No. ____ _ 

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF 

CRIMINAL APPEALS 

WILLIAM BUCKNER HUBBLE 

Petitioner, 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Respondent. 

From the Second Court of Appeals, No. 02-13-00541-CR, 

and the District Court of Cooke County, Texas, 

Cause No. CR-07-256 

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 

Jeff Springer 

State Bar No. 18966750 

SPRINGER & LYLE, LLP 

1807 Westminster 

Denton, TX 76205 

940.387.0404 (ph} 

940.383.7656 (fax) 

jeff@springer-lyle.com (email) 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

PD-0249-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 3/6/2015 2:11:05 PM

Accepted 3/6/2015 2:53:32 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... 2 

IDENTITY OF JUDGES, PARTIES AND COUNSEL .......................................... 3 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... 4 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................... 5 

STATEMENT OF TI-lE CASE ................................................................................. 5 

PROCEDU'RA.L 1-DSTORY ...................................................................................... 5 

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ...................................................................................... 6 

ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 7 

(I) Did the Court of Appeals err in applying Tex. R. App. P. 33(a)(l) 

in its analysis of the context of the trial record? ........................................ 8 

(2) Did the Court of Appeals improperly fail to rebut, or at least 

address, Petitioner's Tex. R. App. P. 33(a)(l) analysis ofthe 

context of the record? ................................................................................. 8 

(3) Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to reach the merits of 

Petitioner's complaint that his trial counsel was prevented from 

telling the jury that one of his enhancement convictions had been 

reclassified to a misdemeanor? .................................................................. 9 

PRAYER ······ ............................................... I II II I Ill I II II I •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• I II I I II I I 13 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 14 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 14 

APPENDIX 

Court of Appeals' Opinion····································~···~····~···~···~··~~···~················ 1 

Court of Appeals' Opinion on Rehearing ........................................................ 2 

2 
IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES AND COUNSEL 

Parties to the Judgment 

Trial Judge 

Defendant's Trial Counsel 

State's Trial Counsel 

Defendant's Counsel on Appeal 

State's Counsel on Appeal 

William Buckner Hubble, Defendant 

State ofTexas, State 

Hon. Janelle Haverkamp, Judge 

235th District Court 

Cooke County, Texas 

Mr. Christopher Fostel, Esq. 

Ector County District Attorney's Office 

300 North Grant, Room 305 

Odessa, TX 797 61 

Ms. Janice Warder, Esq. 

Mr. Ron Poole, Esq. 

Ms. Lisa Decker, Esq. 

Cooke County District Attorney 

101 Dixon Street, Suite 309 

Gainesville, Texas 76240 

Mr. Jeff Springer, Esq. 

1807 Westminster 

Denton, TX 76205 

Ms. Sue Korioth, Esq. 

Special Prosecutor 

P.O. Box 600103 

Dallas, Texas 75360-0103 

3 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases 

Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ................................ 11 

Eckert v. State, 672 S. W .2d 600, 603 (Tex. App. Austin 1984, pet. ref d) ............ 1 0 

Ex parte Hubble, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS I 041 (Tex. Crim. App. 

Oct. 9, 2013) ........................................................................................................... 6 

Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907,909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) .......................... 12 

Melendez v. State, 4 S.W.3d 437,442 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no 

pet.), overruled on other grounds, Small v. State, 23 S.W.3d 549 (Tex.App.--

Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) ..................................................................... 11 

State v. Wooldridge, 237 S.W.3d 714, 716-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .................. 8 

Statutes 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04(d) (Vernon 2013) .................................................. 6 

Rules 

Tex. R. App. P. 33.l(a)(l) ................................................................................... 7, 10 

Tex. R. App. P. 44 ................................................................................................... 10 

4 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 

Petitioner waives oral argument 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Appellant was convicted of felony unlawful possession of a firearm in 20 1 0. 

[CR 51-52]. His range of punishment was enhanced by two prior felonies, one of 

which was a 1987 conviction for burglary of a motor vehicle. /d. He was sentenced 

to sixty years incarceration. /d. 

On appeal, Appellant complained that his sentence was affected by the trial 

court's refusal to allow his trial attorney to argue that the 1987 felony used to 

enhance his range of punishment had been reclassified to a misdemeanor a few 

years after his conviction. In a memorandum opinion with one justice concurring 

in the result only, the Court of Appeals refused to consider the merits of the 

argument, disregarding Petitioner's interpretation of the record and concluding 

instead that the only apparent argument was improper, and error as to any another 

argument had not been preserved for appeal. [AX I at 5]. 

