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27–023 PDF 2007

S. Hrg. 109–793

HURRICANE KATRINA: MANAGING THE CRISIS

AND EVACUATING NEW ORLEANS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 1, 2006

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAVID T. FLANAGAN, General Counsel 

ARTHUR W. ADELBERG, Senior Counsel 

KATHLEEN L. KRANINGER, Professional Staff Member 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

ROBERT F. MUSE, Minority General Counsel 

JOSHUA A. LEVY Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 2

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 14

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 17

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 19

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 21

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 23

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 45

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2006

Hon. C. Ray Nagin, Mayor, City of New Orleans ................................................. 4

Brigadier General Mark A. Graham, Deputy Commanding General, Fifth 

U.S. Army ............................................................................................................. 37

Vincent Pearce, National Response Program Manager, U.S. Department of 

Transportation ...................................................................................................... 40

Dwight David Brashear, Chief Executive Officer, General Manager, Capital 

Area Transit System, Baton Rouge, Louisiana .................................................. 41

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Brashear, Dwight David: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 41

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 92

Graham, Brigadier General Mark A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 37

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 58

Nagin, Hon. C. Ray: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51

Pearce, Vincent: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 40

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 89

APPENDIX 

Post-hearing questions and responses for the Record from: 

Mayor Nagin ..................................................................................................... 98

Three CNN excerpts from television programs on Wednesday night, August 

31, 2005, submitted by Senator Levin ................................................................ 100

Exhibit 7 ................................................................................................................... 102

Exhibit 16 ................................................................................................................. 107

Exhibit 21 ................................................................................................................. 133

(1)

HURRICANE KATRINA: MANAGING THE 

CRISIS AND EVACUATING NEW ORLEANS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2006

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Coleman, Warner, Lieberman, Levin, 

Akaka, Carper, and Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Good 

morning. 

Mayor NAGIN. Good morning. 

Chairman COLLINS. The humanitarian crisis that overwhelmed 

the City of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 

shocked the world and shamed the Nation. The damage came from 

a powerful force of nature, but much of the protracted misery that 

followed was the result of failures across all levels of government. 

Today’s hearing, the Committee’s 14th on Hurricane Katrina, 

will examine the roles, responsibilities, and actions of public officials in preparing for and managing the crisis. We will focus on the 

root causes of failure, including shortfalls in the planning and execution of plans. 

Citizens expected concerted, coordinated leadership. For the most 

part, they got confusion, conflict, and chaos. News photos showed 

the human misery in New Orleans and the surrounding communities. Less obvious was how it might have been mitigated, what 

steps might have been taken to evacuate more people before 

Katrina struck, and to prepare for rescuing those left behind. 

Our first witness this morning is New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, 

the commander-in-chief of the city’s emergency response. He will 

discuss the city’s responsibilities in preparing for and responding to 

Katrina and the adequacy or inadequacy of State and Federal support. I will ask Mayor Nagin about such issues as whether the resources the city devoted to emergency preparedness prior to 

Katrina matched the known risk, whether the city had an effective 

emergency command and control structure, whether plans for prelandfall evacuation of people without vehicles were made and how 

well those plans were understood and carried out, and why the 

2

plans for post-landfall care or evacuation of people left in the city 

were so inadequate and incomplete. 

Our second panel of witnesses consists of public officials who provided support and security to the victims stranded in New Orleans 

and assisted in their eventual evacuation. They represent the Capital Area Transit System of Baton Rouge, the U.S. Army, and the 

U.S. Department of Transportation. Their testimony should help us 

understand the problems of planning, coordination, and communication that compounded the crisis. 

We will also recognize the tremendous efforts of some officials 

and volunteers that produced effective countermeasures to some of 

these problems. 

This crisis displayed failures of leadership, planning, preparation, and execution at all levels of Government. We must take to 

heart the lessons that will better protect our citizens when disaster 

next strikes, as inevitably it will. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Good morning, 

Mayor. 

Mayor NAGIN. Good morning. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for being here. This is our 14th 

hearing, as the Chairman has said, on Hurricane Katrina. I do 

want to say first, Senator Collins and I and other Members of the 

Committee, as you know, Mayor, were in New Orleans and the 

Gulf Coast a couple of weeks ago. Two things really struck us. Last 

time we had been there was a few weeks after the hurricane hit. 

There were large parts of the city that were under water, so we 

could only see them from the air. This time we took the bus right 

around the city. The scope of the devastation is literally unbelievable, and I think we both came back wishing and hoping that every 

Member of Congress will be able to go and see that. I must say 

that those sites and the conversations we had with people in New 

Orleans are in our minds as we go forward with these hearings. 

There is a lot to do to look back at the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We are focused on it with a real 

sense of urgency because we know the hurricane season is coming 

again in June. We want to do everything we can by way of legislative and administrative regulations, that is, regulations to the Executive Branch, to make sure that we are an awful lot better prepared next time. 

We could not help, in speaking to people and interviewing governmental officials, both in Mississippi and in Louisiana, and I 

speak for myself, but I believe I can for Senator Collins in this, 

that we were not satisfied with the Federal Government’s performance in the reconstruction phase. I want to assure you and the people of New Orleans, who I know are grateful for the help that has 

come, but also are restless and to some extent, understandably 

down, that we are working together to make some recommendations about changes that can occur. We want to give more authority 

to decisionmakers for the Federal Government on the ground, to 

give Mr. Powell some more authority, and to do what I think everybody, the President and all Members of Congress want to do with 

3

the billions of dollars that we have appropriated, which is to make 

sure they very quickly go to the rebuilding and return of hope and 

optimism to one of America’s great cities and, of course, a great 

section of our country, the Gulf Coast. 

I want to briefly start with that, in a sense, word of commitment 

and, I hope, hopefulness to you as the Mayor, but through you to 

the citizens of New Orleans. 

Today’s hearing is focused on managing the crisis and particularly the evacuation. We are going to hear from witnesses from all 

levels of government, first, of course, from the Mayor of New Orleans himself. In some ways I think what we are going to hear from 

the Mayor today, what our staff has found, will cause us to ask the 

question of what might have been. What might have been if the 

Mayor’s earlier plans and, if I might say so, demands or questions 

for getting the city ready for a disaster had been acted on? 

The record shows, as our investigation has turned up, that 

Mayor Nagin, elected in 2002, I believe, almost immediately began 

urging officials, both Federal and State, to help New Orleans prepare for a catastrophic hurricane. He asked for help in improving 

the levee system that everyone knew would fail in a catastrophic 

hurricane. He asked for help creating mass evacuation plans to get 

those residents without transportation out of harm’s way. He asked 

for help to improve a faulty communications system. He actually 

began this quest 2 years before the 2004 Hurricane Pam exercise 

so accurately predicted what happened a year later when Katrina 

hit New Orleans. 

Today we are going to learn more about what the Mayor and the 

city government did or did not do to prepare the city for Katrina 

and other catastrophic storms. In some cases it seems to me the 

record shows that work was under way and time just ran out. In 

other cases, good ideas, real questions, and farsighted plans were 

simply never acted upon. 

For instance, as we heard yesterday, there was at least one New 

Orleans city official, Dr. Stephens, who had begun to work on devising a mass pre-storm evacuation plan so as few people as possible would be left behind. Agreements were being negotiated, and 

those negotiations went on, puzzlingly, for almost a year with Amtrak, the Regional Transit Authority, the School Board, and the 

Delta Queen Riverboat Company for pre-storm evacuation, but they 

were not completed when Katrina made landfall. 

Given the Mayor’s longstanding on-the-record belief that an evacuation plan and resources were needed, knowledge that predated 

the Hurricane Pam exercise, we have to ask why did it take so long 

to negotiate those contracts? Why weren’t they signed? Why wasn’t 

the help there when the hurricane struck? 

We have also heard that New Orleans’ budget for emergency preparedness was smaller than some of its neighboring parishes, and 

we want to know if this is true and why. We will also want to know 

why the city’s lead search and rescue agency, the New Orleans Fire 

Department, had no boats and the police department apparently 

had just seven. Also I want to ask is it true, as some have told us, 

that neighboring parishes, obviously with fewer people, had fully 

stocked emergency operation centers that occupied entire buildings, 

while the New Orleans EOC, which the Mayor was forced to try to 

4

1The prepared statement of Mayor Nagin appears in the Appendix on page 51. 

work from until it was no longer occupiable, had just two rooms on 

one floor in City Hall with little equipment prepositioned there. 

Mayor Nagin himself never left the helm during Katrina, but the 

helm itself was inadequate to the crisis. He was left without an office, without communications, without transportation, which obviously made it extremely difficult, if not in some sense impossible, 

for him to exercise the authority that Senator Collins has quite correctly described, commander-in-chief of the emergency response operation for the city. We want to ask could all of that have been 

avoided? 

Madam Chairman, these are just some of the questions that I 

think have to be asked of the Mayor if we are going to fully understand what went wrong during the run-up to and aftermath of 

Katrina and how we, together, can make sure we are totally prepared when and if disaster strikes again. 

Hurricane season is just 4 months away, and we know that nature takes no sabbaticals and time is not our friend. That is why 

this Committee certainly will continue to investigate, educate, and 

then recommend reforms with a sense of urgency that the historic 

record sadly shows was missing in the years, months, and days 

prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Mayor, we welcome you here today. I am going to ask that 

you stand to take the oath, and I would ask all of the other witnesses who will be testifying today to please stand at this time also 

so that I may administer the oath. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

WITNESSES: I do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mayor, please proceed with your 

statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. C. RAY NAGIN,1 MAYOR, CITY OF NEW 

ORLEANS 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am C. Ray Nagin, 

Mayor of one of America’s most unique cities, New Orleans, a city 

that has tragically suffered vast devastation following the worst 

natural and manmade disaster in the history of the United States. 

In August and September 2005, the City of New Orleans was a 

victim of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which not only forced hundreds of thousands of our citizens away from their homes, but took 

the lives of 1,300 people in the region and stole the trust in the 

safety of our city. 

To Senator Collins as Chairman, Senator Lieberman as Ranking 

Member, and to all Members of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to speak directly to you on how we managed this crisis and evacuation of New Orleans. 

I also want to thank those of you who took the time to come, 

those Committee Members or Committee leaders, to New Orleans 

5

to see firsthand the devastation we suffered and are still suffering 

and the determination of our citizens to rebuild their lives in our 

city. I encourage each one of you who have not yet been to New 

Orleans to come see it yourself. It would blow your mind if you 

took the time. 

I would like to take this moment to again thank the American 

people and our friends from around the world for the compassion, 

support, and generosity shown to our city and our residents over 

the last several months. The outpouring from private citizens, governments, and corporations all around the world has been remarkable. 

I begin my testimony, ladies and gentlemen, by painting a picture of New Orleans before Katrina. Our city government was 

transparent and fiscally sound. We had more than $3 billion in construction-related activity going on simultaneously in the city. Our 

real estate market was on fire, and even the infamous Donald 

Trump had just announced the latest Trump Tower in New Orleans that would grace our skyline. 

We also had a starring role as ‘‘Hollywood South’’ of the Nation, 

with hundreds of millions of dollars in films being made in our 

area on an annual basis. Tourism was better than ever, with a 

record 10.1 million visitors coming to our city and thousands of 

people cruising in and out of New Orleans. 

Equally as important, about 38,000 people moved from the poverty rolls, many into new jobs created in 2004 and 2005. New Orleans and its port continues to supply raw goods and our Nation’s energy supply. 

But one day, on August 29, everything changed for this wonderful city. Please allow me this time to walk you through the preparation and evacuation process, along with events that followed the 

landfall of a very dangerous storm, a storm that will go down in 

history for many years to come. 

The Friday before landfall, August 26, 2005, Hurricane Katrina 

crossed Florida into the Gulf of Mexico. Although the path was still 

projected to hit the Florida panhandle, I notified the citizens that 

we needed to watch this storm very closely. I then activated essential staff and asked that each department head begin to prepare 

their staffs for a possible evacuation, with some to stay to provide 

necessary services during and after the storm if it came our way. 

I also worked with regional and State officials to enact our emergency plans and contra-flow to prepare what would turn out to be 

the most successful pre-event evacuation in our country’s history. 

On Saturday, August 27, the models, the forecast models started 

to converge, showing the path of the Category 3 storm had changed 

and placing New Orleans in the middle of the projected cone. 

I called for a voluntary evacuation, urging all citizens that were 

able to evacuate the city to leave, following the contra-flow plan 

created by the State of Louisiana and implemented on a parish-byparish basis. This was very critical because we had to make sure 

that the lower-lying parishes evacuated first in order that we 

would not have the kind of gridlock that you saw in Texas when 

they were trying to evacuate for Hurricane Rita. I reminded citizens of how important it was to prepare for the worst. Many New 

6

Orleanians boarded up their homes, packed up, and got on the road 

to safety. 

Our region had one of the most successful mass evacuations in 

the history of the United States. Over 90 percent of our residents 

evacuated. Over 1 million people left the region within 24 hours. 

We were successful in saving thousands of lives and avoiding the 

horrors of the Pam exercise. 

On Saturday evening, the Governor called me to tell me that she 

had just spoken to Max Mayfield with the National Weather Center and that I should call him. After calling him, he told me that 

in his over 30 years experience in tracking hurricanes, he had 

never seen a storm like this. He had never seen conditions like 

this. 

I immediately called my staff and visited every television station 

in the city to further alert the citizens and to reinforce the need 

for evacuation. 

To provide a safety net to seniors and other citizens who relied 

upon public transportation, I took another very important step by 

encouraging our faith-based communities to reinforce evacuation 

through buddy systems within their community. I encouraged them 

to contact the individuals in their congregations and in their neighborhoods around their churches to make sure that they had an 

evacuation plan and they could implement it and, if they needed 

help, to provide it. 

On Saturday night, the National Weather Service reported that 

Katrina was now a Category 5 hurricane and was approximately 

250 miles away from New Orleans with 190 mile-per-hour sustained winds. Katrina had increased in size within hours and had 

a predicted storm surge of at least 15 or 20 feet. 

After a Sunday morning statewide conference call, I elevated my 

prior calls for voluntary evacuation to the first ever mandatory 

evacuation order in the history of the City of New Orleans. We 

evacuated as many special needs residents as we safely could to a 

State shelter and then opened the Louisiana Superdome for the remaining special needs population. Later that day, we opened the 

Superdome as a refuge of last resort for all citizens who had not 

or could not evacuate the city and used buses, prestaged throughout the city, to transport those individuals to the Superdome. I set 

a curfew for dusk, which is when we expected gale force winds to 

begin. 

There were thousands of residents that did not leave, including 

those with means, who chose instead to ride out the storm like 

their parents had done during Hurricane Betsy. When reality set 

in for many on Sunday, they made their way to the shelter of last 

resort. 

