U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

64–262 PDF 2011

BUSINESS AS USUAL, BELARUS ON THE EVE OF 

THE ELECTIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 110–2–21] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida, 

Chairman 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Hon. David J. Kramer, Department of State 

Hon. Mary Beth Long, Department of Defense 

Hon. David Bohigian, Department of Commerce 

(II) 

BUSINESS AS USUAL, BELARUS ON THE EVE OF 

THE ELECTIONS 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 9 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe ...................................... 1 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe ................................. 2 

Hon. Hilda L. Solis, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Hon. David J. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ....................................... 4 

Laura Jewett, Regional Director, Eurasia, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs ............................... 16 

Rodger Potocki, Director, Europe and Eurasia, National Endowment for Democracy .......................................................... 19 

Stephen B. Nix, Regional Program Director, Eurasia, International Republican Institute ................................................. 22 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin .................... 28 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith ................. 29 

Prepared statement of Hon. David J. Kramer .......................... 30 

Prepared statement of Laura Jewett ......................................... 34 

Prepared statement of Rodger Potocki ...................................... 38 

Prepared statement of Stephen B. Nix ..................................... 43 

Material submitted for the Record by Oleg Kravchenko, 

Charge ́ d’Affaires, Republic of Belarus .................................. 49 

(III) 

(1) 

BUSINESS AS USUAL, BELARUS ON THE EVE 

OF THE ELECTIONS 

September 16, 2008 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 2:39 p.m. in room 328–B Rayburn 

House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, 

Co-Chairman, Commission on Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Christopher 

H. Smith, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Hilda L. Solis, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Hon. David J. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of 

State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; Laura Jewett, Regional Director, Eurasia, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs; Rodger Potocki, Director, Europe and Eurasia, National Endowment for Democracy; and Stephen B. Nix, Regional 

Program Director, Eurasia, International Republican Institute. 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. The Commission hearing will come to order. Today’s 

hearing is titled Business as Usual, Belarus on the Eve of the Elections. Since its independence in 1991, Belarus has been faced with 

a choice, whether to move forward in the direction of greater freedom and respect for human rights or perpetuate the Soviet model. 

Despite some positive steps during its early years, the situation remains rather bleak, especially for those attempting to voice views 

differing from the official line. 

When one looks at what’s happened in Belarus since its independence I think initially there was some reason for hope. But I 

must tell you the repressive regime and the manner in which it 

handles opposition is one which is not reflective of the commitments of OSCE member states. So therefore, I am very interested 

in hearing today’s witnesses as to the current situation in Belarus. 

We know that parliamentary elections are scheduled. We would 

like to have an update as to what’s the prognosis for an open and 

free election in Belarus, what we should be doing in regards to our 

Commission work as it relates to Belarus. 

And we do recognize, at least I think, some encouraging signs of 

Belarus’ comments in regards to recent activities by the Russian 

Federation, which gives us some hope of more independence from 

2 

that member state. Nevertheless, if the Belarus Government chooses to take concrete steps toward genuine progress, I am confident 

that the United States would do everything we can to encourage 

those steps and do what we can so that the citizens of Belarus 

enjoy the freedoms associated with a democratic state that so many 

other countries in Europe have followed since the fall of the Soviet 

Union. 

I will turn now to Ranking Member, Chris Smith from New Jersey. 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, RANKING MEMBER, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Cardin. And thank 

you for convening this very timely and very important hearing. 

And let me just thank you in advance to all of our witnesses for 

their testimony and for the insights that they, I know, will provide. 

Less than 2 weeks before the elections to Belarus’ National Assembly President Lukashenka has given us few signs that these 

elections will be different from other elections held under his rule, 

which have fallen far short of OSCE standards. Once again, the opposition finds officials restricting its campaign activities, and opposition candidates have little access to the state-dominated media. 

Some opposition candidates have been denied registration, while 

other potential opposition candidates have suddenly found themselves unemployed. Of course, we welcome the Belarusian Government’s recent release of some political prisoners, including Alexander Kazulin, and the inclusion of a few members of the opposition on precinct election commissions. But given President 

Lukashenka’s record as Europe’s last dictator and leading abuser 

of human rights, we shouldn’t create false hopes that these gestures portend a new springtime for democracy in Belarus. 

In his long tenure as President of Belarus, Lukashenko has liquidated his country’s democratically elected parliament and conducted a series of phony, stage-managed elections. His government 

has trampled on elementary human rights such as the freedom of 

expression, association and assembly. He has harassed and arrested opposition activists, closed down NGOs and stifled the independent media and restricted religious freedom. 

There was a very disturbing report that I was just handed a copy 

of which points out that candidates for members of parliament 

have been brutally beaten up in Minsk today , including one of the 

best friends of this Commission and of democracy. Anatoly Lebedka 

is seen in the photo in a headlock after being brutally beaten by 

Lukashenka’s thugs. That is an awful indictment of the the state 

of affairs in Belarus. And again, that’s as recently as a news report 

today just a few moments ago. 

The catalogue of Lukashenka’s crimes, as we all know, is all the 

more reason for our government to stand by the suffering people 

of Belarus. We have to continue to support the efforts of brave 

Belarusians to build their civil society and to break Lukashenka’s 

media monopoly. Here our government has a vital role to play as 

does the European Union by technically and financially supporting 

international broadcasting that provides the Belarusians with objective news about their country. 

3 

In recent years, like my good friend and colleague, Ben Cardin 

and like Alcee Hastings and so many members of our Commission, 

we have met with civil society, members of the parliament, including our good friend Anatoly Lebedka and many others now and 

again that are in the crosshairs of the secret police and are suffering immensely. So this hearing is timely. And we need to send 

a clear message that Republican, Democrat, executive branch, 

across the board we stand in solidarity with these very brave and 

heroic individuals. I yield back. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Congressman Smith. 

We’re also joined by Congresswoman Hilda Solis. 

HON. HILDA L. SOLIS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you, Senator Cardin. And I also want to thank 

the Chairman, Mr. Hastings, for having this very important hearing today. 

Back in 1994, Belarus elected Alexander Lukashenka as its first 

democratically elected President. For the past 14 years, he has instituted direct power over institutions, controlled the electoral process and significantly reduced the independent press. Local elections 

carried out in January 2007 resulted in reduced opposition representation in local council. Out of 23,000 elected parliamentarians, 

only 20 opposition representatives won seats in the council at all 

levels. 

Local governments implement many of the policies of the central 

government, including harassment of democratic activists and local 

free press. While more than two-thirds of the periodicals are private, the state-owned press heavily dominates the available news. 

The government also continues to deny independent journalists access to official events and information, suggesting that these events 

or activities would destabilize the situation in the country. 

In June 2007, the Belarus House of Representatives approved a 

law that requires all state officials to receive approval from higher 

authorities before speaking to the press. I find it very disconcerting 

that the government has asserted such control over the electoral 

process and independent press. 

I hope that we can glean more information from the witnesses 

that we have today. Thank you for having this hearing. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much. 

Our first witness—we’re very pleased to welcome to the witness 

table the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights and Labor, David J. Kramer. I say that because Secretary 

Kramer is a member of our Commission. So he could be on this 

side of the table, but he has chosen to be at the witness table, 

which will give him no special privileges in our questioning. 

From July 2005 to March 2008 Mr. Kramer was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs responsible 

for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus affairs as well as the regional nonproliferation issues. Previously he served in the Department of State Office of Policy Planning as a professional staff member. And before that he was a Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary 

of State for Global Affairs. 

4 

He also was Executive Director of the U.S. Advisory Commission 

on Public Diplomacy in Washington. He brings a wealth of experience to his current role. And it’s a pleasure to have him on the 

Commission. 

And we welcome you here today to help us. 

HON. DAVID J. KRAMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR 

Sec. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 

Commission, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear 

before you here today to discuss a very important issue. And that 

is the state of democracy and human rights in Belarus. And let me 

commend the Commission for its engagement on this important 

subject. 

Mr. Chairman, if I may request that my written testimony be entered into the record. 

Mr. CARDIN. Without objection, all of the witnesses’ full testimonies will be made part of the record. 

Sec. KRAMER. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, the active interest 

shown by the Commission, I think, has ensured that a strong message of solidarity has been sent to the Belarusian people from both 

the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government. The 

Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act, which some members and 

staff of this Commission have been instrumental in moving forward, has given the Administration a key tool in formulating policy 

toward Belarus. 

I also wish to applaud the vital work of organizations such as the 

National Endowment for Democracy, International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute for the work they 

have done to help support democracy in Belarus from the grass 

roots. And I’m truly delighted to be appearing here today in this 

hearing with such devoted colleagues as Steve Nix, Laura Jewett, 

and Rodger Potocki. 

Mr. Chairman, given the recent release of all political prisoners 

and the upcoming parliamentary elections September 28th, this 

hearing comes at a time of opportunity for Belarus. If the Government of Belarus shows that it is truly committed to democratic reform, we will have the possibility to develop a more robust relationship between our two countries. As we have said many times, we 

would like to have a different relationship with Belarus, one that 

is based on mutual respect for internationally recognized norms in 

human rights of the people of Belarus. 

For an improved relationship to be possible, Belarus must truly 

abide by its commitments as a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to respect human rights and 

fundamental freedoms and democratic norms. The release of all political prisoners in Belarus is an encouraging step in this direction. 

Former Presidential candidate Alexander Kazulin was freed from 

prison on August 16th, over 2 years after his arrest and conviction 

on charges of alleged hooliganism at a protest after the fraudulent 

March 2006 Presidential election. The Bush administration from 

the President on down, including our embassy in Minsk, pressed 

very hard for his release and met numerous times with his late 

wife and daughters. I truly regret that Iryna Kazulin, herself a 

5 

brave fighter for human rights, did not live long enough to see her 

husband freed. 

On August 20th, Belarusian authorities released the last two political prisoners, businessman Syarhey Parsyukevich and youth activist Andrey Kim. Mr. Parsyukevich and Mr. Kim had been in 

prison on charges stemming from a demonstration held in January 

2008 to protest new government restrictions on businesses. 

Earlier this year the Government of Belarus released five individuals internationally recognized as political prisoners: Andrey 

Klimov, Dmitri Dashkevich (ph), Artur Finkevich (ph), Nicolai 

Avtukhovich, and Yuriy Leonov. Freeing all eight prisoners is a 

meaningful step forward. Of course, we’re also looking to Belarus 

authorities to respect the human rights and civil rights of all 

Belarusian people, in particular the freedoms of assembly and expression, including respect for an independent media. We hope the 

government of Belarus shows a true, sustained commitment to 

democratic reform and respect for human rights. 

As we have discussed many times with the Belarusian authorities, the release of Alexander Kazulin and the other two political 

prisoners, days after provides the opportunity for the United States 

and the European Union to start a dialogue with the Belarusians 

about ways to improve relations. My colleague, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, David Merkel, traveled to Minsk August 21–23 to explore the possibilities for a real 

dialogue between our two governments as well as to deepen our 

contacts with the democratic opposition. 

Mr. Merkel’s was the first visit at this level by a U.S. official 

since my last trip in that same job to Minsk in April 2007. Following Merkel’s visit, the Department of State in coordination with 

the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, 

known as OFAC, approved a 6-month suspension until March 2009 

of sanctions against two subsidiaries of Belarusian state-owned enterprise, Belneftekhim. We will continue to watch Belarus closely 

to determine whether to extend the suspension and take other 

steps or take steps in the opposite direction. 

The release of political prisoners shows that the United States 

and the European Union can be effective in bringing about change 

when we are united. We regularly coordinate with our European allies on the situation in Belarus. And, in fact, DAS Merkel has been 

in Brussels yesterday and today doing just that. And we’ve been 

united in our desire for the unconditional release of political prisoners in Belarus and for the authorities to respect the human and 

civil rights of its people. 

Though we have had occasional tactical differences on how best 

to approach Belarus with the European Union, there is no question 

that the United States and the E.U. share the same goal of seeing 

a democratic Belarus assume its rightful place as a fully integrated 

member of the international community. 

The United States and European Union have had a dual track 

approach to Belarus. We strongly support civil society, NGOs and 

other democratic forces in Belarus while we also take action 

against those whom we hold responsible for electoral fraud, human 

rights abuses and corruption. We also are working closely with the 

European Union to urge Belarus to live up to its obligations to its 

6 

people by allowing an open and transparent electoral campaign 

process and hold free and fair parliamentary elections later this 

month. 

Free and fair elections depend only in part on the conduct of the 

actual balloting and vote tabulation. Both we and the European 

Union have emphasized the need for Belarus to make significant 

progress in improving conditions throughout the electoral process. 

Key concerns include full access for OSCE observers, including to 

the voting process and ballot count, registration of opposition candidates, access to the voters and media for all candidates and participation of the opposition in electoral commissions at all levels. 

And let me echo Congressman Smith’s deep concerns about the 

reports today and the picture of people like Anatoli Lebedka being 

beaten up by Belarus authorities. There is no place; there is no excuse for such conduct and behavior. And we all continue to stand 

with these courageous defenders of human rights in Belarus. 

In previous Belarusian elections, OSCE observers concluded that 

fundamental freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression were disregarded. During its initial assessment of this 

election environment, the OSCE has found no evident progress in 

these areas. The OSCE has numerous times also provided recommendations to the government to improve the conduct of elections in Belarus in line with OSCE commitments. 

Unfortunately, the authorities have not taken any significant 

steps to address these recommendations. Though lack of opposition 

representation on precinct election commissions and allegations 

that employees of regime named candidates serve on the commissions are serious concerns to us. Candidate registration offers a 

somewhat better picture with approximately 78 percent of opposition candidates being registered, still below the 83 percent opposition registration rate in the 2004 elections. 

Now, in addition to the conduct of elections in Belarus, another 

important issue for the United States in improving relations between our two countries is Belarusian authorities’ treatment of imprisoned U.S. citizen, Emanuel Zeltser, who was arrested in March 

of this year and later convicted in a secret trial on charges of using 

false documents and economic espionage. With the real possibility 

for an improvement in the relationship between the United States 

and Belarus we hope and are continuing to press for a quick, humanitarian resolution in Mr. Zeltser’s case. 

We will continue to request consular access to Mr. Zeltser to 

monitor his welfare as well as press for his access to his prescribed 

medications. And as long as his welfare remains endangered, we 

will continue our call for his humanitarian release. 

And I must add, Mr. Chairman, I was saddened to hear of the 

passing this weekend of Mr. Zeltser’s mother. 

No matter what relationship we have with the Government of 

Belarus, we have and will continue to provide assistance to empower the Belarusian people so that they may determine their own 

future. We strive to build NGO capacity, to increase public participation, bolster the capacity of democratic political parties to unify, 

strategize, organize, and connect with constituents and strengthen 

independent media and expand access to objective information. 

