FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MORIS ALFREDO QUIROZ PARADA,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 13-73967

Agency No.

A072-525-513

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted November 14, 2017

San Francisco, California

Filed August 29, 2018

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, Richard A. Paez, 

Circuit Judge, and Timothy J. Savage,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Paez

 * The Honorable Timothy J. Savage, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel granted Moris Alfredo Quiroz Parada’s 

petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 

denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 

under the Convention Against Torture, in a case in which 

Quiroz Parada, a citizen of El Salvador, sought relief after 

he and his family were the victims of threats, home 

invasions, beatings, and killings at the hands of Frente 

Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional guerillas.

The panel held that the record compelled a finding of 

past persecution. The panel explained that the Board 

mischaracterized what Quiroz Parada endured as simply 

threats against his family and attempts to recruit him, and 

ignored, among other evidence, his brother’s assassination, 

the murder of his neighbor as a result of Quiroz Parada’s own 

family being targeted, his experience being captured and 

beaten to the point of unconsciousness, repeated forced 

home invasions, and specific death threats toward his family. 

The panel concluded that the harm Quiroz Parada and his 

family suffered rose to the level of past persecution. 

Applying pre-REAL ID Act standards, the panel held 

that the harm Quiroz Parada suffered bore a nexus to a 

protected ground, as the FMLN guerillas were motivated, at 

least in part, by his family’s government and military 

service. The panel noted that it was immaterial that the 

 ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 3

FMLN’s attempted conscription of Quiroz Parada would 

have served the dual goal of filling their ranks in order to 

carry on their war against the government and pursue their 

political objectives, because their additional goal of 

retaliating against the Quiroz Parada family was a protected 

ground.

The panel held that substantial evidence did not support 

the agency’s determination that the government successfully 

rebutted the presumption of future persecution. The panel 

noted that by the time the IJ considered the country 

conditions information submitted into the record it was five 

years out of date, and predated the FMLN’s rise to power in 

government. The panel explained that the government 

cannot meet its burden of rebutting the presumption by 

presenting evidence of the Salvadoran government’s human 

rights record at a time when the government was run by a 

different political party, particularly when at the time of the 

IJ hearing it was run by the very same FMLN who 

persecuted the Quiroz Parada family. The panel joined the 

Second Circuit in holding that reliance on significantly or 

materially outdated country reports cannot suffice to rebut 

the presumption of future persecution. 

The panel concluded that the agency erred as a matter of 

law in denying Quiroz Parada’s application for CAT relief 

because it ignored pertinent evidence in the record and erred 

by construing the “government acquiescence” standard too 

narrowly. The panel explained that acquiescence does not 

require actual knowledge or willful acceptance of torture, 

and that awareness and willful blindness will suffice. The 

panel further explained that the acquiescence standard is met 

where the record demonstrates that public officials at any 

level, even if not at the federal level, would acquiesce in the 

torture the petitioner is likely to suffer, and that evidence 
4 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

showing widespread corruption of public officials, as the 

record revealed in this case, can be highly probative on this 

point. The panel noted that the country conditions reports 

and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada indicate the 

acquiescence of the Salvadoran government, or at least parts 

of the Salvadoran government, in the rampant violence and 

murder perpetrated by the Mara Salvatrucha gang, at whose 

hands Quiroz Parada fears that he will be killed. 

The panel remanded for reconsideration of his CAT 

claim, an exercise of discretion whether to grant asylum 

relief, and an appropriate order withholding Quiroz Parada’s 

removal.

COUNSEL

Christopher J. Stender (argued), Federal Immigration 

Counselors AZ PC, Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioner.

Janette L. Allen (argued) and Laura Halliday Hickein, Trial 

Attorneys; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Office of 

Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 5

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Moris Alfredo Quiroz Parada fled his native El Salvador 

in 1991 at the age of seventeen after he and his family were 

the victims of threats, home invasions, beatings, and killings 

at the hands of Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 

Nacional (FMLN) guerillas. Twenty-four years after he first 

applied for asylum, Quiroz Parada petitions for review of a 

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 

affirming the denial of his application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT). We conclude that the 

record compels a finding of past persecution, and that 

substantial evidence does not support the agency’s 

determination that the government successfully rebutted the 

presumption of future persecution. We also conclude that 

the agency erred as a matter of law in denying Quiroz 

Parada’s application for CAT relief. Accordingly, we grant 

the petition and hold that Quiroz Parada is eligible for 

asylum and entitled to withholding of removal, and remand 

for reconsideration of his CAT claim.

I.

A.

Quiroz Parada, a native and citizen of El Salvador, 

entered the United States without authorization on May 25, 

1991 at the age of seventeen. Quiroz Parada has 

continuously resided in the United States for the last twentyseven years, and currently lives in Arizona with his wife and 

three children, the latter of whom are United States citizens. 

