## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 19

- 00274

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 3 Tarrant Count y , Texas Trial Court No

. 2016

- 00 6915

- 3

Be fore Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach 

### S IMONE 

### B ARRON 

### , AS 

### T RUSTEE OF THE 

### 3001 D ECATUR 

### T RUST 

### , AND 

### M ERIE 

### Y AZBEK 

### , Appellan t s

V



### . F ORT 

### W ORTH 

### T RA NSPORTATI ON 

### A UTHORI TY 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from the granting of traditional summary judgment for Appellee Fort Worth Transportation Authority (t h e Authority) in an em inent dom ain

case c oncerning certain real property (the Property) owned by Appellant
3001 Decatur Trust (the Tru st ) and acquired via a loan from Appellant Me ri e Yazbek

. The trial court sustained the Authority ’ s “ Ob jections to [ Appellan ts ’ ] Unti me ly
Summa r y Judgment Filings , ” striking A ppellants ’ Summary Judgment Response, the

a ffidavit of Appellant s ’ exper t Jason Jackson , and his appraisal repo r t. The court then granted the Authority ’ s M otion for S ummary J udgment , e stablis hin g the fai r market

v alue of the P roperty at $432,000 and ordering the Authority to deposit that sum into the registry of the court within fourteen days. Based on the summary judgment, t he
trial court subsequently entered f ina l j udgment disposing of the P r operty and proceeds. From these o rders and judgments Appellants a ppeal. We affirm.
I
. BACKGROUND

A. The Property The Aut hority filed this lawsuit to acquire the Property located at 3001 Decatur Avenue, Fort Worth , Texas through emine nt domain

. A s required by Texas law in
eminent d omain ca ses, the tr ial court appointed three special commissioners, who held a hearing and determined that the Property ’ s fair market value was $225,000. The
Trust objected to the aw ard throug h its counsel, Dawson & Sodd, LLP. Af ter the Trust objec ted to the award , the Trustee filed two documents, pro se. The filing of3 such documents “ with out [their] knowledge and against [their ] advice and counsel ” prompted Dawson & Sodd, LLP to withdraw from represent ing the Trust. The trial
court allowed the withdrawal , signing the order July 24, 2017

. The Trust retained new
counsel within a week.
B
. The Parties ’ Expert Witnesses Appellants ’ de adline to designate experts was January 2, 2018. 1 Appellants did

not designate an expe rt by the deadl ine. After the deadline, the Authorit y filed a
M otion for S ummary J udgment based on the u n controverted testimon y of its expert
wit ness, who op ined that the Property ’ s fair market value was $225,000.
On Febru ary 15, 2018, prio r to the summ ary judgment hearing, the Trust
served supplemental dis covery responses and desig n ated Clyde Crum to te stify

re g arding the Property ’ s value

. Mr. Crum opined that the Property ’ s fair market value was $432, 000. The Authority did not move to strike M r. Crum as untimely. 2

1 This case was governed b y a Level 2 Discovery Control Plan. At that level, t he discovery period conclu d es on the earlier of 30 days befor e the date set for trial or 9 months after the first deposition or due da te of the first response to written discove ry. Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.3. I n this cas e, the original tria l da te was Apri l 2, 2018. A c cordingly, the discovery period concluded on March 2, 2018 (there were no depositions or discovery that wa rranted an earlier conclusion to the discovery period )

. Under th e rule, experts mu st be disclosed 60 d ays before disc overy concludes, Tex. R. Civ. P. 195.2(b), which was Janu ary 2, 2018.

2 Although the Aut hority did not seek to strike Mr. Crum, it did move to exclude any testimony from the Tr ustee regarding the Prope rty ’ s fair market val ue. The t rial court gran ted the motion.4 On the same day that the Trust disclos e d M r. Crum , Yazbek fi led a mo t ion to

rec use , seeking to have the trial judge removed from the case. In light of the motion , the summary judgment hearing was canceled. In acco rdance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, the trial cou r t took no further act ion in t h e case , an d the motion to recuse was referred to the Presiding Judge of the Eighth Administrative Judic ial Region

. After a hearing, the motion to recuse was denied.
C. Appellants ’ Delay of Trial

— Remo v al to Federal Court T he t r ial c ourt ente red an ord er setting the case for trial on May 21, 2018

