysis contained in the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) 

September 2004 Web document The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed 

Update for Fiscal Year 2005 to account for changes incorporated in the President’s budget for 

fiscal year 2006 and in the 2006 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). In addition to those 

updates, the briefing incorporates data displays for projections of two alternatives to that FYDP—

one emphasizing military transformation and one emphasizing evolutionary upgrades to existing 

military systems. The briefing is a companion piece to CBO’s October 2005 publication The 

Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: Summary Update for Fiscal 

Year 2006. 

 This presentation does not incorporate changes to the FYDP resulting from Congressional action 

on the President’s 2006 budget request.

 Charts in this detailed update use the concepts of “steady state” and “half-life” for the Department 

of Defense’s (DoD’s) investment plans and weapon systems. Those concepts are explained 

more fully in Box 1-3 of CBO’s January 2003 study The Long-Term Implications of Current 

Defense Plans. (The projections in that report are based on the 2003 FYDP.)

 The updated displays in this presentation differ in some instances from those in previous 

briefings. In some cases, CBO has altered the display format to include additional historical data. 

In other cases, CBO has corrected its historical database of procurement quantities and 

spending. (For example, this update includes corrected procurement spending for Army 

helicopters during the 1980s.) CBO also, in many instances, departs from previous briefings by 

using different color schemes for the displays.

 Because of changes in CBO’s methodology, not all of the charts presented in CBO’s previous 

studies are updated in this presentation. In a similar manner, some charts in this presentation 

show new information not corresponding to any display in previous studies.

 All budgetary projections in this presentation are in billions of 2006 dollars. Numbers in the text 

may not sum to totals because of rounding. See the appendix at the end of the briefing for an 

explanation of selected acronyms and abbreviations.
2

Figure 1-1a Updated

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

Past and Projected Spending for Defense

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Total Cost Risk

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Contingency Cost Risk

Family Housing

Supplemental

Military Personnel

Operation and Maintenance

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Procurement

Military Construction

 This chart updates Figure 1-1 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document The Long-Term 

Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2005. It shows total 

obligational authority (TOA) for the Department of Defense for the 1980-2024 period. Defense 

TOA grew rapidly between the early and mid-1980s, reaching a peak of $443 billion in 1985. (All 

funds are in 2006 dollars.) TOA then generally declined during the late 1980s and into the 1990s, 

reaching a low of about $299 billion in 1997 before rising thereafter to $342 billion by 2001. 

Defense TOA has grown even more rapidly in recent years as U.S. forces have become 

engaged in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2005, DoD’s TOA reached $509 billion, 

including $74 billion in supplemental funding.

 The 2006 FYDP—on which CBO based the projections shown in this presentation—anticipated 

that defense resources (excluding supplemental appropriations) would rise from $420 billion for 

2006 to $461 billion for 2011.

 If the program in the 2006 FYDP was carried out as currently envisioned, the demand for 

defense resources, excluding supplemental resources for contingencies, would average $497 

billion a year between 2012 and 2024, CBO projects—or about $77 billion more than the 2006 

request.

 CBO also made “cost-risk” projections (shown by the dashed red lines in the figure). CBO 

projects that defense resource demands including cost risk will average about $522 billion a year 

through 2011 and about $563 billion between 2012 and 2024. Those amounts are about 17 

percent and 13 percent higher, respectively, than the amounts without cost risk. Assumptions 

underlying the cost-risk projections include the following:

• Costs for weapons programs grow as they have since the Vietnam War; and

• The United States continues to conduct military operations overseas as part of the global 

war on terrorism. 
3

Figure 1-1b

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

CBO’s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for Defense

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Evolutionary Case

Transformational Case

Administration Plan

Administration Plan Cost Risk

Evolutionary Case Cost Risk

Transformational Case Cost Risk

 This chart displays CBO’s projections of the resource implications of its transformational and 

evolutionary alternatives to DoD’s current plans. (The differences in content between those 

alternatives and CBO’s projections of the implications of the 2006 FYDP are summarized in 

Table 1 of CBO’s The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: 

Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2006.)

 The evolutionary and transformational alternatives developed by CBO explore whether it might 

be possible to reduce those long-term demands for defense resources by adopting different 

approaches to modernizing U.S. military forces.

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the average annual demand for defense resources over the 

2006-2024 period would be $438 billion, which is about 9 percent less than CBO’s projection of 

the resources necessary to carry out DoD’s current plans during the same period.

 Under the transformational alternative, the annual demand for defense resources would average 

$451 billion, which is about 6 percent less than CBO’s projection of the resource implications of 

DoD’s current plans.
4

Figure 1-2

Spending for Defense as a Share of Gross Domestic Product

Percent

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Administration Plan

Administration Plan with All Cost 

Ri k

Transformational Case

Evolutionary Case

 This chart updates Figure 1-2 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It compares past and 

projected spending for DoD with the size of the U.S. economy.

 DoD’s spending measured as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) grew through the early 

1980s, reaching a high point in 1983. Its share of GDP declined thereafter, reaching a low point 

in 1999.

 Defense spending’s share of GDP has grown through 2005, but thereafter it begins a gradual 

and steady decline. That drop occurs because projected real (inflation-adjusted) increases in 

GDP outpace projected increases in defense outlays under all three of the alternatives—with and 

without cost risk—that CBO considered.
5

Figure 2-1 Updated

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

Spending for Operation and Support, by Functional Category

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Headquarters and Administration

Total Cost Risk

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Contingency Cost Risk

Operating Forces

Supplemental

Medical

Command and Intelligence

Bases, Installations, and 

Central Logistics

Central Training

 This chart updates Figure 2-1 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. The operation and 

support (O&S) budget, which accounts for about 65 percent of defense spending, pays for DoD’s

day-to-day operations as well as for military and civilian payrolls. CBO projects that O&S 

spending without cost risk will reach $341 billion in 2024.

 Most of the projected increase in O&S spending results from the growing cost of medical benefits 

for military personnel and from rising wages for both military and civilian personnel.

 As the dashed red lines in the figure show, growth in the demand for O&S resources could be 

greater than DoD anticipates. CBO estimates that the O&S budget with cost risk may reach $386 

billion in 2024. The cost risks include:

• Continued involvement in contingency operations associated with the global war on 

terrorism, such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere (that cost risk decreases 

from $71 billion in 2006 to $24 billion in 2024);

• Faster-than-expected growth of DoD’s health care costs ($12 billion of cost risk in 2024); 

and

• A permanent increase of 30,000 in the Army’s end strength ($3 billion of cost risk in 

2024).

 CBO created subcategories of O&S spending based on force and infrastructure codes used 

within DoD.

 Increases in military and civilian pay account for all of CBO’s projected spending growth in every 

subcategory except “Operating Forces” (see Figure 2-4 Updated) and “Medical” (see Figure 2-5 

Updated). CBO projects that those pay levels will grow at the same rate as the employment cost 

index (ECI), a measure of the average pay level in the U.S. civilian economy.
6

Spending for Operation and Support, by Military Department

Figure 2-2 Updated

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

Defense-Wide

Navy and Marine Corps

Air Force

Army

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Contingency Cost Risk

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Total Cost Risk Supplemental

 This chart updates Figure 2-2 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. Between 2006 and 

2011, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will receive approximately 29, 28, and 

26 percent of the O&S budget, respectively. Defensewide activities (labeled “Other DoD” in the 

figure), which include the Defense Health Program, make up the rest of the O&S budget.

 CBO projects that for every department, average annual O&S spending will grow by between 1.2 

percent and 1.9 percent from 2012 to 2024.

 The Army has received the largest proportion of supplemental contingency funding for current 

operations.
7

Spending for Operation and Support, by Account

Figure 2-3a Updated

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022

Operation and Maintenance

Military Personnel (MILPERS)

Total Cost Risk

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Contingency Cost Risk

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Supplemental

 This chart updates Figure 2-3 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. CBO projects that 

military personnel spending will increase from $118 billion in 2012 to $143 billion in 2024, an 

average annual growth rate of 1.6 percent. That growth is attributable to two factors:

• CBO’s assumption, which is consistent with DoD’s planning documents, that military pay 

raises must keep pace with the ECI; and

• CBO’s assumption, which is consistent with that of DoD’s actuaries, that medical accrual 

costs will steadily increase. Those costs are intended to fund future medical spending for 

military retirees and dependents when they reach age 65.

 Operation and maintenance (O&M) spending will increase from $170 billion in 2012 to $198 

billion in 2024, CBO projects, for an average annual growth rate of 1.3 percent. Most of that 

growth stems from:

• The assumption that DoD must provide civilian employees with pay raises equivalent to 

the ECI; and

• Increasing medical costs associated with the Defense Health Program.