He is the sole provider for his family.
6 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

During the Salvadoran civil war of the 1980s and early 

1990s, Quiroz Parada and his family were subjected to 

threats, home invasions, beatings, and killings by FMLN 

guerillas.1 Quiroz Parada’s family was targeted largely 

because of his brother’s military service during the civil war, 

and potentially also because of his father’s work as an 

assistant marshal, a role akin to a sheriff. The FMLN 

apparently found out about the Quiroz Paradas’ government 

connections because some of the family’s neighbors were 

relatives of the guerillas.

In June 1989, FMLN guerillas sought out and murdered 

Quiroz Parada’s brother while he was on leave from the 

military. Following his brother’s assassination, FMLN 

guerrillas broke into the Quiroz Parada family home on at 

least three occasions. The guerillas sought to kill other 

members of the Quiroz Parada family, and, on one occasion, 

to kidnap Quiroz Parada with the apparent intent to forcibly 

conscript him.

The Quiroz Paradas knew the guerillas were specifically 

targeting their family largely because the FMLN guerillas 

would begin calling out their family’s name upon entering 

the Quiroz Paradas’ village. Although the FMLN’s 

announcements were terrifying, they at least gave the family 

enough time to hide in the family’s well and thus avoid harm 

during the first several invasions. On another occasion, 

however, the family did not hear the guerillas approaching 

in time to hide before the guerillas broke into their home. 

Quiroz Parada attempted to flee, but was struck by the 

 1 Because Quiroz Parada “was found credible and his testimony is 

thus accepted as undisputed, the facts recounted here are derived from 

his testimony” and asylum application. Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 

1067, 1071 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004).
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 7

guerillas, tied up, carried out of his home, and beaten; the 

guerillas apparently intended to forcibly conscript him. He 

was only able to escape because the army suddenly arrived 

at his village, which caused the guerillas to flee—but not 

before they beat Quiroz Parada, causing him to lose 

consciousness. Quiroz Parada testified that his family 

realized after this attack that they were being targeted 

because of his brother’s military service.2

The FMLN guerillas’ targeting of the Quiroz Parada 

family also led to collateral consequences for those around 

the family. On one occasion, a different group of FMLN 

guerillas than had committed the previous home invasions 

mistakenly entered the home of the Quiroz Paradas’ 

neighbors instead. The guerillas kidnapped the neighbor’s 

sons and, upon discovering they had kidnapped the wrong 

family’s sons, returned and murdered the mother in anger 

over their mistake.3

Quiroz Parada fled to the United States in 1991 after 

these incidents, but his family members who remained in El 

 2 The record is not entirely clear as to whether the Quiroz Parada 

family was targeted solely on the basis of Quiroz Parada’s brother 

military service, or whether it was a combination of his brother’s military 

service and his father’s position as an assistant marshal. For example, 

the guerillas who kidnapped and beat Quiroz Parada apparently knew of 

his brother’s military service, but were not aware of his father’s status as 

an assistant marshal. We need not resolve this ambiguity, as our analysis 

would be the same either way.

3 There is also some ambiguity in the record about whether the 

neighbor’s mother was murdered as reprisal for wrongly leading the 

guerillas to believe they were kidnapping members of the Quiroz Parada 

family, or whether she was murdered because the guerillas believed her 

to be a member of the Quiroz Parada family. Whichever the guerillas’ 

true motive, it is immaterial to our analysis.
8 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

Salvador continued to suffer harm even after the end of the 

civil war. In 2000, his father received a death threat from a 

former FMLN guerilla’s son, who had become a Mara 

Salvatrucha (MS) gang member in the intervening years. 

This familial transition from FMLN guerilla to MS member 

was apparently common; Quiroz Parada’s family members 

have told him that many sons of former FMLN guerillas are 

now part of the MS gang. These FMLN descendants have 

long memories: the MS member who threatened Quiroz 

Parada’s father told him “You are going to die. Because 

your family was in the military and killed someone from my 

family. And one way or another you will die.” Quiroz 

Parada’s father was killed five years later in a suspicious hitand-run, which Quiroz Parada believes to have been carried 

out by the MS member who threatened his father or one of 

his associates. The threats did not end with his father’s 

death, either: Quiroz Parada’s mother was forced to flee their 

family home after receiving threats from MS gang members 

whose fathers were FMLN guerillas.

Quiroz Parada’s family members have warned him not 

to return to El Salvador because “history will repeat itself”—

meaning that Quiroz Parada will face kidnapping or death at 

the hands of the MS gang members who are descendants of 

FMLN guerillas. As of Quiroz Parada’s hearing before an 

immigration judge (IJ) in 2012, all of his siblings had fled El 

Salvador.4

 4 Prior to fleeing, two of his sisters and their families were threatened 

with murder and rape by MS members. It is unclear, however, whether 

these threats were connected to the Quiroz Paradas’ government service 

during the civil war, or to one sister’s status as a gang informant and the 

other’s status as the mother of a police officer.
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 9

B.