. The

or der advised the parties th at any undisclosed witness es would not testify at trial
without leave of court. Counsel entered an ap p ear ance for Ya z be k

. Appellan ts submitted their trial exhibit and witness li sts, which did not identify Mr. Jackson as a
witness. The trial court also entered an o rder o n motions in limine, which limited the
expert trial t es timony to that of o nly those expert wi tness es whose i dentit ies and opinions had been previously disclosed. M r. Crum was the only expert disclosed by Appellants to testify on the Property ’ s value.
As th e prospective jurors prepared to enter the courtroom for voir di re on the
schedule d trial date , the trial court called the case and asked the parties to announce

r eady for trial. The Trust ’ s counsel informed the trial court that the Trustee had file d a
pro se notice of re moval to federal court wi thout counse l ’ s knowledge. The following day

— fewer than 24 hours after the removal

— the federal court sua sp onte remanded

t he case back to state co urt.5 D. Th e Motion f or Summa ry Judgm ent T he Au thority then filed its Motion for Sum mary Judgment on June 4, 2018

. 3 The Authority sought a judgm ent that would giv e Appellants precisely w hat they
wanted

— a finding that the Property ’ s f ai r market value was $4 32,000 , as dete rmined by the Trust ’ s previously disclosed expert, Mr. Crum

. T he Motion for Summary Judgment was set f or hearing on June 29, 2018. 4
E. Appellants ’ Delay of t he Summary Judgment Hearing
B efore the hearing, th e Trustee, acting pro se, filed a m o tion to r ecuse Judge
H rab al (the “Trustee ’ s f irst m oti on to r ecuse”). 5 The Trus tee filed the motion without

counse l ’ s knowledge ( “Evidently my client has gone behind my back and filed a
Mo tion to R ecuse . . . . ”). 6 Once agai n, in a cco rdance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, the trial c ourt took no further action in the case , and the Trustee ’ s f irst

m otion to r ecuse was referred to the pres iding judge of the region and set for hear ing.

3 The O rder on th e Motion fo r S ummary Judgment forms the basis of this appeal.

4 Two week s after the setting notice issued, the trial cour t granted Yazbek ’s attorney ’s motion t o withdraw.

5 The previou s motion to recuse w as filed by Appellant Yazbek, indivi dually. In
co mparison, the Trustee ’ s f irst m otion to r ecuse, and the subsequent moti ons to recuse, were filed by the Trus tee
.
6 Shortly thereafter, the Trust ’ s counsel withdrew f rom representing the Tr ust. The Trustee conse nt ed to the withdrawal.6 The hearing on the Motio n for Summ ary Judg ment was canceled. Prior to the hearing on the Trustee ’ s first m otion to r ecuse, the Trustee filed an

a mende d m otion to r ecuse Judge Hrabal (the “Trustee ’ s s econd m otion to r ecuse ”). 7
T he T rustee ’ s s econd m otion to r ecuse adde d new arguments fo r recusa l, s uch as the
trial court ’ s decision to exclude the Trustee ’ s valuation testimony and the alleged

r efusal to provide a Lebanese interpreter. The Trustee ’ s s econ d m otion to r ecus e wa s denied.
F. Appe llants ’ Fu rther Delay of the Summary Judgment Hearing After r esolution of the second motion to recuse, the Authority again set a hearing on its Motion for Summary Judg ment, this time for September 14, 2018.
Yazbek filed a moti on for leave of c ourt to fi le a motion for new appraisal and filed a
motion fo r continuance claimi ng she needed time to hire a new att orney. The Trustee
filed a motion for continuance of the summary judgment hearing becaus e the Trust

wa s not represente d by counsel. 8 Appellants set their motions to be heard on

7 When a party files an amended motion to recuse that adds a new theory in support of recusal, the amended motion c onstitutes an additio nal motion to recuse for purposes of coun ting the number of recusal motions filed. See In re Fifty

- One Gambling D evices , 298 S.W.3d 768, 772

– 73 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2009, pet. denied ) (holding that an am ended motion to recuse count ed toward the total tally o f motions w hen the
am ended motion added n ew argume nts)