 Most supplemental contingency funding for operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere is 

allocated to the O&M category.
8

CBO’s Transformational Alternative: Spending for Operation and Support

Figure 2-3b

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Transformational Case

Administration Plan

Administration Plan Cost Risk Transformational Case Cost Risk

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

 This chart displays CBO’s projections of the O&S funding associated with its transformational 

and evolutionary alternatives to DoD’s current plans. (The differences in content between those 

alternatives and CBO’s projections of the resource implications of the 2006 FYDP are 

summarized in Table 1 of CBO’s The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and 

Alternatives: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2006.)

 There is no significant difference between CBO’s projection of the O&S resource demands for 

carrying out DoD’s current plans and its projection of the O&S demands associated with its 

evolutionary alternative. CBO’s projection indicates that under current plans, the average annual 

demand for O&S resources will be $301 billion over the period from 2006 to 2024.

 Under the transformational alternative, the average annual demand for O&S resources over the 

2006-2024 period would be $284 billion, which is about 5 percent less than CBO’s projection of 

the O&S resources necessary to carry out DoD’s current plans during the same period.
9

Spending for Operating Forces, by Military Department

Figure 2-4 Updated

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

Defense-Wide

Air Force

Navy and Marine Corps

Army

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022

Contingency Cost Risk

Supplemental

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

 This chart updates Figure 2-4 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. The O&S subcategory 

“Operating Forces” pays for military and support units assigned to combatant commands.

 CBO projects that the Operating Forces subcategory will experience $6 billion of spending 

growth in addition to pay increases. That extra growth results from:

• Continuing long-term trends of rising O&M costs per active-duty service member in the 

Army and Marine Corps ground forces;

• Increased O&M costs for aging weapon systems; and

• New weapon systems that are more complex and have higher O&M costs than the 

systems they replace.

 By CBO’s estimates, the Operating Forces subcategory receives about two-thirds of all 

supplemental contingency funding. Therefore, CBO has allocated about two-thirds of contingency 

cost risk to that subcategory.
10

Spending for the Military Medical System, by Category

Figure 2-5 Updated

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Direct Care and Other

Accrual

Purchased Care and Contracts 

Pharmaceuticals

Military Personnel

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Cost Risk

Transformational Case

 This chart updates Figure 2-5 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. CBO estimates that 

total real medical spending will increase by 80 percent, from $37 billion in 2006 to more than $66 

billion by 2024. Real medical spending including cost risk could more than double, exceeding $79 

billion by 2024, CBO projects.

 Accrual payments for beneficiaries who are age 65 or older will make up more than 40 percent of 

the increase in medical spending. CBO’s projection indicates that by 2024, accrual payments will 

be more than twice as large in real terms as they are currently, reaching a total of nearly $23 

billion. 

 Pharmaceuticals make up the fastest-growing category of medical spending. Real drug 

expenditures without cost risk will nearly triple, CBO estimates, climbing from $3.6 billion in 2006 

to $9.1 billion in 2024; expenditures including cost risk will nearly quadruple, rising to $12.7 billion 

in 2024. 

 Purchased care and private-sector contracts are projected to grow by 89 percent in real terms, 

from $8 billion in 2006 to $15.2 billion in 2024. Spending in that category including cost risk could 

increase by 130 percent in real terms, reaching $18.5 billion in 2024.

 The category that comprises the military’s direct-care system and other medical spending is 

projected to grow by 43 percent in real terms, from $8.2 billion in 2006 to $11.6 billion in 2024. If 

costs grew more quickly than DoD has anticipated, spending in that category could rise by 109 

percent in real terms, reaching $17 billion in 2024. 

 CBO anticipates that spending for uniformed medical personnel will grow in real terms by only 20 

percent by 2024, paralleling the rate of growth of spending for other types of military personnel. 

CBO expects real spending in the military personnel category to grow from $6.4 billion in 2006 to 

$7.6 billion in 2024.

 Under CBO’s transformational alternative, the introduction of increased deductibles and 

copayments for military dependents and retirees would reduce medical spending—compared 

with its level under the Administration’s plan—by about 25 percent by 2024.
11

Figure 3-1a Updated

Spending for Investment, by Budget Account and Weapon Type

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

50

100

150

200

250

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Aircraft

Total Cost Risk

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

C4ISR

Missiles and Munitions

Ground Combat

Ships

Missile Defense

Other Procurement

Supplemental

Contingency Cost Risk

CBO's September 2004 Projection

 This chart updates Figure 3-1 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It provides a breakout 

of the more than one-third of DoD’s budget (about $148 billion in 2006) allocated to investment, 

which funds development and procurement of DoD’s weapon systems.

 The 2006 FYDP anticipated that investment spending would grow to $165 billion by 2011—about 

11 percent more than the spending expected for 2006. On the basis of that plan, CBO projects 

that if weapons costs do not grow as they have historically, investment resources will continue to 

increase, reaching about $193 billion by 2014, and then decline. Over the 2012-2024 period, 

those resources would average about $172 billion a year.

 Investment demands in CBO’s current projection peak one year later than they did in CBO’s

September 2004 projection (2014 versus 2013). That change resulted primarily from delays—

relative to CBO’s previous assumptions—in the Air Force’s planned schedules for executing 

several of its space programs. 

 If the costs of weapons grow in the future as they have over the past 30 years, resource 

requirements for planned purchases in 2011 could equal $199 billion, or about 21 percent more 

than they would without cost growth. In that case, funding during the 2012-2024 period could 

average almost $199 billion, or about 16 percent more than it would without cost growth. 
12

Figure 3-1b

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

CBO’s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for Investment

0

50

100

150

200

250

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Evolutionary Case

Transformational Case

Administration Plan

Administration Plan Cost Risk

Evolutionary Case Cost Risk

Transformational Case Cost Risk

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

 This chart displays CBO’s projections of the implications for investment resources under its 

transformational and evolutionary alternatives to DoD’s current plans. (The differences in content 

between those alternatives and CBO’s projections of the implications of the 2006 FYDP are 

summarized in Table 1 of CBO’s The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and 

Alternatives: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2006.)

 Under CBO’s projection of the implications of DoD’s current plans, the average annual demand 

for investment resources (excluding cost risk) would be $169 billion over the period from 2006 to 

2024. That demand with cost risk would average $196 billion annually.

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the average annual demand for investment resources over 

the 2006-2024 period would be $125 billion. With cost risk, that demand would average $137 

billion annually.

 Under the transformational alternative, the average annual demand for investment resources 

over the 2006-2024 period would be $155 billion. That demand with cost risk would average 

$179 billion annually.
13

Figure 3-2 Updated

Spending for Investment, by Military Department

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

50

100

150

200

250

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Army

Air Force

Navy and Marine Corps

Defense-Wide

Cost Risk

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Supplemental

CBO's September 2004 Projection

 This chart updates Figure 3-2 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. During the period from 

1980 to 2004, DoD’s investment resources were distributed as follows:

• Army investment averaged $23 billion, or 17 percent of total DoD investment;

• Navy and Marine Corps investment averaged $46 billion, or 34 percent of the total;

• Air Force investment averaged $51 billion, or 38 percent of the total; and

• Investment in other DoD activities averaged $14 billion, or 10 percent of the total.

 During the period from 2006 to 2011, DoD anticipates allocating its investment resources as 

follows:

• Army investment would average $28 billion, or 18 percent of total DoD investment;

• Navy and Marine Corps investment would average $55 billion, or 34 percent of the total;

• Air Force investment would average $57 billion, or 35 percent of the total; and

• Investment in other DoD activities would average $22 billion, or 14 percent of the total.

 During the period spanned by CBO’s projection (2012 to 2024), DoD’s investment resources 

would be distributed as follows:

• Army investment would average $35 billion, or 21 percent of total DoD investment;

• Navy and Marine Corps investment would average $61 billion, or 36 percent of the total;

• Air Force investment would average $54 billion, or 31 percent of the total; and

• Investment in other DoD activities would average $22 billion, or 13 percent of the total.
14

Figure 3-3a Updated

Past and Projected Spending for Army Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Cost Risk

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Other Procurement

Missiles and Munitions

C4ISR

Aircraft

Ground Combat

Missile Defense

FCS

Supplemental

CBO's September 2004 Projection

 This chart updates Figure 3-3 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It depicts the Army’s 

past overall level of investment and future investment plans.

 On the basis of those plans, CBO projects that the Army’s investment spending will exceed its 

previous (1985) peak of $35 billion in 2013, reach a new peak of $42 billion in 2015, and then 

decline to about $29 billion by 2024.

 CBO’s projection of the Army’s annual investment spending from 2012 to 2024 averages about 

$35 billion. Peak demand for Army investment resources has shifted relative to CBO’s previous 

projection, primarily as a result of delays in the Army’s schedule for developing and fielding the 

Future Combat Systems (FCS).
15

Figure 3-3b

CBO’s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for Army Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Evolutionary Case

Transformational Case

Administration Plan

Administration Plan Cost Risk

Evolutionary Case Cost Risk

Transformational Case Cost Risk

 This chart displays CBO’s projections of the implications for investment resources under its 

transformational and evolutionary alternatives to the Army’s current plans. (The differences in 

content between those alternatives and CBO’s projections of the implications of the 2006 FYDP 

are summarized in Table 2 of CBO’s The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and 

Alternatives: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2006.)

 Under CBO’s projection of the implications of DoD’s current plans, the average annual demand 

for Army investment resources (excluding cost risk) would be $33 billion over the period from 

2006 to 2024. That demand with cost risk would average $41 billion annually.

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the average annual demand for Army investment resources 

over the 2006-2024 period would be $22 billion. (The large difference between demand under the 

evolutionary alternative and under CBO’s projection of DoD’s current plans is due to the 

cancellation of the Future Combat Systems program under the evolutionary alternative.) With 

cost risk, the demand for Army investment resources under this alternative would average $23 

billion annually.

 Under the transformational alternative, the average annual demand for investment resources 

over the 2006-2024 period would be $32 billion. (The transformational alternative would retain 

the Future Combat Systems program.) That demand with cost risk would average $41 billion 

annually.
16

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-2,500

-2,000

-1,500

-1,000

-500

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

FCS Stryker M-1 M-2 M-109 MLRS HIMARS Other

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-4a Updated

Procurement of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under DoD’s Current Plans

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Vehicles

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-4 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and 

projected purchases of ground combat vehicles for the Army as measured by number of vehicles 

(the top part of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart). 

 The “Other” category includes such vehicles as the M-88 recovery vehicle, the field artillery 

ammunition supply vehicle, and the M-113 armored personnel carrier.

 Purchases of ground combat vehicles during the 1990s averaged 480 per year, or roughly onethird of the upper end of the range of steady-state purchases needed to sustain the fleet 

indefinitely.

 Under DoD’s current plans and CBO’s projections of their implications, the FCS program—a key 

element of the Army’s transformation plans—would:

• Purchase the first FCS vehicles for the Army’s brigades in 2010; and

• Purchase enough FCS vehicles to equip two brigades a year beginning in 2012.

 The projected annual procurement rate of almost 700 FCS vehicles would not be sufficient to 

maintain the combat vehicle fleet in a steady state.

 The Army’s current plans differ from its 2005 plans in that they delay procurement of the first full 

brigade of FCS equipment from 2009 to 2010.

 CBO’s projections for procurement of Army ground combat vehicles were based on the 

December 2004 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the FCS program. Since that time, DoD

has issued a new SAR showing that the program’s costs have increased by about 50 percent.
17

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-2,500

-2,000

-1,500

-1,000

-500

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

M-113 Stryker M-1 M-2 M-109 MLRS HIMARS Other

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-4b

Procurement of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Vehicles

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of ground combat vehicles for the Army under 

CBO’s evolutionary alternative as measured by number of vehicles (the top part of the chart) and 

billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart). 

 In contrast to DoD’s current plans to procure vehicles as part of the Future Combat Systems 

program, the ground combat vehicles purchased under CBO’s evolutionary case would be 

upgraded versions of existing equipment, including M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley fighting 

vehicles.

 Because the costs for those upgrades would be lower than current estimates of the costs for FCS 

vehicles, average annual procurement of ground combat vehicles under the evolutionary case 

would be $1.7 billion, or 77 percent less than under CBO’s projection of the Army’s current plans.
18

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-2,500

-2,000

-1,500

-1,000

-500

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

FCS Stryker M-1 M-2 M-109 MLRS HIMARS Other

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-4c

Procurement of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Vehicles

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of ground combat vehicles for the Army under 

CBO’s transformational alternative as measured by number of vehicles (the top part of the chart) 

and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart). 

 Under the transformational case, the Army would forgo upgrades to its existing ground combat 

vehicles and allow its current systems to continue aging as the Future Combat Systems were 

procured.

 Relative to the Army’s current plans, that change would save an average of about $180 million 

annually over the period from 2012 to 2024.
19

M-113

MLRS/HIMARS M-109

M-2

M-1

M-60

FCS

Stryker

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

50,000

55,000

60,000

65,000

70,000

75,000

80,000

85,000

90,000

95,000

100,000

105,000

110,000

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-5a Updated

Age and Inventory of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under DoD’s Current Plans 

HalfLife

Years

Number of Vehicles

 This chart updates Figure 3-5 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average 

age of the Army’s fleet of ground combat vehicles (the top part of the chart) and inventories of the 

various vehicle types (the bottom part of the chart). The inventories cover the total number of 

vehicles that the Army now retains and that have not been retired. Those inventories are larger 

than the numbers of vehicles, including spares, that are needed to equip the Army’s active and 

reserve units. For example, CBO estimates that the Army’s total inventory of M-1 Abrams tanks 

exceeds by about 40 percent the number of tanks it would need to equip its units if they were all 

converted to a modular design. 

 The Army has not purchased enough combat vehicles during the past 14 years to prevent its 

ground combat fleet as a whole from aging. Indeed, the fleet’s average age has risen almost 

steadily since 1990. It is currently about 13 years—roughly double what it was in 1990.

 Deliveries of new vehicles will be insufficient to affect such aging until FCS vehicles begin to 

enter the fleet in 2012, at which point the fleet’s average age will begin to rise less rapidly. After 

that, the age of the fleet will continue to increase because the planned rates for procuring Future 

Combat Systems will be lower than the steady-state procurement rates that would arrest aging 

for the Army’s entire inventory of ground combat vehicles—including vehicles that are not 

needed to equip its forces.
20

M-113

MLRS/HIMARS M-109

M-2

M-1

M-60

Stryker

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

50,000

55,000

60,000

65,000

70,000

75,000

80,000

85,000

90,000

95,000

100,000

105,000

110,000

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-5b

Age and Inventory of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Years

Number of Vehicles

HalfLife

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Army’s ground combat vehicles under CBO’s evolutionary alternative. Under that 

case, the Army would purchase upgraded versions of existing equipment, including M-1 Abrams 

tanks and M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles, at the same rates as those planned for procurement of 

FCS vehicles. Therefore, aging trends would be essentially the same under DoD’s current plans 

and CBO’s evolutionary alternative.
21

M-113

MLRS/HIMARS M-109

M-2

M-1

M-60

FCS

Stryker

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

50,000

55,000

60,000

65,000

70,000

75,000

80,000

85,000

90,000

95,000

100,000

105,000

110,000

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-5c

Age and Inventory of Army Ground Combat Vehicles Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Years

Number of Vehicles

HalfLife

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Army’s ground combat vehicles under CBO’s transformational alternative. Under 

that case, the Army would purchase FCS vehicles, but it would forgo the (modest) purchases it 

had planned of upgraded versions of existing equipment, including M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 

Bradley fighting vehicles. As a result, under the transformational alternative, the average age of 

the Army’s ground combat vehicles would rise to 26 years by 2024 rather than to 25 years.
22

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-350

-250

-150

-50

50

150

250

350

AH-1 UH-60 CH-47 OH-58D FUR LUH AH-64 CH-47F Armed Recon JHL

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-6a Updated

Procurement of Army Helicopters Under DoD’s Current Plans

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-6 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and 

projected purchases of helicopters for the Army as measured by number of helicopters (the top 

part of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 The Army plans to increase its annual purchases of new and remanufactured helicopters from 34 

in 2005 to 216 by 2011, with a corresponding increase in funding during that period. Annual 

purchases are slated to decline after that, but they will remain relatively steady at about 93 from 

2014 until 2022.
23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-350

-250

-150

-50

50

150

250

350

AH-1 CH-47 Follow-On UH-60 CH-47 OH-58D LUH AH-64 CH-47F Armed Recon

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-6b

Procurement of Army Helicopters Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of helicopters for the Army under CBO’s

evolutionary alternative as measured by number of helicopters (the top part of the chart) and 

billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the Army would procure a follow-on to its existing 

CH-47 heavy-lift helicopter rather than a new Joint Heavy-Lift Helicopter. It would also forgo 

developing and purchasing a Future Utility Rotorcraft.
24

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-350

-250

-150

-50

50

150

250

350

AH-1 UH-60 CH-47 OH-58D FUR LUH AH-64 CH-47F JHL

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-6c

Procurement of Army Helicopters Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of helicopters for the Army under CBO’s

transformational alternative as measured by number of helicopters (the top part of the chart) and 

billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Under the transformational alternative, the Army would forgo procuring a new “off-the-shelf”

armed reconnaissance helicopter—relying instead on unmanned aerial vehicles developed and 

procured as part of the FCS program to perform aerial reconnaissance. In addition, relative to 

current plans, the transformational alternative would accelerate procurement of both a new 

Future Utility Rotorcraft and a new Joint Heavy-Lift Helicopter.
25

CH-47 CH-47F

UH-1

LUH

UH-60

AH-1

AH-64

OH-58A/C

OH-58D

Armed Recon JHL

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-7a Updated

Age and Inventory of Army Helicopters Under DoD’s Current Plans

Years

HalfLife

Number of Aircraft

 This chart updates Figure 3-7 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average 

age of the Army’s fleet of helicopters (the top part of the chart) and inventories of the various 

helicopter types (the bottom part of the chart).

 Although the Army has bought few new helicopters recently, it has retired a large number of older 

aircraft, reducing its total helicopter inventory to less than half of what it was in the late 1980s and 

early 1990s. Those retirements have allowed the average age of the helicopter fleet to remain 

within or close to the target half-life range. 

 Beginning in about 2008, projected deliveries of new armed reconnaissance and utility 

helicopters will cause the average age of the fleet to stabilize, decline, and then stabilize again.
26

CH-47 CH-47F

UH-1

LUH

UH-60

AH-1

AH-64

OH-58A/C

OH-58D

Armed Recon

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-7b

Age and Inventory of Army Helicopters Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Army’s helicopters under CBO’s evolutionary alternative, in which the Army 

would procure a follow-on to its existing CH-47 heavy-lift helicopter rather than a new Joint 

Heavy-Lift Helicopter.

 The aging trends projected under DoD’s current plans and CBO’s evolutionary alternative are 

similar because the projected numbers of helicopters to be purchased are similar under the two 

cases.
27

CH-47 CH-47F

UH-1

LUH

UH-60

AH-1

AH-64

OH-58A/C

OH-58D

FUR

JHL

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-7c

Age and Inventory of Army Helicopters Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Years

Number of Aircraft

HalfLife

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Army’s helicopters under CBO’s transformational alternative, which would forgo 

procuring a new “off-the-shelf” armed reconnaissance helicopter and rely instead for airborne 

reconnaissance on unmanned aerial vehicles to be developed and procured as part of the FCS 

program. The transformational alternative would also accelerate—relative to current plans—

procurement of both a new Future Utility Rotorcraft and Joint Heavy-Lift Helicopter.

 Because the transformational alternative would speed up purchases of new helicopters—

particularly the Future Utility Rotorcraft—by comparison with current plans and would begin to 

retire the Army’s Apache attack helicopters, the average age of the Army’s helicopter fleet would 

decline steadily through 2024 rather than reach a plateau in about 2018.
28

Figure 3-9a Updated

Past and Projected Spending for Navy and Marine Corps Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Cost Risk

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Other Procurement

Missile Defense

Ships

Aircraft

C4ISR

Ground Combat

Missiles and Munitions

Supplemental

CBO's September 2004 Projection

 This chart updates Figure 3-9 in CBO’s September 2004 Web document. Under DoD’s current 

plans, the Navy would increase investment from $48 billion in 2006 to a peak of about $66 billion in 

2014. After that, investment resources would gradually decline—to $43 billion by 2024—averaging 

about $54 billion a year between 2012 and 2024.

 If costs grew as they have in the past, however, the Navy’s investment spending could rise to a 

peak of about $72 billion in 2014, average $60 billion a year between 2012 and 2024, and then fall 

back to about $49 billion annually by the end of the period.

 Under the President’s budget, the Navy’s planned annual shipbuilding would grow from four to 12 

ships between 2006 and 2011. Under the 2005 FYDP, the Navy had planned to buy 48 ships during 

the 2005-2009 period. Under the 2006 FYDP, the Navy plans to buy 49 ships from 2006 to 2011.

 For 2006, the President has requested one surface combatant, one attack submarine, one 

amphibious ship, and one support ship. 

 The Marine Corps’s plans for purchases through its procurement account have changed little from 

the 2005 to the 2006 FYDP. The service proposes to invest heavily in ground combat vehicles 

(such as the new Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and the Future Light Combat Vehicle) to replace 

its current inventory of aging equipment, a plan that would require substantial resources over the 

next 20 years.
29

Figure 3-9b

CBO’s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for Navy and Marine Corps Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Evolutionary Case

Administration Plan

Administration Plan Cost Risk

Evolutionary Case Cost Risk

Transformational Case 

Transformational Case Cost Risk

 This chart displays CBO’s projections of the implications for investment resources of its

transformational and evolutionary alternatives to the Navy’s and Marine Corps’s current plans. 

(The differences in content between those alternatives and CBO’s projections of the implications 

of the 2006 FYDP are summarized in Table 3 of CBO’s The Long-Term Implications of Current 

Defense Plans and Alternatives: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2006.)

 Under CBO’s projections of the implications of DoD’s current plans, the average annual demand 

for Navy and Marine Corps investment resources (excluding cost risk) would be $54 billion over 

the period from 2006 to 2024. That demand with cost risk would average $60 billion annually.

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the average annual demand for Navy and Marine Corps 

investment resources over the 2006-2024 period would be $40 billion. With cost risk, that 

demand would average $42 billion annually.

 Under the transformational alternative, the average annual demand for investment resources 

over the 2006-2024 period would be $43 billion. That demand with cost risk would average $48 

billion annually.
30

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Submarines Amphibious Ships Support Ships Frigates DDG-51 DD(X) CG-47 CG(X) LCS Carriers

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-10a Updated

Procurement of Battle Force Ships Under DoD’s Current Plans

Number of Ships

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-10 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and 

projected purchases of battle force ships for the Navy as measured by number of ships (the top 

part of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 CBO’s projection anticipates a boost in ship purchases because of the Navy’s plan to enlarge the 

fleet from about 280 ships today to almost 300 ships by 2024. Most of the planned expansion would 

occur in the surface combatant force, with the purchase of 73 littoral combat ships (LCSs).

 Planned increases in the capabilities of LHA(R) and MPF(F) amphibious ships would also 

contribute to higher levels of funding for shipbuilding.

 The Navy anticipates that the CVN-21 aircraft carrier class will cost, on average, about $2 billion 

more per ship than the Nimitz class that the CVN is replacing.

 Under the 2005 FYDP, the Navy planned to buy one DD(X) destroyer in 2005, two each in 2007 

and 2008, and three in 2009. Under the 2006 FYDP, the Navy plans to buy one DD(X) per year 

between 2007 and 2011. It also plans to buy 21 LCSs between 2006 and 2011.

 Attack submarine purchases under the 2006 FYDP would continue at one per year through 2011 

but increase to two per year thereafter.
31

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Submarines Amphibious Ships Support Ships Frigates DDG-51 DD(X) CG-47 LCS Carriers

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-10b

Procurement of Battle Force Ships Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Ships

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 Under the evolutionary alternative, CBO’s projections anticipate a slight increase in battle force 

ships from about 280 today to 290 by 2024. Eventually, however, in the 2030s, the fleet would 

decline to 263 ships.

 The fleet of ballistic missile-carrying submarines would be reduced to 10 under this alternative, and 

the Navy would need to buy only 10 replacement subs in the 2020s and 2030s, compared with 14 

under DoD’s plan.

 The DD(X) and CG(X) programs would be canceled in favor of purchasing more surface 

combatants—a combination of LCSs and upgraded DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers. The 

Navy would buy DDGs at a rate of one per year through 2024.

 The Navy would also purchase one Virginia class attack submarine per year through 2024, for an 

eventual steady-state force of 33 attack submarines.

 The CVN-21 carrier program would be canceled; its replacement would be a large-deck 

conventionally powered aircraft carrier, equivalent in size to today’s existing conventional carriers of 

about 80,000 tons. Under the evolutionary alternative, the Navy would buy the first ship of that class 

in 2012.

 The Navy would also cancel the MPF(F) program and instead buy new cargo ships with sea-basing 

capabilities to modernize the maritime prepositioning squadrons.

 Consistent with the Navy’s current plans, the evolutionary alternative would reduce the number of 

expeditionary strike groups to eight, for a total of 25 amphibious ships. To compensate in part for 

eliminating the MPF(F) ships, the Navy would buy eight replacement LSDs for the LSD-41 and 

LSD-49 classes, which reach the end of their service lives in the 2020s.
32

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Submarines Amphibious Ships Support Ships Frigates DDG-51 DD(X) CG-47 CG(X) LCS Carriers

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-10c

Procurement of Battle Force Ships Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Number of Ships

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 Under CBO’s transformational alternative, the Navy would at first increase the size of its fleet of 

battle force ships from today’s levels and then return to about 280 ships by 2024. The size of the 

fleet would eventually fall to 242 ships in the 2030s.

 As it would under CBO’s evolutionary case, the ballistic missile submarine force under the 

transformational alternative would decline to 10 subs by the 2030s, compared with a force of 14 

today.

 The Navy would buy both the DD(X) and CG(X) in reduced numbers (six and 14, respectively). 