On Monday, August 29, 2005, Katrina, the most powerful Category 4 hurricane to hit the region, made landfall. We began to receive reports of levees breaking. Water rose as high as 18 feet, with 

80 percent of our city receiving some levels of flooding. This is over 

61 square miles of our city was impacted. That would cover the entire DC region and would cover the entire Manhattan region. 

Thousands of people were stranded on their rooftops or in attics 

needing to be rescued. Hundreds died in the waters that engulfed 

our city. The fact that thousands did not die was a blessing because 

7

all scientific predictions estimated that at least 10,000 people 

would die. Primary and secondary power sources, sewer and drainage systems, and communications and power lines were incapacitated. 

Later that evening, we provided FEMA with a priority list identifying commodity and equipment needs and a strategy for the initial 

phases for rescue, recovery, and rebuild. Marty Bahamonde, the 

FEMA senior representative, told me after that meeting that he 

had never seen a public official prepare such a concise plan, and 

it was one of the best plans he had seen in such a short period of 

time with a disaster of this sort. 

In other parts of the city, our first responders were jumping into 

water to rescue people, as 911 operators were consumed with traumatic calls for rescues. They received thousands upon thousands of 

frantic and desperate calls. I ordered all resources to focus on rescue efforts. 

As the days passed, the growing number of people in our streets 

needing shelter required us to open the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center as a second refuge. There were no other options that 

we could see at that point in time. The Convention Center was the 

only facility that was available, that had the square footage, and 

that was high and dry in order for us to put people that were being 

rescued, not only from New Orleans, but from the surrounding parishes. The 350 buses promised by FEMA on Monday still had not 

come. 

The strain on our limited resources intensified as people desperate for necessities and others taking advantage of the unstable 

situation caused a serious security problem. Fires were breaking 

out in the city, and firefighters had very little means to contain 

them. The lack of utilities and communications crippled our city 

and our efforts. 

We faced a serious set of new challenges daily, and even hourly. 

We faced them head on, ready to do whatever it took to save our 

city. I directed our team on a number of occasions to stay focused 

on a couple of key priorities. First, search and rescue of people who 

were trapped and stranded; second, figure out ways to evacuate ultimately the Superdome and the Convention Center and individuals that were being dropped off on bridges as helicopters were rescuing them; third, patching of the levee breach, which at that time 

was still flooding and pumping water into our city; and fourth, 

draining the floodwaters once we stabilized that; and then fifth, recovery of dead bodies. We were getting reports on a daily basis. I 

personally saw dead bodies in the waters, so we knew we had to 

handle those bodies in a respectful manner, and that was one of 

the things we wanted to focus on. 

Every day requests were made to State and Federal authorities 

for emergency assistance needed to save lives and restore order. 

We requested search and rescue assistance, buses for evacuations, 

assistance in patching the levees, food, water, medical supplies, police and fire equipment, and pumps to drain water. 

I don’t know if I can convey the desperation, but I was looking 

at my city, with thousands of people who were on the streets or on 

bridges or in the water, in the Superdome, at the Convention Center, people from the lowest-lying parts of the region being dropped 

8

off in our city from other parishes. We were in the most desperate 

need for assistance. 

On Wednesday, the situation in the Superdome was tenuous at 

best, and no food or water had yet arrived at the Convention Center. Rescue efforts by air were only beginning to get under way because communications channels were down and inconsistent. We 

found creative ways to communicate via text messaging to a communications staff person in Houston. We were trying to get a message to anyone we thought that could get the buses we needed to 

evacuate people. 

Little help had arrived as the day turned to night, and you could 

feel the heaviness in the aftermath. Imagine the nights, pitch 

black, no power, intense heat, and people crying out for help. It 

was a horrible, horrendous situation, and Wednesday night was 

definitely touch and go for the city. 

On Thursday, conditions continued to deteriorate. I received 

word from the National Guard and the New Orleans Police that the 

suffering in the Superdome and the Convention Center was becoming inhumane. There was increasing pressure to leave the buildings, and incidents of violence were escalating. As the days passed, 

I sent out more urgent pleas for help. 

Finally, on Friday afternoon we began to see passengers loading 

into buses. Late Friday night, I watched the last bus leave the Convention Center. Saturday, the final bus left the Superdome. Many 

people had been there in those locations for 7 full days. 

I should point out that at the Superdome, the New Orleans Police Department and the National Guard, a small contingency of 

National Guard, held security intact. That Guard unit and those officers are heroes. People could not leave the Superdome as it was 

surrounded by water and there were no buses. The rations were 

stretched. There was no power and sanitation. Good people suffered 

needlessly. 

In the end, it was a horrible lesson, but one that I am hopeful 

we will learn from. By far, most of the people showed tremendous 

compassion to their fellow man, and heroism existed in the waters, 

at the Superdome, at the Convention Center, on the bridges, and 

on the streets. 

Since the storm, we have been a financially crippled municipality, struggling to bring our city back. Hurricane Katrina, like 

September 11 and other disasters before, has taught us that improvements in planning for disasters must be made at all levels of 

government. Our plans for the future include enhanced evacuation 

routes, staging necessary resources out of the city, and not being 

as dependent on the rescue efforts of other levels of government. 

This storm has challenged us, and we are responding. 

Consideration must also be given to the financial resources that 

should be available for jurisdictions that experience this type of 

major disaster. I urge this Committee, as you are doing these deliberations, to take a closer look at the Stafford Act. Our first responders and essential personnel worked primarily around the 

clock, responding to emergencies, yet under the Stafford Act, assistance is provided for only the overtime component of this very critical work. Then I was forced to drastically, radically, cut our budget and lay off over 50 percent of our workforce when our constituVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
9

ents need the services that these hard-working public servants provide more than ever. This is another effect of the inadequacies of 

the Stafford Act, which only allow for a loan of up to 25 percent 

of lost revenue, regardless of the severity of the need. The Stafford 

Act should be amended to address these and other issues. 

As I conclude, I need to recognize our emergency response team 

led by Colonel Terry Ebbert, my Director of Homeland Security, 

who appeared before you earlier this week. Their work has gone 

largely unnoticed. Despite tremendous personal loss, police officers, 

firefighters, National Guard, EMS workers, my personal staff, or 

my executive staff, as well as other city workers, experienced horrific tragedy and stayed true to their tasks. They are all our heroes. 

I want to once again thank you for allowing me to be here with 

you todayand for your work to ensure that we, as a Nation, are better prepared to respond to future disasters like Hurricane Katrina 

and beyond. My hope is that our collective work to rebuild New Orleans and its region and the Gulf Coast will provide a model of how 

a Nation restores one of its jewels, 

Thank you very much 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Mayor, you decided on Saturday morning, August 27, to 

issue a mandatory evacuation order, but the order was not actually 

issued until almost 24 hours later on Sunday morning. These 24 

hours were critical. During that time, people with the means to do 

so left the city, but those who were left behind faced dramatically 

fewer options once people with cars had left. The evidence suggests 

to me that the delay between when you made the decision and 

when the order was actually issued was caused by your staff debating such issues as whether nursing homes and hotels and hospitals 

should be included, how the order should be enforced, and other 

pretty fundamental issues. 

My question is this: Shouldn’t those kinds of questions have been 

worked out in advance? Shouldn’t your emergency operations team 

have already prepared a mandatory evacuation order, worked 

through the legal issues, so that once you made the decision, it 

would be issued without delay and without the need for further research? 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Let me just point 

out a couple of really key points that I would like the Committee 

to also understand as they try to evaluate this mandatory evacuation order. First off, we had earlier issued a plea to our faithbased community to do a buddy system, and we felt as though we 

had gotten a significant number of people out of the city, including 

the individuals that may or may not have had the necessary transportation to get out. And then as further clarification, I spoke with 

Max Mayfield on Saturday afternoon or evening; it was probably 

about 7:30 or 8 o’clock in the evening, and that is when I made the 

final decision and called my city attorney to get her to finalize the 

mandatory evacuation for the next morning. 

Prior to that, I had already asked her to look at all the legalese 

and to prepare a draft mandatory evacuation, which she had done. 

The only thing that we wanted to make sure of, as we issued this 

mandatory evacuation, was not only that we had the legal authority to do it, but that we also did not create any other problems with 

10

a mass evacuation of the hospitals because we felt as though a lot 

of patients would not be able to get the proper care to be transported where they needed to go. 

And then finally, Madam Chairman, in order to do an effective 

evacuation in the City of New Orleans, we have to take into account the region’s needs, and everything we do as it relates to evacuation is coordinated with the State and with the other parishes. 

And that morning at the 5 a.m. conference call on Sunday morning, 

we told everybody what we were getting ready to do so that they 

could coordinate and make sure that the lower parishes knew exactly what we were getting ready to do, so that they could make 

sure that if they had anyone else to evacuate, they could get them 

out quickly. 

Chairman COLLINS. But time was lost, critical time, deciding 

issues like whether or not nursing homes should be covered. We 

heard testimony about that. Would it not have been better to have 

resolved those kinds of issues about the coverage, who was exempt, 

how it would be applied, prior to the storm as part of the planning 

process? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, Madam Chairman, we tried to cover all of 

those issues, but this was a real-time, real-life situation that had 

never happened before in the history of the City of New Orleans. 

We made the decision based upon the information that I got from 

Max Mayfield, which was Saturday night, and just like this Nation 

has made adjustments after September 11, we will make the proper adjustments going forward. 

Chairman COLLINS. Just before leaving that issue, I want to 

point out that in an interview with your staff, your staff said, ‘‘The 

Mayor said it in the Saturday morning meeting, make it happen 

Saturday morning. He said, if there is any way to make this happen, the mandatory evacuation order, make it happen. I don’t care 

what you have to do. Make it happen.’’

Mayor NAGIN. Right. 

Chairman COLLINS. That was Saturday morning, not Saturday 

afternoon. 

Yesterday we heard extremely troubling testimony that the evacuation of nursing homes was simply not a priority for the city or 

for the State, and the reason, offered by the witness, was that 

nursing homes were required by law to have evacuation plans. Yet, 

the evidence is very clear that many nursing homes did not evacuate their frail, ill patients and that they pleaded for help over and 

over again from the city and from the State. Search and rescue efforts were haphazard and uncoordinated, and the result was the 

needless and tragic deaths of dozens of these nursing home patients. 

When it became evident to you that the nursing homes had not 

evacuated and when you got these reports of the pleas for help, 

what actions did you take? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, Madam Chairman, we had requests for evacuation and support from a lot of different individuals throughout 

the city. I can only speak for the City of New Orleans. I cannot 

speak for the rest of the State. But if we had someone to request 

from a nursing home that they needed the support, we tried to 

prioritize that based upon the information that we were getting 

11

1 Exhibit 21 appears in the Appendix on page 133. 

and the available resources that we had, and we tried to get to 

those individuals as quickly as we could. 

Chairman COLLINS. Did you ask city workers to check on all the 

nursing homes? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, prior to the actual storm hitting, Madam 

Chairman, we had all of our police officers comb the city. And they 

went out with their lights on, and they went throughout all of the 

neighborhoods in the city to make sure that people understood that 

we were moving toward a mandatory evacuation. They visited 

nursing homes and hospitals and various institutions throughout 

the city to try to help them to make sure that they had what they 

needed to evacuate. 

Chairman COLLINS. But that is prior to it becoming evident that 

the nursing homes had not evacuated, that their patients were in 

grave danger. Did you call the Louisiana National Guard to come 

help? What did you do when you started getting those pleas for 

help? 

Mayor NAGIN. We were calling everyone, Madam Chairman. We 

even had some prestaged boats at the National Guard’s offices, and 

we had at least 30 or 40 boats prestaged, and after the event, we 

only had seven or eight that were available to us. So we started 

to make calls to the State and to the Federal Government to try 

to get more resources to deal with not only the nursing homes, but 

the individuals that were on roofs and in their attics. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Thanks, Mayor. In my opening statement, I referred to a letter 

that our staff came across dated October 1, 2002. It is in your book 

as Exhibit 21.1 It is a follow up to a meeting that our colleague 

Senator Landrieu apparently called after Hurricane Isadora hit 

New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. It is just another piece of evidence that people in the region really were on notice and lived with 

the fear of the big one coming. What is really striking in this letter 

is your response to Senator Landrieu after that meeting—I assume 

you wrote to other members of the congressional delegation—about 

what was needed. It goes right to some of the things that we saw: 

The communications systems were not compatible, more pumping 

stations, electric generators, emergency communications and technology systems must be approved. You asked for money to do that. 

Hospital generators must be elevated above basement level. We 

talked about that yesterday. A light rail system is needed to evacuate New Orleans residents, and a shelter of last resort is critical 

for safety of the residents of the Southeast Louisiana region. 

As we look back at it, as I said earlier, it is this question of what 

might have been. One of the ‘‘what might have beens’’ we heard 

yesterday was from Dr. Stephens of the Health Department, where 

he took it upon himself to start negotiating for transportation assets to move people out of harm’s way before a hurricane hit. Did 

that, Mayor, ever reach you? Were you aware of his efforts? It is 

frustrating to look at it now because it looks like he was negotiating for more than a year, had agreements, and they never came 

into being. 

12

Mayor NAGIN. Right. Those negotiations were started by the previous head of our EOC, which was Chief Tullier, and he resigned, 

and there was an interim period or a period of time when we were 

searching for his replacement. During that search, Dr. Stephens 

got involved and talked to a lot of different entities. And then right 

before, a couple of months before the storm, Chief Mathews was 

hired as being the head. 

But getting directly to your point, we tried to do some memorandums of understanding with various entities, whether they be the 

Regional Transit Authority or the School Board or some paddlewheel boats——

Senator LIEBERMAN. And again, these were for transportation assets, hopefully to move people out who otherwise couldn’t get out 

before a hurricane. 

Mayor NAGIN. Absolutely. We were trying to make sure that we 

had every tool available in our tool box that we felt we needed in 

the event of an emergency. Those agreements never got done for 

a lot of different reasons. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. When you look back—I don’t have a lot of 

time—why do you think that happened? Why didn’t they get done 

so the resources were there? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, I think, putting together those types of 

agreements is a little complex in our particular area. RTA, the Regional Transit Authority, we really did not need as a formal agreement as much because I appoint all of those board members and 

we have direct control over those resources. The School Board is a 

little different matter, and it’s a little more complicated from the 

standpoint that the system was in crisis. They had lots of administrative challenges, and it was next to impossible to confect any type 

of agreement with that agency. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. A lot of reasons, but, obviously, you wished 

the agreements had been signed prior to the hurricane. 

