McNair Paper Number 44, Chapter 6,  October 1995
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO LONG-TERM REGIONAL STABILITY**
Many governments wishing to supplement national military instruction rely on the United States to assistin educating future key professionals--presidential advisors, senior commanders, principal staff officers,educators, and trainers.  Promising officers assigned to the U.S. program represent an investment bytheir government and military institution in their country's future security and defense.  Graduates do riseto positions of considerable prominence.  The experience of the Naval Command College (NCC) isillustrative of the importance attached to U.S. schooling, the quality of foreign students, as well as thecontribution of DOD's educational efforts.  Since 1957, 53 percent of international students (641 of 1219)from 77 countries have risen to flag rank; 19 percent of these officers have become chiefs of service. Five percent of graduates between 1977 and 1991 (23) currently hold this position.  At the U.S. ArmyWar College, 54 percent of its foreign graduates (241 of 449) from 85 countries have attained generalofficer rank.  Today, 3 percent, 7 officers, hold the highest position in their army or a cabinet-levelbillet.  (There are no data yet on the initial civilian students.)  
	For its part, Washington also considers these international officer graduates, and now civilianprofessionals, to be an important investment in U.S. security by virtue of the roles they will play inestablishing or sustaining local and regional stability worldwide.  This U.S. interest is pursued throughforeign military education and training in several ways, as the INSS team details below.   

**Access and Subjective Ties**
The International Military Education and Training program today is often described as an "instrumentof influence," able to affect a wide range of U.S. interests from human rights performance to militaryinteroperability.  This notion of "influence," however, requires close examination.  In one traditionalview, IMET and other forms of security assistance are presumed to accord the provider leverage vis avis recipients.  As one experienced observer noted in describing this Cold War mentality, it was believedto be self-evident that "the United States is able to affect the internal and external policy behavior ofrecipient military institutions and governments in a manner congenial with U.S. foreign policyinterests."(Note 27)  This perspective pervades the 1975 and1976 HIRC hearings on international security assistance that produced the IMET legislation.
	The study team found that almost all of today's proponents of foreign military education and trainingcontacted during its research recognize that IMET offers no guarantee of far reaching capacity to alterrecipient institutional values or governmental behavior.  Practitioners speak instead of access, rapport,and ease of communication, terms used by some synonymously with "influence."  Former and currentattachés, security assistance officers, and IMET graduates themselves noted in response to the INSSquestionnaire and during its workshops that security assistance education and training "gives you accessthat you wouldn't or couldn't have without difficulty,"  that is, "access at the senior ranks of host countrymilitary establishments."(Note 28)  Describing an experiencewith a Commandant of the Bolivia Infantry School, a retired Special Forces officer wrote: "We hadinstant rapport as professionals having attended the same schools.  As you well know, in that part of theworld (as well as others) the 'chemistry' factor is the single most important in establishing anenvironment for the exchange of ideas.  "(Note 29) "IMETstudents do act differently from their fellow officers who have not visited the United States," noted aDefense Attaché in an African state.  "They seek out contact with U.S. representatives, are morefriendly, and have a wider range of understanding to our way of thinking and acting."(Note 30) Diplomatic missions find this friendly opening"incredibly useful."  In Maldives, for instance, IMET is the means of access to and inter-action with theclosed world of the National Security Service.(Note 31)  Forseveral African countries, this is the only foreign assistance the United States provides. 
	The foreign military education and training experience in the United States builds what retired LTGWilliam E. Odom, USA, has called "subjective ties" with future military and often political leaders inother states.  In 1993 Congressional testimony he recounted a personal experience:

	Another kind of desirable influence through IMET is demonstrated by US-Pakistani relations immediately afterthe Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  General Zia, the President of Pakistan, was being urged by his foreignminister to scorn US offers of assistance in favor of coming to term with Moscow.  Because Zia had attendedtwo US Army schools, and because he had made extremely close friends with ordinary American citizens duringthose two years, he was subjectively inclined toward the US offer.  As a party to the meeting with him inPakistan when he made the decision to accept the US offer, tying his policy to US strategy for Afghanistan, Igained the impression that his IMET experience was a critical factor in his decision.(Note 32)

