NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ALEXANDER MONZONI, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50329 

D.C. No. 3:16-cr-02674-LAB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2018**

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Alexander Monzoni appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the five-year term of supervised release and three conditions of 

supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea convictions for importation of 

cocaine and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. We 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 21 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-50329

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm as to the supervised 

release term but remand as to the challenged supervised release conditions.

Monzoni first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to 

calculate the Guidelines range for the supervised release term and by insufficiently 

explaining its decision to impose a five-year term. We review for plain error, see

United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and 

conclude that there is none. Monzoni has not shown a reasonable probability that 

he would have received a different sentence had the district court expressly 

calculated the applicable Guidelines range. See United States v. Dallman, 533 

F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, the district court’s reasons for imposing 

an above-Guidelines term of supervised release are apparent from the record as a 

whole, see United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and 

the court did not rely on any proscribed factor in imposing the five-year term. See

18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(c).

Monzoni also contends that the written judgment imposed three conditions 

of supervised release that conflict with the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. 

The government concedes, and we agree, that conditions seven and eight conflict 

with the oral pronouncement of sentence, which did not include these nonstandard 

conditions. See United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2006). 

By contrast, condition four’s mandate that Monzoni support his dependents merely 
3 17-50329

clarified the district court’s oral pronouncement that Monzoni was required to 

support his family, and it was adequately supported by the record. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 5D1.3(d)(1)(A); Napier, 463 F.3d at 1043. Nonetheless, the phrase “and meet 

other family responsibilities” in condition four is unconstitutionally vague. See 

United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2018). We therefore

remand to the district court with instructions to conform the judgment with the oral 

pronouncement of sentence by striking conditions seven and eight, and striking 

from condition four the phrase “and meet other family responsibilities.” See 

United States v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED in part with instructions.