46 

~,TO's Future: 

Beyond Collective 

Defense 

Stanley R. Sloan 

~uwrf 4~ k l~qlL~ 

I1~ ~lIiiDmh Im 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
NATO'S FUTURE: 

BEYOND COLLECTIVE 

DEFENSE 

STANLEY R. SLOAN 

McNair Paper 46 

December 1995 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

[] President: Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF 

[] Vice President: Ambassador William G. Walker 

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[] Editor: Mr, Jonathan W. Pierce 

[] Editor for this issue: Ms. Mary A. Sommerville 

[] Editorial Assistant: Ms. Cherie R. Preville 

[] Distribution Manager: Mrs. Myrna Myers 

[] Secretat]y." Mrs. Laura Hall 

From time to time, INSS publishes McNair Papers to provoke thought and 

inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War 

era. These monographs present current topics related to national security 

strategy and policy, defense resource management, international affairs, 

civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and 

coalition operations. 

Opinions, conclusions, and reconunendalions, expressed or implied, are those of 

the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Governnu, nt agency. 

Cleared for puhlic release; distribution unlimited. 

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further 

permission, wida credit to the hlstitute for National Strategic Studies, 

Washington, DC. A courtesy copy of reviews m~d tearsheets would be 

appreciated. 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing ()ffice 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISSN 1071-7552 
This study is dedicated to the 

memory of Joe Kruzel, 

Nelson Drew, 

and Robert Frasure, 

who lost their lives in the noble 

pursuit of peace 
CONTENTS 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................... vii 

CONCLUSIONS: AN OUTLINE FOR 

A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN ........ 1 

PREMISES: NATO IN THE POST-COLD 

WAR WORLD .......................... 5 

PERSPECTIVES: WHICH NATO? ........... 14 

PARAMETERS: THE CONTEXT FOR 

CHANGE ............................. 21 

PROPOSALS: BEYOND COLLECTIVE 

DEFENSE ............................ 30 

APPENDIX A: NATO'S DAY-TO-DAY OPERATION: 

FROM DETERRENCE TO 

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS .............. 47 

APPENDIX B: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ..... 55 

APPENDIX C: THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT ............................. 59 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ..................... 73 

V 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This McNair Paper is based on an analysis originally prepared and 

published by the Congressional Research Service at the request of 

Senator William V. Roth, Jr., Jason Meyers, Heather Diehl, and 

Tabitha Swann provided research assistance for preparation of the 

report, and Barbara Hennix, Office of Senior Specialists, 

Congressional Research Service, provided production assistance. 

The author appreciates the many constructive comments and 

ideas contributed by reviewers in the Foreign Affairs and National 

Defense Division, the Office of Senior Specialists of CRS, and 

leaders in the Washington "think tank" and diplomatic community. 

The author also benefitted substantially from a series of 

continuing discussions with a small group of European 

Ambassadors to the United States and American experts on 

European security issues; reactions and comments provided by U.S. 

military officers participating in the NATO Staff Officers 

Orientation Course at the National Defense University; and 

discussions with military officers and civilian officials in classes at 

the NATO Defense College. 

vii 
NATO'S FUTURE: 

BEYOND COLLECTIVE 

DEFENSE 

CONCLUSIONS: 

AN OUTLINE FOR A NEW TRANSATLANTIC 

BARGAIN 

Under the much different international circumstances of the mid1980s, it was proposed that the NATO allies ensure NATO's 

future by striking "a new transatlantic bargain." The mare go',d 

of the new bargain was to increase European responsibilities for 

alliance missions. Today, a new bargain may be required to 

clarify NATO's future role as well as to enhance the European 

role in the alliance. Striking a new bargain would require the 

United States and the allies to commit themselves anew to a 

collective approach to advancing their common security 

interests. 

The Governments of the United States, Canada, and the 

European members of NATO believe that continuation of the 

transatlantic alliance will serve their vital interests, but there is no 

consensus among or within NATO member states concerning the 

missions that the alliance should pursue in the period of history 

that follows the end of the Cold War. Consequently no 

consensus exists on how the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization--the structure created to implement the Treaty's 

goals--should be reformed to serve their interests in the future. 

This report assesses the current state of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization and suggests a package of political measures 

and institutional reforms that could be included in a "new 

transatlantic bargain" designed to revitalize the alliance and 

reform the organization. The report concludes that current 

members of the alliance would be well advised to strike a new 
2 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

transatlantic bargain among themselves before inviting additional 

countries to join the 'alliance. A reasonable goal might be to 

conclude the process of revitalizing NATO at a summit meeting 

of NATO leaders in the first half of 1997. 

To be relevant, any new bargain would have to: 

• Accommodate the eventual addition of new members 

• Keep the door open to a constructive relationship with 

Russia 

• Accommodate European aspirations to develop a 

European pillar in NATO 

• Involve France on a regularized basis 

• Keep the United States interested and involved. 

The new bargain could include several elements: 

• A new statement of European and North American 

purpose for and commitment to the alliance. Allied 

governments would declare that they are committed to 

cooperate politically and militarily to help ensure a more 

stable international environment for the post-Cold War 

world. Such a statement would emphasize that the 

governments of the alliance share the responsibilities and 

burdens for maintaining international peace even if not all 

allies will be involved in every peace support operation. 

• A restatement of NATO's mission. In the early postCold War era, it was frequently said that NATO would have 

to become "more political." Even though NATO has always 

been a political as well as a military alliance, it is clear that 

NATO's unique functional role is to promote and implement 

political/military cooperation among member and panner 

states. Collective defense remains at the core of U.S. and 

allied commitments to the alliance. But NATO's day-to-day 

functions are already shifting from collective defense 

activities to collective responsibility sharing across a broad 

range of security-support activities. Such activities are not 

artificially limited by any geographic boundaries, as they do 

not fall under NATO's Article 5 collective defense mandate. 

For non-Article 5 purposes, NATO's future mission seems 

likely to focus increasingly on: 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 3 

--Preserving habits of military cooperation. Even if 

NATO per se never formally ran a peace-support 

operation, the habits of cooperation developed through 

cooperation in NATO would remain absolutely essential 

to the ability of the United States and its European allies 

to conduct successful multilateral military operations in 

the future. 

--Promoting peace. Developing cooperative military 

relations with non-NATO countries can help promote 

international peace. Political/military cooperation in 

NATO could help deter proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction and aggression by rogue states. 

--Restoring peace. In the post-Cold War world, it 

undoubtedly will continue to be necessary from time to 

time to use force to restore peace where it has been 

broken by aggression or other sources of conflict. When 

the allies agree to use NATO for such purposes, the 

alliance will require the means to respond to a diverse set 

of possible operational requirements. 

• A Joint Declaration of Congress recommitting the 

United States to the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty 

and new missions for NAT[). Such a declaration could 

provide a bi-partisan foundation for self-interested U.S. 

policies that seek to share the burdens of maintaining a stable 

international system in cooperation with like-minded nations. 

• Organizational reforms and initiatives intended to 

adapt the alliance to new circumstances of the post-Cold 

War world. The report presents a number of suggested 

reforms intended to help the alliance adjust to new 

circumstances. They include: 

--Give the European allies greater responsibility in 

the alliance by enhancing the positions of Deputy 

SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT, granting those 

senior European officers the authority to run military 

operations using NATO's integrated command 

structure when the United States is not to be a major 

contributor to the operations. The concept would help 

keep the European defense pillar within the framework 
4 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

of the transatlantic alliance, avoid unnecessary 

duplication of resources and command structures, and 

potentially provide a path for France to follow toward a 

regularized military relationship with NATO. 

--Experiment with joint NATO-Western European 

Union structures by merging NATO and WEU 

commands in the Mediterranean region 

--Organize enforcement of a peace agreement in 

Bosnia as a NATO combined joint task force (CJTF) 

--Consider reorganizing NAT() commands along 

functional rather than geographic lines 

--Seek explicit agreement on NATO decisionmaking 

procedures that would allow nations to stand aside 

from future non-Article 5 operations without 

exercising a veto over operations that are favored by 

most other allies 

--Strengthen cooperation with partner countries by 

making the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 

(NACC) the consultative body under which the 

Partnership for Peace program operates and 

establishing a position of NATO Assistant Secretary 

General for Eastern Affairs. 

• The establishment of a Transatlantic Cooperation 

Community among all members of NAT() and the 

European Union to provide a framework for 

consultations on the wide range of political, economic and 

security issues that affect the interests of all states in the 

European and North Atlantic area. This consultative 

framework would be intended to initiate projects that could 

be implemented through existing organizational structures. 

Such a community would embrace, not replace NATO, but 

would help broaden the U.S.-European relationship in areas 

not traditionally handled by NATO's politic-,d-military 

framework. 

Such a package of political initiatives and institutional 

reforms might provide the members of NATO with a revitalized 

cooperative structure and a more flexible set of tools with which 

to approach the new security issues and problems of the post- 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 5 

Cold War world. At the end of the day, however, no set of 

reforms or proposed initiatives will make any difference unless 

the United States and the other allies are willing to make a strong 

conmtitment to multilateral cooperation and to pay the price that 

may be required to create and maintain a relatively peaceful 

international system. Such a commitment has not been fully 

evident in the early years of the post-Cold War period. 

PREMISES: 

NATO IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 

Premises of Reform 

The suggestions developed in this report begin from several key 

premises, which are summarized below: 

• The Governments of the United States and the European 

allies want to preserve NATO. This study is sensitive to the 

view of those who argue that NATO has outlived its purpose 

and should be disbanded, and if the allies are not able to 

adjust NATO's strategy and operations to reflect a new sense 

of common purpose in the post-Cold War world, such 

observers may be on target. The main focus of this report, 

however, is the policy issue of what the U.S. administration 

and Congress, in cooperation with allied governments, may 

need to consider if they wish NATO to remain a useful 

instrument on behalf of their interests. 

• It appears unlikely that the allies can walk away from 

their commitment to open NATO's doors to new members, 

but enlargement of the alliance has become part of NATO's 

problem rather than a solution for the alliance's future. 

• The strategic concept prepared in 1991 pointed the 

alliance in certain directions that it has pursued since, but the 

future mission of the alliance remains clouded by different 

perceptions of its rationale. 

• NATO's mutual defense conmaitment in Article 5 of the 

Treaty of Washington, while still valid for all members of 

the alliance, has been put in NATO's "back pocket." 

Collective defense remains at the foundation of membership 

in the alliance, but NATO's day-to-day activities during the 
6 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

next period of history are likely to focus increasingly on the 

new "risks" and less and less on territorial defense. 

• The European members of NATO are not likely to 

relinquish fully their sovereignty within a supranational 

approach to defense in the foreseeable future, and certainly 

not as a result of the European Union's (EU) 

Intergovemmental Conference scheduled for 1996. But they 

are likely to develop cooperative approaches among 

themselves that prove fiscally, politically, or militarily 

necessary or attractive. Such cooperation is likely to remain 

largely intergovemmental in nature for the foreseeable 

future. 

• It would be wishful thinking for Americans to believe 

that the European allies on their own will be able to take 

over significant responsibilities for defense without LI.S. 

involvement. Future alliance military cooperation will not 

move forward successfully unless the allies shift back to a 

sharing approach from one that seeks division of burdens 

and responsibilities. 

• Implementation of NATO's Combined Joint Task Force 

(CJTP) initiative 1 is critical to make NATO more capable of 

responding to new security challenges. But this may not be 

possible until the upper levels of NATO's decisionmaking 

process are reformed to parallel the flexibility created by the 

CJTF at the operational level. NATO's role in helping 

ensure compliance with a peace settlement in Bosnia could 

provide a critical opportunity to test the CJTF concept. 

Change and Continuity 

The Governments of the United States, Canada, and the 

European members of NATO believe that continuation of the 

transatlantic alliance will serve their vital interests. No 

consensus among or within NATO member states exists, 

however, concerning the missions that the alliance should pursue 

in the period of history that follows the Cold War. 

Consequently, there is no consensus on how the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization--the structure created to implement the 

Treaty's goals under very different circumstances than those that 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 7 

obtain today--should be reformed to serve their interests in the 

future. 

Since the end of the Cold War, the NATO countries have 

been relatively successful in adjusting the policies and programs 

of the alliance to the new intemationai realities in Europe: 

• They have created the North Atlantic Cooperation 

Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 

program to promote consultations and cooperation between 

the NATO allies and the former Warsaw Pact states, Soviet 

republics, and former neutrals. 

• The allies have in the last 2 years set out on the path 

toward inviting new European democracies to join the 

alliance. 2 

• They have agreed to establish a special relationship 

between NATO and Russia. 

• They are currently studying the "why and how" of 

expanding the alliance to include new democracies. 

They have been reluctant, however, to make fundamental 

structural changes to the alliance itself. This reluctance grows 

out of several sources. One influence is a basic "if it ain't broke, 

don't fix it" philosophy. According to this view, the unity of the 

NATO allies was a major force bringing the Cold War to a 

successful conclusion and precipitating the end of the Warsaw 

Pact and the Soviet Union. NATO's proven structure helped 

produce that unity. NATO institutions translated that unity into 

an effective political and military posture. From tiffs perspective, 

proposed new structural arrangements would have to be 

demonstrably better than current ones to overcome the inertia 

created by NATO's past success. 

Another source of resistance to change is the fact that almost 

any structural change in NATO presumably would reduce the 

U.S. role in the alliance relative to that of the European allies. 

