COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman 

RONALD LAWSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0911-01-2 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 

HANOVER JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL CENTER/ 

 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Timothy J. Healy, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Randolph A. Beales, Acting Attorney General; 

Gregory E. Lucyk, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General; Catherine Crooks Hill, Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 Ronald Lawson (claimant) contends that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission erred in finding that he failed to prove 

that he sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in 

the course of his employment on July 21, 1999. Upon reviewing 

the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this 

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the 

commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "In 

order to carry [the] burden of proving an 'injury by accident,' 
a claimant must prove that the cause of [the] injury was an 

identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event and that it 

resulted in an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in

the body." Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 858, 

865 (1989) (citations omitted). Unless we can say as a matter 

of law that claimant's evidence sustained his burden of proof, 

the commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us. 

See Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 

S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 The commission ruled that claimant did not prove that he 

was injured as a result of a specific incident at work on July 

21, 1999. In so ruling, the commission summarized claimant's 

testimony as follows: 

[C]laimant candidly testified at the hearing 

that he was unaware of stepping on any nail, 

screw, or other construction debris during 

his workday on July 21, 1999. The claimant 

testified that he dressed for work at home, 

walked down two flights of stairs and across 

a parking lot to his car, and then drove 

directly to work. After completing his 

eight-hour shift, the claimant drove back to 

his home, walked across the parking lot and 

up two flights of stairs before entering his 

apartment. The claimant did not notice the 

blood in his left sock until after he 

arrived home and removed his shoes, and 

later observed a small hole in the sole of 

his left shoe. The claimant himself 

initially thought that the blood was from "a 

break in the skin from walking so much that 

day," and only later speculated that he 

"possibly" stepped on a nail or some other 

sharp object in the area around Unit 15. In 

this regard, we note that the claimant's 

admitted loss of feeling in his left foot, 

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resulting from his bilateral foot 

neuropathy, made it impossible for even the 

claimant to know precisely when or where he 

suffered the puncture wound. 

 Based upon these factual findings, which are supported by 

claimant's testimony, the commission was entitled to conclude 

that "the mere speculative possibility that the puncture wound 

occurred while the claimant was working on July 21, 1999, does 

not carry his burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that he experienced a compensable injury by accident." 

In addition, as fact finder, the commission was entitled to give 

little probative weight to Dr. John W. Snoddy's opinions because 

they were based upon the speculative possibility that claimant 

injured his foot while working on July 21, 1999. 

 In light of the lack of any evidence, beyond conjecture, 

that claimant's injury was caused by his stepping on a sharp 

object at work, we cannot find as a matter of law that 

claimant's evidence sustained his burden of proving that his 

injury was caused by a specific identifiable incident or sudden 

precipitating event occurring at work on July 21, 1999. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

Affirmed.

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