7 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Belarus service remains a 

leading international broadcaster, providing programming in the 

Belarusian language. The service’s new television program has recently been placed on a Polish-led satellite television channel. In 

addition to that, the Voice of America broadcasts are available in 

Russian to audiences in Belarus. 

Recent assistance successes include our work with five Belarus 

umbrella organizations and our programs supporting the development of an NGO map to analyze civil society trends, improve strategic planning and enhance donor coordination. And we are supporting a Polish-led effort to broadcast television to Belarus via satellite. It is with this assistance that the National Endowment for 

Democracy, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute as well as other non-governmental organizations have been so critically helpful. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, as President Bush has said, quote, 

‘‘The United States will continue to stand with the people of 

Belarus and all those who are working to help Belarus take its 

rightful place in the community of democracies,’’ close quote. Our 

policy, U.S. policy toward Belarus has never been driven by 

Minsk’s relationship with Moscow, whether warm or cold. Instead 

our policy has been driven by the Government of Belarus’ treatment of its own people. 

We have shown our determination to take action against Belarus 

officials responsible for human rights abuses, assaults on democracy and state corruption. The targeted sanctions and penalties we 

have imposed are not directed against the people of Belarus. With 

the release of all political prisoners by the government there, we 

have begun a review of these sanctions and are allowing certain, 

but by no means all, transactions to move forward. 

We never sought regime change per say, merely a change in regime behavior. And we hope we are seeing some positive signs of 

such a change. 

Again, we hope the Government of Belarus shows a true, sustained commitment to democratic reform and respect for human 

rights so that we finally have the opportunity to move our relationship forward. It is my hope that we will look back on this year, Mr. 

Chairman, as a time when relations between Belarus and the 

United States got back on their rightful track. Thank you. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Secretary Kramer. I’m going to talk to 

Chairman Hastings who has joined us. I’m going to ask a few questions, and then I’m going to turn the gavel over to Chairman Hastings. The Senate has started a vote, and I will need to go to the 

Senate floor in order to cast that vote. 

But let me ask you one or two questions at this point. And that 

is you mentioned the fact that the Belarus government has released some of the political prisoners as a positive step. But what 

do you believe was the motivation of the government at this particular moment in the release of these prisoners? Was it an effort 

to try to deal with the public relations internationally? Or was it 

a real change in direction of the Belarus government? 

Sec. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, the release of political prisoners 

started earlier this year, in fact, the beginning of this year when 

I was still in my previous position as the Deputy Assistant SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:04 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\091608 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
8 

retary in the European Eurasian Bureau. And it came about based 

on engagement we had in Minsk with our embassy where we hoped 

and were led to believe that at that time the six political prisoners 

in jail would all be released, including Mr. Kazulin. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Kazulin was the only one who stayed in jail. 

The other five were released, which was a good thing. Any time you 

can secure the release of political prisoners,that is a positive development. 

But we made it clear at that time that any way forward in our 

relationship required the release of all six, not simply five out of 

six. And after we ran out of patience and came to the conclusion 

that Kazulin would not be released in due time as we had been 

promised, we decided to take additional action as we did in early 

March against the government. 

Since then I think it has been a combination of resolve we have 

shown in underscoring to the Government in Belarus that we 

would not bend in our position in our principle that all political 

prisoners had to be released as a precondition for the actual start 

of any kind of dialogue. And I think it has also been the resolve 

of the European Union, which has maintained a similar firm view. 

And I think together this united position has been critical. 

Finally, I think while—— 

Mr. CARDIN. So you’re saying that you believe that this action 

was as a result of Belarus recognizing in order to have dialogue 

with Europe and America that they needed to make this step? Is 

that—— 

Sec. KRAMER. Since 2006 following their election and then the detention of a number of individuals, including Kazulin, but others, 

too, we and the European Union tightened the noose around the 

Government of Belarus. We made life difficult by imposing an expansive visa ban that prevented people from—well, in fact, I can’t 

mention the names, but from the highest levels on down, from traveling to the United States, certainly. And the E.U. did the same 

thing. The E.U.’s list actually is publicly available. 

We also froze the assets of a number of individuals. Well, oddly 

enough or interestingly enough, that list is publicly available from 

the U.S. Department of Treasury. And then beyond that we, in November 2007, because we continued to think that there was not 

going to be any release of these political prisoners, imposed an 

asset freeze and imposed sanctions on Belneftekhim, their largest 

exporter to the United States. 

I think it was a combination of these targeted measures against 

key individuals and against state-owned enterprises that key individuals had a vested interest in that got their attention in a very 

serious way. And it was the looming threat of further sanctions because we made clear after imposing the freeze on Belneftekhim 

that more sanctions could follow. 

The other point I would just add very quickly, Mr. Chairman, is 

at the risk of trying to read their minds, I do think that the Russian attack against Georgia also contributed to Belarus’ decision to 

take this step. I think the repercussions of that move on all of Russia’s neighbors have forced them to rethink some of their policies 

and approaches. 

9 

And I think there is the possibility—again, I can’t say this with 

certainty—that the Government in Belarus decided keeping its options open to the West was something they desired. And they knew 

the only way to do that was to release all the political prisoners. 

That was based on the clear message we had sent. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. Let me just make one other comment. 

And that is the September 28th elections—you’ve already alluded 

to it that it’s not just counting the votes accurately and openly, but 

it’s what leads up to the elections. We are just a couple weeks away 

from the elections now. 

We know that in the 102 districts, I think—110 districts, I believe it is, that there have been repressive practices that have already been deployed making it virtually impossible for opposition 

candidates to have an opportunity at a fair shot of election. So it 

appears, at least from our observations that there these elections 

will not meet the standards that we expect for open, free, and competitive elections and that what we are asking now with the observation teams, et cetera is to look at what happens on the ground 

leading up to the elections and the actual casting of ballots and the 

counting of ballots. 

But I don’t want to give the impression that just because votes 

are cast and counted that they’re open and free elections. 

Sec. KRAMER. Yes. 

Mr. CARDIN. And I hope that you will stay very strong in reporting what has happened in regards to opposition candidates and 

how much progress, in fact, will have been made by Belarus in regards to these parliamentary elections. 

Sec. KRAMER. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that the 

positive move on the release of political prisoners by no means 

guarantees the Government of Belarus a pass on these upcoming 

elections. We will call these elections as we see them. We will rely, 

of course, on the assessments of the observation teams in place, the 

ODIHR mission, parliamentary assembly of the OSCE and others 

who will be on-hand to observe these elections. We do have concerns about the way they have been conducted so far. We regret 

that the government of Belarus has not followed through on the 

recommendations that have been made. 

The problems that opposition representation has encountered in 

being on district election commissions, the fact that almost 20 percent of opposition candidates have been denied registration, transparency of voting, ballot box security, vote counting, all of these 

things—as you rightly point out, Mr. Chairman, it is not simply 

what happens on the 28th. It’s everything leading up to the 28th 

as well as the 28th and following the 28th. And that’s how we’ll 

judge these elections. 

Mr. CARDIN. We’ll be looking forward to getting the reports. 

I now turn the gavel over to Chairman Hastings. Thank you. 

HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HASTINGS [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator. And 

I’ll thank you for carrying forth my apologies for having floor responsibilities before coming here as well. 

10 

In light of the fact that the ranking member and the distinguished special representative were here before myself, I would ask 

of them their indulgence to allow that I read my opening statement. And then I won’t ask questions. 

But before doing that, I’ll take the distinct pleasure in introducing to the audience two people that I’ve spent a large portion 

of my life with, including in Belarus, I might add, at the elections 

that took place previously. The Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE and the Deputy Secretary General of 

the Parliamentary Assembly, Spencer Oliver and Tina Schoen over 

here in this corner. 

Welcome. And tomorrow Mr. Oliver will be presenting to the Helsinki Commission. 

This hearing comes at a very interesting time for a country 

which has the sad distinction of having one of the worst domestic 

human rights records in Europe. Quite frankly, Commissioner Kramer, Mr. Assistant Secretary, I don’t know too many people, if any, 

in the government that have had a more hands on experience in 

dealing with Belarus than yourself. And my compliments to you for 

your efforts on behalf of our government and the Belarusian people 

in those ventures. 

Russia’s invasion of Georgia and ongoing occupation has changed 

the dynamics within much of the OSCE region. With even heretofore normally staunch Russian allies such as Belarusian leader 

Alexander Lukashenka, wary of Moscow’s aggression and reluctant 

to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on a concrete positive 

note, the three remaining internationally recognized political prisoners were released, including Belarus’ most prominent political 

prisoner that I know you and others of us and Mr. Smith and 

countless of us have raised the issue with reference to Alexander 

Kazulin. 

And as a result, the United States has temporarily suspended its 

ban on two U.S. companies dealing with Belarus. There’s a huge 

state-controlled petro-chemical concern. Although other sanctions 

remain in place pending future progress. 

Despite some slight improvements, the election environment in 

Belarus remains significantly problematical, as you just pointed 

out. And since I was the one who led the last OSCE election observation mission to Minsk in March of ’06, I can tell you that there 

is much room for improvement. And I can also tell you that as in 

many countries, I was extremely impressed with the young people 

in Belarus who in spite of pressures and being told that they could 

be arrested, went forth with their demonstrations that took place 

during that time. 

I hope that the Belarusian authorities will take resolute steps to 

improve the election climate in the short time left. And I also remain concerned, Mr. Secretary, about the imprisoned U.S. citizen, 

Emanuel Zeltser, whose health has reportedly seriously deteriorated and who has been denied his doctor-prescribed medications. 

Although I’m told two of them that are vital to him have been allowed to be given to him. 

And also he has been denied some regular consular access. And 

hopefully that will improve. And I call for his humanitarian reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:04 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\091608 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
11 

lease. His brother lives within the confines of the district that I 

represent. 

The human rights and democracy situation in Belarus is so 

wanting that it will undoubtedly take a long and considerable effort to reverse the damage done over the course of the last 14 

years. As I remarked in Minsk in March of ’06 and Deputy Secretary Schoen was there with me, the Belarusian people deserve 

better. However, should the Belarusian authorities display a concrete willingness to begin making progress with respect to their democracy and human rights, the United States should be open to 

prudent and measured engagement. 

So with the release of the political prisoners, are we witnessing 

a glimmer of hope for the beginnings of long-awaited change? Or 

is it business as usual? I look forward to hearing from the other 

witnesses that are with us. And I’m glad I heard some of your testimony. Our other witnesses, too, have extensive experience and 

deep involvement in encouraging respect for human rights and 

democratic change in Belarus. And they’re uniquely qualified to assess the prospects for democratic change in that long-suffering 

country. 

I see Steve Nix is here. I know he is going to be onboard. And 

he and I have been in a lot of these places at different times with 

IRI and NDI and other non-governmental organizations working to 

improve democracy in these areas. 

With that, I would ask the ranking member if he would have any 

questions, to be followed by Ms. Solis. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just ask Secretary Kramer a couple of questions. It’s in 

regard to the sanctions which have been waived until March 2009. 

If these reports of Anatoly Lebedka and others being beaten—and 

if it’s as severe as it could be—and hopefully it is not, but it could 

be—what kind of message have we—or what are our instructions 

basically in terms of those sanctions? Is there a snap-back capability to say, OK, you know, in good faith we have waived—you 

know, we had hoped that you were going in the right direction, but 

frankly, when you go and you beat people up and send bully boys 

out, you know, that flies in the face of reform, which I know you 

agree with? 

But is the March ’09 in concrete? Or is that something that very 

quickly could evaporate, that’s it, we’re going right back to where 

we were before? 

Second, it’s my understanding that Lukashenka’s government 

still has not and hopefully will not recognize South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia as independent states. And it was telling, I think, to 

some extent that Lukashenka did not join the bandwagon in Moscow as many of our friends in the Duma did in backing that violence. 

Now, we all remember that Nicolae Ceausescus played the West 

and the United States for fools. I read Ion Pacepa’s book. I worked 

with his daughter, along with Frank Wolf to get her out after he 

defected. And in Red Horizon he made it very clear that he played 

this dual track difference from Moscow in order to curry certain 

favor in the West. And we swallowed it hook, line and sinker. 

12 

And, you know, there’s not, it would seem to me, a whole lot of 

downside to Lukashenko remaining mute on South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia if we fawn over that. It’s good. It’s positive. If it’s sincere, 

it’s very good. But if it’s nothing but duplicity, I think we need to 

have our eyes opened on that and at least be asking that question. 

Because again, Ceausescu was perhaps among the most brutal, as 

Alcee knows so well, and Steny Hoyer and all of us who were there. 

And Spencer Oliver. You know, he really had the most brutal secret police, Securitate, than anywhere else in Europe. And that’s, 

a pretty dubious distinction. So I’m a little bit concerned about 

that, and I’d be interested in your views. 

And finally, on the issue of the new media law that goes into effect shortly in February. As you know, I’ve introduced the Global 

Online Freedom Act, have been trying to get it passed for 3 years. 

It has stalled again even though it’s ready to come to the floor. All 

three committees have approved it, or at least waived it—Foreign 

Affairs. And we know it’s often we think of China and other countries like Vietnam because of their use of the Internet to restrict 

information. It’s a propaganda tool, but also to find dissidents who 

have Yahoo accounts or any other account. 

And you know what the bill does and how it would force or compel disclosure. Now, this law appears to move Lukashenka’s government further down the line on restricting the Internet and 

using it as a secret police tool in a very large toolbox of repression 

capabilities that he has. Your view on that, and I thank you. 

Sec. KRAMER. Congressman Smith, thank you very much for the 

questions. Let me try to answer them to the best I can. 

On the temporary lifting of the two subsidiaries of Belneftekhim, 

it is not Belneftekhim itself that the sanction has been lifted. It is 

on two subsidiaries of Belneftekhim. Those were imposed following 

the initial imposition of sanctions on Belneftekhim in November 

2007. 

They came in March of this year. And they were imposed after 

we came to the conclusion that Kazulin, the last of the six prisoners, would also not be released. And we took that step because 

we felt the government in Belarus left us no choice and we needed 

to get their attention once again, as I think we very successfully 

did in November in 2007. 

The lifting of those sanctions is a goodwill gesture in response to 

the release of the political prisoners. It can certainly be reimposed 

if need be. And certainly, what happened today will be a factor as 

we examine our sanctions policy toward Belarus. And any future 

possible negative developments that would happen would also be 

factored into those considerations. 

While we are hopeful that the government will take further positive steps that would match the release of political prisoners, we 

will not rely on hope. We will not rely on wishful thinking. And 

this comes to the second question you asked, not only about recognition, but about the possibility of Lukashenka playing us off of 

Russia. 

We won’t rely on wishful thinking. We will rely on specific concrete actions that the government of Belarus needs to take in order 

for us to respond in a positive way. It’s similar to what had been 

proposed several years ago—step by step or selective engagement— 

13 

with the government of Belarus that is predicated on specific steps 

that the government takes in a forward, positive direction that also 

means not just one step and one step backward. It means steps forward, so a continuum in that direction. 

And we are cognizant of the possibility that he is taking the step 

in releasing the political prisoners to ease the pressure off, at least 

from the West, as Russia affords him little haven, given the rising 

energy prices that Russia keeps imposing on Belarus. Belarus has 

not exactly had a lot of friends close by or even more distant in the 

United States. 

The release of all political prisoners, I think, was a significant 

development, one that we had told the government for 2 years we 

would respond positively to if they took that step. But we have also 

told them that is not the be all and end all. We will judge them 

based on their overall behavior. And release of political prisoners 

does not secure them a pass so that they can behave any way they 

want in other areas. 

Mr. SMITH. On that let me just congratulate you on securing 

their freedom. That is an extraordinary feat, and you’re to be greatly commended for it. 

Sec. KRAMER. And I must say the policy on this has been a model 

of interagency coordination, including with the Pentagon because 

the Pentagon has had issues with Belarus’ partnership, the peace 

relationship. They’ve been extremely helpful. The NSC has been 

outstanding, the vice president’s office. Treasury Department has 

been indispensable in terms of the sanctions that we’ve imposed. 

So it’s really been a model for interagency coordination and also 

with the European Union. 

On the recognition part of the question, sir, they have not recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In fact, the only country that 

I’m aware of that has is Nicaragua. And Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia have recognized each other. I’m not sure I’d rack that up 

to a great diplomatic success. 

We have engaged them on this issue. Nothing, from what we’ve 

been told, will happen before the parliamentary elections. We also 

hope that they won’t take that step after the parliamentary elections. And we’ll continue to engage with them on this issue. 

They are facing, I think—there’s no question—significant pressure to recognize. They’re not the only ones facing such pressure. 

And we hope all the neighbors resist this pressure. 

On your third question, the media law, this is a cause of concern. 

When the parliament passed the legislation and then it was signed 

in August into law, we registered our serious concerns with this. 

You’re absolutely right that this will have the affect of requiring 

all media outlets, including domestic-based Internet Web sites to 

reregister with the government, which is likely to lead to the hindering, if not outright closure, of some of these media organizations. This, too, will factor into our overall approach in policy toward Belarus and what kind of steps we take in a positive way 

that would respond to positive developments, but also how we need 

to respond to get their attention when they engage in negative activity. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Ms. Solis? 

14 

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you, Mr. Kramer. I just wanted to touch base 

again on the sanctions. And if you could just go over that again, 

that we’re somehow putting those back, so to speak. And it’s because of the release of these prisoners in part. 

Sec. KRAMER. Yes. 

Ms. SOLIS. What happens after the elections? What happens with 

the notion of the sanctions? And with the detention of Mr. Emanuel 

Zeltser, who is already—we’ve already, I guess, appealed to have 

him released. It seems to me that there should be some standard, 

I’m assuming, that you all are looking at. And what is that? What 

is that standard, if you could share some of that? 

Sec. KRAMER. No, thank you. Thank you for the question and the 

opportunity to elaborate on this. In November 2007, the Treasury 

Department in full coordination with the interagency group issued 

an announcement freezing the assets of Belneftekhim. And that imposed, I think, significant hardship on that company and on the 

Belarusian state as a whole as well as, I think, arguably, on some 

individuals that had ties to that entity. 

In March of this year, after we concluded that Kazulin would not 

be released along with the other five political prisoners, we asked 

the Treasury Department to issue a clarification or an elaboration 

of the announcement from November 2007. And in that announcement in March, the Treasury Department extended the asset freeze 

and sanctions to several of Belneftekhim’s subsidiaries. 

There had been, I would argue, rather helpful ambiguity as to 

whether those subsidiaries had been covered under the initial November 2007 announcement. The March announcement removed 

that ambiguity and made it clear that those subsidiaries were covered. 

Now, as we all know—and I apologize. I’m going to digress for 

a second. That March announcement by Treasury’s OFAC unit led 

the Belarusian authorities to force out our Ambassador and to significantly scale down the presence of our embassy down to five individuals, whom I highly commend for the outstanding job they’ve 

done under very adverse conditions. And let me also, if I may use 

the opportunity, commend the Foreign Service Nationals who have 

also been operating under extremely adverse and difficult circumstances and have behaved heroically, in my view. 

We then were prepared to go ahead with further steps and further sanctions. And I think that the way we looked at the lifting 

of these sanctions in light of the release of political prisoners we 

scaled back what was done in March of this year. But we did not 

scale back what was done in November of last year. So we simply 

dealt with two of the three subsidiaries that were announced in 

March. But the broader Belneftekhim sanction stays in place as a 

point of leverage, quite frankly, to try to prevent further negative 

behavior. And that’s something that we will continue to review. 

Lifting that overall sanction would be a pretty significant step. 

I hope the Government of Belarus earns the lifting of that sanction. 

But it’ll have to earn it. 

Ms. SOLIS. So what would be a trigger that? 

Sec. KRAMER. To lift it? 

Ms. SOLIS. Yes. Because you’re looking at the elections. 

Sec. KRAMER. The elections will be one. 

15 

Ms. SOLIS. Yes. 

Sec. KRAMER. We’ll see how the elections go. And we discussed, 

there are some serious problems with the elections. Treatment of 

members of the opposition, treatment of journalists, treatment of 

NGOs, the ability of NGOs and journalists to operate in an 

unhindered and unfettered fashion inside the country. 

Ms. SOLIS. Is it premature to say you might have a timeline, a 

conceptual timeline to look at to get so folks might be able to review that? 

Sec. KRAMER. It’s conceivable. And, quite frankly, when in January we were approached about what our response would be to the 

release of the prisoners then, we and the government in Belarus 

came to an understanding that there was a timeline there, that the 

release of political prisoners could not be dragged on endlessly so 

as to try to stave off the imposition of further sanctions. Because 

they knew—at least I hoped that they didn’t doubt that further 

sanctions were possible since we’ve hit them several times with 

this after giving them full and fair warning that further sanctions 

would come. 

We don’t necessarily have a particular timeline. Now, obviously 

September 28th would be voting day as well as the campaign and 

everything leading up to it is a point to keep in mind. But I think 

we’ll have to wait and see. I think our expectation is to have further discussions with them after the elections to see how the elections go, to see what they might do after the elections on non-election related issues. And then we can gauge and determine what 

kind of response we would have from that. 

Ms. SOLIS. I’m being a bit facetious, but is there maybe an expectation that something might happen before our elections? 

Sec. KRAMER. There’s hope. But I’m not sure. By November 4th 

I’m not sure I would recommend getting expectations too high. 

Ms. SOLIS. Timelines—the word has different meanings for different people. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sec. KRAMER. If I may, though, just on that point, I think it is 

fair to say this administration, as you know, will be out the door 

January 20th. But everything I can infer suggests that whichever 

Senator winds up the next President, I think this policy that we 

have had toward Belarus will continue. 

Mr. HASTINGS. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Mr. 

Secretary, in light of the time constraints and I am anticipating 

that we will have a vote real shortly and I do want to get to our 

next witnesses, so I’d ask you please just catalogue two questions 

for me. And one is not a question, but rather if you would have 

your good offices tell me just what, if anything, has been done with 

reference to the U.S. citizen that Ms. Solis and I have mentioned, 

Emanuel Zeltser. 

I’d like to know more about the present circumstances. I’m mindful of the facts, at least as are presented, and would like to know 

what, if anything, the government is doing or can do. 

The second thing has to do with your good offices telling us about 

relations between the democratic forces of Belarus with neighboring countries. What I have found is significant changes take 

place when people can communicate. And more specifically Poland 

16 

and Lithuania and Latvia and Ukraine are what I have reference 

to. But you and I can talk about that further. 

I’d like to get to the next panel. You’re welcome to stay and join 

us if you can. And if not, then we certainly understand that you 

have other business. But thank you so much for your testimony. 

Sec. KRAMER. Sure. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HASTINGS. OK. I’d like to invite now and am pleased to do 

so representatives from three organizations, which have been in 

the forefront with respect to Belarus. I had mentioned earlier a 

longstanding good friend, Stephen Nix, who is the Regional Program Director for Eurasia at the International Republican Institute 

and Laura Jewett, the Regional Director for Eurasia for the National Democratic Institute, and Rodger Potocki, the Director for 

Europe and Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy. 

Lady and gentlemen, I would appreciate very much—I believe it 

was earlier announced that your full statements would be made a 

part of the record—if you could abbreviate as much as possible. 

And if Mr. Smith and Ms. Solis are still here, I’m going to begin 

the questioning by asking Mr. Smith to go forward and then Ms. 

Solis. And I’ll be last since I was last to arrive. 

Mr. Nix, no reflection. I know you better than I do our other witnesses. I do know Ms. Jewett. But let’s begin with the lady, all 

right? 

Mr. NIX. Certainly. I’ll defer to you, Mr. Chairman. Of course. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Ms. Jewett? OK. 

LAURA JEWETT, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EURASIA, NATIONAL 

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Ms. JEWETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Commission. I’m Laura Jewett from the National Democratic Institute. And it’s a pleasure to be here. 

And I thank you for this opportunity to comment on the upcoming elections. These elections may turn out to be significant, but 

not for the reasons usually ascribed to elections. They will not 

produce a representative parliament that will legislate on behalf of 

constituents’ interests, which is the outcome expected of democratic 

elections. They are also unlikely to cause a dramatic transformation in the Belarusian political system, which has been the 

outcome of popular reactions to some fraudulent elections in the region in recent years. 

In short, these elections will not likely be remembered for having 

brought democracy to Belarus. They’re more likely to be remembered for their role as both an agent and a barometer of improvements in Belarusian relations with the West. 

They are also noteworthy because of the opportunity they provide 

to Belarusian Democrats to organize and build support for alternative political viewpoints. If Belarusian relations with the West 

do, in fact, improve and if the Democratic opposition makes the 

most of its opportunities, limited though they may be, the longterm prospects for Belarusian democracy may brighten slightly. 

Belarus has yet to organize an election that meets even minimum international standards. ODIHR, the Office for Democratic 

Institutes and Human Rights that you know well, has observed 

elections in Belarus in 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2006. The ODIHR reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:04 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\091608 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
17 

ports have repeatedly concluded that the elections have fallen well 

short of OSCE commitments. These were elections in name only. 

And the September 28th elections are not likely to break what 

is by now a well-established pattern. The political environment is 

simply hostile to competitive participatory elections. I would like to 

highlight just two of the many adverse conditions. 

Most forms of independent political activity, including NGO and 

political party organizing, have been repressed. 2005 amendments 

to the criminal code made operating an unregistered organization 

punishable by up to 2 years in prison. In Belarus registration is reserved only for the organizations most loyal to the government. So 

these provisions constitute a serious threat for many civic groups. 

And they were employed liberally in the run-up to the March 2006 

Presidential election. 

In fact, in February 2006, several civic activists partnering with 

NDI were accused of illegally running an unregistered organization 

and sentenced to prison for periods from 6 months to 2 years. Opposition political parties have faced particular obstacles. The government has arbitrarily deregistered some parties and closed down 

regional branches of others. Party activists are regularly fired from 

jobs, expelled from universities, sentenced to prison terms on manufactured charges such as using obscenities in public. And party 

activists are regularly beaten, as we have seen as recently as 

today. 

The threat of arbitrary liquidation is just one of a large assortment of tools the government has used to prevent parties from 

gaining a foothold. NDI’s own experience, alongside that of other 

international democracy assistance organizations, is evidence of the 

harsh environment. NDI has conducted democracy assistance programs in Belarus since 2000 partnering with citizens who want to 

build democratic political institutions. Yet the institute is unable to 

open an office inside Belarus and staff are unable to get visas to 

travel to the country. Programs are conducted from an office outside Belarus. 

There are no quick fixes to the repression and resulting underdevelopment of civil society and political parties in Belarus. These 

are entrenched features of the political environment. When we look 

back on the 2008 parliamentary elections and compare them with 

their predecessors, it’s a safe bet that we will see more continuity 

than discontinuity. 

That said, as Assistant Secretary Kramer outlined, there are 

signs of a mild thaw in U.S./Belarusian relations, which may find 

reflection in some aspects of this month’s electoral process. The 

conduct of the upcoming elections will serve as another measure of 

the government’s intentions. I would suggest that the following six 

items would be indicators of relative improvements to the process. 

First, the territorial election commissions have registered 77 of 

the 110 unified list opposition candidates who applied, a ratio of 

roughly two-thirds, which is a mildly positive sign. Will any of 

these 77 be deregistered for minor infractions such as spelling errors in application documents or improper placement of campaign 

booths before they make it onto the ballot? 

No. 2, I think Steve Nix and I have slightly different numbers, 

but the conclusion is the same. Of 1,430 district election commisVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:04 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\091608 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
18 

sioners, 36 are from the opposition. Of 69,845 precinct election commissioners, 41 are from the opposition. Opposition representation 

on election commissions is thus miniscule. Nonetheless, are these 

individuals being allowed to exercise their rights and responsibilities? 

No. 3, do candidates have the freedom to conduct active campaigns? This includes the freedom to travel throughout their districts, to conduct campaign activities in locations that are accessible to voters. It precludes arbitrary arrests and detentions of candidates or their teams, dismissals from jobs and other forms of intimidation and pressure. 

No. 4, do candidates have access to the government news media 

beyond the mandated 5 minutes of free television and radio time? 

This would include invitations for interviews, coverage of events 

and opportunities to respond publicly to any coverage. 

Five, are domestic and international observers granted accreditation and full access to all stages of the electoral process, including 

the vote count and tabulation? 

Six, are complaints about the process given due hearing by the 

appropriate electoral or judicial bodies? And are violators prosecuted? 

Two weeks into the 4-week campaign we have preliminary answers to a couple of these questions. In regard to campaigning, 

some opposition candidates are facing obstacles. Some have been 

arrested or detained. Some are under investigation for alleged 

crimes unrelated to the elections. Some have had trouble getting 

campaign literature printed or have had literature confiscated. And 

we’ve heard some reports of candidates not being allowed to set up 

campaign booths to meet with voters. 

With regard to the media, opposition candidates have not been 

given access to state-controlled media, aside from the mandated 5 

minutes of air time. It’s also the case that the negative attacks on 

candidates that were prevalent in 2006 seem not to be occurring 

this year. 

So while the news is not positive, it may be slightly less negative 

than it was 2 years ago. And I leave that to your judgment whether 

that’s an improvement or not. 

If by September 29th, the day following the election, the answer 

to most of the six questions turns out to be no, we can conclude 

that these elections are business as usual in Belarus. If the answers turn out to be yes, it would not necessarily suggest that the 

elections are legitimate, but rather that the Government of Belarus 

is making a modest effort to respond to United States and European concerns with the aim of getting sanctions lifted and improving its positioning with respect to Russia. 

That effort could in turn open slightly more space in the country 

for democratic political organizing. These elections also provide a 

narrow but important opportunity for the democratic forces in the 

country to take advantage of limited political space by articulating 

an alternative vision for Belarus and building public support. It 

has been encouraging to see some progress in the opposition’s efforts over time, including nominating a unified list of candidates 

through a decentralized and participatory process. These achievements are impressive in the highly restrictive Belarusian setting. 

19 

NDI approaches democracy assistance in Belarus as a long-term 

process. No single election will deliver the final result. The September 28th elections provide an opportunity for incremental 

progress due to the broader international context and the efforts of 

Belarusian Democrats. We should encourage those trends while 

keeping in check expectations for dramatic, immediate change. 

NDI appreciates the efforts of Congress to support the people of 

Belarus in establishing a full democracy, the rule of law and respect for political and civil rights. We value the role of this commission in defending human rights and respect for all elements of the 

Helsinki process and in promoting a cohesive U.S. and European 

position toward the Government of Belarus. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Potocki? 

RODGER POTOCKI, DIRECTOR, EUROPE AND EURASIA, 

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 

Mr. POTOCKI. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 

Commission, thank you for the opportunity to comment on the political situation prior to Belarus’ September 28th parliamentary 

elections. In comparison to 2004, the regime in Minsk has adopted 

a different approach to this election. But the changes are of style, 

not of substance. Belarus has not held a free or fair election in 14 

years. And the end result of this one will almost certainly be no 

different. 

To win Transatlantic political and economic concessions, the regime is altering the way it conducts elections in three ways, by allowing international scrutiny, asserting technical improvements 

and moderating the campaign climate. In the past, Alexander 

Lukashenka cared little about Western outcry over his persecution 

of the opposition and falsification of elections. 

The regime’s new business plan is to minimize international condemnation of and encourage domestic apathy about what is already 

a flawed process. Lukashenka wants a ‘‘quiet election’’ that can be 

sold to the West by advertising ‘‘progress’’ on several fronts. 

The regime’s first move toward muting international criticism 

has been to open up the elections to the outside world. Unlike Russia, Belarus has welcomed international monitors. In contrast to 

2004, the regime has been less obstructionist, granting the OSCE 

mission access to the highest levels of government. Lukashenka 

has declared ‘‘We want to show Western countries and Russia how 

elections should be organized.’’ 

This election is being orchestrated to improve Belarus’ image 

abroad. The country’s top election official has made it clear that the 

primary goal is to ‘‘have the results recognized by the international 

community.’’ The acceptance of and focus on international observers also helps gain legitimacy amongst the 71 percent of the people 

who think the election should be monitored. 

But just as importantly the regime’s de ́tente with the West seeks 

to divert citizens’ attention away from the election’s domestic aspects. Up to a third of the state media’s election coverage is centered on the international monitors, not candidates or races. The 

regime’s international spotlight has been carefully focused. In 

terms of monitoring, it has concentrated on the more friendly CIS 

20 

observers. In mid-August, the state news agency Belta devoted four 

times as much coverage to the CIS monitors than to their Western 

counterparts. There has been almost no official coverage of domestic observation efforts. 

Like the government, democratic leaders also recognized the 

paramount role of the international community. By trying to compete with the regime for Western attention instead of campaigning 

at home, the opposition is also deflecting the electorate’s attention 

away from domestic issues. The OSCE’s first interim report stated 

that there is ‘‘very little evidence’’ that an election is actually underway in Belarus. Calls for a boycott by some of the opposition 

also threaten to turn the election into exclusively an international 

show. 

The second tact to temper international dissatisfaction with the 

election process is the regime’s focus on organizational matters. 

Lukashenka has declared ‘‘we want the election to be held in such 

a way so that nobody will be able to criticize us.’’ The Central Election Commission is pointing to procedural improvements as evidence of Belarus ‘‘coming closer to international standards.’’ 

The Central Election Commission has pointed out, for example, 

it has received a total of only 275 complaints since the parliamentary campaign began as compared to 888 during the 2004 campaign. The CIS mission has lauded the Belarusian authorities for 

successfully ‘‘securing the proper organization of the election process.’’ 

Cosmetic changes in routine can produce good publicity, especially if the state controls the media. If this election is perceived 

as more efficiently run, it gives the appearance of being more 

democratic. A focus on procedures helps to influence the one-third 

of voters who consider Belarus’ Election Code as flawed and do not 

believe that this will be a free and fair election. 

Similarly, the state media is reporting on those who are running 

the election, not those running in the election. During the second 

half of July, it devoted more than 70 percent of its parliamentary 

coverage to President Lukashenka. During the first half of August, 

Gomel Pravda, a state regional newspaper covering 17 election districts, allocated 99.82 percent of its election space to the president 

and Central Election Commission. 

An orderly election also contrasts nicely with a democratic opposition painted by the regime as disorganized and riven by conflict. 

The regime, which bases its legitimacy on stability, is using opposition protests against procedural irregularities to accuse the democrats of disturbing the peace. By confronting the regime over procedures rather ideas, the opposition is reinforcing the regime’s ‘‘wellordered’’ election plan. 

The state’s actions are not designed to inform voters, but to influence foreign observers and foster mass indifference. According to 

one OSCE employee, the most important thing for the regime is 

how this election looks to the West, not how it affects Belarusians. 

The third means to ensure a quiet election is to temper political 

noise at home. The regime has moderated its repression against 

the opposition. Candidates report that the current environment is 

appreciably better than it was in 2004. The state media’s coverage 

21 

has improved in the sense that there has been less vitriol flung at 

the opposition. 

But again, this is a change in approach, not in direction. Heavyhandedness has been shelved for subtlety, brute force has been set 

aside in favor of low-level harassment, and intimidation has been 

replaced by indifference. While raising the international profile of 

the election for its own purposes, the regime is downplaying it at 

home. 

Before the campaign began, the regime made sure to eliminate 

many of the troublemakers. A dozen of the opposition’s ‘‘rising 

stars’’ who had previously run strong campaigns and developed 

popular support were not registered. Until today, those who had 

made it past the procedural hurdles had not been subjected to the 

full force of the state’s repression apparatus. But they had been 

forced to undergo tax inspections, expelled from university, fired 

from their jobs, drafted into the army and suffered other pressure. 

The regime hasn’t abandoned the use of force, just ratcheted down 

its intensity. In fact, because it wants this election to come off well, 

most of the election-related arrests have focused on those advocating a boycott. 

To foster indifference, state media has minimized reporting on 

the election. From July to August, election-related coverage actually decreased. The state broadcast media has devoted more time 

to reporting on the weather than the elections. It has offered almost zero coverage of opposition campaigns. State radio rejected 

the opposition’s request to hold debates. As late as the first week 

of September, Soviet Belarus and The Republic, two leading state 

dailies, provided no positive or no negative reporting on political 

parties—they simply ignored them. 

The main news program on state television devoted less than 3 

percent of its election reporting to an anonymous opposition and 

anonymous political parties. An independent monitor reported that 

‘‘there is literally no election campaign going on in the media.’’ 

Finally, the regime is using its administrative resources to limit 

the public outreach of opposition campaigns. Candidates’ television 

addresses were broadcast during rush hour, when working people 

were still commuting home. They appeared not on national television, but on less-watched regional channels. The state provided 

the equivalent of $800 to each candidate for campaigning, the only 

funding that can be legally used to get out his or her message. 

Meetings with voters have been restricted to only a few, out-of-theway places. Campaign materials are limited to isolated billboards. 

The regime’s goal is to make the elections uneventful for the general public. Citizens are being encouraged to go the polls without 

a knowledge of their choices, and the regime is perpetuating the 

ritual of voting that still dominates in this post-Soviet state. 

Mr. Chairman, during Soviet times Belarus was known as ‘‘the 

quiet Republic.’’ The regime is doing all it can today to make this 

a ‘‘quiet election,’’ palatable for the West. But the ‘‘sounds of silence’’ emanating from Minsk ensure that this will not be a free 

and fair election. To answer to the question in the title of this hearing, it is not business as usual in Minsk this fall, but the same old 

scam is still in the works. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thanks, Mr. Potocki. 

22 

Mr. Nix? 

STEPHEN B. NIX, REGIONAL PROGRAM DIRECTOR, EURASIA, 

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Mr. NIX. Mr. Chairman, I hope you know that it’s a true honor 

to appear before you and the members of this Commission. I’d like 

to thank you for your gracious remarks in your opening statement. 

And I would like to thank you and the members of this Commission for your engagement and your interest in this important area, 

the important area of the world that we all work in, the former Soviet states. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to comment first on the title of today’s 

hearing, ‘‘Belarus on the eve of elections, business as usual?’’ Unfortunately, I fear that this is an appropriate title for the pre-election period in Belarus. Sadly the Government of Belarus has a 

track record of denying its people their fundamental right to have 

their voices heard in the ballot box. And we fear that this election 

will prove to be no different. 

A view of the history in post-Soviet Belarus is sobering in terms 

of elections. Local elections held in 2007 were declared by OSCE 

observers as failing to meet international standards. 2004 parliamentary elections fared no better. They were declared to have 

fallen significantly short of OSCE requirements. 

According to exit polling conducted in the 2004 elections by IRI, 

those results demonstrated that Lukashenka’s proposal to amend 

the constitution to allow for a third Presidential term did not have 

the support of a majority of voters and would not have passed. 

Based on the exit polling, an estimated 22 pro-democratic candidates would have won seats had the votes been counted fairly. 

But as you know, Mr. Chairman, no members of the opposition 

were allowed to take seats in that parliament. 

During recent actions by the Government of Belarus, there appears to be cautious optimism by some in the international community that Mr. Lukashenka is taking steps to improve relations with 

the West and to lighten his grip on the opposition. In this past 

month, as was noted earlier, we witnessed the release of political 

prisoners, including Alexander Kazulin, and we heralded the release of these brave men. 

However, we must remember that this action by the regime is 

singular in nature and it falls short of the list of requirements for 

increased diplomatic engagement that have been set forth by both 

the European Union and the United States. We must be careful not 

to view the upcoming elections through rose-colored glasses. And 

we must be increasingly on guard to monitor both the pre-election 

as well as election day events. 

Now, in assessing whether these elections will be free and fair, 

I think it’s instructive to use the standard set, the findings of fact 

from the delegation that you led yourself, sir, the last time out. 

And there are four of them, since my colleagues have covered some 

of them already. 

The first one is the executive apparatus maintains control on 

election commissions. Assistant Secretary Kramer alluded to this. 

I’d like to go into more detail. 

23 

There are 110 district election commissions in Belarus with a 

total membership of 1,430; this is the figure we have. Out of these, 

the opposition was only allowed appointment to 44 seats, representation of only 3.1 percent of the seats. 

Next, there’s a total of 6,485 precinct election commissions with 

a total of 69,845 seats. Of these, the opposition was allowed to have 

48. And that amounts to 0.07 percent of the available seats. 

Mr. Chairman, let me be very blunt. If the regime in Belarus 

were truly interested in running free and fair elections, it would 

ensure that all the votes are truthfully counted. However, when 

only 0.7 percent of the precinct election commissions, the very commissions where the votes are tabulated, are opposition members, 

this is evidence enough that the regime has every interest in controlling the voting results. 

Second standard, candidate registration procedures were abused 

to prevent undesirable candidates from participating in the election, limiting voters’ choice. Again, we see little change. On August 

29th, the CEC [Central Election Commission] announced that only 

276 out of 365 candidates were registered. I’ll cut through some of 

the details because you’ve heard from some of my colleagues. 

Three hundred and sixty-five people sought registration. That 

means 25 percent were denied the right to be on the ballot. Of the 

candidates registered, 78 are opposition members. With 110 electoral districts, this means that voters in approximately 29 percent 

of the districts are not being allowed a choice. If they vote, they 

have no option but to support the regime’s candidate. 

Third point, significant restrictions on fundamental freedoms of 

expression, assembly, and association had an intimidating and constraining effect on the campaign. In Belarus there is a law against 

mass gatherings, which means that any group of two or more people must receive official government permission to do so. This law 

is largely used to control opposition meetings with voters. 

In August, the CEC actually published a list of approved venues 

where candidates can meet with voters. Candidates must receive 

permission in the event they want to meet with voters in any 

venue not listed. This completely hinders effective voter outreach 

by the candidates. 

Fourth point, provisions for early voting, mobile ballot boxes, 

vote counts fall short of minimum transparency requirements for 

independent verification. Again, it’s no news to you, Mr. Chairman, 

early voting 5 days before election day is the period during which 

much of the fraud and vote rigging that you and others have so 

well documented takes place. Again, we foresee similar problems 

with this election. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, it appears that once again it is 

business as usual in Belarus and that the odds are overwhelmingly 

stacked in the regime’s favor. Yet even in the midst of this repressive culture, the United Democratic Forces, a coalition of pro-democratic activists in Belarus, is ardently striving to offer voters an alternative to the regime. 

The UDF has drafted and has implemented a strategy for these 

elections; the cornerstone of which is developing a single unified 

list of candidates in each of the 110 constituencies. The goal of the 

UDF campaign message is to prove to voters that they are a viable 

24 

alternative to the regime and that they have concrete ideas of how 

to bring positive change to the country. 

If elections in Belarus were free and fair, I truly believe that the 

UDF would be represented in this parliament. IRI’s polling demonstrates that the citizens of Belarus are ready for a change, and 

they deserve to be heard. U.S. and European government officials 

must remain vigilant in calling for democratic reform in Belarus. 

We need to remind the Belarusian Government that the world is 

paying close attention to this situation and improved relations with 

the West are related to the transparency of the elections in 

Belarus. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, the UDF have proven their willingness to unite and campaign against all odds. But they realize their 

campaign to bring change to their country is not limited to the parliamentary elections this September. This is a campaign that 

knows no electoral boundaries. 

The regime might prevent change via the ballot box in September 2008, but it cannot squelch the will of the people forever. 

Voters want change, and the UDF represent that change. We owe 

it to the people to acknowledge their dedication and stand with 

them until the end when they witness a truly free and democratic 

Belarus. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. NIX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTINGS. And I’ll turn now to the ranking member, my colleague and friend, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, all three, for, not only the very effective testimony, but for the excellent work you do on behalf of democracy, 

and especially as it relates today to Belarus. Let me just ask a couple of questions. 

Ms. Jewett, both you and Mr. Nix, all three of you really, focus 

on the executive apparatus and how it is so unconscionably stacked 

in favor of the government. Any of us, if we ran into this kind of 

situation, the temptation to boycott would be overwhelming because we all know at the end of the day when the doors are closed, 

we lose. And, you know, we saw that with Meles in Ethiopia. And 

your organizations were kicked out for your good work there. 

And I actually visited President Meles. And, you know, I do believe he’s a dictator and has met the opposition with bullets, mass 

arrests. And then when the re-ballotting occurred under international pressure, the commission was so stacked that they only focused, or largely focused on, any of the seats that they had lost. 

Yet despite it all, the opposition did extraordinarily well, even 

though everything was stacked against them. 

And you mentioned, Mr. Nix, about 71 percent of the sentiment 

of the people in favor of—how did you put it, just to be clear? 

Mr. NIX. Alluding to the previous parliamentary elections? 

Mr. SMITH. Previous parliamentary elections. 

Mr. NIX. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. [Inaudible] OK. 

Mr. NIX [Off-mike.] 

Mr. SMITH. Exactly. But let me just ask you, if I could, about 

these numbers. 

25 

Ms. Jewett, you mentioned 110, 77 were OK, 33 were not. The 

33 that were denied, what kind of cause did they give? And were 

they some of the best and most promising candidates perhaps that 

were being put forward, you know, taking care of the strong ones 

and let some of the weaker candidates get approved? Can any of 

you shed light on the beatings on this Day of Solidarity that occurred or apparently have occurred in Belarus? 

Let me just ask you very briefly about what is your recommendation to the opposition—should they boycott? You know, at what 

point does that become the more prudent thing to do? We know 

that in Nicaragua, as was mentioned earlier, the only area or country that’s recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia recently. Well, 

when Daniel Ortega was running and Uno (ph) united and all of 

those who wanted to sit on the sideline finally didn’t, it made the 

difference and Violeta Chamorro ended up winning that election. 

So, you know, if the opposition is split, you almost guarantee a 

loss, and a worse loss than it would have been had they been 

united and went down. So there’s a very hard call to make. But, 

you know, I think it hurts. 

And finally, Mr. Potocki, you mentioned the sounds of silence and 

the quiet election. And I think it was very incisive on your part. 

It reminds me of that Simon and Garfunkel song, ‘‘Hello, Darkness, 

My Old Friend,’’ because the silence does lead to a darkness that 

we’re already seeing. 

And I do have a lot of questions, but I’ll just finish it with this. 

The OSCE ODIHR deployment that’s been there since August 

15th—have they been able to quantify and qualify this media 

blockout? You know, 5 minutes and presumably the 5 minutes gets 

given to you at midnight so nobody sees it anyway. Are they creating a robust record of what will be an unfair and unfree election? 

Because as we all know and have said, what leads up to it is as 

important, if not more so, than the day of balloting. 

Ms. JEWETT. Thank you. As for the 33 or 32 candidates whose 

registration was rejected, we did not see a clear pattern in whose 

registration was accepted and whose was rejected. But perhaps my 

colleagues have a more incisive eye for that. It was not obvious to 

us whether there was cherry picking going on or whether it was 

arbitrary. 

As to the boycott question, there have been discussions certainly 

in Belarus about a boycott and among the opposition. And it’s my 

understanding that the political council of the UDF will make a 

final decision this weekend. It’s our sense that they will decide 

against a boycott. 

NDI’s advice in these situations typically is that these are decisions that, of course, must be made by the participants themselves. 

And it’s easy sitting here to make judgments about what should be 

done. But generally speaking, our advice is that it’s best to participate. 

Participating in an election does not in itself make an illegitimate exercise legitimate. But it does give opportunities to speak 

to voters, legal opportunities to speak to voters, articulate an alternative vision and build support and to pry a little bit of wedge to 

open up political space. So on balance, participating is the better 

option, is generally our advice. 

26 

Mr. HASTINGS. I would ask you all to give us snap answers at 

this point. So if Ms. Solis has any questions, all of you know what 

that bell means or what those bells mean. 

Either of you gentlemen go forth. 

Mr. NIX. I would just say in response to your question about competition, our advice and counsel to the UDF has been to stay in the 

game to compete. In fact, when we meet with opposition leaders, 

they are not allowed—we will not allow them to use the boycott 

word. We feel very strongly that it’s in their interests to compete 

in this election. We’ve made that very clear to them. 

Last week at the council meeting alluded to earlier, Mr. Kazulin 

made a very impassioned plea to everyone that’s on the ballot to 

remain in the race. We believe that that will be the case. 

Mr. POTOCKI. I would make two points, one in terms of the candidates. I agree with Laura in the sense that there is no pattern. 

But we have seen these dozen or so whom we know were not registered were young people who had done already very well in terms 

of running campaigns and taking part in local or parliamentary 

elections in the past. And so, they were people that had generated 

some popular support. 

In terms of the boycott, we also agree that the candidates should 

remain in the race until the end. This is the only legal chance they 

have to participate and they eliminate the government’s need to 

falsify if they drop out of the election. 

And finally, I would answer Rep. Smith’s question about the 

media monitoring. These are figures from a combination of OSCE 

media monitors as well as independent domestic Belarusian monitors that have been trained with National Endowment for Democracy resources. 

Mr. NIX. One comment in response to your request for additional 

information on the events of today. Mr. Lebedka we can confirm 

was beaten. But he was not the only one. In addition to that, 

Vintsuk Viachorka, with whom you have both met many, many 

times, was also badly beaten as well as his teenage son. Mr. 

Viachorka was quoted after he was taken for treatment for the 

beating. He said these events are savagery. And the European 

Union and the United States should draw the appropriate conclusions. And I agree with him. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Ms. Solis? 

Ms. SOLIS. Mr. Chairman, I am just flabbergasted and disgusted 

from what I’m hearing. And all I could—my first thought is that 

we have to make public this information from the witnesses and 

what we’ve gleaned. I would be a little bit reluctant to say that 

ODIHR should be giving us anything now because usually that 

might put another effect on their authority to do their work. And 

we’ve already seen instances where much of that has already been 

pre-judged in other elections. 

But I think anything we can do as OSCE and Members of Congress to help shed light on this, I think that’s maybe a good word 

to use, is to really provide more transparency on what we know already. Because what you’re telling me is there’s not going to be a 

change in the elections. 

And I would be very concerned about any folks that are campaigning or running for office that would be further harassed, inVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:04 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\091608 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
27 

timidated or incarcerated. And I think those are expectations that, 

you know, if that’s the way the government wants to proceed, then 

folks ought to just know that business is as usual and we ought 

to be prepared to come up with our own solutions shortly after the 

election. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Right. I appreciate both of you. 

Mr. Smith asked several questions. I think you all responded to 

them all. But to the extent that any were left out there, including 

any that I may ask our staff to forward on to you I would appreciate a response. We actively put our information now on our Web 

site. And so, if you do receive questions from us, your time permitting, I would appreciate it very much if you would respond accordingly. 

I thank you all. My favorite expression is it’s hard to apologize 

for working. But we do have to go and vote. And I thank you all 

so very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

28 

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, COCHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION 

IN EUROPE 

Since its independence in 1991, Belarus has been faced with a 

choice—whether to move forward in the direction of greater freedoms and respect for human rights, or perpetuate the Soviet model. 

Despite some positive steps during the early years, the situation remains rather bleak, especially for those attempting to voice views 

differing from the official line. For the last twelve years, since the 

consolidation of Alexander Lukashenka’s rule, the people of 

Belarus have been subjected to systematic state control over society, stifling of independent media and non-governmental organizations, arrests, detentions and violence against those who peacefully 

challenge the authorities. This misrule has led to Belarus’ self-isolation, leading it away from its rightful place among the democratic 

countries of Europe 

Today’s hearing comes at an intriguing moment, with the release 

of political prisoners and Minsk’s reluctance to endorse the Russian 

aggression in Georgia. On the other hand, the current state of affairs does not appear encouraging. From initial reports, it does not 

appear that we are yet witnessing meaningful improvements in the 

run-up to the September 28 parliamentary election, and many in 

the democratic opposition are already calling it an electoral farce. 

I very much look forward to hearing from our witnesses their assessment of the conduct of the election campaign to date. I am 

troubled by the very limited representation of the democratic opposition on the precinct and district election commissions and by the 

questionable denials of registration for some opposition candidates. 

Furthermore, we have yet to witness any reversal in the 

Belarusian authorities’ general human rights record—specifically, 

their poor treatment of non-governmental organizations, independent media and religious minorities. Belarus’ new restrictive 

medial law is also cause for concern. 

Nevertheless, if the Belarusian government chooses to take concrete steps towards genuine progress, I am confident that the 

United States will be willing to help ensure Belarus’ democratic development. The people of Belarus deserve to enjoy the freedoms 

shared by the vast majority of their fellow Europeans. 

29 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our witnesses and 

guests this afternoon. 

Less than two weeks before elections to Belarus’ National Assembly, President Lukashenka has given us few signs that these elections will be different from other elections held under his rule, 

which have fallen far short of OSCE standards. Once again, the opposition finds officials restricting its campaign activities, and opposition candidates have little access to the state-dominated media. 

Some opposition candidates have been denied registration, while 

other potential opposition candidates have suddenly found themselves unemployed. 

Of course, we welcome the Belarussian government’s recent release of some political prisoners, including Aleksandr Kazulin, and 

the inclusion of a few members of the opposition on precinct election commissions. But given President Lukashenka’s record as Europe’s last dictator and leading abuser of human rights, we 

shouldn’t create false hopes that these gestures portend a new 

springtime for democracy in Belarus. 

In his long tenure as President of Belarus, Lukashenka has liquidated his country’s democratically elected parliament and conducted a series of phony, stage-managed elections. His government 

has trampled on elementary human rights such as freedom of expression, association and assembly. He has harassed and arrested 

opposition activists, closed down NGOs, stifled the independent 

media, and restricted religious freedom. I particularly recall the 

‘‘disappearance’’ of several opposition leaders in 1999 and 2000— 

people who have never been seen since and whose cases have never 

been solved. 

The catalog of Lukashenka’s crimes is all the more reason for our 

government to stand by the suffering people of Belarus. We have 

to continue to support the efforts of brave Belarussians to build 

their civil society and to break Lukashenka’s media monopoly. 

Here our government has a vital role to play, by technically and 

financially supporting international broadcasting that provides 

Belarussians with objective news about their country. 

In recent years I have met many Belarussian democrats and 

human rights activists and am convinced that the Belarussian people will take back their country and integrate it into the family of 

democratic nations—and that this will happen sooner than 

Lukashenka thinks. 

30 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. KRAMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 

RIGHTS AND LABOR 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Commission, I 

am honored to appear before you today to discuss the state of democracy and human rights in Belarus and commend the Commission for its engagement on this important subject. Your active interest has ensured that a strong message of solidarity has been 

sent to the Belarusian people from both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government. The Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act, which some members and staff of this Commission have been instrumental in moving forward, has given the Administration a key tool in formulating policy toward Belarus. I also 

wish to applaud the vital work that the National Endowment for 

Democracy, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute have done to help support democracy in 

Belarus from the grassroots. 

Mr. Chairman, given the recent release of all political prisoners 

and the upcoming parliamentary election September 28th, this 

hearing comes at a time of opportunity for Belarus. If the Government of Belarus shows that it is truly committed to democratic reform, we will have the possibility to develop a more robust relationship between our two countries. As we have said many times, we 

would like to have a different relationship with Belarus—one that 

is based on mutual respect for internationally recognized norms 

and the human rights of the people of Belarus. For an improved 

relationship to be possible, Belarus must truly abide by its commitments as a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms 

and democratic norms. 

The release of all political prisoners in Belarus is an encouraging 

step in this direction. Former presidential candidate, Alvaksander 

Kazulin, was freed from prison on August 16th, over two years 

after his arrest and conviction on charges of alleged hooliganism at 

a protest after the fraudulent March 2006 presidential election. 

The Administration, from President Bush on down, including our 

Embassy in Minsk, pressed hard for his release and met numerous 

times with his late wife and daughters. I truly regret that Irina 

Kazulina, herself a brave fighter for human rights, did not live long 

enough to see her husband freed. And on August 20th, Belarusian 

authorities released the last two political prisoners: businessman 

Syarhey Parsyukevich and youth activist Andrey Kim, Mr. 

Parsyukevich and Mr. Kim had been imprisoned on charges stemming from a demonstration held in January 2008 to protest new 

government restrictions on businesses. Earlier this year, the Government of Belarus released five individuals, internationally recognized as political prisoners—Andrey Klimov, Dmitry Dashkevich, 

Artur Finkevich, Nikolay Avtukhovich and Yuriy Leonov. Freeing 

all eight prisoners is a meaningful step forward. Of course, we also 

are looking to Belarus authorities to respect the human and civil 

rights of all Belarusian people, in particular the freedoms of assembly and expression, including respect for an independent media. We 

hope the Government of Belarus shows a true, sustained commitment to democratic reform and respect for human rights. 

31 

As we have discussed many times with the Belarusian authorities, the release of Mr. Kazulin and the other two political prisoners provides the opportunity for the United States and the European Union to start a dialogue with the Belarusians about ways to 

improve relations. My colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

European and Eurasian Affairs, David Merkel, traveled to Minsk 

August 21 to 23 to explore the possibilities for a real dialogue between our two governments, as well as to deepen our contacts with 

the democratic opposition. Merkel’s was the first visit at this level 

by a U.S. official since my last trip to Minsk in April 2007, when 

I held that same position. Following Merkel’s visit, the Department 

of State, in coordination with the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), approved a six-month suspension until March 2009 of sanctions against two subsidiaries of 

Belarusian state-owned-enterprise Belneftekhim. We will watch 

Belarus closely to determine whether to extend this suspension and 

take other such steps. 

The release of political prisoners shows that the United States 

and the European Union can be effective in bringing about change 

when we are united. We regularly coordinate with our European allies on the situation in Belarus (in fact Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Merkel has been in Brussels yesterday and today doing just that) 

and have been united in our desire for the unconditional release of 

political prisoners in Belarus and for the authorities to respect the 

human and civil rights of the Belarusian people. While we have 

had occasional tactical differences on how best to approach Belarus, 

there is no question that the United States and the European 

Union share the goal of seeing a democratic Belarus assume its 

rightful place as a fully integrated member of the international 

community. 

The United States and the European Union have had a dualtrack approach to Belarus. We strongly support civil society, NGOs, 

and other democratic forces in Belarus, while we take action 

against those whom we hold responsible for electoral fraud, human 

rights abuses, and corruption. We also are working closely with the 

European Union to urge Belarus to live up to its obligations to its 

people to allow an open and transparent electoral campaign process 

and hold free and fair parliamentary elections later this month. 

Free and fair elections depend only in part on the conduct of the 

actual balloting and vote tabulation. Both we and the European 

Union have emphasized the need for Belarus to make significant 

progress in improving conditions throughout the electoral process. 

Key concerns include full access for OSCE observers, including to 

the voting process and ballot count, registration of opposition candidates, access to the voters and media for all candidates, and participation of the opposition in electoral commissions at all levels. 

In previous Belarusian elections, OSCE concluded that fundamental freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression 

were disregarded. During its initial assessment of this election environment OSCE has found no evident progress in these areas. 

OSCE has numerous times also provided recommendations to the 

government to improve the conduct of elections in Belarus in line 

with OSCE commitments. However, the authorities have not taken 

any significant steps to address these recommendations. 

32 

The lack of opposition representation on precinct election commissions, and allegations that employees of regime-named candidates serve on the commissions, are of serious concern to us. 

Candidate registration offers a somewhat better picture, with approximately 78 percent of opposition candidates being registered, 

albeit below the 83 percent opposition registration rate in the 2004 

elections. However, the registration appeals process added only 

eight more registered parliamentary candidates out of a possible 52 

denied registration. 

In addition to the conduct of elections in Belarus, another key 

issue in improving the relations between the U.S. and Belarus is 

Belarusian authorities’ treatment of imprisoned U.S. citizen Emanuel Zeltser. Mr. Zeltser was arrested in March of this year and 

later convicted in a secret trial on charges of using false documents 

and economic espionage. Despite our many repeated requests, we 

have been allowed consular access to Mr. Zeltser only five times 

and were denied access to his closed trial. And despite our many 

efforts, including facilitating an exam by an American doctor and 

even bringing his medications to prison officials, Mr. Zeltser reports he has not been allowed access to all his prescription medicines or their comparable Belarusian equivalents. Our consular officer and the American doctor reported such a severe deterioration 

to his health since his imprisonment that we have requested Mr. 

Zeltser’s release on humanitarian grounds. With a real possibility 

for a significant improvement in the relationship between U.S. and 

Belarus, we hope there will be a quick, humanitarian resolution in 

Mr. Zeltser’s case. We will continue to request consular access to 

Mr. Zeltser to monitor his welfare as well as press for his access 

to his prescribed medicines. And as long as Mr. Zeltser’s welfare 

remains endangered, we will continue our call for his humanitarian 

release. 

No matter what relationship we have with the Government of 

Belarus, we have and will continue to provide assistance to empower the Belarusian people so that they may determine their own 

future. We strive to build NGO capacity to increase public participation; bolster the capacity of democratic political parties to unify, 

strategize, organize and connect with constituents; and strengthen 

independent media and expand access to objective information. 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Belarus Service remains a 

leading international broadcaster, providing programming in the 

Belarusian language. The Service’s new television program has recently been placed on a Polish-led, satellite television channel. In 

addition, Voice of America broadcasts are available in Russian to 

audiences in Belarus. Recent assistance successes include our work 

with five Belarusian umbrella organizations, and our programs 

supported the development of an NGO ‘‘map’’ to analyze civil society trends, improve strategic planning and enhance donor coordination. We also have supported the ability of an external radio project 

to improve its program content and expanded its internet audience 

to over 16,000 hits per month—that represents a four-fold increase 

in the number of unique visitors each day to the site since 2006. 

And we are supporting a Polish-led effort to broadcast television to 

Belarus via satellite. It is with this assistance that the National 

Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, 

33 

the National Democratic Institute and our other non-governmental 

partners have been so critically helpful. 

In closing, as President Bush has said, ‘‘The United States will 

continue to stand with the people of Belarus and all those who are 

working to help Belarus take its rightful place in the community 

of democracies.’’ Our policy toward Belarus has never been driven 

by Minsk’s relationship with Moscow, whether warm or cold. Instead, our policy has been driven by the Government of Belarus’s 

treatment of its own people. We have shown our determination to 

take action against Belarus officials responsible for human rights 

abuses, assaults on democracy, and state corruption. The targeted 

sanctions and penalties we have imposed are not directed against 

the people of Belarus. With the release of all political prisoners by 

the Government of Belarus, we have begun a review of these sanctions and are allowing certain transactions to move forward. We 

never have sought regime change per se, merely a change in regime behavior, and we hope we are seeing positive signs of such 

a change. Again, we hope the Government of Belarus shows a true, 

sustained commitment to democratic reform and respect for human 

rights, so that we have the opportunity to move our relationship 

forward. It is my hope that we will look back on this year as the 

time when relations between Belarus and the United States got 

back on track. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

34 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAURA JEWETT, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EURASIA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Commission: 

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the political situation in Belarus during the run-up to its September 28 parliamentary elections. These elections may turn out to be significant, but 

not for the reasons usually ascribed to elections. They will not 

produce a representative parliament that will legislate on behalf of 

constituents’ interests, which is the outcome expected of democratic 

elections. They are also unlikely to cause a dramatic transformation in the Belarusian political system, which has been the 

outcome of popular reactions to some fraudulent elections in the region in recent years. In short, these elections will not likely be remembered for having brought democracy to Belarus. They are more 

likely to be remembered for their role as both an agent and a barometer of improvements in Belarusian relations with the West. 

They are also noteworthy because of the opportunity they provide 

to Belarusian democrats to organize and build support for alternative political viewpoints. If Belarusian relations with the West 

do, in fact, improve and if the democratic opposition makes the 

most of its opportunities—limited though they may be—the longterm prospects for Belarusian democracy may brighten slightly. 

Belarus has yet to organize an election that meets even minimum international standards. The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has observed elections in 

Belarus in 2000, 2001, 2004 and 2006. The ODIHR reports have repeatedly concluded that the elections have fallen well short of 

OSCE commitments, noting concerns about deficiencies in the electoral law; government control of election commissions; restrictions 

on candidates’ access to the ballot; government interference with 

campaigning and intimidation of candidates; constraints on freedom of expression, assembly and association; arbitrary implementation of laws; biased news media; voting procedures that are conductive to abuse; and restrictions on domestic and international observation. These were elections in name only. 

There is not a single opposition deputy in the outgoing parliament, which was elected in October 2004. Freedom House ranks 

electoral processes on a scale of one to seven, with one being the 

best score. In its 2008 Nations in Transit report, Freedom House 

gives Belarus a seven. 

The September 28 elections are not likely to break what is by 

now a well-established pattern. The regime in Belarus is one of the 

most repressive in the former Soviet Union. Over his 14 years as 

President, Alyaksandr Lukashenka has steadily consolidated all political power in his office. The political environment is simply hostile to competitive, participatory elections. I would like to highlight 

just a few of the many adverse conditions. 

Belarusian citizens lack access to independent sources of news 

with which to make informed political choices. The government has 

passed repressive media laws and licensing rules. The broadcast 

media are all government-controlled. Independent journalists have 

faced specious libel suits, harassment and imprisonment. NewsVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:04 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\091608 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
35 

papers have encountered discriminatory pricing for printing and 

distribution as well as arbitrary closures. Even the internet—for a 

while the only reliable source of alternative information—is now 

under threat, as the government has passed a law that requires all 

Belarusian online media to register with the government. 

Most forms of independent political activity, including NGO and 

political party organizing, have been repressed. December 2005 

amendments to the criminal code made operating an unregistered 

organization punishable by up to two years in prison. In Belarus, 

registration is reserved only for the organizations most loyal to the 

government, so these provisions constitute a serious threat for 

many civic groups. They were employed liberally in the run up to 

the March 2006 presidential election. For example, on February 21, 

2006, several civic activists partnering with NDI were accused of 

‘‘illegally running an unregistered organization’’ and sentenced to 

prison for periods from six months to two years. The organization 

in question, called Partnership, was a nonpartisan domestic monitoring organization that had adhered to the highest ethical standards when observing elections. Partnership’s repeated efforts to get 

registered were denied. The government’s prevention of nonpartisan election observation by its citizens violates rights guaranteed by the Belarusian constitution, the Belarusian election law, 

and international obligations, including commitments under the 

OSCE and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights. 

Opposition political parties have faced particular obstacles. The 

government has arbitrarily de-registered some parties and closed 

down regional branches of others. Party activists are regularly fired 

from jobs, expelled from universities, and sentenced to prison terms 

on manufactured charges, such as using obscenities in public. In 

2006 and 2007, authorities closed down two small parties, the 

Belarusian Labor Party and a women’s party, Nadzeya (Hope), 

both for failure to comply with registration requirements—that is, 

insufficient membership and lack of the required number of regional branches. The Belarusian Party of Communists, a major opposition party, was suspended for six months last year for similar 

reasons. The threat of arbitrary liquidation is just one of a large 

assortment of tools the government has used to prevent parties 

from gaining a foothold. 

NDI’s own experience, alongside that of other international democracy assistance organizations, is evidence of the harsh environment. NDI has conducted democracy assistance programs in 

Belarus since 2000, partnering with citizens who want to build 

democratic political institutions. Yet the Institute is unable to open 

an office inside Belarus and staff are unable to get visas to travel 

to the country. Programs are conducted from an office in Kyiv, 

Ukraine. Belarus and Tajikistan are the only countries in the 

former Soviet Union that have prevented an NDI presence. 

There are no quick fixes to the repression and resulting underdevelopment of independent media, civil society and political parties in Belarus. These are entrenched features of the political environment. When we look back on the 2008 parliamentary elections 

and compare them with their predecessors, it is a safe bet that we 

will see more continuity than discontinuity. 

36 

That said, there are signs of a mild thaw in U.S.-Belarusian relations, which may find reflection in some aspects of this month’s 

electoral process. After years of isolationist policies, President 

Lukashenko appears to be reaching out to Europe and the U.S.— 

albeit tentatively and with due consideration to repercussions from 

Russia. The August release from prison of Alyaksandr Kazulin, 

Sergei Parsyukevich and Andrey Kim is the most concrete example. 

In response, the U.S. government has partially lifted economic 

sanctions. 

The conduct of the upcoming elections will serve as another 

measure of the government’s intentions. The following six items 

would be indicators of relative improvements to the process: 

1. The territorial election commissions have registered 77 of 

the 110 unified-list candidates who applied, a ratio of roughly 

two-thirds, which is a mildly positive sign. Will any of these 77 

be de-registered for minor infractions—such as spelling errors 

in application documents or improper placement of campaign 

booths—before they make it onto the ballot? 

2. Of 1,430 district election commissioners, 36 are from the 

opposition. Of 69,845 precinct election commissioners, 41 are 

from the opposition. Opposition representation on election commissions is thus miniscule. Nonetheless, are these individuals 

being allowed to exercise their rights and responsibilities? 

3. Do candidates have the freedom to conduct active campaigns? This would include the freedom to travel throughout 

their districts and to conduct campaign activities in locations 

accessible to voters. It would preclude arbitrary arrests and detentions of candidates or their teams, dismissals from jobs, and 

other forms of intimidation or pressure. 

4. Do candidates have access to the government news media 

beyond the mandated five minutes of free television and radio 

time? This would include invitations for interviews, coverage of 

events and opportunities to respond publicly to any coverage. 

5. Are domestic and international observers granted accreditation and full access to all stages of the electoral process, including the vote count and tabulation? 

6. Are complaints about the process given due hearing by the 

appropriate electoral or judicial bodies and are violators prosecuted? 

If the answer to most of these questions turns out to be ‘‘no,’’ we 

can conclude that these elections are ‘‘business as usual’’ in 

Belarus. If the answers turn out to be ‘‘yes,’’ it would not necessarily suggest that the elections are legitimate, but rather that 

the government of Belarus is making at least a modest effort to respond to U.S. and European concerns with the aim of getting sanctions lifted and improving its positioning with respect to Russia. 

That effort could, in turn, open slightly more space in the country 

for democratic political organizing. 

These elections also provide a narrow but important opportunity 

for the democratic forces in the country to take advantage of limited political space by articulating an alternative vision for Belarus 

and building public support. It has been encouraging to see some 

progress in the opposition’s efforts over time. 

37 

• Since the 2004 parliamentary elections, the United Democratic 

Forces (UDF) has emerged as a national umbrella organization representing a large majority of opposition groups. • The UDF has regional ‘‘branches’’ including all major parties 

and NGOs in six of Belarus’ seven regions. • This year, the UDF branches agreed on a list of unified candidate for each of the 110 electoral districts to avoid splitting the 

opposition vote, as has happened in the past. • The regional branches selected the candidates in a decentralized, participatory and deliberative process. • A broad national civic movement called For Freedom has 

formed with the mission of promoting democratic elections within 

Belarus. The UDF and For Freedom have cooperated on nominating representatives to election commissions. 

These achievements are impressive in the highly restrictive 

Belarusian setting. Regardless of the conduct and outcome of the 

September 28 elections, they have already helped to lay a foundation for democratic development in the future. The skills and methods used will be applicable whenever new political space opens. 

NDI approaches democracy assistance in Belarus as a long-term 

process. No single election will deliver the final result. The September 28 elections provide an opportunity for incremental 

progress, due to the broader international context and the efforts 

of Belarusian democrats. We should encourage those trends while 

keeping in check expectations for dramatic, immediate change. 

NDI appreciates the efforts of Congress to support the people of 

Belarus in establishing a full democracy, the rule of law, and respect for political and civil rights. We value the role of this Commission in defending human rights and respect for all elements of 

the Helsinki process, and in promoting a cohesive U.S. and European position toward the government of Belarus. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. 

38 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RODGER POTOCKI, DIRECTOR, EUROPE AND EURASIA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Commission: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the political situation in Belarus prior to its September 28 parliamentary elections. 

The regime in Minsk has adopted a different approach to the elections, in comparison to the 2004 contest, but the changes are of 

style, not substance. Belarus has not held a free or fair election 

since Alexander Lukashenka was elected president 14 years ago. 

From the 1996 constitutional referendum to the 2006 presidential 

elections, the regime has been rightly charged with obstructing 

election monitoring, manipulating and falsifying tallies, and repressing opposition candidates. This time around, the thrust has 

changed, but the end result will almost certainly be the same. 