During the Cold War, given the magnitude of the Soviet threat, 

the United States was by necessity the dominant force in the 

alliance. At the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged 

as the world's only superpower, but the Europeans became much 

less reliant on the U.S. military guarantee for their day-to-day 

physical security. 
8 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

Many European governments accept that "Europe" should 

assume greater collective responsibility in the alliance. The 

members of the Westem European Union (WEU) have in recent 

years sought to build up WEU's planning, analytical, and 

coordinating capabilities to create the potential for the WEU to 

constitute a "European pillar" in the transatlantic alliance. They 

are reluctant, however, to give the impression that they want to 

reduce the U.S. role because they fear that the United States, in 

response, will pull out of Europe completely. Several highranking officials of several European governments have recently 

proposed a new Atlantic Community, to create a broader 

framework for cooperation between North America and Europe 

as a way of holding the transatlantic alliance together while 

various aspects of that relationship, including NATO structures, 

undergo change. 3 

Another fundamental problem is that the allies have not 

reached a consensus on what NATO's future mission should be. 

Positions taken by participants in the ongoing debate about 

NATO expansion and relations with Russia reflect a wide variety 

of assumptions about what NATO is and should become. Some 

still see NATO mainly as an insurance guarantee against a future 

revival of Russian power. Others view NATO as a vehicle for 

exporting stability and ensuring democratic development in the 

new democracies of Central Europe, and as a key part of a 

developing cooperative security system in Europe. Still others 

see the alliance as an instrument for developing multilateral 

responses to new security problems, particularly with regard to 

crisis management in Europe and beyond. Some U.S. officials, 

including members of Congress, see NATO as a way of 

developing effective burdensharing with our allies. Many 

Europeans regard NATO primarily as a way of keeping the 

United States "in" Europe. A factor for others is the reassuring 

framework that NATO provides for Germany. Some observers 

would include all these elements on the list of NATO's current 

and future functions. 

Each of these positions holds implications for NATO's 

desirable structure. If NATO is only an insurance policy, there 

may not be much need for structural change. On the other hand, 

if NATO is to assume a key role in helping ensure European 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 9 

stability, promoting crisis management cooperation among its 

members, and enlarging to take in new members, further 

evolution may be required in NATO's institutions and 

procedures. Some proponents of NATO enlargement have 

argued that expanding NATO membership would provide the 

main answer to NATO's future mission, but the enlargement 

issue has in fact become part of the problem rather than the 

answer to the question of what NATO's purpose should be in the 

future. Until the allies can produce a clearer statement of what 

NATO is and how the alliance serves their interests, all decisions 

concerning enlargement will remain contentious, and the allies 

will find it difficult to continue the process of reforming the 

alliance to ensure its future relevance. 

In addition, the Bosnian crisis has challenged NATO 

member states to decide what role the alliance should play in 

such circumstances and how NATO should relate to the United 

Nations and other organizations, including the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Western 

European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU). So far, 

the consequences of U.S. and European decisions regarding the 

crisis have damaged the image and credibility of both the United 

Nations and NATO. The allies therefore face NATO's future 

ag',finst the backdrop of perceived failure in their attempts to deal 

with the challenges posed by the Bosnian crisis. 

Given the fact that the NATO countries, including the United 

States, appear to want the alliance to be more than an insurance 

policy, and the likelihood that NATO will decide to include 

some new members in coming years, some questions about 

NATO's structure will have to be faced in the near future. In 

particular, if NATO is to be used as an instrument to help 

develop responses to a wide variety of new security challenges 

in and beyond Europe, it nfight become increasingly important 

to develop greater flexibility in alliance decisionmaking and 

implementation than was possible during the Cold War. 

The allies have already agreed to add "Combined Joint Task 

Forces" (CYI'F) headquarters to NATO force structure to give the 

alliance flexibility in putting together force packages tailored to 

specific crises or contingencies. But the ability to use this new 

tool has been hampered by disagreements about how the allies 
10 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

should exercise political control over the missions of CJTF 

headquarters. 

At the heart of this issue is the question of whether the 

military structure of NATO should continue to reflect a dominant 

U.S. role (in the person of the U.S. general who serves as 

NATO's supreme allied commander) or whether new approaches 

should be developed to reflect more balanced U.S. and European 

roles in the alliance. This is a fundamental question that stirs 

political emotions on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, it is one 

that the United States and the European allies will have to 

address at some point if they hope to develop more flexible 

options for responding to new security challenges. 

NATO'S 1991 Strategic Concept 

Just 2 years after the Berlin Wall fell, punctuating the end of the 

Cold War, President Bush and leaders of the other NATO 

governments in November 1991 agreed on a "strategic concept" 

intended to guide the alliance into the post-Cold War world. 

Even then, the allies recognized that NATO was moving beyond 

a mission focused on collective defense and toward more diverse 

tasks. The allied leaders agreed: "Risks to Allied security are 

less likely to result from calculated aggression against the 

territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences 

of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social 

and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 

disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and 

Eastem Europe. ''~ 

The NATO leaders affirmed in Rome that "Any. armed attack 

on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be 

covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty, ''5 but they 

clearly shifted the focus of defense cooperation in NATO when 

they declared, "However, Alliance security must also take 

account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be 

affected by other risks of a wider nature." And they staked out 

the Allied prerogative to use NATO as an instrument of their 

cooperation in dealing with such "'wider" issues when they noted 

that "Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultations 

among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 11 

where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their 

responses to such risks." 

Four years later, the allies have shifted NATO activities to 

reflect the concept's new direc~ons. For all intents zmd purposes, 

Article 5's mutual defense commitment, "although still valid for 

all members of the alliance and still an issue in the enlargement 

debate, has been put in NATO's "back pocket." The 

commitment remains part and parcel of the alliance, but NATO's 

day-to-day activities, from force and contingency planning at all 

major NATO commands to training and exercises among NATO 

national forces, are increasingly focused on the new "risks" and 

less and less on territorial defense. 6 

The extent to which NATO has already changed remains 

somewhat obscured by the continuing transatlantic policy 

differences over Bosnia and the debate over NATO enlargement. 

In addition, it appears that, in spite of the foresight demonstrated 

in the drafting of the new strategic concept, the political 

commitment to move NATO in some new directions was not 

shared equally by all member states. 

Shifting of Burdens and Responsibilities 

While trying to cope with enlargement and Bosnia, the alliance 

has also begun to de',d with the issue of U.S. and European roles 

in the alliance. The Clinton administration came to office 

apparently determined to change one important aspect of Bush 

administration policy toward European security. The Bush 

administration had expressed profound skepticism about attempts 

to revitalize the Westem European Union (WEU) and to give the 

European Community (now European Union, EU) a serious 

defense dimension] While the Bush administration had seen this 

process as a possible threat to NATO's vitality, the Clinton 

administration chose to see it as a natural shifting of transatlantic 

relations toward greater European responsibilities and burdens. 

At Maastricht in The Netherlands in December 1991, the 

European Union leaders gave new impetus to the communitybuilding process. They agreed to complete a monetary union 

and to adopt a common currency by 1999. The treaty included 

provisions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy based on 

intergovemmental cooperation among the community members. 
12 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

They agreed that the WEU would become the EU's defense arm, 

within the overall framework of the transatlantic alliance. The 

treaty came into effect on November 1, 1993. 

During the NATO summit meeting in Brussels in January 

1994, the Clinton administration pulled out all the stops in 

support of European efforts to develop a European defense 

identity. The summit communique included multiple references 

to the importance of such cooperation and the constructive role 

played by the WEU. The declaration included no fewer than 

eight references to WEU, seven references each to the European 

Security and Defense Identity and European Union, and two 

each to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the 

Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy goal. 

This warm embrace of European unity goals and institutions 

appeared to have broken a deadlock between France and the 

United States that had blocked progress on a number of 

important issues in NATO. Most importantly, the allies 

supported the U.S. initiative to establish Combined Joint Task 

Force (CJTF) commands that could be used to assemble tailored 

responses to specific military challenges. The initiative was 

designed by U.S. nfilitary planners primarily to give NATO a 

more flexible set of options for organizing and conducting 

military operations, but it was promoted at and after the summit 

largely as a vehicle for the European allies to take on military 

operations relying on NATO infrastructure but without active or 

major U.S. participation. 8 

This approach seemed to reflect a degree of U.S. wishful 

thinking that the process of European cooperation could move 

rapidly enough to provide meaningful short-term burdensharing 

relief to the United States. It also reflected some wishful 

thinking among Europeans about the willingness of EU member 

states to submit decisions on important military and security 

issues to some kind of common authority in the context of the 

EU. The overall impact was to set the allies looking for ways to 

"divide" responsibilities and burdens rather than to share them, 

as had been the rule during the Cold War. 

Over 18 months after the NATO summit, the allies have not 

been able to implement the CJTF initiative. This appears to be 

the case in large part because the CJTF sought to reform NATO 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 13 

operations at the business end of the stick without first reforming 

the decisionmaking process and structure required to set up and 

initiate CJTF operations. In particular, the United States and 

France have continued to disagree about the level and degree of 

political control of CJTF operations. 

Meanwhile, it has become clear that the high levels of 

optimism expressed at the summit about prospects for closer 

European defense cooperation greatly exceeded the ability of the 

European allies to make rapid progress toward establishing a 

clear European defense identity, to say nothing of a European 

defense capacity. Now, the EU members plan to review the 

Maastricht European security and defense arrangements in a 

1996 "Inter-Governmental Conference" (IGC), and in parallel 

within the WEU. 

NATO and Lessons from Bosnia 

Over the last few years, talk of NATO military cooperation 

seemed rather theoretical when the allies appear to be impossibly 

at odds over what to do about Bosnia. NATO got in trouble over 

Bosnia because neither the United States nor its European allies 

were willing to risk the sacrifices that could have been required 

to impose and enforce a peace there. This produced a tendency 

on both sides of the Atlantic to blame each other and NATO, as 

well as the United Nations, for the consequent policy failure. 

Without assessing the Bosnian experience further (which would 

go beyond the scope of this paper), it might be useful to suggest 

some "lessons" that the NATO countries might carry away from 

the experience. 9 

The Bosnian crisis has once again emphasized that no 

organization of sovereign states can function any more 

effectively than the consensus among its members permits. If 

neither the United States nor its European allies know what 

values or interests they are willing to defend, no bureaucratic 

arrangements will produce concerted action. 

Until there is greater global consensus about how to deal 

with threats to the peace, the NATO members may emphasize 

the importance of preserving the option of acting outside the 

U.N. framework as well as in response to U.N. requests for 

assistance. This issue is bound to be controversial among the 
14 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

allies, as many European nations will place a high premium on 

ensuring that there is a U.N. or OSCE mandate for most NATO 

military operations. Attitudes in the United States, however, 

currently favor more flexibility for the alliance and are 

particularly wary about NATO relinquishing operational control 

over military operations to U.N. authority. 

Bosnia has also demonstrated that NATO's "golden rule" of 

consultation still needs to be observed religiously if the alliance 

is to survive. NATO members have conducted extensive 

consultations throughout the Bosnian crisis, but the process 

broke down on some occasions, most notably when the United 

States announced it would no longer help enforce the arms 

embargo against the Bosnian govemment in November 1994. 

Now, the possibility of a peace settlement gives the NATO allies 

an opportunity to demonstrate the value of continued political 

and military cooperation in the alliance. 

Perhaps the most important lesson, drawn from both policy 

failures and potential successes in Bosnia, is that, even in the 

absence of a Soviet threat, U.S. leadership tailored to the new 

security realities may remain essential both to a stable European 

security system and to international stability more generally. 

Whether or not the United States will find the patience, 

creativity, and commitment required to provide such leadership 

remains at issue in the current American debate. 

PERSPECTIVES: 

WHICH NATO? 

And the King went to where the blind men were, and 

drawing near s~dd to them: "Do you now know what an elephant 

is like'?" 

And those blind men who had felt the head of the elephal-~t, 

said: "An elephmat, Sir, is like a large round jar. 

Those who had felt its era's, said: "it is like a wimaowing basket.'" 

Those who had felt its tusks, said: "it is like a plough-sh,'u'e." 

Those who had felt its trurtk, said: "it is like a plough." 

Those who had felt its body, said: "it is like a gr,'mary." 

Those who had felt its feet, said: "it is like a pillar." 

Those who had felt its back, said: "it is like a mortar." 

Those who had felt its tail, said: "it is like a pestle." 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 15 

Those who had felt the tuft of its tail, said: "it is like a broom." 

And they fought amongst themselves with their fists. 

declaring, "such is an eleph,'mt, such is not elephzmt, an eleph,'mt 

is not like that, it is like this." 

The Udana or 

the Solemn Utterances of the Buddha 

Like the blind men in this Indian fable, participants in the 

debate on NATO enlargement, the governments of NATO 

nations, potential applicants, and neighboring countries "see" 

NATO from many different perspectives. All these perceptions 

have legitimate political and analytical foundations, but all also 

have limitations as the sole explanation of what NATO is and 

what it should become. To one degree or another, each of the 

following perspectives must be taken into account in any 

reformulation of NATO's mission and restructuring of the 

organization. 

An Instrument for Dealing With Russia 

For many, NATO remains hnportant as an instrument for dealing 

with the power and influence of Russia. Today, of course, 

Russia poses no imminent military threat to the United States or 

its European allies, but some observers see NATO as an 

important insurance policy against a future revival of Russian 

expansionism. For Moscow's former Warsaw Pact allies, 

NATO's most important function is to help protect them from a 

reassertion of Russian influence and control. 

It is completely understandable that former Warsaw Pact 

countries and countries that were formerly part of the Soviet 

Union would want NATO to help reassure against Moscow's reimposition of control. The NATO governments share this 

interest, but they also see the need to make all possible efforts to 

develop a cooperative relationship with Russia, in the hopes of 

contributing to an external environment that will be conducive 

to democratic reform in Russia. 