	It is difficult to measure the degree to which a former IMET or FMS student officer or civilian isfavorably inclined toward the United States.  A graduate may not have made it a part of his judgmentuntil an issue arises that forces him to make a decision.  More than likely, IMET is just one componentof a complex decision process, such as President Zia's.  But it is a factor, and personal exposure to U.S.society, institutions, and values could be the decisive influence.  During a September 1991 crisis inZaire, a general officer-IMET graduate faced such a policy decision and made the difference in getting450 Americans evacuated from a closed national airport under his control.(Note 33)
	On the other hand, the IMET experience may have adverse or no affect.  Clearly, a country's ownculture, political and institutional traditions are significant influences on the attitudes and conduct ofmilitary and civilian leaders.  There will always be powerful leader-graduates with no subjective ties andno interest in U.S. values after the academic or training experience.(Note 34)  Available data, however, suggests that this group ofatypical former students is very small in number.  They often have spent only a few weeks in the UnitedStates or, as the pre-1984 example of the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama suggests, havenot experienced democratic culture.(Note 35)

**Better Bilateral Understanding**
The opportunity for professional development in the United States is an important symbol of a soundbilateral relationship in a world where the potential for misunderstanding between states is ever present. Graduates of U.S. military programs depart with a better appreciation of American cultural referencepoints and style of public debate.  As one survey respondent put it: "Walk a mile in my shoes and you'llprobably better understand and react with me in the future."(Note36)  Research revealed that former student-officers often help behind the scenes to correctmisinformation or place an issue in its proper context.  Undoubtedly, officers who have attended coursesin the United States will be in important command, staff and academic positions where their observationscarry weight, even when they are junior officers.  "The main contribution of the IMET graduates hasbeen the diminishing of emotional and uninformed reactions [within the military institution] against theU.S.," observed a senior civilian Brazilian survey respondent with extensive government service.  "Evenif the formal declarations sound aggressive, IMET programs have created very effective informalchannels that help to clarify sensitive situations, such as a deep suspicion at the Brazilian War Collegethat the U.S. has a plan to seize the Amazon Basin because of its environmental importance."(Note 37)
	Another dimension of bilateral understanding is crucial in a crisis--the existence of high-level,unofficial channels of communication that allow friends to interpret events from their perspectives andthereby improve the accuracy of reporting and depth of analysis.  During the Malvinas/Falklands Warin 1982, shared U.S. educational experiences produced at least two unauthorized channels ofcommunication between senior Argentine and U.S. officer-classmates.(Note 38)  In quickly planning and coordinating Operation*Provide Comfort* in 1991, both the State and Defense Departments benefitted from close relationshipsamong several U.S. foreign service officers, U.S. military officers, and their Turkish militarycounterparts, all of whom had met as students at U.S. war colleges. 

**Neutral Ground Upon Which Neighbors Meet**
There are, in reality, few opportunities for officers from neighboring countries to meet, exchangeviews in a not-for-attribution environment, and become acquainted with one another.  U.S. securityassistance training provides such an opportunity and encourages such interaction.  Internationalstudents at a U.S. installation, often small in number, tend to become a close knit family during aprofessional military course.  Experiences are exchanged and bonds of friendship and trust are oftenformed.  DOD's Informational Program plays a key role in this process.  Its activities bring the foreignstudents together regularly for special events and tours, and in this and in many other ways helpthem to get to know each other outside of the classroom.  Case in point, several years ago a seniorChilean air force officer observed that "relations with the Peruvian Air Force had never been betterbecause his Peruvian classmate from undergraduate pilot training in the United States had also risento an equally important position in his air force.  They had remained friends for more than 20 yearsand were in regular contact.  The Chilean added that 'there is nothing that we cannot work outbetween us.'"(Note 39)
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