Quiroz Parada applied for asylum5 and withholding of 

removal on September 27, 1994. If he is removed to El 

Salvador, Quiroz Parada fears he will be persecuted on 

account of his family status and political opinion. The 

source of that feared persecution is twofold: the MS gang 

members seeking revenge on behalf of their FMLN guerilla 

parents, as well as the FMLN itself—despite the fact that the 

FMLN is currently a political party, rather than a violent 

revolutionary movement. Because the FMLN is now the 

ruling political party, Quiroz Parada does not believe he can 

safely reside in any part of the country without falling victim 

to retribution by the FMLN. Moreover, simply laying low 

is not an option: Quiroz Parada believes the FMLN will learn 

of his return to the country and have the ability to locate him 

because he no longer has any Salvadoran documentation and 

would thus be required to renew all of his documents upon 

arriving in El Salvador. Quiroz Parada also testified that he 

is opposed to the FMLN’s “leftist wing” form of democracy 

and that he would feel compelled to speak out against the 

FMLN-run government’s policies, which he fears would 

result in persecution by the government. While Quiroz 

Parada is aware that the civil war ended several decades ago, 

he does not believe that the Salvadoran government would 

prosecute former FMLN guerillas if “they murder people, or 

behave badly.”6

 5 Because Quiroz Parada applied for asylum prior to the effective 

date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 

Act of 1996, the one-year bar for asylum applications does not apply. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a).

6 Regrettably, as with many critical pieces of his testimony, Quiroz 

Parada’s explanation for why he does not believe in the Salvadoran 
10 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

Thirteen years passed before the government took any 

action on Quiroz Parada’s 1994 asylum application. In May 

2007, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officer 

finally interviewed Quiroz Parada. On May 31, 2007, 

Quiroz Parada’s asylum case was referred to an immigration 

judge; DHS simultaneously issued a notice to appear, 

charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(I) for being present in the United States 

without being admitted or paroled. At a master calendar 

hearing in February 2008, an IJ sustained the charge of 

removability. Quiroz Parada requested relief in the form of 

asylum, withholding of removal, CAT protection, and 

cancellation of removal.

The delays for Quiroz Parada didn’t end there: nearly 

five years passed between his February 2008 hearing and his 

merits hearing before an IJ in November 2012. The 

government submitted its hearing exhibits back in 2008, 

including a 2007 Department of State Country Report and a 

2007 Department of State Profile on El Salvador. Yet for 

unknown reasons, the government did not update their 

exhibits during the years that passed between submission of 

their exhibits and the actual hearing—despite the fact that 

the country conditions reports were five years out of date by 

the time of the merits hearing.

Quiroz Parada, by contrast, submitted his exhibits 

approximately one week before the November 2012 hearing. 

In addition to a written statement describing his past 

persecution and fear of future persecution, Quiroz Parada 

submitted a number of other exhibits corroborating his 

 government’s ability or willingness to prosecute former FMLN members 

who murder or otherwise attack their former enemies is transcribed as 

“[indiscernible] and [indiscernible].”
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 11

claims. For example, he submitted a 2010 letter from his 

sister—written prior to her fleeing the country—imploring 

him to not return to El Salvador for any reason because of 

the risk that he will be kidnapped or killed by MS. The letter 

explained that the “police do[] not help, and they even get 

killed,” and warned that if he were to come back to the 

country, “history would repeat itself.” Another one of his 

sisters sent him a copy of a handwritten threat she received 

from MS members, which said they knew she “snitched on 

the barrio” and warned her that if she failed to leave the area 

by a particular date, her “daughters will suffer the 

consequences.” His exhibits also included several 

newspaper articles about the violence perpetrated by MS in 

Quiroz Parada’s home region; these articles echoed a letter 

from the National Civil Police of El Salvador describing 

MS’s crimes, the gang’s pervasiveness in Quiroz Parada’s 

home region, and how the rampant violence has forced many 

families to flee.

The long-awaited hearing in November 2012 did not 

begin on a promising note. Prior to hearing any testimony

from Quiroz Parada or argument from his attorney, the IJ 

conveyed his belief that Quiroz Parada’s asylum claim “may 

be a lost cause.” Nonetheless, despite the IJ’s significant 

skepticism, he allowed Quiroz Parada’s attorney to present 

Quiroz Parada’s case for asylum. On February 8, 2013, the 

IJ issued a written decision denying Quiroz Parada’s 

requests for asylum, withholding of removal, CAT 

protection, and cancellation of removal. The IJ first found 

that Quiroz Parada was credible under both the pre-REAL 

ID Act and REAL ID Act standards.7 The IJ then 

 7 Although the REAL ID Act governs Quiroz Parada’s claim for 

cancellation of removal, it does not govern his claims currently on 
12 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

determined that Quiroz Parada had not shown past 

persecution, but further concluded that even if he had, DHS 

had rebutted the presumption with evidence of changed 

country conditions. The IJ also found that Quiroz Parada 

had not shown an independent well-founded fear of future 

persecution. Because the IJ determined that Quiroz Parada 

had not established eligibility for asylum through either past 

persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, 

Quiroz Parada necessarily failed to meet the higher bar 

required to obtain withholding of removal. The IJ also 

rejected Quiroz Parada’s claim for CAT relief.