To win Transatlantic political and economic concessions, the regime is altering the way it conducts elections in three ways: by allowing international scrutiny, asserting technical improvements, 

and moderating the campaign climate. The changes are tactical, 

but they are directed at achieving a familiar outcome. In the past, 

Lukashenka cared little about Western outcry over the regime’s 

lack of restraint in persecuting the opposition and falsifying elections. The regime’s new business plan is to try to minimize international condemnation of and encourage domestic apathy about 

what is already a flawed process. Lukashenka wants a ‘‘quiet election’’ that will advertise ‘‘progress’’ on several fronts and can be 

sold to the West, while still producing the predictable outcome. 

SELLING ABROAD

The regime’s first adjustment towards muting international criticism has been to open up the elections to the outside world. Unlike 

Russia, Belarus has welcomed international monitoring of the upcoming elections. As compared to previous contests, Minsk has 

issued invitations in a timely manner and not refused visas to observers. In contrast to 2004, the regime has been less obstructionist, granting the OSCE mission access to the highest levels of 

government. Lukashenka has declared: ‘‘We want to show western 

countries and Russia how elections should be organized.’’ 

This election is being orchestrated primarily for US and European consumption, with the primary purpose of improving Belarus’ 

international image. The country’s top election official has made it 

clear that the Central Election Commission’s primary goal is to 

‘‘have the results be recognized by the international community.’’ 

The acceptance of and focus on international observers also helps 

generate legitimacy amongst the 71 percent of the population that 

thinks the election should be monitored. But just as importantly, 

the regime’s detente with the international community seeks to divert citizens’ attention away from the election’s domestic aspects. 

The country’s airwaves and newspapers have been flooded with 

pieces on Europe, not the elections. Close to a third of the statecontrolled media’s election coverage has centered on the international monitors, not the candidates or races. 

39 

The regime’s spotlight on the international has been carefully focused. In terms of international monitoring, it has concentrated on 

the more friendly CIS observers. During the second week of August, the state news agency Belta devoted four times as much coverage to the CIS monitors than to their western counterparts, but 

there has been almost no official coverage of domestic observation 

efforts. The CIS mission has been careful to reinforce the ‘‘quiet 

election’’ being organized by the regime. Its Russian head declared: 

‘‘The preparations for the parliamentary election in Belarus are 

going on in a calm manner, just as planned.’’ 

Like the government, the leadership of the democratic opposition 

has also recognized the paramount role of the international community. By focusing much of its efforts on competing with the regime for Western attention, instead of campaigning, the opposition 

is also deflecting the electorate’s attention away from domestic 

issues and races. OSCE observers describe the ongoing campaign 

as ‘‘noiseless,’’ and a domestic observer declared that ‘‘there has 

never been such a ‘quiet campaign’ in Belarus.’’ Calls for a boycott 

by some in the opposition also threaten to turn the election into exclusively an international show. As the first interim report of the 

OSCE/ODIHR mission reported, there is ‘‘very little evidence’’ that 

an election is actually underway in Belarus. 

BETTER BUSINESS PRACTICES? 

The second tack to temper international dissatisfaction with the 

election process is the regime’s focus on organizational and technical matters, rather than political contests. Lukashenka has declared that ‘‘we want the elections to be held in an open and democratic way so that nobody will be able to criticize us.’’ It comes as 

no surprise that the Central Election Commission is pointing to 

procedural improvements as evidence of Belarus coming ‘‘closer to 

international standards.’’ Chairperson Lidia Yarmoshyna pointed 

out, for example, that the CEC has received a total of 275 complaints since the parliamentary campaign began, as compared with 

888 complaints during the last parliamentary campaign. The CEC 

has touted accrediting more observers and registering a greater 

percentage of candidates as successes in preparing for the elections. 

The CIS monitoring mission has praised the Belarusian authorities 

for successfully ‘‘securing the proper organization of the election 

process.’’ 

Cosmetic changes in routine do produce good publicity, especially 

if the state controls the media, like in Belarus. If this election is 

perceived as more efficiently run, it gives the appearance of being 

more democratic. A focus on procedures helps to influence the more 

than one-third of voters who consider the country’s election code as 

flawed and do not believe this election will be free or fair. 

Similarly, the state-run media’s election coverage is reporting on 

those who are running the election, not those running in it. During 

the second half of July, the state-controlled media devoted more 

than 70 percent of its coverage on the parliamentary elections to 

President Lukashenka. During the first half of August, the state’s 

leading daily, Soviet Belarus, dedicated 90 percent of its election 

coverage to the president and the CEC. Gomel Pravda, a regional 

40 

newspaper covering 17 election districts, managed to top that figure, allotting 99.82 percent of its space to the president and CEC. 

The regime’s depiction of the election as a series of well-organized procedures helps to promote ‘‘calm’’ because it diverts attention from competing candidates, parties, platforms or issues. As an 

independent media monitor noted, ‘‘When we watch a play, the director is not present on the stage. So far, we have only seen the 

director, lighting technicians and bit players, not the actors themselves, that means the parliamentary candidates and their voters, 

the main actors in the election process. The state media writes very 

little about these actors.’’ 

An orderly election also contrasts nicely with a democratic opposition that is painted by the regime as illegitimate, disorganized 

and riven by conflict. Protests by the opposition against procedural 

irregularities are being used by a regime which bases its legitimacy 

on stability to accuse the democrats of being unruly and disturbing 

the peace. The Central Election Commission has declared, for example, that criticism over the formation of election commissions is 

part of a strategy aimed at preventing the campaign from being as 

quiet ‘‘as we would like it to be.’’ By spending more time tussling 

with the regime over election procedures than campaigning, the opposition has contributed to the regime’s priority of conducting a 

‘‘well-ordered’’ election. The state’s actions and its media coverage 

are not designed to inform voters but to influence foreign observers. 

They foster mass indifference, and preserve the political status quo. 

According to one OSCE employee, the most important thing for the 

regime—and apparently the opposition as well—is how this election looks to the West, not how it affects Belarusian citizens. 

TARGETED ADVERTISING

The third means to insure a ‘‘quiet election’’ is to temper political 

noise at home. The regime has made an effort to moderate its repression against the democratic opposition. Candidates report that 

the current election environment is appreciably better that of 2004, 

when the regime barely cared about international opinion and 

made little pretense in allowing any semblance of competition. The 

state-run media’s coverage has improved in the sense that there 

has been less vitriol flung at the opposition. This time around there 

is no climate of fear. There is some truth in the claim by the secretary of the Central Election Commission that ‘‘The campaign is 

being carried out peacefully, in a quiet manner.’’ 

But again, this is a change in approach by the regime, not a 

change in direction. Heavy-handedness has been shelved for subtlety. Brute force has been set aside in favor of low-level harassment, and intimidation has been replaced by fostering indifference. 

While purposely raising the international profile of the elections for 

its own purposes, the regime’s game plan at home has been to play 

down the elections. 

Before the campaign began, the regime made sure to eliminate 

many of the opposition’s troublemakers. As my colleagues have 

pointed out, leading representatives, including former statesmen, 

government leaders and VIPs, were left off of election commissions. 

A dozen of the opposition’s ‘‘rising stars,’’ who had previously run 

41 

strong campaigns and developed popular support, were not registered as candidates. 

Those who made it past the procedural hurdles of registration 

have not been subjected to the full force of the state’s repressive 

apparatus. Rather than being beaten or arrested, as in 2004, they 

or members of their campaign teams have been forced to undergo 

tax inspections, expelled from university, fired from their jobs, 

drafted into the army and subjected to other forms of pressure by 

the authorities. The regime hasn’t abandoned the use of force, just 

ratcheted down its intensity. In fact, because the regime wants this 

election to come off well, most of the election-related arrests have 

been of those advocating a boycott or, as one judge put it, ‘‘an 

unsanctioned event.’’ Yes, in Belarus, even boycotts must be approved by the state. 

To foster indifference among the populace, the state-run media 

has played down the elections. From July to August, election-related coverage actually decreased. The state broadcast media has 

devoted more time to reporting on the weather than the elections 

in spite of the fact that, as one media monitor quipped, ‘‘there were 

no floods, storms or tsunamis in our country.’’ It has devoted almost zero coverage to opposition campaigns. As late as the last 

week of August and first week of September, Soviet Belarus and 

The Republic, two leading state dailies, provided no positive or no 

negative reporting on political parties—they simply ignored them. 

During the same period, a leading news program on state TV devoted less than three percent of its election reporting to an anonymous opposition and anonymous political parties. There is no mention of the elections as a choice between different candidates, political platforms and possible paths of social, political and economic 

development. State radio rejected the opposition’s request to hold 

candidate debates. Another independent monitor was discouraged 

to see that ‘‘except for the publication of political programs in the 

newspapers and short advertisements on television and radio, there 

is literally no election campaign going on in the media.’’ 

Finally, the regime has used its administrative resources to limit 

the public outreach of opposition campaigns and silence competition between different political visions. Candidates’ television addresses were broadcast during rush hour, from 5:30 to 6:30pm, 

when working people were still commuting home. They appeared 

not on national TV, but on regional channels, which less people 

watch. The state provided the equivalent of $800 to each candidate 

for campaigning. This is the only funding that can legally be used 

to get out his or her message. Meetings with voters have been restricted to only a few, out of the way places, such as parks where 

dogs are allowed. Candidate materials are only allowed to be posted on isolated billboards. The regime’s goal is to make the elections 

unnoticeable for the general public and to prevent any political excitement among common people. Citizens will be encouraged to go 

to the polls without knowing their choices, and the regime is doing 

all it can to keep a tight rein on those who might disturb the ritualization of voting that still exists in this post-Soviet state. 

Mr. Chairman, during Soviet times, Belarus was known as ‘‘The 

Quiet Republic.’’ The regime is doing all that it can to make this 

a ‘‘quiet election,’’ palatable to the West. But ‘‘the sounds of silence’’ 

42 

emanating from Minsk insure that this will not be a free and fair 

election. To answer the question in the title of this hearing; it’s not 

business as usual in Belarus this fall, but a scam is still in the 

works. Thank you. 

43 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN B. NIX, REGIONAL PROGRAM DIRECTOR, EURASIA, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN 

INSTITUTE 

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify 

before the Commission today. I want to first comment on the title 

for today’s hearing ‘‘Belarus on the Eve of the Elections—Business 

as Usual?’’ Unfortunately, I fear that this is an aptly appropriate 

title for this pre-election period. Sadly, the government of Belarus 

has a track record of denying its people their fundamental right to 

have their voices heard through the ballot box, and we fear that 

this election will prove to be no different. 

A view of the history of elections in post-soviet Belarus is sobering. After gaining independence in 1992, the first parliamentary 

elections were held in 1995 and democratically elected Members of 

Parliament rightfully took their seats in Parliament. This bright 

period of democracy lasted a scant year, and in 1996, President 

Lukashenko dissolved the elected parliament and a new Chamber 

of Representatives consisting of 110 members loyal to Lukashenko 

was appointed. 

Parliamentary elections were next held in 2000 and OSCE observers declared that they ‘‘failed to meet international standards 

for democratic elections.’’ The 2004 elections fared no better. The 

OSCE declared ‘‘parliamentary elections in the Republic of Belarus 

fell significantly short of OSCE commitments. Universal principles 

and constitutionally guaranteed rights of expression, association 

and assembly were seriously challenged, calling into question the 

Belarusian authorities’ willingness to respect the concept of political competition on a basis of equal treatment . . . Belarusian authorities failed to create the conditions to ensure that the will of 

the people serves as the basis of the authority of government. . . .’’ 

According to exit polling conducted by the Gallup Organization 

and IRI, the results showed that Lukashenko’s proposal to change 

the Belarusian Constitution to allow him to seek a third term did 

not have the support of a majority of the voters and would not have 

passed. Moreover, based on the exit polling, Belarusians did not 

simply vote against Lukashenko, but voted demonstrably for prodemocratic candidates running for parliament. According to our 

polling, twenty-two pro-democratic candidates would have won 

seats had the votes been fairly counted and reported, but as you 

know; no members of the opposition were allowed to take seats. 

Mr. Chairman, due to recent actions by the regime in Belarus, 

there appears to be cautious optimism by the international community that Mr. Lukashenko is taking steps to improve relations with 

West and to lighten his grip on the opposition. In the past month, 

we have witnessed the release of the final three remaining political 

prisoners in Belarus; including former presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin. We herald the release of these brave men, but it behooves us to question the motives behind their release. Lukashenko 

has a history of making overtures to the West when it suits his interests or he faces challenges from Russia; and it did not go unnoticed that Mr. Kozulin’s release came one day after Russia rebuked 

Belarus for not publicly supporting Russian actions in the South 

Ossetia and Abkhazia conflict. In addition, it should be noted that 

the release of Mr. Kim and Mr. Parsyukevich came one day after 

44 

Lukashenko’s closed door meeting with President Medvedev in 

Sochi. 

While the release of these political prisoners is a positive step, 

we must remember that this action by the regime is singular in nature, and falls far short of the list of requirements for increased 

diplomatic engagement that have been set by both the European 

Union and the United States. We must be careful not to view the 

upcoming elections through rose-colored glasses and must be increasingly on guard to monitor both the pre-election as well as election day events. 

In assessing whether these elections will be free and fair, or 

‘‘business as usual;’’ it is instructive to review the factors which the 

OSCE has stated contributed to the failure of past elections: 

1. THE EXECUTIVE APPARATUS MAINTAINED CONTROL ON ELECTION

COMMISSIONS; 

There are 110 district election commissions (one for each district 

which elects a Member of Parliament) with a total membership of 

1430 seats. Out of these 1430 seats, the opposition was only allowed appointment to 44 seats; representation of only 3.1%. 

Next, there are a total of 6,485 precinct commissions which comprise between five and 19 members each and total of 69,845 open 

seats. Of these 69,845 open seats, the opposition was only allowed 

appointment to 48 seats; 0.07 percent of the total membership of 

election commissions. 

Mr. Chairman, let me be very blunt: if the regime in Belarus was 

interested in running free and fair elections, it would ensure that 

all the votes are truthfully counted. However, when only .07 percent of the precinct election commissions—the very commissions 

where the votes are actually tabulated—are opposition members; 

this is evidence enough that the regime has every interest in controlling the voting results. 

2. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION PROCEDURES WERE ABUSED TO PREVENT UNDESIRABLE CANDIDATES FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE

ELECTIONS, LIMITING VOTERS’ CHOICE; 

It is fair to ascertain that Lukashenko realized that it was in his 

best interest to allow a large number of opposition candidates to 

become registered in order to give the international community the 

false impression that he is allowing a fair playing field. The regime 

knows that it has other ways to control the candidates and the voting results, as I just mentioned. 

Before the candidates were registered, IRI received numerous reports that potential opposition candidates were being dismissed 

from their jobs or expelled from university. One of the most outrageous reports of repression against candidates is as the case of 

Alexander Mekh, who works for Belarus’ profitable pipeline transit 

company Beltransgaz. Mr. Mekh was fired for his political activism, 

and managed to tape the conversation; a copy of the full transcript 

is attached. During this conversation, Mr. Mekh is pressured to 

stop his political involvement or lose his job. His boss tells him, 

‘‘You are a clever man, you just think what you are doing?! You 

will not have income, how will you provide for the family?! You 

45 

won’t start a business. No one will employ you in Kobryn. This is 

dead end!’’ 

On August 29, the CEC announced that only 276 out of 365 people were registered as candidates for the elections; this number is 

less then both the 2000 and 2004 elections. 51 candidates who were 

denied registration appealed and only 8 of these were re-instated. 

In summary, since 365 people were seeking registration, this 

means that 25% were denied the right to even be on the ballot. Of 

the candidates registered, only 78 are opposition members. With 

110 electoral districts, this means that voters in approximately 

29% of the districts aren’t even being allowed a choice; if they vote, 

they have no option but to support the regime’s candidate. 

Once again we see that candidate registration is a convenient 

way for the government to remove ‘‘undesirable’’—meaning opposition—candidates with strong support. The case of Ales Lahvinets, 

an activist of ‘‘For Freedom’’ movement, is illustrative. After Mr. 

Lahvinets’s appeal for registration was denied, the CEC chair 

Lydia Yermoshina told him: ‘‘No one should ever lecture the CEC. 

It costs dearly.’’ 

Lukashenko has also recently made overtures that during this 

election it may be possible that a few opposition members are elected. We must ask ourselves: does this constitute democracy? Does 

‘‘allowing’’ a few opposition members to take seats satisfy U.S. calls 

for free and fair elections? 

3. CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES WERE REGULATED EXCESSIVELY, LIMITING

CANDIDATE PERFORMANCE; 

One way the regime can subtly regulate opposition campaign activities is by showing bias towards regime-supporting candidates. 

Viktar Ivashkevich, a BPF member and candidate hopeful who was 

not allowed registration, was told by voters in his constituency that 

signatures for the regime-supporting candidate in his district were 

forcibly collected from students at a local high school and college. 

Other candidates complain of restrictions on printing their election materials. By law, each registered candidate is given $830 by 

the government with which to create campaign materials. Opposition candidates have reported trouble getting printing houses to 

publish their campaign leaflets. Alyaksei Haurutsikau, registered 

candidate in Vitsebsk, had his documents refused by his regional 

printing house, yet publications of the pro-regime candidate in his 

district were published without problem. These are only two examples of numerous violations which are being reported every day. 

4. SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF

EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION HAD AN INTIMIDATORY

AND CONSTRAINING EFFECT ON THE CAMPAIGN; 

In Belarus, there is a law against mass gatherings, which means 

that any group of more than two people must receive government 

permission to assemble. This law is largely used to control opposition meetings with supporters and voters. In August, the CEC actually published a list of ‘‘approved’’ venues where candidates can 

meet with voters. These venues range from a dance club to a meadow. Candidates were reminded by Lydia Yermoshina, head of the 

46 

CEC, that candidates would have to receive permission in the 

event they wanted to meet with voters in any venue not listed, including dialogue on the street. This completely hinders effective 

voter outreach by the candidates. 

An example of this is Anatol Bukas, a candidate in Barysau, who 

reported that the local authorities didn’t schedule the first meeting 

for voters with registered candidates until September 9; thus limiting their campaign to only two weeks. Furthermore, he also was 

warned by officials that they should review and approved the message to be delivered to voters beforehand. 

5. HEAVILY BIASED STATE-CONTROLLED MEDIA DOMINATED THE

ELECTRONIC AND PRINT SECTORS, AND NO EFFECTIVE COUNTER- BALANCE WAS PROVIDED BY THE INDEPENDENT MEDIA. IN THE END, CANDIDATES HAD VERY LIMITED ACCESS TO THE MEDIA; 

By law, each candidate is entitled to limited coverage in the official news media consisting of five minutes of TV time, and five 

minutes of radio time. They are also entitled to limited access to 

print media, consisting of the ability to print one statement no 

longer than two typed pages in one official newspaper which is determined by CEC. However, the government continues to censor 

the information of opposition candidates. For example, 

‘‘Respublika,’’ an official newspaper of the Council of Minister of 

Belarus, refused to publish election programs of three UCP candidates on the grounds that they contained negative estimates of 

Belarus’ political and economic situation. 

On September 5, the addresses of candidates for deputies in the 

Chyhunachny constituency in Vitsebsk were scheduled to be televised. The first address by the pro-regime candidate went without 

problems. The second address was by opposition candidate Andrei 

Lyavinau; however, during his speech the sound disappeared ‘‘suddenly’’ as he made the following statement to voters ‘‘I urge you not 

to take part in the early vote. The procedure of early vote does not 

guarantee the principle of transparency: for the entire 5 days the 

ballot box is not under control of the district elections commission, 

observers and mass media since 5 p.m. each day.’’ Miraculously, 

sound was suddenly restored when it was time for the third candidate and regime supporter to make his speech. 

6. PROVISIONS FOR EARLY VOTING, MOBILE BALLOT BOXES, THE VOTE

COUNT AND AGGREGATION OF RESULTS, FAR SHORT OF MINIMUM

TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION. 

The main avenue for the regime to falsify elections occurs during 

the early voting period. In Belarus, voting begins five days before 

the actual election day. During this period, we anticipate that the 

regime will not truly count the votes. It will, as it has done in previous elections, manufacture votes for pro-regime candidates. 

CONCLUSION: 

Mr. Chairman, it appears that once again it is ‘‘business as usual 

in Belarus’’ and that the odds are overwhelming stacked in the regime’s favor. Yet even in the midst of this repressive culture, the 

Unified Democratic Forces, a coalition of pro-democratic activists in 

47 

Belarus, is ardently striving to offer voters an alternative to the 

Lukashenko regime. 

Since 2007, the UDF has been drafting and implementing their 

strategy for these elections. The cornerstone of this strategy was 

the development a single, unified list of candidates to run for each 

of the 110 seats on the Chamber of Representatives. The UDF’s 

goal was to maximize resources and support to ensure they had one 

strong, capable candidate representing the UDF in each electoral 

district. Each UDF candidate on the unified list was chosen 

through a primary, caucus or some other democratic method in 

each district. Unfortunately, only 78 of these candidates have been 

registered. 

The UDF has used data derived from polling and focus groups, 

to create a joint campaign message for all of the UDF candidates 

to run under. Polling data evidenced that voters are most concerned about the worsening economic situation in Belarus: rising 

prices, inflation, low standard of living, the cut in social benefits, 

and unemployment. The goal of the UDF’s campaign message is to 

prove to voters that they are a viable alternative to the 

Lukashenko regime, and that they have concrete ideas of how to 

bring positive change to the country. The campaign message is entitled ‘‘Power for the People, and not People for the Power.’’ The 

concept of the campaign message is that the current Chamber of 

Representatives in Belarus holds no real power, and serves as a 

rubber-stamp for President Lukashenko. The UDF’s goal is to remind voters of their rights as citizens, and that positive change and 

solutions to the worsening economic situation can only take place 

if the people have a voice in government; including, the ability to 

elect members of parliament who can enact change. 

Mr. Chairman, if elections in Belarus were free and fair, I truly 

believe that the UDF would be represented in the parliament. IRI’s 

polling demonstrates that the citizens of Belarus are ready for a 

change. When asked to choose between a parliamentary candidate 

that supported change or a candidate that supported the status quo 

in Belarus; respondents indicated by a two-to-one margin that they 

would support a candidate for change. When asked whether reforms in Belarus were necessary, the responses were overwhelmingly affirmative: 83% said yes to reforms for the economy; 82% 

said yes to reforms in social welfare; 62% to reforms in politics; 

85% to reforms in healthcare; and 71% to education reforms. The 

voters in Belarus clearly desire change and they deserve to be 

heard. U.S. and European Government officials must remain vigilant in calling for democratic reform in Belarus. It is imperative 

that we continue to document electoral abuses and repressions 

against opposition candidates and monitor the events on election 

day. We need to remind the Belarusian government that the world 

is paying close attention to this situation, and improved relations 

with the West are related to the transparency of elections in 

Belarus. 

Mr. Chairman, the Unified Democratic Forces have proven their 

willingness to unite and campaign against all odds. But they realize their campaign to bring change to their country is not limited 

to the parliamentary elections of September; this is a campaign 

which knows no electoral boundaries. Lukashenko might prevent 

48 

change via the ballot box in 2008, but he can not squelch the will 

of the people forever. Voters want change, and the Unified Democratic Forces represent that change. We owe it to them to acknowledge their dedication and stand with them until the end when they 

witness the fruition of their goal for a free and democratic Belarus. 

49 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY OLEG 

KRAVCHENKO, CHARGE ́ d’AFFAIRES, REPUBLIC OF BELARUS 

Chairman Hastings, 

Co-Chairman Cardin, 

Members of the Commission, 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the hearing on the upcoming parliamentary elections in my country. On September 28 

the voters of Belarus will decide on the composition of the fourth 

convocation of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus. 

The elections will be a major political event of considerable importance for Belarus. The free and fair elections are also considered 

by the United States and the European countries as a prerequisite 

for the further improvement of relations with Belarus. Belarus has 

repeatedly confirmed its willingness to improve develop relations 

with the United States and the European Union, as well as its determination to hold the parliamentary elections in an open, democratic and transparent manner. 

The elections will be held in full accord with the Belarusian legislation and OSCE commitments. To ensure the elections’ compliance with the international standards, Belarus has vigorously 

taken a number of legislative and political steps aimed at creating 

a truly democratic electoral process. 

To further reinforce the constitutional right of political parties to 

participate in the electoral process the Presidential Decree NO 13 

of June 24, 2008 empowered them to nominate their representatives to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) with a consultative voice. 

8 officially running political parties, including Belarusian Social 

Democratic Party (Hramada), United Civic Party, Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) Party, appointed their representatives to the 

CEC. They are entitled to make statements, put questions, propose 

items on the CEC agenda and participate in its deliberations. 

In seeking to ensure an equal access to mass media for all candidates the Central Election Commission adopted on August 22, 

2008 modalities for the distribution of the candidates’ air time. 

Each candidate will be entitled to 5 minutes of TV and radio appearance paid by the State. Candidates will also be able to publish 

their electoral programmes in national newspapers and regional 

print media. 

Responding to proposals from the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission the Central Election Commission will double the 

time allotted to each candidate on TV and radio by broadcasting 

their presentations for the second time. As another additional goodwill step even more convenient air time for a maximum outreach 

to the audience will be provided for the second airing, of the presentations. 

As an element of public control the CEC also established the 

Media Supervisory Council, with non-government participation, 

which will oversee the conduct of the electoral campaign in the 

media and will act as a focal point for all possible related complaints and appeals. 

The General Prosecutor’s Office set up an ad hoc Working group 

to monitor the implementation of the election legislation with a 

50 

view to ensuring a stable and free environment for the electoral 

campaign and to efficiently prevent possible irregularities. 

Out of 151 political parties’ members in district electoral commissions 38 represent the opposition. On the average, the proportion 

of opposition presence in district election commissions increased 

three times: 32 per cent of all opposition nominees made it to district electoral commissions this year compared with 10 per cent in 

2004. 

Belarus’ Central Electoral Commission registered 424 initiative 

groups that collected voters’ signatures on behalf of nominees (out 

of the original 454 applications). The percentage of rejections for 

registration decreased twofold compared to previous elections. 

Political parties accounted for 40 per cent of all applications. 

Most of them (97) were filed by the ‘‘United Democratic Forces’’ opposition bloc that registered initiative groups. 

365 persons submitted to the election commissions documents for 

registration as candidates to participate in the parliamentary elections. 40 percent of all nominees were affiliated with opposition political forces. 

By the deadline of August 28, 2008 75.6 per cent of nominees 

(276 out of 365) have been registered by the district election commissions as candidates to the deputies of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly. In the previous elections only 51.9 

per cent of nominees (359 out of 692) were registered as candidates. Almost 80 per cent of nominated representatives of political parties have been registered (92 out of 117). 

The rejections of registration were mainly due to the applicants’ 

failure to provide correct lists of voters’ signatures or income declarations. The Central Election Commission thoroughly considered 

all appeals against the decisions of the district election commissions to deny registration and 8 of such decisions have been reconsidered. 

The Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus received 18 appeals of non-registered candidates against the CEC decisions. This 

represents a major, fivefold decrease in complaints compared to 

2004 campaign’s statistics and proves, inter alia, the increased 

election commissions’ professionalism in dealing with the applications. 

The Supreme Court has been considering these appeals in open 

hearings and to date has reversed the candidates’ rejections in 2 

cases. 

The ongoing electoral campaign is regulated inter alia by the 

amended Law on Mass Events that shortened the required period 

for filing a permission request to hold outdoor campaign events 

from 15 to 5 days. 

In order to ensure an open and transparent electoral process in 

line with its OSCE commitments Belarus has well in advance and 

without any restrictions invited international observers, including 

the OSCE ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to monitor the upcoming elections. 

205 international observers have already received their accreditations with the CEC and are being currently deployed throughout 

Belarus, including 145 observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 59—from the OSCE/ODIHR. 

51 

Both the OSCE/ODIHR and the CIS election observation missions have publicly expressed their satisfaction with the cooperative stance of the Belarusian authorities in relation to the international observers, noting that all the requests submitted by them 

were fulfilled and an exhaustive information on the ongoing electoral process was granted. 

The steps taken by Belarus are the most vivid proof of the 

Belarusian leadership will to ensure the democratic nature of the 

upcoming elections. Belarus has done it for itself, not for the 

United States and the European Union. Nor has it been done because of the pressure from their side. 

At the same time, we do count on the unbiased assessment and 

appreciation of the above-mentioned steps by the United States and 

the European Union. The failure to do so would be extremely 

counter-productive! The proven ability to recognize the steps forwards by Belarus and to reciprocate would produce positive results 

for out mutual relations and in the broader international context. 

Thank you. 

Æ 

This is an official publication of the 

Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe. 

★ ★ ★ 

This publication is intended to document 

developments and trends in participating 

States of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

★ ★ ★ 

All Commission publications may be freely 

reproduced, in any form, with appropriate 

credit. The Commission encourages 

the widest possible dissemination 

of its publications. 

★ ★ ★ 

http://www.csce.gov 

The Commission’s Web site provides 

access to the latest press releases 

and reports, as well as hearings and 

briefings. Using the Commission’s electronic 

subscription service, readers are able 

to receive press releases, articles, 

and other materials by topic or countries 

of particular interest. 

Please subscribe today.