e~ 

Security on the 

Eve of the 

21st Century 

Ivelaw L. Grlffi

II~ Im111mhma, IJ! 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
OF THE 21 ST CENTURY 

IVELAW L. GRIFFITH 

McNair Paper 54 

October 1996 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUD

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 
[] Director & Publisher: Dr. Hans A. Binnendijk 

PUBIJCATIONS DIRECTORATE & NDU PRESS 

Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319-6000 

ra Phone: (202) 685--4210 O Facsimile: (202) 685-4378 

rn Director & Managing Editor." Dr. Frederick T. Kiley 

rq Vice Director & General Editor: Major Thomas W. Krise, USA

[] Chief, Editorial & Publications Branch." Mr. George C. Maerz 

[] Senior Editor." Ms. Mary A. Sonmaerville 

[] Editor: Mr. Jonathan W. Pierce 

H Editor for this issue. Major Thomas W. Krise, USAF 

tq Distribution Manager: Mrs. Myrna Myers 

[] Secretary: Mrs. Laura Hall 

From time to time, INSS publishes McNair Papers to provoke thought 

inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post--Cold 

era. These monographs present current topics related to natiomd secu

strategy and policy, defense resource management, international aff

civil-milit~try relations, military technology, and joint, combined, 

coalition operations. 

Opinions, conchzsions, and recotm'nendations, expressed or implied, are tho

the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Def

University, the Department of Defense, or ~my other U.S. (;overnment age

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. 

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without fur

permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Stud

Washington, DC. A courtesy copy of reviews and tearsheets would 

appreciated. 

For sale by the I ;.S. Govelmnent Printing Oflice 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, I)C 20402-9328 

ISSN 1071-7552 
Militarization ......................... 

Intervention ........................ 

Instability .......................... 

3. THE CHANGING STRATEGIC 

ENVIRONMENT ....................... 

Meaning of Security .................. 

Global Military and Political Power ....... 

Economic Relationships ............... 

Rethinking Policy Priorities ............ 

4. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES ............... 

5. CARIBBEAN GEONARCOTICS ........... 

Trafficking Patterns .................. 

Modus Operandi .................... 

National Countermeasures ............ 

Regional and International 

Countermeasures ................. 

6. SECURITY COLLABORATION ............ 

Why Collaborate? ................... 

Regional Security System ............. 

7. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY ......... 

8. CONCLUSION ........................ 

APPENDIX: Caribbean Security Who's Who .... 

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .......... 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ..................... 

iii 
As the 21st century approaches, the international commu

continues to grapple with the consequences of major shifts i

security environment. The world we now live in is a para

political integration and community fragmentation; expan

transnationalism and rising nationalism; unimaginable wealth 

unspeakable poverty; high-tech militaries and Iow-tech conf

decreasing military spending and expanding use of def

resources. In this complex environment, the United Stat

debating its global role and security priorities for the 21 st cen

The United States' evolving security priorities must inclu

workable relationship with our neighbors in the hemisp

particularly the sovereign nations and European territories in 

Caribbean. 

Before we embark on a new Caribbean policy, it woul

constructive to reflect on past U.S. "policies" toward the Caribb

Such reflection is necessary to understand the context-

biases---of past policies, and the legacy we live with as a resu

those policies. 

The United States has had a long, yet inconsistent, sec

interest in the Caribbean. In fact, America's security relation

with the Caribbean predates the early days of the Wa

Independence. The American colonists relied heavily on wea

and gunpowder purchased from sympathetic Dutch merchan

the Caribbean island of St. Eustatius to keep their fledg

rebellion alive. On November 16, 1776, St. Eustatius becam

first foreign territory to recognize the rebellious 13 colonies 

legitimate independent nation when the U.S. Brig-of-War

General Sheehan is Commander in Chief. U.S. Atlantic Command

Supreme Allied Comngtnder, Atlantic. 
, g

response. 

Since that day, American and Caribbean security interests 

been linked. For most of that time, the United States has viewe

Caribbean as a possible arena for subversion or larger conf

involving nonregional powers--British, French, Spanish, Ger

or Soviet. That paradigm remained from our War for Independe

tlu'ough the days of the Monroe Doctrine, to the Spanish-Amer

War, the U-boat campaigns in both World Wars, and finally 

Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 

Despite concern about subversion by extra-regional ac

there had been a realization among U.S. policy makers that 

greatest interests lay in the economic and political developme

this hemisphere. However, from 1917 on, the fear that Euro

powers--either German or Soviet, or their proxies--might estab

a military foothold in the region, dominated our concerns and 

our hemispheric security policy. Some of the most signifi

events of this century that occurred in this hemisphere were 

result of these global power struggles: 

• The Zimmermann telegram that convinced the U.S. pu

that Germany was seeking Mexico's aid against the U.

return for assistance in helping Mexico regain its lost 

territory. 

• Deadly Nazi U-boat attacks in the Caribbean, whic

1942 alone sent 336 allied merchant ships to the bottom. 

• And, of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the closes

superpowers ever came to nuclear conflagration. 

Until quite recently, most of Washington's Caribbean pol

fell under the spell of our Cold War containment strat

contributing to a legacy of U.S. military interventions in 

Caribbean island nations. Today, with the exception of Cuba

all enjoy democratic governments. This fact, together with the 

of the Cold War, provides us an opportunity to develop a com

vision of security that supports our mutual interests. 

Fortunately, the United States now recognizes that the gre

threat from the Caribbean is instability. Obviously, the Un

vi 
are signs that migration is a regional problem. Using 1992 d

Elliott Abrams estimated the number of Caribbean Basin for

nationals living in the U.S., as a percentage of total population f

selected countries, varied from a low 1.5 percent for Costa Ric

a high of 18 percent for Grenada. Five other Caribbean B

countries--Belize, Guyana, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, 

Jamaica--had figures of or near 15 percent. Obviously, this tr

cannot conthme indefinitely, and it is clearly in U.S. interest fo

Caribbean nations to succeed economically and politically. 

In February of 1995, President Clinton unveiled the 

National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. In 

important document, President Clinton highlighted the Decem

1994 "Summit of the Americas" in Miami as the stimulus for a 

Caribbean Strategy. I attended the Summit of tile America

Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. It 

impressive to see representatives from this hemisphere's 

democratic nations agree to a detailed plan of cooperative actio

such diverse fields as health, education, counter-narcot

environmental protection, information infrastructure, and 

strengthening m~d safeguarding of democratic institutions

addition to mutual prosperity and sustainable development. 

Only a few years earlier, it would have been unthinkable tha

sovereign nations in our hemisphere could agree on a comm

vision and a set of common principles to pursue that vision. It 

clear to me that these representatives were talking about the secu

concerns of the twenty-first century---economic growth, free tr

environmental protection, law enforcement cooperation aga

drug trafficking cartels, and political stability. Gone were the m

twentieth century concerns about Marxist-Leninist regimes, for

subversion, or leftist guerrilla insurgencies. Security today me

an economic and political response, with the military playing 

a supporting role. 

Nor was the Summit of the Americas an isolated event. S

that meeting, the themes of the Summit of the Americas have b

reaffirmed in other regional forums, such as the annual Caribb

vii 
neighbors now view security in an integrated regional context

more important, as a cooperative venture among our nations. 

Although the Caribbean is a relatively peaceful re

compared tn the Middle East, Africa, or the Balkans, its divers

language, history, and sociocultural characteristics mak

particularly challenging for American policy makers. 

While Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico sh

common language and history, most of the Caribbean island na

have few linguistic, cultural, or security ties with "Latin Amer

Rather, these nations trace their culture and history to Africa a

non-Spanish-speaking Europe, and their strongest hemisp

affiliations today are with Canada and the United States. We 

recognize and appreciate these differences if we are to buil

level of cooperation required to tackle the hard security i

facing the islands--illegal migration, drug trafficking, dis

relief, envirounaental protection, economic self-sustainment-

build regional solutions like the Regional Security System an

CARICOM Battalion. If we are to prevent regional instability 

build common security goals among this diverse group of nat

we must set the tone in the region by recognizing each i

nation's unique history, characteristics, and, most impor

sovereignty. 

The following McNair Paper by Dr. Ivelaw Griffith, one o

foremost scholars on Caribbean affairs, provides a balanced acc

of the events in the 1970s and 1980s that defined the 

Caribbean security relationship during the later years of the 

War. He discusses the impact of the Cold War on the 

"Caribbean security relationship, and Caribbean responses desi

to balance cooperation with the U.S. and other regional powe

areas of mutual interest, while at the same time protecting 

sovereignty. 

He also shows how the end of the Cold War has fundamen

changed the way we view not only security, but also each oth

partners in an emerging interdependent security relation

Rather than a "rogues gallery" of communist dicta

viii 
will help interested readers re-examine their views of the new 

Caribbean security relationship. It suggests how the U.S., Ca

and others should work with our Caribbean neighbors to pro

stability, development, and democracy, and take advantage o

historic opportunity before us to build a lasting regional sec

system that benefits all nations in the hemisphere. 

The stakes are high for all in the region. Future generation

profit or sufter depending on how well we understand the lega

our shared past, seize the tremendous opportunities of tile pre

and plan accordingly for their future. However, in these reso

constrained times, we must continue to integrate these program

provide the most benefit for every dollar invested in the re

Fortunately, the U.S. has a number of bilateral agreements wit

European and Caribbean allies on which to build. Thes

increasing the effectiveness of the Caribbean counternarc

effort. Our shift in emphasis from anti-insurgency trainin

preparing Caribbean militaries, coast guards, and police to 

together is appropriate and has already paid dividends. Sol

from the CARICOM Battalion patrolled the streets of Haiti a

with Bangladeshi, Canadian, U.S. and other U.N. forces. 

provided essential support in Haiti's struggle for democ

Caribbean peacekeepers have demonstrated their ability to pl

important role as part of "a coalition of the willing" thus ope

other doors to regional cooperation. 

Whether or not you agree with Dr. Griffith's observation

conclusions, his analysis provides an excellent basis for fu

study and discussion. 

ix 
CENTURY 

• 

COMPLEXITY, CHANGE, 

AND CHALLENGE 

This study assesses the Caribbean security landscape on the e

the fast-approaching new century with a view to considering 

the future portends in the security arena. Engaging in even gu

prospection during this period of history is particularly difficul

also exciting, partly because of dramatic changes that the w

began undergoing during the 1980s. These changes make sch

and statesmen approach the new century with a combined sen

expectancy and apprehension. The expectancy stems from 

anticipated benefits of the end of the Cold War, among other th

the apprehension is driven by the mmay unknowns tha

dynamics of changing international relations hold for the f

This is true for the Caribbean as it is for other regions of the w

and it holds true for security as it does for other issue areas. 

The contemporary security scene in the Caribbea

characterized by complexity, change, and challenge. Comple

in part, arises from the fact that the region comprises s

subordinate states that are vulnerable to a wide range of mil

political, and economic actions by states near m~d far. But p

the complexity also is derived from the fact that Carib
policy calculations. 

The global turbulence and the transformations be

experienced make change inevitable, if not always desi

Understandably, some of the dynamics of change in the Caribb

and elsewhere capture some of the elements of the "old" situat

some "old era" issues retain flleir salience. In many cases, plu

change, plus c'est la m&ne chose. Scholars and statesmen 

progressively coming to terms with the complexity factor and 

constantly coping with the turbulence and change. But no longe

there the luxury of first trying to interpret the world be

attempting to change it. Now part of the challenge involves hav

to manage change while interpreting events and outcomes. 
Understanding the Caribbean's present complexity, changes

challenges requires an appreciation of the recent past. A look 

at the decade of the 1980s finds that geopolitics, militariza

intervention, and instability were the major security conc

Given the interface between domestic and international polit

is understandable that there were links among some of these th

and among their domestic, regional, and international asp

Grenada's militarization in the 1980s, for example, was predi

on the need to defend the Grenada revolution against fo

intervention and local counterrevolution. Ironically, this 

militarization created the climate that led to the self-destructi

the revolution, presenting the United States with the opportun

intervene. In so doing, the United States was able to ful

preexisting geopolitical aim. Militarization and concerns 

stability in Dominica, Barbados, and St. Vincent and the Grena

also raised security concerns within the Eastern Caribbean, 

that Eastern Caribbean states not only created the Regional Sec

System (RSS) in 1982 to bolster subregional security, but 

willing accomplices of U.S. intervention ill Grenada a year la

The four themes--geopolitics, militarization, intervention

instability--were often subsumed under a megath

vulnerability. This topic became an important reference poi

analysis of small state security concerns everywhere durin

1980s? States were--and still are---considered vulnerable be

of geographic, political, economic or other factors that cause 

security to be compromised. Vulnerability is thu

multidimensional phenomenon. One study identified six factor

can lend to it: 

• Great power rivalries 

• Territorial claims 

• Possession of valuable resources 

• Provision of refuge to refugees or freedom fighters 
The special position of small states is borne out in all three major 

categories of flu'eats to sectLrity: threats to territorial security 

resulting from incursions to both military and non-military 

sources; flu'eats to political security, which can involve a broad 

range of actions that are deliberately intended to influence and, in 

some cases, bring about a specilic change in the threatened state's 

national policies; and threats to economic security, involving 

action tha ca1 have the effect of undermining a state's economic 

welfare ,and which, additionally, c,'m also be used as ,an instrument 

for political interference. 3 

All the above factors have affected Caribbean countries 

recent years, and some continue to do so at we approach the 2

century. The size and political, military, and economic limitati

of Caribbean countries make them all subject to the dictates of 

United States, the hemisphere's hegemon, and, to a lesser exten

pressures by middle-sized powers such as Brazil, Mexico, 

Venezuela. In explaining the range of threats to which Caribb

states are vulnerable, former Barbadian Prime Minister Ll

Erskine Sandiford, observed: 

Our vuhlerability is manifold. Physically, we are subject to 

hurricanes and earthquakes; economically, to market decisions 

taken elsewhere; socially, to cultttral penetration; and [now] 

politically, to the machinations of terrorists, mercenaries and 

criminals. 4 

Sandiford neglected to mention the vulnerability related to U

foreign policy and security pursuits. 

Caribbean states not only suffer from power deficiencies, 

many of them also have weak state systems, a combination 

exacerbates their vulnerability. As Barry Buzan noted, "whe

state has the misfortune to be both a small power and a weak s

• . . its vulnerability is ahnost unlimited. ''5 On the same is

Robert Pastor once stated that vulnerability in the region has ha
There was considerable attention paid to the expanded U.S. mi

presence in the Caribbean, as well as the geopolitics of the r

that gave rise to this situation, and U.S. national security p

towards the area. The 1980s witnessed dramatic increases in 

military instruments in the Caribbean, including direct mi

presence, increased military sales, aid, and training, exp

intelligence operation, and regular high-profile military maneu

Some of this activity derived from concerns about Marxist or 

leftist govermnents in Jamaica, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suri

among other countries. Fears were also expressed that these 

governments would facilitate Soviet geopolitical designs. Sp

concerns existed regarding Cuba, based on claims made in 

about an expanded Soviet military presence on the island. ~ 

Partly because of these concerns and fears, by 198

Caribbean Basin had become home of 21 U.S. military installa

including five naval, two air force, and seven army bases. 

largest forces were in Puerto Rico, Panama, and Guant~amo, 

together they formed a strategic triangle spanning the 

Caribbean Basin. One very visible trend of U.S. military activ

the 1980s was the holding of high-profile military maneuvers. 

Shield '80 and Readex '80 signaled a shift toward this str

continuing in 1981 with Ocean Venture '81, then the largest p

time naval maneuver since World War II. It involved some 12

troops, 250 ships, and 1,000 aircraft. 

Stn~clural and operational rearrangements were undertak

facilitate this enhanced presence. In one maior instance

Department of Defense upgraded its regional defense netwo

command status by consolidating the 2-year-old Cari

Contingency Joint Task Force at Key West, FL, with the An

Defense Command in Puerto Rico. The result was the creati

December 1981, of the Caribbean Command, responsibl

"waters and islands" of the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico

parts of the Pacific bordering Central and South America. 

command was disbanded in 1989 because of reorganization w

the defense establishment, partly due to budget cuts and 
CaribbemJ (oil, bauxite, gold, nickel, among other natural resour

and U.S. resource needs and business intere~sts. In the late 1980s

instance, 79 percent of the U.S. bauxite imports came from 

Caribbean. Moreover, file Caribbean was supplying the Un

States with a significant proportion of its oil refining and abou

percent of all oil imports. Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC

the Caribbean area also have featured in the strategic ma

(figure 1). Foremost is the Panama Canal connecting the Pa

mad Atlantic Oceans, used for both military and civilian purpo

Once ships exit flile Canal on the Atlantic side, they must use on

more of some 16 passages in the Caribbean Sea to r

destinations in the United States, Europe, Africa, and elsewh

Thus, the Caribbean has had multidimensional strategic value, 

in the context of the East-West rivalry conducted during the 19

the United States did everything possible to thwart actual 

potential threats in the area. ~ 

In terms of the East-West conflict, the USSR was viewe

having several aims in the region, including creating dissen

between the United States mad other countries, promoting confl

and fostering political-military changes that could eventu

facilitate Soviet-Cuban expansion, a° Many analysts considered 

Soviet-Cuban nexus as the centerpiece of Soviet strategic pursu

partly because the only significant Soviet military presence in 

Caribbean was in Cuba. Tiffs presence included modem n

facilities and troops. In September 1991, Mikhaii Gorbac

disclosed that Soviet troop strength stood at 11,000---much la

than the United States had estimated. The Soviets also boa

reconnaissance operations in Cuba, including the 28-square-m

facility at Loudres, reputed to have been the largest of its k

maintained outside file USSR. Yet strong Soviet-Cuban comlect

did not prevent differences over geopolitical issues) ~ nor did 

prevent the Soviets from maintaining other Caribbean contac

with Grenada until 1983, and with Guyana throughout file 198
Z-g- .o 

~; .~,=o I,i,. 
agreement provided for $58 million worth of military suppl

including mortars, machine guns, and anti-aircraft guns. Tha

1981 provided for armored personnel carriers, submachine gu

grenades, radios, generators, and other equipmem The 1982 tre

provided tor additional arms and equipment, including 50 armo

persounel carriers, 30 76-ram. guns, 30 antitank guns, 50 porta

missile launchers, 2,000 AK-47s, and mortars. What "also worr

U.S. policy makers caught in file East-West geopolitical prism w

that Grenada also had extensive military and political contacts w

Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, and ot

Communist countries.12 

Of course, the genesis of all of these geopolitical considerati

predated the 1980s. Yet, that decade was marked by a U

Caribbean policy as dramatic as it was different from earlier on

One significant reason for this was the election in 1980 of Ron

Reagan, which heralded a different foreign mad security poli

harsh anticommunism, a willingness to use force without m

compunction, and an unapologetic pursuit of Ameri

preeminence in global political, economic, and military affairs. T

policy that the Reagan administration fashioned toward 

Caribbean was designed to fit what former Chairman of the Jo

Chiefs of Staff General David Jones called "'a comprehens

strategic vision that integrates regional issues within a larger glo

framework. ,,13 

Thus, unlike President Jimmy Carter who at first had been m

accommodating to leftist regimes in file Caribbean, Reagan mad

obvious from the out~t that he favored regimes that supported U

foreign policy, opposed Cuba and the Soviet Union, and endor

flee enterprise. He therefore made no apologies for rewarding th

who supported U.S. interests or complied with its dictates, or 

punishing those who did otherwise. In addition, while the Ca

administration had given initial priority to multilateral relatio

apart from the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Reagan displa

from the beginning a preference for bilateral deMings that enab

the United States to exercise more leverage. Although Carter 
sovereignty if such a course was considered politically expedi

militarily necessary. 1~ 

MILITARIZATION 

Tile militarization concern pertained to the dramatic grow

military budgets and the expansion of military and police for

some parts of the Caribbean. Moreover, military officials in 

cases were "also increasingly visible and influential in makin

executing policy. This kind of militarization was particularl

of Suriname, Guyana, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Haiti. In Sur

and Haiti the militarization fit the Finer model: "The armed 

substitution of their own policies and/or their persons for th

• • ~,15 recognized civilian authormes. " 

In other cases, the situation involved civilian rulers garn

loyalty and obedience from the armed forces by penetrating 

with political ideas and political personnel, an approach desc

by Eric Nordlinger) 6 Armies became practically arms of 

parties and were compensated with accretions of money, equip

and personnel--precisely the case in Guyana and tile Domi

Republic) 7 In Guyana especially, the security establish

performed not only military functions, but also duties in tile r

of political, economic, and. (later) diplomatic security. TM 

Security consciousness became heightened in the E

Caribbean in the aftermath of several internal and ex

developments: invasion scares in 1976, 1978, and 19

Barbados; a rebellion in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 197

ouster of Eric Gairy in Grenada that same year; and two 

attempts in Dominica in 1981. These events led to several se

initiatives. One was enunciation of the "Adams Doctrin

proposition made by Tom Adams, Prime Minister of Barba

the time, lbr establishing a rapid deployment force in the Cari

to respond to intraregional threats. Adams and Brigadier Ru

Lewis of the Barbados Defense Force (and later also of the 

also proposed creating a standing army in the Eastern Caribb
between these two areas in that Caribbean militarization was pa

a function of the geopolitical environment, especially U.S. sccu

policy. Indeed, there was a ground-breaking volume 

militarization that substantiated connections between the 

themes, z° Other scholars, however, disputed the militariza

argument. Anthony Maingot, for example, called the claim

militarization a myth. 2~ He argued that "the most impor

security-related activities in the Caribbean do not directly inv

the govemments of the area .... There has not been, in fact, a m

military build-up in file English-speaking Caribbean. ''~- 

This dispute was essentially definitional. Maingot did 

accept the expanded U.S. military presence as a manifestatio

militarization. For him, militarization is a state-level phenome

that "denotes and connotes the perversion of civilian structure

a comprehensive emphasis on power by the military. ''z3 O

scholars have shown, though, that there is just as much credib

and intellectual value in examining militarization as 

international-level phenomenon as there is in examining it 

state-level one. 24 

INTERVENTION 

Intervention became a major security theme of the 1980s 

because of a large number of interventions in the Caribbean Ba

but because of the power asymmetries of file states invol

ideological overtones, and the justification proffered by 

intervener in one case. Most of the interventions were underta

by the United States, although other countries took action 

several occasions, as in the Honduran incursions into Nicarag

Those incursions led Nicaragua to take legal action aga

Honduras in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). But a

discontinuation of the action by Nicaragua, the case (Nicaragu

Honduras on Border and Transborder Armed Actions) 

removed from the ICJ docket on 27 May 1992. The two count

agreed to improve bilateral relations, 25 
communist-centered one in its cherished strategic space. 

Grenada intervention also involved controversy about the ro

Barbados, Jamaica, and other Caribbean countries in the ac

Mark Adkin, a retired British army officer involved in 

intervention on the RSS side, is among those who have prov

incontrovertible evidence that the Organization of Ea

Caribbean States (OECS) invitation to the United States w

Washington construct designed to justify its action. 26 

Caribbean argued nonetheless that their support for U.S. actio

participation in the affair was based on their own cons

decisions, not on compulsion by file United States. z7 

The Panama intervention was the first post-World War II 

intervention in Latin American that was not rationalized in ter

communism. President Bush justified Operation Just Cause on 

points: needing to protect the lives of Americans; helping re

democracy in Panama; preserving the integrity of the Panama C

Treaty; and bringing Manuel Noriega to justice for drug traffi

and racketeering, z8 The drugs rationale in particular demonst

the changing nature of the U.S. national security agenda. 

claimed vindication after Noriega was convicted on eight coun

drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering, and 

sentenced on July 10, 1992, to 40 years in prison. '° 

Part of the intervention theme of the 1980s revolved ar

U.S. action in Nicaragua, which was different from that in Gre

and Panama because it was characterized by covert action, a 

of clandestine intervention. That covert action is traceab

November 1981, when President Ronald Reagan signed Nat

Security Directive No. 17 authorizing $19.5 million in fundin

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to create a parami

commando squad to conduct raids in Nicaragua. Covert warfar

unofficially declared in March 1982, when CIA-trained and 

equipped operatives destroyed two major bridges in Chinadeg

Nueva Segovia provinces. The CIA later provided the Contras 

Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, a manual on 

intensity warfare strategy. The CIA itself undertook mis
The United States was castigated by many countries tor th

actions and was also repudiated by the International Court of Jus

(ICJ). In the now famous case, Nicaragua v United States, file c

ruled: 

The United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, 

finmacing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise 

encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary 

activities in mad against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic 

of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary 

intemation~d law not to intervene in file affairs of another state. 3~ 

But, as is well known, the United States denied tile jurisdiction 

the ICJ shortly before the Court announced its decision, ignor

the ICJ ruling that required tile United States to pay reparations 

refrain from any other interventionist activity. Later, tbllowing 

political changes after tile defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1

elections, the consequent ideological adaptations, 

rapprochement between the U.S. and Nicaragua, tile matter 

dropped. In a letter to file ICJ dated September 12, 1991, Nicara

asked for the matter to be discontinued. The Court then issued 

order of discontinuance on September 21, 1991.32 

INSTABILITY 

The Caribbean scene in the 1980s "also featured a significant amo

of internal instability precipitated by various factors, includ

coups and coup attempts, insurgencies, ideological dispu

political factionalism, and disputed political legitimacy. Sev

countries were "affected, some more than others, some with mult

factors, others with one. The noteworthy cases were H

Suriname, Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada, Nicaragua, and 

Dominican Republic. 33 

But by the end of the decade, the manifestations, if not the r

causes, of political instability had been addressed in several pla

among them Grenada and Nicaragua. These changes contribute
Segal continued: Although there are exceptions, there is an a

civil society that protests, dissents, takes its cases to the co

contests free elections, and provides an effective opposition. 

As might be expected, tile themes and issues mentioned a

were not the only ones presented in the 1980s; there were 

concerns. For example, there was increased drug production 

trafficking and the attendant corruption and other problems. C

the Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Antigua-Barbuda, Surinaane

Trinidad and Tobago were the countries that faced the gre

drug-related challenges. Territorial disputes between Guyana 

Venezuela, Belize and Guatemala, and Venezuela and Trinidad 

Tobago also generated several crises. In the Belize-Guatemala 

the crisis was such that Britain established a military garris

guarantee Belizean territorial and political sovereignty. Yet, b

end of the decade, all contending parties had taken steps eith

lessen tensions through confidence-building measures, or to re

their disputes altogether. In the dispute between Venezuela 

Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, a maritime treaty signed in 

1990 effectively settled the matter. In the Belize-Guatemala 

although Guatemala did not relinquish its claim, it recognize

sovereignty of Belize in August 1991, and the two coun

established diplomatic relations the following month. 3s 

NOTES 

1. Commonwealth Study Group, Vulnerability: Small States 

Global Society (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985); S

Harden, ed., Small is Dangerous: Micro-states in a Macro World 

York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, 

Politics, Security, and Development in Small States (London: Alle

Uuwha, 1987); and Willi,'u-n T. Tow, Subregional Security Cooperat

the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1990). 

2. Harden, Small is Dangerous, 13. 

3. Commonwealth Study Group, Vulnerability, 23. 

4. "Communique and Addresses--Eleventh Meeting of the H

of Government of the Caribbean Community," Caricom Perspectiv

Special Supplement (July-December 1990): 6. 
y, y y 

U.S. Caribbean Policy," in H. Michael Erisman, ed., The Carib

Challenge." United States Policy in a Volatile Region (Boulder: West

Press, 1984), 48-71; George Black, "MARE N(-)STRUM: U.S. Sec

Policy in file English-Speaking C~tribbean,'" NACLA Report on 

Americas 19 (July/August 1985): 13-48: Dion E. Phillips, "Carib

Militarization: A Response to the Crisis," Contemporary Marxism

(1985): 92-109; Humberto Garcfa Mufiiz, Boots, Boots. Bo

Intervention, Regional Securi~ and Militarization in the Ea

Caribbean (Rio Piedras: Caribbean Project on Justice and Peace, 1

Jorge Rodrfguez Beruff, "U.S. Caribbean Policy and Reg

Militarization," in Augusto Varas, ed., Hemispheric Security and 

Policy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 89-120: 

Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, "Puerto Rico and the Militarization of 

Caribbean, 1979-1984," Contemporary Marxism 10 (1985): 68-91. 

8. Black, "'MARE NOSTRUM;" Garcia Mnniz, Boots, Boots, B

R.A. Hudson, "Strategic ,and Regional Security Perspectives," in Sandr

Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty, eds., Islands of the Comnumwe

Caribbean, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1989), 585-634

Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean. Problems 

Promises in Subordinate States, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). 

9. Richard Sire and James Anderson, "The Caribbeml Stra

Vacuum," Conflict Studies No. 121 (August 1980), 1-21; David Ronf

Geopolitics, Security, and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin, S

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983; Thomas D. Anderson, Geopo

of the Caribbean, (New York: Praeger, 1984); and Lloyd Searwar, 

Caribbean Conundrum," in Thomas G. Weiss and James Blight, eds.

Suffering Grass (Boulder: Lylme Reinner, 1992), 15-38. 

10. Edward Gonzalez. A Strategy for Dealhig With Cuba. (S

Monica: Rand Corporation, 1982), 288. 