.
8 The Trustee cited the lack of co unsel as j ustification f or the continuance. But as explained above, the Trustee had consented to the withdrawal o f counsel. Mo reover, the withdrawal was prompted by th e Trustee ’ s pro se re moval of the case
on the day of tri al and the pro se f iling of th e T rustee ’ s f irst m otion to r ecuse.7 Se ptember 14, 2018, the same day as the hea ring on the Motio n for Summary Judgment. Appellants ’ motions were never ruled on by the tria l court

. On Septemb er 10, 2018, Appel lants filed t heir joint Summary Judg ment Response

. The Summary Judgment Response was filed by a new att orney, Jerome
Ste in. The Summary Judgment Response relied on an opinion from M r . Jackson , who opine d that the P rope rty ’ s fair mar ket value was $742,000 (the “J ackson Opinion”).
Mr. Jackson had not been previously disclosed as an expert witness, and moreover,
the Jackson Op inion w as filed 251 days after the deadline for designating ex perts. Th e Authority objected to the Ja ckson Op inion and moved to exclude it from the summary judgment record

. Appellants did not file a ny response to the objection. Appellants did file a Fi rst Ame nded Response t o Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Summa ry Judgme nt , which wa s identical to the origina l Sum mary Judgm ent Response but with
no attachments. The parties and th e court subsequently treated the orig inal Summary Judgment Response as the live respon se . We will do the same.
G. First Motion t o Recuse On S eptember 14, 2018 (the hearing date for t he Motion for Summary Judgment), th e Trust and Yazbek each filed a separate suggestion of ba nkruptc y , resulting in a stay of the litigation

. T he bankruptcy cour t dismiss ed the Trust ’ s bankru ptcy case and lift e d the stay of this litigation in Yazbek ’ s bankruptcy case

. After

t he bankruptcy cases were resolved, the Au thority obtained another hearing date for
its long pending Motion for Summary Judgment, this time fo r March 8, 2019.8 H. Appellan ts ’ Additiona l Att empt t o Delay the Summa ry Judgment Hearing Days before the summar y judgment hearing, Appellants ’ counsel, Mr. Stein,
filed a motion to withdraw from representing the Trust and sought a continuance of
the he arin g. Appellants did n ot set ei ther motion fo r hearing , and neither motion was heard by the trial court. One day before the hearing, the Trustee f iled, pro se, y et
another m otion to r ecuse (the “Trustee ’ s third m otio n to r ecuse”).
I
. Tr ial Court ’ s Summary Jud gment O rders
On Marc h 8, 201 9, the trial court hear d the Authority ’ s Motio n for Summary Judgment. 9 On March 12, 2019, the trial court entered an order striking the Jackson Opinion from the summary judgment record. I n a se parate order issued the same d ay,

t he trial court gra nted the M otion for Summary Judgment and ent ered its finding that the Property ’ s fair market value is $4 32,000.
II. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In unnumbered related issues, Appell ants chal l enge (1) th e trial court ’ s

su m mary judgmen t i n favor of t he Authority , va lu ing the Property at $432,000 , and

9 The Trustee ’ s t hird m otion to r ecuse did not require the trial court to refrain from acting because the motion was a tertiary m otion. See Tex. C iv. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 30.016 (b )(1

– 3); Fifty

- One Gambling Dev ic es , 298 S.W.3d at 772

– 73 (defining whi ch recusal motions count toward the limit). Section 30.016(b)(1

– 3) specifically in structs t hat, follow ing the third or subsequent motion fo r re cusal, the judge “sha ll continue to” pres ide over the ca se, sign orders, an d move the cas e to final disposition “ as though [ the ] tertiary recusal motion had not been filed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 30.016(b )(1

– 3)

.9 (2) the trial court ’ s exclusion of the Jackson Opinion

. 10 An appellate cour t reviews a trial court ’ s decision to exclude evidence under an
abuse

- of

- discretion st a ndard. In re J.P .B. , 180 S.W.3 d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005 ) (per
curiam ) . A cou rt abuses its discretion if it acts witho ut reference to any guiding rules or principles. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp. , 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex. 2002). An appell ate court must uphold a trial court ’ s ev id entiary ruli ng if ther e is any legitim ate basis in the record to support it. Drilex Sys., Inc. v. Flores , 1 S.W.3d 112, 119

– 20 (Tex

. 1999 ) (op. on reh ’ g ) ; LSREF2 Apex (TX) II, LLC v. Blomquist , No. 05

- 14

- 00851

- CV, 2015 WL 45545 22 , at *3 (T ex. App.

