earching for 

Partners: 

Regional Organizations 

and 

Peace Operations 

William H. Lewi

and Edward Mark

ag 
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..~ 

~,~ .- 

George C. Marshafl Hall 
Regional Organizations 

and Peace Operations 

William HI Lewis and 

Edward Marks 

McNair Paper 58 

June 1998 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDI

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 
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[] Director: Robert A. Silano 

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ISSN 1071-7552 
. 

. 

. 

. 

Second Leg of the Tripod .......................... 

Third Leg of the Tripod ........................... 

Overriding Questions and Issues for the United States .... 

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE.. 

A Plethora of Organizations ........................ 

NATO: The Emerging Transformation ................. 

Cooperation with Other Security Structures ............ 

Problems of NATO and U.N. Collaboration ............ 

Bosnia Phase Two ............................... 

The Way Ahead ................................. 

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES ........ 

Founding ..................................... 

Military Relations ................................ 

Peacekeeping ................................... 

Cohesion ...................................... 

The View from Moscow ........................... 

The View from Transcaucasia ...................... 

The View from Central Asia ........................ 

The Views of the Other FSUs ...................... 

Conclusions .................................... 

AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS ...................... 

Organization of African Unity ...................... 

Organization of American States ................... 1

Structural Change and Military Roles ................ 1 

PEACEKEEPING IN ASIA ......................... 1

Security Questions .............................. 1

Peace Operations ............................... 1

A Work In Progress? ............................. 1

°,, 

111 
iv 
le 

"Peacekeeping is a 

Invention " 

U.N. 

So declared Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1994. ~ Indeed

peacekeeping emerged in the post-Cold War period as the "mo

prominent U.N. activity." The organization was freed of the shackle

placed upon it by superpower rivalry, that heretofore had rendere

U.N. machinery inoperative in coping with local crises and wa

suddenly becoming "the center of international efforts to deal wit

unresolved problems of the past decades as well as the array 

present and future issues." Between 1988 and 1993, more than 

dozen new peacekeeping operations were launched, involvin~ mo

than 70,000 military and civilian personnel for field operations, at a

annual cost to the United Nations in excess of $3 billion. 

Why this sudden explosion of U.N. peacekeeping activity

Relaxation of Cold War restraints was partially responsible, but 

coincided with a sea change in attitudes toward the nation-stat

"The norms governing intervention have evolved," as Barry Blechma

put it. ~' Governments have come under increasing scrutiny an

criticism for failure to adhere to a growing body of internation

standards in areas formerly considered purely internal matters, f

instance, human rights and political freedom. However, while wor

opinion is more willing to consider intervention in principle, it is als

increasingly leery about military intervention in practice except 
emergency exists. Here the United Nations has the potential t

accomplish things no other international organization or ad ho

coalition can do. In theory, at least, it can deal with modern plagues

assist refugees, and help countries cope with natural disasters

However many of these emergencies reflect the failure of governin

institutions to address effectively deep-seated economic and politica

problems. These problems, natural and manmade, have recently an

increasingly overlapped, creating "complex emergencies," which 

have sometimes overtaxed U.N. competence and capability. Somali

(1993), Bosnia (1994-95), and Rwanda (1994) were dramati

examples of this development. On the other hand, the U.N

operation in Cambodia demonstrated that, with adequate 

international support and political will, the United Nations could 

fulfill an important intervention role on behalf of the internationa

community. The 1997 internal crisis in Cambodia pointed, however

to the need to treat at length with extreme factionalism to assur

postelections stability. 

The expansion of U.N. peacekeeping or peace enforcemen

activities through Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter has caused th

United Nations to run into trouble. The question of the use o

military force by the United Nations, both with respect to competenc

and to legitimacy, has not been fully answered, as was shown i

Somalia and Bosnia. The use of force is difficult enough whe

viewed in clearcut political situations that can be considered threat

to international peace and security, but force becomes even mor

complex when applied to humanitarian and resettlement concerns

For instance, does uninvited humanitarian assistance constitut

intervention in violation of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter relating t

interference in tile domestic affairs of sovereign member states, an

to what extent is such intervention to be justified when government

brutalize their populations or cannot provide minimal services to the

citizens? 

2 
of vague mandates involving some form of expanded or secon

generation peacekeeping, usually combined with responsibility 

dealing with life-threatening challenges to populations, and oft

with a charge to re-establish minimal government controls. N

surprisingly, the U.N. system suffered severe setbacks as it beca

clear that the system had only a limited capacity to deal with comp

crises. As the United Nations found itself overburdened a

underfunded in the years following 1988, a number of member sta

pushed for extensive reform and reorganization, with spec

emphasis on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. In d

course, three new departments were created by combinin

amalgamating, and expanding existing units and creating n

elements: 

• Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

• Department of Political Affairs 

• Department of Humanitarian Assistance 

These changes had been urged on the Secretary-General 

concerned member governments that were wrestling with su

operational questions as augmenting U.N. field mission capabiliti

organizing the diverse and divergent U.N. agencies concerned w

peace support and humanitarian assistance, and arranging for m

effective coordination among the U.N. system, member states, a

nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Beginning in 1990, 

reforms led to the expansion or introduction of numerous relev

capabilities in the U.N. system: interagency cooperation a

coordination, joint financial appeals, mission planning staff, 24-ho

situation room and communication system, training arrangemen

and a rudimentary intelligence-sharing system. 

As these reforms were implemented, Secretary-General Boutr

Ghali pursued two complementary initiatives. First, in his 19

3 
assistance, and U.N. implementation of the same. Most government

clearly believed that Chapter VII forceful intervention is best left to a

hoc coalitions to conduct, albeit with U.N. Security Counc

authority. 

In 1994, the Secretary-General reached out to regiona

organizations in an attempt to energize more active cooperatio

between them and the United Nations under Chapter VIII of th

Charter. Arguing that U.N. resources were, and would likely remain

inadequate to meet all needs, he called on regional organizations t

merge their efforts. Although two meetings of leaders were held i

New York and the subject remains under consideration, little concret

has resulted, t towever, several governments remain interested i

pursuing increased regional peacekeeping. The United States 

actively engaged in organizing support for the Organization of Africa

Unity, and the Russian Federation claims to be creating a regiona

collective security organization among the former members of tt~

Soviet Union. 

While these initiatives were underway, the number o

peacekeeping and humanitarian operations expanded, and 

perception of U.N. incompetence emerged. In the past 2 years th

number of operations and personnel deployed has been sharpl

reduced as member states have cut back on their suppor

Nevertheless it is obvious that the United Nations will not return t

its "traditional peacekeeping" days but will continue to be calle

upon to act on behalf of the international community, tJnder wha

conditions the United Nations will be involved, and to what degre

regional organizations the subject of this study--will participate ar

yet to be determined. 

4 
, )

5 
p, 

Containment of communism defined the national security pol

of the United States for more than four decades. The strategy provid

coherence and a persuasive rationale for policy initiatives on a glo

scale. With containment as the strong strategic focus, success

American administrations helped to organize new internatio

organizations, form alliances, and develop close ties with governme

leaders of varied ideological outlook. Throughout much of the po

World War II period, the United States formed "coalitions of 

willing" on the assumption that its partners shared similar secu

concerns. Some such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organizat

(NATO) proved enduring; others such as the ill-fated Baghdad Pac

the Middle East fell of their own internal contradictions. Rarely 

the United Nations loom large in the U.S. security spectrum dur

much of this period. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its own attendant netw

of alliance partnerships has yielded new challenges in the post-C

War era, a period characterized by some as one of politi

fragmentation and "Third World chaos." Containment is no longe

basis on which to build coherent policies and a supporting rationa

Different policy tools and intervening capabilities are needed to d

with internecine civil wars, the collapse of governing institutions 

war-ravaged societies, and the displacement of populations as a re

of such conflicts. The challenges posed demand responses far m

complex in some respects than the zero-sum arithmetic of the C

War demanded. 

In his celebrated 1992 report to the Security Council, A~enda 

Peace, Boutros-Ghali underscored the productive roles that regio

organizations could play in the areas of preventive diplomacy, pea

operations, and postconflict peace building. He urged the Uni

7 
participation, consensus, and democratization. ~ Agreeing, the 

Security Council in January 1993 invited regional organizations to 

examine "ways and means to strengthen their functions to maintain 

international peace and security within their areas of competence." 

Among the areas identified: "preventive diplomacy, including fact

finding, confidence-building, good offices, peace building, and

where appropriate, peacekeeping." Nowhere was there mention o

military, units to be made available to the United Nations Security 

Council for Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (enforcement) 

operations. 

The proposals set forth by the Secretary-General were not wel

received by many U.N. veterans with substantial experience in peace 

operations. One of them expatiated in 1993 that regional organization 

are not the best first line of defense against most conflicts because 

"they do not cover some conflict areas in any sensible way." A specia

defect, the former official observed, revolves around the accepted 

principle of "impartiality: .... It frequently happens that regiona

organizations are regarded as less objective and less impartial than 

the U.N." Moreover, he contended, such organizations "really don't 

have the capacity for things like peacekeeping." He suggested thei

potential lay as partners with the United Nations in some conflict 

intervention operations where an "unacceptable degree of massive 

retribution" by U.N. mandated forces will lead adversaries "to come 

to the bargaining table more than they want to fight." Because mos

regional organizations lack the capacity to organize and direct large

scale military operations, proponents of this view tend to favor the 

creation of a U.N. standing force of several brigades (15,000 to 

20,000 personnel) for crisis prevention and enforcement purposes

Despite rhetorical outpourings of support by some member states and 

private interest groups, most U.N. members have proffered only 

lukewarm support and, given the substantial funding required for such 

8 
means to counter perceived U.N. "dominance"--involving weaken

Security Council "Perm Five" hegemony in matters of peace a

stability. The "regionalist" bloc included several Brit

Commonwealth member states, the Arab League, and the L

American States. The Organization of American States (OAS) w

particularly outspoken in this regard, its members contending that 

OAS should serve as a pillar of regional collective security. The ini

American view was to tilt U.S. policy in favor of tile United Natio

as the progenitor of actions intended to maintain international or

and stability. Ultimately, however, the U.S. Government acquiesc

in support of the OAS position, producing a Charter that, in the wo

of Innis Claude "conferred general approval upon existing a

anticipated regional organizations, but contained provisions hav

the purpose of making them serve as adjuncts to the United Natio

and subjecting them in considerable measure to the direction a

control of the central organization. "2 The U.N.-NATO "partnersh

approach in Bosnia at the height of the crisis (1993-95) demonstra

the basic impediments involved in any arrangement for joint milit

operations under U.N. auspices and civilian direction. 

The initial U.S. response to Boutros-Ghali's recommendations 

been to consider a triangular crisis management approach involv

the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad hoc coalitio

Each leg in this strategic tripod has certain strengths and weakness

and the decision as to which one or combination to use in a giv

situation is high policy indeed. The regional crisis that arose fr

Iraq's 1 990 invasion of Kuwait generated wide international conc

and a U.N. authorized ad hoc coalition of military forces under U

leadership that succeeded in expelling the Iraqis. However, t

coalition became increasingly frayed; by early 1997, it was exhibit

geriatic infirmities. Another U.N.-organized and -directed force, 

U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), performed abysmally in Bos

and had to be replaced by a combination of NATO and other for

9 
successful in organizing national elections in Cambodia and 

"stitching together" a national coaltition to govern the country. 

Notable achievements were registered elsewhere: in Mozambique, by 

ending civil war and establishing civilian authority, and in South 

Africa, by monitoring elections in 1994 that produced a postapartheid 

multiracial government. 

First Leg of the Tripod 

The lesson learned is that the first leg in the U.S. tripod, the United 

Nations, has no warfighting capability, nor should it be expected to 

develop one. Its primary strength exists in the areas of traditional 

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, to wit: 

• Establishing a mandate for interposition of impartial U.N

forces, lightly armed (and at the request of conflicted parties) to 

monitor adherence to the agreed terms of the cease-fire 

• Providing humanitarian assistance to populations displaced o

otherwise adversely affected by the preceding conflict 

• Encouraging thereafter negotiated settlement of outstanding 

differences either by serving as intermediary or urging other third 

parties to do so. 

The Security Council, over four-plus decades, authorized seven 

distinct types of peace operations: interposition, observation, 

humanitarian support, election monitoring, containment as well as 

disarmament of forces, and peace enforcement. Apart from the single 

peace enforcement operation (Congo, 1960s), the United Nation's 

very real successes in the majority of its operations were predicated 

on the consent of the contending parties. 

When Chapter VII enforcement requirements arose after the end 

of the Cold War, most recently in Kuwait, Somalia, and Bosnia, the 

United Nations was without adequate or effective resources. Prior to 

10 
peace enforcement mandates. 

The Security Council itself levied these obligations on 

inadequately funded and undermanned U.N. "system." The Uni

States bears special responsibility, as the leading member of 

Council's "Perm Five" bloc, for having placed unsupportable burd

on the Secretariat since the end of the Cold War, all in the name 

collective security concept characterized as "asser

multilateralism." Little serious thought was apparently given to 

changing nature of post-Cold War conflict situations in which 

center of gravity was shifting from interstate rivalries to comp

internal wars. Hitherto, the Secretariat peacekeeping culture had b

conditioned to manage holding operations rather than dir

multifunctional operations needed to deal with failed states, eth

feuds, and political separatist movements. The Council now insis

on intervention, often under Chapter VII enforcement mandate, 

discovered that the U.N. was ill-suited for agile use of armed for

linked with civilian agencies for ill-conceived political purposes. 

Recognizing some of the organization's basic infirmit

Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar and then Secretary-Gene

Boutros Ghali, at the urging of the United States, Canada, and oth

launched a number of initiatives to strengthen U.N. competence 

manage complex emergency operations. The organizatio

peacekeeping infrastructure was reorganized, and highly qualif

personnel were added. A new structure was created in the e

1990s, rationalizing and expanding existing peace and humanitar

operations. Three new departments, the Triad, were created 

function as crisis management and coordinating centers for 

Secretary-General: 

• The Department of Political Affairs (DPA), to deal w

political questions. 

11 
The integration of disparate civilian and military Secretariat 

elements such as Field Operations into a unified DPKO was a majo

part of the reforms. These changes of the past several years have given 

the United Nations its first integrated apparatus for managing tile 

expanded responsibilities of "second generation" peacekeeping. 

These include: 

• A clearly identified senior leadership 

• A major increase in the number of specially trained staff fo

DPKO, including secondment by member countries of over 100 

military, officers 

• Creation of a 24-hour situation room to monitor field 

operations and to provide early warning of crises 

• Establishment of a mission planning staff to provide estimates 

of troops, materiel, and financial needs when contemplating 

peace operations 

• Creation of a professional training program for officers 

assigned to peacekeeping missions 

• Development of an intelligence sharing system, largely U.S

assisted, responsive to the needs of senior Secretariat officials. 

The U.N. leadership has also established a small core staff o

experienced military, officers for contingency planning and immediate 

dispatch to crisis areas as an advance Headquarters unit. 

Coincident with the push for organizational reform and 

reorganization, U.N. member governments entered into a dialogue 

about tile purpose, scope, and theory of U.N. peacekeeping and 

humanitarian assistance. A long and complicated debate on these 

subjects was conducted in the General Assembly's Second Committee 

and in the Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations in 

1990 and 1991 on the proposal to create a new Department o

Humanitarian Assistance and the implications therein for wider U.N. 

12 
finally produced a compromise resolution which created the n

department charged with coordination of humanitarian assistan

rather than direct involvment and management of field operatio

Nevertheless, this innovation created an additional comprehens

role for the U.N. in humanitarian assistance and in peacekeep

activities requiring assistance to endangered populations. 

As the Department of Humanitarian Affairs issue was resolved, 

U.N. member states, in the form of the Chiefs of State Summit Secu

Council session of December 1991, charged Secretary-Gene

Boutros-Ghali with the responsibility of defining the appropriate r

for the United Nations in tile post-Cold War era. In Febuary 19

the Secretary-General issued L;.N. document A/47/277-5/2411/, 

Agenda for Peace," in which he outlined a comprehensive range 

U.N. peacekeeping activities: from preventive diplomacy throu

traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement and finally on 

reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged or destroyed societ

This ambitious document was well received initially but a backla

ensued. In a sober reevaluation of his "Agenda," issued in 1995 a

entitled "A Supplement to the Agenda for Peace," the Secreta

General modified his original conceptual approach. 

Essentially, the modification called for a division of lab

differentiating between the authorization of internatio

peacekeeping operations and their implementation. Accepting 

very real practical and political limitations of the United Natio

Boutros-Ghali proposed that the United Nations continue to be 

authorizing authority for the full range of peacekeeping operations 

the form of Security Council resolutions) but would actu

implement only those not requiring the use of coercive force (tha

Chapter VII or peace enforcement operations). Enforcement 

Chapter VII type operations would continue to be authorized 

Security Council resolutions but would be implemented by "contra

13 
improved oversight capacities, the Security Council Perm Five have 

indicated that they intend to be cautious in authorizing new 

peacekeeping operations, especially when cease-fire agreements by 

disputants are absent. As a result, major U.N.-directed peace 

enforcement operations are less likely in the immediate future. 

Second Leg of the Tripod 

Within the past 2 years the United States has turned to the second leg 

of the tripod, regional organizations, to relieve mounting pressures on 

the United Nations in the areas of crisis prevention, peace operations, 

and peace making. Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter provides legal 

and political foundation for this approach. The Chapter suggests that 

regional organizations should serve as "courts of first instance" in 

seeking to resolve local disputes. Such regional organization 

involvement can occur at the invitation of the states involved in 

disputes or "by reference from the Security Council." (The Charter is 

mute on the question of intra-state conflicts.) On the other hand, 

Delegation of responsibility to regional institutions is not total. 

Chapter VIII makes clear that the Security Council does not surrender 

its right to investigate or otherwise intervene in a dispute by turning 

to regional organizations, nor are disputants precluded from bringing 

their disagreements directly to the Security Council. 

Chapter VIII stipulates that no enforcement action may be initiated 

by regional institutions without prior Security Council authorization. 

This does not preclude regional body enforcement action because the 

Security Council may "where appropriate, utilize such regional 

arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority." 

This approach was taken by the Council in urging member states and 

NA-I-O in particular to provide military support for its UNPROFOR 

operations in Bosnia 1 993-95. 

In short, Chapter VIII provides the opportunity for regional 

organizations to act in the face of impending crises that threaten 

14 
• Purposes: the prevention and removal of threats; suppress

of acts of aggression; adjustment or settlement of internatio

disputes; strengthening universal peace; and further

international cooperation. 

• Principles: sovereign equality; fulfilling the obligations 

membership; refraining from the threat or use of force against 

territorial integrity and political independence of sta

cooperation with U.N. efforts for crisis prevention and pe

enforcement; and avoiding interference in the domestic affairs 

states. (The latter is a policy issue of great sensitivity to 

majority of member states.) 

As noted, some limitiation is placed upon regional organizatio

Of particular significance, enforcement action in theory may be tak

only with the specific authorization of the Security Council. Un

Article 51 of the Charter, however, organizations are not preclud

from exercising the "inherent right . . . of collective self-defens

Article 51 provided the foundation for the formation of NATO 

1949, and its justification was to be found in the Rio Treaty of 19

long before the creation of the United Nations itself. Even 

provision does not remove the obligation to keep the Security Coun

informed of any regional organization action contemplated that mi

impact adversely on "international security." 

Initial efforts to use the resources available in regio

organizations were intensified after 1 988. Five years later, 1 6 regio

organizations were cooperating, or evincing interest in cooperati

with the United Nations in peacekeeping or peace-related activiti

Of these organizations, three were regional, eight were subregion

four were interregional, and one global in terms of membership. O

about one-third of the participating organizations had w

established mechanisms for strengthening peace and security. W

15 
were primarily economic or legal reflected a growing concern for a 

comprehensive approach to the maintenance of peace and security. 

Of particular importance, the Organization of Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States 

(OAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had a 

membership umbrella covering all countries in their respective 

regions (i.e., Europe, the Americas, and Africa). A general lacuna 

existed for the East Asia and Pacific region. The Association of South 

East Asian Nations (ASEAN), however, was beginning to reach out to 

nonmember countries, through the framework of its Regional Forum, 

to discuss peace and security issues. 

By 1994, recognizing that the United Nations was suffering 

"system overload" with respect to peace operations and humanitarian 

programs, Boutros-Ghali determined that a burdensharing approach 

involving close consultation with regional organizations would be 

appropriate.Responding to an inquiry, from the Security Council and 

the expressed interest of the General Assembly, he launched 

consultations with major regional organizations as to appropriate 

roles they could play in the maintenance of international peace and 

security. Invited to participate in the consultations were 

representatives from: the British Commonwealth; Commonwealth of 

Independent States (CIS); CSCE; Economic Community of West Africa; 

European Commission; the Arab League; NATO; OAU; OAS; 

Organization of the Islamic Conference; and the Western European 

Union. 

While definitive action was not taken, the following proposals 

were put forward in a concluding statement by the President of the 

U.N. General Assembly: 

• A study should be prepared of intrastate conflicts and the 

comparative advantages of regional and other multilateral 

alternatives to U.N. peacekeeping 

16 
• A General Assembly working group on Security Coun

reform might be created. 

None of these proposals was put to a vote, but the participants agre

that a follow-on meeting should be organized. 

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali convened a second meeting 

February 1996, bringing together the U.N. leadership and seve

regional organizations. Its purpose was to explore opportunities 

enhanced cooperation in the areas of preventive diplomacy, pea

making, and peacekeeping operations. The primary emphasis was 

establishing agreed mechanisms for regular consultation. Held in N

York, the talks also dwelt on situations in which there might be 

deployment of U.N. and regional organization elements, as h

already occurred in Georgia and Abkhazia with the OSCE and 

CIS, in Burundi with the OAU, and Liberia with the Econom

Community fo West African States (ECOWAS) West African regio

organization. Other examplars were the operational support provid

by NATO during the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) phase 

operations in Bosnia, and joint operations with the OAS in the hum

rights phase of the recently completed peacemaking program in Ha

The February 1996 meeting included representatives fr

nonregional groupings (League of Arab States), some prima

economic (European Union), and subregional (Economic Commun

of West African States, ECOWAS). Only NATO and CIS participa

represented organizations with significant military capabilities. T

February consultations evidenced reluctance on the part of m

regional organization participants to assume broaden

responsibilities for the purely military aspects of peace operatio

Their hesitance was largely driven by the limited financial resour

available to them for such operations, rivalries among member sta

in several of the organizations, inadequate military expertise on 

part of some, and fears that their organizations might beco

17 
Despite the hesitancies of the February participants, 

"regionalization" of peace operations is likely to be on the U.N. 

agenda for the remainder of this decade and beyond. NATO's direct 

involvement in the form of an implementation force (IFOR) beginning 

in late 1995 was an important element in the ongoing effort to bring 

peace and unity to Bosnia. Russian involvement, in the name of the 

CIS, in peace operations in Tajikistan and Georgia is part of an 

ongoing pattern for most "Near Abroad" republics. Nigerian influence 

over ongoing Liberian peace operations is also likely to be a given, as 

is American involvement in Haiti. 

Regional organizations have both advantages and disadvantages 

as potential partners in complex emergency type peace operations. 

The sentiments of "ownership" member states feel in regional 

organizations encourages a greater sense of legitimacy in 

deliberations and decisions taken. The more modest scope of these 

deliberations and decisions tends to allay concerns over blatant 

interventionism and derogation of sovereignty. Being more 

homogeneous than the 1 85 plus members of the United Nations, they 

can sometimes more easily produce consensus (although not always 

in a timely fashion); their involvement may have greater acceptability 

by the disputants; and, presumably, they have greater insight to local 

problems and the root causes of conflict. 

However, some observers express concern about the ability of 

some regional organizations to exercise impartiality. Moreover, apart 

from NATO and the EU, few regional organizations have significant 

resources or effective bureaucracies. In addition to past and existing 

conflicts of interest among members, most regional organizations 

have experienced difficulty reconciling the diverse interests of 

member states in decisionmaking and in coordinating field 

operations. Member countries tend to worry about the temptation of 

larger local powers to use regional organizations as cover for 

unilateral interventions. In particular, this problem has bedeviled the 

18 
organization peacekeeping intervention are presented in chapter 

The values and disabilities portrayed are outlined recognizing t

each crisis situation has its own properties and internal dynam

(table 1 ). 

Table 1. Peace operations and regional organizations 

Pro (.on 

Potential Roles 

Crisis Interventk;lJ 

Chapter VIL 

Enforcement 

A4ilitary Capabilities 

Regional organizati~ns 

have the potential to 

cover the full gamut of 

peace operations. 

Geographic proximity 

facilitates early crisis 

warning and 

diplomatic intervention. 

As "courts of first 

instance," regional 

organizations can 

provide legitimacy for 

enforcement. 

National contingents for 

peat:e operations are 

most readily available 

from within each 

region. 

Most existing regional 

organizations have litt

if any security-military 

capabilities. 

Traditional rivalries an

mutual suspic:ion 

impede earlyand 

effective intervention. 

Even with "legitimacy,

actions to be taken 

require U.N. Security 

Council authorization 

and monitoring. 

In nlost regions, 

available forces are illequipped, lack 

mobili~, and do not 

share a common 

military d~i~:trine. 

19 
Knowledge and 

A wareness 

Low-Lnd Spectrum 

High-End Sf)e(trun~ 

External Supt)ort 

disputes and intrastate 

c~mflicts. 

Regional (~rganizations 

have greater in-depth 

knowledge and 

sensitivity to issues. 

Ceas(,-fire (~bservers 

and ele('li()n m(~nil()rs 

are readily availaljle. 

Despite limitations in 

m(~st regi(mal 

(~rganizati(ms, given 

advance warning and 

exlended exuernal 

assislance, they could 

mount reasanably 

"robust" multinational 

forces. 

Regi()nal ()rg, anizatJ(ms 

are increasingly 

inclined to work in 

tandem with "w(Md 

be)dies" i() enhallce tile 

effectiveness of their 

c~perations. 

are lodged in the I,J.N. 

Security Council 

Culture and historical 

prejudices can distori" 

local percel)fic.ls and 

limit effe(:tiveness ()f 

regi()nal organizati()ns. 

Fear nf Incal participant 

prejudices often 

n e('esS ira I es 

accomf)anying L;.N. 

prticipation. 

[~r()bl(..ms ()f COmlTland 

and contr~)l, training, 

rules of engagenlent 

and financial supp()rl 

serw, as ()bstacles t() 

"r()bUStlleSS." 

The degree (ff mutually 

advantageous 

(:()llaborati(:~n varies 

fronl regk~nal 

()rganizafi~n tu regional 

(~rganizafit)n. 

Other factors influence the capacity and willingness of member 

states to undertake complex peace operations and humanitarian 

missions. The most basic is the disinclination to become embroiled 

in the internal affairs of others. I he failure of member states to meet 

their international obligations may lead to censure by regional 

20 
Nevertheless, self-denying boundaries have become somewh

blurred in recent years. Decisions taken by the Security Council 

Somalia, Haiti, and other jurisdictional questions suggest a subtle s

in attitudes by some member states. Not all regional organizatio

accept, however, that violations of "universally" accepted hum

rights standards, failure to comply with treaty obligations, or t

collapse of national institutions provide sufficient cause for forcib

intervention by external parties. 

In some regions, a multiplicity of overlapping regional a

subregional entities exist that, taken together, can occasiona

impede effective action in the security, economic, and diploma

realms. Europe is the prime example today. In the security area, 

notion of Baltic republic security ties and dependency has beco

tangled and complicated by Baltic membership in a wide array 

institutions, regional and subregional. In the years since Latv

Estonia, and Lithuania gained their independence from Moscow, th

have become members of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and 

more recently created Council of Baltic Sea states. They have a

become Associate Members of the European Union and Associa

Partners of the Western European Union, the military arm of 

European Union with links to NATO. Concomitantly, they 

participants in several NATO bodies, notably the Partnership 

Peace program and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Wheth

this web of memberships provides Baltic states insurance agai

future aggression remains an open question. In no region outs

Europe do comparable networks of organization exist. 

There are a number of modalities in which the United Natio

have cooperated with regional organizations in peacekeeping a

other peace-related activities. In the recent past, the United Natio

launched an increasing number of small, joint missions with regio

organizations. Initial efforts at cooperation were complicated 

vexing questions relating to financing of missions, command a

21 
lead organization. This modality has been applied with some success 

between the United Nations and OSCE in jointly engaged peace 

efforts in Georgia, Moldova, Nagorny Karabakh, and Tajikistan

Alternatively, two or more organizations can be engaged in paralle

peace activities in the same area, e.g., the United Nations, the Britis

Commonwealth, EU, and OAU in South Africa. A similar relationship 

exists between the United Nations and the West African regiona

organization, ECOWAS, in crisis-ridden Liberia and Sierra Leone. 

Conventional wisdom and recent experience argue that mos

regional organizations are better suited to play an active role at the 

low end of the peace operations scale--preventive diplomacy

mediation, monitoring and observing, and other traditional forms o

peacekeeping. The balance of their strengths and weaknesses suggest

as well a potentially useful role in crises dominated by humanitarian 

concerns. Regional organizations also could serve as legitimizing 

authorities for specific peace operations, wrestling with the problems 

of collapsed governments and failed states, and providing expert inpu

when nonregional actors intervene in local conflicts. On the othe

hand, close proximity to local conflicts and regional politics ma

undermine the credibility of regional organization involvement i

conflict situations. The reputation of the OAS, for example, wa

tarnished somewhat by its supporting role in the internationa

intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, where the OAS wa

perceived as functioning as a pliable instrument of U.S. policy. It

lustre was restored in the late 1980s with its participation in the 

Central American peace process. The CIS suffers somewha

comparable problems associated with Russia's dominant role in tha

organization. While the two situations of great power preeminence 

are not entirely comparable, many impartial observers worry that th

OAS and CIS could well lose their status as unfettered entities 

unduly influenced by Moscow and Washington and perceived a

evolving into spheres of influence of either regional "eminence gris.

22 
forces to increase their power and enhance their security. The abil

to organize effective military coalitions can be a formidable asset f

any great power. The United States is no exception to this bas

strategic principle. In the past, the United States has relied on alli

support on numerous occasions, especially since" its rise to gre

power status at the onset of this century. The value of ad h

coalitions was reaffirmed during Desert Storm in 1991. 

The 1990-1991 Gulf War produced an avalanche of studi

favoring the adoption of ad hoc coalition strategies on the part of t

United States to deal with acts of aggression, as exemplified by Iraq

invasion of Kuwait. Only belatedly was a key lesson learned--th

timing is critical, i.e., the 6 months available to Washington to depl

American forces and to marshal an array of other national contingen

prior to the launching of Desert Stcrm should not be counted on 

future crisis situations. The half-year grace period prior to t

launching of Desert Storm proved ample time for diplomats 

conduct negotiations for peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi forces while t

coalition was being formed, for command and control arrangemen

to be completed, and for military forces to be deployed into t

Persian Gulf region. The effectiveness of the operation was witho

parallel in modern military annals, but it should be regarded 

unique and and not always replicable. 

The United Nations leadership adopted, in modified form, som

of the lessons learned from Desert Storm. The principal tutorial 

emerge was the need to buttress U.N. capabilities to monitor a

oversee the plans and operations of the lead nation, including cris

of a lesser order of magnitude than that provided by the G

experience. (Some U.N. members objected strenuously to t

delegation of power accorded to the United States in the Gulf confl

and the limited oversight afforded the Secretary-General and t

Security Council.) In part because of member complaints, Boutro

Ghali had called for systematized standby arrangements "by whi
prior consent and reserve the right to respond on a case-by-case basis 

to future calls for national contingents. 

Given this unsatisfactory response, other member governments 

have called for creation of a standing rapid response force, of varying 

numerical size and capability, to be made available to the SecretaryGeneral and the Security Council to deal with emerging emergencies. 

The proposal itself is not r.ew. It is imbedded in Articles 43 through 

46 of the U.N. Charter, which was intended originally to provide a 

pillar for "collective security" under U.N. auspices. Disagreemen

between Washington and Moscow, however, laid to rest these 

ambitious plans. As the Cold War unfolded, the veto was a majo

impediment and can still be used to frustrate Council decisions o

their effective implementation, the existence of a standing force 

notwithstanding. 

The end of the Cold War has engendered no appreciable membe

support for a standing military force. The reasons cover the gamu

from financial stringencies to the growing lethality of peace 

operations environments and the risks of casualties. As a result, there 

is renewed interest in the United States in ad hoc multinational force 

approaches. To be effective, however, such forces must be organized 

and deployed in a timely manner, have clearly established mandates, 

be adequately staffed for the assigned task, and share common 

training and doctrines for field operations. The approach has certain 

intrinsic drawbacks. It is likely to have limited rapid response 

capabilities as emergencies crystallize; participants may not share 

common political and military objectives or common purposes; thei

ability to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances may be 

circumscribed; and decisions taken at political levels could well resul

in ambiguous guidance to deployed forces. 

The performance of the allied coalition in the period preceding 

and during the Gulf War is instructive. The coalition of 30-plus 

nations faced formidable obstacles in overcoming nationa

24 
immediately prior to the onset of hostilities. Control of Arab-Islam

forces fell outside the direct command of General Schwartzko

throughout the campaign it remained under the "control" of the Sa

General Staff, a situation that violated the principle of unity 

command. Schwartzkopf managed to bridge the gap by insisting 

the formation of an informal planning group, the Coaliti

Coordination, Communication and Integration Cell, to form 

common understanding of strategies and operations to be applied 

the onset of hostilities. Even then. the Saudi Government insisted t

Arab ground forces be used solely for joint operations intended 

recover Kuwaiti territory, i.e., Arab ground forces should not 

expected to enage enemy forces outside tile confines of Kuwait. 

Allied naval and air units also encountered major obstacles 

force planning and integration. General Homer, for example, h

direct command of only American aircraft in theater, and while 

had air space control authority, each contributing nation reserved 

right to refuse any air mission assigned to their forces. With 

exception of British, Australian, and Dutch naval forces, ot

participants were not able to operate within U.S. Tactical Na

Command. Reduced naval efficiency was reflected in the assignm

of national forces to separate patrol zones, thus weakening ove

muutual support capabilities. 

At the supply and systems support levels, comparable difficult

arose. Sea and airlift deficiencies were finally overcome throu

recourse to civilian carriers. For the United States in particular, rese

military, military forces had to be mobilized to cover shortfalls 

engineer support, medical staff, logistics personnel, and other com

support elements. Other major coalition participants experienc

comparable problems, especially in meeting organic support 

combat units. Overall, Desert Storm provided many insig

concerning the challenges to be met in organizing large numbers 

national contingents on an ad hoc basis for enforcement operatio

25 
either assume sole responsibility for coalition formation to cope wit

complex crises such as Bosnia (an unlikely prospect) or abdicat

responsibility for a leadership role and suffer an erosion of it

influential position in Europe and elswhere. 

The United Nations and various regional organizations ar

breaking new ground as they address the variegated problems of th

post-Cold War international security environment. No singl

institution or strategy will SLfffice in dealin/; with these problems, i

part because each crisis or situation has its own unique properties

and in part because solutions may not be readily at hand. However

several realities will have to be faced in the period immediatel

ahead. Each of the options available to the United States has its ow

limitations and drawbacks. Whatever tripod is selected to deal wit

emergent crises, there must be clear recognition that the applicatio

of coercive force has consequences: the notion of neutrality an

impartiality will no longer obtain; the use of force may bring order i

its wake but does not ensure long-term stability; and perhaps mos

crucial, use of coercive force constitutes a state of belligerency an

thus requires application of accepted rules of war. The latte

imperative cannot be ignored or obscured with traditiona

peacekeeping rhetoric. These are issues that present choices and risk

that the United States and regional organizations will ignore a

increasing peril to their interests and the "international order." 

Two important implications arise from the analysis thus far. Firs

the ability of the U.S. to forge and manage future coalitions wi

largely be a function of the external security environment. Althoug

shared values and similar political systems can facilitate formation o

ad hoc coalitions, voluntary contributions will be made on the bas

of narrow national self-interest. Second, the U.S. ability to play 

leading role will depend on our own willingness to make significan

financial and military contributions. While there has been muc

discussion of formation of "vertical coalitions" in which the U.S

26 
once U.S. forces have disarmed malcontents and unruly elements. 

The logic of "vertical escalation" has some merit. The log

reposes in a division of labor; states with different but complementar

capabilities can specialize in areas of relative advantage and creat

a coalition that is stronger than one where there is duplication o

effort. This was demonstrated during De.~ert Storm: the United State

provided high-tech weaponry, airpower, intelligence, and most of th

land forces, while Fgypt and Syria gave the coalition greate

legitimacy among other Arab states, and Saudi Arabia provided th

territory from which to prepare and launch the assault. 

The value and durability of ad hoc coalitions will be determine

largely case by case. Some coalitions are likely to have a length

shelf-life, particularly where security interests are not direct

engaged. Some will not entail U.S. participation or only indire

involvement. The 1997 Italian-led internvention in strife-tor

Albania, for humanitarian purposes, may prove instructive in th

regard. However, the growing importance of Chapter VII enforcemen

actions in local disputes involving Security Council authorization fo

formation of ad hoc coalitions will frequently require some measu

of direct U.S. involvement. This requires the United States to maintai

an active diplomatic presence as well as robust military powe

projection capabilities to deal with conflict situations in man

geographic regions. It may be possible to create future coalition

"from scratch," but it will be easier for the United States to do so if 

is actively engaged with potential partners and if it possesses and 

willing to deploy combat capable forces. 

Overriding Questions and Issues 

for the United States 

While inevitable, and not infrequently worthwhile, th

"regionalization" of peacekeeping responsibilities poses some seriou

27 
Central Africa, the Rwanda and Burundi problems have overflowed 

the borders of Zaire and could have adverse consequences fo

Tanzania and Uganda. While the United States can make 

contribution in the form of advice and material support for ad ho

African military coalitions, the challenge is to find "coalitions of th

willing. ''~ If the OAU is not able to do so, the U.N. Security Counci

will probably become a hospice for African lost causes, a debilitating 

prospect at best. Paradoxically, many of the developing countries

fearful of Security Council "interventionism," would prefer to see th

Council sidelined or at least far less active. In their view

"regionalization" is a way to constrain Secretariat capabilities fo

management of peacekeeping operations. The recent reorganization 

of the peacekeeping "system" urged by the United States and other

is to be neither applauded nor ignored in their view. 

The ability of the United States to reshape these skeptical attitude

has declined appreciably over the past 2 years. As noted in a 1996 

State Department study, Washington's influence with other U.N

members has eroded; members are increasingly reluctant to suppor

U.S. ideas about reform. The United States suffers from a number o

disabilities that diminish its capacity to influence the policies of th

overwhelming majority of member countries. The two most obvious 

have been the successful but heavyhanded U.S. effort to den

Boutros-Ghali a second term as Secretary-General despite the suppor

he enjoyed among most members; the second revolves around the 

refusal of the U.S. Congress to meet t_/.S, financial obligations, a

stipulated under the terms of the U.N. Charter. As of lanuary 1997

the United States was at least $1.0 billion in default on payments t

the operating and peacekeeping accounts. According to the Stat

Department study, "The financial crisis has undermined the ability o

the United States and the United Nations to carry out som

(peacekeeping) reforms . . . given its role in the financial crisis, tile 

United States is not a credible advocate for some financial reforms."

28 
organization right to intervene in internal wars or intrasta

conflicts? 

• Can regional organizations maintain a neutral or impart

position or should such notions be set aside? If so, what gene

guidelines should obtain? 

• Should humanitarian assistance interventions occur witho

clearly defined political objectives and precise end states? 

• What initiatives should be taken by re~.~ional organizations a

their members to provide essential crisis management, jo

military planning, and standby forces for peace operations? 

• If these forces are to be multinational in composition, ho

should they be organized, trained, and equipped to ensure t

highest degree of integration and effective command and cont

of operations? 

Command and control is a particularly sensitive issue sin

governments providing military units are loath to place them und

foreign command or to subordinate their national and politic

interests to the purposes for which a regional organization may ha

solicited their support 

An overriding question lies in the difference between t

purported advantages and alleged disadvantages of region

organizations in the sphere of peacekeeping in that the former may 

largely theoretical while the latter are inherently practical--a

therefore determinate. In other words, with respect to region

organizations, there may be less there than meets the eye. If so, bo

the United Nations and the United States may find themselves una

to pass on responsibility as much as they want. 

Clearly, a better interagency process to shape U.S. pea

operations is also needed. The establishment of guidelines in 1994 

the Clinton administration was a useful beginning, but only 

beginning. The fact that U.N. humanitarian and peace-buildi

29 
operations must be matched by comparable efforts within the U.S

Government. Associated with this effort is a clear willingness to inves

at least a minimal level of political capital and resources in American 

involvement. Our experience in Bosnia may prove helpful in shaping 

understanding of challenges presented in dealing with complex 

emergency operations. The participants quickly learned th

importance of an active, reasonably functional network o

international reconstruction and political activities closely tied to the 

missions of deployed military forces from NATO and others engage

in the military coalition. Critical is the maintenance of close, constan

cooperation and coordination among the military, political, and 

humanitarian elements of any future peace operation built on regiona

organization involvement and ad hoc civilian and military coalitions

Notes 

1. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros~Ghali, An Agenda for Peac

(New York: U.N. Secretariat, 1993), 4-6. 

2. Cited in James S. Sutterlein, The United Nations and th

Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to Be Met (Westport, CT

Praeger, 1995), 146. 

3. Boutros-Ghali, 7. 

4. See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning t?om 5omalia

The Lessons of Armed Intervention (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997)

278. 

5. The Washington Post, March 16, 1997, 8. 

30 
f

A New European Architecture 

On initial examination, the several regional organizations 

Europe, when viewed together, appear to offer the greatest potent

among other such entities for the maintenance of peace and stabi

in Europe. Most have a potential to relieve the U.N. of some of 

burdens in dealing with "complex emergencies," in Europe an

conceivably, adjacent regions. A number of reservations must 

add ressed, however: 

• The geographic reach of Europe has proved exceedin

elastic historically. This is evidenced today by the considerati

being given within the confines of NATO, the European Unio

and the Western European Union to expanded membership 

include Eastern and Central European former members of the n

defunct Soviet Union. 

• Concomitantly, the Commonwealth of Independent Sta

(CIS), dominated by Moscow, has roots both in Europe and As

Some of its members are currently seeking special economic a

security ties with Western Europe. 

• The United States, as the leading member of the Atlan

Alliance, is excluded from membership in the WEU and E

Nevertheless, the U.S. Government has offered "lip service" to 

expressed European desire to fashion a regional defen

"identity"--sans U.S. participation. 

• None of the existing regional organizations has the ability 

handle "complex emergencies" in all their phases. Each must r

on the others for resources, cooperation, and coordination 

exemplified in Bosnia at present). 

31 
(GDR) in 1990. East Germany was not only incorporated by its Wes

German neighbor but, as a result, now forms NATO's new securit

boundary with Central Europe. Poland's territorial history 

comparable, having suffered three partial annexations, foreig

occupation, and truncation as a result of the exigencies of World Wa

II. Hungary, former Czechoslovakia, and others reflect simila

boundary adjustments and associated "traumas." In brief

geographically Europe is an entity lacking territorial durability an

stability. As some scholars observe, Europe is more a state of min

than a clearly defined entity. 

NATO itself was certainly not prepared for the pace of change tha

followed the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Warsaw 

Pact. In the fall of 1989, as the Berlin wall was being breached, 

survey of over 30 NATO and Supreme Headquarters Allied Power

Europe (SHAPE) staff officers could find only two who were willing t

consider adopting a new NATO strategy in response to the change

underway in Europe. Yet little over a half year later, the NATO head

of state convened in London and directed the Alliance to undertak

a "fundamental" revision of NATO strategy and to "build new 

partnerships with all the nations of Europe" by reaching out t

NATO's former adversaries in the East and extending to them "th

hand of friendship." To further that end, NATO heads of state invite

the members of the then existing Warsaw Pact to establish regula

diplomatic liaison with NATO. At its next summit meeting, in Rom

in November 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperatio

Council (NACC) and adopted its new Strategic Concept. From tha

point, the Alliance has sought to adapt to the rapid pace of politica

and economic change occurring in the former Soviet Union countries

the Balkans region, and in the Mediterranean basin. 

32 
challenge for statesmen in Europe and the United States will be t

creation of a system of mutually reinforcing institutions in the rea

of European security. Attendant problems are particularly arduo

because many of these institutions have responsibilities that exte

beyond the resolution of local disputes. The principal need is to s

out these rnanifold responsibilities and to assign clearly defined ro

in an atmosphere of mutual accommodation, a something-f

everybody approach. 

F I G U R E 1. In terlockin~, European orga niza tions 

Organization oa Security amd ¢oolmr~m In Europe 

European Union 

Western European Union 

Ireland 2 

Partnership for Peace 

Aust~ z4 Finland:.' Sweden ~.' Malta 

! Euro~A'tJantic ParMe~shlp Coundl 

I North AtlanUc Treaty Organization 

Denmark ~ Ne~erlands Luxembourg 

Belgium Spain Portugal 

Germany France United Kingdom 

Italy Greece 

Norway ~ Turkey ~ Iceland' 

Bulgaria 3 Czech Republic 3 Poland ~ 

Hungary 3 Estonia: Slovakia ~ 

Lithuania 3 Latvia: Sloveni#' 

Romania 3

United States 

Canada 

Albania 

Armenia 

Azert~alJan 

Belarus 

Georgia 

Kazakhstan 

Kyrgyzstan 

Motdova 

Russia 

Turkmenistan 

Uzbekistan 

Ukraine 

I~ia-Hec-zegovlna Cyprus Liechtenstein 

Croatia Holy See Monaco 

San Marlno ER. Yugo~da~a 

Switzerland TajikJstan 

t WEU Associate Member 

2 WELl Observer 

-~ WEU Associate Partner 

' EAPC Observer 

-~ Suspended Member 

33 
Helsinki Final Act, OSCE was the product of the Cold War, intended 

primarily to overcome East-West divisions through forma

consultations. With the end of the Cold War, the organization'

institutional responsibilities were broadened, beginning with the Par

Charter of 1990 and followed by a 1994 meeting in Budapest tha

transformed the OSCE into an entity with enlarged mandate

Currently, its three principal functions are to act as a framework for

• The creation of norms in the OSCE area related t

international law, human rights, minority rights, democracy, th

rule of law and market economy 

• The process of arms control in Europe 

• Early warning, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution

supported by confidence-building mechanisms and th

appointment of a High Commissioner for National Minorities. 

The OSCE is a recognized regional organization within the terms o

the U.N. Charter, Chapter VIII, which provides it with authority t

mandate the initiation of peacekeeping and peace enforcemen

operations within Europe. The primary mission of OSCE is crisi

prevention, however. It is compelled to look to other organization

in Europe, notably NATO, for use of coercive military instruments t

enforce its decisions. This is one justification for NATO assistance i

peacekeeping operations, assistance that is hedged by a declared 

willingness to respond case by case. 

The present 53-member OSCE has several other disablin

limitations. The size of its membership and geographic reach from 

Vancouver to Vladivostock impairs early and effective action in mos

realms. OSCE operating on a consensus basis requires unanimit

minus one, the minus one being tile offending party or state. Th

organization is at best a forum of states unlikely to develop a

executive body capable of organizing or directing field operations

34 
to direct its efforts toward crisis resolution. By 1990, a serio

initiative was undertaken to reorganize, beginning with an ann

council meeting of foreign ministers and creation of a stand

committee of senior officials. This was followed by development 

a Crisis Prevention Center in Vienna, an Office of Democra

Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, and a secretariat in Prag

Emblematic of its new active role were efforts to mediate amo

belligerents in Chechnya, oversight responsibility for the preparat

of elections in Bosnia (1996), and monitoring of the 1996 electio

in Albania. While the potential for mediating and monitoring roles 

readily available, OSCE has little capacity to stop acts of aggress

or civil wars. Major impediments are its slender financial resourc

the need for member unanimity in the policy action field, and 

organization's intrinsic inability to expel recalcitrant members. T

European Union also has a significant role to play, but largely in 

economic and political realms. Founded in 1957 under the l-reaty 

Rome, the organization enlarged its mandate at the Maastri

(Netherlands) summit in December 1991, when the Europe

Community member states adopted a Treaty on Political Union a

a Treaty, on Economic and Monetary, Union, which together form 

Treaty of European Union (EU). With the adoption of the Maastri

Treaty, the EU countries committed themselves to a Common Fore

and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes formulation of polic

relating to the former Soviet Union, including the eventual framing 

a common defense policy. Some EU members believe that the la

could produce a common defense policy compatible with that of 

Atlantic Alliance. 

The EU record on security matters has not been reassuring. T

organization demonstrably failed to deal effectively with the 19

Persian Gulf crisis, and its diplomatic efforts as the Yugos

federation foundered proved counterproductive. More recently, 

diplomatic initiatives in crisis torn Bosnia failed badly, as did 

35 
benefits of a cooperative economic system that continues to evolve

FIGURE 2. WEU organization 

n 

Council 

Working 

Group 

(CWG) 

Mediterranean 

Group 

Secur~ 

Committee 

,- ..-, ... . ..: 

Defense 

Representatives 

Group 

(DRG) 

Open Skies Group 

The European foreign and defense ministers attending th

Maastricht summit announced that the West European Union (WEU)

an arm of the EU, would assume the dual commitment of serving a

the embodiment of the European defense entity and function as th

European pillar within NATO. The WEU had grown out of th

Brussels Treaty of 1948, a Western European initiative aimed a

preventing a resurgence of military threats. At Maastricht, WEU wa

endowed with responsibility for "strengthening the European pillar o

36 
which are not members of the EU 

• Observers are (except Denmark) traditionally neu

countries, members of EU, but not of NATO 

• Associate partners are the countries that have conclud

"Europe Agreements" with the EU--those Central and East

European countries expected to become EU members. 

At the NATC) Summit in 1994, NATO's Heads of State a

Government acknowledged the WEU dual role and enhanced 

further development by announcing readiness to make NATO

collective assets available. The basis for cooperation would 

consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operatio

undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of CFSP goals. In 

June 1996 NATO Ministerial Meeting, the participants announc

plans to impalement the concept of Combined Joint Task For

(CJTF) in collaboration with the WEU. This approach will permit as

sharing, including command and control arrangements to permit "

use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operatio

led by the WEU. ''~ 

Despite this collaborative effort, the WEU must clarify how 

intends to organize its own integral military system, in particular, 

extent to which its proposes to integrate its military planning with 

economic imperatives of the FU. There is a convincing case to 

made for keeping the two organizations separate and distinct--to w

it would simplify decisions to admit the Central and East Europe

countries into the EU without there being the need to extend secu

guarantees to them. On the other hand, given the growing defe

planning collaboration between NATO and the WEU, there is so

doubt that a country could become a full member of WEU with

also achieving comparable status in NATO. Of the WEU's 

European members, only one, the Republic of Ireland (and then o

as one of the observers), is not a member of NATO. For the futu

37 
under WEU command: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping

and crisis management. However, NATO and WEU received much 

unfavorable publicity in 1992 when they both sought form up nava

forces for service in the Adriatic to monitor and subsequently impose 

economic sanctions (under U.N. mandate) against the forme

Yugoslavia. In due course, missions and roles were assigned to nava

units representing each organization and mutually beneficia

col laboration ensued. 

The main pool of military manpower for WEU intervention 

operations lies in the Eurocorps, which became operational in 1994

The principal components are French and German armored divisions 

supported by Belgian and Spanish formations. Armored divisions may 

be useful for imposed cease-fires, much as in 1996 Bosnia, but do no

provide the flexibility and rapid response capability when operations 

occur outside the immediate European theater. The German 

component is also politically constrained at present given the public 

disinclination to provide "heavy" combat units for peace operations

There is general agreement in NATO that the WEU is likely to 

serve as the primary organization for implementing Europe-only 

missions outside the NATO "area of responsibility." For majo

military operations, however, the WEU will require logistics

communications, and intelligence support from NATO. The United 

States will also be required to provide assistance, given its advanced 

technological capabilities. NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) wil

determine what role the organization will play in such missions. The 

United States, hence, will have a veto right and, in theory, a 

significant presence in most European decisiomaking where out-of

area operations are under consideration. 

NATO: The Emerging Transformation 

The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty proclaiming the emergence of a new 

European collective security system, including the United States and 

38 
point of reference from collective defense to peacekeeping and pe

enforcement roles while dealing with the pressing issues of expan

membership and establishing a special relationship with Russia 

the Ukraine. 

FIGURE 3. SHAPE Command Group 

IR 

, Pl~rmin9 S~ 

i 

I I I I 1 

" el ..... ,

The NATO leadership has proceeded cautiously on the ques

of expanded peacekeeping roles. Change is recorded in 

emergence of the Alliance's "Strategic Concept" paper in Novem

1991. It formed the basis for NATO's defense policies, its operati

concepts, and its future planning doctrine. Among the m

imperatives was an examination of how the Alliance's political 

military structures and procedures might be developed and ada

to conduct the Alliance's several missions more efficiently 

flexibly, including peacekeeping. The need to adapt, it 

39 
emerged from several highlevel meetings over the following severa

years. Key among them were the following: 

• In June 1992, the Alliance Foreign Ministers met in Oslo and 

stated their preparedness "to support, on a case-by-case basis, i

accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities 

under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making 

available Alliance resources and expertise. "~ A simila

undertaking was proffered the U.N. Security Council. 

• The 1994 Brussels Summit, inter alia, endorsed the concept o

Combined Joint Task Forces (with WEU) as "a means to facilitate 

contingency operations, including operations with participating 

nations outside the Alliance. "3 

The commitments to the United Nations and OSCE have drawn 

NATO closer to a broader European security environment. Potentia

crisis regions, their security impact on Alliance members, and route

to these regions are of direct interest to NATO. It was agreed tha

NATO commitments might well result in NATO participating i

operations in a wider geographic theater. Attention is being devoted 

to peace and stability of countries on the periphery of Europe-

particularly given "the build up of military power and the proliferation 

of weapons technologies in the area, including Weapons of Mas

Destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the membe

states of the Alliance. "4 Among other matters of concern: internationa

terrorism, radical transnational movements, territorial disputes

disruption of the flow of vital resources, and mass migration. 

With direct reference to peace support operations (PSO), suc

operations are expected to be conducted as part of a combined 

political, economic, diplomatic and military plan. Alliance 

participation is to be decided by the North Atlantic Council case b

case. All military PSO activities are subject to close political contro

40 
Although individual NATO nations have been consis

contributors to U.N. observer missions and U.N. troop deployme

as in UNPROFOR in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Soma

NATO as an institution with its integrated military command 

became involved in U.N. peace operations in 1992. Operation D

Flight, the "no fly zone" enforcement mission over Bos

Herzegovina; Operation Sharp Guard, the Adriatic maritime emba

mission; and IFOR, after the 1995 Dayton accords were sig

governing the restoration of order in Bosnia, are examples of NA

forces operating under U.N. and OSCE mandate. The ac

operations have occurred under the operational control of a m

Regional Major Subordinate Command--AFSOUTH. In addit

NATO resources in the form of a mobile headquarters from North

Army Group (NORTHAG) were provided to the U.N. Bos

Herzegovina Command (BHC) of UNPROFOR up until the latt

termination in 1 995. 

A brief assessment of NATO's capability to conduct pe

operations suggests that the new Strategic Concept's focus on c

prevention and crisis management enhances the organizatio

potential to conduct such peace operations. Further, with 

integrated military command and interoperable forces, it is well su

for both peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and with regar

command and control, it is well prepared at the operational 

tactical levels. Given the involvement of Russian and other n

NATO forces in Bosnia, NATO is strengthening its operatio

experience within NATO and the associated Partnership for Pe

program. 

Cooperation with Other Security Structures 

Despite impressive progress to date, the various European regio

organizations have yet to develop effective coordination and j

planning procedures. For example, the agendas of all differ on 

41 
involvement is required, are civilian-military coordination procedures 

and the appropriate military doctrine applicable to the conduct o

multinational operations. 

Doctrine determines what the assigned military forces will do and 

how, including organization, equipment, training, and rules o

engagement. When the mandate and military, doctrine are established

a division of labor must then be addressed. It may be derived 

functionally in terms of conflict prevention (e.g, the former Republic 

of Yugoslavia of Macedonia), or crisis management (e.g., UNPROFOR 

in Bosnia), or a combination of both (e.g., contemporary 

Bosnia--IFOR). If crisis management, it may entail traditiona

peacekeeping (Cyprus) or peace enforcement (Somalia) and may 

involve a range of civil-military interactions (with NGOs, private 

societies, and others). 

The mission or mandate involves a division of labor among 

security structures and among nations within these security structu res

The United Nations and OSCE provide observers, fact finders, and 

monitors (conflict prevention); the United Nations, NATO, and WEU 

execute preventive deployments and peacekeeping (crisis 

management); and the U.N. and OSCE (by authorization) and NATO 

and WFU (by execution) execute peace enforcement. Today, division 

of labor by function, structure, and geographical focus is developed 

by trial and error with little overall planning coordination among the 

various European security organizations. 

Another area for resolution involves unity of command. Mos

multinational peace operations almost inevitably experience tensions 

over national sovereignty and the military, principle of unity o

command. In both U.N.-directed and U.N.-authorized peace 

operations where different structures are involved, unity of command 

is virtually impossible to achieve. Unity of purpose, however, can be 

achieved and disruptive incidents minimized as long as the mandate 

and accompanying military doctrine are mutually understood and 

42 
not separate concept of NATO capabilities linked to efforts to m

the European security and defense identity a reality. The CJTF is 

principal vehicle that can be used by both NATO and the WEU 

provide either organization the capability to pursue out-of-area pe

operations. Strategic level issues remain to be resolved, includ

provision of political guidance to CITF; creation of po

coordination management mechanisms at the strategic level that 

provide advice to the WEU and coordinate with and perform 

functions performed by the NATO Military Committee; and crea

of a workable theater headquarters mechanism for the WEU 

provide the bridge between the strategic level (WEU) and the tact

level (CJTF). For the foreseeable future, however, the W

organizational structure is likely to remain weak and will not be a

to compete with the more sophisticated NATO military and polit

structures. To be coordinated effectively there will continue to b

need for reciprocity and transparency in terms of the WEU keep

NATO fully informed of WEU planning. A similar need obtains w

the OSCE, because there is growing wariness by the Atlantic Cou

of of being coopted or NATO becoming a "subcontractor" for OS

ventures. 

Problems of NATO and U.N. Collaboration 

Bosnia has proved a particularly unfortunate test case 

collaboration between the military arm of NATO and the Un

Nations "system." The introduction of NATO into the Bosnian c

occurred in 1993, at the height of the genocidal activities of Serb 

Croatian forces. The arrangement came in the form a subcontra

NATO air and naval capabilities were to be placed at the disposa

U.N. officials in place in Bosnia and Croatia. Representatives from 

two organizations had divergent approaches to the mili

requirements at hand: NATO official doctrine, predicated 

anticipated conflict with Warsaw Treaty forces in the four preced
ceasee ageees

By mid-1995, the two organizations were deeply and publicly at 

odds as to how to respond to Serb acts of aggrandizement. The depth 

of their differences was revealed several months previously when the 

credibility of both organizations was exposed to public criticism. This 

was a period of U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was 

responsibile for providing humanitarian assistance to displaced 

persons located mostly in urban centers surrounded and threatened 

with bombardment by Serbian and Croatian militia forces. In 

September 1994, French troops at Sarajevo were under attack by 

Serbian military units, and the local French commander could neither 

protect the capital from attack nor secure ready supply of food and 

medicines for the civilian population. He requested that NATO air 

elements be dispatched to the area surrounding the capital and relieve 

Serb pressure. 

The request reached the headquarters of the U.N. military 

commander, General Bertrand de Lapresle, who was located in 

Zaghreb. He opposed the request on the grounds that an air strike of 

major magnitude would constitute a "provocation," one that could 

well jeopardize UNPROFOR units elsewhere and undermine the U.N. 

mission in Bosnia. The U.N. local civilian authority, Special 

Representative Yasushi Akashi, agreed and concluded that only a 

symbolic military action would be justified. Akashi ordered the 

destruction of an obsolete Serb tank located in an "arms exclusion 

zone" located outside Sarajevo, the ,~esture intending to serve the 

dual goals of "deterrence" and "retaliation." Serb forces were given a 

20-minute warning of the scheduled air strike, which involved the 

dispatch of five aircraft from Italy to destroy the abandoned tank. 

Thus the U.N. reputation for impartiality remained intact. 

NATO commanders were outraged, however. The air strike was 

hardly punitive, would not dissuade the Serbs from further violations, 

and had placed at jeopardy the lives of five airmen as a result of the 

44 
differences proved irreconcilable, and the six U.N. declared s

zones" were to remain hostages to ill fortune, as history would so

demonstrate. 

The ideological and doctrinal gulfs separating U.N. and NA

leaders should have been recognized and addressed early in th

efforts at collaboration. Necessity and official myopia prevai

because neither Brussels nor New York was prepared to acc

responsibility for collapse of the save-Bosnia effort. At the same tim

government officials in the United States and Western Europe w

unwilling to shoulder the risks and burdens involved in force

military intervention and classical nation building. 

Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged from the demise of the Yugos

federation with weak credentials for international recognition a

workable nation-state. It had no historical record as a political en

separate from its neighbors and capable of assuming internatio

obligations and duties associated with independent status. Inde

with the implosion of the Yugoslav federation, Serbian "leaders" w

required in 1992 to fashion political and constitutional bonds fo

state whose population had little sense of nationhood. It w

populated by Southern Slavs speaking a common language 

divided into three major national groups: 43.7 percent Muslims; 3

percent Serbs; and 17.3 percent Croats. An additional 5.5 perc

were designated "Yugoslavs," essentially the offspring of mix

marriages. By 1 992, state institutions were beginning to disintegra

and each group began to seek security in its own community. 