Quiroz Parada appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, 

which dismissed his appeal. In its decision, the BIA 

affirmed the IJ’s determinations on Quiroz Parada’s asylum, 

withholding, and CAT claims, including the IJ’s alternative 

holding that even if Quiroz Parada had established past 

persecution, the government had rebutted the presumption of 

a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA denied 

relief to Quiroz Parada, but granted him voluntary departure. 

Quiroz Parada timely petitioned us for review.

II.

We examine the BIA’s “legal conclusions de novo and 

its factual findings for substantial evidence.” BringasRodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(en banc) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence review 

means that we may only reverse the agency’s determination 

where “the evidence compels a contrary conclusion from 

that adopted by the BIA.” Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 

931 (9th Cir. 2010). While this standard is deferential, 

 

appeal, which were filed prior to May 11, 2005. See Joseph v. Holder, 

600 F.3d 1235, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010).
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 13

“deference does not mean blindness.” Nguyen v. Holder, 

763 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Li v. Ashcroft, 

356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). “Where, as 

here, the BIA has reviewed the IJ’s decision and 

incorporated portions of it as its own, we treat the 

incorporated parts of the IJ’s decision as the BIA’s.” 

Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002).

III.

To be eligible for asylum, Quiroz Parada must establish 

that he is a refugee—namely, that he is unable or unwilling 

to return to El Salvador “because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion.” Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 

1064 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). 

“The source of the persecution must be the government or 

forces that the government is unwilling or unable to

control.”8 Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 

2007). To be well-founded, an asylum applicant’s “fear of 

persecution must be both subjectively genuine and 

objectively reasonable.” Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 924 

(9th Cir. 2004). “An applicant ‘satisfies the subjective 

component by credibly testifying that [he] genuinely fears 

persecution.’” Id. (quoting Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 

1035 (9th Cir. 1999)). The objective component can be 

established in two different ways, one of which is to prove 

past persecution. Id. at 924–25. Past persecution “giv[es] 

rise to a rebuttable presumption that a well-founded fear of 

 8 The parties have not disputed that Quiroz Parada’s previous harms 

were inflicted by forces that the government was either unable or 

unwilling to control. See Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 803 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 2004).
14 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

future persecution exists.” See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 

897 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted), overruled on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 

554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

A.

We first conclude that substantial evidence does not 

support the BIA’s determination that the harms Quiroz 

Parada previously suffered did not rise to the level of 

persecution. Our conclusion is largely driven by the fact that 

the BIA mischaracterized what Quiroz Parada endured as 

simply “threats against his family and attempt[s] to recruit 

him.” This glib characterization ignores, among other 

evidence, his brother’s assassination, the murder of his 

neighbor as a result of his own family being targeted, his 

experience being captured and beaten to the point of 

unconsciousness, repeated forced home invasions, and 

specific death threats toward his family.

It is clear that the harms Quiroz Parada and his family 

actually suffered—murder, physical assault, home 

invasions, and specific death threats—rise to the level of 

persecution under our precedent. It is, of course, “well 

established that physical violence is persecution under 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).” Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d 1096, 

1107 (9th Cir. 2009). Quiroz Parada was beaten into 

unconsciousness, which we have held is “clear[ly]” 

sufficient to show past persecution. See Gafoor v. INS, 

231 F.3d 645, 650 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding it was “clear” that 

petitioner who had been kidnapped and beaten until bleeding 

and unconscious suffered persecution). Moreover, we have 

consistently held that petitioners whose family members 

have been murdered—particularly when the petitioners 

themselves have also suffered physical injury—have 

suffered persecution. See, e.g., Rios v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 15

895, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that petitioner suffered 

persecution where guerillas had kidnapped and wounded 

her, attempted to kidnap her son, and murdered her husband 

and brother); Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“[E]vidence of harm to Petitioner’s family 

supports a finding of past persecution.”). Thus, the BIA’s 

threshold determination—that Quiroz Parada had not 

suffered “persecution”—is not supported by substantial 

evidence.

We next address whether the agency’s determination on 

the issue of nexus—that is, whether Quiroz Parada’s

persecution was “on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political 

opinion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)—was supported by 

substantial evidence. Because the BIA’s decision affirmed 

the IJ’s overall findings on past persecution but did not 

specifically address the IJ’s determination on nexus, we 

review the IJ’s decision “as a guide to what lay behind the 

BIA’s conclusion.” See Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 

458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also Morgan v. Mukasey, 

529 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2008).

For reasons that are difficult to ascertain, the IJ divided 

the harms Quiroz Parada and his family suffered into two 

categories: (1) “threats” against him and his family, which 

the IJ determined had a nexus to his brother’s military 

service and possibly also to his father’s position as a 

marshal, and (2) attempts to forcibly conscript Quiroz 

Parada via home invasions, which the IJ viewed as lacking a 

nexus to his family’s government service. We conclude that 

the agency’s decision that Quiroz Parada only established 

nexus for some of the harms he suffered is unsupported by 

substantial evidence.
16 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

Under pre-REAL ID Act law, where an asylum-seeker’s 

testimony is deemed credible, direct, and specific, 

corroboration is not required to establish the facts to which 

the applicant testifies. See Ladha, 215 F.3d at 899–901. 

And under pre-REAL ID Act law, so long as the applicant 

produces evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that 

the persecutor’s actions were motivated at least in part by a 

protected ground, the applicant is eligible for asylum. See 

Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736–37 (9th Cir. 1999) (en 

banc).

Here, Quiroz Parada’s credible testimony establishes 

that the persecution he and his family suffered was “on 

account of” his family’s government and military service—

which constitutes persecution on account of a protected 

ground in two ways. As we recently reiterated, “the family 

remains the quintessential particular social group.” Rios v. 

Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015). That is, an 

asylum-seeker who has suffered persecution “on account of 

th[eir] familial relationship” has suffered persecution by 

reason of membership in a particular social group. Id. 

(citation omitted). As Quiroz Parada testified without 

contradiction, FMLN members specifically sought out the 

“particular social group” of his family, even shouting the 

Quiroz Parada family name as the guerillas entered the 

family’s village.

Quiroz Parada’s persecution on account of his family’s 

government service also amounts to persecution on account 

of imputed political opinion. In a similar case, we concluded 

that guerillas imputed a political opinion to the petitioner on 

account of her husband’s and brother’s service in the 

Guatemalan military. See Rios, 287 F.3d at 900–01. 

Likewise, in Meza-Manay v. INS, 139 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 

1998), we held that the petitioner’s husband’s work with a 
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 17

Peruvian counter-insurgency police force caused Shining 

Path guerillas to impute a political opinion to the petitioner, 

separate and independent from her actual political views. Id. 

at 764; see also Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 657–61 (9th Cir. 

2000) (holding that Salvadoran military imputed proguerilla political opinion to petitioner due to his aunt and 

uncle’s political affiliations); Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 

954, 959–60 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Sandinistas 

imputed political opinion to petitioner based on her family’s 

ties to the former government); Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 

1066, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]vidence ‘that the alleged 

persecutor acted because of a petitioner’s family’s political 

associations is sufficient’ to satisfy the motive requirement.” 

(alteration omitted) (quoting Kebede v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 

808, 812 (9th Cir. 2004))).

Finally, we note that the agency made much of the 

attempted conscription of Quiroz Parada as a potential 

motivating factor behind the FMLN guerillas’ invasions of 

the Quiroz Parada family home. It is true, of course, that 

conscription by a non-governmental group does not 

necessarily constitute persecution on account of a protected 

ground. See, e.g., Melkonian, 320 F.3d at 1068 (citing INS 

v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992)) (explaining that 

under Elias-Zacarias, forced conscription does not always 

amount to persecution on account of a protected ground, but 

holding that petitioner who was targeted for forced 

conscription on account of his ethnicity and religion had 

been persecuted). But where, as here, there is uncontradicted 

evidence that the attempted forced conscription was on 

account of Quiroz Parada’s family association and imputed 

political opinion based on his brother’s military service—

both protected grounds—that attempted conscription is 

persecution within the meaning of our asylum laws. See id. 

We reiterate that because Quiroz Parada’s claim is governed 
18 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

by pre-REAL ID Act law, he need only demonstrate that his 

persecutors were motivated in part by a protected ground—

which he has amply done. See Borja, 175 F.3d at 736–37; 

Navas, 217 F.3d at 661. Thus, it is immaterial that the 

FMLN’s attempted conscription of Quiroz Parada would 

have served the dual goals of “fill[ing] their ranks in order to 

carry on their war against the government and pursue their 

political goals,” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482, and of 

retaliating against the Quiroz Parada family—the latter is a 

protected ground, even if the former is not.

B.

Having concluded that the evidence compels a finding 

that Quiroz Parada established past persecution on account 

of his familial relationship and imputed political opinion, we 

next address whether the agency erred in its alternative 

conclusion that even if Quiroz Parada had established past 

persecution, the government had successfully rebutted the 

attendant presumption of future persecution. It is on this 

issue that the severe delays Quiroz Parada experienced in the 

government’s processing of his claims for relief become 

most relevant; those delays ultimately produced an agency 

decision unsupported by substantial evidence.