Petitioner challenged the Court of Appeals holding in a Motion for 

Rehearing. [See AX 2]. The motion was denied, but one justice noted that she 

would have granted a rehearing. /d. 

5 
Appellant filed this Petition for Review to challenge the Court of Appeals' 

holding that his trial counsel attempted only an improper argument and failed to 

preserve error on the specific complaint raised on appeal. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Petitioner timely perfected his appeal after this court granted his application 

for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Hubble, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 

1041 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2013). On December 23, 2014 the Court of Appeals 

affirmed his conviction. [AX 1 at 6]. Petitioner requested rehearing on January 22, 

2015. The Court of Appeals denied the motion on February 5, 2015. [AX 2 at 1]. 

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in applying Tex. 

R. App. P. 33(a)(1) in its analysis of the context of the 

trial record? 

(2) Did the Court of Appeals improperly fail to 

rebut, or at least address, Petitioner's Tex. R. App. P. 

33( a )(1) analysis of the context of the record? 

(3) Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to reach 

the merits of Petitioner's complaint that his trial 

counsel was prevented from telling the jury that one 

of his enhancement convictions had been reclassified 

to a misdemeanor? 

6 
ARGUMENT 

A. Factual Background 

A Cooke County jury convicted Petitioner of felony unlawful possession of 

a firearm in April of 2010. [CR 51-52]. At the punishment stage of his trial, 

Petitioner's attorney attempted argue that one of his enhancement convictions, a 

1987 felony burglary of a vehicle, had been reclassified to a misdemeanor a few 

years after the conviction. [3 RR at 86]. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04(d) 

(Vernon 2013). 

Petitioner's attorney began the argument by reminding the jury that the 

conviction had occurred many years before, when Petitioner was 19 years old. [3 

RR at 86]. Then, as he was about to address the crime's reclassification, the 

prosecutor objected (mid-sentence) that the argument was outside the record. /d. 

The trial judge sustained. /d. After the objection was sustained, Petitioner's trial 

counsel simply moved on. He did not perfect a bill of exceptions or attempt to 

explain to the judge how he intended to finish his sentence, but the record makes 

clear what he intended to say: He was about to tell the jury that burglary of a 

vehicle is not a misdemeanor, not a felony. 

When the jury retired to deliberate, it the judge's instructions put the range 

of punishment at 25 to 99 or life. [CR at 43]. The jury obviously split the range 

7 
down the middle. Petitioner's punishment was assessed at sixty years 

confinement. [CR at 41]. 

Petitioner appealed. In two issues, he argued that the trial judge had 

impermissibly prevented his trial attorney from telling the jury that the 

enhancement felony had been reclassified to a misdemeanor} [AX 1 at 3]. The 

Court of Appeals never addressed this argument. It held instead that Petitioner's 

counsel must have intended to argue that the reclassified burglary conviction could 

not be used to enhance Petitioner's sentence, even though Petitioner never raised 

the issue, and even though the record contains no indication whatsoever that this 

argument was intended. [AX at 4-6]. 

This Petition has been filed to challenge the Court of Appeals' failure to 

reach the merits of Petitioner's complaints. 

B. Argument and Authorities 

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in applying Tex. 

R. App. P. 33(a)(1) in its analysis of the context of the 

trial record? 

(2) Did the Court of Appeals improperly fail to 

rebut, or at least address, Petitioner's Tex. R. App. P. 

33(a)(l) analysis of the context of the record? 

1 This court held long ago that the reclassification of a felony to a misdemeanor does not 

disqualify the conviction from being used to enhance the range of punishment. State v. 

Wooldridge, 237 S.W.3d 714,716-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). However, to appellate counsel's 

knowledge, no court has addressed whether the reclassification can be communicated to the jury 

in closing argument. 

8 
(3) Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to reach 

the merits of Petitioner's complaint that his trial 

counsel was prevented from telling the jury that one 

of his enhancement convictions had been reclassified 

to a misdemeanor? 

To preserve error on appeal, Tex. R. App. P. 33.l(a)(l) only requires that the 

specific grounds be apparent from the context of the record. To understand the 

context of the trial court's ruling during the closing argument in Petitioner's case, 

one has to start at the charge conference. There, Petitioner's trial counsel objected 

to the use of the burglary conviction to enhance Petitioner's punishment. [3 RR at 

69-70]. The trial court correctly overruled the objection. /d. at 70. The dialogue 

during the charge conference, however, is important because it demonstrates that 

the trial judge knew that Petitioner's burglary offense had been reclassified, and 

that Petitioner's attorney knew that it would be included in the enhancement 

charge over his objection. 