11. See Cole Blasier, The Giants Rival: The USSR and Latin Ame

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 103-28; W. Raym

Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influences (New Y

Praeger, 1985), 169-77; and Pastor, Whirlpool. On page 223 of Whirlp

Pastor refers to a meeting he had with Fidel Castro in January 1992 w

Castro indicated that "file Soviets opposed all our support for revoluti

Latin America.'" 
13. Tiryakian, "The Military," 50. 

14. See Tiryakian, "The Military;" Black, "MARE NOSTRUM

Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and the Caribbean Basin

Politics of National Insecurity," Jerusalem Journal of Internat

Relations 8, nos. 2-3 (1986): 83-89: Hudson, "Strategic and Reg

Security Perspectives"; AndrOs Serbin, Caribbean Geopolitics: To

Security Through Peace? (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1990); and L

Searwar, "The Caribbean Contmdrnm." 

15. Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback, 2nd ed. (Bou

Westview Press, 1988), 20. 

16. See his Soldiers in Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 

1977). 

17. See George Dalms. Domination and Power in Guyana 

Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982); George Darms, "The Role o

Military in the National Security of Guyana," in Alma H. Young and 

E. Phillips, eds., Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean (Bou

Ly~me Reixmer, 1986), 112-38; and Pablo Marihez, "'The Armed Forc

the Dominican Republic: Professionalization and Politicization,'" in 

Rodrfguez Beruff et al., eds., Conflict, Peace, and Development i

Caribbean (London: Macmillan, 1991 ), 81-109. 

18. See Ivelaw L. Griffith, "The Military mad the Politics of Ch

in Guyana," Journal of lnteramerican Studies and World Affai

(Summer 1991): 141-73. 

19. Black, "MARE NOSTRUM"; G,'u'cfa Mufiiz, Boots, Boots, B

Dion E. Phillips, "The Inca'easing Emphasis on Security and Defense 

Eastern Caribbean,'" in Young and Phillips, Militarization in the 

Hispanic Caribbean, 42-64; Leslie Manigat, "The Setting: Crisis, Ideo

and Geopolitics," in Jorge Heine and Leslie Manigat, eds.. The Carib

and World Politics (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), 25-74

Griffith, 1"he Quest for Security in the Caribbean. 

20. Young and Phillips, Militarization in the Non-Hisp

Caribbean. 

21. Anthony P. Maingot, "The United States in the Carib

Geopolitical Realities mad the Bargaining Capacity of Small State

Anthony T. Bryan et at., eds., Peace, Development and Securi~ 

Caribbean (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 246-49; Antho

Maingot. "The English-Speaking Caribbean and Hemispheric Security
24. See, for example, Miles Wolpin, Militarization 

Counterrevolution in the Third World (Lexington: Lexington Bo

1972); Jagat S. Mehta, ~., Third World Militarization (Austin: LBJ Sc

of Public Affairs, 1985); and Augusto Varas, Militarization and 

International Arms Race in Latin America (Boulder: Westview, 1985

25. "Nicaragua Discontinues C~L~e Against Honduras," UN Chron

29 (September 1992), 78. 

26. See Adkin, Urgent Fury. 

27. Vaughan A. Lewis, "Small States, Eastern C:u'ibbean Secu

mad the Grenada hltervention," in Heine, A Revolution Aborted: 

Lessons of Grenada, 25-63. 

28. See "A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to 

Force in Panama," New York Times, December 21, 1989, A 19. 

29. Larry Rohter, "Noriega Sentenced to 40 Years in Jail on D

Charges," New York Times, July 11, 1992, 1, 8. 

30. Peter Kombluh, "Nicaragua: U.S. Prohlsttrgency Warfare Aga

the Sandinistas," in Michael T. Klare ,and Peter Kombluh ,eds., L

Intensity Warfare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 136-57. 

31. Herbert W. Briggs, "The International Court of Justice Live

to Its Name," American Journal oflnternational Law 81 (January 19

79. 

32. See American Journal of International Law 68 (January 19

173-74. 

33. For more on these cases, see Anthony P. Maingot, "H

Problems of a Transition to Democracy in an Authoritarian Soft St

Journal of lnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 28 (Winter 1986-

75-102; Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg, "hlterest Groups and the Military Reg

in Suriname," in Yotmg and Phillips, Militarization in the Non-Hisp

Caribbean, 90-111; Scott B. MacDonald, "Insurrection 

Redemocratization in Suriname?: The Ascendancy of the "Third Pa

Journal of lnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 30 (Spring 1988): 

32; Griffith, "The Military and the Politics of Change in Guyana"; He

A Revolution Aborted; and Perry Mars, Foreign Influence and Poli

Conflict in the Post-Colonial Caribbean, Working Paper No. 133, Ce

for Studies of Social Change, New School for Social Research, 1992

34. Aaron Segal, "'The Caribbean: Small is Scary," Current His

90 (March 1991): 107. 

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 

The world witnessed dramatic change and turbulence as the 1

gave way to the 1990s. The changes critical to the Caribbean 

examined in this section. But before doing this it is importan

offer a commentary on the subject of security. 

MEANING OF SECURITY 

Security has long been a highly contested concept with a variet

definitions and usages, founded mainly on traditional realist the

Hence, the traditional approach to security emphasizes the mili

variable, focuses on the state as the unit of analysis, and sees st

as rational actors pursuing their national interests. Th

orientation is mainly extern',d, and the utility of secu

countermeasures is measured largely in military terms. Securi

considered part of a country's "high politics." Traditional rea

has long been challenged, but the end-of-Cold War turbulence 

led scholars to question increasingly the validity of the re

conceptualization of international politics generally, and of secu

in particular) Consequently, advocacy for a postrealist definitio

security has developed. 

Postrealists believe that nonmilitary developments can p

genuine threats to long-term security and quality of life; 

traditional concepts of sovereignty cannot cope with torre

transborder flows of narcotics, money, AIDS, arms, 

immi~ants; that no single country can combat these threats al

and that new regional and international rules and institutions wi

needed to cope with the nonmilitary threats facing most countr

They do not exclude the military variable from the security ma

but the economic, political, and, for many, the enviromne

variables are considered as equally important. Postrealists posit 

19 
arena, nonstate actors abound, and some of them wield consider

power, oftentimes more than states. 

This new approach to security is progressively being embr

by professional military officers, 3 and not just by security scho

Yet understandably, not all security analysts support it. Moreo

this "new thinking" does not represent a total debunking 

traditional realism, for as Richard Falk has noted correctly, 

To challenge to centrality of realism does not imply its tota

repudiation. States do remain important actors, war does remain 

profoundly relev,'mt to intenmtional relations, ,and many 

international settings can better be understood as collisions o

interests and antagonistic political forces. 4 

If one adopts the postrealist approach to security, there 

three structural and operational features of the still-transform

global environment with direct implications for the region: 

• The changed structure of global military and poli

power 

• Alterations in economic relationships 

• Policy reprioritization by states which traditionally 

had an interest in the Caribbean. 

GLOBAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL POW

The collapse of world communism and the concomitant end o

Cold War are at the center of fl~e transformation in the first 

The bipolar character of global military-political power has 

replaced by the reemergence of a multipolar global system. 

only is there evidence of multipolarity, but some scholars poi

the development of the multidimensional basis of global po

One reputable scholar, for example, discerns the developmen

different currencies of power affixed to different pole

international power: military, economic mad financial, demograp

and military and economic. He sees the poles varying in 

productivities, with demographic power as more of a liability 
layer (transnational interdependence) showing a diffusion 

power. 6 

This post-Cold War structural-operational transformation 

at least two major implications for the Caribbean, both of w

pertain to the realities of U.S. geographic proximity, power, 

interests. The first is that U.S. policy and action toward 

Caribbean will be shorn of the previous East-West ideolog

cloud, thereby altering the character, if not the scope, of Un

States-Caribbean relations. Although it is true that, so long as F

Castro is able to remain adamant in the pursuit of communis

Cuba, there will be some U.S. concern about an ideological th

"the Communist threat" is virtually nonexistent, partly becaus

regional changes in Nicaragua, Grenada, Guyana, and elsewhe

The previous East-West military-political fixation of the Un

States not only colored its relations with Caribbean countries 

bilateral basis, it influenced multilateral relations as well. Du

the Cold War, the interests and conduct of some Caribb

countries caused them to suffer the consequences of 

displeasure, while others received the benefits of its approbatio

the context of institutions such as the International Monetary F

(IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development B

(IADB). However, there is already evidence that the end of the 

War has led to appreciable change in U.S. attitudes and beha

toward Caribbean countries in these multilateral arenas. 

The second implication is related to the U.S. military pres

in the region. The character and scope of U.S. military deploym

and posture in the Caribbean, part of its geopolitical gmne-pla

countering the former USSR, have already begun to change. Th

contributing to a lesser U.S. military presence, reduced IM

(International Military Education and Training Program) assista

and reduced arms supplies and sales to countries that were e

U.S. allies in the East-West conflict, or considered other

important to U.S. national interests] 

The transfer of responsibility for the Caribbean from USAC

to the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is further evidenc
change satisfies two objectives: 

• To enhance Southern Command's interactions wit

navies of Central and South American nations. 

• To have one commander control all U.S. military acti

in the Caribbean Basin and Central and South America. '

The change takes place in two phases. Phase One, eff

January 1, 1996, gives SOUTHCOM authority over the 

adjoining Central and South America. The second phase, to 

effect after June 1, 1997, will give SOUTHCOM control ov

Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. This move is a reflect

U.S. budgetary pressures and l~)licy rethinking, central to whic

cost-efficiency calculations for counternarcotics operations

one potential risk of this change from the Caribbean vantage 

is the possibility that tile Caribbean will get short shrift 

balancing of security relations between the U.S. and countr

Central and South America, and those in the Caribbean, whic

smaller and relatively less important. 

As Jorge Dominguez rightly observed, the Caribbean no

lesser military importance in world 'affairs, although there rem

some significant military issues in the region. Q Yet, the end 

Cold War does not obliterate the strategic value of the Carib

As was shown, the region's strategic significance is reflect

economic, geographic, and communications attributes that 

transcended East-West geopolitics, cveu though they were aff

significantly by it during tile Cold War. And as will be see

Caribbean is not only of strategic importance to states, but a

non-state actors, notably the drug barons. 

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS 

Allied to the military-political changes attendant upon the e

the Cold War are alterations in the su-ucture and operati

economic power relationships. The profundity of actual 

anticipated economic power changes has been such that one sc

was able to popularize a concept he coined to capture the scop
modalities are becoming dominant in state actions. 2 He ex

that both the causes and instruments of conflict will be econo

The movement toward the formation of economic blocs ar

the world is one imlx~rtanl manifestation of global economic p

alteration. The European Union now boasts a unified market o

million consumers, and ASEAN (the Association of Sout

Asian Nations), with some 420 million people, agreed in Jan

1992 to create a free-trade area as a precursor to establishmen

common market. Original plans called for an ASEAN Free T

Area (AFTA) by January 1, 2003, but ASEAN members are 

aiming for January 2000, following the counsel of Brunei's S

at the September 1995 meeting of ASEAN Council of Econ

Ministers. Closer to home there is NAFFA, with annual produ

of over $6 trillion and some 387 million consumers in Ca

Mexico, and the United States. 

One appreciable consequence of this megabloc phenonleno

the Caribbean is the potential reduction or even loss of econ

assistance, foreign investment, and preferential tra

arrangements. Concerning NAFTA, for example, there is just

fear that the anticipated increase in trade resulting from the rem

of trade barriers in Mexico will help displace U.S. trade 

Caribbean countries and reduce the benefits of tariff prefere

under schemes like the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Ge

Scheme of Preferences, and Section 936 of the U.S. Int

Revenue Code, the last of which is dying a slow death. And t

only one of several policy and institutional concerns with econ

and political security implications. 

The megabloc phenomenon with its varied implications c

at a particularly unpropitious time for the region, given 

cumulative impact of the global and regional turbulence, w

includes depressed banana, bauxite, and sugar production, 

public debt, and high unemployment. A former Deputy Secre

General of the Latin American Economic System observed: 
beyond NAFTA .... It relates much more to the requirements of 

the current global economic environment of increased 

competition, to which NAFTA is itself a response. ~ 

RETHINKING POLICY PRIORITIES 

The military-political changes caused by the end of the Cold 

and the megabloc phenomenon have had both causal 

consequenti',d links to the third general feature of the new strat

environment that is critical to the Caribbean: policy reprioritiza

by big and middle powers that once considered tile Caribbean t

important to them, and or by countries on which Caribbean st

placed importance. Noteworthy in this respect are the United St

Britain, and Venezuela, which is also Caribbean in the Caribb

Basin definition of the region. 

Reprioritizing by these countries is the result of several fac

sometimes acting in combination. These include budge

constraints, economic recession, shifting foreign policy focus

demand by domestic constituencies for more attention to dome

concerns, and leadership changes which may cause po

reevaluation. In tile United States, for example, the 

congressional onslaught by the Republicans has led to 

articulation of and efforts to implement the Contract with Amer

a document with considerable quasi-isolationist overtones. 

In tangible terms, the things just cited have meant reduced 

aid reallocation, preferential trade readjustment, reduced tbr

investment guarantees, and diplomatic downgrading of s

Caribbean countries. For example, the withdrawal by the Britis

their military garrison in Belize was prompted by both budge

difficulties and a review of British foreign and security po

toward Central America and the Caribbean. This action has h

dual effect: increased vulnerability of Belize to territorial 

political sovereignty violation by Guatemala, and reduced Beliz

capacity for credible responses to narcotics production 

trafficking. 
because of the strategic insignificance of those countries, and p

"to shift resources to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Uni

It took congressional pressure, especially from the Black Cau

to reverse the decision on Grenada. The embassy there will re

open, for the time being. 12 Lobbying, however, is not expect

succeed with the United States Information Agency (USIA), w

announced in fall 1995 the closure in 1996 of its office

Suriname, Belize, and Guyana. 13 The Guyana office was clos

March 1996. The United States Agency for Internati

Development (USAID) has also closed its Eastern Caribbean of

which was located in Barbados. 

Not all countries of importance to the region have 

reducing their tangible interaction with the region, though. Fr

and Spain are notable in this regard, although Spain's involve

has been narrowly focused, mainly on Cuba and the Domin

Republic. There are also a few countries that are taking ne

renewed interest in the region, Japan and South Korea among t

Nevertheless, the value of the lost interest seems to far outw

that of the new/renewed relationships. More than this, 

Caribbean's diminished importance based on reprioritization i

limited to actions by states. Some nonstate actors, suc

foundations and multinational corporations, are also a

accordingly. 

A special note is needed about Canada. Although Canada 

been forced to reduce aid because of budgetary problems, its 

relations with Cuba have grown over recent years. Q

understandable, then, is Canada's strident criticism of the C

Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, popularly known a

Helms-Burton Act, which was signed by President Bill Clinto

March 12, 1996. Canada's Caribbean interests extend beyond C

although Canna has long had a "soft spot" for the Commonw

Caribbean, which forces it to strive to maintain credible leve

aid, trade preferences, and technical assistance. 