To the extent that NATO allies emphasize the collective 

defense function of the alliance, they make it more difficult to 

pursue a cooperative relationship with Russia. If collective 

defense is emphasized, the Russians naturally ask "defense 
16 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

against what?" The shortcoming of this perspective, therefore, 

is that as long as there is a chance of Russia becoming a 

cooperative participant in European and international security 

relations, the allies cannot emphasize NATO's territorial defense 

function even if collective defense remains the bedrock of 

NATO membership. 

An Extender of Security and Stability 

Advocates of NATO enlargement argue that NATO's new 

function is to spread stability and security to the East, to fulfill 

NATO's Cold War mission, and to prevent a security vacuum 

from emerging in the area. For example, this is the premise of 

much of the analysis completed by the RAND team of analysts 

that has advocated rapid enlargement of NATO membership, a° 

This perspective is a logical continuation of NATO's function 

of ensuring a European security environment that supports the 

interests of its member states. It also recognizes the need to 

integrate new democracies within the Westem security 

community to avoid their slipping back toward totalitarian 

regimes or into regional conflicts that could spread beyond their 

borders. 

The limitation of this approach is that most Americans and 

even some western Europeans are not willing to make 

commitments to the security of the new democracies at a time 

when they do not appear physically threatened and when 

electorates want their governments to take care of problems on 

the home front. A majority of experts probably would argue that 

preserving stability and promoting democracy in Central Europe 

serves important U.S. and westem European long-term interests. 

The American public may not be convinced, however, that in the 

absence of imminent and overwhelming threats, money or 

political capital should be expended on defending against what 

they see as improbable contingencies. Some may believe that, 

even if these countries were threatened, the United States should 

not expose itself to nuclear or nonnuclear military risks on their 

behalf. 

From this perspective, NATO's future may rest uneasily on 

the argument that its principal new mission is to extend security 

and stability to Eastem and Central Europe. 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 17 

NATO as Part of a Cooperative European Security 

System 

In 1967, the NATO allies completed a study of the alliance's 

mission referred to as the "Harmel Report," named for Belgian 

Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, who led the study group. The 

report affirmed NATO's critical role in defense and deterrence 

but suggested that the alliance also should be an instrument for 

promoting detente between East and West in Europe. This added 

role was critical to NATO's survival at a time of shifting EastWest relationships. It demonstrated to allied electorates that 

NATO governments had no desire to perpetuate the costs and 

risks associated with the Cold War if tensions and threats could 

be reduced through political measures, including arms control 

negotiations, with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 

countries. 

When the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the Soviet Union 

disintegrated, and the Cold War ended, NATO had established 

clear credentials as a proponent of military cooperation as a path 

toward closer political relations. The NATO countries supported 

the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) as the 

broad framework for peaceful relations among European states. 

But they also gave NATO new instruments to promote close ties 

with the former adversaries--a forum for political consultation, 

the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and a program of 

military cooperation, the Partnership for Peace. 

The program, of outreach to former adversaries is 

undoubtedly essential to the future of NATO. This approach 

reflects continuity with the purposes of the alliance emphasized 

in the Harmel Report. Furthermore, the alliance would have 

very little credibility or appeal if it limited itself to defense 

cooperation among the present members. But it is also true that 

such cooperative ventures could be managed through other 

forums. The OSCE itself could arguably serve as the framework 

for much that is currently done in the NACC and the Partnership 

for Peace (although it would have to be given far more military 

security responsibilities fully to replace what NATO is doing 

through NACC and PfP). NATO's role as a key element in an 

emerging cooperative European security system therefore may 
18 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

be a logical continuation of policy, but, probably is not, on its 

own, a sufficient foundation for the alliance's future. 

An Instrument for Multilateral Military Cooperation 

NATO's principal function during the Cold War was to organize 

a defense against a potential Warsaw Pact attack that would deter 

such an attack and, if deterrence failed, be sufficient to preserve 

or restore the territorial integrity of NATO member states. 

Today, the NATO countries face no imminent threats to their 

security that compare with those encountered during the Cold 

War. The irony is that one consequence of the diminished threat 

environment is that continued military cooperation may be just 

as important as during the Cold War, but for different reasons. 

The almost-universal reaction of the U.S. and other NATO 

govemments, parliaments and electorates to the end of the Cold 

War has been to reduce military spending and shrink military 

forces and capabilities. This process has already made it more 

important for most countries to envisage operating in multilateral 

coalitions in all but the least demanding of military operations. 

The United States is perhaps the only country in the world that 

can envision operating militarily beyond its national borders 

unilaterally, without significant involvement with or assistance 

from coalition partners. But the American people and the 

Congress, as well as the administration, have decided that the 

United States should not be the world's "policeman." This means 

that even the United States will require international 

support--political, economic, and military--to promote and 

defend U.S. interests in a minimally stable international system. 

NATO is uniquely qualified to serve as a framework for the 

continuation of military cooperation to deal with new challenges 

to peace and stability. The day-to-day planning, training, and 

exercising in multilateral settings is critical to the ability of 

coalition forces to work together under fire. In addition, 

cooperation in NATO hi combination with defense cooperation 

in the Western European Union is viewed as necessary to avoid 

defense renationalization in Europe. Defense renationalization 

(greater self-reliance and less multilateral cooperation) would, at 

a minimum, waste defense resources. In the extreme, 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 19 

renationalization could produce new regional arms competitions 

and growing tensions among European states. 

Some analysts therefore believe that NATO's most important 

future function will be to sustain the habits of military 

cooperation that were developed during the Cold War. This 

approach is a key premise of NATO's New Strategic Concept, 

and currently no other organization has the mandate or the 

experience to perform the task of facilitating multilateral military 

cooperation. 

The main question mark hanging over this perspective is that 

allied performance in Bosnia and the failure to implement the 

plan for Combined Joint Task Forces have called into question 

the political will of NATO countries to cooperate in dealing with 

the new security challenges in the absence of a Soviet-style 

threat. 

A Burdensharing Tool 

NATO can also be seen as a way to ensure that other countries 

carry a fair share of the burdens of maintaining international 

peace. During the Cold War, some Americans saw NATO as a 

creator of burdens for the United States rather than as an 

instrument for sharing them. Some may still hold this view, but 

the U.S. military presence in Europe, down to approximately 

100,000 troops on shore, is now increasingly oriented toward 

force projection and peace operations rather than toward defense 

of European territory. The day-to-day routines of U.S. forces 

there, once driven by the Warsaw Pact threat, now are focused 

predominantly on "peace operations," a term defined by the U.S. 

Army to include "traditional peacekeeping as well as peace 

enforcement activities such as protection of humanitarian 

assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of 

sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishment of 

protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents." 

Today, therefore, NATO can be seen as a way for the United 

States to share with its closest military allies and parmer states 

the burdens of maintaining international security. The United 

States no longer views the defense of European territory as the 

principal mission of its forces in Europe. It is therefore 

increasingly possible to see NATO as a way to share the burdens 
20 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

of international security maintenance with other countries. The 

main limitation on this perspective is that the allies are still in the 

early stages of deciding what burdens should be shared (just in 

Europe, in the European area, or more globally) and have not 

found working solutions for the question of how to share 

responsibilities as well as burdens. 

A Way to Keep the United States in Europe 

One of the most pervasive European perceptions of NATO's role 

is that of keeping the United States involved in Europe. West 

and East Europeans believe that European peace and stability are 

still at least partly reliant on continued U.S. involvement in 

European affairs, particularly security affairs. Europe's 20thcentury experience leads many Europeans to the conclusion that 

riley are better off when the United States is directly involved in 

European security than when it is absent. This attitude has 

almost as much to do about internal relationships as it does with 

external threats. Russia is still a security concern for many 

Europeans, but they also are concerned about the dynamics of 

relations among themselves. In addition, some Europeans 

believe that a United States that is oriented toward another region 

or is isolated will be a much less predictable factor in 

international relations than one that is constructively involved in 

cooperation with European countries. 

Therefore, even though European countries no longer rely on 

the United States for their physical security, they believe that 

their interests are served by a continuing transatlantic 

partnership. The shortcoming of this perception is that many 

Americans might see no U.S. serf-interest in "remaining in 

Europe," and would see this factor as a disincentivc for keeping 

NATO alive rather than as an incentive. 

A Framework for Germany 

For Europeans, NATO and the transatlantic defense system 

remain an important part of the framework for Germany's place 

in and beyond Europe. Germany's constructive role and 

democratic accomplishments since World War II have built 

substantial trust and good will among its neighbors, east and 

west. Historical concerns linger long on the continent, however, 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 21 

and excessive German power, even if it is limited to political and 

economic power, is still seen as potentially destabilizing, even by 

the Germans themselves. 

Germany's security link to the United States through NATO 

helps reassure Germany's neighbors that Germany will not in the 

future feel it necessary, for example, to acquire nuclear weapons. 

The European Union is seen as a critical part of this framework 

for Germany, but the EU alone would not be sufficient 

reassurance for many in Europe, given the long and difficult 

nature of the process of European integration. Even if such 

concerns are not often voiced publicly, NATO is seen by many 

Europeans as a critical part of the reassurance system in Europe 

that has been responsible for peace and prosperity since World 

War II. 

NATO Seen Fully 

In the fable of the blind men and tile elephant, tile Blessed One 

finally observes "Well is it known that some Samanas and 

Brahmanas, cling to such views, sink down into them, and attain 

not to Nirvana." An "ideal" NATO is probably beyond the reach 

of member govemments today. And participants in the debate 

on NATO's future may well continue to "fight among themselves 

with their fists," as in the fable, declaring "such is an elephant, 

such is not an elephant." The future of the alliance most likely 

must be built on a foundation that accommodates all of these 

perceptions to one degree or another. 

PARAMETERS: 

THE CONTEXT FOR CHANGE 

Proposals for NATO's further evolution will be lacking unless 

riley take h~to account some basic and, in some cases, competing 

requirements. This analysis concludes that reform will have to: 

• Accommodate the addition of new members to the 

alliance 

• Keep the door open to a constructive relationship with 

Russia 
22 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

• Accommodate European aspirations to develop 

European pillar in NATO 

• Involve France on a regularized basis 

• Keep the United States interested and involved. 

Accommodate Addition of New Members 

The next few years undoubtedly will see a continuing debate 

about NATO enlargement. Without prejudging the outcome of 

that debate in the United States and in other alliance countries, 

the best bet today is that at least a few countries will be invited 

to join NATO over the next 5 years. If this is so, an enlarged 

membership is one of the important parameters influencing the 

shaping of NATO's future mission, decisionmaking process, and 

organization. 

If NATO were to continue the strategy and force deployment 

approach of the Cold War years, new members might be 

expected to increase defense spending, accept deployment of 

allied forces on their territory, and possibly host U.S. nuclear 

weapons. Allied countries might be expected to provide 

significant military assistance to help bring new members up to 

NATO standards. 

NATO's strategic concept and other alliance programs, 

however, have placed a different emphasis on the approach to 

new members. Because the alliance perceives no threat to the 

peace in Europe on the scale posed formerly by the Soviet 

Union, the focus for alliance forces and for those of new 

members is on preparations for a variety of peace operations and 

contingencies much less demanding than territorial defense 

against a superpower opponent. It is therefore reasonable to 

presume that, unless the threat situation changes dramatically, 

new members will not require massive defense spending or 

assistance to play a useful role ha NATO's new mission 

orientations or to be made more secure by becoming part of the 

"alliance. No clear threat scenario exists against which applicant 

country military forces can be planned, so the issue is one for 

applicant and NATO governments to address: what levels of 

military interoperability are essential in what time frame, what 

levels of spending appear possible and in balance with the 

country's available resources, and what assistance are the United 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 23 

States and other NATO countries willing to provide. In any 

case, the prospective new members will not be in a position to 

defend themselves against a superpower-type threat, but, in that 

respect, they will be in the same situation as every NATO 

country except, perhaps, the United States. 

The prospect of enlargement does not appear to require the 

allies to change direction from that set out in the strategic 

concept. It does suggest that the new allied perception of the 

post-Cold War threat environment is the one that will condition 

acceptance of new members. 

The simple addition of one, two, three, or more countries to 

the alliance raises questions about the efficacy of NATO's 

decisionmaking process. NATO traditionally has operated by 

consensus procedure. The process of building consensus among 

the current 16 members of the alliance is time consuming and, at 

times, difficult. How would the addition of new members ",ff-fect 

the ability of the alliance to reach timely decisions and act on 

behalf of the interests of the members? 

Enlargement clearly will not make the NATO consensus 

procedure easier or more expeditious, but would there be a large 

qualitative difference between today's NATO and an enlarged 

NATO? Perhaps not, but in any case, it might be prudent for the 

allies to consider amending NATO's procedures to permit certain 

decisions to be taken by something other than a pure consensus 

approach. An enlarged membership increases the importance of 

NATO decisionmaking and military command arrangements 

being sufficiently flexible to allow coalitions of the willing and 

able to act when the entire alliance membershi p does not join in 

or support a particular mission. 

Keep Door Open to Russia 

The effect on relations with Russia of inviting former Soviet 

allies to join NATO is one of the most contentious issues in the 

debate on NATO's future. It can be argued that the actions of the 

United States and its allies will only minimally affect the 

political development of Russia. Whether or not Russia will 

continue its democratic evolution or retreat to authoritarianism 

of some sort is probably dependent primarily on intemal Russian 

dynamics in which the United States and others have very little 
24 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

influence. The future of Russian democratization and economic 

liberalization more likely depends on whether or not Russian 

citizens are able to enjoy a higher quality of life in a reforming 

system than on Russia's relationship with NATO. 

On the other hand, U.S. and European policies will frame an 

important part of Russia's external environment. To the extent 

that these policies can make that environment conducive to a 

constructive Russian evolution, the U.S. and European 

Governments face important policy issues. Furthermore, Russia, 

even as distracted and non-threatening as it appears today, 

clearly has the political and military potential to call into 

question current hopes for the emergence of a stable and 

cooperative European security system. Whether European 

security relations move toward a cooperative model or toward 

some new form of confrontation would have profound 

implications for future U.S. foreign policy and defense spending. 

At this point, Russians across the political spectrum oppose 

NATO enlargement. At least some of this opposition is based on 

Russian images of NATO as a instrument used by the West to 

work against Russian interests--old Cold War thinking. If 

NATO's future were defined primarily as an insurance policy 

against Russian revanchism, there would be no hope of changing 

such Russian perceptions. On the other hand, over time, Russian 

perceptions might become more benign as they observe the 

continuing evolution of NATO's day-to-day activities toward a 

wide variety of peace support activities, some of which will 

involve Russian officials, officers, and military forces through 

the Partnership for Peace program and other NATO outreach 

activities. 

For most observers, it is apparent that the interests of the 

United States and its allies will be served best by a restructuring 

of NATO that protects against the possibility of a future threat 

from Russia while trying to make it less likely that such a threat 

will emerge. This will require that NATO's mission statement 

and activities reflect the desire to facilitate a Russian transition 

from Cold War opponent to post-Cold War partner. One 

American has observed that "'Only when the Western alliance is 

reoriented [to meet the new challenges of peace operations and 

preparations for possible regional conflict] can its membership 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 25 

be expanded without grave risk of pointlessly antagonizing 

Russia. ''12 

Accommodate "European Pillar" in NATO 

The model of a united Europe effectively looking after its own 

defense needs is one that would please many Americans as well 

as Europeans. Even under the best of circumstances, however, 

most analysts doubt that Europe will in the near future be able to 

overcome differing foreign policy orientations and national 

sovereignty concerns to become an international actor in its own 

right. Further, European nations do not now appear willing to 

invest the resources required to prepare for a wide range of 

autonomous military interventions outside Europe without U.S. 

assistance.13 

As noted above, the Clinton administration has taken a very 

favorable attitude toward European defense cooperation. U.S. 

experts and most officials understand that the process of 

European defense cooperation must be viewed as part of the long 

historical development of European unification more generally. 

Most of these experts are not misled by the rhetoric intended to 

promote the development of a common European foreign and 

defense policy. Marten van Heuven, for example, observes that, 

in spite of the tendency of the discussion to focus on institutional 

developments in Europe, U.S. policymakers will have to focus 

on the evolution of national European policies for the 

foreseeable future. According to van Heuven, "Emphasis on the 

architecture of European organizations--the tools to shape the 

purposes of Europe--obscures the fact that, for the present, the 

building blocs of Europe [will be] states, not international 

organizations .... Thus, even as American policy must creatively 

address the issue of relations with and within European 

organizations .... much of the American core business with 

Europe--trade relations perhaps excepted--wiU continue to have 

to be conducted on a bilateral basis. ''14 

Some administration officials are frank enough in off-therecord discussions to say that the United States will continue to 

deal with European officials who have democratically based 

authority to speak and to act. For the time being, there is no 

supranational defense entity on the European level, and it is not 
26 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

up to the United States to create such an entity. Therefore, even 

while hoping for the emergence of more coherence on the 

European level, the United States will continue to see 

representatives of national governments as the most reliable 

interlocutors on defense and security issues. 

Nevertheless, NATO reform will need to take into account 

both the European aspirations to reflect greater European unity 

in their defense and foreign policies and the U.S. desire that the 

Europeans share more equitably the burdens of defense. It may 

be difficult to balance these desires with the reality that European 

cooperation will develop only slowly. NATO reform cannot be 

premised on the existence of a single European authority for 

defense when one is not likely to emerge during the next period 

of history, but NATO reform will have to be flexible enough to 

accommodate .greater European responsibility and burdens in the 

relationship with the United States. 

Regularly Involve France 

French President Charles de Gaulle removed French forces from 

NATO's integrated command structure in 1967, maintaining that 

subordination of French forces in peacetinle to an American 

commander was an unacceptable qualification on French 

national sovereignty. Until the Cold War ended, the allies 

counted on French participation should NATO be attacked by the 

Warsaw Pact, but worried that French absence from peacetime 

cooperation would make it difficult, if not dangerous, for NATO 

and French forces to fight together should war come. The 1991 

Gulf War ended up making this point clearly, which fortunately 

had not been tested during the Cold War. 

A lesson that emerged from the coalition effort to remove 

Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait was that the forces of 

NATO allies were able to integrate their efforts against Iraqi 

forces because of the experience they had in preparing for a 

Warsaw Pact attack. U.S. and British forces, for exarnple, 

worked together very closely and successfully. The French 

forces that were involved, however, had a difficult time fitting 

into allied operations. Because of incompatibilities in military 

equipment, communications, and procedures, French forces had 

to operate parallel to but largely separate from NATO forces. 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 27 

Because France has both the capabilities and the political will 

to contribute to military efforts to maintain international peace, 

it has become increasingly important to bring those capabilities 

into a closer relationship with the forces of other NA'FO 

countries. French resistance to subordinating its forces to U.S. 

command remains strong, however, and the allies have been 

forced to find ways to adjust decisionmaking procedures to 

accommodate French participation. As one expert observed, 

"Since French reluctance to commit its forces to NATO's 

integrated command structure has remained firm, alternative 

mechanisms for overcoming that reluctance have had to be 

found, if only because France's military assets are too important 

to be left outside the NATO-WEU coalition framework. ''15 

Over the last 2 years, the allies have attempted to 

accommodate French political concerns by adjusting the way the 

alliance does business. These adjustments have facilitated closer 

military cooperation with France, but they do not constitute a 

reliable permanent solution. The most difficult unresolved issue 

ks that of political control of non-Article 5 operations conducted 

under NATO auspices or under WEU auspices with NATO and 

U.S. support. The problem is that the French Government still 

regards NATO's integrated command structure as a U.S.- 

dominated organization, because an American senior officer 

always serves as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

(SACEUR). 

The French particularly object to U.S. command and control 

of operations in which the Uniled States is not the principal 

military participant. Because of this French concern and the 

equally strong U.S. desire to keep the SACEUR in charge of 

military operations run out of one of his subordinate commands, 

the allies have not been able to agree on the final political 

guidance required to implement the CJTF initiative. 

Resolution of this issue is absolutely critical to the future 

ability of the allies to respond effectively to non-Article 5 

demands. The allies have already made some significant 

concessions to encourage closer French cooperation. For 

example, the role of NATO's Defense Planning Committee 

(DPC), in which France does not participate, has been deemphasized by blending what would previously have been 
28 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

discussions held in the DPC into the North Atlantic Council 

framework, where France does participate fully. (The French 

prefer that all important decisions be taken in the context of the 

North Atlantic Council, NATO's only decisionmaking body that 

derives its authority directly from the North Atlantic Treaty.) 

Further evolution of the NATO system of political 

consultation, planning, and decisionmaking for military 

operations may be required, however, to cut a deal with the 

French that would regularize their participation in a systematic 

and effective approach to non-Article 5 military operations. 

Keep the United States Interested and Involved 

Without an interested and hwolved United States, NATO loses 

all meaning. Some analysts have been led by recent events to 

conclude that this has already happened. In July 1995, colunmist 

William Pfaff wrote that NATO's present "impotence" results 

because the alliance is "an agent of American policy, at a time 

when both executive and congressional branches of American 

government are convinced that the American public will 

electorally punish any decision placing U.S. forces at risk. ''16 If 

Pfaff is right, then it is critically important to NATO's future that 

Americans see their interests as served by continuing military 

cooperation with the European allies. Why should the United 

States be willing to make any sacrifices to perpetuate such 

cooperation? 

What are U.S. interests in maintaining the alliance? The 

United States finds itself at the end of the Cold War facing no 

imminent threats to its vital national security interests, and in the 

absence of a Soviet/Communist threat, the United States faces a 

spectrum of options between two extremes. One would be to 

become the global policeman, unilaterally enforcing sufficient 

world order to protect long-term U.S. political, economic, and 

security interests. Neither U.S. public nor elite opinion supports 

such a role. Another extreme would be to withdraw, taking an 

isolationist posture. Even though current American behavior 

suggests in many respects either an isolationist, unilateralist, or 

escapist approach to the world, most experts and officials 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 29 

apparently reject this, at least in principle. Clearly, a range of 

multilateral options is found between these two extremes. The 

world apparently needs policing if regional conflicts are not to 

spread. In the longer term, the United States hopes to encourage 

the development of indigenous security arrangements in each 

region of the world to help maintain stability. 

In the near term, if the United States does not want to be the 

world's policeman but believes that its values and interests 

require maintaining a degree of order in the international system, 

it presumably will have to rely on cooperation with other 

countries to police the intemational system. Multilateral military 

operations can be ineffective or even dangerous if not planned 

and practiced in advance. In theory, that leaves open a wide 

variety of organizational options, but when one looks for nations 

with compatible political objectives and military forces capable 

of, and experienced in, operating successfully with U.S. forces, 

most of them are members of NATO. 

Perhaps the United Nations might one day provide a 

framework for military cooperation, but the consensus in the 

United States today is that we will not be able to count on the 

United Nations for effective operational control or even 

coordination of military operations for some time into the future. 

Many members of Congress, perhaps a majority, would oppose 

putting U.S. forces into combat under a U.N. command unless it 

is actually a U.S. or NATO command. 

In sum, it appears that the United States and its NATO allies 

(and the new democracies who aspire to membership in NATO) 

have a continuing rationale for maintaining the Atlantic alliance 

and adapting it to the security environment of the post-Cold War 

world. In spite of the bad experiences in Bosnia, and the reality 

that there will be U.S.-European differences over security policy 

issues in the future, it appears that the United States and its allies 

have few promising options beyond NATO in the foreseeable 

future if they wish to preserve a degree of global stability and 

assume that the use of force may be required. 
30 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

PROPOSALS: 

BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain 

Under much different international circumstances in the mid1980s, it was suggested that the NATO allies ensure NATO's 

future by striking "a new transatlantic bargain. "'~7 The main goal 

of the new bargain was to increase European responsibilities for 

alliance missions. Today, a new bargain may be required to 

clarify NATO's future role as well as to enhance the European 

role in the alliance. Most of all, however, a new bargain would 

require the United States and the European allies to commit 

themselves anew to a collective approach to advancing their 

common security interests. 

Before the allies issue the first bavitations to potential new 

alliance members, they might wish to strike a new bargain 

among themselves at a summit meeting, for example in the first 

half of 1997, that would make clear how they see their 

commitments to the alliance and to NATO's new roles and 

responsibilities. 

Sharing Burdens and Responsibilities 

If the alliance is to preserve a degree of unity of purpose in the 

post-Cold War world, the allies will have to reform NATO's 

approach to military cooperation in ways that share military 

burdens and responsibilities rather than dividing military 

burdens and responsibilities. The tendency of recent years has 

been to divide. Until recently, the United States has largely told 

the Europeans that Bosnia is their problem; meanwhile, many 

Europeans have been looking for ways to accomplish military 

missions without U.S. assistance. This approach was enshrined 

in the January 1994 NATO summit that made much of separate 

European and American responsibilities and raised questions 

about the U.S. commitment to defense cooperation with its 

European allies. 

The alliance probably cannot survive if these approaches 

persist. Rather, the allies would have to make a commitment to 

return to a sharing approach in which all allied governments 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 31 

made a commitment to cooperate in NATO for the purpose of 

promoting international peace and stability. If future NATO 

programmatic and organizational decisions are not premised on 

a sharing rather than a dividing approach, allied cooperation will 

continue to deteriorate. Moreover, a sharing approach 

suggests that there should be no artificial geographic boundaries 

placed on non-Article 5 military cooperation. This means that 

non-Article 5 cooperation would be constrained only by the 

willingness and ability of the allies to contribute in any given 

instance. The mutual defense commitment contained in the 

NATO treaty's Article 5 will likely remain limited by the 

geographic description of its coverage in Article 6, but there is 

nothing in the treaty that geographically constrains non-Article 

5 military cooperation. 

Restating NATO's Mission 

NATO has been and always will be a political as well as a 

military alliance. In the early post-Cold War era, it was popular 

to say that NATO would have to adapt to new circumstances by 

becoming "more political." It is increasingly clear, however, that 

NATO's unique functional role remains its utility as a means to 

promote and implement political/military cooperation among 

member and partner states. As all member countries shrink the 

size and capabilities of their armed forces, the ability to form 

coalitions to deal with a wide variety of peace-threatening 

situations is becoming increasingly important. As British expert 

David Greenwood has put it, NATO is moving from an 

"alliance-in-being" to a "coalition-in-waiting," or perhaps, 

carrying the thought one step further, variable coalitions-inwaiting. 