The opening rounds of armed conflict had actually begun 

1991, when Serbians and Croatians fought for control over 

Croatian town of Vukovar and adjoining areas. In due course, S

forces, reinforced by the Yugoslav Army, gained control over 

percent pf Croatian territory. By 1992, the armed conflict had spr

into Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European Union, which had fruitles

sought to broker a series of cease-fires and peace accords, found it

4~ 
and U.S. diplomats throughout 1992-93, all reflecting a desire to 

avoid the use of military force to end the strife. Each peace plan was 

summarily rejected by one or another of the contending parties. Based 

on the notion of ethnicity, each of the peace plans reflected 

progressive acknowledgment of partition as a logical outcome--and 

the geographical reduction of Sarajevo to a small principality. The 

most noteworthy effort was jointly launched by the United Nations 

and the soon-to-be renamed European Community. Former Secretary

of the Army Cyrus Vance represented the United Nations; former U.K. 

Foreign Secretary Lord Owen did the honors for the European Union. 

The Vance-Owen peace plan of 1993 was rejected by Serb "leaders" 

in Bosnia. The U.S. Government also opposed the plan, provoking 

widening strains in the Atlantic Alliance. However, the United States 

generated no acceptable approach of its own and was perceived in 

much of Europe as vacillating and increasingly contradictory. 

The United Nations, with U.S. endorsement, had begun to 

organize an humanitarian relief effort in 1 992, including formation of 

the multinational UNPROFOR. This force received as its initial 

mandate provision of emergency supplies to Sarajevo and 

surrounding areas, included the opening of a land corridor for 

unfettered delivery of aid. In August 1992, Security Council 

Resolution 770 enjoined UNPROFOR to use "all measures necessary" 

to deliver humanitarian assistance. However, the Council refused to 

recognize that the situation in Bosnia was a civil war in which the 

parties involved were loathe to accept "impartiality." If anything, 

relief goods and supplies were viewed as items to be controlled and 

embargoed should circumstances require. Hence, protection of 

Sarajevo and the provision of humanitarian assistance could be 

vouchsafed only by the use of overriding force--such force was also 

required to protect other U.N. designated "safe areas." UNPROFOR, 

however, was ill equipped to meet such requirements. 

46 
resolutions. Decisions on the means to be applied would 

determined by the U.N. Secretary-General's representative in 

region, Mr. Akashi, and the U.N. military commander. Their assig

priorities were maintenance of "impartiality" in the confl

protection of UNPROFOR units, and delivery of humanitarian aid 

the "safe areas." NATO could initiate no military action without p

U.N. approval. Thus, a joint "turnkey" or parallel managem

arrangement had to be fashioned, one clearly at odds with 

traditional NATO doctrine of unity of command. 

Serious disagreements were to develop under this turn

arrangement and crippled both organizations. For the Secreta

General and U.N. field representatives, mission survival was 

primary imperative. Therefore, UNPROFOR was to remain lig

armed and unthreatening. Its numbers were too limited, given 

geomorphology of Bosnia, and therefore stretched too thin to cond

major military operations to protect "safe areas." For example, 

"weapons exclusion zone" around Sarajevo could not be enforc

with available ground forces. Indeed, the Serb units were enscon

atop the surrounding hills with ample fields of fire for artillery a

tank units. When UNPROFOR did unleash compliance effo

(primarily at U.S. urging), dozens of U.N. personnel w

apprehended by the Serb forces, disarmed, and subjected to pub

humiliation. The U.N. leadership concluded that it could not enfo

any peace accord but could only hope to monitor such accords 

feed where possible displaced populations. 

NATO, by comparison, saw Bosnia as an opportunity to deve

new missions and roles for itself in the wake of the collapse of 

Warsaw Treaty Organization and the former Soviet Union. Howev

its members agreed to the dual turnkey arrangement only a

extensive debate, noting that NATO was assuming a quasi-surrog

status vis-a-vis the United Nations. However, the NATO leaders

assumed that the organization would be empowered to force lo

47 
safety catch: It made intervention in Bosnia dependent not only on 

a general mandate by the U.N. Security Council but also on 

authorization by the secretary-general, who in turn d~legated the 

decision to his representative on spot. In short, NATO has made an 

organization unwilling to use force the guardian of its ability to use 

force. ~ 

NATO would have been well advised to proceed with greater 

caution. As one former U.N. assistant secretary observed in fall 1994, 

" The institution of the Secretary-General is inherently inappropriate 

to manage the use of force .... By involving itself in decisions on the 

use of force, the institution of the Secretary-General compromises the 

impartiality critical to its capacity as a negotiator. "j Nevertheless, 

NATO had wittingly delegated decisionmaking authority to an 

institution conditioned not to manage the use of force under Chapter 

VII mandate. 

The tragic consequences of this division would be acted out at 

Srebrenica in mid-1995, when a small Dutch UNPROFOR unit 

surrendered the city's Muslim population to the mercies of Serb 

conquerors. 

Bosnia Phase Two 

The abject failure of the United Nations, NATO, and other parties to 

deal effectively with the widening Bosnia crisis was undermining their 

credibility and demanded reexamination of existing strategies. Their 

moral standing had been shredded as Serb forces slaughtered 

unarmed Muslims after the fall of the Srebrenica "safe area," bombed 

the enclave of Tuzla, and took several hundred U.N. Blue Helmets 

hostage in reprisal for limited NATO air attacks (again at U.S. urging). 

To stiffen resistance to ongoing Serb attacks, Presidents Chirac and 

Clinton received approval for transfer of overall military command 

authority to NATO forces, thus ending the dual turnkey approach, 

48 
TABLE 2. Summation of arl~uments 

The key arguments for retaining a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH are: 

• AFSOUTH has emerged as a very important region in NATO 

must remain a strong symbol of trans-Atlantic resolve and capabiliti

• The NATO command structure is intended to respond to risks t

threaten the shared interests of all NATO members. 

• This is the only U.S.-led regional command in Europe and losin

will weaken U.S. operational and political support for NATO. 

• Significant measures have already been taken to enhance E

within NATO. 

• Removing the command link befween AFSOUTH and the Sixth F

will increase reaction time in crises. 

• IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the continued need for U.S. leadershi

the area. 

• Successful U.S. diplomacy in this vital region has been strengthe

by the U.S. command at AFSOUTH. 

• U.S. command at AFSOUTH can help stabilize tensions through

the Mediterranean area. 

• NATO responses to new ballistic missile proliferation threats aga

the AFSOUTH area will benefit from a U.S. command. 

• U.$. command facilitates participation by Partner countr

including the Russians. 

• U.S. command maximizes the effectiveness of modern C41 asse

• Complicated command arrangements, such as a bifurcated regio

and functior,dl command at AFSOUTH, can harm NAIO

responsiveness in crisis. 

By summer 1995, the balance of local power was beginning 

shift unfavorably against Serb interests. At a conference held 

49 
of Western European governments. The Rubicon was being crossed 

and, quite obviously, UNPROFOR could not expect to return to its 

traditional doctrines and roles. Nor could the threatened use of 

overriding force by its adversaries be blinked away by Belgrade and 

local Serb chieftains. 

The 1995 Dayton accords laboriously negotiated by the various 

parties to the conflict unde. U.S. auspices produced a new threshold 

of expectation that peace was at last close on the horizon. The 

accords contained a number of internal contradictions and unsettled 

questions, however: 

• The accords accept the territorial ethnic status quo resulting 

from the war while simultaneously seeking to restore Bosnia's 

prewar multiethnic "essence." 

• It seeks to end the wartime ethnic partitioning of ethnic 

communities but provides no vehicle for the assured return of 

refugees to original places of residence. 

• It seeks through national and municipal elections to provide 

a constitutional and institutional framework for state building but 

fails to provide safeguards against separate ethnic nation building. 

• It authorizes the formation of a multinational 60,000-man plus 

military entity under NATO to replace UNPROFOR, but the soonto-be constituted Implementation Force (IFOR) was to have a 

limited enforcement mandate and to be disbanded 1 year after its 

formation. 

In December 1996, lack of realism regarding the IFOR exit date and 

appropriate exit strategies led NATO to agree to a Followon Force 

(FOFOR) deployment of approximately 30,000 men (including 8,500 

American troops) to remain through March 1998. IFOR, during its 

tenure, succeeded in separating the various militias, fashioning a 

separation zone of 2 to 3 miles, and securing the cantonment of some 

50 
Official NATO doctrine adopted by NATO in February 1994, m

than 18 months previous to the signing of the Dayton accor

includes the following: 

• Confirming withdrawal of foreign forces from the conflict a

• Observing and reportin~ human rights abuses 

• Supervising and validating the conduct of referenda 

elections 

• Inspecting areas and facilities for compliance with te

agreed among parties to the conflict 

• Provide a temporary law enforcement authority in the miss

a rea 

• Coordinate humanitarian aid efforts by national a

international civil or military agencies 

• Assist in the handling of refugees and displaced persons. 

The Dayton accords created a separate and distinct range 

responsibilities for organizations other than NATO. For example, 

has been delegated authority to arrange for the econom

rehabilitation of Bosnia as well as the arranging of elections, natio

and local; the United Nations has been required to organize a sm

unarmed police force to control ethnic conflicts; the U.N. H

Commissioner for Refugees is to secure their repatriation. T

approach that emerged jerrybuilt out of Dayton gives ove

responsibility to one agency or organization, thus violating one of 

basic management principles for multifunctional operations. 

The IFOR effort has been evaluated by NATO officials 

Secretary of Defense Perry as "successful." The evaluation has b

tendered in terms of criteria that are narrowly based. IFOR manag

to complete its perceived mission with few combat-related casualt

Its various national contingents gained valuable chain of comma

intelligence/information collection, and related field experience. 

51 
of engagement. In addition, experience gained in the area of C 

operations, especially for ad hoc coalition partners, could prove o

great value in the future. 

There is an accompanying downside to any objective evaluation 

of IFOR. IFOR interpreted its mandate in narrow operational terms 

and did little to diminish tensions and disagreements amongst the 

ethnic communities. These were largely set aside for future validation, 

as well as the growing doubt within some NATO circles about the 

efficaciousness of using military power over an abbreviated period o

time to secure satisfactory political outcomes. Equally important, 

there is greater appreciation regarding obstacles to be overcome in 

divergent international bureaucratic cultures where customs and 

procedures are at variance with those of other organizations. Effective 

"lock step" is much desired but difficult to attain. Not to be ignored

any evaluation of IFOR effectiveness has been the reconciliation o

the conflicted agendas of local parties in the civil war. 

Some of the local participants and signatories viewed thei

acceptance of the accords as contingent, leading NATO observers to 

conclude that the signatories and associates viewed their signatures 

as having no lasting value. 

Any assessment of IFOR performance must take into account its 

role and impact on NATO expansion plans. Attention should be 

accorded NATO and CIS peacekeeping operational zones as potential 

spheres of influence. Where the interests of NATO members are no

at risk, the inclination will be to accept CIS "zones of influence," the 

exceptions being the grey geographic areas of Eastern and Centra

Europe. Barring membership in NATO, countries in these two areas 

are likely to become marshlands of uncertain security status, much 

like Bosnia, where the NATO-CIS relationship may evolve into eithe

collaboration to secure peaceful resolution or one of open 

competition. 

52 
the diplomatic and economic resources and skills to bring Bosnia i

the "community of European nations." The challenge for EU 

heightened by the fact that member states view foreign policy as 

extension of national self-interest. Constituent EU members of 

WEU have little desire to project force while subordinating 

interest, particularly if it involves risking their soldiers' lives to 

common policy dictated by others. With the WEU treaty up 

possible renegotiation in 1998, members have an obligation 

"mutual defense," which is difficult for traditional neutrals such 

Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland to accept unconditionally. 

Economist recently underscored the EU/WEU dilemma: 

If the EU one day includes the Baltic states, they are likely to be 

virtually inde{ensible, whatever the wording of WEU members' 

duties. Yet how, then can membership of the WEU be a condition 

for countries wanting to join the WEU ? And how can the EU be 

"integrated"into the WEU as the Union's "de{ense pillar" within 

NATO? ~ 

This is not to say that progress is not being made in the developm

of NATO and WEU doctrine for peace operations. Current efforts 

draw on the lessons of the former Yugoslavia have identified poten

NATO roles in a spectrum of operations, including humanitar

assistance, conflict prevention, traditional peacekeeping, and pe

enforcement operations, should a situation emerge that would requ

the use of force. Such NATO roles, to be carried out in suppor

U.N. or OSCE mandates, are designed to build on unique capabilit

that the Alliance has fashioned over the past 40-plus years: 

• A proven command and control structure 

• The development of NATO standardization agreements 

procedures and equipment 

53 
One of the clear lessons of the Yugoslav experience, however, ha

been that as impressive as these capabilities may be, NATO 

unlikely to be called upon to act alone in peace support operations

Provision will have to be made to incorporate non-NATO forces an

organizations alongside those of the Alliance. 

The Way Ahead 

Secretary of State Madeleine AIbright observed that the perio

immediately ahead represents a critical time line for the Europea

region. Organizations that served as benchmarks during the Cold Wa

period have either dissolved or are engaged today in efforts a

realignment, reorganization, or reexamination of their basic purpose

and roles. Western Europe is moving toward economic and monetar

union, and a number of former Warsaw Treaty Organization membe

states east of the EIbe are casting their lot to seek membership in th

European Union and its military adjunct as well as in NATO. Th

period ahead, from 1998 through 1999, is a crucial one as variou

European organizations are compelled to evaluate the credential o

applicants for membership. The European Union has pledged t

expand its rolls; the Organization for Economic Cooperation an

Development (OECD), has already welcomed Poland, Hungary, an

Czech Republic to its ranks; and the OSCE is promoting democrati

standards throughout Europe, but is still seeking to define 

meaningful role for itself in the security realm. The OSC

performance in Bosnia may prove the litmus test defining its futur

usefulness. 

NATO, however, will almost certainly prove the primar

organization in shaping the future of Europe in terms of peacekeepin

roles and missions. NATO confronts several challenges within th

organization and from neighborhoods once considered threatening

The alliance has proved enduring despite many interna

54 
clear imperative is to fashion a new NATO or else face the risk 

being considered an "ossified institution." 

The "new" NATO contemplated is one prepared to exte

membership to selected countries east of the Elbe that fully m

NATO standards in the military, economic, and political realms. T

organization has in recent years established two entities to facilit

cooperation and joint military exercises with former Warsaw Tre

Organization members--the North Atlantic Cooperation Coun

(NACC) and the Partner for Peace program (PfP)--as well as to eng

in joint military planning and exchanges of military information. 

NATO has been adapting its military structures and proced

since July 1990, when the allies declared, "The Alliance's integra

for structure.., will change fundamentally." A major facet of cha

has been the increased European re0resentation on higher staffs a

in senior billets. In addition, since WEU moved to Brussels in Janu

1993 to undertake its new roles of strengthening the European pi

of NATO, NATO has taken significant steps to empower WEU w

real military assets to accomplish its tasks. WEU and NATO m

quarterly in joint Council sessions, their secretaries-general meet of

to discuss matters of common interest, and the WEU Secreta

General is invited to North Atlantic Council ministerial meetings

Implicit in NATO's expanded ties is its future roles and missio

In particular, NATO must address the extent to which it is prepa

to undertake "out of area" actions, that is, areas that do not fall wit

the traditional alliance operational zone. Members of the allia

have supported operations in Bosnia and adjacent areas, 

authorized by the United Nations and theOSCE. Alliance lead

have made clear that they are prepared to consider future missio

but have yet to provide clear guidelines for planning purposes 

which geographic zones constitute "areas of interest" in which NA

would be prepared to deploy forces. 

55 
of mixing U.N.directed peacekeepers with NATO peace 

enforcers" in the same tactical context and theater of operations 

proved unsound, conceptually and practically. For NATO, the issu

remains on the table with respect to future peace operations. Wha

did emerge in Bosnia was the clear understanding that use of coercive 

military force by an organization inevitably makes that organization 

a co-belligerent in the eyes of other belligerents, and where certain 

nations provide units for both peace enforcement and peacekeeping

the belligerent who is under attack may be unwilling to distinguish 

between the two. 

Notes 

1. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoint.s and Force Structure (Washington

DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), 74. 

2. Ibid., 76. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid., 76. 

5. Major General John O. B. Sewall, U.S. Army (Ret.), "The UN, CSCE

NATO, and WEU: Peacekeeping Cooperation," paper presented at the 10t

Annual Strategic Studies Conference, "NATO in the 1990s, Moving From 

Theory into Action," hosted by the U.S. delogation to NATO, September 15

18, 1994, 8. 

6. The Economist, October 23, 1996, 23. 

7. Ibid. 

8. The Economist, May 1 8, 1995, 41. 

56 
Independent States 

It seems to be almost instinctual to attempt to create a succes

organization to a dissolved empire. The English smoothly mov

from Empire to the British Commonwealth, the French 

Francophone Community, and the Portuguese have rece

announced the formation of a Luso League. The creation of 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the dissolution of 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, therefore, can be seen as a re

action as much as a deep-dyed plan to reestablish Moscow's autho

or a far-sighted liberal dream of a new, consensual form of regio

relationship. 

Certainly prominent military and civilian figures in Moscow, s

to be leaders of the new Russian Federation, were the originators 

instigators of the CIS project, and it is reasonable to assume that th

individuals and institutions each had different agendas, from emp

to commonwealth to personal motives. The last category proba

included tactical political calculations by Boris Yelstin in 

competition with Gorbachev for Russian leadership. The dissolut

of the USSR left Gorbachev with no role or status while convers

transferring to Yelstin, as leader of the new Russian Federation, 

governance powers inside Russia hitherto belonging to Gorbachev 

chief of state of the USSR. The CIS, then, offered Yeltsin at lea

potential formal role in the neighboring countries where Gorbac

had exercised sovereign powers. 

The various Russian sponsors of the CIS proposed different 

often competing characters for that organization: military, econom

financial, even cultural. None has taken firm shape, although 

military has been the most prominent, partially because of a lac

57 
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58 
CIS forum to bring pressure on Russia in the spring and summer 

1 997 to help end the Sbkhazian secession. Meanwhile, outsiders 

Western Europe and the United States have been uncertain how 

deal with this Russian regional innovation, but through NATO

Partnership for Peace have pursued a somewhat independent ne

relationship with many of the members of the CIS. Not unlike t

proverbial elephant, therefore, the CIS appears to be a very differe

creature to different observers such as Russians, other CIS membe

the United Nations, and Americans. 

From its beginning, the CIS has pursued three major theme

membership, institution building, and--most ambiguous and yet mo

important of all--role seeking. The last item can be encapsulated 

the question, "Commonwealth or Empire?" framed by William Odo

and Robert Dujarric in the title of their Hudson Institute stud

Indeed, Russian policy toward the CIS often has been ambivalen

reflecting the internal debate between the neo-Communist a

imperial forces and the liberal reform movement. The leadership 

the other countries has been equally ambivalent and changeab

with the old "apparachik" figures anxious to retain as much 

possible of the ties and policies of the USSR, while the mo

nationalist and reform forces seek greater actual independence. 

In Moscow, the CIS was viewed as an instrument of Russ

policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus, although there was lit

agreement on the character of the desired relationship

commonwealth or empire or something in between. In Central As

the old Communist elites still in power wanted to continue with t

old command arrangements and limit democratic political expansio

while obtaining a degree of local authority for themselve

Kazakhstan's president was especially forceful in pushing this poli

of a strong, highly integrated CIS--"a new Soviet Union with loc

autonomy"~--but it failed to develop rapidly or institutional

Elsewhere the CIS "project" was viewed with suspicion but could n

~9 
Founding 

The CIS was inaugurated when Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed 

an initial agreement on December 8, 1991, in Minsk, Belarus. Thi

move by the three Slavic states created some unease among the othe

Former States of the Soviet Union. The five Central Asian states issue

a statement almost immediately, on December 13, which commented 

favorably on the agreement signed and expressed a desire to join a

equal founders, given certain modifications and amendments. The

called for a summit meeting of the former republics to discuss th

issues, which was held in due course in Alma-Ata on December 21

1991. This meeting enlarged the CIS membership to 11, a

designated as High Signatory Parties with equal footing as co

founders. Only four of the FSU republics stayed out: Georgia and th

three Baltic states. Georgia later applied (or was coerced) for CI

membership in 1993, but the Baltic states have resolutely remaine

outside and show no signs of changing their minds. 

On January 22, 1993, the Charter of the CIS was formall

adopted, initially by only seven states, and entered into force i

January 1994. Even prior to that, a Coordinating and Consultativ

Committee was established at the deputy head of government leve

The CIS Minsk "working group" was transformed into a forma

secretariat. In September 1993, a council of foreign ministers and 

commission on human rights were established. At the time a

agreement for a CIS economic union was also signed, but onl

Turkmenistan and Ukraine signed on initially. Although this wa

potentially an important step toward institutionalization an

consolidation of the CIS, it has not been implemented, and the CI

remains essentially an intergovernmental forum, with little in the wa

of executive authority or institutions. 

6O 
power are the predominant trends. 2 Whatever it turns out to be, t

Russian Federation will be a major power with appropriate interes

and concerns. Mr. Paul Goble of Radio Free Europe has outline

what he calls the "trend line of Russian foreign policy," which 

based on 10 challenges or issues in current RF foreign policy: 

• NATO expansion 

• Former Yugoslavia 

• China 

• The "Near Abroad," especially concern for Russian 

citizens there 

• Relations with Iran, especially with respect to the Caucasu

• Oil prices 

• Rebuilding the Navy's ability to project force 

• Arms Control, re-open the existing agreement 

• Economy 

• Building of national institutions 

Russia, however, can pursue these interests in various ways. Tw

obvious strategic choices--at opposite ends of the conceptu

spectrum--would be one based on cooperation with the West, wh

another might be focused on resurgence of Russian imperialism in t

area of the former Soviet Union. It appears, for the moment at lea

that Moscow is attempting to pursue these policies simultaneous

"The new Russian foreign policy wants both membership in t

Western club and a privileged role in Eurasia. "3 This approach is n

surprising, given Russia's urgent need to concentrate on intern

matters for the foreseeable future combined with the lack of a nation

consensus on a wide range of questions, from a definition of Rus

itself to agreement on the desirable political and economic models 

be adopted. 

6/ 
mid1993. Nevertheless both Azerbaijan and Moldova continued t

participate in CIS meetings in one capacity or another. The CI

charter makes a distinction between "founding members" and late

adherents, although there does not appear to be any significan

difference in the quality of these memberships. The charter als

provides for the status of associate members for those who wish t

participate only in selected activities, and other states may atten

meetings observers if so approved by the Council of the Heads o

States. Membership of tile CIS finally consisted of 12 countries of til

old USSR minus the tree Baltic states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan

Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Despite concerns, fears, an

objections, Moscow has obtained (by various means) affiliation by a

of the former states of the USSR except the Baltics. 

It is not completely clear, however, what affiliation o

membership means. Different countries pursued different approache

to their obligations and to their participation in decisionmaking in th

CIS. The December 30, 1991, Agreement creating the Councils o

Heads of State and Heads of Government of the CIS stipulated tha

decisions in both councils would be reached by consensus. Howeve

the agreement also permitted members to abstain in a particular case

with such abstention not to be considered as an obstacle to th

adoption of a decision. Individual members therefore possess a vet

over any given decision but may also abstain without breakin

consensus. These arrangements have been confirmed in late

procedural agreements. 

This right not to participate (which is similar to the voting proces

in the United Nations) is widely employed by members of the CIS

who practice a form of selective signing. In fact, only a few of th

many CIS agreements have been signed by all member states. Russi

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have formed the hard core o

the CIS by signing almost all of the agreements. (Now that Belarus ha

62 
social areas. 

In any case, few of the CIS agreements are legally binding; rath

they are declarations of intention. Where Russia has maintained 

reinstated tighter ties (as in Belarus, Georgia, and Azerbaijan), it h

done so by manipulating bilateral pressures. Proposals for some fo

of military integration and economic union have been the m

difficult and the most contentious of the core questions that w

determine the character, and future role, of the CIS. The experien

to date in these two central areas has not been definitive. 

Military Relations 

Resistance to military integration is particularly strong, and Mosc

is having trouble maintaining even limited border troop arrangemen

in a few countries. In essence, all Russia's partners in the CIS, exce

for Belarus, are leery of having the Commonwealth turn into a milita

control mechanism as was the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Th

accept that they must maintain or reinstitute some economic ties 

are attempting to limit the security relationship and demonstrate 

viable political independence--minimizing their ties wh

maximizing benefits. 

While Ukraine has been the most visible in pursuit of Weste

security arrangements to counterbalance those with Moscow, oth

CIS countries have pursued similar policies in varying degrees. 

have signed their own individual Partnership for Peace agreemen

there are no CIS-PfP links. Countries of the CIS participating in 

Bosnian adventure are doing so with national units, with no C

identity or cohesion. Even the bilateral agreements Russia 

procured allowing Russian forces to be based in CIS countries (su

as Georgia, Armenia, and Tajikistan) permit indigenous personnel 

join those units in significant numbers. 

A major Russian CIS initiative is the effort to obtain secu

treaties, but those few signed to date have lacked substance. A ma
, py g

Clearly, some senior Russian military officials expected (or at lea

hoped) that the CIS would provide for a continuation of the comple

Soviet military structure--under Russian leadership. This did n

occur, as all the FSUs eventually insisted on the right and need 

create their own military. Especially in the military area, many vie

a comprehensive military arrangement as continuation of Moscow

central authority. 

At the Tashkent summit in May 1992, Russia essentially shifte

the whole discussion to another plane by introducing a proposal f

a collective security treaty for the CIS. By doing so, Moscow cam

down on one side of an argument that had been central to th

question of CIS military policy: whether to follow the old Warsa

Pact (centralized) or the NATO (looser) model. A collective secur

pact was closer to the NATO model and was based on the existenc

of national military policies and structures; further, it essentia

closed the argument over the character of CIS military arrangemen

by opting for national forces. However, this agreement is vague 

many details and is far from providing for the continuation of 

integrated regional military system. Many have expressed reservation

and concerns--Ukraine thought the treaty was incompatible wi

other CIS agreements, and Belarus thought it incompatible with 

own constitution. Nevertheless, while most have resisted t

continuation of Russian central military authority, Moscow h

established Russian military presence in several of the CIS memb

states. 

Five CIS summits were held in 1993, with little further progre

made with respect to military matters, and attention shifted mo

toward economic questions. In May, the CIS Council of Defen

Ministers abolished the post of commander in chief of CIS Arme

Forces and in December eliminated the CIS Armed Forces Comman

itself. In essence, by the end of 1 993 the effort to create a combine

64 
deployments was pursued, and the concept paper on the preventi

and settlement of conflicts on the territories of the CIS member sta

referred to above was adopted in early 1996. Therefore, a leg

structure for multinational CIS military relations has been created, 

case anyone might wish to use it. 

Peacekeeping, therefore, might offer Moscow a form of acceptab

military cooperation less satisfactory than outright military integrati

but still somewhat more structured than a collection of bilate

agreements. 

Peacekeeping 

One major concern of members of this regional organization is th

of collective security, although there is a sharp distinction betwe

the attitude of Russia (proactive) and the others (suspicious). Wh

Russian interest initially focused on questions such as the future of t

USSR military structure and the protection of borders, war 

Nakorno-Korabagh and conflicts in Georgia and Moldova resulted 

introduction of "peacekeeping" or "peacemaking" into the collecti

security agenda at the Kiev CIS Summit in 1992. All CIS membe

(except Turkmenistan) signed "The Agreement on Military Observ

Groups and Collective Peace-Keeping Forces in the CIS." T

agreement included many restrictive conditions, similar to U.

"terms," which called for a request from all parties and a cease-fire 

place--but still introduced the concept as a possible task for the C

as a regional organization. 

Subsequent agreements were signed, such as "The Protocol on t

Status of Military Observer Groups and Collective Peacekeepi

Forces" and "The Protocol on Manning, Structure, Logistic Supp

and Financing of the Military Observer Groups and Collecti

Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent State

6~ 
~\ ~-.v ~" ~, \ 

• ' \ \ 

-" "-"-~ ,--- ~ ~'-"-~ -" 'I ~ ' ~ 

Ccs~ian 

t 

tern~t:on~ boundary 

~ubfiC b~n~ory 

~pu~ic ~nter 

d~ted rood 

~mlta'e 

66 
19, 1996. This concept paper lays out arrangements almost identic

to those of classic U.N. peacekeeping: consensual operations 

voluntary forces financed by special assessment. Particula

significant elements of the concept paper are: 

• "The member-states of the CIS will strive to strengthen the r

of the Commonwealth in the peaceful settlement of conflicts" 

joint agreement and action. 

• Special note was made of the desirability of "hea

participation of the United Nations and the OSCE in efforts 

regulate conflicts on the territories of the member-states of 

Commonwealth." 

• Any such activity will be regulated by the U.N. Charter, 

Charter, and other documents of the CIS, the generally recogniz

principals and norms of international law, relevant U.N. Secu

Council resolutions, OSCE documents, and other relev

agreements between member-states of the CIS. 

• With regard to the settlement of conflicts in the territories 

its member-states, the CIS will operate as a regional organizat

in conformity with Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. 

• The Council of the Heads of States of the CIS is the autho

for defining and authorizing of peacekeeping mandates a

operations. 

• Peace enforcement operations (Chapter VII type authority 

the use of force) are permitted only when so authorized by 

U.N. Security Council. 

This convention, interestingly enough, codifies the limited nat

of CIS peacekeeping to conflict resolution. None of the CIS states 

for that matter, Russian states, until the current Bosnia operation) 

engaged in any of the humanitarian assistance or complex emergen

management activities so characteristic of recent U.N. peacekeep

(;7 
concept paper clearly prohibits Chapter VII type peac

enforcement operations unless authorized by the Security Counci

Essentially, therefore, the ClS peacekeeping authority is limited t

what is generally referred to as "traditional" or consensua

peacekeeping under the provisions of Chapter VI of the U.N. Charte

The ClS, therefore, has adopted criteria and standards whereby 

could "provide an international framework for specific intervention

by re~ional actors." However, many observers believe that "oversigh

arrangements are needed to make the legitimacy of such actio

conditional on international standards, "4 such as the U.N. Observe

Force linked to the CIS peacekeeping operation in the Abkhaz regio

of Georgia. 

The Russians sought formal U.N. recognition (and the financin

that would go with it) in 1994, but Secretary-General Boutros-Gha

made it clear during a visit to Moscow that the request would not b

met and that U.N. peacekeeping operations would be only thos

under U.N. control from beginning to end. Moscow continued th

effort to obtain international recognition, and in the spring 199

session of the General Assembly's Special Committee o

Peacekeeping Operations, the Russian representative stated that th

Russian Federation attached particular importance to th

establishment of working relations between the CIS and the Unite

Nations, favoring participation of the United Nations and the OSC

in dispute resolution activities within the CIS, to includ

peacekeeping operations. He added with some asperity, "So fa

unfortunately, we have to note that Russia is still obliged to carry th

main burden of moral, political, and financial responsibility fo

peacekeeping in the ClS States." 

In Moscow's eyes, the ClS is an established regional organizatio

of the type covered by Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, and n

formal or procedural recognition by the United Nations is needed o

even provided for. Former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali) at lea

66 
concerning the TransDniester region between Russia and Moldo

(1992) and those between Georgia and Russia (several in 1992 

1993). 

Later developments in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan resu

in these countries joining the CIS, the later deployment of a 

peacekeeping force in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, and an ad 

peacekeeping force in the South Ossetian region of Georgia. 

force obtained the right to wear U.N. blue berets. 

Meanwhile, developments in the Dniester River area of Mold

enabled the Russians (who had large army units stationed in 

country) to play an active role in local developments. Although 

attempt to break off part of the country and have it join Russia fa

for the moment, Russia was able to retain a position and role in 

country by relabeling its forces as CIS peacekeepers. 

Moscow offered another peacekeeping force to assist with 

Nakorno-Karabagh conflict, but both parties, especially 

Azerbaijan Government, strongly prefer either a CSCE or U.N. fo

Nevertheless, Moscow will probably continue to attempt to cons

peacekeeping operations as a policy option in the geographic are

the former USSR. While many will continue to harbor suspici

about Russian intentions in doing so, the reality remains that in

and intrastate conflicts in the area, present and future, will req

attention. 

Regardless of their internationally recognized status, or 

thereof, four Russian-sponsored "peacekeeping forces" were, and 

are, deployed, in Tajikistan, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Osse

and Moldova. 

69 
steoyeas specaepesetateto coodate aussa

operations there. Kozyrev addressed the U.N. General Assembly i

September and proclaimed a special peacekeeping role for Russia i

the CIS and asked that Russian peacekeeping forces be given th

status of U.N. peacekeepers. 

To bolster this request, Russia obtained promises of support from 

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan and launched a diplomati

campaign to obtain U.N. sanction. The diplomatic effort failed, an

the United Nations declined to grant the Russian request, but th

effort signaled a Russian policy of claiming a special role fo

peacekeeping under CIS cover. This was actually Russia's secon

attempt to place a "peacekeeping" force in Tajikistan. The firs

operation had been authorized by the CIS in January, 1993 in a

attempt to stabilize the political environment in Tajikistan. Althoug

deployed, it consisted only of Russian troops and had little success

if only because a cease-fire agreement was never achieved. 

The second and more ambitious operation produced the Coalitio

Peacekeeping Forces (KMS), which numbered approximately 25,00

troops (the vast majority Russian) under the command of a Russia

general. (The command and control arrangements, however, appea

somewhat ambiguous,as the KMS commander does not appear t

have clear cut authority over Russian units, much less those from 

other CIS states.) The mandate of the KMS is also more ambitious

representing a full-scale intervention under the authority of the CI

Collective Security Treaty, which smacks more of peace making tha

peacekeeping. Some have described it as turning Tajikistan into a d

facto Russian-CIS (actually Russian-Uzbeck, in the opinion of some

protectorate. 

The KMS remains deployed in Tajikistan, mostly as backup to th

border troops on the southern border with Iran although one majo

unit is deployed in the Tajik capital where it performs the function o

propping up the government. Both within the context of the KM

70 
role, the Security Council has declined to do so, limiting U

involvement to the authorization in December 1994 of an obse

force (UNMOT-U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan) with 

authorized strength of 84, including local civilian staff. In 

connection, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy. B

the Special Envoy and UNMOT were authorized to pursue the u

mediation, cease-fire agreement monitoring, and humanita

assistance tasks, and were specifically instructed to maintain c

liaison with the "Collective Peace-keeping Forces of 

Commonwealth of Independent States in Tajikistan" as well as w

the Mission of the Organization of Security and Cooperation 

Europe and local forces. 

This effort began to unravel in late 1996, when the T

opposition several times routed superior but clearly unmotiva

government forces in the narrow middle section of Tajikistan 

connects the western and eastern parts of the country. Continu

discussions among the various parties produced another pe

agreement in late June 1 997, but did not, at least immediately, re

in any noticeable increase in civil accord. In fact, the alignmen

forces among Tajiks became more complicated, with var

government forces apparently aligned against the Government. 

early August, Russian officials (speaking for the CIS FORCE) 

opposition leaders announced they would remain neutral in th

intragovemment squabble. Concurrently, Russia continues to pu

an active bilateral policy, reaching across the border into Afghanis

in an effort to frustrate the anti-Russian Tajik rebels. 

Georgia (Abkhazia) 

Relations between the minority Abkhaz and the majority et

Georgians, tense for decades, erupted in 1 992 in the aftermath of 

breakup of the USSR, when the local Abkhaz authorities attempte

separate from the newly independent Georgia. Russian involvem

71 
oatag te detaed oe aog te baGeoga

"border." 

However, the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia is no

alone; it shares the field with UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in 

Georgia), a Special Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General, individua

U.N. specialized agencies and programs, and a resident mission o

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE

Although the United Nations declined Russia's request that the CI

force in Georgia be granted U.N. status, the Security Counci

resolution mandating UNOMIG does specifically mention the CI

peacekeepers and thereby link them to U.N. efforts. However, the 

multinational effort in Georgia-Abkhazia has been noted for its lac

of cohesion and integration among the various players. 

Little progress was made throughout 1995 and the first half o

1996, but the political situation appeared to improve when Georgian 

President Shevardnadze won the November 1995 election, thereb

significantly strengthening his efforts to stabilize the country, and the 

Abkhaz leader announced a new position accepting the principle o

a "Federate Union" (undefined). In addition, several changes were 

introduced to improve the integration and effectiveness of the overal

operation in early 1996, and the mandates of both forces were 

extended. 

These developments enhanced the peacekeeping and regiona

organization credentials of the CIS. Russian Foreign Ministe

Primakov himself chaired meetings in February 1996 between the 

disputants in Moscow, although without any particular success. Late

in the year, the Georgian Government began to make public noise

about the possibility of it asking Russia to withdraw the force, unles

it could produce acceptable results quickly. 

Diplomatic and political activity in 1997 did result, however, i

some direct contact between the Abkhaz and Georgian leaders and 

a joint statement in August 1997, in which both pledged to refrain 

72 
Georgia (South Ossetia) 

The South Ossetian conflict is similar to the Abkhazian in tha

involves a minority ethnic group in a newly independent country, 

differs in that the group in question shares its ethnicity with kin acr

the border in Russia (North Ossetia). Open tension between 

Ossetians and the Georgians developed in 1989 and after as the n

Georgian Government instituted a Georgian language program as w

as other Georgian nationalist initiatives. Increasing tensions resu

in South Ossetian local government declaring its independen

which the Georgian Government rejected, and abolishing So

Ossetia's previous autonomous status. The conflict escalated, and 

mid-1991 there were interethnic war with blockades, hostage-taki

and artillery attacks. Georgian President Gamsakhurdia fled and 

replaced by Edward Shevardnadze, but the conflict continued 

Russia increased its involvement, finally organizing a meeting in J

1 992 near the Russian city of Sochi, which produced a cease

agreement and the organization and deployment of a j

peacekeeping force. 

The South Ossetian mission is not a CIS operation but the 

attempt by Moscow at a what has been described as a local coali

model. The force of approximately 1,500 is composed of troops f

both sides of the conflict as well as Russia (both Russian Federa

and "local" troops from North Ossetia). As the largest contributo

well as political patron, Russia dominates and leads the force. 

The force's mandate was originally to separate the warring s

by creating a buffer zone between South Ossetia and Georgia. 

mid-1 993 the operation appears to have expanded into a m

general policing and monitoring activity throughout South Ossetia

the South Ossetian government does not appear to have been abl

establish anything serious in the way of local police administrat

Little progress has been made in resolving the conflict since th

although the Georgians and the South Ossetians signed an accor
Moldova 

The peacekeeping operation in Moldova is also an ad ho

arrangement: a bilateral agreement between Moldova and Russia, no

CIS authorized. It is designed to separate regional factions along th

Dniester River; half is composed of Russian troops and the re

comprises Moldovan and Dniester battalions. 

Although billed as a peacekeeping operation, the force mor

clearly represents a direct Russian involvement in the internal affair

of a former Soviet republic. The conflict arise from the efforts of th

east bank region of the Dniester River to secede from Moldova, a

especially strong impulse following the collapse of the USSR an

Moldovan independence. The conflict is political rather than ethni

and was exacerbated by the role of the Russian 14th Army, which wa

based in the region and which actively supported the Dniester forces

Negotiations among Moldovan, Russian, and Dniesteran authoritie

resulted in a cease-fire agreement in luly 1992 in Moscow. 

In what Kevin O'Prey calls "Moscow's local coalition model fo

mediation and peacekeeping,'"' the Russian and Moldovan president

agreed to act as joint guarantors of peace and authorized 

peacekeeping force. In the event only Russia was willing t

contribute peacekeepers to the Moldovan mission, other CIS an

some East European states had offered to send peacekeepers bu

backed out and called for the use of OSCE mechanisms. However

when the OSCE in July 1992 refused the Moldovan Government'

request for a OSCE peacekeeping force, Chisinau finally accepted 

Russian proposal for a tripartite (Russian, Dniester, Moldovan) forc

to be labeled as CIS peacekeeping force. The peacekeepers, abou

4,000 strong, were deployed in July and August 1992 in a buffer zon

separating Moldovan and Dniester forces. In addition, the OSCE sen

a resident observer mission. 

74 
However, Moscow has actually withdrawn a significant portion of 

contribution to the peacekeeping force over the past 2 years, argu

that some of their functions could be assumed by its 14th Army u

stationed in the area, thereby further diluting the neutral characte

the peacekeeping force. 

Cohesion 

The passion for their new-found independence by most of the form

members of the USSR is obviously why there has been little progr

in new institution building and the evolution of common policy (a

the consequent continued parallel growth of Russian bilateral polic

in the area). In reality, the CIS was created largely in an ad h

manner, without a unifying concept of coherent structure. Mos

the agreements concluded have been reached though a process 

compromise that has attempted to meet Moscow's bottom line 

preventing a further disintegration of inherited relations, wh

enabling the other members to pursue varying degrees of independ

national political life. The key word or concept is "reintegration," 

there is little agreement of what that means. Increasingly it appe

to mean a mixture of economic and military ties, varying from coun

to country. 

However, by late 1993, the CIS took on new life with 

accession of Georgia and Azerbaijan (even though their n

membership was less than fully voluntary). Each of the th

Caucasian states discovered that, for different reasons, it could 

retain full independence from the Russian Federation. 

Not surprisingly, apart from the Russian Federation each mem

of the CIS is attempting to pursue a membership policy that bring

some advantages (e.g., Russian support for Armenia in Nakor

Karabagh), while limiting Russian influence. Russia's intentions, 

noted above, are not fully transparent, or maybe just not yet f

developed. Everyone, including Russia, has a separate agen

75" 
of a common market and monetary union by 1997, and join

transport and energy systems. [hey are to coordinate thei

defense an foreign policies but insist each will maintain it

individual sovereignty. 

• Pro-integration but suspicious of outright union: Kazakhstan

Kyrg~/zstan. These two have joined Russia and Belarus in a pac

with less integrated structures promoting economic integration 

and a customs union within the broader CIS framework

However, there are no supranational bodies envisaged. 

• Less interested in integration but dependent on Russia

Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. All four belong to 

collective security system within the CIS dominated by Russia

Georgia depends on Russia to keep separatists in check; Armenia 

sees Russia as a protector against its Muslim neighbors; Tajikistan 

has 25,000 Russian troops to fight Moslem rebels; and Uzbekistan 

has few resources and little ability to resist Russian pressures

Although members of the NATO Partnership for Peace (excep

Tajikistan), they have refrained to date from holding join

exercises with Western countries. 

• Hostile to integration: Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan

Moldova. None is active in CIS activities; Ukraine and 

Turkmenistan have not even signed the CIS charter. Ukraine 

leads the resistance. This group is less dependent on Russia

Turkmenistan has gas and Azerbaijan has oil. Neither Azerbaijan 

nor Moldova has agreed to hoist Russian bases or forces, and 

Turkmenistan has proclaimed itself Central Asian's first neutra

state. 

• Totally opposed: The Baltic States. These three led the drive 

to leave the USSR, inspiring nationalists elsewhere. All three hav

refused to joint the CIS and have declared their intention to join 

NATO and the European Union. 

76 
reflected in the lack of coherent policy in a number of ar

including the purpose and future of the Commonwealth 

Independent States, a Moscow creation. 

In the foreign policy area, Moscow has shifted from a world v

to a focus on its "frontier," now largely composed of for

constituent parts of the USSR. Many Russians, of course, wan

bring these "neighbors" of what they call the "Near Abroad" back 

the fold but are facing questions of how to do so and then how 

define the new relationship. The other successor states of the U

naturally view Moscow's interest in reintegration with mixed inte

and suspicion, as do many Western observers. 

A major instrument for official Russian Federation policy on 

question appears to be the CIS. Moscow is touting this organiza

as a natural development, based on history, common interest, 

mutual consent, designed to provide for a reintegration of many of 

successor states of the USSR into a more or less coherent regio

space. Two aspects to this policy merit close watching: first, 

degree of success in reintegrating the region; second, the characte

the institutional result. For the United States and Western Europe, 

final judgment, according to U.S. Ambassador to the Rus

Republic Thomas Picketing, will depend upon: 

• The degree of mutual consent by which the process is purs

• The degree of mutual advantage shared by the participa

especially the smaller nations 

• The degree to which the CIS permits political, economic, 

social interaction with outsiders (such as the the United States 

the European Union)$ 

The CIS, apparently conceived by Moscow in the hectic day

1 991 to be the successor institution to the USSR, failed to take f

in any meaningful way in its first few years. Moscow attempted 

77 
description of the CIS as both a process and an institution for the 

reintegration of the former states of the Soviet Union into a new 

politico-economic-social space. They claim that even without the 

institution the process is actually underway and will lead sooner or 

later to a more or less reintegrated regional entity based on the 

following realities: 

• Economic: the {JSSR was an integrated economy built on the 

organizing principle of no "duplication" of economic activities; 

few if any of the successor states are yet able to pursue an 

independent economic life. 

• Security: the USSR had centralized military institutions, and 

the CIS countries are now forced to build their own institutions 

from scratch and at enormous cost. Thecomplex border situation 

(between the Russian Federation and CIS members; between the 

CIS members and the external world; and from there back again 

into Russia itself) makes that task even more difficult. 

• Common heritage: History, exists, and there is a vast common 

heritage of language, customs, bureaucratic cultures, and 

memories (e.g., of the Great Patriotic War). 

The border questions are particularly pressing. The internal 

borders within the former USSR were rather casual affairs, and all the 

infrastructure of border protection and control was placed on the 

external borders of the USSR. The breakup of theLJSSR has left the 

Russian Federation essentially without clearly demarcated borders 

with many of its new neighbors, especially in the Caucasus and 

Central Asia. The political problems connected with obtaining clearly 

marked borders, e.g., between Russia and Georgia, are reportedly 

vexing. 

Russian policy thinkers have formulated the idea of the "Near 

Abroad," a contiguous area consisting of former republics of the USSR 

78 
in 1996, other Russian candidates clearly meant to claim that rig

Needless to say, the whole concept of the Near Abroad ra

eyebrows, at minimum, in those countries so designated. 

At the same time, the transformation of former USSR bor

regions (under Moscow's control as states of the centralized US

into independent states leaves Russia without an external geograp

security buffer. In attempting to deal with this disturbing nakedne

Moscow has pressed for bilateral agreements that permit 

deployment of Russian border troops (which include a large num

of recruits from the host countries) manning Georgia and Armen

borders with Turkey and Iran. However, even a satisfact

arrangement with respect to purely security matters will not allev

Russian concerns arising from an essentially wide-open movemen

goods and peoples across these borders, given the weak or e

nonexistent capability of these newly independent countries 

control their borders. As long as these conditions exist, Rus

concerns about smuggling, arms transfers, crime, and terrorism 

continue. 

In sum, Russian officials argue that existing "objective" fac

lead to some form of reintegration, which they insist is not a cover 

re-establishment of the imperial relationship of the USSR. The is

surfaced in Russian internal politics in March 1996, when 

Communist-dominated State Duma passed a resolution decla

invalid the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. Boris Yel

turned this action of the Duma against the Communists in 

electoral campaign by making the case that he was more able to b

about some form of reintegration of the former republics than w

the Communists, in the form ofaconsensualCIS. He obtained 

support of most of the leaders of the other former Soviet republics 

his position. Nevertheless, clear policy on the future of the CI

absent, and pending the achievment of any consensus, 

Government of the Russian Federation under President Yelst

79 
the CIS as a mechanism for dealing with local conflicts in the 

neighboring former states of the Soviet Union that now belong to the 

CIS. Conflicts in Tajikistan and Georgia resulted in the introduction 

of the concept of peacekeeping into the CIS agenda, followed by an 

agreement among several of the CIS members to create CIS "peace 

maintenance forces." These are currently deployed in Georgia and 

Moldova, and Moscow has indicated interest in further CIS 

peacekeeping operations in the region. As explained by the Russian 

Ambassador to the United Nations, Sergey Lavrov, "The emergence 

of conflicts on political and ethnic grounds in the newly independent 

states in the territory of the former Soviet Union poses a serious threat 

to the security and stability of those states and Russia,... as well as 

to regional and international peace in general" and therefore "defined 

as an international organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

the CIS is already making its contribution to peacekeeping in 

Commonwealth territory. ''8 

The View from Transcaucasia 

The Yranscaucasia region constitutes a complex geopolitical matrix-- 

a version of three-dimensional chess that illustrates again the validity 

of General de Gaulle's comment about geography making politics

At one level there is the intricate, intimate, and occasionally conflictridden relationship among the peoples of Caucasus region: primarily 

the secessionist movements of the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians o

Georgia, the Armenians of Nakorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan, and the 

peoples of the Russian Federation across the border in the 

Transcaucasus (most notably the Czechens). At another level there is 

the interplay between Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (and thei

various peoples) and the surrounding layer of major regiona

powers--Russia, Turkey, and Iran--who were all once suzerains in 

the Caucacus and might wish to be so again. 

80 
Abkhazia, the future of more than one million refugees and interna

displaced persons continues to be uncertain. Out of this numb

more than 900,000 people (250,000 in Armenia, 405,000 

Azerbaijan, and 250,000 in Georgia) are receiving internatio

humanitarian assistance. This combination of fragile governmen

internal and intrastate conflict, and economic deterioration follow

the collapse of the USSR is an obvious arena for regio

peacekeeping initiatives. 

Armenia 

The Armenian Government is focused on four foreign policy issu

• The future of Nakorno-Karabagh and relations with Azerbai

• Establishing relations with its other neighbors, especi

Turkey, but also with Georgia and Iran 

• How to break out of economic as well as political isolati

• The character of the CIS and Armenia's role in it. 

Yerevan joined the CIS at its inception, seeing in it both 

opportunity and a danger. It offers the prospect of an accepta

relationship with Russia, which Armenia needs for security reason

to maintain Russian sympathy in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict a

in the longer run, to counter the "Turkish Threat." The Nagor

Karabagh question is particularly important for the current Armen

Government, which wants to concentrate on nation-building tasks 

is caught between a more militant diaspora political movement 

Dashnak party) and the Nakorno-Karabagh regime. This conf

raises all sorts of internal and international problems for the Armen

Government, which finds itself isolated both economically 

politically. 

Moscow's continued sympathy and potential for assistance 

resolving these problems is important for Yerevan. Yerevan 

81 
weapons and other materiel.) Moscow has also offered to sponsor a 

CIS peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabagh. While Yerevan does 

not wish to offend Moscow or discourage it playing a constructive 

(pro-Armenian) role in the conflict, it must be cautious about the 

implications of a truly neutral CIS involvement and, like Azerbaijan, 

will want to see the shape of the agreement before it agrees to the 

deployment of a peacekeeping force. (The inviolability of national 

borders is a traditional preoccupation of newly independent states.) 

Azerbaijan 

Azerabaijan's problems are equally daunting. It resisted joining the 

CIS until late 1993, when continued internal instability (some say 

Russian fomented) and defeat in the war in Nakorno-Karabagh 

produced economic as well as political chaos. Azarbaijan is opposed 

to the concept of reintegration among the former states of the USSR 

(if only because of the conflict over the future ownership and 

disposition of Caspain Sea petroleum), but joined the CIS under 

Russian pressure and with the Russian promise that in doing so it 

could it obtain Russian assistance in resolving the Nakorno-Karabagh 

problem. Baku remains bitter about what is believes is Russian 

support (including provision of military supplies) for Armenia and 

nervous about Russian attempts to remain a major player in the 

Caspian Sea petroleum developments. 

In the event Azerbaijani membership in the CIS has not produced 

any noticeable or significant change in Russian policy with respect to 

the Nakorno-Karabagh situation, and Azerbaijani participation in the 

CIS has been accordingly less than enthusiastic. They have refused 

to sign most of the agreements, especially those relating to security 

and the deployment of "CIS" border troops in Azerbaijani territory,. 

Specifically Baku has resisted Russian suggestions for a CIS 

peacekeeping force in Nakorno-Karabagh, absent a negotiated 

agreement, and attempted to pre-empt this proposal by turning to the 

82 
visit to Brussels in April 1996. 

Georgia 

Georgia was essentially dragooned into the CIS in 1994 following 

initial period of postindependence instability, which most observ

believe was fostered by Russia or by individual Russian offic

operating independently. 

Georgia would prefer to avoid a too tight security embrace 

Russia but finds itself in need of Russian assistance in a numbe

areas, apart from the obvious economic and transportation ties. T

CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia is completely Russian, a

Moscow must obviously be a party to any solution of the Abkh

secession. Russia continues to play the role of mediator in the So

Ossetian problem, most recently during the latest accord signed 

the two parties in May 1996. And Russia maintains troops in Geor

in three different and distinct categories: border troops on the Turk

border, a regular garrison remaining from Soviet days, and the 

peacekeeping force. Georgia hopes somehow to cut itself i

Azerbaijani's oil future, and this also may require Russian support. 

other words, while Tsiblisi may see Moscow as part if not the s

source of most of its problems, it also sees the Russian Federation 

a necessary participant in the solution of those very same problem

Nevertheless, developments in 1996 indicate that Presid

Shevernadze and his Government believe the time is ripe fo

reappraisal of relations with Moscow, relations essentially forced 

Tsbilis in the early, chaotic days of Georgian independence. In e

September, Georgia and Uzebistan signed a bilateral milit

agreement, outside of the CIS context, and a military train

agreement with Germany, and a military cooperation agreement w

Turkey. Throughout 1996, Shevardnadze and the Georgia Parliam

publicly criticized the CIS peacekeeping effort and Russian policy 

freezing the situation in Abkhazia, thereby protecting the Abk
commander of the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia. In other words, 

Shevardnadze is attempting to use the CIS and the Russian-Georgian 

military relationship as instruments to encourage Russia to serve 

Georgian interests as well as its own. 

The View fl"om Central Asia 

The Central Asian members of the CIS--Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 

Turkmenistan, Krygyzstan, and Tajikistan--all share geographic 

proximity, ethnic, and cultural affinities and a Russian/Soviet 

experience. On the other hand, there is considerable disparity in size

population, resources, and internal political situations. Even their 

Russian experience varied, as well as the economic consequences o

the collapse of the USSR. Finally, of course, the ambitions and 

rivalries of their individual leaders play a role in their attitudes and 

policies toward regional and international issues. 

As noted earlier, Central Asian attitudes toward reintegration of 

the former Soviet space and the CIS vary considerably. Kazakhstan 

and Kyrgyzstan favor both; Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are les

interested but very dependent in different ways on Russia; and 

Turkmenistan is flatly opposed. The subregional view of CIS 

peacekeeping is equally skeptical, as evidenced by the clea

preference for U.N. involvement in CIS peacekeeping operations. I

is interesting to note that Uzbekistan has, like Russia, found the 

concept of CIS peacekeeping of some use in pursuing its own foreign 

policy objectives in Tajikstan. 

In the past few years, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan 

have made serious efforts to cooperate among themselves in 

economic and fiscal matters as well as in defense and security 

matters. However, in spring 1996 they agreed to create a Central 

Asian peacekeeping battalion to be earmarked for U.N. sponsored 

operations and scheduled joint exercises in 1997 as part of NATO's 

PfP program. Tajikstan was not invited to participate in this program, 

84 
gg

Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries may well re

consensus on a core agenda. They seek both to secure their countr

secular orientation and to deny Moscow an opportunity to reestab

regional hegemony under the guise of combating "Isla

fundamentalism." 

Tajikistan is unique in Central Asia as the "beneficiary" o

peacekeepin~ operation. Although cautious and skeptical ab

Russian plans for reintegration of the countries of the area, 

Government of Tajikstan is so dependent on Moscow merely 

remain in power that its views are muted at best. The anti-Russ

rebels are very real, but the Government has no choice except to 

along with Russian activities and policies. Tajikistan is there

caught between Russia's aim to ensure that other powers do not 

in to fill the power vacuum left by the USSR and the other ne

independent states of Central Asia. Among these countries, the 

with the strongest cards to play is Uzbekistan, which has influenc

sizable areas of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, a large if obsolete mili

arsenal, and links with Afghan leaders. 

The Views of the Other FSUs 

Ukraine is the most significant member of the CIS after Russia. W

not exactly a challenger for leadership, Ukraine is interested 

limiting Russian influence. It also has its own fish to fry, notably 

ongoing argument with Moscow over the division of the Black 

fleet and naval bases. In an effort to reduce Russia's role as 

primary source of military and technical assistance, Ukra

concluded bilateral security cooperation agreements in 1996 w

Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. 

A regular meeting of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, 

October 29, 1996, in Dushanbe, provided a clear view of the attit

of most CIS members toward any aggressive CIS peacekeeping. 
ppg jy 

delegations in attendance rejected Moscow's proposal to appoin

General Mikhail Kolesnikov as head of the CIS Military Cooperatio

Staff, arguing that his predecessor had also been Russian and that th

post must not be monopolized by Russia. The Ukrainian delegation

head, Deputy Defense Minister General Ivan Bizhan, stated tha

Ukraine will participate only in U.N. or OSCE "peacekeeping

operations and not those under CIS. 

The situation in Afghanistan and on the Tajik-Afghan border wa

a major topic. Some unspecified countries (very probably the Centra

Asian) endorsed a proposal to prolong the mandate of "CI

peacekeeping" forces in Tajikistan. Some (again unspecified) minister

supported the formation of "regional and subregional securit

systems" in fulfillment of the draft CIS collective security concep

Tajik president Imomali Rahmonov, together with the Russia

delegation, urged approval of that proposal. There was no word o

the agenda item regarding the mandate of Russian "peacekeepers" 

Abkhazia and the appointment of a new commander of that force, 

point of controversy between Russia and Georgia. The meeting ende

after a half-day, instead of the day-and-a-half originally scheduled

The rejection of Kolesnikov leaves the CIS Military Cooperation Sta

headless as its former chief, General Viktor Samsonov, was name

recently to Kolesnikov's former post as head of Russia's General Staf

Moldova is another "beneficiary" of Russian bilatera

peacekeeping and therefore not in a position to have much of a view 

of the concept in a theoretical sense. Most observers agree tha

peacekeeping as practiced in Moldova has had little of the neutra

character usually required but has been more in the nature of Russia

intervention. In recent months, the Government of Moldova has fe

emboldened (or desperate enough) to complain publicly abou

Russian failure to comply with certain elements of the 199

agreement, notably the withdrawal of Russian troops. Give

86 
peacekeeping role in the region. 

Belarus is in the unique position of appearing to want mo

integration with Russia than Russia is willing to give. Moscow se

Belarus as the catalyst for integration in the CIS, as well as 

traditional part of the motherland wishing to return home, but is lee

about the very significant economic costs involved. 

Conclusions 

The problems the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) face

in obtaining recognition as a true regional organization begin with 

Russian origin and character; it is seen by too many as a facade f

Moscow's true imperial intentions. Without greater acceptability, 

ability to perform regional peacekeeping functions will rema

limited. 

Although many observers will agree that the new Russia

Federation is made up of disparate tendencies, and that not a

Russians or Russian leaders wish to renew Russia's traditional imperi

vocation, Moscow's propensity for political interference and gener

mischief making, 9 as exemplified in the concept of the Near Abroa

remains and cannot be ignored. This bent is exacerbated by th

transitional stage of politics and policy making in the Russia

Federation. Without a consensus on the character of the post-USS

Russian Federation, individual Russians (military and civilian) fin

opportunities for entrepreneurial politics. "Despite its claims to th

contrary, the military engages in politics, resists reform, seeks 

preserve the military-industrial complex .... and generally poses 

considerate threat to the future of Russian democracy and th

tranquillity of its neighbors. ''1° 

In addition there is the question of what Paul Goble ca

capability: the difference between what Moscow might want an

what Moscow can obtain. ~ He notes that Moscow probably wan

to recover the Ukraine and the three Baltic states but can't, an

87 
Chechnya has shown that Russias frontier region is volatile at bes

and that great dangers lie ahead for Russia if it continues to stir up 

conflicts and ethnic animositites in the region beyond its borders

Ambassador Matlock points out that Georgian Presiden

Shervardnadze has shrewdly pressured Moscow, through cleve

manipulation of the CIS forum and the Russian-Georgian military 

relationship, to play a more constructive role in the Abkhazia 

situation by using its influence on the secessionists. 1~ 

All these swirling currents can be seen in the four so-called 

peacekeeping operations currently underway in the territories of the 

member states of the CIS and the one proposed but not yet accepted

Of these four, two can be reasonably called peacekeeping operations 

in the sense usually meant, using criteria derived by the U.N. tradition 

and experience. In Georgia, both the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 

operations, despite suspicious beginnings and ambiguous objectives

now appear to be functioning within generally accepted guidelines 

for Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. However, in Tajikistan the 

Russian (with Uzbekistan support) operation, under the guise o

peacekeeping, is clearly functioning as an external support for a loca

government facing a rebel challenge. A similar situation obtains in 

Moldova, where the exclusively Russian peacekeeping force i

providing external support for a breakaway movement. 

The present state and future possibilities for CIS-authorized and 

CIS-sponsored peacekeeping in the CIS region can be studied in the 

unfolding Nagorno-Karabagh situation. The existence of the CIS and 

the fact that both contestants are members would appear to offer an 

almost textbook opportunity for regional organization conflic

resolution and peacekeeping. In this situation, the role of a majo

outside player (especially one also a member of the relevant regiona

organization) could well be constructive. In fact, Russia has offered 

to assist with mediation and to provide a peacekeeping force, an offe

the Azerbaijan Government has firmly rejected, at least for the 

88 
However, it should be noted that the recent CISapprov

"Convention on Peacekeeping" lays down the criteria for such a ro

l he Convention was clearly motivated by concern, if not fear

additional Russian attempts (following Moldova and Tajikistan) 

appropriate the peacekeeping label for unilateral, hegemoni

activities. The Convention is an obvious effort to set limits to Russ

activity but also creates positive criteria for truly consensual, regio

multilateralism. The problem will be to create CIS legitimacy a

credibility. One interesting approach has reportedly been floate

to bring in the United States and possibly others to participate w

Russia as joint mediators and possibly peacekeepers in the Nakor

Karabagh situation. While such a suggestion might well 

unwelcome in Moscow (and in Washington, for different reasons)

could offer a way to unblock the Nagorno-Karabagh situation wh

pushing the CIS toward a more transparent and credible regio

organization. 

The CIS was clearly seen as an artificial formation in its early da

but in 1993 its Russian proponents initiated a more sophistica

presentation that focuses on the effort to reintegrate former So

republics on a more consensual basis. As part of that approa

Moscow is also attempting to present the CIS as the regio

peacekeeping organization of choice, seeking recognition as a U

Chapter VIII regional organization, similar to the OAS. Howev

regardless of Russian intentions, trustworthy or not, the CIS faces 

additional problem that the vast majority of its members is still sh

as independent nation-states. If it is difficult to make bricks with

straw, then it is equally difficult to create a multinational organizat

without viable nations as members. 

One practical aspect of this problem is that CIS peacekeepin

too dependent on Russian resources. This is the problem with th

operations currently underway and gives too much scope to Rus

89 
pg pgg

in Central Asia, except possibly for Tajikistan, where th

Government's life depends upon support from Moscow. Belarus is 

panting suitor for Russian favors, while Moldova is a "victim" o

target; successful evolution of the CIS is not a pertinent concern at th

time for the Government of Moldova. Ukraine is the majo

"competitor" for influence within the CIS, but obvious limitation

make it more of a "spoiler" trying to keep Moscow honest than a re

competitor. 

Each of these members of the CIS has its own internal conflict

and transition problems, but all share suspicions of Moscow's rea

intentions combined with varying degrees of dependency on Russi

Nevertheless, each CIS capital recognizes, at least in principle, i

own need for some form of regional cooperation. This need include

a mechanism and process for conflict resolution and peacekeeping

The CIS region is rife with interstate and intrastate conflicts, som

ethnic, others more political. The problem of ethnic Russians livin

in all of the former republics of the USSR can easily create ne

conflicts. However, all the former Soviet Union members continu

to express much greater confidence in external organizations like th

United Nations (the CIS and the Economic Commision for Europ

signed a memorandum on economic standards and norms in Apr

1 997), the OSCE, and NATO (eight of them, including Russia, ar

active in the Partnership for Peace program). 

The prospects for regional peacekeeping by the CIS constitute 

subset of attitudes toward the broader questions of the future of th

CIS as a reintegrating and/or collective security organization. From 

its beginning, it has been dogged by suspicion and skepticism. I

Russian sponsors have alternated between fostering it as a militar

union, a currency union, and an economic union, sometime

concurrently and competitively and without significant success. 

9O 
War world that need to create a new and viable relationship wit

Russia as well as find an independent role in the wider world. 

addition there is the question of the evolution of a post-Cold Wa

Russia. There is an ongoing internal Russian debate betwee

proponents of a "big Russia" and those who wish for a "small Russia

In other words geography and mass dictate that Russia will be 

major power, if not the major power, in Halford J. Mackinder

World Island, but the answer to the question of what kind 

hegemon is stil open to discussion. The creation of a robust region

organization with the Russian Federation as primes inter pares is 

possible palatable alternative to the dangers of a "great Russia" on th

one hand, and the destabilizing frustration of a "small Russia" o~l th

other. Whether the United States and others can assist in th

development is an open question, but use of the international an

multinational peacekeeping process, under UN patronage an

mentorship, may offer one low-cost, low-risk option. 

Notes 

1. William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, "Commonwealth or Empire

Hudson Institute, quoted in The Washington Post, June 16, 1996, K2. 

2. Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtosva, "Russia's Election: No Turnin

Back," Foreign Policy no. 103 (Summer 1996). 

3. Ibid. 

4. Cameron R. Hume, "Leadership in Crisis Situations," draft articl

1966. 

5. Kevin O'Prey, "Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia

Occasional Paper 23 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, Ju

1995). 

6. Reuters (Kiev), April 8, 1996. 

7. Ambassador I homas Pickering, remarks made at a presentation 

the Middle East Institute, June 1996. 

8. Sergey Lavrov, "The Russian View of Peacekeeping: Internation

Activity for Peace," Brown Journal of World Affairs (Winter/Spring 1996)

91 
Washington, DC. 

12. Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "Success Story," The New York Review of Book

September 25, 1997. 

92 
f

Peacemaking was not an integral part of the lexicon of diploma

as they contemplated the end of World War II and the creation of 

new international organization to replace the defunct League 

Nations. Prime Minister Winston Churchill sought to point the way 

suggesting a network of institutions that could serve as pillars for t

soon-to-be formed United Nations. Noting the potential contributio

of regional associations or "councils," Churchill suggested, "The

should be several regional councils, august, but subordinate; the

should form the massive pillars upon which the world organizatio

should be founded in majesty and calm. < The prime ministe

meditation on the subject was well received by many delegates at t

San Francisco founding conference. 

However, the Churchill suggestion proved more eloquent illusio

than substantive pillar. Left for future consideration and elaboratio

was the nature of the "councils," existing and future. For examp

was the British Commonwealth truly capable of maintaining pea

and security on a global canvas? To what extent should London, wi

an assured veto as a member of the Security Council, subordinate 

Commorlwealth interests to those of the General Assembly? Shou

France, with extensive colonial holdings in Africa and Asia, not ha

comparable privileges? And, for the United States, as the Goliath 

the Western Hemisphere with overriding military force at its dispos

should not the Organization of American States (OAS) formed in 1 94

serve as an American "pillar"? 

History in the form of the emergent Cold War and processes 

decolonization ultimately provided the answers. Serious econom

difficulties at home that helped diminish the attractiveness of colon

possessions in times of financial stringency led to the termination 

British imperium in much of Africa and Asia. In the process, t
of Salazaar. Only the Englishspeaking territories in southern Africa 

remained to have their futures determined as the period of the Cold 

War entered its final stages. 

One issue remained to be resolved. It proved a difficult and 

exasperating conundrum involving the division of labor between th

United Nations and regional organizations in defusing or otherwise 

intervening into conflicts involving intrastate contending parties

Conventional diplomatic thinking held that interstate conflicts tha

threatened the order and stability of a region should be susceptible t

third-party intervention, which would be disinterested, impartial, an

intended to bring the conflict to early resolution through good offices 

and mediation. Where internal disorders and civil wars wer

involved, the fear obtaining among many U.N. member states wa

that neighbors (for a variety of reasons) would not be disinterested 

and impartial. Thus, the issue was posed. Could regiona

organizations such as the OAS prove effective in efforts to maintain 

peace and stability, or to raise forces to ensure such condition 

Indeed, could the OAS be expected to act vigorously in the face o

U.S. opposition, or Soviet intervention to support local surrogates? 

The emerging Cold War made the issue of intervention b

regional organizations moot as the two superpowers transferred thei

rivalries to Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Both sought loca

allies and supported "wars of liberation," covertly transferring arms t

those willing to accept the "guidance" of Washington and Moscow

The United Nations, for its part, sought to fill in with peacekeeping 

missions when and where the superpowers were prepared to accede

i.e., when vital national interests were not perceived as engaged o

others welcomed the conflict resolution efforts of the United Nations

The majority of OAS member states welcomed U.N. involvement i

mediating local disputes, fearing that to do otherwise would 

subordinate them to the will and wishes of the two superpowers. The

continued to hope that the OAS might assume some of the sam

94 
suspicions and enmities between the Arab north and Black Afric

states rooted in religion and history; ideological and foreign poli

differences among founding members, particularly those willing 

maintain close ties with the West and others linked to Moscow 

foreign policy and economic planning inspiration; and t

disinclination of the overwhelming majority to see the OAU becom

an organization of mobilizing diplomatic and military resources 

bring local conflicts to early conclusion. The ineffectual performan

of the OAU carl also be traced to the Cold War rivalries injected in

the continent after many colonies severed their colonial mooring

Africa became an arena in which covert action, liberati

movements, and massive arms transfers propped up unpopu

governments and polarized much of the continent. 

In the postindependence and post-Cold War era, many of t

distortions and distractions remain imbedded in Africa. Superpow

rivalries have receded; Washington and Moscow have collaborat

in efforts to end local conflicts by supporting United Nations a

OAU peacekeeping efforts. But the continent has evolved into a zo

of growing political instability. The overwhelming majority rema

heavily dependent on external sources of support for economic a

security assistance. French military contingents based in Afr

continue to intervene in Francophone states whose civili

governments are imperiled by military mutineers, largely to resto

internal order and rescue threatened European communities. In t

economic realm, the European Union has supported the Lo

Convention over the past 30 years. The Convention has yielded ov

$15 billion in assistance to African and Caribbean states. I Iowev

the Convention expired in 1997, and donor fatigue is likely to lead 

substantial revisions and marked declines in assistance levels. 

95 
that might arise should be resolved through peaceful negotiation

either bilaterally or through the good offices of the OAU. A secon

admonition contained in the Charter enjoined nonintervention in th

internal affairs of member states. The basic hope and expectatio

were that crises and conflicts would be self-contained. 

The tlope of containment has never been realized. Cold Wa

rivalries produced blatant acts of intervention by great powe

surrogates--Somalia in Ethiopia, Zaire in Angola, Libya in Chad

Moreover, with or without great power meddling, the sub-Sahara

region proved a zone of endemic disorder and instability. Beginnin

in the early 1960s, wars in the Western Sahara, Chad, the Hor

region, Sudan, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, an

others claimed more than four million lives and caused large number

of displaced persons and refugees. Genocide, most recently 

Rwanda, has claimed more than 500,000 lives and the number 

likely to rise as the crisis in neighboring Burundi and Zaire deepen

An historical perspective has been provided by one American schola

Political instability has plagued Africa since most of its countries 

became independent in the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1980, eight 

civil wars took place on the continent; ten more occurred over the 

next decade. Almost one-third of the world's genocides between 

1960 and 1988 (eleven of thirty-five took place in Africa. Between 

1963 and 1985, sixty-one coups d' etat occurred in Africa--an 

average of almost three coups per year. Between 1960 and 1990, 

Africa's conflicts accounted for more than 6.5 million deaths. 2 

AS a result of spreading disorders and instability, the OAU ha

suffered various forms of system overload, resulting in near paralys

when crises arise. Many of its honest broker efforts over the yea

have failed abysmally. In due course, the organization has come to b

overshadowed by the United Nations and various non-Africa

96 
in the OAUs inability to identify emerging crisis situations an

deal with them with dispatch 

• Severe shortages of qualified political-military specialists an

a bureaucratic system which suffers perennial gridlock 

• Petty jealousies and rivalries among member states 

• The absence of a consensus-building system to ensure th

adequate financial resources are available when addressi

looming problems. 

The frailities of the OAU, particularly the absence of a tradition 

consensus building, was reflected late in 1996 in failed memb

support for the candidacy of Boutros-Ghali for a second 5-year ter

as U.N. secretary-general. 

Accompanying the frailities of the OAU has been the authoritaria

character of state systems constructed in the postindependenc

period. Most states emerged with a limited educated class and cad

of well-trained bureaucrats and technocrats. The policies adopted 

narrowly based power elites were intended primarily to assure the

continuation in power over an extended period of time. In additio

to creation of autocratic single-party regimes, they organize

patrimonial systems that recruited poorly trained followers in

bureaucratic ranks, established patron-client networks, and adopte

economic plans predicated on centralized state control and directio

The form of patrimonial politics and economic planning that emerge

ultimately failed to meet popular needs and undermined t

legitimacy of both the state and its leadership. 

Weak legitimacy and failed popular support had untowa

consequences for the OAU, as might be expected. There were perio

of intervention by the organization. For example, the OAU sought 

bring warfare in Chad (where Muammar Qadaffi's forces had be

injected) and in Western Sahara (where Morocco had launched 

irredentist campaign of military occupation) to an end but w

97 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Oriented primaril

around a crisis early-warning approach, the mechanism was expecte

to develop enhanced peacekeeping, peace building, an

peacemaking capabilities for the OAU. The U.S. Government ha

supported these efforts, primarily with financial aid concentrated o

improving the mechanism's communications crisis tracking system

However, a sense of limitation existed almost from the time of th

mechanism's founding. Its mandate carried the followiD~ provision

If conflicts "degenerate to the extent of requiring collective 

international intervention and policing, the assistance or, wher

appropriate, the services of the United Nations will be sought." I

1994, Rwanda provided the best example of the OAU's sense o

limited competence: 

When asked by the U.N. Secretary-General to assume responsibility 

for peacekeeping in Rwanda, the OAU declined on the ground that 

the U.N. was better equipped to do it. The OAU is only able to 

deploy small observer groups (as it did in Rwanda when the first 

peace agreement was reached). Involvement in intrastate conflict 

also poses a problem for the organization. ~ 

In the absence of an OAU consensus on intervention in intrastat

conflicts, non-African third-party intervention has proved more th

rule than the exception. British and American collaboration ende

Southern Rhodesia's white-dominated rule and brought the country

(subsequently renamed Zimbabwe) to independence in ] 978-79; th

former Soviet Union dispatched $1 billion in military hardware and 

large advisory team to Ethiopia, which helped remove Soma

invaders from Ethiopia's Ogaden province in 1978-79; and Frenc

forces restored order in a number of Francophone African states. 

In the case of Rwanda, efforts on the part of the United Nation

to find an equitable solution ultimately failed, producing a

outpouring of one million refugees into neighboring Zaire, Tanzania

98 
suffered similar failure in addressing the manifold issues associate

with the widening crisis, one which threatens to spill over in

neighboring African Lakes Region countries. In mid-1997, an

Mobutu forces, with assistance from Rwanda, Uganda, and Ango

toppled the Mobutu regime that had ruled Zaire since 1965. 

The recent record of U.N. efforts in Africa has shown som

notable successes, as well as traumatizing failures. Its collaborati

approach with the U.S. in Somalia proved disastrous for a number 

reasons. The failure to establish well-defined political objectiv

together with deeply flawed military planniD; and confused chain 

command arrangements helped to produce the October 1993 debac

in which 19 U.S. soldiers were killed and the termination of U.

operations in Somalia the following year. The principal lesson to 

learned was amply identified by two African affairs specialists in 

recent article: 

The broad lesson to be drawn . . . is that military and diplomatic 

interventions have a much greater chance of succeeding when they 

are linked to a genuine political settlement or an ongoing, sustained, 

political process for obtaining one. Military action without a clear 

political context is without utility. Likewise, diplomacy needs an 

element of pressure (again, usually sustained) to be effective. 4 

Successful U.N. intervention in Africa has occurred when a cle

balanced peace settlement plan had been negotiated and agreed 

by tile main parties to a dispute. 1,1 Mozambique and Namibia, t

peace plan fashioned covered a wide spectrum of issues includi

cease-fires, cantonment of forces, demobilization, internationa

monitored elections, reforms of the judiciary, and reorganization 

security institutions. In the case of Angola, final settlement has yet 

materialize. For its part, the United Nations learned several valuab

lessons in Angola. In 1991-92, the Security Council was unable 

organize and deploy a sufficiently large peacekeeping force 

99 
round of negotiations to get the peace process on track. Mos

observers are hopeful that ultimate reconciliation will occur, and th

nation will be able to get on with the job of peace building, much a

has occurred in Mozambique under U.N. auspices. 

In recent years, civil war in Liberia drew the attention of 

subregional organization, the Economic Community of West Africa

States (ECOWAS). The military intervention of ECOWAS occurred 

August 1990, approximately 8 months after the war had erupted

Nigeria, as the largest and militarily most powerful member o

ECOWAS, argued that intervention was justified on the grounds tha

continued conflict threatened the stability of Liberia's neighbors, a

ultimately would prove the case. The proposed intervention woul

become a peace enforcement operation involving a multinationa

West African force that would rise to 14,000 men. ]-he force

injected, designated ECOMOG, were commanded by the Nigerians

Rather than bring the Liberian conflict to early conclusion, th

injection of the multinational force actually widened the war. In du

course, jealousies and rivalries between Francophone contributor

and English-speakers undermined unity of command. Nigeria, unde

a military dictatorship, lost credibility as an honest broker, and th

competence of its military commanders was questioned. Financia

constraints, an underdeveloped logistic support system, and declinin

troop morale further enfeebled the ECOMOG efforts. By 1996

ECOMOG lost complete control over the capital of Monrovia as riva

factions invaded the city and looted its shops and internationa

assistance agency facilities. The United Nations, which ha

maintained a small observer group in Monrovia, was compelled t

evacuate it and close down its operation. For some observers, th

failures of the ECOMOG operation raised serious doubt about th

future of subregional peace enforcement in Africa. 

The U.S. response to the crises recently emerging in Africa wa

tentative on the whole. During a 1 994 conference with American

100 
system. The latter was slow to emerge, in part because the limi

number of experienced African personnel available and the short

of African matching funds. In addition, the U.S. Governm

established an "lnteragency Core Group" to plan and program for 

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiati

Not directed exclusively toward African recipients, the program 

been useful in mobilizing resources across existing U

programs--notably, our International Military Education and Train

program (IMET) and financing of military equipment purchases. 

The U.S. Government has also launched preliminary consultatio

with European governments that traditionally have been contribut

to U.N. peace operations. The purpose of the discussions was 

explore ways to enhance peacekeeping capabilities in selec

African countries through a combination of training and mate

support, as well as to encourage several African governments to p

a lead nation role. 

The most recent effort on the part of the Clinton administrat

was an ill-fated action in 1996 by Secretary of State War

Christopher to encourage several African governments to join 

formation of a standing force bringing together approximately 10,0

men. In travels through Africa, the secretary received a luke-wa

response from several African leaders, who expressed concern 

Washington's initiative might lead to excessive U.S. influence 

African problem areas. Others apparently felt that Washingt

disinclined to make U.S. forces available, was unfairly ask

unprepared African governments to shoulder an unwanted burde

Organization of American States 

With the end of the Cold War, Latin America has begun the ardu

process of reconceptualizing the basic crisis management goal

multilateral organizations in the region. At the center of discuss

101 
g g g 

• Peacekeeping. 

At the center of discussion are the responsibilities and mandates 

that the region's most venerable organization, the OAS, should 

assume. At its founding, participating delegates hoped the 

organization might serve as a useful vehicle to eventually change the 

old hemispheric political order in which interstate conflict unsettled 

the regional equilibrium. The OAS Charter was quite explicit on thi

point, underscorin~ the need to "generate a regional institutiona

framework to formalize and consolidate.., peaceful relations among 

the states in the region." 

Almost from inception, the OAS failed to live up to officia

expectation. Little consideration was given to peacekeeping roles

thus blighting prospects for uninvited intervention in interstate 

conflict situations. Traditional suspicion of U.S. hegemonic ambitions 

in the region provided the primary motivation for member stat

hesitancy in embracing a broad peacekeeping mandate for tile OAS

The original inspiration in creating the OAS--to develop a regiona

collective security system at the height of World War II--languished 

in the postwar period as historic rivalries and suspicions surfaced. 

During the decade following its founding, the OAS, spasmodically 

and without great enthusiasm, did undertake limited mediating and 

peacekeeping initiatives. (The organization's tentative embrace o

traditional peacekeeping as an important element of institutiona

responsibility would have to await the demise of East-West rivalries.

A monitoring role evolved when small teams of military advisers were 

dispatched to conflicted border regions: the Nicaragua-Costa Rica 

border in 1948-49; the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border once again in 

1 957; and, more than a decade later, a small OAS peace observe

team deployed along the Honduran-El Salvador frontier in the wake 

of the 1 969 "soccer war." 

102 
of Soviet global ambitions and a profound threat to hemisphe

stability. The Kennedy administration adopted a two-pronged strate

to deal with the perceived threat--a counterinsurgency progra

closely coordinated with like-minded governments in the reg

targeted against Cuban-backed liberation movements, combined w

massive economic development assistance to address the underly

causes of popular alienation vis-a-vis local governments. La

America and the Caribbean regions were viewed by Washington 

arenas for Cold War competition requiring the U.S. to fashion spec

ties with local military, establishments and security forces. At the sa

time, covert-action programs were fashioned by the U.S. intelligen

community to cope with liberation movements throughout 

hemisphere. 

A not inconsiderable consequence of this multifaceted U

approach was to shrivel OAS crisis intervention capacities and 

arouse additional suspicions in some Latin American circles that 

American "crusade" would ineluctably lock Washington into supp

for conservative, inherently authoritarian regimes. This w

exemplified during the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic. 

political upheaval was looming as local parties fell into dispute o

election results and fierce fighting erupted in the capital of Sa

Domingo. The landing of U.S. military forces in April and May 1 9

to safeguard foreign nationals was a unilateral action undertak

without consultation with OAS ambassadors. The U.S. Governme

contended that the OAS crisis review procedures were 

cumbersome to ensure early and effective action--this despite the f

that the OAS had reached a decision within 12 hours during 

October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In due course, the United Sta

urged the creation of an inter-American force to replace Americ

troops. 

The U.S. demarche to the OAS was received with only mod

levels of support. The OAS resolution creating the proposed fo

103 
contended that such a force would serve as after-the-fact 

legitimization for U.S. intervention. In due course, the size of the 

American military contingent diminished substantially and the OAS 

unit, approximately brigade sized, suffered a number of casualties 

after its deployment. 

The Dominican experience further "soured" the OAS on 

multilateral peace operations. For many years thereafter, the OAS 

even avoided use of the term "peacekeeping," preferring instead 

"peace observation" or "verification." The 1980s saw a further erosion 

of OAS capacities in crisis resolution, particularly with the internal 

conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, which had 

problems subsumed under Cold War .considerations and the 

introduction of Reagan "doctrine" strategies for countering 

Communist influence in Central America and the Caribbean regions. 

With the phasing out of the Cold War, local leaders in Central 

America, most notably President Arias of Costa Rica, undertook 

individual and collective initiatives to end ongoing conflicts. In the 

process, the OAS benefitted. It dispatched help to monitor the 1990 

election in Nicaragua, which ended the Communist dictatorship 

there; participated in the joint mission with the United Nations to 

assist in the demobilization of Contra forces there as part of the 

Central American peace process; and in December 1990, dispatched 

observers, along with the United Nations, to monitor elections in 

Haiti. However, the OAS demonstrated it had a limited capacity to 

compel the return of President Aristide to office after his ouster by a 

military cabal. It required the threat of forceful U.S. military 

intervention in 1995 to restore Aristide to office. 

Structural Change and Military Roles 

The OAS, unlike its African counterpart, has demonstrated in recent 

years that it can make significant contributions to Latin American 

peace and stability, although it is not yet capable of organizing large104 
were aroused regarding the willingness of the hemispheres ma

power to restrain the use of military force barring an OAS manda

The need materialized to harmonize hemispheric interests with U

desires not to diminish its capacity for autonomous actions where 

national interests are at risk. In short, how and when could 

United States be induced to surrender its "cop on the beat" approa

to problems arising in the Western Hemisphere? 

The OAS has concentrated on reshaping without destroy

existing institutions and bodies most prominent in the 

hemispheric order. The OAS has one significant advantage in 

regard--it possesses the "largest storehouses of vintage secu

instruments" -as Richard Downes noted in an unpublished artic

Unfortunately, many existing organizational entities have eit

atrophied or failed to reach mature development since their creat

The Advisory Defense Committee, contemplated in Articles 65 and 

of the OAS Charter, as a source of advice to emergency meetings 

foreign ministers, has never convened. The 1947 Treaty of In

American Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) was not successf

employed once to deal with minor border disputes and m

invasions from dissident political factions in the 1960s and 197

The assistance tendered by the United States to the British during 

1982 Falklands-Malvinas crisis and its subsequent arming of 

"contras" during the Central America wars of the 1980s furt

weakened the credibility of the TIAR as a multilateral instrument 

dealin~_~, with a~,gression, internal or external. Similarly, the 56-ye

old Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has long languished as 

appendage of the OAS, which oversees its budget without accord

the Board full status within the OAS system. 

Promoting consultation of security issues has recently forme

significant part of the OAS's re-invention efforts, as Richard Dow

has observed. G Delegates to the OAS General Assembly approved 

benchmark "Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Rene

105 
the new conditions in the region, 8 a process that led to creation of 

a Commission on Hemispheric Security in 1992. Subsequent OAS 

General Assembly resolutions have called for sharing information on 

defense spending, registration of conventional arms, and 

consolidation of nuclear nonproliferation treaties. Major regional 

conferences on security, and confidence-building measures that might 

be adopted have also emerged. 

Closely related to initiatives involving institutional re-invention is 

an accompanying broad-based effort to underscore two hypotheses 

deemed proven by Western and especially European experience-- 

that civilian control of military forces should be strengthened and that 

the promotion of security confidence-building measures will raise the 

region's security to a more comfortable level. With respect to the first 

consideration, a Unit for the Support of Democracy was formed in 

1990; the OAS's Resolution 1080, passed in the 1991 General 

Assembly meeting in Santiago, Chile, commits the organization to 

convene an emergency meeting of the OAS foreign ministers within 

1 0 days of "any sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic 

institutional process" in a member state. The OAS has employed this 

process in three cases: following the September 1991 coup d'etat in 

Haiti; after Peruvian President Fujimori's self-coup of April 1992; and 

in May 1993, in response to Guatemalan President Serrano's 

suspension of the constitution. While the OAS was unable to bring 

about a return to democracy in Haiti, its efforts did reverse threats to 

democratic government in the Peruvian and Guatemalan cases. 

A similar prominence has been afforded to promoting proper 

civilian-military relations by the U.S. defense establishment and 

civilian academics and politicians hemispherewide who are weary of 

the abuses of nearly 30 years of praetorian rule. An important subtext 

of the 1994 Summit of the Americas was support for civilian 

leadership in the Americas and implicit rejection of the abuses of the 

military, government prevalent during the previous three decades. The 

106 
democracy as a concept or cite the need for improved civilmilit

relations. 

The vigorous support by the U.S. Government for civilian con

of military forces has not been widely acclaimed by groups concer

with perpetuating strong military establishments. Some local observ

believe that the United States seeks downsizing of Latin mili

forces, ultimately hoping to convert them into police forces. Oth

believe that downsizing will afford the lJnited States the luxury 

justifying preservation of what some believe is an overly large 

military establishment. Still others contend that existing civi

authorities lack expertise in military matters, and thus civi

oversight could well engender tensions between civilian leaders 

military commanders. A further consideration is the absence o

OAS enforcement mechanism, reflecting the historic unwillingnes

the OAS to sanction the use of force against offending parties and 

lingering uneasiness throughout the hemisphere about 

unilateralism. Failing the absence of an enforcement mechanism, 

OAS must rely on diplomacy and threats of economic sanctions 

discourage deviation from the democratic standard. While provisi

exist for the suspension of a member state whose government 

been overthrown by force, ratification is required by two-thirds of 

membership--an exceedingly high requirement that has yet to oc

One measure worthy of serious consideration and support by 

U.S. Government is a long-standing Argentinian proposal to estab

a regional center under lJ.N. auspices where Latin American mili

forces could train with Western militaries for internatio

peacekeeping duties. A number of Latin American mili

establishments have lent military units for peacekeeping duty un

U.N. direction in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. A w

rounded training program coordinated with European and 

military specialists could well serve as a suitable area for explora

107 
complex multinational peace operations. The end of the Cold War 

and the demise of the eastern bloc opened opportunities for localized 

strife in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Military conflicts have erupted 

or in some instances intensified in Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Zaire, 

and a half-dozen other countries. Most of these conflicts are internal 

but, as noted earlier, offer the prospect of contaminating and 

destabilizing neighboring states. In the process, governing institutions 

have suffered severe erosion and their legitimacy has been placed in 

doubt. The military capacities of most OAU members are low, as 

William Thorn, a long-time observer of the African scene, has written: 

Most African state armies are in decline, beset by a combination of 

shrinking budgets, international pressures to downsize and 

demobilize, and the lack of the freely accessible military assistance 

that characterized the cold war period. With few exceptions, heavy 

weapons are dormant, equipment is in disrepair, and training is 

almost nonexistent. Most militaries would have a difficult time in 

scraping together a company or battalion for international 

peacekeeping duties. In short the principal forces of order are in 

disorder in many countries at a time when the legitimacy of central 

governments (and indeed sometimes the state) is in doubtfl 

African weaknesses are becoming apparent at a time when the United 

Nations and the OAU have demonstrated a growing inclination to 

turn a blind eye to emerging African crises or to declare 

powerlessness in resolving those in which government and state 

authorities have virtually evaporated. Both organizations appear to be 

doing peacekeeping less and entertaining the prospect of military 

intervention with greatly diminished enthusiasm. When the challenge 

of peacekeeping intervention arises, it is fueled by humanitarian 

considerations. As the 1993-94 Somali debacle underscored, 

however, humanitarian intervention unaccompanied by clearly 

108 
notably Secretary of State Warren Christopher, to generate suppor

Western Europe and sub-Saharan Africa for formation of an 

African Crisis Response military capability to deal with local c

situations. The proximate cause for this late 1996 initiative 

Christopher was the widening humanitarian problem arising 

eastern Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda, together with the prospect 

one million would be at risk with the eruption of widening arm

conflict in the region. The Christopher approach was not suppor

by most Western governments, and France signaled its gen

opposition to the effort. In Africa, public protestations of support w

followed by nonaction, and the initiative fell of its own weight. 

A number of factors came into play to undermine the Christop

effort. Primary was lack of recognition in Washington of 

fundamental infirmities of most African military establishments 

the shortage of human and financial resources to underwrite 

venture. Second, the question of command and control was cer

to confuse the situation with potential contributors unwilling to pl

their forces at the disposition of a noncountryman. A subsid

consideration was the legitimizing or authorization of a mandate 

such a force and the ability of contributing nations to share in 

decisionmaking processes regarding overall missions and ro

Equally important were worries about rising costs associated w

long-term peace operations and the ability of governments within 

OAU to share the burden of responsibility for operational co

While the United States signaled its willingness to assume some of 

attendant costs, African fears of non-African domination of operati

could not be laid to rest. 

For the immediate future, the OAU and most African governme

are likely to "punch considerably below their potential weig

therefore peace operations are likely to arise. The OAU lacks 

experience and institutional foundations for organizing and direc

such operations. As a result, whatever major interventions occur 

109 
neocolonial both in appearance and in substance. 

Notes 

1. Cited in lames S. Sutterlein, The United Nations and the 

Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to Be Met (Westport, CT

Praeger, 1995), 89. 

2. Michael J. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Interna

Conflict. (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1993), 286. 

3. Ibid., 293. 

4. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore 

Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: U.5. 

Institute of Peace, 1995), 16. 

5. Richard Downs, "The OAS Role in Peace Operations," paper 

prepared for the National Defense University, Washington, DC, August 1996, 

27. 

6. Ibid., 16. 

7. ibid. 

8. Ibid., 18. 

9. William Thorn, "Tile African Military: Problems and Prospects," 

Africa Digest 1 8, no. 2 (September 1995), 8. 

110 
pg 

The countries of Asia are undergoing enormous changes, econom

as well as political. The Cold War framework that influenced 

much of the world's political development is gone and not 

replaced by a new structure. This is true of Asia, even though 

Cold War, at its height, was not the sole determinant of As

developments. What it did determine was how the United States a

the Soviet Union approached the region as well as the manne

which they interacted with China. The end of the Cold War 

removed this particular influence hut not the influence of these ma

global powers, at least of the United States. It has also exposed m

openly the region's own economic and political-security issues

own personality rooted in its own economic dynamism, differen

growth rates, and still unsettled political character. 

In this context the countries of the region have entered int

complex discussion of collective security, the central element 

which is to define what that term means for the Asia-Pacific regi

As in so many areas, the end of the Cold War requires some n

thinking. It is true that the central security role played by the Uni

States continues, but the fluidity of the post-Cold War environm

implies that the existing triangular relationship among the Uni

States, China, and lapan (and one can add Russia occasionally) 

their roles in the region may evolve. With this consideration in mi

member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEA

launched the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a consultative proc

by which they hope to engage other countries in the region--a

most especially the four "outside" majors--in a dialogue on secu

concerns. Although formally defined as a consultative forum, not 

operational organization, ARF has launched several very limited 

111 
institutions for cooperation and coordination are in their infancy, a

Richard Baker puts it. 1 The regional political dynamic is very fluid

and the end of the Cold War has only strengthened the anticolonia

commitment to the independent nation-state. The nation-state 

continues to be the beneficiary of anticolonial emotions, the focus o

the new allegiances of these rapidly industrializing countries, and the 

funnel through which much of the benefits of this industrialization i

distributed. Even separatist movements in the region pay tribute to 

the nation-state idea as they attempt to create their own. The 

widespread Asian resistance, at least among government elitcs, to 

Western ideas of human rights (seen as attempts at externa

interference into their internal affairs) is at least partially due to thi

commitment to this now sacrosanct idea of national sovereignty. 

Although the Cold War generally inhibited regional development

concerns over developments in Vietnam and Cambodia contributed 

to the growth of ASEAN. The first effort toward an indigenous regiona

effort divorced from the tensions of the Cold War was the 

establishment in 1967 of ASEAN, founded by Thailand, Indonesia

Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines and later joined by Brune

and then Vietnam. The dramatic economic growth (at least partially 

fueled by the economic and commercial opportunities offered by the 

Vietnam War) led to efforts to establish economic cooperation, bu

they did not produce any significant results until 1989, with the firs

meeting of the Asian-Pacific Economic Council (APEC). APEC wa

created as an economic process for extending that dialogue to 

important "external" economic powers. Then, in 1993, ASEAN 

initiated the idea of a regional security dialogue, and in 1994 AR

held its first meeting in Bangkok. 

ASEAN was created as a limited economic organization, albei

one with a hidden political agenda. Although it has developed quite 

irnpressively, with Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar about to enter, 

definite effort was and continues to be made to prevent infringements 

112 
support among regional governments for international institution

limited, except, of course, for the United Nations, which is see

nonthreatening for a number of reasons, including the prominent 

of the Non-Aligned Movement. 

The general preference remains for some form of coordinat

well short of collective action while avoiding turning t

organization into a pure debating society like the Europ

Parliament. These attitudes have led to the enunciation of wha

called the "Asian Way"--a commitment to its own diplomatic s

of musyawarah and mufakat, or consultation and consensus. T

means the organization does not take stands on issues that exceed 

comfort levels of all its members. Achieving this requires a delic

balancing act, described in one official publication as not mov

"too fast for those who want to go slow, and not too slow for th

who want to go fast." The resulting consensus politics may be u

to smooth over, obviate, and even occasionally resolve inters

disputes and conflicts among its members, but its two prim

functions are to ensure the primacy of national governments an

prevent interference in their internal affairs, especially by ~overnme

external to the area. 

ARF was created in 1994 by the ASEAN countries as a means 

process for engaging the major external powers (especial ly the Un

States, China, Russia, and Japan) in a security dialogue. While 

Russian Federation does not raise the concerns of the old USSR, 

China remains the great question, the United States is clearly 

strongest single military power in the Pacific--and the future of 

American commitment in the area is at least open to discussion. M

Asia-Pacific governments desire that the United States continue 

security role but at the same time are strengthening their own defe

capabilities. Meanwhile, everyone watches China to "see what it 

be like when it grows up, "2 as one knowledgeable observer puts 

is too early to tell if a new security configuration will emerge in 

113 
design informal and gradualist. It does not have a permanent 

secretariat, and decisions are made without official votes, as is 

customary with ASEAN. As a result, no country wants to participate 

in an ARF meetin~, without at least trying to appear conciliatory. 

Hence China helped temper tensions over the disputed Spratly Islands 

by offering for the first time to negotiate its claims in the context o

accepted international norms. At the same time, Beijing promised to 

publish more information about its defense budget. Such moves 

conform with the forum's stress on building confidence among 

members before moving on to other stages of crisis management. 

Consensus is the norm as well as the process, and the fact that many 

of the potentially serious problems (for instance, Korea) are not in 

ARF's in-basket enables its members to use this period of relative 

noncrisis to create new habits and new relationships. 

The organization and procedures of ARF are carefully designed to 

ensure that ASEAN's members remain the directing core. Despite its 

elaborate membership structure--Consultative Members, Sectoral and 

Dialogue Partners, and Observers--attendees participate as simple 

members except for the guarantee that an ASEAN member will 

occupy the chair (at least through the first 7 years). The "ASEAN 

Way" was thereby extended formally into the security area. ASEAN 

and ARF are primarily forums or venues, intergovernmental bodies fo

dialogue and consensus building. ASEAN has evolved certain 

executive organizations, but ARF is still in an embryonic state 

organizationally. 

Several so-called "Track I1" efforts (where academic and policy 

analysts discuss and review regional confidence-building measures, 

environmental issues, etc.), such as CSCAP (Council for Security 

Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) and NEACD (Northeast Asian 

Cooperation Dialogue) have been created. They fit nicely into 

ASEAN/ARF's consultative ambiance and provide an even less formal 

114 
y

dynamics underneath. ASEAN created ARF in 1994 to deal with 

major external (that is, outside of Southeast Asia, not outside of 

Pacific Rim area) powers on security questions. Although most h

recently become robust economies, most Asian governments 

relatively new and tentative political systems. The expected la

three members (Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos) have be

characterized by The Economist as the "awkward" squad 

recognition of their economic and political weakness compared 

their neighbors) Internal dissension and conflicts can easily spill o

into neighboring countries, although no serious security problems 

perceived to exist at the moment in the South East Asia area. The 

danger area is seen as North Asia, especially Korea. Althou

potential problems exist in South East Asia, for instance in the So

China sea with its conflicting territorial claims, by and large politi

stability and economic growth have put the area in the best shap

has been in decades, if not generations. One pre-ARF situation 

create concern and lead to collective action. Although ASEA

members turned to the United Nations to run the Cambodian aff

it was nevertheless seen as a high moment for ASEAN political acti

Internal affairs must be a major preoccupation for th

governments, with a concomitant concern for international no

such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference 

domestic affairs. With this attitude, support for internatio

institutions will be cautious: relatively high for the nonthreaten

United Nations and more suspicious of those with a hint 

supranational norm-setting (human rights) or governance. The 

security question is how to deal with China when "it grows u

Regional interaction with lapan and Russia are important questi

but slightly less pressing. The United States is and will remai

major player but it is not a consistent hegenqon, and there 

concerns by some that there could be a gap between a withdraw

United States and the failure to develop replacement powers 

1 1.5 
by the Interim Report on the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan 

Defense Cooperation," issued in June 1997. 

Dramatic economic progress in the area has been the primary 

contributor to the growing legitimacy of the governments of the 

region. Development and economic growth remain government 

priorities, if only for this political reason. The financial and economic 

problems faced by Thailand in mid-1997, and by extension its 

regional partners, obviously created a strain but should be 

manageable, at least in political terms. 

The importance of economic development in national priorities, 

development founded on outward oriented economy policies, 

provides a somewhat contradictory theme for these governments. The 

policy problem for Asian countries was how to involve the outside 

powers (especially China) in these concerns (both political and 

economic) while retaining some measure of control. APEC and other 

Track II arrangements were efforts to do so in the economic sphere. 

Although ASEAN and APEC were, and are, essentially economic 

cooperative arrangements, they have had implications in the politicosecurity area, if only as examples. 

The five original members of ASEAN (ranging in political styles 

from monarchy through various forms of authoritarianism's and 

democracies) have not been at war despite numerous territorial 

conflicts and other tensions since the founding of the organization. 

While these tensions and potential trouble spots continue, the norm 

of nonuse of force to resolve disputes amongst them has gained 

increasing acceptance, a trend attributed at least partially by many 

observers to the beneficent and calming effect of a habit of dialogue 

and collegiality developed over 30 years in the corridors of ASEAN. 

(Obviously, growing economic interdependence supports and, in a 

sense, "funds" this process.) However, the political, not to mention 

economic, character of the newest candidates (Cambodia, Laos, and 

Myanmar) will obviously create problems. The ASEAN claim that it 

116 
APEC has persistently expanded its approach into a wider are

beyond its own limited ASEAN membership. APEC summit meetin

and regular meetings of officials and businessmen provide furth

opportunities for accommodating diverse interests. This process 

APEC duplicates that which occurred in ASEAN, where contacts a

channels pursued over a period of time helped create a sense 

common interests to balance against special national interests. T

development in the economic area could stimulate similar efforts 

the security sphere. In Asia, trade and economic arrangements su

as the Pacific Area Free Trade and Development (PAFTAD) and t

Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) preceded vario

security conferences and meetings such as the Kuala Lumpur As

Pacific Roundtable and the Conference on Security Co-operation 

the Asia-Pacific Area. ARF followed APEC. Interaction between t

two spheres is normal and therefore likely to continue. 

In the security area, ASEAN has also provided private "corrido

where its members could quietly discuss and attempt to ameliora

regional problems and manage relationships in the region. 

instance, Philippine-Indonesian tensions have been moderated ov

the years by formal and informal contacts in the ASEAN context. T

is a form of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution at the l

end of the peacekeeping scale. ASEAN members played an importa

role in the Cambodian situation, by supporting the anti-Khmer Rou

resistance movement (a political decision) and then turning to t

United Nations (an operational decision). They did so, however, 

by raising the ASEAN 'flag" but by coordinating and agree

informally within the ASEAN context. 

ARF was the initiative to accomplish the same in the security a

but with the participation of other Pacific powers. ASEAN views A

as a forum for dialogue and consensus building. It is not viewed as 

executive body or agent of the intergovernmental process, or a

precursor to any form of collective security agency, like NATO. B

117 
developments in Cambodia and Myanmar may pose severe challenge 

to the "Asian Way." 

It is unlikely that ARF will expand in some manner to become a 

form of regional "governance," even in the limited form claimed by 

some other regional organizations. First of all there are too many 

overlapping concerns, involving overlapping regions and powers. 

(The claim of the United States and Russia, for instance, to be Asian 

countries may be true, but ignores that they are also the nation-state 

equivalent of cosmopolitan individuals and private corporations with 

serious out-of-area interests.) The tension between the ASEAN desire 

to retain control over the course of events in Asia and the need for 

accommodation of the external "Great Powers" will certainly inhibit 

ARF institutionalization. This tension between insecure regimes and 

external pressures and influence will continue for the foreseeable 

future. Finally the rapid expansion of ARF, now with 21 members, 

"exacerbates the forum's tendency towards process rather than 

s u bsta nc e.'4 

However, in that form, ARF, along with numerous bilateral and 

multilateral agreements and relationships, is a process rather than a 

specific organizational project that throws a "spider's web" over the 

Gullivers of major powers. Whether it might yet develop into a more 

concrete project or organization is a matter for the future, but at the 

moment its members resist even a formal relationship in U.N. Charter 

Chapter VIII terms with the United Nations. 

Peace Operations 

Individual South East Asian states have been very active in 

international peacekeeping, often participating in U.N. "traditional" 

peacekeeping operations. The Cambodia operation was of that genre, 

although much more ambitious and located in the Asian region. Both 

individually and collectively as ASEAN, the countries of Southeast 

Asia have been interested in peacekeeping in their region, but mostly 

11~ 
become an organization for the authorization and mounting 

peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless it has begun to inch into t

general subject area, beginning with a seminar on "Peacekeepin

Challenges and Opportunities for the ARF," held March 7-9, 1995, 

Brunei. At the seminar there was wide-ranging discussion of optio

to strengthen the capacities of the United Nations in peacekeepin

The focus was substantially on those ideas with relevance to the AR

Participants emphasized support for the U.N. peacekeeping effo

illustrated by the growing numbers of ARF members contributing 

peacekeeping operations. Discussion also focused on the role 

regional groupings as called for by the then U.N. Secretary Gene

in his "Agenda for Peace." There was a strong sense th

peacekeeping should be viewed as part of a continuum involvi

preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace making, and pea

building (with no clear cut demarcations noted). A number 

participants felt that more attention should be paid to prevent

diplomacy. While noting that there was clearly a substantive role 

ARF members and the ARF as a grouping to support the Unit

Nations, the general sense was that an excessive focus 

"regionalization" might detract from effective U.N. operations. It w

also pointed out that the ARF is a fledgling forum, and prematu

demands should not be made upon it now. 

At ARF's first Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on the subject, held 

Kuala Lumpur on April 1-3, 1996, a statement was released th

noted, "Tile participants were of the view that the discussion on t

subject of peacekeeping within the ARF context promoted grea

understanding in the Asia-Pacific region." The meeting w

organized around three main presentations: the "Current Status 

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," "Training for Pea

Support Operations," and "Stand-by Arrangements." Howev

several delegates told outside observers that as peacekeeping is rea

a U.N. matter and ARF members' views are very diverse, only abstr

119 
continue the intersessional process on peacekeeping for another year. 

This was somewhat of a surprise, as the original proposal for ARF 

consideration of peacekeeping was limited to 1 year, and most 

observers had thought that the ISM had pretty much exhausted the 

interest of ARF members in the subject. The Senior Officials Meeting 

also a~reed to schedule intersessional meetings on demining and 

"training the trainers." All these considerations and proposals were 

reviewed at the Third ARF, held in Jakarta on July 23, 1996. 

Specifically noting that "the ARF should expand carefully and 

cautiously," the Chairman summarized the participating ministers' 

acceptance of the proposals of the ISM on Peacekeeping Operations 

by stating that ARF participants should: 

• Work together more closely both within the ARF context and 

in the United Nations as part of the ongoing dialogue on U.N. 

peacekeeping operations 

• Promote greater sharing of peacekeeping experience and 

expertise among themselves through, inter alia, training courses, 

developing a roster of trainers, sharing national training programs 

and facilities, contributing to financing of such training, and 

fostering cooperation among national peacekeeping training 

centers 

• Support a U.N. peacekeeping capacity, working closely with 

the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), 

through loan of military and civilian personnel and other bilateral 

support arrangements and specifically by taking part in Standby 

Arrangements to facilitate the planning and deployment of U.N. 

peacekeeping operations. 

The Third ARF also agreed that the ISM on Peacekeeping 

Operations, co-chaired by Canada and Malaysia, would continue its 

activities for another year to coordinate the implementation of these 

120 
called Track II level (government officials meet in their priva

capacities with nongovernment specialists for what are billed as fre

flowing discussions). At previous ARF-sponsored meetings of t

type, preventive diplomacy was broadly defined as "action aimed 

preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between a

within states, or preventing them from escalating into arm

confrontation. "s This definition fits comfortably into the range 

peace operations enunciated by then U.N. Secretary-General Boutr

Boutros-Ghali in his "Agenda for Peace" and his subsequent efforts 

engage regional organizations in a closer collaborative relationsh

with the U.N. in peace operations. 

This initiative is another, albeit modest, move by ARF toward 

more active collective security role. In 1995 the then ARF chairm

stressed the Forum's focus on confidence-building measures b

noted that preventive diplomacy would be a "natural follow-on." T

1 995 ARF Concept Paper set out ways to proceed with prevent

diplomacy and notes the possibility of developing a set of guidelin

for the peaceful settlement of disputes. All these events are still w

situated in the dialogue or discussion mode, but it is interesting t

these events indicate at least a willingness to consider an act

preventive diplomacy role for ARF in the future. 

Meanwhile, ASEAN's members prefer to turn to the Unit

Nations if a peacekeeping operation is deemed necessary in t

region (e.g., Cambodia). Actually, there have been few oth

situations that called for action. Papua New-Guinea was an unus

and perhaps "the precedent setting case, with Australia leading an 

hoc regional peacekeeping coalition under at least informal approv

from its regional neighbors. A 400-strong South Pacific Regio

"peacekeeping force" was organized ad hoc by several countries 

the area when the conflict on the island of Bougainville escalated 

the early 1990s and resulted in a temporarily successful negotiatio

The force was deployed in October 1994 to ensure the safety of 

121 
pursued. 

What is the likelihood of other conflicts in the region that might 

call for regional peacekeeping efforts? Probably small, East Timor and 

the Spratlys notwithstanding. Asian cotJntries are firmly, even 

doctrinally, opposed to interference in internal affairs, and there is a 

general feeling of lack of need as well as lack of interest. Some of the 

conflicts are too big or explosive for peacekeeping (Korea and 

Taiwan), but Cambodia could return and who knows what will be 

Burma's future? 

As for the Spratlys, China would probably prefer to negotiate 

separately with each of the claimants, but this approach would be 

unlikely to settle all the conflicting claims. Indonesia has sought to 

broker a peaceful settlement, but to date the claimants have been 

unable to resolve their differences. An overall settlement might be 

possible by establishing a multilateral regional regime guaranteeing 

freedom of navigation to ships of all nations and access to gas 

resources according to an agreed upon apportionment formula, but 

such an approach can obviously not be forced on any of the 

claimants, especially China. (China rejects any formal organization 

which includes Taiwan.) However, now that Vietnam has become a 

member of ASEAN, the ASEAN claimants may find it easier to reach 

some reasonable settlement. Even if such a proposal were rejected by 

China and Taiwan, it would at least serve to produce an agreement 

among the ASEAN claimants and thereby reduce tension among 

them. Nevertheless, the very process of organization and meetings is 

shaping policies and programs in certain areas, such as search and 

rescue (not really peacekeeping but collective action nonetheless), 

humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping activities such as 

preventive diplomacy. In these subjects, at least a problem definition 

stage is underway. However, with respect to these subjects, the 

orientation is well within Chapter II rules (peacekeeping) and far short 

of any thought of Chapter VIII operations (peace enforcement). 

122 
focusing on preventive diplomacy and informal consultations as rol

for themselves as an organization, and fostering participating by the

members in U.N. activities (training, financing, standby arrangement

etc.). Peacekeeping for ASEAN and ARF is not an active project, b

rather a hook for dialogue. 

However, more active future activity is not foreclosed. It 

worthwhile to note that ARF is showing persistent interest in t

subject of search-and-rescue coordination and cooperation. An IS

on that subject has also been established that proposes a fai

extensive program of sharing training, expertise, facilities, cros

posting of personnel, and joint exercises. These subjects we

probably selected as they are politically neutral and noncontroversia

and yet can move a little further down the road toward region

operations. 

Neither ASEAN nor ARF showed any interest in the field 

disaster relief until 1996. However, the third ARF authorized t

convening of an ISM on the subject and will presumably consider 

proposals at the next ARF. Disaster relief required by purely natu

catastrophe, of course, is a benign and nonpolitical activit

However, the demand for disaster relief and humanitarian assistan

arising from local or regional conflicts has become a major eleme

of contemporary crisis and conflict management. In fact, t

importance of nonmilitary humanitarian assistance has become t

distinguishing character of so-called second generation peacekeepin

ARF movement in this area, if any occurs, could be a significa

addition to peacekeeping capability of the organization. 

When the subject of peacekeeping in the global context 

raised--that of U.N. peacekeeping operations--Asians appear to 

very comfortable and are ve~,, supportive of U.N. peacekeeping whe

peacekeeping appears called for. Four ASEAN member sta

(Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) have participated 

are currently participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and tw

12-~ 
A Work in Progress? 

Clearly, ASEAN contributes to political security in the Asia-Pacific 

region, if only as a corollary to its focus on regional economic 

development. However, actual and potential conflicts exist, and 

regional economic development can lead to further tensions as well 

as tighter links among countries. Southeast Asia is growing politically 

as well as economically, and population growth as well the adhesion 

of new countries will increase ASEAN's role on the world scene, if 

that expansion is managed successfully. Economic growth is not 

shared at the same level, and the three expected new members are 

both politically and economically much less developed. Their 

membership is bound to create some tension. 

Nevertheless, these countries have historically worried about the 

actual or potential dominance from the powers from China and Japan 

(and the USSR in the Cold War period). They therefore both seek and 

appreciate the balancing presence of the United States, although 

neither Myanmar nor Cambodia is likely to focus on this beneficial 

aspect of relations with the United States for the foreseeable future. 

How far ARF can go as a security instrument is a subject for 

continual discussion. For instance, there is little institutionalized 

contact among defense establishments at the policy level, although 

there is an elaborate process of contact at the operational or military 

level, much of it fostered by the United States through its Pacific 

Command. U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry launched a trial balloon 

in early 1996 when he proposed a meeting of defense ministers from 

the 44 nations in the Asia-Pacific area. It was apparently conceived 

of as a useful complement to the ARF process and would symbolize 

the evolving security equation in the post-Cold War period while 

highlighting U.S. leadership. Although the proposal was not made in 

the context of ARF, such a meeting would clearly engage the ASEAN 

initiated process, especially if it were to lead to an effort at 

124 
multilateral defense contacts, ARF notwithstanding, Secretary Perry

proposal did not strike fire. (Also, he made it in the APEC contex

which presumably raised other concerns.) The Southeast Asian

share a cultural ethos of consensus, if only because of their share

interest in national governance and their shared abhorrence 

external interference in their internal affairs. Also, they share 

perspective of realism and pragmatism with respect to feasib

political developments. That is, they neither want nor believe 

possible robust regional political organization. Obviously, the

concern over the inevitable prominent if not dominant role of Chin

in a regional body reinforces this perspective. Bringing China into 

consensus-type organization is obviously quite different from bringin

it into a more cohesive institution. 

Discussion over the future character of ARF has included som

thought of moving ARF toward a more formal, structured charact

with some executive responsibilities in the security area, but the

appears to be little real interest in this approach among ASEA

members. Others--notably in the American, Canadian, an

Australian Governments--have shown periodic interest (if genera

only speculative and informal) in institutionalizing ARF as a region

security organization. Secretary Perry's proposal may seen as on

manifestation of this interest. However, given the reluctance of Asia

governments to seriously consider this approach, the prospects are n

high for any move in this direction, and any such proposals are no

obviously low on the priority list. As a result, and as a delibera

policy, the U.S. Government has adopted a passive role towa

ASEAN's potential in this area, eschewing any temptation to pushin

institutionalization. On the other hand, there is a persistent Weste

interest (possibly arising from cultural preferences f

institutionalization) in moving ARF down the road toward a mo

active regional role in collective security and conflict resolution. 

125 
sovereignty disputes in the South China sea. "~' Two major differences 

in perspective separate ARF from further movements toward a more 

concrete role: 

• Whether ARF should become a player in "out of area" 

situations, e.g., North Asia 

• Whether potential "in area" situations (e.g., the Spratlys) are 

imminent enough to require action now. 

ASEAN's members are generally reluctant about the first question 

and doubtful (given Chinese attitudes) about the second. Therefore, 

they see no need for ARF to attempt to substitute the United States, or 

for the triangular relations among the United States, China, and Japan, 

even if they could figure out how to do it. Nevertheless, ARF can 

contribute to the stability of that relationship, if only marginally, and 

as a supplement for bilateral arrangements. 

A subtheme of the collective security perspective is that of 

regional peacekeeping--whether or not ASEAN, presumably working 

through ARF--might wish to create a regional peacekeeping 

capability (peacekeeping as usually understood in terms of traditional 

U.N. Charter Chapter VI consensual operations in support of a ceasefire agreement). Here as well, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region 

do not show much interest, even though several of them are 

enthusiastic supporters of and participants in U.N. peacekeeping 

operations. In the Southeast Asia region, the above-mentioned 

aversion to formalizing multilateral defense contacts is combined with 

the general reluctance to create robust multilateral political 

organizations. 

In addition, there is the always dominant consideration that major 

actors in the area are in fact "outsiders." Creation of a "local" conflict 

resolution capability implies an invitation to these outsiders, some 

form of fornlal participation by them in the area. While the roles of 

I26 
these problems, when forced to, by an ascending process of bilater

contacts, informal consultation, and discussion in ASEAN's corridor

ad hoc local peacekeeping arrangements (such as Bougainville), a

then if necessary a call to the United Nations. In this context the foc

on confidence-building measures, the tentative initiative toward 

ARF preventive diplomacy process, practical cooperation 

detaining and search and rescue, and ongoing discussion on vario

aspects of peacekeeping operations combine to hint at a potentia

more active ARF in the general area of peace operations. 

Notes 

1. Richard Baker, interview by Edward Marks, lune 22, 19

Honolulu, HI. 

2. Ralph Cossa, interview by Edward Marks, lune 23, 1996, Honolu

HI. 

3. "The Tigers Lose Their Grip," The Economisc" July 19, ] 997. 

4. Patrick M. Cronin and Emily T. Metzgar, "ASEAN and Regio

Security," Strategic Forum no. 85 (Washington, DC: National Defen

University Press, October 1996). 

5. Ralph Cossa and Simon Tay, "Preventive Diplomacy: ARF's N

Step," Asia Times, November 4, 1996. 

6. Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs 75, no

(September/October ] 996). 

127 
Range of 

Organizations A vailable 

It is commonplace to observe that the United Nations has reach

its limit in enforcement in the maintenance of international peace a

security. (It still offers potential in terms of the formation 

international norms--of a "Global Code of Ethics"--but that is 

different subject.) The organization does not possess the instrumen

needed for enforcement implementation, and its ability to opera

under a committee approach based on "consensualism" impedes 

capacity to meet crises expeditiously. The unfolding 19

breakdowns in Central Africa affecting Rwanda, Burundi, and Za

and the feckless performance of the United States, France, and Afric

"leaders" underscore the point. 

Therefore, tile search for additional support or for substitutes w

continue, specifically for regional organizations. In som

circumstances, the United States will even encourage the formati

of new such entities, as underscored in April 1996, when th

Secretary of Defense William Perry proposed a series of steps th

might be taken by Balkan nation defense establishments to enhan

their capability to conduct joint peacekeeping operations in th

region. He urged their participation in "every NATO-organiz

peacekeeping exercise in the region" to develop habits of milita

cooperation, thus raising a question in the minds of some observe

if the security boundaries of NATO were becoming too elastic. 

However, a wide range of regional organizations with primar

security mandates already exists. Some of these organizations ha

overlapping mandates, and they have differing relationships with t

United Nations. A number have formal observer status in the Gene

Assembly, while NATO has a liaison relationship with t

Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Almost air have had so

involvement in peace operations (see the appendix, annex 1 ), and

129 
Table 3. Regional and subregional organizations 

Africa 

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) 

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 

Economic Community of Central African States (ECOCAS) 

Southern African Development Community (SADC) 

Americas 

The Organization of American States (OAS) 

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 

Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) 

Asia 

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 

Europe and North At~antic 

European Union (EU) 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

Western European Union (WEU) 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 

Middle East 

Arab League (AL) 

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 

Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) 

Arab Maghreb Union--North Africa (UMA) 

With the exception of NATO and possibly CIS, most of these 

organizations possess limited experience in organizing multinational 

forces to deal with "complex emergencies." A number of obstacles 

would have to be overcome if effective peace operations were to be 

organized. An agreed command and control arrangement structure 

130 
deployed to execute. Finally, financial support for field operatio

would have to be assured, including appropriate recompense f

serving military and civilian personnel in the field. 

One question that will require special attention relates to the lev

at which integration of command for multinational forces shou

occur. The distinction in military parlance between command a

operational control may be useful. Command applies to such matte

as overall direction, discipline, morale, and logistics. The

responsibilities are by tradition met by participating member state

Operational control is of a different order of responsibility, involvin

tactical decisions in the field undertaken by the area commander, h

staff, and subordinate commands. The extent to which member stat

are prepared to surrender control of their forces to a foreig

commander has proved a vexing issue. 

An additional area that requires close examination involv

missions and roles. In "complex emergencies," the distinctions draw

between purely military or security enhancing operations and tho

entailing civilian support functions frequently prove illusor

Conventional wisdom surrounding "mission creep" provides 

meaningful guidelines for forces assigned to the field, especially sin

civilian components of the operation depend heavily on t

maintenance of a secure environment in which to functio

Overlapping assigned missions and roles are shown in table 4. 

As was demonstrated in Bosnia, disagreements may emer

between civilian-led and military components involved in operatio

generated in part by differing cultural and bureaucratic perspective

difficulties in generating timely financial support among governme

agencies and NGOs, different "lag times" in initiating field operation

and incompatible staffing arrangements. In addition, strategi

adopted for "existing" operations may differ quite markedly. Missio

and roles also have to be tailored to actual conditions in the area 

operation, with unanticipated local crises threatening to disru

131 
Table 4. Roles and missions for multinational forces to deter 

un wan ted beha vior 

Provide Early 14/arnin,~ 

Deter infiltration, aggression 

Maintain territorial integrity, political independence 

Compel Prescribed Behavior 

Create safe havens, weapons free zones 

Disarm, demobilize local forces 

Deny combatants freedom of movement 

Remove "rogue" leaders 

Locate, detain war criminals 

Conduct punitive strikes 

Enforce economic, arms embargo 

Secure withdrawal of foreign forces, advisors, mercenaries, 

paramilitaries 

Liberate seized territory 

Restore government, provide security 

Dismantle, destroy arms inventories and production facilities 

Humanitarian Relief 

Protect rel ief operations 

Provide emergency relief from manmade disasters (medical, shelter, 

water, etc.) 

Conduct relief operations (convoys, air drops, etc.) 

Noncoercive Support 

Establish buffer zones between combatants 

Monitor cease-fire; investigate violations 

Patrol borders 

Supervise prisoner exchanges 

Monitor disengagement, withdrawal of forces 

Clear mine fields 

Provide security for elections 

Assist in restoring law and order 

Support rebuilding of infrastructure 

132 
organizations, as well as with the United Nations. Tile former of

have agendas at odds with established state authority and the agend

of regional organizations. While the regional organizations and 

United Nations have the capacity to provide the adhesive necess

to ameliorate tensions that are emerging, they have yet to dev

successful strategies that tie together the national institutions of fail

states with the plans and actions of the multiple players increasin

involved in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. T

United States is well positioned to encourage efforts to integrate a

coordinate the programs and activities of institutions and agenc

concerned with the two fields of endeavor. 

133 
1:~.5 
Fiftieth session 

Agenda item 118 

ENGLLSH 

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

RUSS:AN

JOINT INSPECTION UNIT 

Note by the Secretary-General 

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members ot 

General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Uniz entitled "Shari:

respon~ibi!ities in peace-keeping: the United Nations and regional 

organizations" (J:U/REP/95/4). 

95-32179 (E) 091195 131195 

I IIIIII IIIII M IIIII IIIII IIIII IIIII IIII IIII 
REPORT ON 

SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACE-KEEPING

THE UNITED NATIONS AND 

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Prepared by 

Fatih K. Bouayad-Agha 

Boris P. Krasulin 

Joint Inspection Unit 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 

I. INTRODUCTION ........................ 

lI. LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR 

COOPERATION BEI%VEEN THE UNITED NATIONS 

AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS .......... 

II1. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: MECHA.NISMS AND 

CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN PEACE-KEEPING .... 

A. Actual and potential role of regional 

organizations in peace-keeping and 

other peace-related activities ................ 

B. Mechanisms and instruments of a selected 

number of regional organizations ............. 

C. Cooperation of regional organizations 

in recent peace-keeping operations of 

the United Nations ..................... 

IV. SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACE-KEEPING 

AND OTHER PEACE-RELATED ACTIVITIES . . . 

A. Preparedness of the United Nations to 

increase cooperation with regional 

organizations ......................... 

B. United Nations assistance .................. 

Notes ................................... 

Annexes 

I. Regional. subregional and intcrregional 

organizations cooperating with the United 

Nations in peace-keeping and other 

peace-related activities ...................... 

11. Cooperation of regional organizations 

in current United Nations peace-keeping 

operations ............................. 

I-6 

7-18 

19-~ 

19 - 24 

25 - 36 

37 - 54 

55 - 83 

56 - 66 

67 - 83 

V 

1 

3 

6 

12 

17 

17 

20 

25 

26 

37 
CSBMs 

CSCE 

DDSMS 

DHA 

DPA 

DPKO 

ECHO 

ECOMOG 

ECOWAS 

EU 

IPFs 

JIU 

LAS 

MICIVIH 

NATO 

NMOG 

OAS 

OAU 

OIC 

OSCE 

UNDP 

UNESCO 

UNHCR 

UNITAR 

UNMOT 

UNOMIG 

UNOMIL 

UNOMSA 

UNPROFOR 

WEU 

Confidence and security-building measures 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Department for Development Support and Management Se~'ice

Department of Humanitarian Affairs 

Department of Political Affairs 

Department of Peace-keeping Operations 

European Community Humanitarian Office 

Military Observer Group (of ECOWAS) 

Economic Community of West African States 

European Union 

Indicative planning figures 

Joint Inspection Unit 

League of Arab States 

International Civilian Mission (in Haiti) 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Neutral Milita~ Observer Group (of OAU) 

Organization of American States 

Organization of African Unity 

Organization of the Islamic Conference 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

United Nations Development Programme 

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizatio

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

United Nations Institute for Training and Research 

United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan 

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 

United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa 

United Nations Protection Force 

Western European Union 

/
these operations are multifaceted. Because of the expansion in both size and mandates, 

United Nations' capacity to carry out peace-keeping activities has been overstretched. At 

same time, the comprehensive approach required to maintain international peace and secu

inevitably influences the manner in which the United Nations carries out its duties effectiv

There is now a need to share responsibilities in collective security with other organizati

Against this background, interest over the involvement of regional organization

collective security has increased within the framework of Chapte/- VIII of the Charter of 

United Nations, which calls for the Member States to make every effort to achieve pa

settlement of local disputes through regional organizations before referring them to 

Security Council. The Inspectors conclude that, both the legal framework and political 

are sufficient for implementing the provisions of Chapter VIII; and that what is required 

is the effort to translate the provisions into action. 

There are many peace-related activities which regional organizations have b

undertaking. Many of them place their emphasis on preventive diplomacy and peacemak

At the same time, certain regional organizations are also involved in or are planning pe

keeping missions. In order for other regional organizations to participate more activel

peace-keeping, there is a need to enhance their capacity to plan, launch, manage and pro

administrative and logistical support to field operations. It is not within the mandate of 

to evaluate the capacity of regional organizations to carry, out their tasks effectively in 

field. Accordingly, no such attempt is made in the present report. It does, howe

presents views of Member States and regional organizations, as contained in the Un

Nations documents and other materials, as well as those provided to the Inspectors du

their consultations with representatives of Member States and certain regional organizati

Since it is difficult to make a precise distinction between peace-keeping and other pe

related activities, the present report is also concerned with these activities. 

Regional organizations differ in mandate, structure, capacity and experience in carrT

out activities aimed at maintaining peace and security. Therefore, there should not be a r

formula for the division of labour between them and the United Nations. Since no 

conflicts are the same, a flexible approach is called for in selecting the modality 

cooperation appropriate to each conflict situation. Cooperation between the United Nat

and regional organizations in peace-keeping is a relatively recent undertaking, 

consequently there is insufficient "knowledge on the effectiveness of each m .odality. I

therefore, necessary, to conduct an evaluation of each experience in cooperation with regi

organizations and to create a "knowledge bank containing the results, so that lessons lea

can be taken into account in the planning of similar activities in the future. 
So as to increase cooperation between the United Nations and regional organization

it is necessary, as a prerequisite, to enhance coordination and cooperation among vario

entities of the United Nations. A comprehensive approach to peace and security also requir

increased coordination within the United Nations system, since such an approach calls f

more active participation by organizations of the System whose mandates are mainly in t

economic and social sectors. 

While a number of decisions regarding more active involvement of region

organizations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities have been" adopted latel

the Inspectors believe that further measures aimed at enhancing cooperation in this fie

between the United Nations and regional organizations are needed in order to decentrali

these activities. 

Planning and management at Headquarters, at the inter-organizational level an

in the field 

Headquarters: 

l~¢comm¢ndation 1 

(a) To Drenare and oresent for consideration by the General Assembly 

comprehensiv(~ strategic programme Qf cooperation with regional organization

in peaq(~-keeping and other peaqe-related activities. This programme should 

aimed at decentralization of peacemaking activities and enhancing the role 

regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Natio

Charter, while ensuring that the primary responsibility in these matters remai

with the United Nations Security Council. A project team composed 

representatives of all departments concerned should be established for t

elaboration of such a programme. It should not be a universal model f

cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations: rather 

should reflect a flexible and pragmatic approach which would allo

modifications, taking into account the particular needs and potential of region

organizations. Since the aim of the programme is to enhance the role 

regional organizations, it would be useful to involve some of them at one po

in the work of the proposed team. 

(b) In order to coordinate the practical implementation of such a ~)rogramme

~mall unit with a clearing house function should b~ ~;tabli~hed. This unit w

also serve as a focal point to deal with and respond to queries of Member Sta

and regional organizations. 
(d) Th0 United Nations development system in gener-ol,...a~d hummail~p

organizations in particular, should be encouraged bv their res~ctive governi

bodies to contribute tO pro.rooting and strenmhening national policies a

structures of peaceful ~,overnance as an indispensable adjunct to regio

arrangements for oeace and security. More recomaition should be ~,iven to 

t~tenti~ll contribution of UNESCO pnd QNDP in this area. 

Inter-organizatlonal level: 

Recommendation 2 

(a) 

(b) 

Conclusions 9f bilat¢~l framework agreements between the United Nations a

regional or~,anizations concerning practical a~l;~ets of oeace-keetgin~, and 0th

peaee-r(~lated activities. 

Creation of a mechanism for coooeration between the United Nations a

regional organizations: 

Institutionalization of t~eriodic meetings between the Secretary-Gene

of the United Nations and th, heads of regional organizations to revi

the status of cooperation and to explore new steps to further progress 

this field; 

The field: 

p~nicip~tion of s.necialize0 agencie~ ha the proposed meetings in or

to deal with specific areas of cooperation; 

E.stablishment of a permanent working groun composed 

representatives of the United Nations and regional organizations, 

practical implementation of the recommendations of high-level meeti

and for dealing with current issues. 

R¢¢qrarncndqtion $ 

Since the Member States of the United Nations confer primary responsibility 

the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council, 

St~cial Reoresentative of the United Nations Secretary-General should be gi

the resoonsibilitv for overall ¢(;x)rdinati0n of peace-keeping operafigns wit h 

participation of rezional organization~. 
include, inter alia, the United Nations peace-keeping fellowship programme 

(similar to Disarmament fellowships), training of trainers programme, advisory 

services on the necessary infrastructure and procedures, standards and principles 

for planning and managing United Nations peace-keeping operations. 

(b) The existing United Nations training facilities, such as the International Training 

Centre of the International Labour Organisation in Turin, should be utilized for 

these purposes. 

(c) The General Assembly may wish to encourage Member States and regional 

_organizations to put their facilities and human resources for standardized 

training al the disposal of the United Nations, other regional organizations and 

Member States. They should be encouraged to organize workshops and 

seminars dealing with different aspects of peace-keeping operations and United 

Nations specialized personnel should be invited to lecture. 

Financing 

Recommendation 5 

(at The General Assembly may wish to recommend the establishment of voluntary 

trust funds in regional organizations for their peace-keeping operations. . and 

other related activities and call upon Member States, as well as nongovernmental and private organizations and individuals, to make contributions 

to such funds. 

(b) 

(c) 

The General Assembly may wish to consider establishing an emergency 

revolving fund tO finance regional organizations' activities in maintaining peace 

~nd security. If it so decides, the Secretary-General should submit a feasibility 

study to the Assembly for establishing such a fund. The study should cover al

important aspects such as the size and type of activities to be financed, the 

criteria for determining eligibility to borrow from the fund, funding methods, 

repayment procedures and so on. 

The General Assembly may also wish to consider establishing a trust fund to 

finance United Nations training programmes for peace-keeping and other peace

related activities. It is proposed that such a fund should be financed by 

voluntary contributions from other organizations (both public and private), and 

from Member States. Resources from the proposed fund should be used, inte

alia, to enable representatives of regional organizations to participate in United 

Nations programmes. 
y py 

is a need to find partners who would share responsibilities in collective security. 

2. The present report puts forward the findings and recommendations of a study recen

undertaken by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) on cooperation between the United Nati

and regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. Its objective i

contribute to the current efforts to increase the involvement of regional organizations 

collective security, in the hope that this would ease the burden on the United Nations. T

Inspectors are aware that there is no agreed definition of "regional organizations", and 

the Charter of the United Nations uses the phrase "regional arrangements and organization

For the sake of semantic simplification, however, they are collectively referred to 

"regional organizations" in the present report. 

3. The Inspectors consider that regional organizations should be the first port of call 

the prevention and pacific settlement of local disputes, without prejudice to the glo

responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for international peace and secur

Since many conflicts are increasing!y local or civil in nature, there is a growing consen

that they could more easily be prevented or speediIy resolved through regional initiatives 

approaches. 

4 The Inspectors believe, however, that there is no external substitute for the prim

and fundamental responsibility of Member States in each region for building comprehens

domestic peace and security systems in keeping with the Charter of the United Natio

Regional arrangements for fostering peace and security will owe their success, in the f

analysis, to effective actions by Member States in the respective regions to strengthen t

national policies and institutions for peaceful governance. 

5. Since the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in pe

keeping and other peace-related activities is a relatively new trend, the Inspectors cons

the present report as interim in nature. In-depth evaluation of such cooperation can 

undertaken when more experience in this area has been gained by the United Nations 

regional organizations. 

6. In conducting this study, the Inspectors had a series of discussions with United Nat

officials responsible for peace-related activities. They also consulted a number 

representatives of Member States who were actively involved in the deliberation of is

related to peace and security. They visited the headquarters of the Association of South

Asian Nations (ASiA.N), in Jakarta, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Tr

Organization (NATO) in Brussels, the Organization of American States (OAS) 

Washington, D.C., and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, 

discussed the subject with the Secretar2,.-General of the Organization for Security 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCF_.) in Vienna. Owing to the limited resources available to J

The Charter of the United Nations 

8. The Charter of the United Nations provides in Chapter VIII a legal framework 

sharing responsibilities ha the maintenance of peace and security between the United Nat

and regional organizations. Chapter VIII also calls for the Member States to make ev

effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through regional organizations be

referring them to the Security Council. It also requests the Security Council to encour

the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional organizations ei

on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council, and wh

appropriate, to utilize regional organizations for enforcement action under its a,*thority. 

addition, Chapter ~,'q of the Charter refers to regional organizations as one of the means 

the peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, Chapter VIII of the Charter provides 

appropriate regional action. 

General Assembly 

9. In its resolution 46•58 of 9 December 1991, the General Assembly requested 

Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and the Strengthening of the R

of the Organization to consider the proposal on the enhancement of cooperation between 

United Nations and regional organizations, as well as other specific proposals relating to 

maintenance of international peace and security (paragraph 4 (a)). In March 1994, 

Special Committee adopted a draft declaration on cooperation between the United Nat

and regional organizations in this field, which reaffirms the role of regional organizati

as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter. The text of the draft declaration has b

submitted to the General Assembly for consideration and adoption at its forty-ninth sessi

In its resolution 49/57 of 9 December 1994, the General Assembly approved the Declara

on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangem

or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 

Security Council 

I0. On 31 JanuaD" 1992, the Security Council met at the level of Heads of State 

Goverrtment. The presidential statement made at the conclusion of the meeting invited 

Secretary-General to prepare his analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening 

making more efficient, within the framework and provisions of the Charter, the capaci

the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping. 

statement also suggested that the Secretary-General's analysis and recommendations c

cover, in.let alia, "the contribution to be made by regional organizations in accordance 

Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter in helping the work of the Council" (S/23

page 3). 
(pg)

12. On 28 May 1993, the Security Council issued a presidential statement in which i

reaffirmed the importance it attached to the role of regional organizations and to coordination 

between their efforts and those of the United Nations in the maintenance of international 

peace and security. The Council, acting within the framework of Chapter VIII of the United 

Nations Charter, called again upon regional organizations to "consider ways and means o

enhancing their contributions to the maintenance of peace and security". The Council then 

expressed "its readiness to support and facilitate, taking into account specific circumstances, 

peace-keeping efforts undertaken in the framework of regional organizations and 

arrangements in accc~rdance with Chapter VIII of the Charter" (S/25859, page 3). 

13. On 3 May 1994, the Security Council expressed, in a presidential statement, its view 

that one of the factors that should be taken into account when considering the establishment 

of new peace-keeping operations was the existence of regional or subregional organizations 

and whether they were ready and able to assist in resolving the conflict (S/PRST/1994/22, 

page 2). 

14. On 22 Februao, 1995, the President of the Security Council made a statemen

concerning the Secretary-General's position paper entitled "Supplement to an Agenda fo

Peace" (A/50/60-S/1995/1). In that Presidential Statement (S/PRST/1995/9), the Security 

Council recognized that the responsibilities and capacities of different regional organizations 

varied, as well as their readiness and competence to participate in efforts to maintain 

international peace and security, as reflected in their charters and other relevant documents. 

The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's wilingness to assist regional organizations a

appropriate in developing a capacity for preventive action, peacemaking and, where 

appropriate, peace-keeping. It then drew particular attention in this regard to the needs o

Africa. 

Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations 

15. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations repeatedly encouraged all regiona

and subregional organizations to be involved in peace-keeping operations in their respectiv

areas of competence and mandates, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. Th

Committee also stressed the need to enhance cooperation between regional organizations an

the United Nations, and suggested a number of ways to enhance such cooperation. 2 Th

recommendations of the Special Committee are reflected in General Assembly resolution

concerning a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in a

their aspects. For example, in paragraph 53 of its resolution 47/71 of 14 December 1992

the General Assembly emphasized that "any deployment of peace-keeping operations shoul

be accompanied, as appropriate, by an intensification of coordinated political efforts by th

States concerned, by regional organizations and by the United Nations itself as part of th
ppg p

Secretary-General 

16. In his "An Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General recommended a greater role 

regional organizations in peace-related activities: 

"But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can 

render great service if their activities are undertaken in a rnamler consistent with 

the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relations,hip with the 

United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter 

VIII ... Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have 

primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but 

regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with 

United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also 

contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in 

international affairs ... And should the Security Council choose specifically to 

authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing 

a crisis within its region, it could serve to tend the weight of the United Nations 

to the validity of the regional effort ..2' ',kl471277-SI24111, paras. 63-65). 

17. In "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General stated that it wo

not be appropriate to try to establish a universal model for the relationship between 

Urtited Nations and regional organizations as their capacity for peacemaking and pea

keeping varied considerably. The Secretary-General, however, identified certain princip

on which the relationship should be based. Such principles include those concerning the n

for agreed mechanisms for consultations, respect for the primacy of the United Nations 

set out in the Charter, the division of labour and consistency by members of regio

organizations who are also Member States of the United Nations in dealing with a comm

problem of interest to those organizations (A/50160-S/1995/1, paras. 87-88). 

18. Charters and other instruments of a number of regional organizations also provide le

and political frameworks for coordination and cooperation between them and the Un

Nations in matters relating to peace and security (see III.B of the present report). 
pg, yp

the Charter of the United Nations deliberately provides no precise definition of regional 

arrangements and agencies. This allows "useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of 

States to deal with a marker appropriate for regional action which also could contribute to the 

maintenance of international peace and security" through associations or entities. They could 

include tteaty-based organizations, security and defence organizations, organizations for 

general regional development or for economic cooperation, and groups created to deal with 

specific political, economic or social issues. Thus, regional organizations can contribute to 

international peace and security in accordance with their mandates and capabilities. 

20. There are 16 regional organizations which are cooperating or have shown interest in 

cooperating with ~he United Nations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities. 

Most of them have responded to the note verbale of the Sectetary-General in which he 

transmitted the text of the presidential statement of the Security Council dated 28 January 

1993 (see para. 11 above). Among these organizations, three are regional, eight are 

subregional, four are interregional and one is global in terms of membership. Nine have 

observer status with the United Nations General Assembly. About one-third of them have 

well-established mechanisms for peace and security, many of which are for preventive 

diplomacy and peacemaking. With respect to their characteristics, nine can be considered 

as organizations for general purposes, four are economic organizations, two are concerned 

with defence and one with legal issues. The interests of those organizations whose primary 

purposes are in the economic or legal field appear to reflect a growing concern for a 

comprehensive approach to the maintenance of peace and security. This also suggests the 

need for the United Nations to identify those regional organizations involved in economic, 

social, legal and humanitarian affairs which have the potential for contributing to 

international peace and security, and to increase cooperation with them. (For more detailed 

information, see annex I.) 

21. OSCE, OAS and OAU already cover practically all countries of their respective regions 

(i.e., Europe, the Americas and Africa). A great lacuna exists in the "Asia and Pacific" 

region. ASEAN is, however, teaching out to non-member countries, through the framework 

of its Regional Forum, to discuss peace and security issues. The first such Forum was held 

in July 1994; another will be held in 1995. 

22. The Inspectors recognize the foUowing advantages of regional organizations in carTying 

out activities in the maintenance of peace and security: 

proximity to the conflict situation. This enables a regional organization to have 

an intimate knowledge of the conflict situation; 

the shared historical experience and culture of its Member States which could 

facilitate the solution of regional problems; 

/*
) 

23. However, geographical proximity and shared historical experience may have negat

effects on mediation capacity in some cases. Furthermore, in some instances, parties to 

conflict may see the United Nations mission as an expression of concern by the internatio

community as a whole and therefore providing impartial support to conflict resoluti

Under such circumstances, parties to the conflict may prefer that the United Nations, rat

than the regional organization, play a leading role in conflict resolution, as has been the c

with a number of recent United Nations operations. 

24. The Inspectors understand fully and share the intention of regional organizations 

emphasize early warning and conflict prevention since many of them are not well equipp

either financially or institutionally, to car~' out full-scale peace-keeping activities, althou

they can participate actively in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. The Inspect

nonetheless consider that regional organizations can play a more active role in peace-keepi

as demonstrated by organizations such as CIS, OAU and the Economic Community of W

African States (ECOWAS). OSCE is also developing peace-keeping capabilit

Organizations charged with security and defence, such as NATO, are certainly be

prepared than the United Nations to launch Peace-enforcement operations. Furthermore, 

of the military, in humanitarian assistance is increasing. Because recent peace-keep

operations are becoming more and more multifaceted, the involvement of those organizati

concerned with economic and social development and human rights issues is expected 

increase. It is, therefore, important to provide a flexible formula for division of lab

between the United Nations and regional organizations as the latter differ so much 

mandates, structure, experience and resources. At the same time, the Inspectors note 

concerns of regional organizations that cooperation between them and the United Nati

should not be based on a hierarchical relationship. Accordingly, the Inspectors agree w

the view that division of labour should be established in such a way as to optimize 

comparative advantages of the two based on mutual understanding and agreements. 

flexible and pragmatic approach is necessary to meet the particular needs of each spec

situation. 

B. Mechanisms and instruments of a selected number of regional organizations 

1. Organization of African Unity (OAU) 

25. By the Declaration adopted at the Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session of the Heads of S

and Governmen! held in Cairo from 28 to 30 June 1993, the OAU established a Mecha

for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolutions. The primary objective of 

Mechanism is the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. The Declaration (AHG/DEC

(XXIX), Rev. 1) states that "emphasis on anticipator" and preventive measures, and conce

action in peace making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to the complex 
in the peace-keeping operations in Africa". 

26. The Mechanism is built around a Central Organ, which is composed of the States 

members of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. In order to 

assist the Central Organ, the Conflict Management Division was established in 1993 within 

the OAU Secretariat. The Cairo Declaration also established the "OAU Peace Fund" for the 

purpose of "providing financial resources to support exclusively the OAU operational 

activities relating to conflict management and resolution". The fund is financed from 

appropriations from the OAU regular budget, voluntary contributions from Member States 

as well as from other sources within Africa. In this context, during the 30th African Summit 

held in June 1994 in Tun.is, the President of South Africa, Nelson MandeIa, announced a 

contribution of US$ 300,000 to the "OAU Peace Fund". -~ With the consent of the Central 

Organ, volumary contributions from sources outside Africa can also be accepted. In 

September 1994, the Urfited States Congress authorized the President to provide assistance 

to strengthen the conflict capability of the OAU and to allocate for these purposes not less 

than US$ 1,500.000 for each of the fiscal years 1995 through 1998. This proceeds from the 

assumption that it is in the national interest of the United States to help build African 

capability in conflict resolution since, inter alia, it would reduce the enot-mous human 

suffering which is caused by wars in Africa together with the need for United Nations 

inte~'ention as African institutions develop the ability to resolve African conflicts. 

27. With respect to cooperation between the United Nations and OAU, Article II of the 

OAU Charter lists as one of its aims the promotion of international cooperation in keeping 

with the Charter of the Umted Nations. The above-mentioned Cairo Declaration states as 

follows: 

"The OAU shall also cooperate and work closely with the United Nations not only with 

regard to issues relating to peace-making but, and especially, also those relating to 

peace+keeping. Where necessary, recourse will be had to the United Nations to 

provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the OAU's activities 

in Conflict Prevention, Management and Rest~hitJon in Africa in keeping with the 

provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of regional organizations in 

the maintenance of international peace and security" (AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX), Roy. 1, 

para. 25). 

2. Organization of American States (OAS) 

28. The amendments to the OAS Charter, adopted by its General Assembly in December 

1985, gave greater powers of mediation to the Permanent Council by allowing it to "resolve 

a dispute between members, whether or not all the parties concerned had (as previously 

stipulated) agreed to take the matter before the OAS". The amendments also increased the 
special committees ,.vhic.~ may contribute to the maintenance of peace and security, f

example, the Special Commirtee to Monitor Compliance with the Trade Embargo on Hai

The GAS convenes an ad hoc meeting of ministers of foreign affairs whenever needs aris

Such a meeting was convened in May 1993, tc discuss the situation in GuatemaIa and t

GAS Secretary-General was requested "o send a fact-finding mission. GAS is convening 

Regional Conference en Confidence - and Security-Building Measures in the Region in 19

(AG/RES.1288 (XXIV-O/94), para. 6). 

29. The GAS Charter provides a legal framework for cooperation between the Unit

Nations and GAS in general terms. The preambie of the GAS Chamer "reaffirms t

principles and purposes of the United Nat:ons anti Article 1 clefines GAS as a regiom

agency. Artic:e 2 proclaims the purposes of GAS in order "to put into practice the principl

on which it is founded and to fulfil its regional obligations under the Charter of the Unit

Nations (SI25996, page 12). Article 53 concerns cooperation between the United Natio

and GAS With respect to cooperation in peace a.".d security, the General Assembly of t

GAS has adopted a hum'err of resolutions. For example, resolution AG/RES. 1236(XXII

0/93) of 11 June 1993 requested the Special Comminee on Hemispheric Security to gi

priority in its programme of work to, inter alia, "the relationship between the GAS and t

United Nations in all matters related to regional security within the framework of th

respective normative instruments". In its resolution ,a9/5 of 2! October 1994. the Unit

Nations General Assembly welcomed "the offer cf the Chairman of the Permanent Coun

of the Organization of American States to the President of the Security Council concerni

the readiness of the Organization of American States to cooperate with the United Natio

in its efforts to improve measures for the prevention and peaceful solution of regional a

international conflicts" (para. 4). It requested both Secretaries-General (of the Unit

Nations and GAS), or their representatives, to resume consultations with a view to signin

during 1995. an agreement for cooperation betv.,een the United Nations and GAS (para. 

3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

30. According to the Secretary-General of OSCE, its greatest emphasis is on early warni

and conflict prevention since "prevention is preferable to cure".r OSCE mechanisms us

for these purposes include: the Vienna Mechanism on Unusual Militaw Activities, establish

in 1990: the Berlin Mechanism on Serious Emergency Situations, established in 1991: a

the Moscow Mechanism on Human Dimension, established in 1991. Th~ OSCE Hi

Commissioner on National Minorities and the Wa.,"saw Office for Democratic Institutions a

Human Rights also contribute to early warning. OSCE confidence and security-build

measures (CSBMs) can also serve as an early warning indicator. ~ As for a mechanism 

peaceful settlement of disputes, OSCE established The Valletta Mechanism in 1991, a

modified it in 1992. In addition, the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within 

OSCE has been in force since December 199,..t. The OSCE Provision for Direc
gy py 

to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict. It is responsible also for the 

implementatiqn of CSBMs". ~° OSCE establishes ad hoc steering groups specifically 

assigned to deal with conflicts: for example, the Minsk Group charged with mediation and 

settlement of the conflict around Nagomy Karabakh. One of the most important channels 

of conflict prevention and crisis management are activities under the aegis of the Chairmanin-Office. 

31. With regard to cooperation between the United Nations and OSCE, the "Helsinki 

Summit Declaration", adopted on 10 July 1992, states in paragraph 25 the views of the 

participating States of OSCE, formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (CSCE), as foIlows: 

"Reaffirming the commitments to the Chat'ter of the United Nations as subscribed to 

by our States, we declare our understanding that the CSCE is a regional arrangement 

in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Cha~er of the United Nations. As such, it provides 

an important link between European and global security. The rights and 

responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council remain unaffected in their 

entirety. The CSCE will work together closely with the United Nations especially in 

preventing and se~ling conflicts". 

32. .An agreement on a framework for cooperation and coordination between the United 

Nations and OSCE was signed by the Secreta~,-GeneraI of the United Nations and the 

Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE Council in May 1993. In its resolution -18/19, the General 

Assembly endorsed the framework for cooperation and coordination (AI48/185, annex). 

Efforts to further improve cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and 

OSCE have continued. In his letter to the Secretary-General, dated 14 June 1994, the 

Chairman-in-Office of OSCE stated that what appeared necessary was a more updated 

definition of the tasks and the attributes of OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter 

VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. He also mentioned that the fundamental issue of 

linking the OSCE's preventive diplomacy and crisis management activities with those of the 

United Nations would be dealt with at the OSCE Summit, held at Budapest on 3 and 6 

December 1994. A joint proposal by German), and the Netherlands, "OSCE First", was 

submitted to the Budapest Review Conference. The proposal (Doc.828/94 of 17 May 1994) 

calls for the participating states to commit themselves to make every effort to achieve pacific 

settlement of local disputes through OSCE before referring them to the United Nations. The 

Secretary-Gene~l of the United Nations in his report on the cooperation between the United 

Nations and OSCE states: 
4. European Union (EU) 

33. The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February. 1992, provid

a legal basis for the Union to develop its common foreign and security policy. Article J. 

Title V of the Treaty stipulates that the objectives of the policy are not only to strengthen th

security of the Union and its Member States, but also to p~serve peace and strength

international security. Article J 4, Title V recognizes the Western Eurcpean Union (WEU

as an integral part of the development of the Union. The Declaration on Western Europea

Union, attached to the Treaty, states that WEU will be built up in stages as the defen

component of the European Union. 

5. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 

34. Article 6 of the Minsk Agreement of 8 December 1991, which established the CI

stipulates that the Member States of the Commonwealth will cooperate in safeguardin

international peace and security. CIS has adopted a number of legal instruments concernin

appropriate arrangements for peace-keeping. They include: the agreement concerning group

of military, observers and collective peace-keeping forces in CIS and associated Protocol

adopted on 20 March 1992; the Collective Security Treaty of 15 May 1992; and th

agreement concerning collective peacemaking forces and joint measures for their material an

technical support, adopted on 24 September 1993. The authority to establish peace-keepi

operations is vested in the Council of the Heads of State. 

35. The Security Council was informed in June 1994 that on the basis of the provisions 

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council of the Heads of State of C

had decided to deploy the CIS Peace-keeping Force to Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia. 

accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, the United Nations Security Council has been ke

informed of the size of such forces and of their activities (S/1994/732, armexL 

6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

36. The NATO Summit held in Rome in November 1991 adopted the new Strateg

Concept which recognized the importance of preventive diplomacy and success

management of crises. NATO reported that in December 1992 the Allied Ministers h

stated "their readiness to respond positively to initiatives that the United Nations Secreta

General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation" of the resolutions 

the United Nations Security Council ($125996, page 18). In the Declaration adopted at 

NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994, it was stated that its Member States would wo

in concrete ways towards "creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields 

peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations". )~ 
multifarious mandates, including peace-keeping in the traditional sense, assistance in political 

senIements, electoral assistance, human fights monitoring and humanitarian assistance. 

Accordingly, mission components include not only military' elements but also civilians 

responsible for a variety of functions. Ten regional organizations have been cooperating with 

the United Nations in recent peace-keeping missions (see annex II). The more active 

involvement of regional organizations in :he maintenance of peace and security was a result 

of the relaxation of international tension after the end of the cola war. Their invoh, ement 

may also have escalated because of the increasingly complex nature of United Nations peacekeeping operations, which requires the United Nations to seek the cooperation of regional 

organizations within :heir areas of competence. The following are examples of peace-keeping 

a.nd other peace-related activities of regional organizations. 

Assistance in political settlements 

38. The OAU has undertaken a series of diplomatic initiatives for the solution of conflicts 

m Angola, Bunmdi+ Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and the Western Sahara. Both the League 

,~ Arab States ILAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have been 

invoh, ed in diplomatic initiatives concerning Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They 

have also pa,~icipateci, together with the United Nations and OAU, in the National 

Reconciiiation Conference for the political settlement of the Somali conflict. ECOWAS has 

been playing a central role in the efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Liberian conflict. 

OAS has been involved in the peace process in Central America and Haiti. OSCE has been 

playing the leading role in peacemaking in South Ossetia in the Republic of Georgia, 

Nagorny Karabak,h, and Moldova. It also has field missions in Skopje (the Former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia), Estonia, Latvia, Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Tajikistan. 

OSCE is cooperating with the United Nations in Abkhazia (Georgia) and Tajikistan. The 

European Union and the United Nations co-sponsor the International Conference on the 

Former Yugoslavia. The European Community (Union) has deployed the European 

Community Monitoring Mission in the former Yugoslavia. Its mandates are to help stabilize 

the agreed cease-fires and mediation and confidence-building. CIS has been involved in 

negotiations for the political settlement of conflicts in South Ossetia and Tajikistan. At the 

irutiative of ASEAN, the United Nations sponsored the International Conference on 

Kampuchea in 1981. 

Deployment of military observers/peace-keeping forces 

39. ECOWAS created a MiIitar?" Observer Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990. ECOMOG 

is cooperating with the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), which is the 

first United Nations peace-keeping mission undertnken in cooperation with a peace.keeping 

operation already established by another organization. OAU established the Neutral Military 

Obsera,er Group (NMOGI in 1992 to monitor the cease-fire in Rwanda. NMOG elements 

/
Ossetia. Preparations are at an advanced stage to launch a peace-keeping operation by OS

in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 12 

Peace/sanctions enforcement 

40. NATO and the WEU are engaged in the joint monitoring and enforcement of the a

embargo and the economic sanctions against the former Yugosal;,,ia in the Adriatic, in o

to ensure the strict implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. In addit

the WEU is involved in the implementation of the sanctions against the former Yugosl

in the Danube operation. NATO is also implementing a number of Security Cou

resolutions concerning the former Yugoslavia, including the monitoring and enforcemen

a "No-Fly Zone" over Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also providing close air support for 

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). 

Sanctions assistance 

41. The EU and OSCE have jointly deployed Sanctions Assistance Missions ha 

countries neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). T

have also provided these countries with some necessary, resources to facilitate t

enforcement of the sanctions. Sanctions Assistance Missions are currently statione

Albania, Bulgaria. Croatia, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Rom

and Ukraine. Under the direction of the joint EU-OSCE Sanctions Coordinator and 

Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre in Brussels, mission officials ad

the authorities of the host countries on the implementation of sanctions imposed by the Un

Nations Security Council Committee on Sanctions against former Yugoslavia. 

Mine clearance 

42. The WEU conducted mine clearance activities in the Gulf in the framework o

relevant Security Council resolutions. OAS has provided mine-clearing assistanc

Nicaragua. 

Human rights/political process monitoring 

43. The Commonwealth Secretariat, EU and OAU co-operated with the United Natio

monitoring the transitional process in South Africa. EU has recently concluded an agree

with the United Nations for the dispatch of human rights monitors to Rwanda. OAS an

United Nations have established the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) to v

respect for human rights as laid down in the Haitian Constitution and, in the internat

instruments to which Haiti is a party. OSCE deals with human rights issues throug

Warsaw Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commiss
44. The Commonwealth Secretariat, EU and OAU, cooperated with the United Natio: " in 

the electoral observation and verification in South Africa. OAS has been increasingly 

providing electoral assistance to its member countries. For example, in 1993, it sent election 

monitoring missions to Paraguay, Peru. Honduras, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 

The OSCE Warsaw Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights also provides 

electoral assistance. 

Humanltarlan assistance 

45. In June 1994,the OAU Council of Ministers adopted resolution CM/Res.1527 (LX) 

on the holding of a regional conference on assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced 

persons in the Great Lakes region in Burundi, which was endorsed by the Heeds of State and 

Government of OAU. The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 49/7, 

endorsed the OAU resolution and invited the competent bodies of the United Nations system 

to take part in the implementation of the OAU initiative. The European Community 

Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was established in 1992 in order to provide humanitarian 

assistance to populations from any part of the world outside the Community who are affected 

by natural catastrophes or emergencies, many of which are in conflict zones. ECHO 

cooperates with a number of United Nations agencies, with the most important partner being 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 

46. The above-mentioned activities of regional organizations are only examples, not an 

exhaustive list. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the most active area in which regional 

organizations are involved is assistance in political settlements. In 9 of the 12 active peacekeeping missions which were launched after 1991, regional organizations have cooperated 

with the United Nations in the efforts for a political settlement of the conflicts (see annex II). 

At the same time, regional organizations are increasingly being involved in other functions, 

from peace-keeping to humanitarian assistance. The use of military personnel in 

humanitarian relief operations has proved to be advantageous to the success of these 

operations. Cooperation between the United Nations and defence/security organizations in 

this area is, therefore, expected to grow. 

Modalities for cooperation 

47. There are a number of modalities in which the United Nations have cooperated with 

regional orgar.izations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities. In the past, the 

United Nations launched a small number of joint missions with regional organizations. 

Those missions were carried out with some predictable, early stage difficulties inasmuch as 

each organization had a different way of doing business. In addition, there were problems 

of how to divide the cost, who was responsible for providing logistic support and so on. 

Furthermore, it became apparent that a single chain of command was essential for peace- 
48. Another modality for cooperation is that of one organization playing a leading role a

others supporting the lead organization. This modatity has been applied to the relationsh

between the United Nations and OSCE in the context of their peace efforts in Georg

Moldova, Nagorny Karabakh and Tajikistan. 

49. Two or more organizations can be engaged in parallel peace activities in the same are

One such example is the recent efforts by the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the E

and OAU in South Africa. The CIS Peace-keeping Force and UNOMIG are in place 

Abkhazia, Georgia. They "function as two separate and independent operations, each und

its own command, but in close cooperation and coordination with each othe

(S/19941529/Add.1, para. 4). A similar relationship exists between the United Nations a

ECOWAS in Liberia. The presence of many organizations is sometimes necessary to bu

confidence among the parties to the conflict. 

50. Different organizations could be assigned different functions, such a.s peacemakin

peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building. Since each organization 

autonomous, the assignment of functions should be based on mutual understanding amo

the organizations. Difficulties with this modality could be minimized by each organizati

assuming the leadership for a different stage of the conflict, on the condition that cle

understanding exists among the organizations involved as to their respective roles and t

requirements for the smooth transition of authority. However, in many conflict situation

various functions are required at the same time. In this type of situation, the issue 

command and control may make this modality difficult to utilize successfully. 

51. Each modality mentioned above requires different methods of cooperation. Metho

of cooperation required at the level of headquarters and the field are different, as are tho

for different functions. However, it is possible to replicate successful features of cooperati

at the operational level. The successful methods for exchange of information a

coordination of activities selected by the United Nations Observer Mission in South Afr

(UNOMSA) and cooperating organizations can, therefore, be adopted by future missions 

a similar nature. The experiences of the Coordinating Committee, the Technical Task Fo

and the Joint Operations Unit merit a thorough examination, since they could provide use

information for future missions. Various methods have been proposed for cooperation a

coordination between UNOMIG and the CIS Peace-keeping Force. Specifid methods 

suggested for cooperation and coordination at each of the four levels: force headquarte

sector zone headquarters, UNOMIG monitoring team with CIS battalion, and UNOM

patrol with CIS patrols (S/1994/818, paras. 14-20). It is too early to assess th

effectiveness. However, evaluation of the UNOMIG experience with CIS should 

undertaken at appropriate times and the lessons learned should be used later. 
Whet,her this could be one of the crucial success factors, only time can tel!. 

53. Cooperation between the Lrnited Nations and regional organizations in ~he maintenance 

of international peace and security is a relatively new trend. Therefore, sufficient knowledge 

does not exist as to which modality for coopera:ion or methods of cooperation to employ for 

what types of situations and needs. For this purpose, there should be a2, assessment of 

cooperation, with the participation of all the organizations invotved, after the completion of 

each United Nations mission. Lessons thus learned should be utilized when planning new 

missions. In his final report on the question of South Africa, the Secretary-General stated 

his intention to invite regional organizations to "work out together guidelines for future 

cooperation based on the success, as well as the mistakes", of the common experience in 

South Africa and elsewhere (S/1994/717, para. 139). One such meeting was held on 1 

Aumast 1994 at United Nations Headquarters. Meetings on cooperation in the maintenance 

of peace and security between the United Nations and regional organizations should be 

institutionalized, and ex post assessments mentioned above should be studied at those 

meetings. 

54. At a meeting held in September 1993 between the secretariats of the United Nations 

system and OAU, a set of recommendations for concrete action were adopted, including 

those on cooperation in conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. Those 

recommendations included assistance to be provided by the United Nations system (see 

A/48/475/Add. 1, paras. 21-24). One year later, the implementation process of some 

recommendations has still not begun. Such a low level of implementation can be attributed 

partially to the lack of a time-frame and unclear identification of responsibility for 

implementation. In future agreements concerning United Nations assistance, those United 

Nations entities responsible for implementation should be clearly identified and a time-frame 

should be established. 

/.
legal and political frameworks that are conducive to the sharing of responsibilities in 

maintenance of peace and security between the United Nations and regional organizatio

Equally important is the existence of factors for the successful implementation of polic

contained in legal instruments and manifested in the political will of Member States 

organizations. Such factors may include: the preparedness of the United Nations to incre

cooperation with regional organizations: and the capacity and experience of regio

organizations to plan, launch, manage and provide administrative and logistics support 

field operations. United Nations assistance can contribute to the enhancement of the capac

and experience of regional organizations in these areas. 

A. Preparedness of the United ,Nations to increase 

cooperation with regional organizations 

56. The Inspectors consider that in order for the United Nations to increase cooperat

with regional organizations, it must have, as a prerequisite, mechanisms to plan its activi

effectively and efficiently and to ensure smooth information flow and the sharing 

experience within the United Nations. 

57. There is a close relationship between peacemaking, peace-keeping and humanitar

actions. There is also a strong Iink between peace and development. Prevention 

preferable to cure, and prevention of conflicts ultimately requires people's conviction 

peace is good for ever>'body. In this connection, the Inspectors note that in February. 1

the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) establis

a Culture of Peace Programme. UNESCO is contacting organizations of the United Nati

system and regional organizations to ensure that its Culture of Peace Programme is carefu

harmonized with related activities. Organizations of the United Nations system wh

mandates are in the economic and social sectors are increasingly involved in peace-rela

activities. The Inspectors, therefore, agree with the view of the Secreta~'-General that 

second-generation United Nations peace-keeping operations may involve the entire Un

Nations system in comprehensive reconstruction efforts" (see SG/SM]941178 of 31 Octo

1994). Therefore, there is a need for a comprehensive approach to maintain internatio

peace and security, one element of such an approach is increased cooperation between 

United Nations and regional organizations. 

58. At present, each depa~ment "ff the United Nations plans its activities based on anal

done by its own staff within the area of its competence. For example, the Policy 

Analysis Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKOs) "acts as a think-t

providing in-depth analysis of policy questions within the Department's sphere 

responsibility" (A/49;336, para. 62). It appears that after having made the overall plans 

their own activities, departments coordinate with each other in the implementation of t

plans. While this is an improvement over past practice, which did not include a high 
regional organizations to design careiully integrmed Icivilian and military,) plans for 

complex, multidimensional operations" (A/49/336, para. 64). While the Inspectors welcome 

the efforts of DPKO at the operational !evel, they nonetheless consider that there is also a 

need for a continuous strategic analysis of what the United Nations can do and should do as 

a whole to promote and maintain peace and security, by itself or with other organizations, 

including regional organizations. The results of analyses done by various departments, not 

only by those concerned with political and military, activities but also by those involved in 

the economic and social sectors, should, therefore, be consolidated to allow one 

comprehensive strategic anaIys!s for each conflict area or situation. Such comprehensive 

analysis should be undertaken by a pro~ect team created for a specific area or situation and 

composed of the representatives of all the departments concerned. The results of such 

analysis should be used to facilitate decision-making by the Secretar3.'-General and his top 

aides. The project team should '.hen prepare overall strategies for implementing the plans 

made by the Secretary'-General, and approved by governing bodies. Each depa~ment or 

office should, in turn, base their implementation plans on these overall strategies. In order 

to assist project teams and to inform various departments and offices on recent developments, 

the establishment of a small unit may be necessary. Such a unit should be entrusted with a 

clearing house function (i.e., to act as depository and disseminator of information in a 

systematic manner) for peace-related activities as well as with responsibilities for providing 

administrative and technical sea, ices to project teams. 

60. The Inspectors are concerned that the results of discrete and independent analyses 

conducted by various departments, no mater how useful they are to serve their own purposes, 

may not facilitate the Secretary,-General and his top aides in taking a proactive approach and 

long-term planning from the strategic perspective. The Inspectors were informed by the 

Secretariat that elaborate consultative arrangements have been made by DPKO, the 

Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) 

and, therefore, the small unit described in paragraph 59 above would not be necessary,. At 

the same time, one department stated that the project team approach suggested by the 

Inspectors would be difficult to put into effect. Owing to time constraints, it was not 

possible at this time for the Inspectors to examine whether the consultative arrangements 

among the three departments would address the concern of the Inspectors fully or how 

difficult it would be to implement the project team approach. However, a JIU report on the 

strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations system for conflict prevention, which 

is currently at the initiation stage, ,.,,'ill examine these issues. 

61. A comprehensive approach to peace and security increases the involvement of regiona

organizations. DPKO, DPA and DHA all have regional divisions through which liaison with 

regional organizations is maintained. However, in order to facilitate the dissemination of 

information to interested regional organizations, the small unit mentioned above should a!so 

be responsible for the clearing house function on United Nations relations with regiona
62. Information sharing among the Headquarters departments concerned with pea~.e a

security has improved significantly in the past few years. A Task Force established by t

Secretar)'-General includes the Secreta~'-General kimself, his two Senior Advisors, the Leg

Counsel and the Under-Secretaries-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Peace-keeping a

Political Affairs. It meets weekly. The Under-Secretaries-General of the three Departmen

also meet weekly, followed by the meeting in which all the Directors of the thr

Departments participate. 

63. There is, however, room for improvement, particularly at the working level, whe

important information is not consistently transmitted to all officers concerned ~ Based 

the understood link between peacemaking, peace-keeping and humanitarian activities as w

as the expected increase in the number of regional organizations cooperating with the Unit

Nations in these areas, there is a need to increase interaction among staff members engag

ha activities related to these functions. It is suggested that DHA, DPKO and DPA establi

mechanisms to ensure a smooth information flow and increase interaction at all levels. Wi

respect to the working level, they could create a project team or a task force for each confl

area, not only to exchange information and experience but also to heip each other 

performing their tasks. This would avoid duplication of efforts and increase utilization 

the best talent available. For instance, a Political Affairs Officer who has been involved 

activities for peacemaking in a certain area could participate in a fact-finding mission 

DPKO to the same area; DPKO and DHA desk officers could contribute to policy analy

done by DPA, and so on. Results of the work done at this level should then be reviewed 

the meeting of the Directors concerned. It is time for the United Nations to loosen rig

bureaucratic demarcation in order to utilize resources more efficiently and effectively. 

64. The sharing of information at the working level outside Headquarters is based on go

will and is not institutionalized. Since a comprehensive approach to peace and secur

would require increased coordination and cooperation not only among the organizations 

the United Nations system but also between the United Nations and regional organization

there is a need to improve information flow at the working level. 

65. The Inspectors have been informed by those with field experience that coordination 

the field level is sometimes poor, because many organizations are not coordinating th

efforts with others. Since peace-keeping operations are increasingly multifaceted, 

involvement of regional organizations with different mandates is expected to increase. Th

regional organizations may be cooperating directly with a United Nations mission or with 

specialized agencies in the same area. This would make coordination even more diffic

It is, therefore, suggested that in a large-scale peace-keeping mission with multifari

mandates, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the area should be given 

responsibility for overall coordination. The United Nations, organizations of the system 

regional organizations in the area could create task forces at various levels to facilitate 
Humanitarian Coordinators, who are designa',ed by the United Nations Emergency Relief 

Coordinator, function under the overall authority of the Special Representative concerned, 

with responsibility for coordination of United Nations humanitarian assistance for the 

complex emergency in question. The extent of implementation as well as the effectiveness 

of this policy in enhancing coordination in the field are still being evaluated. The 

forthcoming JIU reports on humanitaman assistance will address relevant aspects of these 

issues. 

B. United Nations assistance 

67. Many regional organizations lack resources and experience in peace-related activities, 

particularly in peace-keeping. However, since regional organizations differ in mandates, 

structure and the size of membership, their needs also vary. With respect to early warning 

and preventive diplomacy, an area of priority for many regional organizations, the need to 

strengthen their capacity may be Iess acute. In fact, some regional organizations seem to 

have more advanced mechanisms in this respect than the United Nations. 

68. Peace-keeping is the area in which regional organizations generally need assistance. 

Even those orgamzations with large budgets lack practical experience in planning, launc,hing 

and managing operations. Furthermore, in launching a large-scale peace-keeping mission 

with multifarious objectives, many organizations would need external assistance, because, 

unlike the United Nations, they do not have a network of agencies engaged in various types 

of operational activities required for such a mission. For organizations which are at the early 

stage of developing their capacity for peace-keeping, external assistance for evaluating their 

mechanisms, administrative procedures and structure may be necessary. Some of those 

organizations with established mechanisms may still need financial assistance to cover the 

cost of peace-keeping operations. Limited membership may mean lack of the necessary 

persuasive influence, particularly in a situation where there is insufficient political agreement 

among Member States or where a regional power is closely involved. In such a case, 

political support from organizations with universal membership, such as the United Nations, 

may be necessary for the regional organization concerned to carry, out peace-keeping tasks. 

For regional organizations with specific mandates, such as defence organizations with 

advanced structure and capability, a clear understanding of their role may be the only 

incentive necessary, for them to cooperate effectively with other organizations in conflict 

resolution. 

69. If regional organizations are encouraged to be more actively involved in the 

maintenance of international peace and security, it is axiomatic that assistance should be 

provided to meet their needs. Without approp6ate assistance, they may be driven into a 

quagmire where resources do not match mandates. In this connection, the United Nations 

has been giving assistance to regional organizations. Resources permitting, its assistance 
August 1993 (S/26376), informed the Seore{aw-GeneraI that the Council would support 

establishment of a voluntary tp.lst ftuld. A Trust. Fund for the Implementation of the Coto

Agreement in Liberia was thus established pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Cou

resolution 866 (1993). Its purpose is to "receive voluntary, contributions in order to prov

support for the implementation of the Cotonou ,Accord, including deployment of ECOM

peace-keeping troops, demobilization of combatants, elections and humanitarian assistan

It is managed by the United Nations and the disbursement of funds is made through 

Special Representative of the SecretaD'-General in Liberia. On 13 July !994, the Secu

Council expressed its concern that sufficient financial and other support for the IECOM

troops had not yet been forthcoming despite the importance of their continued presenc

the Liberian peace process. The Council, therefore, called on "all Member States urge

to consider providing financial or material support either through the Unitcd Nations t

fund or on a bilateral basis to enable ECOMOG to fulfil its responsibilities in accorda

with the Cotonou Agreement" (SIPRST/1994/33, page 2]. As of 30 September 1994, 

Trust Fund received cash contributions of USS 17.8 milhon from four donor com~tries

which US$ 1 million was earmarked for humanitarian assistance. The rest was for the 

of ECOMOG, mainly in procurement and maintenance of equipment and rations. 

addition, one donor country, made in-kind contributions (trucks). 

71. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 937 (1994) on the situation in Georgia, the Secu

Council requested the Secretar3,'-General to establish "a voluntary fund for contribution

support of the implementation of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Fo

signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 and/or for humanitarian aspects including detaining

specified by the donors, which will in particular facilitate the implementation of UNOMI

mandate". The Fund was established on 26 July 1994. Depending on the stipulation of 

donors, resources in the Fund could be used to finance certain CIS activities in orde

implement the Agreement. It should be mentioned that UNOMIG has received prac

support from the CIS Peace-keeping Force when its resources have not been suffic

(S/1994/!160, page 5). 

72. Since the United Nations has long experience in organizing pledging conferences 

voluntary, contributions, it could provide technical assistance and/or facilities to the intere

regional organizations for the holding of such conferences. 

73. Some regional organizations were not able to raise funds in a timely manner to fin

fact-finding missicms or activities connected with political negotiations. Delays in carr

out such activities had negative consequences on the peace process. If there had be

revolving fund from which these organizations could borrow to finance their emerg

activities, they might have succeeded in diffusing tension and instability. The Ce

Emergency Fund was established by the Secretary-General under his authority in accord

with General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. It is "designed as a 
of peace and security. However, since the scope of such a fund is expected to be broad, the 

Inspectors are not in a position to recommend the establishment of such a fund without a 

thorough examination of such aspects as the size, type of activities covered, criteria for 

determining the eligibility to borrow from the fund, funding methods, repayment procedures 

and so on. 

74. One of the mandates of UNDP is to promote the transfer of know-how through 

institution building. This applies to conflict resolution. Furthermore, peace and security are 

necessary, to sustain development. At the same time, as the UNDP Administrator stated, 

"lasting peace and security depend on development that eliminates great disparities". ~J 

Therefore, UNDP is assisting in the area of conflict resolution through institution building. 

For example, an on-going project entitled, "Improvement of the OAU administrative 

management capability (tL~.F/87/lO1)" has a fellowship component on conflict management, 

which was implemented in May 1994. An OAU proposal for a new project on conflict 

prevention, management and resolution, and democratization process is currently under 

review. In May 1994, the UNDP Administrator stated that UNDP would contribute to the 

OAU Peace Fund "by providing three million dollars to be used as seed money to strengthen 

OAU's capacity for the development of the programmes to operationalize the activities 

envisioned under the Fund."*~ 

75. The UNDP Administrator stated in his report on the preparation for the fifth 

programming cycle that the financial resources of UNDP for regional programmes were 

reduced by 26 per cent as a result of the UNDP Governing Council decision 90/34 to allocate 

more IPFs to low-income countries (DP/1991/24, para. 21). Therefore, the strategy of 

UNDP is to set priorities and to develop new ideas and model projects which attract donors. 

It may also be possible to u~e IPF funds for regional organizations. For example, UNDP 

made significant contributions to United Nations activities related to electoral assistance. In 

the case of Mall, funding from the IPF was released to finance the participation of observers 

affiliated with OAU (A/47/668, para 60). 

76. .~Mthough the General Assembly has recognized that the training of peace-keeping 

personnel is primarily the responsibility of Member States, it requested the Secretary-Genera! 

to develop and publish peace-keeping training guidelines, manuals and other relevant training 

material. It also requested that "he Secrelary-General review and improve arrangements for 

training civilian, police and military peace-keeping personnel, using the appropriate 

capabilities of Member States, regional organizations and arrangements, in accordance with 

their constitutional mandates and Chapter VIII of the Charter, and of non-governmental 

organizations and the Secretariat (General Assembly resolution 48/42). Thus, the United 

Nations is expected to cooperate with regional organizations in improving training of peacekeeping personnel. 
the target of the Unit is .",lamber States, and it does not have enough resources to prov

assistance to regional organizations systematically. 

78. The Centre for Human Rights provides technical legal assistance and advisory serv

in connection with national elections. The Centre's Voluntary Fund for Techn

Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights can provide funding for human rights compon

of electoral assistance. The feasibility of utilizing the Centre's programmes for techn

assistance and advisory services as well as the Centre's Voluntary Fund in efforts to enha

the capacity of regional organizations in human rights monitoring should be examined. 

Department for Development Support and Management Services (DDSMS) also provi

technical assistance in electoral administration. Although the resources of DDSMS can

be used for regional programmes, its technical expertise in this area should be utilized on 

i~fforrnai basis to assist regional organizations, for example, training programmes organi

by other United Nations entities in this area. 

79. The International Training Centre of the international Labour Organisation locate

Turin, has assisted DPKO in the development of a peace-keeping training manual 

preparing the pedagogical design, layout and illustrations. The manual was printed by 

Turin Centre and is now being tested at various seminars and courses before being finali

It is designed to assist commanders of national contingents and their training officer

preparing and conducting in-country training progt-ammes before deployment in pe

keeping operations. DPKO, the Turin Centre and the United Nations Institute for Train

and Research (UNITAR). have collaborated in peace-keeping training. 

80. As the preceding paragraphs indicate, various entities of the United Nations 

revolved in technical assistance and training in the fields of peace-keeping and rel

functions. There should be a clearing house for these activities so that interested Mem

States and regional organizations could obtain information from one source on the assist

provided by the United Nations. The DPKO Training Unit could assume the clearing h

function since its training programme covers a wide area of activities. It is also neces

to establish a task force on United Nations :ethnical assistance in peace-keeping and rel

functions, with the participation of all entities concerned. The task force could 

responsible for developing a comprehensive approach to technical assistance inclu

practical steps of implementation. It could also undertake periodic aszessment of 

implementation, with a view to improving further the way such United Nations techn

assistance is provided. 

81. In order to include regional organizations in United Nations training programme

peace-keeping and other peace-related activities, a trust fund could be establis

Alternatively, other organizations could be solicited to provide funds for these trai

programmes. Such funds could be used to sponsor trainees or fellows participating in U
82. Dissemination of information is an area in which the United Nations has long 

experience. Therefore, it can assist regional organizations to access information on current 

activities being undertaken by others. The Electoral Assistance Information Network was 

established in 1992. The Network is managed by the United Nations Electoral Assistance 

Division in DPKO. The Division produces an armual report on electoral assistance activities 

unde~aken by the Network members. The report should be issued inore frequently, not just 

on an annual basis. A periodic report on the activities undertaken by regional organizations 

in the fields of peace-keeping and related functions can also be useful as a tool for crossfertilization. At present, only four intergovernmental regional organizations (the 

Commonwealth Secretariat, OSCE, OAS and OAU) belong to the Network. The Division 

should make efforts to reach out to other regional organizations. 

83. In the JIU report entitled "Staffing of the United Nations peace-keeping and related 

missions (civilian component/", it was recommended that regional organizations should be 

encouraged to second pe~ormel to United Nations missions (JIU/REP/93/6, Recommendation 

IV (d)). Following the JIU recommendation, it has been reported that regional organizations 

had been encouraged to second personnel to United Nations field operations (A/481945, para. 

52). However, there is no evidence that such encouragement was made on a systematic 

basis. Participation in United Nations field operations by personnel of regional organizations 

in United Nations field operations can be not only beneficial to the United Nations but also 

to those organizations in gaining practical experience. Conversely, United Nations personnel 

can also be seconded to field operations of regional organizations. United Nations retirees 

with field experience could be sponsored by the United Nations or donors to participate in 

peace missions of regional organizations. 
(A/47/253L paras. 13i 4; IA,48.;173L paras. 1  1112; and (A/49/136), para. 90. 

3. For example, in 1994 the soldiers of the ECOWAS Miiitary Observer Group 

(ECOMOG) in Liberia were paid about one sixth of the soldiers of the United Nations 

Observer Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL). 

4. For example, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. 

5. To date. the Government of Scuth Africa has contributed US$ 377,840 to the OA

Peace Fund. 

6. Eu~'opa VVorld Year Book 1994, Vol. I (Europa Publications, 1994), p. 192. 

7. Wilhelm Hoynck (Secretary-General of OSCE), "CSCE works to develop its conflict 

prevention potential", NATO review., April 1994, p. 16. 

8. Ibid., p. 17. 

9. The CSCE Secretariat. "CSCE Facts" (mimeograph), June 1994, p. 3. 

10. Ibid.. p. 2. 

11. "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting 

the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 

1991", (Press Communique M-1 (94)3), 11 Janua~ 1994, p. 5. 

12. Floynck. Ioc. cir., p. 19, 

13. JIU interviews with the Secretariat staff. 

14. "Africa: Conflict Prevention and New Development Initiatives', (Speech by the 

UNDP Administrator, James Gustave Speth, at the African-American Institute, New 

York on 24 May 1994), page 7. 

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aes s a dstgused potcatay aas speca

with extensive experience in the academic and foreign policy fie

He has served on Presidential Task Forces, co-authored fore

assistance legislation, and, as a senior State Department offic

played a seminal role in establishing the Office of the Under-Secre

of State for Security Assistance (1972-73). Previously he served 

the Policy Planning Staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defen

Upon retiring from the Department of State, Dr. Lewis was appoin

a member of the faculty, The George Washington University, wh

he founded and directed the graduate level program in security po

studies. Until 1996, he also was appointed a Senior Fellow of 

Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defe

University, where he played a leading role in conducting resea

efforts relating to U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations. 

Dr. Lewis has published widely in political-military subject a

and is the co-editor of Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challe

After the Cold War (1993). His articles have appeared in For

Policy, The Review of Politics, The Middle East Journal, Strat

Forum, and Mediterranean Quarterly. He currently serves on 

editorial advisory board of three journals and is a consultant 

several advanced research organizations. 

Ambassador Edward Marks is a retired senior American diplo

currently involved in a number of projects and activities concer

with multinational and national management of comp

emergencies. These include research and a conference series on 

role of civilian police in international peacekeeping under 

sponsorship of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (C

and the Police Executive Research Forum, and design 

management of crisis management exercises for the U.S. militar

a consultant with private firms. He is an Adjunct Fellow at CSIS 

the Center of Excellence in Emergency Management of Honolulu

187 
Cape Verde; and Deputy Director for CounterTerrorism of the 

Department of State. He is a graduate of the National War College 

and spent a year as a Visiting Senior Fellow at CSIS in Washington. 

Ambassador Marks is the author of several works on peacekeeping 

and the United Nations, as well as articles on terrorism, the 

professional U.S. military officer, and crisis management exercises. 

He is currently Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Foreign Service 

Journal. 

188 
Europe under General Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat 

Normandy on July 25, 1944. 

The following is a complete list of McNair Papers. For information 

availability of specific titles, contact the NDU Press. 

1. Ioseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 198

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Rep~ion, May 1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutio

Monarch? October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Contro/., November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, Novem

1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the T

World, February, 1990. 

7. Iohn Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Fore

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of Insurgenc

Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The PEPC

and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July ] 990. 

12. Ewan ]amieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, M

1991. 

13. Richard ]. Dunn III, From Gettysbur R to the Gulf and Beyo

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warf

March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Mili

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the C

War, February 1993. 

16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy 

Post-Soviet Europe, lune 1993. 

17. William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nat

Peacekeeping Operations, l une 1993. 
pgg

199~;s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 

Sanctions, 199(~-9.3, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia ~s "Velvet Divorce," Vi~egrad Cohesion, 

and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian 

Urquhart, Peacekeepin~: The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failin,q States, January 

1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure, 

February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, 

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a 

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.5.-/apan 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1994. 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force. Desert Storm and Beyond, 

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The Impossible 

Dream, January 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's Role ill 

Politics, January 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NAT(-) from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security 

m Transition, January 1995. 

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencin~ Chinese Arms Transfers, 

February 1995. 

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: 

A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, March 1995. 

38. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy k7 Transition: Dynamics of 

Continuity and Change, March 1995. 

39. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO 

Expansion, April 1995. 
44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training: A

Assessment, October 1995. 

45. EIli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Ara

Israeli Wars? October 1995. 

46. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defens

December 1995. 

47. M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, Janua

1996. 

48. Mark I. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Miilitar

January 1996. 

49. Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Trouble in Paradis

Europe in the 21st Century, March 1996. 

50. Alan L. Gropman, Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War I1: Myth a

Reality, August 1996. 

51. Ralph A. Cossa, The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Securi

September 1996. 

52. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, October 199

53. Donna Lee Van Cott, Defiant Again: Indrgenous Peoples and La

American Security, October 1996. 

54. Ivelaw L. Griffith, Caribbean Security on the Eve uf the 21st Centu

September 1996. 

55. Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, October 199

56. Simon V. Mayall, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition, January 1997. 

57. David F_. Johnson, Modern U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Wielding 

Terrible Swift Sword, July 1997. 
National Defense University Press Books~works by statesme

scholars, specialists, and students in the fields of strategic studie

defense policy, and military affairs (all volumes since 1996 an

selected back titles) 

Strategic Assessment--a comprehensive illustrated annual repo

prepared since 1995 on major strategic issues (all editions) 

Strategic Forums--four-page briefs on a wide range of internationa

security issues by leading defense analysts (more than 140 titles

McNair Papers~monographs on key foreign and defense polic

topics (all papers since 1996 and selected back titles) 

¢ 

http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/press/nduphp.html 

loint Force Quarterly (]FQ)~a professional military journal publishe

for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to promote understandin

of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and speci

operations forces. JFQ focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare

contingency planning, combat operations conducted by unifie

commands, and joint force development (all issues). 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel 

An on-line catalog of publications--both electronic and printed--wi

be available later this year. In the meantime, explore the Nation

Defense University home page for titles published by INSS as well 

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