— Da ll as J uly 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem

. op.) ( re lying on Rule 19 3.6 (a)

– (b) of the T e xas Rules of Civil Procedure to hold that
trial court did not abuse its discre tion in striking summary judgment response
documents wh ich had not been timely produced in response t o di scovery reque sts).

10 In their reply brief, Appellants generally a cknowledge what couns el describes
as the “ st range . . . procedural posture ” of the case a nd argue t hat to dep ri ve them of their expert ’ s opinion because of their lawyers ’ failures to disclose un fairly depri ves them of their rights to fair compensation guar anteed by A rticle One , Section Seventeen of the Tex as Con stitution

. Tex. Const. art. I, § 17. Appel lants vaguely argue that this court should somehow lib erally constru e the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
u n der Rule 1 to “ ach ieve a just, fair , and equitable result ”

— re vers ing th e trial court ’ s judg ment and re m anding the ca se for further proceedi ngs in whi ch their stricken expert ’ s t estimony would be allowed

. We find Appellant s ’ briefing inadequate on this poin t. An a ppellant ’ s brief is req uir ed to co ntain a “ c lear and concise arg ument that includes appropriate citations to leg al authori ty
. . . . This requirement is not satisfied by merely utterin g brief, conclusory statements uns upported by legal citations. ” Ol sen v. Comm ’ n for Law

. D iscipline , 347 S.W.3d 876, 888 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (cit ation omitted)

.10 We review a s ummar y judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. v . Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010)

. We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence f avorable to t he nonmovant if r easonabl e juro rs could, and disregarding evidence contrary to th e nonmovant unless reasonable jurors
could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844,
848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge ever y reasonab le inferenc e and resolve any d oubts in the

n onmovant’s fa vor. 20801, I nc. v. Parker , 249 S.W.3 d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). If a trial

court ’ s order does not specify the grounds up on which it gr anted summary judgment, we must affirm if any of the theor ies presen ted to the tr ial court and pre se rved f or
app eal are me ritorious. Provi dent Life & Acc. Ins. Co . v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003).
III. ANALYSIS A. Exclusion of t he Jackson Opinion
We will first review Appellants ’ conten tion that the tria l court abus ed its
di scre tion i n striking the Ja ck son Opin ion becaus e th at issue ’ s r esolution materially
affects th is court ’ s analysis of Appellants ’ issue challenging the trial court ’ s summary judgment as to the P ro perty ’ s value.
M r. Jack son was not timel y de signated, and his Opinion was not timely
dis closed. T he record conc lusively establishes that he was not t imely designated
because he was first identified and his O pinion was first presented in Appellants ’ Summary Judgment Response 251 days after the de adli ne for dis closin g experts ( the11 expert dis clo sure de adline was Janua ry 2, 2018, and Mr. Jackson was f irst identified on Septembe r 10, 2018). Appellants concede in their initial br ief that they failed to timely
disclose him

. 11 Thus, t o o verturn th e t rial court ’ s ex clusion of Mr. Jackson and his Opinion , Appellants must demonstrate that the trial cour t abuse d it s discretion by finding that they failed to demonstrate good cause or a lack of unfair surprise or prejudice to the A uthority. See Fort Brown Vi lla s III C ondo

. As soc., Inc. v. Gillenwater , 285 S.W .3d 879, 881 (Tex. 2009) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 193. 6). The rule applies equally to trials and summary judgment hearings. Id. ; Blomquist , 2015 WL 45545 22, at *3. In this case, Appellants did not respond to t he Authority ’ s objection to the late
des ignation and disclosure of Mr. Jackson and his O pinion . Lik ewise , Appellants made no showing of good cause or of the lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Because
A ppellants did no t re q uest leave to serv e late d iscov ery respo nses that the trial court denied an d ma de no showing of lack of prejudice or unfair surprise, t he trial court di d
not abuse its discretion by exclu ding the Jackson O pinion

. See Mancuso v. Cheaha Land
Serv s. , LLC , No

. 02

- 09

- 241

- CV, 201 0 WL 3193317, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug

. 12, 2010, no p et.) (mem. op.) ; s ee also L ee v. Wal

- Mart , No. 11

- 14

- 000 78

- CV ,

11 Alt hough Y azbek filed a m otio n for l eave of c ourt to f ile a m otion for a n ew a ppraisal, th e tr ial court never ruled on this mo tion. Yazbek ther efore preserved no right to raise t his issue on appeal

. Hagan v. Pennington , No. 05

- 18

- 00010

- CV, 2019 WL 2521719, at *5 (Te x. App.

— Dallas June 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).12 2016 WL 1072644, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Eastland Mar

. 17, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. 12
We overrule t his issue.

12 Appellants misplace the burdens required for the admission of untimely disclosed evidence. Yazbek s eeks t o demonstra te prejud i ce to her from the e xclusion of the Jack son O pinion . However, her bu rde n was t o establish no unfair prejud ice or surprise to the Authority from the admission of t hat evidence

. See In re Kings Ridge Homeowners As s ’

n, I nc. , 303 S.W .3d 77 3, 783 (Tex . App.

— For t Worth 2009, orig. proce eding ) (requiri ng a party to show that the lat e dis cl osu re “will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties ”) ( citing Te x. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a)(2)). Appellants also arg ue that the Author ity co uld not sho w that it would have been prej udiced by the late designation of Mr. Jackson. Howe ver, this argument improperly reverses the burden of proof . The b urden was on Appellants to show that t he A uthority would not have b een un du ly prejud iced.
A ppe llants further conte nd that there was n o undue prejudice to the Auth ority b eca use it could cross

- examine Mr. Jackson at trial. This type of argument has been
r ejected in a similar case involving the failure to timely designate an exp er t witness offer ed in response to a motion for summary judgment

. As stated in Ersek v. Davis & Davi s , P.C. ,

Er sek conte nds that Davis & Davis was not unfairly surprised or prejudiced beca use an expert witness was required to establish this ca use of action a nd b ecause Erse k off e red Davis & Davis open a ccess to depose the expert witness. We do not find the se argumen ts persua sive. First, the fact that an expert witness is necessary to establi sh Erse k ’ s cause of action does not establish that the defense would n ot b e unfairly surpr i sed by this expert named at this time. “The rules were revised to make that so rt of anti cipation unnecessary.” [ Snider v. Stanl ey , 44 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 2001, pet . denied ) ]

. The supreme court discussed the concept of unf ai r surpris e prior to t he revision of the rules in Alvarado v. Farah Manufactu ring Co. : D eterm i ning whether a party is r eally surprised by an offer of testimony not formally identifie d in discovery is difficult. The better prepared counsel is for trial, th e mo re like ly he is to have anticipated what evidence may b e offered against h is client, and t h e less likely he is to b e surprised. It would13 B. Proprie ty of Summary Judgment
We w ill no w address Appellant ’ s rem ai ning i ssue , that th e tri al court erred by granting the s ummary judgment and establis hing the value of the property at $432,000. Appellants succinctly st ate in their Brief that “ [t] he sole issue on ap peal is
the determinatio n of t he fair market value of the Prope rty on June 2 8, 20 17, the date of taking.” T he trial court granted th e Motion for Summary Judgment and entered its
findi ng that the Property ’ s fair market value was $4 32,000. Appel lants claim a fact
issue was crea ted b y thr ee “competing” Property values: (1) the c ommis sioners ’ award of $2 25,000; (2) M r. Crum ’ s appraisal of $432,000; and (3) M r. Jackson ’ s apprais al of $732,000.

hardly be right to reward compet ent counse l ’ s diligent preparation by excusing his opponent from complying with the r eq uiremen ts of the ru les.

. . . A party is entitled to pr epare for trial ass ured that a witne ss will not be called be c ause opposing counsel has not identified him or her i n response to a proper interrogatory. 830 S.W.2d [ 911 , 915 (Tex. 1992 ) (op. on reh ’ g ) ] . Furthermore, simply granting t he firm the right to depose the witness does not ensure that it is not unf airly surprised o r prejudi ced. See Snider , 44 S.W.3d at 717

– 18

. Accordingly, we hold that the t rial court did not abuse its discretion by failing t o conclude that D avis & Davis was n ot unfa irly surpr ised or prejudiced by Ersek ’ s failure for more than one y ear to designate an expert witness to support his cause of action. 69 S.W.3d 268, 272 (Tex. App

. — Austin 2 002, pe t. denied)

.14 The commiss ioners ’ award of $225,00 0 cann ot se rve as a basis for rev ersal for
three reasons. First, Appellants did not argue in th eir Summary Jud gment Response
that the commissioners ’ award created a f act issue. According ly, Appellants waived the argume nt. See Little v. Needha m , 236 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1 st Dist.] 200 7, no pet.) ; Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc. , 86 S.W. 3d 344, 34 8 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2002 ) (op. on reh ’ g ) , aff ’ d

, 134 S.W .3d 190 (Tex . 2004)

. Second, eve n if Appellant s had pr operly pres erved this complaint , th e

comm issioners ’ award could not create a f act issue beca use the award was not admissible evide nce as a matte r of law. See PR Inv s. and Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. State , 251 S.W. 3d 472, 476 ( Tex. 20 08) ( citing State v. Hilton , 412 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. 196 7)) ; C

ity of McKinney, Tex

. v. El dorado Par k

, Ltd. , 206 S .W.3d 185, 192 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2006, pet. denied ) ( noting that the special commissioners ’ award is vacated and
inadmiss ible in the trial de nov o before the tria l court )

. Finally, even if th e comm issioners ’ award were admissible evidence , it would

no t r esult in reversible error in this case

. A ppellants s uffer ed no harm, as they received $432,000 , the amount they had sought through their own ti mely designate d
expe r t and an amount more than the commi ssioners ’ award . It was also the highest

am ount the ad mis sible evidence supported. Turning to the Jackson O pi nion, it cannot create a fact issue , either. As we h eld above, the tria l court did not abus e its discretion by e xcluding the J ackson O pinion
from c onsideration ; it was therefore no t com peten t summary judg ment evidence

.15 Because neither the commissioners ’ aw ard n or the Jackson O pinion create d a fact issue as to the Propert y ’ s f air market value, th e only value left f or the trial court to consider was M r . Crum ’ s appraisal value of $432,0 00, which is pr ecisely the amount stated in the trial court ’ s ruling.
The v alue of land for purp oses of condemnation is properly a matter of exper t opinion

. State v. Cent

. Expressway Sign A ssoc s. , 302 S.W.3d 866, 874 (T ex. 200 9 ) (op. on
reh ’ g )

. The only expert opini on regar ding the v alue of this l and which was properly
before the trial court was M r. Crum ’ s opinion , and that opinion was not otherwise challenged by A ppellants r egarding its reliability or c redibility. He was, after all, their
time ly designated expert witness. Therefore, the e vidence be fore the trial court was
proper summary judgment evidence upon which the court could rely in granting its summary judg ment. Expert opini on ma y be sufficient to support a traditional motion
for summary judgment as to the value of real pr operty. Ha rris C ty. Appraisal Dist

. v. Riverway Hold ings, L.P. , No. 14

- 09

- 00786

- CV, 2011 WL 529466, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] Feb

. 15, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A s noted by that court, We reject HCAD ’ s a ccompanying c ontention that a tri al court cann ot grant a traditional s ummary judgment in favor of the property

- owner movant on the basis of u ncontroverted and unchallenged ex pert opin ion evidenc e addressing property valuation

. . . . HCAD ’ s argument contr avenes Rule 1 66a(c), which recognizes tha t a m ovant can establish its right to summary jud gment based solely on the uncontroverted testimony of an expert witness if (1) the sub ject ma tter is suc h that a trier of fac t would be guided solely by the opinion t estimony of a n expert; (2) the evidence i s cle ar, positi ve and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies; a nd (3) the evidence could have16 been readil y controver ted. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ; Anderson v. Snider , 808 S.W. 2d 54, 55 (Te x .1991 ) [ (per curiam) (op. on reh ’ g) ]

. Id

. W e overrule this issue.
I V
. C ONCLU SION Having overruled Appellants ’ two issues , we affirm the trial court ’ s judgment

.

/s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice
Delivere d: April 8, 2021