A petitioner who has suffered past persecution is 

presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The government may rebut 

that presumption if it establishes by a preponderance of the 

evidence that either (1) there “has been a fundamental 

change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer 

has a well-founded fear of persecution,” or (2) the “applicant 

could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part 

of the applicant's country of nationality.” Id. The 

presumption only applies to fear of persecution “on the basis 

of the original claim,” such that if the fear of future 
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 19

persecution is “unrelated to the past persecution,” the 

petitioner bears the burden of establishing he has a wellfounded fear. Id.

Where the government submits “evidence of changed 

country conditions tending to rebut the presumption of a 

well-founded fear of persecution, the IJ must make an 

‘individualized determination’ of how the changed 

circumstances affect the alien's specific situation.” Ali v. 

Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 

2005)). “Where past persecution has been established, 

generalized information from a State Department report on 

country conditions is not sufficient to rebut the presumption 

of future persecution.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 

Kamalyan v. Holder, 620 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010)).

1.

Although the agency9 determined that Quiroz Parada had 

not established past persecution, it alternatively concluded 

that even if he had established past persecution, DHS had 

rebutted the presumption. Specifically, the IJ considered the 

2007 Department of State country conditions report 

adequate evidence that Quiroz Parada would “no longer 

face[] any fear related to the civil war or the FMLN” were 

he to return to El Salvador. The IJ did not acknowledge that 

by the time of the hearing, the country conditions report was 

five years out of date. The IJ did, however, briefly 

acknowledge that the FMLN had come to power “in recent 

 9 Because the BIA’s discussion of whether the government rebutted 

the presumption was limited to a brief, conclusory affirmance of the IJ’s 

determination, we review the IJ’s decision “as a guide to what lay behind 

the BIA’s conclusion.” See Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).
20 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

years,” but stated that “there was no evidence presented to 

the Court indicating that it participates in the killing, 

disappearance, forced conscription, or even discrimination 

against any individuals formerly affiliated with the 

government, such as the respondent and his family.” Today, 

we join the Second Circuit and hold that reliance on 

significantly or materially outdated country reports cannot 

suffice to rebut the presumption of future persecution; as 

such, the agency’s determination must be reversed. See 

Tambadou v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 298, 302–04 (2d Cir. 

2006); Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2002).

Unlike fine wine, reports on country conditions do not 

improve with age—a reality that our colleagues on the 

Second Circuit have repeatedly acknowledged. In 

Tambadou, for example, the court granted a petition for 

review where the BIA’s 2002 decision relied upon a 1996 

country conditions report to determine that conditions had 

adequately changed in Mauritania such that the presumption 

of future persecution had been rebutted. 446 F.3d at 302–

04. Given the six-year delay between the report’s 

publication and the BIA’s decision, the Second Circuit aptly 

observed that “it is difficult to see how the Report could be 

said to describe ‘current’ conditions.” Id. at 303. Similarly, 

in Yang, the court granted a petition for review of a BIA 

decision affirming an IJ’s determination that the petitioner 

had not established a well-founded fear of future 

persecution, because the IJ’s decision had relied heavily on 

a 1993 country conditions report. 277 F.3d at 163. Noting 

that “current country conditions bear vitally as to asylum,” 

the court reversed and remanded because “the administrative 

record is silent as to China's contemporary treatment of 

persons with backgrounds similar to [petitioner’s].” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Second 

Circuit observed that while it was possible conditions had 
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 21

not changed in the eight years between the 1993 country 

report and the time of its decision, “the consequences of 

deportation are simply too grave to leave this solely to 

surmise.” Id.

The circumstances here are even more extreme and even 

more demanding of reversal than those in Yang and 

Tambadou. The country reports at issue in this case were 

already a half-decade out-of-date by the time of the IJ 

hearing—unlike in Yang and Tambadou, where the country 

conditions reports were relatively current at the time of the 

IJ hearings and only became out-of-date while the petitioners 

waited for their cases to be heard by the BIA and then the 

federal courts of appeals. The government gave no 

explanation for why it failed to submit more recent reports 

before the IJ hearing in 2012, nor can we discern any from 

our review of the record. The reports are now more than a 

decade out-of-date—although we note that the eleven-year 

gap between the reports’ publication and our opinion today 

is still not as long as the thirteen years it took for DHS to 

process Quiroz Parada’s asylum application.