The most recent reflection of this is the Commtmique o

Canada-CARICOM Summit, held March 3-5, 1996 in Gren
CARIBCAN of those products which are currently excluded f

the arrangement. ''~4 The Communique also identified Cana

continuing assistance in such varied areas as debt managem

small business development, the environmenl, drugs, and regio

security. 

NOTES 

1. See, for example, Buzan, People, States, and Fear; Charles 

Kegley, Jr., "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Re

Myths and the New hltemational Realities," International Stu

Quarterly 37 (June 1993): 131-46; Joseph J. Romm, Defining Natio

Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); 

Robert Latham, "Thinking About Security After the Cold W

International Studies Notes 20 (Fall 1995): 9-16. 

2. This formulation is from Theodore Sorensen, "America's F

Post-Cold War President," Foreign Affairs 71 (Fall 1992): 29. 

3. For example, Gen. James R. Harding, "Security Challenges 

opportunities in the Americas," North-South 3 (February- March 19

48-51; Vice Adm. Jorge Patricio Arancibia Reyes, "View from Chile

L. Erik Kjonnerod, ed., Hemispheric Security in Transition: Adjustin

the Post-1995 Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense Univer

Press. 1995); Gen. John J. Sheehan, "Lessons of 1994; Outlook for 

Future," Presentation at the USACOM-NDU-North-South Ce

Caribbean Security Sympositan, Miami, April 18, 1995; and Gen. Barr

McCaffrey, "Lessons 1994; Prognosis for 1995 and Beyond," Presenta

at the SOUTHCOM-NDU Annual Slrategy Symposium, Miami, Apri

1995. 

4. See his "Theory, Realism, and World Security," in Michae

KIare and Daniel C. Thom~, ex'ls., Worm Security: Trends and Challen

at Century's End (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 10. 

5. Stanley Hoffm,'m, "A New World Order and its Troubl

Foreign Affairs 69 (Fall 1990): 115-22. 

6. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" Foreign Affair

(Spring 1992): 88. 

7. For a discussion of military changes pertaining to the Caribb

see Httmberto Garcfa Mufiiz and Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, "U.S. Mil

Policy Toward the Caribbean in the 1990s," Annals of the Amer
Release No. 066-96, February 7, 1996. The changes to the UCP go b

USACOM and SOUTHCOM shifts. Adjustments also affect the P

Conunand, the Central Command, and the Strategic Command. The 

itself is the overall schema that guides all unified commands, b

establishh~g missions, responsibilities, mad force structures, (b) delin

geographic areas of responsibilities (for geographic combat comman

and (c) specifying functional responsibilities (for functional comman

9. Jorge I. Domfnguez, "The Caribbean in a New h~terna

Context," in Anthony T. Bryan, ed., The Caribbean." New Dynam

Trade and Political Economy (Miami: North-South Center, Univers

Miami, 1995), 2. 

10. Edward N. Luttwak, "'From Geopolitics to Geo-econom

National Interest 20 (Summer 1990): 20. 

11. Henry S. Gill, "NAFTA: Challenges for the Cari

Commtmity," in The Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Po

Economy, 49. 

12. See Steven A. Holmes, "'Less Strategic Now, Grenada is to 

American Embassy," New York Times May 2, 1994, A l, A6; and Ho

"U.S. Embassy for Grenada," New York Times May 15, 1994, A9. 

13. Bert Wilkinson,"US Pulls Away from Region," New York 

News October 17, 1995, 6. hlcidentally, the Peace Corps presen

increasing slightly, h~ 1995 an office was reopened in Guyana after c

during the 1970s as relations between Guyana mad the (I.S. soured. 

14. Communique, Canada-CARICOM It eads of Government Su

St. George's, Grenada, March 5, 1996, 4. 
Although turbulence and transformations are precipitating cha

in many areas, some security issues from the previous era 

retained their salience. One issue with continued salienc

territorial disputes, one where the dynamics have been cha

pertains to drugs. Territorial disputes and drugs are, however

tile only items on the region's security agenda; they are amon

most critical ones) 

The outbreak of hostilities between Peru and Ecuado

February 26, 1995, not only threatened to shatter "the Spir

Miami" 6 weeks after its creation, but it provided sob

testimony of the continued salience of territorial and bo

disputes in the America~s. Moreover, while there had bee

accentuation of peace initiatives in the hemisphere even befor

Smnmit of the Americas, among lhe collateral consequences o

Peru-Ecuador conflict has been a jolting of memories abou

ntunber of similar disputes in existence and a rekindlin

nationalist sentiments about the prosecution of claims. 

In the Guyana-Venezuela case, for instance, the aftermath o

Peru-Ecuador war led to apprehension in Guyana over troub

signals coming from Venezuela. In relation to its Guyana c

which is tor two-thirds of the country, Venezuela's For

Minister, Miguel Burelli Rivas, visited Guyana March 2-3, 199

ask for priority attention to be given to the issue. More troub

though, he called on President Cheddie Jagan of Guyana to ha

proposal to be pursued in practical terms" ready for when J

meets Rafael Caldera during fall 1995. Guyana flatly refuse

diplomatic arm twisting. 2 As a result, Venezuela suspe

plans for a Jagan-Caldera summit, although the two leaders 

briefly later, on October 8, 1995, while Jagan was in tran

Venezuela, on his way to the Non-Aligned Summit in Colom

29 
,I 

o 

t 

i 

f,!l 

I 

tll! 

i 

, GUYANA 

I Mlantic (~cean 

" i BRAZIL 

i 

6z°w 

SURINAME 

-4

~oiw 58 ~W 56 

FIGURE 2. Territorial claims against Guyana 
involving the claim by the former to the entire territory of the l

is not settled, although Guatemala recognized Belizean soverei

in 1991 and its posture has changed significantly since then. 

However, these territorial disputes are not the only ones i

Caribbean Basin. Others involve Venezuela and Colom

Colombia and Nicaragua. Suriname and France (over Fr

Guiana), El Salvador and Nicaragua, and Honduras and Nicara

It is useful to note, however, that while structural and operati

post-Cold War changes might not have affected the salienc

territorial disputes, they have helped to create an environ

where peace and reconciliation are emphasized, and 

environment itself can make a difference in approaches to reso

territorial and other disputes. 

NOTES 

1. For an assessment of d~e region's security agenda, see lvel

Griffith, "Caribbean Security: Retrospect :rod Prospect," Latin Ame

Research Review 30 (Summer 1995): 3-32. 

2. See"Indecenl Proposal," and "Venezuela's Ultimattun,'" Gu

Review no. 27 (April 1995): 2-6; and "[Foreign Minister Clement l R

Says No," Guyana Review no. 29 (June 1995): 7. 
The "Caribbean lies at what J6se Martf once called "the Vortex o

Americas," making it a bridge or front between North and S

America. European leaders recognized the strategic importan

this vortex soon "after the 1492 encounter between Europe an

Americas. This strategic importance has persisted over 

centuries, and it was dramatized in geopolitical terms durin

Cold War. However, the strategic value of the Caribbean lie

only in its geopolitical value as viewed by state actors engag

systemic conflict and cooperation. Over recent years the regio

also been viewed as strategic by nonstate drug actors, also 

conflict and cooperation in mind, but in terms of geonarcotics

geopolitics. 

Geonarcotics is a concept developed to explain the mu

dynamics of the narcotics phenomenon. It posits that: 

• The phenomenon is multidimensional with four 

problem areas: drug production, consumption-a

trafficking, and money-latmdering 

• These give rise to actual and potential threats to 

security of states around the world 

• The drug operations and the activities to which they 

rise precipitate conflict and cooperation among various 

and nonstate actors in the international system. 

Over and above this, the term captures the dynamics of tour fac

drugs, geography, power, and politics. 

Geography is a factor because of the global spacial dispe

of drug operations, and because certain geogaphic fea

facilitate some drug operations. Power involves the abili

individuals and groups to secure compliant action. This pow

both state and nonstate in source, and in some cases non

sources exercise relatively more power than state entities. 

politics, the fourth factor, revolves around resource allocation i

33 
production, consumption and abuse, trafficking, and mo

laundering, 2 it is trafficking that best highlights the regio

strategic value. Aspects of both the Caribbean's physical and so

geography make it conducive to drug trafficking. Except 

mainland Belize, French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname, Caribb

comatries are 'all island territories. Some are plural island territor

such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines, which comprise clos

600 islands, and the Virgin Islands, composed of about 100 isla

and cays. Indeed, one, the Bahamas, is an archipelago of 700 isla

and 2,000 cays. This island character permits enlry into and us

Caribbean territories t?om scores, sometimes hundreds, of diffe

places from the surrounding sea. For the mainl,and states, acces

from various places from the Atlantic Ocean in the case of Guy

Suriname, and French Guiana, and from tile Caribbean coast in 

case of Belize. And when one adds to the matrix the inability 

Caribbean countries to provide adequate territorial policing, t

vulnerability to trafficking is more readily appreciated. 

The most important location feature of the region's phys

geography is proximity. This proximity is dual: to South Amer

a major drug-supply source, and to North America, a maior dr

demand area. On the supply side, the world's cocaine is produ

in South America, coming notably from Colombia, Peru, Boli

Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Colombia alone produces abou

percent of all the cocaine in tile world, ahhough only about 

percent of worldwide coca leaf cultivation is done th

(Colombia's coca cuhivation is reported to have grown 13 perc

in 1995, making that country the world's second largest c

producer, after Pen~. Bolivia's place is now reduced l¥om secon

third.) A significant proportion of global heroin and mariju

production also comes from South and Central America, especi

from Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, and Guatema

On the demand side, the United States has the dubi

distinction of being the world's single largest drug-consum

nation. An analyst at the Congressiozml Research Service repo

in 1988: 
By 1993, however, State Department estimates placed consum

of cocaine alone at 150-175 metric tons, valued at $15-17.5 bil

In April 1995, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, then head of SOUTHC

and now the U.S. drug "czar," estimated that about 300 mt o

approximately 575 mt of cocaine available worldwide in 1994 

consumed in the United States. 6 

As is evident from figure 3, there is not much distance bet

either the Caribbean and South America, or the Caribbean an

United States, especially the southern and northeastern parts o

United States. For example, except for French Guiana 

Suriname, the distance of all Caribbean countries is less than 2

miles from Miami, and only seven of them are more than 2

miles from Atlanta and Washington, DC. As for distances bet

the Caribbean and some main South American drug centers, ov

percent of Caribbean countries are no more than 1,000 miles 

Caracas, and all except Belize (in relation to Caracas), Fr

Guiana (in relation to Cali and Medellfn), and Suriname (in rel

to Medellin) are less than 1,500 miles away from Bogota, 

Caracas, and Medellfn. The distances involved are often quite 

For example, the island of Bimini in the Ballamas is just 40 

from the Florida Keys; a mere 90 miles separate Cuba from 

United States; only 7 miles separate La Brea in southwe

Trinidad and Pedernales in northeastern Venezuela; the tow

Lethem in southwest Guyana is a mere 75 miles away from th

of Boa Vista in northeast Brazil; and Eteringbang, Guyana, is 

28 miles from El Dorado, Venezuela] 

Europe is also a huge drug consuming area. Despit

relatively greal distance between that continent and the Carib

region, the Caribbean is a major transit area for cocaine, heroin

marijuana bound for Europe. 8 Several reasons explain this. O

proximity between the Caribbean and South America. A se

relates to commercial, communications, and other linkages bet

Europe and the Caribbean, which provide the institutional and 

infrastructure for trafficking. 
14. 

~4 
certain customs, immigration, and transportation connec

between these territories and their respective European "own

and these are exploited by traffickers. Some of the arrangemen

similar to those involving the United States and Puerto Rico an

U.S. Virgin Islands, which also facilitate traffickers aimin

destinations in continental United States. 

The Caribbean's vulnerability to trafficking and the pros

for continued trafficking make drugs a clear and present dan

the region. One way to understand the geography dyn

involved is to examine trafficking patterns and the modus ope

of traffickers. 

TRAFFICKING PATTERNS 

Apart from shipping their own marijuana to the United States, 

Caribbean countries are important transshipment centers for 

American cocaine, heroin, and marijuana bound tbr Europ

North America. 

Bahamas 

For more than two decades, the B',dlarnas, Belize, and Ja

dominated this business. The Bahamas is an excellent cand

given its 700 islands and 2,000 cays and strategic location 

airline flight path between Colombia and South Florida. 

typical cocaine trafficking mission, aircraft depart from the 

coast of Colombia, arriving in the Bahamas 4 to 5 hours later

cargo is dropped either to waiting vessels, or for later collectio

placement on vessels, and then the final run is made to a U.S. 

of entry. However, this is not the only trafficking method. Rec

traffickers have been using other tactics, including use of C

waters to evade OPBAT (Operation Bahamas and the Turk

Caicos) measures. Cocaine seizures dropped from 490 kilos in 

to 390 kilos in 1995, while marijuana seizures incr

dramatically from a 1994 figure of 1,420 kilos to 3,530 ki
deaodug suggg. pat oa og coast e 

contiguous borders with Guatemala and Mexico, two major he

and marijuana producers, there are dense unpopulated jungle a

and numerous inland waterways. Moreover, there are about 

isolated airstrips and virtually no radar coverage beyond a 30-m

radius of the international airport at Belize City. While there sti

air tr'~cking, recently there has been an increasing use of mari

routes. Crack has also been featuring more prominently. While 

kilos of cocaine were seized in "all of 1994, two seizures in Janu

1995 alone netted 636 kilos of cocaine. The overall 1995 coc

seizures amounted to 840 kilosJ ° 

Jamaica 

Jamaica has long been kcy to tile drug trade, given its l

coastline, proximity to the United States, its many ports, harb

and beaches, and its closeness Io the Yucatan and Windw

Passages, as figure 2 shows. Trafficking takes place by both air 

sea, using both legal and illegal airstrips for air operations, 

cargo, pleasure, and fishing vessels for maritime ones. Many of 

illeg',d airstrips are only 1,200 to 1,500 feet long, just enough le

for use by Pipers. Cessnas, BE-100, and KingAir aircr'Mt. Jamai

west and south coast are the most popular areas for air traffick

Apart from landings on strips designed or adapted for d

operations, landings have been made on roads, in cane fields, 

on legal strips owned by bauxite and sugar companies. The Jam

Defense Force (JDF) has destroyed close to 100 illegal airstrips, 

as the JDF Chief of Staff explained, given the heavy limeston

many of the popular landing areas, operators are often able to m

fields serviceable within 10 days of destruction. 