Collective defense remains at the core of the U.S. and allied 

conmfitments to the alliance. This analysis concludes, however, 

that collective defense will not be the principal focus of NATO's 

activities during the next period of history. Moreover, it would 

be politically divisive to try to enlarge the alliance and still 

maintain a constructive relationship with Russia if collective 

defense were to remain the main focus of alliance activity in this 

period. This change in NATO's mission is already reflected in 

NATO's routine work schedule) 8 NATO's day-to-day activities 
32 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

are shifting from collective defense to collective responsibility 

sharing across a broad range of security-support activities. Such 

an evolution is the only one that can accommodate all the factors 

currently influencing U.S. and allied security interests. In this 

case, NATO's future mission will increasingly focus on the 

following mutually reinforcing goals: 

• Preserving habits of military cooperation, by 

preparing allied commanders and forces to participate in 

multilateral military operations to ensure a high degree of 

readiness and interoperability among alliance and partner 

forces for whatever missions NATO nations may agree to 

take on, whether or not such missions are directed through 

the integrated command structure; 

• Promoting peace, by developing cooperative military 

relations with partner countries, including Russia, through 

the Partnership for Peace program and the North Atlantic 

Cooperation Council, and through the cooperative use of 

allied military forces to provide humanitarian relief and 

disaster assistance, when necessary; using NATO 

cooperation to deter aggression by rogue states and 

discourage and deter proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction; and 

• Restoring peace, by conducting multilateral military 

operations intended to restore or enforce a peace that has 

been broken by aggression or other sources of military 

conflict. 

As long as no NATO country faces the kind of threat that 

used to be posed by the Soviet Union, NATO's strategy and force 

deployments will look substantially different than during the 

Cold War. They will be intended largely to support the functions 

specified above. This means that, unless circumstances change, 

the Article 5 mutual defense con~ifirment will remain in NATO's 

"back pocket," readily available if necessary in the future, but 

not the day-to-day preoccupation of the alliance. Such a posture 

will help the allies make a more effective allocation of limited 

defense resources while reassuring Russia and other nonmember 

countries that their interests will not be threatened and, in fact, 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 33 

will be reinforced by defense cooperation that develops around 

the nucleus of NATO member states. 

This new mission focus, if it is to serve as NATO's main 

rationale for the next period of history, will have to be made 

clear to allied electorates, potential applicants, and countries that 

have parmership arrangements with NATO but that might not 

qualify for NATO membership in the near future, including, and 

especially Russia. A restatement of NATO's missions could take 

the form of a revised New Strategic Concept, accepted by allied 

governments at a summit meeting within the next 2 years. 

Furthermore, NATO will have to continue to evolve its internal 

organization, command structure, consultative and 

decisionmaking procedures, and its training and exercise routines 

to implement its new mission objectives. 

Reaffirming U.S. Leadership and Commitment 

Perhaps the most important reform that the United States could 

initiate on behaff of NATO would be to start the process of 

rebuilding confidence among the allies in U.S. leadership and 

support among the American people for a U.S. international role 

based on collaboration with like-minded democracies. Such a 

commitment does not necessarily require deploying more troops 

in Europe or spending more money on defense. It would require 

greater clarity in U.S. executive and congressional policies about 

the U.S. role in the world. 

One way to initiate the process of constructing a new form 

of U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War world could be for the 

Congress to paxs, and the President sign, a Joint Declaration of 

Congress recommitting the nation to the goals of the North 

Atlantic Treaty. Those goals, as laid down in the preamble and 

articles 1 and 2, include: 

• Safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and 

civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of 

democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law; 

• Promoting stability and well-being in the North Atlantic 

area; 

• Uniting their efforts for collective defense and for the 

preservation of peace and security; 
34 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

• Contributing toward the further development of peaceful 

and friendly international relations by strengthening their 

free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of 

the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and 

by promoting conditions of stability and well-being; and 

• Eliminating conflict in their international economic 

policies and encouraging economic collaboration between 

any or all of them. 

At the same time, the Joint Declaration could accept the 

principle that the new forms of cooperation in NATO outlined in 

the mission discussion above are essential to the U.S. interest of 

promoting international peace and stability while not becoming 

the world's policeman. Such a Joint Declaration could provide 

a bi-partisan foundation for serf-interested U.S. policies that seek 

to share the burdens of maintaining a stable international system 

in cooperation with NATO allies and partner states. 

Organizational Reform 

Enhancing positions of Deputy SACEUR and Deputy 

SACLANTo As noted earlier, the European members of NATO 

are not likely to relinquish fully their sovereignty within a 

supranational approach to defense in the foreseeable future, and 

certainly not as a result of the Intergovemmental Conference 

scheduled for 1996. But they are likely to develop cooperative 

approaches among themselves that prove fiscally, politically, or 

militarily necessary or attractive. NATO will have to be 

sufficiently flexible to accommodate this process. 

By the same token, NATO's ability to perform its new 

missions will continue to be handicapped by a French position 

outside the framework of NATO military cooperation. The first 

reform suggested, intended to respond to this requirement, would 

restructure NATO to facilitate European command of operations 

taken on by largely European forces without damaging NATO's 

integrated command structure or breaking unity of command. 

Under this proposal, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

(SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 

(SACLANT) would remain U.S. officers, and their deputies 

Europeans. The Deputy SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT 

would be nominated by the members of the Western European 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 35 

Union or of the European Union, if the Europeans wish, as a way 

of bringing NATO's European pillar into a close relationship to 

the NATO military command. The nominations would be 

approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to ensure the 

involvement of those NATO allies who are not WEU or EU 

members. The two European officers could also logically be the 

most senior military officers in the WEU or EU structure, as 

determined by the European allies. 

In this new approach, the allies would have a variety of ways 

to conduct a non-Article 5 mission using the Combined Joint 

Task Force concept. When the allies decide in the North Atlantic 

Council to pursue a non-Article 5 mission in which the United 

States would participate fully, and to form a Combined Joint 

Task Force for the purpose, the SACEUR (or SACLANT) would 

be in charge, as would be the case under current NATO 

procedures. NAC guidance would flow through the NATO 

Military Committee to the SACEUR, down through a Major 

Subordinate Command to the CJTF commander. 

In another scenario, if the NAC decided that the operation 

should be conducted largely by European allies with a 

supporting U.S. role, the Deputy SACEUR (or Deputy 

SACLANT) would assume control of the operation, with full 

access to the assets of the integrated command structure. In a 

third scenario, if the NAC decided that the European allies 

should take full responsibility for the operation without any U.S. 

role, the Deputy SACEUR (or SACLANT) would shift to his 

European (WEU or EU) command function and run the 

operation independent of U.S. or NATO support. In retum for 

this strengthening of European responsibilities in the Alliance, 

the package deal would require that France negotiate reliable and 

predictable conditions with the other allies under which France 

would cooperate with NATO's reformed command structure. 

The goal of the allies would be to make practical arrangements 

for French involvelnent without sacrificing the integrity of the 

command structure. 

It would be desirable if, in the first experience with such a 

system, the Deputy SACEUR were a French officer, and the 

Deputy SACLANT a British officer. (Currently, British officers 

hold both the Deputy SACEUR and the Deputy SACLANT 
36 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

positions.) In the future, the Europeans might choose a German 

officer for the Deputy SACEUR position, but today Germany is 

still limited by domestic constraints on the use of its military 

forces. Thus Britain and France are likely to remain willing 

contributors in responses to non-Article 5 military contingencies. 

Such a structure would create a way for the European allies 

to take responsibility for leadership and burdens within the 

NATO structure at a time when they have not elaborated a WEU 

or EU structure sufficient to support militarily demanding 

operations. If the system worked, it might help avoid 

unnecessary duplication of structure and resources that could 

result from elaborating separate WEU/EU capabilities. This 

approach would also have the advantage of not disrupting 

normal command relationships from the SACEUR/Deputy 

SACEUR (or SACLANT/Deputy SACLANT) level down 

through a major subordinate command to a Combined Joint Task 

Force operation. 

One concem about European leadership of non-Article 5 

operations has been that an Article 5 contingency could grow out 

of a non-Article 5 operation (for example, if the operation led to 

an attack on a NATO member's territory). The fact that the 

operation had been kept within NATO's command structure 

would allow the SACEUR easily to assume control to manage an 

Article 5 response, if the NAC agreed that such a response was 

necessary. 

In order for such a system to work, when the NAC commits 

to a mission, the decision would have to specify what resources 

allies are willing to devote to that mission. It would be 

particularly important for the United States to make clear what 

assets it wouM make available in the case of a largely European 

operation. The United States would also be expected to follow 

through with its commitments once they are made. As Patricia 

Chilton argues, "Even greater damage [to allied cooperation] 

would result from a situation in which the US initially agreed to 

a WEU operation using NATO assets and CJTF headquarters, 

but later withdrew from this position. ''~9 

Merging NATO and WEU structures in the 

Mediterranean region. If the allies are not able in the near 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 37 

term to agree to the reform of the command structure described 

above, or in combination with the reform, they might wish to try 

a more limited experiment with a merger of NATO and WEU 

command structures in the Mediterranean. An Italian defense 

analyst has suggested making the Mediterranean the region in 

which to concentrate efforts to develop the WEU as a means to 

strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Maurizio Cremasco 

has proposed that subordinate headquarters under NATO's 

command in the Mediterranean, Allied Forces South 

(AFSOUTH), be restructured to be able to operate as NATO and 

WEU headquarters, with their commanders wearing NATO, 

WEU, and national hats. In a second phase, according to 

Cremasco, "The command and control of the AUied Forces in the 

Southern Flank is rotationally assumed by a European Admiral 

(who will wear a NATO and a WEU hat), flanked by an 

American Admiral (who will maintain his NATO and national 

hat). ,,2o 

Cremasco argues that this approach would encourage deeper 

security and defense integration of NATO and WEU, facilitate 

NATO and WEU crisis management activities in the 

Mediterranean, prevent unnecessary duplication of a European 

military structure parallel to that of NATO, ease implementation 

of the CJTF concept in the region, and help keep development of 

a European security and defense identity within the transatlantic 

context. 

A Combined Joint Task Force for Bosnia? With the 

prospect of a peace settlement in Bosnia, NATO could seize on 

the opportunity to structure the planned Implementation Force 

([FOR) as a NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Such an 

approach could help turn NATO's bad experience with Bosnia 

into a positive outcome. 21 A collective NATO force in Bosnia 

could be a credible presence for all former combatants and help 

ensure the success of the peace settlement. Allies and partner 

nations, including Russia, could contribute forces to the 

presence, and the burden could be shared by many nations rather 

than by a few. If some allies are reluctant to call the [FOR a 

C3TF, the alliance could nonetheless use the operation as a test 

case for command and decisionmaking procedures to be agreed 

for future CJTF operations. 
38 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

Reorganizing NATO commands along functional lines. 

NATO commands are currently organized on a geographic basis, 

reflecting NATO's plan for defense against a Warsaw Pact attack 

as well as a political balance among NATO nations in the 

distribution of command organizations and responsibilities. 

With NATO increasingly focused on performing a wide variety 

of tasks largely beyond the borders of NATO members, the old 

geographically focused organization may no longer be the most 

effective way to do business. 

A new organization might be constructed along functional 

lines, designed to facilitate training, exercising, and deployment 

of forces to meet the new diverse challenges to security. At the 

same time, a number of current commands could be combined 

and the entire structure streamlined. The exact nature of a 

functional reorganization is beyond the scope of this study, but 

it is clear that such a reform would inevitably meet substantial 

bureaucratic resistance from within national military 

establishments. It would have to be carefully planned in order to 

produce not only an effective military organization but also one 

that reflects a balance of political interests in the alliance. 

Because there are so many self-interested perspectives on 

this issue, NATO might usefully appoint an independent 

commission composed of retired military officers from a wide 

range of NATO nations, respected military scholars and 

independent experts to develop recommendations for a new 

functionally organized command structure. 

Facilitating coalitions of the willing and able. NATO is 

a consensus-based organization. According to the NATO 

Handbook, "When decisions have to be made, action is agreed 

upon the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no 

voting or decision by majonty. .... 22 

As long a~s NATO remains a voluntary association among 

sovereign states the organization will operate on the basis of 

consensus. In the less orderly, less predictable post-Cold War 

world, and particularly with an expanded NATO membership, 

the requirement to achieve consensus for all actions that "allied 

countries might propose or consider could, in theory, immobilize 

the alliance. 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 39 

This issue was addressed in a nonattribution paper that 

circulated at NATO headquarters in 1994 and was provided to 

CRS anonymously in 1995. According to the view of its author, 

who at the time was involved at a high level in allied 

decisionmaking, NATO's current consensus system forces 

member nations either to approve an operation politically or to 

draw criticism from others for "blocking" action. In the 

observer's view, "A better solution would provide an 'emergency 

exit' for those unable or unwilling to participate which does not 

prohibit action by others. This can be done by removing the 

requirement for consensus for Article 4 operations." 

According to the author of this informal paper, the advocacy 

of a non-consensual approach to decisionmaking for non-Article 

5 operations was rejected. The solution proposed would have 

created a separate NATO decisionmaking body for non-Article 

5 operations, ranging from humanitarian relief and disaster 

assistance through peacekeeping to peace enforcelnent. 

According to the proposal, decisions in that body could be taken 

by at least two-thirds of Alliance members, with the majority 

including at least two of the four largest financial contributors to 

the alliance. 

Any majority voting procedure for non-Article 5 operations 

probably will remain beyond political acceptance for the 

foreseeable future. And it should be noted that the consensus 

requirement can in fact facilitate decisionmaking by forcing 

countries to make difficult decisions in order to remain 

influential and respected members of the alliance. But the 

challenge of finding a way around the potential consensus barrier 

for non-Article 5 operations remains. In a time of reduced 

budgets and attempts to simplify governmental operations, it 

may not be prudent or necessary to create a separate 

decisionmaking body for non-Article 5 operations. And so 

perhaps the focus should be on decisionmaking procedures for 

non-Article 5 operations in the North Atlantic Council itself. 

The allies could consider less formal alternatives to a 

weighted majority system like that proposed in the anonymous 

draft. Those could include allowing states that did not want to be 

politically linked to a given operation to "take a footnote" on a 

decision in the NAC as allies have done from time to time during 
40 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

the alliance's history on decisions that posed domestic political 

or other difficulties for them. This would allow countries to opt 

out without blocking the operation. Countries could also take the 

option of remaining silent on a decision, neither agreeing to it 

nor footnoting their opposition. In the case of strong opposition, 

a country could perhaps even ask that none of its assets or 

contributions to infrastructure expenses be used in support of the 

operation. In all cases, the SACEUR would be required to 

render a .judgment concerning whether or not the operation 

remained feasible in light of whatever support was offered by 

member states and whatever support was going to be withheld. 

Strengthening cooperation with partners. As the alliance 

moves toward accepting new members over the next few years, 

it will be increasingly important to establish and nurture 

cooperation with partner countries that are not yet members. 

Such an effort is necessary to encourage partner countries to 

concentrate on the goals of developing effective civilian control 

of their military establishments and preparing to cooperate in 

NATO's new missions. Encouraging new democracies to move 

away from their understandable preoccupation with territorial 

defense and their residual fears about Russian domination would 

help create a more constructive, cooperative atmosphere in 

Central and Eastem Europe. Such an orientation would also help 

mitigate Russian concerns that NATO is working against 

legitimate Russian security interests. 

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), created 

during the Bush administration, and the Partnership for Peace 

(PfP) program, an initiative of the Clinton administration, could 

work together more effectively. The NACC is a forum where all 

countries that wish to participate in a dialogue with NATO 

countries can do so; 23 the Partnership for Peace program allows 

any NACC nation to develop a program of cooperation tailored 

to their specific circumstances, abilities and needs. The Clinton 

administration has tended to give short shrift to the NACC while 

it concentrated on the Partnership for Peace and enlargement. In 

fact, however, the NACC and the PfP are natural partners ha a 

program of NATO outreach. 

U.S. defense analyst Jeffrey Simon has proposed a program 

designed to enhance the effectiveness to NATO's outreach to 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 41 

potential new members as well as to countries that may not seek 

such membership or may qualify only many years hi the future, u 

Simon proposes 

• Institutionalizing the NACC as the political/consultative 

umbrella under which the individual PfP programs would 

operate 

• Establishing a position of NATO Assistant Secretary 

General for Eastern Affairs to provide political oversight and 

coordination for PfP's military activities ,and political 

objectives. 

A Transatlantic Cooperation Community 

If the United States should recommit to an active and involved 

U.S. role in and beyond Europe, new cooperative approaches 

beyond those falling in NATO's mandate are likely required. 

Even though NATO's goals, listed above, include elimination of 

economic conflict in relations among the allies, the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization has traditionally focused primarily 

on military aspects of security. In today's world, security is 

increasingly dependent on a variety of interdependent factors, 

including transnational political, economic, military, and other 

aspects. 

There is apparently a growing sentiment in Western Europe 

that the challenges faced by the NATO allies cannot be 

completely resolved within the narrow confines of the alliance, 

or even in a treaty between the United States and the members of 

the European Union. The diverse nature of post-Cold War issues 

affecting allied interests suggests the need for a new initiative 

designed to broaden the context of the transatlantic relationship. 

The point of doing so would be to give form and substance to the 

apparent belief of all allied governments that, even in the 

absence of a Soviet threat, they continue to share many values, 

goals, and interests. 

At the annual Wehrkunde Conference in Munich, Germany, 

in early February 1995, foreign and defense ministers from 

Britain, France, and Germany separately proposed a new 

European-American pact. German Defense Minister Volker 

Ruhe called for a "new, wider trans-Atlantic contract" designed 
42 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

to emphasize the importance of military, political, and economic 

cooperation on behalf of Western economic interests and 

democratic values, z~ The approach was supported by Minister of 

Defence Malcolm Rifkind, who had advocated the idea some 

months earlier. Rifkind said, "Defense issues alone do not offer 

a broad enough foundation for the edifice we need." Along the 

same lines, French Foreign Minister Alain Jupp6 called for "a 

new trans-Atlantic charter to consolidate the common desire of 

North America and Europe to contribute to international stability 

in all its dimensions. ''26 

As suggested by these officials, creation of a Transatlantic 

Cooperation Community 27 an intergovemmental consultative 

framework within which diverse cooperative projects could be 

initiated---could provide the new political foundation for 

cooperation required for the post-Cold War world. Such a 

community would encompass, not replace, NATO, which would 

remain the framework for transatlantic security cooperation. It 

would symbolize and provide a vehicle for consultation and 

cooperation between the United States and the members of the 

European Union. It would also help mitigate problems caused 

by the fact that some European NATO members are not 

currently members of the European Union, and would not be 

included in a U.S.-EU bilateral treaty. To add parliamentary 

involvement to the mix, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), 

NATO's interparliamentary consultative body, could become the 

Transatlantic Cooperation Community's representative forum for 

considering issues and making recommendations to the member 

governments. Perhaps most importantly, creation of a 

Transatlantic Cooperation Community might help generate the 

political energy in the United States and the Et~ropean countries 

needed to address the challenges of moving beyond the Cold 

War, strengthening the international economic system, and 

dealing with new security challenges. 
NOTES 

1. For background information on the CJTF initiative, see Stanley 

R. Sloan, Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and New Missions for 

NATO, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report No. 94-249 S, March 

17, 1994. 

2. For analyses of enlargement and Russia see Stanley R. Sloan and 

Steve Woehrel, NATO Enlargement and Russia: From Cold War to Cold 

Peace?, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report No. 95- 

594 S, May 15, 1995 and Paul E. Gallis, NATO: Enlargement in Central 

Europe. Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report No. 

94-879 F, November 10, 1994. 

3. Stanley R. Sloan, European Proposals Jbr a New Atlantic 

Community, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report 

No. 95-374 S, March 10, 1995. 

4. 'q'he Alliance's Strategic Concept," Agreed by the Heads of State 

and Government participating in the meeting of tile North Atlantic Cotmcil 

in Rome on 7-8 November 1991. 

5. Article V states that 'q'he Parties agree that an armed attack 

against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 

considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if 

such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 

individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the 

Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by 

taking, forthwith, individually and in concert with the other P,'u'ties, such 

action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 

and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Article VI limits the 

geographic application of Article V (and only Article V) to the territory of 

the Parties in Europe or North America, the territory of Turkey and islands 

under jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north 

ofthe Tropic of Cancer. 

6. See appendix A for a survey of NATO's recent day-to-day 

activities. 

7. For background on the Bush Administration approach see 

Catherine Guicherd, A European Defense Identity: Challenge and 

Opportunity for NATO, Congressional Research Service Report for 

Congress 91-478, June 12, 1991. 

8. See Charles L. Barry, "NATO's Bold New Concept--JTF," Joint 

Force Quarterly (Summer 1994). 

9. The "lessons" are drawn from Stanley R. Sloan, "U.S. 

perspectives on NATO's future," International Affairs 71-2, 229. 
44 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

10. See, for example, Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. 

Stephen Larrabee, "NAT() Exp,'msion: The Next Steps." Survival 37. no. 

1 (Spring 1995): 7-33. 

1 I. FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, December 1994), iv. 

12. Michael O'Hanlon, "How to be a 'Cheap Hawk,"' The Brookings 

Review (Summer 1995): 35. 

13. The Royal United Services Institute in London estimates that the 

development of independent logistic, intelligence, and communication 

systems as well as nuclear forces would require an increase in defense 

spending from a current European average of 2.5 percent of GDP by 1.5 

perceut. This amounts to an increase of $107 billion per year into the next 

century, a sum which European constituencies are unlikely to be willing to 

support. See "The Defence of Europe: It Can't be Done Alone," The 

Economist, February 25, 1995, 19. 

14. Marten van Heuven, "Europe in 1995: Identity, Architecture, and 

Commitment," RAND Paper, 1995, 13-14. 

15. Patricia Chilton, "Common, Collective or Combined? Theories 

of Defense hltegratitm in file Europeall Union," in Carolyn Rhodes mad 

Sonia Mazey, eds., The State of the European Union (Vol. 3): Building a 

European Polio? (Boulder, CO: Lyrme Ricnner Publishers, 1995), 81-109. 

16. William Pfaff, "U.S.-Led NATO Is Neutered by American 

Domestic Concerns," International Herald Tribune, July 20, 1995, 8. 

17. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic 

Bargain (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), 1985. 

18. For a discussion of the operational shift in NATO's warfighting 

strategy away from entrenched forward-deployed forces to mobile reaction 

forces appropriate to post-Cold War threats ~e General George A. 

Joulwan, "The New NATO," in The RUS! Journal, April 1995, 2. 

19. Chilton, 19. 

20. Maurizio Cremasco, "Mediterranean Security: Issues and 

Prospects," Paper presented to a conference in Naples, Italy from 27 

February to 1 March 1995, on "Mediterranean Security in the Post-Cold 

War Era" organized by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), 

National Defense University, Washington, DC. At the Lisbon meeting of 

the WEU Council of Ministers in May 1995, France, Spain, Italy, and 

Portugal agreed to form a 12,000 strong rapid reaction force (EUROFOR) 

and a joint naval force (EUR()MARFOR). These will come under d~e 

auspices of the WEU as forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU). The 

plamaed traits, to be headquartered in Italy, could play ,an importzmt role in 

implementation of Cremasco's suggested initiative and, more generally, in 

a developing cooperation between NATO and WEU. 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 45 

21. The author appreciates contributions to the development of this 

fliought by Stephen A. Cmnboue of file Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. 

22. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, Brussels, 

1995, 94-96. 

23. See S. Nelson Drew, NATO From Berlin to Bosnia, McNair Paper 

35, NDU Press, 25. Drew's article draws particular attention to the 

accomplislunents of the NACC in the first 6 months of 1993. The NACC 

Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping succeeded, where NATO 

had failed, in outlining basic definitions and concepts, such as common 

terminology, and operational principles, for peace operations. 

24. Jeffrey Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Guaranteeing Success," 

Strategic Forum #44. NDU Press, 1995. 

25. Joseph Fitchett, "Western Europe Proposes New Trans-Atlm~tic 

Pact," International Herald Tribune, February 7, 1995, 1. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Originally discussed in Stanley R. Sloan, "US perspective on 

NATO's future," International Affairs 71, no. 2 (April 1995): 230-231. 
APPENDIX A: 

NATO'S DAY-TO-DAY OPERATION: 

From Deterrence to Peace Support Operations 1 

During 1994, many aspects of the day-to-day operations of the 

"alliance have been specifically tailored to prepare NATO to operate 

in the new security environment. As a consequence, the alliance 

has already begun to assume some of the operational characteristics 

of a "peace-support" organization. In its pla~ming, preparation, and 

training both with alliance members and with members of the 

Partnership for Peace program, NATO appears to be developing 

capabilities designed to carry NATO's mission beyond collective 

defense. 

PROMOTING PEACE 

In a variety of ways, NATO is using military cooperation to 

promote peaceful and constructive relations among all states in 

Europe. The Partnership for Peace framework document signed by 

all partners and the Individual Partnership Programs developed 

between the Alliance and Parlner countries on a bilateral basis 

emphasize goals of interoperability and cooperation in humanitarian 

and peace operations. This has been a consistent theme in joint 

exercises both planned and already undertaken. Three 1994 

exercises took place in this context, and 11 major exercises, 

involving troops from the company to the battalion level, are 

scheduled for 1995. The first such exercise, Cooperative Bridge 94, 

conducted in Poland, helped to identify many requirements tbr 

effective peace operations with Partner countries. To date, smaller 

exercises on a multilateral basis among alliance and partner 

members, "in the spirit of PfP," have not been uncommon. 

47 
48 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

Table 1. Partnership for Peace Exercises in 1995" 

Major NATO-PfP Exercises Planned in 1995 

Name 

Cooperative 

Rescue 

Cooperative 

Nugget 

Cooperative 

Venture 

Form/ 

Type 

Sea 

Land 

Sea 

Cooperative Land 

Determination 

Cooperative Sea 

Partner 

Cooperative Logistic 

Suppo~ 

Cooperative 

Challenge 

Cooperative 

Jaguar 

Cooperative 

Light 

Cooperative 

DragonEsperia 

Cooperative 

MermaidClassica 

Land 

Land, 

Sea, Air 

Land 

Land 

Sea 

Dates 

7 

June 

6-28 

Aug 

4-18 

Sept 

7-16 

Sept 

10-15 

Sept 

25-29 

Sept 

26 

Sept6 Oct 

2-13 

Oct 

12-24 

Oct 

18-28 

Oct 

Nov 

Area~Location 

Bulgaria 

Louisiana, 

USA 

Norwegian/ 

Barents 

Sea 

Romania 

Bulgaria 

Norfolk, USA 

Czech 

Republic 

Jutland/ 

Denmark 

Baltic/ 

Skagerrak 

Hungary 

Italy 

Mediterranean 

Sea 

*Adapted from NATO Review, July 1995, 8. 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 49 

For example, in January 1995, Albania hosted a search-andrescue exercise in which the United States, the United Kingdom, 

Germany, Turkey, and Greece took part. z 

Other exercises have promoted cooperative approaches to 

crisis management and peace operations. Exercise Strong 

Resolve, carried out in February and March of 1995, was 

designed to test NATO mobility and ability to deploy rapidly 

into areas of potential conflict, pursuant to NATO's new 

emphasis on highly mobile forces. Crisis Management Exercise 

95 (CMX 95), a planning exercise conducted at NATO 

headquarters, was aimed at testing consultation and 

cooperation procedures, and encompassed peace operations and 

civilian-military cooperation themes. Tradition',d C~ld War 

scenarios dealing with East-West conflict or nuclear use were 

excluded from this exercise. 3 

In August 1995, exercise Cooperative Nugget--the first 

Partnership for Peace exercise to occur within the United 

States--simulated a joint deployment of Allied and Partner 

forces to a war-tom island republic. This exercise sought to 

accomplish the dual goals of developing practical military skills 

required for multilateral humanitarian interventions and of 

cultivating military-to-military contacts and mutual 

understanding between former adversaries. 

The stated goal of such exercises is to "'develop cooperative 

military relations between the Partners and NATO for the 

purposes of joint planning, training and exercises in support of 

peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and 

other operations as may be subsequently agreed" as well as to 

"develop among Partners forces that are better able to operate 

alongside those of NATO. ''4 The objective is to develop habits 

of cooperation for deploying multilateral forces for "'collective 

responses to threats to peace and stability" alongside NATO 

forces. 5 

SEMINARS AND PERSONNEL EXCHANGES 

In addition to the major exercises both already undertaken and 

planned, NATO has organized a wide range of seminars. Such 

seminars have covered topics such as "Legal Aspects of 
50 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

Peacekeeping" and "Peacekeeping and its Relationship to Crisis 

Management." These meetings may be valuable in contributing 

to the development of common Allied and Partner perspectives 

on such issues and in transferring practical information to Partner 

countries. They may also serve to create personal links between 

military and civilian officials. 

The establishment of permanent military liaisons between 

NATO and eleven Partner members at NATO headquarters in 

Brussels and through the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, 

Belgium, aids in facilitating such initiatives. The liaison officers 

in Brussels participate in meetings of the Political-Military 

Steering Committee, and the Coordination Cell is tasked to 

coordinate joint Partner-NATO military activities and to carry 

out overall planning to implement Partnership programs. The 

permanent basing of these officers in close quarters with Allied 

planning and command institutions may serve to deepen 

channels of regular communication and coordination between 

the Alliance and Partner defense communities both at the 

organizational and personal levels. Brussels and Mons-based 

Partner officers and their families take part in SHAPE 

community life and their children attend SHAPE schools, 

increasing opportunities for such links to form. Such 

cooperation also serves as a confidence-building measure among 

partner countries as well as between them and NATO allies. 

Meanwhile, each class at the NATO Defense College in 

Rome, Italy, now routinely includes officers from non-NATO 

nations for 2-week periods of participation and study. Midlevel 

officers and defense and foreign ministry officials from former 

Soviet states, former neutral nations and East and Central 

European countries join actively in the lectures and seminar 

discussions on international and European security issues. 

PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR PEACE 

OPERATIONS 

The implications of peace operations for defense planning were 

addressed as early as December 1992, at the meeting of NATO's 

Defense Planning Committee. Specifically, the ministers said 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 51 

that the DPC would identify measures in the area of command 

and control, logistical support, infrastructure, and training that 

could contribute to NATO's peace operations capabilities and 

incorporate planning and preparation in this area into Alliance 

procedures. 6 The defense planning process has been made open 

to participation by Partner states to improve transparency in 

defense planning. Such planning is aimed at the practical goal 

of enhancing interoperability so that Partner forces can operate 

side by side with NATO forces in peace operation scenarios, but 

also seeks to develop a "common defense culture and habits of 

cooperation. ''7 Such common defense culture and planning, in 

which collective rather than competitive aspects of security are 

emphasized, has played a central role in avoiding the 

renationalization of defense within alliance members. 8 

The autunm i994 meeting of NATO's Conference of 

National Armaments Directors emphasized the development and 

procurement of joint systems with applicability for peace 

operations. One such system is a proposed joint allied ground 

surveillance system, similar to the U.S. AWACS system, which 

has been used extensively in operations over the former 

Yugoslavia. The need for effective combat "'friend or foe" 

identification systems, crucial both in war-making operations as 

well as in peace operations, has been identified, and options are 

under study for cooperative testing and eventual deployment. 

Self-protection systems for transport planes as well as minedetection systems capable of detecting nonmetallic mines, a 

weapon widely used in the former Yugoslavia, were also 

discussed at this conference. 

Long-term planning regarding interoperability, both within 

NATO as well as between alliance members and Partner states, 

has begun to emphasize peace operations as well. In early 1995, 

the North Atlantic Council decided to organize a new 

Standardization Organization, with the goal of improving allied 

policies concerning materiel, technical and operational 

standardization. To encourage participation in standardization 

planning, they stated that they would consider input from partner 

countries. The heads of the committee; Robin Beard, Assistant 

Secretary General for Defense Support; and General G.J. Folmer, 

Director of the International Military Staff, affirmed that 
52 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

considerations of interoperability in the field of peace operations 

would play an important role in the work of the committee. 9 

NATO IN BOSNIA 

NATO's participation in the Bosnian conflict stands as the 

current example of an operational deployment of NATO forces 

in a peace-support capacity. Since its invitation in 1992 to 

provide air support for threatened U.N. peacekeepers and enforce 

the naval embargo of the former Yugoslavia, NATO has actively 

supported the efforts of the United Nations. Active support has 

not translated into flawless coordination, however, apparently 

because of unresolved operational and political issues both 

between these organizations and within the alliance itself. 

Alliance preparation to assist in any potential withdrawal of 

UN forces from the former Yugoslavia has been continuous and 

extensive. In late February 1995, NATO conducted a computer 

shnulation of an UNPROFOR evacuation. NATO contingency 

planning in tile former Yugoslavia was a key issue discussed at 

a March 1995 meeting of U.S. Secretary of Defense William 

Perry, the French, German, and British defense nfinisters, and 

NATO Secretary General Willy Claes. They announced that 

contingency planning was complete and that the first phase of 

the operation, pre-positioning of equipment, had already taken 

place. The second phase, involving creation of communications 

and control centers in and around Bosnia, was not launched at 

that time because of concems that such preparations could be 

interpreted as a sign that a withdrawal was imminent, l° 

NATO AS A PEACE OPERATIONS SUPPORT 

ORGANIZATION 

This brief survey of activities illustrates the extent to which 

NATO's day-to-day activities are focused on peace operations 

support. NATO appears now to be uniquely qualified to play 

such a role, even ff the new mission focus has not been clearly 

articulated by NATO members. 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 53 

NOTES 

1. Prepared by Jason D. Meyers, an M.A. candidate in U.S. Foreign 

Policy at the American University, Washington, DC. 

2. Atlantic News, January 27, 1995, 1. 

3. Atlantic News, February 3, 1995, 2, and February 22, 1995, 3. 

4. Parmership for Peace framework document, agreed on the lOth 

of January, 1994. 

5. Drew, 31. 

6. NAT(.) Press Communique, December 11, 1992, paragraph 4. 

7. Manfred Woerner, cited in Drew, 28. 

8. Drew, 28. 

9. Atlantic News, J,'muary 27, 1995. 

10. Atlantic News, March 8, 1995, 3. 
APPENDIX B: 

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

Washington DC, 4th April 1949 

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and 

principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live 

in peace with all peoples and all governments. 

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 

civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 

individual liberty and the rule of law. 

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic 

area. 

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for 

the preservation of peace and security. 

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty: 

ARTICLE 1 

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United 

Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be 

involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace 

and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in thcir 

international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner 

inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 

A R TICLE 2 

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful 

and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon 

which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of 

stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their 

international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. 

A R TICLE 3 

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the 

Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective 

self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and 

collective capacity to resist armed attack. 

ARTICLE4 

Thc Parties will consult together whenever, in thc opinion of any of 

55 
56 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

lheru, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any 

of the Parties is threatened. 

ARTICLE5 

l-he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 

l-urope or North America shall be considered an attack against them 

all. and consequently they agree that. if such an armed attack occurs, 

each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefence rccognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 

will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 

t~cccssary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 

security of the North Atlantic area. 

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof 

:.l~,tll immcdiatcly be reported to the Security Council. Such measures 

.,,hall bc tcrnmlated when the Security Council has taken the measures 

acccssary to restore and maintain international peace and security. 

ARTICLE6 ~ 

l:or the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the 

I'artics is deemed to include an armed attack: 

-- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, 

on the Algerian Departments of France('), on the territory of 

Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties 

in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; 

--- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, .when in or 

ovcr these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation 

forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the 

Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North 

Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. 

ARTICLE 7 

The Treaty does not effect, and shall nol be interpreted as affecting, in 

any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties 

which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility 

of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. 

As anaended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 

on Ihe accesion of Greece and Turkey. 

' On 16th January 1963 the Council noted that insofar as the former 

Algerian Departments of France were concerned the relevant clauses of 

this Treaty had become inapplicable as from 3rd July 1962. 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 57 

ARTICLE8 

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in 

force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in 

conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter 

into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty. 

A R TICLE 9 

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall bc 

represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this 

Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet 

promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies 

as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a 

defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. 

ARTICLE 10 

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European 

State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to 

contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this 

Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by 

depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the 

United Stales of America. The Government of the United States of 

America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such 

instrument of accession. 

ARTICLE 11 

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties 

in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the 

Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the 

other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force 

between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of 

the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, 

Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 

and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect 

with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications? 

ARTICLE 12 

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time 

s The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of 

thc ratifications of all signatory states. 
58 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together 

for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors 

then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area including 

the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the 

Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international 

peace and security. 

A R 77CLE 13 

Afler the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may 

cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been 

given to the Government of the United States of America, which will 

inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each 

notice of denunciation. 

ARTICLE 14 

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, 

shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United 

States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that 

government to the governments of the other signatories. 
APPENDIX C: 

THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

Agreed by the Heads of State and Government 

participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 

Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991 

1. At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Hcads of State 

and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance 

to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming 

the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, 

they recognized that the developments taking place in Europe would 

have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aim~ would be met 

in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. 

The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below. 

PART I - TIlE STRA TEGIC CONTEXT 

The New Strategic Environment 

2. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central 

and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. 

The USSR's former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The 

Soviet Union and its Republics are undcrgoing radical.change. The 

three Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces 

have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their 

withdrawal from Pohmd and Germany by 1994. All the countries that 

were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantlcd the Warsaw Pact 

and rcjected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying 

degrc~, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving 

pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a 

market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source 

of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overCOnlC. 

3. In the Wcst, there have also been significant changcs. Germany has 

becn united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European 

institutions. The fact that the countries of the European Community 

are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity; and the enhancement of the role 

of the WEU, are important factors for European security. The strengthening of the .security dimension in the process of European. integration, 

and the enhanccment of the r61e and responsibilities of European 

members of thc Alliance arc positive and mutually reinforcing. The 

development of a European security identity and dcfence rfile, reflected 

59 
60 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

in tile strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not 

only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the 

integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole. 

4. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability 

and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE 

agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE agreements and 

confidence and security-building measures of 1990). Implementation of 

the 1991 STARTTreaty will lead to increased stability through substantial 

and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further 

far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear forces of the United 

States and the Soviet Union will be pursued following President Bush's 

September 1991 initiative. Also of great importance is the Treaty on 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris 

Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance's numerical inferiority in key conventional weapon systems and provide for effective 

verification procedures. All these developments will also result in an 

unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual confidence. Such transparency would be 

further enhanced by the achievement of an Open Skies regime. There 

arc welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of a global ban on 

chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising arms exports and 

l llc proliferation of certain weapons technologies. 

5. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already 

contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe. As a 

result of the Paris Summit, it now includes new institutional arrangetnents and provides a contractual framework for consultation and cooperation that can play a constructive r61e, complementary to that of 

NATO and the process of European integration, in preserving peace. 

6. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led 

to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel 

Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. 

Thc monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was 

the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future 

and ri,~ks to thc security of the Alliance remain. 

7. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security environment 

iu whi~;h the positive changes referred to above have come to fruition, in 

part,cular, it assumes both the completion of the planned withdrawal of 

,";uviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full 

iml)lct+leJttation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The implemcntatiotl of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light 

t~f the evolving security environment and in particular progress in 

fulfilli~g these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the 

extent nece&sary. 

Security Challenges and Risks 

8. "lhe security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 61 

nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, 

full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been 

removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. 

Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been 

substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased 

accordingly. 

9. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks 

to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multidirectional, which makes them hard to predict and assess, NATO must 

be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the 

,security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise 

in various ways. 

I0. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated 

aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the 

adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious 

economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and 

territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and 

Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain 

limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity 

of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical 

to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve 

outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect 

on the security of the Alliance. 

I I. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertaintics that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation 

from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than 

those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These cap,'~bilitics have to bc 

taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved. 

12. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial 

relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle 

East. The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery 

of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 

Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of 

military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the 

area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic mi~iles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance. 

13. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever 

direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington 

Treaty. However, Alliance security must also lake account of the global 

context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a 

wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 

disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and 

sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation 

among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where 

appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to 

such risks. 

14. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks 
62 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

have to be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and 

cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, 

including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant 

factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the 

strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, 

however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict in Europe. On the 

other hand, there is a greater risk of different crises arising, which could 

develop quickly and would require a rapid response, but they are likely 

to be of a lesser magnitude. 

15. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic 

context. The first is that the new environment does not change the 

purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines 

their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the 

changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame 

its strategy within a broad approach to security. 

PART H- ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY 

FUNCTIONS 

The Purpose of the Alliance 

16. NATO's es,~ntial purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and 

reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and 

security of all its members by political and military means in accordance 

with the principk~ of the United Nations Charter. Based on common 

values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has 

worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting 

peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged. 

The Nature of the Alliance 

17. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of 

North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the 

practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in 

support of their common interests. 

18. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of 

common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states 

in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. 

Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's 

daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no 

single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in 

dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states 

of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the 

field of dcfence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to 

enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives. 

19. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the 

Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their 

national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to 

overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions 

conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 63 

with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together 

with other nations, are able to pursue the development of cooperative 

structures of security for a Europe whole and free. 