But the staleness of the country conditions reports is not 

the most troubling part of the government’s handling of 

Quiroz Parada’s asylum claim. Quiroz Parada suffered past 

persecution by the FMLN on the basis of his family 

association and imputed political opinion. At the time of the 

2007 country conditions reports, the FMLN had been 

reconstituted as a political party, but did not have control of 

either the Salvadoran legislature or the presidency. But in 

2009—two years after the publication of the country 

conditions reports, and three years prior to the IJ hearing—
22 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

the FMLN rose to power.10 The IJ correctly observed that 

the 2007 country conditions reports did not mention any 

politically-motivated killings by the government or any 

mistreatment by the government of people whose families 

had fought against the FMLN in the civil war. But this does 

not mean that there was any evidence in the record to rebut 

Quiroz Parada’s fear that an FMLN-run government would 

engage in such persecution, because the FMLN had not yet 

taken power at the time of the 2007 reports. Common sense 

dictates that the government cannot meet its burden of 

rebutting the presumption by presenting evidence of the 

Salvadoran government’s human rights record at a time 

when the government was run by a different political party—

particularly when the government is now run, as it was at the 

time of the IJ hearing, by the very same FMLN who 

persecuted the Quiroz Parada family. The agency’s 

determination that the presumption had been rebutted thus 

lacks substantial evidence.

2.

Because the agency’s determination that the government 

successfully rebutted the presumption of future persecution 

is unsupported by substantial evidence, we hold that the 

presumption has not been rebutted and that Quiroz Parada is 

statutorily eligible for asylum and entitled to withholding of 

removal, and remand for the Attorney General to exercise 

his discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) as to whether to 

grant asylum. See Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 

1078 n.11, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2004); Ndom v. Ashcroft, 

384 F.3d 743, 756 (9th Cir. 2004); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 

383 F.3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004). Particularly where, as 

 10 Because the IJ noted that the FMLN had come to power “in recent 

years,” we need not take judicial notice of this fact.
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 23

here, the government took thirteen years to process the 

asylum application and then another five years to hold a 

hearing before an IJ—during which time the government had 

every opportunity to submit more up-to-date evidence of 

changed country conditions, but failed to do so—“to provide 

the [government] with another opportunity to present 

evidence of changed country conditions . . . would be 

exceptionally unfair.” Ndom, 384 F.3d at 756 (quoting 

Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1078 n.11). Such circumstances 

implicate our previously-expressed concern that “constant 

remands to the BIA to consider the impact of changed 

country conditions occurring during the period of litigation 

of an asylum case would create a ‘Zeno’s Paradox’ where 

final resolution of the case would never be reached.” 

Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1078 n.11 (quoting Hoxha v. Ashcroft,

319 F.3d 1179, 1185 n.7 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alteration 

omitted).11

IV.

We next address whether the BIA erred in determining 

that Quiroz Parada failed to establish eligibility for CAT 

protection. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to review 

his CAT claim and that the agency committed several 

reversible errors in its analysis.

A.

As an initial matter, we reject the government’s 

contention that we lack jurisdiction to consider Quiroz 

 11 Because we conclude that the unrebutted presumption of future 

persecution makes Quiroz Parada eligible for asylum and entitled to 

withholding of removal, we need not address whether substantial 

evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Quiroz Parada did not 

establish an independent well-founded fear of future persecution.
24 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

Parada’s CAT claim because he did not raise it before the 

BIA. Although Quiroz Parada did not specifically appeal his 

CAT claim to the BIA, the agency addressed the merits of 

the claim. It is well-established that we may review any 

issue addressed on the merits by the BIA, regardless of 

whether the petitioner raised it before the agency. See 

Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 

2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 355 (2014). Accordingly, we 

have jurisdiction to review the claim.

B.

The BIA’s12 adjudication of Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim 

requires reversal because the agency ignored pertinent 

evidence in the record—in violation of our precedent and 

CAT’s implementing regulations—and erred by construing 

the “government acquiescence” standard too narrowly. To 

obtain relief under CAT, a petitioner must prove that it is 

more likely than not that he or she will be tortured in the 

country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The torture 

must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 

consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 

acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 

For those not subject to mandatory denial of withholding, 

CAT eligibility entitles the petitioner to withholding of 

removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). See Hosseini v. 

Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2006).

The agency’s first error was its failure to consider all 

relevant evidence. CAT’s implementing regulations 

 12 As the BIA’s discussion of Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim was 

limited to a single sentence affirming the IJ’s conclusion, we review the 

IJ’s decision “as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusion.” See 

Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 25

explicitly require the agency to consider “all evidence 

relevant to the possibility of future torture,” and we have 

repeatedly reversed where the agency has failed to do so. 

See, e.g., Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 770–72 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“[W]here there is any indication that the BIA did not 

consider all of the evidence before it, a catchall phrase [that 

the agency has considered all of the evidence] does not 

suffice, and the decision cannot stand.”); Aguilar-Ramos v. 

Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The failure of 

the IJ and BIA to consider [relevant evidence] constitutes 

reversible error.”). Relevant evidence includes the 

petitioner’s testimony and country conditions evidence. See 

Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72. Moreover, a petitioner’s credible 

testimony “may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof 

without corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

Here, the relevant evidence included Quiroz Parada’s 

credible testimony, the 2007 country conditions reports, and 

exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada. Yet the IJ summarily 

dismissed Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim, stating:

Based on the respondent’s testimony and the 

evidence in the record, the Court finds that 

the respondent has not shown that he is “more 

likely than not” to be tortured if he is 

removed to El Salvador. In addition, to be 

eligible for CAT relief, the respondent must 

establish that the torture feared would be 

inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a 

public official or other person acting in an 

official capacity. Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N 

Dec. 1306, 1311 (BIA 2000), disagreed with 

on other grounds by Zheng v. Ashcroft, 

332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003). “Article 3 of 

the Convention Against Torture does not 
26 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

extend protection to persons fearing entities 

that a government is unable to control.” Id. 

at 1312. The respondent has not alleged that 

he fears torture inflicted by any governmental 

entities in El Salvador, nor by any other entity 

with the acquiescence of any government 

official. Thus, he has not established 

eligibility for CAT relief.

This conclusion ignored significant evidence in the record 

demonstrating that 1) Quiroz Parada credibly feared death at 

the hands of the MS gang, and 2) the country conditions 

reports and other evidence in the record established not only 

that the government “acquiescence[d]” in the MS gang’s 

violence, but also that Salvadoran security forces engaged in 

torture on a regular basis—as the IJ himself found in a 

section of his decision summarizing the country conditions 

evidence:

[P]rotection of human rights was undermined 

by widespread violent crime, rampant 

judicial and police corruption, intimidation 

by the ubiquitous violent street gangs, and 

violence against witnesses. Criminal gangs 

are a serious, widespread, and pervasive 

socio-economic challenge to the security, 

stability, and welfare of El Salvador. Indeed, 

gangs are blamed for the bulk of crimes and 

murders in El Salvador. While the 

government's fight against the gangs has met 

with some success in areas, El Salvador 

remains an exceptionally violent country 

because of the pervasive gang violence.
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 27

Although arbitrary arrest, prolonged 

detention, and torture are prohibited in El 

Salvador, Salvadoran security forces 

apparently continue to participate in such 

practices on a regular basis. Conditions in 

detention are degrading and extremely 

dangerous. Many officials throughout all 

levels of government engage in corruption 

with impunity despite a recent increased 

emphasis on enforcement.

Thus, while the IJ did “consider” the country conditions 

reports, the significant and material disconnect between the 

IJ’s quoted observations and his conclusions regarding 

Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim indicate that the IJ did not 

properly consider all of the relevant evidence before him. 

See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72 (explaining that indications of 

the agency’s failure to properly consider all of the relevant 

evidence “include misstating the record and failing to 

mention highly probative or potentially dispositive 

evidence”).

The agency’s second error was its overly narrow 

construction of the “acquiescence” standard. In a similar 

case, we reversed and remanded where the agency “erred by 

construing ‘government acquiescence’ too narrowly,” 

noting that “acquiescence does not require actual knowledge 

or willful acceptance of torture; awareness and willful 

blindness will suffice.” Aguilar-Ramos, 594 F.3d at 705–06 

(citing Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 

2003)). In Aguilar-Ramos, we found “evidence in the record 

that suggests that gangs and death squads operate in El 

Salvador, and that its government is aware of and willfully 

blind to their existence.” Id. at 706. So too here.
28 QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS

Moreover, we have held that the acquiescence standard 

is met where the record demonstrates that public officials at 

any level—even if not at the federal level—would acquiesce 

in torture the petitioner is likely to suffer. Madrigal v. 

Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2013). Evidence 

showing widespread corruption of public officials—as the 

record reveals here—can be highly probative on this point. 

See id. at 510 (noting that “[v]oluminous evidence in the 

record explains that corruption of public officials in Mexico 

remains a problem”). As in Madrigal, the country 

conditions reports and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada 

indicate the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government (or 

at least parts of the Salvadoran government) in the 

“rampant” violence and murder perpetrated by the MS 

gang—at whose hands Quiroz Parada fears that he will be 

killed. And as we have previously held, “torture” under CAT 

includes killings. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771.

Because the agency erred by failing to consider all 

relevant evidence and by improperly construing the 

government acquiescence standard, we reverse the BIA’s 

determination that Quiroz Parada is not eligible for CAT 

relief and remand to the agency for further consideration of 

his claim.

V.

We conclude that Quiroz Parada suffered past 

persecution on account of his family association and imputed 

political opinion, and that the presumption of future 

persecution has not been rebutted. Under these 

circumstances, he is eligible for asylum, and entitled to 

withholding of removal. We remand to the BIA for the 

agency to reconsider Quiroz Parada’s claim for relief under 

CAT, for the Attorney General to exercise his discretion as 
QUIROZ PARADA V. SESSIONS 29

to whether to grant Quiroz Parada asylum, and for an 

appropriate order withholding Quiroz Parada’s removal.

PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.