RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 15, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0440-MR

CHRISTOPHER MARK JOHNSON APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE TIMOTHY KALTENBACH, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CR-00631

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2020, Appellant, Christopher Johnson (Johnson), was 

indicted by a McCracken County grand jury for second-degree assault. With the 

advice of counsel, Johnson pleaded guilty to an amended charge of first-degree 

wanton endangerment. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23

L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Thereafter, he retained new counsel and filed a motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. An evidentiary hearing was conducted during which 
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multiple witnesses testified, including Johnson. Having carefully considered the 

evidence, the trial court denied Johnson’s motion, and sentenced him to two-years’ 

imprisonment in accordance with his plea agreement. The court issued the 

following written findings:

a. [D]efendant discussed his case with at least two 

attorneys and an investigator at the Department of Public 

Advocacy prior to entering his plea. He and his counsel 

discussed his case both during a lengthy telephonic 

conference and in person. 

b. The defendant reviewed the evidence in his case 

provided in discovery with his attorney. 

c. His attorneys investigated whether entry of the plea 

would violate the terms of his probation and he was 

advised that entry of a guilty plea could result in 

violation of his probation. 

d. His attorneys were informed about the possibility of a 

video recording on the events leading to his charge and 

the defendant made an informed decision to accept a 

favorable plea without obtaining the video. 

3. The Court finds there was no coercion. No evidence 

of coercion was presented.

For the following reasons, we affirm. 

When determining whether a guilty plea was entered 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, trial courts 

must consider the totality of the circumstances. This 

inquiry is inherently fact-sensitive and we review for 

clear error.
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Commonwealth v. Patton, 539 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 

If, however, the trial court determines that the guilty plea 

was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or deny the 

motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion. This 

decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 

standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when it 

renders a decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable, 

unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.

Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (footnotes 

omitted). In support of his argument on appeal, Johnson recites the allegations 

raised in his motion to withdraw, and cites extensively to testimony presented 

during the hearing. Johnson specifically alleges deficient performance of counsel 

and that he “felt coerced into entering the plea.” 

To successfully establish the invalidity of a guilty plea

based upon the allegedly deficient performance of

defense counsel, the movant must satisfy both prongs of

the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)

and restated by this Court in Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58

S.W.3d 482, 486-487 (Ky. 2001). The movant must

demonstrate that: (1) defense counsel’s performance fell

outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance; and that (2) a reasonable probability exists 

that, but for the deficient performance of counsel, the 

movant would not have pled guilty, but would have 

insisted on going to trial. In making that determination, 

the trial court must indulge the strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.
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Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476, 481 (Ky. 2016) (citing Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2070. 

Having reviewed the arguments and record presented, Johnson’s 

assertions either lack specificity, or are otherwise unpersuasive. In consideration 

of the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court 

committed clear error, or that it ultimately abused its discretion in denying 

Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, we AFFIRM. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Sarah D. Dailey

Frankfort, Kentucky 

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky 

Melissa A. Pile 

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky