UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1383

CALVIN TYRONE NORTON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY ROSIER, in his individual capacity; CITY OF 

WHITEVILLE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (7:14-cv-00260-BO)

Submitted: November 24, 2015 Decided: January 7, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.

Calvin Tyrone Norton, Appellant Pro Se. Clay Allen Collier, 

CROSSLEY MCINTOSH COLLIER, Wilmington, North Carolina, for 

Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Calvin Tyrone Norton filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action 

against Jeffrey Rosier, Chief of Police of Whiteville, North 

Carolina, and the City of Whiteville (collectively, 

“Defendants”). Norton alleged that Rosier violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by conducting a traffic stop of his vehicle in 

South Carolina, without justification or lawful authorization as 

a certified police officer, and that the City of Whiteville had 

facilitated Rosier’s actions. The district court granted 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the alleged 

encounter with Rosier was so de minimis as to fail to constitute

a constitutional violation; that Norton failed to allege an 

official policy, practice, or custom of Whiteville that would 

permit municipal liability under § 1983; and that it lacked

jurisdiction over Norton’s pendent state law claims. 

On appeal, Norton challenges the dismissal of his § 1983 

claim against Rosier and Whiteville. 

As a threshold matter, we address the jurisdictional issues 

raised by Defendants in their informal brief, which rely on a 

prefiling injunction imposed against Norton in the North 

Carolina state courts. We review questions of law related to 

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Home Buyers Warranty 

Corp. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2014). We find no 

error in the district court’s conclusion that neither the 
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Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine nor the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1738 (2012), deprived the court of authority to decide 

Norton’s claims. See Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 464 (4th 

Cir. 2006) (discussing Rooker-Feldman); Davani v. Va. Dep’t of 

Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Davenport v. 

N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 3 F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing 

Full Faith and Credit Act).

Turning to the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

determination, we review de novo the dismissal of a complaint 

for failure to state a claim, accepting factual allegations in 

the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the nonmoving party. Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t 

v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012). To 

survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555, 570 (2007). 

The temporary detention of an individual during a traffic 

stop, even if only for a limited time or purpose, constitutes a 

Fourth Amendment seizure. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 

 1 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); 

Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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809-10 (1996). Because a routine traffic stop is more like an 

investigative detention than a custodial arrest, we evaluate a 

traffic stop under the test set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1 (1968). United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 207 (2014). Under this inquiry, the 

officer’s decision to stop the vehicle must be both “justified 

at its inception” and adequately “limited both in scope and 

duration.” United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506-07 

(4th Cir. 2011). A police officer is entitled to initiate a 

Terry stop only where it is “supported by a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in 

criminal activity.” United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 

(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In his complaint, Norton alleged that Rosier stopped him 

despite the fact that he was not speeding or violating any law 

at the time of the stop. Moreover, he alleged that Rosier did 

not charge him or warn him that he had violated a law. 

Accepting these allegations as true, as we must on a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion, we conclude that Norton has alleged a violation 

of the Fourth Amendment. See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 506 

(noting that a vehicle stop must be “justified at its inception” 

to satisfy the Fourth Amendment); id. (noting that stopping an 

automobile is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if there is 

a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred). 
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While we have reviewed the alternative arguments Defendants have 

proffered in support of the dismissal of Norton’s Fourth 

Amendment claim, we find them unpersuasive. Thus, we conclude 

that the district court’s dismissal of Norton’s § 1983 claim 

against Rosier must be vacated. 

We find no error, however, in the district court’s 

conclusion that Norton failed to allege an official policy, 

practice, or custom sufficient to state a claim against the City 

of Whiteville. See Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th 

Cir. 1999). Additionally, we note that Norton’s state law 

claims were dismissed solely due to the absence of a cognizable 

federal claim; as we reinstate the federal claim against Rosier, 

dismissal of the pendent state law claims on this basis cannot 

stand. In reinstating Norton’s state law claims, we express no 

opinion as to the merits of these claims or the propriety of 

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them, leaving that 

determination to the district court in the first instance.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment in 

part, insofar as it exercises subject matter jurisdiction over 

the action and dismisses Norton’s § 1983 claim against the City 

of Whiteville; vacate the district court’s judgment in part, 

insofar as it dismisses Norton’s § 1983 claim against Rosier and 

his pendent state law claims; and remand for further 
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proceedings.2 We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

 2 We have reviewed Norton’s supplemental reply briefs but 

find no basis for imposing sanctions against Defendants or their 

counsel.