Only 42 LCSs would be purchased under this alternative, compared with 73 under the President’s 

budget plan.

 The attack submarine force would be reduced to 39 in the steady state but would shrink by more 

than that for several years during the 2020s.

 The Navy under this alternative would cancel the CVN-21 carrier program and replace it with a new 

light carrier. However, to project power simultaneously in a larger number of places, the Navy 

would purchase two light carriers for every CVN-21 that was canceled, reaching an eventual fleet 

(in the very long run) of 20 light carriers.

 A smaller MPF(F) squadron would be purchased to provide the Navy with a sea-basing capability. 

In return, the number of amphibious ships in the eight expeditionary strike groups would be reduced 

to 17 under the assumption that the new sea-basing ships would sometimes be operating with the 

amphibious ships. No LSD(X)s would be purchased under the transformational alternative. 
33

Support Ships

Amphibious Ships

Submarines

Frigates

LCS

Destroyers

DDG-51

DD(X)

Cruisers

CG-47

Carriers CG(X)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-11a Updated

Age and Inventory of Battle Force Ships Under DoD’s Current Plans

HalfLife

Years

Number of Ships

 This chart updates Figure 3-11 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average 

age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the chart) of the Navy’s battle 

force ships.

 Beyond 2009, the average age of the Navy’s ship fleet is projected to grow slightly, from 17 years 

to 19 years—which is somewhat older than CBO’s previous projection but within the half-life value 

of 15 to 20 years.
34

Support Ships

Amphibious Ships

Submarines

Frigates

LCS

Destroyers

DDG-51

Cruisers

CG-47

Carriers - Nuclear

Carriers - Conventional

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-11b

Age and Inventory of Battle Force Ships Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Ships

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the 

chart) of the Navy’s battle force ships under CBO’s evolutionary alternative. Throughout the 2012-

2024 projection period, the number of battle force ships would increase slightly, ending at 290 ships 

in 2024. Reductions would follow in later years as older ships were retired without being replaced.

 Under this alternative, the average age of the force would increase through 2024, rising from about 

17 years today to 20 years (the upper end of the half-life range of 15 to 20 years) by 2024.
35

Support Ships

Amphibious Ships

Submarines

Frigates

LCS

Destroyers

DDG-51

DD(X)

Cruisers

CG-47

Carriers CG(X)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Light Carriers

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-11c

Age and Inventory of Battle Force Ships Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Ships

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the 

chart) of the Navy’s battle force ships under CBO’s transformational alternative. Throughout the 

2012-2024 projection period, the number of battle force ships would increase slightly and then 

decline to about 280 ships in 2024. Large reductions would follow in later years as many older 

ships were retired without being replaced.

 Under this alternative, the average age of the force would increase through 2024, rising from about 

17 years today to 21 years—which would exceed the half-life range of 15 to 20 years—by 2024.
36

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-200

-180

-160

-140

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

F/A-18A/B/C/D F/A-18E/F AV-8B F-14A/B/D EA-6B JSF UCAV EA-18G

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-12a Updated

Procurement of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under DoD’s Current Plans

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-12 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and 

projected purchases of fighter and attack aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps under DoD’s

current plans as measured by number of aircraft (the top part of the chart) and billions of 2006 

dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Spending for procurement of tactical fighters for the Navy and Marine Corps will average about 

$3.9 billion a year (without cost risk) during the 2006-2024 period, CBO projects.

 Although in most years of the projection period, spending would be lower than that average, it 

would be substantially higher from 2008 through 2011 because of simultaneous purchases of 

F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft.
37

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-200

-180

-160

-140

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

F/A-18A/B/C/D F/A-18E/F AV-8B F-14A/B/D EA-6B EA-18G

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-12b

Procurement of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

Steady 

State

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of fighter and attack aircraft for the Navy and 

Marine Corps under CBO’s evolutionary alternative as measured by number of aircraft (the top 

part of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Under the evolutionary alternative, DoD would cancel the Joint Strike Fighter program and 

instead continue to buy F/A-18E/F fighters for both Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. That 

change would save about $1 billion annually relative to DoD’s current plans, CBO projects.
38

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-200

-180

-160

-140

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

F/A-18A/B/C/D F/A-18E/F AV-8B F-14A/B/D EA-6B JSF UCAV EA-18G

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-12c

Procurement of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Steady 

State

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of fighter and attack aircraft for the Navy and 

Marine Corps under CBO’s transformational alternative as measured by number of aircraft (the 

top part of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Under the transformational alternative, DoD would curtail the F/A-18E/F program and buy only 

short takeoff/vertical landing versions of the Joint Strike Fighter for use on smaller aircraft 

carriers. Average annual procurement spending for Navy and Marine Corps fighters would be 

$3.2 billion from 2006 through 2024, versus $3.9 billion under current plans.
39

EA-6B

F-14A/B/D

EA-18G

F/A-18A/B/C/D

AV-8B

F/A-18E/F

A-7 JSF

A-4

F-4 UCAV

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

5,500

6,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-13a Updated

Age and Inventory of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under DoD’s Current Plans

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart updates Figure 3-13 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average 

age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the chart) of the Navy’s and 

Marine Corps’s fighter and attack aircraft.

 If DoD’s current plans are carried out, the average age of the Navy’s fighter and attack aircraft 

fleet will remain within the target half-life range of 10 to 15 years throughout the 2006-2024 

projection period.
40

EA-6B

F-14A/B/D

EA-18G

F/A-18A/B/C/D

AV-8B

F/A-18E/F

A-7

A-4

F-4

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

5,500

6,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-13b

Age and Inventory of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Years

HalfLife

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Navy’s and Marine Corps’s fighter and attack aircraft under CBO’s evolutionary 

alternative.

 Under that alternative, DoD would cancel the Joint Strike Fighter program and instead continue 

to buy F/A-18E/F fighters for both Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. Because DoD would 

continue to purchase the F/A-18E/F at the current production rate of 42 aircraft per year, new 

aircraft would enter service more rapidly than under current plans, which call for procuring 43 

JSFs for the Navy and Marine Corps in 2013 and 50 per year beginning in 2014. As a result, the 

average age of Navy and Marine Corps fighters would be slightly less under the evolutionary 

alternative than under DoD’s current plans.
41

EA-6B

F-14A/B/D

EA-18G

F/A-18A/B/C/D

AV-8B

F/A-18E/F

A-7 JSF

A-4

F-4 UCAV

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

5,500

6,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-13c

Age and Inventory of Navy Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Years

Number of Aircraft

HalfLife

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Navy’s and Marine Corps’s fighter and attack aircraft under CBO’s

transformational alternative.

 Under that alternative, DoD would curtail the F/A-18E/F program and instead purchase only short 

takeoff/vertical landing versions of the Joint Strike Fighter for use on smaller aircraft carriers. 

Initially, the JSFs would be produced at annual rates that were lower than those now planned for 

purchases of F/A-18E/Fs. As a consequence, the average age of the Navy’s and Marine Corps’s 

fighters would be slightly greater under the transformational alternative than under DoD’s current 

plans.
42

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

AH-1Z/UH-1Y MV-22 CH-53E CH-53X AH-1W

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-14a Updated

Procurement of Marine Corps Helicopters Under DoD’s Current Plans

Number of Aircraft

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-14 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and 

projected purchases of helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft for the Marine Corps as measured by 

number of helicopters (the top part of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom 

part of the chart).

 Procurement of the V-22 tilt-rotor transport to replace the existing CH-46 helicopter fleet 

accounts for the majority of the funding projected for purchases of Marine Corps helicopters.
43

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120 AH-1Z/UH-1Y New Medium Helicotper MV-22 CH-53E CH-53X AH-1W

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Steady 

State

Figure 3-14b

Procurement of Marine Corps Helicopters Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft for the Marine 

Corps under CBO’s evolutionary alternative as measured by number of helicopters (the top part 

of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Under the evolutionary alternative, DoD would end procurement of the V-22 tilt-rotor transport to 

replace the existing CH-46 helicopter fleet. Instead, it would purchase a new medium-lift 

helicopter and buy additional CH-53X aircraft. 
44

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

AH-1Z/UH-1Y MV-22 CH-53E CH-53X AH-1W

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-14c

Procurement of Marine Corps Helicopters Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Number of Aircraft

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft for the Marine 

Corps under CBO’s transformational alternative as measured by number of helicopters (the top 

part of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 There is no difference between the transformational alternative and DoD’s current plans in terms 

of purchases of Marine Corps helicopters and rotary-wing aircraft. 
45

CH-46E

MV-22

CH-53D CH-53E

CH-53X

AH-1W AH-1Z

UH-1N

UH-1Y

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-15a Updated

Age and Inventory of Marine Corps Helicopters Under DoD’s Current Plans

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart updates Figure 3-15 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average 

age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the chart) of helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft for the Marine Corps.