When jury argument began only a short time later, Petitioner's attorney 

devoted a few minutes to the burglary conviction. {3 RR 86]. Then, it became 

obvious that he intended to address the reclassification. The record of the 

argument and objection is short: 

William Hubble was born in 1968. The State has 

alleged that he committed the crime, or was convicted 

of a crime of burglary of a motor vehicle in 1987. 

That would have made him around 19 years old. I don't 

know very many people that would want to be judged on 

their behavior as a 19 year old. 

* * * 

9 
But another thing to remember about burglary of a 

motor vehicle, and no one is saying it's a good crime. 

There's no such a thing. But you also need to realize 

that since then and now --

MR. POOLE: Judge, objection. He's going outside 

the record. 

THE COURT: Sustained. 

MR. FOSTEL: Okay. 

!d. It takes no imagination to complete the sentence: "But you also need to realize 

that since then and now-- [burglary of a vehicle has been reclassified to a 

misdemeanor.]" (Emphasis added.) Apparent from the context of the record was 

that Appellants' trial counsel intended to tell the jury that the enhancement felony 

had been reclassified to a misdemeanor. 2 Beyond this, the record is completely 

silent. 

Petitioner argued in the Court of Appeals that the judge erred in sustaining 

the prosecutor's objection. [AX 1 at 3]. Evidence of Appellant's prior conviction 

for burglary of a vehicle had been admitted, showing that the conviction occurred 

in 1987. See, State's Exh. 8; [3RR at 66]. That the offense had been reclassified by 

the legislature as a misdemeanor was not a fact extraneous to the evidence, but a 

reasonable explanation of the law based upon facts admitted. See Eckert v. State, 

672 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. App.-- Austin 1984, pet. refd). Since its 

reclassification was not a misstatement of the law, Appellant argued that his 

2 This was the subject of Appellant's issue on appeal-whether that argument was a correct 

statement of the law, constituting proper jury argument. This is a question of first impression 

that the Court avoided by determining that trial counsel had failed to preserve error. 

10 
attorney was entitled to discuss it. ld. See also Melendez v. State, 4 S.W.3d 437, 

442 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.), overruled on other grounds, 

Small v. State, 23 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. refd). 

The trial judge erred when she sustained the Prosecutor's objection, and it cannot 

be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error would not have affected 

Petitioner's sentence. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3 

The Court of Appeals refused to address Petitioner's argument. Instead, it 

determined that "the only matter apparent to the trial court from the context of the 

record was that defense counsel wanted to inform the jury that it should not use the 

prior burglary conviction for enhancement. .. " [AX 1 at 5]( emphasis added). The 

court did not explain how this conclusion is supported by the record, nor did it 

attempt to rebut Petitioner's analysis. 

The Court of Appeals' rationale is demonstrably flawed. If it were correct, 

one should be able to complete trial counsel's unfinished sentence with a phrase 

consistent with the court's conclusion that he attempted to inform the jury that the 

conviction could not be used for enhancement. There is simply no way to do that. 

The court's tortured analysis requires finishing the sentence per Petitioner's 

analysis, then speculating about what might be said afterward. Rule 33 does not 

3 Prohibiting counsel from making a particular jury argument amounts to a denial of the 

defendant's right to counsel when the argument is one the defendant is entitled to make. 

Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

11 
allow for that kind of conjecture; instead, it limits courts to what is "apparent from 

the context of the record", eliminating speculation about what might occur after the 

matter apparent are concluded. Tex. R. App. P. 33.l{a){l). 

Having decided that Petitioner's attorney attempted an improper argument, 

the Court dismissed any other interpretation by holding that, to the extent any other 

statement was intended, Petitioner's trial counsel failed to preserve error. [AX 1 at 

5]. The Court dismissed other contextual interpretations without ever addressing 

Petitioner's analysis, nor explaining how the argument he advocated had been 

waived when the one raised sua sponte by the Court of Appeals was not. In short, 

its analysis was erroneously harsh and patently unfair: 

The standards of procedural default. .. are not to be implemented by 

splitting hairs in the appellate courts. As regards specificity, all a party 

has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a complaint on appeal is to let the 

trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and 

to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when 

the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it. 

Lankston v. State. 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Had the court 

fairly examined the record and Petitioner's complaint, it would have agreed with 

Petitioner's contextual analysis, determined that his trial counsel had preserved 

error, and reached the merits of Petitioner's appea1.4 

4 It is worth noting that Justice Dauphinot only concurred in the Court of Appeals' result, and 

ultimately would have granted Appellant a rehearing. [AX I at 6; AX 2]. 

12 
PRAYER 

Petitioner's complaint in this case was crystal clear to everyone in the 

courtroom on the last day of his trial. His trial attorney didn't need to do anything 

else to make his intentions clearer. The Court of Appeals erred in resorting to a 

procedural default to avoid the merits of Petitioner's complaint that the trial court 

erred and deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by sustaining the 

objection that prevented his attorney from telling the jury that one of his 

enhancement convictions had been reclassified to a misdemeanor. 

THEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Court to grant his Petition for 

Review; determine that court of appeals erred in failing to reach the merits of 

Petitioner's complaint; and reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand this 

case to the court of appeals for a decision on the merits. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Jeff Springer 

State Bar No. 18966750 

SPRINGER & LYLE, LLP 

1807 Westminster 

Denton, TX 76205 

940-387-0404 (phone) 

940-383-7656 (fax) 

jeff@springer-lyle.com 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 

in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on the 6th day of 

March, 2015, by delivering it to the following: 

Ms. Janice Warder, Esq. Ms. Sue Korioth, Esq. 

Cooke County District Attorney Special Prosecutor 

101 Dixon Street, Suite 309 P.O. Box 600103 

Gainesville, Texas 76240 Dallas, Texas 75360-0103 

ian ice. warder@.co.cooke. tx. us suekori oth@.ao l.com 

Lisa McMinn 

State Prosecuting Attorney's Office 

P.O. Box 13046 

Austin, TX 78711 

information@.soa.texas.gov 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

In compliance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), I certify that this document 

contains 1.876 words. This document was created in Microsoft Word. The body is 

in conventional 14 point text, and the footnotes are in conventional 12 point text. I 

have relied on the software and word-count generated by the software in making 

this certificate. 

14 
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00541-CR

WILLIAM BUCKNER HUBBLE APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 235TH DISTRICT COURT OF COOKE COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 07-256

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant William Buckner Hubble was charged with unlawfully possessing 

a firearm at a location other than where he lived after having been convicted of a 

felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.04(a) (West 2011). The State filed 

notice of its intention to use two prior felony convictions to enhance punishment

to habitual offender status. The notice included a 1994 felony possession-of-a-

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

controlled-substance conviction and a 1987 felony burglary-of-a-motor-vehicle

conviction. 

A jury found Hubble guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Prior to 

commencement of the punishment phase of trial, Hubble’s defense attorney

objected to the use of Hubble’s 1987 burglary-of-a-motor-vehicle conviction as a 

prior felony conviction for enhancement purposes because the legislature had 

reclassified that offense from a felony to a misdemeanor after Hubble’s 1987 

conviction. The trial court overruled the objection. 

During the punishment phase of trial, the State introduced evidence to 

support the two prior felony convictions. The State also introduced evidence of 

Hubble’s prior misdemeanor convictions for assault in 1997, possession of 

marijuana in 2003 and in 2005, driving while intoxicated in 1993 and 2005, and 

possession of a prohibited weapon in 2006 and of a 1987 judgment revoking 

probation for burglary of a habitation.

During closing arguments, Hubble’s attorney argued,

Now, the charge, of course, has a huge wide range just like I 

told you it would during voir dire. You can assess anywhere from 

two to 99 years or life, depending upon your findings after you 

review this charge on punishment. 

. . . The State has alleged that he committed the crime, or 

was convicted of a crime of burglary of a motor vehicle in 1987. 

That would have made him around 19 years old. I don’t know very 

many people that would want to be judged on their behavior as a 19 

year old.

Now, did there happen to be a gun? Obviously not. . . . . But 

another thing to remember about burglary of a motor vehicle, and no 
3

one is saying it’s a good crime. There’s not such a thing. But you 

also need to realize that since then and now— 

The State then objected that “he’s going outside the record.” The trial court 

sustained the objection. 

The jury found both enhancement allegations to be true, which increased 

the punishment range to a minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment and a maximum 

of 99 years’ or life imprisonment, and assessed Hubble’s punishment at sixty 

years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §12.42(d) (West Supp. 2014). 

The trial court sentenced Hubble accordingly. Although Hubble did not timely 

perfect an appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted his request for 

leave to file an out of time appeal. See Ex Parte Hubble, No. WR-79509-01, 

2013 WL 5568448 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2013) (not designated for 

publication).

In two issues, Hubble contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

sustaining the State’s objection to his closing argument as set forth above. 

Hubble argues that the trial court’s ruling impermissibly limited his closing 

argument and deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Hubble 

acknowledges that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the State 

may use for enhancement purposes a prior felony that has since been 

reclassified as a misdemeanor. See State v. Wooldridge, 237 S.W.3d 714, 716–

17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). And he concedes that the State’s use of his prior 

conviction for burglary of a motor vehicle for enhancement was proper in this 
4

case because that offense was classified as a felony at the time of his 1987 

conviction. Rather, Hubble asserts that he should have been allowed to tell the 

jury that the offense of burglary of a motor vehicle has since been reclassified as 

a misdemeanor and that, consequently, had he committed that offense a few 

years later, the State could not have used it to enhance his punishment in this 

case. 

To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the 

trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds 

for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request, 

objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Landers v. State, 402 S.W.3d 

252, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the 

request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining 

party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 

33.1(a)(2); Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “To 

avoid forfeiture of a complaint on appeal, all a party has to do is let the trial judge 

know what he wants and why he thinks he is entitled to it and do so clearly 

enough for the judge to understand the request at a time when the trial court is in 

a proper position to do something about it.” Bedolla v. State, 442 S.W.3d 313, 

316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Here, Hubble did not inform the trial court of the specific argument he 

intended to make after the State interrupted his argument to object and after the 
5

trial court sustained the State’s objection. Defense counsel argued, “[A]nother 

thing to remember about burglary of a motor vehicle, and no one is saying it’s a 

good crime. There’s not such a thing. But you also need to realize that since 

then and now—” The only other argument in the record that sheds light on what 

defense counsel was attempting to argue was his objection at the beginning of 

the punishment phase of trial to the State’s use of Hubble’s 1987 burglary of a 

vehicle conviction for enhancement. Specifically, defense counsel stated, 

Judge, I am going to object to the portion and to any enhancement 

that’s come up with regard to burglary of a motor vehicle inasmuch 

as that offense since then has been reduced to a Class A -- I mean, 

not this particular one. I’m saying the legislature since the ‘80s has 

realized -- has thought better of it and gone back in and made that a 

Class A misdemeanor. I don’t think it’s fair to come at him two 

decades later using it as a felony enhancement. And we are asking 

that that be removed from the charge. 

As the State recognizes on appeal, Hubble was not required to formally 

except to the trial court’s ruling on the State’s objection to preserve error for 

appeal but the only matter apparent to the trial court from the context of the 

record was that defense counsel wanted to inform the jury that it should not use 

the prior burglary conviction for enhancement because it has been reclassified as 

a misdemeanor. To the extent that defense counsel was attempting to make any 

other argument, he has not preserved his complaint for appeal. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 33.1(a)(1). And to the extent that defense counsel was attempting to 

argue that the jury should not use Hubble’s 1987 felony conviction to enhance his 

punishment because it has since been reclassified as a misdemeanor, this is not 
6

a proper statement of the law, as conceded by Hubble on appeal. See

Wooldridge, 237 S.W.3d at 716–17. This argument is also contrary to the law 

contained in the jury charge. See State v. Renteria, 977 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1998) (holding that jury argument stating law contrary to the jury 

charge is improper). The jury charge stated the applicable law regarding the 

jury’s consideration of the prior felony offenses alleged by the State for 

enhancement; the jury was tasked with determining whether the allegation of the 

prior conviction was true beyond a reasonable doubt. An argument that the jury 

find the allegation not true because the prior offense is no longer classified as a 

felony would be an improper suggestion that the jury refuse to follow the law. 

See Eckert v. State, 672 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, pet. ref’d). 

Because Hubble was not entitled to make the only argument preserved for 

appeal and because he did not preserve for appeal any other complaint 

regarding his attempted jury argument, we overrule Hubble’s two issues and 

affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). 

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DAUPHINOT, J. concurs without opinion.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 23, 2014 
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00541-CR

WILLIAM BUCKNER HUBBLE APPELLANT

 

 V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 235TH DISTRICT COURT OF COOKE COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 07-256

------------

ORDER

------------

We have considered “Appellant’s Motion For Rehearing.”

It is the opinion of the court that the motion for rehearing should be and is

hereby denied and that the opinion and judgment of December 23, 2014, stand

unchanged.

The clerk of this court is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the

attorneys of record.n

SIGNED February 5, 2015.

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

FILE COPY
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DAUPHINOT, J. would grant.

2

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