# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 4, 2018 *

Decided April 5, 2018

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 17

‐ 1610

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellee

,

v

.

IVAN RENE MOORE,

Defendant

‐ Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

No. 12

‐ C

‐ 271

Lynn Adelman,

J udge

.

O R D E R

Ivan Moore has been before us twice contesting a judgment of foreclosure—once

to argue the merits and once to challenge a procedural irregularity. He lost both times.

See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Moore

, 599 F. App’x 600 (7th Cir. 2015); Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A. v. Moore

, 618 F. App’x 857 (7th Cir. 2015). He now complains that the district court

erroneously confirmed the foreclosure sale. But the court did not abuse its discretion

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp

. P. 32.1No.17

‐ 1610 Page 2

when it confirmed the sale and entered a deficiency judgment against Moore, so we

affirm its judgment.

We summarized the facts of Moore’s case in our first decision, Wells Fargo Bank

,

599 F. App’x at 601, and so we do not repeat them here. After the district court entered

judgment permitting Wells Fargo to foreclose on the two properties that Moore had

used to secure a $7.1 million dollar mortgage, the properties sold for $100,000 at a

sheriff’s sale. Wells Fargo then moved to confirm the sale and amend the judgment.

After a hearing, the court granted the motion and entered a deficiency judgment against

Moore for $7,101,105.52.

In this appeal, Moore primarily attempts to relitigate issues that we already have

settled, but he also challenges the confirmation of the foreclosure sale, which occurred

after his second appeal. Moore asserts that the Milwaukee County Sheriff, Wells Fargo,

and a third party conspired to deprive him of his property by misusing the foreclosure

process. Moore believes that the sheriff did not properly give notice of the sale; Wells

Fargo lied to the court about the value of the two properties; and no sheriff’s sale really

occurred. But Moore’s contentions are not supported by evidence.

Moore first contends that the district court should not have confirmed the

foreclosure sale because the sheriff did not give proper notice. Moore argues that he

was entitled to six weeks’ notice, but he relies on an outdated statute. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 815.31(2) (West 2011). Wisconsin law currently requires notice of a foreclosure sale to

be publicly posted for three successive weeks. W IS

. S TAT

. § 815.31(2); see Bank of Am.,

N.A. v. Booth

, 866 N.W.2d 405, 2015 WL 2007791, *1–2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 5, 2015). Here,

the sheriff attested that he did just that and provided a copy of the published notice to

the district court. Moore’s further contention that he was entitled to personal notice has

no support in the law. See Family Sav. & Loan Ass ʹ n v. Barkwood Landscaping Co.

,

286 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Wis. 1980). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that the bank followed the notice requirements. See United States v. Peters

, 777 F.2d 1294,

1298 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[C]onfirmation of a judicial sale rests in the sound discretion of

the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse.”)

Next, Moore argues that the properties were not sold for a fair value. See W IS

.

S TAT

. § 846.165(2). Fair value means “nothing more than such reasonable value as does

not shock the conscience of the court.” First Wis. Nat’l Bank of Oshkosh v. KSW Invs., Inc.

,

238 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Wis. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bank of N.Y.

v. Mills

, 678 N.W.2d 332, 336 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). Moore’s two properties sold for aNo.17

‐ 1610 Page 3

total of $100,000. Moore opines that they were worth at least $1.5 million, but he

submitted no appraisal to support his estimate. Wells Fargo, on the other hand,

provided evidence that the properties were worth between $217,000 and $230,000

combined and that a contractor had estimated that one of them needed extensive

repairs that could cost over $172,000. Moreover, there were tax liens on the properties

totaling $76,900. The district court found that given this unrebutted evidence, $100,000

was a “fair value.” This was not an abuse of discretion. See Peters

, 777 F.2d at 1298 n.6.

Last, Moore argues that the district court erred in confirming the sale because an

original sheriff’s deed of foreclosure did not exist. This, he asserts, proves that the

sheriff sale never occurred, so the court had nothing to confirm. Wisconsin law requires

that “[n]o later than 10 days after” a foreclosure sale, the sheriff must “[f]ile a report of

the sale with the clerk of court” and “deliver to the clerk of court

. . . the deed to the

mortgaged premises.” W IS

. S TAT

. § 846.16(1)(b). But at the end of the confirmation

hearing Wells Fargo’s counsel told the district court that the clerk’s office was unable to

locate the original sheriff’s deed when asked, and in counsel’s understanding, “it likely

does not exist.”

Moore did not object to the missing deed at the confirmation hearing, but the

defendants do not argue that he waived the argument. See Alioto v. Lisbon

, 651 F.3d 715,

721 (7th Cir. 2011). Instead, they correctly point out that the evidence does not support

Moore’s assertion that the original deed never existed. Copies of both the sheriff’s report

of the foreclosure sale and the sheriff’s deed, signed on October 12 and 13, 2016,

respectively, were docketed in the district court that same month, long before the

confirmation hearing. Furthermore, the sheriff wrote in the foreclosure report that he

“executed a Sheriff’s Deed of the Property and

. . . delivered the Deed to the Clerk of

this Court to be held until confirmation of sale.” The evidence supports the district

court’s finding that all the requirements of W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 846.16 were met and that

confirmation was appropriate. And the district court remedied the problem of the

missing deed by including in the final confirmation order an instruction to the sheriff to

execute another deed so that an original could be transmitted to Wells Fargo with the

amended judgement as required by § 846.16(3m). Nothing the district court did violated

§ 846.16, nor did the missing deed mean the court should not have confirmed the sale

when the evidence demonstrated that the foreclosure had proceeded in accordance with

state law. See id. § 846.16(2m), (4).

AFFIRMED