 Under DoD’s current plans, the average age of the Marine Corps’s helicopter fleet would begin to 

decline rapidly toward the end of the 2006-2011 FYDP period with increased deliveries of rebuilt 

and upgraded utility and attack helicopters and deliveries of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft.

 DoD’s current plans would reduce the planned rate of increase in annual V-22 production to its 

maximum of 43 helicopters a year. That lesser “ramp-up” in production accounts for the smaller 

reduction in average age compared with the reduction in CBO’s September 2004 projection.
46

CH-46E

H-92

CH-53D

CH-53E

CH-53X

AH-1W

AH-1Z UH-1N

UH-1Y

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-15b

Age and Inventory of Marine Corps Helicopters Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft for the Marine Corps under CBO’s evolutionary 

alternative.

 Under that alternative, the average age of the Marine Corps’s helicopter fleet would begin to 

decline somewhat more rapidly than it would under DoD’s current plans. The accelerated decline 

derives from CBO’s assumption that the new medium-lift helicopters that would be purchased 

instead of the V-22 would be procured at higher annual rates than that latter aircraft because 

their unit costs would be less. 
47

CH-46E

MV-22

CH-53D CH-53E

CH-53X

AH-1W AH-1Z

UH-1N

UH-1Y

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-15c

Age and Inventory of Marine Corps Helicopters Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft for the Marine Corps under CBO’s transformational 

alternative.

 There is no difference between purchases of Marine Corps helicopters and rotary-wing aircraft 

under the transformational alternative and under DoD’s current plans. Therefore, inventories and 

average age also do not differ between the two cases.
48

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3.0

3.2

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-700

-600

-500

-400

-300

-200

-100

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

EFV AAV-7 LAV M-1

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Steady

State

Figure 3-16 Updated

Procurement of Marine Corps Ground Combat Vehicles Under DoD’s Current Plans and CBO’s Alternatives

Steady

State

Number of Vehicles

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-16 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and

projected purchases of ground combat vehicles for the Marine Corps under DoD’s current plans

and CBO’s alternatives as measured by number of vehicles (the top part of the chart) and billions

of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Projected purchases of the new Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), which will replace the

existing fleet of amphibious assault vehicles, account for the majority of procurement funding for

the Marine Corps’s ground combat vehicles.

 There are no differences between CBO’s projections of purchases of ground combat vehicles for

the Marine Corps under DoD’s current plans and its corresponding projections for its evolutionary

and transformational cases.
49

M1A1

LAV FLCV

AAV

EFV

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

5,500

6,000

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-17 Updated

Age and Inventory of Marine Corps Ground Combat Vehicles Under DoD’s Current Plans and CBO’s Alternatives

HalfLife

Years

Number of Vehicles

 This chart updates Figure 3-17 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the age (the

top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the chart) of ground combat vehicles for

the Marine Corps under DoD’s current plans and CBO’s alternatives.

 When deliveries of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle begin, the average age of the fleet will

decline, reaching a minimum of about 20 years in 2019, at which time EFV deliveries will end and

the retirement of the current fleet of advanced amphibious assault vehicles will be complete.

 There are no differences between CBO’s projections of purchases of ground combat vehicles for

the Marine Corps under DoD’s current plans and its corresponding projections for its evolutionary

and transformational cases.
50

Figure 3-19a Updated

Past and Projected Spending for Air Force Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Other Procurement

Missiles and Munitions

C4ISR

Missile Defense

Space Systems

Cost Risk

Aircraft Supplemental

CBO's September 2004 Projection

 This chart updates Figure 3-19 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. The 2006 FYDP 

anticipates that Air Force investment will increase from $55 billion in 2006 to $57 billion in 2011.

 CBO projects sustained increases in purchases of new tactical aircraft, reflecting continued 

production of the F/A-22 fighter through 2008 (with production now planned to end three years 

sooner than the 2005 FYDP had specified) and the beginning of production of the Joint Strike 

Fighter in 2008 (one year later than planned under the 2005 FYDP).

 Developments over the past year in the Air Force’s long-term planning for systems such as a 

proposed medium-range bomber and for replacements for a heavy bomber and the KC-135 

tanker, as well as the schedules that DoD anticipates for launching new and replacement satellite 

systems, have led CBO to substantially change its projections for Air Force investment beyond 

2011. As a result of those changes, CBO’s projections now imply a relatively stable average level 

of investment for the Air Force (about $61 billion annually) between 2012 and 2024. 
51

Figure 3-19b

CBO’s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for Air Force Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Evolutionary Case

Transformational Case

Administration Plan

Administration Plan Cost Risk

Evolutionary Case Cost Risk

Transformational Case Cost Risk

 This chart displays CBO’s projections of the implications for investment resources of its

transformational and evolutionary alternatives to the Air Force’s current plans. (The differences in 

content between those alternatives and CBO’s projections of the implications of the 2006 FYDP 

are summarized in Table 5 of CBO’s The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and 

Alternatives: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2006.)

 Under CBO’s projection of the implications of DoD’s current plans, the average annual demand 

for Air Force investment resources (excluding cost risk) would be $60 billion over the period from 

2006 to 2024. That demand with cost risk would average $66 billion annually.

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the average annual demand for Air Force investment 

resources over the 2006-2024 period would be $45 billion. With cost risk, that demand would 

average $48 billion annually.

 Under the transformational alternative, the average annual demand for investment resources 

over the 2006-2024 period would be $56 billion. That demand with cost risk would average $62 

billion annually.
52

0

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-450

-400

-350

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

A-10/OA-10 F/A-22 F-15 F-16 JSF UCAV FB-22

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-20a Updated

Procurement of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under DoD’s Current Plans

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-20 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and 

projected purchases of fighter and attack aircraft for the Air Force as measured by number of 

aircraft (the top part of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the 

chart).

 CBO projects that purchases of tactical aircraft will be within steady-state ranges beginning in 

2014.

 In the chart, funding for the FB-22 represents funding for the system that the Air Force will field 

as an interim long-range strike aircraft before it develops a new long-range bomber. CBO’s

projection incorporates the assumption that the interim system will be a derivative of the F/A-22 

fighter.

 CBO calculated the steady-state ranges displayed in the chart using the assumption that the 

reduction that has occurred in the planned purchases of the F/A-22 implies a comparable 

reduction in the total inventory of air-superiority fighters that the Air Force will sustain in future 

years.
53

0

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-450

-400

-350

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

A-10/OA-10 F/A-22 F-15 F-16 F-16E

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-20b

Procurement of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of fighter and attack aircraft for the Air Force 

under CBO’s evolutionary alternative as measured by number of aircraft (the top part of the 

chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the Air Force would end production of the F/A-22 in 2006, 

cancel the Joint Strike Fighter program, and instead purchase new upgraded versions of the 

F-16. Existing F-15C fighters would be upgraded under a service-life extension program (SLEP). 

Because that SLEP would not reset the lifetime of those planes’ airframes to be equivalent to that 

of a new aircraft, the chart does not reflect the quantities and costs of those SLEPs. 

 Under this alternative, the Air Force would not purchase an interim long-range bomber 

(potentially, a derivative of the F/A-22).
54

0

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-450

-400

-350

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

A-10/OA-10 F/A-22 F-15 F-16 JSF UCAV

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-20c

Procurement of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of fighter and attack aircraft for the Air Force 

under CBO’s transformational alternative as measured by number of aircraft (the top part of the 

chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Under the transformational alternative, the Air Force would end production of the F/A-22 in 2006, 

buy short takeoff/vertical landing versions of the Joint Strike Fighter exclusively, and substitute 

unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) for about 40 percent of its currently planned purchase of 

conventional takeoff JSFs.

 In CBO’s projection, purchases of tactical aircraft would be within steady-state ranges beginning 

in 2016.
55

A-10/OA-10

F-4

A-7

F-101

F-106 F-5

F-105

F-16 JSF

F-15

F/A-22 F-117

UCAV

F-111

FB-22

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

11,000

12,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-21a Updated

Age and Inventory of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under DoD’s Current Plans

Years

Number of Aircraft

HalfLife

 This chart updates Figure 3-21 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average 

age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (bottom part of the chart) of the Air Force’s fighter 

and attack aircraft.

 CBO’s updated projection of the average age of the Air Force’s tactical aircraft shows an 

increase, relative to last year’s estimate, in the fleet’s average age throughout the 2012-2024 

projection period. (The average age would just reach 15 years in 2024, once substantial 

numbers of Joint Strike Fighters had been delivered.) That increase results from the curtailment 

of production of F/A-22 fighters and the delay in production of the JSF described in the notes to 

Chart 3-19a.
56

A-10/OA-10

F-4

A-7

F-101

F-106 F-5

F-105

F-16

F-15

F/A-22 F-117

F-111

F-16E/F

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

11,000

12,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-21b

Age and Inventory of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Air Force’s fighter and attack aircraft under CBO’s evolutionary alternative.

 Under that alternative, the Air Force would terminate the F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter 

programs and instead purchase a new upgraded version of the F-16. Existing F-15Cs would be 

upgraded under a service-life extension program.

 The average age of the Air Force’s fighter fleet would be greater in 2024 (about 19 years) under 

the evolutionary alternative than it would be under the projection of DoD’s current plans (15 

years). That difference arises because CBO’s projections for the evolutionary alternative include 

purchases of the same number of new F-16s as are now planned for the JSF but no purchases 

of new fighters to replace the Air Force’s existing F-15Cs. 
57

A-10/OA-10

F-4

A-7

F-101

F-106 F-5

F-105

F-16 JSF

F-15

F/A-22 F-117

UCAV

F-111

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

11,000

12,000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-21c

Age and Inventory of Air Force Fighter and Attack Aircraft Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Years

Number of Aircraft

HalfLife

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Air Force’s fighter and attack aircraft under CBO’s transformational alternative.

 Under that alternative, the Air Force would curtail purchases of the F/A-22, buy short takeoff/ 

vertical landing versions of the Joint Strike Fighter exclusively, and procure unmanned combat 

air vehicles instead of about 40 percent of the purchases of JSFs that are currently planned. 

 The projected average age of the Air Force’s fighter fleet in 2024 under the transformational 

alternative would be about 18 years, compared with an average age of 15 years under DoD’s

current plans. The reason for the alternative’s higher figure is that CBO assumed that production 

of UCAVs would increase more slowly than JSF production would (because the development of 

UCAVs has progressed less quickly than the development of the JSF). 
58

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

B-1B B-2

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-22a Updated

Procurement of Air Force Bombers Under DoD’s Current Plans

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-22 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and 

projected purchases of bombers for the Air Force as measured by number of aircraft (the top part 

of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 CBO projects that no new long-range bomber will be produced before 2024, although work on its 

development will start in about 2017.
59

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

B-1B B-2 LRSA

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-22b

Procurement of Air Force Bombers Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of bombers for the Air Force under CBO’s

evolutionary alternative as measured by number of aircraft (the top part of the chart) and billions 

of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart)

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the Air Force would not purchase an interim bomber (which 

might have been based on a derivative of the F/A-22 fighter). Instead, in 2014, the Air Force 

would begin developing a new long-range bomber, with production to start in 2023, to replace the 

current fleet of B-52s and B-1s. 
60

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

B-1B B-2

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-22c

Procurement of Air Force Bombers Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of bombers for the Air Force under CBO’s

transformational alternative as measured by number of aircraft (the top part of the chart) and 

billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 There is no difference between bomber procurement under CBO’s projection of DoD’s current 

plans and under its transformational alternative: no new bomber would be produced prior to 

2024, although work on its development would begin in about 2017.
61

B-52

B-1B

B-2

FB-111

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-23a Updated

Age and Inventory of Air Force Bombers Under DoD’s Current Plans

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart updates Figure 3-23 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average 

age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the chart) of bombers for the Air 

Force.

 Because under DoD’s current plans no new bombers would be purchased and no existing

bombers retired, the average age of the fleet would increase steadily throughout the 2012-2024 

projection period.
62

B-52

B-1B

B-2

FB-111

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-23b

Age and Inventory of Air Force Bombers Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of bombers for the Air Force under CBO’s evolutionary alternative.

 Under the alternative, purchases of a new bomber would begin in 2023, but those aircraft would 

not enter the fleet and be operational until after 2024. As a result, the average age of the Air 

Force’s bomber fleet would increase steadily throughout the 2012-2024 projection period.
63

B-52

B-1B

B-2

FB-111

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-23c

Age and Inventory of Air Force Bombers Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of bombers for the Air Force under CBO’s transformational alternative.

 There is no difference between bomber procurement under CBO’s projection of DoD’s current 

plans and under its transformational alternative: no new bomber would be produced before 2024, 

and the average age of the fleet would increase steadily through 2024.

.
64

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-45

-40

-35

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

C-130 C-130J C-17 C-5

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-24 Updated

Procurement of Air Force Airlifters Under DoD’s Current Plans and CBO’s Alternatives

Steady

State

Steady

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-24 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and

projected purchases of airlifters for the Air Force as measured by number of aircraft (the top part

of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 CBO’s projections incorporate the assumption that DoD will end the production of C-17 airlifters

at 180 aircraft and will modernize the entire C-5 fleet by installing new engines.

 There are no differences between CBO’s projections of airlifter procurement under DoD’s current

plans and under its evolutionary and transformational alternatives.
65

C-130

C-130J

C-141

C-17

C-5

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

2,200

2,400

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

CBO's September 2004 Projection

Figure 3-25 Updated

Age and Inventory of Air Force Airlifters Under DoD’s Current Plans and CBO’s Alternatives

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart updates Figure 3-25 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average

age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the chart) of the Air Force’s

airlifters.

 There are no differences between CBO’s projections of airlifter procurement under DoD’s current

plans and under its evolutionary and transformational alternatives.
66

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

KC-10 New Tanker

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Steady 

State

Figure 3-26a Updated

Procurement of Air Force Tankers Under DoD’s Current Plans

Steady 

State

Number of Aircraft

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart updates Figure 3-26 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows past and 

projected purchases of tankers for the Air Force as measured by number of aircraft (the top part 

of the chart) and billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 DoD is currently analyzing alternatives to determine a future course for tanker modernization, 

funds for which are included in the 2006 FYDP beginning in 2008.

 For this projection, CBO assumed that DoD would purchase (not lease) new tankers at a rate 

that would rise to 10 aircraft a year by 2012. Procurement would continue until DoD had replaced 

the fleet of 466 KC-135 tankers that its current plans call for by 2008. 

 CBO’s dollar estimates are based on costs for a fleet of KC-767 tankers. Those projections are 

intended to represent whichever approach the Air Force might select for modernizing its tanker 

fleet. 
67

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

B-1B B-2 LRSA

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-26b

Procurement of Air Force Tankers Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Number of Aircraft

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of tankers for the Air Force under CBO’s

evolutionary alternative as measured by number of aircraft (the top part of the chart) and billions 

of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the remaining KC-135E tankers that had not yet been 

modernized would be equipped with new engines and refurbished to bring them to the KC-135R 

configuration. Procurement of a new tanker would be delayed until 2019. 

 CBO’s dollar estimates are based on costs for a fleet of KC-767 tankers. Those projections are 

intended to represent whichever approach the Air Force might select for modernizing its tanker 

fleet.
68

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

KC-10 New Tanker

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-26c

Procurement of Air Force Tankers Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Number of Aircraft

Steady 

State

Steady 

State

Billions of 2006 Dollars

 This chart shows past and projected purchases of tankers for the Air Force under CBO’s

transformational alternative as measured by number of aircraft (the top part of the chart) and 

billions of 2006 dollars invested (the bottom part of the chart).

 There are no differences between CBO’s projections of tanker modernization procurement under 

DoD’s current plans and under its transformational alternative.
69

KC-10

KC-135

KC-767

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-27a Updated

Age and Inventory of Air Force Tankers Under DoD’s Current Plans

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart updates Figure 3-27 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. It shows the average 

age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of the chart) of the Air Force’s 

tanker fleet.
70

KC-10

KC-135

KC-767

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-27b

Age and Inventory of Air Force Tankers Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Air Force’s tankers under CBO’s evolutionary alternative.

 Because under the evolutionary alternative the Air Force would delay purchasing new tankers 

until 2019, the average age of the tanker fleet would increase steadily until those new tankers 

were delivered, beginning in about 2021. Note also that under this alternative, the remaining KC135E tankers currently in the fleet would not be retired; instead, they would be refurbished to 

bring them to the KC-135R configuration.
71

KC-10

KC-135

KC-767

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Actual FYDP CBO Projection

Figure 3-27c

Age and Inventory of Air Force Tankers Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

HalfLife

Years

Number of Aircraft

 This chart shows the average age (the top part of the chart) and inventories (the bottom part of 

the chart) of the Air Force’s tankers under CBO’s transformational alternative. There are no 

differences between CBO’s projections of the average age and inventories of tankers under

DoD’s current plans and under its transformational alternative.
72

Figure 3-29a Updated

Past and Projected Spending for Defense Agency Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Other

Missile Defense

Cost Risk

Supplemental

CBO's September 2004 Projection

 This chart updates Figure 3-29 of CBO’s September 2004 Web document. DoD’s budget 

provides money for a variety of specialized agencies that perform advanced research, develop 

missile defenses, oversee special operations, and develop and manage information systems.