Mosl of the cocaine air operations usi~g Jamaica over the 

few years have involved San Andres and Bogot~i in Colombia, 

Bahamas, Panama, and Curaqao. Traffickers do not rely only 

illegal flights; legal commercial flights are also used. Particul

popular, and problematic fi)r Jamaican officials, was the commer

link between San Andres and Montego Bay. That connection 
drug trafficking centers, countermeasures there and in Sou

Central America have prompted traffickers to seek and de

alternative routes, bringing eastern and southern Cari

countries into greater prominence since the early 1990s. The 

are of such a magnitude that, in November 1994, Puerto Ric

the U.S. Virgin Islands were designated by the United State

"czar" as High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA

designation surely appropriate to other areas in the r

Moreover, because of the increased drug activity, in July 19

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) upgraded its prese

Puerto Rico from "Office" to Field Division, increasing its st

and assigning a special agent to oversee the Caribbean, for

done from Miami. The Division became operational on Octo

1995. 

Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles 

These are said to serve as vit',d links in the transshipment of c

and heroin from Colombia, Venezuela, and Surinaine to the U

States and Europe. Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaqao are very cl

Venezuela, from which much of the drugs confiscated in 

islands come. Trafficking in the Dutch Caribbean gen

involves tile use of commercial and private airlines, air 

flights, and cruise ships, although ship containers have also 

used. In Suriname, for example, in 1994 one seizure alone 

207 kilos of cocaine concealed in cargo waiting to be ship

Europe. 

Seizures in Aruba for 1995 totalled 153 kilos of cocain

kilos of marijuana, aald 4 kilos of heroin. In the Nethe

Antilles the figures were 111 kilos of cocaine, 810 ki

marijuana, and 8 kilos of heroin, z2 In January 1996, while ope

near Grand Cayman, tile British frigate HMS Brave recovered 

million worth of cocaine that had been dumped at sea earli

together, there were 3,000 pounds of cocaine in 40 bales. 13 O

for the Cayman Islands in 1995, 548 people were arrest
apparently both with and without official sanction. One 1983 D

report dates official Cuban involvement to 1991, suggesting t

there were economic and political motives involved. Cuban offic

have also been indicted in the United States for trafficking. One 

the earliest cases of importance was in November 1982 when f

senior officials were convicted in absentia. 

Andres Oppenheimer asserts that Fidel Castro and Colomb

drug operators once had a long association, based mainly 

political convenience. Castro is said to have first ordered 

intelligence agencies to penetrate the Colombian drug network

the 1970s to gain access to what then appeared as potentially one 

Latin America's most powerful economic and political forc

Indeed, he says, "When the Carter administration launch

exploratory dialogue with the Castro regime in the late 1970s, o

of the things the Cubans offered was to help stop drug smuggl

through the Caribbean. The proposal died when normalization ta

collapsed. ''15 

Cuban involvement in trafficking commanded tile great

attention in 1989 when several top military officials were convic

and given harsh sentences for trafficking, corruption, and ot

infractions. Several analysts indicate that the participation 

military officials in the smuggling of drugs and other commodit

was not done mainly to profit individual officers, but to sati

economic needs of the military in particular, and economic a

political interests of Cuba generally. Evidence suggests that Cub

military and political high command 1,a~ew about the trafficking 

drugs and other contraband, and that they colluded in it. But th

turned on the architects of the operations when it became politica

inconvenient to have their operations continue. 

Although there is no credible evidence of present Cub

Government involvement in trafficking, there is evidence of 

practice in Cuba. For example, in April 1992, 29 Cubans in the c

of Camaguey were found guilty of possessing and trafficking 

cocaine. Some were also convicted of currency and weapo

possession charges. ~6 Cuban officials reported that 3.3 mt of coca
involvement: geographic location, poorly monitored c

mountainous interior, about 20 unpatrolled airstrips, inadequa

enforcement resources, and corruption. In Haiti, the complic

military and other officials has been well established. 18 The 

estimated in 1993, for instance, that 2 to 4 tons of cocaine p

through Haiti, mostly with the blessings of military officia

April 1994, Gabriel Toboada of the Medellfn cartel told a 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that Lt. Col. J

Michel Francois, then commander of Haiti's police, collabora

the shipment of tons of cocaine during the 1980s. According 

testimony, the deal had been sealed in 1984 following Fran

visit to Medellin. Haiti was reportedly used as a bridge 

United States, with both the flights and the cargo protected 

military? ~ Officially reported cocaine seizures have been incre

recently, but the figure plunged in 1995: in 1992, the 

reported was 56 kilos; 1993, 157 kilos; 1994, 716 kilos; and 

550 kilos] ° 

Guyana 

This country has recently become an important center of opera

Like other Caribbean countries, Guyana's trafficking use s

graduation from marijuana to cocaine and heroin. The e

known trafficking case was in June 1979, when a trader fro

bauxite mining city of Linden arrived from Jamaica with 60 p

of compressed marijuana, it Cocaine and some heroin now 

Guyana from "all three neighboring countries: Brazil, Surinam

Venezuela. Cocaine seizures in 1993 were 463 kilos--1,000 p

higher than in 1992. The exceptional 1993 figure was due t

dramatic seizure in June 1993, when 800 pounds of cocaine 

dropped from air into the Demerara river, along with $24,00

huge quantities of Colombian and Guyanese currency. S

Guyanese, Colombians, and Venezuelans were implicated 

affair. = 

During 1994 alone, 56,707 kilos of marijuana were confis

up from 15,654 kilos seized in 1993. And in January 1995, 
indicate a decrease in the amount of drugs transiting the country

may be the result of more sophisticated techniques and coordinat

on the part of drug smugglers or an insufficient drug enforcem

unit, or both. ''~ 

The air, sea, and land routes developed for smuggl

contraband into Guyana from Brazil, Venezuela, and Surina

during the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s have now b

adapted to narcotics trafficking. A further complication is the 

that the borders with these neighboring countries are very lo

1,120 kilometers with Brazil, 745 kilometers with Venezuela, 

600 kilometers with Suriname. Moreover, traffickers are able 

lake advantage of the country's large size (214,970 squ

kilometers), the coastal habitation, and absence of adequ

manpower and equipment to police the territory. In relation to 

trafficking, for example, there are 92 legal airports (private 

public), most of them in remote parts of the country where 

physical and social geography provides clear advantages 

traffickers. Like elsewhere in the Caribbean, trafficking in Guy

is not done only by air runs dedicated to drug delivery or collecti

commercial flights are also used. 

Guyana's physical geography makes it also vulnerable 

maritime trafficking. Guyana, whose name is derived from 

Amerindian word that means "Land of Many Waters," has hundr

of inland rivers and creeks. Moreover, there are 13 huge rivers 

flow into the Atlantic Ocean, and each of those rivers has a netw

of tributaries. The maritime traffic is also facilitated by the fact t

the network of rivers also runs into Brazil, Suriname, 

Venezuela. For example, the Takatu river in southwest Guy

flows into the Parima, a tributary of the Rio Nero, which flows i

the Amazon in Brazil. 

The Guyana situation is clear evidence of the vulnerability 

Caribbean countries to drug trafficking and other operatio

Geography apart, a contributor to this situation is the absence 

adequate military and police resources lor credible responses. 

effect, the state lacks the power to exercise proper political 
diversions in order to execute large operations. s 

MODUS OPERANDI 

Drug trafficking brings out the creativity and ingenuity of 

operators and the people who collude with them. People have 

every possible orifice of the human anatomy, every possible 

of clothing, all manner of fruits and vegetables, and a vari

craft, furniture, and other filings for the conveyance of drugs. 

far as the human anatomy is concerned, use has been made 

vagina, anus, arm pits (to strap packages of drugs), tile abd

and the back (to strap packages), the tongue (by placing drugs 

it), both natural and false hair, thighs (where drugs are strapp

inner thighs), and the stomach and intestines. Indeed, the

people---called swallowers or mules--who specialize in tile 

the stomach and intestines. One Eastern Caribbean official r

a case where a leg wound was used. Condoms with cocaine 

found in the wound and within the bandaging of file wound. 

Drugs have also been found in fish, rice, cake, pepper 

coconuts, yams, bananas, "coffee beans" (where the bean

cocaine pellets stamped to the shape of coffee beans and dip

coffee syrup), cheese, butter, cans of fruit, beer, and juice, cig

packaging, vegetables, detergent, furniture and furniture fix

lumber, pifiatas, mannequins, bales of cloth, mail, ceramic til

cream, bottles of shampoo and mouthwash, video tapes, f

vegetables, concrete posts, wooden coat hangers, rum (where 

cocaine is purported to be coconut rum), and countless 

objects. All sorts of clothing are used, including shoes and sne

with false soles and heels. Both dead and live birds and anima

also used to convey drugs. And in one attempted candy dis

1,000 pounds of cocaine packed inside candy containers 

seized upon arrival in New York in March 1996, having 

aboard an American Airlines flight from Puerto Rico. 26 

People of all ages and of both sexes are involved in traffi

and old women are sometimes used, because they do not 
The woman, Gwendolyn Martinez, a grandmother, later admi

that she had been recruited in Brooklyn for the job. U

conviction she was sentenced to 10 years in jail. 27 Martinez was 

of several "granny mules" arrested during 1993 and 1994 in Guy

and Trinidad. 

Some operations are very sophisticated, using dig

encryption devices, high-frequency transmitters, cell

telephones, beepers, radar tracking devices, flares and sensors 

air drops, and other equipment. Some trafficking is d

individually, but most of it is conducted through networks. Mos

the networks could not exist or succeed without the collusion 

people in government and private agencies in various positions 

at all hierarchical levels: people in shipping companies, custo

and immigration agencies, warehouses, police forces, the milit

airlines, export and import companies, stores, cruise ships, truck

companies, and factories, for example. Some officials collude 

acts of omission: they just fail to perform certain acts, go to cer

places, or return to their posts at a certain time. 

Thus, while the recent global turbulence and transformati

have "altered the strategic environment in many ways, because of 

continued salience of some issues and the heightened dynamic

others, the Caribbean strategic environment still holds some c

and present dangers. Drug trafficking presents some of th

dangers. The implications of trafficking go beyond merely 

consequences of being transit centers, partly because not everyth

intended to go through the region actually does so. Some of 

cocaine and heroin remain, both by default and by design

payment for services, for example, in the latter case. Partly beca

of all this, throughout the Caribbean there are problems of dru

related crime, arms trafficking, and corruption. What, then, is be

done about the narcotics phenomenon? 
phenomenon. They need to be multidimensional because 

operations and their impact are multidimensional; they need 

multilevel--national, regional, and international--because 

operations and many of the problems they precipitate are 

national and transnational; and they have to be multiactor l

two above reasons, plus the fact that countries lack the nece

individual capabilities to meet the threats and challenges. H

responses come not only from governments, but also from na

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Interna

Governmental Organizations (IGOs), and International 

Governmental Organizations (INGOs). 

National countermeasures are wideranging in scope, 

sufficiently substantive in character. They include law enforce

education, interdiction, demand reduction, rehabilit

intelligence, crop substitution, airport and seaport manage

financial services regulation, and legislation. There 

regionwide standard for most of the countermeasures, alth

countries emulate successful models elsewhere and com

practices do exist. The kind and impact of countermea

introduced depend essentially on three things: perceptions 

predicament, national capability, and foreign support. 

Public sector resources are insufficient to design and impl

narcotics countermeasures. This is more so be

countermeasures need to be both multidimensional 

simultaneous. In other words, circumstances are such tha

cannot apply education, and then rehabilitation, and 

interdiction. As a matter of fact, no set of measures can rea

undertaken only sequentially. Education, rehabilit

interdiction, and other measures have to be applied at the 

time. Indeed, in many places it was a failure to adopt simulta

measures, based on misperception of the situation, tha

contributed to its deterioration. 

Most countries have therefore adopted an inclusive appr

actively reaching out locally to NGOs and corporate agenci

partnership in countermeasures. Generally, though, eve
began in 1974 with some ambitious aims: eradication o

marijuana cultivation; arrest of all persons, equipment, aircraft, 

marine vessels engaged in trafficking; and destruction of all ill

airstrips. It involved joinl army-police operations heavily suppo

by the United States. The U.S. obligations were usually for sal

for 25-30 people to cut and burn marijuana fields, fuel for 

helicopters, boats, and vessels used in operations, funds to purc

chemicals, equipment, and supplies to cut and spray field,s; and 

lease of Bell 205 helicopters for use by the JDF air wing. 

United Stales also provided vessels for the JDF Coast Guard, 

helped with intelligence gathering. 

Operation Buccaneer was interrupted for 11 years, lar

because of U.S. antipathy toward the socialist posture of 

Michael Manley government. Operation Buccaneer recomme

in 1985 and continued as an annual exercise, interrupted onl

1988 when Hurricanc Gilbert hit Jamaica and destroyed most o

island's marijuana fields. Because of budget constraints, the Un

States stopped funding Operation Buccaneer in 1993. Howe

residual funds from previous years enabled a drastically redu

operation to be conducted in 1994. Operation Buccaneer fin

ceased in December 1994. 28 

Foreign a~,~sistance is not only bilateral, but multilateral, as 

be seen later. Aid sometimes comes from places with generally 

interest in the Caribbean, which suggests that the rationale be

the assistance is often not the specific country getting it, bu

issue concerned; the fact that drugs constitute an interdepend

issue is what really matters. In one case, Germany gave DM 4

0575,000) toward drug rehabilitation in Jamaica. The money 

given in Deccmber 1993 for Patricia House, a rehabilitation fac

for recovering addicts that had been established in 1991 

supporl from the European Community, the Jamaican governm

and Richmond Fellowship, a Jamaican NGO. 29 

Virtually all Caribbean countries have national drug coun

that are supposed to set policy on countermeasures. They usu

are composed of officials from various government bodies as 
Netherlands Antilles, and the National Drug Council (NDC) o

Bahamas are a few examples of these bodies. Understand

structures vary from country to country. 

National Master Plans are considered the ideal tools 

establishing national strategies and mechanisms for comb

drugs. There are Master Plans in over 18 places, including, ill o

of adoption, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Grenada, 

Netherlands Antilles, tile Dominican Republic, Jamaica, St. Vin

m~d the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Antigua-Barbuda, the British V

Islands, Haiti, Belize, Anguilla, Barbados, Turks mad Caicos, A

Bermuda, Dominica, and Cuba. 3° Some of the Plmls are prelimi

others are complete. However, there two problems with M

Plans, one of which the United Nations International Drug Co

Program (UNDCP) notes: "A severe lack of consistenl, perti

reliable, and comprehensive data on drug abuse and traffic

seriously inhibits proper assessment of the actual situation

precludes planning of appropriate counter-measures. ''3~ A se

problem pertains to implemeutation: for a variety of resource 

other problems the implementation record in many places is 

poor. 

Several Caribbean countries have mounted demand redu

programs, and at least one has pursued crop substitution. Trinid

demand reduction program is actually one strand of a two-pro

national drug control strategy. The second aspect is supply con

The overall plan attempts to develop a comprehensive 

integrated response to ensure that the problems are addressed 

all • fronts simultaneously. The hope is to modify behavior thr

public education and positive influences on attitudes and va

Prevention through education is seen as a continuous pro

involving the psychological development of children, the tra

of teachers, professional and community leaders to de

programs, and the treatment, rehabilitation, and social reintegr

of the addicted population. Recognizing the need 

multidimensional, multiactor efforts, the Trinidad plan also c
identified, among them: 150,000 people in five communit

students, teachers, and administrators in select schools; addicts 

their families; and governmental and non-governmental age

workers involved in counternarcotics work. The projec

proceeding on two main tracks. The first addresses improving 

ability to design and implement demand reduction programs. 

locus here includes enhancing national research capabilities, pu

drug education, school prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, 

training government and NGO officials. 

The second track emphasizes the development 

implementation of intensive demand reduction activities in 

communities: The communities are: San Fernando, in southw

Trinidad; Arima, in northern Trinidad; Chaguanas, the northw

section of the island; Scarborough, in southern Tobago; 

Laventille, in northwest Trinidad. These five communities w

selected based on several considerations. First, they 

representative of different types of drug problems affec

Trinidad and Tobago. Second, they offer a fairly wide geograp

spread, allowing models to be tested in a diverse selection of 

country's population. Moreover, they are places where the so

infrastructure and community and political organizations 

sufficiently developed to give the project a reasonable chanc

Success. 

The project is estimated to cost $1.9 million; $462, 469 f

local sources, and the remainder from the UNDCP. This proje

actually Phase II of a longer term initiative, the first part of wh

ran from October 1992 to October 1994. Several things w

accomplished during the first phase, including the training of 

community leaders in basic drug abuse prevention, preparatio

educational materi',ds, and establishment of the NADA

Secretariat. Given what officials in Trinidad and Tobago cons

as current and projected drug consumption practices, 

expectation is that several other phases will be necessary after 

current one is completed. 32 
pursuit of income substitution activities. In specific terms, the 

is to establish 1,520 acres of permanent and semipermanent c

and 700 acres of cash crops, and provide 1,890 farmers 

chicken broilers for poultry rearing. 

The project area covers farms in the parishes of St. Ann

Cathemae, St. Elizabeth, and Westmoreland--the parishes wit

highest marijuana production. With information from soil, 

use, climate, and market considerations, three models 

developed. The first consists of l-acre units divided into sec

for cash crops, permanent or semi permanent crops, and po

farms, each with 100 birds initially. Model II involves 2-acre 

to be used similarly, but with a different size allocation for the 

sets of things. Model III consists of 3-acre units divided as foll

one acre for permanent or semipermanent crops; hall-acre for 

crops; and the rest for a 200-bird poultry house. 

Approximately 2,000 farmers are expected to benefit from 

program in the first year, increasing by 1,000 in the second 

third years. Substitute crops include yams, carrots, coffee, c

papaya, and sugar cane. Training will be offered to farmers, as 

be basic farm tools such as forks, machetes, and files. 

nonagricultural aspect of the program includes creation of co

industries for processing agricultural produce, the productio

crafts using goat skin and straw, dressmaking, embroidery

other needlecraft. Women are the principal target for 

activities, but men are not excluded. 

The program began in late 1994 and is expected to cost J

million over its 3-year duration. Funding comes from the Jama

government, and grants from local NGOs, IGOs, and fo

governments. This program builds on a 1988 pilot proje

southwest St. Ann, where farmers were given J$1,700 wor

seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides each in an effort to encourag

shift away from marijuana cultivation. The St. Ann experimen

considerable problems, but was judged as fairly successful. No

in this regard has been the commitment of many farmers to rei
opposed to the alternative crops. The planners in Janaic

realistic but hopeful in this regard, noting that "While is it i

realistic to expect this plan to generate income capacitie

marijuana production, a sufficient level of income will be gene

devoid of the risk and negative social impact [that comes] 

production of the illegal crop. ''34 

One troubling area in several countries is rehabilitation. S

countries have several clinics and hospitals with rehabilit

programs. In the Bahamas, for example, rehabilitation is offer

the Sandilands Rehabilitation Center, at Doctors Hospital, 

elsewhere. In Trinidad and Tobago, it is undertaken at New 

Ministries, Mount St. Benedict, Caura, Rebirth House, 

elsewhere. But some countries, notably in the Eastern Caribb

have absolutely no rehabilitation capability. What is worse, 

are places without facilities where addiction is worsening, bec

of the fallout from increased trafficking. In Guyana, one of 

places, 35 and in other places that lack rehabilitation facil

'addicts are usually treated at public mental institutions and pr

medical clinics. 

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 

COUNTERMEASURES 

Caribbean counties participate in a variety of regional 

international networks. Some of them, like the Inter-American 

Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the Caribbean Fina

Action Task Force (CFATF), the OAS Money Laundering E

Group (OAS-MLEG), and the UNDCP, are devoted sole

combatting drugs. For some of them, such as the Associatio

Caribbean Conmlissioners of Police (ACCP) and the RSS, drug

part of a wider mandate. Like national effo~s, regional 

international initiatives are multidimensional, covering the 

areas dealt with nationally. But unlike the national level, reg

and international operations see less NGO and INGO involvem

and more from states and IGOs. 
the United States, the UNDCP, and CICAD, will become part o

existing criminal justice complex that includes the Police S

College and the Jamaica Police Academy. Initially to be read

tile elld of 1993, its opening has been delayed by incomplete n

assessment and delayed funding. However, it is expected to bec

operational in September 1996. 3° Recognizing the key rol

intelligence in all countemarcotics efforts, the ACCP agreed in 

1994 to pursue an allied initiative: the creation of a Regional D

Intelligence System. 37 

Many Caribbean countries, including Jamaica, Trinidad 

Tobago, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Guyana, alr

have United States-sponsored Joint Information Coordina

Centers (JICCs) that are linked electronically with the D

operational and anaiysis center in Texas called the E1 P

Intelligence Center (EPIC). However, several Caribbean offi

have stressed the importance of having a system within the re

to serve the region since most of the JICC intelligence data f

are unidirectional: from Caribbean JICCs to EPIC. 

Caribbean countries are also part of several internati

counternarcotics regimes. Among these are the 1961 United Nat

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; the 1971 Convention 

Psychotropic Substances; the 1972 Protocol amending the 

Convention; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffi

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Indeed, 

Caribbean country, the Bahamas, has the distinction of being 

first counlxy to ratify the 1988 Convention, on January 30, 1

The Convention includes provisions on drug trafficking, mo

laundering, organized crime, and related issues, such as a

trafficking. It requires states that are party to it (120 up to 

1996) to strengthen laws concerning financial reporting, extradi

assel forfeiture, and other subjects. It also urges adherent

improve cooperation in intelligence, interdiction, eradication, 

other areas. 

As of May 1996, all Caribbean countries except Belize 

Cuba had ratified the 1988 Convention, ratification of which is 
provisions, and all Caribbean countries are remiss, for var

reasons, including administrative lethargy, and technical, finan

and other resource limitations. Of course, there is variation am

countries of the extent of delinquency. 

About 90 percent of the regional and internati

countermeasures involve foreign support--by states, IGOs, 

INGOs, in various combinations. Because the regional 

international agencies involved recognize the importanc

coordinating their assistance, several of them formed a coordin

mechanism in 1990. Called the Bridgetown Group because 

centered in the Barbados capital, it includes representatives 

tile American, British, Canadian, Dutch, and French diplom

missions in Barbados (and in Trinidad and Tobago in the case o

Dulch and French missions), the OAS, m~d the UNDCP. The G

meets every 6 to 8 weeks to coordinate programs. The succe

the Bridgetown Group has led to tile creation of four other gro

the Georgetown Group (in Guyana); the Port of Spain Group 

Trinidad and Tobago); the Samo Domingo Group (in file Domin

Republic); and the Kingston Group (in Jamaica). 38 

Most Caribbean countries have signed Mutual Legal Assist

Treaties (MLATs) with the United States, among them Anti

Barbuda, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Repu

Grenada, Haiti, Suriname, St. Kitts-Nevis, m~d Trinidad 

Tobago. MLATS provide for training, joint interdiction, a

sharing, extradition, intelligence, and material and techn

support. Some countries, like the Bahamas and Jamaica, have 

had several complementary agreements with the United States

Some agreements provide for ship-rider arrangements, w

allow Caribbean military and police personnel to sail aboard 

Coast Guard ships to authorize the boarding of suspect vesse

Caribbean waters and arrest suspects and confiscate their dr

Among the most recent complementary arrangements were t

put in place between the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago. Signe

Prime Minister Basdeo Panday and Secretary of State Wa
September 1993 when Cuba granted permission lbr U.S. aircra

enter Cuban airspace in hot pursuit of suspected traffickers ab

a speedboat. Following the chase, Cuban maritime author

detained the vessel and two suspects. They delivered the narc

(720 pounds of cocaine) and the suspects to U.S. officials. 4° 

Other bilaleral narcotics treaties exist. Belize, for example

agreements with Mexico for intelligence exchange and Mex

assistance with demand reduction and rehabilitation, among o

things. Bilateral agreements "also exist between Suriname 

Colombia, Cuba and Guyana, Suriname and Guyana, Venezuela 

Guyana, Suriname and the Netherlands, Cuba and Jamaica, Trin

and Tobago and Venezuela, Jamaica and Mexico, Cuba 

Panama, and other sets of countries. These cover a range of j

and individual initiatives. In one unique case, Trinidad and To

and Venezuela signed a pact that provided for joint air patr

Unfortunately, it was never fully implemented. 

Intelligence and interdiction measures are among the 

costly of countermeasures, and they involve consider

technology, which Caribbean countries lack. This partly exp

the sustained and significant U.S. role. Once during the 1980s 

were ground-based air radar systems in Providenciales, Turks 

Caicos Islands (TCI); Guant',inamo Bay, Cuba; and Borinq

Puerto Rico; and five sea-based aerostat radars in the Baha

some with both sea and air detection features. An aerostat r

itself is an airborne surveillance system that consists of unman

tethered, helium-filled balloons that carry radar. Each aerostat 

about $10 million to install and near $4 million to operate annu

during the 1980s. 42 Radars were also used at Lovers Lea

Jamaican from August 1991 to December 1994 as part o

Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN)J s 

One intelligence and interdiction countermeasure of s

distinction, which uses some of this technology, is OPBA

started in 1982 as a U.S.-B',thamas operation dedicate

apprehending airborne smugglers in the Bahamas. U.S. equipm

primarily helicopters, and personnel are used to transport and a
pq

Nassau. 

Over the years supplementary operations were mounted

instance, in September 1986 Operation Bandit was initiated by 

Customs to improve apprehension response time. Use was ma

helicopters based in Florida, with Bahamanian police and mi

aboard to authorize arrests and seizures in the Bahamas. In Oc

1986, SEABAT (Sea Based Apprehension Tactics) was launch

provide ship-based launch platforms for helicopters with Baha

law enforcement personnel aboard. OPBAT has been credited 

securing hundreds of arrests and the seizure of thousands of to

cocaine and marijuana, as well as hashish and other drugs. In

it was considered so vital that a multilateral treaty, involvin

Bahamas, Britain (for TCI), and the United States was sign

July 12, 1990, extending the OPBAT basing network from 

bases to four, the fourth being at Great Inagua, the southern

island of tile Bahamas. "~ 

Also of importance is CBNR, mentioned earlier. A

operational peak, it drew signals from 17 radar sites in 10 coun

However, CBRN has been plagued with problems. Each site c

only 180 miles, and sites are often non-functional because o

weather or poor maintenance. CBRN is being replaced w

system that is more sophisticated. In June 1995 the Cayman Is

site was closed following earlier site closures in Honduras, 

Rica, and Panama. 

The system that will replace CBRN is ROTHR--Reloca

Over-the-Horizon Radar---originally designed to track S

bombers, and can scan many times further than conventional 

A prototype ROTHR wa,s established in Virginia in April 1993

a second system in Texas m~derwent final testing during Septe

1995. Puerto Rico is to be the site of the third ROTHR

Pentagon explained that the first two sites cm] scan 2,000 mil

a clear day, and 1,600 miles on a day with atmosp

disturbances. Thus, they can sweep most of the Caribbean, C

America, and northern Colombia and Venezuela. ~5 
Kent, consists of 32 antennas; the other is in Chesapeake. The 

is the receiver site, with 372 pairs of 19-foot tall aluminum 

arranged in two parallel rows stretching 1.5 miles. As mig

expected, ROTHR is even more expensive that CBRN: $12 m

each, with annual operating costs of between $12 million and 

million per facility. 46 

The way the United States pursues some of its unilatera

joint countermeasures has often been a problem for some Carib

countries. United States law enforcement officials are know

have pursued suspects into the territorial waters of Carib

countries, making arrests in those countries' jurisdict

sometimes without even courtesy notification of the arrests. T

has often been virtual coercion by U.S. agencies in the selecti

personnel for local drug enforcement operations, and in the d

and implementation of countermeasures. 

Caribbean leaders have often protested such "affronts to 

sovereign authority. The most public occasion was in July 

Writing on behalf of CARICOM, the then Chairman of CARIC

Antigua-Barbuda Prime Minister Vere Bird, Sr., wrote to Pres

Ronald Reagan protesting "attempts to extend domestic U

States authority into neighboring countries of the region wi

regard to the sovereignty and independent legal systems of 

countries. '~7 In essence, this is part of the dilemma of Carib

countries where drugs are concerned. Michael Morris puts it 

"The policy dilemma posed by the drug trade for small Carib

states is that individually [and even collectively] they c

control the drug trade, but that a US-controlled, anti-drug str

Ibr the region may impinge on national sovereignty. '~'~ 

There is considerable "'muddling through" in the design 

implementation of narcotics countermeasures in the region. Va

factors account for this: capability limitations, administr

lethargy, a "rock-and-hard-place" dilemma in which policy m

find themselves partly because drug operations have both neg

and positive aspects, and the fact that decisions about many nat

programs, not to mention the regional and international one
operato~ with the possibility that they might increase the scope 

their operations in the region. 4~ 

NOTES 

1. For a full explanation of this issue, see Ivelaw L, Griffith, "F

Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics," Internatio

Journal 49 (Winter 1993-94): 1-36. 