The Fundamental Tasks of the AIliance 

20. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to 

preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military 

capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an 

overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its 

members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other 

nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European 

security, including in the field of arms control and disarmameut. 

21. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks: 

I. To provide one of tile indispensable foundations for a stable security 

environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which 

no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European 

nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. 

Ii. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 

as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that 

affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing 

risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of 

ll~eir efforts in tields of common concern. 

lIl. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the 

territory ofany NATO member state. 

IV. To preserve tile strategic balance within Europe. 

22. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE 

also have r61es to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European idcntity in 

security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europcans 

to take a greater share of responsibility h~r their security and will Ilelp 

to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it 

can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential 

thrum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement 

on policies bearing on the security and defcuce commitments of its 

members under tile Washington Treaty. 

23. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out 

above, member states conlirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as 

their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty 

remain unchanged. 

PARTHI- A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY 

Protecthtg Peace in a New Europe 

24. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of 

safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and 
64 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both 

political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains tile 

basis of the Alliance's security policy. 

25. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security 

situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through 

political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw 

all the consequences from the fact that ,security and stability have 

political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as tile 

indispensable defenec dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges 

facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is 

rcllected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; 

dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence 

capability. 

26. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defence capability, 

seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or 

design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among 

all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the 

Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership 

among all European countries in dealing with common security probIcms. 

27. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament 

policy contributes both to dialogue and to cooperation with other 

nations, and thus will continue to play a major r61e in the achievement 

of tile Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms 

control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the 

lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of 

defcnce. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence :md 

arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony. 

28. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, 

tile Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests 

of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth 

in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institulions. In this respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being 

made by other organizations such as tile European Community and 

the CSCE, and that the r61es of these institutions and of the Alliance are 

con~plementary. 

Dialogue 

29. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for 

dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the 

other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has 

established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the 

countri¢~ of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for' in the London 

Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular 

diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and 

information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies, 

individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unpre- 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 65 

cedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and eJ~t;ouragc greater mutual understanding 

of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and prcdictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can 

help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through inteusdicd 

military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's 

pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater cooperation 

throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts 

by peaceful means. 

Cooperation 

30. The Allies are also committed to pursue cooperation with all 

states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of 

Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and 

productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all 

relevant fields of European sccurity, with the aim, inter alia, of prcvcnting crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective managcment. 

Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations 

in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving 

beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy 

of cooperation is the exprcs,.;ion of the inseparability of security among 

European states, it is built upon a common recognition among Alliance 

members that the persistence of new political, economic or social 

divisions across thc continent could lead to future instability, and such 

divisions must thus be diminished. 

Collective Defence 

31. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly 

important. Nonethcless. the military dimension remains essential. The 

maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness 

to act collectively in the common defcnce remain central to the Alliance's 

security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, 

is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, 

and to guarantec that military aggression directed against the Alliance 

can never bc perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is 

equally indispensable ~o that dialogue and cooperation can be undertaken with conlidenee and achieve their desired results. 

Manugemcnt c~f CrisLs" ctnd C~mflic't Prevention 

32. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the 

success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war 

depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive 

diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of 

its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely 

and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much 

smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the 

Allianee are less predictable than before. 

33. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for 

the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of 
66 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the 

Alliance's political authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate 

crisis managementmealsures as required from a range of political and 

other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by 

the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset 

and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end. 

34. The potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe 

must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent 

conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all 

other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the rrle of 

the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Communily, Western European Union and United Nations may 

also have an important role to play. 

PART IV- GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE 

Principles of Alliance Strategy 

35. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requites a 

broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic 

environment enables the Alliance to change a number of important 

features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while 

reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it 

was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised 

force posture responding to the changed circumstances. 

36. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental 

principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its 

weapons will ever be used except in self-defcnce, and it does not 

consider itself to be anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military 

strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of 

force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and 

effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating 

conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies 

must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the 

territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by 

making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and 

withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the 

Icrritorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and 

thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe. 

37. The security ofall Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on 

all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives 

depends critically on the equitable sharing o f rrles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of North 

American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to 

the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North 

America. As the process of developing a European security identity and 

dcfcnce r61e progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 67 

European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the 

Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the 

defence of Europe. 

38. Tile collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical 

arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military 

and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure 

as well as on cooperation and coordination agreements. Key features 

include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, 

where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards 

and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. 

39. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the 

Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of 

nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date 

where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level. Both elements 

are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the 

other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring 

that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, 

or territorial gains, by conventional means. Taking into account the 

diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must 

maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide range of conventional 

response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot 

ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make It unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace. 

The AIliance's New Force Posture 

40. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move 

away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards 

a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible 

response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes 

stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now 

facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the 

missions of the Allies' military forces and in their posture. 

The Missions of AIliance Military Forces 

41. The primary rrlc of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the 

security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. 

But this rrle must take account of the new strategic en~cironment, in 

which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and 

multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war. 

42. In peace, the r61e of Allied military lorces is to guard against risks 

to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the mainten- 
68 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

ancc of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is 

prcscrvcd. They can contribute to dialogue and cooperation thrmlghout 

Furope by their participation in confidence-building activities, including 

those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well 

as in vcrification of arms control agreements. Allies could, further, be 

called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing 

forces for United Nations missions. 

43. In the event of criscs which might lead to a military threat to the 

security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces can complemcnt and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, 

and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their 

peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for 

measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to 

dctcr action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes 

place, to respond to and repel it as well as to reestablish the territorial 

integrity of member states. 

44. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe 

has bccome highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance's 

military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect 

I~acc, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at 

the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should 

;lggrcssion occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities 

;J'ad thc ;~ppropriate mix of forces already described. 

(hlidclitws for the Alliance's Force Posture 

45. To implemcnt its security objectives and strategic principles in the 

new cnvironmcnh the organization of the Allies' forces must be adapted 

h, provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing 

ct isc.s that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war, 

wifilc rclaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied 

tc~ ritt~ry and to restore peace. The posture of Allies" forces will conform 

|t) thc guidclines developed in the following paragraphs. 

46. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's 

military forces will continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and 

will l~c adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including 

arms control agreements. This means in particular: 

(a) that the ovcrall size of the Allies' forces, and in many cases their 

readiness, will be reduced; 

(b) that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive 

posture in the central region will no longer be required. The 

peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient 

military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including 

where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces. Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences 

within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the 

shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions 

will be subject compared with the central region and, in the southern 

region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in 

the adjacent areas. 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 69 

47. To ensurc that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an 

effective rrle both in managing crises and in countering aggression 

against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility 

and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these 

reasons: 

(a) Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant 

proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction 

elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of 

which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity 

and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend 

the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched 

without long warning time. 

(b) Tile forces of tile Allies will be structured so as to permit their 

military capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to 

build up by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance 

security, including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one that 

prudence dictates should not be ruled out - of a major conflict. 

Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply 

both within Europe and from North America will be of critical 

importance. 

(c) Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that 

would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces 

quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, 

flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. 

These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime. 

(d) In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction 

and other available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis 

management, the Alliance's political authorities will, as before, 

exercise close control over their employment at all stages. Existing 

procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and 

posture of Alliance forces. 

Characteristics of Conventional Forces 

48. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability 

to fulfil their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriatc to 

the new security environment. This will be reflected in force and 

equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; 

deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, 

all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the 

Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces, 

main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to 

ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their 

lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a 

means of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. Main defence 

and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable 

elements. 

49. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to cooperate closely 
70 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

;rod combinc and assist each othcr in operations aimed at achieving 

;l~U t:ctl objectives. These forces will consist of the following: 

t~) Gromsdforces, which are essential to hold or regain territory. Tile 

majority will normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall. 

there will be a greater reliance on mobilization and reserves. All 

categories of ground forces will require demonstrable combat cffeclivcness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for 

flcxiblc deployment. 

(h) Marithneforces, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility 

and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's 

crisis response options. Thcir essential missions are to ensure sea 

control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, 

to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the 

deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent. 

(c) ,,fir forces, whose ability to fulfil their fundamental roles in both 

independent air and combined operations - counter-air, air infertilelion and offensive air support - as well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential 

to the overall effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their r61e 

in supporting operations, on hind and at sea, will require appropriate long-dislance airlift and air refuelling capabilities. Air dcfence 

I\~iccs, including modern air command aud control systems, are 

required to ensure a secure air dcfence environment. 

50. Ill light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic 

missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special 

consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary 

approaclacs including, for example, export control and missile defcnces. 

51. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest possible achievement of 

a global, comprehensive, and effectively veriliable ban on all chemical 

weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions 

oI" a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained. 

52. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall 

force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will 

facilitatc the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly 

important for tile achievcmcnt of the missions of the Allies' forces. The 

Alliancc's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, 

the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays 

the key r61e, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational 

European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an 

emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a 

similarly important r61e to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work 

together in the common defence. Allies' efforts to achieve maximum cooperation will bc based on the common guidelines for defencc defined 

above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary 

mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defcnce identity and the Alliance. 

53. In order to bc able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible 
STANLEY R. SLOAN 71 

contingencies, the Allies concerned will require effective surveillance 

and intelligence, flexible command and control, mobility within and 

between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of 

forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is available. 

The capability of the Allies concerned to build up larger, adequately 

equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the 

ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and 

to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. 

Elements of all three force categories will be capable of being employed 

flexibly as part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. 

Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the necessary 

lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise 

arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context. 

54. For the Allies concerned, collective defcnce arrangements will rely 

increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve 

to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; 

reinforce tile transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European 

pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce 

solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable 

formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to 

make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a 

highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions. 

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces 

55. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is 

political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. 

They will continue to fulfil an essential r61e by ensuring uncertainty in 

the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to 

military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is 

not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the 

Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the 

United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent r61e of their own, 

contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies. 

56. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of 

Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved 

in collective defence planning in nuclear rbles, in peacetir0e basing of 

nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to 

NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance 

will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces 
72 NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

nced to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility 

and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of 

the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the 

minimum level suflicient to preserve peace and stability. 

57. "l'he Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in 

lhe sccurity situation, including conventional force levels in Europe 

maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO's 

ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should 

it bc necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons 

might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more 

rcmotc. They can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic 

nuclear forces. They will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based 

in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear 

forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of 

dual capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by 

offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be 

deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or groundlaunched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be eliminated. 

PART V- CONCLUSION 

58. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the 

Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, 

sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's security policy is 

based on dialogue; eooperalion; and effective collective defence as 

Inutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full 

use of the new opportunities available, tile Alliance will maintain 

security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requiremcnts of dcfencc. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential 

contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order. 

59. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in 

arms control and confidence-building measures with the objective of 

enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in 

protnoting dialogue and cooperation between states on the basis of the 

principlcs enunciated in the Paris Charter. 

60. NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further 

dcvelopments in the politico-military environment, including progress 

in Ihe moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes 

in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic 

Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's 

defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear 

force posture and its collective dcfence planning arrangements. 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Stanley R. Sloan is the Senior Specialist in International Security 

Policy for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of 

Congress. He has held a variety of analytical and supervisory 

positions in CRS for over 20 years. Prior to his CRS service, Mr. 

Sloan served in a number of capacities at the Central Intelligence 

Agency, including Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western 

Europe and NATO desk officer. He also served as a member of the 

U.S. delegation to the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force 

Reductions and was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Air Force. 

Mr. Sloan is the author of numerous reports for Congress and 

journal articles on international and European security issues. His 

books include NATO in the 1990s (1989) and NATO's Future: 

Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (1985). 

73 
McNair Papers 

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home of 

the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense 

University. An Army post since 1794, the fort was given its present name 

in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair. General 

McNair, known as "Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three 

million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground forces in 

Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 25 

July 1944. 

ThefoUowing is a complete listing of published McNair Papers. For 

information on availability of specific titles, contact the Distribution 

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 

Washington, DC 20319-6000 (telephone: commercial 202/475-1916; DSN 

335-1916). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 

1989. 

2. Jolm E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch ?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SD! and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third World, 

Febru,'u'y 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign 

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diph~macy," in 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View oflnsurgencies: 

hzsights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Lhlke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The PEPCON 

and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: Coping 

with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare, March 1992. 
14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military 

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the Cold War, 

February 1993. 

16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad" : Security Policy in PostSoviet Europe, June 1993. 

17. Willi,'un H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations, June 1993. 

18. Sterling D. Sessions ,'rod Carl R. Jones, Interoperability: A Desert 

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations Charter 

Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey Simon; 

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and Jarnes McCarthy, European 

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine. November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing States, January 

1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure, 

February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, 

April 1994. 

30. J~ulaes W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a 

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-Japan 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1994. 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond, 

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The 

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's Role in 

Politics, January 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from. Berlhz to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security 

in Transition, January 1995. 
36. K,q_rl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms 

Transfers, February 1995. 

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Br,"tdford, lnteragency Cooperation: 

A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, March 1995. 

38. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of 

Continuity and Change, March 1995. 

39. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO 

Expansion, April 1995. 

40. James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Securi~ 

Alignments in Europe, April 1995. 

41. Barry R. Sclmeider, Radical Responses to Radical Regim.es: 

Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995. 

42. Johrl Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, July 1995. 

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French 

Security Policy, August 1995. 

44. John A. Cope, hzternational Military Education and Training: An 

Assessment, October 1995. 

45. Elli Lieberm,'m, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-ls'raeli 

Wars? October 1995. 
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