 The investment funding allocated to those activities in the 2006 FYDP averages about $22 billion 

a year over the period from 2006 to 2011.The majority of the differences between CBO’s

September 2004 and its current projections are associated with two changes to DoD’s previous 

plans that the Defense Department incorporated in the 2006 FYDP:

• In the 2005 FYDP, DoD included about $8 billion to fund unspecified research 

and development projects associated with military transformation. CBO’s 2004

projection incorporated the assumption that that practice would continue, which 

commensurately raised the demand for future resources. However, the 2006 FYDP no 

longer includes that funding, so CBO’s current projection omits it as well.

• In the 2006 FYDP, DoD inserted an accounting credit of about $19 billion into the 

defense agency accounts over the 2006-2011 period. That credit represents the 

difference between the costs of the programs set out in the FYDP and the fiscal controls 

that DoD uses for planning. CBO treated the credit as a source of cost risk during the 

FYDP period because DoD might not be able to adjust its programs to bring its plans into 

line with its assumptions about funding.
73

Figure 3-29b

CBO’s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for Defense Agency Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Evolutionary Case

Transformational Case

Administration Plan

Administration Plan Cost Risk

Evolutionary Case Cost Risk

Transformational Case Cost Risk

 This chart displays CBO’s projections of the resource implications for defense agency investment 

under its transformational and evolutionary alternatives to DoD’s current plans. Under CBO’s

projection of the implications of DoD’s current plans, the average annual demand for defense 

agency investment resources (excluding cost risk) would be $22 billion over the period from 2006 

to 2024. That demand with cost risk would average $25 billion annually.

 Under CBO’s evolutionary alternative, the average annual demand for defense agency 

investment resources over the 2006-2024 period would be $19 billion. With cost risk, that 

demand would average $19 billion annually.

 The average annual demand for defense agency investment resources under CBO’s

transformational alternative does not differ from such demand under CBO’s projection of DoD’s

current plans.

 The differences between CBO’s projections of defense agency investment under DoD’s current 

plans and under CBO’s evolutionary alternative are due primarily to different assumptions made 

in the two cases regarding the future activities that DoD would undertake in developing and 

deploying missile defenses. In particular, under the evolutionary alternative, DoD would deploy 

no additional ground-, sea-, air-, or space-based missile defenses beyond those already 

accomplished. Continuing efforts would be confined solely to research and testing of missile 

defense concepts.
74

Past and Projected Spending for Missile Defense Investment

Figure 3-30a Updated

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Terminal-Phase Missile Defense 

Procurement

Common Systems 

Procurement

Boost-Phase Missile 

Defense Procurement

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

 Midcourse-Phase Missile Defense 

Procurement Cost Risk

CBO's September 2004 Projection

 This chart updates Figure 3-30 of CBO’s September 2004 projection. In CBO’s projection, total 

investment in missile defense peaks in 2013 at about $15 billion and then decreases, as systems 

finish with the procurement phase and become operational. If, however, costs grow as they have 

historically, pursuing the programs included in CBO’s missile defense projection will cost an 

additional $3 billion a year, on average, peaking at about $19 billion in 2013.

 The Missile Defense Agency is working to deploy the Initial Defense Capability (IDC) of the 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. CBO assumes that DoD will subsequently expand 

the IDC, deploying additional interceptors and radars. 

 CBO also assumes that DoD will deploy the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) by 

2017. STSS will support missile defense activities with a nine-satellite constellation of spacebased infrared sensors in low-Earth orbit.

 DoD has begun developing a boost-phase kinetic-energy interceptor system, which CBO 

assumes will be deployed beginning in 2013.

 The airborne laser (ABL) boost-phase system will consist of a high-energy chemical laser 

mounted on a Boeing 747 aircraft. CBO’s projection incorporates the assumption that seven ABL 

aircraft will be purchased through 2017.

 CBO’s projection also includes the assumption that DoD will purchase as planned the Patriot 

Advanced Capability 3 short-range missile defense system as well as eventually procure the 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System. 
75

Figure 3-30b

CBO’s Evolutionary and Transformational Alternatives: Spending for Missile Defense Investment

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

Evolutionary Case

Transformational Case

Administration Plan

Administration Plan Cost Risk

Evolutionary Case Cost Risk

Transformational Case Cost 

 This chart displays CBO’s projections of the resource implications for missile defense investment 

under its transformational and evolutionary alternatives to DoD’s current plans. Under CBO’s

projection of the implications of DoD’s current plans, the average annual demand for missile 

defense investment resources (excluding cost risk) would be $10 billion over the period from 

2006 to 2024. That demand with cost risk would average $13 billion annually.

 Under the evolutionary alternative, the average annual demand for missile defense investment 

resources over the 2006-2024 period would be $3 billion. With cost risk, that demand would 

average $3 billion annually.

 The average annual demand for missile defense investment resources under CBO’s

transformational alternative does not differ from such demand under CBO’s projection of DoD’s

current plans.

 The differences between CBO’s projections of DoD’s current plans for missile defenses and its 

evolutionary alternative are shown in Table 6 of CBO’s The Long-Term Implications of Current 

Defense Plans and Alternatives: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2006. As mentioned in the 

notes to Figure 3-29b, under the evolutionary alternative, DoD would deploy no additional 

ground-, sea-, air-, or space-based missile defenses beyond those already in place. Continuing

efforts would be confined solely to research and testing of missile defense concepts.
76

Figure 3-31a Updated

Procurement Versus Steady-State Levels Under DoD’s Current Plans

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Aircraft

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

C4ISR

Missiles and Munitions

Ground Combat

Ships

Missile Defense

Other Procurement

Supplemental

Steady 

State

 A way to measure the adequacy of planned purchases of military equipment is to compare them 

with steady-state levels (the procurement needed to sustain planned forces indefinitely). CBO 

estimated the annual level of steady-state purchases by dividing a planned inventory of weapon 

systems by the expected service life of those systems. Multiplying those steady-state purchases 

by the estimated unit costs of the various systems that DoD plans to buy yields an overall 

estimate of annual steady-state procurement costs. In making that calculation, CBO used two 

alternative estimates of service lives. One assumes DoD’s current projections for service lives, 

which are generally longer than those planned for during the Cold War. The other uses the 

shorter service lives incorporated in DoD’s Cold War-era planning.

 Using DoD’s estimates for the unit costs of new equipment, CBO estimates that annual steadystate procurement funding for DoD ranges from $114 billion to $143 billion, corresponding to the 

assumption of longer or shorter service lives described above.

 DoD’s planned procurement budgets for the 2006-2011 period are below CBO’s estimates of the 

steady-state procurement costs needed to sustain currently planned forces. That is why the 

average ages of DoD’s equipment generally rise through 2009.

 If current plans were carried out through the 2012-2024 period, procurement would be within the 

steady-state range (between the estimates with long and short service lives), CBO projects. That 

is why average ages for many weapon systems either remain constant or decline after 2012.
77

Figure 3-31b

Procurement Versus Steady-State Levels Under CBO’s Evolutionary Alternative

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

Steady

State

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Aircraft

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

C4ISR

Missiles and Munitions

Ground Combat

Ships

Missile Defense

Other Procurement

Supplemental

 Using its estimates of the unit costs of new equipment, CBO projects that annual steady-state

procurement funding for DoD under the evolutionary alternative will range from $82 billion to

$103 billion, corresponding to the assumption of longer or shorter service lives described above.
78

Figure 3-31c

Procurement Versus Steady-State Levels Under CBO’s Transformational Alternative

Billions of 2006 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority

Steady

State

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024

Aircraft

Actual CBO Projection FYDP

C4ISR

Missiles and Munitions

Ground Combat

Ships

Missile Defense

Other Procurement

Supplemental

 Using its estimates for the unit costs of new equipment, CBO projects that annual steady-state

procurement funding for DoD under the transformational alternative will range from $103 billion to

$133 billion, corresponding to the assumption of longer or shorter service lives described above.
79

AAV: Amphibious Assault Vehicle

ABL: Airborne Laser

C4ISR: command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CBO: Congressional Budget Office

DoD: Department of Defense

ECI: employment cost index

EFV: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

FCS: Future Combat Systems

FUR: Future Utility Rotorcraft

FYDP: Future Years Defense Program

GDP: gross domestic product

HIMARS: High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System

IDC: Initial Defense Capability

JHL: Joint Heavy Lift

JSF: Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix

Acronyms and Abbreviations

LAV: light armored vehicle

LCS: littoral combat ship

LHA(R): Landing Helicopter Assault (Replacement)

LRSA: Long-Range Strike Aircraft

LSD: Landing Ship, Dock

LUH: Light Utility Helicopter

MLRS: Multiple-Launch Rocket System

MPF(F): Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)

O&M: operation and maintenance

O&S: operation and support

SAR: Selected Acquisition Report

SLEP: service-life extension program

STSS: Space Tracking and Surveillance System

TOA: total obligational authority

UCAV: unmanned combat air vehicle