2, For more on these issues, see Duke Pollard, Tile Problem

Drug Abuse in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Georgetown: Caric

Secretariat, 1987); Anthony P. Maingot, "'Latmdering the Gains of 

Drug Trade: Mizuni and Caribbean Tax Havens," Journal oflnterameric

Studies and Worm Affairs 30 ((Summer-Fall 1988): 167-87; Ivelaw 

Griffith, "Drugs and Security in the Commonwe;dth Caribbean," Jour

of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 31 (July 1993): 70-1

Michael A. Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security (New York: St. Mart

Press, 1994), 132-65; Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Money Laututering Dilem

in the Caribbean, Working Paper No. 4, Institute of Caribbean Stud

University of Puerto Rico, September 1995; and Ivelaw L. Griffith 

Trevor Munroe, "Drugs ,and Democracy in the Caribbean," Journa

Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 33 (November 1995): 357

3. For a discussion of Latin American drug production in glo

context, see Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker, 111, eds., D

Trafficking in the Americas (Miami: North-South Center, University 

Miami, 1994); United Nations, Report of the International Narco

ControlBoardfor 1995, E/'INCB/1995/1, January 1996, 37-45; ,and U

Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Rep

[hereafter INCSR], 1996, 61-158. 

4. William Roy Surrett, The International Narcotics Trade: 

Overview of its Dimensions, Production Sources, and Organizations, C

Report for Congress 88-643, October 3, 1988, 1. 

5. INCSR, 1993, 16. 

6. Gen. McCaffrey, "Lessons of 1994: Prognosis for 1995 

Beyond," Presentation at the SOUTHCOM-NDU Annual Strat

Symposium, Miami, April 25, 1995. 

7. I am grateful to Brig. (Ret.) David Granger of the Guy

Defense Force for the Guyana-Brazil and the Guyana-Venezu

information and to Ricardo Mario Rodriguez, Minister Cotmselor at 
Lee, III and Scott B. MacDonald, "Drugs in the East," Foreign Polic

90 (Spring 1993): 89-107; axed INCSR, 1996, 315-432. 

9. INCSR, 1996, 166. 

10. The Jauuary 1995 seizure is reported in INCSR, 1995, p. 12

total 1995 figure comes from INCSR, 1996, 122. 

11. Interviews with Rear Adm. Peter Brady, Chief of Staff

Captain Desmond Edwards, Military Intelligence Officer, JDF 

Quarters, Up Park Camp, Jamaica, December 19, 1994. 

12. INCSR, 1996, 187. 

13. "British Ship Makes Cocaine Haul," New York Carib 

February 3, 1996, 4. 

14. INCSR, 1996, 209. 

15. Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final ltour (New York: S

,and Schuster, 1992), 4 I. 

16. "Cocaine Found on Coast Brings 29 to Court," Miami He

April 14, 1992, 13K. 

17. INCSR, 1995, 166. 

18. See Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement. and Fo

Policy: The Cartel, Haiti, and Central America. Committee on Fo

Relations Hearings, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 12, and 14, 1988

Alexandra Marks, "Haiti's Military May Dig in Heels to Keep Luc

Drug Trade," Christian Science Monitor November 1, 1993, 1, 14. 

19. Tim Weiner, "Colombian Drug Trafficker Implicates Haiti P

Chief," New York Times April 22, 1994, A7. 

20. INCSR, 1995, 176, and 1NCSR, 1996, 177. 

21. Interview with Winston Felix, Assistant Commissioner of P

(Crime), Eve Leafy Police Head Quarters, Georgetown, Guyana, Jun

1994. 

22. See Mohamed Khan, "Drugs Dropped by Mysterious Airc

Stabroek News (Guyana) June 8, 1993, 1, 11; and "23 Held in Air-dro

Cocaine Probe," Stabroek News June 9, 1993, 1, 11. 

23. See INCSR, 1994, 189; Alim Hassim, "Marijuana Con

valued at US2M," Stabroek News January 6, 1995, 1; and "Three Ch

for Trafficking," Stabroek News January 16, 1995, 1, 24. 

24. INCSR, 1996, 175. 
Headquarters, Bridgetown, July 19, 1994; Rear Adm. Peter Brady o

JDF; Supt. Reginald Ferguson, Head of Drug Enforcement Unit, Bah

Police Force, Nassau, December 22, 1994; and Alvin Goodwin, De

Commissioner of Police, Antigua-Barbuda, in Port of Spain, Trin

January 21, 1995. 

26. New York Times, "Cocaine Concealed in Candy Boxes," Ap

1996, A11. 

27. "I0 Years in Jail for Honduran," Stabroek News Novemb

1993, I. 

28. Interviews with Rear Adm. Brady ,and Captain Edw

December 1994. 

29. See "Drug Rehab Program Gets German Aid," Jamaica Iie

December 15, 1993. 

30. UNDCP, Subregional Program Framework for the Carib

1994-95. Bridgetown, Barbados, October 1994, 19. 

31. Ibid., 12. 

32. UNDCP, Assistance to the [Trinidad and Tobago] National D

Abuse Demand Reduction Program, AD/TRI/94/910,1994, 5-22. 

33. Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Agriculture, Alterna

Systems for an Illegal Crop, September, 1994, 1-11. 

34. Ibid., 2. 

35. See Ryan Naraine, "A Drug Rehab Clinic--When?" Stab

News September 6, 1993, 5; and Moh,'uned Khan, "Prison Boss Call

Drug Rehab Clinic," Stabroek News September 4, 1993, l, 13. 

36. Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Drugs and World Politics: The Carib

Dimension," The Round Table, no. 332 (1994): 428; and telep

conversation with Michel Amiot, UNDCP Caribbean Director, Septem

22, 1995. 

37. Interview with Commissioner Durant, July 1994; and A

Hassim, "Regional Crime Data Exch~u]ge System Agreed," Stabroek N

May 25, 1994, 12. 

38. Interview with Michel Amiot, Bridgetowu, Barbados. July 

1994. 

39. See lnternet Express, "T&T Signs AJlti-crime Treaty with U

March 9, 1996. 
y 

42. U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Anti-Drug E

in the Bahamas, GAO/GGD-90-42, March 1990, 17, 22. 

43. Interview with Rear Adm. Brady, December 1994. 

44. U.S. GAO, Drug Control: Anti-Drug Efforts in the Bahama

16; INCSR, 1991, 180-81; and INCSR, 1995, 160. The 1995 IN

reported erroneously that OPBAT has been terminated. 

45. New York Carib News, "Radar Station to Close," April 4, 

p. 10; and Tim Johnson, "Cold W,'u" Tools Turned oil Narcos," Jam

Weekly Gleaner September 14, 1995, 18A. 

46. Bradley Graham, "Drug Flights Cross Pentagon's Super 

Screen," Washington Post August 23, 1995, A I. 

47. Ron Szmders,"The Drug Problem: Policy Options for Cari

Countries," h~ Jorge I. Domfnguez et al., eds., Democracy in the Cari

(B:dtimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 22; and West I

Commission, Time For Action (Black Rock, Barbados, 1992), 348-

48. Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security, 141. 

49. Omitted from this discussion on countermeasures is the mat

money laundering countermeasures. For this, see Caribbean Fin

Action Task Force, Annual Report 1994-95 (Port of Spain, Trin

August 1995); and Griffith, The Money Laundering Dilemma 

Caribbean, 15-22. 
Despite the considerable regional and international action to co

drugs, collaboration in the Caribbean is not limited to drugs, 

brief examination of the Regional Security System (RSS) 

shows. However, before turning to the RSS, it is important to p

the logic behind security collaboration in the region. ~ 

WHY COLLABORATE? 

An underlying assumption of any meaningful regional sec

cooperation is that there are common regional threats, or at leas

perception of such threats by the relevant political and mil

elites of the countries concerned. In addition, as suggested i

discussion on countermeasures, countries also cooperate becau

capability limitations. Such limitations are pronounced in 

region, and they involve money, natural resource base, manpo

weapons, technology, and training. However, capability limita

are not uniform, and there are countries within the Caribbean 

sufficient individual capabilities to execute some security mis

efficiently by themselves. 

The assessment of common threats and the existenc

capability limitations should not mask the reality that ther

challenges to cooperation. Sometimes it does, however, provi

the basis for frustration when expectations and objectives ar

fulfilled. One such challenge is the capability challenge. 

challenge does not merely arise because of the actual constr

and limitations with regard to money, equipment, training, e

does so because inherent in the capability disparities of cooper

states is to need for those with fewer deficiencies to give relat

more to the collective effort. 

Achievh~g what amounts to capability progressiveness, ak

taxation progressiveness in a domestic context, is not always 

because sometimes 

61 
paradoxically, the venture itself may be jeopardized becau

capability dilemmas that are resolvable by the reluctan

recalcitrant partners 

• Domestic political considerations, such as changes in 

configuration of governmental power, public opinion, 

timing may make it difficult for the country with the 

deficiency to deliver on pledges made earlier. 

Beyond the capability challenge there is a soverei

challenge. The capability disparities themselves are a reflectio

power asymmetries within the area. But while, becanse of po

deficiencies and the nature and scope of some of the thr

involved, paying continued credence to the traditional notio

sovereignty is challengeable, sovereignty is both a prized integ

nationhood and part of schema for dealing with some of the thr

especially by the very small states. The larger states in 

parmership therefore need to be mindfi~l of sovereignty sensibil

in dealing with the group, and in relation to both the decis

making and execution sides of collaboration. 

Over and above this, there is need for acceptance of 

substance and symbolism; that while some states may not be 

to "pull their weight," inclusiveness in planning and execu

missions is still important. The symbolism of inclusiveness i

only invaluable for sustaining the partnership of state actors, 

also important for the psychological aspect of efforts to deal 

non-state "enemy" actors. Such actors, the drug operator

particular, must sense or perceive inclusiveness and parmershi

the states confronting them. 

One further challenge that is a perennial bugbear in some pl

pertains to bureaucratic politics. Whether we like it or not, t

will be jurisdictional turf battles and coordination difficu

involving army and coast guard/navy, army and police, a

intelligence units and police intelligence outfits, etc. Some of t

battles and difficulties can undermine security initiatives with

single country. Thus, the potential dangers involved when sev

countries and agencies are involved are even greater. All 
REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM 

As was noted earlier, it was the perception of common threat

recoguition of capability limitations that gave rise to the RSS

RSS was established in October 1982 through a Memorandu

Understanding (MOU) signed by five Eastern Caribbean coun

Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vi

and tile Grenadines. St. Kitts-Nevis joined the following Febr

and Grenada in January 1985. 

Concerns about militarization by Barbados and St. Vincen

the Grenadines stymied efforts in 1986 to upgrade the MOU 

security treaty and thereby give the RSS international 

personality, but those efforts were not altogether abandoned

MOU w~s revised in 1993, and a treaty was finally signed bet

the end of February and file beginning of March 1996, with M

5, 1996 being the treaty date. According to the operational he

the RSS, all member-countries were expected to ratify the trea

June 1996. -~ Under the treaty the RSS is required to pr

contingency plans for and assist member-countries in na

emergencies. In operational terms, this mandate includes 

interdiction, search and rescue, customs and immigration co

protection of off-shore installations, and natural and other dis

and threats to national security. 

As figure 4 shows, the slructure of the RSS involves a Co

of Ministers, which comprises national security ministers, 

central policy-making body. Operational command falls un

Regional Security Coordinator (RSC) who heads a Central Li

Office (CLO), which is located in Barbados. Barbados also pro

the RSC, currently Brigadier Rudyard Lewis, who is substan

Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defense Force. 0_~wis i

founding RSC.) The CLO plans and coordinates in conjunction 

a Joint Coordinating Committee comprising army commander

police commissioners. (See the appendix for a list of militar

police heads for the entire Caribbean.) Figure 4 identifie
O0 

~.~~,, 

~0 ~* O0 

oo~ .~t ~ii ~0 

0 

~ ~o ~'- .~ "~ 

o 

~a5 

=o ~.. 

o 

~uON 

:~ :r: ! 
police. 

The RSS gained notoriety in 1983 for its role in the 

intervention in Grenada, namely mopping up and postinv

policing, roles that were more politically expedient, give

controversy over the intervention, than militarily neces

However, the RSS had become involved in the Grenada crisis 

before the intervention, by conducting intelligence mission

designing plans to rescue Maurice Bishop, all of which be

subordinated to U.S plans once the decision to intervene was 

in Washington. Apart from its roles in Grenada and conti

interdiction and other measures, the RSS deployed forc

Trinidad mid Tobago following the coup attempt there in 

August 1990, to support the local military and police forces. T

and police were also deployed in St. Kitts-Nevis during Nov

1994 following a mass prison riot that was part of a larger 

driven crisis. 

RSS forces have been deployed annually since 1985 in m

training exercises, in conjunction with forces from other Cari

countries, the United States, and, at varying times, from B

France, and the Netherlands. Tile first exercise, Operation E

Palm, was held in September 1985 and focuse

counterinsurgency. The 1995 maneuvers, Tradewinds '95, 

held between March and May, and dealt with amphibious mis

mainly coast guard search and rescue, oil pollution manage

and port management. The 1995 exercises involved all Angio

Caribbean countries, reflecting the growing participation that 

significantly in 1989. In addition to Caribbean and U.S. f

French troops also participated, mainly in the St. Kitts-Nev

and on a bilateral basis with St. Kitts-Nevis. 

To acommodate the May 7-8 Barbados meeting of Cari

military officials, along with U.S. military officials responsib

the region, Tradewinds '96 was held betweeen March 4 and 

28, 1996. As with previous maneuvers, Tradewinds '96 inv

not only RSS military and police forces, but also troops fro

United States, the Bahamas, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago
Because of capability limitations of member-states, the RSS 

had to rely on foreign material and political supporl. The orig

foreign benefactors were the United States, Britain, and Can

operating on a bilateral basis with member-countries. But given 

geopolitical changes, budget pressures, and other factors identi

earlier, the level of support has diminished over the years. At 

same time, RSS-member states themselves have been experienc

economic difficulties, preventing them from fulfilling t

financial obligations to the System, thereby aggravating 

dependency problem. The combined effect of this reduced fore

support and the delinquency of member-states can only serv

compromise the operational readiness of the System, 

consequently, its ability to rise to the challenge of helping to c

with threats and apprehensions in the region. 5 

NOTES 

1. The cooperation challenges raised here are drawn from lvelaw 

Griffith, "Regional Security in the Caribbean: The Cooperation Logic 

Some Challenges." Paper delivered oll the Symposium on Coopera

Security in the Caribbe,'m, co-sponsored by IJSACOM, the Nati

Defense University, and the North-South Center, University of Miami, 

held in Miami, April 18-19, 1995. 

2. Telephone conversation with Brig. Rudyard Lewis on Marc

1996. 

3. This is clear from what is so far the best account of the affai

terms of the domestic political and geopolitical circumstances 

precipitated the hztervention, the intervention as planned and executed, 

its ,aftermath: Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Gren

(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989). 

4. These and other details of the 1995 and 1996 exercises w

provided in telephone conversations with Brig. Lewis and Lt. Col. Tr

Thomas of the Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force, both on Jtme 24, 1

with Brig. lewis on March 8, 1996, and with Lt. Col. Thomas on Marc

1996. 