Let me ask you this factual question. On the day of landfall, 

when did you learn, to the best of your recollection, that the levees 

had broken? Because, obviously, that took this from being a hurricane to being a disaster. 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, it was sometime Monday after the storm had 

hit. The gentleman from FEMA, Marty, came to see us. We were 

waiting for the winds to die down so we could go up. He had already flown up. He then gave us a very graphic report that the levees had failed in the Lower 9th Ward at the Florida Avenue Canal, 

and there were some other breaches. But at that time, I don’t recall 

that the 17th Street nor the London Avenue Canal had breached 

at that time. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What did you do upon receiving that information? Did you attempt yourself to communicate that to Federal 

officials? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. We started the process immediately as we 

would get information. Marty was also communicating up the Federal lines. We wanted to make sure that State officials understood, 

and more importantly, we were really focused on the rescue efforts, 

if there were people that were down in the Lower 9th Ward that 

had problems, how do we get to them quickly? 

13

1 Exhibit 16 appears in the Appendix on page 107. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. One of the questions that we are 

going to be looking at is what kind of support and capabilities the 

Department of Defense can provide in a crisis like this and what 

you were looking for. I gather that after landfall both the Governor 

and yourself had been making requests for involvement by the National Guard and the military generally; is that correct? 

Mayor NAGIN. That is correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And National Guard troops came into Louisiana and New Orleans from around the country, but that does not 

begin until Wednesday. That said, according to testimony that we 

have from your Communications Director, which is in Exhibit 16,1

you continue to see a need for additional capabilities from the Federal Government as the week went on. 

I presume it was one of the things that led to your meeting with 

the President and the Governor on Friday, September 2. I just 

want to ask you a series of questions about those meetings. Prior 

to that meeting on September 2, had you and the Governor reached 

some kind of agreement about what assets and capabilities you 

were going to seek from President Bush? 

Mayor NAGIN. As far as an agreement, well, it was basically a 

discussion of and a focus on the amount of Federal resources we 

needed to continue the rescue efforts and the dewatering efforts. 

That was the primary focus. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. At that meeting, did you ask specifically for 

anything from the Department of Defense, to the best of your recollection? 

Mayor NAGIN. I was specifically asking for a clear chain of command as it related to who had final authority so that we could get 

things moving much quicker. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You mean for the Federal Government generally in New Orleans? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. In response—because at that point you felt 

that there was not a clear chain of command. 

Mayor NAGIN. I felt as though—and I think I described it in this 

manner at that meeting—that there was an incredible dance going 

on between the Federal Government and the State Government on 

who had final authority, and it was impeding, in my humble opinion, the recovery efforts, and it was very frustrating. I suggested 

that they put General Honore ́ in control for a period of time. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right, National Guard. 

Mayor NAGIN. They would just coordinate every resource that 

was available to expedite the needs that we had. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Was a decision made at that meeting with 

the President and the Governor? 

Mayor NAGIN. No. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you recall any conversation at the meeting with President Bush and Governor Blanco on Friday, September 2, about the need to invoke on the Insurrection Act or any 

attempt or discussion of a possible decision by the President to 

place the Louisiana National Guard under the control of the Department of Defense? 

14

Mayor NAGIN. I was not privy to those particular discussions. I 

do remember a discussion about posse comitatus, and there was 

some talk about that, about what could and could not be done. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Did the principals at the meeting—just to 

wind it up—come to a conclusion, as you recall it, about what assistance the Federal Government would provide that it was not 

providing up until that point on Friday, September 2? 

Mayor NAGIN. To be real frank with you, that meeting left me 

somewhat disappointed. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. In what way? 

Mayor NAGIN. Because there was no real decision that was made 

at that meeting, and I think there was a 24-hour period where the 

President and the Governor were going to get back together. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And that was about the question of whether 

the National Guard would be federalized? 

Mayor NAGIN. It was just a question of who had final authority. 

I am not sure the details of what they were debating. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And so at that point you felt that held up 

a clear decision about other questions regarding Federal authority? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. I was hoping that—we had everyone in the 

room that was decisionmakers——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. Well, you had the President, the Governor, and yourself. 

Mayor NAGIN [continuing]. That could make a decision at that 

meeting and move forward. I was very—I probably was a bit pushy 

at that meeting because in the midst of all the rhetoric that was 

going on around the table, I stopped everyone and basically said, 

‘‘Mr. President, Madam Governor, if the two of you don’t get together on this issue, more people are going to die in this city, and 

you need to resolve this immediately.’’ And they said, ‘‘Yes.’’ And 

I said, ‘‘Well, everybody else in this room, let’s leave and let them 

work this out right now.’’

Senator LIEBERMAN. And the two of them then stayed alone in 

the room? 

Mayor NAGIN. No. The President said, ‘‘Nobody has to leave. 

We’ll go in another room and see if we can work this out.’’

Senator LIEBERMAN. So the Governor and the President did go in 

the other room and continued discussions. 

Mayor NAGIN. They went in a private room. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time is really up, but just a final word. 

So it went at least 24 hours. When do you think you got the clarity 

of decision that you were looking for from the Federal Government? 

Mayor NAGIN. It was sometime around the 24-hour mark. I think 

they, obviously, must have come to grips with Admiral Allen as 

being the key person, and he showed up, and that was history. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Mayor, good to have you here. Let me start off first just reflecting on the Stafford Act. Clearly, we need to take a look at that. 

I had a chance to be in New Orleans recently with the Chairman, 

the Ranking Member, and a couple of my colleagues, and there is 

15

a lot of work to be done, and you have to have people doing it. So 

I hope that we take a look at that. 

Let me express one of my concerns. As I watch this, one of my 

concerns is about where we go in the future; that as a result of 

what looked like inaction at the local level, there is a lot of talk 

now about needing the Federal authorities to come any time there 

is a major crisis and take care of this. The reality is that those who 

are closest to things on the ground, I think, have to be very much 

involved, if anything, directing, saying, ‘‘Hey, we need it,’’ and then 

get it delivered. 

But I worry, as an offshoot of a perception that folks on the 

ground were not in charge and were not making things happen, 

that there will be a move to change this, and I think we have to 

reflect on that. 

One of the other things that has come up in these discussions 

and hearings has been a lot of finger pointing as to who was in 

charge. We had Levee Board folks here and the State folks here 

and the Corps of Engineers here, and I have to tell you, everyone 

was pointing every different way as to, well, ‘‘It was their responsibility.’’

Let me step back a little bit to discuss your communication abilities on Tuesday after we know the levees had broken, disaster has 

totally hit way beyond the hurricane. Can you talk about where 

you were operating out of and what kind of communication capacity did you have on that Tuesday? 

Mayor NAGIN. I was operating pretty much out of our EOC office 

at City Hall, but more directly across the street in the Hyatt Regency Hotel. We had an office that we had occupied, along with our 

utility company, as well as the military was in and out of there on 

a regular basis. It was a convenient location from the standpoint 

that we had access to the Superdome and to the heliport. 

Senator COLEMAN. To be very blunt, the perception was that you 

were up there, kind of the last man going down with the ship, but 

not coordinating, not in touch, not really being in charge, but kind 

of trying to hold things together as it was falling apart. Did you 

have adequate communication linkages and equipment to get done 

what you thought had to be done? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, I think that’s what’s being missed in this 

whole discussion. You had a city that was totally devastated. Nothing like this has ever happened. When you look at what happened 

in September 11, it was a couple of square blocks in New York. 

This was totally different. All communications networks were pretty much failing, if not intermittent, and the only way we had to 

communicate was the old-fashioned way, to meet with people faceto-face, to send text messages. The cell phone system was inoperable. The phone system was down for the most part. So that perception was due to—or was contributed to because of the severity 

of the conditions. 

Senator COLEMAN. So I would take it that it would be your hope, 

as we come out of these hearings, that we address the issue of communication. Is there something today that you would have done—

would you have placed yourself somewhere different? Would you 

have put yourself in a position to be more of a visible force, even 

16

if you couldn’t be doing much, just physically out there? Would you 

change? 

Mayor NAGIN. I probably would change a few things, but I 

wouldn’t change much from this perspective. I made the decision 

very early that I was going to stay with the people that were suffering, and I was going to be a part of that, and I really didn’t care 

about the political consequences, if you will, because I felt I had to 

feel exactly what those individuals were feeling in order to have 

the sense of urgency to make sure that change was happening as 

quickly as it was. So I didn’t spend a whole lot of time trying to 

keep up with everybody doing these multiple press conferences that 

were going on all the time. I stayed focused on the needs of the 

people that were hurting. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would offer, respectfully, as a former mayor, 

that sometimes it is one thing to understand and to feel what folks 

are feeling, and it is another thing to be out there projecting, ‘‘I am 

in charge, someone is in charge. We’re going to take care of this,’’ 

and kind of lifting up. And in the end, lifting up the sense of those 

who are suffering, and at least from the outside, the perception was 

that you were doing that, that you were right there feeling what 

people were feeling, but as a result it seemed like there was a void 

at the local level, and it did not seem like there was then anyone 

at the State level filling that need, or the Federal. I mean it 

seemed like every level of government did not do all that folks 

hoped they would do in what admittedly are circumstances that, 

unless others could be there, you could not imagine, because I came 

there 4 months later, and it is still hard for me to imagine. But 

that’s just perception. 

I offer that and I would hope in the future for others in this that 

people reflect on that, but then have the tools that you did not 

have, the ability to communicate. We have not heard much about 

it. We have talked about it here. I just think it is absolutely critical, and that we are not leaving people isolated any more in crises 

like this. 

Mayor NAGIN. Mr. Coleman, I appreciate those comments, but I 

will tell you, I have a huge box of satellite cell phones that did not 

work during this crisis. We tried just about everything possible. At 

the end of the day, I am more comfortable with the fact that by 

staying and doing the things that I did, we saved lives versus perceptions. 

Senator COLEMAN. Just a last question then on this issue of responsibility, State, Federal, if we were to be in this position again, 

if there were three things that you would change in regard to 

knowing who is in charge, just click them off, one, two, three, 

something more clear from the feds, something more clear from the 

State, something perhaps you need that you did not have? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, I don’t know if I can click off any three 

things, but I just think that there needs to be a clearer chain of 

command that does not necessarily violate local input because 

when you’re local you understand the needs much better than anyone else. But I think with that type of disaster, being overwhelmed 

by a hurricane, there needed to be more resources that came much 

quicker and not necessarily a dance on whether State or Federal 

authority rules. I mean that is just ridiculous to me. 

17

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mayor Nagin, welcome to the Committee. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. I know you are still in the middle of a massive 

recovery effort in New Orleans. I want you to know that many of 

my constituents in Hawaii have written to me with deep concern 

about New Orleans and the people there. I want you to know also 

that our prayers have been with you and are still with you. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Although we are here to examine your role in 

the Hurricane Katrina response, I would like to discuss with you 

the ongoing recovery and reconstruction activities going on there. 

Through these hearings, I have been concerned by numerous reports that New Orleans is not receiving adequate assistance for reconstruction and preparation for future emergency response. 

What are your top three needs that have not been met by the 

Federal Government? 

Mayor NAGIN. Top three needs. The first one is temporary housing. We have a request for—depending upon who you talk to—

45,000 to 65,000 temporary homes, whether they be travel trailers 

or what-have-you. We have only been able to deliver less than 

2,000 travel trailers to date. That is probably one of the most frustrating things right now because we are having a very difficult 

time standing up our economy, and we are having a very difficult 

time getting our people back. 

The amount of travel trailers that can be installed on a daily or 

weekly basis will probably take us 6 months to a year before we 

can catch up. I don’t understand it. You would think that this great 

country could bring contractors from around the country, around 

the world for that matter if they don’t have them around the country, to expedite and get this job done. So that’s the first thing. 

The second thing I will tell you is that we are in limbo and on 

hold as it relates to how individuals go in and repair their homes 

permanently. We do not have a Baker-type bill, which has been 

widely debated and now is not something that is going to be supported by the White House, which I understand. We do not have 

enough direct funding to go to an individual that did everything 

right, bought their home, lived above the floodplain, did not have 

to buy flood insurance, didn’t buy flood insurance, and now the insurance company is basically saying this was a flood event and not 

a wind event, so therefore, you get zero. So we have lots of individuals that can’t move back because they don’t have the financial resources to accomplish that. So the lack of resources from that 

standpoint would be my second big point. 

My third point would primarily deal with the business aspects of 

the economy. New Orleans is an incredibly important center for 

this Nation and the State. We produce most of the seafood for the 

Nation, oil and gas. You name it, we do it, raw materials coming 

into the city. We do not have the resources for small businesses to 

get started up, whether they be fishermen, or whether they be peoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
18

ple that support oil and gas. The GO Zone legislation was a great 

piece of legislation, but it targeted big businesses, and the small 

businesses do not have the support that they need right now. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for that response. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Prior to Hurricane Katrina hitting New Orleans, 

did you request any transportation resources from the Federal Government? 

Mayor NAGIN. We have been making requests all along for support for light rail systems, enhancements to the transportation systems that we have in place. I had someone in my office contact Amtrak also prior to Katrina to see exactly if they had trains available 

so we could use those as another evacuation tool. What we got back 

was all of the trains were booked through September and we didn’t 

have anything available. Then earlier than right before Katrina, we 

talked to Amtrak, and they said that basically they could only 

bring individuals to Hammond, which is not that far away from 

New Orleans, and that wouldn’t be sufficient for evacuation purposes. 

Senator AKAKA. Mayor Nagin, you testified that after reviewing 

the priority list compiled by Under Secretary Brown on August 29, 

Marty Bahamonde, the first FEMA representative on the ground in 

New Orleans, stated, ‘‘This is one of the best plans I have ever seen 

presented by a city after a disaster.’’

However, when Mr. Bahamonde testified before this Committee 

in October, I asked him what was on the list that you gave to 

Under Secretary Brown, and he testified that he never saw the list. 

I would like to clarify this issue for the record. How do you reconcile these seemingly contradicting accounts? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, I met with Marty, and we talked about the 

disaster, and after he gave me his accounts on what had happened, 

and the breaches, and the highway systems that had been knocked 

down to the east, and I had already started to formulate some 

ideas on how we would start this recovery. And I had them on a 

white sheet of paper pretty much like this, and I shared all those 

thoughts with him, and that was the plan that I was proposing as 

we moved forward. And when we finished with that conversation 

and he looked at that list, he basically said that he had never had 

the opportunity to meet with a public official like this and to have 

such clear thoughts on exactly how we should move forward and 

how the resources should be focused. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for that clarification. 

Mayor Nagin, an after-action report prepared by the New Orleans 

Police Department stated that the failure of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) was a significant problem. There was an 

unannounced change of location during the storm and a breakdown 

of communication between command staff and officers on the 

street. The report indicates that many officers and supervisors did 

not even know that OEP existed, despite the fact that OEP was designed to coordinate emergency functions. How do you respond to 

these criticisms? 

Mayor NAGIN. The Police Department is a critical agency for us, 

and I am not sure who the gentleman was who testified. I will tell 

you this, that the police chief, the assistant police chief, all were 

19

very familiar with the operations of the OEP area and were pretty 

intimately involved in a lot of the planning. I would also point this 

out to you, that right after the storm, police headquarters was pretty much under water or took on a significant amount of water, and 

we had a very difficult time communicating with the various districts that were also under water. So there was a period of time 

where communication was definitely challenged, and it was difficult getting all the information out there we needed. 

As we gained access to those individuals through the police radio 

system that was working very infrequently, we started to commandeer and get people organized, but we had to do it in temporary locations. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your responses, Mayor Nagin. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Mayor, welcome. It 

is good to see you. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CARPER. We thank you for your presence here today and 

for your testimony. You mentioned the Baker proposals, Representative Baker. I have a number of questions. I am going to ask you 

not to dwell on this for too long, but just take a moment and just 

highlight the Baker proposal for us, tell us what you like about it, 

what you do not. In the face of the lack of support from the Administration, is it something we should try to support? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, the Baker bill, as I appreciate it, is designed 

to set up a corporation that would be targeted with the ability to 

go in and purchase homes and also to allow for mortgages to be forgiven to free up individuals to start to re-create their lives at 60 

percent of their pre-Katrina equities. 

Senator CARPER. What do you like about it? What are its shortcomings, and is this something we ought to get behind and support? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, what I like about it is that it will provide 

us with another tool and more financial resources to make some individuals whole in the City of New Orleans, but also to give them 

some equity so that they can reinvest in other areas of the city that 

are on higher ground. I think you should support it. 

One of the things that I have heard from the White House that 

they’re having a problem with is basically that it’s open-ended, 

there’s no cap on it, which I think Congressman Baker would be 

able to deal with it, and then there is also grave concern about it 

being precedent setting from the standpoint now that the Federal 

Government is a huge landholder and in the redevelopment business. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Can you give us your perspective on what is 

going on with respect to the levees, fixing the levees, getting ready 

for the next big storm? How are we doing? 

Mayor NAGIN. I had a briefing right before I came up for this 

hearing from the Corps of Engineers, General Crear, who has done 

20

a really good job. They seem to be moving along. They have lots 

of challenges. They have a couple of contractors that are a little behind schedule, but they have back-up plans. In addition to that, 

they are not going to be able to armor the levees, which I think 

is a huge weakness from the standpoint of if we have another 

Katrina-like storm. We’re going to build better levees, but they 

won’t be as strong as we originally thought. 

Senator CARPER. Did you say armor the levees? What do you 

mean? 

Mayor NAGIN. The levees, for the most part, were made with soil 

and grass, and the concept to armor them was going to rely more 

upon concrete, rocks, and wire mesh and other support systems on 

each side of the levees. The funding, it is my understanding, is not 

there for them to do that. 

Senator CARPER. Any advice for us as we serve in our oversight 

role to try to make sure that the kind of problems we had with the 

collapsing of the levees and the overtopping of the levees does not 

happen again? What should we be doing to be more vigilant? 

Mayor NAGIN. I think we ought to really pay attention to the design of the levees and utilize some independent scientists to look 

at that. Then I think we ought to really pay attention to the construction, the quality of the construction as it continues to go on. 

And then finally, just the pace of construction to make sure that 

it meets the timelines of the next hurricane season. 

Senator CARPER. My understanding is that not only the levees 

provided significant defense to New Orleans and the region, but 

also the wetlands, I guess, to the south. 

Mayor NAGIN. That is correct. 

Senator CARPER. Anything going on with respect to those wetlands, restoration of those wetlands and helping you provide what 

I would call almost a first line of defense against——

Mayor NAGIN. It’s my understanding that there’s not a lot going 

on as it relates to wetlands restoration, and it’s something that this 

Nation really needs to pay attention to a lot closer, in my opinion. 

For every mile of wetlands it allows for us to subside a storm surge 

by one foot, and since the coastal erosion problem in Louisiana is 

so severe right now, we probably lost 100 years worth of coastline 

as it relates to this storm, of coastline natural erosion. We’re really 

vulnerable, and this Nation should pay attention to it and help us 

out. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. Switching gears here, you mentioned 

light rail options. I think you mentioned Amtrak and so forth. I 

think you said that your staff or someone in the city had reached 

out to Amtrak to ask if they could provide some assistance with respect to the evacuation. I think you mentioned the town of Hammond? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. My staff tells me that we understand that the 

day after Katrina made landfall that Amtrak offered to run up to, 

I think, four trains a day over some dry tracks that they had identified to move people out of New Orleans. This was after the fact. 

I am told each train could have moved maybe as many as 500–600 

people with water and food. But in the end, I am told that it took 

several days to get the attention of the folks that were in charge. 

21

I realize you are up to your eyeballs in alligators and water, but 

it took several days to get the attention of people in charge, and 

that only one partially filled train was utilized on the Friday night 

after the storm, that was like 5 or 6 days after the storm came 

through, to take evacuees to Lafayette. 

I do not know if you are familiar with this saga, but if you could 

cast some light on it——

Mayor NAGIN. I’ve heard this story a number of times, and it 

keeps getting better every day. It’s like catching a fish, the fish 

gets better as you talk about it. I heard the rumor right after the 

storm, was never able to confirm that. Even talked to Chief Mathews, who supposedly got the call, and he didn’t recall getting that 

particular offer. 

But if that offer was on the table, and if they knew that we were 

struggling, why didn’t Amtrak reach out to the State officials, to 

the Federal Government, to FEMA, and try every available avenue 

to make sure that people understand this was available. 

Senator CARPER. Or vice versa. Some of those entities could have 

been reaching out to—somebody should have talked. 

Mayor NAGIN. We called Amtrak prior to the storm, right before 

it hit, and they told us there was nothing available, and we took 

that as gospel, and maybe we shouldn’t have. 

Senator CARPER. One last question. Somebody mentioned—I 

think it was you—a light rail system. We are going to have more 

hurricanes in the future, as we all know. It could be as bad, maybe 

even worse than Katrina. But I understand that New Orleans and 

I think maybe it is the Baton Rouge transit systems, along with 

Amtrak, and I think Kansas City Southern, are in negotiations to 

establish commuter rail links between, I think, the two cities to 

help reduce some serious traffic congestion that has existed since 

New Orleans was reopened to its citizens and to its businesses. I 

just want to know what the status is of those negotiations, and how 

do you plan maybe to use this kind of commuter rail service in the 

future to assist, not just in moving people on a regular basis today, 

but to help us with possible evacuations in the likelihood of another hurricane, maybe as early as 5 or 6 months from now? 

Mayor NAGIN. We have been talking with all the individuals that 

you mentioned, and it is my understanding that maybe two trains 

will be made available to have runs in the mornings and in the 

afternoons between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Those trains 

are primarily designed to help the workers and evacuees that have 

moved to Baton Rouge to come back and forth between Baton 

Rouge and New Orleans. And we are going to look at that as an 

option for the future as an evacuation tool. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. Good luck. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, first I want to congratulate you for your continuing review of what took place in 

these terrible days in our country. It has real value because if we 

learn what really happened, perhaps we can legislate change to 

22

make sure that if it does happen again, that we do not see the kind 

of consequences that came out of New Orleans. 

We have excellent witnesses, and we are happy to hear the Mayor’s view. There has been a real effort with this and other hearings, 

but I want to raise some concerns about this investigation. As you 

know, Madam Chairman, I advocated the creation of an independent commission, not unlike the 9/11 Commission, to see what 

happened with Katrina. Now, unlike congressional committees 

which often get stuck in politics, an independent commission would 

not be reluctant to issue subpoenas to get information. Unfortunately, what we see is a refusal by the White House to release documents and blocking officials there from speaking to the Committee, and that is, in my view, obstructing the Committee’s investigation. 

The Department of Homeland Security, which this Committee 

has jurisdiction over, is even refusing to give us key documents, 

probably on the orders, likely on the orders from higher up. 

Madam Chairman, you and Senator Lieberman wrote to the 

White House, the Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, on January 12, in 

which you stated, ‘‘The Executive Office of the President is hindering the Committee’s efforts to obtain information.’’ So we need 

to ask ourselves, why is the White House not coming forward in 

this review? 

I am not sure if this Committee, no matter how well intentioned, 

will ever be able to get to the bottom of this. We need to examine 

whether we should hand this investigation over to an independent 

commission with subpoena power. 

Mr. Mayor, your review of events has an amazing clarity to it, 

as you remember moments—I guess this gets seared in your mind 

when you are under that kind of pressure. I would ask you about 

the behavior of the police department in those days. I know you 

have been complimentary about the chief and the deputy chief. 

Were there mass absences? We read about that in the papers. I 

just want to hear what finally did take place during those stressful 

days. 

Mayor NAGIN. Senator, there was some exodus among some of 

the New Orleans Police Department. We are in the process of completing hearings for every officer that was missing in action for one 

reason or another. We have gone through most of those, and we 

have had separations. Out of a group of 1,650 or 1,690 officers, we 

probably will be separating with about 150 officers. For the most 

part, most of the NOPD, New Orleans Police Department, operated 

at the highest level of heroics, but unfortunately, we did have some 

that were not engaged in the battle. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That is not an unusual condition when 

stress really starts developing. It is too bad, but I trust, Mr. Mayor, 

that you are going to look at past training programs. 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. 

Senator LAUTENBERG [continuing]. And how discipline was developed. 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And I urge you to reinstate the confidence 

that people had. One of the things that we have heard from the 

President is that no one anticipated the breach of the levees, the 

23

weaknesses there. As far as you know, did anyone in the Federal 

Government tell you that there were recognized weaknesses there, 

and otherwise, was this a total surprise that the levees were weak? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, Senator, no one prior to the storm admitted 

that there were any weaknesses in any levee system. And if it 

wasn’t for the failure of the levees, I wouldn’t be here today testifying. This was something that was overseen and managed by the 

Corps of Engineers, along with some local support. Obviously, some 

of the forensic scientists that are looking at this now have uncovered some design flaws and construction flaws. It is absolutely 

amazing to me that a levee system that is so critical to this Nation 

and to the city had these problems. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Bahamonde testified here in startling 

honesty, I thought, and said that there had been discussions in 

FEMA, none that he was directly associated with, but that he was 

aware of, that had discussed some weaknesses in the levees. The 

fact is that in the prior couple of years, funds were taken from the 

Corps of Engineers, reduced substantially from levels of about $30 

million a year down to $3 million a year, designed for work on the 

levees. Now, they would not be working on the levees if there was 

no concern about the quality of the structure. So people knew that 

there was a weakness there that had to be taken care of, and yet, 

nothing happened to change that course. 

How do you see that having fallen by the wayside? 

Mayor NAGIN. Senator, since I have been in office now about 4 

years, I have lobbied the Corps of Engineers, as well as Congress, 

consistently every year with this funding issue. It seems as though 

the Corps makes a request, it gets cut by OMB, I think it is. We 

come to the Hill, and we try to get either our Senator or Congressman to do a plus-up, and it is never enough money that we need. 

It just seems to be part of the process, unfortunately. The levees 

in New Orleans never really were understood as far as how critical 

they are, and there didn’t seem to be the political will to spend the 

money to do it right. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Madam Chairman. I hope that we 

are going to be able to continue our pursuit of the truth here as 

much as one can determine. I congratulate you on this. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I also commend 

you and Senator Lieberman again for your determined effort here 

to get all the information we possibly can. It is a very thorough set 

of hearings. It is a very important set of hearings. I also want to 

join Senator Lautenberg in supporting your insistence that we get 

information from the White House and from the Homeland Security Department. There is no basis that I know of for denying this 

Committee that information. You and Senator Lieberman have 

made your request clear, and I think the entire Committee is supportive of those efforts to get documents and information, and I 

want to commend you on it. 

It is a disturbing pattern in this Administration of denying Congress important information. They do not assert Executive privilege, which they have a right to assert, they just deny us informaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
24

tion. It is a pattern I have seen in other committees where we have 

tried to get information. It is totally unacceptable. It thwarts the 

checks and balances which the Constitution has put in place to 

have oversight of the Executive Department’s operations, and we 

just have to keep putting all the pressure on them we know how 

to, and I hope, if necessary, subpoena documents. 

Welcome, Mayor. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

Senator LEVIN. Let me add my welcome to you. I understand 

there is still a large number of people unaccounted for. The number 

we have as of the middle of December is about 5,300 people. What 

does that represent? Is there a list of 5,300 people that are still unaccounted for? Is that on a website? Is there an effort being made 

to account for everybody who is unaccounted for? 

Mayor NAGIN. Senator, that’s a great question. I’ve seen several 

different numbers. They seem to range between 3,500 and the 

number that you just mentioned. Lots of the individuals are families that were separated, children that were separated from their 

mothers and fathers, and every day it is being worked on. 

I had a FEMA individual tell me that he was still receiving, 

FEMA was still receiving 25 calls a day from people looking for relatives or friends that they hadn’t been able to locate. Some of them 

are senior citizens that were under medical care that may or may 

not have had identification as they were moved around the country, 

so it is just a bringing together of a lot of the people. 

Unfortunately, it may be some individuals that were potentially 

washed away as a result of the storm, so we just don’t know right 

now. 

Senator LEVIN. Is there one place where the number of unaccounted for people are listed? 

Mayor NAGIN. It is my understanding the State has a listing, as 

well as FEMA. 

Senator LEVIN. Right. There are three meetings which I am interested in, and a number of the Members of the Committee, I 

think, have already asked you and other witnesses about. One is 

the Monday evening meeting with FEMA, where you gave them a 

priority list which identified commodities and equipment. The priority list that you provided to FEMA on that Monday included 

buses to get people evacuated from the Superdome and other 

places. 

Did FEMA require a specific request from the Governor before 

they supplied the buses which you requested at, I believe, a Monday night meeting with them? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. I wasn’t privy to those discussions, but it’s 

my understanding that FEMA would discuss whatever needs we 

had with the State, and hopefully, that was coordinated to provide 

the resources that we need. 

Senator LEVIN. Were you the Incident Commander for New Orleans under the National Response Plan? 

Mayor NAGIN. It’s my understanding that myself and Colonel 

Terry Ebbert were designated in that fashion. 

Senator LEVIN. As the Incident Commander for New Orleans? 

Mayor NAGIN. I’m not sure, sir. 

25

Senator LEVIN. It is our understanding there was a National Response Plan and that the Mayor was so designated. Are you familiar with the National Response Plan? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Whose responsibility was it to get the food and 

the water and other supplies to the Convention Center? Was that 

yours? Was it the State’s? Was it FEMA’s? Whose responsibility? 

I am now talking not about evacuation, but the food and supply 

need at the Convention Center. 

Mayor NAGIN. It’s my understanding it was a joint responsibility. 

Senator LEVIN. Between whom and whom? 

Mayor NAGIN. Between the locals, the Federal, to get the initial 

supplies. And then we were always under the impression that the 

Federal Government would provide supplies after the initial period. 

Senator LEVIN. When people started flowing into the Convention 

Center, I think as early as Monday, but clearly on Tuesday, and 

then major numbers Tuesday, Wednesday, the failure to provide 

food and water to those people, whose responsibility was it? Was 

it yours? Was it FEMA’s? Where did that responsibility rest? I will 

ask that first. 

Mayor NAGIN. We took responsibility for making sure those individuals would have food and water for at least 3 days. 

Senator LEVIN. But they did not. 

Mayor NAGIN. They did. 

Senator LEVIN. Three days. They did not have it——

Mayor NAGIN. In the Superdome. 

Senator LEVIN. I am talking Convention Center. 

Mayor NAGIN. The Convention Center is a different——

Senator LEVIN. That is the one I am asking about. Whose responsibility was it to get food and water to the people at the Convention 

Center, which was the back-up facility? 

Mayor NAGIN. The primary facility, the local government had 

total responsibility, as well as the State for that. The Convention 

Center was a shelter that evolved as it relates to the event. The 

Superdome filled up to capacity, and we were looking around for 

another facility to house people on a very temporary basis, and 

then we made a request to FEMA to provide food and water for 

those individuals. 

Senator LEVIN. Your Monday night list though, the Convention 

Center was listed as a refuge of last resort in lieu of the Superdome; is that not correct? 

Mayor NAGIN. No, it evolved, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Finally, the meeting that you had with the President on Friday, did the President at that meeting request, suggest 

to the Governor, that the National Guard be federalized? 

Mayor NAGIN. I did not hear that conversation, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you have heard it if it existed? I mean, 

were you there? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, I was there, but there was a private meeting 

that the President and the Governor had, which I was not privy to. 

Senator LEVIN. Did you suggest to the President that that happen? 

26

Mayor NAGIN. I did not. I suggested that we have one chain of 

command, and my suggestion was that General Honore ́ assume 

that position. 

Senator LEVIN. Over the National Guard? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. That would then be the federalization of the National Guard because he is with the Federal Government. 

Mayor NAGIN. I was thinking more from a coordination role. 

Senator LEVIN. I see. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Mayor, I want to follow up on several issues that have been 

raised. You had an exchange with Senator Lieberman about a critical meeting you had with the President and the Governor to try 

to straighten out the confused chain of command. 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman COLLINS. And you described it very eloquently as an 

incredible dance between the Federal Government and the State 

Government that impeded the response. And it must have been extraordinarily frustrating to you to hear this dispute over who was 

going to be in charge of the National Guard assets, when all you 

wanted was someone to be in charge and to start delivering help 

to your city. Is that a fair summary? 

Mayor NAGIN. That is very fair. 

Chairman COLLINS. You mentioned that the meeting concluded 

without a decision. Was it not the Governor who asked for 24 hours 

to make a decision on the two options that the President presented 

to her? 

Mayor NAGIN. That’s my understanding of what happened. 

Chairman COLLINS. I just wanted to clarify that point. I want to 

follow up on Senator Levin’s point about the Convention Center. It 

is my understanding that you decided to open the Convention Center on August 30 because you had flooding and overcrowding at the 

Superdome. Is that correct? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, that’s correct, ma’am. 

Chairman COLLINS. So then search and rescue teams began delivering people to the Convention Center. In addition, people just 

flocked there on their own. 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman COLLINS. The Louisiana National Guard has estimated 

that there were as many as 19,000 people at the Convention Center. So you have this huge exodus to the Convention Center, and 

yet, as Senator Levin pointed out, and as your timeline affirms, the 

Convention Center, unlike the Superdome, was not supplied with 

food and water. Is that correct? 

Mayor NAGIN. The Convention Center was a refuge of last resort 

that came out of necessity, and as it started to develop—the 19,000 

didn’t happen overnight. It was something that evolved. The hotels 

started to evacuate because their diesel power was running out, 

and people were coming from the hotels, from other parishes, and 

individuals were walking out of the water along the river, which 

was the high side, to go to the Convention Center. We did not have 

the resources to provide food. Water ran until the pump stopped, 

so there was water over there, and then when the pump stopped, 

there was not. So we had to get FEMA to provide bottled water. 

27

1 Exhibit 7 appears in the Appendix on page 102. 

Chairman COLLINS. And indeed in the timeline from your office, 

there are entries for Wednesday, August 31, that say ‘‘Convention 

Center numbers growing, no food or water.’’ And on Thursday, September 1, ‘‘Convention Center numbers growing, no food or water.’’ 

We also know from widely publicized reports that neither Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff nor FEMA Director Michael 

Brown were even aware that the Convention Center was open and 

being used for a shelter. They did not, according to their interviews, understand that until Thursday, September 1. 

I am trying to get a clearer picture of why the city sent people 

to the Convention Center when there were no supplies there and 

no security. Why wasn’t there communication with FEMA to ask 

for supplies? We have gone through roughly 800,000 pages of documents, and we cannot find any evidence of a request from the city 

or from the State to FEMA to get supplies to the Convention Center. 

Mayor NAGIN. With all due respect to Secretary Chertoff and Mr. 

Brown, I don’t understand how anyone in authority, with this type 

of crisis, can say that they were not aware that we had a crisis in 

New Orleans and we had people that were stranded on roofs, on 

highways, and at the Convention Center and they didn’t know 

about it. That is just next to impossible. The entire Nation was enthralled on this disaster, so I categorically reject their claims. 

Chairman COLLINS. I find that extremely troubling as well, because as you point out, you could turn on the television. Those of 

us not in Louisiana had access to television, and we could see what 

was happening. But did the city inform FEMA or did the city inform the State that you had an unexpected situation where you 

opened up the Convention Center, which you had not supplied with 

food, water, medical teams, or security, and that you needed help? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, ma’am, every day, twice a day, three times 

a day. FEMA was with us in our OEC. I had evacuated most of 

my executive staff to Baton Rouge. We were able to communicate 

with them, although intermittently, about the challenges. My chief 

administrative officer was communicating with the State officials 

as well as Homeland Security officials who were congregated in 

Baton Rouge. So I am absolutely appalled that they would be saying this. 

Chairman COLLINS. That is an issue that we will take up when 

they come before us. I also want to follow up on Senator Levin’s 

question about the assessment of needs that you provided to Marty 

Bahamonde of FEMA that you have mentioned. It is Exhibit 7 1 in 

your book, dated August 29. 

I have read through this pretty carefully, and I do not see any 

request for buses. I just wanted to clarify that for the record. But 

also to ask, given the problem of evacuating people without the 

means to evacuate themselves, why didn’t you, in this rather comprehensive list, request buses? A lot of your buses were flooded at 

that point. 

Mayor NAGIN. Madam Chairman, this is one of many requests 

that were made by us. Some were made in writing. This request 

was more about physical assets than other needs. We spoke firstVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
28

hand with Marty about the need for buses. They had three FEMA 

representatives that came down right after I spoke with Marty, 

and they were in charge of the buses. We had conversations with 

them as well as the Governor and the Senators at the heliport 

about the need for buses and other needs. This was done on almost 

a constant basis. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Mayor, let me go back to something we talked about before. 

We have testimony, generally referred to yesterday, but really more 

specifically from one of the witnesses the Committee interviewed. 

This was about requests that the New Orleans Fire Department 

had made to the city for additional purchasing of boats. 

Mayor NAGIN. Right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Obviously, this goes back to Hurricane Pam 

and the fear that if the hurricane hit, the levees would break, there 

would be flooding, and there would be a need for some capacity for 

water rescue. So to the best of your ability, what happened to the 

fire department’s request for more boats? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, we heard their request. I coordinated the 

boat situation with Chief Compass, and we were able to secure—

I think it was 40 boats prior to the event. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You said in that weekend? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, prior to the event, and those boats were 

staged at the National Guard facility, which was along the river in 

the by-water, the upper 9th Ward area. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Where did you get them? Do you remember? 

Mayor NAGIN. We rented some, we purchased others. I mean we 

had a contingency of boats. Then right after the storm, some of 

them were blown away and we couldn’t get to others. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Actually, that part of the story is one of the 

remarkable, most admirable parts, and I kept hearing it all 

around; the resourcefulness of, in some cases, commandeering 

boats, hot-wiring them to carry out the rescue. 

Mayor NAGIN. That was post the event. That was when we started to commandeer. Pre-event we had some staged. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I was looking back a little bit further. Just 

from the point of looking at what happened in the budget process, 

I gathered that the fire department meant as much as a year before, maybe even more than that, they had requested more fire 

boats and they were turned down. 

Mayor NAGIN. They were probably requesting, in their budget, a 

purchase of boats——

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is right. 

Mayor NAGIN [continuing]. As a normal operating expense, and 

being an urban center that was cash strapped, I’m pretty sure it 

didn’t survive the budget process. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. As I hear you, I had not been thinking 

about it as I asked the question, but unfortunately—I will just say 

this real briefly—it is part of a larger problem, and it is why some 

of the Federal funding programs for purchase of equipment by local 

fire and police departments are so important because the local first 

responders’ budgets are so greatly consumed with personnel costs 

29

that often there is not the money left over for the acquisition, as 

in this case. 

Mayor NAGIN. That’s correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me go back to that FEMA list, the list 

you gave to FEMA that we talked about. My recollection is that 

you met with Michael Brown, was it Monday night? It must have 

been Tuesday morning because I think—well, Monday night or 

Tuesday morning. 

Mayor NAGIN. It probably was Tuesday because Monday I don’t 

think he was there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. He was not around, that is correct. I guess 

I would ask you for your impression first. I will give you my impression—and you were there. I was startled that Marty 

Bahamonde was basically, for a period of time, Saturday and Sunday and into Monday, the only FEMA person on the scene. Were 

you surprised as the crisis came? 

Mayor NAGIN. I was surprised at a lot of things, but FEMA, I 

think, underestimated this event. Marty understood it because he 

was in the midst of it. But I think everyone up the food chain really underestimated it even to the point of getting the accurate information to the President, himself. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, I have that question myself as this goes 

on. And that underestimation that you are talking about by FEMA 

of Katrina, if I understand you correctly, is not just in the days 

leading up to it, notwithstanding the Dr. Mayfield warnings and 

all, but in the immediate aftermath of landfall as well. 

Mayor NAGIN. Absolutely. One of the things I noticed about some 

of the FEMA resources that were there was they all were well 

meaning, but they over-promised and under-delivered on a fairly 

consistent basis. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You have anticipated my next question, 

which is: As we look at the list that you gave FEMA—and as you 

said in the last exchange you had, it was not the only series of requests you made—would you say in that first week to 10 days or 

so that FEMA came through for New Orleans? 

Mayor NAGIN. No, I wouldn’t say that. I think that they struggled, they continue to struggle, and I hope another city does not go 

through this. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Amen. I heard a story, and I want to ask 

you if you could recollect it in your own words, that sometime later 

in the week, perhaps Saturday, Secretary Chertoff came to town 

and you went to the FEMA staging area, which was at the New 

Orleans Saints practice field. 

Mayor NAGIN. You heard about that, huh? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So I am right so far? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, you are. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And am I right that you saw at the field a 

number of items that you had requested like lights, portable toilets, 

and ice that the city needed, but for some reason remained on the 

field? 

Mayor NAGIN. I am testifying, right, so I’m going to make sure 

I do this without getting too excited. I was so flabbergasted—I 

mean we were in New Orleans, we were struggling. The city was 

touch and go as it relates to security. And when I flew out to ZephVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
30

yr Stadium, to the Saints facility, I got off the helicopter and just 

started walking around, and I was awestruck. 

We had been requesting portable lights for the Superdome because people were standing at night and all over. To make a long 

story short, there were rows of portable lights. 

We knew sanitary conditions were so poor we wanted Portolets. 

They had Portolets all around the Saints facility. 

I stopped and talked to a gentleman who was a firefighter from 

California. I said, ‘‘Man, it’s great for you to be here. You just got 

here, right?’’ He said, ‘‘No. We drove all night, 36 hours. We’ve 

been sitting around, waiting for the orders to go into the city to 

help.’’

Then we went into the facility because I hadn’t eaten, and it was 

like the Ritz Carlton. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You mean at the field? 

Mayor NAGIN. At the field. They had water. They had ice. They 

had everything you could—they even had doggone watermelons on 

the counters. And our people were down in the city eating MREs. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Was Mr. Brown there, Michael Brown? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, Mr. Brown was with the Secretary. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Did you ask either Secretary Chertoff or Director Brown what was going on? 

Mayor NAGIN. I was so upset that I didn’t because they called me 

and said, ‘‘Drop everything, we need to see you.’’ And when I got 

there, it seemed like it was more of a press event than anything 

else. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is not just a sad story. It is an outrageous story, and it is one, I assure you, that we will ask Secretary Chertoff and Mr. Brown when they testify to explain to us. 

Thank you. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will also join 

in efforts to make sure that we get full access to information, but 

I do want to say that—is this our 14th hearing? 

Chairman COLLINS. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. That any inference that the efforts of this 

Committee are inadequate to have oversight and figure out what 

is going on is simply beyond the pale, and I just want to, for the 

record, reject that. This is an extraordinary effort that you and the 

Ranking Member have been leading in a bipartisan way, and I am 

overwhelmed by what is being done and what will continue to be 

done. I just wanted to put that on the record. 

Mr. Mayor, you are not known for understatement, but saying 

that FEMA underestimated the event, both in their response and 

afterwards, is an understatement, and I appreciate your——

Mayor NAGIN. Restraint. 

Senator COLEMAN. Your restraint in that. 

Mayor NAGIN. Not known for that. [Laughter.] 

Senator COLEMAN. I share the outrage of my colleague from Connecticut, and we will pursue that. 

Let me just ask you one question about the buses. We have 

talked a lot about that. It is clear, as you know, that not everyone 

was going to get out, and I have heard stories, anecdotes, parents 

31

never left and grandparents never left, and we have been through 

this before. So you know that no matter what your plans are, they 

are not going to get out. 

Mayor NAGIN. Right. 

Senator COLEMAN. There was a story in the Washington Post

that talked about buses that were left, hundreds of buses, school 

buses were left idle in flooded parking lots after Katrina because 

the bus drivers fled. Who was responsible for those folks and having them understand what their responsibility is and what you 

needed them to do? 

Mayor NAGIN. That was the School Board. Those buses were the 

School Board buses, and they pretty much coordinated those efforts. 

We have Regional Transit Authority, where we have city-owned 

buses that we staged in high ground and never flooded, and we 

were able to keep a small contingency of our bus drivers to get people from their homes to the shelters of last resort, and after that 

they evacuated also. 

Senator COLEMAN. I raise it because another authority, School 

Board and something, and one of your concerns has clearly been 

about line of authority, and who is in charge above you. But I 

would suspect that on a city level, as you kind of look at this, and 

we look down the road, is the way that one can strengthen your 

power as Mayor over—even though you do not have control over 

the School Board, I presume in New Orleans, like in St. Paul, but 

that in times of crisis, is there something that has to be done to 

give you the very clear authority over all these entities so we do 

not have a situation where we have the Levee Board saying one 

thing and School Board saying another and city folks something 

else. 

Mayor NAGIN. It is not necessarily after the event or when the 

event happens that there is a lack of authority, but to force the 

issue of MOUs and moving buses out prior to an event, that is 

where the authority is lacking. Once the event happens, we declare 

a state of emergency and we can commandeer, but by commandeering at that point in time, it is a little late. 

Senator COLEMAN. When you are sitting there, it is Tuesday, all 

heck has broken loose, your city is being destroyed. You know you 

have citizens out there without the ability to get out. What are you 

thinking at that point in time and what are you doing then to say, 

hey, we are going to get these people out. What are the things that 

are right in the forefront of your consciousness at that time? 

Mayor NAGIN. It was resource allocation. How many resources 

did I have to take care of this particular mission? What other resources I can gather. How can I coordinate communications when 

communication systems are pretty much down? Those sorts of 

things run through your mind. 

Senator COLEMAN. You mentioned the satellite phones. Aren’t 

they supposed to work regardless of whether you got——

Mayor NAGIN. They were supposed to work. I don’t know what 

was going on. I have a whole box of them if you’d like one. 

Senator COLEMAN. If they worked I would like one, but obviously 

they do not. That is all I have. Thank you, Mr. Mayor. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

32

1 Exhibit 7 appears in the Appendix on page 102. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

You indicated that the use of the Convention Center was unexpected and came out of necessity, and that somewhat mystifies me, 

given your own presentation to FEMA on Monday night and Tuesday, where you explicitly laid out the Convention Center backup as 

being a real possibility. And I want to read to you from Exhibit 7, 

which I gather you either read from or talked about Monday night, 

and then gave it to FEMA on Tuesday, as I understand it. 

Mayor NAGIN. That is not the Convention Center. 

Senator LEVIN. It is the Convention Center, and that is what I 

want to go through with you, on Exhibit 7.1

Mayor NAGIN. OK. 

Senator LEVIN. This is from your office on Monday, and it is an 

impressive document. I think the Chairman is correct, it does not 

make specific reference to buses, and you were asked about that. 

Mayor NAGIN. Right. 

Senator LEVIN. Take a look at your notice to FEMA. 

Mayor NAGIN. Alternative needs. 

Senator LEVIN. You put them on notice according to this, your 

document. You put them on notice Monday night and then handed 

them this document on Tuesday. ‘‘Access to the Convention Center 

to use it as the refuge of last resort in lieu of the Superdome,’’ as 

an alternative need. You laid it out to them. ‘‘If this option is exercised, each of the above-listed needs would also be required for the 

Convention Center.’’ And one of the above-listed needs was—if you 

look at the dot right above that request, it says from FEMA, but 

I assume it means to FEMA, for ‘‘assistance in providing food, 

water and toiletries for evacuees.’’ So if this is accurate, you indeed 

did notify FEMA. 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. But if you notice the last sentence it says, 

‘‘Drs. Stephens and Lupin are exploring the feasibility of this option.’’ We were looking around saying, where could we possibly go? 

And we were not certain at that time that was an option. We were 

looking at it. 

Senator LEVIN. You were looking at that option and notified 

FEMA that you were looking at that option. 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. They were put on notice that you were looking 

at that option, and there were certain benefits to it. The advantages of using the Convention Center, you wrote here, ‘‘include no 

leaking roof and large open space that may help with claustrophobia of some evacuees.’’ So you were looking at the option and 

they were aware of it. Is that a fair summary? 

Mayor NAGIN. That’s probably fair, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. So when they suggest—it was suggested on 

Thursday that the first they even heard of people being at the Convention Center was Thursday, when in fact, it was all over television Wednesday night, it is incomprehensible, but it is also incomprehensible that they were not aware as early as Monday night 

33

1The three excerpts from television programs on Wednesday night, August 31, 2005, submitted by Senator Levin appear in the Appendix on page 100. 

and Tuesday that you were exploring the option of Convention Center use for evacuees. Is that fair? 

Mayor NAGIN. That’s correct, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, I would ask, Madam Chairman, that three 

excerpts from television programs on Wednesday night, August 31, 

be made part of the record at this time.1

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator LEVIN. The first one is CNN, where their observer on the 

scene said there was a National Guard presence, but in not all 

areas. ‘‘I was down at the Convention Center standing right across 

from 3,000 people who had gathered at this Convention Center. 

These people are hungry, they’re tired, they’ve got nowhere to go, 

they’ve got no answers. They’ve got no communication whatsoever.’’

In addition, the MSNBC report that, ‘‘There are frightening stories tonight’’—this is Wednesday night at 10—‘‘at the Convention 

Center where everybody has been told, go down there, you can get 

some medical treatment, they’ll be able to get you out of town. So 

we have seen people walking for miles, carrying their suitcases. 

Well, we’ve been told down there at that Convention Center it’s absolute chaos.’’ So that is the Wednesday night report. 

And the third report is from Paula Zahn on CNN as well, where 

‘‘there are literally thousands of people,’’ she said, ‘‘lined up at this 

Convention Center, wandering aimlessly, I mean, mothers with 

their babies, little kids, walking through this putrid water, and 

there is this dead body that’s just sitting there.’’ And that Paula 

Zahn TV report was at 8 o’clock on Wednesday night as well. 

One final question, and that is that apparently there was a National Guard unit at the Convention Center during that time. But 

for what reason I do not follow, it did not get involved in assisting 

people. I do not know if that is accurate or not, but is it accurate 

that there was a National Guard unit right at the Convention Center, separated apparently by a wall of some kind from where most 

of the people were. What do you know about that? 

Mayor NAGIN. It is my understanding that—from talking to the 

police chief and some other law enforcement agents, that there 

were National Guards, not a big contingency, that were supporting 

police officers as well as State police. There was a decision that 

was made on site—I don’t know exactly who it came from—that the 

National Guard would not actively engage and that they would primarily stay on the periphery of what was going on at the Convention Center. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know why that decision was made? 

Mayor NAGIN. No, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Mayor, I want to just follow up briefly on the Convention 

Center issue. There is no doubt in my mind that Federal officials 

should have known that the Convention Center was being used as 

a shelter by looking at television and seeing the reports that Senator Levin has just put in the record. But in fact, there is also no 

indication that you informed the Federal Government that you 

34

were going to invoke the alternative that you put down in your request of August 29. There are no documents, and indeed, in our 

interviews with FEMA officials, there is considerable evidence that 

they confused the Convention Center and the Superdome and 

thought that they were one and the same. 

We will follow up with FEMA about this issue, but just so you 

know, there is no evidence in the 800,000 pages of documents that 

there was a notification. Nor was there evidence of the request for 

food and water that this plan clearly contemplated would be triggered once the Convention Center was activated. And it still is 

troubling to me that people were sent to the Convention Center 

without the city or State ensuring that there were some initial supplies there, particularly since you contemplated that you might 

have to use the Convention Center. I know you told people to bring 

supplies, but I do not understand why the city did not ensure that 

there were some supplies there until you could get FEMA to activate the plan. 

Mayor NAGIN. Madam Chairman, all I can tell you is that in the 

heat of the moment things were evolving, and they were evolving 

very quickly. And when we could provide documents, we provided 

them, such as the report that is in this exhibit. But once power 

started to fail, we had difficulties doing simple things such as we 

tried to do flyers for individuals in the Convention Center and the 

Superdome, but had no means of doing the copies. But we were 

talking to FEMA, the State, and the Federal Government on a dayto-day basis, hour-to-hour basis, trying to get them to understand. 

Chairman COLLINS. Could you tell us who the person was that 

you notified at FEMA if it was not done in writing? Who was it 

that you talked to to say, ‘‘We are now opening the Convention 

Center and we are going to need help?’’

Mayor NAGIN. I think you would have to ask Colonel Ebbert that, 

since he was in charge of coordinating those efforts. 

Chairman COLLINS. Let me also go back to an exchange that you 

had with Senator Akaka. You referred to the testimony we heard 

earlier this week from one of the police captains who was very critical of the city’s Office of Emergency Preparedness. I just want to 

make sure that you realize that this was not just one police officer. 

This was an official after-action report that was completed by the 

command staff of the New Orleans Police Department. It is not just 

one captain, and it is a devastating indictment of the Office of 

Emergency Preparedness. The summary section of this after-action 

report includes language that says, ‘‘total failure of OEP. Although 

identified as the point of command for the emergency, the OEP was 

out of communication with a large percentage of the department 

several times during the storm.’’ One captain on the command staff 

wrote in his report that, ‘‘The OEP needs to be revamped.’’ Another 

captain wrote, ‘‘Unified command was never established.’’ A third 

captain wrote, ‘‘If their role is to have us prepared to handle a disaster such as this, they FAILED,’’ and failed is in capital letters. 

‘‘They lacked a plan, did not provide the necessary equipment, provided no direction or leadership.’’

This language is directly from the first responders that your city 

relies upon, and it is from three captains, who on their own initiaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
35

tive launched the search and rescue operations to save the lives of 

New Orleans residents. I know you are grateful for their initiative. 

In light of this indictment that is not just from one captain, it 

is the after-action report of the command staff of the department, 

what actions are you taking to strengthen OEP? 

Mayor NAGIN. Well, we’re doing our own critical analysis, 

Madam Chairman, as far as OEP, the communications networks. 

One of the things we’re asking for is a 25-mile interoperability communication system, which we did not have prior to the event. So 

when all the communications networks went down, I can understand how some commanders would have felt as though they 

weren’t being communicated to adequately so they had to take matters in their own hands. 

We hope to resolve that issue going forward by putting the system, a redundant system that we have, in place. As a matter of 

fact, we have stood up the first free Wi–Fi system in an urban environment in the country’s history, and that is the basis for us to 

have redundant communications going forward. 

Chairman COLLINS. Do you think the criticisms in this report are 

fair? 

Mayor NAGIN. I think that our police officers went through a lot 

during this storm, and they were looking for help in a crisis situation from a lot of different sources, and I think it’s something that 

they believed at the time, but it was only a very limited view of 

what was going on. We had police officers in the OEP. They had 

police radios that didn’t work as consistently as we would like, so 

therefore, communication was cut off. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I do not have any further questions. 

Thanks, Mayor. Maybe I will just ask you this. I cannot resist. 

Having gone through everything we have gone through, all we have 

learned, understanding that the city is still devastated in a lot of 

ways, is the city ready for the hurricane season? Will it be ready 

in June? 

Mayor NAGIN. Today we are not ready. If the Corps of Engineers 

does what they claim they will do, and it appears as though they 

will, a core of the city will be pretty well protected for the next hurricane season. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. In other words, if they get the levees reconstructed back to Category 3 resistance, as we have come to understand that term, by June, that will give the protection. 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Has it been possible, in the midst of everything else going on in the city, to get ready in all of the ways—

although, obviously, this is a much smaller city in population now, 

but transportation out, shelter, etc.—are you able to do that while 

rebuilding the city? 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. We’re working on simultaneous fronts. The 

evacuation plan will be updated and communicated and able to be 

executed at a moment’s notice come June, so we feel very comfortable with that. 

But I don’t want to leave an impression that we’re totally out of 

the woods, Senator. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. No. In terms of preparation? 

36

Mayor NAGIN. In terms of preparation, we’ll be there and we’ll 

evacuate, and we won’t have the same situation we had at the Superdome or the Convention Center. 

But I must tell you, without coastal restoration, we still have 

major parts of the city that are still vulnerable, parts of New Orleans East, and the lower 9th Ward, which brings in St. Bernard and 

Plaquemines, so we still have lots of work to do. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree. Those of us who went again a couple of weeks ago when we saw you, I think we came away feeling 

that we have to do everything we can to get ready if another hurricane, God forbid, hits New Orleans, but the work of recovery, including the restoration of the marshes, is the work not of a single 

year, but of years. 

Mayor NAGIN. Yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We intend to stick with you until it is done. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. Well, we need to get some housing. If 

we can get housing going, we can stand up the city. Along with the 

restoration of the levees, I think we can all be proud at the end 

of the day that we’re doing something that we need to do. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mayor. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Just on a narrow line of inquiry, we talk a lot about spreading 

democracy around the world. I was mayor on September 11. It was 

a primary day, and we had the race. When do you plan to have 

elections? How do you conduct elections when your people are all 

over the country? Is that something folks are working on? 

Mayor NAGIN. It’s something that’s being worked on, but I will 

tell you this, Senator, I’m all for having elections, but I want to 

make sure that they’re fair elections. And the fact that as Mayor 

of the City of New Orleans, I still do not have the FEMA list that 

will allow me to communicate with my citizens who are spread out 

over 44 different States, to at least let them know that they can 

come back, causes me to pause as far as whether we can have fair 

elections or not. 

The Secretary of State and the Governor are working on this, but 

I have some grave questions about giving all of our citizens the opportunity and the right to exercise their vote, and it’s scheduled for 

April 22. So it’s right upon us, and we still have not communicated 

with those residents around the country. 

Senator COLEMAN. I wish you the best in that effort, Mayor. 

Mayor NAGIN. Thank you. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Mayor, I want to thank you very much for your testimony 

here today, and I also want to publicly thank you for your cooperation with our investigation. It is really important that we find out 

exactly what went wrong so that we can improve our capabilities 

at all levels of government to respond to future disasters, whether 

they are natural disasters like Katrina or man-made ones like terrorist attacks. 

I want to echo the comments of my colleagues, both of whom visited your city with me recently, that I was stunned by how much 

work remains to be done. It is extraordinary to me that we have 

37

1The prepared statement of General Graham with attachments appears in the Appendix on 

page 58. 

appropriated $85 billion, and yet parts of your city look precisely 

as they did when Senator Lieberman and I visited 2 weeks after 

Katrina had struck. This is going to require a long-term partnership among all levels of government and the private sector to rebuild New Orleans. I want to echo my colleagues that I, too, am 

committed to that. But we also need a long-term commitment by 

all levels of government to make sure that we have learned the lessons of Katrina and that regardless of what happened in the past, 

and how the response may have failed or the planning was inadequate, we have to learn those lessons and go forward to make sure 

that the response in the future is much better. 

If we rebuild New Orleans bigger, better, or at least better than 

ever before, we need to make sure that it is no longer as vulnerable 

as it was. That is why this investigation must continue, and then 

all of us will work to implement the recommendations and reforms 

that result. 

Again, I thank you for being here today. 

Mayor NAGIN. I thank you, Madam Chairman. I thank all the 

Committee Members. I thank you for frank questions. The City of 

New Orleans has been an open book since this event. We have cooperated fully. When our computer system crashed, we went and 

recovered data that we normally couldn’t get access to. We are committed to making sure that this never happens again for New Orleans, nor for any other city in America. I would encourage you to 

continue to probe. Make sure that all levels of government answer 

the tough questions. Don’t let them squirm out, I don’t care who 

it is. We need to get to the bottom of this, and this must never, 

ever happen again in this Nation’s history. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

We are now going to call forward our second panel, which consists of individuals with key roles in executing the evacuation of 

the Greater New Orleans area following Katrina. 

The first witness is Brigadier General Mark Graham, the Deputy 

Commanding General of the Fifth U.S. Army. General Graham has 

over 30 years of active duty military service. In response to Hurricane Katrina, General Graham was the Deputy Commanding Officer of Task Force Katrina. 

Vince Pearce serves as the National Response Program Manager 

at the U.S. Department of Transportation. He is responsible for the 

Department’s preparedness activities under the National Response 

Plan and its coordination with FEMA for all related planning and 

training activities. 

Dwight Brashear is the Chief Executive Officer and General 

Manager of the Baton Rouge Capital Area Transit System. 

General Graham, we are going to begin with you. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK A. GRAHAM,1

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, FIFTH U.S. ARMY 

General GRAHAM. Madam Chairman, Members of the Committee, 

I am honored to appear before you today to discuss my participaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
38

tion in the evacuation efforts in New Orleans in the aftermath of 

Hurricane Katrina. 

I am Brigadier General Mark A. Graham, Deputy Commanding 

General of Fifth U.S. Army/Army North, stationed at Fort Sam 

Houston, Texas. I was serving in this position on Wednesday, August 31, 2005, when we deployed an Operational Command Post 

(OCP) consisting of 24 soldiers and Department of the Army civilians from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 

On Tuesday, August 30, Lieutenant General Robert T. Clark, the 

Commanding General of Fifth U.S. Army, spoke with Lieutenant 

General Russel J. Honore ́, Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina 

(JTF-Katrina), and proposed to send an Operational Command 

Post to Louisiana. Lieutenant General Honore ́ agreed to our deployment. The OCP was sent as part of JTF-Katrina to augment 

Colonel Anthony F. Daskevich, the Defense Coordinating Officer for 

Louisiana, and his Defense Coordinating Element in Baton Rouge 

to provide planning support to FEMA and to enhance the communications and coordination capability for JTF-Katrina. 

I arrived at the State Emergency Operations Center in Baton 

Rouge at approximately 5 p.m., Wednesday, August 31. I immediately reported to Lieutenant General Honore ́. With the concurrence of Louisiana Governor Kathleen B. Blanco and Major General 

Bennett C. Landreneau, the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana, Lieutenant General Honore ́ changed our mission and directed me to evacuate the City of New Orleans and the greater 

New Orleans area in order to save lives and relieve human suffering. 

We immediately began our planning and worked through the 

night with Federal, State, and local agencies to develop an evacuation plan with the Superdome being the main effort. Our plan 

considered the use of multiple modes of transportation, ground, air, 

rail, and water. However, execution of our plan was based on available resources. 

We coordinated with FEMA, who had already begun efforts to obtain commercial and school buses. We used these buses as they became available. Commercial buses were used to transport displaced 

persons out of State to shelters identified and coordinated by 

FEMA. School buses were used only to transport people to the airport for evacuation by air. We synchronized our efforts and began 

evacuation of the Superdome upon the arrival of buses mid-morning on Thursday, September 1. This evacuation was coordinated 

with the National Guard personnel at the Superdome. The National Guard soldiers escorted the evacuees from the Superdome, 

across a pedestrian bridge, through the Hyatt Regency Hotel lobby 

where ARNORTH liaison personnel then efficiently had them load 

buses located on the connecting city street where they were then 

transported to shelters. 

We initially used the Texas Highway Patrol and later the Louisiana State Police to escort buses for security purposes and route 

orientation. We established command and control liaison team 

nodes at the Superdome and mile marker 209, an easily identifiable road intersection which included a truck stop on Interstate 

Highway 10, which was approximately 20 miles from the Superdome. Mile marker 209 was the best point where we could assemVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
39

ble such a large number of buses and quickly dispatch them to the 

Superdome and other areas in the city. 

We also deployed liaison team command and control nodes to the 

New Orleans Airport and to the I–10 Causeway. All of our command and control nodes were used to coordinate and synchronize 

our 24-hour evacuation operations. We provided our own communications using iridium satellite phones and intermittent Blackberry coverage. During the evening of Thursday, September 1, the 

OCP was augmented with an additional 28 soldiers and Department of the Army civilians from Fifth U.S. Army. This allowed us 

to better maintain 24-hour operations. Utilizing this network, by 

the end of the day on September 1, we had evacuated approximately 15,000 displaced persons out of the City of New Orleans. 

Air evacuation operations began at the New Orleans Airport on 

Friday, September 2. However, the majority of persons that the Department evacuated left by bus. Additionally, we used one Amtrak 

train to move under 100 persons from the Superdome to Baton 

Rouge and a river ferry to move people to Algiers Point where they 

were boarded on buses. Also on September 2, Lieutenant General 

Honore ́ coordinated with the Louisiana National Guard to secure 

the Convention Center and to provide basic sustainment items. 

Approximately 1,000 individuals were evacuated from the Convention Center on September 2. Overall on September 2, we evacuated approximately 32,000 additional displaced persons for a total 

of 47,000 from the Superdome, the I–10 Causeway, Algiers Point, 

and the Convention Center. 

By Saturday, September 3, we completed the evacuation efforts 

at the Superdome. We had shifted the main effort to the Convention Center. Within 7 hours, the Convention Center evacuation was 

complete. By the end of the day, Saturday, September 3, we had 

evacuated approximately 18,000 additional displaced persons for a 

total of over 65,000 persons. 

On Sunday, September 4, we closed our command and control 

nodes at the Superdome and Convention Center. With fewer than 

1,500 additional displaced persons evacuated on this day, we considered the main evacuation of the City of New Orleans and the 

greater New Orleans area complete. At this point, we had successfully coordinated the efforts and provided command and control for 

the evacuation of New Orleans. 

Although Hurricane Katrina was a tragedy, I am extremely 

proud of the professionalism and selfless service of each military 

and civilian member of our Fifth Army/Army North Team. Their 

superb efforts to coordinate with local, State, and Federal agencies 

were instrumental in our ability to evacuate over 65,000 displaced 

persons in a 72-hour period. Their dedication and devotion were 

critical to what I consider an enormous undertaking to alleviate the 

difficult circumstances and suffering of fellow Americans. We were 

simply Americans helping Americans. 

Thank you again for allowing me to testify before this Committee. I am now prepared to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, General. Mr. Pearce. 

40

1The prepared statement of Mr. Pearce appears in the Appendix on page 89. 

TESTIMONY OF VINCENT PEARCE,1 NATIONAL RESPONSE 

PROGRAM MANAGER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. PEARCE. Madam Chairman, Members of the Committee, I 

am Vincent Pearce, National Response Program Manager at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, responsible for DOT’s activities 

under the National Response Plan, which consists primarily of 

Emergency Support Function 1 (ESF–1), Transportation. 

I deployed to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

FEMA, National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) on August 

30, 2005, to lead the Department’s efforts, having spent the prior 

3 days in the DOT Crisis Management Center as part of DOT’s crisis management team. I worked from the NRCC continuously 

through Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Before Katrina struck, the team of DOT and contractor personnel 

was leaning forward in the saddle. On August 27, the Evacuation 

Liaison Team began coordinating frequent calls between DOT, 

FEMA, the National Hurricane Center, and State officials to discuss the pre-Katrina evacuation on the highways. 

On August 28, 2005, DOT staff at the NRCC called DOT’s Emergency Transportation Center to advise them to plan for the possibility of needing 500 buses to assist in a post-landfall evacuation. 

The Center notified DOT’s transportation services contractor, 

Landstar Express America, which began immediately exploring 

possible sources for vehicles and drivers. 

At 12:30 a.m. on August 31, we received verbal notification from 

FEMA that they would be tasking us to provide 455 buses (a figure 

that eventually grew to a peak of 1,105 several days later) for the 

evacuation of the Superdome; authorization to proceed arrived at 

1:45 a.m. At 5:25 p.m. that same day, FEMA tasked the Department of Defense to provide, ‘‘command and control for all evacuation in the New Orleans area and lower LA affected parishes.’’ As 

each bus that Landstar secured arrived in the designated staging 

areas, control was transferred from DOT to DOD. 

By 1 p.m. on August 31, DOT had a professional fleet management contractor onsite at the first staging area designated by the 

Louisiana State Patrol and the Louisiana National Guard. Roughly 

20 buses were already onsite. By midnight, some 200 buses had arrived and were ready for operation, having already outgrown the 

first two staging areas and moved to a third. Over 200 additional 

buses were already contracted and en route. By September 5, 2005, 

DOT had contracted for over 1,100 vehicles. 

DOT is participating in a review across the Federal Government 

to determine how to do better. While this Committee and others 

undertake the important work of identifying problems and fixes, I 

hope you also have time to recognize what went right. The drivers, 

dispatchers, and other employees of Landstar are among the unsung heroes of Katrina. Following Katrina, the DOT Inspector General conducted a review of internal controls over the Landstar contract and reported that, ‘‘The circumstances surrounding the disaster were both dire and extraordinary, and FAA Southern Region 

41

1The prepared statement of Mr. Brashear appears in the Appendix on page 92. 

management and our contractor provided an unprecedented level of 

response to the crisis as it unfolded.’’

In a chaotic environment, they brought thousands of buses and 

trucks when and where they were asked to. They have earned the 

thanks and appreciation of the Department of Transportation, and 

we hope yours as well. 

Thank you. I stand by to answer questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Brashear. 

TESTIMONY OF DWIGHT DAVID BRASHEAR,1 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CAPITAL AREA TRANSIT SYSTEM, BATON 

ROUGE, LOUISIANA 

Mr. BRASHEAR. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for allowing me 

to testify before you here today. 

The words of Ralph Waldo Emerson come to mind when he said: 

‘‘The wise man in a storm prays to God, not for safety from danger, 

but for deliverance from fear.’’

Once again, I am honored that you have requested me here today 

to discuss disaster preparedness and emergency response to Hurricane Katrina. I hope to show you today that mass transit played 

a valuable role during Hurricane Katrina, and it continues to aid 

in the devastation and aftermath of this cataclysm. 

First, I bring greetings to you from Baton Rouge’s Mayor-President Melvin Kip Holden and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco. 

They were both pivotal in my ability and my organization’s ability 

to maximize efforts in providing essential emergency services. I 

would also like to take this opportunity to recognize the contributions of FEMA, the Federal Transit Administration, the U.S. DOT, 

and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, 

and also I would like to thank the American Public Transit Association for their presence here today and their support in my testimony. 

I would also like to recognize all the agencies that worked so 

tirelessly for many weeks to assist in the needs of displaced citizens and the delivery of goods and services, and these include the 

offices of the Mayor-President, the city-parish employees, the Governor’s staff, the State Department of Transportation, the MPO, 

the State Police, local fire and local police, and many public and 

private agencies and organizations. Last, I would like to express 

the gratitude of all the people along the Gulf Coast for the help 

that this great Nation has given, from you, the elected officials, to 

many people and organizations from every State in this Nation. 

I am a witness to the resolve and resourcefulness and commitment of people extending a hand and opening their hearts to millions of hurting displaced families, many of whom have lost everything. I say to you today that we must continue to meet the shortterm emergency needs, and we must commit ourselves to the longterm rebuilding and resettlement needs of our fellow sisters and 

brothers. 

You have asked me here today to discuss resources that were put 

into developing pre-Katrina evacuation plans and into post-storm 

42

evacuation of New Orleans. I will present my comments as they relate to pre- and post-Katrina defining periods for the Gulf Coast 

area. Transit in Baton Rouge pre-Katrina had my agency’s eyes set 

on a major public involvement process to put a referendum before 

the voters in East Baton Rouge Parish to expand our service and 

to develop a very good mass transit system, which included bus 

rapid transit and light rail. 

We had a fair amount of traffic congestion prior to Katrina and 

associated infrastructure issues. Baton Rouge was a capital city 

with a population of about 400,000 with an estimated urban area 

of about 600,000, and it was a city excited about the future and potential growth. 

As you know, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast on August 

29, 2005, and I can only describe it as an event of shock and awe. 

A critical crisis situation happened in Baton Rouge almost overnight. Within 24 hours, approximately 400,000 of the 1.3 million 

population of New Orleans were moved into the Baton Rouge area. 

The road infrastructure was over capacitated. A 20-minute peak 

period commute went to almost 2 hours. And my transit system, 

the small transit system of Baton Rouge, was overwhelmed. Buses 

simply had to pass people up along transit routes due to passenger 

loads. Food, water, gas, utilities, and medical became critical supplies. A logistics nightmare ensued for moving anything. Support 

and coordination efforts of Federal, State, and local entities were 

pushed and stressed beyond endurance limits. 

Capital Area Transit System (CATS) did not facilitate in the 

evacuation of New Orleans. That is to say that my agency did not 

participate in the evacuation of New Orleans, as we were engaged 

in implementing emergency transit services in the greater Baton 

Rouge area. The elderly and disabled and those with special needs 

were moved from homes to shelters. I worked with the CATS property and the parish Office of Emergency Preparedness. I actually 

had to drive through the hurricane from my home to the parish 

OEP, swerving past flying debris. I understand that when you are 

part of the first responder team, the simple fact is that you will 

have to take some risk. But you plan for these, and you minimize 

your exposure. 

The Capital Area Transit System is prepared and part of the 

local government’s first responder team. Transit system professionals know the transportation road network, command excellent 

service deployment ability, and they have good communication systems. In Baton Rouge, we participated in the OEP disaster incident 

table top exercises and management practices on an ongoing basis. 

Many transit professionals possess the tools to respond to chemical, 

biological, flood, fire, and terrorist disaster incidents. Tools for dealing with the disasters need to be developed, upgraded, and practiced constantly. Common operating platforms, logistics management plans, use of professionals, resource inventory and availability, clear chains of command, and practice are what I believe 

to be critical components of meeting the challenge of disaster management. Through practice, team members learn to trust each 

other, focus on an incident with changing dynamics, and optimize 

the use of available resources. 

43

I was called by the Governor’s Office on the evening of August 

31 to assist the State in the post-Katrina evacuation of New Orleans. On September 1, 2005, I reported for duty at the State OEP 

facility, and quickly I realized what General George Patton must 

have been thinking when he said: ‘‘In 40 hours I shall be in battle, 

with little information, and on the spur of the moment I will have 

to make the most momentous decisions. But I believe that one’s 

spirit enlarges with responsibility and that, with God’s help, I shall 

make them and make them right.’’

Although I had no direct involvement in developing pre-Katrina 

evacuation plans, I assisted in the coordination and evacuation 

from the Superdome, Convention Center, I–10, and other areas. 

School buses, transit buses, and inter-city coaches from around the 

country came to assist in our needs. Some may say it should have 

been done better, and I believe that ‘‘woulda,’’ ‘‘shoulda,’’ and 

‘‘coulda’’ become the operative words. As we have more time to reflect and assess how the emergency operation was implemented, 

these decisions will result in new protocols, new processes and programs, and this is good because real change requires real change, 

and that is exactly what we are after. 

My agency and the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority, 

FEMA, the FTA and local MPO, State Transportation Department, 

and local governments worked 14-hour days from September 8 

through September 19 to develop an emergency Baton Rouge-New 

Orleans project proposal. FEMA and FTA responded with a $47 

million contract on October 1, 2005, and we believe this is probably 

the largest such contract in the history of this country for a mass 

transit property. 

Today, my agency and the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (NORTA) work side-by-side in our city, providing emergency 

transit services to displaced hurricane victims and also providing 

a transportation option to gridlock and traffic congestion. 

NORTA is operating emergency fixed-route local and ADA paratransit service in Baton Rouge, and we hope to shortly begin park 

and ride, and we hope this will alleviate some of the traffic congestion along the Baton Rouge highways. The FEMA/FTA project has 

allowed NORTA to begin calling back some of its 1,350 displaced 

employees. NORTA has also begun start-up service in New Orleans. This is a transit success story because of the partners in this 

persevered and championed the mission. It required real change in 

State and local policies and procedures, real change in coordination 

and internal operations of my agency and the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority. It has required help from sister agencies 

across this country for equipment. It has required the replacement 

of fear with endless possibilities and boundless opportunities. 

When I think back to August 29, it must have been a day much 

like what caused Longfellow to write: ‘‘Be still sad heart and cease 

repining, for behind the dark clouds the sun is still shining. Thy 

fate is a common fate of all, into each life some rain must fall.’’ And 

we have to have dark and dreary days in order for us to appreciate 

the brighter days. 

And I’m here to say that Baton Rouge and New Orleans are 

standing on the sunlit path of progress and rebuilding. 

44

Once again, Madam Chairman, I thank you for allowing me to 

tell you that mass transit is working. It worked in the evacuation, 

and I hope and pray that God will continue to bless this Nation 

and to bless this government. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator Lieberman, I understand that you have a scheduling 

constraint, so why don’t you proceed with your questions. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, thank you very much for 

your courtesy. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

Just very briefly, Mr. Pearce, I want to ask you a couple of questions. You are the National Response Manager for the Department 

of Transportation of the Federal Government. Under the National 

Response Plan, Federal DOT, logically enough, has the lead for 

ESF–1 transportation components of response. I was struck in your 

testimony that you reported that the first time FEMA asked the 

U.S. Department of Transportation to obtain buses was at 1:45 

a.m. on Wednesday, which would have been August 31, which is 2 

days after landfall. I was impressed, on the other hand, if I heard 

you correctly, that you were in the Department, presumably based 

on the weather forecasting that everybody had heard, not to mention earlier warnings—I know DOT participated in Hurricane Pam, 

but you had begun to mobilize. And my question is two-fold really. 

One, why do you think it took so long for FEMA to ask you for 

help, and two, did anyone at DOT do anything before receiving that 

official request on Wednesday to provide transportation assistance 

to New Orleans? 

Mr. PEARCE. Senator, it would probably not be appropriate for 

me to speculate as to FEMA’s internal discussions or operations, so 

I’ll defer to your asking them that question. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How about DOT? 

Mr. PEARCE. What we did based on the concern by the gentleman 

I had leading the ESF–1 at the NRCC on August 28, was we contacted our contractor——

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is Saturday, 2 days—no, that is Sunday, the day before landfall, right? 

Mr. PEARCE. Yes, sir. And they began contacting a variety of 

sources for motor coaches. They began with their primary bus subcontractor. They identified some other major carriers, including the 

Nation’s largest. They identified four of the major motor coach associations as possible sources, and they began touching base with 

these basically to make them aware that there may be a need in 

the Gulf area and to start considering how they would be able to 

provide resources. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How quickly could they have gotten buses 

into the Gulf, into New Orleans, for instance? 

Mr. PEARCE. One of the reports was 12 hours from one of the 

providers. Of course, one of the things that our contractor did very 

intelligently was they also looked geographically, so they focused 

on Gulf region providers who obviously would be able to get there 

sooner. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. If asked by FEMA, or I suppose anybody at the Department of Homeland Security, therefore, in a timely way, could the Department of Transportation have provided 

buses prior to the hurricane making landfall? 

45

Mr. PEARCE. Yes, sir, we could have. We had already been mobilized and were moving large quantities of disaster relief supplies 

into the staging areas. We had mobilized on September 27 into the 

State Emergency Operations Center, into the Regional Response 

Coordination Center, and the NRCC. The buses would have been 

simply another transportation asset that we would have acquired, 

deployed to wherever we were asked to, and then stood by for further direction. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you this last question. You 

said—and I believe it is true—under the National Response Plan, 

DOT can engage in prestaging transportation resources, including 

those to be used for evacuation prior to a disaster, but only at the 

request of the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, or pursuant to a Federal support request. We have heard from other DOT 

personnel that they believe they have no authority to procure assets without authorization from FEMA. I wonder, after Pam, but 

certainly after Katrina, whether that is the kind of issue that 

should be worked out in advance and not when the storm is upon 

some area of America? 

Mr. PEARCE. Senator, I would say that, among many other questions, is going to be part of the study we are doing, directed by the 

Senate, of assessing Gulf State evacuation plans, working jointly 

with the Department of Homeland Security, and conversely, working with them on the congressionally directed study of emergency 

management and operation plans of all of the States and the 75 

metropolitan areas. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Pearce. 

Madam Chairman, thanks again for your courtesy. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Warner, would you like 

to speak now? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I have been around here for a long time. I always enjoy 

quotations, and I think you, Mr. Brashear, picked two very fitting 

quotations to highlight your important testimony. 

Mr. BRASHEAR. Thank you, sir. 

Senator WARNER. I happen to remember a good deal about the 

first one because I am a little older than the rest of you and been 

around a little longer, but the second one, I am going to make sure 

I get a copy of that. Would you be kind enough? Is it in this written 

comment that we have before us? 

Mr. BRASHEAR. No, sir. I have it written in my journal here. 

Senator WARNER. Maybe you can scribble it out for me. 

Mr. BRASHEAR. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. Thank you again for this hearing, 

as well as the other hearings. It is terribly important that we provide for the Senate a record of what has taken place and will be 

taking place regarding Katrina. 

Now, General, first I want to say that testimony before this Committee and other committees of the Congress clearly reflect extraordinary commendation on all members of the Armed Forces of the 

United States, be they the regular Army or the Guard and Reserve, 

in their respective and somewhat diverse missions on behalf of givVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Feb 13, 2007 Jkt 027023 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
46

ing support to others to help alleviate the suffering and to bring 

order to this area. I accompanied the distinguished Chairman down 

on one of the early visits, and we saw General Honore ́ still in action down there. I had a nice private visit with him, and I am 

greatly impressed with him as a professional officer and his dedication, how he put so much of his strength and wisdom into his mission. 

And as I understand, you served under him briefly for a while 

down there; is that correct? 

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator WARNER. My first question is with reference to the doctrine of posse comitatus. I have suggested to the Secretary of Defense that they study that doctrine, given the lessons learned in 

this tragic situation, to determine if some modifications to the law 

should be made. We can all hope a natural disaster such as this 

will never happen again to the United States, but I think we know 

better and have to prepare for it. We never envisioned this one. As 

you know, in that doctrine, the regular forces cannot participate in 

law enforcement activities, whereas the Guard and Reserve can. 

Did you observe any problems as a consequence of the active 

forces not being able to assist the Guard and Reserve or local law 

enforcement in such instances where law and order had to be 

brought about? 

General GRAHAM. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator WARNER. Did you see that it was any handicap whatsoever that here are two soldiers working together, one a Guardsman, one a Regular, both in similar uniforms, and the local residents and others cannot tell the difference between the two, particularly in an extreme situation, and if law enforcement were required, the Regular would simply have to take two paces step back 

and let the Guardsman handle it, but you did not see any instances 

of that nature? 

General GRAHAM. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator WARNER. But you were aware of the law and therefore 

you counseled your forces on what they could and could not do? 

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator WARNER. Well, we are still trying to study that issue. I 

just want to bring it up. 

I did a little research on the important missions that you have 

down there. You have described it in your testimony, but I would 

like to look to the future and see if I have this correct now. With 

reference to homeland defense, the Department of Defense initially 

split responsibility between the First and Fifth Army geographically, with the Fifth Army responsible for all west of the Mississippi and the First Army responsible for all east. However, the 

mission changed from one of a geographic responsibility to one designed to support specific functions for each division nationwide. In 

other words, each division now had a nationwide responsibility 

with specific components. For example, the Fifth Army was to prepare for homeland defense support, that is, matters dealing with 

terrorism and traditional homeland security needs, while the First 

Army would align itself with Guard training and, as a result, the 

more FEMA type of disaster response. Is that basically correct? 

47

1The documents submitted by General Graham appear in the Appendix on page 63. 

General GRAHAM. No, sir, it is not. Fifth U.S. Army standing up 

to become Army North, the Army service component to Northern 

Command. 

Senator WARNER. Yes. 

General GRAHAM. In that role, sir, we will have the missions of 

homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. The 

First Army’s mission will be training readiness and mobilization 

for our reserve components. 

Senator WARNER. I would like to, Madam Chairman, ask unanimous consent that this officer can place in the record the change 

to command responsibilities for the active forces in the event that, 

I presume, NORTHCOM would give the orders to activate it, would 

that be correct? 

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir. And you are talking future, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Yes, future, that is correct. 

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. We are looking at the future as part of our 

study here in this Committee. 

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Were you personally participating in the construct of this new, should we say, general order for the 

NORTHCOM and the two armies? 

General GRAHAM. No, sir, I was not. I arrived in August 2005, 

sir. That process began sometime earlier in 2005. 

Senator WARNER. I see. Did they try and modify it or change it, 

given the experiences, the Katrina problems? 

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir. Our initial operating capability was 

effective September 15 during the hurricane event, and as we reported back to our headquarters different information, the main 

command post staff back in headquarters was making changes to 

the documentation and using lessons learned, as we speak, and the 

current organization is now different from what the original organization had intended to be based on this experience, sir. 

Senator WARNER. All right. Would you place into the record the 

orders as now standing for the utilization of our active forces and 

such other material as might be pertinent in our study of this situation?1

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. I thank you very much. I thank the Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

General Graham, perhaps the most troubling testimony that we 

have heard in 14 hearings on this issue is the testimony earlier 

this week that nursing home patients were not evacuated prior to 

the landfall, and that nursing homes ran out of fuel for generators, 

ran out of essential supplies, and that patients actually needlessly 

died because they were not evacuated. Did either the city or the 

State seek any assistance from the military, to your knowledge, to 

assist in evacuating nursing homes? 

General GRAHAM. Ma’am, not that I’m aware of. 

Chairman COLLINS. Would that have been a mission that you 

would have been able to undertake had you been asked to do so? 

48

General GRAHAM. Ma’am, certainly if the mission had come to us, 

we would have done an analysis to see if we could do the mission. 

But, yes, ma’am, if it would have come to us, we certainly would 

have done that work. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Pearce, was the Department of Transportation asked to provide any assets, to your knowledge, to assist 

in the evacuation of nursing homes? 

Mr. PEARCE. When we received our first task to provide buses, 

that task also included a requirement to provide 300 ambulances, 

but that requirement was canceled a matter of hours later, and we 

were told by FEMA that it had been duplicated and, in fact, was 

transferred or being executed by the General Services Administration. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Brashear, did your agency play any role 

in trying to evacuate the nursing homes? 

Mr. BRASHEAR. No, ma’am, we did not. 

Chairman COLLINS. General Graham, the Governor of Louisiana, 

in her narrative response to the Committee, has implied that the 

evacuation of the Superdome took National Guard forces away 

from life-saving search and rescue operations. As the lead Federal 

officer in charge of evacuating New Orleans, in your judgment, did 

the evacuation of the Superdome shift National Guard resources 

away from ongoing search and rescue efforts? 

General GRAHAM. No, ma’am, not that I’m aware of at all. 

Chairman COLLINS. From each of your perspectives, is there any 

particular lesson that you learned from Hurricane Katrina that is 

going to change your operations in the future or are those reviews 

still under way? General Graham. 

General GRAHAM. Ma’am, under our new organization, we will 

have defense coordinating officers and their staffs located within 

the 10 FEMA regions, and we think enhancing their ability for fulltime coordination will allow them to be better prepared in the future because we will have firsthand knowledge of all the local residents at the time. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think that is an excellent recommendation 

and improvement. 

Mr. Pearce. 

Mr. PEARCE. I think we share with every entity that was involved in the response the intense frustration of trying to work at 

a local, regional, and national level absent the communications necessary to achieve really effective coordination between our personnel at all of those levels. We are very much engaged in efforts 

to figure out how to solve this problem, and in fact, how it becomes 

a component of establishing within ESF–1 and more broadly what 

is referred to as the common operational picture, so that in fact we 

have a clear understanding and ability to interact regarding what’s 

going on here in Washington, what’s going on at the regional level, 

and what’s going on down at the incident level itself. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Brashear. 

Mr. BRASHEAR. Yes, ma’am. For our efforts, we continue to rediscover and reassess our role as a mass transit provider in the Gulf 

Coast, State of Louisiana, what we need to do better, how we can 

get more involved. And I think one of the things that transit professionals—and I spoke in Long Beach just a couple days ago—is 

49

that we need to insist that these types of things be handled by 

transit professionals. We each have our respective disciplines. Mine 

just happens to be mass transit and moving large numbers of people, hopefully, efficiently, and I think working with the American 

Public Transportation Association, we are looking at how we can, 

in a coordinated effort, use other like transit properties that may 

not be affected by a disaster like this, bring those resources to bear. 

We have cities like Houston and Dallas and other cities that 

could have, their transit systems could have provided resources to 

us very quickly. And so we are working through the industry 

through this country to make sure that we are ready as an industry to respond to these types of things in the future. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to thank each of you for your cooperation with the Committee’s investigation and your testimony here today. There may 

well be some additional questions for the record following up on 

Senator Warner’s questions, for example. The hearing record will 

remain open for 15 days. Thank you for being here. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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