5. For more on the RSS, see RSS Staff, "The Roles of the Regi

Security System in the East Caribbean," Bulletin of Eastern Caribb

Affairs 11 (January-February 1986): 5-7: ,and Ivelaw L. Griffith, "The R

The collaboration challenges, some which are manifested 

Regional Security System (RSS), are, however, only part 

landscape of complexity and challenge. A critical part of it 

to the need to strengthen democracy. 

The most popular approach to democracy used by Cari

social scientists is the Schumpeterian approach, which 

contention and participation as the central features of demo

As far as Carl Stone was concerned, for example, "democra

be defined as a process which seeks to distribute power from c

of power concentration to the majority of citizens in a po

system. ''~ For Evelyne Huber, "Democracy is defined by fr

fair elections, at regular intervals, in the context of guarantee

and political rights, responsible government (i.e., accountabi

the executive to elected representatives) and political inclusio

universal suffrage and nonproscription of parties). ''2 

specialists view democracy as "A system of government in 

there is meaningful and extensive political competitio

positions of government power, at regular intervals, a

individuals and organized groups, especially political partie

Elections are a critical legitimizing mechanism for democ

and thus there is need for them, and for them to be free an

Nevertheless, as Douglas Payne of Freedom House co

observed, "To assume that elections alone are an accurate ga

the health of democracies is naive at best." Thus, fo

notwithstanding the importance of free and fair election

critical democracy challenges in the Caribbean involve fu

meaningful participation by citizens in policy making, acc

decisiomnakers and in~itutions of government, and responsiv

by political rulers. 

Central to the maintenance of democracy and the resp

human rights is the climate and character of the po

environment. An environment where political elites act as t

69 
p, g

civil and political fights of opponents of the regime specifically 

of members of the body politic generally. Hence, transparency 

accountability in political rule are critical, not only for electi

but for decisionmaking generally. 

Political stability is not a guarantee of democracy and 

protection of human rights. But there are strong links betw

stability and democracy, and between stability and human rig

Stability itself is a function of at least four factors: polit

legitimacy, political authority, political equality, and polit

participation. Legitimacy requires that the governing elites 

representative and be based on a popular mandate. Authority rel

to a reciprocal relationship between government and people wh

the political elites exercise power and tile citizens consent to its 

Equality implies the possession of rights by citizens to partici

actively in tile political process without regard to distinctions s

as race, ideology, gender, social geography, and social cl

Participation, the fourth factor, inw~lves the ability of citizen

influence the nature and operation of political rule thro

institutions such as political parties, unions, the courts, and 

media. It is the absence of some or "all of these that creates polit

instability. ~ 

The experiences of Suriname and Haiti show that w

electoral democracy and stability are necessary, they are 

sufficient. One writer makes the important point that "ending c

conflict, holding relatively free elections, and installing ele

civilian regimes [are] not, in and of themselves, sufficient to cr

democratic systems. ''6 This brings us to the issue of institutions, 

of which is the judiciary. The critical role of this institutio

democracy generally and to human rights specifically needs 

belaboring. 

The term "justice delayed is justice denied" comes to life in 

Caribbean due to case backlogs, absence of sufficient judi

personnel, and inadequate facilities, among other things. 

observation about Jamaica has regionwide relevance: "Excessiv
j, y p

nature and operation of police forces and prisons and other cr

justice agencies affect not only the work of the courts, b

quality of justice generally. Beyond the judiciary and these cr

justice institutions, the media, educational institutions, po

parties, and labor unions are important pillars of func

democracy, and they all need to be strengthened in the Carib

Given the resource and institutional limitations of the r

external support is also necessary to strengthen Cari

democracy, to help repair and sustain the institutions men

above, among other things. However, as noted earlier, s

donors are reevaluating their foreign aid policies, with the 

that aid is being reduced. Donor fatigue is also a contributor

situation certainly does not help the sustenance of demo

However, although international-level action is crucial, it is 

substitute for domestic-level action. For as Richard Millett 

correctly: "Prime responsibility for the success of any demo

system rests with national elected authorities .... Interna

assistance for strengthening democratic institutions needs 

enhanced, but political will can never be imported. ''s 

NOTES 

1. Carl Stone, "Democracy and Socialism in Jamaica: 1972

in Paget Henry and Carl Stone, eds., The Newer Caribbean (Philad

Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983), 235. 

2. See her"The Future of Democracy in the Caribbean," in J

Domfnguez et al., eds., Denvocracy in the Caribbean (Baltimore

Hopkins University Press, 1993), 74. 

3. Carlene J. Edie, "Introduction," in Carlene J. Edi

Democracy in the Caribbean (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 2. 

4. Douglas W. Payne, "'Ballots, Neo-strongmen, Narco

Impunity," Freedom Review 26 (January-February 1995): 27. 

5. For more on these connections, see Samuel Huntington, P

Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 

and Charles Andrain, Political Change in the Third World (Boston: 

and Hyman, 1988). 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 68. 

8. Millett, "Beyond Sovereignty," 20. 
In comparison with regions such as the Balkans, the Middle 

and Central Africa, the Caribbean is a peaceful region, b

analysis of tile dynamics of the region's complexity, change

challenges suggests that the security landscape is fraught 

variety of dangers. Some are not so much specific threats as th

apprehensions, and some of these are clear and present, while 

are not. Moreover, these threats and apprehensions do not 

uniform impact on the countries in the region, but their cha

and scope, the size and capability limitations of the countrie

the vulnerability of Caribbean countries to state and nonstate 

make the entire region subject to the impact of these flu'ea

apprehensions. 

The supreme challenge facing Caribbean states as they g

with the problems that characterize the region's security land

on the eve of the 21st century is, of course, survival

vulnerabilities to which these small states are subject, a

threats and apprehensions facing them make real the quest

whether some of them can survive in the 21st century as po

and economic entities with more than just a mere modic

sovereignty, which itself is undergoing change becau

turbulence and change within and outside the security are

thinking of this matter I am reminded of a statement made 

1984 by Shridat Ramphal, then the Secretary General 

Commonwealth of Nations, which still so aptly captur

dilemma of Caribbean and other small states: "Sometimes it 

as if small states were like small boats pushed out into a tur

sea, free in one sense to traverse it; but, without oars or prov

without compass or sails, free also to perish. Or perhaps, 

rescued and taken aboard a larger vessel. ''2 

Some people look to various integration mechanis

potential "larger vessels." The Association of Caribbean 

(ACS), which was formed in July 1994, is the latest 

73 
Robert Pastor notes in an article on United States-Caribb

relations in the May 1994 issue of The Annals of the Ameri

Academy of Political and Social Science, "The United States is b

a solution and a problem." 

How scholars and statesmen assess the Caribbean's supr

challenge and its threats and apprehensions near the end of 

century will influence what actions they propose and implemen

"address them in the new century. For as the late Kenneth Bould

presciently observed more than a quarter-century ago, "Peo

whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations 

not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation, whatever 

may mean, but to their 'image' of the situation. It is what we th

the world is like, and not what it is really like, that determines 

behavior. ''4 One can only hope that the "image" of the Caribb

presented here is useful to those who have to design and implem

policies relating to its security. 

NOTES 

1. James Rosenau provides an assessment of global turbulence in 

Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Pr

1990), and of Caribbean turbulence in "Hurricanes are not the O

Intruders: The Caribbean in an Era of Global Turbulence," Paper prese

at the Conference on International Secttrity in the Greater Caribbe,'m, 

at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, October 20, 1

2. Ramphal was then delivering the opening address at the 

meeting of the Commonwealth experts on small state security. 

Commonwealth Study Group, Vulnerabili~: Small States in the Gl

Society (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985), 119. 

3. For a cogent assessment of the ACS and some of its challen

see Henry S. Gill, The Association of Caribbean States: Prospects fo

"Quantum Leap," North South Agenda Papers No. 11, Janu,'u'y 1995

4. Kemleth Boulding, "National Images and International System

in James N. Rosenau, ed., huernational Politics and Foreign Policy (N

York: The Free Press, 1969), 423. 
il0 o 

£ 

@ 

o 

fl3'~ 

enU

~ Z 

N"~ 0 

,~ r'-i z 

~zla. 

IIIU- 

113 en 

~ 

¢n 

e 

(ll 

n 

ha ha 

z z 

0 0 

Z Z 

o g 

b 

Z 

o ~ 

e-~ 

E 

e-- 

75 
E 

nr,~ 

o 

~ 

N 

Ii 

.'g_ 

o 

O 

rr 

UJ 

"o 

O 

E 

Z 

O 

Z 

~u 

r.- O 

.-)rr 

~u ~J 

Z Z 

O O 

z z 

.~ 

n 

,h 

° 

J~ 

J~ 

O 

n 

,h 

Z 

O 

Z 

~u 

o 

f- 

~) 

¢- 

~o 

"O 

"o 

O 

trr 

0_ 

Z 

O 

Z 

~u 

O 

CL 

O 

t- 

~o 

n 

n 

C 

Z 

O 

Z 

~u 

tO 

J~ 

O 

.to 

r~ 

o 

rr 

..o 

¢1 

o 

c 

a c~ u_ 

o_ 

fl) 

o 

a) 

76 
Z Z Z Z Z Z 

0 0 0 0 0 0 

Z Z Z Z Z Z 

GI 

Z 

~C3 

v 

• ~ ~ ~ ~" 

o ~.~ --- ,-. 

I-: ,< n- C~ c ~ :_-, ac m ~ 0 

eo ~ ~'~ 

Z c: c= 

09 

I-* 

E 

o 

J~ 

0 

l-- 

c 

I-- 

77 
Z 

o 

Z 

~u 

Z 

o 

Z 

~u 

O 

r./] 

CI ._i 

-r o2 

c 

O 

o 

,-~ N ~ ._m 

0 ~ .,..~ 0 q) c 

~z~ 2: E.~ m.o"~ 

,-" = > ,'r -- ~" :" ~ 

00Z 0 ~ 0 0 o 

~= ~,-- ~ ~> ~ c c'~ 

o.o.~ ~,-r >, 8."¢ 

"6 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~.~- ~ ~ 

.---_~ ~ ~ 

~ r- ~-._ ~ ~7- ~.--~ 

.-=.s:: ~- "6 ~ N .... "~ a; ~N 

~oo 

78 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

ACCP 

ACS 

AFTA 

ASEAN 

BWIA 

CARIBCAN 

CARICOM 

CBI 

CBRN 

CFATF 

CIA 

CICAD 

CLO 

DEA 

DOM 

EPIC 

GAC 

GDF 

HIDTA 

IADB 

ICJ 

IMET 

IMP 

INGO 

JDF 

JICC 

MLAT 

MOU 

NACD 

NaCoDAP 

Association of Caribbean Commissioners of 

Police 

Association of Caribbean States 

ASEAN Free Trade Association 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

British West Indian Airways 

CaribbeanCanada Trade Agreement 

Caribbean Community and Common Market 

Caribbean Basin Initiative 

Caribbean Basin Radar Network 

Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Comisi6n Interamericana para el Control del Abu

Drogas (lnterAmerican Drug Abuse Control 

Commission) 

entral Liaison Office 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

D6partment d'Outre Mer 

E1 Paso Intelligence Center 

Guyana Airways Corporation 

Guyana Defense Force 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 

Inter American Development Bank 

International Court of Justice 

International Military Education and Training 

Program 

International Monetary Fund 

International NonGovernmental Organization 

Jamaica Defense Force 

Joint Information Coordinating Center 

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 

Memorandum of Underst,'mding 

National Advisory Council on Drugs (Guyana) 

National Council for Drug Abuse Prevention 

79 
OASMLEG 

OECS 

OPBAT 

PROPUID 

ROTHR 

RSC 

RSS 

SEABAT 

SLOC 

SOUTHCOM 

SSU 

TCI 

UCP 

UNDCP 

USACOM 

USAID 

USIA 

WTO 

OAS Money Laundering Experts Group 

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 

Operation Bal~amas and Turks and Caicos 

Programa Para la Prevenci6n de Uso Ind6bido de 

Drogas (Program for the Prevention of the Illeg,'d 

of Drugs) 

Relocatable OvertheHorizon Radar 

Regional Security Coordinator 

Regional Security System 

Sea Based Apprehension Tactics 

Sea L,'me of Communication 

U.S. Southern Command 

Special Service Unit 

Turks and Caicos Islands 

Unified Command Plan 

United Nations International Drug Control Program 

U.S. Atlantic Command 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

U.S. Information Agency 

World Trade Organization 

80 
Inter-American security, he is editor of Strategy and Security 

Caribbean (Praeger, 1991), author of The Quest for Security 

Caribbean (M. E. Sharpe, 1993, 1994), and coeditor of Demo

and Human Rights in the Caribbean (forlhcoming from Wes

Press). 

His work has also has been published in several sch

journals, including Caribbean Affairs, Conflict Quar

International Journal, Journal of Commonwealth and Compar

Politics, Journal of lntemmerican Studies and World Affairs, 

American Research Review, and The Round Table. Prof

Griffith is Book Review Editor of Hemisphere and is cur

writing Sovereignty Under Siege, a book about the se

implications of drugs, funded by the MacArthur Foundation an

North-South Center, University of Miami. 

81 
Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normand

July 1944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers

information on availability of specific titles, contact the Distrib

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort Mc

Washington, DC 20319-5066 (telephone: commercial 202/685-

DSN 325-43 79). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 

2. Jolm E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitu

Monarch? October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes hzdustries Strategic, Nove

1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Fo

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomac

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of 

Insurgencies : Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry': 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nation

Nationless States. September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, lran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 199

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Be

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Wa

March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S and NATO Force Structure and M

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. ()scar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the 

War, February 1993. 
Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey S

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McC

European Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Econ

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Vis

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way, Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing S

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Stru

February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on A

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabi

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment 

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-J

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1994

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Be

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's R

Politics, January 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-At

Security in Transition, January 1995. 

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese 

Transfers, February 1995. 

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, lnteragency Cooper

A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, March 1995. 
Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995. 

42. Jolul Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, July 1995. 

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of F

Security Policy, August 1995. 

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training

Assessment, October 1995. 

45. Elli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in A

Israeli Wars? October 1995. 

46. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Def

December 1995. 

47. M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim Central 

January 1996. 

48. Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Mii

January 1996. 

49. Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyfiakopoulos, Trouble in Par

Europe in the 21st Century, March 1996. 

50. Alan L. Gropman, Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War 1I: 

and Reality, August 1996. 

51. Ralph A. Cossa, The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Sec

September 1996. 

52. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, Oc

1996. 

53. Donna Lee Van Cott, Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and 

American Security, October 1996. 
National Strategic Studies 

is pleased to announce 

a new program of 

electronic publication! 

Strategic Forums 

McNair Papers 

Strategic Assessment 

Selected Books 

NDU Press Book Catalogue 

Electronic publications can 

be found on the World Wide Web 

at the award-winning NDU Home Pa

http://www,ndu.edu 

For direct access to 

publications only, use 

http://www, ndu.ed u / cgi-bi n/wai
INSITvuTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY