COMMAND DECISIONS 

Ediled With Introductory Essay By 

Kenl Roberts Greenfield 

The ;) IIthors 

Ma rtin Blumcnson 

Robert W. Coakley 

Slelson Conn 

Byron Fairchild 

Richard M. Leighton 

Cha rles V. P. von Lutlicha u 

Cha rles B. MacDonald 

Sidney T. Ma lhews 

Earl F. Ziemke 

Maurice Ma tloff 

Ralph S. Mavrogordato 

Leo J. Meyer 

John Miller, jr. 

Lou is MOrlon 

Forresl C. Pogue 

Roland G. Ruppenthal 

Robert Ross Smilh 

CENTER OF M ILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STilTES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D. c. 1987 
Li brary o r Congress Ca talog Card Num ber: 59- 60007 

The material in Decisions I. 2. 4-7. 9- 14 . and 16- 23 appeared in 

the Il arcourt . Brace editio n or COII/II/alld DmJIOIIJ. © 1959 by 

Harcourt . Brace and Company. Inc. 

Fir'i l I'tilllt'd 19IiO-Ci\ IIJ Puh 70-7 

I>'or sate by the Suprnnl.endenl or lJoc:umentll, U.S. Government Prmtmg Office 

Wll8hmgton. OC 2Q40:.!. 
Foreword 

The Center of Military History takes pleasure in offering Command Decisions in a new paperback format. The text remains unchanged from previous printings. This widely acclaimed study 

analyzes a series of key decisions by heads of state and military 

commanders during World War II. As an adjunct to the U.S. Army 

in World War II series, the volume consists of twenty-three fully 

researched and separate essays that present a stimulating range of 

interpretive viewpoints. The authors include some of the most 

respected names in the field of military history. 

Command Decisions has proved extremely useful to both the 

military and academic communities. This softback edition should 

continue to appeal to readers int~rested in military history and 

specifically in the processes of critical decision-making at the highest 

levels. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 November 1983 

DOUGLAS KINNARD 

Brigadier General, USA (Ret.) 

Chief of Military History 

The U.S. Army Center of Military History 

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories 

as required by the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including historical properties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also maintains liaison with public and private agencies 

and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field of military 

history. The Center is located at 20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., 

Washington, D.C. 20314. 

III 

Preface 

Decision has always exerted a powerful attraction for the student 

of military affairs. In the study of decisions in war, whether on the 

field of battle or in the councils of state, lie the great lessons of the 

conflicts that have shaped the course of history. These lessons the 

professional soldier seeks in order to fit himself for the ultimate 

responsibilities of command; the student of human affairs seeks them 

to explain past events. 

The historians writing the history of the United States Army in 

World War II have had a unique opportunity to study the decisions 

of that conflict. The response of the Army's schools and colleges, as 

well as the public, to this aspect of their work emphasized for them 

the interest of soldier and scholar alike in decision-making in war at 

various levels of government and command. As research progressed 

and material with which to illustrate this theme accumulated, it 

appeared that a book on the subject based on the work already accomplished would be of interest to a variety of readers: This volume 

is an outgrowth of that idea. 

It is not designed to be a systematic or comprehensive treatise on 

decision-making. Nor could it be. Because of the limitation of time 

selection had to be based more on readily available material than on 

such criteria as balance between levels of command, areas of operation, or the relative importance of the decison. Chosen therefore 

almost entirely from work already done, anp arranged in chronological order, these studies are complete in themselves. Each can be 

read independently of the others. Only in the Introductory Essay has 

an effort been made to relate the decisions to each other and to the 

general problems of decision-making. 

All of the studies included in this volume deal with World War 

II. This restriction was agreed upon, not in order to make this a 

book about World War II, but because that is the field of study in 

which research and thought of the Army's historians is at present 

furthest advanced in depth and maturity. In publishing this volume 

the Office of the Chief of Military History has, in short, declared an 

extra dividend on its series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II. At a later date, when work on the postwar series now in 

v 
progress has advanced far enough, it may be possible to do the same 

for the UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE CONFLICT WITH 

THE COMMUNIST POWERS. 

Only one of these studies, the first, has been written specifically 

for this collection. The others have been derived from lectures, 

articles, and chapters of books in print or still on their way to publication. All have been recast to meet the requirements of the present 

volume. And in every case, they are studied reflections on events to 

which for a number of years the authors have been devoting their 

research and writing. 

The form of the present volume and the final selection of the 

studies to be included in it are the responsibility of a Panel composed 

of Col. Seneca Foote, Charles B. MacDonald, Maurice Matloff, Leo 

J. Meyer, Louis Morton, and Lt. Col. Ernest E. Steck, under the 

chairmanship of the Chief Historian, K. R. Greenfield. The task of 

assembling the studies originally was performed by Lt. Col. Clifton P. 

Semmens. Cotonel Steck has looked after the cartographic illustrations. Preparation of the chronology, inserted as an aid to recollection, was supervised by Colonel Foote. Miss Ruth Stout did the final 

editing and, with the assistance of Mrs. Loretto Stevens, prepared the 

volume for the printer. Virginia C. Leighton compiled the index. To 

all these the authors wish to acknowledge their appreciation; responsibility for the contents is theirs alone. 

Washington, D.C. 

10 October 1958 

VI 

THE PANEL 
Contents 

Number Page 

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY by Kent Roberts Greenfield ........ . 

1. GERMANY FIRST: THE BASIC CONCEPT OF ALLIED 

STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II by Louis Morton. . 11 

The Color Plans, 1919-1938. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

Strategic Adjustment, 1938-1940. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 

The Critical Summer if 1940. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 

Shift to the Atlantic, September 1940-January 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 

The Decision Is Made. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

2. THE GERMAN DECISION TO INVADE NORWAY 

AND DENMARK by Earl F. Ziemke. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 

German Interest in Norway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 

The First Planning Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 

The Final Planning Phase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 

The Decision in Retrospect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 

3. DECISION TO LAND UNITED STATES FORCES IN 

ICELAND, 1941 by Byron Fairchild. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

The Shifting Focus of American Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 

The President's Decision and the War Department's Response. . . . . . 80 

Problems, Remote and Immediate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 

INDIGO Planning, First Phase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 

A New Decision: Reinforcement, Not Relief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 

A Final Glance at the INDIGO Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 

4. JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR by Louis Morton........ 99 

The Journey Begins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 

The Road to War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 

The Fatal Turn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 

The End if the Road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 

5. THE DECISION TO EVACUATE THE JAPANESE 

FROM THE PACIFIC COAST by Stetson Conn...... 125 

6. THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN by 

Louis Morton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 

War Plan ORANGE . .. " .... ' . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 152 

MacArthur's Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 

"WPO-3 Is in Effect". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 

Effects?! the Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 

VII 
~~n ~~ 

7. THE DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 

by Leo J. Meyer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 

Plans for Cross-Channel Operations Get the Green Light. . . . . . . . . . 176 

The President Breaks the Deadlock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 

The Issue of Inside Versus Outside Landings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 

The Transatlantic Essay Contest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 

8. U.S. MERCHANT SHIPPING AND THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS by Richard M. Leighton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 

Anglo-American Shipping Collaboration in 1942. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 

Casablanca and the Six-Million- Ton Misunderstanding. . . . . . . . . . . 206 

The Shipping Crisis of March 1943. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 

The President Disposes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 

9. THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AS A ROUTE FOR AID TO 

THE USSR by Robert W. Coakley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 

The Soviet Protocols and the Routes of Delivery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 

Early Failure To Develop the Persian Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 

The Northern Route and the Second Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 

The Problem in Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 

The July Crisis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 

The Decision on American Responsibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 

The Military Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 

The CCS Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 

The Results of the Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 

10. OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN AT 

THE CAIRO-TEHRAN CONFERENCES by Richard 

M. Leighton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 

Tools of Amphibious War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 

Alarums and Excursions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 

First Cairo: The Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 

Tehran: Enter ANVIL, Compromise on OVERLORD. . . . . . . . . . . 271 

Second Cairo: Scratch BUCCANEER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 

11. MACARTHUR AND THE ADMIRALTIES by John 

Miller, jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 

The Background: Rabaul and the Central Pacific. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 

Decision To Expand Into. the Bismarck Archipelago. . . . . . . . . . . . 291 

Japanese Decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 

Decision To Send a Reconnaissance Force to the Admiralties. . . . . . . 295 

The Decision To Remain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 

12. HITLER'S DECISION ON THE DEFENSE OF ITALY 

by Ralph S. Mavrogordato. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 

13. GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO by Martin Blumenson. . . . 323 

Vlll 
Number Page 

14. GENERAL CLARK'S DECISION TO DRIVE ON ROME 

by Sidney T. Mathews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 

15. THE 90-DIVISION GAMBLE by Maurice Matloft'. . . . . . . . 365 

16. THE ANVIL DECISION: CROSSROADS OF STRATEGY 

by Maurice Matloft'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 

17. GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENTAN 

(13 AUGUST 1944) by Martin Blumenson. . . . . . . . . . . . 401 

18. LOGISTICS AND THE BROAD-FRONT STRATEGY by 

Roland G. Ruppenthal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419 

19. THE DECISION TO LAUNCH OPERATION MARKETGARDEN by Charles B. MacDonald. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429 

20. THE GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES by Charles V. P. von Luttichau. . . . . . . . . . . . 443 

The Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444 

Strategic and Tactical Considerations Influencing the Decision. . . . . . 448 

The Consequences if the Ardennes Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 

21. LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA by Robert Ross Smith. . . . . 461 

The Strategic Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461 

The Debate Over Luzon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466 

22. THE DECISION TO HALT AT THE ELBE by Forrest C. 

Pogue .................. , ................... , ... .. 479 

The Situation in the Spring of 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 

Berlin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482 

A Line if Demarcation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488 

Prague. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489 

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492 

23. THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB by 

Louis Morton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493 

The Interim Committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494 

Military Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 

The Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506 

The Japanese Surrender. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514 

CHRONOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519 

CODE NAMES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529 

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533 

INDEX............................ ............ ............ 535 

IX 
Maps 

Number Page 

1. The Landings in Norway, 9 April 1940. . . . ... .. . ... .... .. 51 

2. The Occupation of Denmark, 9-10 April 1940.. .. .. .... ... 65 

3. Japanese Plan and Disposition of the Armies, November 1941 107 

4. Luzon. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 

5. Corregidor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 

6. Persian Corridor Supply Routes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 

7. The Mediterranean, 1943. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 

8. Allied Advance Toward the Bismarck Sea, as of 29 February.. 292 

9. The Arnhem Operation, 17-26 September 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . 431 

10. Battle of the Ardennes, 16-26 December 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 

Maps I-IX Are In Inverse Order Inside Back Cover 

I. Lines of Communication in French North Africa 

II. American Transoceanic Supply, 1942-1943 

III. Allied Strategy in Italy, January 1944 

IV. The Anzio Beachhead, 31 January 1944 

V. Allied Situation in Italy, May 1944 

VI. Breakout and Advance to the Seine, 25 July-25 August 1944 

VII. Pursuit to the German Border, 26 August-15 September 1944 

VIII. Pacific Ocean Areas, 1 August 1942 

IX. Drive to the Elbe, 4 April-7 May 1945 
Introductory Essay 

by 

Kent Roberts Greenfield 

"Command Decision" is a term that, although now much in 

vogue, eludes precise definition. What it immediately suggests is a 

military commander, faced with a difficult choice or choices, taking the 

responsibility for a serious risk on the basis of his estimate of the 

situation. 

It implies the presence of certain elements as basic ingredients of 

the act of decision: a desired objective or an assigned mission, a calculation of risk, exercise of authority, assumption of personal responsibility, and a decisive influence on the course of events. While all 

but one of the decisions in this volume were decisions regarding the 

use of military means, not all were made by military commanders. 

Again, in some of the most important neither the exercise of authority nor the assumption of responsibility was personal. But the other 

ingredients mentioned are present in every case, and all are illustrated 

in a variety of combinations. 

Twelve were decisions of chiefs of state. Of these, two (1 and 4) 

were decisions of a national government, in the first case the government of the United States, in the second that of Japan. Six others 

(3, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 23) were decisions of the President of the United 

States acting as commander in chief of its armed forces; three (2, 12, 

and 20) were decisions of the Nazi dictator. One (10) was a decision 

of the Allied chiefs of state. Two (16 and 21) were decisions of the 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; one (15) a decision of General George C. 

Marshall as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. The remainder were 

decisions by commanders in the field: five (6, 11, 18, 19, and 22) by 

Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower in their 

capacity of theater commanders; one (17) by an army group comKENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD, Chief Historian, OCMH. Ph.D., The 

Johns Hopkins University. Taught: University of Delaware; Yale University; Chairman, Department of History, Johns Hopkins. Chief, Historical 

Section, Army Ground Forces, World War II. Legion of Merit. Colonel 

(Ret., USAR). Author: Economics and Liberalism in the Risorgimento (Baltimore, 1934); The Historian and the Army (New Brunswick, 1954). Coauthor: 

Organization rif Ground Combat Troops (Washington, 1947), in UNITED 

ST ATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
2 COMMAND DECISIONS 

mander, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley; one (14) by an army commander, 

Lt. Gen. Mark Clark; one (13) by a corps commander, Maj. Gen. 

John P. Lucas. 

The selection of decisions to be included in this book was based 

on availability of material rather than a theoretical design, and it is 

not large enough to have the value of a random sampling. Yet the 

number of cases in which the decision was the outcome of a collective process does point up a tendency that has been generally observed, namely, the increasing role of staff work and committees in 

military decision-making. The higher the level of decision in the 

cases here included the more clearly this tendency shows itself. Lincoln 

sent troops into the Shenandoah Valley against Stonewall Jackson 

while the main body of the Union Army was committed in the peninsula, without consulting anyone but Stanton. President Roosevelt 

could do no such thing in World War II. At the highest level of 

strategy in World War II the final decisions on the Allied side were 

collective decisions. Furthermore, the Joint and Combined Chiefs of 

Staff in World War II were governed by the rule of unanimity. 

Their decisions are therefore to be studied as compromises among 

representatives of powerful and often stubborn interests, advancing 

arguments and proposals rooted as much in these as in an objective 

view of the situation. 

The studies in the present collection, extracted from the work 

of authors writing the history of World War II, represent the historical approach to the subject of decision in war, and derive their 

value from that fact. 

Other and more direct approaches to the subject are being made. 

Scientific analysis is being applied to staff operations in this as in 

other fields where prompter and more effective co-ordination and 

management of human and mechanical energies seem necessary to 

the attainment of economic and social objectives. One conspicuous 

manifestation of this trend is operations research, of which so much 

is now expected. It "was born from the need for the scientific preparation of decisions" -a need intensified by the increasing scope and 

tempo of military operations. An industrial engineer, Charles Kittel 

of Bell Telephone Laboratories, has hopefully characterized operations 

research as "a scientific method of providing responsible leaders with 

mathematically established bases for their decisions." 1 

No matter what scientific, technological, and organizational ad·· 

vances are made, the use of military power still has to be put in motion 

1 Both quotations are from "Operations Research," translated and digested from an 

article by Maj. j. Barbier, in Revue de difense national (October, 1957). Militar~ Review, 

Vol. XXXVIII, No.5 (August, 1958), 75-80. 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 3 

by fallible human beings. Recognizing this fact as inescapable, behavorial scientists have undertaken to push systematic analysis into 

this final act of individual judgment and will. They believe that the 

judgment and will of the individual are channeled by conditions 

inside as well as outside of his personality, which can be empirically 

determined; that these also are part of a social and psychological 

"process" and are therefore a proper subject for "operations research." 

The analytical model of the act of decision that the behavorial scientists have constructed as a guide to profitable research raises questions that should interest any commander who has to make decisions. 2 

These scholars readily admit that the questions they raise are more important, at least for the present, than the answers that anyone can give. 

But they can legitimately claim that their "approach is one fruitful 

method of alerting the observer to the major determinants of state 

behavior and analyzing such factors." 3 

The historical studies in the present collection contain information that will be found useful in the search for answers to questions 

that such inquiries have raised. The historian knows that "asking the 

right questions is fundamental to all scholarly inquiry." 4 But he cannot afford to let himself be bound by any predetermined set of 

questions or assumptions. His business is to establish and relate the 

facts of experience within the broadest possible horizon of interest. 

He cannot know what questions his readers will bring to his reconstruction of the past. What he seeks to do is to make it as varied 

and rich in meaning as his respect for objective fact-finding and his 

sense of historical perspective permit him to make it. The present 

studies were written by historians with this outlook and objective, as 

part of a comprehensive history of World War II. They can be expected, therefore, to provide only partial or indirect answers to the 

questions of either decision makers or students of decision-making. 

Furthermore, because the studies included were selected with reference to their immediate availability for publication they cannot be 

expected to illuminate all of the factors that affected even the major 

decisions of World War II. Nevertheless, they throw much light on 

influences at work in the making of decisions under the stresses of 

the greatest of wars to date, and they have a value of suggestion that 

2 Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. M. Sapin, Decision Makzng as an Approach 

to the Study of International Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis Project, Organizational Behavior 

Section, Foreign Policy Analysis Series No.3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1954). See also Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Jvfihtary in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday and Company, 1954), Short Series in Political Science . 

. 1 Snyder et al., Decision Making, p. 12. 

, Ibid., p. 2. 
4 COMMAND DECISIONS 

they would not have had if patterned to answer a predetermined set 

of questions. 

The studies in this volume provide abundant illustration of ways 

in which staff work and prior consultation tend to narrow the range 

of choice at the higher levels of decision (Studies 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 

12, 15, 16, 20, 21, and 23). This tendency, it will be noted, was by 

no means confined to American experience: it will be found as well 

in the decisions of the enemy and the British. At the national level, 

it was not only the staff system but the organization of government 

that reduced the range of final choices. The Japanese system of government was such that no one person could make a final decision. 

The British system gave greater authority to individuals, but committees had a more authoritative role than in the American system. 

That system, vesting the President with the authority of commander 

in chief of the armed forces, makes the conclusive decision the responsibility of an individual, as it was under the Nazi regime in 

Germany. In the cases of the American decision to beat Germany first 

and the Japanese decision for war (1 and 4), the choice was made 

only when the force of events rendered a final decision inescapable. 

In a number of important cases, as previously observed, the final decision was a collective act. In several of the cases where final responsibility fell upon an individual, the facts and recommendations produced by previous staff work had reduced the number of reasonable 

choices to a minimum. For example, in the case of General Marshall's 

momentous decision to set a 90-division limit on America's contribution to the ground combat forces of the Allies (15), the fact-finding 

and advice of experts whom he trusted left him small latitude for 

choice in making his initial decision, which was to halt activations at 

that limit in 1943. Only when Qe decided in 1944 to stick to that 

limitation against the judgment of the Secretary of War did he take 

a serious risk on his own responsibility. 

All of the decisions referred to illustrate a characteristic of the 

staff system that gravely endangers the wisdom of the decisive choice. 

That system, it has been remarked, is shaped to eliminate, "at each 

level of consideration, ... alternative courses of action, so that the 

man at the top has only to approve or disapprove-but not to weigh 

alternatives." 5 He is expertly briefed on these alternatives, but no 

brief can be an adequate substitute for experience as a footing for 

the play of intuition or wisdom, which is the commander's final contribution to the process of decision. "Government by brief may be 

5 Representative Vinson, Report for the Committee on the Armed Services, 22 May 

1958, on Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 85th Congress, 2d Session, 

House of Representatives, Report 1765. 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 5 

dangerous, but generalship by brief is worse." 6 But it is necessary and 

unavoidable. Technological advances, operating with revolutionary 

force on our whole civilization, have introduced into military forces, 

and the employment of military power, a variety and complexity with 

which no single mind, not even that of a military genius, can be expected to cope in arriving at an estimate of the situation. Only by 

elaborate staff processes can the data be winnowed and the issues 

compacted into manageable form. An intricate organization of staffs 

and committees has therefore become necessary to the management 

of big wars, as of big business and big government. But how can the 

commander be sure that he has within his grasp all the elements of 

intelligence that, if he were in direct touch with them, might vitally 

affect his judgment? His besetting problem is to keep alive his intuitive insight, which leaders in the past could nourish on a first-hand 

knowledge and experience of events. The reader will find in this 

book interesting illustrations of the way in which leaders in World 

War II tried to solve this problem. 

When Mr. Truman decided to use the atomic bomb (23), he was 

faced with a "yes or no" choice, and cast his vote in favor of the majority opinion of his advisers, which was affirmative, but he did so 

after not only weighing the alternatives that they presented but also 

examining for himself the grounds for their preferences. Mr. Roosevelt habitually stirred up and explored alternatives for himself. He 

wanted to hear his advisers argue vigorously for various alternatives; 

encouraged controversy and even contentiousness among them, often 

at the expense of orderly administration; listened to many voices; then 

chose his course of action. His methods are illustrated in the present 

collection not only by the story of his decision in favor of invading 

North Africa (7) but by his insistence in 1943, against the strong 

urgings of his military and logistical advisers, on executing his pledge 

to support the British war economy with American merchant shipping 

(8). Having overruled his advisers, who believed that such support 

would wreck the deployment schedule to which their strategic plans 

were geared, Mr. Roosevelt brought into play other agencies of his 

war administration and directed his military staffs to recast their estimates and redouble their efforts to find a solution for their problems. 

In the payoff, both requirements-support of the British economy and 

support of all major planned operations-which had seemed to be 

mutually exclusive, were met. 

General Marshall wanted his briefings brief, but he insisted on 

thorough and responsible staff judgments, got them through a remark6 General Sir Richard N. Gale, "Generalship and the Art of Command in the Nuclear 

Age," Royal United Service Institute Journal, Vol. 101 (1956), pp. 376ff, 379. 
6 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ably compact and effective organization, the Operations Division of 

the War Department's General Staff, his global command post in 

Washington/ and, by personal conferences and correspondence with 

his commanders and other means, kept his judgment remarkably 

responsive to the intangibles of the world situation with which he had 

to cope. The reader will find interesting variations of this approach 

in studying the decisions of General MacArthur, General Eisenhower, 

General Clark, and General Bradley as described in this volume and 

elsewhere. He must be left to speculate as to the extent to which 

the commander's recognition of the problem, and his characteristic 

approach or variations of it, were attributable to training, temperament, and personality, or to the situation each was facing. 

Mr. Roosevelt sounded· for advice and used it in his own way. 

But this is not to say that the outcome of Mr. Roosevelt's decisions 

was not largely dependent on good staff work, both in analyzing the 

facts and carrying out his directions. The reader will find instructive 

evidence of this if he compares the cases cited above with the fumbling and delays that attended the execution of the President's 

Iceland decision in 1941 (3), under conditions of quasi mobilization 

when the War Department was not yet equipped and organized to 

handle emergencies. Even after the War Department and its General 

Staff had been reorganized in 1942, it was necessary, in order to convert the Persian Corridor into a major supply route to Russia, for the 

President to intervene to get the result which the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff had decided on as a strategic requirement. The study of this 

case (9) shows the length of time and the weight of authority that 

may be necessary to make a strategic decision effective amid the conflicting claims of a big war and with the ponderous overhead that it 

calls into being. 

Hitler, like Roosevelt, refused to let the play of his judgment be 

bound by briefings. In two of his decisions described in this collection (his decision to occupy Norway and Denmark, and his decision 

on the defense of Italy-2 and 12), Hitler, after some uncertainty, 

made his own choice among the recommendations of his military 

experts. In the third and most fateful-his decision to stake the fate 

of his nation on the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944 

(20)-he overruled all expert advice and substituted his own judgment. This he did time and again. The results lend no encouragement to the idea that a commander can afford to break away from 

the staff system and rely solely on an intuitive estimate of the 

situation. 

7 Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951). 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 7 

How to keep the tool of organization sensitive and effective as an 

instrument of judgment is only one of the problems of decision in 

war. Logistics or economic feasibility is another factor that weighed 

heavily on command decisions in World War II. It played its part 

in every decision here presented; it is especially emphasized or illustrated in Studies 7, 9, 15, and 18. Its importance as a factor in the 

President's decision to give the British war economy a priority claim 

on American merchant shipping in 1943 is obvious (8). Equally obvious was its effect in stopping the Allied forces' triumphant pursuit of 

the Germans in September 1944 and its influence on General Eisenhower's decision to follow a broad-front strategy in his advance to the 

Rhine (18 and 19). In Study 10, which is in effect a reinterpretation 

of the Cairo-Tehran decisions on strategy (and as such is to be compared with the views set forth in the study of the ANVIL decision-16), 

the author is primarily concerned with the effect of a logistical 

factor-the availability of assault shipping-in narrowing the range 

of strategic choices. It was an economic factor-the claims of war 

industry and the conclusion of the experts regarding the manpower 

required to maintain the productive capacity of the American war 

economy-that made General Marshall's decision to stop activating 

divisions in 1943 all but inevitable; by the fall of 1944, when he 

made his decision that eighty-nine divisions would suffice to finish the 

Army's missions in the war, he was freer to weigh purely military 

considerations (15). 

In view of the number of strategic decisions included in this book, 

one might expect to find the influence of the political factor on military decisions abundantly illustrated. Actually the instructiveness of 

these studies on that point is almost entirely negative, even when the 

decisiQns were made by governments or chiefs of state. Political interests figured in the high-level debates on strategy, and prolonged them, 

as one can see in the studies of the decisions at Cairo-Tehran (10) 

and the decision to execute ANVIL (16). When a political authority, 

Mr. Roosevelt or Adolf Hitler, made a military decision, he undoubtedly had political considerations in mind and the authors point these 

out when the evidence shows that they were influential. But even 

in the case of 1-1r. Roosevelt they had a decisive influence only in one 

instance here presented-the President's approval of the demand that 

American citizens of Japanese origin be evacuated from the west coast 

(5)-and this, though a command decision and publicly justified on 

military grounds, was not a strictly military decision. In deciding to 

commit the American Joint Chiefs against their will to the invasion 

of North Africa in the fall of 1942, Mr. Roosevelt broke a deadlock 

between the responsible military chiefs of the United States and 
8 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Great Britain, which made this a politic, if not a political decision, 

and he also had in mind the effect of timely offensive action on the 

morale of the American public, a political consideration. But he 

could, and did, invoke the sound military principle of seizing the 

earliest promising opportunity to pass to the offensive with decisive 

effect. However much debate and tension over strategic choices the 

political interests of the two principal Western Allies produced in 

World War II, their final decisions, and those of each of the principals, were firmly planted on military grounds, and none was reached 

until it made military sense in terms of their resolution to bring 

about the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. 

As far as the United States was concerned, military strategy, conceived in terms of this aim, became national policy for the duration 

of the war. Mr. Churchill more and more vigorously demurred, as in 

his open protest against General Eisenhower's decision to halt the 

forces of the Western Allies on the line of the Elbe (22). But as the 

war power of the United States increased and that of Britain 

declined, he found it the better part of political valor to go along 

with the Americans, convinced as he was that the integrity of the 

Anglo-American coalition was the paramount interest of his country 

and of the Western democracies. In short, the prevalence of military 

over political elements in the decisions comprised in this book is not 

the res ult of editorial selection but typical of World War Ir.s 

Many readers will find the decisions of field commanders of 

greater interest than the high-level decisions. While none of the field 

decisions in this book are below corps level, they deal with battle and 

with situations in which the military man can more easily imagine 

himself. They also focus more sharply on the individual, on his loneliness in taking a risk, and on the personal qualities with which he 

faced the act of decision. Even when the historian is denied the evidence necessary to say what these were, the reader can test his own 

personality and endowments against the demands of the situation with 

which a commander was faced, confident that the situation is portrayed accurately and as fully as it can be. Such an exercise can 

stimulate his imagination regarding the factors, single or in combination, with which war may one day confront him. 

Would he have reacted with the promptness and resourcefulness 

that General MacArthur displayed when he found that his decision 

to meet the Japanese invasion of Luzon on the beaches had been 

based on a mistaken estimate of the capacity of the Philippine Army? 

S For an interesting discussion of this, see Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 9 

(Study 6) Would he have had MacArthur's sense of the psychological 

effect of going to Los Negros in person to dramatize his decision 

whether to invade the Admiralties in force? (Study 11) If the reader 

had been in General Lucas' place at Anzio, when he found that the 

VI Corps could land virtually unopposed, would he have seized the 

opportunity that seemed to exist, though General Lucas could not be 

sure of it, and struck inland at once at the enemy's line of communications with the German forces in the Gustav Line to the south? 

(Study 13) Would a general of different personality and temperament 

have made General Clark's decision in June 1944 to put a loose construction on a direct order of his superior, send the VI Corps directly 

toward Rome, and confront General Alexander with an accomplished 

fact? (Study 14) If the reader had been General Bradley in August 

1944 would he, in the absence of instructions from the Supreme 

Commander, have stopped the XV Corps at Argentan and sent it to 

the Seine, foregoing a fighting chance to close the Argentan-Falaise 

gap and trap the German forces repulsed at Mortain? (Study 17) 

Such a use of history is a legitimate and profitable exercise, 

though it can never be conclusive. The historian can sometimes 

sketch with confidence a commander's persistent and dominant traits 

of character. Unfortunately, he can rarely say, and never be sure, 

how these operated in producing a given decision. He is bound to 

use with skepticism what a commander says or writes after the event 

about his motives, so quickly corrosive is the effect of hindsight, the 

compulsion to justify ourselves, and lapses of memory. Even when the 

historian has a diary that a commander kept at the time he cannot 

be sure that it tells him what he needs to know. But this is the most 

precious kind of evidence he can get. Fortunately in one case in the 

present collection (13) the author had it, in the diary that General 

Lucas kept at Anzio, confiding to it day by day his views and 

anxieties, and we are here permitted to share at least the feelings 

with which a commander made his estimate of the situation and a 

momentous decision. 

The quest for the intangibles of personal motivation will continue 

to be fascinating, if only because of our insistent conviction that the 

qualities of an individual that affect his decision can never be reduced 

to a formula and that these qualities have a determining effect on 

the fate of humanity. 

512525-0-60-2 

1 

Germany First: The Basic Concept of 

Allied Strategy in World War II 

by 

Louis Morton 

Behind all the critical decisions of World War II was a preponderance of judgment among those responsible for American strategy 

that the main effort of the United States in a war with the Axis 

Powers of Europe and Asia should be made in the European theater 

and that Germany must be defeated first. This view coincided, 

naturally enough, with the interests of the European members of the 

coalition but was based entirely on the estimate that such a course 

of action would best serve the interests of the United States. It was 

an American consensus, arrived at only after a long sequence of discussions and decisions which reflect a reorientation of American views, 

interests, and plans going back to World War 1. Made before American entry into World War II, in the context of a world threatened 

by Axis aggression in Europe and Asia, the judgment that Germany 

must be defeated first stands as the most important single strategic 

concept of the war. From it and the painful deliberations that preceded the decision was finally crystallized the war plan known as 

RAINBOW 5, the plan put into effect when the Japanese struck at 

Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on that "day of infamy" in December 1941. The present essay is a review of this vitally important process of crystallization. 1 

I In preparing this essay the author has relied principally on the official records found 

in the Army's files and has cited these wherever applicable. But he owes a large debt 

LoUls MORTON, Historian with OCMH since 1945. Ph.D., Duke University. Lieutenant Colonel, USAR. Author: Robert Carter of Nomini Hall 

(Princeton, 1941); The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, 1953), Strategy and 

Command: Turning the Tide, 1941-1943 (in preparation), (coauthor) Strategy and 

Command: The Road to Victory, 1943-1945 (in preparation), UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; numerous articles in military and historical 

journals; and lectures at National War College, Army War College, and 

various Service schools and universities. 
12 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The Color Plans) 1919-1938 

American strategical planning in the period immediately following 

World War I was largely conditioned by the postwar political system 

and by the wide popular reaction against war. The Versailles 

Treaty, the Washington Treaties of 1921-1922, and the League of 

Nations (to which Germany was admitted in 1925) gave promise to 

the war-weary peoples of the world of an international order in which 

war would be forever banished. That promise seemed to many to 

have been fulfilled in 1928 when representatives from most of the 

nations in the world met at Paris to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact 

renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Though the 

United States was not a member of the League, American policy was 

closely and consciously designed to support the actions of the League 

in its efforts to further world peace. 

During these years of disillusion with war, isolationism, and Congressional economy, military planning in the United States was largely 

theoretical. Germany had just been defeated and stripped of military 

power. Russia was preoccupied with internal problems and, though 

also to his colleagues in the Office, Chief of Military History, who have studied these 

events in their own works, and to many others who have dealt with this complex subject 

in whole or in part. Among the volumes in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II that should be consulted in connection with the present study are: Stetson Conn 

and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (in press); Richard M. Leighton 

and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (1956); Maurice Matloff 

and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planningfor Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (1953); Louis Morton, 

The Pacific War: Strategy and Command, Vol. I (in preparation); Mark Skinner Watson, Chief 

of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (1950). The official British volume by j. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. II, September 1939-June 1941, is also useful, as are the semiofficial 

volumes of Samuel Eliot Morison's History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 

The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-Apn11942, Vol. III (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 

1948) and The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943, Vol. I (Boston: Little, Brown 

and Company, 1947). The two volumes of William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, 

The Challenge to Isolation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952) and The Undeclared War 

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), though not official, are based on a thorough study 

of the State Department records and are an indispensable source for a study of American 

policy in this period. The reader may also wish to consult a work written from the revisionist point of view, the best statement of which can be found in Charles A. Beard, 

President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). 

Among the most important sources for the present study is the memoir and biographical 

literature of the period, valuable as a supplement to the official records. Most useful are 

Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Millin Company, 1949) and The 

Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Millin Company, 1950); Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of 

Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948); Robert E. Sherwood, 

Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948); and Henry 

L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper 

& Brothers, 1948). These works represent only a small proportion of those that may be 

used with profit, but they should serve as the basis for further investigation into this complex subject. 
GERMANY FIRST 13 

Communism was recognized as a menace, the Bolshevik regime was 

in no position to engage in military adventures. Neither France nor 

Italy had sufficient naval force to attempt any major operation in the 

Western Hemisphere and had no reason to do so in any case. 

Of all the powers in Europe, only Great Britain was theoretically 

in a position to engage the United States in war with any prospect 

of success. The British had extensive holdings in the Western Hemisphere from which to launch attacks on American territory and they 

had enough dreadnoughts and battle cruisers to obtain naval supremacy in the Atlantic. But the possibility of a contest with Britain was 

extremely remote, for there was no sentiment for war on either side 

of the Atlantic. 

In the Pacific and Far East, the situation was different. Between 

Japan and the United States there were a number of unresolved differences and a reservoir of misunderstanding and ill will that made 

the possibility of conflict much more likely in that area than in the 

Atlantic. Moreover, Japan's position had been greatly strengthened as 

a result of the war and the treaties that followed. In the view of the 

planners, the most probable enemy in the foreseeable future was 

Japan. Thus, U.S. strategic thought in the years from 1919 to 1938 

was largely concentrated on the problems presented by a conflict arising out of Japanese aggression against American interests or territory 

in the Far East. 

The preparation of strategic war plans involving joint (i. e.) Army 

and Navy) forces-and for all practical purposes this meant most of 

the plans prepared by the American staff-was the responsibility of 

the Joint Board, predecessor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reorganized 

in 1919 to correct defects that had become apparent since its establishment in 1903, the board consisted of six members, the Army Chief 

of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, their deputies, and the 

chiefs of the War Plans Divisions of each of the services. To it came 

all matters that required co-operation between the two services, either 

by referral or on the initiative of the board itself. It had no executive 

functions or command authority and until 1939 reported to the War 

and Navy Secretaries. Its recommendations were purely advisory, and 

became effective only upon approval by both Secretaries, and, in 

some cases, by the President himself. 

The most notable improvement of the 1919 reorganization was the 

formation of a Joint Planning Committee to assist the board. Consisting of eight officers, four each from the War Plans Division of the 

Army and of the Navy, this committee performed the detailed investigation and study required for policy decisions, preparation of war 

plans, and all other matters involving joint actions of the Army and 
14 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Navy. It was, in effect, a working group for the Joint Board and made 

its reports and recommendations directly to that body. 

The problems considered by the Joint Board after World War I 

varied widely, but the development of joint war plans constituted, as 

it had from 1903 to 1913, the major work of the board, with most 

attention being given to a possible war with Japan-called ORANGE 

in accordance with the system in effect between 1904 and 1939 of 

designating war plans by colors, each color corresponding to a specific 

situation or nation. The mandate to Japan of the German islands in 

the Central Pacific had given that nation numerous bases astride the 

U.S. Fleet's line of communication and made American defense of 

the Philippines in the event of war with Japan virtually impossible. 

Moreover, in the Five Power Naval Treaty of 1922, the United 

States, Great Britain, France, and Italy had promised not to fortify 

their Far Eastern possessions in return for a pledge by the Japanese 

to restrain themselves similarly. By this agreement Japan was virtually 

assured that the Philippines, Guam, and Hong Kong would not become formidable fortresses threatening the home islands. And although Japan had to accept British and American superiority in 

capital ships at the Washington Conference of 1922, its naval position 

in the Pacific improved greatly as a result. In the years that followed, 

while the United States scrapped ships and Japan built them, the 

strength of the U.S. Fleet relative to that of Japan so declined that it 

is doubtful if during the 1920's and 1930's it could have met the latter on equal terms in the western Pacific. 

The first postwar plan for war in the Pacific, developed between 

1921 and 1924, reviewed America's unfavorable strategic position and 

recognized Japan as the probable enemy. The strategic concept 

adopted by the planners in the event of hostilities was to fight "an 

offensive war, primarily naval" with the objective of establishing "at 

the earliest date American sea power in the western Pacific in 

strength superior to that of Japan." To do this, the United States 

would require a base in that area capable of serving the entire U.S. 

Fleet. Since the only base west of Pearl Harbor large enough for this 

purpose was in Manila Bay, it would be essential, said the planners, 

to hold the bay in case of war and be ready to rush reinforcements, 

under naval protection, to the Philippines in time to prevent their 

capture. To the Army fell the vital task of holding the base in 

Manila Bay until the arrival of the Fleet, but the major role in any 

war with Japan would be played by the Navy, for success in the final 

analysis depended on sea power. 

War Plan ORANGE made no provision for a landing on the Japanese home islands. Japan was to be defeated by "isolation and 
GERMANY FIRST 15 

harassment," by the disruption of its vital sea communications, and 

by "offensive sea and air operations against her naval forces and 

economic life." Presumably it would not be necessary to invade J apan, but the planners recognized that if they could not bring .Japan 

to her knees by these means they would have to take "such further 

action as may be required to win the war." 2 

For about fifteen years, the strategic concepts embodied in the 

ORANGE Plan formed the basis for most American war planning. Variations of the plan were prepared and discussed at length. Every 

conceivable situation that might involve the United States in a war 

with Japan, including a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor, was 

carefully considered and appropriate measures of defense were 

adopted. At least half a dozen times between 1924 and 1938, the 

plan was revised, sometimes in response to military changes and 

sometimes as a result of Congressional sentiment, or because of the 

international situation. Each time, all the implementing plans had to 

be changed. The Army and Navy had their separate ORANGE plans, 

based on the joint plans and complete with concentration tables, mobilization schedules, and the like. In addition U.S. forces in the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and other overseas bases had their joint and 

service plans, as did the defense sectors and continental commands 

within the United States. Rarely have plans for a war been so comprehensive and detailed, so complete on every echelon, and so long 

in preparation. 

But the United States never fought this war, for ORANGE was 

based on a situation that never came to pass. The ORANGE war envisaged by the planners was a war between the United States and 

Japan alone. Neither side, it was assumed, would have allies or attack the territory of a third power. It was a war that was to be 

fought entirely in the Pacific, with the decisive action to take place 

in the waters off the Asiatic coast. 

These assumptions by the military strategists of the Army and 

Navy were entirely justified by the international situation and 

reflected a reasonable estimate of the most probable threat to American interests, an estimate that was shared by most responsible officials 

during these years. But the planners did not, indeed could not, 

ignore other possibilities, no matter how remote. Thus, during the 

same years in which they labored on ORANGE, the joint planners con2 Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, 1924, Joint Board OB) 325, Scr. 228. 

After numerous drafts, the plan was completed and approved by the Joint Board and the 

Secretary of the Navy in August 1924 and by the Secretary of War the following month. 

The Preliminary Estimates of the Situation, Joint War Plan ORANGE, and other n·\evant 

studies are filed in War Plans Division (WPD) 368; JB 325, Ser. 207; JB 305, Sers. 208 

and 209; General Board 425, Ser. 1136. 
16 COMMAND DECISIONS 

sidered a variety of other contingencies that might require the use 

of American military forces. Among the most serious, though one of 

the most unlikely, of these was a war with Great Britain alone (RED), 

which in the planners' estimate could conceivably arise from commercial rivalry between the two nations, or with Great Britain and Japan 

(RED-ORANGE). The latter contingency was conceded by all to present 

the gravest threat to American security, one that would require a 

full-scale mobilization and the greatest military effort. 

In their study of these two contingencies the military planners 

came to grips with strategic problems quite different from those presented by ORANGE. A war with Japan would be primarily a naval 

war fought in the Pacific. So far as anyone could foresee, there 

would be no requirement for large ground armies. There was a possibility, of course, that Japan would attack the Panama Canal, 

Hawaii, and even the west coast, but no real danger that Japan 

could seize and occupy any of these places. In the unlikely event of 

a conflict between Great Britain and the United States, there was a 

real possibility of invasion of the United States as well as attacks against 

the Canal and American interests in the Caribbean and Latin America. 

In such a war, the major threat clearly would lie in the Atlantic. 

Plans developed to meet the remote danger of a RED war, in contrast to ORANGE, called for the immediate dispatch of the bulk of the 

U.S. Fleet to the Atlantic and large-scale ground operations to deprive the enemy of bases in the Western Hemisphere. As in ORANGE, 

it was assumed that neither side would have Allies among the great 

powers of Europe and Asia, and no plans were made for an invasion 

of the enemy's homeland by an American expeditionary force. This 

was to be a limited war in which the United States would adopt a 

strategic defensive with the object of frustrating the enemy's assumed 

objective in opening hostilities. 

The problems presented by a RED-ORANGE coalition, though 

highly theoretical, were more complicated. Here the American strategists had to face all the possibilities of an ORANGE and a RED warseizure of American possessions in the western Pacific, violation of the 

Monroe Doctrine, attacks on the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and other 

places, and, finally, the invasion of the United States itself. Basically, 

the problem was to prepare for a war in both oceans against the two 

great naval powers, Great Britain and Japan. 

As the planners viewcd this problem, the strategic choices open to 

the United States were limited. Certainly the United States did not 

have the naval strength to conduct offensive operations simultaneously 

in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; she must adopt a strategic 

defensive on both fronts or else assume the strategic offensive in one 
GERMANY FIRST 17 

theater while standing on the defensive in the other. The recommended solution to this problem-and it was only a recommended 

solution, for no joint war plan was ever adopted-was "to concentrate on obtaining a favorable decision" in the Atlantic and to stand 

on the defensive in the Pacific with minimum forces. This solution 

was based on the assumption that since the Atlantic enemy was the 

stronger and since the vital areas of the United States were located 

in the northeast, the main effort of the hostile coalition would be 

made there. For this reason, the initial effort of the United States, 

the planners argued, should be in the Atlantic. 

A strategic offensive-defensive in a two-front war, American strategists recognized, entailed serious disadvantages. It gave the hostile 

coalition freedom of action to attack at points of its own choosing, 

compelled the United States to be prepared to meet attacks practically everywhere, exposed all U.S. overseas possessions to capture, and 

imposed on the American people a restraint inconsistent with their 

traditions and spirit. Also it involved serious and humiliating defeats 

in the Pacific during the first phase of the war and the almost certain loss of outlying possessions in that region. 

But the strategic offensive-defensive had definite advantages. It 

enabled the United States to conduct operations in close proximity t.o 

its home bases and to force the enemy to fight at great distance from 

his own home bases at the end of a long line of communications. 

Moreover, the forces raised in the process of producing a favorable 

decision in the Atlantic would give the United States such a superiority over Japan that the Japanese might well negotiate rather than 

fight the United States alone. "It is not unreasonable to hope," the 

planners observed, "that the situation at the end of the struggle with 

RED may be such as to induce ORANGE to yield rather than face a 

war carried to the Western Pacific.":3 

This plan for a RED-ORANGE war was admittedly unrealistic in 

terms of the international situation during the 1920's and 1930's. The 

military planners knew this as well and better than most and often 

noted this fact in the draft plans they wrote.' But as a strategic exer-

.1 Proposed Joint Estimate and Plan-RED-ORANGE. prcpart'd in WPD (Army) and approved by Chief of Staff, 3 June 1930, as basis for joint plan, G-3 Obsolete Plans. Reg. 

Doc. 245-G Additional material on RED-ORANGE may be found in same file 245-A 

through F and in WPD 3202. No joint plan was ever approved. 

I In 1923, the Arm)" draft of RED-ORANGE started with the statement, "Under existing 

conditions a coalition of RED and ORANGE is unlikely," and twelve years later the Director of Naval Intelligence, commenting on another draft plan, stated that a RED-ORA;\lGE 

combination was "highly improbable" in the next decade, if at all. Army Draft RLDORANGE, 1923, Reg. Doc. 245-F; Ltr, Director ONI to Director WPD, 27 Jun 35, sub: 

Jt Estimate of Situation, RED-ORANGE, copy in WPD 3202. By 1935, planning for such 

a war had virtually ended. 
18 COMMAND DECISIONS 

cise it was of great value, for it forced the military planners to consider seriously the problems presented by a war in which the United 

States would have to fight simultaneously in the Atlantic and Pacific 

Oceans. In an era when most war planning was focused on the Pacific and when Japan seemed the most likely enemy, this experience 

may have seemed irrelevant. But it was to prove immensely useful 

in the plans developed for World War II. 

By late 1937 the assumptions that had given to ORANGE planning 

its prime importance during the past decade and a half had become 

of doubtful validity. International events had created a situation that 

made it increasingly unlikely that a war between the United States 

and Japan could be limited to these two nations. Germany, Italy, and 

Japan had joined hands in the Anti-Comintern Pact, and threats or 

direct acts of aggression were the order of the day in Europe and 

Asia. Great Britain and France, still suffering from the prolonged 

economic crisis of the early 1930's and weakened by domestic conflicts, remained passive in the face of this threat, seeking to avert 

armed conflict by a policy of appeasement. 

In the light of these developments, the Joint Board directed its 

planners to re-examine the ORANGE plan. In its view, the existing 

plan was now "unsound in general" and "wholly inapplicable to 

present conditions." The planners were to develop a new plan which 

should provide, the board specified, for an initial "position if readiness" 

along the west coast and the strategic triangle formed by Alaska, 

Hawaii, and Panama. In addition, the planners were to make "exploratory studies and estimates" of the various courses of action to be 

followed after the position of readiness had been assumed. Clearly 

implied in these instructions was the injunction to consider the possibility that the United States might become involved in a European 

conflict while engaged in offensive operations in the Pacific.s 

In less than two weeks, the Joint Planning Committee reported its 

inability to reach an agreement. The Army members, viewing the 

uncertain situation in Europe, were reluctant to underwrite offensive 

operations in the Pacific beyond those essential to the security of the 

strategic triangle and the west coast. With the European Axis in 

mind, they pointed out that political considerations might require 

limited action and purely defensive operations in the Pacific. To uncover vital areas in the Western Hemisphere for an offensive in the 

far Pacific seemed to the Army planners foolhardy indeed. Thus, their 

plan provided for purely defensive operations after the assumption by 

U.S. forces of a position of readiness. 

'Memos, JB for JPC, 10 Nov 37, sub: Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, Scr. 

617, and Col S. D. Embick for WPD, 3 Nov 37, same sub, AG 225. 
GERMANY FIRST 19 

To the Army planners, the primary problem was to determine 

the kind of war the United States should fight. Should the situation 

dictate operations designed only for the defense of the United States 

or of the Western Hemisphere, then the war in the Pacific might well 

take on a limited character. It was impossible to determine in advance just what the situation would be, whether the United States 

would be involved with one or more of the Axis Powers, or even what 

forces would be available. It might well be, declared the Army planners, that national policy and public opinion would neither require 

nor support a plan for offensive operations in the Pacific. 

The Navy members of the Joint Planning Committee argued that 

American strategy could not be limited to a purely defensive position 

in readiness but must aim at the defeat of the enemy. Once war began, production could be quickly increased to provide the means required both for the security of the continental United States and for 

offensive operations in the Pacific. Should the European Axis give aid 

to the enemy, the naval planners assumed, with Great Britain clearly 

in mind, that the United States would have allies who would provide 

the assistance needed by the U.S. Fleet to maintain naval superiority 

over Japan. "The character, amount, and location of allied assistance," 

they hastened to add, "cannot be predicted." 6 

The separate reports submitted by the Army and Navy members 

of the Joint Planning Committee put the choice between the opposing strategies squarely up to the Joint Board. The board avoided the 

choice by issuing new instructions to the planners on 7 December 1937. 

The new plan, it specified, should have as its basic objective the defeat of Japan and should provide for "an initial temporary position 

in readiness" for the Pacific coast and the strategic triangle. This last 

was to be the Army's job; the Navy's task would consist of "offensive 

operations against ORANGE armed forces and the interruption of 

ORANGE vital sea communications." 7 

Even under these revised instructions, the planners were unable 

to agree on the best way to meet an Axis threat. Faced with another 

split report, the Joint Board turned ov~r the task of working out a 

compromise to the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of 

Naval Operations. These two, after a month of discussion, finally 

came up with a new ORANGE plan on 18 February 1938. This plan 

maintained the traditional offensive strategy in the Pacific, but it also 

took into account the danger of a simultaneous conflict in the At-

,; Ltrs, Army and Navy Members JPC to JB, 28 and 30 Nov 37, sub: Joint Basic War 

Plan ORANGE, JB 325, Ser. 617. The Army plan is in Appendix A, the Navy's in Appendix B. See also, Draft Memo. Col W. J. Krueger, 22 Nov 37, sub: Some Thoughts on 

Joint War Plans, AG 225. 

7 Directive, JB to JPC, 7 Dec 37, sub: Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, Scr. 618. 
20 COMMAND DECISIONS 

lantic-the first time this possibility was recognized in ORANGE planning. On the outbreak of a war with Japan, the United States would 

first assume a position in readiness and make preparations for the offensive against Japan. It would then be ready to meet any unexpected 

development that might arise, including an attack in the Atlantic. If 

none did, the Navy would then proceed to take the offensive against 

Japan with operations directed initially against the mandated islands 

and extending progressively westward across the Pacific. These operations combined with economic pressure (blockade) would, it was believed, result in the defeat of Japan and a settlement that would assure the peace and safeguard American interests in the Far East. 8 

Strategic Adjustment) 1938-1940 

The 1938 revision of ORANGE, with its emphasis on flexibility, represented an enormous advance in military planning. The Navy's single-mInded insistence on an advance into the western Pacific was still 

present but it was modified by an increased awareness of the uncertainties of a world threatened by the rising tide of Axis aggression. 

The Army, with its concern for the defense of the United States, was 

shifting away from the Pacific orientation that had dominated strategic planning since World War I and was turning anxious eyes toward 

Europe. A RED or a RED-ORANGE war was a theoretical probability 

no longer worth considering, and the Atlantic area occupied more 

and more the attention of the strategists. Moreover, all earlier plans 

had assumed the United States would fight alone; now that the world 

was becoming divided between two armed camps that assumption 

might have to be revised. 

Though it was the Army planners who seemed most aware of the 

danger from Europe, it was the Navy that made the first move to 

strengthen America's Atlantic defenses. In December 1937, the director of the Navy War Plans Division, Capt. Royal E. Ingersoll, was 

sent to London to discuss informally with the British Admiralty the 

new construction programs of the two navies and the conditions of 

U.S.-British naval co-operation in the event both nations were involved in a war against Japan. During the course of these discussions, 

the possibility of a German war inevitably arose. The British viewed 

this possibility with concern, for the Germans could be expected to 

attack British trade routes in the Atlantic. Should Italy join Germany, 

the prospects were even more alarming. The French, if they entered 

the war, would hold the western Mediterranean, but the British would 

S Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, 21 Fcb 38, JB 325, Ser. 618. The plan was approved 

by the Secretary of the Navy on 26 February and by the Secretary of War two days later. 
GERMANY FIRST 21 

still have to place the bulk of their forces in the Atlantic. They would 

have little, therefore, to send to the Far East. Here the United States 

could perform a valuable service in the common cause by taking up 

the slack in the Far East in return for the security the Royal Navy 

would provide in the Atlantic. Even if the United States became involved in the European conflict, Great Britain could still be relied 

upon to man the Atlantic barrier so long as the U.S. Fleet assumed 

responsibility for the Pacific. It is perhaps for this reason that the 

Navy members of the Joint Planning Committee seemed less concerned 

about the Atlantic and more interested in the Pacific than the Army 

planners. 9 

Events in Europe in 1938 fully justified the concern of American 

policy makers and planners, and the Munich crisis in September of 

that year provided the impetus to a comprehensive review of American strategy. Taking the lead from the public statements of President 

Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the Joint Board directed its planning committee in November to make a study of the 

course the United States should follow if German and Italian aggression in Europe and simultaneous Japanese expansion in the Far East 

should threaten American security and interests in both the Atlantic 

and Pacific."° 

Here, for the first time, was a specific directive to the planners to 

study (within the context of the current international situation) the 

problems presented by a two-ocean war in which the United States, 

acting in concert with allies, would be opposed by a coalition. These 

problems had been studied before in the ORANGE-RED plans, but under entirely different assumptions and in a completely unrealistic situation. They had been considered briefly and tangentially also in the 

latest revision of ORANGE with its provision for a position in readiness and co-operation with allies. The informal naval conversations 

in London in January 1938 were a clear recognition of the possibility 

of such a war and the first step toward the intimate military collaboration that marked the Anglo-American relationship during World 

War II. 

For almost six months, the planners of the Joint Board considered 

the problem presented by simultaneous Axis aggression in the Atlantic 

and Pacific areas and finally in April 1939 submitted their report. In 

it they reviewed the world situation, estimated the likelihood of war, 

calculated the probable objectives of the Axis in Europe and Japan 

" For an account of the Staff Conversations in London early in 1938, sec Pearl IIarbor Report, Part 9, pages 4272-78 and Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, U.S.-British Nayal Cooperation, 1939-1945, Section I, Part C, pages 37-38. 

10 Min, JB Mtg, 9 Nov 38. 
22 COMMAND DECISIONS 

in the Far East, discussed the effects of concerted action by these 

powers on the United States, and analyzed the strategic problems involved in the various situations that might result from such action. 

So comprehensive was the report, such a model of strategic analysis, 

that it was characterized by the Joint Board as "a monument" to its 

planning committee and became the basis for much of the strategic 

planning before Pearl Harbor. 11 

In their effort to arrive at a sound military strategy for the United 

States, the joint planners examined the various contingencies that might 

arise as a result of Axis aggression. On the basis of this examination, 

they concluded that: 

1. Germany and Italy would take overt action in the Western 

Hemisphere only if Great Britain and France remained neutral or were 

defeated. 

2. Japan would continue to expand into China and Southeast Asia 

at the expense of Great Britain and the United States, by peaceful 

means if possible but by force if necessary. 

3. The three Axis Powers would act together whenever the international situation seemed favorable. If other countries, including the 

United States, reacted promptly and vigorously to such action, then 

a general war might well follow. 

The reaction of the United States to these or any other situations 

that might arise, the planners pointed out, would depend in large 

measure on the forces available and the extent to which American 

interests were involved. In the event of a threat in both oceans simultaneously, the United States, they maintained, should assume the 

defensive in the Pacific, retaining adequate forces based on Hawaii 

to guard the strategic triangle. Arguing further in a manner reminiscent of RED-ORANGE planning, the strategists of the Joint Board declared that priority in a two-ocean war must go first to the defense 

of vital positions in the Western Hemisphere-the Panama Canal and 

the Caribbean area. From bases in that region, the U.S. Fleet could 

operate in either ocean as the situation demanded, but its primary 

obligation must always be to control the Atlantic approaches to the 

Western Hemisphere, especially to the south where the continent was 

most exposed. This task would not be difficult if Great Britain and 

France actively opposed Axis aggression, but if they did not the security of the South Atlantic would become the major concern of U.S. 

forces, and the active co-operation of the Latin American states the 

indispensable prerequisite for political and military action. 

II Min, JB Mtg, 6 May 39; Ltr, JPC Rpt, Exploratory Studies, 21 Apr 39, JB 325, 

Ser. 634. The discussion of the report is based on the Exploratory Studies and related 

papers in the same file. 
GERMANY FIRST 23 

On the basis of their study the joint planners recommended that 

a series of war plans be prepared, each of them to be applicable to 

a different situation. Priority in these plans, they held, must be given 

to the defense of the United States, and this would require safeguarding the security of the Western Hemisphere. To hold firm to these 

objectives would be no easy task, the planners recognized. Not only 

must strategy be linked to policy, but it must also take cognizance 

of such intangibles as tradition, the spirit of the nation, and "emotionalized public opinion." 

The pioneering study by the joint planners in 1939 raised sharply 

and dramatically the question of American policy in the event of concerted aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan. By focusing on the 

threat to the Caribbean and South America, the planners challenged 

strongly the long-standing orientation of American strategy toward 

the Pacific and gave weight to the Army's arguments against offensive operations in the western Pacific. 

The planners raised another issue that needed to be resolved before the course of national policy could be charted. All the color plans 

had been based on the assumption the United States would act alone. 

Was this assumption valid in terms of the international situation and 

in the face of a threatening Axis coalition? Should the strategists in 

drawing up their plans therefore assume that the United States would 

have allies? And if so, who would they be and what would we be 

expected to do for them and they for us? Like the Atlantic versus 

Pacific issue, this question of allies involved political matters al)d 

would have to be resolved by the President himself. 

It was perhaps as well that no firm answers were forthcoming in 

the spring of 1939, for the course of events was still far from clear. 

The planners recognized this when they proposed that alternative 

plans be prepared to meet different situations in which the United 

States would have to meet the combined threat of Germany, Italy, 

and Japan. The Joint Board, in approving the work of the planners, 

accepted this recommendation and in June 1939 laid down the guide 

lines for the development of these war plans, aptly designated RAINBOW 

to distinguish them from the color plans." 2 

There were to be five RAINBOW plans in all, each of them based 

on a different situation. The objective of all was the same-to defend 

the United States and the Western Hemisphere from Axis aggression 

and penetration, overt or concealed. In developing their plans, the 

12 The first directive of the Joint Board was dated 11 May 1939, but on further study 

was revised and amended instructions issued on 30 June. Min, JB Mtgs, 6 May and 30 

Jun 39, JB 325, Ser. 634; Ltrs, JB to JPG, 11 May 39, sub: Joint Army and Navy Basic 

War Plans, RAINBOWS 1, 2, 3, and 4; JPG to JB, 23 Jun 39, same sub; and JB to JPG, 

30 Jun 39, same sub, all in JB 325, Ser. 642 and 642-1. 
24 COMMAND DECISIONS 

planners were to assume that initially at least the United States would 

be alone and that the European as well as the Latin American democracies would remain neutral. But in each of the plans they were 

to "set forth the specific cooperation that should be sought from allied or neutral Democratic Powers, with respect to specific Theaters 

of Operations to render our efforts fully effective." Common to all of 

the plans was the assumption that the United States would face a 

coalition rather than a single power. 

The five specific situations forming the basis of the five RAINBOW 

plans were defined by the Joint Board as follows: 

RAINBOW 1 assumed the United States to be at war without major allies. United States forces would act jointly to prevent the violation of the 

Monroe Doctrine by protecting the territory of the Western Hemisphere 

north of 10° South Latitude, from which the vital interests of the United 

States might be threatened. The joint tasks of the Army and Navy included protection of the United States, its possessions and its sea-borne 

trade. A strategic defensive was to be maintained in the Pacific, from behind the line Alaska-Hawaii-Panama, until developments in the Atlantic 

permitted concentration of the fleet in mid-Pacific for offensive action 

against Japan. 

RAINBOW 2 assumed that the United States, Great Britain, and France 

would be acting in concert, with limited participation of U.S. forces in 

continental Europe and in the Atlantic. The United States could, therefore, undertake immediate offensive operations across the Pacific to sustain 

the interests of democratic powers by the defeat of enemy forces. 

RAINBOW 3 assumed the United States to be at war without major allies. Hemisphere defense was to be assured, as in RAINBOW 1, but with 

early projection of U.S. forces from Hawaii into the western Pacific. 

RAINBOW 4 assumed the United States to be at war without major allies, employing its forces in defense of the whole of the Western Hemisphere, but also with provision for United States Army forces to be sent 

to the southern part of South America, and to be used in joint operations 

in eastern Atlantic areas. A strategic defensive, as in RAINBOW 1, was to 

be maintained in the Pacific until the situation in the Atlantic permitted 

transfer of major naval forces for an offensive against Japan. 

RAINBOW 5 assumed the United States, Great Britain, and France to 

be acting in concert; hemisphere defense was to be assured as in RAINBOW 1, 

with early projection of U.S. forces to the eastern Atlantic, and to either 

or both the African and European Continents; offensive operations were 

to be conducted, in concert with British and allied forces, to effect the defeat of Germany and Italy. A strategic defensive was to be maintained in 

the Pacific until success against the European Axis Powers permitted transfer of major forces to the Pacific for an offensive against Japan. 13 

Of the five plans, RAINBOW 1 was basic, though most limited. Providing for the defense of the Western Hemisphere from the bulge of 

Brazil to Greenland and as far west as Midway in the Pacific, it es1:1 Kittredge, U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, Sec. I, Part D, Notes, pp. 42-46; Memo, 

JPC to JB, 23 Jun 39; Min, JB Mtg, 30 Jun 39, JB 325, Ser. 642. 
GERMANY FIRST 25 

tablished the necessary conditions that had to be met before any of 

the other plans could be executed. RAINBOW 2 and 3 called for offensive operation into the western Pacific, the former on the assumption 

that Great Britain and France would be allies, and the latter that 

they would not. In this respect, RAINBOW 3 established virtually the 

same conditions as the ORANGE plan. RAINBOW 4 also assumed that 

Great Britain and France would be neutral, presumably as a result 

of Axis military action, and therefore emphasized the defense of the 

Western Hemisphere against external aggression. Emphasis in this plan 

as in RAINBOW 1 was on limited action to fend off any Axis threat 

to the American Republics. In neither case (RAINBOW 1 or 4) were 

major U.S. forces to be sent to Europe or to the far Pacific. 

The situation envisaged in RAINBOW 5 came closer to the conditions of World War II than any of the others, though these were not 

foreseen at the time. Like RAINBOW 2, it assumed the active collaboration of Great Britain and France. But unlike that plan, which 

called for the United States to make the major effort in the Pacific, 

RAINBOW 5 envisaged the rapid projection of American forces across 

the Atlantic to Africa or Europe "in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany, Italy, or both." Clearly implied in this statement 

was the concept that finally emerged as the basic strategy of World 

War II: that in a war with the European Axis and Japan Germany 

was the major enemy and that the main effort therefore should be 

made in Europe to secure the decisive defeat of Germany at the earliest 

possible date. 

In June 1939 the international situation seemed to point toward 

the concept outlined under RAINBOW 2, that is, the projection of U.S. 

forces into the western Pacific with Great Britain and France providing the defenses of the Atlantic. The Navy was particularly interested 

in this plan, for it would have to carry the major load in any drive 

across the Pacific. And since the plan assured British and French allies, the Navy would be relieved of some of its responsibilities in the 

Atlantic to concentrate on the Pacific enemy. At the same time, the 

United States would have to protect the Far Eastern interests of its 

allies "as its major share in the concerted effort." Britain's plans for 

the defense of its Pacific and Asiatic possessions were, therefore, of the 

utmost importance to the American naval planners. 

Captain Ingersoll's visit to London in December 1937 had opened 

the way for a helpful exchange of information and co-ordinated planning between the American and British staffs. By the summer of 1939 

the time seemed ripe for further conversations, and in Mayan officer 

of the Admiralty Plans Division came to Washington to talk to the 

naval planners. 
26 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The increasing closeness between American and British naval planning was a vital element in the emergence of an Atlantic-first strategy. 

From the American point of view, such a strategy and the naval collaboration that flowed from it had a sound basis in national selfinterest. Admiral Mahan had pointed this out at the turn of the 

century and it had become a cardinal principle of American naval 

doctrine since. In the nineteenth century the Royal Navy alone had 

controlled the seas, and thus made possible the development of the 

United States; in the twentieth century, declared Mahan, the cooperation of Great Britain and the United States would assure the 

safety of the Atlantic community. Together, the two navies could 

command all the important sea routes of the world. 

Policy makers as well as naval officers understood very well the 

close dependence of American security on British sea power. President Roosevelt had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913 

to 1920 and fully appreciated the importance of sea power to the 

United States. Control of the Atlantic, he knew, must be always in 

the hands of friendly powers. That was a fundamental tenet of American policy and no effort would be too great to prevent any potential 

enemy from gaining command of the Atlantic approaches to the 

Western Hemisphere. Soon to become British Prime Minister, Churchill 

understood as well as Roosevelt the implications of naval power for 

the security of both countries. 

The summer of 1939 was one of tense expectancy. Europe was on 

the verge of war and Japan showed no disposition to abandon aggression in Asia. During these months, a joint RAINBOW 1 plan, which 

had first priority, was completed and the two services hurriedly pushed 

forward completion of their own plans for hemisphere defense. 14 

There were important organizational changes, too, at this time. 

In an effort to keep in close touch with his military advisers, President Roosevelt, on 5 July 1939, placed the Joint Board under his immediate "supervision and direction." Up to that time, the board, it 

will be recalled, had reported to the two service Secretaries, under 

whose authority the board functioned. It now had a broader basis, 

but still sent its recommendations through the Secretaries, for the 

President had no desire to alter existing procedures. 15 This change 

coincided with a change in the high command. 

"Joint War Plan RAINBOW 1, JB 325, Ser. 642-1. Approved by the Joint Board on 9 

August, by the Secretary of \Var and Secretary of Navy on 14 August 1939, and by the 

President orally two months later. 

" Military Order, 5 Jul 39; Memo of Secy JB, 20 Jul 39, JB 346, Ser. 646. 1 August, 

Admiral Harold R. Stark was appointed Chief of Naval Operations to succeed Admiral 

William D. Leahy, and a month later General George C. Marshall formally succeeded 

Malin Craig as Chief of Staff of the Army after two months as Acting Chief of Staff. 
GERMANY FIRST 27 

The outbreak of war in Europe early in September 1939 gave a 

fresh urgency to RAINBOW planning. RAINBOW 2 seemed to fit the 

situation of the moment best and while work went forward on the 

development of plans, the President took measures to strengthen the 

nation's defenses and to keep America out of war by keeping war away 

from America. Immediately on the outbreak of hostilities he proclaimed 

the neutrality of the United States, while ordering the Army and Navy 

to bring their strength up to the full authorized level. On his initiative, the foreign ministers of the American Republics met at Panama 

at the end of September to proclaim their neutrality and to devise 

measures for their joint defense. An American security zone was proclaimed in the western Atlantic, and plans made to patrol the zone 

to keep war away from the Americas. 

Throughout the winter of 1939-1940, the period of the "phony 

war," the joint planners sought to develop plans to meet the RAINBOW 2 contingency. The task proved a formidable one, indeed, for 

the range of possibilities was wide. Moreover, each proposed course 

of action in the Pacific had to be co-ordinated with the plans of the 

Allies. But without specific knowledge of these, the planners were 

faced with many uncertainties. In April 1940, therefore, they proposed that conversations should be held with the British, French, and 

Dutch "as soon as the diplomatic situation permits." By that time, 

the Army planners had prepared four drafts of a proposed RAINBOW 2 

plan, on each of which the Navy had commented in detaip6 

The Critical Summer of 1940 

The planners were still trying to solve the problems posed by 

RAINBOW when, in the spring of 1940, the nature of the war in Europe changed abruptly. Early in April German forces invaded Denmark and Norway and by the end of the month had occupied both 

countries. On 10 May the German campaign against France opened 

with the attack on the Netherlands and Belgium, and four days later 

German armor broke through the French defenses in the Ardennes. 

At the end of the month the British began the evacuation from Dunkerque, and on 10 June Italy declared war. A week later, the beaten 

and disorganized French Government sued for peace. With France 

defeated and England open to attack and invasion, the threat from 

the Atlantic looked real indeed. 

In this crisis, American strategy underwent a critical reVIew. 

Clearly, RAINBOW 2 and 3 with their orientation toward the far Pa-

'0 The various drafts of RAINBOW 2 can be found in the Army files of the JPC, JB 

325, Ser. 642-2. 
28 COMMAND DECISIONS 

cific were scarcely applicable to a situation in which the main threat 

seemed to lie in Europe. The defeat of France in June and the possibility that Great Britain might soon fall outweighed any danger that 

Japanese aggression could present to American security. Calling for 

an early decision from higher authority, the Army planners argued 

that since the United States could not fight everywhere-in the Far 

East, Europe, Africa, and South America-it should limit itself to a 

single course. Defense of the Western Hemisphere, they held, should 

constitute the main effort of American forces. In any case, the United 

States should not become involved with Japan and should concentrate on meeting the threat of Axis penetration into South America.17 

The Army's concern about America's ability to meet a possible 

threat from an Axis-dominated Europe in which the British and 

French Navies might be employed against the United States was shared 

by the Navy. As a result, the joint planners began work on RAINBOW 

4, which only a month earlier had been accorded the lowest priority, 

and by the end of May had completed a plan. The situation envisaged now in RAINBOW 4 was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine by 

Germany and Italy coupled with armed aggression in Asia after the 

elimination of British and French forces and the termination of the 

war in Europe. Under these conditions, the United States was to limit 

its actions to defense of the entire Western Hemisphere, with American forces occupying British and French bases in the western Atlantic. 18 

Acceptance by the Joint Board of the RAINBOW 4 plan was the beginning rather than the end of the comprehensive review of strategy 

precipitated by Germany's startling success in Europe. Still in doubt 

was the fate of Great Britain and the French Navy, and American 

policy depended to a very large degree on these two unknowns. Possession of the British and French Fleets would give the European Axis 

naval equality with the U.S. Fleet and make possible within six 

months hostile operations in the Western Hemisphere. Since six 

months was the time required to mobilize, equip, and train American 

forces, the planners asserted that "the date of the loss of the British 

or French Fleets automatically sets the date of our mobilization." 19 

During the dramatic weeks of May and June 1940, the President 

met with his military advisers almost daily and discussed with them 

17 Memos, WPD for Cofs, 22 May 40, sub: National Strategic Decisions, and Cofs for 

WPD, 23 May 40, no sub; Aide-Memoire, Maj. M. B. Ridgway, 23 May 40, all in WPD 

4175-10. 

lR Ltr, JPC to JB, 31 May 40, sub: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-RAINBOW 

4. The Joint Board approved the plan early in June and the Secretaries soon after. It 

was not approved by the President until 14 August. Relevant papers are in JB 325, Ser. 

642-4. 

19 Joint RAINBOW 4, JB 325, Ser. 642-4. 
GERMANY FIRST 29 

every major development of the war. On 13 June, shortly before the 

fall of France, he called in the intelligence chiefs of the Army and 

Navy and asked for an evaluation of the situation, posing a number 

of specific questions. This request precipitated an interim review of 

the various courses of action open to the United States in the light 

of the rapidly changing situation. As the planners saw it, there were 

three alternative courses open: 

1. To maintain a strong position in the Pacific and to avoid commitment everywhere else. 

2. To make every effort, including belligerent participation, to 

sustain Great Britain and France. 

3. To take whatever measures were required to prevent Axis penetration into the Western Hemisphere. 20 

All three possibilities had already been considered in one or another of 

the RAINBOW plans, but, as the planners pointed out, the essence of 

the problem now was time. RAINBOW 4 was the best course to follow 

in this situation, in their view, and the end of British or French resistance, they held, should be the signal for American mobilization. 

On the morning of 17 June, the day after the planners had submitted their report, General Marshall discussed the problem with his 

immediate assistants. "Are we not forced," he asked, "into a question of reframing our naval policy, that is, purely defensive action 

in the Pacific, with a main effort on the Atlantic side? We have to 

be prepared," Marshall told his staff, "to meet the worst situation 

that may develop, that is, if we do not have the Allied fleet in the 

Atlantic." The time had come, he thought, to mobilize the National 

Guard and to discontinue shipments to England of munitions that 

would be needed for American mobilization. 21 

On the basis of this discussion, the Chief of the War Plans Division, Brig. Gen. George V. Strong, recommended that same day that 

the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations propose to the 

President as the basic policy of the United States: first, a purely defensive position in the Pacific; second, no further commitments for 

material aid to the Allies; and third, immediate mobilization for hemisphere defense. These recommendations reflected the pessimistic and 

strongly conservative outlook of the Army staff at the time, a view 

the Army planner made no effort to conceal. His proposal, Strong 

stated frankly, was "a recognition of the early defeat of the Allies, 

an admission of our inability to furnish means in quantities sufficient 

21' Memo, Senior Army and Navy Members JPC to Directors WPD, 16 Jun 40, WPD 

4250-3. 

21 Notes on Conference in OCS, 17 Jun 40, Misc Conf, Binder 3. 
30 COMMAND DECISIONS 

to affect the situation, and an acknowledgment that we recognize 

the probability that we are next on the list of Axis powers .... " 22 

General Marshall and Admiral Stark approved General Strong's 

recommendations in principle on 18 June and directed their planners 

to outline the measures required "to effect an immediate mobilization of national effort for Hemisphere Defense." The result was a comprehensive review of national policy during the latter part of June by 

the War and Navy Departments, the State Department, and the 

President. With the study of the questions proposed by Roosevelt on 

the 13th, this review furnished an estimate of probable war developments and outlined the action required for full-scale mobilization and 

for aid to Britain and her allies. Though never approved by the 

President, the conclusions of the planners nevertheless reflected his 

views and constituted an important milestone in the development of 

U.S. strategy for World War 11. 23 

The critical point at issue in the discussions was the fate of the 

French Fleet and the future of Great Britain. The military wished to 

base their plans on the worst of all possible contingencies-that England, if not the British Empire, would be forced out of the war and 

that the French Fleet would fall to the Axis. The President, on the 

other hand, believed that American action should be based on the 

assumption that Great Britain would remain an active belligerent and 

that the military situation in Europe would not alter appreciably in 

the next six months. He did not feel, either, that aid to Britain 

should be cut off entirely, and countered the planners' arguments with 

the observation that if a small amount of aid would see the British 

through without seriously retarding American preparations, then that 

aid should be furnished. Nor was the President willing to put the 

armed forces on a wartime basis or to support full mobilization of 

manpower and industry. He agreed on the necessity for defense of 

the Western Hemisphere and the protective occupation of European 

colonial possessions as well as other strategic positions in the Caribbean area and in Central and South America, but only after consultation and negotiation with the other nations concerned. 

As a result of these discussions, the planners recommended that 

American policy be based on the following: 

1. That the British Empire would continue to exist in the fall and 

winter of 1940, though Great Britain itself might not remain an active combatant. 

22 Memo, WPD for Cors, 17 Jun 40, sub: National Defense Policy, WPD 4250-3. 

2:1 The relevant papers are filed in WPD 4250-3. 
GERMANY FIRST 31 

2. That France would be occupied by German forces, and even 

if the French in North Africa or elsewhere continued resistance, U.S. 

aid would not alter substantially the French position. 

3. That U.S. participation in the war as an active belligerent 

could not prevent the defeat of France or of Great Britain at this time. 

This estimate of the situation at the end of June led the planners to 

recommend, as the "Basis for Immediate Decisions Concerning the 

National Defense," a defensive strategy in the Pacific, regardless of 

the fate of the French Fleet. But if that fleet did fall into German 

hands, the planners recognized they would have to consider the question of whether to move the major portion of the U.S. Fleet to the 

Atlantic. The planners thought, too, that the further release of war 

materials needed for American forces would seriously weaken the 

United States. But they did not rule out altogether aid to Britain 

and stipulated, in accordance with Roosevelt's wishes, that aid would 

be given "under certain circumstances." 24 

During the summer of 1940, American policy and strategy were 

shaped in large measure by President Roosevelt's conviction that 

Britain must be encouraged to resist and that the British Fleet must 

not be permitted to fall to Germany. In a real sense, therefore, American strategy was dependent upon British fortunes. Only "one force," 

said Henry Stimson on the day after France's surrender, "remained 

between the Nazis and the Western Hemisphere-the British Fleet." 

If that fleet were lost, the United States would stand alone. 25 

Reassurances from the British that they had no intention of giving up the fight were gratifying to a President so closely committed 

to British support, but a more objective estimate of Great Britain's 

ability to resist invasion and detailed information on which to base 

plans were needed. To fill this need as well as to see for themselves 

how the British were fighting and what they needed most, the Army 

and Navy sent special observers to London in the summer of 1940 at 

Mr. Churchill's request. The Army observers were General Strong, 

Chief of the War Plans Division, and Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons 

of the Air Corps. Both would remain for only a few weeks, but the 

Navy observer, Rear Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, was to remain in 

London on extended duty. Already, the British had appointed their 

own Admiralty Committee, headed by Admiral Sir Sidney Bailey, to 

consider "naval cooperation with the United States Navy" in the event 

24 Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 27 Jun 40, sub: Basis for Immediate Decisions . 

. . See also preliminary studies by the planners, with the President's comments, in 

WPD 4250-3. 

"Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 318-19. 
32 COMMAND DECISIONS 

of American entry into the war, and had made clear to the Americans in a general way how they intended to fight the war. 26 

With the arrival of the special observers in London in August 1940, 

the conversations which had been carried on informally by the Navy 

since December 1937 were broadened to include Army representatives and enlarged in scope to include basic questions of strategy, 

command arrangements, and materiel requirements. None of the observers doubted the determination of the British people to continue 

their resistance. In their month in England, Generals Emmons and 

Strong were greatly impressed by the coolness and confidence of the 

British under attack, and by the organization, training, and techniques 

for defense against air attack. 27 The British faith in the efficacy of 

air bombardment, and the independent position of the Royal Air 

Force had an effect also on the two Army observers. Implicit in their 

report was a reflection of the British belief that Germany could be 

so weakened ultimately by bombardment as to make ground operations on the Continent feasible. 

The American observers also learned much about British strategy 

for the conduct of the war. In broad terms, the British chiefs outlined for the American observers their policy for the conduct of the 

war: 

1. The security of the United Kingdom and Imperial possessions 

and interests. . 

2. Command of the home waters and the eastern Mediterranean, 

while seeking to regain command of the entire Mediterranean. 

3. An intensified air offensive and economic pressures against both 

Germany and Italy. 

4. Development of resources for major offensive ground operations 

when opportunity offered. 28 

As to the Far East, the British admitted frankly that their interests would be best served if the U.S. Fleet remained in the Pacific. 

Their original plan had been to send a naval force to the Far East 

in the event of a Japanese attack, but that was no longer possible. 

On the other hand, if Japan came into the war and if the United 

States sent a portion of the fleet into the Atlantic, British surface vessels from the home fleet and the force at Gibraltar could be sent to 

the Far East. "The support of the American battle fleet," observed 

26 For a complete account of these developments and naval conversations, see Kittridge, U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, Section III, Parts A and B. 

27 Memo, Emmons and Strong for CofS, 22 Sep 40, sub: Observations in England, 

WPD 4368. 

28 Minutes of the Meetings with the British are in WPD 4402-1. 
GERMANY FIRST 33 

the Chief of the Air Staff, "would obviously transform the whole 

strategical situation in the Far East." 

On the question of American material aid, the British were equally 

frank. In response to a question from Admiral Ghormley as to whether 

the British were relying on economic support and eventual co-operation 

of the United States, they replied that in plans for the future "we 

were certainly relying on the continued economic and industrial cooperation of the United States in ever-increasing volume." These, 

they declared, "were fundamental to our whole strategy." But on the 

question of the "eventual active cooperation" of the United States, 

the British were somewhat evasive. "No account had been taken" of 

this possibility, they told the American observers, "since this was 

clearly a matter of high political policy." 

For the British, Germany clearly was the main enemy and the 

"mainspring" of the Axis effort in Europe. Arguing from this basis, 

the British insisted that "whatever action may be necessary against 

any other country must, therefore, be related to our main object, which 

is the defeat of Germany" -a statement that came very close to the 

basic strategic decision of World War II. And when Admiral Ghormley 

asked the British how they expected to achieve this goal and whether 

the final issue would be decided on land, they replied that "in the 

long run it was inevitable that the Army should deliver the coup de 

griice." But they hoped that the Army's task could be made considerably easier by "a serious weakening in the morale and fighting efficiency of the German machine, if not a complete breakdown." How 

this would be accomplished the British did not specify, but their 

emphasis on bombardment indicated that air power would certainly 

playa leading role in the weakening of Germany. 

Shift to the Atlantic, September 1940-January 1941 

Events in Europe after June 1940 gave hope for a brighter future 

than had seemed possible after the German offensives in April and 

May. The success of the British in beating off the attacks of the 

Luftwaffe and the reports of the special observers led to a more favvorable program of support for the British war effort and to other 

measures of aid such as the transfer of fifty old destroyers in return 

for a lease on air and naval base sites in British possessions in the 

western Atlantic. For the moment, the Axis threat in Europe seemed 

to be blunted and the way opened for co-operation with the British 

in the Far East. 

But the summer calm gave way to the storms of September. On 

the 22d of the month, Japanese troops entered northern Indochina, 
34 COMMAND DECISIONS 

and five days later the Japanese Government announced its adherence to the Rome-Berlin Axis. Just two days before the signing of 

the Tripartite Pact, the Army planners had completed a report on 

the ability of the United States to cope with the problems presented 

by the Axis threat. After reviewing the possibilities in Europe, the 

planners pointed out that the United States might soon face renewed 

advances in the Far East, possibly against the Netherlands Indies, or 

the Philippines, but that it would not be possible to oppose such moves 

by a major effort in the Pacific in view of the greater danger in the 

Atlantic. Operations in the Pacific, they maintained, should be held 

to the minimum. 29 

There was general agreement in Washington with this view. The 

main problem was how to avoid a conflict with Japan and at the same 

time maintain American interests and defend American possessions in 

the Far East. The answer perhaps lay in Europe, for there was strong 

reason to believe that Japan would take no overt military action 

against the United States or Great Britain until German victory seemed 

assured. This line of reasoning served to strengthen the view that as 

long as Great Britain was in danger, the United States should remain on the defensive in the Pacific. It was also a powerful argument 

for continued aid to Britain and for opposition to any move that might 

risk serious hostilities with the Japanese. 

Early in October the entire subject of American policy toward 

Japan was reviewed at the highest level in Washington. Inevitably 

the question of British co-operation arose. The military chiefs opposed 

strong action on the ground that the British would be unable to send 

any forces into the area and that the United States could not undertake to assume Allied obligations in the Far East. Despite the wellknown views of the American staff, the British continued their efforts 

to persuade the Americans to join in the defense of their Far Eastern 

possessions by sending naval units to Singapore. In May 1940 Churchill 

had offered to let the Americans use Singapore "in any way convenient" in order, as he put it, to "keep the Japanese quiet in the 

Pacific." On 4 October he tried again. In a strong personal message 

to President Roosevelt discussing the Far Eastern situation, he asked, 

"Would it not be possible for you to send an American squadron, the 

bigger the better, to pay a friendly visit to Singapore? There they 

would be welcomed in a perfectly normal and rightful way.".30 

Both Admiral Stark and General Marshall were opposed to the 

dispatch of an American naval force to Singapore and agreed that 

29 Memo, WPD for Cols, 25 Sep 40, sub: Problem of Production ... , WPD 4321-9. 

:10 The message is quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 497-98; see also p. 25. 
GERMANY FIRST 35 

the greater danger was in the eastern Atlantic. Secretary Hull also 

opposed the move. As he told the British Ambassador: "It will not 

be wise, even from the British standpoint, for two wars to be raging 

at the same time, one in the East and the other in the West. If this 

country should enter any war, this would immediately result in greatly 

cutting off military supplies to Great Britain." 31 The move would be 

politically inexpedient also, for this was an election year and Roosevelt was already in the midst of a campaign for election to a third 

term. A military gesture such as Churchill had proposed was likely 

to lose more votes than it would gain. Thus, on the ground of political expediency as well as strategy, the President turned down Mr. 

Churchill's invitation. 

Developments since the summer of 1940 had made the need for 

a closer co-ordination of British and American plans increasingly evi: 

dent. Almost every important problem faced by the military planners 

raised questions that could not be settled without a knowledge of 

British capabilities and plans. But the hectic months of a Presidential 

campaign and the uncertainty of the outcome discouraged any serious effort to lay the basis for such co-ordination. By early November, 

President Roosevelt's re-election seemed certain and on the eve of the 

election Admiral Stark made the first bid for a firm and clear statement of American policy that would provide the basis for co-ordinated 

U.S.-British plans. 32 It was the most comprehensive analysis thus far 

of the various courses of action open to the United States, the military effect of developments in Europe and Asia, and the close relationship between British fortunes and American policy. Known as the 

"Plan Dog" memorandum because the recommended course of action 

if the United States became a belligerent was contained in paragraph 

D ("Dog" in military parlance), Admiral Stark's study constitutes 

perhaps the most important single document in the development of 

World War II strategy. 

The central point of Admiral Stark's analysis was the recognition 

that American security depended to a very large extent on the fate 

of Great Britain. This note he sounded at the very outset with the 

assertion that "if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could 

win everywhere; but that if she loses the problems confronting us 

would be very great; and while we might not lose everywhere) we might, 

possibly, not win anywhere." Should the British Empire collapse, it 

'" Memoirs of Cordell Hull, I, 906. 

'" Memo, Stark for Secy of Navy, 12 Nov 40, no sub. This is a revision of the original 

4 November memo, no copies of which are in the Army file, revised to include the Army 

WPD comments and sent to the President. All papers relevant to this memo are filed in 

WPD 4175-15. 
36 COMMAND DECISIONS 

seemed probable to Stark that the victorious Axis powers would seek 

to expand their control, economically at first and then politically and 

militarily, into the Western Hemisphere. The military consequences 

of a British defeat were so serious for the United States, Stark declared, that Britain ought to be assisted in every way possible. He 

did not believe, either, that Britain had the manpower or material to 

conquer Germany. Assistance by powerful allies would be necessary 

ultimately, and to be ready for this eventuality Britain "must not only 

continue to maintain the blockade, but she must also retain intact 

geographical positions from which successful land actions can later be 

launched." 

In facing the consequences of close co-operation with the British, 

Admiral Stark boldly raised the possibility-thus far avoided-of active American participation in the war. Since Britain could not herself defeat Germany, the question was how American resources in men 

and supplies could be employed in combination with the British to 

achieve this end. Admiral Ghormley, it will be recalled, had raised 

this question with the British in London in August, asking whether 

large-scale ground operations would be necessary. He had received 

an affirmative reply from the British then, and Stark now returned 

to this point. Blockade and bombardment, the means favored by the 

British, he did not think would do the job. The only certain way of 

defeating Germany was "by military success on shore," and for that, 

bases close to the European continent would be required. "I believe," 

Stark declared, "that the United States, in addition to sending naval 

assistance, would also need to send large air and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to participate strongly in this land 

offensive. " 

Considering the importance of the Atlantic to American security, 

Stark argued strongly against major commitments in the far Pacific 

that would involve the United States in an all-out effort against Japan 

such as was envisaged in ORANGE. Such a course would have the effect of drawing resources away from the Atlantic and cutting down 

aid to Britain. Even a limited war against Japan would require strong 

reinforcements in the southwest Pacific and southeast Asia to defend 

British and Dutch possessions. Also, it might prove very difficult indeed to prevent a limited war from becoming unlimited, as the Japanese later found out. Nor did Stark see how the defeat of Japan, 

even if this could be accomplished, would contribute materially to 

the more important objectives of the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the continued existence of the British Empire. To perform 

all the tasks required to achieve these objectives, the United States 

could "do little more in the Pacific than remain on a strict defensive." 
GERMANY FIRST 37 

The major alternative courses of action open to the United States, 

as Stark viewed the possibilities, were four, and he stated them as 

questions: 

A. Shall our principal military effort be directed toward hemisphere 

defense and security in both oceans? [Similar to RAINBOW 1 and 4.] 

B. Shall we prepare for a full offensive against Japan, premised on assistance from the British and Dutch forces in the Far East, and remain on 

the strict defensive in the Atlantic? [Similar to RAINBOW 2, or RAINBOW 3 

and ORANGE with allies.] 

C. Shall we plan for sending the strongest possible military assistance 

both to the British in Europe and to the British, Dutch, and Chinese in 

the Far East? [In effect, this would call for an equal effort on two fronts 

while defending the Western Hemisphere.] 

D. Shall we direct our efforts toward an eventual strong offensive in 

the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific? 

[Similar to RAINBOW 5.] 

There was no doubt in Admiral Stark's mind that the alternative 

outlined in paragraph "Dog" would best serve the national interests. 

It would enable the United States to exert all its effort in a single 

direction, make possible the greatest assistance t0 Britain, and provide 

the strongest defense of the Western Hemisphere. The one great disadvantage of Plan Dog, of course, was that it would leave Japan free 

to pursue her program of expansion in Asia and the southwest Pacific. Therefore the United States, while making every effort to avoid 

war with Japan, should seek to keep that nation from occupying 

British and Dutch possessions in that area. 

Plan Dog was the course to be followed in the event of war-and 

Stark seemed to have little doubt that the United States would soon 

be involved in the European conflict. But if war did not come, or, 

as he put it, "until such time as the United States should decide to 

engage its full forces in war," the best course to follow would be that 

outlined in paragraph A, that is, build up the defenses of the Western Hemisphere and stand ready to fight off a threat in either ocean. 

Should his proposals find favor with the President, Stark strongly 

urged measures to put them into effect. The first step would be to 

prepare a joint plan as a guide for Army and Navy planning, and at 

least the "skeleton" of alternative plans for other situations that might 

develop. Such plans, however, would be of limited value if there was 

not a "clear understanding between the nations involved as to the 

strength and extent of the participation which may be expected in 

any particular theater .... " For this reason, therefore, he recommended that secret staff talks be initiated with British military and 

naval authorities "to reach agreements and lay down plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it necessary 

to enter the war." The British had already suggested such conversa-
38 COMMAND DECISIONS 

tions on varIOUS occasions, the most recent suggestions having been 

made in October by the British Ambassador to Secretary Hull ill 

Washington, and by Admiral Sir Dudley Pound to Ghormley ill 

London. 

The reaction of General Marshall and the Army planners to Plan 

Dog was entirely favorable. As a matter of fact, the Army had argued 

substantially along these lines in June 1940, when the prospect of an 

Axis victory in Europe had seemed so great, and General Marshall 

had then asked whether it would not be advisable to reframe U.S. 

naval policy so as to place the main effort in the Atlantic with "purely 

defensive action in the Pacific." 33 Thus, except for minor comments, 

the Army planners endorsed the Stark proposals, which went forward 

to the President on 13 N ovem ber. On the 18th the Joint Board instructed its planning committee to study the questions raised by Admiral Stark and prepare recommendations for submission to the 

President and the Secretaries of War and Navy.34 

The British, who presumably learned of Plan Dog from Admiral 

Ghormley, also agreed with Admiral Stark. Since the plan was based 

so largely on the need to maintain the British Empire, this is not surprising. Churchill thought the plan "strategically sound" and "highly 

adapted to our interests," as indeed it was, but only because of the 

identity of British and American interests. He was "much encouraged 

by the American naval view," and cautioned his staff "to strengthen 

the policy of Admiral Stark" and "not use arguments inconsistent 

with it." 35 Apparently the British chiefs took this advice seriously for 

on 23 November Admiral Ghormley reported to Stark that in the 

view of the Admiralty, which he believed to be the view of the British Government, "the primary objective of the war is the defeat of 

Germany and Italy," and that in case Japan and the United States 

should enter the war, U.S.-British strategy in the Pacific should be 

to contain the Japanese and prevent extension of the operations to 

the south and to the Indian Ocean.36 But the British clung to their 

faith in Singapore, and still hoped the United States would send a 

naval force there to hold it against the Japanese. 

While arrangements went forward for conversations with the Brit-

:33 Notes of Conference in OCS, 17 Jun 40, sub: Defense Problems, OCS Misc Conf. 

H Ltr, CotS to JB, 18 Nov 40, sub: National Defense Policy for the United States, JB 

325, Ser. 670; Memos, WPD for CotS, 13 Nov 40, sub: National Policy of the U.S.; Secy 

Gen Staff for WPD, same date, no sub; and ColS for Secy of War, same date, no sub, all 

in WPD 4175-15. 

:J5 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 690-91. The quotes are from his message of 22 N 0-

vember 1940 to the First Sea Lord. 

:;6 Ghormley to Stark, 23 Nov 40, quoted in Kittredge, U.S.-British Naval Relations, 

Sec. II, Part D, p. 313, and Notes, App. B, Records of Admiralty Meeting, 22 Nov 40. 
GERMANY FIRST 39 

ish, the joint planners continued their efforts to produce a statement 

of national defense policy based on Admiral Stark's recommendation. 

If acceptable, this document was to be submitted for approval to the 

President by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and was to serve 

as the basis for instructions to the American representatives in the 

forthcoming staff conversations. On 21 December the joint planners 

completed their work. In all essential respects, their recommendations 

were similar to those of Admiral Stark. The major objective of U.S. 

defense policy, they said, was the security of the Western Hemisphere, 

and this was to be secured by full co-operation with the British 

Commonwealth. Until forced to enter the war, the United States should 

follow the course advocated in paragraph A of Stark's memorandum; 

if forced into war with Japan, the United States should at the same 

time enter the war in the Atlantic and limit operations in the midPacific and Far East so as "to permit prompt movement to the Atlantic of forces fully adequate to conduct a major offensive in that 

ocean." 37 American policy and strategy, therefore, would be designed 

to defeat Germany and its allies in order to prevent the extension of 

Axis influence into the Western Hemisphere, while seeking to keep 

the Japanese from entering the war or from attacking British and 

Dutch territory in the Far East. 

The Joint Board approved the work of its planners on 21 December, and the Secretaries of War and Navy gave their approval soon 

after. The original intention was to have the Secretary of State join 

the two service Secretaries in submitting these recommendations to 

the President for his approval as the basis for future action by all 

agencies of the government. But Mr. Hull refused. He was in general 

agreement with these policies, he declared, but was doubtful of the 

propriety of "joining in the submission to the President of a technical 

military statement of the present situation." 38 

Arrangements for staff conferences with the British were completed 

early in January 1941, and on the 15th the British delegation left for 

the United States. There had been preliminary exchanges of view by 

cable and a proposed set of instructions prepared for the American 

representatives. But the military authorities still did not have President Roosevelt's approval of the recommended national defense policy, 

which was to constitute the guide lines for the American delegates. 

Finally, on 16 January, the President met with his principal advisers, 

:17 Ltr, JPC to JB, 21 Dec 40, sub: National Defense Policy for the U.S., JB 325, Ser. 

670. Earlier drafts and directives are in the same file. See also relevant papers in WPD 

4175-15 and JB 325, Ser. 674. 

38 Memo, Brig Gen L. T. Gerow for Cofs, 3 Jan 41, sub: Conf with Secy of State, 

WPD 4175-15. 
40 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the two Secretaries and the service chiefs. Present at the meeting also 

was the Secretary of State. The group came to be known informally 

as the War Council. 

The meeting opened with a consideration of the problems raised 

by the possibility of simultaneous action by Germany and Japan 

against the United States. The President thought there was only "one 

chance in five" of such an attack but he avoided any commitment 

on the basic question of whether to plan for a major effort in the Atlantic or Pacific. On one point, though, he left no doubt. There was 

to be no curtailment of aid to Britain, even in the event of a concerted attack in the Atlantic and Pacific. Clearly, the President's 

major concern was with Great Britain. In that sense, he was of the 

same mind as his chief military and civilian advisers. He thought the 

Navy should be prepared to convoy shipping in the Atlantic and continue to patrol the east coast. But he was equally anxious that the 

Army should not be committed to any operations until it was fully 

prepared, and that American military policy should be "very conservative" until its strength had been greatly increased. In Latin 

America, the United States would have to be prepared, the President 

declared, to provide forces, properly trained, to assist the governments 

in their resistance to subversive Axis activity. 

The President's view of American policy in the Pacific coincided 

closely with that of the military authorities. There the United States 

would stand on the defensive with the fleet based on Hawaii. There 

was to be no naval reinforcement of the Philippines, and the commander of the Asiatic Fleet, based in the Philippines, was to have 

discretionary authority in the event of attack to withdraw when he 

thought it necessary. The choice was his and it would be up to him 

to decide whether to sail east toward Pearl Harbor or south to Singapore, as the British wished. 39 

By the middle of January 1941, the major lines of American strategy in World War II had emerged and the re-election of President 

Roosevelt assured a continuation of the policy established during the 

critical summer months of 1940. While hoping to achieve his aims by 

measures short of war, the President had publicly stressed during the 

preceding months America's unreadiness for war and the danger from 

Europe and the Far East. Army and Navy planners had defined the 

problem facing the United States in a series of studies and had made 

plans to meet various situations which might arise. The most likely 

contingency in early 1941 was that the United States, allied with 

.1" Memo, Cofs for WPD, 17 Jan 41, sub: White House Conf of 16 Jan 41, WPD 

4175-18. 
GERMANY FIRST 41 

Great Britain, might be involved in a two-ocean war against a combination of Germany, Italy, and Japan. In such a contingency, it was 

generally agreed, the United States would adopt a defensive role in 

the Pacific and make its main effort against the most powerful and 

dangerous enemy, Germany. But many matters still remained to be 

decided before firm plans could be made that would best serve the 

interests of the United States and the free nations of the world. First 

among these was the necessity for agreement between the United 

States and Great Britain on how best to secure these objectives. 

The Decision Is Made 

During the first three weeks of January 1941 the planners of the 

Joint Board completed their arrangements for the American-British 

Staff Conference. On 21 January they submitted to the board a proposed agenda for the meetings and a statement of the American position. The meetings were to be nonpolitical; no specific commitments 

were to be made (except for methods of co-operation) and agreements 

reached would be subject to approval by the two governments. Within 

this framework, the delegates were to determine the best methods by 

which the forces of both nations could defeat Germany and its allies 

should the United States be "compelled to resort to war"-a phrase 

introduced by the President; reach agreement on the methods and 

nature of military co-operation; and co-ordinate plans for the use of 

their forces. 

As a guide for the delegates, American national objectives were 

defined in virtually the same terms that Admiral Stark used: (1) Pwtection of the Western Hemisphere against military or political encroachment by any other power; (2) Aid to the British Commonwealth; 

(3) Opposition by diplomatic means to Japanese expansion. In the 

event of war, the "broad military objective" of the United States and 

Britain would be the defeat of Germany, which would be "most effectively attained" by placing the principal military effort in the Atlantic, or "navally in the Mediterranean" -another presidential phrase. 

In the way of practical advice in negotiating with the British, the 

delegates were to keep the following in mind: 

It is believed that we cannot afford, nor do we need, to entrust our 

national future to British direction .... 

United States Army and Navy officials are in rather general agreement 

that Great Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Germany unless the 

United States provides that nation with direct military assistance .... 

It is to be expected that proposals of the British representatives will 

have been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the British Com-
42 COMMAND DECISIONS 

monwealth. Never absent from British minds are their postwar interests, 

commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard our own eventual 

interests. 4o 

The Joint Board gave its approval to these instructions and procedures on 22 January, submitting them in turn to the Secretaries of 

War and the Navy with the suggestion that the statement defining 

the military position and strategy governing the action of U.S. forces 

be approved by the President. As a result Secretary Knox personally 

submitted the report to the President on the 23d and three days 

later Roosevelt approved it with minor changes in wording. 41 

The American-British staff conversations opened in Washington 

on 29 January 1941 and continued through fourteen sessions to 

29 March, when the delegates submitted a final report, commonly 

known as ABC-1. 42 At the outset, the British stated their position 

clearly and fully: 

1. The European Theater is the vital theater where a decision must 

first be sought. 

2. The general policy should therefore be to defeat Germany and Italy 

first, and then deal with Japan. 

3. The security of the Far Eastern position, including Australia and 

New Zealand, is essential to the cohesion of the British Commonwealth 

and to the maintenance of its war effort. Singapore is the key to the defense of these interests and its retention must be assured. 

In line with this strategy, U.S. naval forces, after appropriate dispositions for defense of the Western Hemisphere, should be employed 

mainly in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, the British stated. But they 

also declared that the United States should maintain in the Pacific a 

fleet large enough to prevent the Japanese from prejudicing the main 

effort in the Atlantic. 

There was no disagreement between the Americans and the British on the first two points. Both sides were agreed that Germany was 

the main enemy and their first objective. They agreed further that 

the Atlantic would be the decisive theater of the war and the principal effort of the two nations would be made there. The delegates 

also recognized the legitimate interests of each side, an indispensable 

basis for co-operation. On the American side, the security of the United 

40 JPC to JB, 21 Jan 41, sub: Jt Instruction for Army and Navy Representatives ... , 

JB 325, Ser. 674. 

41 Memo, FDR for Secy of Navy, 26 Jan 41, JB 325, Ser. 674; Min, JB Mtg, 22 Jan 

41. The changes are noted above. 

42 Papers relating to the meeting are located in OPD Executive Office Files, Item 11, 

Executive 4, and WPD 4402-1 passim. The report itself is found in several files, but is 

available in printed form in the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Exhibit 49, Part 15, pages 

1485-1542. 
GERMANY FIRST 43 

States and the defense of the Western Hemisphere were considered 

of paramount interest, with first call on American forces. British interests were broader, encompassing the security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. "A cardinal feature of British strategic policy," 

the delegates agreed, "is the retention of a position in the Far East 

such as will insure cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth 

and the maintenance of its war effort." 

The third point of British strategy, the importance of Singapore, 

involved the whole question of Far Eastern strategy. On this, there 

was a fundamental disagreement between the British and the American delegates. This disagreement stemmed partly from different national interests. The British had to deal with problems of Commonwealth security, and in their view Singapore was essential to the defense 

of India, Australia, and New Zealand. American interests in the Far 

East, though substantial, were not as vital. The only American possession of importance in the area, the Philippines, had virtually been 

written off as indefensible in a war with Japan. 

There was a basic difference in outlook also between the British 

and Americans. Reflecting their insular position and long tradition in 

wars against continental powers, the British placed their main emphasis on sea and air power rather than large-scale ground forces. 

The reduction of Germany by these means would be a slow process, 

but the British were accustomed to long wars and had no doubt of 

ultimate victory. The final blow, they expected, would be delivered 

by ground armies, but to prepare for that eventuality they would first 

secure or regain the strategic positions required for the offensiveSingapore, the Mediterranean-and then concentrate on weakening 

the enemy's war machine. Victory with minimum losses and minimum risks, exploitation of superior naval power and avoidance of 

large-scale continental operations-that was the classic British strategy. 

The Americans, conscious of their overwhelming material power 

and unwilling to face the prospects of a long war, wished to concentrate all their power at the earliest possible moment against the main 

enemy. To achieve this aim and end the war quickly with fewer casualties in the long run, they were willing to face the temporary loss 

of strategic positions like the Philippines and to risk substantial casualties initially rather than disperse their forces or adopt a purely 

defensive or delaying strategy. 

These differences emerged sharply in the discussions over Singapore. What the British were asking the Americans to do was to underwrite the defense of the Commonwealth and incorporate as a 

central feature of Allied strategy the British concept of the importance 

of Singapore as the key to defense of the Far East, even at the ex-
44 COMMAND DECISIONS 

pense of concentrating for a decisive blow against Germany at the 

earliest possible date. Though the Americans appreciated the political, 

economic, and symbolic significance of Singapore for the British Commonwealth, they doubted its strategic value and the wisdom of underwriting its defense. To accept the British proposal would not only 

have been contrary to their instructions but would constitute, the 

American delegates believed, "a strategic error of incalculable 

magnitude." 43 They therefore refused to budge from the position that 

the British must look after their own special interests, as the United 

States would look after its own in the Philippines, and that the two 

nations should act together where their interests coincided, that is, in 

the North Atlantic and the British Isles. 

The report submitted by the American and British delegates laid 

down the basic guidelines of allied co-operation in World War II. It 

defined clearly the policies, the "paramount interests" of both countries, and the general strategic concepts designed to support these 

policies. Among the major strategic objectives accepted by both sides 

were: 

1. The early defeat of Germany, the predominant member of the 

Axis, the principal military effort of the United States being exerted 

in the Atlantic and European area, the decisive theater. Operations 

in other theaters were to be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the main effort. 

2. The maintenance of British and allied positions in the Mediterranean area. 

3. The strategic defensive in the Far East, with the U.S. Fleet 

employed offensively "in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by directing Japanese strength away from Malaysia." 

To secure these objectives, the delegates agreed on a number of 

specific measures, including economic pressure, a sustained air offensive against German military power, the early elimination of Italy 

from the war, raids and minor offensives at every opportunity, and 

the support of resistance movements in Axis-dominated countries. All 

these would be preparatory to the final offensive against Germany. 

For that it would be necessary to secure bases in the Mediterranean 

and on the west and northwest shores of Europe, and to gather 

"maximum land forces, composed largely of mobile armored divisions," to defeat and destroy the German Army. 

The agreements reached between the American and British staffs 

and embodied in ABC-l were never intended to be binding on the 

43 Memo, Army Delegates for Cofs, 12 Feb 41, sub: Dispatch of U.S. Forces to Singapore, WPD 4402-3. 
GERMANY FIRST 45 

two nations, or to have any political or official character, but only 

to determine the way in which the United States and the British 

Commonwealth could defeat Germany "should the United States be 

compelled to resort to war." From the start it was understood that 

conclusions reached by the conferees would have to be confirmed by 

the Chiefs of Staff of both nations and were contingent upon political 

agreements by the two governments. In line with this understanding, 

General Marshall and Admiral Stark gave their tentative approval to 

the ABC-l report and advised the British Chiefs that they would present it to the President for approval at an appropriate time. 44 At the 

same time the Joint Board issued a new directive for the preparation 

of plans under RAINBOW 5, the situation most closely meeting the requirements laid down in ABC-I. 

Work on RAINBOW 5 had been initiated originally in May 1940, 

after the German offensive in the west but before the fall of France. 

In April of that year the Joint Board had established a new priority 

for the development of RAINBOW plans, placing 5 after 2 and 3. 45 

The situation envisaged then in RAINBOW 5 was a war in which the 

United States, allied with Great Britain and France, would project 

its armed forces "to either or both of the African and European continents as rapidly as possible" to accomplish the decisive defeat of 

Germany. The planning done in May on this basis was rendered obsolete within a month by the fall of France. Moreover, it seemed 

doubtful at the time that Great Britain would survive, and the planners turned their efforts to other RAINBOW situations-first, RAINBOW 4 

(hemisphere defense), and then RAINBOW 3 (United States alone in a 

major effort against Japan). By the end of 1940, when it appeared 

that Britain would survive and a revised RAINBOW 5 situation was 

the most likely contingency to plan for, arrangements were already 

under way for the American-British Staff conversations. 

Once the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations had given 

their approval to ABC-I, work on RAINBOW 5 progressed rapidly. By 

30 April, the Army and Navy had agreed on a joint plan and on 

that date submitted their work to the Joint Board. For the purposes 

of this plan, the allies-Associated Powers, they were called-were 

assumed to be the United States, the British Commonwealth (less 

Eire), the Netherlands Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, China, the Governments-in-Exile, and the Free French; the Axis nations, Germany, 

Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and possibly Japan and Thai44 Ltr, CofS and CNO to Special Army and Navy Observers in London, 4 Apr 41, 

sub: Tentative Approval of ABC-I, WPD 4402-18. See notation on Copy 98, Pearl Harbor 

Attack Hearings, Part 15, 1485. 

45 Ltr, JPC to JB, 9 Apr 40, sub: Jt Plans-RAINBOW, Approved 10 Apr, JB 325. Ser. 

642-1. 
46 COMMAND DECISIONS 

land. These last two, even if they were not in the war initially, were 

potential enemies and the possibility of their intervention was therefore taken into account in the plan. 46 

RAINBOW 5 was virtually identical with ABC-I. As a matter of 

fact, one of the first assumptions of the plan was that the allies would 

conduct the war "in accord with ABC-I" and the arrangements 

made with the Canadians. Thus, the strategic concepts, supporting 

measures, and missions enumerated in ABC-l were repeated almost 

verbatim in RAINBOW 5. For the U.S. Army, "the primary immediate 

effort" would be to build up large land and air forces "for major offensive operations against the Axis powers" and other operations were 

to be restricted to those that would "not materially delay this effort." 

Just what these operations would consist of was not specified, although 

reference was made, as in ABC-I, to a large-scale attack by ground 

forces against Germany and to the capture of bases from which to 

launch such an offensive. As one of the Army planners explained at 

the time, "a plan must be formulated upon a situation and no prediction of the situation which will exist when such a plan can be implemented should be made." 47 

RAINBOW 5 was neither a blueprint for victory nor a plan of operations. It merely outlined the objectives and missions of American 

forces in case of war on the basis of assumptions that seemed sound 

at the time. Specific plans to achieve these objectives were still to be 

made. The first step was to secure authority to proceed. 

Joint Board authority came on 14 May when the board formally 

approved both RAINBOW 5 and ABC-I, which it had tentatively approved early in April. Approval of the Secretaries came on 28 May 

(Navy) and 2 June (Army), at which time both plans went to the 

President, with the explanation that the British Chiefs of Staff had 

approved ABC-l provisionally and submitted it to their government 

for approval. The President apparently read the two documents carefully but withheld approval of ABC-Ion the ground that the British 

had not yet approved it. Nor would he approve RAINBOW 5, presumably because it was based on ABC-I, that is, on arrangements with 

the British which had not yet been accepted by their government. 

He did request, however, that "in case of war" the two plans be returned to him for his approval. 48 

46 Ltr, JPC to JB, 30 Apr 41, sub: Joint Basic War Plan-RAINBOW 5, End A, JB 325, 

Ser. 642-5. 

47 Memo, WPD for Cofs [May 1941]' sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeditions, 

cited in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 45-46. 

48 Min, JB Mtg, 14 May. The correspondence relating to the approval by the Secretaries and the statement recording the President's reaction are filed in JB 325, Ser. 642-5. 
GERMANY FIRST 47 

The President's ambiguous response to the carefully worked out 

arrangements with the British, and to the American plans based on 

these arrangements, raised the question whether the Army and Navy 

were authorized to proceed with their own planning for war on a 

RAINBOW 5 contingency. This question was resolved on 10 June at a 

meeting in Mr. Stimson's office. General Marshall's view was that 

since the President had not disapproved the plan, the Army could 

proceed with its own arrangements. This seemed reasonable, and it 

was on that basis that the services proceeded to make detailed plans 

for the employment of their forces!9 

Though the President had not given his approval, the decision on 

the course the United States would follow in the event it was "compelled to resort to war" had, in effect, been made. The United 

States would make the main effort in the Atlantic and European area 

where the major enemy, Germany, was located. Just how the final 

blow would be delivered was not yet known, but the Americans expected it would require a large-scale ground offensive. In the Pacific 

and Far East, United States strategy would be defensive, with greatest emphasis on the area encompassed by the strategic triangle, 

Alaska-Hawaii-Panama. Implicit in this concept was acceptance of 

the loss of the Philippines, Wake, and Guam. Thus, in a period of 

less than three years, the Pacific orientation of U.S. strategy, developed over a period of many years, was completely reversed. By mid1941, in response to the threat from Europe, the eyes of American 

strategists were focused on the Atlantic. It was there, they believed, 

that the war in which the United States was certain to be involved 

would be decided. 

These expectations were more than fulfilled. Though the war when 

it came opened with an attack in the Pacific, the President and his 

military advisers made it clear at the outset in the first of the wartime conferences with the British held at Washington in December 

1941-January 1942 (ARCADIA) that they would stand by their decision 

to defeat Germany first. Not once during the course of the war was 

this decision successfully challenged . 

• 9 Min, Conference OSW, 10 June 41, WDCSA, Secy of War Conf, 1. 

2 

The German Decision To Invade 

Norway and Denmark 

by 

Earl F. Ziemke 

The German invasion of Norway was a dramatically daring military operation. The decision to embark on the venture was made by 

Adolf Hitler as Chief of State and also (since December 1938) as 

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the German Reich. He 

arrived at it over a period of six months during which the proposal 

was debated at length in the highest echelons of the German Armed 

Forces. Hitler's own attitude shifted during that time from lukewarmness verging on indifference to determination. Since the war the decision has been both praised and condemned; here it is presented as 

an example of decision-making in a developing situation. 1 

Even though the occupation of Norway and Denmark had no significant effect on the outcome of the war, it established a milestone 

in the history of warfare by demonstrating the effective reach of modern military forces. Although lacking the resources to capitalize on it, 

the Germans had made a move of potential value to them in the development of a global strategy. It confronted the United States as 

well as Great Britain with a strategic threat. It brought Germany, 

theoretically at least, into a position to strike outward from the mainland of Europe toward Iceland, Greenland, and possibly the North 

American continent. 

1 A more extensive discussion of the German planning and operations appears in Earl 

F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater oj War, 1940-1945, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-271 (Washington, 1959). The British and Allied side of the Norwegian operation 

is presented in T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 

1952) and in]. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Volume II (London: H. M. Stationery 

Office, 1957), Chapters V and VI. 

EARL F. ZIEMKE, Historian with OCMH since 1955. B.A., M.A., and 

Ph.D. in history, University of Wisconsin; staff member, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University. U.S. Marine Corps, World 

War II. Author: The German Northern Theater if War, 1940-1945 (in preparation), Foreign Studies series, OCMH. 
50 COMMAND DECISIONS 

German Interest in Norway 

Immediately after the outbreak of war in September 1939, Norway, jointly with Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, announced its 

neutrality. In that action the Scandinavian states were following a 

policy they had adhered to consistently, if not always with complete 

success, since the middle of the nineteenth century. Germany, for its 

part, on 2 September 1939 presented a note in Oslo in which it declared its intention to respect the territorial integrity of Norway under all circumstances but warned that it expected the Norwegian 

Government to maintain an irreproachable neutrality and that it would 

not tolerate an infringement of that neutrality by a third power. A 

month later, on 9 October, in a secret memorandum on the conduct 

of the war, Hitler stated that the neutrality of the "Nordic States" 

was to be assumed for the future and that a continuation of German 

trade with those countries appeared possible even in a war of long 

duration. 2 

With due allowance for Hitler's tendency to play by ear, it can 

be said that the German interest in Norwegian neutrality at the beginning of the war was sincere. For Germany the advantages were 

substantial. Of the approximately six million tons of Swedish magnetite iron ore which Germany imported annually, about half passed 

through the Norwegian ice-free port of Narvik. (See Map 1.) From 

Narvik, as long as Norway remained neutral, ore ships could travel 

safely in the Leads, the passage inside the numberless islands fringing 

the Norwegian west coast. The Leads also made it much more costly 

and difficult to blockade Germany since blockade runners could steam 

up the long Norwegian coast and break out above the Arctic Circle 

in waters difficult to patrol. Consequently, in wartime the neutrality 

of Norway was a significant German asset, one which the British 

could be trusted not to overlook. 

Passive exploitation of Norway's neutrality did not exhaust the 

German strategic interests in the Norwegian area. After World War I 

an opinion had developed in the German naval command which held 

that if the German Fleet had had bases in Norway and had not been 

bottled up in the North Sea that war might have gone differently for 

the Navy. It was a return to this line of thought which brought forward a proposal for a shift to more aggressive action in Norway. 

In the last week of September 1939, with the campaign against 

Poland drawing rapidly to a successful conclusion, Hitler and the 

Commander in Chief, Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, began casting about for measures to be adopted in case the war against Great 

2 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, 1946), Vol. VII, Doc. 052-L. 
THE LANDINGS IN NORWAY 

9 April 1940 

StllllOC1d 

','onels 

\'fA P I 

~ ., 

tJd ~v 
52 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Britain and France had to be fought to the finish. One possibility 

was to proclaim a "siege of Britain," which would be put into effect 

by the Navy and the Air Force. In the days immediately following, 

even though Hitler (on 27 September) announced his intention to 

open a land offensive in the West before the end of the year, 

the Armed Forces High Command and the service commands examined various possibilities for the future conduct of the war. On 2 October the Armed Forces High Command asked for the Navy's opinion on the following three: a land offensive in the West, the "siege 

of Britain," delaying tactics. Raeder opted for the siege of Britain 

and ordered the Naval Staff to draw up the supporting arguments. 3 

The siege of Britain offered the Navy a decisive role in the warprovided it could be carried out. The Submarine Command had only 

twenty-nine Atlantic-type submarines; and the Navy had concluded 

in the "Battle Instructions" of May 1939 that in wartime the English Channel would be completely blocked and the British would 

spare no pains to close the northern route out of the North Sea, between the Shetland Islands and Norway.4 Resolution of the first 

problem, that of the submarines, was a matter of time; the second, 

how to achieve freedom of action outside the North Sea, Raeder turned 

to on 3 October. Informing the Naval Staff that he considered it necessary to acquaint Hitler as soon as possible with the considerations 

favorable to extending the Navy's operational bases to the north, he 

ordered an immediate investigation to determine what places in Norway would be most suitable as bases and how they could be acquired. 

He thought that the combined diplomatic pressure of Germany and 

the Soviet Union might be enough to secure the bases "peacefully." 5 

It was quickly agreed that Trondheim and Narvik offered the 

best sites, but on the questions of whether they could or should be 

acquired the estimates were almost entirely negative. When the Chief 

of Staff, Naval Staff, broached the question to the Chief of Staff, 

Army, he was told that difficult terrain, poor communications, and 

long supply lines placed almost insurmountable obstacles in the way 

of a military operation to secure the bases and that, if it was attempted, 

the entire war industry would have to be devoted to Army requirements. This would bring the submarine program to a halt, thereby 

making it impossible to exploit the bases. 6 The Army, having just 

J War diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A (hereafter cited as Naval 

War Diary) (ONI: Washington, 1948), Vol. I, p. 113 and Vol. 2, p. 8. 

4 Battle Instructions for the Navy (Edition of May 1939), in Fuehrer Directives and Other 

Top-Level Directives of the German Armed Forces, /939-/94/ (ONI: Washington, 1948), p. 25. 

c, Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (hereafter cited 

as International Military Tribunal) (Nuernberg, 1949), Doc. 122-C. 

6 Naval War Diary, Vol. 2, p. 39. 
GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK 53 

had what it considered to be a narrow escape in Poland, was trying 

to talk Hitler out of opening an offensive against the Allies in France, 

and it was in no mood to contemplate additional adventures in 

Scandinavia. This timorousness, as Hitler saw it, caused him to lose 

confidence in the Army leadership and later to exclude the Army 

High Command almost entirely from the planning for the operation 

in Norway. 

In its own considerations, set down on 9 October, the Naval Staff 

was far from enthusiastic. A base on the coast of Norway, it conceded, 

would be of great value to the fleet which Germany planned to have 

after 1945, but until then it could be used profitably only by the 

submarines. While a base, at Trondheim for instance, would undeniably be useful for submarine warfare, the length and vulnerability of 

its lines of communication to Germany would greatly reduce its value. 

Finally, to acquire such a base by a military operation would be difficult, and even if it could be acquired by political pressure, serious 

political disadvantages-among them, loss of the protection which 

Norwegian neutrality gave German shipping-would have to be taken 

into account.7 

By this time Hitler's own thoughts on the future course of the war 

had crystallized, and on 9 October he put the finishing touches on a 

lengthy political and military analysis in which he reaffirmed his intention to launch an offensive in the West. On the same day, in Directive No.6 for the Conduct of the War, he ordered the Army to 

prepare an offensive on the northern flank of the Western Front with 

the objectives of smashing large elements of the French and allied 

armies and taking as much territory as possible in the Netherlands, 

Belgium, and northern France to create favorable conditions for air 

and sea warfare against Great Britain and for the defense of the Ruhr. 

The next day Raeder explained to Hitler that the conquest of the 

Belgian coast (at the time even Hitler believed this would be the limit 

of the advance) would be of no advantage for submarine warfare 

and then, mentioning Trondheim as a possibility, pointed to the advantages of bases on the Norwegian coast. Hitler replied that bases 

close to Britain were essential for the Air Force but agreed to take 

the question of Norway under consideration. 8 

7 OKM, SKL, Ueberlegungen zur Frage der StuetzpunktgewinnungJuer die Nordsee-Kriegfuehrzmg, 

9.10.39. Copies of the captured German Navy records are in the custody of the Director 

of Naval History, U.S. Navy Department. 

, DenkschriJt und Richtlinien ueber die Fuehrung des Krieges im Westen, 9.10.1939 and Der 

Oberste B~{ehlshaber der Wehrmacht, OKW Nr. 172/39, WFA/ L, Weisung Nr. 6Juer die Kamp{-

JUehrung, 9.10.39, in OKM, Weisungen OAW (Fuehrer). OC~1H. Fuehrer COT/ferences 011 .\lllllers 

Dealing With the German Navy (hereafter cited as Fuehrer Conferences) (ONI: Washington, 

1947), 1939. p. 14. 
54 COMMAND DECISIONS 

But in the succeeding weeks Hitler, preoccupied with his plans 

for an invasion of France and the Low Countries, left the Norwegian 

question in the background. Raeder himself did not return to it until 

25 November, when he told the Naval Staff that he saw a danger, 

in the event of a German attack on the Netherlands, that Britain 

might stage a surprise landing on the Norwegian coast and take possession of a base there. Two days later, he emphasized the importance 

of attacks on sea traffic between Norway and the British Isles and 

stated that it was difficult to intercept ships leaving Norway because 

they could travel long distances in Norwegian territorial waters. In 

a conference with Hitler on 8 December he reverted to this problem 

and stated that it was important to occupy Norway.9 

In December Raeder also came into contact with Vidkun Quisling, 

the leader of the Norwegian National Union Party (Nasjonal Samling) 

modeled on the German Nazi Party. The National Union Party was 

small and had little influence in Norwegian politics; but Quisling, 

who had served as Norwegian Minister of War in the early 1930's, 

claimed to have well-placed contacts in the Norwegian Government 

and the Army. He was also a protege of Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Foreign Political Office of the Nazi Party. With 

Rosenberg's support he had attempted, without much success, in the 

summer of 1939 to drum up interest in a German occupation of Norway. In Raeder he found a receptive listener, and at their first meeting, on 11 December, he told him that the danger of a British 

occupation of Norway was great and he maintained that the Norwegian Government had already secretly agreed to permit such an 

occupation. The National Union Party, he suggested, was in a position to forestall the British move by placing the necessary bases at 

the disposal of the German armed forces. In the coastal area men in 

important positions had already been bought for the purpose, but a 

change in Germany's attitude was absolutely necessary since months 

of negotiations with Rosenberg had not produced the desired results. 

On the next day Raeder recounted these statements to Hitler and 

took the occasion to review the pros and cons of an operation in 

Norway. Quisling, he said, had made a trustworthy impression but 

had to be dealt with cautiously since he might only be attempting 

to further his own interests. A British occupation of Norway, in 

Raeder's opinion, would be intolerable because Sweden would then 

come entirely under British influence, the war would be carried into 

the Baltic, and German naval warfare would be completely disrupted 

in the Atlantic and the North Sea. On the other hand, a German 

9 Naval War Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 155, 168. Fuehrer Conference5, 1939, p. 45. 
GERMAN INVASION OF NOR WAY AND DENMARK 55 

occupation of bases in Norway would produce strong countermeasures by the British Navy for the purpose of interrupting the transport 

of ore from N arvik. The German Navy was not prepared to cope 

with this; nevertheless, Raeder believed the risks had to be taken and 

recommended that, if Quisling made a good impression on Hitler, 

permission be given for the Armed Forces High Command to collaborate with Quisling in preparing plans for an occupation either by 

peaceful means, that is, by German forces being called in, or by 

force. On 14 December, after talking with Quisling, Hitler ordered 

the Armed Forces High Command to "investigate how one can take 

possession of Norway." 10 

Hitler received Quisling again on 18 December. Then as at the 

previous meeting Hitler expressed a personal desire to preserve the 

neutrality of Norway; but, he stated, if the enemy prepared to extend the war, he would be obliged to take countermeasures. He promised financial support for Quisling's party and indicated that the 

Armed Forces High Command would assign him missions and turn 

to him for information as the planning progressed. During the following months Quisling kept in close contact with Rosenberg, furnishing intelligence information and warnings of an impending Allied 

invasion. In Oslo, a repre'sentative of the Rosenberg office and the 

naval attache maintained close contact with the Quisling organization. The idea of an operation dependent on the support of Quisling 

and his followers was soon dropped, however, because of the number 

of uncertain factors involved-not the least among them the suspicion 

that Quisling had vastly overstated his strength and capabilities-and 

the need to preserve secrecy. After December Quisling had no part in 

the planning. 11 

Although Hitler may have been impressed by Quisling's apparent 

offer of a cheap success in Norway, a more significant explanation 

for his sudden spurt of interest lies elsewhere. A new and serious element had been recently added to the Scandinavian situation by the 

Soviet attack on Finland (30 November 1939). The Soviet aggression had aroused immediate sympathy for Finland among the Allies 

and in the Scandinavian countries. Norway and Sweden feared an 

extension of Soviet influence. (Quisling, talking to Raeder, had said 

the Norwegian Government would turn to Great Britain for help 

against the Soviet advance.) Germany, bound by the Nazi-Soviet Pact 

in which Finland was declared to be outside the German sphere of in10 Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, pp. 54-57. Tagebuch General ]odl (WFA), 13 Oct 39-30 Jan 

40. International Mihtar;' Tribunal, Doc. 1 BII-PS (hereafter cited as the ]odl Dian), 13 

Dec 39. 

11 International Military Tribunal, Doc. 004-PS. 
56 COMMAND DECISIONS 

terest, adopted a policy of strict neutrality which occasioned a strong 

wave of anti-German sentiment in Scandinavia. For Germany, the most 

serious consideration was that Allied intervention to aid Finland could 

be expected to entail an occupation of Norwegian ports. 12 

While the situation was by no means as dangerous as Raeder and 

Quisling painted it, German concern for Allied action in Scandinavia 

was not without substance. Since the beginning of the war Allied expectations with respect to Norway had developed almost exactly along 

the lines predicted by Raeder; however, the devising of practical means 

for realizing these expectations had been quite another matter. In midSeptember Winston Churchill had presented his Plan CATHERINE, 

which involved sending naval forces through (he straits leading into 

the Baltic Sea to gain control of those waters and to stop the Swedish 

ore traffic. Although CATHERINE was rejected as too dangerous and no 

other plan was devised, the Allies, influenced by the widely held thesis 

that Germany did not have the resources to sustain a long war, continued to regard Norway, and Narvik in particular, as their most promising strategic objective. With the Soviet invasion of Finland, the moment 

of opportunity seemed to have come, especially when the early successes of the Finns made it appear that the Red Army was weak. 

The French Government, eager to draw the main action of the war 

away from the Franco-German frontier went so far as to think of establishing a major theater of war in Scandinavia and of challenging 

both the Soviet Union and Germany there. The British, on the other 

hand, wanted to avoid offering excessive provocation to the Russians, 

with the result that while Allied hopes ran high it was not until the 

end of January 1940 that agreement came on the method of attaining them. 

The First Planning Phase 

In the week following Hitler's first meeting with Quisling, Brig. 

Gen. Alfred JodI, Chief of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High 

Command, set in motion an investigation of the Norwegian problem. 

While the preliminary -work was begun by the high commands of the 

three services, JodI remained in doubt concerning the future handling 

of the matter. On 18 December he discussed it with the Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force, presumably on the assumption that the Air Force 

role would be predominant in any operation that might result. In the 

course of these preliminaries, preparations were made to assign targets 

in Norway to the Reconnaissance Squadron "Rowel)) (a special purpose 

unit which was supposed to be able to escape detection from the ground 

by flying at extremely high altitudes). As late as 2 January 1940, how12 Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, p. 56. Naval War Diary, Vol. 4, p. 56. 
GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK 57 

ever, the "Rowel" Squadron had still not been committed, and the scope 

of the intelligence missions which had been assigned to the air attaches 

in Norway in December was still limited. 1:1 

At the end of December, reporting to Hitler, Raeder again declared it essential that Norway not fall into British hands. He feared 

that British volunteers "in disguise" would carry out a "cold" occupation and warned that it was necessary to be ready. That his feeling 

of urgency was not shared in other quarters was demonstrated on 1 

January, when General Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the Army, 

and General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High 

Command, agreed that it was in Germany's interest to keep Norway 

neutral and that a change in the German attitude would depend on 

whether or not Great Britain threatened Norway's neutrality. 1 I 

Shortly after the turn of the year Hitler's attention was drawn 

more sharply toward Norway by increasing Allied talk of intervention 

in the war between Russia and Finland and, more particularly, by a 

British attempt on 6 January to secure Norwegian and Swedish acceptance of a proposal to allow British naval forces to operate inside 

Norwegian territorial waters. On 10 January he released to the service high commands the Armed Forces High Command memorandum 

Stu die Nord, which had been completed ten days earlier and embodied 

the preliminary considerations of the services regarding an operation 

in Norway. 

Studie Nord proceeded from the premise that Germany could not 

tolerate the establishment of British control in the Norwegian area 

and that only a German occupation could forestall such a development. As a result of the Russo-Finnish war, it was stated, anti-German opinion was on the increase in Scan dina via, and Norwegian 

resistance to a British occupation was hardly to be expected. It was 

also thought that the British might use a German attack in the West 

as an excuse to occupy Norway. Further work on the study was to 

be done under the direction of an Air Force general. The chief of 

staff was to be supplied by the Navy and the operations officer by the 

Army. From these assignments it appeared that the predominant roles 

were expected to fall to the Air Force and the Navy. The operation 

was estimated to require about one division of Army troops. ", 

During the review of Studie Nord the Naval Staff once more argued 

strongly against an operation in Norway. It did not believe a British 

occupation of Norway was imminent, and if considered a German 

occupation without any previous action having been taken by the 

1J JodI Diary, 18, 19, 20 Dec 39, and 2 Jan 40. 

14 Kriegstagebuch des Generalobersten Franz Halder, International Military Tribunal, Doc. 

'KW-3140 (hereafter referred to as the Halder Diary), III, 13. 

l' International Military Tribunal, Doc. 021-C. Halder Diary, III, 3, 18. 
58 COMMAND DECISIONS 

British as a strategically and economically dangerous venture that 

would result in loss of the security afforded by the territorial waters 

of a neutral Norway. At the end, Raeder agreed that the "best" solution was preservation of the status quo. H) 

Between 14 and 19 January the Naval Staff worked out an expansion of Studie Nord. Similar supplementary studies were prepared in 

the Army and Air Force high commands, but both of those services 

were deeply involved in the planning for operations in the West and, 

therefore, gave the Norwegian question only cursory treatment. In its 

study the Naval Staff reached two important conclusions, namely, that 

surprise would be absolutely essential to the success of the operation 

and that part of the assault force could be transported by sea using 

fast warships of the fleet as transports. If surprise could be achieved, 

the Naval Staff contended, Norwegian resistance would be negligible 

and the only units of the British Navy that would need to be taken 

into account would be those which might be on patrol off the coast 

of Norway, possibly one or two cruisers. A decision to use warships 

as transports would overcome limitations imposed by the range of the 

air transports and would make it possible to consider the simultaneous 

occupation of a number of points along the Norwegian coast as far 

north as N arvik. 1 7 

During the first weeks of Jam:lary Hitler's attention remained concentrated on the plan for invading France and the Low Countries, 

which he hoped to put into execution before the end of the month. 

However, after the middle of the month the weather predictions became increasingly less favorable, and on 20 January he announced 

that the operation could probably not begin before March. With that 

announcement it became possible to look at the Scandinavian situation in a new light. The delay in the German invasion of France could 

give the Allies time to intervene in the north, a contingency which 

Hitler, who had been impatient to resume the offensive since October 

1939, may well have regarded as a welcome challenge. On 23 January he ordered Studie Nord recalled. The creation of a working staff 

in the Air Force High Command was to be dropped, and all further 

work was to be done in the Armed Forces High Command. Hitler 

thus killed two birds with one stone, placing the planning for an operation in Norway on a somewhat firmer basis and at the same time 

giving vent to his rage over an incident that had occurred earlier in 

the month which had resulted in plans for the invasion of France 

and the Low Countries falling into Allied hands when an Air Force 

major made a forced landing on Belgian territory.'s On the 27th, in 

1" International Military Tribunal, Doc. 021-C. 

17 GKM, SKL, I Gp. 73/40, Ueberlegungen Studie Nord, 19.1.40. 

1S Halder Diary, III, 19, 29. 
GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK 59 

a letter to Commanders in Chief, Army, Navy, and Air Force, Keitel 

stated that henceforth work on Studie Nord would be carried out under 

Hitler's direct personal guidance in closest conjunction with the overall direction of the war. Keitel would take over supervision of the 

planning, and a working staff, which would provide a nucleus for the 

operations staff, would be formed in the Armed Forces High Command. Each of the services was to provide an officer suitable for operations work, who also, if possible, had training in organization and 

supply. The operation was assigned the code name WESERUEEUNG.19 

In creating a planning staff for WESER UEE UNG Hitler anticipated the next Allied step by less than a week. After the Commander 

in Chief of the Finnish Army, Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, appealed for help on 29 January, the Allied Supreme War 

Council decided to send an expedition timed for mid-March. The 

French wanted to blockade Murmansk and attempt landings in the 

Pechenga region, and they talked of simultaneous operations in the 

Balkans in addition to the occupation of parts of Norway and Sweden."" 

The British plan which was adopted was more modest. While ostensibly 

intended to bring Allied troops to the Finnish front, it laid its main 

emphasis on operations in northern Norway and Sweden. The main 

striking force was to land at Narvik and advance along the railroad 

to its eastern terminus at Luld., occupying Kiruna and Gallivare 

along the way. By late April two Allied brigades were to be established along that line. Two additional brigades would then be sent to 

Finland. 21 

The staff for WESERUEEUNG assembled on 5 February and was 

installed as a special section of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces 

High Command. Its senior officer was Capt. Theodor Krancke, commanding officer of the cruiser Admiral Scheer. On the first day Field 

Marshal Hermann Goering, obviously annoyed at having been relegated to a subsidiary role in what appeared to be developing as a 

primarily air operation, had not yet appointed an Air Force 

representative. 

Although it was widely assumed after the failure of Allied counteroperations in Norway that the Germans had laid their plans well in 

advance, probably even before the outbreak of war, such was not the 

case. The Krancke staff began its work with very modest resources. 

German military experience offered no precedent for the type of operation contemplated, and the Armed Forces High Command and 

service memorandums prepared after December 1939 furnished little 

more. guidance than tentative points of departure for operational planUl Jodi Diary, 23 Jan 40. International Military Tribunal, Doc. 063-C. 

20 International Military Tribunal, Doc. 82-Raeder. 

21 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 13. 
60 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ning. A certain amount of intelligence information on the Norwegian 

Army and military installations was available, which, while it was useful and later proved to be accurate, was not of decisive importance. 

For maps and general background information it was often necessary 

to rely on hydrographic charts, travel guides, tourist brochures, and 

other similar sources. The limitation on personnel imposed by the 

necessity for preserving secrecy was another handicap. Nevertheless, 

in the approximately three weeks of its existence the Krancke staff 

produced a workable operations plan. 

The Krancke Plan for the first time focused clearly on the technical and tactical aspects of the projected operation. It envisioned 

simultaneous landings at Oslo, Kristiansand, Arendal, Stavanger, 

Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. Control of those fairly small areas, 

it was held, meant control of the entire country, since they were the 

principal centers of population, industry, and trade. Moreover, with 

the capture of those places and their garrisons, the Norwegians would 

lose eight of their sixteen regiments, nearly all of their artillery, and 

almost all of their airfields. 22 The operation was to be executed by a 

corps of approximately six divisions, the first assault wave of which 

was to be transported half by warships and half by plane. Primarily 

it would be an airborne operation. The 7th Air Division (airborne troop 

command) was expected to supply eight transport groups and five 

battalions of parachute troops in the first wave and thereafter to bring 

In the 22d (Airborne) Infantry Division within three days.23 

The Final Planning Phase 

In mid-February the Altmark incident gave the first real sense of 

urgency to the preparations for WESERUEBUNG. On 14 February 

the German tanker Altmark) with 300 British seamen captured by the 

commerce raider Graf Spee aboard, entered Norwegian territorial waters 

on its return trip to Germany. Despite strong misgivings, the Norwegian 

Admiralty, though suspecting the nature of the "cargo," permitted 

the Altmark to proceed. On 16 February, when six British destroyers 

22 This method of operation took advantage of a major weakness of the Norwegian 

Army, namely, that it could not mobilize to fight as a unit. Because of the peculiar geography of the country, mobilization was by divisions, with single divisions~for the most 

part having no contact with each other~scattered throughout the major centers from Oslo 

to Harstad in the vicinity of Narvik. On paper, the Norwegian Army consisted of six 

divisions with a peacetime strength of 19,000 men and a war strength of 90,000. But up 

to April 1940 it had only 16,000 men under arms (including 1,800 for air defense, 950 

in the Army Air Corps, and 300 security guards). The German intention, therefore, was 

not to meet and defeat each one of the divisions on its home ground but to capture the 

main centers before mobilization could begin. _ 

23 OKW, WFA, Abt. III, Weisung an Oberbefehlshaber "Weseruebung," 26.2.40. 
GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK 61 

put in an appearance, the Altmark took refuge in Jossing Fjord near 

Egersund escorted by two Norwegian torpedo boats. Disregarding protests from the Norwegian naval craft, the British destroyer Cossack 

entered the fjord and, sending a party aboard the Altmark, took off 

the prisoners after a brief skirmish. 

The deliberate action of the Cossack convinced Hitler that the British 

no longer intended to respect Norway's neutrality, and on 19 February he ordered a speed-up in the planning for WESERUEBUNG. On 

JodI's suggestion it was decided to turn the operation over to a corps 

commander and his staff. Lt. Gen. Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, Commanding General, XXI Corps, was nominated for the task-largely because he had acquired some experience in overseas operations during 

the German intervention in Finland in 1918. 24 

At noon on 21 February von Falkenhorst reported to Hitler and 

was offered the mission of planning and-when and if the time camecommanding the operation against Norway. The planning was to be 

carried out with two considerations in mind: (1) to forestall a British 

move by occupying the most important ports and localities, in particular, the ore port of Narvik; and (2) to take such firm control of the 

country that Norwegian resistance or collaboration with Great Britain 

would be impossible. 25 On the next day, after von Falkenhorst had 

reviewed and approved the Krancke Plan, his appointment was confirmed. Four days later, on 26 February, a selected staff from Headquarters, XXI Corps, began work in Berlin. 

The first major question to be decided concerned Denmark. As 

early as December 1939 the German Army had taken under consideration the question of occupying Denmark in conjunction with an 

operation against Norway. In a supplement to Studie Nord the Naval 

Staff had recommended acquisition of bases in Denmark, especially 

at the northern tip of Jutland, as a means of approaching the Shetlands-Norway passage and of facilitating naval and air control of the 

Skagerrak. The Krancke staff had assumed that the necessary bases 

in Denmark could be secured by diplomatic pressure reinforced with 

the threat of a military occupation; but after the von Falkenhorst 

staff had been installed it was decided not to rely on half measures 

of that sort. On 28 February von Falkenhorst outlined a plan to 

Keitel that included the occupation of Denmark. At the same time, 

the estimate of troop requirements was raised by two divisions. 

On the same day an even more important new element was introduced, one which eventually made necessary a complete revision of 

'4 Jodl Diary, 19 Feb 40. Halder Diary, III, 62, 64. 

25 Gruppe XXI, la, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1,20.2.40-8.4.40,21 Feb 40. AOK 20 E 1 BO/5. 

Copies of the captured German Army records are on file at the National Archi,,'s. 
62 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the Krancke Plan. JodI secured Hitler's approval for a proposal to 

prepare WESERUEBUNG in such a fashion that it could be executed 

independently of the forthcoming campaign in the West both in terms 

of time and of forces employed. All of the planning up to that time 

had started from the assumption that WESERUEBUNG would have 

to come either before or after GELB (the invasion of France, the 

Netherlands, and Belgium) since the 7th Air Division, in particular, 

would be required for both operations. The Armed Forces High Command now proposed to reduce the commitment of parachute troops 

for WESERUEBUNG to four companies and to hold back one regiment of the 22d Infantry Division. This change and that concerning 

Denmark were approved by Hitler on 29 February. 26 

Two days later, on 1 March, Hitler issued the "Directive for Case 

WESERUEBUNG," which set forth the general requirements for the 

operation and authorized the beginning of operational planning. The 

stated strategic objectives were to forestall British intervention in 

Scandinavia and the Baltic, provide security for the sources of Swedish 

iron ore, and give the German Navy and Air Force advanced bases 

for attacks on the British Isles. Daring and surprise were to be relied 

on rather than strength in terms of number of troops. The idea of a 

"peaceful" occupation to provide armed protection for the neutrality 

of the Scandinavian countries was to be basic to the whole operation. 

Von Falkenhorst as Commanding General, Group XXI, was to be 

directly subordinate to Hitler.27 Denmark and Norway were to be 

occupied simultaneously, with WESERUEBUNG SUED involving the 

occupation of all of Denmark and WESERUEBUNG NORD the occupation of Norway by means of air and seaborne landings at the most 

important places along the coast.28 

The appearance of the Fuehrer directive brought an immediate 

wave of protests and objections from the Army and Air Force. With 

the campaign in the West impending, neither wanted to divert forces 

to a subsidiary theater of operations. The Army had not yet altered 

the negative attitude toward the projected campaign which Halder 

had expressed on 5 October 1939. Moreover, personal feelings were 

involved since up to that time neither the Army nor the Air Force 

High Command had been brought directly into the planning for 

WESERUEBUNG. Halder noted in his diary that as of 2 March 

Hitler had not "exchanged a single word" with the Commander in 

Chief, Army, on the subject of Norway. The Army also objected to 

26 Gruppe XXI, la, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1, 26-29 Feb 40. Jodi Diary, 28 Feb 40. 

27 In German military terminology group (Gruppe) was used to designate an intermediate unit, in this instance between a corps and an army. 

" International Military Tribunal, Doc. 174-C. 
GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK 63 

troop dispositions being made independently by the Armed Forces 

High Command. The Air Force protested that the demands on 7th 

Air Division and other air units were too high. 

On 3 March, declaring that he expected Allied intervention in 

Finland in the near future, Hitler sharply ordered the services not to 

delay the preparations for WESERUEBUNG by further disputes. (On 

2 March Great Britain and France had submitted notes to Norway 

and Sweden requesting the right of transit for troops which they intended to send to the aid of the Finns.) He demanded that the forces 

for WESERUEBUNG be assembled by 10 March and ready for the 

jump-off by the 13th so that a landing would be possible in northern 

Norway on approximately 17 March. 29 

On 5 March WESERUEBUNG was discussed in a meeting with 

Hitler at which the three commanders in chief were present. Field 

Marshal Goering, angry and claiming he had been kept in the dark 

about the operation, condemned all planning so far as worthless. After 

Goering had given vent to his feelings, Hitler again stated that he expected Allied intervention in Scandinavia under the guise of help for 

Finland in the near future and then demanded and secured immediate agreement on the commitment of German forces. Two days later 

Hitler signed a directive assigning the 3d Mountain Division, 69th, 163d, 

196th. and 181st Infantry Divisions. and the 11th Motori;::ed Rifle Brigade for 

employment in Norway and the 170th, 198th, and 214th Infantry Divisions for Denmark. That disposition of forces was declared to be final 

and no longer subject to change. Simultaneously, WESERUEBUNG 

and GELB were completely divorced from each other. 30 The 7th Az'r 

Division and 22d Infantry Division were released for GELB. It was no 

longer possible to contemplate airborne and parachute landings on 

the scale which had been envisioned in the Krancke Plan. 

Meanwhile, the staff of Group XXI had completed "Operations 

Order No. 1 for the Occupation of Norway," which it issued on 5 

March. The order was concerned with the landings and consolidation 

of the beachheads. Two possibilities were envisioned: (1) that the desired objectives of a peaceful occupation could be achieved, and (2) 

that the landings and occupation would have to be carried out by 

force. If the first possibility materialized, the Norwegian Government 

was to be assured of extensive respect for its internal sovereignty and 

the Norwegian troops were to be treated tactfully. If resistance was 

encountered, the landings were to be forced by all possible means, the 

29 Karl Jesko von Puttkamer, Die unheimliche See (Vienna: Verlag Karl Kiihne, 1952), 

p. 31. Halder Diary, III, 64. Jodi Diary, 1, 2, and 3 Mar 40 . 

. 10 Jodi Diary, 5 and 7 Mar 40. Gruppe XXI, la, Krzegstagebuch Nr. 1, 5 Mar 40. OKW, 

WFA, Abt. L, Nr. 22082/40, in Anlagenband 1 ,-um K.T.B. 1, Anlagen 1-52. AOK 20 E 180/7. 
64 COMMAND DECISIONS 

beachheads secured, and nearby mobilization centers of the Norwegian 

Army occupied. Complete destruction of the Norwegian Army was 

not considered possible as an immediate objective because of the size 

of the country and difficulty of the terrain, but it was believed that 

the localities selected for landings comprised the majority of the places 

needed to prevent an effective mobilization and assembly of Norwegian forces and to control the country in general. Attempted Allied 

landings were to be fought off; unnecessary losses were to be avoided; 

and, if the enemy proved superior, the troops were to withdraw inland until a counterattack could be launched. 31 

Landings in approximately regimental strength were to be made 

at Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Kristiansand, and Oslo, and landing 

parties of one company each sent ashore at Egersund and Arendal 

to take possession of the cable stations. Stavanger was to be taken in 

an airborne operation. The initial seaborne landing force of 8,850 men 

was to be carried in five groups of warships. No major reinforcement 

of the landing teams at the beachheads was contemplated until contact had been established overland with Oslo, where the main force 

was to debark-16,700 men (in addition to the 2,000 landed on W 

Day) to be brought in by three sea transport echelons during the first 

week, with another 40,000 to be transported in shuttle movements 

thereafter. An additional 8,000 troops were to be transported to Oslo 

by air within three days after W Day.32 

"Operation Order No. 1 for the Occupation of Denmark" was also 

completed although it was not -issued until 20 March. (See Map 2.) 

The principal military objective of WESERUEBUNG SUED was Aalborg at the northern tip of Jutland. Its two airfields were to be taken 

on W plus 2 hours by a parachute platoon and an airborne battalion. 

Full control of the airfields and the lines of communication from Germany would be secured by the 170th Infantry Division and the 11th 

Motorized Rifle Brigade in a rapid advance across Jutland from the 

German border. Five warship groups, consisting of light naval craft, 

merchant vessels, and the World War I battleship Schleswig-Holstein, 

were organized to stage landings on the west coast of Jutland and the 

Danish islands. 33 Command of operations in Denmark was given to 

XXXI Corps under General der Flieger Leonard Kaupisch. 

31 Gruppe XXI, la, Nr. 20/40, Operationsbefehlfuer die Besetzung Norwegens, Nr. 1, in Anlagenband zum KT.B. 1, Anlagen 1-52. AOK 20 E 180/7. 

:<2 Verbindungsstab Marine, B. Nr. 130, Seetransportuebersicht nach dem Stande vom 22.3.40, in 

Gruppe XXI, Anlagenband 5 zum KT.B. Nr. I. AOK 20 E 180/10. Kurt Assmann, The German Campaign in Norway, Origin of the Plan, Execution of the Operation, and Measures against 

Allied Counter-attack (London, 1948), p. 13. 

:<:l Gruppe XXI, la, 126/40, Operationsbefehlfuer die Besetzung von Daenemark, Nr. 1, in Anlagenband 1 zum KT.B. Nr. 1, Anlagen 1-52. AOK 20 E 180/7. 
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66 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Since the first objective of WESERUEBUNG was to induce both 

Norway and Denmark to surrender without a fight, special provisions 

were made to open negotiations with both governments at the moment 

of the landings. The German Ministers in Oslo and Copenhagen were 

designated Plenipotentiaries of the German Reich. At W Time they 

would present the German demands and thereafter, if the demands 

were accepted, would keep the Norwegian and Danish Governments 

under surveillance. The operations officer of Group XXI and the chief 

of staff of XXXI Corps were named PlenipotEntiaries of the Wehrmacht. Traveling in civilian clothes, they were to go to Oslo and 

Copenhagen two days before W Day. After making last-minute reconnaissances, they would instruct the Ministers (who were not to be informed of their missions until the night before the landings) and 

thereafter, using special codes, inform the headquarters and the landing teams of the outcome of the negotiations. 

After 5 March the timing of WESERUEBUNG became the major 

concern at the highest German command level. Admiral Raeder in 

conference with Hitler on the 9th declared that the execution of 

WESER U EB U NG was urgent. The British, he maintained, had the 

opportunity of occupying Norway and Sweden under the pretext of 

sending troops to help the Finns. Such an occupation would result in 

loss of the Swedish iron ore and could be decisive against Germany. 

WESERUEBUNG itself he characterized as contrary to all the principles of naval warfare, since Germany did not have naval supremacy 

but would have to carry out the operation in the face of a vastly 

superior British Fleet; nevertheless, he believed success would be 

attained if surprise was achieved. 34 

On 12 March with news of peace impending in the Soviet-Finnish war, which was expected to hasten Allied action, and with information that the Allies had again offered assistance to Finland, a 

speed-up in the German preparations was ordered. 35 The Navy had 

already canceled all other naval operations on 4 March and on that 

day had begun holding submarines in port for WESERUEBUNG. On 

the 11th long-range submarines were dispatched to the main ports on 

the Norwegian west coast, where they were to combat Allied invasion 

forces or, according to the circumstances, support WESERUEBUNG.36 

The Allied effort, meanwhile, had moved slowly, and the Finnish 

Army, under the weight of massive Soviet offensives which had begun 

in February, had reached the limits of its endurance. The British held 

back two divisions from France, intending to put them into the field 

34 Fuehrer Coriferences, 1940, I, 20. 

35 Gruppe XXI, la, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1, 12 Mar 40. 

36 Naval War Diary, Vol. 7, p. 63. 
GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK 67 

in Norway, and planned to expand their force eventually to 100,000 

men. The French intended to commit about 50,000. 37 The British and 

French staffs agreed that the iatter half of March would be the best 

time for going into Norway; but, aside from the desire to exploit the 

situation created by the Russo-Finnish conflict, they saw no compelling reason to act quickly since they were convinced that the important Trondheim-N arvik area was beyond the Germans' reach and 

could be taken at any time. Allied plans, furthermore, remained contingent on the Norwegian and Swedish Governments' granting rights 

of transit to Allied troops. They had turned down a request by Finland to that effect on 27 February, and another by the British and 

French Governments on 3 March. By that time Finland had decided 

to sue for peace. On 9 March the Allied governments told the Finnish 

Ministers in Paris and London that if a request was made the Allies 

would come to the aid of Finland with all possible speed. The French 

went so far as to urge that such a request be made. They promised 

delivery of a hundred bombers within two weeks, but left the dispatch 

of troops still dependent on the attitude of Norway and Sweden. On 

the same day, Marshal Mannerheim, who regarded the Allied proposal as too uncertain, gave his government categorical advice to 

conclude peace. 38 

At the last minute, on 12 March, still hoping for an appeal from 

the Finns, the Allies decided, at the suggestion of the French, to attempt a semi peaceable invasion of Scandinavia. Assuming that the 

recent diplomatic responses of the Norwegian and Swedish Governments ran counter to public opinion in those countries, they proposed 

to "test on the Norwegian beaches the firmness of the opposition." A 

landing was to be made at N arvik; if it succeeded, it would be followed by one at Trondheim. Forces for Bergen and Stavanger were 

to be held ready. The objectives were to take Narvik, the railroad, 

and the Swedish ore fields; but the landing and the advance into 

Norway and Sweden were to take place only if they could be accomplished without serious fighting. The troops were not to fight their 

way through either Norway or Sweden and were to use force only "as 

an ultimate measure of self-defense." 39 

The signing of the peace treaty between Russia and Finland in 

Moscow on the night of 12 March put an end to the Allied plans. 

The Germans observed British submarines concentrated off the 

Skagerrak on the 13th, and an intercepted radio message setting 14 

:17 Derry, ihe Campaign in Norway, p. 13. 

:jg Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim (New York, Dutton, 

1954), pp. 380-87 . 

.39 Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. II. p. 113. 
68 COMMAND DECISIONS 

March as the deadline for preparation of transport groups indicated 

that the Allied operation was getting under way. But another message, intercepted on the 15th, ordering the submarines to disperse 

revealed that the peace had disrupted the Allied plan. 40 

General opinion in the Armed Forces High Command and the 

Navy High Command was that, with the pretext for action gone, the 

Allies would not undertake an operation against Norway in the near 

future. Even Raeder for a time doubted whether a German operation 

in Norway was still necessary. The fact remained that the Allies had 

intended to go into Scandinavia, and for Hitler that was enough. He 

was convinced, he stated, that the British would not abandon their 

strategic aim of cutting off the German ore imports and believed that 

the possibility of a future Allied occupation still existed; therefore, 

WESERUEBUNG would have to be executed. 

Although Hitler was probably in large part influenced by his 

gambler's instinct and his disinclination to abandon an operation once 

it had been prepared and he thought it could be carried off successfully, he was more nearly right in his estimate of Allied intentions 

than he knew. On 21 March Paul Reynaud became the head of a 

French Government committed to a more aggressive prosecution of 

the war; and a week later, at a meeting of the Supreme War Council, 

the Scandinavian question again came under consideration. The new 

Scandinavian undertaking was to consist of two separate but related , 

operations, WILFRED and Plan R 4. WILFRED involved the laying of 

two mine fields in Norwegian waters, one in the approaches to the 

Vest Fjord north of Bodo, and the other between Alesund and Bergen, 

with the pretended laying of a third near Molde. It was to be justified by notes delivered to Norway and Sweden several days in advance protesting the inability of those nations to protect their 

neutrality. The supposition was that WILFRED would provoke German 

counteraction, and Plan R 4 was to become effective the moment the 

Germans landed in Norway "or showed they intended to do so." 

Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish frontier formed the principal 

objectives of Plan R 4. The port was to be occupied by one infantry 

brigade and an antiaircraft battery, with the total strength to be built 

up eventually to 18,000 men. One battalion, in a transport escorted by 

two cruisers, was to sail within a few hours after the mines had been 

laid. Five battalions were to be employed in occupying Trondheim 

and Bergen and in a raid on Stavanger to destroy Sola airfield, the 

largest in Norway and the closest to the British Isles. The plan depended heavily on the assumption that the Norwegians would not 

40 Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 22. Naval War Diary, Vol. 7, p. 100. 
GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK 69 

offer resistance; and, strangely, the possibility of a strong German 

reaction was left almost entirely out of account.41 

On the German side, after the Finnish-Soviet peace was announced, 

Hitler hesitated temporarily as he cast about for means of justifying the 

operation, but the time for decision had come. From the point of view 

of the Navy, an early execution was imperative because all other 

naval operations had been brought to a standstill by the preparations and because after 15 April the nights would become too short 

to afford proper cover for the naval forces. Reporting to Hitler on 26 

March, Raeder declared that the danger of an Allied landing in Norway was no longer acute, but since he believed WESERUEBUNG 

would have to be carried out sooner or later he advised that it be 

done as soon as possible. Hitler agreed to set the day for sometime in 

the period of the next new moon, which would occur on 7 Apri1.42 

On 1 April Hitler approved the plans for WESERUEBUNG after 

a detailed review; on the following day, after having been assured by 

the Commanders in Chief, Navy and Air Force, that ice would not 

impede naval movements in the Baltic and that flying conditions 

would be satisfactory, he designated 9 April as WESER Day and 0515 

as WESER Time. The first supply ships sailed on 3 April and the 

warships began putting out from German ports at midnight on the 

6th. 43 

It was not until after the first German ships were at sea that the 

Allies reached an agreement on their own operation. The execution 

of WILFRED and Plan R 4 was at first tied to Operation ROYAL 

MARINE, a British proposal for sowing fluvial mines in the Rhine. 

The French objected to this on the ground that it would provoke 

German bombing of French factories. WILFRED had been scheduled 

for 5 April, but it was not until that date that the British Government agreed to carry out the Norwegian operations independently of 

ROYAL MARINE; consequently, the mines were not laid until the morning of 8 April, by which time the German ships were advancing up 

the Norwegian coast. When it became known on the morning of the 

8th that the German Fleet, which had been sighted by aircraft in the 

North Sea on the previous day, was at sea in the vicinity of Norway 

the mine-laying force was withdrawn and Plan R 4 was abandoned. 

In the end the Allied venture accomplished nothing and gave 

Hitler the excuse he needed for WESERUEBUNG. The coincidence of 

Allied and German forces heading toward Norway at exactly the same 

time reinforced the myth of Hitler's "intuition" and gave rise to the 

41 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, pp. 15ff. 

42 Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 22. 

43 Gruppe XXI, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1, 1 and 2 Apr 40. 
70 COMMAND DECISIONS 

post hoc) ergo propter hoc argument that WESERUEBUNG was forced on 

Germany by the aggressive intentions of the Allies. Actually there is 

no evidence that Hitler knew of WILFRED or Plan R 4, and it appears highly unlikely that he would have risked his Navy in Norwegian 

waters if he had known or suspected that the British Navy would be 

engaged in major operations in that area at the same time. 

The Decision in Retrospect 

On WESER Day, despite the fact that Warship Groups 1 and 2 had 

been sighted by British reconnaissance planes in the North Sea on 7 

A pril and that one of the ships of the 1st Sea Transport Echelon had 

been sunk off Norway on the same day and its survivors-some of 

them soldiers in uniform-had been taken ashore in Norway, surprise 

was achieved everywhere except at Oslo, where Germany's newest 

cruiser Bluecher was sunk by the guns and torpedoes of coastal forts 

on the fjord outside the city. The Danish Government capitulated 

immediately, but the Government of Norway declared its intention 

to fight and, taking advantage of the delay in the German landing 

at Oslo, escaped into the interior. Within a week the Allies had committed forces at Narvik, Namsos, and Andalsnes to aid the Norwegians. But the superiority of the German plan and preparations was 

quickly proved, and by the first week of May the Allies had been 

driven out of Namsos and Andalsnes, leaving central and southern 

Norway firmly in German hands. British counteroperations at sea 

were not much more successful, and the German Air Force quickly 

demonstrated the ability of airpower-given the proper conditionsto neutralize superior sea power. At Narvik, nearly out of the striking 

range of the German Air Force, the situation was somewhat different. 

There the British Navy moved in quickly, and none of the ten German destroyers which had carried the landing force north managed 

to escape. By 14 April, after Allied troops had begun landing, Hitler 

was on the verge of instructing the regiment at Narvik to withdraw 

into Sweden and be interned. It took the combined efforts of the 

Army and Armed Forces High Commands to dissuade him from committing that signal piece of cowardice, which would also have amounted 

to sacrificing the primary objective of WESERUEBUNG. Thereafter 

the Narvik regiment staged a skillful and stubborn defense until early 

June, when the Allies, under the pressure of catastrophic developments 

in France, decided to evacuate. On 9 June, a day after the last 

Allied troops had sailed, the Norwegian Army surrendered. 

In comparison with the expenditures of men and materiel which 

became commonplace later in the war, the cost of the Norwegian Cam-
GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK 71 

paign was minor. German casualties were 1,317 killed, 1,604 wounded, 

and 2,375 lost at sea or otherwise missing. The British lost 1,869 men 

in ground fighting and upward of 2,500 more at sea. The Norwegian 

losses numbered 1,335 men, and those of the French and Poles, 530. 

Of the losses on both sides, the only ones of major significance were 

those sustained by the German Navy. At the end of June 1940 Germany had only one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and four 

destroyers fit for action. In the anxious days of the summer of 1940 

that was a source of some comfort to the British. Winston Churchill 

has described it as a "fact of major importance potentially affecting 

the whole future of the war." 44 On the other hand, the Norwegian 

Campaign constituted the high point in the German Navy's exploitation of its surface forces. 

As an isolated military operation the German occupation of Norway was an outstanding success. Carried out in the teeth of vastly 

superior British sea power, it was, as Hitler said, "not only bold, but 

one of the sauciest undertakings in the history of modern warfare." "" 

Well planned and skillfully executed, it showed the Wehrmacht at its 

best; nevertheless, some of the faults which were later to contribute 

greatly to the German defeat were already present, although not yet 

prominent enough to influence the outcome of the campaign. For 

success the operation depended heavily on daring and surprise combined with lack of preparedness and indecision on the part of the enemy. Those elements won campaigns but were not enough to win the 

war. Also in this campaign two serious defects of Hitler's personal 

leadership were revealed: his persistent meddling in the details of operations and his tendency to lose his nerve in a crisis. 

To some extent, too, WESERUEBUNG gave evidence of Hitler's 

fatal weakness, his inability to keep his commitments within the bounds 

of his resources. Most German authorities still contend that Germany's 

strategic interests in Scandinavia and the existence of Allied intentio'ns to open an offensive there created a compelling necessity for 

German action. However, two who qualify as experts of the first 

rank have concluded that WESERUEBUNG was not the sole solution for Germany, and probably not the best. General der Artillerie 

a. D. Walter Warlimont has pointed out that, even if the Allies had 

been able to establish a foothold in Norway, they would have been 

forced to relinquish their hold there once Operation GELB (the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France) had started and 

that, if it were still necessary, the occupation of Norway could have 

44 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton 

Miffiin Company, 1948), p. 657. 

45 Gruppe XXI, Notizfuer das Kriegstagebuch, 1.4.40, In Anlagenband 1 "urn K. T.E. NT. k, AnIngen 1-52, AOK 20 E 180/7. 
72 COMMAND DECISIONS 

been accomplished more cheaply after GELB.46 Professor Walther 

Hubatsch in his history of the Norwegian Campaign reaches essentially the same conclusion and adds the observation that Germany 

"undoubtedly" had the strength at that time to force the Allies back 

out of Scandinavia. He observes also that in Scandinavia the Allies 

would have had to contend with strong opposition on the part of the 

Soviet Union as well as Germany.47 These views find further support 

in the official British historian's statement that "given the political 

situation of 1939-40 British intervention in some form was inevitable; 

and given the paucity of the then resources in men and arms, a 

more or less calamitous issue from it was likewise inevitable." 48 Of 

course, the clock cannot be set back and the function of history is 

not to speculate on what might have been; yet the contentions of 

Warlimont and Hubatsch, although they may benefit to some extent 

from hindsight, do in fact reflect a strong body of opinion which 

existed in the German Command at the time and which, in essence, 

opposed the then growing tendency to plunge in with a full-scale offensive at any point which was or might be threatened. 

To return to the firmer ground of tangible gains, WESERUEBUNG 

brought Germany control of its supply line for Swedish iron ore (later 

also for Finnish nickel), a number of new naval and air bases, and 

some other economic advantages. The naval and air bases somewhat 

improved the German position with respect to the British Isles, increased the chances to break out into the Atlantic with raiders, and 

later made possible air and sea attacks on the Allied Murmansk convoys. However, a decisive improvement, particularly in the naval situation, was not achieved. Germany could still be shut off from the 

open sea, and for the Navy the advantages gained in the bases were 

offset by the losses in ships sustained during WESERUEBUNG. 

In the further course of the war Norway became the staging area 

for an advance across Finland to Murmansk and the Murmansk 

Railroad. That attack bogged down in the summer of 1941 short of 

its objectives, and thereafter the fronts in Finland and Norway stagnated, tying down more than a half million men and tremendous 

amounts of materiel. Although Hitler insisted to the very last that 

Norway was the strategic key to Europe, the expected Allied invasion never came; and on 8 May 1945 the German Army in Norway 

surrendered without having fired a shot in the decisive battles of 

the war. 

4fi Walter Warlimont, Gutachten zu der Kriegstagebuch-Ausarbeitung OKW/WFSt "Der 

noerdliche Kriegsschauplatz," p. 19, MS # C-099 I. OCMH .. 

47 Walter Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzung von Daenemark und Norwegen 1940 (Goettingen, 

1952), p. 261 ff. 

48 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 246. 
3 

Decision To Land United States Forces 

In Iceland, 1941 

by 

Byron Fairchild 

In July 1941, five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl 

Harbor, the first American task force of World War II departed for 

Iceland. Until then, the interest and attention of the War Department had for the most part been focused in the direction of South 

America. As War Department planners saw it, sending troops to Iceland was not an element of the hemisphere defense policy and current military strategy. The decision to undertake the operation was 

made by President Roosevelt in early June, not as a new course of 

policy but because the circumstances attendant upon the particular 

step made the taking of it at that time seem desirable. After the 

President made the basic decision to send troops to Iceland, the War 

Department faced the task of appraising the feasibility of the operation in the light of what was being done elsewhere at the same time. 

The decisions that the War Department was then called upon to 

make were difficult and crucial. 1 

1 The general background of policy and strategy against which the Iceland decisions 

were made will be found in Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959); 

Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948); Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War 

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947); Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 

I (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947); and William L. Langer and S. Everett 

Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), and by 

the same authors, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953). 

BYRON FAIRCHILD, Historian' with OCMH since 1949. Ph.D., Princeton University. Taught: University of Maine, Amherst College, and Munson Institute of Maritime History. Author: Messrs. William Pepperrell (Ithaca, 

1954). Coauthor: The Framework if Hemisphere Defense, The Army and Industrial 

Manpower, and Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, to be published in 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; and The Army and 

Military Assistance Program, to be published in UNITED STATES ARMY 

IN THE KOREAN WAR. 
74 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Early in the European conflict both the British and the Germans 

had recognized what the Vikings had demonstrated ten centuries before, namely, that Iceland was an important steppingstone between 

Europe and the New World. Hitler several times toyed with the idea 

of a descent upon the island and laid preliminary plans for it; but 

to forestall such a move British troops, soon joined by a Canadian 

force, had landed in Iceland on 10 May 1940. Icelandic annoyance 

with the British and Canadian garrison, and British losses in the war, 

which made a withdrawal of the Iceland garrison seem desirable, 

plus American concern for the Atlantic sea lanes, combined to bring 

Iceland within the American defense orbit. 

By the early spring of 1941 the British position in the Mediterranean had become extremely precarious. Weakened by the withdrawal of some 50,000 troops to Greece and surprised by greatly reinforced German and Italian forces, Britain's Army of the Nile was 

driven back, with serious losses, across the African deserts to the 

Egyptian border. Disaster in Greece, following hard upon the rout in 

North Africa, added 11,000 dead and missing to the casualties of the 

African campaign. There was thus a pressing need for the 20,000 or 

so British troops tied down in Iceland. Meanwhile the Battle of the 

Atlantic had taken a critical turn when, in March, German U-boats 

moved westward into the unprotected gap between the Canadian and 

British escort areas. Shipping losses mounted steeply. Although the 

Royal Navy immediately established a patrol and escort staging base 

in Iceland, a dangerous gap in the ocean defenses remained. 

American concern in the protection of the North Atlantic sea 

lanes, and in the defense of Iceland as well, had been acknowledged 

in the recently concluded Anglo-American (ABC) staff conversations. 

Although Britain, in her own interest and on her own initiative, had 

already committed herself to both tasks, they were recognized as matters of mutual responsibility in the final staff report, the so-called 

ABC-l agreement. Britain, it was decided, would provide a garrison 

for Iceland as long as the United States remained a nonbelligerent; 

should the United States be forced into the war against the Axis 

Powers, American troops would then relieve the British garrison. By 

admitting and accepting this measure of responsibility, however conditional it was, the United States laid itself open to an appeal for 

assistance whenever Britain should find the defense of Iceland too 

burdensome. If the United States, instead of awaiting formal entry into 

the war, was to undertake immediately the responsibility it had accepted for relieving the British troops in Iceland, then British losses 

in North Africa and Greece could be to some extent replaced without undue strain on British manpower. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 75 

Iceland, no less than Britain, was anxious to have the British garrison depart. Intensely nationalistic, proud of their ancient civilization, 

the Icelanders chafed under the "protective custody" in which they 

found themselves placed. As long as Canadian troops made up a large 

part of the garrison force, they had felt that a wholly British contingent would be preferable, but when the Canadians were later replaced by British troops most Icelanders seemed to find their lot no 

more bearable. As the scope of Germany's aerial blitzkrieg widened, 

the people of Iceland grew more uneasy; for to be "defended" by one 

of the belligerent powers, they felt, was an open invitation to attack 

by the other. The Icelandic Government shared the apprehensions of 

the people and found further annoyance in Britain's control of Iceland's export trade. 

The Shifting Focus of American Interest 

Taking a pessimistic view of England's chances of survival the 

Icelandic Government had, as early as mid-July of 1940, approached 

the Department of State concerning the possibility of Iceland's coming under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine and in September and 

December the question was again raised. In Iceland it was apparently 

expected that a simple declaration by the United States to the effect 

that Iceland lay within the western hemisphere, and therefore within 

range of the Monroe Doctrine, would make the presence of foreign 

troops unnecessary. If a garrison was required, it was thought that 

American troops, being those of a nonbelligerent power, would not 

draw German attacks. And once Iceland was accepted as part of the 

"Monroe Doctrine Area" it was hoped that a favorable trade agreement could be arranged with the United States." 

Toward all these informal, exploratory inquiries the United States 

Government adopted a noncommittal attitude. Unwilling to make a 

definite decision until circumstances required it, the Department of 

State pointed to the necessity of not tying its hands with prior commitments. The War Department was in full accord with the view of 

the Department of State. When staff conversations with the British 

concerning America's future course got under way early in 1941, both 

the War Plans Division and G-2 recommended that no action be 

taken at that time relative to any possible request by Iceland for 

, Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, pp. 687-88; Memo of Conversation Between S.]. Stefan»on, Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs, and B. E. Kuniholm, American Consul, Reykjavik, 18 Dec 40, and Dispatch, Kuniholm to Dept of State, 24 Dec 40, 

both in Adjutant General's Central File (AG) 380 (2-1-41) Iceland; Ltr, Under Secy 

State Sumner Welles to Secy Navy Frank Knox, 20 ]un 41, GHQ-OPD, INDIGO "A." 
76 COMMAND DECISIONS 

American protection. Accordingly, on 11 February 1941 Secretary of 

War Henry L. Stimson informed the Secretary of State that the War 

Department shared the latter's views that the United States should 

"neither discourage nor encourage an approach to this Government 

by the Government of Iceland." 3 

Then came the British reverses in the Mediterranean and increasing German success in the North Atlantic. 

After the conclusion of the ABC conversations in March, Washington's interest in Iceland had quickened as an outgrowth of the 

problem of placing American planes and supplies in the hands of the 

British and as part of the task of making the United States Navy's 

"neutrality patrol" more effective. On 10 April, while picking up survivors from a Dutch vessel torpedoed off the coast of Iceland, the 

American destroyer Niblack) which earlier in the month had been 

given the job of reconnoitering the waters about the island, went into 

action against a U-boat whose approach was taken as an intention to 

attack. This was the first of a number of "incidents" that were to 

take place in the waters south of Iceland, where from this time on 

the safety zone of the Western Hemisphere and Germany's blockade 

area overlapped. For on the very same day President Roosevelt decided to extend the neutrality patrol to the middle of the Atlantic, 

roughly to the 26th meridian. Also on 10 April, Mr. Harry Hopkins 

and his legal aide, Mr. Oscar Cox, were considering the possibility 

of convoys being escorted by the U.S. Navy within the Western 

Hemisphere, a step which the President was not yet prepared to take, 

and the feasibility of transshipping goods to Britain from ports within 

some defined boundary of the Western Hemisphere. This led to the 

further thought, expressed in a memorandum from Cox to Hopkins 

on 12 April, that public vessels of the United States could be used to 

transport men and materials to the American bases recently acquired 

in the Atlantic and that, in fact, nothing in the Neutrality Act of 

1939 prohibited public vessels from going anywhere with anything! 

Then on 13 April President Roosevelt received assurances from Prime 

Minister Winston Churchill that Britain was determined to fight 

through to a decision in North Africa. American goods and munitions 

would perhaps be the deciding factor in the campaign. On the following day, Mr. Hopkins and Under Secretary of State Sumner 

3 Memo, Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow, ACotS WPD, for CotS, 10 Feb 41, War Plans 

Division (WPD) file 4493; Ltr, Secy War to Secy State, 11 Feb 41, AG 380 (2-1-41) Iceland. 

, Notes on Diary of Henry L. Stimson, entry of 10 Apr 41, and Calendar of Hopkins 

Papers, Book IV, Items 3-4, both in OCMH files. See also Stimson and Bundy, On Active 

Service, p. 368. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 77 

Welles met with the Icelandic Consul-General and reopened the question of American protection for Iceland. 5 

At the end of the month, the War Plans Division recommended 

that an Army survey party be sent to Iceland for the specific purpose 

of preparing detailed plans for its defense. Merely calling attention to 

the commitment under the ABC-l agreement, the War Plans Division gave no sign of anticipating that the Army would soon be called 

upon to relieve the British garrison. No great haste was made in 

organizing the party. Although the Chief of Staff gave his approval 

on 2 May, it was not until some ten days later that messages went 

out requesting the commanding officers of the units provisionally assigned to a move into Iceland, of which the 5th Infantry Division was 

one, to designate officers for the survey party.6 By then the possibility 

of a German move into Spain and Portugal, which shifted attention 

away from the North Atlantic, and changes in the prospective assignments of two of the units designated for use in Iceland, along with a 

shortage and rapid turnover of officers, had contributed to a further 

delay. 

During the early days of May, Nazi propaganda drums, in characteristic preinvasion fashion, had begun beating out a crescendo of 

anti-Portuguese accusations. 'Every omen seemed to point to Spain 

and Portugal as the next victims of German aggression. 7 Deeply 

anxious, the Portuguese Government prepared to move to the Azores, 

which had been included within the bounds of the American neutrality 

patrol and from which, by one of the facts of geography, the sea and air 

routes from Europe to South America and the Panama Canal could 

be controlled. The concern of the United States can be roughly 

measured by the high priority assigned to the preparation of a strategic 

survey of those islands. In a list of seventeen areas, arranged in order of 

urgency, which the War Plans Division submitted to G-2 on 7 May, 

the Azores were given second place. Top priority was assigned to the 

region around Dakar, in French West Africa, whereas Iceland, in sixteenth place, was far down the list. 8 That a declaration of war by 

Germany would follow the landing of American troops on either the 

Azores or Iceland, whether by invitation of the respective governments or not, was regarded by War Department planners as almost 

certain; but sending troops to the Azores was considered to be more 

, Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 290. 

6 Memo, Brig Gen Harry]. Malony, Actg AColS (WPD), for ColS, 30 Apr 41. WPD 

4493; Memo, Col Orlando Ward for ColS, 2 May 41, OCS Conference Binder 15; Ltr, 

TAG to CG 5th Div et al., 13 May 41, and 1st Indorsement to foregoing from Col B. S. 

Dubois, CA, to TAG, 19 May 41, both in WPD 4493. 

7 Memo, Actg AColS WPD for ColS, 16 May 41, V1PD 4300-10; Morison, Battle of the 

Atlantic, pp. 66-67; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 296. 

8 Memo, Actg AColS WPD for AColS G-2, 7 May 41, WPD 4300-7. 
78 COMMAND DECISIONS 

easily justified as a measure III defense of the Western Hemisphere 

than a move into Iceland. 9 

As the month of May passed, German designs became more obscure, and American apprehension shifted from one danger spot to 

another. The French West Indies had been considered a potential 

threat ever since the fall of France, and at the first sign of skulduggery on the part of Admiral Robert, Vichy High Commissioner at 

Martinique, American plans contemplated an immediate landing of 

marines supported by the 1st Infantry Division. Meanwhile, a modus 

vivendi that had been presented to Admiral Robert in 1940 seemed 

to be successfully keeping him in line. Nevertheless, alarming reports 

appeared in American newspapers on Sunday, 18 May, and the spotlight briefly pointed at Martinique. Then it swung away. Although 

estimates of Hitler's intentions toward Spain and Portugal were conflicting and although the actual moves the Germans made were hard 

to interpret, the Azores again assumed importance. On 22 May President Roosevelt directed the Army and Navy to be ready within 

thirty days to forestall a German attack on the Azores by getting there 

first."° The naval balance in the Atlantic, which an Azores landing 

might easily swing in Britain's favor, was thrown into uncertainty just 

at this time by the daring foray of the powerful German battleship 

Bismarck and her consort Prinz Eugen. On the same day that President 

Roosevelt ordered the Azores preparations started, Bismarck and Prinz 

Eugen were slipping past the British Home Fleet into the North 

Atlantic. Two days later, after a sharp five-minute engagement, the 

two ships sank the British battle cruiser Hood, severely damaged the 

newly commissioned Prince of Wales, then disappeared into the fog and 

mist of the Denmark Strait. The threat to the Azores, indeed to the 

entire Atlantic area, lasted until British air and naval units ran down 

and sank the Bismarck off the coast of France on 27 May and forced 

Prinz Eugen into refuge in Brest. 

While the chase after the Bismarck was on, the target of German 

intentions gradually became more discernible. In the early morning 

of 20 Maya swarm of Nazi paratroopers had descended on the island 

of Crete. The British garrison, soon without adequate air protection 

and naval support, was unable to beat off the invaders and ten days 

later Crete fell victim to the Nazi war machine. In defense of the 

island some 13,000 British troops and ten ships of the Royal Navy 

" Memo, unsigned, undated, OPD file, INDIGO "A." A fuller account of Azores planning appears in Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Chapter V. 

10 Conf in Secy Stimson's office with Gen Marshall et al., 19 May 41, Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 parts 

(Washington, 1946), Part 15, p. 1631; First Ind (to Memo, Malony for G-2, 16 May), 

G-2 to WPD, 20 May 41, WPD 4300-10; Ltr, "Betty" [Adm Stark] to Adm H. E. Kimmel, CINCPAC, 24 May 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, pp. 2168-70. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 79 

were 10st. 11 The ensuing possibilities were ominous. Using Crete as a 

springboard, the Germans might jump either southward to meet up 

with Rommel's North African army in Egypt, or eastward into Vichycontrolled Syria, thence through riot-torn Iraq and north to the 

Caucasus. A move in the latter direction would be in keeping with 

Prime Minister Churchill's strong conviction and reports received by 

the State Department to the same effect: that German armies were 

poised in Central Europe for an imminent attack on Russia. Everything pointed to a spread of war to the eastward. 

The situation in the Mediterranean lent an element of compulsion 

to the withdrawal of the British garrison in Iceland. The reduction of 

German naval strength in the Atlantic had somewhat eased the threat 

to the Azores, and to the Cape Verdes and Canary Islands, to the 

extent that Britain felt capable of undertaking their defense without, 

at this time, any American assistance. And finally a German involvement with Russia would make less likely a declaration of war on the 

United States in the event of an American move into Iceland. The 

Azores at once lost the precedence assigned to them only a week or 

so before. 

Meanwhile, the War Department had already taken steps to facilitate putting into effect one of the American commitments under the 

ABC-l agreement. On 18 May, Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney had 

arrived in London as head of the military mission which, should the 

United States enter the war, would be the command headquarters 

of U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles, but which, for the time being, 

went by the euphemistic pesignation of Special Observer Group, 

London. Iceland was envisaged as a prospective theater of operations 

geographically within the sphere of the Special Observer Group. When 

General Chaney's instructions were being drafted and the composition of his group was being decided upon, in early April, the indications had been that American forces would not be sent to England 

or Iceland before the following September at the very earliest. '2 On 

this account, and no doubt to maintain as much of the fiction of neutrality as possible, General Chaney was given no specific instructions 

concerning Iceland or any other field of proposed Anglo-American 

co-operation. He was merely directed to establish the channels by which 

that co-operation could at some future time be carried out and to 

govern himself in accordance with those paragraphs of the staff agreement that provided for the exchange of missions and defined in general terms their purpose. B The Special Observer Group had scarcely 

11 E. W. Mcinnis, The War: Second Year (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 

pp. 186-92. 

"Memo, AColS G-2 for ColS, 7 Apr 41, WPD 4402-5. 

1\ Ltr, ColS to Chaney, 24 Apr 41, WPD 4402-5. 
80 COMMAND DECISIONS 

begun to take soundings in those channels when the decision was 

taken to move into Iceland as soon as possible. 

The President's Decision and the War Department's Response 

The shifting tides of war and strategy had not only thrust into the 

background the prospect of an American landing in the Azores and 

created a more urgent need elsewhere for the British troops that were 

in Iceland, they had also strengthened President Roosevelt's determination to ensure the safety of Britain's North Atlantic supply line. 

Declaring an unlimited national emergency, the President in a speech 

on 27 May promised all possible assistance in getting supplies to 

Britain. The American neutrality patrol was helping to ensure delivery, 

Roosevelt declared, and "other measures" were being devised, he 

told his radio audience. Two days later, in response to an inquiry 

made by the President not long before, Prime Minister Churchill informed Roosevelt that he would welcome the immediate relief of the 

British garrison, and during the following weekend the American 

Ambassador to Great Britain, John G. Winant, arrived in Washington with a further message from Churchill regarding the situation in 

the North Atlantic. Secretary Stimson and the Secretary of the Navy, 

Frank Knox, were heartily in favor of sending American forces to 

relieve the British in Iceland. After a discussion of this and other steps 

that might be taken to aid Britain, which the two Secretaries had 

with Mr. Harry Hopkins, Secretary Stimson at a meeting of the War 

Council on 3 June asked the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, to investigate "our possibilities in case we take vigorous action 

in the Northeast." General Marshall cautiously endorsed an Iceland 

expedition in preference, at least, to making a landing in the Azores. 14 

President Roosevelt, who had been in Hyde Park over the weekend, returned to Washington on Tuesday morning, 3 June, and immediately had Winant present his report and Churchill's message. 

Telling Secretary Stimson about the meeting, Winant on the following Thursday gave Stimson to understand that the President had 

made up his mind to send American forces to Iceland. Later that day 

Stimson himself saw the President and came away satisfied that the 

"fateful decision" had indeed been made." 5 

14 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 523; John G. Winant, Letter From Grosvenor Square (Boston: Houghton Millin Company, 1947), pp. 194-95; Stimson Diary, entries 

of 2 and 3 J un 41 ; Notes on War Council Mtg, 3 J un 41, in Secy War's Conference 

Binder 1. 

"Stimson Diary, entries of 5 and 6 Jun 41; Diary of Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, 

ACofS WPD, entry of 5 Jun 41, in OCMH files. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 81 

On the strength of Secretary Stimson's request in the War Council 

meeting of 3 June, the War Department had hastily resumed the 

long-dormant preparations for sending a survey party to Iceland, 

although the head of the War Plans Division and some of his subordinates were opposed to the idea of an Iceland expedition. Lt. Col. 

Kirby Green of the 5th Infantry Division and three other officers were 

ordered to Washington on 3 June; but, since it appeared that they 

would not be able to leave for Iceland until the end of the month, 

the War Department requested General Chaney to send out a survey 

party from London and then to advise how the relief of the British 

garrison should be carried out. He was to say what American troops 

would be required, what quantities of ammunition and supplies should 

be sent, and how much would be turned over to the American forces by 

the departing British. 16 Discussions between General Chaney's staff 

and British officers began on 4 June on such matters as housing the 

American troops, the antiaircraft defense of Iceland, and the necessary 

fighter plane strength; and it was decided that a joint Admiralty, Air, 

and War Ministry committee would collaborate with the Special 

Observer Group in planning the relief of the British forces. 17 Apparently the stage was set for General Chaney to play a prominent role 

in the formulation of plans for the Iceland movement. 

The War Department began preliminary planning at once. Since 

only a meager body of firsthand data was available, the point of departure had to be the decision itself (that American troops would 

immediately and completely relieve the British garrison) and frOm 

that point planning had to proceed on the basis of the two known 

factors: that approximately 30,000 troops would be required, and that 

either the 1st or 5th Division would provide the nucleus of the force. 

In the absence of other data the chief consideration governing the 

strength and composition of the proposed Iceland garrison was that it 

must be comparable to the British units for the relief of which the 

American force was intended. The report of the reconnaissance made 

by USS Niblack, a copy of which had been forwarded to the War 

Department on 7 May, placed British ground strength in Iceland at 

about 25,000 men, although this, it appeared later, was an overestimate. The Royal Air Force was reported to have about 500 men, 

with five Sunderland flying boats and six Lockheed Hudson bombers, 

for antisubmarine patrol, and about a dozen Fairey-Battle seaplanes 

16 Memo, ACoiS WPD for TAG, 3 Jun 41, sub: Special Observers to Iceland, and 

Memo, ACoiS WPD for TAG, 5 Jun 41, sub: Iceland Reconnaissance, both in WPD 4493. 

17 SPOBS: The Special Observer Group Prior to the Activation of the ETO, Historical 

Monograph, in OCMH files. 
82 COMMAND DECISIONS 

and two Moth fighters. IS The British deficiency in fighter plane 

strength, which the War Department soon afterward pointed out 

and London readily conceded, was a matter of concern from the 

very beginning, and the earliest War Department calculations included 

somewhat heavier air strength than the British garrison enjoyed. 

Given the size and nature of the British garrison, the War Department went ahead with the plans for a ground force that would consist of one infantry division reinforced with two antiaircraft regiments, 

a harbor defense regiment, an engineer regiment, and the usual services. The combat aviation planned for the American force would 

consist of one bombardment and one headquarters squadron, totaling 

eighteen medium bombers, and one pursuit squadron of twenty-five 

planes. The troop strength of the entire force totaled 28,964. '9 

Since the 5th Division was scheduled to be ready for field service 

by midsummer, it had been provisionally assigned to the Iceland operation as long as that operation belonged to the fairly remote and 

indefinite future. Although the division would not be completely prepared for combat, no armed opposition to the initial landings in Iceland 

was expected. 20 But the decision to make an immediate move required 

that an immediately available unit be substituted. As a result, in the 

preliminary planning and the discussions that took place during this 

first week in June, the 1st Division was scheduled for the job in lieu 

of the 5th. The shift of units apparently was made with some misgivings, for the 1st Division was the best equipped infantry division in 

the Army, the only one that approached a state of readiness for combat involving landings on a hostile shore. 21 To tie the division down 

in Iceland would make impossible the fulfillment of the missions contemplated for it in current war plans and would thus give a cast of 

unreality to those plans. 

Problems, Remote and Immediate 

Two of the problems that later on were to harass the War Department planners remained in the background for the time being. 

Legislative restrictions on the use of selectees, of members of the 

Reserve and of the National Guard did not, in these early stages of 

IH Report from Comdr D. L. Ryan to CNO, 2 May 41, WPD 4493-1; Memo [Capt] 

R. E. Schuir'mann [USN] for Marshall, 7 May 41, GHQ 333.I-Iceland Base Command-Binder 38. 

u, Tentative List of Units for Iceland [no date, filed with WPD memo to ColS, 5 Jun 

41] OPD file, INDIGO "A." 

'" Chart showing Readiness of Divisions for Field Service (as of 31 March 41), WPD 

4416. 

21 Emergency Expeditionary Force Plan, inclosure to Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 15 

May 41, WPD 3493-11; Memo, ACofS WPD for ColS, 9 Jun 41, sub: Readiness of Combat Divisions, WPD 4416-\. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 83 

planning, seem to jeopardize the Iceland operation. And that there 

would be adequate shipping also seemed fairly certain. 

The question of shipping, in late May and early June 1941, appears to have been not primarily whether vessels were available but 

rather where they should be employed. The problem was one of allocation, which in turn depended on decisions of strategy that were as 

yet unmade, on future requirements that could seldom be calculated 

with accuracy, on the Maritime Commission's co-operation which, as 

the War Department saw it, was not always assured, and on the fullest 

use of commercial shipping and voyage charters, which the Army at 

this time was extremely reluctant to employ. The situation, as it concerned troop transports, was complicated just at this time by the transfer of six or seven of the Army's largest vessels to the Navy for operation and control. Although the immediate effect was something of a 

dislocation, since the Navy laid up several of the ships for conversion 

into attack transports, the net result was a gain to the combined 

transport fleets because the Maritime Commission at once turned over 

to the the Army six fair-sized passenger liners to replace the tonnage 

that had been transferred to the Navy.22 

As soon as the decision to relieve the British garrison had been 

taken, the head of the Transportation Section of G-4, Col. Charles P. 

Gross, discussed the matter of transportation with a representative of 

the Navy. The problem, simply stated, was to place in Iceland, as 

soon as possible, nearly 30,000 men with 231,554 ship tons of equipment, weapons, and supplies, and to provide thereafter some 25,000 

tons of shipping each month for maintenance. 23 The Navy Department gave assurances that on five days' notice three naval transports 

with a total capacity of 4,000 men could be provided for the Iceland 

movement; that on or about 20 June four Army transports being converted by the Navy and with a capacity of about 6,000 men could 

be made available; and that by 28 June transportation for the entire Iceland force could be provided. In forwarding this information 

to the Chief of Staff on 5 June, the War Plans Division pointed out 

that to provide transportation for the entire Iceland force would nevertheless require the "use of all Marine transports" and would "immobilize the Marine Force for the time being." 24 

"Memo. Maj Gen Richard C. Moore, DColS, for Secy War, 10 Jul 41, sub: Utilization of Army Vessels, G--4/29717-26. See also Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: 

Responsibilities, Organi<.ation, and Operations (Washington, 1951), Ch. V, and Richard M. 

Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 

1955), Ch. II, both in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

2.1 Memo, Gross, G-4, for AColS vVPD, 5 Jun 41, OPD file, INDIGO "A," and Memo, 

unsigned, sub: Tonnage and Cubage of Equipment of Army Troops, no date, filed with it. 

24 Memo, AColS WPD for ColS, 5 Jun 41, sub: Transports for Movement to Iceland, 

WPD 4493-3. 
84 COMMAND DECISIONS 

At the same time, the War Plans Division raised inquiry concerning 

the effect of the legal restrictions that prohibited the National Guard, 

members of the Reserve, and men drafted under the Selective Service Act from serving outside the Western Hemisphere and which 

limited their terms of military service to a period of twelve months. 

For purposes of naval defense the President had placed the Atlantic 

frontier of the western world, quite arbitrarily, along the 26th meridian, which excluded the whole of Iceland. 25 The question was one of 

policy, not geography; and if policy for the moment dictated a course 

of exclusion, circumstances at any future time might well prescribe a 

change in policy. Whatever concern was felt during these first days 

in June seems to have arisen over the time limit rather than the controversial geographical restriction. On this basis it was entirely rational for the Chief of Coast Artillery to observe that selectees would 

have to be used in constituting the harbor defense regiment proposed 

as part of the Iceland garrison. In any event the problems posed by 

the legal restrictions did not seem insuperable as long as the 1st Division was being considered for the nucleus of the force. Although 75 

percent of the officers of that division had been drawn from the Reserve, it was presumed that most of them would volunteer for duty in 

Iceland. The problem, in this respect, was considered to be one of 

maintaining secrecy. As for enlisted men, only a "small percentage" 

of them were selectees, and only about 10 percent of the men of the 

two antiaircraft regiments-the 61st and 68th-were subject to the restrictions written into the Selective Service and National Defense Acts. 26 

Harbor conditions and the lack of facilities at Reykjavik were 

recognized as the real limitation. Although Reykjavik, the capital of 

Iceland, was the largest town and chief port, its harbor was shallow, 

subject to occasional hurricanes, and had a fairly wide range of tide. 

Both G-2 and Naval Intelligence reported a depth of only sixteen feet 

alongside the piers at low water, whereas the available ships drew 

from twenty-five to thirty feet. As a consequence, all troops and cargo 

would have to be lightered ashore and the rate of discharge would 

therefore be slow. 27 For this reason the Navy recommended that the 

movement be handled in four convoys sailing at intervals of about three 

weeks beginning 15 June. Each convoy would consist of four troopships and four cargo vessels carrying approximately 7,000 men and 

60,000 tons of cargo. Each would make the trip to Iceland in about 

"Ltr, TAG to CGs, 21 May 41, sub: Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan 2, 

WPD 4414-1. 

26 Memo, Office of Chief of CA for ACofS WPD, 5 Jun 41, WPD 4493-29, Strengthening the National Defense; Statement of General George C. Marshall ... (Testimony of 9 

J ul 41 in Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, U.S. Senate) (Washington, 1941). 

27 Memo, Gross, G-4, for ACofS WPD, 5 Jun 41, OPD file, INDIGO "A." 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 85 

ten days and require fifteen days for discharge. Since the vessels that 

made up the first two convoys could thus repeat their voyages, only 

sixteen ships would be needed, the Navy optimistically reported. With 

the departure of the last convoy from Iceland, about 10 September, 

the entire operation would be completed. On 5 June the War Plans 

Division submitted the Navy's neatly drawn blueprint to the Chief of 

Staff. The outstanding points, as noted by the War Plans Division, were: 

that the Iceland and Azores operations could not be carried out simultaneously because of the shipping situation; that the Iceland movement 

should be conducted in stages because of meager housing and harbor 

facilities; and that it would be impossible to conduct the operation in 

secrecy.28 But before further steps were taken, the course of affairs took 

a new turn as the result of Stimson's conference with the President 

that same day, 5 June. 

In discussing with Secretary Stimson the effect the Iceland movement would have on the use of expeditionary forces for all other purposes under the basic war plans, the President expressed his opinion 

that a unit of marines would have to go in the first contingent to Iceland. Although this solution was not thoroughly to the liking of the 

Chief of Staff, he recognized that it would permit substituting the 5th 

Division for the more indispensable 1st Division as the basic component of the force and that thus the latter division would once more 

be available for the role originally assigned to it in the war plans. Accordingly, on 7 June, General Marshall informed the War Plans Division that the Iceland preparations should be based upon using the 

5th Division with a Marine Corps unit for the first wave of the force. 29 

The 6th Regiment of Marines, which had been ordered east from San 

Diego when the Azores operation was still in the air late in May, was 

at this moment en route to the Atlantic by way of the Panama Canal. 

It was now, with appropriate reinforcement, designated the 1st Marine 

Brigade (Provisional) and on 12 June, while the regiment was still at 

sea, orders were drafted for the newly created brigade to depart for 

Iceland ten days later. 30 

Simultaneously, the War Department took the initial steps required 

by the shift of units. Personnel of the 5th Division were "frozen" in 

their assignments. The commander of the division, Maj. Gen. Joseph 

M. Cummins, was ordered to Washington to participate in the planning. The respective divisions of the General Staff were asked to pre-

"Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 5 J un 41, sub: Transports for Movement to Iceland, 

WPD 4493-3. 

29 Gerow Diary, entry of 7 J un 41. 

:10 Draft Ltr of Instructions, CNO to CinCLant, 12 Jun 41, OPD file, INDIGO "A." 

The official mimeographed orders were dated 16 June. See also John L. Zimmerman, The 

First Marine Brigade (Provisional): leeland, 1941-42 (Historical Div, Hq USMC, 1946), p. 6. 
86 COMMAND DECISIONS 

pare embarkation plans, to make ready special clothing and equipment, and to investigate and plan the necessary housing. The required 

change in the convoy schedule previously recommended by the Navy 

was sketched out. The new timetable, submitted to the War Department on 16 June, tentatively provided for three convoys sailing at tenday intervals, beginning 20 August, each carrying 8,500 men. 31 

The shift of units also brought forward the problem of personnel. 

In contrast to the 1st Division, as many as 41 percent of the enlisted 

men of the 5th Division were selectees and from 75 to 88 percent of 

the officers were members of the Reserve. Earlier, when the 5th Division had been provisionally designated for a possible Iceland expedition under the ABC-l agreement, General Marshall had pointed out 

that volunteers and Regular Army personnel could be substituted for 

the selectees while the division was awaiting its ocean transportation. 32 

Now G-l estimated that, by shifting troops within the division, one 

infantry regiment and one field artillery battalion could be prepared 

for movement within a week after orders were issued; or, by transferring men from at least three other divisions, the entire 5th Division could be made ready within three weeks. The War Plans Division 

favored the second course of action on the ground that the alternative 

would lower the combat efficiency of those units of the division from 

which the three-year enlisted men were drawn. The preparation of detailed plans for shifting personnel was assigned to G-l and G-3 on 

12 June, but the execution of the plans was to be deferred until 

specifically ordered. 33 

By mid-June at least seven different offices and agencies were to 

one extent or another involved in planning for the Iceland expedition, and very shortly General Headquarters (GHQ) would enter the 

picture. In London, General Chaney's Special Observer Group was 

working out a program premised upon the relief of the British as the 

principal object and designed primarily to provide a satisfactory timetable. In the War Department, G-l and G-3 were preparing the 

plans by means of which suitable, adequately trained personnel would 

be available. G-4 was engaged in planning the embarkation and 

transportation of the troops and in preparing plans for housing and 

equipping them. The War Plans Division had the task of working out 

:\1 Memo, G-I for ColS, 9 Jun 41, OCS 21176-6; Tel, TAG to CG 5th Div, II Jun 

41, and unsigned Memo Reference a Conference Held in WPD on 12 June, 13 J un 41, 

both in WPD 4416-1; Memo, unsigned, Office of CNO, 16 Jun 41, sub: Tentative Schedule for Move of Army to INDIGO, OPD file, INDIGO "A." 

:12 Notes, on Conference in Office of Secy War, 19 May 41; OCS file, Emergency 

Measures-1939-1940, Binder 1. 

":1 Memo, Lt Col Lee S. Gerow for Gen Gerow, WPD, Jun 41, sub: Readiness of the 

5th Division, WPD 4416-\. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 87 

such details as command and interservice relations and of drawing together the various plans into a comprehensive whole that would conform to broader strategy. The Navy was involved in the formulation 

of Army plans so far as they concerned convoys and shipping. Finally, 

the Army-Navy Joint Board, through its Joint Planning Committee, 

was responsible for preparing the basic directive, which would be the 

definitive joint plan for the operation. 

INDIGO Planning) First Phase 

By this time also, American reconnaissance parties were descending upon Iceland in a flurry of activity. First to appear was Lt. William C. Asserson, USN, Officer-in-Charge of the Navy's Greenland 

survey. His report on possible patrol plane bases in Iceland did not 

reach the War Department until the end of June, and by then the 

Army's plans had already been laid, changed, and superseded. The 

survey party sent out from London by General Chaney was next to 

arrive and spent nearly a week gathering data on housing and living 

conditions, on air, coast, and harbor defe'nses, the state of airdromes, 

mine fields, docking facilities, communications, and the like. On 12 

June, the day after the Special Observers party arrived from London, 

two Army officers and a Marine Corps survey party arrived from 

the United States. The Army officers were Lt. Col. Geoffrey M. O'Connell, Coast Artillery Corps, who had been designated a member of the 

group organized on 3 June, and Capt. Richard R. Arnold, Corps of 

Engineers. After spending a total of thirty hours in Iceland and conferring briefly with Lieutenant Asserson in Newfoundland, Colonel 

O'Connell and Captain Arnold returned to Washington and presented 

a nineteen-page report on their reconnaissance. 34 

Within three days after Colonel O'Connell and Captain Arnold 

returned, the War Department received two other reports on Iceland, 

one from General Chaney and a second from Maj. Gen. H. O. Curtis, General Officer Commanding the Brit"ish forces in Iceland. Fearing the limitations that would affect the proposed operations were 

not properly understood, General Curtis had placed before the American survey parties his views on the various problems of command, 

housing, and transportation, which he then sent off as a long dispatch to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 35 In accordance with 

General Curtis' recommendation, the British Embassy forwarded a 

H The other members of the Army survey party chosen on 3 June were sent with the 

1st Marine Brigade and therefore did not reach Iceland until 7 July, 

:15 Cablegram, ALABASTER to TROOPERS (personal from Curtis to Chief of Imperial 

Gen Staff), 13 Jun 41. OPD file, INDIGO "A." 
88 COMMAND DECISIONS 

summary of his dispatch to the War Plans Division on the same day 

that Colonel O'Connell and Captain Arnold were submitting their report; and a few days later the full text was received by the war Department. General Chaney summarized his own recommendations in 

a lengthy cable to the War Department on 19 June; and on 24 June 

Lt. Col. George W. Griner, Jr., one of the members of the Special Observers survey party, arrived in Washington with General Chaney's 

complete plan. 36 

All three reports highlighted these aspects of the problem: first, the 

lack of harbor facilities at Reykjavik and the outports, which would impose limitations on shipping; second, the availability of housing, which 

was conditioned upon the British evacuating their Nissen huts; and 

third, the onset of winter gales and snow after late September, which established a deadline for the operation. Each report differed from the 

others in the relative weight assigned to these factors, in the thoroughness with which they were covered, and, in some cases, in the matter of 

factual detail as well. As a presentation of the basic data necessary for 

formulating any plan, the O'Connell-Arnold report reflected the haste 

in which the data had been gathered. All the thirty-five topics it dealt 

with were, with a few exceptions, treated in superficial, far from 

specific, fashion. 37 

General Chaney's report was in the nature of counsel on matters 

of policy, on the decisions that were required, and on the way they 

should be executed. The data on which he based his recommendations were included in nine annexes covering the various arms and 

services. 38 Where General Curtis, in his dispatch, emphasized the shipping and cargo-handling difficulties that would be encountered, General Chaney, on the other hand, was inclined to stress the housing 

problem. In either case the conclusion was that the entire operation 

must be completed before the advent of winter weather late in September and that the utmost co-operation between the British and the 

Americans would be required. 

The distinguishing feature of General Chaney's plan was its bilateral approach in providing a timetable not only for the movement of 

American troops to Iceland but for the withdrawal of the British garrison as well. Both moves, and the relief of the marines, were to be 

accomplished in five stages. The first four contingents of American 

36 Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO, Part I, The Predecessor Commands; SPOBS and USAFBI, Historical Monograph, pp. 40-41, in OCMH files; Rad, 

TAG to SPOBS, No. 16, 27 Jun 41, WPD 4402-34. 

37 A copy of the report by Lt. Col. G. M. O'Connell and Capt. R. R. Arnold (9-16 

June 1941) is in OPD file, INDIGO "A." 

.38 Report of Reconnaissance of Iceland, Chaney to CofS, 19 Jun 41, WPD 4493-20. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 89 

troops were to consist of about 6,000 men each. The relief of the British 

was to begin as soon as the second convoy completed discharge and 

was to proceed successively following the arrival of each American 

convoy thereafter. When the last American contingent, of some 4,500, 

had landed, the marines would return to the United States and the 

last of the British units would depart for England. The entire movement would be completed by the end of September. So precise was 

the schedule as to demand what would have been in fact a unified 

Anglo-American effort. General Chaney in his plan provided for such 

an effort. None of the others did so. 

Shipping requirements and the housing problem seem to have been 

the rocks on which the Chaney plan foundered. On both subjects, General Chaney and the War Department disagreed in several particulars. 

As for housing, General Chaney's plan was to make use of the 

Nissen huts vacated by the British units scheduled for relief. The total 

number of men who could thus be housed would come to about 22,-

000, but the British, he reported, would deliver enough material for 

huts to accommodate the remainder of the American forces. The inevitable overlapping period between the arrival of troops from America and the departure of corresponding British units for England 

would, according to General Chaney, present the gravest problem. 

During this period either the British or Americans would have to live 

in tents. He therefore regarded it as absolutely essential that the first 

American Army contingent arrive in Iceland by 1 August. When he" 

informed the War Department that the British would deliver the material for all additional huts necessary, General Chaney had neglected 

to say how many this would be. The War Plans Division, clearly skeptical, requested immediate confirmation that the British could furnish the 

3,128 huts that the War Department figures indicated would be required. 39 General Chaney, it then transpired, had calculated that less 

than half this number would be necessary. Whereas the War Department estimated that accommodations for 10,000 additional men would 

be needed (including any British units remaining through the winter), 

General Chaney figured on 7,000. The War Department estimate for 

hospital facilities and storage was three times as high as his. And finally, General Chaney took no account of space for headquarters, 

mess, kitchens, and dayrooms, for which the War Department figured 

an additional 1,008 huts would be needed. What the British would 

provide was a total of 1,336 huts, General Chaney replied to War 

39 Cablegrams, SPOBS to TAG, No. 13, 18 Jun 41, WPD 4493-11; SPOBS to TAG, 

No. 15, 19 Jun 41, OPD file, INDIGO "A"; TAG to SPOBS, No. 11, 23 Jun 41, AG 

320.2 (6-9-41). 
90 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Plans Division, and, unable to make out how the War Department 

total of 3,128 had been reached, he referred the War Plans Division 

to Colonel Griner for complete details. 40 

Discrepant calculations in the matter of shipping requirements 

were the root of further confusion. On the subject of harbor conditions General Chaney's observations controverted a number of assumptions from which War Department planning had proceeded. The 

War Department was basing its preparations on lightering troops and 

cargo ashore, on account of the low depth of water at the Reykjavik 

piers, whereas General Chaney considered this impossible. There 

were no lighters at Reykjavik, he pointed out, no cargo cranes on the 

piers, and the availability of coastal shipping for lighterage purposes 

was questionable. It was feasible, he continued, to dock vessels with 

a maximum draft of twenty-one feet. He therefore based his calculations on berthing all the cargo vessels alongside the piers and discharging them by means of ships' booms. According to his convoy 

schedule the operation would require a total of thirty-one ships, nearly 

twice the number that the Navy had been figuring upon using. They 

might have been found without too much difficulty had it not been that 

practically all the cargo transports under Army and Navy control were 

larger and deeper than those called for in the Chaney plan. And even 

if his shipping requirements had been completely met, the total cargo 

capacity of the thirty-one vessels, including repeated voyages and the 

use of troopships to their maximum capacity, would have been at least 

43,000 tons short of the figure which two weeks earlier had been the 

basis of War and Navy Department shipping calculations. Anomaly 

was added to discrepancy when General Chaney recommended a 

level of supply somewhat higher than that used by the War Department to estimate the cargo requirements. Furthermore, General Chaney 

incorporated in his report a British request that, because of their own 

shi pping shortage and to reduce port congestion in Iceland, certain 

American transports be made available for the movement back to England of British troops and equipment. This request the War Department absolutely and unconditionally rejected. 41 

Meanwhile, the War Plans Division had been working along the 

lines of the convoy schedule drawn up by the Navy on 16 June. But 

no sooner was the schedule set up than a modification seemed necessary. Convinced that a serious lack of housing and storage was in 

prospect, especially in the northern and eastern outports, the War 

4U Rad, SPOBS to TAG, No. 19, 25 Jun 41, OPD file, INDI(~O "A." General Chaney 

was probably basing his figures on British Army housing scales, which allotted considerably less space per man than did the ,corresponding American tables. 

41 Rad, TAG to SPOBS, No. 18, 28 Jun 41, OPD file, INDIGO "A." 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 91 

Plans Division proposed that a construction party of 2,200 engineers 

precede the first regularly scheduled contingent in order to make certain that the necessary huts were in place by the end of September. 4

" 

This would add a fourth convoy to the schedule. Even more consequential was the change made in the level of reserve supplies. The 

War Department's early plan of 5 June had been based on an initial 

60-day level of supply, to be raised and maintained at a 90-day level 

by the time the operation was completed. But on 21 June the Chief 

of Staff approved a recommendation made by the War Plans Division on the same day that supply requirements (except ammunition) 

be increased to a 90-day level, to be raised to a 180-day level within 

the period scheduled for the troop movement. The effect was that cargo 

requirements were doubled. Instead of approximately 230,000 ship tons 

of cargo to be handled along with the troops, the figure now jumped to 

the neighborhood of 450,000 tons. By thus changing one of the basic 

conditions, the War Department made General Chaney's plan entirely impracticable; for if the limitation on the draft of vessels, insisted upon by General Chaney and the British, was to be observed, 

the Navy noted, a total of seventy-five cargo vessels would be necessary.43 

Using troop and cargo figures furnished by the War Plans Division, the Navy Department now worked up a convoy schedule adapted 

to the War Department's new requirements. Four convoys, sailing 20 

July, 25 August, 4 September, and 14 September, were scheduled. To 

transport the 29,000 or so troops and 445,200 ship tons of cargo 

would require a total of forty-one ships, including the three largest 

vessels in the American merchant marine. Only three cargo ships of 

less than twenty-one feet draft were provided, and these were intended 

for the northern and eastern outports. To mitigate unloading problems at Reykjavik, three steam lighters were to be taken along, under 

tow, in the first convoy. In submitting the schedule on 20 June, Captain Oscar Smith of the Navy Department gave no assurance that the 

required vesssels would be available. The shipping situation, he pointed 

out, had become serious, and on this account it was essential that requirements be reduced to the minimum. 44 

42 Memo (unused), WPD for Cofs, 19 Jun 41, sub: Relief of British Troops in Iceland, OPD file, INDIGO "A"; Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Jun 41, sub: U.S. Forces for INDIGO, WPD 4493-15. 

4:J Memo, Gross for ACofS WPD, 5 Jun 41, and accompanying Tonnage and Cubage 

of Equipment for Army Troops, OPD file, INDIGO "A"; Memo, ACofS WPD for ColS, 

21 Jun 41, sub: U.S. Forces for INDIGO, WPD 4493-15; Memo, [Capt] Oscar Smith, 

USN, for Lt Col Leven C. Allen, WPD, 20 Jun 41, sub: Logistics Involved ... ,OPD 

file, INDIGO "A." 

44 Memo, Smith for Allen, cited n. 43. 
92 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The general situation was further beclouded by growing uncertainty within the War Department. Despite the substitution of the 

5th Division, the War Plans Division continued to view with alarm 

the effect of the Iceland expedition upon the Army's readiness to put 

its basic war plans into execution. The selectee problem was emphasized at every opportunity. The cost of the construction program was 

stressed. And when the President began to express his fears that the 

proposed force was inadequate and intimated that it might be well 

for the British garrison to remain in addition to the American forces, 

General Gerow countered with the thought that the whole operation 

be called off, since he considered it to be dictated by political considerations rather than military necessity.45 

The Supply Division of the General Staff, G-4, took a similarly 

pessimistic view. The bottleneck, according to G-4, was not shipping 

but inadequate wharf facilities in Iceland. And on this premise, Brig. 

Gen. Eugene Reybold, chief of the division, questioned the feasibility 

of all the proposals so far considered. It was evident, he asserted, that 

the efforts of the War Department would have to be pointed toward 

anyone or all of the following: extending the relief movement beyond September in spite of the danger of stormy weather; cutting down 

the force by perhaps providing for a joint United States-British garrison; and reducing equipment and supplies to bare necessities.<6 By 

recommending that the expedition be limited to a total of 200,000 ship 

tons of cargo, that current planning be modified to conform to this 

limitation, and that even the risk of partial failure be accepted, General Reybold helped to knock the Iceland plans into a cocked hat. 

Meanwhile, an administrative change was taking place by which 

certain planning functions held by the War Plans Division were to 

be turned over to GHQ, the separate staff agency, activated in 1940, 

through which the Chief of Staff could exercise command of the field 

forces. During its first year of existence GHQ had training responsibilities only; but now the time seemed to have come for it to assume 

its full role as a command group. In this capacity, GHQ was to have 

the task of ,drafting detailed theater plans for the operations assigned 

to it, while the War Plans Division would continue to draw up the 

strategic plans that prescribed and defined the operations. In anticipation of this step, Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, head of the planning section of the War Plans Division, had been transferred to GHQ 

on 15 June as Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of plans and operations. His previous assignment had thrown him into the midst of the 

45 Gerow Diary, entries of 19 and 20 Jun 41. 

46 Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS WPD, 25 Jun 41, WPD 4493-38. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 93 

Iceland preparations, and although the formal directive authorizing 

the enlargement of GHQ's functions was not issued until 3 July, General Malony almost at once took up where he had left off in the War 

Department. He was presiding over a conference held in the War Plans 

Division on 24 June when Colonel Griner arrived from London with 

General Chaney's recommendations. The next day members of the 

War Plans and GHQ staffs met in an effort to fit General Chaney's 

plan into the mosaic being pieced together in the War Department, 

but the result, as the GHQ Diary records, was "pretty confused and 

obscure." 47 

On the following Tuesday, 1 July, the Army-Navy Joint Planning 

Committee finally completed and submitted to the Joint Board the 

basic directive for the Iceland operation. Given the short title INDIGO, 

it was intended to be the definitive joint plan to which all subsequent 

planning should conform. 48 Unfortunately it emerged stillborn. The 

plan failed to survive a policy decision taken the very same day, a 

decision that was partly the culmination of the War Department's approach to the problem and partly the result of the President's fears 

that the proposed garrison was inadequate. 

Heretofore the confusion and the vacillation and the irreconcilable plans had generally arisen over a question of method, of how to 

transport to Iceland by a definite date a specified number of men with 

a given amount of supplies and equipment. But the tendency to approach a solution by changing the terms of the proposition gradually 

developed, and the more pronounced this tendency became, the 

larger grew the area susceptible to dispute and revision. Shuffiing the 

supply requirements had necessitated several changes in the plan before the INDIGO directive finally established a convoy schedule by cutting back the bulk of reserves to a 90-day level, by setting a 200,000-

ton limit on cargo, and by making a corresponding reduction in the 

number of cargo transports.<9 General Gerow, head of War Plans Division, had privately urged that the operation be abandoned. G-4 had 

suggested the possibility of reducing the size of the force and had formally recommended extending the date of the movement. Now, on 1 

July, the size of the American force was brought seriously into question and the whole INDIGO plan was thrown into discard. 

47 GHQ Diary, 6-23-41 to 3-4-42, Army Ground Forces (AGF) file 314.81; Kent R. 

Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington 1947), pp. 15-20. 

4' Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan for the Occupation of Iceland by a Permanent 

Garrison of the U.S. Army (short title-INDIGo), submitted 1 Jul 41, OPD file, INDIGO 

"B." 

49 Annex C to INDIGO directive, cited nA8. 
94 COMMAND DECISIONS 

A New Decision: Reinforcement, Not Relief 

It was primarily President Roosevelt's doubt whether there were 

enough British troops in Iceland which led, paradoxically, to the reduction in size of the American force sent there in 1941. Informed of 

his views, the British Foreign Office in late June gave a definite pledge 

that no troops would be withdrawn until both the United States and 

Britain were satisfied that the defenses of Iceland were secure. The 

Foreign Office agreed that it would not be an "over-insurance" for 

the American force to be increased by an additional "brigade group" 

(about 7,100 men) and by greater air strength. That the British garrison would be completely relieved was still the understanding of the 

Foreign Office, which at this moment was in fact using the withdrawal 

of British troops as an argument to persuade the Icelandic Government to request American protection. 50 When it finally reached President Roosevelt, the rather luke-warm invitation voiced a concern 

similar to his own; for, as one of several conditions on which American protection would be accepted, the Icelandic Government stated: 

... it is considered obvious that if the United States undertake defense of 

the country it must be strong enough to meet every eventuality, and particularly in the beginning it is expected that, as far as possible, efforts will 

be made to prevent any special danger in connection with change-over. 

Iceland Government lays special stress on there being sufficient airplanes 

for defensive purposes, wherever they are required and [wherever 1 they can 

be used, as soon as decision is made for the United States to undertake the 

defense of the country.51 

The War Plans Division, on the other hand, had deprecated any 

suggestion that the force provided in the INDIGO plan be increased. 52 

Reinforcing the British, instead of relieving them, was the alternative; 

and this was the solution the President adopted. From Hyde Park he 

telephoned Admiral Stark that the marines were to go to Iceland at 

once and the Army was to send whatever force would be necessary 

for relieving the marines and for providing an adequate garrison, 

jointly with the British. 53 The invitation from Iceland to take over the 

task of defense, its acceptance by the President, the orders for the ma50 Ltr. British Ambassador Lord Halifax to Under Secy of State Welles, 28 Jun 41; 

Telg, Foreign Office to Halifax, 28 Jun 41; and Ltr, Welles to Marshall, 29 Jun 41, all 

in OPD file, INDIGO "A." Report of Conference Between the British and American Ministers to Iceland and the Prime Minister (Iceland), from American Minister to Secretary 

of State, 28 Oct 41, GHQ 320.2 Iceland-Strength. 

51 Defense of Iceland by U.S. Forces: Agreement Between the United States of America and Iceland, Department of State Executive Agreement Series 232, No. 1703 (Washington, 1942). 

In the interest of clarity, a few changes of punctuation have been made in the quoted 

extract. 

"Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 Jul 41, sub: Relief of British, INDIGO, WPD 4493-31. 

." Memo, CNO for Dir of War Plans (USN), 1 Jul 41, OPD file, INDIGO "A." 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 95 

rines to resume their voyage (they had been held in Newfoundland 

for three days in expectation of the Icelandic request), and the decision that the Army would reinforce the British, not relieve them, 

all came on the same day, 1 July 1941. 

Neither General Chaney nor the British had been forewarned; 

both were understandably puzzled by the new development, and the 

immediate response was a surprised protest from the British Admiralty. 

"Planning here [London] has been based on the assumption that it 

was the United States intention to replace British troops in Iceland," 

the Admiralty expostulated. The only questions previously raised, continued the Admiralty, had concerned, first, the overlap between the 

arrival of American troops and the departure of the British, and second, the matter of air strength. Now came the news that the British 

were to remain. "Can you help to elucidate?" the Admiralty asked 

the Joint Staff Mission in Washington, while General Chaney sent a 

similar query to the War Department. 54 No clarification was forthcoming until 5 July when the War Plans Division informed Chaney: 

The following resulted from conference today. Administration plans to 

ask Congress at early date to remove legal restrictions on employment of 

Reserve Officers and Selectees. This request will provoke bitter Congressional controversy. Consequent delay will prevent total relief as originally 

planned. Revised plan tentatively approved at conference contemplates 

token relief only of relatively small number British troops and relief of Marines. This limited relief will be possible only if legislative restrictions are 

removed .... 55 

The claim was not then made, as it was soon afterward, that the 

legal restrictions themselves caused the original INDIGO plan to be abandoned; and as for the effect of Congressional controversy over lifting 

them, if the President had already made up his mind to ask for their 

removal when he made the Iceland decision on 1 July the War Plans 

Division had apparently been kept uninformed of his intentions. But 

the release of the Chief of Staff's biennial report on the morning of 

Thursday, 3 July, opened the question to public discussion. Immediately the leaders of isolationist opinion let loose a barrage of criticism against General Marshall's recommendation that the twelvemonth limitation on the length of service be removed. Recklessly outspoken in his opposition, Senator Burton Wheeler was quoted by 

The New rork Times as being "reliably informed" that "American 

troops will embark for Iceland ... ," and was further reported as 

having announced the specific date of sailing. 56 President Roosevelt, 

who had been at Hyde Park for the past week, suddenly changed his 

" Admiralty to Joint Staff Mission, 3 July 41, OPD file, INDIGO "A." 

"Memo, WPD for TAG, 5 Jul 41 (with cable No. 22 to SPOBS), WPD 4493-37. 

56 The New York Times, Friday, July 4, 1941. 
96 COMMAND DECISIONS 

plans to remain there over the weekend, and took the train for Washington Friday night. His first move the next morning was to call together Secretary Stimson, Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and Acting Secretary of State Welles, along with Admiral 

Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and General 

Marshall, for a discussion of the Iceland problem. The result of the 

conference was embodied in the message sent to General Chaney 

later in the day, but neither the President nor Secretary Stimson as 

yet saw fit to comment publicly on the recommendations in General 

Marshall's report. Then, on the following Monday, 7 July, Presidential Secretary Stephen Early dropped a guarded hint to the press that 

a message to Congress asking an extension of the twelve-month limit 

of service was to be expected. It was almost completely overshadowed 

by the announcement, simultaneously made, that the marines had 

landed in Iceland. 57 

A Final Glance at the INDIGO Planning 

The arrival of the marines ended only the first phase of implementing the President's decision to launch the Iceland operation. 

During this phase the military planners had been occupied with the 

practical aspects of the problem. What the operation was to be had 

been agreed upon. How to carry it out was the objective of the planners during June. The decision to send marines as the first contingent, 

the failure of the War Department and the Special Observer Group 

in London to agree on several important facts, the number of agencies involved in planning and the entrance of GHQ into the planning 

picture just at this time, the variety of data, the misgivings of G-4 

and the War Plans Division concerning the feasibility of the operation, all hampered the early efforts of the planners. 

Duplication of effort, particularly in the collection of data, was 

noticeable. Although specialization might justify the number and variety of surveys, the technicians tended to overstep the bounds of their 

specialties. Not having the time for extended firsthand surveys, all of 

them relied heavily on a common source for their data. The situation was summed up with a trace of understatement by Lt. Col. Clarence N. Iry, who arrived in Iceland with the marines, when he observed that British officers were "somewhat surprised at the number 

of Americans who have asked them for the same information." 58 

The various reports were, as a consequence, individually prolix and 

collectively repetitious. 

" Ibid., Saturday, July 5, Sunday, July 6, Tuesday, July 8, 1941. 

58 Report, Iry to Chief of Engrs [about 23 Jul 41], WPD 4493-67. 
LANDING UNITED STATES FORCES IN ICELAND 97 

After the first phase came a time of indecision, from early July 

to mid-August. Procedural questions were no longer the primary concern. Again the problem was the substantive issue of what to do and 

how many troops to do it with. But the nature of the proposed operation having once been changed, to change it still further whenever 

obstacles appeared in the way was the path of least resistance. Total 

relief of the British was discarded, first, in favor of reinforcing the 

British and relieving the marines, and then in favor of reinforcing the 

marines and relieving a small token force of the British. Between these 

two proposals, in point of effect as well as time, a number of choices 

were considered and rejected, and a stopgap measure adopted. This 

was the dispatch on 27 July of a small task force, the major element 

of which was the 33d Pursuit Squadron, as the first echelon of Army 

troops. In all it numbered about 1,100 men and 30 aircraft. With the 

new situation created by the President's decision not to relieve the 

British garrison, a number of special questions came into prominence. 

The restrictions affecting the service of selectees and members of the 

Reserve were magnified by the conflict in Congress over the attempt 

to repeal them. The question of command was made more delicate. 

And there were elements of uncertainty for the marines, for if the 

problem of how to relieve the British could lead to a decision not to 

relieve them, so might the question of how to relieve the marines. In 

this situation, two factors contributed most to producing the indecision: the President continued to fear that the garrison decided upon 

would prove inadequate for the defense of Iceland and, at the same 

time, the War Department was obliged to move slowly and softly, even 

to the point of making no progress, so as not to jeopardize the enactment of new selective service legislation. 

With the passage of the Selective Service Act in August and with 

the decision made on the same day that the marines would stay in 

Iceland for the time being, the War Department could apply itself 

to the problem of how to carry out a given operation. Preparations 

were pushed forward and on 5 September the second echelon of Army 

troops, consisting of about 5,000 men of the 10th Infantry Regiment, 

5th Engineers, 46th Field Artillery Battalion, and various service units, 

sailed for Iceland. More weighty problems, more momentous decisions, 

and the greater demands of global war were to make themselves felt 

before the marines and the British forces were finally relieved in the 

spring of 1942. 

4 

Japan's Decision for War 

by 

Louis Morton 

Few if any of the fateful decisions of history are as well documented 

as the one Japan made on 1 December 1941 to go to war with the 

United States and Great Britain. The sequence of events that led to 

this decision has been described in rich detail and at first hand by 

those who played the leading roles in this drama of national suicide, 

and, with somewhat more detachment, by the students of diplomacy 

and Far Eastern affairs. The rise and fall of cabinets in prewar Japan, 

the confidential deliberations of its highest political bodies, the tortuous path of its diplomacy, and the views of its most influential leaders have been analyzed and illuminated by jurists and scholars alike. 

For those who wish to retrace the road to Pearl Harbor, the signposts 

are indeed numerous and the way well lighted. 

Not so well charted is the course taken by the Japanese Army and 

Navy to gain by force what the politicians and diplomats could not 

win by negotiation. The path is a faint one, but the journey along it 

rewards the traveler with an understanding of the strange mixture of 

reality and illusion which led Japan to attack the most powerful nations in the Pacific. It confirms and clarifies, too, the role of the military in Japan's political life, and makes clear how the needs and capacities of the Army and Navy at once established and limited national objectives and ambitions. And along this path lies the explanation for Japan's dramatic blow against Pearl Harbor and its choice 

of time, place, and method of attack. 1 

1 The substance of the present essay in contained in the author's article entitled "The 

Japanese Decision For War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXX (December, 1954), 

1325-35, copyright 1954 by U.S. Naval Institute, and is reproduced here with the Institute's permission. Other published accounts in English of the events leading to Japan's 

decision may be found in Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950); Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World 

War II, Vol. III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-Apri11942 (Boston: Little, Brown and 

Company, 1948); the two volumes of William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, ChalBiographical sketch of author, p. 11. 
100 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The Journey Begins 

The Army in Japan traditionally stood for a course of expansion 

which would make Japan the unchallenged leader of Asia. In 1936 

the Army gained a predominant position in the political life of the 

nation and its program became the official policy of the government, 

and since then it had been preparing for war. The program adopted 

in that year called for, among other things, the establishment of a 

"firm position" on the Asiatic continent-a euphemistic way of saying that China must be conquered; expansion into southeast Asia to 

secure the bases and raw materials needed to make Japan economically strong and self-sufficient; strengthening the military forces of the 

nation; development of critical war industries; and the improvement 

of air and sea transportation. 2 

Though this program was to be achieved gradually and peacefully, if possible, it clearly implied military action, both in China and 

in southeast Asia. And to prepare for that contingency, the Japanese 

Government turned all its efforts into military channels. In 1936, appropriations for military expenditures rose sharply and continued to 

rise thereafter. The entire economy of the nation was placed under 

rigid controls and oriented toward war; heavy industries were expanded, the production of aircraft and munitions was increased, and 

every effort was made to stockpile weapons, equipment, and strategic 

ra w materials. 3 

The shortage of oil was the key to Japan's military situation. It was 

the main problem for those preparing for war, and, at the same time, 

the reason why the nation was moving toward war. For the Navy the 

supply of oil was critical; for the Army it was always a limiting factor. 

And none of the measures taken to curtail civilian consumption or 

manufacture substitutes ever gave Japan enough of this precious commodity to free it from restraint by the Dutch, the British, and the 

lenge to Isolation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), and The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953); U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 

United States, Japan: 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943). A number of other works dealing in 

part with this subject will be found in the present author's critical essay On the bibliography of the Pearl Harbor attack published in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (April, 

1955), 462-69. 

2 International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE), Exhibit 216; Political 

Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part I, App. I, Japanese Studies in World War 

II, No. 147. 

3 Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1949) Ch. I; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effoci of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Washington, 1946), p. 12; IMTFE, Judgment, Part B, pp. 114ff, 353; History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-1945, Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 72, p. 5. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 101 

Americans, who controlled the sources of supply. Without oil, Japan's 

pretentions to empire were empty shadows. 4 

Japan's move into China in July 1937, eight months after it had 

signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, produced further difficulties. The 

vigor of the Chinese reaction soon led to full-scale war, an eventuality 

the Japanese military neither expected nor desired. Moreover, the 

United States, like other nations with interests in China, refused to 

acquiesce in this fresh assault on the status quo in Asia. In unmistakable terms, it made clear to Japan that it still stood by the open-door 

policy and the territorial integrity of China. Japan's action in China 

was in violation of all existing treaties, and, in the American view, 

the only solution to the China Incident was the complete withdrawal 

of Japanese forces from China. This was a price the military leaders 

of Japan would never pay for the good will of the United States. 

The war in China, from which Japan could extract neither honor 

nor victory, proved a continuing drain on the resources of the nation, 

requiring ever more stringent controls, higher appropriations, and further expansion of war industries. By the end of 1941 Japan's industry and manpower had been so completely mobilized that the transition to total war was scarcely noticed. 

The growth of Japan's military forces matched its industrial growth. 

Between 1936 and 1941 the size of the Army more than doubled. The 

number of divisions rose from 20 to 50; air squadrons, from 50 to 

150. And China provided the testing ground for doctrine and a reservoir of combat-trained veterans. Naval forces grew rapidly also 

after 1936 when Japan withdrew from the naval conference of that 

year. By 1940 combat tonnage had jumped to over one million tons, 

giving Japan a navy more powerful than the combined American and 

Bri tish fleets in the Pacific. 5 

Despite these preparations for war, neither the Army nor the Navy 

developed during the decade of the thirties any specific plans for the 

use of this formidable military machine against a coalition of western powers. In the files of the high command were general statements 

of policy and annual operations plans, but, except for those that 

concerned China, they were defensive in concept and dealt only with 

the United States and Soviet Russia. In no case, it was emphasized, 

should Japan fight more than one enemy at a time. The plans were, 

in the words of one Japanese officer, "outdated writings" and "utterly 

nonsensical." 6 

4 USSBS, Oil in Japan's War (Washington, 1946), p. 1; IMTFE, Judgment, p. 902. 

5 Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 2-3; USSBS, Japanese Air Power (Washington, 

1946), pp. 4-5; USSBS, Japanese Naval Shipbuilding (Washington, 1946), App. A. 

6 Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part IV, Japanese Studies in World 

War II, No. 150, pp. 1-2; IMTFE, Deposition of Shinichi Tanaka, Exhibit 3027. 
102 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The absence during this period of specific plans reflecting national 

objectives and government policy is remarkable. The preparation of 

such· plans is the major function of a general staff, and was routine 

in the United States and other democratic countries where the military was much more closely controlled than in Japan. The fact that 

the Japanese General Staff-which had studied in the best schools in 

Europe- had failed to prepare such plans as late as 1940 cannot be 

attributed either to peaceful intentions or to a supreme confidence in 

diplomacy. It was based solely on a realistic appreciation of Japan's 

economic weakness and lack of the strategic resources required for 

modern warfare. 

Toward the end of 1940, after Germany had conquered most of 

western Europe, Japan set out to remedy its basic weaknesses by a 

program of expansion in southeast Asia. There, in the crumbling British, Dutch, and French empires, lay the oil, rubber, bauxite, and other 

vital resources Japan needed so badly. Only the United States and Soviet Russia stood in the way, and their interference, the Japanese believed, could be checkmated by political alliance. Thus, in the months 

that followed, Japan sought to immobilize the United States with the 

Tripartite Pact and to gain the friendship of Russia with a five-year 

pact of nonaggression and neutrality. 

Simultaneously with these diplomatic and political measures, the 

Japanese Army and Navy began to prepare more actively for a general war while laying the basis for military action in the south. Renewed efforts were made to stockpile vital resources and in late October the Total War Research Institute was established. In December 

.1940 the Army ordered three divisions, then in south China, to begin 

training for operations in tropical areas. During the next few weeks 

special studies were made of the geography, terrain, and climate of 

Malaya, Indochina, the Netherlands Indies, Thailand, and Burma, 

and of the problems involved in military operations there. By January 1941 Japanese pilots were flying reconnaissance and taking aerial 

photographs over the Malayan coast and the Philippines, and the War 

Ministry and Foreign Office were printing military currency for use 

in the southern area. It was at this time, too, that Admiral Isoroku 

Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet) conceived the idea of a 

carrier-based air attack on Pearl Harbor and ordered his staff to 

work out the problems posed by such an operation. 7 The Japanese 

Army and Navy were unmistakably moving away from the defensive 

7 Tanaka Deposition; Imperial GHQ Army Dept Directive No. 791, 6 Dec 40, No. 

810, 16 Jan 41, No. 812, 18 Jan 41, all in Imperial GHQ Army Directives, Vol. I; 

IMTFE, Judgment, pp. 878-81; Robert E. Ward, "The Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor 

Plan," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXVII (December, 1951), pp. 1272-75. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 103 

concepts which had guided their planning during the preceding 

decade. 

The Road to War 

The summer of 1941 was the critical season for the diplomats as 

well as the soldiers of Japan. The war in China was still on, draining the meager oil reserves of the nation and creating an insoluble 

barrier to agreement with the United States. The Tripartite Pact had 

produced an effect opposite from that intended and erected another 

obstacle to an understanding between the two countries. And finally, 

the Dutch, backed by the Americans and British, had successfully resisted Japanese efforts to secure economic concessions in the Indies. 

The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 forced the Japanese 

to review their program for the conquest of southeast Asia. For over 

a week they debated the question of the effect of Germany's action 

on Japan. Some thought it better to move north now rather than 

south; others that the time had come to make concessions and reach 

agreement with the United States, whose hand in the Pacific had 

been strengthened by the Russo-German war. President Roosevelt, who 

listened in on the debate through the medium of MAGic-the code 

name applied to intercepted and decoded Japanese messages-characterized it as "a real drag-down and knock-out fight ... to decide 

which way they were going to jump-attack Russia, attack the South 

Seas [or] sit on the fence and be more friendly with us." 8 The foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, favored the first course; the Army, 

the second; and the premier, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the third. 

On 2 July 1941, at a Conference in the Imperial Presence, the 

leaders of Japan made their decision. It was a clear-cut defeat for 

the pro-Axis foreign minister and those who believed with him that 

Japan should attack Russia. For the others it was a compromise of 

sorts. Negotiations with the United States, begun in February 1941, 

would be continued in an effort to settle the issues between the two 

countries. At the same time the plans aln;ady made for the domination of Thailand and Indochina, the first objectives in the Southern 

Area, would be put into effect immediately. "We will not be deterred," 

the Imperial Conference decreed, "by the possibility of becoming involved in a war with England and America." 9 In short, Japan 

would attempt the difficult feat of sitting on the fence and advancing south at the same time. 

H Ltr, Roosevelt to Ickes, 1 Jul 41, cited in Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 

1940-1941, p. 646. The 2 July decision is included among the IMTFE Exhibits, 588; Ltr, 

Grew to author, 19 Jun 41, OCMH. 

9 IMTFE, Exhibit 585. The events leading to the decision are covered in Political 

Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part IV, and Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 209-19. 
104 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The problems posed by Germany's attack on Russia were hardly 

settled and the decision made to abide by the Tripartite Pact and 

the drive southward when a new crisis arose. On 21 June Cordell Hull 

had handed the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, 

a note asking for some clear indication of a genuine desire for peace 

and making allusions to the pro-German attitude of certain members 

of the Japanese Government. This communication was still unanswered; and now Matsuoka insisted on outright rejection of the note 

and the termination of the talks. The Premier, Prince Konoye, wished 

instead to reply with counterproposals already prepared by the Army 

and Navy. Matsuoka would not budge from his position and Konoye, 

given the nod by War Minister General Hideki Tojo and after consultation with the Emperor, submitted the resignation of the entire 

cabinet on 16 July. Two days later he received the Imperial mandate to form a new cabinet which, except for Matsuoka who was replaced by Admiral Soemu Toyoda, was the same as the old one. The 

Japanese could now go ahead with the program outlined at the Imperial Conference of 2 July.iO 

The first move of the new government was the virtual occupation of French Indochina. Protesting that Indochina was being encircled, Japan issued what was in effect an ultimatum to the Vichy 

Government on 19 July. On the 24th Roosevelt offered to guarantee 

to the Japanese equal access to the raw materials and food of Indochina in return for the neutralization of that country, but nothing 

came of the proposal. The following day Japanese troops moved into 

the southern portion of Indochina. Japan now possessed strategically 

located air and naval bases from which to launch attacks on Singapore, the Philippines, and the Netherlands Indies. 

Although the French acquiesced in this raid on their empire, the 

United States was not so obliging. In the view of the State Department, this fresh Japanese aggression constituted a threat to American 

interests in the Far East and justified the imposition of additional 

economic restrictions, then being considered by the President, as a 

warning to Japan. 11 These restrictions were finally put into effect on 

10 IMTFE, Judgment, pp. 928-30; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 223-26. The American position, which remained virtually unchanged throughout the negotiations, was outlined by Mr. Hull in four points: 

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; 

2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; 

3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; 

4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means. 

Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2d 

Sess., Doc 244 (Washington, 1946), p. 294. 

11 Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, Vol. II, p. 342. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 105 

26 July when the President, against the advice of his Chief of Naval 

Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, issued an order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Since Japan no longer had the dollars 

with which to purchase the urgently needed materials of war, the effect 

of this measure, which the British and Dutch supported, was to create 

an economic blockade of Japan. So seriously did Admiral Stark regard 

this move that he warned Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of 

the Asiatic Fleet, to take "appropriate precautionary measures against 

possible eventualities." 12 

The sharp American and British reaction to their move into Indochina came as a surprise to the Japanese and precipitated an intensive review of the nation's readiness to wage war. The picture was 

not encouraging. The powerful Planning Board which co-ordinated 

the vast, complex structure of Japan's war economy found the country's resources meager and only enough, in view of the recent action 

of the United States, for a quick, decisive war to gain the riches of 

the Indies. "If the present condition is left unchecked," asserted Teiichi 

Suzuki, president of the board, "Japan will find herself totally exhausted and unable to rise in the future." The blockade, he believed, 

would bring about Japan's collapse within two years, and he urged 

that a final decision on war or peace be made "without hesitation." 13 

The Navy's view was equally gloomy. There was only enough oil, 

Admiral Osami Nagano told the Emperor, to maintain the fleet under 

war conditions for one and a half years and he was doubtful that 

Japan could win a "sweeping victory" in that time. His advice, therefore, was to drop the Tripartite Pact and reach agreement with the 

United States. 

The Army and other powerful forces in the Japanese Government 

did not share these views. They thought there was enough oil on hand 

to wage war and that renunciation of the Tripartite Pact would not 

necessarily bring about a change in U.S.-Japanese relations. Marquis 

Koichi Kido, the Emperor's chief adviser, discussed the problem with 

Prince Konoye and agreed that before a decision on war or peace 

could be made, the Army and Navy would have to reach agreement. 

By the middle of August the two services had agreed on a broad 

line of strategy. The impetus came from a series of studies presented 

by the Total War Research Institute, a subordinate body of the Planning Board. Forecasting the course of events during the next six 

months, the Institute called for the invasion of the Netherlands Indies 

12 Rad, CNO to CINCAF, 25 Jul 41, in Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings Before the Joint 

Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, 1946), Part 14, pp. 

1400-1401. 

13 Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part IV, pp. 9, 73-77. 
106 COMMAND DECISIONS 

in November, followed the next month by surprise attacks on British 

and American possessions in the Far East. Anticipating that the United 

States and Great Britain would utilize Soviet bases in a war against 

Japan, the Institute's studies dealt with the problems of economic 

mobilization; military planning, except in the most general sense, was 

left to the services. 14 

These studies, as well as others, were discussed heatedly during the 

tense days that followed the embargo. From these discussions emerged 

four alternative lines of strategy, all of them designed to accomplish 

the swift destruction of Allied forces in the Far East and the early 

seizure of the Netherlands Indies. (See Map 3.) The first was based on 

the Institute's studies and provided for the seizure of the Indies and 

then of the Philippines and Malaya. The second called for a step-bystep advance from the Philippines to Borneo, Java, Sumatra, and 

Malaya. The reverse, from Malaya to the Philippines, constituted a 

third line of action and one which would have the advantage of delaying attack against American territory. The fourth plan proposed at 

this time consisted of simultaneous attacks against the Philippines and 

Malaya followed by a rapid advance along both axes to the Indies. 

Admiral Yamamoto's plan for an attack against Pearl Harbor, work 

on which had begun in January, did not enter into the calculations 

of the planners at this time. 

Army and Navy planners agreed that the first plan was too risky 

for it would leave Japanese forces exposed to attack from the Philippines and Malaya. The Navy preferred the second plan; it was safe, 

provided for a step-by-step advance, and created no serious problems. 

The Army objected to it, however, on the ground that by the time 

the main objectives in the Netherlands Indies and Malaya were 

reached the Allies would have had time to strengthen their defenses. 

The third plan, with its early seizure of Malaya and bypassing of the 

Philippines, appealed greatly to the Army planners who hoped in this 

way to gain southeast Asia and delay American entry into the war. 

But this course, as the Navy pointed out, also placed American naval 

and air forces in the Philippines in a strategic position athwart Japan's 

line of communication and constituted a risk of the utmost magnitude. 

The fourth course, simultaneous attacks and advance along two axes, 

created serious problems of co-ordination and timing and a dangerous 

dispersion of forces. But because it was the only course which compromised the views of both groups, it was finally adopted. For the 

first time the Japanese had a strategic plan for offensive operations 

designed to achieve the goals of national policy against a coalition of 

14IMTFE, Exhibits 870, 870-A, and 871. 
JAPANESE PLAN 

AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMIES Novtmbet 1941 

o U 1 [ II 

CHI N A 

·'~ 

, • PHIllPPINE ,) "l~.' " ~ ~~" 

(""""'Q!'(! G'" 00",,,-", IUOIIdfl 

SOUTHERN ARMY 

14th Army - 10 PnlitpplI'IU 

1511'1 Army -10 Tholland 

1611'1 Army - to EO.I Indies 

2511'1 Ar my - 10 MoIQ)' 

fl'" I, 

GA"O~IN£ ISLANDS 

USTRALIA 

MAP 3 

, 

... 

MARSHALL IS 

, 

,. 

0" 
108 COMMAND DECISIONS 

enemies. 15 Operational plans for each objective were still to be made, 

forces organized, trained, and rehearsed. 

Though the Army and Navy had agreed on strategy, the Japanese 

Government was still reluctant to take the final step. Contributing to 

this lack of resolution was the slowing down of Germany's advance in 

Russia and the Japanese Navy's concern over the shortage of oil 

reserves. From the end of July until his resignation in October, Premier Konoye sought to persuade his cabinet colleagues to adopt a less 

aggressive policy in an effort to reach agreement with the United States. 

The first sign of this new policy was a proposal, delivered by 

Admiral Nomura in Washington on 6 August, for a personal meeting, 

a "leaders' conference," between the premier and President Roosevelt. 

General Tojo had agreed to this proposal only on the understanding 

that Konoye would use the occasion to press the program for expansion to the south. The American reply on the 17th that a prerequisite 

to such a meeting was the settlement of the issues between the two 

countries confirmed Tojo and the Army leaders in their view that the 

United States would never yield to the Japanese demands and that 

war should begin as soon as the Army and Navy were ready.'6 

The difference between the two points of view was temporarily 

resolved early in September and formalized at an Imperial Conference 

held on the 6th of the month. The agreement, characteristically Japanese, was expressed in language which both sides could accept and 

interpret in their own way. The negotiations with the United States, 

it was agreed, would be continued, as Konoye wished. But at the same 

time military preparations would be pushed to completion so that the 

nation would be ready for war by the end of October, that is, in six 

weeks. "If by the early part of October," the conferees decided, "there 

is no reasonable hope of having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations ... we will immediately make up our minds to 

get ready for war .... " 17 

The Imperial Conference also fixed the minimum demands Japan 

would make and maximum concessions it would grant in the negotiations with the United States and Great Britain. The former were hardly 

likely to gain acceptance. First, both the Western Powers would have 

15 Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part IV, pp. 9-10. 

16 Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 20, pp. 3998-4000, 4009-10; 

Pearl Ha'fbor Attack Report, pp. 298, 302-07, 310; Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 

Vol. II, pp. 549-555. 

17 Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 20, pp. 4022-23. The wording 

of this important statement varies in different documents. IMTFE Defense Document 

1579 gives a slightly different wording as does Judgment, Chapter VII, page 939. The 

Japa~se phrase "Kaiseno Ketsui su" may be translated literally "decide to open hostilities." Konoye apparently did not interpret the phrase as meaning that it was a decision for 

war; 'rojo did. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 109 

to promise to discontinue aid to China, close the Burma Road, and 

"neither meddle in nor interrupt" a settlement between Japan and 

China. Second, America and Britain would have to recognize Japan's 

special position in French Indochina and agree not to establish or 

reinforce their bases in the Far East or take any action which might 

threaten Japan. Finally, both nations would have to resume commercial relations with Japan, supply the materials "indispensable for her 

self-existence," and "gladly co-operate" in Japan's economic program 

in Thailand and Indochina. In return for these "minimum demands" 

the Japanese were willing to agree not to use Indochina as a base for 

further military advance, except in China, to withdraw from Indochina "after an impartial peace" had been established in the Far East, 

and, finally, to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands. 18 

While the negotiations went forward, the Army and Navy General 

Staffs continued their preparations for war and the troops earmarked 

for operations in the south intensified their training, usually under 

conditions approximating those of the areas in which they would fight. 

Since agreement had already been reached on the strategy for war, 

General Gen Sugiyama, Army chief of staff, was able shortly after 

the 6 September Imperial Conference to direct that detailed operational plans for the seizure of Malaya, Java, Borneo, the Bismarck 

Archipelago, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines be prepared. 19 

The Army planners immediately went to work and the next two 

months witnessed feverish activity in the General Staff. 

By the end of August the Navy planners had worked out their 

plans for seizing bases in the western Pacific, and had from Admiral 

Yamamoto a separate plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor. "Tabletop maneuvers" at T.okyo Naval War College between 10 and 13 September resulted in agreement on operations for the seizure of the 

Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Burma, and islands in 

the South Pacific, but there was still some doubt about Yamamoto's 

plan. The exercise had demonstrated that a Pearl Harbor strike was 

practicable, but many felt that it was too risky, that the U.S. Pacific 

Fleet might not be in port on the day of the attack, and that the danger 

of discovery during the long voyage to Hawaii was too great. But 

Admiral Yamamoto refused to give up his plan and finally, when he 

failed to convert his colleagues, offered to resign from the Navy. The 

combination of his strong argument that the success of the southward 

drive depended on the destruction of the American Fleet, his enormous prestige, and his threat to resign were too much for opponents 

18 Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 20, pp. 4022-23; IMTFE, Doc. 

1652, Exhibit 588. 

19IMTFE, Deposition of Shinichi Tanaka, Exhibit 2244. 
110 COMMAND DECISIONS 

of the plan. In mid-October, a month after the maneuvers, the Navy 

General Staff finally adopted his concept of a surprise carrier-based 

attack on Pearl Harbor and incorporated it into the larger plan for 

war. 20 

This larger plan, which was virtually complete by October 20 and 

was the one followed by the Japanese when war call1e, had as its 

immediate objective the capture of the rich Dutch and British possessions in southeast Asia. The greatest single threat to its success was 

the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and this threat the Japanese 

now hoped to eliminate by the destruction or neutralization of the 

fleet at the start of war. Air and naval forces in the Philippines, which 

stood in position along the flank of their advance southward, the 

Japanese expected to destroy quickly also, seizing the islands later at 

their leisure. Finally, America's line of communications across the 

Pacific was to be cut by the capture of Wake and Guam. Once these 

threats had been removed and the coveted area to the south secured, 

Japanese military forces would occupy strategic positions in Asia and 

in the Pacific and fortify them immediately. These bases would form 

a powerful defensive perimeter around the newly acquired empire in 

the south, the home islands, and the vital shipping lanes connecting 

Japan with its new sources of supply. With these supplies the Japanese thought they could wage defensive war indefinitely. 21 

The area marked for conquest formed a vast triangle whose east 

arm stretched from the Kuril Islands in the north, through Wake, to 

the Marshall Islands. The base of the triangle was formed by a line 

connecting the Marshall Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, Java, and 

Sumatra. The western arm extended from Malaya and southern 

Burma, through Indochina, and thence along the China coast. 

The acquisition of this area would give to Japan control of the 

resources of southeast Asia and would satisfy the national objectives 

in going to war. Perhaps later, if all went well, the area of conquest 

could be extended. But there is no evidence in the Japanese plans of 

an intention to invade the United States or seek the total defeat of 

that nation. Japan planned to fight a war of limited objectives and, 

having gained what it wanted, expected to negotiate for a favorable 

settlement. 

20 For a full account of the evolution of the Pearl Harbor plan see Ward, "The Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor Plan," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXVII, 1272-8\. 

21 Japanese Army-Navy Central Agreement, Nov 41, copy in USSBS, The Campaigns 

of the Pacific War, pp. 43-46; Combined Fleet Top Secret Order No.1, copy in Pearl Harbor 

Attack Hearings, Part 13, pp. 431-84; Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part IV, 

pp. 47-123; Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, rev. ed., pp. 29-39; History of the Southern 

Area Army, 1941-1945, Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 24, pp. 4-8; Army and 

Nav, 'Iirectives, Imperial GHQ Directive, Vol. I. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 111 

Japanese planners anticipated that certain events might require an 

alteration in their strategy and outlined alternative courses of action 

to be followed in each contingency. The first possibility was that the 

negotiations then in progress in Washington would prove successful. 

If this unexpected success was achieved, all operations were to be suspended, even if the final order to attack had been issued. The second 

possibility was that the United States might take hostile action before 

the attack on Pearl Harbor by sending elements of the Pacific Fleet 

to the Far East. In that event, the Combined Fleet would be deployed 

to intercept American naval forces while the attacks against the Philippines and Malaya proceeded according to schedule. 

The possibility of a Soviet attack, or of a joint U.S.-Soviet invasion 

from the north, was a specter that haunted the Japanese. To meet 

such a contingency, Japanese ground forces in Manchuria were to be 

strengthened while air units from the home islands and China were 

to be transferred to meet the new threat. Thereafter the attack to the 

south would proceed on schedule. 

The forces required to execute this vast plan for conquest were 

very carefully calculated by Imperial General Headquarters. A large force 

had to be left in Manchuria, and an even larger one in China. Garrisons for Korea, Formosa, the home islands, and other positions 

required additional forces. Thus, only a small fraction of the Japanese 

Army was available for operations in the south. Of the total strength 

of the Army's 51 divisions, 59 mixed brigades, and 1,500 first-line 

planes, Imperial General Headquarters could allocate only 11 divisions aqd 

2 air groups (700 planes) to the operations in the south. . 

In the execution of this complicated and intricate plan, the Japanese planners realized, success would depend on careful timing and 

on the closest co-operation between ground, naval, and air forces. No 

provision was made for unified command of all services, then or later. 

Instead, separate agreements were made between army and fleet commanders for each operation. These agreements provided simply for 

co-operation at the time of landing and for the distribution of forces. 

In addition to supporting the Army's operations in the south, the 

Combined Fleet had other important missions. Perhaps the most important, and certainly the most spectacular, was that assigned the Pearl 

Harbor Striking Force. Later, this force was to support operations of the 

4th Fleet in the capture of Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago, and 

then to assist in the southern operations. The 6th Fleet (submarines) 

was to operate in Hawaiian waters and along the west coast of the 

United States to observe the movement of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and 

make surprise attacks on shipping. The 5th Fleet was to patrol the waters 

east of Japan, in readiness for enemy surprise attacks, and, above all, 

keep on the alert against Russia. 
112 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The Japanese plan for war was complete in all respects but onethe date when it would go into effect. That decision awaited the outcome of the negotiations then in progress and of the struggle in the 

cabinet between those who advocated caution and those who pressed 

for immediate action. "Time had become the meter of strategy" and 

Japan "was crazed by the tick of the clock." 22 

The Fatal Turn 

The six weeks' reprieve Konoye had won on 6 September to settle 

the outstanding issues by diplomacy went quickly by without producing a settlement. A new proposal, which Nomura delivered to Hull 

on 27 September, was rejected by the Americans, who were unwavering 

in their position on China. Nomura renewed the request for a meeting 

between Roosevelt and Konoye but on 10 October was constrained 

to tell Foreign Minister Toyoda that there was not "the slightest 

chance on earth" of a "leaders' conference" so long as Japan refused 

to compromise. The negotiations, in the words of Toyoda, had "slowly 

but surely ... reached the decisive stage." 23 There was apparently 

no way of reconciling the basic differences over China. 

The domestic situation was no better. The demands of the Army 

and Navy for a decision on the question of war were becoming ever 

more insistent. Oil stocks were steadily diminishing, the most favorable season of the year for operations was approaching, and failure 

to act soon might force a delay of many months and expose the 

Japanese to a Soviet attack on Manchuria. Finally, on 24 September, 

General Sugiyama and Admiral Nagano, the Army and Navy chiefs 

of staff, submitted a joint letter calling attention to the shortage of 

supplies, the effect of the weather on operations, and the problems of 

mobilizing, staging, and deploying their forces. "With all the force of 

their positions" they asked for a quick decision "by 15 October at the 

latest," so that they could start operations by mid-November. 24 

With no agreement in sight, Konoye sought to win an extension. 

On 12 October he invited War Minister Tojo, the Navy and Foreign 

Ministers, and the president of the Planning Board to his home for 

a final conference on the question of war and peace. At the meeting 

the premier argued strongly for continuing the negotiations beyond 

the deadline, then set at 15 October. The Navy Minister would not 

commit himself, but General Tojo, on the ground that success in the 

negotiations would require concessions in China, refused to go along 

22 Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 270. 

23 Pearl Harbor Attack Report, p. 322. 

24 Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part IV, pp. 13-15. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 113 

with Konoye. The issue had now been narrowed to the withdrawal 

of Japanese troops from China and on the morning of the 14th the 

premier again sought Tojo's consent. "On this occasion," he urged 

the War Minister, "we ought to give in for a time ... and save ourselves from the crisis of a Japanese-American war." Tojo again refused, 

and at a cabinet meeting later in the day demanded that the negotiations be termiI}ated. Finally, late that night, he sent Konoye a message 

stating that the cabinet ought to resign, "declare insolvent everything 

that has happened up to now, and reconsider our plans once more." 25 

Without Tojo's support Konoye had no recourse but to resign. The 

Army, seeking possibly to avoid responsibility for the decision which 

must soon be made, suggested that his successor be a prince of the 

Imperial family. The suggestion was rejected as contrary to tradition 

and the Marquis Kido, together with the council of senior statesmen 

(former premiers), recommended that Tojo himself be named premier. 

The Emperor accepted this recommendation. On the 18th Tojo took 

office with an Imperial mandate to reconsider Japan's policy in relation to the world situation without regard for the 6 September decision. The fate of Japan was in the hands of its generals. 

In Washington, where every Japanese move was carefully weighed 

and analyzed, the cabinet crisis was cause for real concern and Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's cables from Tokyo did little to lessen it. On 

the 16th, when Konoye resigned, Admiral Stark told Pacific and 

Asiatic Fleet commanders there was "a strong possibility" of war 

between Japan and Russia. Warning them that Japan might also 

attack the United States, Stark instructed the two commanders to take 

"due precautions." This message Admirals Hart and Husband E. Kimmel passed on to their Army colleagues, who, a few days later, 

received quite a different message from Washington informing them 

that they need not expect an "abrupt change in Japanese foreign 

policy." 26 Apparently the Army did not agree with the Navy's estimate of the international situation, and neither mentioned the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor. 

The period from 18 October to 5 November was one of mounting tension and frantic preparations on both sides of the Pacific. In 

Tokyo the Tojo cabinet and the High Command, meeting in an almost 

continuous series of Liaison Conferences, considered every aspect of 

Japan's position and the possibilities of each line of action. Finally, 

on 5 November, a decision was reached and confirmed by a Confer25 Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 20, p. 4010. 

26 Memo, Gerow for CofS, 18 Oct 41, sub: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet; Rad, 

CNO to CINCPAC and CINCAF, 16 Oct 41, both in Pearl Harbor Attack Heanngs, Part 

14, pp. 1389, 1402. See also Ltr, Grew to author, 19 Jun 49, OCMH. 
114 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ence in the Imperial Presence. This decision was substantially the same 

as that reached on 6 September: to continue negotiations in an effort 

to reach an agreement with the United States, and, if no settlement 

was reached, to open hostilities. The deadline first set was 25 November, later extended to the 29th of the month. The significance of this 

decision was revealed in a message the new Foreign Minister Shigenori 

Togo sent Admiral Nomura, in Washington, on the 4th telling him 

that relations between the two countries had "reached the edge." 

Next day he wrote that time was "exceedingly short," and the situation "very critical." "Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please 

bear this in mind and do your best," Togo said. "I wish to stress this 

point over and over." 27 

The Imperial Conference agreed to make two more proposals to 

the United States. The first, Proposal A, was an amendment to the 

latest Japanese proposal and provided for a withdrawal from China 

and French Indochina, when and if a peace treaty was signed with 

Chiang Kai-shek. In certain areas in China, to be specified in the 

treaty, Japanese troops would remain for a "suitable period," vaguely 

and informally stated to be about twenty-five years. Further, the 

Japanese Government would interpret its obligations under the Tripartite Pact independently of the other Axis Powers. Lastly, Japan 

would agree not to discriminate in trade, provided all other nations 

did the same. In his instructions to Nomura, Foreign Minister Togo 

emphasized that while other matters could be compromised in his negotiations with the United States, Japan could not yield on the question 

of China. 

In Proposal B, to be made if the first was rejected, no mention 

was made of the Tripartite Pact or the removal of Japanese troops 

from China. Japan would withdraw her troops from southern Indochina immediately and from the northern part of that country only 

after the negotiation of a peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, or after 

the conclusion of a "just peace" in the Pacific. In return, the United 

States was to agree not to interfere in the negotiations with China, 

and to co-operat-e with Japan in the acquisition and exploitation of 

natural resources in the Netherlands Indies. Finally, the United States 

was to resume commercial relations with Japan, and to provide that 

nation with oil. 28 

With the decision made and the deadline set, the Army and Navy 

drew up an agreement embodying the objectives of the war and an 

outline of operations. About the same time Admiral Nagano sent 

27 Dispatch, Togo to Nomura, 4 and 5 Nov 41, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 

12, Exhibit I, p. 92. 

28 The text of the two proposals is reproduced in IMTFE, Exhibit 770. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 115 

Yamamoto his final orders and told him to be ready to strike "by the 

first part of December." During the next few weeks .the fleet was 

readied for action, and on November 26 the Pearl Harbor Striking Force 

left its lonely assembly area in the snowbound Kurils and sailed due 

east for Hawaii. 29 

The Army acted with similar dispatch. On November 6 General 

Sugiyama issued instructions to the Southern Army, which had the task 

of taking the southern area, to prepare detailed plans for operations. 

Four days later the ranking Army and Navy officers of Southern Army 

and the Combined Fleet met in Tokyo to work out final arrangements 

for joint operations. On the 20th of November, the actual order for 

the attack was issued, but with the proviso that operations would not 

begin until the results of the diplomatic negotiations were known.:lo 

In Washington, the privileged few followed each move of the Japanese in the mirror of MAGIC while observing in reports from all parts 

of the Far East increasing evidence of Japanese military preparations. 

Japanese ship movements toward Malaya and the concentration of 

shipping at Formosa, staging area for the attack on the Philippines, 

were quickly detected by American observers. Mr. Grew, who had 

reported as early has 27 January 1941 that there was talk in Tokyo 

of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, warned on 3 November that 

recent troop movements placed Japan in a position to start operations 

"in either Siberia or the Southwest Pacific or in both," and that war 

might come with "dramatic and dangerous suddenness." "Things 

seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the Pacific," wrote 

Admiral Stark to his Pacific Fleet commander on 7 November. A 

month may see, literally, most anything .... It doesn't look good."3l 

The first proposal agreed upon at the Imperial Conference of 5 

November was handed to Mr. Hull by Ambassador Nomura two days 

later. On the 12th the Secretary of State told the Japanese Ambassador that the proposal was being studied and that he hoped to have 

a reply ready within three days. When it came, it proved to be rejection of Proposal A on the ground that the offer to withdraw troops 

from China and Indochina was indefinite and uncertain and that the 

United States could not agree to the Japanese definition of nondiscrimination in trade. 

On 20 November Admiral Nomura, who now had the benefit of 

the advice of his colleague Saburo Kurusu, presented Proposal B, vir-

'9 USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, App. 12, pp. 43-46; App. 14, p. 49. The 

Combined Fleet Top Secret Order Number 1 is printed in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, 

Part 13, pages 431-84. 

30 Hist of Southern Army, 1941-45, pp. 4-8; Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 29-39. 

"Telgs, Grew to Hull, 27 Jan and 3 Nov 41, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 14, 

Exhibit 15, pp. 1042, 1045-60; Ltr, CNO to Kimmel, 7 Nov 41. 
116 COMMAND DECISIONS 

tually a restatement of the "minimum demands" and "maximum 

concessions" of the 6 September Imperial Conference. Intercepted 

Japanese messages had already revealed to Mr. Hull that this was to 

be Japan's last offer for a settlement. 32 To the Secretary of State, the 

new Japanese offer "put conditions that would have assured Japan's 

domination of the Pacific, placing us in serious danger for decades to 

come." The commitments which the United States would have had 

to make were, in his opinion, "virtually a surrender." 33 

The problem faced by the American political and military leaders 

was a serious one. An outright rejection of Proposal B might well provide Japan with'the pretext for war. Full acceptance was out of the 

question. The only way out of this dilemma was to find a "reasonable counter-proposal" or a basis for temporary agreement. In support 

of this view, Admiral Stark and Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, who 

as chief of the Army War Plans Division acted for the Chief of Staff 

during his absence, pointed out to the Secretary of State that a modus 

vivendi would "attain one of our present major objectives-the avoidance of war with Japan." "Even a temporary peace in the Pacific," 

Gerow urged, "would permit us to complete defensive preparations 

in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British-both of which are highly important." 34 

During the next four days, various drafts of a modus vivendi were 

prepared, and on the 25th the entire matter was reviewed at a meeting of the service secretaries and the Secretary of State. The general 

view was that the modus vivendi should be adopted, but Hull was pessimistic and expressed the view that the Japanese might "break out any 

time with new acts of conquest by force" and that national security 

now "lies in the hands of the Army and Navy." 35 Nor could the 

American Government ignore the unfavorable reaction of the Allied 

powers to the modus vivendi. The Chinese reaction was especially sharp, 

and from Chiang came a bitter protest, supported by a cable from 

Churchill. 

The President was faced with a fateful decision. The Army and 

Navy wanted time to prepare for war, and were willing to buy it with 

minor concessions. But the slight prospect of Japanese acceptance of 

the modus vivendi was, in the view of the Secretary of State, hardly 

worth the risk of lowering Chinese morale and resistance and opening 

:12 Rad, Tokyo to Washington, No. 812, 22 Nov 41, IMTFE, Doc. 2593, Item 17. 

Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordelt Hu/{, 2 vols. (New York: Thf' Macmillan Company, 1948), Vol II, p. 1069. 

:)4 Memos, Stark and Gerow for Secretary of State, 21 Nov 41, in Pearl Harbor Attack 

Hearings, Part 14, pp. 1104-07. General Marshall was attending the maneuvers in North 

Carolina. 

J5 Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 1180. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 117 

the way for appeasement. President Roosevelt agreed. Thus the American reply to Proposal B, handed to the Japanese Ambassador on the 

afternoon of the 26th, omitted the modus vivendi. 36 

In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Army and Navy 

chiefs felt that commanders in the Pacific should be warned immediately. Already, the Navy had sent out word on the 24th-to be passed 

on to the Army commanders-that prospects for an agreement with 

Japan were slight and that Japanese troop movements indicated that 

"a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on 

Philippines or Guam" was a possibility.37 Now, on the 27th, Stimson 

asked General Gerow whether the Army should not send a warning. 

Gerow showed him the Navy message of the 24th, but this failed to 

satisfy Stimson who observed that the President wanted a warning 

message sent to the Philippines. As a result, a fresh warning, considered a "final alert," was sent to Hawaii, the Philippines, Panama, and 

San Francisco. The commander of each of these garrisons was told of 

the status of the negotiations with Japan, the imminence of hostilities, 

and the desirability of having Japan commit the "first overt act." 

Each was instructed to "undertake such reconnaissance and other 

measures" as he thought necessary and to carry out the tasks assigned 

in the war plan if hostilities occurred. With the exception of MacArthur, each of the commanders was also warned not to alarm the 

civilian population or to "disclose intent." At the same time G-2 of 

the War Department sent an additional and briefer message to Hawaii 

and Panama, but not to the Philippines, warning against subversive 

activities. 

The Navy warning of the 27th, which was passed on to the Army 

commanders, was more strongly worded and definitely an alert for 

war. "This dispatch," it read, "is to be considered a war warning ... 

and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few 

days." Navy commanders were alerted to the likelihood of amphibious 

operations against either the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or Borneo 

and instructed to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in their war plans." The 

possibility of attack on Pearl Harbor was not mentioned in either 

message. 38 

36 Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, Vol II, pp. 766-70; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1077-

82; Pearl Harbor Attack Report, pp. 35-43. 

37 Rad, Op NAV to Comdrs Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, 242005 Nov 41, Pearl Hlllli()) 

Attack Hearings, Part 14, p. 1405. 

38 Memo, Gerow for Marshall, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Situation; Rads, Marshall 

to CG USAFFE, Hawaiian Dept, Carib Def Comd, Nos. 624,472,451, 27 Nov 41, OCS 

18136-118 and WPD 4544-16; Miles to G-2 Hawaiian Dept, No. 472, 27 Nov 41. Most 

of these are published in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 3, page 1021, Part 14, pages 

1328-30. Stimson's account of these events is in Part 39, page 84. The Navy message 

is in Part 14, page 1406. See also Pearl Harbor Attack Report, pp. 199-201. 
118 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Though the date 26 November marked the real end of negotiations, the Japanese were not yet ready to go to war. On the 27th a 

Liaison Conference summarily rejected the American note. But to gain 

a few days, the Japanese instructed Nomura and Kurusu on the 28th 

to do their best to keep the conversation open. Now, on the 30th, Tojo 

presented the cabinet view for war, but even at this late date several 

of the senior statesmen expressed doubts about the wisdom of a war 

with the United States. Konoye asked why it was not possible to continue "with broken economic relations but without war," to which 

Tojo replied that the final consequence of such a course would be 

"gradual impoverishment." 3fl Later that day the same group met with 

the Emperor and each man presented his views. Already the force 

scheduled to attack Pearl Harbor was on its way across the North 

Pacific and elements of the Southern Army were assembling for their 

various attacks. 

Final details for the opening of hostilities were completed on the 

30th at a meeting of the Liaison Conference. At that time the attack 

on Pearl Harbor was discussed and agreement reached on the form 

and substance of the note which would formally end the negotiations 

and sever the relations between the two countries. Hostilities would 

follow but no declaration of war, it was decided, would be made in 

advance. The timing of the Japanese reply to Hull's note was discussed 

also and it was agreed that the Naval Staff would make the decision 

in order to gain the fullest advantage of surprise at Pearl Harbor and 

elsewhere. 40 

The decisions of the Liaison Conference were formalized and sanctioned by the council in the Imperial Presence on 1 December. Tojo, 

who presided at the meeting, explained the purpose of the conference. 

Then the ministers and the chiefs of staff discussed the question of 

war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The 

vote was unanimously for war. "Our negotiations with the United 

States regarding the execution of our national policy, adopted 5 November, have finally failed," reads the record of the meeting. "Japan 

will open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the 

Netherlands." The Emperor spoke not a single word during the meeting,, 1 

All was in readiness; only the date for the start of war remained 

to be fixed and that was quickly decided. The 8th of December Uapanese Standard Time) was the date selected and on the 2d the Army 

and Navy chiefs passed this information on to the forces moving into 

:l" Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 20, p. 4012. 

40 IMTFE, Exhibits 2954 and 2955, Depositions of Tojo and Togo. 

41 IMTFE, Exhibit 588, Doc. 1652, Records of Imperial Conferences. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 119 

position for the attack. But on the slim chance that by a miracle the 

United States would agree to the Japanese terms, the Navy chief of 

staff added that should an amicable settlement be reached "all forces 

of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to 

their bases." From Admiral Yamamoto's flagship at the Kure naval 

base went the message Niitaka rama Nobore (Climb Mount Niitaka), 

the prearranged signal for the attack on Pearl Harbor.42 

Various considerations underlay the choice of so early a date. Both 

the Army and Navy felt that delay would be disastrous. By March 

1942 America's naval superiority as well as the reinforcements in the 

Philippines would make the plan extremely hazardous, if not impossible of execution. Moreover, by that time the Americans and British 

would have completed their preparations in the Philippines and 

Malaya. Weather, too, was a decisive consideration in the Japanese 

plan. The conquest of Malaya would require five months and would 

have to be completed by spring, the best time for military operations 

in Manchuria in the event that Russia should decide to attack. 

Finally, December and January were favorable months for amphibious 

operations in the Philippines and elsewhere, with the tide and moon 

favoring the attacker. 

In arriving at their decision for war, the Japanese gave little or 

no thought to the interests and desires of their Axis partners. Carefully they kept their plans secret from Mussolini and Hitler, although 

Hitler at least would have greatly preferred a Japanese attack on 

Soviet Russia or the British base at Singapore. Only on the 4th, three 

days after the decision for war was made, did the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin hint at the possibility of early hostilities when he cautiously inquired whether the German Government would declare war 

on the United States if Japan moved first, a contingency that was 

not covered in the Tripartite Pact. Even then Hitler suspected nothing 

and so little did the Japanese regard his wishes that they did not make 

an official request for a declaration of war until the afternoon of the 

8th. 43 

The first week of December 1941 was one of strain and nervous 

tension in Tokyo and of suspense and somber watchfulness in Washington. The signs of an early break were too clear to be missed by 

42 These messages are reproduced in USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific l1'ar, page 51, 

and elsewhere. 

43 Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 331; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 910-

Il; The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943, edited by Hugh Gibson (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 

and Company, Inc., 1946), entries for 3 and 4 December 1941. On 30 November, Foreign 

Minister Togo had told his Ambassador in Berlin that "war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan ... quicker than anyone dreams." Quoted in 

Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 336. 
120 COMMAND DECISIONS 

those who could read the intercepted Japanese messages and intelligence reports but there was no realization of the danger to Pearl 

Harbor. Nomura and Kurusu saw Hull several times, but both sides 

knew nothing could come of these meetings. On the 4th, Thursday, 

Congress adjourned for a long weekend. Next day the Japanese 

Embassy began to leave Washington and Nomura reported to his 

home office the partial destruction of codes. 

On 6 December President Roosevelt composed a last-minute plea 

for peace to the Emperor. On the same day a Liaison Conference in 

Tokyo approved the decision to have Nomura deliver Japan's final 

note at 1300 the next day, thirty minutes before the scheduled launching of the attack on Pearl Harbor. This note, in fourteen parts, began 

to arrive in Washington late on the 6th. Thirteen of the fourteen 

parts of the message were in American hands that night, together with 

reports of two large Japanese convoys off Indochina, headed south. 

Unidentified aircraft, presumably Japanese, had been observed over 

Luzon where by this time a full air alert was in effect and where the 

troops had already moved into defensive positions along the beaches. 

In Manila, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, alarmed over Japanese movements, was just leaving for his flagship Prince of Wales after concluding arrangements with Hart and MacArthur for concerted naval action in the event of an attack. 

That same day, 6 December, the Japanese forces were rapidly approaching their destinations. The Pearl Harbor Striking Force after a 

voyage across the Pacific was heading southeast for the final run and, 

at 2300 (Washington time), was about 600 miles north of Oahu. On 

Formosa airfields were the planes for the attack on Clark Field, and 

the troops scheduled to seize advance airfields in the Philippines had 

already left staging areas in Formosa and the Pescadores. The invasion force for Guam was in position fifty miles north of the island 

and the Wake force stood ready at Kwajalein. Advance units of the 

Japanese 25th Army had left Hainan in two convoys on 4 December 

on their way to Malaya and on the 6th were nearing southern 

Thailand and Khota Baru. 

On the morning of the 7th, Sunday, the fourteenth and last part 

of the final Japanese note was in American hands. Though it did not 

indicate when or where war would start, its intent was clear. A short 

time later two additional messages were intercepted. Taken with the 

fourteen-part note breaking off the negotiations, they were starkly revealing. One instructed the Japanese Ambassador to destroy the code 

machines and secret documents; the other, to deliver the fourteenpart message at 1300 (Washington time). At 1030 that morning 

Stimson and Knox went to Hull's office where they were closeted for 

well over an hour and at 1230 the President received the Chinese Am-
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 121 

bassador to whom he read his note of the day before to the Emperor. 

"This is," he told Hu Shih, "my last effort for peace. I am afraid it 

may fail." 44 

General Marshall spent Sunday morning on the bridle path and 

reached his office about 1100. The intercepted message giving the 

deadline (0730 Hawaiian time) for delivery of the fourteen-part note 

struck him as significant and he suggested to Admiral Stark that an 

additional warning be sent to the Pacific. He then composed a message to the commanders in Hawaii, the Philippines, Panama, and San 

Francisco telling them that the Japanese were destroying their coding 

machines and would present at 1300 "what amounts to an ultimatum." "Just what significance the hour set may have," he added, 

"we do not know, but be on alert accordingly." Declining an offer 

from Admiral Stark for the use of the Navy's radio, Marshall turned 

the message over to an officer for transmission over the Army's network and was assured shortly before noon that it would be delivered 

in thirty minutes. By a series of ironical circumstances and unexpected delays the message to Hawaii was in turn entrusted to commercial telegraph and radio and then to a bicycle messenger who, on 

his way from Honolulu to Fort Shafter, was caught in the attack 

wi th his still encoded message. 4 5 

President Roosevelt's personal note to the Emperor reached Tokyo 

at noon of the 7th (Tokyo time), but was not delivered to Ambassador Grew until 2100 that night. Shortly after midnight (about 1100 

of the 7th, Washington time), he called on the Foreign Minister to 

request an audience with the Emperor, but Togo said he would deliver the message himself. Meanwhile Ambassador Nomura had made 

an appointment to see Mr. Hull at 1345. He and Kurusu arrived at 

the State Department a half hour late and were admitted to Hull's 

office at 1420, only a few minutes after the Secretary had received a 

telephone call from the president telling him of the attack on Pearl 

Harbor. The Japanese emissaries handed the secretary the fourteenpart note, which he already had on his desk. Mr. Hull, after pretending 

to read the note, turned to the two envoys. "In all my fifty years of 

public service," he said with feeling, "I have never seen a document 

that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions-infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable 

of uttering them." 46 The Japanese left without making any comment. 

In Tokyo, Ambassador Grew received from Foreign Minister Togo 

the Japanese fourteen-part note breaking off the negotiations about 

14 Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 340. 

"" Pearl Harbor Attack Report, pp. 219-28. 

4G Pearl Harbor Attack Report, p. 41. 
122 COMMAND DECISIONS 

four hours later (approximately 0800, Tokyo time). Later that morning, after Japanese bombs had fallen on Hawaii, Guam, and Wake, 

after Japanese forces had attacked the Philippines, Hong Kong, and 

Shanghai, and Japanese troops had landed in Malaya, Mr. Grew received an announcement that a state of war existed between Japan 

and the United States. Around noon General Tojo read to "a stunned 

and silent nation" the Imperial Rescript declaring war. The broadcast closed on the martial strains of «Umi rukaba": 

Across the sea, corpses in the water; 

Across the mountain, corpses in the field. 

I shall die only for the Emperor, 

I shall never look back. 

The End if the Road 

From the vantage point of hindsight, Japan's decision to go to 

war appears as a supreme act of folly. By this decision the Japanese 

leaders appear to have deliberately committed their country to a hopeless struggle against a combination of powers vastly superior in potential industrial and military strength. This view has perhaps been 

most effectively presented by Admiral Morison who characterized the 

Pearl Harbor attack which brought the United States into the war as 

a politically disastrous and strategically idiotic move. "One can search 

military history in vain," concluded Morison, "for an operation more 

fatal to the aggressor." 47 

But to the Japanese, their decision, though it involved risks, was 

not a reckless and foolhardy one. It was based, for one thing, on the 

expectation that the United States would prefer to negotiate rather 

than fight. The Japanese leaders fully appreciated the industrial potential of the United States and that nation's ability to fight a major 

war on two fronts. But they had to accept this risk, as General Tojo 

said, "in order to tide over the present crisis for self-existence and 

self-defense." 48 

The Japanese, it must be emphasized, did not seek the total defeat of the United States and had no intention of invading this country. They planned to fight a war of limited objectives and having once 

secured these objectives to set up a defense in such depth that the 

United States would find a settlement favorable to Japan an attractive 

alternative to a long and costly war. To the Japanese leaders this 

seemed an entirely reasonable view. But there were fallacies in this con47 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 

III, The Rising Sun in the Pac~fic, 1931-Apri11942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), 

p.132. 

4< Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part V, p. 37. 
JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR 123 

cept which Admiral Yamamoto had pointed out when he wrote that it 

would not be enough "to take Guam and the Philippines, not even Hawaii and San Francisco." To gain victory, he warned his countrymen, 

they would have "to march into Washington and sign the treaty in the 

White House." 49 Here was a lesson about limited wars that went unheeded then and is still often neglected. 

Perhaps the major Japanese error was the decision to attack the 

United States at all. The strategic objectives of the Japanese lay in 

southeast Asia and if they had limited their attacks to British and 

Dutch territory the United States might not have entered the war. 

Such a course would have involved risks but it would have forced the 

United States to act first. And there was, in 1941, strong opposition 

to a move that would have appeared to a large part of the American people as an effort to pull British and Dutch chestnuts out of the 

fire. As it was, the Japanese relieved the Roosevelt administration of 

the necessity of making a very difficult choice. The alternatives it 

faced in December 1941, when the Japanese were clearly moving 

southward, were either to seek from Congress a declaration of war if 

Japan attacked the British and the Dutch in southeast Asia or to stand 

by idly while the Japanese secured the rich resources of Malaya and 

the Indies which would enable them to prosecute the war in China 

vigorously to an early end. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 

with one blow resolved all the problems and mobilized the American 

people as nothing else could have done. 50 

The Japanese based much of their hope for success on the situation in Europe. The war there favored their plans and they saw little possibility of an early peace. Germany, they believed, would defeat Russia, or at least gain military domination of the European 

continent, but they doubted that the Germans would be able to 

launch a successful invasion of England. At any rate, it was clear that 

both the British and Russians would be too preoccupied in Europe for 

some time to come to devote their attention to the Far East. The 

4" Masuo Kato, The Lost War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 89. 

'0 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and fora,. (New 

York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 390. Evidence on public opinion is not conclusive. 

A Gallup poll reported in The New York Times for February 23, 1941 found that although 

56 percent of those polled were in favor of an' effort "to keep Japan from seizing the Dutch 

East Indies and Singapore," only 39 percent supported risking war in such an attempt. 

Again, in August 1941, a Fortune poll showed that 33.7 percent of those polled w['[e in 

favor of defending the Philippines, East Indies, and Australia, and only 22.3 percent favored 

the defense of an unspecified portion of this area. The conclusion of John VV. Masland. 

writing in 1941, was that "powerful commercial interests and articulate isolationist pressure groups" opposed American opposition to Japan. John W. Masland, "American Attitudes Toward Japan," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Sorlal Science (May. 

1941), p. 165. Sec also Public Opinion, 1935-1946, prepared by Mildred Strunk undn the 

editorial direction of Hadley Cantril (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19.11). p. 1077. 
124 COMMAND DECISIONS 

United States had an important stake in Europe, too, and would be unwilling to concentrate its forces in the Pacific, the Japanese estimated, 

so long as the outcome in Europe remained in doubt. 

The possibility of avoiding war with the United States was seriously considered and discussed at length in Tokyo, but the Japanese 

were apparently convinced that if they moved south the United 

States would go to war. Their only hope lay in knocking out the fleet 

and removing the Philippine threat so that the United States would 

be unable to take offensive action for eighteen months to two years. 

By that time, the Japanese estimated, they would have secured the 

southern area and established themselves firmly behind a strong outer 

line of defense. With the resources thus won-such as oil, rubber, 

bauxite-they would be in a position to wage defensive warfare almost indefinitely. The United States, they reasoned, would be unable 

to sustain the major effort required to break through this defensive 

screen in the face of the losses imposed by a determined and weUtrained foe. As a result, the Japanese leaders felt justified in their 

hopes that the United States would be forced to compromise and 

allow Japan to retain a substantial portion of her gains, thus leaving 

the nation in a dominant position in Asia. 

This plan was not entirely unrealistic in 1941, but it completely 

overlooked the American reaction to Pearl Harbor and the refusal of 

the United States to fight a limited war-or Japan's ability to so 

limit it. The risks were recognized, but the alternatives were not estimated correctly. Yet, even had the Japanese appreciated fully the extent of the risks, they would probably have made the same decision. 

To them, correctly or incorrectly, the only choice was submission or 

war, and they chose the latter in the hope that their initial advantages and the rapid conquest of southern Asia would offset the enormous industrial and military potential of the enemy. 

In the final analysis, the Japanese decision for war was the result 

of the conviction, supported by the economic measures imposed by 

the United States and America's policy in China, that the United 

States was determined to reduce Japan to a position of secondary importance. The nation, Tojo and his supporters felt, was doomed if it 

did not meet the challenge. In their view, Japan had no alternative 

but to go to war while she still had the power to do so. She might 

lose, but defeat was better than humiliation and submission. ''Japan 

entered the war," wrote a prince of the Imperial family, "with a 

tragic determination and in desperate self-abandonment." If it lost, 

"there will be nothing to regret because she is doomed to collapse 

even without war." 51 

51 Statement of Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, 9 Jun 49, ATIS, G-2 FEe, copy in OCMH. 
5 

The Decision To Evacuate the Japanese 

From the Pacific Coast 

by 

Stetson Conn 

One of the Army's largest undertakings in the name of defense during World War II was the mass evacuation of persons of Japanese 

ancestry from the Pacific coast states-from all of California and from 

the western halves of Oregon and Washington. The decision to evacuate the Japanese was one made at the highest level-by the President of the United States acting as Commander in Chief. What Army 

plans and recommendations lay behind this decision? With what alternatives was the President presented? To what extent was his decision based on military considerations? 1 

Initial plans for evacuation of suspected persons from strategic 

areas along the Pacific coast concerned enemy aliens of all three Axis 

nations-Germany, Italy, and Japan-rather than persons of J apa1 This study is part of a chapter, "The Army and Japanese Evacuation," written for inclusion in a nllul11l' entitled Guarding the enitrd States and Its Outposts, which is being prepared for 

publication in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. That chapter covers 

the proposal for the mass evacuation of Japanese residents from Hawaii as well as the 

west coast decision. The principal published works on various facets of the subject include: 

United States War Department, Final Report: Japanese Evacuationfrom the West Coast, 1942 

(Washington, 1943) (hereafter cited as Final Report); Morton Grodzins, Betrayed: Politics 

and the Japanese Evacuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949) (hereafter 

cited as Japanese Evacuation); Dorothy S. Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, The Spoilage 

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946) and The Salvage (Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 1952); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Watson, 

Prejudice, War, and the Constitution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954); and the 

United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, WRA: A Story of 

Human Conservation (Washington, 1946) (hereafter cited as WRA). 

STETSON CONN, Historian with OCMH since 1946. Ph.D. in history, Yale 

University. Taught: Yale University, Amherst College, and The George 

Washington University. Author: Gibraltar in British Diplomacy in the Eighteenth 

Century (New Haven, 1942). Coauthor: The Framework of Hemisphere Defense 

and Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, to be published in UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
126 COMMAND DECISIONS 

nese ancestry alone. Of the latter, the census of 1940 showed that, out 

of a total of 126,947 in the continental United States, 112,353 were 

living in the three Pacific states. California had 93,717 Japanese, or 

nearly three fourths of the national total. Of the west coast Japanese, 

40,869 were aliens (called issei) ineligible for citizenship through naturalization proceedings, and 71,484 were American-born (called nisei) 

and therefore United States citizens. In early 1942 there were about 

58,000 Italian and 22,000 German aliens in the Pacific states. A good 

many of the German aliens were recent refugees from Nazi Germany. Most of the Germans, and a large proportion of the Japanese 

and Italians, lived in or near the principal cities and adjacent strategic areas. For several decades the Japanese population had been 

the target of hostility and restrictive action, a situation that unquestionably colored the measures taken against these people after Pearl 

Harbor. 

An agreement of 18 July 1941 between the War and Justice Departments gave Justice responsibility for controlling enemy aliens in 

the continental United States in the event of war. Before Pearl Harbor both Justice (primarily, through its Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the armed services had closely scrutinized the records of 

prospective enemy aliens and compiled lists of those against whom 

there were grounds for suspicion of disloyalty. Presidential proclamations of 7 and 8 December 1941, dealing with the control of Japanese and of German and Italian aliens, respectively, provided the 

basis for immediate and subsequent action against enemy aliens suspected of hostile intent or of action against the national security. On 

7 December President Roosev~lt authorized the Army to co-operate 

with the FBI in rounding up individual enemy aliens considered actually or potentially dangerous. By 13 December the Department of 

Justice had interned a total of 831 alien residents of the Pacific states, 

including 595 Japanese and 187 Germans; by 16 February 1942 the 

number of alien Japanese apprehended had increased to 1,266. By 

specifically authorizing the exclusion of enemy aliens "from any locality in which residence by an alien enemy shall be found to constitute a danger to the public peace and safety of the United States," 

the Presidential proclamations also provided a basis for evacuation on 

a larger scale. 2 

2 Ltr, TAG to CGs, 29 Jul 41, inclosing copy of the SW-Atty Gen agreement of 18 

Jul 41, in Adjutant General's Central File (AG) 014.311 (1-13-41), Sec. I; Proclamations 

of 7 and 8 Dec 41, copies in Provost Marshal General (PMG) File 014.311 WDC and 

PMG 383.01 Hawaii; Tel Conv, SGS with Lt Gen John L. DeWitt, 7 Dec 41, Western 

Defense Command (WDC) File 381 RAINBOW 4; Memo, Special Asst to SW for PMG, 

13 Dec 41, PMG 014.311 WDC; J. Edgar Hoover, "Alien Enemy Control," Iowa Law Review, XXIX (March, 1944), 396-408. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 127 

During the first few days after the Pearl Harbor attack the west 

coast was alarmed by a number of reports-all false-of enemy ships 

offshore. It was in the midst of this atmosphere that the first proposal for a mass evacuation of the Japanese developed. On 10 December a Treasury agent reported to Army authorities that "an estimated 20,000 Japanese in the San Francisco metropolitan area were 

ready for organized action." Without checking the authenticity of the 

report, the Ninth Corps Area staff worked until late that night on a 

plan for evacuation, which was then approved by the corps area commander. The next morning the Army called the local FBI chief, who 

"scoffed at the whole affair as the wild imaginings of a discharged former F.B.I. man." This stopped any local action for the moment, but the 

corps area commander duly reported the incident to Washington and 

expressed the hope that "it may have the effect of arousing the War 

Department to some action looking to the establishment of an area 

or areas for the detention of aliens." 3 His recommendation that "plans 

be made for large-scale internment" was forwarded by the Chief of 

Staff's office to G-2 and to the Provost Marshal General. 4 

On 19 December, and apparently as one consequence of this initial flurry, the Western Defense Command sent the following recommendation to its Washington command post, at that time General 

Headquarters: 

1. In view of the fact that the West Coast of the United States has now 

been designated and is functioning as an active Theater of Operations, it 

is recommended that action be initiated at the earliest practicable date to 

collect all alien subjects fourteen years of age and over, of enemy nations 

and remove them to the Zone of the Interior. 

2. It is also recommended that these individuals be held under restraint 

after removal from the Theater of Operations in order to preclude their 

surreptitious return. 

3. Records indicate that there are approximately 40,000 of such enemy 

aliens and it is believed that they constitute an immediate and potential 

menace to vital measures of defense. 5 

In making this recommendation the Army commander on the Pacific 

coast, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, was acting not only as commanding 

general of the Fourth Army and Western Defense Command but also 

as commander of the Western Theater of Operations, established on 

11 December with the same territorial limits as those of the defense 

command. However General DeWitt may have felt during December 

:l Memo, G-2 Fourth Army for ColS Fourth Army, 11 Dec 41, Western Defense Command-Civil Affairs Division (WDC-CAD) File 014.31 Enemy Aliens. 

4 Office, Chief of Staff (OCS) File Index, 11 Dec 41, Tally Card info re OCS 21227-

38 and 39 . 

. ,Ltr, CG WDC to CG GHQ, 19 Dec 41, WDC-CAD 014.31. 
128 COMMAND DECISIONS 

about the treatment of enemy aliens, he was then firmly opposed to 

an evacuation of citizens. During a telephone conversation between 

Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion, the War Department's Provost Marshal 

General, and General DeWitt on 26 December 1941, General Gullion 

remarked that he had just been visited by a representative of the Los 

Angeles Chamber of Commerce, who had asked for a roundup of all 

Japanese in the Los Angeles area. In response, General DeWitt said 

(and General Gullion expressed agreement with what he said): 

I thought that thing out to my satisfaction. . . . If we go ahead and 

arrest the 93,000 Japanese, native born and foreign born, we are going to 

have an awful job on our hands and are very liable to alienate the loyal 

Japanese from disloyal. ... I'm very doubtful that it would be common 

sense procedure to try and intern or to intern 117,000 Japanese in this 

theater. . . . I told the governors of all the states that those people should 

be watched better if they were watched by the police and people of the 

community in which they live and have been living for years. . . . and 

then inform the F.B.I. or the military authorities of any suspicious action 

so we could take necessary steps to handle it ... rather than try to intern all those people, men, women and children, and hold them under 

military control and under guard. I don't think it's a sensible thing to do . 

. . . I'd rather go along the way we are now ... rather than attempt 

any such wholesale internment .... An American citizen, after all, is an 

American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can 

weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary.6 

In any event, all planning for mass evacuation of either aliens or citizens from strategic areas was deferred pending new arrangements that 

were in the making with the Department of Justice for more effective 

control of enemy aliens. 

While these arrangements were being worked out, the Provost 

Marshal General proposed that responsibility for the alien program 

be transferred from Justice to the War Department in all theaters of 

operations. After the decision to activate an Eastern Theater of Operations, he amended his proposal so that, in the continental United 

States, it would apply only in the Western Defense Command. 7 General DeWitt opposed the transfer, at least until it became evident 

that the Department of Justice through the FBI could not control the 

situation on the west coast. He thought the FBI organization on the 

coast could handle matters effectively if Attorney General Francis 

Biddle would provide the FBI with adequate authority. General DeWitt also thought civil control of the alien program better than mili6 Tel ConY, DeWitt with Gullion, 26 Dec 41, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 

42-43). 

7 Memo, PMG for SW, 22 Dec 41, and Memo, PMG for G-2, 30 Dec 41, both in 

PMG 014.311 Gen P/W. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 129 

tary control of it. General Gullion therefore decided to hold up his 

proposal until there was better evidence of its necessity.8 

What General DeWitt wanted at this time was the issuance of clear 

instructions to FBI agents on the west coast that would enable them 

to take more positive steps to prevent sabotage and espionage. At his 

urging Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had conferred with Mr. 

Biddle, and thereafter the Attorney General speeded up the implementation of the Presidential proclamations of 7 and 8 December. In 

late December the Department of Justice announced regulations requiring enemy aliens in the Western Defense Command to surrender 

radio transmitters, short-wave radio receivers, and certain types of 

cameras by 5 January 1942. On 30 December General DeWitt was 

informed that the Attorney General had also authorized the issuance 

of warrants for search and arrest in any house where an enemy alien 

lived upon representation by an FBI agent that there was reasonable 

cause to believe that there was contraband on the premises. In addition, the Department of Justice and the Provost Marshal General had 

arranged to send representatives to San Francisco to confer with General DeWitt in order to work out more specific arrangements for controlling enemy aliens. To centralize and expedite Army action in 

Washington, Gullion also arranged for DeWitt to deal directly with 

the Provost Marshal General's office on west coast alien problems, and 

for the latter to keep General Headquarters (GHQ) informed of developments. As a result of this arrangement, the responsible Army command headquarters in Washington had little to do during January 

and February 1942 with the plans and decision for Japanese 

evacuation. 9 

The San Francisco conference took place on 4 and 5 January 1942. 

Before the meetings the War Department's representative, Maj. Karl 

R. Bendetsen, chief of the Aliens Division, Provost Marshal General's 

office, recommended that General DeWitt insist on several measures 

beyond those already ordered by the Attorney General. In particular 

he urged the definition of strategic areas from which all enemy aliens 

were to be excluded and that authority to prescribe such areas be 

vested in the Army. He also insisted that there must be a new and complete registration of enemy aliens and a "pass and permit" system simiR Tel Convs, DeWitt with Gullion, 26 and 27 Dec 41, and Tel Conv, DeWitt with Col 

Archer L. Lerch, Deputy PMG, 1 Jan 42, all in WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 

42-43); Memo for File. Lerch, 1 Jan 42, General Headquarters (GHQ) G-l file, Subversive Activities, WDC. 

"Memo, Lerch for TAG, 30 Dec 41, PMG 014.3\\ WDC; Memo, PMG for ACofS 

G-l, GHQ, \ Jan 42, and inclosed copy of Ltr, PMG to DeWitt, \ Jan 42, GHQ G-l 

file, Subversive Activities, WDC. 
130 COMMAND DECISIONS 

lar to the one prevalent in prewar Europe. The Justice representative, 

Assistant Attorney General James Rowe, Jr., also presented broader 

plans for action than any the Attorney General had hitherto approved. 

In opening the conference, General DeWitt emphatically declared his 

serious concern over the alien situation and his distrust in particular of 

the Japanese population-both aliens and citizens. But, according to 

the later recollections of Mr. Rowe, the general during the meetings 

expressed strong opposition to a mass evacuation of the Japanese. 

What he wanted was a full implementation of the President's proclamations. He particularly wanted the FBI to have blanket authority 

to "search, enter, and arrest" at the homes and business premises of 

all suspected individuals. In a formal commentary on Mr. Rowe's proposals, General DeWitt expressed some apprehensions that they 

would prove inadequate, but further discussion on 5 January led to 

an exchange of identical memorandums on the following day representing a plan of action mutually agreeable to General DeWitt, to 

Mr. Rowe, and to Mr. N. J. L. Pieper, the chief FBI agent on the 

Pacific coast who had also attended these meetings. These memorandums provided for an alien registration with the least delay, for 

FBI searches of suspected premises under regulations that subsequently proved entirely satisfactory to General DeWitt, and for the 

designation of restricted areas from which enemy aliens would be 

barred by the Attorney General, who would "entertain" Army recommendations on this score if they were accompanied by an exact description of each area. 10 

The arrangements agreed upon at the San Francisco meetings took 

much longer to put into effect than either General DeWitt or the Justice Department representatives had anticipated. The registration of 

enemy aliens was finally undertaken between 2 and 9 February, and 

the large-scale "spot" raids that General DeWitt was especially anxious to have launched did not get under way until the same week; 

thus both operations took place in the period when agitation against 

the Japanese was rapidly mounting. General DeWitt had anticipated 

that he could fix the boundaries of the restricted areas by 9 January, 

but it was 21 January before he sent the first of his lists (for California only) to Washington for transmission to the Attorney General. 

One of his principal difficulties was to reconcile the recommendations of the Navy, which by agreement were to be made through 

10 Memo, Maj Bendetsen for DeWitt, 3 Jan 42, and Notes on Conf in Office of DeWitt, 4 Jan 42, both in WDC-CAD 014.31 Aliens; Memo, CG WDC for Rowe, 5 Jan 42, 

the attached Tab A, entitled Summary of Communication (i.e., Rowe to DeWitt), 4 Jan 

42, and Memos of 6 Jan 42, all reproduced in Final Report, pp. 4-6, 19-24; Tel ConY, 

De Witt with Col Raymond R. Tourtillott, 5 Jan 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43); tenBroek et al., Prejudice, War, and the Constitution, pp. 104-05. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 131 

General DeWitt, with the position of the Department of Justice. Navy 

commanders wanted to exclude not only enemy aliens but also all 

American-born Japanese who could not show "actual severance of all 

allegiance to the Japanese Government." 11 

General DeWitt's recommendation of 21 January dealing with 

California called for the exclusion of enemy aliens from eighty-six 

"Category A" restricted zones and their close control by a pass and 

permit system in eight "Category B" zones. Many of the Category A 

areas, in the vicinity of strategic installations, were uninhabited or 

had no alien population, but the execution of the recommendation 

nevertheless would have required the evacuation of more than 7,000 

persons. Only 40 percent of these would have been Japanese aliens; 

the majority would have been Italians. 12 

The Secretary of War's letter (drafted in the Provost Marshal 

General's office), which forwarded this recommendation to Mr. Biddle, added the following comments: 

In recent conferences with General DeWitt, he has expressed great apprehension because of the presence on the Pacific coast of many thousand 

alien enemies. As late as yesterday, 24 January, he stated over the telephone that shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore radio communications, undoubtedly coordinated by intelligent enemy control were continually operating. 

A few days ago it was reported by military observers on the Pacific coast 

that not a single ship had sailed from our Pacific ports without being subsequently attacked. General DeWitt's apprehensions have been confirmed 

by recent visits of military observers from the War Department to the Pacific coast. 

The alarming and dangerous situation just described, in my opinion, 

calls for immediate and stringent action. 13 

Actually there had been no Japanese submarine or surface vessels anywhere near the west coast during the preceding month, and careful 

investigation subsequently indicated that all claims of hostile shore-toship and ship-to-shore communications lacked any foundation whatsoever. 14 General De Witt's recommendations for restricted areas in 

11 The Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval District commanders made recommendations in 

identical language on this score. Memo, Adm John W. Greenslade, Commandant Twelfth 

Naval District, for CG Northern California Sector, 8 Jan 42, and Ltr, CG IX Army Corps 

to CG WDC, 8 Jan 42, both in WDC-CAD 014.31 Aliens. 

l' Ltr and Incls, CG WDC to Atty Gen (through PMG), 21 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 (California) General. 

1:1 Ltr, SW to Atty Gen, 25 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 (California) General. The transcript 

of General DeWitt's telephone remarks referred to reads, "We know there are radios along the 

coast; and we know they are communicating at sea. They may be communicating with 

each other. ... " Tel Conv, DeWitt with Gullion, 24 Jan 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel 

Convs (DeWitt 42-43). 

H Ltr, James L. Fly, Chairman Federal Communications Commission, to Atty Gen 

Biddle, 4 Apr 44, quoted in WRA monograph by Ruth E. McKee, Wartime Exile: The 

Exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast (Washington, 1946), pp. 154-58. 
132 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Arizona followed on 24 January, and for Oregon and Washington on 

31 January; the recommendations were forwarded by the War Department to Justice on 29 January and 3 February, respectively.15 By the 

latter date the position of the Japanese population was under heavy 

attack, and in consequence the alien exclusion program was being 

eclipsed by a drive to evacuate all people of Japanese descent from 

the west coast states. 

Agitation for a mass evacuation of the Japanese did not reach significant dimensions until more than a month after the outbreak of war. 

Then, beginning in mid-January 1942, public and private demands 

for federal and state action increased rapidly in tempo and volume. 16 

Behind these demands lay a profound suspicion of the Japanese population, fanned, of course, by the nature and scope of Japan's early 

military successes in the Pacific. Army estimates of the situation 

reflected this suspicion. An intelligence bulletin of 21 January concluded that there was an "espionage net containing Japanese aliens, 

first and second generation Japanese and other nationals . . . thoroughly organized and working underground." 17 In conversations with 

Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark of GHQ on 20 and 21 January, General 

De Witt expressed his apprehension that any enemy raid on the west 

coast would probably be accompanied by "a violent outburst of coordinated and controlled sabotage" among the Japanese population.18 

In talking with General Gullion on 24 January, General DeWitt stated 

what was to become one of the principal arguments for evacuation. 

"The fact that nothing has happened so far is more or less ... 

ominous," he said, "in that I feel that in view of the fact that we 

have had no sporadic attempts at sabotage there is control being exercised and when we have it it will be on a mass basis." But in this 

same conversation he also said that he was still opposed to any move 

to transfer authority from Justice to the War Department because he 

thought there was "every indication" that the arrangements made with 

the Department of Justice and its FBI were going to prove satisfactory.19 

The publication of the report of the Roberts Commission, which 

had investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, on 25 January had a large 

15 General DeWitt's final recommendation in this series, with respect to Utah, dated 

16 February 1942 (copy in PMG 384.4 WDC), lists and describes the seven preceding 

ones. 

16 Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, contains the most detailed analysis of the pressures 

that developed during January and February for Japanese evacuation. 

17 GHQ G-2 Info Bull 6, 21 Jan 42, copy in Assistant Secretary of War (ASW) McCloy File 014.311 WDC Gen. 

IS Memo, Clark for Judge Advocate GHQ, 24 Jan 42, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens. 

19 Tel Conv, DeWitt with Gullion, 24 Jan 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 

42-43). 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 133 

and immediate effect on both public opinion and government action. 

The report concluded that there had been widespread espionage in 

Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, both by Japanese consular agents and 

by Japanese residents of Oahu who had "no open relations with the 

Japanese foreign service." 20 The latter charge, though proved false 

after the war was over, was especially inflammatory at the time it 

was made. On 27 January General DeWitt had a long talk with Governor Culbert L. Olson of California and afterward reported: 

There's a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against 

the Japanese of all classes, that is aliens and non-aliens, to get them off 

the land, and in Southern California around Los Angeles-in that area 

too-they want and they are bringing pressure on the government to move 

all the Japanese out. As a matter of fact, it's not being instigated or developed by people who are not thinking but by the best people of California. 

Since the publication of the Roberts Report they feel that they are living 

in the midst of a lot of enemies. They don't trust the Japanese, none of 

them. 21 

Two days later the general and Mr. Pieper, the FBI chief, met with 

the Attorney General of California, Mr. Earl Warren. General DeWitt 

reported that Mr. Warren was in thorough agreement with Governor 

Olson that the Japanese population should be removed from the state 

of California and the general expressed his own unqualified concurrence in this proposal and also his willingness to accept responsibility 

for the enemy alien program if it were transferred to him.22 

In Washington, as Major Bendetsen told General DeWitt on 29 

January, the California Congressional delegation was "beginning to 

get up in arms," and its representatives had scheduled an informal 

meeting for the following afternoon to formulate recommendations 

for action. Some Washington state congressmen also attended the 

meeting, to which representatives of the Justice and War Departments 

were invited. Major Bendetsen reported General DeWitt's views to 

the. assembled congressmen and, though denying that he was authorized to speak for the War Department, nevertheless expressed the 

opinion that the Army would be entirely willing to take over from 

Justice, "provided they accorded the Army, and the Secretary of War, 

and the military commander under him, full authority to require the 

services of any other federal agency, and provided that federal agency 

'0 The Roberts Report is published in Pearl Harbor Attack: Hean'ngs Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (39 parts) (Washington, 1946), Pt. 39, pp. 

1-21. 

21 Tel ConY, DeWitt with Bendetsen, 28 Jan 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Conys (DeWitt, 42-43). 

2' Tel Cony, DeWitt with Bendetsen, 29 .Tan 42, as recorded both in WDC-CAD 

311.3 Tel Conys (DeWitt, 42-43) and in PMG 384.4 WDC; PMG Daily Record of Operations, 29 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. 
134 COMMAND DECISIONS 

was required to respond." 23 The congressmen unanimously approved 

a suggested program of action, which called for an evacuation of enemy 

aliens and "dual" citizens from critical areas, but which made no 

specific mention of the Japanese. In presenting the Congressional program to his chief, Major Bendetsen described it as actually "calling 

for the immediate evacuation of all Japanese from the Pacific coastal 

strip including Japanese citizens of the age of 21 and under, and 

calling for an executive order of the President, imposing full responsibility and authority (with power to requisition the services of other 

Federal agencies) upon the War Department." 24 He also reported the 

Congressional recommendations, as adopted, to General DeWitt, who 

expressed general approval of them despite some technical objections. 

The next day, the general recorded this opinion: 

As a matter of fact, the steps now being taken by the Attorney General 

through the F.B.I. will do nothing more than exercise a controlling influence and preventative action against sabotage; it will not, in my opinion, 

be able to stop it. The only positive answer to this question is evacuation 

of all enemy aliens from the West Coast and resettlement or internment 

under positive control, military or otherwise. 25 

The Department of Justice in the meantime had agreed informally 

to accept General De Witt's initial recommendation for restricted areas 

in California, and it was preparing to carry out this and other aspects 

of the alien control program. On 28 January it announced the appointment of Thomas C. Clark as Co-ordinator of the Alien Enemy Control program within the Western Defense Command, and Mr. Clark 

arrived on the scene of action on the following day. On 29 January 

Justice made its first public announcement about the restricted Category A areas that were to be cleared of enemy aliens by 24 February.26 

As a result of the Congressional recommendations and other developments, Attorney General Biddle asked War Department representatives to attend a meeting in his office on Saturday afternoon, 1 February. There he presented them with the draft of a press release to 

be issued jointly by the Justice and War Departments, indicating 

agreement on all alien control measures taken to date and including 

the statement: "The Department of War and the Department of Justice are in agreement that the present military situation does not at 

this time require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese 

race." In opening the meeting Mr. Biddle stated that Justice would 

23 Tel Cony, DeWitt with Bendetsen, 30 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. 

24 Memo, Bendetsen for PMG, 31 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. 

25 Memo for Record, 31 Jan 42, dictated but not signed by DeWitt, WDC-CAD 014.3\. 

26 Department of Justice press releases, printed as Appendix, pp. 302-14, to H. Doc. 2124, 

77th Cong., 2d Sess. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 135 

have nothing whatever to do with any interference with Citizens or 

with a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The War Department 

representatives-Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, General 

Gullion, and Major Bendetsen-agreed to the wording of the press 

release except for the sentence quoted. The meeting then adjourned, 

the War Department representatives withholding approval of any press 

release until General De Witt's views could be obtained, and until they 

learned the outcome of a conference at Sacramento that had been 

arranged for 2 February between General DeWitt, Mr. Clark, the 

governor of California, and other federal and state officials. Major 

Bendetsen informed the Chief of StafPs office that the Justice Department's proposal had been held up also because General DeWitt in 

telephone conversations had been provisionally recommending the 

evacuation of the whole Japanese population from the Pacific coastal 

frontier. In the meantime the Provost Marshal General's office had 

been formulating plans for mass evacuation and had already located 

sufficient non troop shelter to provide for substantially all of the west 

coast Japanese. In a telephone conversation immediately after the 

meeting with Justice representatives, Major Bendetsen reported, General DeWitt agreed to submit a recommendation for mass evacuation 

in writing. 27 

Before General DeWitt could report the outcome of the Sacramento 

meeting, Secretary Stimson met, on 3 February, with Mr. McCloy, 

General Gullion, and Major Bendetsen to confer about the proposed 

press release and the Japanese problem in general. They discussed a 

proposal under which military reservations would be established around 

the big aircraft factories and some port and harbor installations, and 

from which everyone could be excluded at the outset and until they 

were licensed to return. In practice, licenses would not be issued to 

Japanese residents or to other groups or individuals under suspicion. 

It appeared that under this plan citizens as well as aliens could be 

excluded legally without obvious discrimination. 

During the 3 February discussion, Mr. Stimson was handed a record of a telephone conversation between General George C. Marshall, 

Chief of Staff, and General DeWitt, who had called just as the Secretary of War's meeting was getting under way. In it, General DeWitt 

said: 

I had a conference yesterday with the Governor and several representatives from the Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture, with 

27 Tel Con v, DeWitt with Bendetsen, 1 Feb 42, and Tel Conv, Gullion with Clark, 

4 Feb 42, both in PMG 384.4 WDC; Tel Conv, DeWitt with Gullion, I Feb 42, GHQ 

G-I file, Subversive Activities, WDC: Enemy Aliens; Memo, Bendetsen for SGS, 2 Feb 

42, AG 014.311 (1-13-41), Sec. 10. 
136 COMMAND DECISIONS 

a view to removal of the Japanese from where they are now living to other 

portions of the State. And the Governor thinks it can be satisfactorily 

handled without having a resettlement somewhere in the central part of 

the United States and removing them entirely from the state of California. 

As you know the people out here are very much disturbed over these aliens, 

the Japanese being among them, and want to get them out of the several 

communities. And I've agreed that if they can solve the problem by getting them out of the areas limited as the combat zone, that it would be 

satisfactory. That would take them 100 to 150 miles from the coast, and 

they're working on it. The Department of Justice has a representative here 

and the Department of Agriculture, and they think the plan is an excellent one. I'm only concerned with getting them away from around these 

aircraft factories and other places. 28 

In other exchanges on this and succeeding days General DeWitt 

explained that what the California authorities proposed to do was to 

move both citizen and alien Japanese (voluntarily if possible, and in 

collaboration with American-born Japanese leaders) from urban areas 

and from along the seacoast to agricultural areas within the state. 

They wanted to do this in particular in order to avoid having to 

replace the Japanese with Mexican and Negro laborers who might 

otherwise have to be brought into California in considerable numbers. 

The California officials felt they needed about ten days to study the 

problem and come up with a workable plan. By 4 February it 

appeared to General DeWitt that they could produce a plan that would 

be satisfactory from the standpoint of defense. 29 

After meeting with Secretary Stimson on 3 February, McCloy called 

DeWitt to tell him about the licensing plan and to caution him against 

taking any position in favor of mass Japanese evacuation. 3D The next 

day General Gullion told General Clark that Mr. Stimson and Mr. 

McCloy were against mass evacuation of the Japanese. "They are 

pretty much against it," he said, "and they are also pretty much 

against interfering with citizens unless it can be done legally." While 

agreeing that the Stimson-McCloy point of view represented the War 

Department position for the moment, Gullion also said that personally 

he did not think the licensing action proposed was going to cure the 

situation. 31 On this same day, 4 February, Colonel Bendetsen (just 

promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel) in talking with General 

DeWitt remarked that he was sure that American citizens of Japa28 Tel Cony, Marshall with DeWitt and accompanying notes of Col Deane, 3 Feb 42, 

in OCS Tel Convs Binder 2. 

29 Memo, DeWitt for ASW McCloy, 3 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC; Tel Convs, DeWitt 

with Joyce, 3 Feb 42, DeWitt with Bendetsen, 4 Feb 42, and DeWitt with Gullion, 5 Feb 

42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43). 

:10 Tel Cony, DeWitt with McCloy, 3 Feb 42, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens. 

:n Tel Cony, Gullion with Clark, 4 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 137 

nese extraction would have to be excluded from some areas at least. 

General DeWitt evaded a direct comment at this point in the conversation, but later said: 

You see, the situation is this: I have never on my own initiative recommended a mass evacuation, or the removal of any man, any Jap, other 

than an alien. In other words, I have made no distinction between an 

alien as to whether he is Jap, Italian, or German-that they must all get 

out of Area A, that is the Category A area. The agitation to move all the 

Japanese away from the Coast, and some suggestions, out of California 

entirely-is within the State, the population of the State, which has been 

espoused by the Governor. I have never been a body [sic] to that, but I 

have said, if you do that, and can solve that problem, it will be a positive 

step toward the protection of the coast ... But I have never said, "You've 

got to do it, in order to protect the coast"; ... I can take such measures 

as are necessary from a military standpoint to control the American Jap if 

he is going to cause trouble within those restricted areas. 32 

The projected joint press release of the War and Justice Departments, 

which had been submerged in this more fundamental issue, was finally 

issued in revised form on 5 February, and in terms that differed from 

what either General DeWitt or the Provost Marshal General's office 

had wanted. With respect to citizens, it stated innocuously: "The 

Government is fully aware of the problem presented by dual nationalities, particularly among the Japanese. The appropriate Governmental 

agencies are now dealing with the problem." 33 

Three days earlier, on 2 February, members of Congress from all 

three Pacific states had organized informally under the leadership of 

their senior Senator, Hiram Johnson. He had appointed two subcommittees, one headed by Senator Rufus C. Holman of Oregon to consider plans for increased military strength along the Pacific coast, and 

the other by Senator Mon C. Wallgren of Washington to deal with 

the questions of enemy aliens and the prevention of sabotage. On 4 

February General Clark of GHQ and Admiral Harold R. Stark, the 

Chief of Naval Operations, were asked to testify on the west coast 

military outlook at a meeting of the first of these subcommittees. Before 

they spoke, Senator Holman summed up the situation by saying that 

the people on the west coast were alarmed and horrified as to their 

persons, their employment, and their homes. General Clark said that 

he thought the Pacific states were unduly alarmed. While both he 

and Admiral Stark agreed that the west coast defenses were not adequate to prevent the enemy from attacking, they also agreed that the 

chance of any sustained attack or of an invasion was-as General Clark 

l" Tel Cony, Cen DeWitt with Col Bendetsen, 4 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs 

(DeWitt, 42-43). 

33 Press release of 5 Feb 42, quoted in Crodzins, Japanese Evacuation, p. 258. 
138 COMMAND DECISIONS 

put it-nil. They believed that sporadic air raids on key installations 

were a distinct possibility, but they also held that the west coast military defenses were considerable and in fairly good shape; and as 

Admiral Stark said, from the military point of view the Pacific coast 

necessarily had a low priority as compared with Hawaii and the far 

Pacific. These authoritative Army and Navy views were passed on to 

the Wallgren subcommittee, but they do not seem to have made much 

im pression. 34 

On this same day, 4 February, the federal government's Office of 

Facts and Figures completed an analysis of a hasty survey of public 

opinion in California and concluded: "Even with such a small sample, 

... one can infer that the situation in California is serious; that it 

is loaded with potential dynamite; but that it is not as desperate as 

some people believe." 35 A contemporary Navy report described what 

was happening to the Japanese population in the Los Angeles area in 

these words: " ... loss of employment and income due to antiJapanese agitation by and among Caucasian Americans, continued 

personal attacks by Filipinos and other racial groups, denial of relief 

funds to desperately needy cases, cancellation of licenses for markets, 

produce houses, stores, etc., by California State authorities, discharges 

from jobs by the wholesale, unnecessarily harsh restrictions on travel 

including discriminatory regulations against all Nisei preventing them 

from engaging in commercial fishing." While expressing opposition to 

any mass evacuation of the Japanese, the report concluded that if practices such as those described continued there would "most certainly 

be outbreaks of sabotage, riots, and other civil strife in the not too 

distant future." 36 

In fact, no proved instances of sabotage or of espionage after Pearl 

Harbor among the west coast Japanese population were ever uncovered. The most damaging tangible evidence turned up against the 

Japanese was that produced by the intensive searches of their premises by the FBI from early February onward. By May it had seized 

2,592 guns of various kinds, 199,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,652 sticks 

of dynamite, 1,458 radio receivers, 2,914 cameras, 37 motion picture 

cameras, and numerous other articles that the alien Japanese had been 

ordered to turn in at the beginning of January. A major portion of 

the guns and ammunition was picked up in a raid on a sporting goods 

34 Memo for Record, Chief WD Liaison Br, 6 Feb 42, GHQ file, WDC: Protection of 

Vital Installations; Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, pp. 71-73; H. Doc. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d 

Sess., pp. 2-3. 

:15 Memo, Bur of Intelligence for Dir OFF, 4 Feb 42, copy in ASW 014.33 Enemy 

Aliens on the West Coast (hereafter cited as ASW 014.311 EAWC). 

:w Report, Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle, Eleventh Naval District, through 

Commandant to CNO, no date, copy in ASW 014.311 EAWC. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 139 

shop. After assessing this evidence, Department of Justice officials 

concluded: 

We have not, however, uncovered through these searches any dangerous persons that we could not otherwise know about. We have not found 

among all the sticks of dynamite and gun powder any evidence that any 

of it was to be used in bombs. We have not found a single machine gun 

nor have we found any gun in any circumstances indicating that it was to 

be used in a manner helpful to our enemies. We have not found a camera 

which we have reason to believe was for use in espionage. 37 

There were better if less tangible grounds for suspecting that some of 

the Japanese people-citizens as well as aliens-might become disloyal 

in the event of aJapanese invasion. The Navy report mentioned above 

indicated that a small but significant minority of the west coast Japanese could be expected to be highly undependable in a crisis; and 

subsequently the War Relocation Authority concluded that for this 

reason "a selective evacuation of people of Japanese descent from the 

west coast military area was justified and administratively feasible in 

the spring of 1942," although it concluded also that a mass evacuation such as was actually carried out was never justified. 38 

Within this setting Colonel Bendetsen on 4 February wrote a long 

memorandum to General Gullion that stated at the outset his conclusion that an enemy alien evacuation "would accomplish little as a 

measure of safety," since the alien Japanese were mostly elderly people who could do little harm if they would. Furthermore, their removal 

would inevitably antagonize large numbers of their relatives among 

the American-b.orn Japanese. After considering the various alternatives that had been suggested for dealing with citizens, Colonel Bendetsen recommended the designation of military areas from which all 

persons who did not have permission to enter and remain would be 

excluded as a measure of military necessity. In his opinion, this plan 

was clearly legal and he recommended that it be executed by three 

steps: first, the issuance of an executive order by the President authorizing the Secretary of War to designate military areas; second, the 

designation of military areas upon the recommendation of General 

DeWitt; and, third, the immediate evacuation from areas so designated of all persons to whom it was not proposed to issue permits to 

re-enter or remain. Colonel Bendetsen assumed that, if military areas 

were established on the west coast in place of all Category A restricted 

areas thus far recommended by General DeWitt, about 30,000 people 

would have to be evacuated. 39 

:17 Draft of Memo, early May 42, Atty Gen for Roosevelt, as quoted in Grodzins, Jap- anese Evacuation, pp. 134~36. 

3S WRA, p. 182. 

'H'Memo, Bendetsen for PMG, 4 Feb 42, PMG 014.311 Gen P/W. 
140 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The Deputy Provost Marshal General, Col. Archer L. Lerch, 

indorsed Colonel Bendetsen's proposals, and in doing so commented 

on what he called the "decided weakening of General DeWitt" on 

the question of Japanese evacuation, which he considered "most unfortunate." He also thought the plan for resettlement within California 

being worked out between General DeWitt and the state authorities 

savored "too much of the spirit of Rotary" and overlooked "the necessary cold-bloodedness of war." 40 General Gullion presented a condensed version of Colonel Bendetsen's observations and recommendations in a memorandum to Mr. McCloy on the following day. In 

doing so, he also noted that General De Witt had changed his position, and now appeared to favor a more lenient treatment of the 

American-born Japanese to be worked out in co-operation with their 

leaders; in General Gullion's opinion, such co-operation was dangerous and the delay involved was "extremely dangerous." 41 A revision 

of this memorandum, with all reference to General De Witt deleted, 

became the Provost Marshal General's recommendation of 6 February 

to Mr. McCloy that steps be taken immediately to eliminate what 

General Gullion described as the great danger of Japanese-inspired 

sabotage on the west coast. He advised that these steps should include 

the internment by the Army of all alien Japanese east of the Sierra 

Nevada mountains, together with as many citizen members of their 

families as would voluntarily accompany them, and the exclusion of 

all citizen Japanese from restricted zones and their resettlement with 

the assistance of various federal agencies. 42 

On the following day, 7 February, Colonel Bendetsen read General Gullion's memorandum to General DeWitt, who expressed some 

enthusiasm for its recommendations but did not want to indorse them 

without further study.43 By 7 February, also, Mr. McCloy had decided 

to send Colonel Bendetsen to the west coast "to confer with General 

DeWitt in connection with mass evacuation of all Japanese. 44 When 

Colonel Bendetsen departed for San Francisco he carried new instructions for the Army's west coast commander. These instructions, together 

with President Roosevelt's decisions on 11 February, presently to be 

mentioned, were to produce new and detailed recommendations from 

General DeWitt. 45 

40 Memo, Deputy PMG for PMG, 4 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. 

41 Memo, PMG for ASW, 5 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC. 

4' Memo, PMG for ASW, 6 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC. 

43 Two Tel Convs, DeWitt with Bendetsen, 7 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs 

(DeWitt, 42-43). 

H Talley Card 31 in re OCS 21227-88. 

15 On II February General DeWitt referred to his new recommendations collectively 

as "the plan that Mr. McCloy wanted me to submit." Tel ConY, DeWitt and Bendetsen 

with Gullion, II Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43). 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 141 

In the meantime, the War and Justice Departments had been 

approaching an impasse over the area evacuations contemplated under 

the enemy alien control program. After agreeing informally to accept 

General DeWitt's initial California recommendation, Justice officials 

balked at accepting the very large size Category A areas he recommended for Washington and Oregon, since they included the entire 

cities of Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland. The execution of this recommendation would have required the evacuation of about 10,700 additional enemy aliens and, as in the case of California, only about 40 

percent of these would have been Japanese. As a practical matter the 

Department of Justice would have found it extremely difficult to supply either the manpower or the internment facilities that a compulsory evacuation of seventeen or eighteen thousand enemy aliens would 

have required, and by 4 February its Washington representatives were 

intimating that, if there were any further Category A recommendations or if the evacuation of any citizens were to be involved, Justice 

would have to bow out and turn its evacuation responsibilities over 

to the War Department. General DeWitt on 4 February was considering putting the whole Los Angeles area into Category A because 

his air commander had recommended Category A zones around 220 

different installations that, when plotted on the map, almost blanketed 

the area anyway. For the same reason, General DeWitt believed he 

might have to put all of San Diego in Category A also.'8 He finally 

recommended the blanket Category A coverage of the two cities in a 

letter of 7 February, and five days later he recommended that almost 

all of the San Francisco Bay area be put in Category A. If all of General DeWitt's recommendations for Category A areas through 12 February had been accepted, it would have made necessary the evacuation 

of nearly 89,000 enemy aliens from areas along the Pacific coastonly 25,000 of whom would have been Japanese. 47 

It should be borne in mind that none of the enemy alien program 

recommendations submitted by General De Witt through 16 February 

included American citizens of Japanese or other extraction. The concentration of the Japanese population near strategic points seemed in 

itself to be sinister in 1942. Actually, there was a greater proportionate concentration of German and Italian aliens near strategic points 

than there was of Japanese. General DeWitt's Category A recommendations would have affected nine tenths of the west coast Ger46 Tel Conv, DeWitt with Bendetsen, 4 Feb 42, and DeWitt with Gullion and Bendetsen, 4 Feb 42, both in GHQ G-l file, Subversive Activities, WDC; Memo, CG WDC for 

PMG, 5 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. 

47 The statistics in this paragraph have been compiled from General DeWitt's several 

recommendations and supplementary communications that he wrote in justification of them, 

which are located in various Provost Marshal General files. 
142 COMMAND DECISIONS 

man alien population and nearly three fourths of the Italian aliens, 

but less than two thirds of the Japanese aliens. Of course General DeWitt after 3 February was also counting upon the California state authorities to persuade the citizen Japanese to evacuate California's urban 

areas and other sensitive points along the coast. 

In a letter to the Secretary of War on 9 February, Attorney General Biddle formally agreed to announce the Category A areas initially 

recommended for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington as prohibited to enemy aliens by 15 or 24 February-applying the latter date 

to those areas that had a considerable alien population. But Mr. Biddle 

questioned the necessity of forcibly excluding German and Italian aliens 

from all of these areas and wondered why whole cities had been included in Washington and Oregon and none in California. He added 

that if, as he had been informally advised, all of Los Angeles County 

was going to be recommended as a Category A area, the Department of 

Justice would have to step out of the picture because it did not have 

the physical means to carry out a mass evacuation of such scope. In 

conclusion, he stated that the Department of Justice was not authorized under any circumstances to evacuate American citizens; if the 

Army for reasons of military necessity wanted that done in particular 

areas, the Army itself would have to do it.48 

The Attorney General's stand led naturally to the drafting of a 

War Department memorandum summarizing the "questions to be determined re Japanese exclusion" that needed to be presented to President Roosevelt for decision. These questions were: 

(1) Is the President willing to authorize us to move Japanese citizens as 

well as aliens from restricted areas? 

(2) Should we undertake withdrawal from the entire strip DeWitt originally recommended, which involves a number of over 100,000 people, if we 

included both aliens and Japanese citizens? 

(3) Should we undertake the intermediate step involving, say, 70,000, 

which includes large communities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and 

Seattle? 

(4) Should we take any lesser step such as the establishment ofrestricted 

areas around airplane plants and critical installations, even though General 

De Witt states that in several, at least, of the large communities this would be 

wasteful, involve difficult administrative problems, and might be a source of 

more continuous irritation and trouble than 100 percent withdrawal from 

the area? 49 

48 Tel Conv, Col Bryan with Bendetsen, 11 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs 

(Bendetsen, Feb/Mar 42). 

49 Memo for Record (unsigned), 11 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC. The figures given 

in (2) and (3) are about equal to the Japanese population that these steps would affect. 

It therefore appears that the memorandum did not contemplate a mass evacuation of German or Italian aliens. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 143 

In the early afternoon on 11 February Mr. McCloy accompanied Mr. 

Stimson to the White House, where they obtained answers to the four 

questions. The President told the War Department secretaries to go 

ahead and do anything they thought necessary under the circumstances. 

"We have carte blanche to do what we want to as far as the President's 

concerned," Mr. McCloy informed Colonel Bendetsen immediately 

after the White House conference. The President specifically authorized the evacuation of citizens. In doing so he observed that there probably would be some repercussions to such action, but said that what 

was to be done had to be dictated by the military necessity of the 

situation. Mr. Roosevelt's only reported qualification was, "Be as reasonable as you can." Mr. McCloy also told Colonel Bendetsen that 

he thought the President was prepared to sign an executive order giving 

the War Department the authority to carry out whatever action it 

decided upon. 50 

The President's decisions gave an understandable impetus to the 

so-called final recommendation being prepared by General DeWitt, 

which with the assistance of Colonel Bendetsen he had begun to draft 

on the evening of 10 February. Completed as a formal memorandum 

for the Secretary of War on 13 February, it was forwarded with a covering memorandum to GHQ via air mail. 51 General DeWitt's new recommendations differed from those he had already submitted under the 

enemy alien control program in only one important particular: he recommended the enforced evacuation by federal authority of the American-born Japanese from the Category A areas already recommended 

by him in previous letters to the Secretary of War. 52 His memorandum reached GHQ at 5:00 P.M., 18 February. On 19 February it 

was decided at a GHQ staff conference not to concur in General DeWitt's recommendations, and instead to recommend to General Clark 

that only enemy alien leaders be arrested and interned. General 

Clark, being aware of developments in the War Department, must 

50 Tel Convs, McCloy with Bendetsen, 11 Feb 42, at 10:00 A.M. and 11:15 A.M. 

Pacific time (the White House conference occurring between the two calls), WDC-CAD 

311.3 Tel Convs (Bendetsen, Feb/Mar 42); Tel Cony, DeWitt and Bendetsen with Gullion, 11 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43). 

51 Memo, CG WDC for SW (through CG FF), 13 Feb 42, and covering Memo, CG 

WDC for CG FF GHQ, 14 Feb 42, originals in PMG 014.311 WDC. The basic memorandum is published in Final Report, pages 33-38, where it is erroneously dated 14 February. As of 11 February, General DeWitt was planning to have Colonel Bendetsen carry 

his recommendations back to Washington, but on 12 February, because of the general's 

doubt that GHQ and General Marshall had been "thoroughly informed" of developments, 

he decided to submit them through the normal channels of communication. Tel ConY, 

DeWitt with Clark, 12 Feb 42, and Gullion with Bendetsen, 14 Feb 42, both in WDCCAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43). 

52 The recommendations of the 13 February memorandum are described below at greater 

length in connection with the discussion of the War Department's directives of 20 February. 
144 COMMAND DECISIONS 

have realized the futility of a GHQ nonconcurrence. 53 On 20 February GHQ sent General DeWitt's memorandums to the War Department through normal channels, with an indorsement that they 

were being "transmitted in view of the proposed action already decided upon by the War Department." 54 They finally reached the 

Provost Marshal General's office "for remark and recommendation" 

on 24 February, the day after General DeWitt received new directives from the War Department that differed in many particulars 

from the recommendations he had submitted. 55 

In the meantime, on 13 February, the Pacific coast Congressional 

subcommittee on aliens and sabotage had adopted the following 

recommendations: 

We recommend the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed 

dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States from all strategic 

areas. 

In defining said strategic areas we recommend that such areas include 

all military installations, war industries, water and power installations, oil 

fields, and refineries, transportation and other essential facilities as well as 

adequate protective areas adjacent thereto. 

We further recommend that such areas be enlarged as expeditiously as 

possible until they shall encompass the entire strategic area of the states of 

California, Oregon and Washington, and Territory of Alaska. 

These recommendations were forwarded to President Roosevelt with 

a covering letter of the same date signed on behalf of the entire west 

coast Congressional delegation. 56 On 16 February the President sent 

the letter and its inclosed recommendations to Secretary Stimson, with 

a memorandum that read: "Will you please be good enough to reply 

to Congressman Lea in regard to the enclosed letter." 57 

On the same day, 16 February, Colonel Bendetsen boarded an airplane in San Francisco, reaching the War Department's offices in 

.;:l Both the original and the carbon of General De Witt's recommendations in AG 014.311 

(1-13-41), Sec. 10, are stamped to indicate receipt in GHQ on the date and at the hour 

indicated. As Colonel Bendetsen said on 19 February, the DeWitt recommendations "must 

have hit the wrong airline." Tel Conv, Bendetsen with Donald A. Stroh, 19 Feb 42, PMG 

384.4 WDC. The GHQ action is recorded in GHQ 337 Staff Confs Binder 2, entry of 

19 Feb 42; and in Memo, G-5 Sec GHQ for Clark, 19 Feb 42, GHQfile, WDC: Enemy 

Aliens. 

54 1st Ind, GHQ for TAG, 20 Feb 42, on Memo, CG WDC for CG FF, 14 Feb 42, 

GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens. 

"2d Ind, TAG for PMG, 22 Feb 42, on Memo, CG WDC for CG FF, 14 Feb 42, 

PMG 014.311 WDC. (Stamped RECEIVED IN PMG, 11:00 A.M. 24 Feb 42.) 

56 Recommendations inclosed in Ltr, Senator Holman, Senator Wallgren, Representative Lea, et at., to President Roosevelt, 13 Feb 42, AG 014.311 (2-16-42). 

57 Memo, President Roosevelt for SW, 16 Feb 42, AG 014.311 (2-16-42), received in 

Secretary's office at 9: 11 A.M., 17 Feb 42. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 145 

Washington about noon on 17 February.58 Before his arrival, the 

Provost Marshal General's office initiated a telegraphic survey among 

the corps area commanders with the following message: 

Probable that orders for very large evacuation of enemy aliens of all 

nationalities predominantly Japanese from Pacific Coast will issue within 

48 hours. Internment facilities will be taxed to utmost. Report at once maximum you can care for, including housing, feeding, medical care, and supply. Your breakdown should include number of men, women, and-children. 

Very important to keep this a closely guarded secret. 59 

A follow-up letter explained that 100,000 enemy aliens would be involved, 60,000 of whom would be women and children, and that all 

were to be interned east of the Western Defense Command, "50 percent in the Eighth Corps Area, 30 percent in the Seventh, and 10 

percent each in the Fourth and Sixth." 60 There were three reasons 

for the intention (as of 17 February) of removing the Pacific coast 

Japanese to areas east of the Western Defense Command. Since midDecember General DeWitt had insisted that internment of enemy aliens 

ought to be outside his theater of operations; some of the governments 

of the intermountain states had already indicated that they would not 

countenance any free settlement of the west coast Japanese within their 

borders; and, lastly, an Army survey of existing facilities for internment 

in the five interior states of the Ninth Corps Area disclosed that they 

could not accommodate more than 2,500 people. 

The final steps toward a decision on the evacuation of the west 

coast Japanese began on 17 February with another conference between Secretary Stimson and President Roosevelt. Thereafter, Mr. 

ox Tel Conv, DeWitt with Gullion, 17 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC. In the Final Report, it is stated (page 25): 

"The War Department representative [Colonel Bendetsen] carried back to the Secretary 

the recommendation of the Commanding General that some method be developed empowering the Federal Government to provide for the evacuation from sensitive areas of 

all persons of Japanese ancestry, and any other persons individually or collectively regarded as potentially dangerous. The Commanding General's proposal was reduced to writing 

in a memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated February 14, 1942 .... This recommendation was presented to the Secretary of War on or about February 16th." 

The author has not found any other evidence that General Dc Witt's recommendations 

in this memorandum were considered or referred to in the preparation of new War Department directives on the subject between 17 and 20 February. After these directives 

were drafted and after talking with General De Witt on 20 February, Colonel Bendetsen 

wrote to the Secretary of War: "It was I who misunderstood General DeWitt's plan.-he 

has no mass movement in mind." Memo, Bendetsen for SW, 21 Feb 42, and atchd transcript of Tel Conv, DeWitt with Bendetsen, 20 Feb 42, in SW file, Aliens . 

. ',,, Memo, PMG for TAG, 17 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. This copy bears the notation: "Gen Gullion took this up in person with Mr. McCloy who approves." 

00 Ltr, TAG to CGs Corps Areas, 17 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. The reference to all 

Japanese residents as aliens was rather frequent practice in Army exchanges on the subject during February 1942. 
146 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Stimson met in the afternoon with Mr. McCloy, General Clark, General Gullion, and Colonel Bendetsen. General Clark protested that a 

mass evacuation would involve the use of too many troops. Mr. 

Stimson again expressed his dislike of mass evacuation. But finally the 

Secretary decided that General De Witt should be instructed to commence an evacuation immediately and to the extent he deemed necessary for the protection of vital installations. At the conclusion of this 

meeting, General Clark consulted his GHQ chief, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. 

McNair, who decided that General DeWitt should not be allotted any 

additional troops for evacuation purposes. 61 

On the evening of 17 February, McCloy, Gullion, and Bendetsen 

met with Justice representatives at the home of Attorney General Biddle. After some preliminary discussion, General Gullion pulled from his 

pocket and proceeded to read the draft of a proposed Presidential executive order that would authorize the Secretary of War to remove both 

citizens and aliens from areas that he might designate. Mr. Biddle accepted the draft without further argument, because the President had 

already indicated to him that this was a matter for military decision. 

After several more meetings between Justice and War Department officials during the next two days, the executive order was presented to 

the President and signed by him late on 19 February.62 Between 18 and 

20 February Mr. McCloy, General Gullion, and Colonel Bendetsen 

drafted the instructions for General 'DeWitt to guide his execution of 

the evacuation plan, and embodied them in two letter directives, 

both dated 20 February. These directives and a copy of Executive 

Order 9066 reached General DeWitt on 23 February.63 

On 21 February the Secretary of War, in accordance with the 

President's request, answered the Congressional letter of 13 February 

by assuring the west coast delegation that plans for the partial or complete evacuation of the Japanese from the Pacific coast were being 

61 Memo for Record, Gen Clark, 17 Feb 42, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens. General 

Clark also told General Marshall about the meeting and the decision about troops, but 

the author has been unable to find any evidence in Army records that the advice of the 

Chief of Staff was sought in the formulation of the War Department plan for Japanese 

evacuation. 

62 Memo, PMG for CofS, 20 Feb 42, OCS 21227-113; Ltr, Mr. Biddle to the author, 

31 Aug 56. See also Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, pp. 266-67, and tenBroek et al., Prejudice, War, and the Constitution, pp. 111-12. 

63 Ltrs, SW to CG WDC, 20 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC; Notes on Conf in ODCofS, 

20 Feb 42, OCS Conf Binder 32. The longer of the letters became the Outline Memorandum published in part in Final Report, pages 28-29, and attached to a letter from the 

Assistant Secretary of War to General DeWitt, 20 February 1942, page 27 of the report. 

Executive Order 9066, 19 February 1942, and the shorter Secretary of War letter of 20 

February 1942 are also published in Final Report, pages 25-27. The letters were apparently hand-carried by Colonel Bendetsen to San Francisco when he flew there on 22 February. 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 147 

formulated. G4 In consultation with the Department of Justice. War 

Department officials at this time also prepared a draft of legislation 

that would put teeth into the enforcement of the new evacuation program, but did not submit it to Congress until 9 March. This draft as 

a bill became Public Law 503 after brief debate; it was passed by a 

voice vote in both houses on 19 March and signed by the President 

on 21 March. Three days later, the Western Defense Command issued its first compulsory exclusion order. 65 

As already noted, the plan for evacuation presented in the War 

Department's directives of 20 February differed materially from the 

plan recommended by General DeWitt in his memorandum of 13 

February.fiG The central objective of the DeWitt plan was to move all 

enemy aliens and American-born Japanese out of all Category A areas 

in California, Oregon, and Washington that the general had recommended through 12 February. Although General DeWitt had repeatedly described the Japanese as the most dangerous element of the west 

coast population, he also made it clear as late as 17 February that 

he was "opposed to any preferential treatment to any alien irrespective of race," and therefore that he wanted German and Italian aliens 

as well as all Japanese evacuated from Category A areas. 67 His plan 

assumed that all enemy aliens would be interned under guard outside the Western Defense Command, at least until arrangements could 

be made for their resettlement. Citizen evacuees would either accept internment voluntarily, or relocate themselves with such assistance as 

state and federal agencies might offer. Although this group would be 

permitted to resettle in Category B areas within the coastal zone, General De Witt clearly preferred that they move inland. The central objective of the War Department plan was to move all Japanese out of 

the California Category A areas first, and they were not to be permitted 

to resettle within Category B areas or within a larger Military Area No. 

1 to be established along the coast. 68 There was to be no evacuation of 

Italians without the express permission of the Secretary of War except 

on an individual basis. Although the War Department plan ostensibly 

64 Ltr, SW to Representative Lea, 21 Feb 42, AG 014.311 (2-16-42). 

65 Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, pp. 331-39; Final Report, pp. 29-31, 49. On the legal 

aspects and consequences of the Presidential and Congressional decisions, see Clinton Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951), 

pages 42-54. 

fifi The analysis that follows, unless otherwise noted, is based on the original of the 

De Witt memorandum in PMG 014.311 WDC, and the copies of the WD directives in 

AG 014.311 (1-13-41), Sec. 1. 

fi7Tel Conv, DeWitt with Gullion, 17 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC. 

fiR The central objective of the War Department plan is clearly outlined in paragraphs 

1-6 of the Outline Memorandum of 20 February, paragraphs omitted in the publication 

of the memorandum in Final Report, pp. 28-29. 
148 COMMAND DECISIONS 

provided that German aliens were to be treated in the same manner as 

the Japanese, it qualified this intention by providing for the exemption 

of bone fide German refugees. This qualification automatically stayed 

the evacuation of German aliens until General De Witt could discover 

who among them were genuine refugees. The War Department plan 

contemplated voluntary relocation of all types of evacuees to the maximum extent possible, with internment as necessary outside the Western 

Defense Command. Another major difference between the two plans 

was related to General DeWitt's recommendation of a licensing system 

for Category A areas; the President's executive order of 19 February 

did not require the application of the licensing plan, and licensing 

was not embodied in the War Department's directives of 20 February. 

There were other lesser differences between the two plans. General 

DeWitt had recommended that before any evacuation all preparations 

should be complete, including the "selection and establishment of internment facilities in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas." As 

already noted, the War Department at this time was also planning 

to put all internees east of the Ninth Corps Area, but its directives 

did not contemplate postponement of evacuation until internment facilities were ready. General DeWitt had also recommended the initial and separate internment of all enemy alien males over fourteen 

years of age until family units could be established in internment 

camps. The War Department plan had no such provision. As for the 

number of people to be involved, General DeWitt's memorandum contained an estimate that 133,000 people would have to be evacuated 

either voluntarily or by compulsion. A breakdown of the figure (based 

on his previous Category A recommendations) discloses that his plan 

would have involved about 69,000 Japanese (25,000 aliens and 44,000 

American citizens), about 44,000 Italians, and about 20,000 Germans. 

The War Department planners apparently made no estimate of the 

numbers that their directives would involve, but eventually they did 

involve more than 110,000 Japanese residents-citizens and aliensof the Pacific coast states. 

Nearly three years later, in December 1944, the Supreme Court 

upheld the constitutionality of mass evacuation, in the test case of 

Korematsu v. United States. Its decision, rendered in the midst of war, 

also had to be made without access to many pertinent records. The 

Court concluded: 

Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the 

Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared 

an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security 

measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West 
EVACUATING JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST 149 

Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in 

this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined 

that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need 

for action was great, and time was short. We cannot-by availing ourselves 

of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say that these actions were 

unj ustified. 69 

Would the Court's conclusion have been the same in the light of 

present knowledge? Considering the evidence now available, the reasonable deductions seem to be that General DeWitt's recommendation of 13 February 1942 was not used in drafting the War Department directives of 20 February for a mass evacuation of the Japanese 

people, and that the only responsible commander who backed the 

War Department's plan as a measure required by military necessity 

was the President himself, as Commander in Chief. 

69 323 United States Reports, pp. 223-24. 

6 

The Decision To Withdraw to Bataan 

by 

Louis Morton 

On 23 December 1941, only two weeks after the attack on Pearl 

Harbor, General MacArthur-then commanding American forces in 

the Philippines-made one of the most difficult and important decisions of his long and famous military career. Under the threat of impending disaster, he determined on that day to withdraw his forces 

on Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula, to declare the Philippine capital, 

Manila, an open city, and to transfer his headquarters to the tiny island of Corregidor. The successful execution of this plan had farreaching results: it saved the 75,000 troops on Luzon from immediate 

defeat, delayed the Japanese timetable for conquest by four months, 

and kept large Japanese combat forces tied up in the Philippines long 

after Malaya, Singapore, and the Indies had fallen. It is not the purpose of this essay to describe the masterly skill with which the elaborate maneuver-a double retrograde movement-was accomplished. 

Rather it is to examine the background and circumstances leading 

to the critical decision to withdraw to Bataan. 

The war in the Philippines had begun on 8 December with a disastrous air attack against Clark Field, an attack which destroyed half 

the heavy bombers of MacArthur's Far East Air Force. In the tragic 

two weeks that followed, the Japanese continued to achieve astounding 

successes. During the first few days of the war, they made three preliminary landings on Luzon to secure airfields and to support the main 

landings to come. On the 22d they made their main assaults, putting 

the bulk of Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma's 14th Army ashore at Lingayen Gulf, about 135 miles north of Manila. By 23 December the 

Japanese not only had landed a large number of troops north of the 

capital but had achieved aerial and naval supremacy in the Philippines and had isolated the archipelago from Australia to the south 

Biographical sketch of author, p. 11. 
152 COMMAND DECISIONS 

and from Hawaii and the United States to the east. 1 It was in these 

circumstances that MacArthur made his decision to withdraw to 

Bataan. 

War Plan ORANGE 

Plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands had been in existence for many years when General MacArthur returned to active duty. 

The latest revision of these plans, completed in April 1941 and called 

WPO-3, was based on the joint Army-Navy ORANGE plan of 1938, 

one of the many "color" plans developed during the prewar years. 

Each color plan dealt with a different situation, ORANGE covering an 

emergency in which only the United States and Japan would be invol ved. In this sense, the plan was politically unrealistic and completely outdated by 1941. Tactically, however, the plan was an excellent one and its provisions for defense were applicable under any 

local situation. 2 

Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but 

in Central Luzon. (See Map 4.) The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops, had the main task 

of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat 

those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these 

attempts, the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force 

was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay. The Americans were to 

make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to 

the control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the "last extremity." 

In addition to the regular U.S. Army troops, the defenders could 

rely on the military forces of the Commonwealth, the Philippine Army, 

which had been organized and trained by General MacArthur. If 

used as anticipated in WPO-3, the Philippine Army would be under 

the command of the Department Commander, a U.S. Army officer, 

and would be utilized to defend Manila Bay. The plan did not contemplate using Philippine Army troops for the defense of the entire 

archipelago. 

1 For a full account of the campaign, see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philzppines, in 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953). The account that 

follows is based upon this volume and includes material taken from it. 

2 Unless otherwise noted, this description is based on the Philippine Department Plan 

ORANGE, 1940 Revision (short title: HPD WPO-3), AGO No. 326. The author has also 

had the benefit of conversations with the former Philippine Department Com mander. 

Maj. Gen. George Grunert, MacArthur's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. R. K. Sutherland, his 

deputy chief of staff, Maj. Gen. R. J. Marshall, and various division commanders and 

staff officers who participated in the planning and execution of the plan. 
MAP 4 
154 COMMAND DECISIONS 

WPO-3 divided Luzon, the principal theater of operations, into 

six sectors and provided a mobile reserve. Detailed plans for the defen~e of each sector were made by the sector commanders. The commander of the Philippine Division, the only U.S. Army division in 

the Philippines, in addition to conducting operations in the sector or 

sectors assigned to him, was to organize the defenses of Bataan and 

to command operations there if necessary. 

The supply plan in WPO-3 was a complicated one. Provision had 

to be made to supply the six sectors during the initial phase of operations, to withdraw supplies into Bataan, and to establish there a 

supply base capable of supporting defensive operations by a force of 

31,000 men for a period of six months. The supplies required for this 

purpose were designated the defense reserves, and except for ammunition most of these had already reached the Philippines. Some were 

already on Bataan, but the greatest portion by far was stored in the 

Manila area, which was as yet without adequate protection from air 

attack. Since these supplies would have to be moved to Corregidor 

and Bataan in the event of war, WPO-3 stipulated that the FilipinoAmerican defenders would fight a delaying action to keep the roads 

open long enough to carry out this phase of the operation. 

Nothing was said in WPO-3 about what was to happen after the 

defenses on Bataan crumbled. Presumably by that time, estimated at 

six months, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have fought its way across the 

Pacific, won a victory over the Combined Fleet, and made secure the line 

of communications. The men and supplies collected on the west coast 

during that time would then begin to reach the Philippines in a steady 

stream. The Philippine garrison, thus reinforced, could then counterattack and drive the enemy into the sea. 

. Actually, no one in a position of authority at that time (April 1941) 

believed that anything like this would happen. Informed naval opinion 

estimated that it would require at least two years for the Pacific Fleet 

to fight its way across the Pacific. There was no plan to concentrate on 

the west coast and no schedule for the movement of men and supplies 

to the Philippines. Army planners in early 1941 believed that at the 

end of six months, if not sooner, supplies would be exhausted and the 

garrison would go down in defeat. WPO-3 did not say this; instead it 

said nothing at all. And everyone hoped that when the time came 

something could be done, some plan improvised to relieve or rescue 

the men stranded 7,000 miles across the Pacific. 

MacArthur's Plan 

General MacArthur had the answer to those who saw no way out 

of the difficulty in the Philippines: transform WPO-3, which he re-
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN 155 

garded as defeatist and defensive, into an aggressive plan whose object would be the defeat of any enemy that attempted the conquest 

of the Philippines. An optimist by nature, with implicit faith in the 

Philippine people, MacArthur was able to inspire the confidence and 

loyalty of his associates and staff. His optimism was contagious and 

infected the highest officials in the War Department and the government. By the fall of 1941 there was a firm conviction in Washington 

and in the Philippines that, given sufficient time, the defenders could 

successfully resist a Japanese attack. 

In pressing for a more aggressive plan, enlarged in scope to include 

the entire archipelago, MacArthur could rely on having a far stronger 

force than any of his predecessors had had. His growing air force included by the end of November 1941 thirty-five B-17's and almost a 

hundred fighters of the latest type. Many more were on their way. The 

performance of the heavy bombers in early 1941 justified the hope that 

the South China Sea would be successfully blockaded by air and that 

the islands could be made a "self-sustaining fortress." 3 

MacArthur could also count on the Philippine Army's one regular and ten reserve divisions, inducted into the service of the United 

States by executive order on the same day he was called back to active duty. During his term as Military Advisor, he had worked out 

the general concept of his strategy as well as detailed plans for the 

use of this national army. As commander of U.S. Army Forces in the 

Far East (USAFFE) he could plan on the use of the regular U.S. Army 

garrison as well as the Philippine Army. He was in an excellent position, therefore, to persuade the War Department to approve his own 

concept for the defense of the Philippines. 

Almost from the date that he was recalled to active duty in the 

Philippines, on 26 July 1941, MacArthur began to think about replacing WPO-3 with a new plan.' From the first, he apparently intended to defend the Inland Seas and the entrances to Manila and 

Subic Bays, and by September his plans had progressed so far that 

he informed Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright of his intention to 

reorganize the forces in the Philippines and to give that officer his 

choice of commands. 5 

The opportunity to request a change in plans for the defense of 

the Philippines came in October, after MacArthur received a copy of 

3 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New 

York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 388. 

"Interv with Col Legrande A. Diller, formerly aide to General MacArthur, 20 May 

49. Wainwright mentions also that as Philippine Division commander he worked during 

May, june, and july 1941 to secure revisions of WPO-3. Sec General jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwn~t;ht's Story, the Account oj Four Years oj Humiliating DeJeat, Surrender, 

and Captz'vity (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), p. 10. 

"Wainwright, General Wainwrlght's Story, p. 21. 
156 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the new war plan, RAINBOW 5, prepared by the Joint Board some 

months earlier. This plan, which was world-wide in its provisions and 

conformed to arrangements with the British staff, called for a defensive strategy in the Pacific and Far East and recognized Germany as 

the main enemy in the event of a war with the Axis. Based on the 

assumption that the United States would be at war with more than 

one nation and would be allied with Great Britain, RAINBOW accepted 

implicitly the loss of the Philippines, Wake, and Guam. Like ORANGE, 

it assigned Army and Navy forces in the Philippines the mission of 

defending the Philippine Coastal Frontier, defined as those land and 

sea areas which it would be necessary to hold in order to defend 

Manila and Subic Bays. Also, as in ORANGE, the defense was to be 

conducted entirely by Army and Navy forces already in the Philippines, augmented by such local forces as were available. 6 No reinforcements could be expected. 

MacArthur immediately objected to those provisions of RAINBOW 

relating to the Philippines and called for the revision of the plan on 

the ground that it failed to recognize either the creation of a high 

command for the Far East or the mobilization of the Philippine Army. 

In a strong letter to the War Department on 1 October, the former 

Chief of Staff pointed out that he would soon have a force of approximately 200,000 men organized into eleven divisions with corresponding air force, corps, and army troops. There could be no adequate 

defense of Manila Bay or of Luzon, he said, if an enemy were to be 

allowed to land and secure control of any of the southern islands. 

With the "wide scope of possible enemy operations, especially aviation," he thought such landings possible. He urged, therefore, that the 

"citadel type defense" of Manila Bay provided in the ORANGE and 

RAINBOW plans be changed to an active defense of all the islands in 

the Philippines. "The strength and composition of the defense forces 

projected here," General MacArthur asserted, "are believed to be 

sufficient to accomplish such a mission." 7 

The reply from Washington came promptly. On the 18th, General George C. Marshall prepared a memorandum for MacArthur 

informing him that a revision of the Army mission had been drafted 

in the War Department and was then awaiting action by the Joint 

Board, "with approval expected within the next ten days." The recommendation to redefine the Philippine Coastal Frontier to include 

6 Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan RAINBOW 5, Joint Board No. 325, Serial 642-5, 

OPD Reg. Docs. 

7 Ltr, MacArthur to TAG, 1 Oct 41, sub: Operations Plan R-5, WPD 4178-18. MacArthur repeated the same request, in virtually the same language, in a personal letter to 

Marshall on 28 October 1941, WPD 4477-2. 
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN 157 

all the islands in the archipelago would also be presented to the Joint 

Board for approval. The assignment of a broader mission than that 

contained in RAINBOW, Marshall explained, was made possible because 

of the increased importance of the Philippines "as a result of the 

alignment of Japan with the Axis, followed by the outbreak of war 

between Germany and Russia." 8 

With this notice that his plans would soon be approved by the 

Joint Board MacArthur immediately organized his forces to execute 

the larger mission. On 4 November he formally established the North 

and South Luzon Forces and the Visayan-Mindanao Force, all of 

ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES, USAFFE, 3 DECEMBER 1941 

Troop Assignment 

Sector 

U.S. Army I Philippine Army 

I 

North Luzon Force ________ 26th Cavalry (U.S.) 11 th Division 

One bn, 45th lnf (PS) 21st Division 

Brty A, 23d FA (PK) (PS) 31st Division 

Btrys Band C, 86th FA (PS) 71st Division (used as di66th QM Troop (PK) (PS) rected by USAFFE) 

Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.) 

South Luzon Force _________ Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.) 41st Division 

Hq and Hq Btry, Btry A, 86th FA 51st Division 

(PS) 

Visayan-Mindanao Force ___ Force Hq and'Hq Co (PS) 61st Division 

81st Division 

WIst Division 

Reserve Forct _____________ Philippine Division (less 1 bn) 91st Division 

86th FA (PS) less dets Hq, Philippine Army 

Hq, Philippine Dept 

Far East Air Force 

Harbor Defense ____________ Headquarters 

69th CA (U.S.) 

60th CA (AA) (U.S.) 

91st CA (PS) 

192' CA (PS) 200th CA (AA) (U.S.), assigned to 

PCAC 

Sou",: Ltr Orders. CG USAFFE to CG NLF, SLF, V-MF, 3 Dec 41, AG 381 Phil Records (12-3-41); USAFFEUSFIP Rpt of Opus, pp. 17-18. 

8 Memo, Marshall for MacArthur, 18 Oct 41, sub: U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, 

WPD 4175-18. 
158 COMMAND DECISIONS 

which had actually been in existence for several months already.9 A 

month later, on 3 December, he issued the orders defining the missions of these and his other principal tactical commands. (See accompanying table.) The North Luzon Force, which had been under the 

command of Brig. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr., from 3 to 28 November, now came under General Wainwright. This force had responsibility for the most critical sector in the Philippines, including part of 

the central plains area, Lingayen Gulf, the Zambales coast, and the 

Bataan Peninsula. General Wainwright was instructed to protect airfields and prevent hostile landings in his area, particularly at those 

points opening into the central plains and the road net leading to 

Manila. In case of a successful landing the enemy was to be destroyed. 

In contrast to WPO-3, which provided for a withdrawal to Bataan, 

MacArthur's plan stated there was to be "no withdrawal from beach 

positions." The beaches were to "be held at all costs." 10 

The South Luzon Force under Brig. Gen. George M. Parker, Jr., 

was assigned the area generally south and east of Manila. Like the 

force to the north, it was to protect the airfields in its sector and prevent hostile landings. General Parker was also enjoined to hold the 

beaches at all costs. The South Luzon Force was much smaller than 

that in the north. It consisted initially of only two Philippine Army 

divisions, the 41st and 51st, and a battery of field artillery. Additional 

units were to be assigned at a later date when they became available.ll 

On Luzon, between the North and South Luzon Forces was the 

Reserve Area, including the city of Manila and the heavily congested 

area just to the north. This area was directly under the control of 

MacArthur's headquarters and contained the Philippine Division (less 

one battalion), the 71st and gIst Divisions (PA), the 86th Field Artillery CPS), the Far East Air Force, and the headquarters of the Philippine Department and the Philippine Army. The defense of the entrance to Manila and Subic Bays was left, as it always had been, to 

Maj. Gen. George F. Moore's Harbor Defense augmented by the 

Philippine Coast Artillery Command." 2 

aWPO-3 Is in Effect" 

When the Japanese made their first landings on 10 and 12 December at the northern and southern extremities of Luzon, General 

"USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 15, copy in OCMH. 

,0 Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG North Luzon Force, 3 Dec 41, sub: Defense of the 

Philippines, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Records. 

11 Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG South Luzon Force, 3 Dec 41, sub: Defense of the 

Philippines, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Records. 

"USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 17-18; Ltr Orders, CG USAFFE to CG Philippine Division, 6 Dec 41, sub: Movement Plans. 
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW T O BATAAN 159 

MacArthur made no disposition to contest them. He correctl y surmised 

that these landings were designed to secure advance a ir bases and 

th a t the Japanese had no intention of driving on Manila from any of 

th ese beachheads. H e did not regard the situation as serious enough 

to wa rra nt a cha nge in his plan to oppose the ma in attack, when it 

ca me, with an a ll-out defense a t the bea ches. The MacArthur Plan, 

then, remained in effect. 13 

Whether th e J a panese la ndings represented the ma in a ttack or 

not, General M acArthur had to consider seriously the prospect of an 

eventual withdrawa l to Ba taa n a nd the evacuation of Manila . To 

prepare the President of the Commonwea lth, Manuel L. Quezon, for 

the worst, he sent word to him on the mornin g of the 12th to be ready 

to move to Corregidor on four hours' noti ce. ( See M ap 5.) Shocked and 

wholl y unprepared for this ((startling message," Quezon arranged a 

co nference with M acArthur that night a t the M a nil a Hotel. At the 

meeting, MacArthur explained that there was no immediate cause 

ror concern, and that he was onl y "preparing ror the worst in case 

the J a pa nese should land in great force at different pl aces." In such 

eve nt, it wo uld be unwise, he told Quezon, to have his forces scattcred. He intended to concentrate his army on Bataan, and to move 

MAP; 

1\ For an account of these t"a rl y landings. S(,l' Morlon. Fall oflh~ Ph,hppmfS, pp. 98-1 15. 
160 COMMAND DECISIONS 

his headquarters, together with the High Commissioner and the Commonwealth Government, to Corregidor and declare Manila an open 

city. "Do you mean, General," asked Quezon, "that tomorrow you 

will declare Manila an open city and that some time during the day 

we shall have to go to Corregidor?" MacArthur's answer was an 

emphatic "No." He did not seem to be certain that the move would 

even be necessary, and was evidently only preparing the President for 

such a possibility. The meeting closed with Quezon's promise to consider the matter further. Later he consented, with reluctance, to move 

to Corregidor if necessary.'4 

The possibility of a withdrawal seems to have been in the minds 

of other officers in MacArthur's headquarters before the main Japanese landings. During an inspection of the 21 st Field Artillery (PA) 

position along Lingayen Gulf, Col. Constant L. Irwin, MacArthur's 

G-3, showed little interest in the tactical placement of the guns. 

Instead, wrote Col. Richard C. Mallonee, the regimental instructor, 

Colonel Irwin showed a great deal of interest in the location of the 

ammunition and supply routes, selected to conform with the mission 

of holding at the beaches. "He took a look at our ammunition disposition and the dangerous supply routes," declared Mallonee, "and 

very violently announced that it would be impossible to withdraw the 

ammunition in time to save it, and by God, he would crucify anyone 

who lost so much as one round." 15 This was the first time, remarked 

Mallonee that he heard the word "withdraw." He explained to Colonel Irwin that his orders were to hold at all costs, and repeated Wainwright's order to the troops of the North Luzon Force that "we must 

die in our tracks, falling not backward but forward toward the enemy." 

The answer of the G-3 officer was "Don't believe everything you 

hear." 16 

The chief of staff of the 21 st Division (P A), the senior instructor 

of the division, and Colonel Mallonee were all now thoroughly confused about the mission, and after a conference decided to request 

clarification from General Wainwright's headquarters. They were told 

that the mission was still to hold at all costs, "but by the manner in 

which it was issued it was evident that there is considerable doubt in 

the minds of the North Luzon Force command as to whether the mission is actually as given." 17 

14 Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1946). pp. 

194-98. Present at the meeting also were Col. Manuel Nieto, the President's aide, and Lt. 

Col. Sidney L. Huff, MacArthur's aide. 

15 Col Richard C. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 56, copy in OCMH. 

16 Ibid. The conversation between Irwin and Mallonee took place in the presence of 

the senior American instructor and chief of staff of the 21st Division (PA) and several 

other officers. Ltr, Col R. M. O'Day to author, 16 Nov 49, OCMH. 

17 Ibid., p. 57. 
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN 161 

If any doubts existed they were quickly dispelled when the main 

force of General Homma's 14th Army came ashore at Lingayen Gulf 

on the morning of 22 December. The two Philippine Army divisions 

guarding the 120-mile Lingayen coast lin:e immediately took such 

action as they could to meet the invasion, while Wainwright quickly 

dispatched the 26th Cavalry of Philippine Scouts to hold the road 

leading from the beaches into the central Luzon plain. And from 

MacArthur's reserve came a tank battalion and twelve 75-mm. guns 

on self-propelled mounts. Clearly, there was no question about the 

determination to resist the enemy at the beaches. But performance 

fell far short of plans, and the Japanese succeeded that morning in 

landing three infantry regiments with supporting artillery and tanks. 

While these troops fanned out to the east and south, the rest of the 

14th Army continued to come ashore. By the end of the day, the Japanese had secured most of their objectives and were in position to 

debouch onto the central plain. 

Fighting on the 22d had been confused and indecisive. The stiffest 

resistance put up by the Scouts of the 26th Cavalry could not prevent the Japanese from moving south. The defiles leading east from 

the narrow beaches had fallen and the road to Baguio, the Philippine 

summer capital, lay open. With the mountains to their rear, and 

Japanese troops in front and north of them, the defenders had little 

choice but to retreat south. "My right [north] hand in a vise," the 

American commander told MacArthur before he left the Philippine 

summer capital to the Japanese, "my nose in an inverted funnel, constipated my bowels, open my south paw." 18 

The performance of the untrained and poorly equipped Philippine 

Army troops was the clearest sign of disaster. At the first appearance 

of the enemy, they had broken and fled to the rear in a disorganized 

stream. When stopped, they always had the same story to tell-how 

they were subjected to heavy mortar and artillery fire, bombed and 

strafed by enemy planes, threatened by hostile tanks usually headed 

straight for them, deserted by their officers, and left all alone to meet 

the oncoming Japanese. Always they had stood their ground bravely, 

continued to fire their rifles, and only fallen back under the greatest 

necessity. Often, they claimed to have been captured and then to 

have escaped. Now they were tired, hungry, and filled with a consuming desire to be transferred to the motor transport service where 

they could serve their country by driving a truck. 19 

18 Rad, Lt Col John P. Horan to MacArthur, 24 Dec 41, AG 370.2 (19 Dec 41), Phil 

Records. 

19 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 62-63. See also Col James V. Collier, Notebooks, II, 35-

38, copy in OCMH. 
162 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The action of the 23d was critical. In the American line that 

morning was the 71st Division CPA) astride the critical Route 3 leading south. To its left was the 11 th Division CPA), and along the southern coast of Lingayen Gulf was the 21st. The 26th Cavalry was under 

orders to fall back to reorganize, and a combat team of the 91st 

Division CPA), attached to North Luzon Force from USAFFE reserve, 

was speeding north to reinforce the 71st Division. 

The Japanese made their main effort along Route 3, where they 

soon made contact with the 71st Division. At this point the Japanese 

attack stalled, largely because of the action of the division artillery. 

Later, when Japanese planes and tanks entered the action, the Filipino infantry broke and fled, leaving the artillery uncovered. The line 

might have held if the 91st Combat Team had arrived in time, but 

at this critical moment it was far from the scene of combat. 

The situation was serious. A meeting of the American commanders 

was hastily called and a revised plan adopted. The 71st Division was 

to establish a new line about five miles to the south, astride Route 3, 

where it would be reinforced by the 91st Combat Team when and if 

that unit arrived. The 26th Cavalry would set up an outpost line to 

the rear through which the troops could fall back if necessary. 

It was now evident to General Wainwright that he could no longer 

hold back the Japanese flood. His only hope lay in retiring behind 

the Agno River, which curved in a huge arc from the southern shore 

of Lingayen Gulf to the mountains on the east and constituted the 

first formidable obstacle in the path of the advancing Japanese. Late 

on the afternoon of the 23d, therefore, Wainwright telephoned General MacArthur's headquarters in Manila and requested permission 

to withdraw behind the Agno River. Any further defense of the Linga yen beaches, he declared, was entirely "impracticable," but if 

MacArthur would sanction this withdrawal and release to him the 

Regular Army Philippine Division from USAFFE reserve, Wainwright 

promised to mount a counterattack. MacArthur readily granted Wainwright permission to withdraw to the Agno River, but would go no 

further. He wanted to know what plans Wainwright had made for a 

counterattack-he had none yet- and made it clear that his chances 

of getting the Philippine Division were very slight. It was on this note 

that the conversation ended. 20 

Wainwright's admission on the afternoon of the 23d that further 

defense of the beach was useless, and his request for permission to 

withdraw behind the Agno could have come as no surprise to General MacArthur. The possibility of a withdrawal had been considered 

20 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 35-36. 
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN 163 

from the start, but it was the withdrawal to Bataan not the Agno 

River that was in his mind. A withdrawal to the Agno, he must have 

decided by this time, would only halt the Japanese temporarily. And 

he could have placed but slight faith in the chances of a successful 

counterattack. Only on this basis is it possible to explain his lukewarm 

reaction to Wainwright's proposal for a counterattack and his refusal 

to release the crack Philippine Division, the one division in the islands 

that consisted entirely of Americans and Scouts. Thus, Wainwright's 

telephone call must simply have confirmed his belief that the time 

had come to withdraw to Bataan. 

Just when MacArthur made the decision to withdraw is not clear. 

We know that as early as the 12th he had alerted Quezon to this 

possibility. And, though he made no change in plans when the Japanese landed at Lingayen ten days later, his message to General Marshall on that date clearly indicated that he now believed he might 

have to withdraw quickly. He estimated that the Japanese force disembarking from seventy to eighty transports in Lingayen Gulf had a 

strength of 80,000 to 100,000 men, and reported that he had on 

Luzon only about 40,000 men. He anticipated that this "enormous 

tactical discrepancy" between the two forces would eventually compel 

him "to operate in delaying action on successive lines through the 

central Luzon plain to final defensive positions on Bataan." When 

forced to do so, he told the Chief of Staff, he would declare Manila 

an open city, and move his headquarters, together with the Commonwealth Government and the High Commissioner's office, to Corregidor, which, he said, "I intend to hold." General Marshall immediately 

replied that his proposed line of action was approved by the War 

Department, and that he was doing his utmost to send aid. Implied 

also was approval by President Roosevelt, who, Marshall said, had 

seen all of MacArthur's messages. 21 

We now know that the actual strength of the Japanese forces that 

came ashore in Lingayen Gulf was only 40,000, about half as large 

as MacArthur estimated it to be. On the other hand, the strength of 

the troops on Luzon under General MacArthur's command at this 

time was considerably higher than the 40,000 figure he gave to the 

Chief of Staff. Even without the Air Force, the number of American 

troops alone could not have been less than 20,000. In addition, there 

were 12,000 Philippine Scouts. To the total of 32,000 must be added 

the strength of seven Philippine Army reserve divisions and one regular division, as well as the constabulary, inducted into the service of 

the United States by this time. Even at half-strength, and many of 

21 Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No.3, 22 Dec 41, and Marshall to MacArthur, same 

date, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen), Far East. 
164 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the units were undoubtedly at two-thirds strength at least, the total 

number of troops on Luzon at this time could not have been less than 

65,000-70,000. 22 No evidence has come to hand that explains the discrepancy between the actual and reported strength of the forces on 

Luzon. 

The events at Lingayen Gulf on the 22d and 23d of December 

could scarcely have given General MacArthur any reason to alter the 

bleak picture he had painted for the Chief of Staff. Wainwright's 

request on the afternoon of the 23d was simply the culmination of a 

series of events that narrowed down the choices open to him. Now he 

had only two: either make a firm stand on the line of the Agno and 

give Wainwright his best unit, the Philippine Division, for a counterattack; or withdraw all the way to Bataan in planned stages. He 

decided on the latter, thus abandoning his own plan for defense and 

reverting to the old ORANGE plan. 

The reason for this decision is not difficult to discern, and it has 

nothing to do with the supposed numerical superiority of the Japanese 

landing force, as MacArthur had implied in his message to General 

Marshall. Rather it was the quality not the quantity of his troops 

that was responsible for the failure to halt the Japanese. Up to this 

time, General MacArthur seems to have had the greatest confidence 

in the fighting qualities of the Philippine Army reservists, and in the 

ability of his forces to hold the central Luzon plain. The events of 

the 22d and 23d forced a revision of this view. "General MacArthur, 

viewing the broken, fleeing North Luzon Force," wrote Col. James V. 

Collier, a G-3 officer on MacArthur's staff, "realized that his cherished 

plan of defeating an enemy attempt to advance toward Manila from the 

north was not now possible .... " 23 MacArthur never publicly acknowledged the poor performance of the Army he had done so much to organize and train, but it was noted by every American who served with 

the Philippine Army units and is the central fact that emerges from a 

study of the first days of the campaign. To this reason for the withdrawal must be added General MacArthur's desire to save the city of 

Manila from destruction. 

Having made his decision to withdraw to Bataan, MacArthur 

notified all force commanders on the night of 23 December that 

"WPO-3 is in effect." 24 Nothing more was required. WPO-3 was 

well known to all U.S. Army officers who had been in the Philippines 

six months or more. Under it, the Philippine Department headquar-

" For a breakdown of the forces in the Phili ppines on the eve of war see Morton Fall 

of the Philippines, pp. 48-50. ' , 

'" Collier Notebooks, II, 38. 

24 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 36. 
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN 165 

ters, after the experience of numerous maneuvers, had selected certain delaying positions along the central Luzon plain. These positions 

had been reconnoitered, and were considered fairly strong defensive 

lines along the route of withdrawal to Bataan. It only remained to 

issue written orders to supplement the announcement that WPO-3 

was in effect. 

The next morning, 24 December, at 1100, the USAFFE staff was 

called to a conference. Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland announced 

the decision and stated that the headquarters was to be moved to 

Corregidor that evening. By special order all officers in the headquarters, except those of high rank who had been promoted a few days 

earlier, were promoted one grade. To the War Department, General 

MacArthur sent news of his decision as well as the further information that the Japanese had landed at Atimonan and Mauban in 

southern Luzon that morning. 25 "Tonight," he told the Chief of Staff, 

"I plan to disengage my forces under cover of darkness. For the present, I am remaining in Manila, establishing an advanced headquarters 

on Corregidor." 26 

On the afternoon of 24 December, President Quezon and High 

Commissioner Francis B. Sayre, with their personal and official families, sailed to Corregidor. MacArthur's headquarters began to move 

that night, Christmas Eve. Next morning Headquarters USAFFE 

opened at Topside on Corregidor and MacArthur reported his new 

position to Washington. A rear echelon, headed by the deputy chief 

of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, remained behind in Manila 

to close out the headquarters and to supervise the shipment of supplies and the evacuation of the remaining troops. 27 

Effects if the Decision 

The decision to withdraw to Bataan altered completely the course 

of the campaign, and a new plan based on ORANGE was quickly 

devised. General Wainwright's new orders directed him to withdraw 

slowly, holding the Japanese until 8 January north of the key city of 

San Fernando, where the main highway leading into the Bataan 

Peninsula began. That done, he would withdraw into Bataan. The 

two-week delay was designed to allow time for the movement of sup25 Rad, CG USAFFE to AGWAR, 24 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen), Far East. 

MacArthur mistakenly reported that the Japanese were standing off Nasugbu. :'-io landing 

was ever made there. 

,<> Rad. MacArthur to Marshall, 24 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

27 USAFFE Rpt of Opns, pp. 33, 40; Interv with General Marshall, 7 Apr 48, copy in 

OCMH. 
166 COMMAND DECISIONS 

plies, the preparation of defenses on Bataan, and the withdrawal of 

the South Luzon Force. During the withdrawal, Wainwright's troops 

were to occupy successive defensive positions, five in all. The intention 

was to delay the Japanese by forcing them to deploy for an organizetd attack against each position, and withdraw to the next line before 

a serious battle developed. Wainwright was also to cover the withdkawal of the troops located south of Manila. These units were to retire 

northward through and around Manila, across the Pampanga River, 

over the Calumpit bridge to San Fernando, and thence to Bataan. 

All of the South Luzon Force was to clear the bridge before 8 January. During the withdrawal, a Bataan Defense Force, organized on 

24 December, was to prepare defensive positions on Bataan. A total 

of almost three divisions was ordered into the peninsula immediately 

to establish a line behind which the withdrawing troops could fall for 

protection. 28 

This plan for the withdrawal to Bataan called for a difficult maneuver requiring accurate timing and the closest co-ordination. One slip, 

one road left unguarded, one bridge blown too soon or not soon 

enough, might well imperil the entire plan. Should the forces in north 

and south Luzon fail to pull back to Bataan, or should the Japanese 

seize the road net leading into the peninsula, then the strategic objective of the withdrawal, the denial of Manila Bay to the enemy, would 

be jeopardized. 

To support the movement to Bataan a new plan of supply was 

quickly drawn. Under War Plan ORANGE the movement of supplies 

to Bataan was to begin immediately on the outbreak of war and continue until the depots and warehouses there had been stocked with 

sufficient supplies to sustain a garrison of 43,000 men for six months. 

When MacArthur substituted for ORANGE his order to fight it out on 

the beaches, this supply plan was canceled. The supplies earmarked 

for Bataan under ORANGE therefore went to advance depots and railheads behind the beaches. When MacArthur ordered a return to 

ORANGE, many of the supplies needed on Bataan were scattered, and 

no measures had yet been taken to move them to Bataan. MacArthur's 

decision left only seven days, until 1 January, when Manila was 

evacuated, in which to bring in the supplies, and instead of the 43,000 

men provided for in ORANGE, the force withdrawing to Bataan would 

be closer to 80,000. This change in plans was destined to have a greater 

28 USAFFE Rpt of Opns, pp. 33-35; Collier Notebooks, II, 47; Sutherland to CG 51st 

Div, 24 Dec 41, sub: Operations Orders, AG 371 Phil Records; South Luzon Force Report, pp. 16, 19, copy in OCMH. 
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN 167 

effect on the ability of the defenders to hold Bataan than any other 

phase of the operation. 

The supply plan went into effect on the morning of 24 December, 

when General Marshall called the G-4 and the quartermaster into 

his office and told them of the decision to withdraw all troops on Luzon 

to Bataan and to evacuate Manila. Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake, the 

quartermaster, was instructed to move his base of operations to Bataan 

immediately and to check on the reserves at Corregidor to be sure 

that there was enough to supply 10,000 men for six months. Small 

barges and boats required to move the supplies from Manila to Corregidor and Bataan were quickly gathered, and within twenty-four 

hours Corregidor was completely stocked with the supplies for a sixmonth campaign. At the same time, all supplies were immediately 

started on their way to Bataan by every available means-water, truck, 

and rail. Ammunition had already been stored in the peninsula, 

together with certain defense reserves including 300,000 gallons of gasoline, lubricating oil, and greases, and about 3,000 tons of canned meats 

and fish. 29 

In Manila, the rear echelon worked valiantly to get all the supplies out of the city before the Japanese moved in. Those small craft 

not transferred to Corregidor and Bataan were destroyed; demolitions 

were carried out with efficiency and dispatch. By the time General 

Marshall and his men moved out on New Year's Eve, everything that 

might possibly be of value to the enemy had been destroyed or distributed to the civilian populace. 30 

In the rush of events on the evening of 23 December, no one had 

remembered to inform the Navy of the change in plans. Admiral 

Thomas C. Hart, Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, had seen 

a copy of MacArthur's message to the Chief of Staff predicting such 

a move, however, and was not surprised to learn the next morning 

from his liaison officer that Manila was to be declared an open city 

and that all military forces were to be evacuated from the capital that 

day. He was now faced with the choice of moving to Corregidor, where 

Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell, commander of the 16th Naval District, was already established, or southward to the Netherlands Indies 

where most of the Asiatic Fleet had gone at the beginning of war in 

the Pacific, and where he had already decided to go ultimately.31 Hart 

2[' QM Rpt of Opns, pp. 20-21 . 

. 10 Interv with Gen R. J. Marshall, 7 Apr 48; Carlos Romulos, I Saw the Fall of the Phllippines (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1942), pp. 68-90. 

:11 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 41, ONR&L. 
168 COMMAND DECISIONS 

decided on the latter course, largely because it was evident that the submarines would soon have to go south, and announced his decision to his 

staff at a conference that day. Next morning he turned over to Rockwell full command of all naval activities in the Philippines and late 

that night left Manila aboard a submarine. 32 

With all fields capable of basing American bombers gone and with 

the prospect of the early loss of all fighter strips except those on 

Bataan, there seemed to be no justification for retaining the Far East 

Air Force in the Philippines. Already most of the B-l7's which had 

survived the Clark Field attack had been sent to Darwin, Australia. 

On 24 December MacArthur called Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, 

the Far East Air Force commander, to his office and told him that 

he was to go to Australia. His new mission would be to protect the 

line of communications southward and to support the defenses of the 

Philippines. Brereton offered to stay on, but MacArthur told him that 

he could perform a greater service in Australia. Brereton closed his 

headquarters in Manila at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 24th and 

left that evening in a PBY to join his bombers at Batchelor Field near 

Darwin. All that remained in the Philippines of the once formidable 

Far East Air Force was a handful of fighters. Since only a few men 

were required to fly and service these planes, most of the airmen who 

did not go south eventually became infantry soldiers on Bataan. 33 

On the 26th Manila was officially declared an open city and 

MacArthur's proclamation was published in the newspapers and 

broadcast over the radio. That night the blackout ended and the capital was ablaze with lights. The Japanese were not notified officially 

of the proclamation but learned of it through radio broadcasts. The 

next day, and thereafter, they bombed the port area, from which supplies were being shipped to Bataan and Corregidor. 

With the evacuation of the government and the army a feeling of 

foreboding and terror spread through the city and the exodus, which 

had ceased after the first confusion of war, began again. "The roads 

back into the hills," noted a newspaper correspondent, "were black 

with people striving to reach their native villages .... The few trains 

still running into the provinces were literally jammed to the car tops." 34 

The business district was deserted and there were few cars along Dewey 

"" Ibid., pp. 45-46; Rad, Hart to Stark, 241225, Dec 41, and Ltr, Hart to MacArthur, 

25 Dec 41, sub: Move of Comd Post, both in War Diary 16th Nav Dist; Rockwell, Naval 

Activities in Luzon Area, pp. 6-8, ONR&L. 

.'" Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York: William 

Morrow and Company, 1946), pp. 55-59; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., 

The Army Air Forces In World War II, Vol I, Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 

1942 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 221-22. 

:14 Clark Lee, They Call It Pacific (New York: Viking Press, 1943). pp. 126-27. 
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN 169 

Boulevard. "No girls in slacks and shorts were bicycling along the water 

front," wrote Maj. Carlos Romulos regretfully, "and there were no 

horseback riders on the bridle path .... The Yacht Club, the night 

clubs and hotels ... all looked like funeral parlors." 35 Despite the 

lifting of the blackout Manila seemed like a deserted city. 

Meanwhile, in the early morning hours of the 24th, two days after 

the landings at Lingayen Gulf, another Japanese force had landed at 

Lamon Bay, below Manila. The Japanese now had troops north and 

south of Manila, in position to march on the capital. They had, moreover, forced General MacArthur to abandon his plans for the defense 

of Luzon and to order a withdrawal to Bataan and Corregidor. This 

decision had led the Asiatic Fleet and the Far East Air Force to fall 

back on the line Soerabaja in Java and Darwin, 1,500 miles away 

and left Manila, the pearl of the Orient, open to the invaders. The 

Japanese could feel justly proud of their accomplishments. 

But General Homma could draw small comfort from his success, 

for MacArthur's forces were still intact. In a period of two weeks, under 

the most difficult circumstances and under constant pressure from the 

enemy, the American and Philippine troops had completed a skillful 

and dangerous withdrawal and successfully escaped to Bataan. So long 

as they could maintain their positions there, the Japanese would be 

unable to use Manila harbor. 

If the decision to withdraw to Bataan had sealed the fate of 

Manila, it had also made possible the accomplishment of the mission 

assigned in War Plan ORANGE: to delay the Japanese and hold the 

entrance to Manila Bay. Thus, MacArthur's decision to withdraw his 

Luzon forces into Bataan forced upon the Japanese a difficult and 

costly four-month campaign to win a battle that must to them have 

seemed won on 23 December. 

It is interesting to contrast MacArthur's decision of 23 December 

1941 with that of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commanding the 

Japanese 14th Area Army in the Philippines three years later, reached 

when MacArthur's victorious Southwest Pacific Area forces were preparing to return to Luzon. 36 The situation MacArthur faced in December 1941 and that which confronted Yamashita in December 1944 

were quite similar. Both commanders had to prepare their defenses 

against opponents with superior air and naval forces and with ground 

forces possessing mobility and fire power with which both were unable 

to cope. In both cases there was scant hope that the defending com-

"', Romulos, I Saw the Fall oflhe Philippines, pp. 73-74. 

:36 The following pages were prepared by Robert Ross Smith and are based on Chapters V, XIII, and XVII and the Conclusion of a forthcoming volume by him, Triumph 

in the Philippines, in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
170 COMMAND DECISIONS 

manders could receive reinforcements or supplies once the battle was 

joined on Luzon. But there were important differences, for the commanders had different missions. While not explicitly stated, it was generally understood that MacArthur's mission under War Plan ORANGE 

was to hold Manila Bay for six months. Yamashita's mission, less specific, was to pin down on Luzon as many U.S. Army divisions as he 

could for as long as possible in the hope of slowing the Allied advance 

toward Japan. 

When Yamashita assumed command in the Philippines on 9 October 1944, Imperial General Headquarters expected to fight the decisive 

battle for the archipelago on Luzon. But MacArthur's invasion of the 

central Philippines at Leyte that same month precipitated a quick 

switch. Imperial GHQ; despite Yamashita's remonstrances, decided to 

fight it out at Leyte. As a result, the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a 

shattering defeat. Japan's air power incurred grievous losses that it 

could ill afford; precious divisions from Luzon and China were 

ground up before the Allied onslaught; and irreplaceable Japanese 

cargo ships and transports were sunk. Leyte was indeed a graveyard 

of Japanese hopes and plans. 

Yamashita was a realist. As early as the first week of November 

1944 he concluded that Leyte was lost, and requested higher authority to permit him to concentrate his efforts on preparing the defenses 

of Luzon. But Imperial GHQ denied him this request until after MacArthur, on 15 December, struck out boldly from Leyte to Mindoro, 

just south of Luzon. Then and then only did Imperial GHQ give Yamashita permission to cease the futile effort to hold Leyte and turn 

his attention to Luzon. 

By late December Yamashita knew that Imperial GHQ must soon 

write Luzon off as a strategic loss. He could expect no help from the 

Japanese Navy nor any significant air reinforcements for the defense 

of Luzon. Whatever limited attempts higher headquarters might make 

to send him ground reinforcements would end, he knew, once MacArthur's troops reached Luzon. Realizing all this he had decided as 

early as the first half of November that his operations on Luzon 

would have to be primarily defensive. By late December he concluded that his defense would have to be a static one. To conduct 

this defense he had a variety of units, most of them underfed, understrength, and underequipped, totaling about 272,000 troops including 

air, ground, and naval services. The leadership, training, and organization of many units left much to be desired, and Yamashita did not 

obtain even nominal command of Army Air Forces and naval shorebased troops on Luzon until after the new year opened. Lacking adequate transportation and supplies of many types, his logistical situation approached the impossible. 
THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO BATAAN 171 

Yamashita realized that within the framework of his mission to 

conduct a protracted delaying action on Luzon he had no hope of 

defending all the island. He did not have the troops, supplies, and 

equipment to do so, and the terrain over much of Luzon would not 

provide him with desired natural defensive positions. He could not 

hope to hold the vital central plains-Manila Bay region against the 

superiority in ground and air forces he knew MacArthur would bring 

to bear. To withdraw to Bataan, as MacArthur had, appeared an 

unwise move to Yamashita. Bataan he considered a cul-de-sac. On 

that small peninsula his 272,000 troops could not find food. Concentrated in such a limited area, they would be quickly cut to ribbons 

by the superior air, naval, and ground fire power available to MacArthur. In addition, he considered the city of Manila virtually indefensible and its defense of little significance unless tied to the defense 

of the entire bay region, which he could not, in any case, hope to 

hold for long. He concluded, therefore, that to attempt to deny 

Manila Bay to the Allies could lead only to the early annihilation of 

his forces, making it impossible for him to carry out plans to pm 

down major Allied forces on Luzon for a protracted period. 

This was Yamashita's key decision. By making it, he fixed the 

strategy of MacArthur's campaign for the reconquest of Luzon. 

Yamashita concentrated most of his strength in three mountainous 

strongholds. The strongest and most important of these defensive sectors covered all Luzon northeast and east of Lingayen Gulf and included within its area the island's roughest, most inhospitable mountains. In these mountains, with about 150,000 men, Yamashita intended to make his last stand. The second defensive groupment numbered approximately 30,000 troops, mainly of the Army Air Forces 

and the Navy. This force Yamashita located in mountain country 

west of the central plains and dominating the Clark Field air center. 

The third major concentration, 50,000 troops, he posted in the mountains east and northeast of Manila, controlling the principal sources 

of the city's water supply. 

As events turned out, a deviation from Yamashita's plans-a 

deviation that illustrates his command and control problems-served 

to deny the use of Manila Bay to the Allies for some time. Contrary 

to Yamashita's orders, a force of some 17,000 troops under naval 

command elected to defend Manila, and held out until 3 March 

1945. Salvage, repair, and construction problems in the bay area were 

of such magnitude that it was well into April before the Allies could 

profit by Manila's port facilities. Thus, directly or indirectly, the Japanese prevented the Allies from employing Manila Bay for roughly 

three months after MacArthur's initial landings on Luzon on 9 January 1945, as compared to the five months that MacArthur's and 
172 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Wainwright's forces, by their stands on Bataan and on Corregidor, 

had denied the bay to the Japanese three years earlier. Yamashita's 

groupment west of Clark Field remained a threat for a little over a 

month after 9 January. The Japanese in the mountains east and 

northeast of Manila retained their hold over Manila's water supply 

for nearly five months. 

In 1942, American resistance on Luzon, except for minor, isolated 

forces, ended on 9 April, almost four months to the day after the initial Japanese attacks against the Philippines. Corregidor lasted one 

more month. In 1945, Yamashita's main force did better. Holed up 

in the mountain fastnesses of northern Luzon, it was still resisting 

when Japan surrendered, seven and a half months after MacArthur's 

initial landings, and Yamashita estimated he could have continued the 

fight in those northern mountains for another month. 

Who made the wiser decision-MacArthur or Yamashita? 
7 

The Decision To Invade 

North Africa (TORCH) 

by 

Leo]. Meyer 

Before dawn on 8 November 1942, American soldiers waded 

through the surf of North African beaches in three widely separated 

areas to begin the largest amphibious operations that had ever been 

attempted in the history of warfare. These troops were the vanguard 

for a series of operations that eventually involved more than a million of their compatriots in action in the Mediterranean area. One 

campaign led to another. Before the surrender in May 1945 put an 

end to hostilities in Europe, American units in the Mediterranean 

area had fought in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Sardinia, Corsica, and 

southern France.' 

1 George F. Howe, Northwest Afrzca: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington, 1957), 

in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, covers in detail the operations that 

led to victory in Tunisia in May 1943. The Navy story is related by Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943, Vol. I (Boston: Little, Brown and 

Company, 1950), and Operations in North African Waters, October 1942-June 1943, Vol. II 

(Boston: Little. Brown and Company, 1950), History of United States Naval Operations in 

World War II. Books that deal with the TORCH decision are: Maurice Matloff and Edwin 

M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Wac/are 1941-1942 (Washington, 1953) and Richard 

M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, in VNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An 

lntimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948); Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge 

Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948); Winston S. 

Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950); Arthur Bryant, 

The Turn of the Tide (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1957). 

LEO J. MEYER, Historian with OCMH since 1948. B.A., M.A., Wesleyan University; Ph.D., Clark University. Taught: Clark University, Worcester Poly technical Institute, New York University. Deputy Chief Historian, 

OCMH. Troop Movement Officer, New York Port of Embarkation; Chief 

of Movements, G-4, European theater; Commanding Officer, 14th Major 

Port, Southampton, England-; Secretariat, Transportation Board. Legion of 

Merit, Bronze Star, O.B.E. Colonel, TC (Ret.). Author: Relations Between 

the United States and Cuba, 1898-1917 (Worcester, 1928); articles in Encyclopedias A mericana and Britannica, Dictionary oj A merican Biography, Dictionary oj 

American History, and various professional journals. Coauthor: The Strategic 

and Logistical History oj the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, to be published 

in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
174 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The decision to take the initiative in the West with an Allied invasion of North Africa was made by Prime Minister Winston S. 

Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was one of the 

few strategic decisions of the war in which the President overrode the 

counsel of his military advisers. 

The reasons for it were as much political as military. At first 

TORCH, as the operation was called, had no specific military objective 

other than to effect a lodgment in French North Africa and to open 

the Mediterranean to Allied shipping. It stemmed mainly from a demand for early action against the European members of the Axis, and 

ostensibly was designed to ease the pressure on the hard-pressed 

Soviet armies and check the threatened advance of German power 

into the Middle East. 

A combined Anglo-American attack on North Africa might have 

come earlier had it not been for the pressing need to use the extremely 

limited resources of the Allies to defend the eastern Mediterranean 

and stem the Japanese tidal wave that ultimately engulfed Burma, 

Malaya, the East Indies, the Philippines, and large areas of the southwest Pacific. In fact the invasion of North Africa had been a main 

topic of discussion between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister 

Churchill, and their chief military advisers, known collectively as the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), at the first of the Allied wartime 

conferences held in Washington (ARCADIA) during the week before 

Christmas 1941. 2 The thought of a North African undertaking at 

that time was inspired by hope of winning the initiative at relatively 

small cost and "closing and tightening the ring" around Germany, 

preparatory to a direct attack upon the core of its military power.'] 

American military leaders had long appreciated the fact that the 

occupation of North Africa held the promise of producing valuable 

results for the Allied cause. (See Map I, inside back cover.) It would prevent Axis penetration of the French dependencies in that region, help 

secure the British line of communication through the Mediterranean, 

and provide a potential base for future land operations in the Mediterranean and southern Europe. 4 Nevertheless, they were opposed on 

2 For a full discussion of the views presented at ARCADIA, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-1942. 

3 Memo, COS for CsofS, 22 Dec 41; sub: American-British Strategy, Operations Division (OPD) files ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41). 

'Joint Board GB) 355 Ser. 707, II Sep 41, Sub: Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies. Before TORCH there were a number of 

plans for the invasion of North Africa. As early as the spring of 1941 the U.S. Joint Board had 

begun work on plans to seize Dakar. The code name for this operation was BLACK, later 

changed to BARRISTER. GY~INAST and S'-'PER-GY~NAST contemplated joint operations with 

the British in the Casablanca area. The British also had a plan for a landing in Tunisia. 

For additional details on GYMNAST and SUPER-GYMNAST, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic 

Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, Chapters XI and XII. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 175 

strategic grounds to the dissipation of Allied strength in secondary 

ventures. 5 Confident that America's great resources eventually would 

prove the decisive factor in the war, they favored a concentration of 

force in the United Kingdom for a massive attack against western 

Europe at the earliest possible time. 6 

The British accepted the American view that the main blow 

would eventually have to be delivered in western Europe, but they 

hesitated to commit themselves on when and where it should fall. 

Even at this early stage they showed a preference for peripheral campaigns to be followed by a direct attack on the enemy only after he 

had been seriously weakened by attrition. Such a "peripheral strategy" came naturally to British leaders. They had followed it so often 

in earlier wars against continental powers that it had become deeply 

imbedded in England's military tradition. But another factor that led 

them to shy away from an immediate encounter with the enemy on 

his home grounds was the vivid memory of earlier disasters on the 

Continent. About these the British said little at this time but that the 

fear of another debacle influenced their arguments can be taken for 

granted. Later it was to come more openly to the surface. 

Churchill and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial' General Staff, from the outset stressed the advantages of a 

North African operation. They made much of the tonnage that 

would be saved by opening the Mediterranean and the likelihood 

that the French in North Africa, despite the fact that they were torn 

by dissension, would co-operate with the Allies once they landed. 

Thus France would be brought back into the struggle against the Axis. 

While the majority of American military leaders had their doubts 

about the value of a North African invasion and its chances of success, President Roosevelt was attracted to the idea largely because it 

afforded an early opportunity to carry the war to the Germans. In 

his opinion it was very important to give the people of the United 

States a feeling that they were at war and to impress upon the Germans that they would have to face American power on their side of 

the Atlantic. 7 Because of the interest of the two political heads, who 

in many matters saw eye to eye, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, without committing themselves definitely to any operation, agreed at the 

ARCADIA Conference to go ahead with a plan to invade North Africa . 

. ,Memo, WPD for ColS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Strategic Conceptions and Their Applications 

to SWPA, OPD files, Exec 4, Envelope 35; Notation by Eisenhower, 22 Jan 42 entry. Item 

3. OPD Hist Unit File. 

13 The date for such an assault as estimated in early 1942 was to be sometime in the 

spring of 1943. 

7 Notes, GCM [George C. Marshall], 23 Dec 41, sub: Notes on Mtg at Whil<' House 

With President and Prime Minister Presiding, War Plans Division (WPD) 4402-1%. 
176 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The task of working out such a plan was given to General Headquarters (GHQ) in Washington. By combining the main features of 

GYMNAST and a British scheme to attack Tunisia, GHQ produced a 

plan in record time called SUPER-GYMNAST. 8 This plan was first submitted for review to Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who had been 

working on plans to seize Dakar, and then to Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. 

Fredendall. On the basis of their comments a revised plan was drawn 

up and approved on 19 February 1942.9 

Plans for Cross-Channel Operations Get the Green Light 

Soon thereafter, unforeseen developments arose that prevented immediate implementation of the revised plan. Among these were the 

heavy losses the British Navy suffered in the Mediterranean and the 

Japanese advances in southeastern Asia, the Philippines, and the 

Netherlands Indies which made it imperative to give the Pacific area 

first call on American resources, particularly in ships. The shipment 

of men and supplies to the threatened areas put so great a strain on 

the Allied shipping pool, already seriously depleted by the spectacular 

success of German U-boats,"O that little was available for an early 

venture into North Africa or anywhere else. Before the situation 

eased, preparations for meeting the German Army head on in Europe, known as BOLERO, had received the green light in priorities 

over SUPER-GYMNAST. 

As in the case of SUPER-GYMNAST, BOLERO had its roots in strategic thinking that antedated Pearl Harbor. Months before 7 December, basic Anglo-American strategy, in the event of America's entry 

into the war, called for the defeat of Germany, the strongest Axis 

Power, first. This grand strategic concept was discussed as a hypothetical matter in pre-Pearl Harbor British-American staff conversations 

held in Washington between 29 January and 27 March 1941 and 

later set forth in the Allied agreement (ABC-1) and in the joint 

Army-Navy plan, RAINBOW 5, which were submitted to the President 

in June 1941. 11 While sympathetic toward the strategy in both ABC1 and RAINBOW 5, Roosevelt refrained from approving either at the 

time, probably for political reasons. At the ARCADIA Con~erence in 

December 1941, the basic strategic concept was confirmed and a deS The code name GYMNAST continued to be used loosely by many to apply to SUPERGYMNAST as well as the original plan. 

9 Interv with Brig Gen Paul M. Robinett, USA (Ret.), 29.Tun 56, OCMH. 

10 Morison, Battle oj the Atlantic, Chs. VI, VII. 

11 Ltr, Secy War and Secy Navy to President, 2 Jun 41, copy filed in JB 325, Ser. 

642-5. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 177 

cision was made to begin the establishment of an American force in 

the United Kingdom. This decision, however, "was not definitive" 

since it was essentially based on the need of protecting the British 

Isles and did not include their use as a base for future offensive operations against the Continent. The omission troubled many American 

leaders, including Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who in early 

March tried to persuade the President that "the proper and orthodox 

line of our help" was to send an overwhelming force to the British 

Isles which would threaten an attack on the Germans in France. In 

this he was supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had accepted 

the detailed analysis of the military situation, worked out by the War 

Plans Division under Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower in late February. As a result the President replied to the Prime Minister on 8 

March that in general the British should assume responsibility for the 

Middle East, the United States for the Pacific, and both should operate jointly in the Atlantic area. At the same time, the American 

planners were assigned the task of preparing plans for an invasion of 

northwest Europe in the Spring of 1943. 

The principal argument for selecting this area for the main 

British-American offensive was that it offered the shortest route to the 

heart of Germany and so was the most favorable place in the west 

where a vital blow could be struck. It was also the one area where 

the Allies could hope to gain the necessary air superiority, wh~re the 

United States could "concentrate and maintain" the largest force, 

where the bulk of the British forces could be brought into action, 

and where the maximum support to the Soviet Union, whose continued participation in the war was considered essential to the defeat 

of Germany, could be given." 2 By 1 April an outline draft, which 

came to be known first as the Marshall Memorandum and later as 

BOLERO, was far enough advanced to be submitted to the President 

who accepted it without reservation and immediately dispatched Mr. 

Harry Hopkins and General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of 

Staff, to London to obtain British approval. 13 

As originally conceived, BOLERO contemplated a build-up of military power in the United Kingdom simultaneously with continuous 

raids against the Continent, to be followed by a full-scale attack on 

Hitler's "Festung Europa" in the spring of 1943. Later the code 

name ROUNDUP was applied to the operational part of the plan. Under this plan forty-eight divisions, 60 percent of which would be 

American, were to be placed on the continent of Europe by Septem12 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 415-16. 

1:1 Ibid., pp. 418-19; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-1942. pp. 183-85; 

Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 280. 
178 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ber of that year. Included in BOLERO was a contingent alternate plan 

known as SLEDGEHAMMER, which provided for the establishment of a 

limited beachhead on the Continent in the fall of 1942 should Germany collapse or the situation on the Eastern Front become so desperate that quick action in the west would be needed to relieve German pressure on the Soviet Union. 

In London Hopkins and Marshall outlined the American plan to 

the British. While stressing BOLERO as a means of maintaining the 

Soviet Army as a fighting force, they also emphasized the need of arriving at an early decision "in principle" on the location and timing 

of the main British-American effort so that production, allocation of 

resources, training, and troop movements could proceed without delay.!! 

Churchill seemed to be warmly sympathetic to the American proposal to strike the main blow in northwestern Europe, and described it 

as a "momentous proposal" in accord with "the classic principle of 

war-namely concentration against the main enemy." 15 But though 

the Prime Minister and his advisers agreed "in principle," Marshall 

was a ware that most of them had "reservations regarding this and 

that" and stated that it would require "great firmness" to avoid further dispersions. '6 That he was right is borne out by the fact that 

Churchill later wrote that he regarded SLEDGEHAMMER as impractical 

and accepted it merely as an additional project to be considered 

along with invasion of North Africa and perhaps Norway as a possible operation for 1942.17 At all events, BOLERO was approved by the 

British on 14 April with only one strongly implied reservation: it was 

not to interfere with Britain's determination to hold its vital positions 

in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area. 'S 

British Opposition to an Early Cross- Channel A ttack Grows 

While BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER was acceptable to the British III 

mid-April, it remained so for less than two months. '9 By early May 

11 Min of Mtg, U.S.-British Planning Staffs, London, 11 Apr 42, Tab N. ABC 381 

BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. For a fuller treatment of these discussions see Gordon A. Harrison, 

Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, 1951), pp. 13-18, in UNITED STATES ARMY I~ 

WORLD WAR II. 

15 Ltr atchd to Min ofMtg, U.S. Representatives-British War Cabinet, DefColl1. 14 Apr 

42, Chief of Staff 1942-43 files, WDCSA 381.1. 

H; Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 13 Apr 42, CM-IN 3457. 

17 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 323-24. 

18 Paper, COS, 13 Apr 42, title: Comments on Gen Marshall's Memo, COS (42)97(0) 

Tab F, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5; Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 181-85; Bryant, Turn 

~fthe Tide, pp. 286-87. 

19 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 418-19. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 179 

they were expressing strong doubts that the resources to launch an 

early cross-Channel operation could be found. 20 In part the uncertainty 

was due to the state of the American landing craft production program which was not only lagging far behind schedule but was indefinite as to type and number. What the full requirements in craft would 

be no one actually knew, for all estimates in regard to both number 

and type were impressionistic. In the original outline plan, the number needed had been placed at 7,000. This was soon raised to 8,100 

by the Operations Division (OPD), still too conservative an estimate 

in the opinion of many. Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNamey, Deputy Chief 

of Staff, for example, considered 20,000 a more realistic figure." 1 As 

to type, the Army had placed orders with the Navy for some 2,300 

craft, mostly small 36-foot vehicle and personnel carriers, for delivery 

in time for a limited operation in the fall. These, along with 50-foot 

WM boats (small tank lighters), were considered sufficiently seaworthy 

by the Navy to negotiate the waters of the English Channel. The rest 

of the 8,100 were expected to be ready for delivery in mid-April 1943, 

in time for ROUNDUP. 22 

This construction program, seemingly firm in early April, soon ran 

into difficulties. Toward the end of April the Navy, after re-examining 

its own requirements for amphibious operations in the Pacific and elsewhere, concluded it needed about 4,000 craft. If its estimates were allowed to stand, only about half of the Army's needs for SLEDGEHAMMER could be met in the construction program. Some of the resulting 

deficit might possibly be made up by the British, but this seemed unlikely at the time for their production was also behind schedule. 

The second obstacle arose when the British questioned the ability 

of the landing craft on which construction had begun to weather the 

severe storms that prevailed in the Channel during the fall and winter 

months. They convinced the President that their objections to the 

type of craft under construction in the United States were sound, as 

indeed they were. The result was that a new program, which shifted 

the emphasis to the production of larger craft, was drawn up and 

placed under British guidance. Like the earlier program this one also 

underwent a series of upward changes. 23 

As the requirements rose, the prospects of meeting them declined. 

In late May it was still possible to expect delivery in time for ROUNDUP 

in the spring of 1943 but the hope of obtaining enough craft for SLEDGE-

'" Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 300-301. 

'1 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, p. 377. 

'" Ibid. 

2:1 Ibid., pp. 379-80. 
180 COMMAND DECISIONS 

HAMMER had dwindled. If the latter operation was to be undertaken at 

all, it would have to be executed with what craft and shipping could be 

scraped together. This, of course, would increase the danger that 

SLEDGEHAMMER would become a sacrificial offering launched not in 

the hope of establishing a permanent lodgment but solely to ease the 

pressure on the Soviet armies. For this the British, who would be required to make the largest contribution in victims and equipment, 

naturally had no stomach. 

In late May when Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign 

Commissar, visited London to urge the early establishment of a second front in western Europe, he found Churchill noncommittal. The 

Prime Minister informed him that the British would not hestitate to 

execute a cross-Channel attack before the year was up provided it 

was "sound and sensible," but, he emphasized, "wars are not won by 

unsuccessful operations." 24 

In Washington a few days later, Molotov found that a different 

view on SLEDGEHAMMER from the one he had encountered in London still prevailed. Roosevelt, much more optimistic than Churchill, 

told him that he "hoped" and "expected" the Allies to open a second front in 1942 and suggested that the Soviet Union might help 

its establishment by accepting a reduction in the shipment of lendlease general supplies. 25 The conversations ended with a declaration 

drafted by Molotov and accepted by the President which stated that 

a "full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of 

creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942." 26 This statement, although not a definite assurance that a cross-Channel invasion would 

soon be launched, differed considerably from the noncommittal declarations of the Prime Minister. It clearly indicated that Washington 

and London were not in full accord on the strategy for 1942 and that 

further discussions between U.S. and British leaders were necessary 

to establish a firm agreement. 

By the time of the second Washington conference in June 1942 

the Prime Minister and his close military advisers, if they ever 

truly accepted the U.S. strategy proposed by Marshall, had definitely 

undergone a change of mind. They now contended that an emergency 

invasion in 1942 to aid Russia would preclude a second attempt for 

years to come and therefore no direct attack should be undertaken 

24 Quoted in W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy, History olthe 

Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1949), pp. 

406-07. 

25 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-1942, pp. 231-32; Sherwood, Roosevelt and 

Hopkins, pp. 568-70. 

26 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-1942, pp. 231-32. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 181 

unless the German Army was "demoralized by failure against 

Russia." 27 

Aware of the fact that the British had grown cool to SLEDGEHAMMER, if not to ROUNDUP, as the strategy for 1942 and 1943 and anxious to get American troops into action against the main enemy as 

quickly as possible, President Roosevelt in mid-June sounded out his 

military advisers on the resurrection of GYMNAST. The suggestion met 

with strong dissent from Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall, both of whom now were convinced that the British were just 

as much opposed to ROUNDUP for 1943 as they were to SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942. 28 

In deference to their views, Roosevelt refrained from openly supporting the British position during the June conference in Washington, with the result that the meetings ended with BOLERO and 

ROUNDUP-SLEDGEHAMMER ostensibly still intact as the basic AngloAmerican strategy in the North Atlantic area. But Churchill's vigorous arguments against a 1942 cross-Channel invasion of the Continent and Roosevelt's lively and unconcealed interest in the Mediterranean basin as a possible alternative area of operations indicated 

that the opponents of diversionary projects were losing ground. The 

defeat of the British Eighth Army in a spectacular tank battle at 

Knightsbridge in Libya on 13 June, the subsequent fall of Tobruk on 

21 June, followed by the rapid advance of Field Marshal Erwin 

Rommel's army toward Alexandria and the Suez Canal, further weakened the position of the U.S. military leaders, for as long as Commonwealth forces were fighting with their backs to the wall in Egypt 

no British Government could be expected to agree to a cross-Channel 

venture. 

Churchill, who had hurriedly returned to England in the crisis 

created by Rommel's victories, soon made it unmistakably clear that 

he was adamant in his opposition to any plan to establish a bridgehead on the Continent in 1942. 29 A premature invasion, he reiterated in a cable to Roosevelt, would be disastrous. Instead he recommended that the American military chiefs proceed with planning for 

GYMNAST while the British investigated the possibility of an attack on 

Norway UUPITER), a pet project of his. To his representative in Washington, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, he sent a message making it clear 

that he wanted a North African operation. "GYMNAST," he stated, 

27 Memo, COS for War Cabinet, 2 Jul 42, sub: Future Operations WP (42) 278, (COS 

42)195(0), ABC 381 (7-25-42) Sec. 4-B, 19; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-

1942, p. 266. 

" Stimson and Bundy, 071 Active Service, p. 419. 

29 Churchill, Hinge oj Fate, pp. 334-35. 
182 COMMAND DECISIONS 

"affords the sole means by which the U.S. can strike at Hitler in 

1942. . . . However if the President decided against GYMNAST the 

matter is settled" and both countries would have to remain "motionless in 1942." 30 But for the time being the impetuous Prime Minister 

was in no position to press strongly for the early implementation of 

the project, eager though he was to assume the offensive. For weeks 

to come the military situation would demand that every ton of available shipping in the depleted Allied shipping pool be used to move 

men, tanks, and other materials around southern Africa to hold Egypt 

and bolster the Middle East against Rommel's army and the even more 

potentially dangerous German forces in Russia that had conquered 

Crimea and were massing for an offensive that might carry them across 

the Caucasus into the vital oil-rich regions of Iraq and the Persian 

Gulf.31 

Strong support for the Prime Minister's objections to a premature 

invasion of the Continent had come from the British Chiefs of Staff. 

After considering the advantages and disadvantages of SLEDGEHAMMER, they stated in their report to the War Cabinet on 2 July: "If 

we were free agents we could not recommend that the operation 

should be mounted." 32 In reaching this conclusion they were ostensibly persuaded by two reports, one from Lord Leathers, British Minister of War Transport, who had estimated that the operation would 

tie up about 250,000 tons of shipping at a time when shipping could 

ill be spared, and the other from Lord Louis Mountbatten, which 

pointed out that, in the absence of sufficient landing craft in the 

United Kingdom, all amphibious training for other operations, including cross-Channel in 1943, would have to be suspended if SLEDGEHAMMER were undertaken. The War Cabinet immediately accepted the 

views of the British Chiefs of Staff and on 8 July notified the Joint Staff 

Mission in Washington of its decision against an operation on the Continent even if confined to a "tip and run" attack. 33 

In submitting its views on the strategy to be followed, the War Cabinet carefully refrained from openly opposing ROUNDUP as an operation 

for 1943. But the effect was the same since it was not possible to conduct both the African invasion and the cross-Channel attack with 

the means then at the disposal of the Allies. 

lO See JCS 24th Mtg, 10 July 42; Msg, Churchill to Field Marshal Dill, 12 Jul 42, 

ABC 381 (7-25-42) Sec. 4-B; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 301-02,318. 

:ll How serious the British considered this latter threat to their vital oil resources is 

clearly indicated in the many references to it in Field Marshal Brooke's diary. See Bryant, 

Turn of the Tide, Chs. 8, 9. 

J2 Memo, COS for War Cabinet, 2 Jul 42, sub: Future Opns WP (42) 278 (COS 42), 

ABC 381 (7-25-42) Sec. 4-B, 19. 

':lMsg, War Cabinet Offs to Joint Staff Mission, 8 Jul 42; Leighton and Coakley, 

Global Logistics, 1940-1943, p. 384. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 183 

Because of the lag in landing craft construction, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff realized that SLEDGEHAMMER was rapidly becoming a forlorn 

hope. By the end of June, out of a total of 2,698 LCP's, LCV's, and 

LCM's estimated as likely to be available, only 238 were in the 

United Kingdom or on the way.34 By mid-July General Hull informed 

Eisenhower, who had gone to London, "that all the craft available and 

en route could land less than 16,000 troops and 1,100 tanks and vehicles." 35 This was 5,000 troops and 2,200 tanks less than the estimates made in mid-May. Despite these discouraging figures, Marshall 

and King stubbornly continued to object to dropping SLEDGEHAMMER 

from the books, not because they wanted it but because they clearly 

recognized that the fate of ROUNDUP was also at stake in the British 

Government's attitude toward the emergency operation. Whether in 

earnest or not they now went so far as to advocate that the United 

States should turn its back on Europe and strike decisively against Japan unless the British adhered "unswervingly" to the "full BOLERO 

plan." 36 This attitude so impressed Field Marshal Dill that he seriously 

considered cabling his government that further pressure for GYMNAST at 

the expense of a cross-Channel operation would drive the Americans 

into saying, "We are finished off with the West and will go out in 

the Pacific." 37 What Dill did not know was that Roosevelt was opposed to any action that amounted to an "abandonment of the British." Nor did the President openly agree with his Joint Chiefs of 

Staff that the British would be as unwilling to accept a large-scale 

cross-Channel attack in 1943 as in 1942, whatever their present 

views. 38 He was still determined to commit the Western Allies to action against the Germans before the end of the year, somehow and 

somewhere. If an agreement with the British on a cross-Channel attack could not be reached he was quite willing to settle for some other 

operation. Unlike his chief military advisers, he was far from hostile to 

a campaign in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, or elsewhere in 

the Atlantic area, if circumstances ruled out SLEDGEHAMMER or 

ROUNDUP. In fact, Secretary Stimson believed he was weakening on 

BOLERO and considered him somewhat enamored of the idea of operations in the Mediterranean. 39 The President's willingness to accept 

a substitute for an early invasion of Europe appears in the instructions he gave Harry Hopkins, General Marshall, and Admiral King 

34 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, p. 382. 

:;5 Ibid. 

36 Memo, King and Marshall for President, 10 Jul 42, WDCSA file BOLERO. 

" Draft Cable in ColS file ABC 381 (7-25-42) Sec. I. 

:« Msg, Roosevelt to Marshall, 14 Jul 42, WDCSA file BOLERO; Sherwood, Roosevelt 

and Hopkins, p. 602. 

:;9 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 425. 
184 COMMAND DECISIONS 

when he sent them to England on 18 July with large powers to make 

a final effort to secure agreement on a cross-Channel attack. Should 

they become convinced after exploring all its angles with the British 

that such an operation would not prevent "the annihilation of Russia" by drawing off enemy air power, they were to consider other military possibilities.4(J 

As might have been expected, the American delegates failed to 

convince Churchill or the British military chiefs that an early assault 

on the Continent was practical. The Prime Minister, after questioning both the urgency and feasibility of SLEDGEHAMMER, again emphasized the value of a North African operation and suggested that if 

the approaching battle for Egypt went well, it might be possible to 

carry the war to Sicily or Italy.41 

A realistic estimate of the military situation at the time indicated 

that launching a successful operation against the mainland of Europe 

in 1942 was far from bright. Allied war production potential was still 

comparatively undeveloped and battle-tested divisions were unavailable. Landing craft, despite a high production priority ordered by the 

Navy in May, were still scarce, shipping was woefully short, and modern tanks, capable of meeting those of the enemy on equal terms, were 

just beginning to roll off the assembly lines. Even if the production 

of materiel could be speeded up time was required to raise and organize a large force and train units in the difficult techniques of amphibious warfare. By according additional overriding priorities to 

BOLERO, the flow of men, equipment, and supplies to the United Kingdom could be increased, but this meant running the grave danger of 

crippling forces already engaged with the enemy. Should this risk be 

accepted, there still remained the problem of erecting a logistical organization that could feed men, equipment, and supplies into the 

battl~ area without interruption. Considerable progress had been made 

in building such an organization in the United Kingdom but it was 

still far from perfect. Taking all these matters into consideration, 

along with the likelihood that the Germans would have enough 

strength in France and the Lowlands to contain an invasion without 

weakening their eastern front, the Combined Chiefs of Staff concluded 

that, at best, the only landing that could be made on the Continent 

in 1942 would be a minor one, aimed at securing a foothold with a 

port and holding and consolidating it during the winter. But the 

hard facts mutely argued against pitting any force against a veteran 

40 Memos, Roosevelt for Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 16 Jul 42, sub: Instructions 

for London Conf, Jul 42, signed original in WDCSA 381, Sec. 1; Sherwood, Roosevelt and 

Hopkins, pp. 603-05; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-1942, p. 273. 

41 Combined Staff Conf, 20 Jul 42, WDCSA 319.1; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-1942, p. 278. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 185 

army on the chance that it would be sustained during the stormy 

winter weather. 

The Americans saw this as clearly as the British. As realists, they 

knew that an operation in execution would take priority over one in 

contemplation, and that it would generate pressures that could upset 

the basic strategy agreed upon for Europe. The weakness of their 

stand was that nearly a year would probably elapse during which few 

Americans other than those in the air force would be in action against 

the Germans. Such a situation the impatient President whose full 

support they needed could not bring himself to accept. Knowing this, 

Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff reiterated time and again 

the advantages of a North African operation in conjunction with a 

counteroffensive in Libya. They stressed all the old arguments: it 

could lead to the liberation of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, bring 

the French there back into the war against the Axis, open the Mediterranean to through traffic thus saving millions of tons of shipping, 

cause the withdrawal of German air power from Russia, and force 

the Germans and Italians to extend themselves beyond their capacity 

in reinforcing their trans-Mediterranean and southern front. They 

would not admit that a North African operation in 1942 would rule 

out ROUNDUP and contended instead that early action in the Mediterranean would lead to a quick victory which would still permit it 

to be launched in 1943. 

The Americans, on the other hand, continued to hold out for 

SLEDGEHAMMER. They resisted the idea of dropping SLEDGEHAMMER, 

primarily in order to forestall a diversionary and indecisive operation 

which would syphon off resources and prevent a true second front 

from being established in 1943. Marshall and King, if not Hopkins, 

were certain that the fate of ROUNDUP was at stake and held as 

firmly as ever the belief that a direct attack against the Continent 

was the only way to assist the hard-pressed Soviet armies and seriously threaten the military power of Germany. But because of the 

President's instructions to agree to some military operations somewhere in 1942, it was impossible for them to hold their ground indefinitely. Their position was not strengthened by the course of events 

in Russia, in the Middle East, and in the Atlantic, or by the opinion 

expressed by General Eisenhower-recently appointed Commanding 

General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army 

(ETOUSA)-that SLEDGEHAMMER had less than a fair chance of success!2 Nor were they helped by the secret message from Roosevelt to 

42 Memo, Conclusions as to Practicability of SLEDGEHAMMER, 17 Jul 42; Diary of Commander in Chief, OPD Hist Unit file. This memorandum was prepared by General Eisenhower after consultation with Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee, 

and Col. Ray W. Barker. 
186 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Churchill, saying that "a Western front in 1942 was off' and that he 

was in favor of an invasion of North Africa and "was influencing his 

Chiefs in that direction." 43 Furthermore, since a cross-Channel operation to ease the pressure on the Soviet Union would have to be carried out primarily by British forces, because the shipping shortage precluded the flow of U.S. troops and aircraft to the United Kingdom 

in large proportions before the late fall of 1942, the American representatives could not insist on it. Marshall therefore refrained from 

pressing for the retention of SLEDGEHAMMER in the BOLERO plan after 

23 July but continued to insist on ROUNDUP. This left the whole question of alternative action for 1942 undecided. 

The President Breaks the Deadlock 

Informed of the deadlock by Marshall, Roosevelt sent additional instructions to his representatives in London, directing again that an 

agreement on an operation for 1942 be reached. This message specifically instructed the American delegation to settle with the British 

on one of five projects: (1) a combined British-American operation in 

North Africa (either Algeria or Morocco or both); (2) an entirely 

American operation against French Morocco (the original GYMNAST); 

(3) a combined operation against northern Norway (JUPITER); (4) the 

reinforcement of the British Eighth Army in Egypt; (5) the reinforcement of Iran. 44 

The American military chiefs, Marshall and King, now knew that 

SLEDGEHAMMER was dead, for no cross-Channel attack was possible 

in the face of British objections and without the President's strong support. Preferring the occupation of French North Africa with all its 

shortcomings to a campaign in the Middle East or Norway, they reluctantly accepted GYMNAST. 45 On 24 July a carefully worded agreement, drawn up by Marshall and known as CCS 94, was accepted 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It contained the important condition that the CCS would postpone until mid-September final decision 

on whether or not the North African operations should be undertaken. (The date 15 September was chosen because it was considered 

the earliest possible day on which the outcome in Russia could be 

forecast.),6 If at that time the Russians clearly faced a collapse that 

4J Quotation from Brookc's diary, 23 July entry, in Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 344. 

44 Msg, President to Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 23 Jul 42, WDCSA 381, Sec. 1; 

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Plannzng, 1941-1942, p. 278; Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 13. 

4[, For War Department views on Middle East operations see OPD study, 15 Jul 42, 

sub: Comparison of Opn GYMNAST With Opns Involving Reinforcements of Middle East, 

Exec 5, Item 1. 

46 CCS 34th Mtg, 30 Jul, ABC 381 (7-25-42) Scc. 1. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 187 

would release so many German troops that a cross-Channel attack 

in the spring of 1943 would be impractical, the North African invasion would be launched sometime before 1 December. Meanwhile, 

planning for ROUNDUP was to continue while a separate U.S. planning staff would work with the British on the North African project, 

now renamed TORCH!7 

The door to later reconsideration of the agreement, deliberately 

left open in CCS 94 by General Marshall in order to save the 

ROUNDUP concept, did not remain open long. In a message to the President on 25 July, Harry Hopkins urged an immediate decision on 

TORCH to avoid "procrastination and delays." 48 Without further consulting his military advisers, Roosevelt chose to assume that a North 

African campaign in 1942 had been definitely decided upon and at 

once cabled his emissaries that he was delighted with the "decision." 

At the same time he urged that a target date not later than 30 October be set for the invasion. 49 By ignoring the carefully framed conditions in CCS 94 and in suggesting a date for launching TORCH, the 

President actually made the decision. In so doing, he effectively jettisoned ROUNDUP for 1943, though he probably did not fully realize it 

at the time. 

Although Marshall must have realized the fatal impact of Roosevelt's action on ROUNDUP he was reluctant to view it as one that eliminated the conditions stipulated in CCS 94. At the first meeting of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff held after his return to Washington he 

therefore refrained from accepting the "decision" as final and pointed 

out that the mounting of TORCH did not mean the abandonment of 

ROUNDUP. 5o At the same time, he recognized that a choice between 

the two operations would have to be made soon "because of the logistic consideration involved," particularly the conversion of vessels to 

combat loaders which, according to a "flash estimate" of the Navy, 

would require ninety-six days. Nor was Admiral King willing to admit 

that the President had fully decided to abandon ROUNDUP as well as 

SLEDGEHAMMER in favor of TORCH. 51 

If Marshall and King entertained any hope of getting the President to reopen the issue and make a definite choice between ROUNDUP 

and TORCH they were doomed to disappointment. Instead, on 30 

47 Memo by CCS, 24 Jul 42, sub: Opns in 42-43, circulated as CCS 94, ABC 381 

(25 Jul 42). For details, see the treatment of CCS 94 and its interpretation in Matloff 

and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-1942. 

4S Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611. 

49 Msg, President to Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 25 Jul 42, WDCSA 381, Sec. 1. 

'0 This view is also expressed in a personal letter, Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 Jul 42, 

GCM file under Eisenhower, D. D. 

51 Min, 34th Mtg CCS, 30 Jul 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42) Sec. 1. 
188 COMMAND DECISIONS 

July, at a meeting at the White House with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

the President stated that "TORCH would be undertaken at the earliest 

possible date" but made no comment on its possible effect on 

ROUNDUP. 52 The next day his decision on TORCH was forwarded to 

the British Chiefs of Staff and to General Eisenhower. 53 

However loath the President's military advisers were to sidetrack 

plans for the direct invasion of the Continent and accept a secondary 

project in its place, an attack on French North Africa, alone among 

the operations considered, met strategic conditions for joint AngloAmerican operations in 1942 on which both Churchill and Roosevelt 

could agree. Without the wholehearted support of the two top political leaders in the United States and Great Britain, no combined 

operation could be mounted. In short, TORCH from the beginning had 

su pport on the highest political level in both countries, an advantage 

never enjoyed by either ROUNDUP or SLEDGEHAMMER. 

The decision to invade North Africa restored Anglo-American cooperative planning, which had been showing signs of serious strain. 

It was now on a sound working basis that permitted the establishment of rights and priorities with relentless determination. What was 

still needed was a final agreement between Washington and London 

on the size, direction, and timing of the contemplated operation. 

Such an agreement was not easy to reach. The big question to be 

decided was where the main effort of the Allies should be made and 

when. On this issue Washington and London were at first far apart. 

The Issue if Inside Versus Outside Landings 54 

The strategic planners in Washington, mindful of the dangers in 

French opposition, hostile Spanish reaction, and a German counterstroke against Gibraltar with or without the support of Spain, proposed making the main landings outside the Mediterranean on the 

Atlantic coast of French Morocco. Troops would take Casablanca 

and adjacent minor ports, seize and hold the railroad and highways 

to the east as an auxiliary line of communications, secure all the approaches to Gibraltar, and consolidate Allied positions in French Morocco before moving into the Mediterranean. This, the planners estimated, would take about three months. The plan was a cautious one, 

52 Memo, Maj Gen Walter B. Smith for jCS, 1 Aug 42, sub: Notes of Conf Held at 

the White House at 8:30 PM, 30 jul 42, OPD Exec 5, Item I, Tab 14. 

5:1 Before leaving London, Marshall informed Eisenhower that he would be in command of the TORCH operation, if and when undertaken, in addition to being Commanding General, ETousA. This appointment was later confirmed by the CCS. 

54 For an extended account of this subject see, Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 

1940-1943, pp. 427-35. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 189 

dictated primarily by the fear that the Strait of Gibraltar might be 

closed by the Germans or the Spanish, acting singly or together. 

The bold course, advocated by the strategic planners in London, 

including many Americans working with the British, was to strike 

deep into the Mediterranean with the main force at the outset and 

then, in co-ordination with the British Eighth Army moving west from 

Egypt, seize Tunisia before the Germans could reinforce the threatened area. They viewed with feelings approaching consternation the 

cautious American strategy that would waste precious months in taking ports and consolidating positions over a thousand miles distant 

from Tunisia, whose early occupation they believed to be vital to the 

success of TORCH. Should the Germans be permitted to establish 

themselves firmly in that province it was feared that they might, because of shorter lines of communications and land-based air power, 

be able to hold out indefinitely, thus preventing the extension of Allied control to the strategic central Mediterranean. 

The proponents of the inside approach also stressed the relative 

softness of the Algerian coastal area as compared with that around 

Casablanca. In their view Algeria with its favorable weather and tide 

conditions, more numerous and better pons, and proximity to Tunisia 

seemed to have every advantage over western Morocco as the main 

initial objective. They believed that even in the matter of securing 

communications it would be safer to move swiftly and boldly through 

the Strait of Gibraltar and seize ports along the Algerian coast as far 

east as Philippeville and Bone. Strong determined action there would 

cow the Spanish and make them hesitate to permit German entry 

into Spain for a joint attack on Gibraltar. On the other hand they 

contended that an unsuccessful attack in the Casablanca area, where 

operations were extremely hazardous because of unfavorable surf conditions four days out of five, would almost certainly invite Spanish 

interven tion. 55 

The Transatlantic Essay Contest 56 

For weeks arguments for and against both strategic concepts were 

tossed back and forth across the Atlantic in what has aptly been 

called a "transatlantic essay contest." Meanwhile preparations for the 

attack languished. A logical solution to the problem was to reconcile 

the conflicting views by combining both into a single plan. This, General Eisenhower, who had been designated to command the operation 

'" Ltr. Prime Minister to Harry Hopkins, 4 Sep 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of 

Fate, p. 539; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 401-02. 

:,6 For an extended account see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, pp. 

417-24. 
190 COMMAND DECISIONS 

before Marshall left London, attempted to do in his first outline plan 

of 9 August when he proposed approximately simultaneous landings 

inside and outside the Mediterranean, the first strong and the latter 

relatively weak. 57 

Almost immediately the plan struck snags in the form of insufficient naval air support and assault shipping. Shortly after it was submitted, both the American and the British Navies suffered severe losses 

in naval units, particularly in aircraft carriers. 58 Since close landbased air support would be negligible, confined to a single airfield at 

Gibraltar under the domination of Spanish guns, carriers were necessary to protect assault and follow-up convoys for the operation. In 

view of the recent naval losses and needs elsewhere in the world, 

finding them would take time. The U.S. Navy quickly let it be known 

that it had no carriers immediately available to fill the void and was 

unwilling to commit itself on when they would be. This meant that 

the burden of supplying seaborne air protection would probably fall 

on the British. 

Equally if not more important in determining the size and timing 

of the landings was the availability of assault shipping. Most of the 

American APA's (assault troop transports) were tied up in the Pacific where they were vitally needed. To transport the twelve regimental combat teams, envisioned as the force needed to make the 

three landings, would require 36 APA's and 9 to 12 AKA's (attack 

cargo transports); and as yet the program for converting conventional 

transports to assault transports had hardly begun. 59 On 2 August the 

Navy estimated that sufficient assault shipping, trained crews, and rehearsed troops for an operation of the size originally contemplated 

would not be ready for landings before 7 November. The British 

were against postponing the operation and, to gain time, were willing 

to skimp on the training and rehearsals of assault units and boat 

crews.60 The President sided with them on an early attack and on 12 

August directed Marshall to try for a 7 October landing date even 

if it meant the reduction of the assault forces by two thirds. It now 

fell to Eisenhower and his planning staff to rearrange their plan in 

the light of available resources and under the pressure for quick 

action. 

In his second outline plan of 21 August Eisenhower set 15 Oc57 Draft Outline Plan (Partial) Opn TORCH, Hq ETOUSA, 9 Aug 42, ABC 381 (7~2S~42) 

4A 

58 The United States Navy lost a carrier and several cruisers in the Guadalcanal operation; the Royal Navy, one aircraft carrier sunk and one damaged in trying to 

reinforce Malta. 

59 Conversion had begun on ten small vessels taken off the BOLERO run. 

60 Bryant, Turn oj the Tide, p. 400. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 191 

tober as a tentative date for the invasion and proposed dropping the 

Casablanca operation entirely and concentrating on the capture of 

Oran in Algeria. 61 That having been accomplished, he would move 

in two directions, eastward into Tunisia and southwest across the 

mountains into French Morocco. This plan seemed to ignore the danger 

to the Allies' line of communications from the direction of both Gibraltar and Spanish Morocco should Spain join the Axis Powers. It also 

failed to take sufficiently into account the shortage in naval escorts 

and the logistical problems involved in funneling all the men, equipment, and supplies needed to seize Algiers, French Morocco, and Tunisia into the port of Oran, whose facilities might not be found intact. The complicated convoy arrangements for the assault, follow-up, 

and build-up phases of the operation that would have to be made 

were enough by themselves to doom the plan in the eyes of the military chiefs in Washington as too risky. 

In response to continuous pressure from the President and the Prime 

Minister for an early assault, Eisenhower advanced D Day from 15 

October to 7 October, when the moon would be in a phase that 

would facilitate surprise. This date he viewed as the earliest practical 

time for the beginning of the invasion. But few informed leaders believed that this date could be met. Admiral King considered 24 October more likely, and even the British planners, who were consistently more optimistic about an early D Day than their American colleagues, admitted that meeting the proposed date would require a 

"superhuman effort." 62 

The most serious problem confronting planners on both sides of 

the Atlantic continued to be the scarcity of assault shipping. The Navy's 

original estimate of fourteen weeks as the time required to convert conventional ships to assault vessels, train crews, rehearse troops in embarkation and debarkation, load troops and cargo, and sail from ports 

of embarkation in the United States and the United Kingdom to destination remained unchanged. This meant that 7 November, the date 

given in the original estimate, would be the earliest possible day for 

the assault to begin. The Navy might also have pointed to the shortage of landing craft for transporting tanks and other assault vehicles 

as an argument against an early D Day. LST's were under construction at the time but none were expected to be available before October or November. 63 

61 Msg, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 22 Aug 42, copy in ABC 381 (7-25-42), Sec. 4-B. 

62 Msg, King to Marshall, 22 Aug 42, sub: Sp Opns, OPD Exec 5, Item 1; Msg 236, 

COS to Jt Staff Mission, 4 Aug 42, Exec 5, Item 2. 

6:1 No LST's actually became available in time for the initial landings but three 

"Maracaibos," forerunners of the LST's, were. 
192 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Nevertheless Roosevelt and Churchill, impatient of delay, continued to insist on an early invasion date. It was such pressure in the 

face of shipping, equipment, and training deficiencies that was responsible for Eisenhower's 21 August proposal to limit drastically the 

size of the assault and confine it entirely to the Mediterranean. 

The plan found few supporters even among those who made it. 

Eisenhower himself regarded it as tentative and the date of execution 

probably too early because as yet little progress had been made in 

planning the force to be organized in the United States and not 

enough was known about scheduling convoys, the availability of air 

and naval support, or the amount of resistance that could be 

expected. 64 

So widely varying were the reactions to the plan in \Vashington 

and London that a reconciliation of views appeared impossible. Fortun;;ttely for the success of the operation, a spirit of compromise developed. By 24 August the British military chiefs were willing to 

moderate their stand for an early invasion somewhat and even to accept the idea of a Casablanca landing, provided the scope of TORCH 

was enlarged to include an attack on Philippeville, a port close to 

Tunisia. Their willingness to make concessions, however, was contingent on a greater naval contribution by the United States. 65 The proposal was unacceptable to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff who 

now used the 21 August plan to bolster their original argument that 

the main blow should be struck in the west, outside the Mediterranean, at or near Casablanca. They would accept an assault on Oran 

along with one on Casablanca but none against ports farther to the 

east. They were also willing to adjust Eisenhower's directive as he had 

requested, bringing his mission more in line with his resources, but 

they stubbornly opposed any increase in the U.S. Navy's contribution 

which would weaken the fleet in critical areas elsewhere in the world. 

Such was the status of TORCH planning when Churchill returned 

from Moscow where he had been subjected to Stalin's taunts because 

of the failure of the Western Allies to open up a second front on the 

Continent. 66 Only by playing up the military advantages of TORCH 

and giving assurances that the invasion would begin no later than 30 

October had he been able to win the Soviet leader's approval of the 

operation. Thus committed, it is no wonder that Churchill was alarmed 

at the turn matters had taken during his absence from London. With 

characteristic vigor he at once sprang into action to restore the strategic concept of TORCH to the shape he believed essential to success. 

64 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-1942, p. 289. 

65 Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 403. 

66 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 484-86; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 373-74. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 193 

In a series of messages to Roosevelt, he urged the establishment of a 

definite date for D Day,67 and argued eloquently for an invasion 

along the broadest possible front in order to get to Tunisia before the 

Germans. "The whole pith of the operation will be lost," he cabled, 

"if we do not take Algiers as well as Oran on the first day." 68 At 

the same time he urged Eisenhower to consider additional landings 

at Bone and Philippeville. 69 He was confident that a foothold in both 

places could be attained with comparative ease and expressed the 

opinion that a strong blow deep inside the Mediterranean would 

bring far more favorable political results vis-a-vis Spain and the 

French in North Africa than would an assault on Casablanca. He 

was not opposed to a feint on that port but he feared making it the 

main objective of the initial landings. Because of the dangerous surf 

conditions, he argued, "Casablanca might easily become an isolated 

failure and let loose upon us ... all the perils which have anyway 

to be faced." 70 As to the time of the attack, he would launch it by 

mid-October at the latest. To meet that target date, he believed naval 

vessels and combat loaders could be found somewhere and outloading 

speeded up. 

Roosevelt, equally unwilling to accept a delay, proposed in his 

reply two simultaneous landings of American troops, one near Casablanca, the other at Oran, to be followed by the seizure of the road 

and rail communications between the two ports and the consolidation of a supply base in French Morocco that would be free from dependence on the route through the Strait of Gibraltar. He appreciated the value of three landings but pointed out that there was not 

currently on hand or in sight enough combat shipping and naval and 

air cover for more than the two landings. He agreed however that 

both the Americans and the British should re-examine shipping resources "and strip everything to the bone to make the third landing 

possible." 71 In his reply Roosevelt also conveyed his views on the national composition of the forces to be used in the initial landings 

within the Mediterranean. Recent intelligence reports from Vichy 

and North Africa had convinced him that this was a matter of such 

great political import that the success or failure of TORCH might well 

depend on the decision made. These reports indicated that in the 

breasts of most Frenchmen in North Africa an anti-British sentiment 

still rankled in consequence of the evacuation at Dunkerque, the de67 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 528. 

68 Ibid., p. 530. 

69 Msg 1511, London to AGWAR, 26 Aug 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42) Sec. 4-B. 

70 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 531. 

71 Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 30 Aug 42, Exec 5, Item 1; Churchill, Hinge of Fate, 

p. 532. 
194 COMMAND DECISIONS 

struction visited on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, British intervention in the French dependencies of Syria and Madagascar, and the 

abortive attack by British-sponsored de Gaulle forces on Dakar. Both 

the President and his advisers were convinced that the strength of 

this sentiment was such that the inclusion of British troops in the assault was extremely dangerous. 72 Roosevelt therefore insisted on confining the initial landings to American troops. 

Churchill did not share the view that Americans "were so beloved by Vichy" or the British "so hated" that it would "make the 

difference between fighting and submission." 73 Nevertheless he was 

quite willing to go along with the President's contention that the 

British should come in after the political situation was favorable, provided the restriction did not compromise the size or employment of 

the assault forces. At the same time he appropriately pointed out that 

the American view on the composition of the assault would affect shipping arrangements and possibly subsequent operations. Since all the 

assault ships would be required to lift purely American units, British 

forces would have to be carried in conventional vessels that could 

enter and discharge at ports. This necessarily would delay follow-up 

help for some considerable time should the landings be stubbornly 

opposed or even held Up.74 

As a result of the transatlantic messages between the two political leaders, a solution to the impasse of late August gradually but steadily began to emerge. On 3 September, Roosevelt, who had promised 

to restudy the feasibility of more than two landings, came up with a 

new plan in which he proposed three simultaneous landings-at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. For Casablanca he proposed a force of 34,-

000 in the assault and 24,000 in the immediate follow-up (all United 

States); for Oran, 25,000 in the assault and 20,000 in the immediate 

follow-up (all United States); for Algiers, 10,000 in the initial beach 

landing (all United States) to be followed within an hour by British 

forces. All British forces in the follow-up, the size of which would 

be left to Eisenhower, would debark at the port of Algiers from noncombat loaded vessels. All the American troops for the Casablanca 

landing were to come directly from the United States; all those for 

Oran and Algiers, from the American forces in the United Kingdom. 

As for shipping, the United States could furnish enough combat load72 AFHQ Commander in Chief Despatch, North African Campaign, p. 4. 

73 These views of Churchill are not in accord with the reports from British intelligence 

agents that Churchill showed Harry Hopkins in July when he was urging the United 

States to accept a North African offensive. Nor are they the same as those expressed in 

his message of 12 July to Dill. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 610-11; Msg, Churchill to 

Field Marshal Dill, 12 Jul 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42) Sec. 4. 

74 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 534. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 195 

ers, ready to sail on 20 October, to lift 34,000 men and sufficient transports and cargo vessels to lift and support 52,000 additional troops. 

Total available shipping under U.S. control, he estimated, was enough 

to move the first three convoys of the proposed Casablanca force. 

This did not include either the American transports, sufficient to lift 

15,000 men, or the nine cargo vessels in the United Kingdom that 

had previously been earmarked for the TORCH operation. Under the 

President's proposal, the British would have to furnish (1) all the shipping (including combat loaders) for the American units assigned to 

take Oran and Algiers except the aforementioned American vessels 

in the United Kingdom, (2) the additional British troops required for 

the Algiers assault and follow-up, and (3) the naval forces for the 

entire operation, less those that the United States could furnish for 

the Casablanca expedition. 

Churchill replied to the American proposal at once, suggesting 

only one modification of importance, a shift of ten or twelve thousand troops from the Casablanca force to that at Oran in order to 

give more strength to the inside landings. Unless this was done, he 

pointed out, the shortage in combat loaders and landing craft would 

rule out an assault on Algiers. 75 

Roosevelt consented to a reduction of approximately 5,000 men in 

the Casablanca force and expressed the belief that this cut, along 

with a previous one made in the Oran force, would release enough 

combat loaders for use at Algiers. Whatever additional troops were 

needed for that landing the President believed could be found in the 

United Kingdom. To these proposals the Prime Minister agreed on 5 

September. 

The scope and direction of the landings were now decided; the 

"transatlantic essay contest" was over. Only the date of the invasion 

remained to be settled. The planning staffs in both Washington and 

London, after six weeks of frustrating uncertainty, could now breathe 

a sigh of relief and proceed with definite operational and logistical 

preparation without the harassing fear that the work of one day would 

be upset by a new development in strategy the next. 

The final decision represented a compromise on the conflicting 

strategic concepts of Washington and London. It sought to minimize 

the risks to the line of communications involved in putting the full 

strength of the Allied effort inside the Mediterranean without giving 

up hope of gaining Tunisia quickly. The plan to make initial landings east of Algiers at Philippeville and Bone, advocated by the Brit75 Msg 144, Prime Minister to Roosevelt, 5 Sep 42, Exec 5, Item 1; Churchill, Hinge 

of Fate, Ch. VII; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 403. 
196 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ish, was abandoned but the assault on Algiers was retained at the 

expense of the forces operating against Casablanca and Oran. The 

political desirability of an all-American assault, though probably still 

valid, was compromised to the extent that British forces were to be 

used at Algiers in the immediate follow-up and for the eastward push 

into Tunisia after a lodgment had been attained. 

No date was set for the attack. The decision the Combined Chiefs 

left to Eisenhower who had a number of matters to consider in making it.76 Because of broad political and strategic reasons and the normal deterioration in weather conditions in the area of impending 

operations during the late fall, the earlier the landings, the better. 

The vital need for tactical surprise pointed to the desirability of a newmoon period. But in the final analysis D Day would be determined 

by the time needed to assemble and prepare necessary shipping, 

acquire naval escorts, equip American units in the United Kingdom, 

and train assault troops and landing craft crews in amphibious operations. By mid-September Eisenhower was sufficiently convinced that 

his logistical and training problems could be solved by late October 

and so he set 8 November for the attack. 77 

His optimism that this date could be met was not shared by all 

his staff, particularly those acquainted with the tremendous logistical 

tasks that remained to be completed. More than the political leaders 

and strategic planners they realized that no task forces of the size 

contemplated could be fully equipped and shipped in the short time 

remaining, no matter how strongly imbued with a sense of urgency 

everyone concerned might be. 78 If there was to be an invasion at all 

in November, they realized that the Allies would have to cut deeply 

into normal requirements and resort to considerable improvisation. 

Events were to prove that those who doubted the complete readiness 

to move on 8 November were correct. 

Even in retrospect, it is debatable whether the decision to invade 

North Africa was the soundest strategic decision that could have been 

made at the time and under the existing circumstances. If there had 

to be an operation in the Atlantic area in 1942 that had a chance of 

succcess, few students of World War II will argue today that TORCH 

was to be preferred over SLEDGEHAMMER. The shortage of landing 

craft and other resources necessary to attain a lodgment in northwest 

Europe and to sustain it afterward was sufficient reason for the rejec76 CCS 103/3, 26 Sep 42, Sub: Outline Plan Opn TORCH. 

77 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, p. 424. 

78 Memo, Col Hughes, DCAO AFHQ, for Gen Clark, 14 Sep 42, sub: Estimate of 

the Supply and Administrative Aspects of Proposed Operations, original in European 

Theater of Operations file, USFET AG 400, Supplies and Equipment, Vol. V. 
DECISION TO INVADE NORTH AFRICA (TORCH) 197 

tion of SLEDGEHAMMER. There was little real doubt but that TORCH 

would siphon off the necessary men and equipment required for 

ROUNDUP in 1943. This the American military leaders saw clearly as 

did the British, although the latter never admitted it openly in conference. The real question therefore remains: Was it wise to embark 

on an operation in the northwest African area in 1942 at the expense 

of a possible direct attack against the Continent in 1943? The British 

as a group and some Americans, notably the President, believed it 

was; most of the American military leaders and strategic planners 

thought otherwise. 

The preference of the British for TORCH undoubtedly stemmed 

fundamentally from their opposition to an early frontal assault on 

Festung Europa. Their inclination for a peripheral strategy was based 

in part on tradition, in part 011 previous experience in the war, in part 

on the desirability of opening up the Mediterranean, and in part on 

the need of bolstering their bastions in the Middle East. More than 

the Americans they knew what it meant to try to maintain a force in 

western Europe in the face of an enemy who could move swiftly and 

powerfully along inner overland lines of communications. Having 

encountered the force of German arms on the Continent earlier in 

the war, they naturally shied away from the prospect of meeting it 

head on again until it had been thoroughly weakened by attrition. 

The American military leaders, on the other hand, less bound by 

tradition and confident that productive capacity and organization 

would give the Allies overwhelming odds within a short time, believed 

the war could be brought to an end more quickly if a main thrust 

was directed toward the heart of the enemy. In their opinion the enemy, 

softened by heavy and sustained preliminary bombardment from the 

air, would become a ready subject for such a thrust by the summer 

of 1943. They also believed that an early cross-Channel attack was 

the best way to help the Russians whose continued participation in 

the war was a matter of paramount importance. They did not want 

SLEDGEHAMMER any more than the British, but fought against scrapping it before Russia's ability to hold out was certain. They opposed 

entry into North Africa because they did not consider it an area 

where a vital blow could be struck and because they wanted to save 

ROUNDUP. Churchill, Brooke, and others may assert, as they do, that 

no cross-Channel attack would have been feasible in 1942 or in 1943 

because the Allies lacked the means and the experience in conducting 

amphibious warfare, and because the enemy was too strong in western Europe. Marshall and his supporters can contend with equal vigor 

that had not TORCH and the preparations for subsequent operations 

in the Mediterranean drained off men and resources, depleted the 
198 COMMAND DECISIONS 

reserves laboriously built up in the United Kingdom under the BOLERO 

program, wrecked the logistical organization in process of being established there, and given the enemy an added year to prepare his 

defenses, a cross-Channel operation could have been carried out successfully in 1943 and the costly war brought to an end earlier. Whose 

strategy was the sounder will never be known. The decision that was 

made was a momentous one in which political and military considerations were so intermingled that it is difficult to determine which carried 

the greater weight. For that reason if for no other, it will be the subject 

of controversy as long as men debate the strategy of World War II. 
8 

U.S. Merchant Shipping and the 

British Import Crisis 

by 

Richard M. Leighton 

In March 1943 the partnership of the United States and Great 

Britain faced one of its severest tests. Allied military fortunes in that 

month seemed at a low ebb-not in the same sense as a year earlier, 

when the war itself had seemed about to be lost, but as a result of 

an almost complete reversal of the bright expectations that had prevailed at the Casablanca Conference only a few weeks before. The 

reversal was a matter partly of military defeats and setbacks in the 

field, partly of a sudden upturn in merchant shipping losses, and 

partly of the revelation that the estimated shipping capabilities on 

which the Casablanca strategic decisions had rested had been seriously 

overestimated. At this critical juncture, the Brit.ish authorities demanded 

large additional tonnages of American shipping in support of their own 

war effort at home and overseas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned 

that the effect would be to cripple American operations overseas for 

the remainder of the year. The President decided, nevertheless, to 

grant the request. It was one of the rare occasions during the war 

when Roosevelt clearly overruled his military advisers in a matter intimately related to high strategy. In this case the results spectacularly 

vindicated his judgment, for the gloomy predictions of the military 

experts failed to materialize. The incide~t strikingly illustrates Roosevelt's real ascendancy over the military high command when he chose 

to assert it, and the informal, almost haphazard, means by which he 

RICHARD M. LEIGHTON, Faculty, Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces. Harvard University, University of Cincinnati, Cornell University, 

Ph.D. Taught: Brooklyn College, University of Cincinnati, The George 

Washington University. Historical Officer, Headquarters, Army Service 

Forces, 1943-46. Historian, OCMH, 1948-59. Coauthor: Global Logistics and 

Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 1955) and Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-

1945 (in preparation), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
200 COMMAND DECISIONS 

made it effective. It also stands as a landmark in the development of 

Anglo-American military-economic collaboration, which made the alliance of the two countries in World War II one of the most effective 

in the history of coalition warfare. 1 

Anglo-American Shipping Collaboration in 1942 

The Anglo-American partnership in World War II achieved a 

union and co-ordination of the war-making resources of the two countries unprecedented in their efficiency, a genuine pooling of effort on 

many fronts behind the military front. Nor was it wholly a case of a 

strong power supporting a weaker one. American aid did enable the 

British to fight, as Churchill has pointed out, as though they were a 

nation of fifty-eight million instead of forty-eight million people. 2 On 

the other hand Britain's war effort, skillfully meshed with America's, 

enabled the United States to produce on a scale that would otherwise 

have been impossible. Britain put almmt 11 percent of its population 

into uniform; the United States less than 8 percent. The disparity is 

significant, and no less so because the two figures are not very far 

apart. The Anglo-American alliance represented a union of societies, 

both heavily industrialized, urban, and economically mature, whose 

similarities outweighed their differences. Collaboration between them 

demanded administrative and technical adjustments far more intricate 

than that between, say, the United States and China, which was wholly 

a matter of material and technical assistance on one side and manpower on the other. Timing was also important. Britain's mobilization was almost complete by the time U.S. mobilization swung into 

high gear after Pearl Harbor. For one year Britain fought alone, and, 

1 The story of the shipping crisis of March 1943 and the developments leading to it 

can be found, in slightly less detail than given here, in Richard M. Leighton and Robert 

W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 1955), Chs. XXV and 

XXVI; this work should also be consulted for the general background and ramifications 

of the episode. The study is based on research in primary records of the War Department, the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the U.S. War Shipping Administration; these last are at present in the custody of the U.S. Maritime Administration. Rather 

sketchy accounts ofthe crisis, from the British point of view, are given in C. B. A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (London: H. M. Stationery Office and Longmans, 

Green Co., 1955), Ch. XVII, and W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1949), Ch. XIV, both in the official British History 

of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series. These two works are, of course, invaluable for an understanding of the British war economy and the pooling of British and 

American merchant shipping. To the best of the writer's knowledge, however, no other 

published acco,unt of the March 1943 shipping crisis exists, and studies of World War II 

strategy hardly mention it. 

2 Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 

pp. 7-8. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 201 

for two and a half years more or less, held the line in Europe and 

the Middle East while the United States mobilized, deployed, and 

staved off disaster in the Pacific. Not until 1943 was the United States 

able to wage offensive war on a large scale. 

The two countries collaborated most closely in the joint use of 

merchant shipping, a sphere in which they very nearly achieved a 

full-fledged pooling of resources. Throughout 1942, however, this collaboration was more of a burden than a help to Britain. Although 

the amount of American merchant shipping in British service almost 

doubled, British warships were diverted to help protect the sea lanes 

in the western Atlantic, with consequent thinning of protection elsewhere, and Britain also contributed heavily to American shipping 

services, particularly in troop ships. British shipping losses in 1942 fell 

just short of 6 million deadweight tons (an increase of a third over 

those in the year preceding, when Britain had been fighting the war 

at sea alone); American losses were less than 2.5 million tons. American shipyards, moreover, were able in this year to offset U.S. losses 

to the extent of almost 4 million tons, while Britain, with only a meager 

building capacity, showed a net loss of more than 2 million tons. By 

the end of March 1943 Britain's dry cargo shipping tonnage had fallen to 18.5 million deadweight tons, almost 3 million tons less than 

its total on the eve of Pearl Harbor.3 

The drain on British merchant shipping during 1942, which Britain's new ally was not yet able to make good, posed a serious and 

growing threat to the British war economy. The heart of that economy 

lay in the industries and people of the United Kingdom, which 

depended for their very existence on an uninterrupted flow of imports. 

These had already declined from a prewar average of more than 50 

million deadweight tons to 42 million in 1940 and 31 million in 1941. 

In 1942, despite desperate efforts to arrest the decline and increased 

assistance from the United States, they fell to 23 million. Even with 

drastic curtailment of domestic consumption and services and increased 

local production of food and munitions, this was far less than was 

needed to meet current requirements. Britain had to eat into its stocks, 

:l (1) Behrens. Merchant Shipping, pp. 69, 293. (2) War Shipping Administration, Shipping Summary, Vol. II, No.6, June 1945. (3) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, 

pp. 412~14, 416~17. 

Deadweight tonnage represents the total carrying capacity of a ship, including ship's 

gear, supplies, and personnel, expressed in long tons (2,240 pounds). Figures on ship 

losses in this paragraph are extrapolated from gross tonnage figures given in (I) by applying a factor of 1.5. (Gross tonnage is a measure of a ship's entire enclosed space expressed in units of 100 cubic feet.) Deadweight tonnage figures in (2), the officially 

accepted U.S. source for World War II shipping losses, are not broken down to show 

separate categories for American- and British-controlled shipping. Tanker losses, reported 

separately, are not used in the present study. 
202 COMMAND DECISIONS 

which by the end of the year had fallen an estimated 2.5 million tons 

to a level dangerously near what the War Cabinet had decided must 

be regarded as irreducible. 4 

By late summer U.S. as well as British officials were growing uneasy 

over the trend. Lewis Douglas, deputy administrator for the War 

Shipping Administration (WSA), visited London in July and he and 

Averell Harriman, the President's lend-lease representative there, 

submitted a special report to the President on 2 August, supplementing 

a more comprehensive one by the two Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards (CSAB) (Washington and London) and warning that 

substantially greater aid in American shipping would be needed if 

Britain were to continue its war effort on the current scale. On 6 October the United States, through the CSAB, formally accepted the principle that, as merchant shipbuilder for the United Nations, it would 

undertake to assign an "appropriate portion" of the residue of tonnage built over tonnage lost in order "to relieve the burden on the 

war services of each of the other United Nations." Before the end of 

that month the President decided to expand the merchant shipbuilding program, hitherto held back because of a shortage of steel, to the 

full capacity of the shipyards. However, the British Government, while 

reasonably confident that Britain would be the chief foreign beneficiary 

of this expansion, felt that the clear drift of the national economy 

toward disaster called for more specific assurance and concrete action. 

It decided to seek from its ally "a solemn compact, almost a treaty" 

setting forth the amount of shipping Britain could expect. 5 

In November Sir Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production, 

came to Washington to negotiate such a settlement, not merely for 

shipping but for the whole field of munitions as well. Depletion of 

domestic stocks, he pointed out, had gone so far that imports had 

little or no margin left for fluctuation; henceforth, the flow must keep 

pace with consumption. Lyttelton requested the United States to guarantee enough shipping in 1943 to enable Britain to bring her dry cargo 

imports up to 27 million tons, a figure that would retard, though it 

would not halt, the depletion of stocks while providing raw materials 

for an expanded output of munitions. To produce these results would, 

the British estimated, require the transfer to British service of ship4 (1) Behrens, Merchant Shipping, pp. 264, 291. (2) Hancock and Gowing, British War 

Economy, pp. 423-26. U.S. shipping did not directly service the U.K. import program in 

1942, but its indirect contribution to that program, by releasing British shipping from 

other routes, was equivalent to between five and six million tons of imports. 

5 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 423-26. (2) Behrens, Merchant 

Shipping, pp. 316-18. (3) Correspondence in WSA Douglas File, folders, Hopkins, Shipping Correspondence, British Merchant Shipping Mission Mise, U.K. Imports. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 203 

ping equivalent to 2.5 million deadweight tons in continuous employment throughout the year-an amount considered sufficient to bring 

III about 7 million tons of imports via the North Atlantic route.s 

The President's response was prompt and sympathetic. He wrote 

to Rear Adm. Emory S. Land of the U.S. Maritime Commission: 

In all probability the British are going to lose again in 1943 more ships 

than they can build. If we are going to keep England in the war at anything like this maximum capacity, we must consider the supplementing of 

their merchant fleet as one of the top military necessities of the war. 7 

Rooseveles principal civilian advisers concurred; the military, evidently, 

were not consulted. Replying formally to the Prime Minister on 3() 

November, Roosevelt noted that the U.S. shipbuilding program was 

being augmented to at least 18.8 million deadweight tons in 1943, 

possibly 20 million.s He promised that the United States would make 

available in 1943 (as a loan rather than by transfer of flag, as requested), sufficient shipping to meet Britain's marginal needs for carriage 

of 27 million tons of imports, along with requirements for military 

supply and essential war services. Over and above U.S. shipping 

already in British service, the amount needed had been estimated, the 

President noted, as "an average of nearly 300,000 tons each month 

of carrying capacity." 9 

6 (1) Behrens, Alerchant Shipping, p. 318. (2) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, 

pp. 421, 428-29. 

7 Memo, FDR for Land, 30 Nov 42, MS Index to Hopkins Papers, Book VII, Shipping, p. 4, Item 3(f), filed in OCMH. 

g Actual construction in 1943 totaled 19.2 million tons. Gerald J. Fischer, A Statistical 

Summary of Shipbuilding Under the U.S. j\1aritime Commission During World War II (Washington, 1949), Table B-1, p. 39. 

9 Ltr, President to Churchill, 30 Nov 42, ABC 400 (11-9-42). Where the President 

got the figure can only be conjectured. This much carrying capacity put into the U.K. 

import service each month and left continuously in service would bring in some 9.36 

million tons of imports by the end of the year (assuming each ship made 4.8 round voyages per year), rather than the 7 million the British had asked for. On the other hand, 

if by "carrying capacity" the President, who was notoriously impatient of lechnical distinctions, really meant "shipping," then his "nearly 300,000 tons" might be a round 

figure for the 281,000 tons of additional shipping that would be needed each month (assuming carrying capacity to be 80 percent of a ship's deadweight tonnage) to carry 7 

million tons of imports. Ten days before, the President's shipping advisers had advised 

him to turn over to the British "thirty percent of the excess of U.S. dry cargo construction over U.S. ship losses .... in amounts each month as nearly equal as present forward 

commitments permit." This, too, figures out at about 300,000 tons per month. Memo, 

Land, Douglas, and Harriman for President, 20 Nov 42. See also paper, Allocations 

Needed To Maintain British Services, 19 Nov 42, and related correspondence, WSA Douglas 

File, folder Allocs Gen. The original British request for 2.5 million tons of shipping in 

service throughout the year, if the 80 percent factor is used for arriving at carrying capacity, would add up to 9.6 million tons of imports. It would seem therefore that the 

British figured on carrying capacity of only 60 percent of ship's deadweight tonnage. If, 

however, the 60 percent factor is applied to a monthly increment of 300,000 tons of shipping, the total is only 5.6 million tons of imports. 
204 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The President's letter contained important qualifications. No schedule was set up for turning over the shipping, and the President warned 

that transfers would lag during the next three months because of current commitments in the Mediterranean. He hoped, too, that with the 

expected opening of the Mediterranean passage in 1943, the shorter 

turnaround would enable the British to reduce requirements. He 

emphasized the need· for strict economy on both sides and reserved 

the right in an emergency to divert shipping temporarily from the 

U.K. import service. On the other hand, the President set no ceiling 

to the amount of shipping that might be made available, he acknowledged the British estimate of import requirements as "substantially 

correct," and he assured Churchill that U.S. shipping would not be 

diverted from the import program without his personal approval. 

Subsequently, U.S. shipping officials, in working out detailed arrangements, restated reservations already laid down in the agreement of 

6 October 1942 and elsewhere-especially the proviso that any tonnage allotted to the British must come out of the excess, if any, of 

new construction over losses, and would be limited to demonstrated 

need. Io 

The President's warning of a probable lag in early deliveries was 

immediately borne out. Shipments in American bottoms during December were hardly more than token in character, and the schedules 

drawn up by WSA provided for delivery of only 1.8 million tons of 

imports, soon revised downward to 1.15 million tons, in the first half 

of 1943. Britain's own shipping position, meanwhile, was deteriorating rapidly. Military demands upon shipping for the forces in North 

Africa proved far larger than expected, and British shipping suffered 

heavily-far more so than American-from German submarines during the period of the North African operation. Apart from losses, evasive routing in areas where escorting had to be curtailed or dispensed 

with lengthened already long voyages and thus in effect reduced the 

net movement of cargo. During the same period, moreover, Britain 

was lending her ally ships to move U.S. cargo from the United Kingdom to North Africa-some 682,000 deadweight tons of shipping 

between October 1942 and mid-April 1943, or more than twice as 

much as the United States lent to Britain for use on this route. (See 

Map II, inside back cover.) The impact upon the U.K. import program 

was devastating. During the last quarter of 1942 imports came in at 

an annual rate of only about 20 million tons, which was at least 6 

10 (I) Ltr, President to Churchill, 30 Nov 42, cited n. 9. (2) Memos, Douglas for Salter, 

13 and 21 Dec 42, WSA Douglas File, Reading File. (3) Other papers in WSA Douglas 

File, folders, Salter Memos and U.K. Imports. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 205 

million tons less than the total consumption for that year. In January 1943 imports fell to the lowest point, as it proved, of the whole 

war-less than half the level of January 1941, nearly 42 percent less 

than in January 1942-and by February the British had to revise 

downward their estimate of the amount of imports they could expect 

to carry in their own shipping. Fearing new military demands and 

uneasy over the lag in American aid, the British Government began 

to doubt the wisdom of allowing domestic stocks to drop as far below 

their end-1941 level as it had earlier been willing, in expectation of 

American aid, to permit. Food stocks had fallen by the end of 1942 

to a level that would support wartime consumption for only three or 

four months, and for certain important items the level was even lower. II 

In January 1943 the Prime Minister took the drastic step of switching 

to the Atlantic area import routes 52 of the 92 monthly sailings usually 

assigned to service the Indian Ocean, in order, as he put it, not to 

make Britain "live from hand to mouth, absolutely dependent on the 

fulfillment of American promises in the last six months of the year." 

This was a bold, even a desperate move. 12 The ships that carried military cargo for British forces all along the route to India also carried 

food and other basic economic necessities for the civilian populations, 

while in their cross voyages they contributed to the complex interregional trade on which these countries also depended. The removal 

of so much tonnage endangered the delicate balance between subsistence and famine in the whole Indian Ocean area, particularly in 

India itself, and in fact contributed to the outbreak of famine in Bengal 

later in the year. On their return trips, moreover, the same ships performed other vital services-carrying coal, for example, from South 

Africa to the Argentine, and picking up bauxite cargoes in British 

Guiana. 13 British officials emphasized that the switch of shipping was 

aimed at retarding depletion of domestic stocks, not building them up, and 

that it would not justify a reduction in American aid. While they expected 

the switch to produce a net gain of about 1.7 million tons of imports during 

1943, there would still be a requirement for 7.6 million tons to be carried 

in American bottoms. The U.S. economic mission in London not only 

agreed with this position but also urged that the American shipping 

contribution during the first six months of 1943 should be raised to a level 

sufficient to bring in three million tons of imports, in order to keep within 

11 Behrens, Merchant Shipping, pp. 315-16. 

12 Ltr, Prime Minister to Gen Ismay, 5 Jan 43, quoted in Winston S. Churchill, The 

Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 926. 

I:l Behrens, Merchant Shipping, pp. 319-22, 340-53. 
206 COMMAND DECISIONS 

supportable limits the burden upon U.K. ports and railroads during the 

second half of the year. 14 

Casablanca and the Six-Million- Ton Misunderstanding 

In the midst of these negotiations the political and military leaders of the two countries met at Casablanca for the third of their great 

wartime conferences. The conference was held late in January 1943 

in an atmosphere of moderate optimism. Allied armies in North Africa 

were preparing for a final drive to clear Tunisia, U.S. forces in the 

Pacific were reorganizing after successful operations in the southern 

Solomons and New Guinea and preparing to eject the Japanese from 

the Aleutians, and German armies were in full retreat along the whole 

Eastern Front. Even the Atlantic battle, although losses of dry cargo 

shipping had soared above a million deadweight tons in November 

1942, seemed at the moment to be turning in favor of the Allies. '5 The 

principal concrete agreement reached at the conference was the decision to invade Sicily (HUSKY) as soon as possible after the conclusion 

of the campaign in Tunisia. But for the undertaking closest to the hearts 

of the Americans, an invasion of northwestern Europe across the English 

Channel, the prospects were uncertain, and, as far as carrying out 

such an operation in 1943 was concerned, seemed extremely remote. 

The Germans already had more forces in western Europe than the 

Allies could hope to bring to bear against them. Even if a bridgehead could be seized, it would probably be hemmed in during the 

winter, as General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial 

General Staff, put it, "with wire and concrete," and excellent eastwest communications would enable the Germans to build up forces 

more rapidly than the Allies. 16 

If a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 had become impracticable, the 

Americans were intent on laying the foundation for launching it in 

spring of 1944. Whether an invasion force of sufficient size could be 

amassed in the British Isles seemed in large measure to be a question 

of how much cargo shipping could be made available to move U.S. 

equipment and supplies across the North Atlantic. The Combined 

Chiefs of Staff (CCS) accordingly asked Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somerveil, head of the U.S. Army Services of Supply and the only U.S. 

representative present who could claim any familiarity with the ship14 (I) Correspondence and papers in WSA Douglas File, folders, U.K. Imports and 

Allocs Gen. (2) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 429-30. 

15 WSA Shipping Summary, Vo!' II, No.6, June 1945. 

16 See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, pp. 673-75. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 207 

ping situation, to draw up a schedule showing how many U.S. troops 

could be deployed to Britain and supported there during the remainder 

of 1943. In this task he had the assistance of Lord Frederick Leathers, 

the British Minister of War Transport, who was of course fully informed 

on all matters relating to British shipping, an important element in the 

question under consideration. 

Unfortunately, the officials of the U.S. War Shipping Administration, who alone could have spoken with authority on the American 

side of the picture, were not present, and Somervell, it developed, was 

not fully abreast of recent developments in the negotiations between 

British and U.S. shipping officials on the question of American aid. 

The British import program, as such, received only perfunctory attention at Casablanca and it appeared in the final decisions of the conference only in the form of a reaffirmation of the already accepted 

principle that maintenance of Britain's war economy would be a first 

charge on Allied resources and effort. The Joint Chiefs themselves had 

not learned of the President's commitment to make U.S. shipping 

available to bolster the British economy until late in December, when 

a copy of Roosevelt's letter to Churchill of 30 November was shown 

to them "very unofficially and confidentially" by the British representatives in Washington. 17 Presumably this tardy intelligence was 

passed on to General Somervell, but at Casablanca he displayed a 

degree of confusion over the precise terms of the President's letter and 

of the program set up to implement it that Lord Leathers must have 

found puzzling. 18 

Somervell apparently had two misconceptions concerning the 

President's commitment. First, he seemed to regard it as aimed at 

replacing Britain's net shipping losses-a principle considered and 

rejected two months earlier-rather than at meeting Britain's marginal needs. The difference could mean much or little, depending on 

the actual course of ship losses in 1943, but Somervell hoped that ship 

losses would decline sufficiently in 1943 to reduce the total demand 

substantially. Somervell's second, and more serious, misconception lay 

in his interpretation of the ambiguous phrase "nearly 300,000 tons 

each month." He apparently regarded this, in the first place, as an 

implied ceiling on the amount to be turned over, and, in the second 

place, as a single-voyage rather than a cumulative allocation of shipping. Under this interpretation, and with only eleven months remain17 Memo, Deane for Marshall, King, and Arnold, 26 Dec 42, CCS 400 (11-30-42). 

18 Behrens, Merchant Shipping, pagc 319, asserts that WSA officials also were unaware 

of the President's commitment for more than a month after it was made, but WSA records show conclusively that that agency was actively involved in both thc preliminary 

discussions and the development of implementing arrangements immediately following. 
208 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ing in the year, 300,000 tons of carrying capacity each month would 

bring in only about 2.5 million tons of imports at most, not 7 million. I;! 

Somervell's tentative schedule for U.S. overseas deployment in 1943, 

after allowing for substantial movements to the Mediterranean and 

other theaters, envisaged something more than a million U.S. troops 

to be assembled in Britain by the end of the year, out of a total of 

almost 2.4 million expected to be overseas. 20 This estimate represented 

the maximum capacity of cargo shipping to support troops overseas 

during the first half of 1943, and of troop shipping to move them 

during the second half, when cargo shipping was expected to become 

more abundant. These assumptions, however, rested upon Somervell's 

misinterpretation of the shipping commitment to Britain. Beyond this, 

Somervell expected the British themselves to contribute substantial 

amounts of shipping for the American build-up in the United Kingdom-a personnel lift of 345,000 mainly during the spring and summer, and 1.6 million measurement tons (about 1.34 million deadweight tons) of cargo shipping, mainly late in the year. The British 

offer of troop shipping was in fact conditional upon the availability 

of sufficient escorts to convoy it, which, in view of the probable needs 

for the impending attack on Sicily, seemed a risky assumption. 21 

Somervell did indeed elicit from Lord Leathers a tentative undertaking to lend the tonnage stated for cargo shipping, but the undertaking was heavily qualified to protect both Britain's import program 

and her major operational needs. It was, in fact, conditional upon 

Britain's having a surplus of shipping available for the purpose-a 

wholly unreal condition, as Leathers subsequently pointed out, since, 

according to the President's 30 November letter, Britain was to receive 

only enough U.S. shipping to fill marginal needs that could not be 

met with shipping already in British service. There could, therefore, 

be no surplus to give back to the Americans. In any case, the figure 

of 1.6 million measurement tons was a rapid estimate "subject to 

19 (I) CCS 172, Note by Somervell, 22 Jan 43, Shipping Capabilities for BOLERO 

Build-up. (2) Msg, Salter to Douglas, 25 Feb 43, WSA Douglas File, folder Allocs Gen. 

How much aid Somervell was actually figuring on is not clear. His chief of transportation, General Gross, on separate occasions later mentioned 3 million and 2.4 million tons 

of imports. See Memo, Gross for Marshall, 17 Mar 43, and handwritten note on Msg, 

Douglas to Harriman, 9 Mar 43, both in Hq ASF, folder Shipping 1941-43. 

20 By the end of 1943 Army forces overseas numbered about 2.6 million, but only 

768,000 were in the European theater. Statistical Review, World War II (Army Service 

Forces, no date), p. 198. 

21 CCS 172, 22 Jan 43, cited n. 19. Actually, lack of escorts caused the virtual suspension of U.S. troop movements to the United Kingdom during the spring and early summer, but by the end of the year the British were able to meet almost their entire 

commitment of troop shipping, largely by using fast liners such as the two Queens, which 

could sail unescorted. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 209 

check." Somervell, Leathers later asserted, "fully understood this and 

repeatedly acknowledged his understanding." As Sir Arthur Salter, 

Leathers' representative in Washington, summed up the matter: 

Lord Leathers gave an overoptimistic estimate (safeguarded because 

slated to be checked) on an unreal assumption given by General Somervell. It was in any case a provisional estimate (even on that unreal basis) 

and not a commitment, and it was all on the repeatedly stated, and 

acknowledged, basis that it was only an estimate of what, on a given 

assumption, might be available after British import requirements had been 

met. 22 

Even with the addition of the considerable number of British forces 

already in the United Kingdom and yet to be organized, Somervell's 

projected build-up of American forces in 1943 would provide hardly 

more than a fair beginning toward an invasion army capable of overcoming Germany's defenses in the West. Allowing for a large contingent of air force personnel for the planned strategic bombing offensive against Germany, and for service troops to build and operate the 

base of operations in Britain, the one-million-odd U.S. troops that 

Somervell thought could be amassed there by the end of 1943 would 

contain a ground army of only seven or eight divisions. A larger 

build-up could only be achieved by diverting shipping from other 

theaters, with consequent diminution of strength, loss of momentum, 

and, probably, sacrifice of the initiative so painfully won during the 

latter part of 1942-consequences the Americans were unwilling to 

risk in the Pacific and the Far East, and the British were unwilling 

to risk in the Mediterranean. Despite publicly proclaimed hopes of 

defeating Germany in 1943, the Allied leaders no longer seriously 

anticipated that a decisive blow could be struck in western Europe 

until 1944. Accepting Somervell's deployment schedule as a basis for 

detailed planning, the CCS clung to the hope that by the following 

spring sufficient forces would be on hand in the United Kingdom for 

a major cross-Channel effort. 

The hope, and the deployment expectations on which it rested, 

depended on a.ssumptions on both sides that, as we have seen, were' 

far apart. The British counted on enough U.S. shipping to carry more 

than 7 million tons of their domestic imports in 1943; they were about 

to ask, in fact, for enough to carry some 7.6 million tons, and, if the 

need could be established, could reasonably expect under the terms 

of the President's pledge of 30 November that the request would be 

granted. On the American side, the military leaders were making plans 

based on the assumption that British demands on U.S. shipping would 

come to less than a third of this amount and that, out of the ship-

" Memo, Salter for Douglas, 25 Feb 43, WSA Douglas File, folder Alloes Gen. 
210 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ping lent, the British would turn back a substantial part to carry military cargoes for the U.S. forces in Britain. Between the two sets of 

expectations stretched a gap roughly equivalent to more than 6 million tons of carrying capacity over the coming year-more than a 

fourth of the entire tonnage of cargo that was in fact to be shipped 

to all U.S. Army forces o'Zerseas in 1943. The unrecorded discussions 

at Casablanca must repeatedly have come within a hairsbreadth of 

revealing to both sides how far apart their fundamental assumptions 

were. There must have been many moments when Somervell or Leathers dimly and uneasily sensed that the other's premises were different 

from his own. Frequently, Leathers later reported, he told Somervell 

"that he preferred that British aid [to the American build-up in Britain], because of uncertainties, should not be counted in Somervell's 

study .... 23 Nevertheless, the conference came to an end with the 

misunderstanding still unrevealed. The revelation, when it came, was 

to be explosive. 

The Shipping Crisis of March 1943 

For almost seven weeks after Casablanca the misunderstanding 

persisted. Somervell left for a tour of North Africa, the Middle East, 

and India, while WSA and British officials in Washington continued 

their negotiations over the scale of American assistance. 

Meanwhile, the military outlook was deteriorating. In the South 

Pacific the Americans moved another step up the Solomons ladder 

without opposition into the Russell Islands, but prospects for a rapid 

concerted drive on Rabaul, key Japanese bastion barring the road 

back to the Philippines, faded as the staffs in Washington belatedly 

faced up to the requirements, largely glossed over at Casablanca, that 

such an effort would demand. Late in March, after a wrangle between 

the Washington planners and theater representatives, the Joint Chiefs 

finally bowed to the necessity of deferring the reduction of Rabaul 

until some time in 1944. In Burma, a British drive south along the 

Arakan coast toward Akyab, just over the border from India, bogged 

down, and it became increasingly clear that the British commanders 

there had no stomach for the larger operations to which this was to 

have been a prelude. Prospects for aggressive action in the ChinaBurma-India theater were further clouded by the bitter dispute 

between Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell and Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault over the latter's insistence upon a dominant role for U.S. air 

forces in China, which would require most or all of the limited amount 

20 Msg. Harriman to Douglas, 23 Feb 43, WSA Douglas File, folder Alloes Gen. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 211 

of supplies that could be flown over the Hump, at the expense of Stilwell's program for equipping and reorganizing the Chinese armies 

and constructing a land route into China. In Europe it was clear by 

March that the expectations of immediately resuming the build-up 

of U.S. forces in Britain while pressing the North African campaign 

to a successful conclusion had been visonary. Troop and cargo movements across the North Atlantic dwindled almost to the vanishing 

point as shipping and escorts were diverted to move reinforcements 

and materiel to the Mediterranean. And in mid-February the Allies 

suffered a crushing setback in North Africa when Field Marshal 

Erwin Rommel launched a powerful counteroffensive in western 

Tunisia that broke through thinly deployed U.S. armor and for a 

time threatened to sever the Allied supply line from Algeria and 

Morocco. As Allied military fortunes stagnated or declined, the war 

at sea took a sudden turn for the worse. In February the U-boats, 

having refitted and reorganized, struck with deadly effect in the North 

Atlantic, concentrating on the several-hundred-mile gap in midocean 

that lay beyond the range of air cover from existing bases. Ship losses 

in March soared to a level only slightly lower than their peak in November, and the Casablanca deployment expectations went up in smoke. 

It was at this juncture that the whole issue of shipping aid to Britain 

came unexpectedly to ahead. 24 

On 19 February Lewis Douglas had a talk with Somervell, just 

returned from his trip abroad. Somervell wanted to set up a special 

convoy of twenty-five ships to carry equipment and supplies to hasten 

the rearming of French forces in North Africa. Douglas was dubious. 

If the demand were met in full, he said, ships would probably have 

to be taken from the British import program, and this, under the arrangements Somervell no doubt knew of, could only be done with the 

President's consent. Somervell looked blank, asked "What arrangement?" and, when reminded of the President's letter of 30 November, 

replied that this had now been superseded by his agreement at Casablanca with Lord Leathers. He showed Douglas a copy of CCS 172, 

his Casablanca deployment paper, containing the heavily qualified 

British offer to contribute 1.6 million measurement tons of cargo shipping to the U.S. build-up in the United Kingdom. Douglas discreetly 

24 (1) Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 

1951), Pl'. 7-16, 673. (2) Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide (New York: Doubleday and 

=:ompany, Inc., 1957), pp. 489-9\. (3) Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval 

Operations in World War II, Vol. II, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), Ch. XIV 

and App. I. (4) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds.), ,The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, Vol. II, Europe-TORCH to POINTBLANK-August 1942 to December 1943 

(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 384-95. (5) Behrens, Merchant Shipping, pp. 293, 367. (6) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, App. H. 
212 COMMAND DECISIONS 

refrained from argument, promised to do what he could to find ships 

for the special convoy, and, after some desultory talk about SomerveIl's trip, hurried back to his office. 25 

Within a few days, after a quick check with Sir Arthur Salter in 

Washington and an exchange of cables with Harriman in London, 

Douglas had the British version of the Casablanca bargain. Meanwhile, faced by an alarming lag in the flow of British imports, WSA 

officials were drawing up new schedules greatly increasing the amount 

of U.S. shipping to be diverted to British use during the critical first 

half of the year. 26 

Yet almost two more weeks passed before Somervell realized what 

had happened. Douglas had told him enough on the 19th to indicate 

the actual scope of the American commitment to maintain British imports, and may have assumed that Somervell now understood the 

situation. As for the special convoy, most of the vessels needed were 

actually in sight, and Douglas was anxious to avoid asking the President to invoke the escape clause of the 30 November pledge in order 

to divert the remainder from the British import program. While this 

matter was still pending, Somervell's transportation chief, Maj. Gen. 

Charles P. Gross, notified Douglas on the 27th that the Army would 

appreciate WSA assistance in putting pressure on the British to make 

good their "commitments" of shipping for the U.S. build-up in the 

United Kingdom Douglas replied that the latest messages from 

Harriman in London offered little hope on this score in the light of 

the deterioration of the British import program. Still later, Douglas 

(according to his own account) again explained the British position to 

Somervell, and Somervell, on 9 March, approved a cable Douglas 

sent to Harriman noting his (Somervell's) understanding of that position. But what neither Gross nor even Somervell (despite the latter's 

discussions with Douglas on 19 February and subsequently) understood up to this point, apparently, was the full extent of the gap, in 

terms of actual tonnages, between the amount of shipping they, and 

the amount that the British, expected would have to be lent to meet 

Britain's full import requirements. Precisely what made the light suddenly dawn is not clear, but on 10 March Gross scribbled a startled 

notation to Somervell: 

Lord Leathers made his promise to you with U.S. help to the extent of 

lifting 7,000,000 tons in mind. You accepted it with that help reduced to 

25 Douglas Notes on Conference With Somervell, 19 Feb 43, WSA Douglas File, folder 

Army Reqmts. 

26 (I) Douglas Notes on Conference With Salter, 19 Feb 43, WSA Douglas File, folder 

Army Reqmts. (2) Msg, Harriman to Douglas, 23 Feb 43, and (3) Memo, Salter for 

Douglas. 25 Feb 43, both in WSA Douglas File. folder Allocs Gen. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 213 

30 sailings a month in mind, or about 2,400,000 tons lift. The whole matter of U.S. help in the U.K. import program must come out in open for 

decision by CCS.27 

The British, meanwhile, were getting worried. Late in February 

Eisenhower sent in a request for still another special convoy to sail in 

April. This made unavoidable a decision on the import program at a 

time when other decisions on combined allocations for shipping were 

pressing for attention-for the Burma and Sicily build-up movements, 

which must shortly begin, for Soviet aid, and for reviving the flagging build-up in the United Kingdom. Finally, there was a growing 

feeling in London that a new and definitive division of shipping resources between the two countries was imperative. Early in March 

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was sent to Washington to take up 

the problem directly with the President. He brought with him a 

strongly worded note from the Prime Minister: 

Our tonnage constantly dwindles, the American increases .... We 

ha ve undertaken arduous and essential operations encouraged by the belief that we could rely on American shipbuilding to see us through. But 

we must know where we stand. We cannot live from hand to mouth on 

promises limited by provisos. This not only prevents planning and makes 

the use of ships less economical; it may in the long run even imperil good 

relations. Unless we can get a satisfactory long-term settlement, British 

ships will have to be withdrawn from their present military service even 

though our agreed operations are crippled or prejudiced. 28 

On 12 March Eden arrived in Washington, and on the same day 

the British representatives brought before the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff their estimated shipping requirements for carrying out their share 

of the military operations projected at Casablanca. The point of departure in the British presentation to the CCS was that the import 

program of 27 million tons for 1943 was above discussion, and no allusion was made to current estimates, then under discussion with 

WSA, that as many as 9 million of the 27 million tons might have to 

be carried in American shipping. The paper emphasized that the 

27 (1) Note, dated 10 Mar 43, on Msg, Douglas to Harriman, 9 Mar 43, Hq ASF, 

folder Shipping 1941-43. (2) Douglas' Notes on Telephone Conversation With Hopkins, 

19 Feb 43, and (3) Douglas Notes on Conference With Gross, I Mar 43, both in WSA 

Douglas File, folder Army Reqmts. (4) Douglas Notes on Telephone Conversation With 

Hopkins, 22 Feb 43, WSA Douglas File, folder Hopkins. (5) Memo, Land and Douglas 

for President, 23 Feb 43; (6) Ltr, Gross to Douglas, 27 Feb 43; and (7) Msg, Douglas to 

Harriman, no date, all in WSA Douglas File, folder Allocs Gen. 

" (I) Quotation from Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, p. 430. (Quoted by 

permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.) See also Ltr, Leathers to COS, 

I Mar 43, quoted Ibid., pp. 336-38, and Ch. XVII. (2) Douglas Notc~ on Conference 

With Gross, I Mar 43, and Telephone Conversation With Somervell, 5 Mar 43, both in 

WSA Douglas File, folder Army Reqmts. (3) Memo, Salter for Douglas, 3 Mar 43, and 

(4) Msg, Harriman to Douglas, no date, both in WSA Douglas File, folder Allocs Gen. 
214 COMMAND DECISIONS 

maintenance of Britain's domestic war economy had always been recognized as a first charge on coalition resources. It warned that the 

current rate of imports held out little prospect of meeting even a 12-

million-ton goal by midyear, which the British considered imperative 

if the quota for the entire year were to be met. Over and above assistance to the import program and American shipping already servicing British programs in the Indian Ocean, Africa, and Australasia, 

the British set forth the following additional requirements for American shipping: 

(a) Fourteen sailings per month to the eastern Mediterranean in April, 

May, and June for the maintenance of British forces in the Sicily operation during its early stages; 

(b) Twenty-five sailings per month in April, May, and June, and nineteen per month in July and August, to the Indian Ocean for the build-up 

for the Burma offensive; 

(c) Assistance on a scale yet to be determined in shipping equipment 

and supplies to Turkey. 

No British cargo shipping could be provided, moreover, for the U.S. 

build-up in the United Kingdom. 29 

The reaction of the Washington staffs to this demand was violent. 

Hurried calculations of the implications of the requested transfers produced appalling statistics. Recent deployment estimates had indicated 

that about 1.4 million U.S. Army troops might be sent overseas in 

1943, while certain adjustments in the U.S. Navy's requirements had 

opened the possibility either of increasing that figure or of raising assistance to the British import program to a level of 5 million tons. If 

7 million tons of imports must be carried, the Army's deployment 

would have to be cut by 225,000 men; a loan of shipping to support 

British forces in the Mediterranean and India would mean a further 

cut of 375,000 men. Taken together, the British proposals threatened 

to reduce a potential U.S. deployment of over 1.5 million troops to 

about 800,000. Moreover, the cut would be made primarily during 

the critical spring months, when shipping would be at its tightest and 

when, according to current plans, the battle of Tunisia was to reach 

its climax, preparations for HUSKY were to be completed, and the 

build-up of air forces in Britain was to hit full stride. During these 

months, if British demands were met in full, the movement of U.S. 

forces would virtually cease. 30 And what if the aid were refused? 

29 (1) CCS 183/1, 12 Mar 43, title: Review of the Availability of UN Shipping (memo 

by representatives of COS). (2) CCS 183/3, 18 Mar 43, same title. 

30 (I) Memo,. Gross for Marshall, 17 Mar 43, sub: CCS 183/1. ... (2) Incl to CCS 

183/2, 18 Mar 43, title: Review of Availability of UN Shipping, both in ABC 

560 (2-26-43) Sec. IA. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 215 

Since the British had already made it clear that they intended to meet 

their import quota in full, whatever the cost to other programs, the 

probable consequences of forcing them (assuming they could be 

forced) to support their share of the planned offensives in the Mediterranean and in Burma wholly from their own resources seemed 

hardly less catastrophic than would be the impact of the requested 

aid, if granted, upon U.S. strength overseas. British participation in 

the Soviet aid shipments to Murmansk would cease immediately and 

for the duration of the Sicily campaign, and all maintenance shipments for either the British forces in North Africa or those in the Indian Ocean area would have to be suspended until July, and reduced 

for the remainder of the summer to half the normal scale. This was, 

of course, pure hypothesis, since it was unlikely that the British would 

accept such deprivation of their forces overseas, and neither the U.S. 

nor the British Government was likely to permit so heavy a cut in the 

Soviet aid program. 31 

Caught in a predicament from which they saw no escape, the Joint 

Chiefs and their staffs fumed helplessly. In CCS conClave the U.S. 

representatives argued that the irreducible minimum of British imports 

was not a question to be determined unilaterally by the British, but 

should be weighed against other demands. Admiral King even went 

so far as to challenge the premise that maintenance of the British economy at a given level was a first charge on Allied resources, and SomerveIl thought that U.S. shipping for British imports should be provided 

only "to the extent that the United States thinks is necessary." Staff 

estimates pointedly noted that if American shipping assistance to Britain were held at the level currently being supplied, as many as two 

million U.S. troops might be deployed and supported overseas in 1943. 

General Gross, according to Douglas, who saw him immediately after 

the British submitted their proposals, was "very much disturbed and 

upset," and in a meeting of the Combined Military Transportation 

Committee three days later his complaints against the British (in the 

presence of their representatives), for having concealed at Casablanca 

the extent of their dependence on U.S. shipping, were couched in language so blunt that the committee decided to consider most of the 

discussion off the record. Gross saw no reason why the British import 

program should be sacrosanct. "If they were to exert their utmost en-

'll Inc! B to CCS 183/2, 18 Mar 43. As it happened, the convoys to northern Soviet 

ports were suspended in March and did not run again until late in the year, primarily 

because of the requirements of escort coverage for the 1\1editerranean convoys, The suspension was partly compensated for by increased shipments via the Persian Gulf from 

July on and by shipments to Vladivostok on the north Pacific route in vessels flying the 

USSR flag. 
216 COMMAND DECISIONS 

deavors," he wrote to Marshall, pointing to the four-million-ton gap 

between 1942 imports and the 1943 goal, "the call upon us would be 

equal to ... shipping to lift 3,400,000 tons of imports," not 7 or 8 

million. A sacrifice of only 3 million tons of imports, according to staff 

estimates, would free enough shipping to meet Britain's military 

needs in full. 32 

General Marshall showed Gross's suggestion to Sir John Dill, the 

British Army representative on the CCS. The latter remarked, with 

exquisite tact, that it was "a good straightforward review of this baffling problem" and merely reminded Marshall that the War Cabinet 

decision on a 27-million-ton import quota for 1943 was his "Bible," 

and that the program imposed deep cuts on civilian production in 

Britain in order to build up the production of munitions (with an ultimate saving in shipping space) by some 50 percent. "I am most anxious," Dill concluded, "that all our cards should be put on the table. 

The shipping problem is terribly serious and time is rushing by." 33 

With U-boats sinking ships at the rate of more than four a day 

and only a handful of subs sunk to show for this slaughter, the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff fully shared Dill's sense of urgency.34 The Joint Strategic Survey Committee was advising them to review and reorient the 

whole strategic program outlined at Casablanca, since it was obvious 

that the planners at that time had "overestimated prospective resources, 

particularly shipping, and underestimated the demands on them."35 A 

viable strategy, thought the committee, must first of all recognize the 

irreducible claims of such basic commitments as antisubmarine operations, support of forces overseas, and maintenance of the war economies, and tailor military operations to what could be carried out with 

residual resources, especially shipping, not absorbed by the basic commitments. But Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, chief of OPD, reflected 

the prevailing Army view that strenuous efforts must be made to find 

silipping to carry out the Casablanca military program, if necessary 

by imposing "severe cuts" on the nonmilitary programs.36 

32 (I) Memo, Gross for Marshall, 17 Mar 43, cited n. 30. (2) Douglas Notes on Conference With Gross, 12 Mar 43, WSA Douglas File, folder Army Reqmts. (3) Memo, 

Keating for Douglas, 30 Mar 43, same file, folder CMTC. (4) OPD Notes on JPS 66th 

Mtg, 24 Mar 43, ABC 560 (2-26-43) Sec. IA. (5) CCS 183/2. (6) Rpt by JSSC, 23 Mar 

43, Review of Availability of UN Shipping, ABC 560 (2-26-43) Sec. IA. (7) Supplementary Min, 75th Mtg CCS, 12 Mar 43. 

33 Note, Dill to Marshall, 18 Mar 43, Hq ASF, folder Shipping 1941-43. 

34 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 344; Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 10. 

35 JSSC II, 22 Mar 43, title: Survey of Present Situation, ABC 381 (9-25-41) Sec. 4. 

30 Memo, Handy for Marshall, 28 Mar 43, with atchd notes and related papers in 

Exec 3, Item lA, Case 55. The position of the JSSC was sustained by the JCS two weeks 

later in CCS 199, 13 Apr 43, title: Survey of Present Strategic Situation. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 217 

This was the crux of the matter. In a wrangle over strategic priorities in the CCS, the Americans argued with some heat that the 

war economy programs should not be allowed to become irreducible 

fixed charges but, like military requirements, should be subject to adjustment. Strategy must not become the residuary legatee of war economy arbitrarily sustained at a level that, in a deteriorating military 

situation, might seem relatively luxurious. But it was a losing battle. 

The British representatives refused to budge from their position that 

maintenance of the British war economy, at the level fixed by the British Government and approved by the President, was a first charge 

against Allied resources. The Americans secured only a deviously 

worded amendment to the effect that "first charge" programs were 

somehow to be supported "concurrently" with other programs and 

operations. 37 

At this juncture the problem was taken away from the CCS altogether. Before the Joint Chiefs could get their teeth into the substance 

of the new British shipping requirements, they were informed the President had appointed a "special board" headed by Harry Hopkins to 

look into the matter, and there was nothing to do but await a decision. Since, as Admiral Ernest J. King glumly remarked, "shipping 

[is] at the root of everything," it seemed not unlikely that the new 

board would "reorientate strategic policy" and "in effect supersede the 

Combined Chiefs." 38 

As it happened, the Joint Chiefs were granted one more move. Hopkins asked Somervell to draw up a scheme of shipping allocations along 

the lines that the military thought the situation demanded. Somervell's 

first plan, completed in three days, offered little aid to the British import program, and that mainly at the expense of the Soviet aid program. This scheme he replaced almost immediately by a second oneprobably in response to hints from his superiors that, in view of the 

recent decision to suspend the Murmansk convoys, the President was 

not likely to take kindly to suggestions that might further irritate the 

Kremlin. The second plan raised the quota of sailings to the Persian 

Gulf after mid-1943 well above earlier estimates of the maximum capacity of the ports in that area, pared down or eliminated various 

Western Hemisphere services, lopped twenty-three sailings off the British Burma build-up in expectation of savings from the opening of the 

Mediterranean, and reduced military shipments to Alaska and other 

quiet areas. The deepest cut was in tonnage allotted to the U.K. import program, leaving only enough to carry about 2.3 million tons dur37 (1) Min, 76th Mtg CCS, 19 Mar 43. (2) OPD Notes on 66th Mtg JCS, 24 Mar 43. 

38 Min, 76th Mtg CCS, 19 Mar 43. 
218 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ing the last three quarters of the year, plus a possible 1.7 million tons 

to be sandwiched in with Army cargoes to the United Kingdommaking an estimated total, with first-quarter shipments, of 4.8 million 

tons. The bulk of import shipments would be made in the last quarter of the year. As for military requirements, Somervell's recommended allocations were, he assured the Chief of Staff, the bare minimum needed. To divert shipping to sustain the British war economy 

"in excess of that required to meet the bare necessities of living" 

would prolong the war, weaken the will of the Russians to continue 

fighting, and be "indefensible on any ground." He concluded, "If we 

are in this war to win [the shipping] must be provided. It is recommended that we press for Presidential approval." 39 

The Joint Chiefs were uncertain how to put their case to the President. Admiral William D. Leahy, who had talked to Hopkins, thought 

it would be tactless to recommend specific reductions in lend-lease or 

British import shipments, since this was under WSA jurisdiction, but 

King and Marshall believed it was the duty of the JCS to advise the 

President on the whole problem. Their view prevailed. Admiral Leahy 

accordingly wrote the President on 10 April that "drastic curtailment of 

civilian commitments as well as reductions in U.S. shipping allocations to the British import program" would be necessary if the Casablanca decisions were to be carried out. He appended Somervell's 

recommended allocations. 40 

The President Disposes 

The Joint Chiefs were almost two weeks too late. Lewis Douglas, 

who had strong convictions on the subject of aid to Britain, had been 

quietly working to find a solution that would not force the President 

to void his original commitment to Churchill. He was worried by the 

rebellious mood and anti-British feeling he saw developing among 

the military. In his opinion, the drying up of the British import program, confirmed beyond any doubt by competent American observers 

:10 (I) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 25 Mar 43, with atchd table, and related papers, 

in ABC 560 (2-26-43) Sec. IA. (2) Figures on first-quarter British import shipments in 

American bottoms proved to be less than half Somervell's estimate. See Hancock and 

Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 429-30. (3) Persian Gulf shipments in 1943 actually 

were far less than here estimated. See T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to 

RlLSsia, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1952), App. A, 

Table I. 

40 (I) Memo, Leahy for President, 10 Apr 43, Inc! A in JCS 251/2, 10 Apr 43, Allocation of Allied Shipping; (2) Notes on 72d Mtg JCS, 6 Apr 43, and 73d Mtg, 9 Apr 43; 

and (3) Memo, Secy JCS for JPS, 20 Mar. 43, sub: Allocation of Allied Shipping, all in 

ABC 560 (2-26-43) Sec. lA. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 219 

in England, menaced the entire Allied ~ar effort. He was determined, 

as he wrote Harriman, to do what he could "to prevent our military 

from successfully pressing home their claims. . . . They do not seem 

to realize ... that the U.K. import program is as important to the 

military success of our armies as is, for example, the bauxite movement to the United States." He also suspected that the vehement opposition of the military to further loans of shipping to bolster British 

imports portended a new challenge to civilian control over allocation 

of U.S. shipping. His representative on the Combined Military Transportation Committee had reported to him, on 15 March, an imprudent remark by General Gross that WSA should have consulted the 

Joint Chiefs before complying with the President's instructions on shipping allocations. Douglas promptly passed the remark on to Hopkins.41 

It may have been Douglas' warning that a concerted attack by 

the military upon the British import program was in the making that 

led Hopkins on the 19th to take personal charge of the negotiations. 

Hopkins consulted various individuals-Douglas, Somervell, Sir Arthur Salter, and others-but Douglas, standing at the very center of 

the shipping picture and enjoying close personal relations with Hopkins, held the key. During the last week of March he evidently succeeded in convincing Hopkins, first, that "the President had already 

made a commitment and that we had to look at the matter in that 

light," and, second, that since the military were unlikely to concede 

this as a point of departure, nothing would be gained by drawing them 

into the negotiations. Meanwhile, the President was being pressed by 

Anthony Eden not merely to meet the original commitment of aid 

to the British import program, but to expand it.42 

On 29 March Hopkins, Douglas, and Eden met with the President at the White House. No military representatives were present 

and Douglas, with occasional promptings from Hopkins, held the floor. 

He presented two main arguments-that the British import program 

must be sustained, and that this, despite the warnings of the military 

chiefs, could in fact be done without crippling the Casablanca strategic 

program. Douglas explained that the current rate of importation 

would bring only 16 million tons to the United Kingdom by the end 

of the year, and that even if U.S. commitments were met in full, the 

41 (I) Ltr, Douglas to Harriman, 27 Mar 43, WSA Douglas File, Reading File. (2) 

Memo by Douglas, 19 Mar 43, WSA Douglas File, folder Control of Transportation. 

(3) Douglas Notes on Lunch Conference With Hopkins, 19 Mar 43, WSA Douglas File, 

folder Hopkins. (4) Memo, Keating for Douglas, 30 Mar 43; WSA Douglas File, folder CMTC. 

42 (I) Douglas Notes on Lunch Conference With Hopkins, 19 Mar 43, WSA Douglas 

File, folder Hopkins. (2) Memo, Clay to Styer, 20 Mar 43, sub: Conference With Hopkins, Hq ASF, folder Shipping 1941~43. 
220 COMMAND DECISIONS 

decline in British carrying capacity would result in a year's total almost 2 million tons less than the 27 million tons on which the two 

governments had agreed in November. The program, he argued, was 

an "essential part of the productive processes" of the United Nations, 

and any serious shortfall "would at last come back to us" in the form 

of a weakening of the total Allied war effort. Further, Douglas stressed 

the dangers, inherent in the Army's proposed allocations, of accumulating a deficit in the spring and summer that might be too heavy to handle in the autumn and winter. 43 

Speaking to his second point, Douglas remarked that the Navy 

had not even submitted its requirements beyond the second quarter, 

and that the Army had never allowed WSA to see the "inner guts" 

of its cargo shipping requirements. In practice, Douglas bluntly 

charged, the military services' stated requirements had always turned 

out to be inflated. He thought they probably were inflated now. Beyond midyear, he was certain, both military and nonmilitary programs 

could be carried out, if shipping were carefully budgeted. The problem 

was really localized in the second quarter-April, especially, was "very, 

very tight." Douglas believed, nevertheless, that if military needs were 

discounted somewhat, particularly in their regular maintenance services, it would be possible not merely to accelerate the British import 

program but also to carry forward all the planned military operations 

and programs, including requested operational aid to the British except for the build-up for operations in Burma. The latter, he said, 

hinged largely on the opening of the Mediterranean and, in any case, 

would probably have to be deferred until early 1944: 4 

The President apparently needed little convincing. Before Douglas 

had got well into his discussion of the military programs, he abruptly 

announced, "Well, we can consider the import program settled." 

Turning to Eden, he added, "You can tell the Prime Minister it's a 

settled matter and we will . . . make good our commitments." 

Neither Douglas nor Eden (who had said virtually nothing during 

the meeting) pressed the demand for an explicit enlargement of the 

U.S. commitment beyond 7 million tons of imports. 45 

It remained, as the President remarked at the end of the meeting, "to settle it with the military." The immediate problem was to 

determine whether the first installment of shipments for the Burma 

4:1 Douglas Notes on White House Conference. 29 Mar 43, WSA Douglas File, folder 

Allocs Gen. 

44 Ibid. 

45 (I) Ibid. (2) Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate HistoT)' (New York: 

Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 716~17. (3) Ltr, Douglas to Harriman, 30 Mar 43, WSA 

Douglas File, Reading File. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 221 

build-up could be met. Paradoxically, the U.S. military leaders now 

stood almost alone in insisting that the Burma offensive, planned for 

late in the year, be carried out. The British, who had the main responsibility, were by now wholly disenchanted with the project, and 

the President, more and more intrigued by the idea of relying on air 

power in this theater instead of the slow and costly build-up of ground 

forces, went so far as to attempt to persuade his military advisers to 

abandon the plan and to use the shipping for the U.S. build-up in 

Britain. Marshall and King stood their ground, arguing that it was 

imperative to maintain heavy pressure on the Japanese in southeast 

Asia, and the President was unwilling to overrule them. Douglas' own 

analysis of the shipping problem had tended to support the view that 

it was usually possible to scrape together a few more ships by skimping here and there. Presently, therefore, Douglas received instructions 

from Hopkins to try to meet at least the April quota for the Burma 

build-up, now reduced to about twenty sailings. Douglas doubted the 

wisdom of committing large amounts of U.S. shipping to the other 

side of the world where it would be beyond immediate recall to the 

Atlantic, at least until the outcome of impending Mediterranean operations could be foreseen. On the other hand, he could see the value 

of sweetening somewhat the bitter pill the President had forced his 

military advisers to swallow in the matter of British imports. Before 

the end of April, therefore, the twenty sailings for India were squeezed 

from various civilian and military maintenance services, the British 

themselves contriving to contribute a few. The first installments on 

aid to the British build-up for the Sicily operation were also met. 4H 

Reactions of the Joint Chiefs to the President's decision are not recorded, but Somervell and Gross, at least, did not disguise their chagrin. Douglas, conferring with them on final arrangements for the April 

shipments, found both in a disgruntled mood, Somervell grumbling 

that the British "were getting off very light," Gross still insisting that 

Britain could manage very well in 1943 with only 16 million tons of 

imports. A few days later Somervell went so far as to complain to the 

President that allocations made by WSA, contrary to Douglas' claims, 

would not provide the shipping needed for U.S. military operations. 47 

And in May, in drawing up the Army's 1943 shipping budget for the 

Washington Conference (TRIDENT), Somervell pointedly tabulated the 

requirements in such a manner that allocations for British imports were 

46 Correspondence in WSA Douglas File, folders, Allocs Gen and Army Reqmts. 

47 (1) Douglas Notes on Conference With Adm Smith and Gens Somervell, Gross, 

and Wylie, 7 Apr 43, and (2) Memo, Douglas for Hopkins, 13 Apr 43, both in WSA 

Douglas File, folder Army Reqmts. (3) Draft Memo, for signature of President, Somervell 

for Hopkins, 12 Apr 43, Hq ASF, Reading File [under "H"]. 
222 COMMAND DECISIONS 

shown as reduced by amounts necessary to meet all other requirements 

in full. 48 

Nevertheless, the President held to his course. Swollen by American aid, the British import program rapidly revived during the spring. 

From a low point of 4.5 million tons in the first quarter, imports 

reached 7.2 million tons in the second, making a total only 300,000 

tons short of the 12 million tons that had seemed so unattainable in 

March. At TRIDENT the final U.S. shipping budget included not merely 

the full stated requirements of the import program, but also only 

slightly reduced allocations of shipping to support British forces in 

the Mediterranean and India. 49 Later in May the President took a further, more far-reaching step. He directed WSA to transfer to Britain, 

under bareboat charter for the duration of the war, fifteen to twenty 

cargo vessels per month over the next ten months. This placed the 

capstone on the policy, enunciated on 6 October 1942, by which the 

United States had progressively assumed the role of merchant shipbuilder for the Anglo-American coalition. 50 

The whole massive shift of U.S. shipping into British services, decided upon during a crisis in the war at sea, was admittedly a gamble-one the U.S. military leaders naturally resisted, since their operations stood to lose if the gamble did not payoff. The gamble did 

payoff, and the dark predictions of the military shipping staffs did 

not materialize. That they did not do so was, in some measure, a vindication of Douglas' repeated assertion that stated military requirements for shipping were usually inflated. During the spring shipping 

crisis of 1943', WSA often failed to meet these requirements as originally stated, but just as often ships sailed on Army account without 

full cargoes and on numerous occasions the Army reduced its requirements or even turned back ships for lack of ready cargo. What confounded the logistical experts above all, however, was the spectacular 

turn of the tide in the war at sea. Beginning in April a new and more 

effective organization of antisubmarine operations, bolstered by longrange bombers covering the mid-ocean gap, began to take effect. Ship 

losses in that month dipped to less than half those in March, and in 

June they fell to a point (182,000 deadweight tons) that by compari4S See Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 

1943-1945, a forthcoming volume in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, 

MS, Ch, III. 

HI Ibid. Offensive operations in Burma were by this time only tentatively planned and 

shipping allocations to support them were postponed until late in 1943 and early in 1944. 

,,0 (I) Haneock and Gowing, British War Economy, tables on pp. 357 and 431. 

(2) Behrens, Merchant Shipping, pp. 354-55. (3) Ltr, President to Prime Minister, 28 May 

43, MS Index to Hopkins Papers, Book VII, TRIDENT Conf, p. 4, Item 23. (4) Correspondence in WSA Douglas File, folder British Merchant Shipping Mission. 
THE BRITISH IMPORT CRISIS 223 

son with the whole experience since Pearl Harbor semed trifling. New 

construction, meanwhile, continued to climb, in May and June making net gains over losses of more than 1.5 million tons a month in all 

types of merchant shipping. The military shipping staffs continued to 

shake their heads-the trend could not last. Early in May they still 

foresaw huge deficits, and as late as July the Combined Military Transportation Committee, analyzing monthly average losses during the 

first five months of the year, which had fallen well below the agreed 

planning factors, were suspicious as to the meaning of "the present 

lull in Axis submarine action." 51 

The civilian shipping experts, for their part, had always been skeptical of predictions of shipping availability beyond six months in the 

future-approximately the length of the longest turnaround-and on 

the eve of the TRIDENT Conference Douglas and Salter sounded a general note of caution to the strategic planners: 

All estimates of available shipping and requirements ... covering a 

long period extending into the future are necessarily un precise and subject 

to all the changing fortunes of war. Shipping availabilities fluctuate with 

the progress of submarine warfare, routing, loss of shipping in assault operations, and a variety of additional factors. Military requirements vary in 

accordance with developments in the theaters of war and modified strategic 

plans. 

For these reasons, Douglas and Salter were not too worried over the 

huge shipping deficits currently predicted by the military staffs, which, 

they thought, were "within the margin of error inherent in a forward 

projection" and "may well prove to be manageable." 52 By the time the 

Allied leaders met again, at Quebec in August, the shipping deficits 

had in fact disappeared. 

51 CCS 174/1, 2 Jul 43, title: Loss Rate for 1943 (report by CMTC). 

52 (1) Notes on Statements of Dry Cargo Shipping Position, 10 May 43, signed by 

Salter and Douglas, Hq ASF, folder Shipping 1941-43. (2) Leighton and Coakley, Global 

Logistics, 1940-1943, Ch. XXVI. 

9 

The Persian Corridor as a Route for Aid 

to the USSR 

by 

Robert W. Coakley 

During World War II, the United States and Great Britain carried on a massive supply program for the USSR based on the rationale that the Soviet Union's continuance in the war as an active and 

powerful ally was a fundamental condition for victory over Hitler's 

Germany. Until May 1945, common agreement on the necessity for defeating Germany totally and finally tended to obscure differences in 

political aims. American and British leaders-both military and political-agreed that without involvement of the major portion of the 

German Army on the Eastern Front, any invasion of Fortress Europe 

from the west would be rendered practically impossible. They therefore accorded aid to ihe USSR a claim of extremely high priority 

on Anglo-American material resources. But getting the promised supplies delivered and satisfying the demands of the Soviet Government, 

a most exacting ally, was an onerous task. It involved some of the 

most difficult decisions that the Western Allies had to make. One of 

the most important of these, reached in August and September 1942, 

was to give the U.S. Army control of the movement of munitions and 

supplies to the USSR through the Persian Corridor, and to accord 

that project one of the highest priori ties in the Allied scale. (See Map 6.) 

This decision was made at a critical juncture of the war against Germany, in a period before the tide had definitely turned in favor of 

the Allies, when any commitment, however small, of ships, supplies, 

and trained men had to be carefully weighed in the strategic balance. 

ROBERT W. COAKLEY, Historian with OCMH since 1948. William and 

Mary College, University of Virginia, Ph.D. Taught: University of Virginia, 

Tulane University, University of Arkansas, Fairmont State College. Historian, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, and 

U.S. Forces, European Theater, 1945-46. Coauthor: Global Logistics and 

Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 1955) and Global Logistics and Strategy, 

1943-1945 (in preparation), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II. 
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THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 227 

Only the President and Prime Minister could make the basic decision that the Americans should have responsibility. But before this 

basic decision could be given any practical effect, military agencies 

at several different levels had to formulate plans and estimate the impact of fulfilling them. And it was the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) 

who gave the project the final stamp of approval after the military 

plan was drawn up. The whole process serves as a prime example of 

the complexity of the processes by which such politico-military decisions are arrived at in the conduct of coalition warfare. 1 

The Soviet Protocols and the Routes if Delivery 

The supply program for the USSR took the form of a series of 

protocols, definite diplomatic commitments negotiated at the highest 

governmental levels stipulating exact quantities of specific types of supplies to be made available to the USSR by the United States and 

Great Britain over a given period of time. The First Protocol, signed 

at Moscow on 1 October 1941 while the United States was still at 

peace, covered the nine-month period from that date until 30 June 

1942. The Second Protocol was negotiated to cover the period from 

1 July 1942 to 30 June 1943 and the Third and Fourth for similar 

annual periods in 1943-44 and 1944-45. 2 These protocols were the 

bibles, so to speak, by which supply to the USSR was governed. In 

this way they differed from any other of the lend-lease commitments 

of the United States Government before and during World War II. 

To be sure, adjustments in protocol quantities could be made by 

negotiation with the Russians, and each protocol contained a safeguarding clause stipulating that the fortunes of war might make delivery impossible,3 but neither adjustments nor safeguarding clauses 

1 The present study is based primarily on Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 1956), and T. H. Vail Motter, The 

Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (Washington, 1952), both in UNITED STATES ARMY 

IN WORLD WAR II. Some use has also been made of two other volumes in the same 

series: Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas 

(Washington, 1957), for certain details relating to the transportation problem in Iran; and 

Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 

(Washington, 1953), for the story of the development of Anglo-American strategy. On 

the convoys to North Russia, Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 

1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947) and Winston S. Churchill, 

The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950) contain useful information. 

Guides to the original source material beyond those cited herein may be found in the 

footnotes and bibliographies of UNITED STATES ARMY iN WORLD WAR II. 

2 For the text of the Soviet protocols see U.S. Dept of State, WAR TIME INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Soviet Supply Protocols, Publication 2759, European Ser. 22 

(Washington, no date). 

3 For instance, in the Second Protocol the safeguarding clause read as follows: "It is 

understood that any program of this sort must be tentative in character and must be 

subject to unforeseen changes which the progress of the war may require from the standpoint of stores as well as from the standpoint of shipping." See above, n. 2. 
228 COMMAND DECISIONS 

provided any genuine avenue of escape from commitments except 

when the Russians wen: willing to agree. And pressure from the Russians was relentless not only for fulfillment of existing commitments to 

the letter but for additional quantities and for new weapons that the 

developing war on the Eastern Front led them to think desirable. The 

rationale behind the program gave these pressures almost irresistible 

force despite the sacrifices involved for the Anglo-American effort in 

the West. 

These sacrifices were greatest during the years 1941 and 1942 

when British and American resources were under heavy strain to meet 

even the minimum requirements of their own forces. Every military 

move required a close calculation of the availability of troops, of 

equipment, and of shipping to transport them. The supplies and equipment promised to the Soviets could be made available only at considerable sacrifice of an American Army in training and a British Army 

fighting for its life in the Middle East. Shipping, the most crucial resource of all in the period following Pearl Harbor, could also be put 

on the run to the USSR only by accepting limitations on the deployment of American and British forces to danger spots round the globe. 

Yet furnishing the supplies and the shipping in the end proved to be 

the less difficult part of the task of supplying the USSR; by mid-1942 

the central problem had become that of opening or keeping open 

routes of delivery over which these ships and supplies, made available at such sacrifice, could move to the USSR. 

These routes of delivery were long, roundabout, and difficult. With 

the Germans in control of most of western Europe and of French 

North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Baltic were closed to Allied 

cargo vessels. This left three main alternative routes for the transport 

of supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union. The first ran 

across the Atlantic and around the coast of Norway to Soviet Arctic 

and White Sea ports, principally Murmansk and Archangel, the second across the Pacific to Vladivostok and over the Trans-Siberian Railway to European Russia, the third around the coast of Africa to the 

Persian Gulf and thence across Iran to the Soviet border. (See Map 

II, inside back cover.) Each of these routes had its definite limitations. 

The northern route around Norway was the shortest but it also was 

the most vulnerable to attack by German submarines and land-based 

aircraft. Moreover, winter cold and ice frequently blocked Soviet harbors and rendered sailing conditions for Allied merchantmen scarcely 

tolerable even ~ithout the German threat. The route to Vladivostok 

ran directly past the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. Ships 

flying American or British flags could not proceed through waters 

controlled by the Japanese once Japan had gone to war against Brit-
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 229 

ain and the United States. And even in Soviet flag shipping, a very 

scarce commodity in 1941-42, the United States did not dare risk 

supplies and equipment definitely identifiable as for military end use. 

Moreover, the rail line from Vladivostok to European Russia had initially a very limited capacity. The southern route via the Persian 

Gulf was the only one relatively free of the threat of enemy interference, but in 1941 it possessed an insignificant capacity. Iranian ports 

were undeveloped and the Iranian State Railway running north to 

the USSR was rated in October 1941 as capable of transporting but 

6,000 tons of Soviet aid supplies monthly, hardly the equivalent of a 

single shipload. 

In August 1941, by joint agreement with the USSR, the British 

moved into control of southern Iran while the Soviet Union took 

over the northern portion of the country. This joint occupation, regularized by treaty arrangements between the two powers and a new 

Iranian Government, secured the land area through which supplies 

transported by sea over the southern route could be carried on to the 

USSR. The question of the effort the British and Americans should 

devote to developing the necessary facilities in Iran to make any considerable flow of aid through this area possible was therefore a basic 

one from the moment the vVestern Allies committed themselves to a 

large-scale Soviet aid program. For a year after the initial occupation, preoccupation with other tasks in a period of scarcity of men 

and materials combined with Soviet intransigence to delay any positive decision or practicable plan. During that year the major effort 

was devoted to forwarding supplies to the USSR over the more vulnerable northern route. Only after the Germans had demonstrated 

beyond any reasonable doubt that they could make the northern 

route prohibitively costly, did the United States and Britain decide 

on a concentrated effort to develop the Persian Corridor as an alternate route. 

Early Failure To Develop the Persian Gulf 

American and British transportation experts in September 1941 

freely predicted that the southern route would eventually provide the 

best avenue for the flow of supplies to the USSR, but there was little 

immediate follow-up on this prediction. The Russians insisted on the 

use of the northern route, evidently both because it promised quicker 

delivery of supplies closer to their fighting fronts and because they 

feared the establishment of a strong British or American position in 

Iran so close to the Soviet border. The British, faced with the necessity of developing adequate supply lines for their own hard-pressed 

forces dispersed through the Middle East from Egypt to India, lacked 
230 COMMAND DECISIONS 

resources to devote to developing facilities for Soviet aid. On the borders of Egypt and in Libya, the British Eighth Army was engaged in 

a seesaw battle with the Afrika Korps; in Syria and Iraq the British 

Tenth Army stood guard against a German drive southward through 

the Caucasus to the oil fields of Iraq and Iran whence the very lifeblood of the Commonwealth war effort flowed. Immediately after entry 

into southern Iran, the British prepared a plan for developing transport facilities through their zone to a point where they could carry, 

by the spring of 1942, 72,000 long tons of Soviet aid supplies in addition to essential cargoes for British military forces and the Iranian 

civilian economy, but this plan proved to be more a hope than a promise. Soviet insistence on the use of the northern route left the Bl"itish 

with no strong incentive to push developments in Iran when the limited manpower and materials available to them were sorely needed 

to develop supply lines more vital to their own military effort in the 

Middle East. 

Initially the American position in Iran was anomalous and it remained so even after Pearl Harbor. The United States was not a party 

to the agreement with the Iranian Government. The American Government therefore had to limit its actions in Iran to supporting the 

British. And before American entrance into the war against Germany, 

this support had to be rendered through lend-lease channels in such 

a way as not to compromise the neutrality of the United States. At 

the urgent request of the British, two missions were dispatched to the 

Middle East in the fall of 1941, one to Egypt under Brig. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell and the other to Iran under Brig. Gen. Raymond A. 

Wheeler, with the justification that they were necessary to make lendlease aid "effective." These missions were instructed to aid the British in the development of their lines of communication, under conditions where British desires as to projects to be undertaken were to 

govern. Proj~cts were to be financed with lend-lease funds and carried out by civilian contractors. 

The British plan for development of Iranian facilities was conditioned on the expectation of the assistance of Wheeler's mission as 

well as of large-scale shipments of American lend-lease supplies and 

equipment. Elaborate plans were drawn up but Pearl Harbor completely disrupted them. Mission projects were shoved far down the 

scale of priorities while the United States carried out its initial deployments to the Pacific and the British Isles. Mission personnel and 

materiel waited at dockside for shipping that could not be allocated. 

And even when initial U.S. deployments were completed, these priorities were advanced very little. Under arrangements made by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff shortly after Pearl Harbor, the whole Middle East was designated a British area of strategic responsibility just 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 231 

as the Pacific was designated an American one. American strategic 

plans placed their emphasis on concentration of resources for an early 

invasion of Europe and Army planners sought to keep their commitments in support of the British Middle East to a minimum. In the 

running argument between the British and American Chiefs of Staff 

over a peripheral strategy versus one of concentration, the Americans 

won at least a temporary victory in April 1942. In a conference in 

London at that time, it was agreed that preparations should be made 

for both an emergency entrance onto the Continent in 1942 to prevent Soviet collapse (SLEDGEHAMMER) and for full-scale invasion in 

1943 (ROUNDUP). The build-up in the British Isles for both these purposes (designated BOLERO) was placed at the top of the American 

priority scale from April through July and the Middle East missions 

continued to be treated as poor relatives. 

A War Department decision in February 1942 that the missions 

should be militarized served only to produce additional delays and 

confusion. Requisite numbers of service troops to perform the tasks 

planned for civilian contractors were simply not available under the 

priority the missions were granted. Against a request for something 

over 25,000 men submitted by General Wheeler as the requirement 

to carry out projects planned, the War Department decided it could 

allot but 6,950 in the troop basis and only 654 of these could be moved 

to Iran before 1 September 1942. This decision, predicated on continuing use of contractor personnel, gradual rather than immediate 

militarization of contractor projects, and utmost use of indigenous 

labor, meant that the great bulk of Wheeler's projects had to be 

placed in a long-deferred second priority. Few even of the contractor 

personnel had arrived in the Persian Gulf by April 1942. During that 

month General Wheeler himself was transferred to India to become 

head of the Services of Supply there and was succeeded as head of 

the Iranian mission by Col. Don G. Shingler. 

Without the extensive American assistance expected, the British 

were unable to devote sufficient resources to the development of Iranian 

facilities to increase significantly the transit capacity through their 

zone in Iran. Almost inevitably they concentrated their resources in 

the area on supply installations and facilities and the port of Basra 

in Iraq, designed to serve their own Tenth Army. The few American 

contractor personnel who did arrive were assigned the task of developing the port of Umm Qasr in Iraq, designed as a subsidiary port 

in the Basra complex. Thus the first opportunity to develop Persian 

Gulf facilities went largely by default.4 

• On these early developments see Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 13-15, 28-100; Leighton 

and Coakley, Global Logistics, pp. 108-14,503-07,552-56,567-59. 
232 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The Northern Route and the Second ProtocoL 

While the Persian Gulf languished, the Americans and British devoted their main energies toward forwarding supplies over the difficult northern route, basically in accordance with Russian desires. 

This effort mounted to its crescendo in April and May 1942, when 

the Americans, having completed initial deployments and finally found 

supplies and ships to transport them to the USSR, attempted to make 

up previous deficits in their commitments under the First Protocol. 

During April some 63 ships cleared American ports headed for north 

Russia, and plans were laid to send almost as many in May. For the 

long pull, the President proposed that some 50 American ships be 

placed in regular monthly service over the northern route from March 

through November each year, 25 from November through the following March. The Persian Gulf was given but a small role. The Russians indicated they wanted only trucks and planes delivered via this 

route. In accordance with their desires, the goal for the southern 

route was set, in January 1942, at 2,000 trucks and 100 bombers 

monthly, these to be shipped knocked down, assembled in plants to 

be operated by contractor personnel under the Iranian mission, and 

driven or flown to the Soviet Zone; only small additional quantities 

of general cargo were to be forwarded over the Iranian Railway and 

in the assembled trucks. 5 

This planning in early 1942 ignored latent German capabilities 

to interrupt shipments around the coast of Norway. Shipping over 

the northern route proceeded under convoy of the British Navy from 

Iceland onward. During 1941 and the early part of 1942, these convoys were virtually unmolested by the Germans. As of the end of 

March 1942, only one ship had been lost out of the 110 that had 

sailed over the route. But in February Hitler began to shift the weight 

of his naval and air strength to Norway and the March convoys, although they suffered small loss, were subject to heavy attack. As the 

daylight hours in the far north lengthened during April and May, 

attacks were stepped up, losses mounted, and each convoy became a 

serious fleet operation posing a heavy drain on British naval resources. 

Churchill and the British Admiralty, fearing that if British naval 

strength was concentrated too heavily in protecting the Murmansk 

convoys the Germans would shift their naval strength to the midAtlantic, decided in late April that only three convoys of 25 to 35 

5 (1) Rpt on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR, prepared by the 

Protocol and Area Information Staff, USSR Br, and the Div of Research and Rpts, Dept 

of State, 28 Nov 45 (hereafter cited as Rpt on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45). (2) Leighton 

and Coakley, Global Logistics, pp. 555-56, 567-68. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 233 

ships each could be sent through every two months. Since planned 

loadings in the United States had been going forward on the supposition that 107 ships would move in these convoys during May alone, 

the proposed curtailment came as a heavy blow to Roosevelt's hopes 

that American commitments under the First Protocol could be fulfilled. But deplore the decision as he might, the American President 

was in no position to offer American naval convoy as a supplement 

to British, and on 3 May 1942 he acquiesced in Churchill's decision, 

expressing at the same time the hope that the convoys could at least 

be kept to the maximum of 35 ships. Even this hope was doomed to 

disappointment. In the two convoys started out from Iceland in May 

only 57 ships saIled rather than 70 and of these 9 were lost, despite 

heavy naval convoy. Many of the 63 ships sent out from the United 

States in April merely served to create a log jam of shipping at the 

Iceland convoy rendezvous, a log jam that was liquidated only by 

unloading many cargoes in British ports. 6 

Curtailment of the northern convoys made it impossible for the 

United States to fulfill its promises under the First Protocol. Yet in 

the midst of these difficulties a Second Protocol was negotiated covering the period 1 July 1942 through 30 June 1943 based on the 

premise, as stated by the President, that strategic considerations required that "aid to Russia should be continued and expanded to the 

maximum extent possible." 7 The British and American shipping authorities, basing their calculations on the British plan to send through 

three convoys every two months, estimated the capacity of the northern route at slightly over three million short tons over the protocol 

year and optimistically added another million short tons to be carried 

via the Persian Gulf. The Pacific route was left entirely out of their 

calculations. Accepting these tenuous shipping figures as gospel, the 

President and his advisers offered the USSR a total of 4.4 million 

short tons over the Second Protocol year, about three times as much 

as was actually delivered under the First Protocol. Though this Second Protocol was not officially signed until October 1942, it actually 

went into effect in July when the first expired, and from that date 

forward the Americans and British stood committed to the delivery 

of this massive tonnage to the USSR. And in contrast to the First 

Protocol, in which British and American obligations were approximately equal, the great majority of supplies under the second were to 

come from American sources. 

This first crisis on the northern route inevitably threw the spot6 (1) Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 256-66. (2) Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 

158-71. (3) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, pp. 557-58. 

7 Ltr, President to SW, 24 Mar 42, AG 400.3295 (8-14-41), Sec. I. 
234 COMMAND DECISIONS 

light on the Persian Gulf as the only important alternative for forwarding war supplies to the USSR. The Russians, now taking a more 

realistic view of the situation, reversed their previous position and 

asked that not only planes and trucks but all sorts of military equipment in the largest quantities possible come via the southern route. 

In cutting back shipments scheduled to move over the northern route 

in May 1942, the shipping authorities decided to divert 12 ships to 

the Persian Gulf and to follow with 12 more in June. Harry Hopkins, the President's confidential adviser, wanted to increase this rate 

and send 8 more monthly if the Persian Gulf could handle them. The 

Second Protocol schedules, as noted above, proposed shipment of a 

million short tons via the southern route over the year beginning 

1 July 1942.B 

The Problem in Iran 

This decision in May 1942 to speed up shipments to the Persian 

Gulf was a premature one made in an atmosphere of crisis. It was 

soon obvious that even the cargoes of the twenty-four ships sent out 

in May and June could not be unloaded and sent on to the USSR 

unless more drastic steps were taken to develop Iranian facilities. An 

effort began almost immediately to push this development but it was 

unaccompanied by any realistic appraisal of what was needed, any 

fundamental upgrading of priorities, or more logical division of 

responsibilities. The major effort was simply devoted to accelerating 

unfulfilled plans already on the books. On the American side, the 

Iranian mission was given a clear directive stating that its primary 

responsibility would be to facilitate the flow of aid to the USSR and 

not to aid the British, and that projects in Iran should be placed in 

first priority and those in Iraq and elsewhere in second. Colonel 

Shingler was told of the new million-ton goal for the Second Protocol 

year and designated the American representative for executing the 

program for "receipt, assembly and forwarding" of the material to be 

shipped through Iran under these arrangements. 9 As a consequence, 

the handful of American construction personnel at Umm Qasr quickly 

transferred the center of their activities to the port of Khorramshahr 

in Iran. Nevertheless, the position of both the mission and the American Government remained anomalous. The British retained strategic 

responsibility for the area and direction of the effort to forward supplies to the USSR; the American mission's task was still only that of 

aiding them to effect these deliveries. If the primacy of the task of 

R Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, pp. 560-69. 

9 Msg 100, AGWAR to AMSIR, 10 Apr 42; Msg 177, 9 May 42; and Msg 208, 

20 May 42, all in AG 400.3295 (8-9-41), Sees. 4 and 5. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 235 

forwarding supplies to the USSR was recognized on the American 

side, the British were still in no position to place it above their own 

military needs. 10 

Nevertheless when the American mission shifted its activities from 

Iraq to Iran in April 1942, the dimensions of the task to be performed 

in developing Iranian facilities had at least been generally defined. 

Reduced to bare essentials, this task involved development of port 

facilities and of egress roads, increase of the capacity of the TransIranian Railway as far north as Tehran at least tenfold, improvement 

of existing roads and construction of new ones north from the ports 

to the Soviet Zone, construction and operation of aircraft and truck 

assembly plants, and development of trucking facilities to supplement 

the carrying capacity of the railroad. 

The best developed Iranian port was on the island of Abadan, the 

site of what was then one of the world's largest oil refineries, owned 

by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. But Abadan figured in British 

plans for supply to the USSR only as a site for delivery of cased aircraft for assembly and of particularly heavy equipment that could not 

be unloaded elsewhere. The rest of the capacity of the port was 

reserved for oil shipments. Similarly Basra in Iraq, the only other 

well-developed port in the area, was already overloaded with cargo 

for the British Army, although it also had to serve initially as the 

principal reliance for handling Soviet-aid cargoes. Any really significant augmentation of shipments to the USSR would require development of the Iranian ports proper-Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, 

Ahwaz, and Bushire-and of the lighterage basin at Tanuma (or 

Cheybassi) across the Shatt-al-Arab from Basra in Iraq. Khorramshahr 

and Bandar Shahpur were the key ports, and each initially possessed 

only one berth capable of handling large vessels. Ahwaz was a small 

barge port one hundred miles up the Karun River from Khorramshahr; 

Bushire, a small port on the west shore of the Persian Gulf whence the 

main highway in Iran ran north to Tehran. 

From Bandar Shahpur the railway ran north via Ahwaz and 

Andimeshk to Tehran and thence through the Soviet Zone to Bandar 

Shah on the Caspian Sea, through some of the most difficult mountainous terrain in the world. The railway was without adequate highpowered locomotives and rolling stock, the line was laid with light 

rail, and it lacked an automatic signal system to speed traffic. The 

British had placed the railway under military control and assigned a 

force of 4,000 soldiers to run it, but the locomotives and rolling stock 

promised from the United States were slow in arriving, and the 

increase in rail capacity came equally slowly. 

10 Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 59-64. 
236 COMMAND DECISIONS 

To supplement the railroad, the British had four trucking routes 

under development, all operated by a quasi-governmental corporation, 

the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, using native drivers. 

Two routes ran wholly within Iran, from Bushire and Andimeshk, 

respectively, to Tabriz within the Soviet Zone. A third started at 

Khanaqin on the Iraqi railway, ran north from Basra through 

Baghdad, and also terminated at Tabriz. The fourth involved a 

devious route running by rail out of Karachi, India, to Zahidan in 

southeastern Iran and thence by truck to Meshed in the Soviet Zone 

in the northwest. This last route was used but infrequently and the 

Russians objected that deliveries over it provided supplies too far from 

the fighting fronts. All the routes were over the poorest sort of dirt 

roads, and United Kingdom Commercial Corporation operations were 

seriously handicapped by lack of trucks and efficient drivers.ll 

Once it had been concentrated in Iran, the American mission was 

assigned some of the most essential tasks-construction of additional 

docks at Khorramshahr, operation of truck assembly plants at 

Andimeshk and Khorramshahr and of an aircraft assembly plant at 

Abadan, construction of highways connecting Khorramshahr, Ahwaz, 

Andimeshk, Tanuma, and Tehran, and assistance to the British in the 

performance of a variety of other tasks. The British Army and the 

United Kindgom Commercial Corporation remained in control of all 

transport operations. 12 

When queried by Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell in May 1942 

about Hopkins' project for sending twenty ships per month via the 

Persian Gulf, Shingler replied that the ports would not be prepared 

to handle that many (120,000 tons of Soviet cargo) until the end of 

October 1942, when planned improvements were scheduled for completion, and that even. then inland clearance would be limited to 

78,000 tons monthly and there would be insufficient storage for the 

excess until clearance capacity had been improved. He offered little 

hope that the ports would be able to unload and clear in expeditious 

fashion the 87,000 long tons of Soviet aid dispatched from the United 

States during May and the 91,000 tons shipped in June when these 

cargoes arrived in July and August. British shipping representatives in 

the area were even more pessimistic. Undeterred, the Washington 

authorities cut back these shipments only slightly in July and August, 

to 63,000 and 66,000 long tons, respectively. 13 

While forwarding these tonnages, Washington and London contributed more by way of pressure for accomplishment than they did 

11 Bykofsky and Larson, Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 379-82, 403-04. 

12 (1) Ibid., pp. 380-81. (2) Motter, Persian Corridor, p. 84. 

13 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, pp. 569-70. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 237 

by way of sending men and materiel to accelerate the pace of development. The British remained unable to spare men or resources, and 

the Americans were reluctant to commit significant additional 

resources to the Middle East. The handful of Americans present in 

Iran in April had grown to only slightly more than 1,000 by 1 July, 

817 civilians and 190 military personnel. Though shipments of necessary transportation, construction, and port equipment were expedited, 

all too frequently delays developed in shipping the most critical items 

such as port cranes, rail equipment, and heavy construction supplies. 

The effects of a lack of centralized responsibility and a co-ordinated 

plan with high priority were all too apparent. 

As a result, in no particular did progress during the three months 

after the May decision justify optimism. The heavy shipments to the 

Gulf ports inevitably brought an increasing threat of port congestion. 

Development of the ports lagged behind Shingler's predictions, and 

inland clearance, ever the biggest bottleneck, lagged even further. 

The Iranian State Railway, necessarily the primary reliance, was 

carrying, as late as August 1942, only 35,770 long tons of supplies for 

all purposes and of these only 12,440 were supplies for the USSR. 

The trucking operations of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, never characterized by a high degree of efficiency, were but 

a poor supplement. While the need for capacity for Soviet aid rose, 

the British found it necessary. to add the burden of supply for the 

Polish Army they were evacuating through Iran to that of the British 

military and the Iranian civilian economy. While the two U.S. truck 

assembly plants at Andimeshk and Bandar Shahpur and the plane 

assembly plant at Abadan began operations in April, their capacity 

continued low and it was further limited by the lack of adequate port 

and inland clearance facilities. Such was the situation in the Persian 

Corridor when the Allies found themselves facing a new and more 

serious crisis in their effort to maintain even a limited schedule 

of convoys over the northern route.14 

The July Crisis 

On 27 June 1942, convoy PQ-17, the third of the three convoys 

the British had promised to push through during the two-month 

period of May-June, departed Reykjavik, Iceland, for the long run 

over the northern route. The convoy contained 33 merchantmen, 22 

American and 11 British, and had an unusually large naval escort. 

In a grim running battle with German air and sea raiders, 22 of the 33 

14 (1) Ibid., pp. 570-73. (2) Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 85, 101-55, and App. A, 

Table 5. 
238 COMMAND DECISIONS 

merchant vessels were lost. Shocked by these heavy losses, the British 

Admiralty decided to suspend the northern convoys "at least till the 

northern ice-packs melted and receded and until perpetual daylight 

passed." On 17 July Churchill informed Stalin of the decision, saying 

that continuation "would bring no benefit to you and would only 

involve dead loss to the common cause." Stalin's reply was a brutal 

rejection of the British reasons for halting the convoys and a bitter 

protest, in the strongest language, against the action taken. 15 

The decision to suspend the northern convoys came at a critical 

juncture in the affairs of the Anglo-American coalition, at a time 

when the entire strategic concept for the year 1942 was undergoing 

drastic revision. In June the war in the Middle East took a dangerous 

turn. General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel launched a drive into 

Egypt opening up a new threat to the Suez Canal and the Middle 

East oilfields. At the same time, the German drive through the USSR 

was plowing relentlessly forward through the Caucasus, threatening 

these same oilfields from another direction, and raising the possibility 

of complete defeat of the Soviet Army. In this critical situation, the 

American staff was forced to reconsider its position and take immediate emergency steps to bolster the British position in the Middle East. 

Supply aid was stepped up and an American air force (the Ninth) 

established in Egypt. A new command was set up, United States 

Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME) under Maj. Gen. 

Russell L. Maxwell, formerly head of the North African mission, and 

Maxwell was allotted the quota of service troops he had previously 

been denied. 

The crisis in the Middle East gave the final death blow to any 

hopes that SLEDGEHAMMER, the plan to invade the Continent in 1942, 

could be carried out. The American staff continued to hope that commitments to the Middle East could be kept from interfering with the 

execution of ROUNDUP, the invasion plan in 1943. But this hope ran 

afoul of the President's determination that American troops must be 

put in action against the Germans in 1942. In instructions given to 

his staff for conferences with the British at London in mid-July, 

Roosevelt made it quite clear that unless SLEDGEHAMMER could be 

carried out either an American Army must be committed to the 

Middle East or the invasion of North Africa undertaken. The decision 

taken at the conference (18-25 July 1942) was on the invasion of 

North Africa in the fall (Operation TORCH).16 

15 (1) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 262-71. (2) Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 179-92. 

16 On the strategic developments of this period see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, particularly pages 233-84; for the TORCH decision, see above, pages 173-98. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 239 

The TORCH decision vastly complicated relations with the Russians 

at precisely the same time that the northern convoys were suspended. 

In conversations in May with Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav 

M. Molotov, President Roosevelt had given more positive assurances 

of the opening of a second front in 1942 than the British or even his 

own staff thought justified. The TORCH decision, in the Russian view, 

did not conform to these assurances nor did it promise to take much 

of the pressure off the USSR. While both Roosevelt and Churchill 

continued to hope that it would not prevent invasion of the Continent 

in 1943, both the American and British military staffs were convinced 

that it would. Thus the TORCH decision and the cancellation of the 

northern convoys created a doubly embarrassing situation for the 

President and Prime Minister vis-a-vis Stalin. Even if the convoys 

were resumed in September, they would probably have to be 

suspended again for at least two months to provide the requisite naval 

support for TORCH in November. Thus, while the Russians battled for 

their very existence, the second front in Europe that they had been 

clamoring for was not to become a reality, nor would they receive 

the supply aid promised under the Second Protocol unless some new 

means of delivery were found. It promised to be, as Churchill told 

Roosevelt in September, "a formidable moment in Anglo-AmericanSoviet relations." 17 

The July crisis evoked a diligent and almost frantic search for 

alternate means of delivery of supplies to the USSR. Churchill had 

long supported an operation OUPITER) to secure the northern fringes 

of Norway and thus clear the route for the northern convoys, but 

neither his own nor the American staff ever looked with favor on this 

plan. It could, in any event, hardly be carried out except as a substitute for TORCH. The Pacific route to the USSR also inevitably 

came in for increased consideration. Plans were developed for delivering the majority of all planes to the USSR via an air ferry from 

Alaska to Siberia, but the Russians were at first un-co-operative and 

development of the ferry route was distressingly slow. For a brief 

moment, the Americans considered sending vessels on the long route 

through the Bering Sea and around the northern fringes of Siberia, 

and actually turned over seven vessels to the Russians for this purpose, but the Russians themselves evidently found the route impractical and placed the vessels instead on the run to Vladivostok. The 

transfer of more ships to the Soviet flag in the Pacific for use on this 

Vladivostok run was of course a possibility, but in July and August 

1942 it had little to recommend it. The greatest Soviet needs seemed 

17 Msg 151, Prime Minister to President, 22 Sep 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), Sec. 4-B. 
240 COMMAND DECISIONS 

clearly to be for military equipment and supplies that could not be 

risked on the Pacific route; Vladivostok was a long way from the 

critical fighting front in the Caucasus; and the outright transfer of 

ships to the USSR involved a complete loss of control over their 

future use, a very serious thing in view of the general shortage of 

cargo shipping in 1942. 18 

The finger thus pointed to the Persian Gulf as the only logical 

alternative to the northern route for the shipment of military supplies; 

indeed it had already been pointing in that direction since the first 

difficulties with the northern convoys in April. But each turn of the 

strategic wheel had brought some new demand on British and American resources that prevented the assignment of sufficiently high priority and the diffusion of responsibility between British and Americans 

had prevented the development of any co-ordinated plan. Paradoxically enough, the decision to commit additional American resources 

to the Middle East in June had the practical immediate effect of 

slowing shipments of men and material to the Persian Gulf for the 

highest priority went to getting the Ninth Air Force to Egypt and 

supporting the British effort in the desert. There were no significant 

accretions of American personnel in Iran in July and August 1942. 

And under the new command arrangement, Colonel Shingler's Iranian 

mission was made a service command in the USAFIME Services of 

Supply. 

The crisis in July produced a situation in which either facilities in 

the Persian Gulf would have to be extensively developed or else the 

United States and Britain would have to renege completely on their 

promises under the Second Protocol. Whereas, under the shipping estimates that originally lay behind the Second Protocol, one million tons 

were to be forwarded through Iran during the protocol year, that 

goal had now to be more than doubled if the southern route was to 

compensate for the deficiencies of the northern. It was set, in fact at 

200,000 tons monthly, in a situation where the previous goal of 72,000 

tons a month, proposed by the British in the fall of 1941, was still 

far short of attainment. The question for decision, by mid-July 1942, 

was less whether Iranian facilities should be developed than how, by 

whom, and to what extent. The welter of confused responsibilities that 

had characterized the earlier effort had to be resolved, and a clearcut decision rendered on the priority to be given the project. From 

the very beginning it had been clear that only the Americans had the 

resources to accomplish the task; but to turn it over to them would 

require delicate adjustments in relationships as long as the area 

" Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, pp. 564-66. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 241 

remained one of British strategic responsibility and the military forces 

there under British command. In terms of priority, the basic question 

was the extent to which the BOLERO build-up for invasion of the 

Continent in 1943, already subordinated to TORCH, should be further 

subordinated to the effort to ensure continued deliveries of supplies to 

the USSR. These were questions that only the President, the Prime 

Minister, and the combined Chiefs of Staff could decide. And both 

because it was primarily American commitments for delivery of supplies that were concerned and because only the Americans had the 

resources adequate to the task of developing the facilities in Iran to 

the desired extent, the responsibility for decision lay mainly with the 

President of the United States. 

The Decision on American Responsibility 

The President showed no inclination to view the obstacles that 

had arisen to the continued delivery of supplies to the USSR as insuperable. In his instructions to his staff for the London negotiations 

in July he answered categorically the question of whether a serious 

effort should be made to meet the Second Protocol: 

British and American materiel promises to Russia must be carried 

out in good faith. . . . This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete 

collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our 

part.'9 

In taking this position, the President indicated clearly that he thought 

this aid must flow mainly via the Persian Gulf until the northern 

convoys could be resumed. 

An intensive exploration of the question of how this could be accomplished followed. On 13 July 1942, evidently anticipating the 

British decision to suspend the northern convoys, Averell Harriman, 

the President's personal lend-lease representative in London, cabled 

Harry Hopkins calling attention to the need for speed in expanding 

transit facilities through Iran. His recommendation was that the U.S. 

Army should take over operation and control of the Iranian State 

Railway in the British Zone. Admiral King, General Marshall, and 

General Somervell agreed generally that steps must be taken to increase Iranian transit facilities, but they stopped short of any positive 

recommendation that the Americans should take over the railroad, 

pending further study. The President, nonetheless, readily accepted 

19 Memo, President for Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 16 Jul 42, quoted in Robert E. 

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An lntlmait History (New York: Harper & Brothers, rev. 

ed., 1950), pp. 603-05. See also Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp. 273-78. 
242 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Harriman's proposal. Replying on 16 July to Churchill's formal notification of the suspension of the northern convoys, he placed it before 

the Prime Minister. Churchill accepted the proposal immediately with 

some enthusiasm and informally communicated his views to Harry 

Hopkins, then in London, though he delayed a formal response to 

the President until the whole matter had been subjected to further 

study.20 

In a sense, then, the basic decision that the Americans would take 

over the task of developing facilities in the Persian Gulf had been 

taken by the President and agreed to by the Prime Minister by midJuly. But it took two months more to make that decision final 

enough to give it practical effect. Recognition on both sides that the 

matter needed further study reflected the immense complications of 

d.e problem and the fact that it seemed unlikely that merely turning 

the Iranian State Railway over to the Americans would provide an 

adequate solution. It was clear that a much more far-reaching decision was needed which would delineate clearly the dimensions of the 

task of supplying the USSR through Iran, the cost of carrying out 

such a task, the division of responsibility and the best organization 

for it, and the priority to be accorded this effort in relation to other 

essential military and civilian activities in the area. The "further 

study" consequently took over a month. Many hands entered into it. 

Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, Assistant Executive of the Munitions 

Assignments Board, went out to the Middle East on a special mission 

in late July as the personal representative of General Marshall and 

Harry Hopkins to determine on the spot what steps should be taken 

to increase Persian Gulf capacity for Soviet aid. Churchill and Harriman, after a visit to Stalin in August, returned via Tehran and Cairo 

also to investigate the situation at first hand. At the hub of the factfinding stood General Maxwell in Cairo, who, as commander of 

USAFIME, had a newly assigned responsibility for American operations in the Persian Gulf. 

It was less on the highly placed dignitaries, nevertheless, than on 

the pick and shovel men, British and American, in the Persian Gulf, 

that the real job of fact-finding fell. The final estimates on which 

action was based were gathered together by Colonel Shingler, largely 

on information received from British transportation authorities in the 

area. Shingler's tables were postulated on the use of all the Iranian 

ports and partial use of Basra in Iraq and Karachi in India for cargoes to be cleared through Iran. Against a current (August 1942) ca20 (I) Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 177-78, IgOn. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 

pp. 544, 600. (3) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, p. 574. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 243 

pacity of 189,000 long tons for all these ports, Shingler proposed a 

target of 399,500 tons for June 1943. Rail clearance currently running at little more than 35,000 long tons he thought could be increased to 180,000 in the same period under American operation. By 

providing trucking lines to haul 139,500 tons per month, he would 

bring total monthly inland clearance capacity to 319,500 tons. Deducting estimated essential requirements of the British military in 

Iran and the Iranian civilian economy, Shingler figured it would ultimately be possible to forward 241,000 long tons of supplies monthly 

to the USSR. This would provide enough capacity to meet the currently accepted goal of 200,000 long tons per month of Soviet-aid 

supplies via the southern route, but it must be kept in mind that 

Shingler did not believe that target could be met until June 1943, 

much too late to meet the immediate need for an alternate to the 

northern route. 

In mid-August most of the interested parties-Harriman, Churchill, Spalding, Maxwell, Shingler, and British commanders in the Middle East-gathered at Cairo in a conclave that lasted several days. 

Using Shingler's estimates as their point of departure, but modifying 

them in several ways, they arrived at a general estimate and plan for 

action. This plan and estimate Maxwell forwarded to the War Department on 22 August. Excluding Shingler's figures for Basra and 

Karachi, it set the target for the Iranian ports at 261,000 long tons 

monthly. The monthly target for the railroad remained at 180,000 

tons, but the trucking goal was expanded from 139,500 to 172,000 

tons, making a total inland clearance target of 352,000 long tons 

monthly. To achieve these goals, Maxwell recommended that the 

U.S. Army take over the operation not only of the railway, but 

also of the ports-Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, Bushire, and 

Tanuma-and operate a truck fleet to supplement that of the United 

Kingdom Commercial Corporation. Troop requirements to meet these 

objectives were calculated to be 3 port battalions, 2 railway operating battalions, 1 engineer battalion, and 2 truck regiments-a total 

of approximately 8,365 men, all of whom, Maxwell said, had been 

included in the troop basis for the Middle East on a deferred priority. Materiel requirements, in addition to organizational equipment 

for the service troops, were set at 75 additional steam locomotives, 

2,200 20-ton freight cars or their equivalent, and 7,200 trucks averaging seven tons in capacity.21 

Maxwell's recommendations were contingent on receipt of "speccific requests ... from the British authorities." The specific request 

21 Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 180-90. (2) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 

pp. 574-75. 
244 COMMAND DECISIONS 

came from Winston Churchill to the President on the same day. 

Churchill said: 

I have delayed my reply until I could study the Trans-Persian situation on the spot. This I have now done both at Tehran and here, and 

have conferred with Averell, General Maxwell, General Spalding and their 

railway experts. The traffic on the Trans-Persian Railway is expected to 

reach three thousand tons a day for all purposes by the end of the year. 

We are all convinced that it ought to be raised to six thousand tons. Dnly 

in this way can we ensure an expanding flow of supplies to Russia while 

building up the military forces which we must move into North Persia to 

meet a possible German advance. 

To reach the higher figure, it will be necessary to increase largely the 

railway personnel and to provide additional quantities of rolling stock and 

technical equipment. Furthermore, the target will only be attained in 

reasonable time if enthusiasm and energy are devoted to the task and a 

high priority accorded its requirements. 

I therefore welcome and accept your most helpful proposal contained 

in your telegram, that the railway should be taken over, developed and 

operated by the United States Army; with the railroad should be included 

the ports of Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur. Your people will thus 

undertake the great task of opening up the Persian Corridor, which will 

carry primarily your supplies to Russia. All our people here agree on the 

benefits which would follow your approval of this suggestion. We should 

be unable to find the resources without your help and our burden in the 

Middle East would be eased by the release for use elsewhere of the British 

units now operating the railway. The railway and ports would be managed entirely by your people, though the allocation of traffic would have 

to be retained in the hands of the British military authorities for whom 

the railway is an essential channel of communication for operational purposes. I see no obstacle in this to harmonious working. 22 

Harriman followed with a cable to the President the next day, 

strongly reinforcing the Prime Minister's arguments and Maxwell's 

recommendations. Maxwell, Spalding, and he all agreed, Harriman 

said: 

(a) that with proper management and personnel and with additional 

equipment the capacity of the railroad to Teheran can be increased to six 

thousand long tons a day, 

(b) . that the British have not the resources or personnel to carry out 

this program even if we should supply the equipment, 

(c) that unless the United States Army undertakes the task the flow of 

supplies to Russia will dry up as the requirements of the British forces in 

the theatre increase, 

(d) that the importance of the development of the railroad to its 

maximum cannot be over-emphasized, 

(e) that the condition in the Prime Minister's cable of the British retaining control of traffic to be moved is reasonable, offers no practicable 

difficulty and should be accepted. 23 

" Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 22 Aug 42, quoted in Motter, Persian Corridor, p. 190. 

2:l Msg, Harriman (signed Maxwell) to President, 22 Aug 42, CM-IN 8657,23 Aug 42. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 245 

While placing his main emphasis on the railroad, Harriman also recommended the dispatch of the three port battalions and asked favorable action on the request for trucks and personnel to increase road 

transport, though he placed the last in a priority second to the railroad and the ports. 

The Military Plan 

On 25 August, the President turned both Churchill and Harriman's cables over to General Marshall with a request that he have a 

plan drawn up to accomplish what was being proposed and give 

his judgment as to whether the United States should accede to the 

request. Marshall assigned the task to General Somervell's Services of 

Supply (SOS). Within the SOS primary responsibility fell on Col. D. 

O. Elliot, head of the Strategic Logistics Division, working under the 

general supervision of Brig. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Assistant Chief of 

Staff for Operations, SOS. Somervell told his subordinates that he 

wanted to present the Chief of Staff with "a complete study in every 

respect . . . one that can be regarded as a model." 24 

The resultant SOS Plan, presented by Lutes to Somervell on 

4 September 1942, met this high standard in almost every respect. 25 

It brought all the earlier proposals on the railroad, ports, and trucking organization together in one single plan for a balanced and selfcontained American service command in the Persian Gulf. This command was to be formed in the United States and shipped to Iran by 

increments to take over from Shingler's sparsely staffed mission, 

absorbing the latter in the process. Thus, while the SOS Plan was 

built on the recommendations drawn up at Cairo, it expanded the 

personnel and materiel recommendations contained in those recommendations considerably, producing a far more accurate estimate of 

what the project to develop the Persian Gulf would actually cost 

other efforts. In order to provide for a balanced service command, 

24 (I) Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 29 Aug 42, Hq Army Service Forces (ASF) Folder 

Operations. ASF records have been retired to National Archives. (2) MS Index to Hopkins Papers, V, Aid to Russia, Item 69. A copy of this index to Hopkins papers in the 

Hyde Park Library is in OCMH. (3) Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 191-92. 

25 (I) Plan for the Operation of Certain Iranian Communications Facilities Between 

Persian Gulf Ports and Tehran by U.S. Army Forces, 3 Sep 42, Persian Gulf Command 

Folder 235 (hereafter cited as SOS Plan). The Persian Gulf Command folders (PGF), 

at present with Army records in Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va., consist of some 

of the documents used by T. H. Vail Motter in preparation of the volume The Persian 

Corridor and Aid to Russia. (2) Control Division, ASF, folder of same title as above contains most of the papers used by Colonel Elliot in preparation of the plan, including 

memorandums from various persons who rendered advice and from chiefs of technical 

services. It is to be found with the rest of the ASF records in National Archives. 
246 COMMAND DECISIONS 

troop requirements were expanded from the 8,365 in the Maxwell 

cable to 23,876. While 4,515 of these, road maintenance personnel, 

were placed in a deferred category, they were to prove in the end as 

necessary as any of the others. Though the target figures and the 

estimated numbers of trucks, rail cars, and locomotives remained the 

same in the SOS Plan as in the Cairo recommendations, the additional organizational equipment for the service troops vastly expanded 

the total amount of materiel required. 

Meeting these requirements, the planners found, would be difficult. The pool of service troops available was smali, and a large proportion of those activated had either been earmarked for BOLERO or 

would be necessary for TORCH. The production of heavy equipmentlocomotives, rail cars, and large trucks-was limited, and, outside domestic requirements, most of that under production had been 

earmarked for the British. As usual, shipping was the most critical 

commodity of all. The SOS Plan noted that "all troop and cargo 

ships have been assigned missions [and] any new operations must be 

at the expense of other projects." If the project was to succeed it 

must be given a priority second only to the operational requirements 

of TORCH, and above those of the build-up for the invasion of the 

Continent in 1943 . 

Presupposing this high priority, the SOS planners proposed that 

of the 19,361 troops considered essential for early shipment, 8,969 

could be made available by diversion from BOLERO, 8,002 from other 

troop units already activated (mainly for second priority objectives in 

Iran and North Africa), and 1,501 from new activations. Of the road 

maintenance troops in a delayed category, 1,503 would also have to 

come from the BOLERO troop basis, the rest from miscellaneous 

sources. One port battalion of 889 men was to be diverted from General Wheeler's Service of Supplies in Karachi where it was reportedly 

not doing port work. Provision of the locomotives and rail cars would 

also require diversions from other sources in the Middle East and 

India, but the major portion would have to come from new production or from the domestic railroads. Trucks presented the most difficult problem of all. It was thought that 500 of 10-ton capacity could 

be repossessed from a number turned over to the British under lendlease and 600 of capacity unknown withdrawn from a stock at 

Karachi intended for shipment into China,' but for the rest it would 

be necessary to substitute 2V2-ton cargo trucks in larger numbers for 

the trucks of 7-ton capacity requested. 

Shipping requirements for men and materials added up, according 

to Transportation Corps estimates, to a total of 471,000 ship tons. 

The SOS Plan provided for movement of 11,000 men on the West 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 247 

Point and Wakefield in late October, the rest on British troopships to 

be released from deployment of U.S. air forces to the Middle East in 

January 1943. Both movements represented diversions from BOLERO. 

Cargo shipments should begin 1 October and continue through January at the rate of 110,000 tons, approximately 10 ships per monthagain a diversion from BOLERO, but partially compensated by the fact 

that the shipping pool would be increased by release of cargo ships 

originally scheduled to sail over the northern route. 26 

The most difficult question of all was timing. Shingler had estimated that the final targets for port capacity and inland clearance 

could not be met before June 1943. Both General Spalding and 

Averell Harriman insisted that this target date could be moved forward to February 1943 and Spalding presented estimates to SomerveIl on this basis on his return to Washington. The British, remembering their own experience, were extremely dubious that more than 

half the target could be achieved by February and felt that June 

would be far more realistic. The SOS planners refused to commit 

themselves definitely but postulated a "material advancement" of the 

June target date set by Shingler. 27 The SOS Plan for movement was 

geared to this "material advancement." Priorities were proposed as, 

first, rail operations; second, ports; and third, road operations. The 

5,004 troops required for the railroads and the 5,016 for the ports 

(including miscellaneous service and headquarters elements necessary 

to complement them) could be taken care of in the first troop movement scheduled for October. The equipment for their operations 

could be made available and shipped in co-ordination with the 

troops. They should be in the theater and ready to take over operation of the ports and railroads by the end of the year. The 8,114 

troops primarily for truck operations and in third priority, would follow in January and should be in the theater at least by early March. 

The heavy trucks, whose availability was most in question, or smaller 

substitutes for them, could probably be made available by this time. 

The essence of the conclusion dictated by General Somervell was 

that, if high enough priority was given to the movement of troops 

and supplies, the whole operation was feasible. He ended with the 

recommendation "that this plan be accepted as the basis of future 

operation of supply routes in the Persian Corridor." 28 

26 Memo, Maj Gen C. P. Gross, CoIT, for Gen Somervell, 30 Aug 42, sub: Transportation Service for Persian Gulf. Control Div, ASF, folder on SOS Plan. 

27 (I) SOS Plan, par. 4. (2) Memo, Spalding for Somervell, 4 Sep 42, sub: Target 

Estimates of Persian Gulf Supply Routes; and Memo, Spalding for Elliot, 5 Sep 42, with 

Incl, Comments by Lt Col W. E. V. Abraham of British Middle East Command on 

American Estimates, both in Control Div, ASF, folder on SOS Plan. 

28 SOS Plan, Synopsis, pars. 7, 8. 
248 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The CCS Decision 

Somervell submitted the plan to the Chief of Staff with a draft 

cable for the President to send to the Prime Minister indicating his 

acceptance of the latter's proposal and his approval of a plan to put 

it into effect. But final approval of the plan was not to come through 

this channel. The Persian Gulf project involved both matters of combined strategy and division of military responsibility in the Middle 

East that required consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

General Marshall therefore placed the plan before them, and it was 

they who rendered the final decision. 

In consideration of the plan before the Combined Staff Planners 

(CPS), the British had their opportunity to present their views. The 

British planners in general accepted the SOS Plan but they remained 

more pessimistic about the possible rate of development. They pointed 

to one glaring contradiction in the American calculations. Persian 

ports would be unable, during the months following, to handle shipments of supplies on the scale contemplated for the new American 

command "without cutting the scheduled Russian shipments and the 

essential civil and military maintenance commitments." They therefore insisted on a reduction in the schedule of these cargo shipments 

from ten to five ships per month at the outset, stipulating that it 

might be increased later at the discretion of the authorities on the 

spot. Beyond this, the only other revision in the plan proposed by the 

CPS was to add the barge port of Ahwaz to the list of facilities to be 

operated by the American command. 29 

Having made what they considered necessary revisions in the 

plan, the CPS turned to the question of its strategic implications and 

the problem of division of responsibility between British and Americans in Iran. Its strategic implications were clear. It would "increase 

the dispersion of ... U.S. military resources" and "divert personnel, 

equipment and ships that are at present set up for other theaters." 

The greatest effect would be on the build-up in the British Isles for 

invasion in 1943 and this effect would be felt most severely in the 

diversion of cargo shipping. The CPS noted: 

Transportation required for this plan will reduce the number of sailings for BOLERO to the extent of about 21/2 times the number of sailings 

for the project. On the assumption that 44 cargo ship sailings are required 

to complete the move the cost to BOLERO would therefore be a total of 

110 sailings during the period of the move. The longer turnaround to the 

Persian Gulf results in a proportionately larger quantity of shipping being 

removed from other military operations. The number of cargo sailings 

29 CCS 109/ I, Rpt by CPS, 22 Sep 42, title: Development of Persiall Transportation 

Facilities. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 249 

monthly may be increased in direct proportion to the reduction of ships 

allocated to the Persian Gulf for handling lend-lease to Russia. Personnel 

shipping in ships of 20 knots or better can be made available without interfering with present planned operations of higher priority.30 

The planners could see no alternative to accepting this cost. "If our 

shipping losses continue at their present excessive rate along the 

Northern Russian route," they noted, "it may become necessary to 

use the Persian Gulf route entirely." This statement had additional 

force in view of developments since July when the planning for 

American operation of Persian Gulf facilities had begun. After the 

two months' suspension during July and August, the British resumed 

the northern convoys in September using a very heavy naval escort, 

only to lose some thirteen cargo vessels out of forty. Neither this scale 

of escort nor this rate of loss could be sustained during the early 

stages of TORCH and the President and Prime Minister were forced 

to the decision that the convoys must be canceled again during October 

and November. While the Combined Staff Planners were weighing 

the Persian Gulf plan, Churchill and Roosevelt were pondering the 

question how to break the bad news of the new suspension of convoys to Stalin. "My persisting anxiety is Russia," wrote the British 

Prime Minister, "and I do not see how we can reconcile it with our 

consciences or with our interests to have no more PQ's till 1943, no 

offer to make joint plans for JUPITER [the invasion of Norway], no 

signs of a spring, summer or even autumn offensive in Europe." 31 It 

is not therefore surprising that the CPS recommended to the Combined Chiefs "favorable consideration" of the proposition. that "the 

U.S. Army accept responsibility for developing and operating the 

transportation and port facilities in the Persian Corridor" in accordance with the SOS Plan.32 

In making this recommendation, the CPS had to resolve finally 

the old question of the relative responsibilities of British and Americans for movement control. The general principle of Churchill's cable 

that the United States should operate the transport facilities subject 

to British allocation of traffic required some definition, and the first 

version of the plan presented by the British raised definite fears on 

the American side that they wished to control shipments from the 

United States as well as internal traffic through the corridor. Ameriican strategic planners, in General Marshall's Operations Division, 

never very enthusiastic about this diversion of American resources 

30 [hid. 

31 (1) Msg 151, Prime Minister to President, 22 Sep 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), Sec. 

4-B. (2) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics·, p. 583. 

32CCS 109/1,22 Sep 42. 
250 COMMAND DECISIONS 

from their primary objective of a cross-Channel invasion, thought the 

United States should not undertake the project with responsibility so 

divided in the theater. They wished to give first priority to supplies 

for the USSR. But British counterobjections to this produced a compromise, if not satisfactory to all at least acceptable, in the tradition 

of nearly all Anglo-American wartime relations. The British were to 

continue to exercise strategic responsibility for the defense of the area 

against enemy attack and for security against internal disorders. In 

view of this responsibility, the British commander-in-chief of the Persia-Iraq Command would control "priority of traffic and allocation of 

freight" for movement from the Gulf ports northward. But, recognizing the primary objective of the United States as increasing and 

ensuring the uninterrupted flow of supplies to Russia, the CPS proposed this statement: "It is definitely understood that the British control of priorities and allocations must not be permitted to militate 

against attainment of such objective, subject always to the military 

requirements for preparing to meet a threat to the vital Persian Gulf 

oil areas." The U.S. commanding general in the Persian Gulf was 

granted the right of appeal though the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff on any British decision which he thought 

would prejudice the flow of supplies to the USSR. General priority of 

movement was stated as follows: "Over and above the minimum requirements for British forces consistent with their combat mission, and 

essential civilian needs, Russian supplies must have highest priority." 33 

These provisions meant that the British control over allocation of 

freight would not be exercised except in case of imminent threat of a 

German attack or an Axis-inspired uprising. In normal circumstances 

there would be fixed allocations for British military forces and for civilian needs which would be transported as first priority, and all additional capacity would go to the movement of Soviet-aid supplies. 

This delicate matter decided, the Combined Chiefs approved the CPS 

recommendations on 22 September 1942 without any recorded discusSIon. 

In rendering its decision, the CCS made no definite stipulation as 

to the priority to be given the Persian Gulf project, apparently on 

the theory that this must be left to the President. They had, nevertheless, in mid-August adjusted their shipping priorities to give Soviet 

aid cargoes going via the southern route priority equal to that of 

military shipments for TORCH and the Middle East and above those 

:l:l (1) All quotations above from CCS 109/1. (2) Memo, Elliot for Lutes, 4 Sep 42, 

OPD 334.8, CCS, Case 16. (3) CCS 109, 2 Sep 42, title: Development of Persian Transportation Facilities. (4) Research Draft prepared by OPD Hist Unit, USSR in U.S.-British 

Plans and Operations in 1942, pp. 83-85, MS, OCMH. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 251 

for the BOLERO build-up. A Presidential directive giving virtually the 

same priority to the project for developing Iranian facilities to handle 

these shipments was therefore almost a foregone conclusion. It was 

forthcoming on 2 October 1942 when the President instructed the 

Secretary of War that "the project for the operation and enlargement 

of the Persian Corridor be given sufficient priority and support in 

the form of men, equipment and ships to insure its early and effective accomplishment." 34 With this directive the SOS Plan as modified by the CCS decision was put into action. 

The Results of the Decision 

Persian Gulf facilities under American operation eventually provided an adequate substitute for the northern route for delivery of 

supplies to the USSR but this development came much later than 

the planners in August and September 1942 had hoped and much 

LOO late to permit fulfillment of American commitments under the 

Second Protocol. Shipments of both supplies and personnel for the 

Persian Gulf Command were delayed well beyond the schedule proposed in the SOS Plan. Mistakes were made both in the planning 

and in the early operations. A trucking fleet that would carry anything like the 172,000 tons proposed in the SOS Plan was never sent. 

The transition from British to American operation took longer than 

planned, and the Americans also took longer to make their operation 

effective. Under British operation, improvement was slow during the 

latter half of 1942. Approximately 40,000 long tons of Soviet aid were 

delivered through the Corridor in September 1942, only 51,000 in 

January 1943. Total tonnage on the Iranian State Railway expanded 

only from 36,000 in August 1942 to 52,000 in January 1943. Between 

January and May 1943, the Americans assumed operation step by 

step and the turnover was generally complete by 1 May. During this 

transition period total tonnage delivered to the Russians expanded to 

101,000 in April, while the railroad carried 65,000 tons in March. 

Under complete American operation, the figure for tonnage delivered 

to the USSR was nearly doubled by September 1943, reaching 199,000, 

and the railroad achieved a capacity of 175,000 tons in October. This 

achievement of the target loads came six months after the date predicted by Harriman and Spalding and three months after the more 

pessimistic goal proposed by Shingler in August 1942. After October 1943 the Persian Gulf was in a position to forward even more 

cargo than it proved necessary to send by that route. In the peak month 

:14 (1) Memo, President for SW, 2 Oct 42, AG 400.3295 (9-1-42) Sec. 12. (2.) Motter, 

Persian Corridor, p. 180. (3) Leighton and Coakley, Global J,ogistics, pp. 578, 584. 
252 COMMAND DECISIONS 

of July 1944 some 282,097 long tons of supplies were delivered to the 

USSR through the Corridor. 35 

The effects of the ultimate success achieved by the American command are clearly apparent in the figures on performance under the 

various protocols. On the first and second, deliveries were only about 

75 percent of the material promised, while on the third the United 

States exceeded its promises by 30 percent and on the fourth had already met 95 percent of its commitments when the war in Europe 

came to an end on 8 May 1945 and the schedules were revised. True, 

a shift in Soviet priorities, after Stalingrad, from military equipment to 

civilian-type supplies that made possible a far greater use of the Pacific route during this later period also influenced the result, but in 

large measure it was the opening of the Persian Gulf that made possible so high a scale of shipments, with the northern route intermittently closed throughout the war. 36 

Despite the delays in fulfillment of the goals then, the decision 

must be evaluated as a sound one if the rationale of the program of 

aid to the USSR is accepted. The cost involved to the build-up for 

invasion of the Continent was not a determining factor in postponing 

that operation until mid-1944. By the time the decision was finally 

rendered, there were so many other diversions and dispersions of 

American resources under way or in prospect that the Persian Corridor project was simply one of the minor factors contributing to the 

delay in concentration in the British Isles. 

The principal criticism of the decision then must be that it was 

belated, unduly slow both in the making and in execution. It was 

reasonably apparent in October 1941 that the Persian Corridor would 

have to be extensively developed if supply commitments to the USSR 

were to be met and the crisis on the northern convoy route in April 

and May 1942 made it doubly certain. For a long period, there was 

a clear contradiction in American policy on aid to the USSR. Supplies and the ships to carry them were accorded almost the highest 

priority possible while the means of developing the only secure route 

for delivery of the supplies were accorded one of the lowest. This 

situation had reached the point, by July 1942 when the northern convoys had to be suspended, where only a decision at the highest level 

could resolve it. The President made that decision, ending the contradiction in policy. Yet the necessity for carrying out, almost de novo, 

35 (I) Estimate for August 1942 is based on Msg, AMSIR to AGWAR, 12 Oct 42, 

CM-IN 05027. All other figures are from Motter, Persian Corridor, App. A, Tables 4, 5. 

(2) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, pp. 577-83. 

36 (I) State Dept Rpt on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45. (2) Leighton and Coakley, 

Global Logistics, pp. 583-97. 
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 253 

a survey of requirements needed to perform the task and the means 

of meeting them delayed even the beginning of fulfillment of the decision for almost two months. It took another year for its complete 

effects to be felt. The lesson then appears to be that the plans for 

development of any line of communications must be prepared well 

in advance and a decision taken as early as possible on the means to 

fulfill them. Otherwise, amidst the competing claims of a global conflict, the relatively small requirements of such a project tend to get 

lost in the shuffie of major undertakings despite the importance they 

may have for over-all strategy. 

In 1942 the importance of the Persian Corridor project for overall strategy was not inconsiderable. The need for speed must be 

evaluated in terms.of developments on the Russian front in that year. 

While the Persian Gulf decision was in the making the Germans were 

moving steadily forward to their rendezvous with destiny at Stalingrad. If the Persian Gulf facilities had been ready, the amount of 

British and American supplies reaching the Russians during this critical battle would have been much greater. As it was, the Russians 

won with what they had and what the British and Americans did in 

fact contribute. But had the battle gone the other way, British and 

American leaders might well have had good cause to regret the fact 

that the decision to make a concentrated effort to develop the southern route had not been made earlier. 

10 

OVERLORD Versus the Mediterranean 

at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences 

by 

Richard M. Leighton 

The long debate between U.S. and British leaders over the strategy 

of the European war reached a climax and a turning point at the 

great mid-war conferences at Cairo and Tehran late in 1943. Since 

the decision to invade North Africa, a year and a half earlier, the 

debate had focused on the war in the Mediterranean, the British 

generally advocating a bold, opportunistic strategy, the Americans a 

more cautious one. On the surface, they had disagreed on specifics 

rather than fundamentals. Few on the American side advocated complete withdrawal from the Mediterranean, and U.S. leaders were as 

quick as the British to respond to the opportunity offered by the disintegration of Italian resistance in early summer of 1943. They opposed the British primarily on the choice of objectives, especially east 

of Italy. For their part, the British never questioned the principle that 

the main attack against Germany in the West, and the decisive one, 

must eventually be made from the northwest (OVERLORD) not the 

south. In the meantime, they argued, aggressive operations in the Mediterranean were not merely profitable but even essential in order to 

waste the enemy's strength and to contain and divert enemy forces 

that might otherwise concentrate on other fronts. But the debate was 

embittered by American suspicions that the British intended somehow 

to sidetrack, weaken, or indefinitely postpone the invasion from the 

northwest, subordinating it to peripheral and indecisive ventures in 

the Mediterranean that would serve their own long-range political 

ends. Since the British consistently disclaimed such intentions, the issue of OVERLORD versus the Mediterranean could not be debated as 

such-and, indeed, cannot now be proved even to have existed outside the minds of the Americans. For them, nevertheless, it was the 

real issue, and the question actually debated at Cairo and Tehran, 

Biographical sketch of author, p. 199. 
256 COMMAND DECISIONS 

whether OVERLORD should be postponed a few weeks in order to permit certain small-scale operations in the eastern Mediterranean, was 

only the shadow. From the American point of view, the great achievement of the conferences was not the compromise reached on the latter 

question-essentially a technical matter, worked out on the staff 

level-but the decision of the Big Three-Roosevelt, Stalin, and 

Churchill-to make OVERLORD and its southern France complement, 

ANVIL, the supreme effort of the Western Allies against Germany in 

1944. After Cairo-Tehran, Mediterranean strategy continued to be a 

source of friction, but American leaders seemed to consider the crossChannel invasion as assured and the issue of OVERLORD versus the 

Mediterranean as closed. 1 

Tools if Amphibious War 

In November 1943 Allied military fortunes were high. On the 

Eastern Front Soviet armies had crushed the Germans' summer ofI The present essay is condensed from several chapters of Richard M. Leighton and 

Robert \'Y. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, a forthcoming volume in 

the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, based on original research 

in the records of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, including the official minutes 

and papers of the Cairo-Tehran Conferences, and Army records in the custody of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, G-3, filed in the Federal Records Center of the National Archives. A contrasting interpretation of the Cairo-Tehran Conferences will be 

found in another volume in this series, Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition 

Wmjiu/', 1943,,1944 (Washington, 1959). The conferences are also described from various 

points of vie" in a number of other works in the series: Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel 

A ttack (\Vashin~ton, 1951); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command 

Problems (Washington, 1956); Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954); 

and Louis ~10rton and Henry Morgan, The Pacific War: Strategy and Command, The 

Road to Victory (in preparation). Three other American studies deal with the CairoTehran Confi:rences at some length: Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1957); William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, 

Thel'r Co-Operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); and 

Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 

1948). The outstanding British interpretation is John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, 

August 1943-September 1944 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1956), in the official British 

History ~f the Second World War. (Permission to quote from this work has been received 

from the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.) Of the large memoir literature, Winston 

S. Churchill's Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951) contains the 

most detailed and valuable account. The published memoirs of Admiral William D. Leahy, 

Admiral Ernest J. King, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Maj. Gen. John R. Deane 

are also useful, though sketchy on the conferences themselves. Arthur Bryant's two-volume 

biography of Lord Alanbrooke (General Sir Alan Brooke), Turn of the Tide and Triumph 

in the West (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1957, 1959), is also useful for the British position. Three American studies, recently published, contain brief, provocative analyses, 

from the American point of view, of the Anglo-American debate on European strategy 

in World War II: Kent Roberts Greenfield, The Historian and the Army (New Brunswick, N.J.: 

Rutgers University Press, 1954); Samuel Eliot Morison, Strategy and Compromise (Boston: 

Little, Brown and Company, 1958), and Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957). 
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258 COMMAND DECISIONS 

fensive against Kursk before it had got well under way, and had 

launched a series of powerful counteroffensives which by late November had driven the enemy across the Dnieper, isolated the Crimea, 

and, farther north, pushed almost to the Polish border. British and 

Americans in the Mediterranean had swept through Sicily in July 

and August, forced the capitulation of Italy, and invaded the peninsula in September, bogging down finally in the mountains south of 

Rome. (See Map 7.) The strategic bombing offensive against the German homeland continued with mounting intensity, despite heavy losses, 

and in early autumn the hitherto lagging build-up of American invasion forces in the British Isles swelled to massive proportions. In the 

Pacific war, the New Guinea offensive had reached the Huon Peninsula with the capture of the important enemy base at Finschhafen, 

the South Pacific campaign had advanced to Bougainville in the 

northern Solomons, and the push across the central Pacific had begun with fiercely contested landings on Tarawa and Makin in the 

Gilberts. In the Atlantic, the U-boats had been decisively defeated, 

and shipping losses reduced to negligible proportions. On all fronts 

except Italy and Burma the Allies were advancing. Germany's defeat 

was now predicted for October 1944, and the American planning committees had been ordered to produce a scheme for ending the war 

against Japan within the year following. Optimism ran high. 

Behind this optimism lay the realization that men and materials 

would be available on the scale needed to sustain and quicken the 

momentum already gained. The immense weight of Soviet manpower 

and industry, after more than two years of mobilization, was now 

making itself felt; Soviet armies, backed by masses of reserves and 

munitions, now had a capacity for sustained offensive warfare that 

the enemy no longer possessed. In the West, Britain's war effort had 

passed its peak, with armed forces fully deployed and manpower and 

industrial capacity fully engaged. American armed forces, on the other 

hand, though approaching the limits of their planned expansion, were 

still mostly uncommitted; the bulk of the U.S. Army was at home, 

waiting to be deployed overseas, and only a handful of divisions had 

actually seen action. American war industry by now had achieved a 

productivity that in many categories of munitions actually surpassed 

foreseeable needs. Military supply programs were already being cut 

back, and pressures were building up to expand production of civilian 

goods. The most spectacular achievement of American war production was in shipbuilding. American shipyards in this year poured out 

19.2 million deadweight tons of merchant shipping, which was more 

than two and one-third times as much as had been built in 1942. Early 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 259 

in August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the chairman of the War 

Production Board that they no longer expected merchant shipping to 

be the bottleneck of the overseas war effort. 2 

Only one category of supply-landing craft-threatened seriously 

to limit Allied strategy in 1944. At Cairo and Tehran, indeed, the 

apparent necessity of choosing between a postponement of OVERLORD 

and abandonment of planned or proposed amphibious operations elsewhere was dictated by the shortage of landing craft-more particularly, 

of one type of landing vessel, the Landing Ship, Tank (LST). Less 

than 300 LST's were in existence in November 1943, almost all built 

in the United States. Of these, 139 were in the Mediterranean-67 

of them allocated to the British under lend-lease-and, except for a 

small contingent, were all earmarked for transfer to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD as soon as the amphibious phases of the Italian 

campaign were completed. For OVERLORD, in addition, the United 

States had agreed the preceding spring to provide 62 more new LST's 

during the coming winter. The remaining new production of LST's 

was allocated to the war in the Pacific. 3 

Production of LST's and other landing ships and craft in the 

United States had been late in getting under way, reaching large volume only in the winter of 1942-43 and then rapidly falling off. This 

first wave of production, aimed originally at the now discarded plan 

for a cross-Channel invasion in spring of 1943 (ROUNDUP), had proved 

generally adequate, together with the smaller output of British factories and yards, to meet the rather modest needs of Allied amphibious 

operations before mid-1943. 4 Even the invasion of Sicily, in some respects the most massive amphibious operation of the entire war (eight 

divisions were landed simultaneously), was adequately mounted without drawing upon a substantial reserve of U.S. assault shipping in 

2 (1) Frederick C. Lane, Ships for Victory: A History of Shipbuilding Under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), pp. 601-05. 

(2) Gerald J. Fischer, A Statistical Summary of Shipbuilding Under the U.S. Maritime Commission 

During World War II (Washington, 1949), Table A-4. (3) Leighton and Coakley, Global 

Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, MS, Ch. X. 

3 A few LST's of special design were constructed in Britain early in tl.e war. In origin, the LST was a British-designed vessel, like virtually all the landing ships and craft 

used in World War II. Under wartime agreements, the United States constructed most 

of the merchant and amphibious shipping used by both countries, thus enabling Britain, 

with limited building capacity, to concentrate on expanding its Navy. 

For figures on distribution of LST's in November 1943 see CCS Memo for Info 175, 

23 Nov 43, Landing Craft Reports, 1 Nov 43. 

4 SLEDGEHAMMER, the tentatively planned emergency cross-Channel attack in fall of 

1942, had been canceled, partly because of a shortage of assault lift, but for other reasons as well. 
260 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the Atlantic or interfering with planned deployments of craft to the 

Pacific.' 

From the Navy's point of view the whole landing craft production program had been undertaken at the worst possible time-when 

the Navy was straining to rebuild sea power destroyed or immobilized 

at Pearl Harbor and in later engagements, in order to gain supremacy 

in the Pacific, while at the same time trying to break the stranglehold of enemy submarines upon the sea lanes in the Atlantic. The 

program competed with many other lines of war production for materials, above all for the steel, engines, and facilities needed to build 

other types of combatant vessels. A Navy official commented bitterly 

in April 1943 that the high rate of landing craft construction achieved 

late in 1942 had been obtained "only by cutting across every single 

combatant shipbuilding program and giving the amphibious program 

overriding priority in every navy yard and every major shipbuilding 

company. The derangement ... will not be corrected for about six 

months." (; As landing craft schedules were terminated or cut back 

that winter and spring, the Navy pushed the building of escort vessels to meet the revived menace of the German V-boats in the Atlantic, 

which in March reaped a harvest of more than a million deadweight 

tons of Allied shipping. 7 Navy officials candidly wanted no more 

emergency landing craft programs. 

By August 1943, however, pressures were building up to increase 

the output of landing craft, at a time when, as a result of the abatement of the submarine menace, the Navy was cutting back its escort 

and antisubmarine vessel programs. While the landings on Sicily had 

been successful, with losses lower than anticipated, the greater part 

of the entire amphibious fleet in the Mediterranean was tied up for 

weeks after the initial landings moving supplies over the beaches and 

performing other administrative tasks. Other amphibious undertakings were in prospect in the Mediterranean, in southeast Asia, and 

on the two main avenues of advance toward Japan across the Pacific. 

The biggest prospective deficit of amphibious shipping, however, 

loomed in the planned cross-Channel assault, then scheduled, as a 

result of decisions at the Washington Conference of May 1943, for 

" (1) Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-

1943, UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), pp. 376-82, 602-03, 

682-83. (2) George Mowry, Landing Craft and the War Production Board (WPB Study No. 

11, July 1944), Ch. II. (3) Jeter A. Isley, and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 1-4,47-48. (4) Harrison, 

Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 60-6\. For a description of the various types of landing ships 

and craft, see ONI226, Allied Landing Craft and Ships (Office, Chief of Naval Operations, 

April 1944). 

(j JPS 152/1, 3 Apr 43, title: Production of Landing Craft. 

7 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, MS, Chs. I and III. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 261 

the spring of 1944. For this undertaking, against what was expected 

to be the most heavily defended coast line in the world, the assault 

as then tentatively planned was to be on a scale of only about three 

and a half divisions with two more afloat, a limit imposed arbitrarily 

by the predicted availability of assault shipping. At the Quebec Conference of August 1943 Prime Minister Churchill bluntly called for 

an immediate increase in American landing craft production, pledging at the same time a maximum effort in his own country, in order 

to strengthen the OVERLORD assault. The same demand was voiced 

on the American side in various quarters. 

In September and again late in October, the Navy with JCS approval ordered large increases in landing craft production. Navy officials framed the new program, however, with an eye to the war in 

the Pacific, not the war in Europe. Large segments of the program 

were devoted to new types of vessels mainly adapted to warfare in 

the Pacific-notably armored amtracks (LVT's) and the new LCT(7), 

actually a small landing ship-inevitably at the expense of the older 

types desperately needed in Europe. Nor would the increases become 

effective in time to help OVERLORD if the operation were carried out 

early in May 1944. Allocations of new production to OVERLORD were 

limited to about three months' output, at current low rates, at the 

end of 1943. To this Admiral Ernest J. King, on 5 November, promised to add something less than a month's production of LST's, 

LCI(L)'s, and LCT's, and not all of these seemed likely to arrive in 

the United Kingdom in time to be used in the invasion. 8 

A month before the Allied leaders assembled at Cairo, U.S. representatives at a conference of foreign ministers in Moscow pointed to 

the new landing craft program as indisputable proof that the longpostponed second front would be opened the following spring. In 

Washington, by contrast, the British were being warned privately that 

no more new landing craft would be forthcoming for OVERLORD. 9 It 

was the latter assumption that shaped the options laid before the conferees at Cairo and Tehran. 

Alarums and Excursions 

American military leaders and their staffs, on the eve of the 

Cairo-Tehran Conferences, were in a mood to force a showdown on 

the strategy of the European war. 10 As they viewed it, Allied strategy 

S Ibid., MS, Chs. X, XI. 

9 Ibid. 

10 This section is condensed from Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 

1943-1945, MS, Chs. VI through X. For a good summary, see Harrison, Cross-Channel 

Attack, Ch. II. 
262 COMMAND DECISIONS 

since the decision to invade North Africa had been drifting steadily 

away from the northwestern Europe orientation, agreed on in April 

1942, and into a peripheral line of action that could only end in 

stalemate. Preparations for a cross-Channel invasion in spring of 1943 

had been suspended, the British Isles almost denuded of American 

troops, and American resources had been diverted into the development of a new line of communications and a new invasion base in 

North Africa. The decision at Casablanca in January 1943 to attack 

Sicily had ensured that the Mediterranean would continue to be the 

main theater in Europe during 1943 and that no cross-Channel invasion could be attempted until 1944 at the earliest. Since then British persuasion and the ineluctable logic of momentum had drawn the 

Allies deeper into the Mediterranean-into Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, 

Sardinia, Corsica-and a long, uphill struggle still loomed ahead in 

Italy. Most alarming to the Americans was the persistent effort of the 

British to broaden the Mediterranean front eastward-by pressure on 

Turkey to enter the war, by proposals to seize ports on the Dalmatian coast and to step up aid to the Balkan guerrillas, and, most 

recently, by an ill-advised incursion into the Dodecanese Islands 

which had cost the British several thousand troops killed and captured and untold loss of prestige. Persistent dabbling by the British 

in this region raised, in American minds, the dread specter of military operations and political involvement in the Balkan peninsula, a 

land of inhospitable terrain, primitive communications, and turbulent 

peoples. 

In the light of developments in the Mediterranean, American military leaders discounted the repeated pledges of loyalty by the British 

to the cross-Channel invasion strategy. They tended to gloss over or 

ignore the immense investment Britain already had in the crossChannel operation, the heavy contributions of British shipping to the 

build-up of American invasion forces and material in the United 

Kingdom (almost half the entire tonnage used), and the persistent 

pleas of British leaders for a strengthening of the OVERLORD assault. 

It was widely believed in American official circles that British leaders 

feared to come to grips with the German Army on equal terms, that 

they were haunted, as Secretary of War Stimson put it, by the "shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkerque." 11 Army staff officers, wrestling 

with the paradox, could only conclude that the great Anglo-American 

invasion army amassing in the United Kingdom was intended by the 

11 (1) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New 

York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 435-38. (2) Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 573-76. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 263 

British to be "a gigantic deception plan and an occupying force" after 

the expected German collapse. 12 

In recent weeks American suspicions of British intentions had 

quickened. At the Quebec Conference in August, the OVERLORD plan 

prepared by the Anglo-American planning staff in London had been 

accepted by both sides with little discussion. But the British had 

rejected an American demand that OVERLORD be given an "overriding" priority over operations in the Mediterranean. Prime Minister 

Churchill, then and subsequently, had stressed, to a degree that aroused 

American misgivings, the stipulations written into the OVERLORD plan 

to the effect that additional forces would be needed if German strength 

in France exceeded certain levels. As yet, the Americans had not made 

an issue of this point, since the JCS had approved the stipulations 

along with the plan. Then, late in October, a crisis had suddenly 

developed in Italy when it appeared that the Germans were winning 

the build-up race south of Rome and might soon be in a position to 

launch a crushing counterattack. Churchill and the British Chiefs had 

reacted with what the Americans considered unjustified alarm. The 

British had proposed the temporary retention in the Mediterranean of 

all assault shipping earmarked for OVERLORD, and, more disturbing, 

had intimated that if the situation in Italy continued to deteriorate 

it might be necessary to postpone OVERLORD beyond its present target date of 1 May 1944. After some discussion, it had been agreed 

that sixty-eight OVERLORD LST's should remain in the Mediterranean 

until mid-December, as the theater commander, General Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, had requested, to help mount an amphibious turning movement around the enemy's right flank south of Rome. But the JCS 

and their staffs were still worried, as the time for the Cairo meetings 

approached, over the implied British threat to OVERLORD. For the 

British Chiefs had bluntly warned that they intended, at the forthcoming conference, to bring up for reconsideration "the whole position of the campaign in the Mediterranean and its relation to 

OVERLORD." 13 

Finally, early in November, the Americans received a disturbing 

hint of the role the Soviet leaders might play at Tehran. At the foreign ministers' conference in Moscow late in October, Marshal Joseph 

V. Stalin had displayed a lively interest in the operations of his allies 

in the Mediterranean, and, to the astonishment of the Western repre120PD paper [about 12 Nov 43], U.S. Courses of Action in Case Sextant Decisions 

Do Not Guarantee OVERLORD, Exec 5, Item 12a. See also various staff studies in ABC 

381 Strategy Section Papers (7 January 1943), Numbers 131-95. 

l:l Memo, Representatives COS, in CCS 379, 26 Oct 43, Opns in Mediterranean. 
264 COMMAND DECISIONS 

sentatives, had reacted with bland unconcern when British Foreign 

Secretary Anthony Eden had hinted that, owing to the worsening 

situation in Italy, it might be necessary to postpone OVERLORD. After 

the conference, Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, head of the U.S. military 

mission in Moscow, had been bombarded by complaints from the Soviet 

staff about Allied inaction in the Mediterranean. Deane had concluded from all this that the Soviets, as he informed Washington, 

"want to end the war quickly and feel they can do it," and therefore were less interested in OVERLORD, six months or more distant, 

than in immediate action to draw German strength from the Eastern 

Front. Deane warned his superiors to expect a Soviet demand at the 

forthcoming conference for a greater effort in the Mediterranean, 

including "some venture in the Balkans," even if that meant delaying 

OVERLORD. '4 Deane's warning caused a furor in Washington, where it 

was apparently taken at face value. Combined with the disturbing 

hints from London of an impending attack on OVERLORD, it conjured 

up nightmarish visions of a concerted Russo-British demand at Tehran for a major shift of effort to the Mediterranean-or worse, to the 

eastern Mediterranean-at the expense of OVERLORD. '5 

First Cairo: The Options 

At Cairo, the Americans found that the British, too, were ready 

for a showdown. "It is certainly an odd way of helping the Russians," declared Churchill after a scathing review of recent setbacks 

in the Mediterranean, "to slow down the fight in the only theatre 

where anything can be done for some months." 16 The British Chiefs 

of Staff seized the initiative with a blunt criticism of American insistence on the "sanctity of OVERLORD." 

We must not ... regard OVERLORD on a fixed date as the pivot of 

our whole strategy on which all else turns. In actual fact, the German 

strength in France next Spring may, at one end of the scale, be something 

which makes OVERLORD completely impossible and, at the other end, some14 (1) Msg 51, Deane to JCS, 9 Nov 43, with related papers in Exec 5, Item 15, Env. 

3. (2) John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), p. 35. 

(3) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 286-89. (4) Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New 

York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), Vol. II, p. 1301. (5) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 

100-101, 156-157. 

1.' Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, MS, Ch. XI. 

16 Quoted in Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 332-33. The Cairo-Tehran meetings lasted 

from 22 November through 7 December 1943. At Cairo, Roosevelt, Churchill, and their 

military advisers met formally for the first time with Chiang Kai-shek. The Tehran meetings (28 November-I December) brought the two Western leaders together with Premier 

Stalin for the first time. A second series of meetings, attended by British and Americans 

only, was held at Cairo on 2-7 December. See Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, Ch. XVI. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 265 

thing which makes RANKIN not only practicable, but essential. This 

policy, if literally interpreted, will inevitably paralyse action in other theatres without any guarantee of action across the Channel. . . . It is, of 

course, valuable to have a target date to which all may work, but we are 

firmly opposed to allowing this date to become our master. ... 

They were prepared, they asserted, to carry out the cross-Channel 

invasion "as soon as the German strength in France and the general 

war situation gives us a good prospect of success," but they insisted 

that unless the Allies pursued an aggressive course of action in the 

Mediterranean during the coming winter and spring, such conditions 

were unlikely to develop. 17 

The ominous implications of this manifesto were hardly borne out, 

however, by the British Chiefs' concrete program for the Mediterranean. They wanted to advance beyond Rome only as far as the Pis aRimini line (the same limit the JCS had in mind); to extend more 

aid to the Balkan partisan forces in the form of weapons, supplies, 

technical assistance, and commando raids; to try to bring Turkey into 

the war before the end of the year; and, with Turkish consent, to 

open the Dardanelles (shortest route to the USSR) to Allied shipping. 

The opening move, provided Turkey's support were assured, would 

be an attack about February 1944 on the largest of the Dodecanese 

Islands, Rhodes, which commanded the approaches to the Aegean 

and the Straits. Finally, control of the whole Mediterranean area would 

be unified under a British commander. (This last the Americans were 

already prepared to concede, in return for the appointment of a U.S. 

commander for OVERLORD.) In short, the British hoped by means of 

a major effort in Italy and what Ambassador Winant called "bushleague tactics" east of Italy to force the Germans back along the entire 

Mediterranean front. By the Prime Minister's reckoning, the eastern 

Mediterranean operations would involve not more than a tenth of 

the combined British and American resources in the whole theater. 

But, while all the troops and other means needed were available in 

the area, the landing ships and craft were scheduled for early transfer to the United Kingdom. To retain them for the required time 

might mean postponing OVERLORD as much as six weeks or two 

months-that is, until about 1 July 1944. '8 

As far as Italy and the Balkans were concerned, the U.S. Chiefs 

had no quarrel with these proposals. They even saw certain advantages in gaining Turkey as an active ally, provided the price paid 

17 (1) CCS 409, Note by COS, 25 Nov 43, OVERLORD and the Mediterranean. (2) 

Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 109-12. RANKIN was one of several alternative plans for crossing the Channel in the event of a German collapse before the OVERLORD target date. 

1R (1) CCS 409, cited n. 17(1). (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 104-21, 165-67. (3) 

Min, 2d Plenary Mtg, SEXTANT, 24 Nov 43. 
266 COMMAND DECISIONS 

for intervention was strictly limited. But they doubted the ability of 

the Turks to hold their own if attacked by the Germans, and felt no 

enthusiasm for another try at Rhodes, so soon after the recent disaster. 

Moreover, the American staffs challenged the timetables and requirements of the British plan at many points. They doubted whether the 

Rhodes operation could be fitted into the LST movement schedules, 

even if OVERLORD were postponed to 1 July. 19 

The British, however, had an alternative proposal: the necessary 

assault shipping for the Rhodes operation might be taken from southeast Asia. In August a new Allied command had been set up in 

southeast Asia under Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, embracing 

Burma, Ceylon, Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and Sumatra (but neither 

China nor India). Since then the basic divergence of British, American, and Chinese purposes in the area, not to mention the differences 

within each camp, had been sharpened. British aspirations looked primarily south and southeast, toward a restoration of Britain's prewar 

possessions and influence in Malaya and the East Indies. The Americans were more interested in increasing China's effectiveness as an ally 

and in gaining bases in China for bombing and, ultimately, invading 

Japan. For the British, therefore, Burma was a stage on the road to 

Singapore and beyond-one that might, perhaps, be bypassed-while 

for the Americans it lay on the route over the Himalayas into China. 

Although construction had begun early in 1943 on a road from Ledo, 

in India's Assam Province just over the Burmese border, to connect 

with the old Burma Road where it crossed into China, contact 

between China and her allies depended for the present on the airlift. 

Throughout 1943 supplies delivered over the Hump from India to 

China each month had not exceeded, on the average, what could be 

carried by a single medium-sized freighter. Competition for this trickle 

of cargo was fierce. Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Mountbatten's American deputy and commander of the U.S. China-Burma-India theater 

(lying partly within Mountbatten's command), wanted to use the supplies mainly to equip Chinese forces in China in order to help in the 

reconquest of northern Burma, scheduled to begin early in 1944 before 

the onset of the spring monsoon. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, 

commanding the U.S. air forces in China, believed the airlift should 

be greatly expanded and devoted entirely to support of an air offensive against Japanese communications in China and with the home 

islands. Chennault's program, which promised quicker results at lower 

cost than Stilwell's long-range plan of regenerating Chinese armies 

and restoring land communications with China, appealed both to the 

19 The discussion of these points is described in detail in Leighton and Coakley, Global 

Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, MS, Ch. XI. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 267 

President and to Chiang Kai-shek, though the latter naturally 

demanded an airlift large enough to support both programs. Since 

the preceding spring the bulk of supplies brought over the Hump had 

in fact gone to Chennault's air forces. However, Roosevelt's broader 

aims for China coincided with Stilwell's. His purpose in inviting 

Chiang to Cairo (over British objections) was, in part, to discuss further economc and military aid-which was imperative, Chiang said, 

if China were to continue fighting-and, in part, to enlist his co-operation in the forthcoming Burma offensive. 

The general plan of this offensive was to launch converging drives 

into northern and central Burma-by British-Indian forces from the 

west, by Stilwell's American-trained Chinese from the northwest, and 

by Chiang's own armies from southern China. Subsidiary features of 

the plan included a British naval demonstration in the Bay of Bengal by fleet units released from the Mediterranean after the Italian 

surrender, and an amphibious operation-although where this would 

be carried out was still somewhat uncertain. A year earlier Stilwell's 

plan for the reconquest of Burma had included a major amphibious 

attack on Rangoon; at the Washington Conference of May 1943 this 

had been scrapped, for lack of assault shipping, in favor of smaller 

landings near Akyab and on Ramree Island, along the Burma coast 

just below the Indian border. To mount these operations, a contingent of half a dozen attack transports, eighteen LST's, and a number 

of smaller craft, had been sent to India, arriving there finally, after 

a protracted hold-over in the Mediterranean, early in the fall. 

Churchill, meanwhile, had come out strongly for an "Asiatic-style 

TORCH" in the form of a surprise descent on the northern tip of 

Sumatra (CULVERIN), which the Americans opposed as eccentric to 

the main effort and his own advisers thought would require more 

resources than were available. The theater commanders, finally, had 

proposed a more modest substitute in the form of landings on the 

Andaman Islands, southwest of Rangoon, in March or April 1944. 

This operation (BUCCANEER) had been tentatively endorsed by both 

the British and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, though it, along with the 

remainder of the whole plan, still awaited formal approval. BUCCANEER 

was, then, the amphibious part of the general plan (CHAMPION) submitted to Chiang at Cairo. 20 

Immediately the plan ran into heavy weather. Hardly anyone, in 

fact, had much enthusiasm for BUCCANEER, except perhaps Chiang, 

20 (I) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 148-53. (2) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. II. (3) [Mountbatten] Report to CCS by Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1945 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1951), p. 27. (4) Mati off, Strategic 

Planning for Coalition Waifare, 1943-1944, Ch. XIV and Ch. XVI, pp. 2-3. 
268 COMMAND DECISIONS 

who had not been informed of its objective, but who independently 

suggested the Andamans as a suitable objective. Its most serious defect 

was that it seemed to have little connection with the mainland operations it was intended to support, and hardly represented a threat 

serious enough to provoke a strong reaction. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

preferred it to CULVERIN, but were not committed to any particular 

operation; Admiral King himself favored a landing on the mainland 

near Moulmein with a view to cutting across the isthmus to Bangkok, 

but such an undertaking was not thought feasible with the assault 

shipping available. Evidently the most that could be said for BUCCANEER was that it would provide a base for future amphibious landings on the mainland and for bombing the new Bangkok-Moulmein 

railroad, which gave the Japanese in Burma direct overland connections with the Gulf of Thailand. 21 Churchill made no secret of his 

distaste for BUCCANEER and had earlier declared that if he could not 

have CULVERIN he would send the British assault shipping back to 

the Mediterranean. At Cairo he expanded on the idea: if the Americans would not accept CULVERIN, and if they refused to postpone 

OVERLORD the few weeks necessary to carry out the attack on Rhodes 

and move assault shipping back to the Mediterranean, then why not 

take the shipping needed for Rhodes from southeast Asia? BUCCANEER 

might be postponed rather than canceled. As Churchill remarked, 

"There really cannot be much hurry. The capture of the Andamans 

is a trivial prize compared with Rhodes, and also it can be undertaken at any time later in the year." 22 

That Churchill was willing to entertain the idea of doing BUCCANEER at all, despite his candidly expressed scorn for the operation, 

was the result of the position taken at Cairo by the Chinese Generalissimo. Chiang immediately branded the whole Burma plan (CHAMPION) as inadequate. As a price for his participation in a more ambitious one, moreover, he demanded an immediate increase in the airlift 

far beyond the capacity of available transport aircraft and explicit 

guarantees from the British that the land operations would be supported simultaneously by major co-ordinated naval and amphibious 

attacks. The unreasonableness of the airlift demand, and the arrogance 

shown by Chiang's subordinates in discussing it with the Western 

military leaders, caused the latter to close ranks, and drove even Gen21 (1) Mountbatten Report, p. 27. (2) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command 

Problems, p. 51. (3) Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, A 

Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 509-10. (4) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Y, 162. (5) Min, CCS 129th Mtg, 24 Nov 43. 

22 Msg, PM for CsofS Com, 21 Nov 43, quoted in Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 686. 

(2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Y, 114, 159. (3) Min, 2d Plenary Mtg, SEXTANT, 24 Nov 43. 

(4) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 66. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 269 

eral Marshall to exasperation. 23 A moderate increase in the airlift was 

ordered, but the Chinese were told unequivocally that they must choose 

between an offensive in Burma and expanded ferry operations, since 

both competed for transport aircraft. As for BUCCANEER, the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff did not at first take a strong stand, agreeing to postpone action pending decisions yet to be taken on the broader strategy 

of the war against Japan and the British role in it. In the CCS, therefore, Chiang's demand for an amphibious operation was carefully and 

noncommittally "noted," with a promise merely of future "consideration." Churchill, however, sharply challenged Chiang's view of the 

interdependence of the naval and amphibious phases of CHAMPION 

and the land operations. He pointed out that, in the absence of accessible bases and because of the time needed to refit and redeploy British naval forces from the Mediterranean, direct naval support could 

not be provided in the forthcoming spring campaign, even though he 

could promise that by March strong naval forces would be operating 

in the Bay of Bengal. Finally, he told Chiang emphatically that no 

definite undertaking to carry out an amphibious operation in conjunction with the land campaign could be given. 24 

Chiang thus faced defeat on all his demands. Early in the afternoon of the 25th he agreed to the CHAMPION plan as drawn, with the 

sole stipulations that the British should gain naval superiority in the 

Bay of Bengal-which Churchill had already promised- and that 

the plan should include an amphibious operation-to which Churchill 

was willing to agree if the Americans met his own conditions in the 

Mediterranean. At the same time, however, Chiang was demanding 

that President Roosevelt give him something to show for having 

attended the conference. 25 The President obliged. On the same afternoon he told Stilwell and Marshall he had decided, as a further concession to Chiang, greatly to enlarge the program of equipping Chinese 

divisions, and, some time on the same day, he seems to have given 

Chiang a pledge that BUCCANEER would be carried out on the scale 

and at the time planned. 26 

2:1 (I) See Marshall's outburst quoted in joseph W. Stilwell, Theodore H. White, ed., 

The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p. 255. (2) Min, 

129th Mtg CCS, 24 Nov 43. (3) Min, l30th Mtg jCS, 25 Nov 43. 

24 (I) Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 328. (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 162, 164-65, 

571. (3) Min, CCS 128th Mtg, 23 Nov 43. (4) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 65. (5) Min, 1st Plenary Mtg, SEXTANT, 23 Nov. 43. 

2[, See Marshall's remark at the jCS meeting earlier in the day. Min, jCS 130th Mtg, 

25 Nov 43. 

," The evidence on this last point is strong but not conclusive. Churchill (Closing the 

Ring, page 328) and Leahy (I Was There, page 201) both assert unequivocally that the 

pledge was given and Ehrman accepts this as fact (Grand Strategy, Volume V, page 165). 

Matloff (Strategic Planuing for Coalition Waifare, 1943-1944, Chapter XVI) regards it as at 
270 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The President's pledge left his military chiefs very little room for 

maneuver. If the Soviet leaders at Tehran should insist, as the Joint 

Chiefs fully expected them to insist, on an immediate major effort by 

the Western allies in the Mediterranean, with or without OVERLORD, 

approval of the British program seemed assured. The assault shipping 

allotted for BUCCANEER, now sacrosanct, could not be made available 

for Rhodes. If OVERLORD shipping currently in the Mediterranean 

were used instead, how could it be replaced in time to meet the OVERLORD target date? New American production after January was allotted 

to the Pacific, and Admiral King bristled at the suggestion of further 

inroads on this source. The only remaining possibility seemed to be 

to postpone OVERLORD a few weeks as the British had proposed, thus 

giving more time to redeploy assault shipping and, incidentally, making available another one or two months' production of landing craft. 

As Admiral Leahy remarked, the problem was brutally simple: the 

JCS had to decide whether or not they could accept a delay in OVERLORD; if they could not, "the problem appeared insoluble." 27 

The President, at least, had been thinking of delay. Back in Washington Justice James F. Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization, had received on the 23d a "very urgent" message from him 

inquiring whether the output of landing craft could be increased, by 

means of an overriding priority, during the first five months oj 1944-an 

inquiry that made sense only under the assumption that OVERLORD 

might be postponed beyond 1 May 1944. Byrnes' reply, dispatched 

on the 25th, Indicated that substantial increases might be possible in 

April and later, but virtually none before then. Roosevelt probably 

knew, therefore, when he promised Chiang an amphibious operation, 

that if OVERLORD were postponed to July, it could be bolstered by 

the addition of some twenty-two new LST's, not to mention ten more 

now allocated but unlikely to reach the United Kingdom in time for 

a May assault-and this without encroaching on existing Pacific allocations of February and later output. 28 

Final decision had to wait, then, until the Russians showed their 

hand. At the last Cairo meeting with the British (on the 26th) before 

least highly probable. Romanus and Sunderland, who give little attention to the amphibious phases of the war in Burma, do not mention the pledge, though they do mention 

the promise to equip more Chinese divisions. It may be significant that the President, in 

the interview with Stilwell and Marshall mentioned above, seemed from his remarks to 

have the Andamans operation on his mind. But the most convincing evidence is to be 

found, as shown below, in the abrupt change in the attitude and position of the jCS on 

the morning of 26 November. 

27 Min, jCS l31st Mtg, 26 Nov 43. 

"(I) Msg, FDR to Byrnes, Dir OWM, 23 Nov 43, Exec 5, Item 14. (2) Msg, Byrnes 

to President, 25 Nov 43, in jCS Memo for Info 171,27 Nov 43, ABC 561 (30 Aug 43). 

(3) Mowry, Landing Craft and the WPB, pp. 30-32. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 271 

going to Tehran, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff stressed the sanctity of BucCANEER, but said little about OVERLORD or the Mediterranean. Sir 

Alan Brooke asked them whether they understood that "if the capture of Rhodes and Rome and Operation BUCCANEER were carried 

out, the date of OVERLORD must go back." Marshall assured him they 

did. Would it not be better, urged Brooke perplexedly, to postpone 

BUCCANEER rather than OVERLORD? What if the Russians should 

demand both a strong Mediterranean offensive and an early OVERLORD? The situation had become embarrassing. Finally, Admiral 

Leahy blurted out a broad hint: the U.S. Chiefs of Staff "were not 

in a position to agree to the abandonment of Operation BUCCANEER. 

This could only be decided by the President and the Prime Minister." There was little more to say. The Americans accepted the British program as a basis for discussion at Tehran, but on the contradictory assumption that it "would in no way interfere with the 

carrying-out of Operation BUCCANEER." The British left with the 

distinct impression, as Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay reported to the 

Prime Minister, that the Americans, now rigid against any tampering 

with BUCCANEER, contemplated a postponement of OVERLORD "with 

equanimity." 29 

Tehran: Enter ANVIL, Compromise on 0 VERLORD 

At the opening general meeting at Tehran, on 28 November, the 

three principals, at Stalin's brusque suggestion, promptly got down to 

business. Roosevelt noted in his opening remarks the possibility that 

OVERLORD might have to be postponed "for one month or two or 

three," and spoke of the various operations in the Mediterranean that 

were being considered to relieve enemy pressure on the Eastern Frontin the Aegean, at the head of the Adriatic, and in Italy. OVERLORD, 

he pointed out, would draw away more German divisions than any 

of these, and he urged that, if possible, it not be delayed "beyond 

Mayor June." Churchill presented the British case, elaborating on 

the promising opportunities that could be exploited in the eastern 

Mediterranean without detriment either to the campaign in Italy or 

to OVERLORD. How would the Soviet Union, he asked, regard this 

prospect "even if it meant as much as about two months' delay in 

OVERLORD?" 30 

Up to this point the atmosphere had been cordial. To the pleased 

surprise of the Westerners, Stalin opened his remarks. with an almost 

casual promise that the Soviet Union would intervene in the war 

29 (I) Min, CCS 131st Mtg, 26 Nov 43. (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 166-67. 

30 Min, 1st Plenary Mtg, EUREKA, 28 Nov 43. 
272 COMMAND DECISIONS 

against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated. This confirmed and 

strengthened the more tentative offers the Soviet marshal had made 

on earlier occasions. But his next words brought the discussion abruptly 

to a tense climax. He declared bluntly that the whole Mediterranean 

program appeared to him to involve an excessive dispersion of forces. 

OVERLORD should be made the "basic" operation for 1944, and all 

other operations, however attractive, regarded as diversions. He saw 

only one useful possibility in the Mediterranean, an attack on southern France (which Churchill had mentioned in his opening remarks) 

followed by a drive northward toward an eventual junction with the 

main OVERLORD forces-the classic pincers formula, which the Russians had applied so often in their own theater. Why not, he suggested blandly, suspend the Italian campaign immediately in order 

to release forces for this operation, and then launch OVERLORD two 

or three months later? 31 

General Marshall must have been reflecting sardonically, while 

Stalin was dropping his bombshell, on an innocent remark he himself 

had made in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs that morning, to the effect 

that the Soviet demands, whatever they might be, "would probably 

simplify the problem." 32 Whatever the reasons for the sudden evaporation of Stalin's recently displayed interest in Mediterranean operations, and for his return to the old familiar insistence on a "second 

front" -perhaps because, with Soviet armies now at a standstill in 

the Ukraine, a grand convergence on southeastern Europe no longer 

promised quick victory-his proposals immeasurably complicated what 

had been an essentially simple, if baffling, dilemma. The Mediterranean was a "going" theater of war in which the Western allies had 

a heavy investment. To stop short on the present line in Italy would 

be almost as repugnant to the Americans as to the British, and 

Churchill promptly and emphatically asserted that from the British 

point of view the capture of Rome was both strategically and politically imperative. Stalin seemed, moreover, not to have grasped the 

limiting role of shipping and landing craft, or the central problem of 

timing and sequence that grew out of it. He had to be reminded that 

the troops in the Mediterranean, except for seven divisions already in 

transit to the United Kingdom, were irrevocably bound there for lack 

of shipping to deploy them elsewhere. He missed the point that the 

southern France operation and the landings in the Adriatic had been 

suggested as mutually exclusive alternatives and that the Rhodes 

operation was very modest in scope. When Churchill reminded him 

of this last fact, he conceded that on those terms the capture of 

31 (I) Ibid. (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 174-76. 

32 Min, 132d Mtg JCS, 28 Nov 43. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 273 

Rhodes might be worthwhile. But if both the Rome and Rhodes operations were to be carried out, or even only the latter, how could a 

landing in southern France, two or three months before OVERLORD 

(for which Stalin had stipulated no date) be worked into the schedule-unless OVERLORD was postponed? 33 

At this juncture the President, who had been silent during the 

above exchange, suddenly interposed. Stalin's proposals, he said, had 

raised a serious problem of timing. A choice must be made: either 

undertake Churchill's Aegean operations, which would delay OVERLORD a month or two, or, as the Soviet premier had suggested, "attack 

[southern] France one or two months before the first of May and then 

conduct OVERLORD on the original date." His own preference, Roosevelt 

added, was for the latter alternative. 34 

Churchill was caught off balance. Nothing in the President's earlier 

remarks had suggested any intention to insist on adherence to the 

1 May target date for OVERLORD. He had, in fact, seemed to accept 

the idea of postponement, urging only that it be brief. His military 

advisers, by the end of the Cairo meetings, had seemed resigned to 

the inevitability of some delay. But by implying now that Stalin himself had demanded a 1 May date (which he had not, in fact, done), 

the President evidently hoped to enlist his support. If so, it was an 

adroit maneuver, for Stalin failed to challenge the President's implication. Its significance was not lost on Churchill, who immediately 

protested against the idea of condemning twenty or more divisions in 

the Mediterranean to inactivity "solely for the purpose of keeping the 

May date for OVERLORD," and chided the President for the "rigid 

timing" of the program he had proposed. 35 

The Russians had shown their hand. For the Americans the nightmare of an Anglo-Soviet demand for a shift to the Mediterranean 

had been dissipated in the comforting assurance that the Soviet leaders once more stood solidly for the primacy of OVERLORD and shared 

the American aversion for operations in the eastern Mediterranean. 

It quickly became clear, moreover, that the Russians also shared 

American suspicions as to British motives, for in the course of the next 

day (the 29th) both Churchill and Brooke, under Soviet grilling, were 

repeatedly obliged to go through the ritual of affirming their loyalty 

to OVERLORD. 36 At a meeting of the military representatives on this 

.le (1) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 175. (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 355. 

:H (1) Min, 1st Plenary Mtg, EUREKA, 28 Nov 43. (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 176. 

[Italics supplied.] 

:: (1) M~n, 1st. ~lenary Mtg, EUREKA, 28 Nov 43. (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 176. 

(1) Mill, MIlitary Mtg, EUREKA, 29 Nov 43. (2) Min, 2d Plenary Mtg, EUREKA, 

29 Nov 43. (3) See also Churchill's account of Stalin's attack on General Brooke at the 

banquet on the evening of the 30th, Closing the Ring, pages 386-88. 
274 COMMAND DECISIONS 

same day the Soviet leaders indicated no very specific notions as to 

what should be done in the Mediterranean or when. When Sir Alan 

Brooke pointed out the risk that a landing in southern France so long in 

advance of OVERLORD might be crushed before OVERLORD could get 

under way, the Soviet representative, Marshal Klementy Voroshiloff, 

merely reiterated rather woodenly his master's statement that the 

operation would be a valuable complement to OVERLORD. Anyway, 

he added, Stalin did not insist on a southern France operation. All 

other undertakings in the Mediterranean, "such as Rome, Rhodes, 

and what not," were diversions that, if carried out at all, should be 

"planned to assist OVERLORD and certainly not to hinder it." Evidently the Soviet leader intended to let his allies squabble unhindered 

over Mediterranean strategy. According to Voroshiloff, however, Stalin 

did insist on OVERLORD-and "on the date already planned." 37 

Thus the issue was finally joined on the timing of OVERLORD. On 

this same 29 November Roosevelt, now committed to fight for a May 

OVERLORD and evidently confident that with Soviet support he could 

win, sent a message to Washington tardily instructing Justice Byrnes 

to call off the proposed speed-up in landing craft production, since 

"the increase in critical types ... does not become effective enough 

to justify change in present construction programs." 38 At the plenary 

meeting that afternoon, Stalin set forth his position in the language of 

an ultimatum. He also pressed for an early appointment of a commander for the operation. Soviet forces, he promised, would match the invasion from the west by a simultaneous offensive from the east. 39 

Churchill held the floor for most of the session with a spirited defense 

of the British Mediterranean program. He vainly tried to draw out 

Stalin on his proposal for a southern France operation, for which, as 

he pointed out, no plan had yet been drafted, and he warned, as 

Brooke had already done, that if the attack were too weak or launched 

too early, it would invite disaster. If, on the other hand, a two-division 

amphibious lift could be left in the Mediterranean, bright possibilities 

opened up-turning movements along the Italian coasts, then a swift 

37 Min, Military Mtg, EUREKA, 29 Nov 43. 

38 (I) Quoted in Mowry, Landing Craft and the WPB, p. 31. See also pp. 32-33. Actually, the program had already been accelerated, in response to Roosevelt's message of 

the 23d, since certain measures had to be set in train immediately, without waiting for 

the President's order. (2) See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy 1943-

1945, MS, Ch. X. 

39 Min, 2d Plenary Mtg, EUREKA, 29 Nov 43. This was hardly a compelling argument for a May OVERLORD since the Russians, as the British pointed out, had never 

launched a summer offensive in that month. According to Churchill, Stalin told him at 

lunch on the 30th that he wanted OVERLORD in Mayor in June in order for it to synchronize with the Soviet offensive. In the event, the latter jumped off on 23 June, two 

and a half weeks after OVERLORD. See Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 380, 383. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 275 

capture of Rhodes, and finally an invasion of southern France in conjunction with OVERLORD. This might mean setting back OVERLORD by 

six to eight weeks, or-and Churchill here introduced the alternative 

for the first time at Tehran-the needed assault shipping could be 

brought back from India. At all events, Churchill concluded, if the 

handful of vessels needed for Rhodes could not somehow be found, it 

was unreasonable to suppose that the larger number required for an 

invasion of southern France or any other diversionary operation in 

support of OVERLORD could be provided. He reminded the Soviet 

premier that OVERLORD could not be undertaken at all unless there 

was a reasonable expectation of success based on certain specified 

conditions of enemy strength. This brought from Stalin his celebrated 

query: Would OVERLORD be ruled out if there were thirteen instead 

of twelve mobile German divisions in France and the Low Countries on 

D Day? Churchill assured him it would not. 40 

Stalin made no effort to answer Churchill's arguments. He ignored 

the allusion to BUCCANEER, restated his demand for a May OVERLORD, 

and indicated his preference for a southern France invasion two or 

three months before OVERLORD; if this proved impossible, the operation might be launched simultaneously with OVERLORD or even a little 

later. All other operations in the Mediterranean he regarded as diversions. Roosevelt finally interposed to suggest a date for OVERLORD 

"certainly not later than 15 or 20 May, if possible." Stalin chimed 

agreement. Churchill promptly and emphatically dissented, and the 

atmosphere again became tense. Finally, the problem was referred to 

the military representatives to work out before the next afternoon, when 

final decisions would be reached. 41 

Despite the appearance of a deadlock, the germ of a compromise 

had already emerged. Both Stalin and Roosevelt had refrained from 

demanding a 1 May date. Before lunch the next day (30 November) 

Churchill decided to agree to a date sometime in May, and the British 

Chiefs of Staff came to the meeting with their American opposites 

that morning with specific proposals worked out on this basis!2 General Eisenhower would be allowed to keep the sixty-eight OVERLORD 

LST's in the Mediterranean until 15 January in order to ensure the 

early capture of Rome. This meant, by British calculations, that OVERLORD could not be earlier than June- but the British Chiefs were will40 (1) Min, 2d Plenary Mtg, EUREKA, 29 Nov 43. (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 371. 

(3) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 179. 

41 (1) Min, 2d Plenary Mtg, EUREKA, 29 Nov 43. (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 

370. (3) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 180. (4) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 788. The 

British accounts indicate that both Roosevelt and Stalin gave the OVERLORD date as "in 

May," or words to that effect. 

42 (1) Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 376. (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 181. 
276 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ing, in order to satisfy Stalin, to define this as "in May." They were also 

prepared to support an operation against southern France and, most 

important, to agree that no assault shipping earmarked for OVERLORD 

should be retained in the Mediterranean specifically for the Rhodes 

operation. The· key to this last concession lay in their final proposition: as a result of Stalin's momentous pledge -on the 28th to enter 

the war against Japan after Germany's defeat, they argued, the role 

of China in the coalition had been automatically reduced, and the 

whole case for an offensive in Burma in spring 1944, including BucCANEER, had been weakened. The British now hoped, in short, to 

persuade the Americans to cancel BUCCANEER and send its assault 

shipping back to the Mediterranean, where it could be used to help 

mount the southern France operation-and, as a likely by-product, 

the attack on Rhodes as well. If the Americans refused to cancel 

BUCCANEER, the burden would be upon them to find the assault shipping for southern France elsewhere, leaving the same probability that 

it could also be used for Rhodes. 43 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, feeling confident in the assurance of Soviet support, had worked out their own position. The assault 

shipping already in the Mediterranean could be safely kept there 

until mid-January, as General Eisenhower had asked, to support the 

Italian campaign, without endangering an early May OVERLORD. 

With what remained after the withdrawals, the staff estimated, it 

would be possible to mount a two-division assault against southern 

France (now labeled ANVIL). This operation, for tactical and strategic 

reasons, should be launched no earlier than three or four weeks before 

OVERLORD rather than on the date suggested by Stalin. But the later 

date would not leave time, the Americans emphasized, to shift any 

of the landing craft over to the eastern Mediterranean for an attack 

on Rhodes and get them back to Corsica in time to refit for the 

ANVIL landings. Ergo-no Rhodes operation. The problem, as Admiral 

Leahy triumphantly summed up, "seemed to be a straightforward one 

of the date of OVERLORD." 44 

The argument that a southern France operation would be feasible 

but a Rhodes operation would not hinged on logistical calculations of 

an extremely speculative character. While these calculations, involving forward projections of landing craft availability, could not be 

positively disproved at the time-although the British challenged them 

43 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 181. 

44 (I) Min, 132d Mtg, CCS, 30 Nov 43. (2) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p_ 125. (3) 

James D. T. Hamilton, Threat to Southern France, in draft MS on the southern France 

operation, OCMH. The Americans had little reliable data on the southern France operation with them at Tehran. See Matloff, "The ANVIL Decision: Crossroads of Strategy," 

below. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 277 

at every point-the case for the ANVIL landings seemed particularly 

flimsy. Sir Alan Brooke could cite against it the verdict of General 

Eisenhower, a month earlier, that the assault shipping remaining in 

the Mediterranean would suffice for no more than a one-division lift, 

that the build-up following the assault would be very slow, and that 

no attack on such a scale would be likely to succeed. 45 The British 

did not believe the OVERLORD shipping could be moved back to the 

United Kingdom, after mid-January, in time for a May D Day, and 

they feared, incidentally, that the landing craft allotted for OVERLORD 

were inadequate. 

Caught between contradictory logistical estimates, the discussion 

deadlocked. Nevertheless, the afternoon deadline was at hand, and 

the Russians had to be given an answer. The military leaders agreed, 

therefore (falling back on the subterfuge suggested by the British), 

that the Russians could be told "we will launch OVERLORD during 

May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the south of 

France on the largest scale that is permitted by [available] landing 

craft," with a target date, for planning purposes, the same as that for 

OVERLORD. The advance in Italy would continue as far as the Pis aRimini line, and the sixty-eight LST's requested by Eisenhower would 

be left in the Mediterranean until 15 January. The fate of BUCCANEER 

and the Aegean operations was reserved for discussion at Cairo. 46 

Thus the difficult questions of timing and provision of means raised 

by Stalin's bombshell on the 28th were left unanswered, and no 

breath of discord rumed the meeting of the principals on the afternoon of the 30th, when the military decisions were ratified. It was 

inconceivable, Churchill declared, "that the two nations, with their 

great volume of production, could not make the necessary landing 

craft available." 47 

Whatever else they did, the Tehran decisions did not spell defeat 

for the British program in the Mediterranean. The heart of that program-capture of Rome and advance to a defensible line beyondnow seemed assured, even though it had been the first target of Stalin's 

attack. The modest proposals for the Balkans had been accepted. 

American opposition had centered on the Aegean operations, for which 

Admiral King had warned he would not under any circumstances 

turn over American landing craft. 48 Nevertheless, the prospects of 

45 (I) Min, 132d Mtg CCS, 30 Nov 43. (2) Msg NAF 492, Eisenhower to CCS, 29 

Oct 43, quoted in Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, MS, pp. 188-89. 

46 (I) Min, 132d Mtg CCS, 30 Nov 43. (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 182. (3) Msg 

FAN 281, CCS to Eisenhower, 1 Dec 43, Exec 3, Item 13. 

" Min, 3d Plenary Mtg EUREKA, 30 Nov 43. 

"' (I) Min, JCS 131st Mtg, 26 Nov 43. (2) See Hopkins' strong statement in Sherwood, Rooevelt and Hopkins, pages 793-96. 
278 COMMAND DECISIONS 

mounting the attack on Rhodes had been immeasurably improved by 

the introduction of an assault lift requirement for ANVIL, and Stalin 

had supported the British view, which was written into the formal 

conclusions of the Tehran Conference, that Turkey should, if possible, 

be brought into the war before the end of the year. The attitude of 

the Turks themselves, on which the whole enterprise would depend, 

was soon to be tested anew in negotiations at Cairo. At all events, the 

British left no doubt in American minds that they intended to press 

forward with their Aegean plans, and that, in view of Stalin's firm 

pledge of participation in the war against Japan, they now regarded 

BUCCANEER as fair game. 49 

Second Cairo: Scratch BUCCANEER 

Back at Cairo, the CCS faced the task of finding enough assault 

lift to carry out (1) a late Mayor early June OVERLORD, (2) a simultaneous southern France operation, (3) the British attack on Rhodes, 

as soon as possible following the impending landings south of Rome, 

and (4) BUCCANEER, still scheduled for March. The British promptly 

renewed their attack on BUCCANEER. The operation was now even 

more vulnerable than before, since the receipt of Mountbatten's most 

recent plan which provided for a considerably stronger assault, with 

increased requirements for assault shipping and carrier-borne aviation. 

The ends in view seemed hardly commensurate with the cost, for 

more than 50,000 troops were to be concentrated against a garrison 

estimated at only about 5,000. The British insisted, moreover, on debating the larger issue of the whole campaign in Burma, which, in 

view of American plans for the Pacific and Stalin's firm promise to 

enter the lists against Japan, seemed to them to make little sense. The 

JCS were mainly worried lest, in the absence of an Allied offensive 

in Burma, the Japanese might seize the initiative and overwhelm the 

precariously defended American air bases in China. But they found 

it difficult to defend BUCCANEER on its merits. General Marshall candidly admitted that if the operation could be dropped without wrecking the mainland campaign, "he personally would not be seriously 

disturbed." ·50 

Whatever the defects of BUCCANEER, the JCS ';V'ere, of course, no 

more inclined than before to release its assault shipping if the craft 

H' CCS Memo for Info 165, 2 Dec 43, Military Conclusions of the EUREKA Conference. 

It was also noted that Stalin had undertaken to attack Bulgaria if the latter attacked 

Turkey. 

C,() (I) Min. CCS 135th Mtg, 5 Dec 43. (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 185-86. (3) 

Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 65-67. (4) Morton and Morgan, The Pacific War: Strategy and Command, The Road to Victory, MS, Ch. 1. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 279 

were to be used to mount an attack on Rhodes. But the British 

adroitly shifted ground. They now soft-pedaled their Aegean plans 

(which depended mainly on the outcome of negotiations with the Turks, 

anyway), and concentrated on 'he problem of mounting an adequate 

attack against southern France, to which the Americans were firmly 

committed. ANVIL, they argued, must not be tailored to the leavings 

of other undertakings (as implied in the Tehran formula), but should 

be made strong enough to form a genuine complement to OVERLORD. 

This meant an assault by at least two divisions, perhaps three. But 

when the staffs checked their hasty Tehran estimates against the more 

ample data available at Cairo, they found that the residual assault 

lift in the Mediterranean, after OVERLORD withdrawals, would not 

exceed one and two-thirds divisions and might be even less. After a 

halfhearted attempt to hew to the Tehran line, the ]CS conceded the 

need for at least a two-division assault, and on 4 December Admiral 

King, in a surprise move, offered to meet the ANVIL assault shipping 

deficit from new production previously allotted to the Pacific. 51 

King's offer opened no breach in the opposition of the ]CS to the 

Rhodes operation, since, as he made clear, the new ships and craft 

could not reach the Mediterranean in time to be used for it. On the 

other hand, although they almost covered the calculated deficit 

against a two-division ANVIL assault, they did not guarantee this operation. 52 They left no margin for unforeseen contingencies, and many 

on the American as well as on the British side considered even a twodivision assault too weak. There was, moreover, growing uneasiness 

over OVERLORD'S own weakness, even after the allocations of 5 November. Time was growing short. OVERLORD and ANVIL were now 

designated the supreme operations for 1944; the responsible command51 (I) Min, CCS 133d Mtg, 3 Dec 43. (2) Min, 3d Plenary Mtg, SEXTANT, 4 Dec 43. 

(3) CPS 131/1, 3 Dec 43, Amph Opns Against South of France. (4) Msg 10131, Adm 

Badger to VCNO, 5 Dec 43, Exec 5, Item 13. (5) CCS 424, Rpt by CPS and CAdC, 5 

Dec 43, Amph Opns Against South of France. (6) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V. 184, 187, 

195. 

King's offer was accompanied by a warning that it might result in setting back the 

operation against Truk, the main Japanese base in the Caroline Islands. He did not mention that the JCS had already decided, some three weeks earlier, to suspend the attack on 

Truk pending the results of carrier raids to test whether it might be feasible to bypass 

the fortress. See Min, JCS 123d Mtg, 15 Nov, and 124th Mtg, 17 Nov 43, and Robert 

Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 

II (Washington, 1953), p. 6. 

" The total extra lift required was figured at 3 XAP's (modified assault transports), 

12 MT ships (freighters fitted for vehicle carriage), 26 LST's, and 31 LCT's. King promised to provide the XAP's, the LST's, and 26 of the LCT's. The MT ships were, or 

would be, available in the area; the five LCT's could be taken from craft earmarked for 

OVERLORD, to be replaced by others in the contingent promised for OVERLORD on 5 November. See CCS 424, 5 Dec 43, cited. n. 51. 
280 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ers were about to be named,53 and few doubted that when they reviewed the existing plans they would demand a more ample provision 

of means. At the plenary meeting on 5 December Harry Hopkins 

elicited from the military leaders, after some sharp cross-questioning, 

the remarkable admission that although they had given the stamp of 

approval to a two-division ANVIL and a three and a half division 

OVERLORD, they believed nevertheless that both operations should be 

strengthened. 54 

After two days of discussion at Cairo, the problem had thus taken 

on new dimensions. It was no longer a question of mounting the ANVIL 

assault at a fixed scale. Now it seemed necessary to provide a pool of 

assault shipping large enough to mount both ANVIL and OVERLORD 

on a scale as yet undetermined but adequate to give each a reasonable margin of safety. Precisely how much shipping would be needed 

could not be known until the plans themselves were revised and developed in detail. The very uncertainty on this score lent force to the 

British argument that it would be folly to commit precious assault 

shipping irrevocably to a venture in southeast Asia that even the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff conceded to be of secondary importance. 

At the plenary meeting on the 5th, Churchill bluntly pointed out 

that only the President's unilateral pledge to Chiang stood in the way 

of agreement. He suggested that Chiang might be offered some lesser 

substitute for BUCCANEER, which itself would then be postponed until 

after the monsoon. The remainder of the campaign could be carried 

out as planned. Hopkins supported this idea. The President, obviously 

unhappy, finally agreed to the suggestion that Mountbatten's representatives, then in Cairo, and Mountbatten himself should be queried 

as to what small-scale amphibious operations might be undertaken if 

he had to give up the bulk of his assault lift. At the same time the 

CCS were ordered to re-examine forthwith the two main European 

operations "with a view to increasing the assaults in each case." 

Roosevelt's full capitulation swiftly followed. That same afternoon, 

after consulting with his advisers (only King, in the JCS, held out 

against postponing BUCCANEER), he sent Churchill a brief message: 

"BUCCANEER is off." 55 

The Joint Chiefs were not informed of the decision until the next 

day, but they must have realized, after their meeting with the Presi-

,-,;j The President announced General Eisenhower's appointment as OVERLORD commander on 6 December. 

"Min, 4th Plenary Mtg, SEXTANT, 5 Dec 43. 

"" (1) Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 411. (2) Min, 4th Plenary Mtg, SEXTANT, 5 Dec 

43. (3) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 190-92. (4) King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 

425. (5) William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 213. (6) 

Sherwood, Roosevrlt mid Hopkins, p. 801. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 281 

dent, that it could not long be delayed. What now had to be decided 

were the precise alternatives to be offered Chiang. On the night of 

the 5th the British and U.S. planners made a list of various amphibious operations that might be undertaken in Burma during the spring, 

assuming arbitrarily that the shipping to be withdrawn from the theater would comprise most of the LST's, combat loaders, and small 

aircraft carriers. It was not an impressive list. The Joint Chiefs, studying it the following morning, were inclined to conclude that it might 

be better to give up serious amphibious ventures in the Southeast Asia 

Command altogether during this season, and transfer all the BUCCANEER assault shipping back to European waters. The British agreed. 

The CCS accordingly recommended that major amphibious operations 

in the Bay of Bengal be delayed until after the monsoon, and that 

Chiang Kai-shek be offered two alternatives: the mainland offensive 

as planned, with British n~val control of the Bay of Bengal assured, 

but without BUCCANEER, for which would be substituted carrier strikes, 

commando raids, and bombardment of Bangkok and the railroad; or 

postponement of the mainland offensive, compensated for by increased 

airlift to China and more rapid development of the long-range bombardment program from bases in China. Later that day Mountbatten's reply came in, stating flatly that seaborne operations smaller 

than BUCCANEER would not be worth the effort. He proposed that, in 

anticipation of Chiang's probable reaction, only limited land operations in northern and central Burma and along the Arakan coast be 

undertaken, and that the aim of opening the land route to China during this season be abandoned. 56 

By evening of the 6th all knew that the President, without informing the JCS, had decided to abandon BUCCANEER and, moreover, had 

already cabled Chiang the bad news, presenting the same alternatives 

arrived at by the Chiefs of Staff that morning. 57 Chiang's reply had 

not yet been received, but the President was due to leave Cairo the 

following morning and the conference decisions could not wait. Accordingly, the two alternatives presented to Chiang were both included 

56 (I) Min, 136th Mtg jCS, 6 Dec 43. (2) Min, 136th Mtg CCS, 5 Dec 43. (3) Min, 

137th Mtg CCS, 6 Dec 43. (4) CCS 427, Rpt by CPS, 5 Dec 43, title: Amph Opns in 

Southeast Asia Alternative tq BUCCANEER. (5) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 70. (6) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 192-93. 

57 (I) Msg, President to Chiang, 5 Dec 43, Exec 10, Item 70. (2) Min, 5th Plenary Mtg, 

SEXTANT, 6 Dec 43. Since the CCS recommendations were those approved by the jCS 

and had been drafted by General Marshall, it is possible that Marshall had earlier shown 

this draft to the President and that the latter used it, but without informing Marshall. At all 

events it seems unlikely that the Chiefs of Staff could have known on the morning of the 

6th that the President had already cabled Chiang, since they were discussing their own 

draft with a view to submitting it to the President. See Matioff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, MS, Ch. XVI, p. 60. 
282 COMMAND DECISIONS 

in the final SEXTANT paper approved by the President and Prime 

Minister at the plenary meeting on the night of the 6th. 

In the light of the Generalissimo's known attitude, there could be 

little doubt that he would reject the first; there was considerable doubt 

that he would accept even the second. Actually, by ruling out any 

worthwhile substitute for BUCCANEER, and so informing the Chinese 

leader forthwith, the President had thrown away an option that might 

have been acceptable to Chiang, inasmuch as the latter had never 

been told precisely what sort of operation was contemplated, but only 

that it would be a major one. At the time the conference decisions 

were approved, however, the leaders had Mountbatten's word for it 

that nothing less than BUCCANEER would serve. Later in the month 

Mountbatten changed his mind, but by then the President's message 

had left Chiang in no mood for compromise. In any case, Mountbatten's small residue of assault shipping was soon to be swallowed up 

in the maw of swelling European requirements. On 7 December the 

world-wide redeployment of assault shipping dictated by the SEXTANT 

decisions began as the CCS ordered Mountbatten to send fifteen LST's 

and six assault transports-the bulk of his amphibious fleet-back to 

European waters. 58 

It has become almost a commonplace in American interpretations 

of World War II to say that at Tehran the British were forced to 

abandon their reservations concerning OVERLORD. Thus, it is asserted, 

the primacy of OVERLORD vis-a.-vis the Mediterranean, and, indeed, 

its execution were finally assured. 59 Like the classic query, "When did 

you stop beating your wife?" this interpretation accepts as fact what 

is actually the nub of the issue, namely, the American allegation that 

the British, and Churchill in particular, had never intended to go 

through with OVERLORD and only resigned themselves to do so under 

Soviet pressure at Tehran. In reality, both Churchill and Brooke, 

forced repeatedly by the Russians to state their intentions concerning 

OVERLORD, held firmly to their position. At the end of the conference it was what it had been before: OVERLORD would be the main 

58 (1) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 193, 211-12. (2) Mountbatten Report, p. 29. (3) Romanus and Sunderland. Stilwell's Commmand Problems, pp. 75ff. 

59 For example, Sherwood (Roosevelt and Hopkins, page 788) states that Churchill at the 

plenary meeting on the 29th "bowed to the inevitable"- i. e., accepted OVERLORD-by 

promising Stalin that "Britain would hurl every ounce of her strength across the Channel 

at the Germans." Admiral Leahy in his memoirs (1 was There, page 209) speaks of the 

decision on a May OVERLORD (which he represents as a capitulation by the British, not a 

compromise) in the same sense-e. g., the British "fell into line." See also Harrison, CrossChannel Attack, pp. 125-26; Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), p. 229; Matloff, 

Strategic PlanningJor Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, Ch. XIII, pp. 71-72; "The Decision to 

Invade Southern France," MS, pp. 8-9; Greenfield, The Historian and the Army, p. 54; Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, pp. 212-13, 244. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 283 

effort of the Western Allies in Europe, and, as far as the British were 

concerned, it would be carried out, as Churchill told Stalin on 30 November, "provided the enemy did not bring into France larger forces 

than the Americans and British could gather there." 60 In essence, this 

was the reservation already spelled out in the OVERLORD outline plan 

and accepted by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff themselves. Whether British 

leaders secretly harbored reservations of a more far-reaching nature 

is not known now (except by themselves) and probably will never be 

known. Certainly, the Americans had no basis at the time, other than 

hearsay, for suspecting that they did. The historian's position is likely 

to depend largely on where he decides to place the burden of proofon the Americans to demonstrate that their suspicions were based on 

fact, or on the British to show that their professions were sincere. 

As for Stalin's stand on OVERLORD, it was no more than a restatement of the familiar "second front" theme dinned into Western ears 

from the time of the German invasion of Russia down to the Moscow 

Conference of October 1943. It may be doubted whether Stalin was 

taken in by the transparently vague formula finally decided on to define the target date for the operation, but there is no indication that 

he attached any importance to it. His whole attitude at Tehran toward the timing of OVERLORD and supporting operations in the 

Mediterranean was one of lofty indifference. At all events, his pronouncements on OVERLORD added nothing to earlier Anglo-American 

agreements on the relation between the cross-Channel invasion and 

the Mediterranean. The most significant effect of Stalin's position was, 

not the essentially empty characterization of OVERLORD and ANVIL 

as "supreme" operations in 1944, but the CCS decision on 5 December to explore the possibility of strengthening the two assaults. This 

decision which virtually invited the responsible commanders to demand 

the means they considered necessary, formally recognized-what the 

]CS since spring of 1943 had refused to concede-that the limit 

placed on the size of the OVERLORD assault at the TRIDENT Conference was arbitrary and unrealistic. In principle, it represented a real 

vindication of the stubborn efforts by the British since early 1942 to 

obtain more American landing craft for OVERLORD. How many would 

actually be forthcoming remained to be seen. For the present, over 

and above the allotments made at the TRIDENT and QUADRANT Conferences, the planners could count on the vessels released from southeast 

Asia, most of about two months of American production of LST's, 

LCI(L)'s, and LCT's, pledged by Admiral King on 5 November and 

4 December, a handful of U.S. and British assault transports, and an 

indeterminate amount of new British LCT's. These additions, it was 

60 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 380. 
284 COMMAND DECISIONS 

expected, "should provide a satisfactory lift both for OVERLORD and 

ANVIL." The expectation proved to be overoptimistic. 61 

With relation to the war in the Pacific, Stalin raised an issue that 

was welcome to the British and may have been embarrassing to the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff. No debate on the question is recorded, but the 

CCS, in making OVERLORD and ANVIL the "supreme" operations for 

1944, agreed that "nothing must be undertaken in any other part of 

the world" to jeopardize their success. Never before had the crossChannel operation been underwritten in such sweeping terms; the 

statement wiped out provisos, insisted upon by the ]CS at the TRIDENT 

Conference, that in the face of reverses in the Pacific the United 

States would be obliged to expand her operations there, even at the 

expense of the effort in Europe. In principle, at least, the war in the 

Pacific was now subordinate to the war in Europe. 62 

Coming at the time they did, the decisions at Cairo and Tehran 

relating to the war in Europe have inevitably taken on a retroactive 

luster from the dramatic events of the following summer-the invasion of Normandy and southern France, the advance up the Italian 

peninsula, the sweep across France to the Rhine. The decisions foreshadowed the events; it is less certain that they shaped them as well. 

To contemporaries, indeed, it seemed as though the whole conference 

program was going awry almost before the ink was dry. As the Cairo 

meetings ended, the outlook for the attack on Rhodes was good. The 

British could reasonably count on using for it the ex-BuccANEER assault shipping now on its way back to the Mediterranean, since the 

conference agreements stipulated only that any operations undertaken 

in the Aegean must be "without detriment" to OVERLORD and ANVIL. 63 

Negotiations with the Turks were going well. Less than a week later, 

the Turks suddenly raised the ante on military aid demanded as the 

price of intervention, and by the 25th Churchill had abandoned his 

Aegean plans. Similarly, by the middle of the month the planned 

61 The additional lift was listed as follows: 

LSTs 

LCI(L)s 

LCTs 

For OVERLORD 

23 U.S. 3 British 

24 U.S. 

19 U.S. 45 British 

For ANVIL 

36 U.S. 5 British 

31 U.S. 

Assault transports 3 U.S. 6 British 

See CCS 428 (Rev.), 15 Dec 43, Annex V. 

62 CCS 426/1, 6 Dec 43, Rpt to President and Prime Minister. 

63 (1) CCS 428 (Rev.), 15 Dec 43, Annex V. (2) CCS 426/1, 6 Dec 43, Rpt to President and Prime Minister. (3) A summary of the Cairo-Tehran decisions prepared for the 

Army Service Forces on 15 December stated that Turkish intervention and surrender of 

Bulgaria were considered "probable," and that in this event it would be necessary "to 

mount such operations as may be practicable in the Eastern Mediterranean .... " See 

Memo, Gen Wood for various addressees, 15 Dec 43, sub: SEXTANT Decisions, ASF Plan· 

ning Div Folder SEXTANT Decisions. 
OVERLORD VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN 285 

landings south of Rome, taken almost for granted at Cairo and Tehran, 

had been canceled owing to the failure of the American Fifth Army 

to reach positions within supporting distance of the target area. Later 

in the month, they were revived on a larger scale and, after a frantic 

search for the necessary assault lift, finally carried out late in January at Anzio. ANVIL, too, came under fire almost immediately, as the 

OVERLORD commanders laid claim to its allotted assault lift, and after 

protracted debate the plan was canceled. When the Allies finally invaded southern France in mid-August, the operation was no longer 

strategically related to OVERLORD and could not have been justified 

by the arguments used at Tehran. 

As for OVERLORD itself, Stalin's unequivocal insistence upon the 

operation undoubtedly enhanced the likelihood that it would be carried out, even in the face of an unforeseen increase in German power. 

On the other hand, the massive preparations for the invasion had already generated a momentum difficult if not impossible to arrest. Any 

radical change of direction or of emphasis at this time-let alone 

later-would have caused an upheaval in plans and preparations more 

costly than many military defeats. As a practical matter, the war in 

Europe had progressed beyond the point of no return. Even the date 

was hardly any longer in the realm of strategic decision. After Tehran 

strategic planning was pointed toward a late Mayor early June 

OVERLORD (though the administrative staffs continued for some time 

to work toward an early May deadline), but in the end the actual 

date of the launching was shaped, as Churchill has remarked, mainly 

"by the moon and the weather." 64 

64 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 376. 

11 

MacArth ur and the Admiralties 

by 

John Miller, Jr. 

On 29 February 1944 one thousand American soldiers landed on 

a small Japanese-held island in the Pacific. They were accompanied 

by a famous American general whose youthful appearance and physical vigor belied his sixty-four years. At the day's end they had killed 

a few Japanese, lost two killed and three wounded themselves, and 

captured an airfield. How many more Japanese opposed them was 

not clear, but in the afternoon the general told them to stay and defend their ground until reinforcements arrived. 

The thousand soldiers came from the 1st Cavalry Division; the 

island was Los Negros in the Admiralties group of the Bismarck 

Archipelago; the general was Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief 

of all Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific Area. Behind his decision 

to go to the Admiralties with the thousand men, and to keep them 

there, lay a complex series of decisions and operations. From these 

decisions blossomed a complex series of events which materially aided 

the Allied cause. 1 

The Background: Rabaul and the Central Pacific 

Seizure of the Admiralties was an integral part of two major Allied offensives: the campaign against the great Japanese air and naval 

bases at Rabaul, New Britain, in the Bismarck Archipelago, which 

1 This study is based on John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington 1959). 

JOHN MILLER, JR., Historian with OCMH since 1945. Ph.D., University of Iowa. Taught: University of Omaha; University of Iowa; Graduate 

School, U.S. Department of Agriculture; American University. U.S. Marine 

Corps, Pacific Theater, in World War II. Author: Guadalcanal: The First 

Offensive (Washington, 1949) and CARTWHEEL: The Reduction oj Rabaul 

(Washington, 1959), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

Coauthor: Korea 1951-1953 (Washington, 1956); Combat in Korea, Volume II, 

to be published in UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR. 
288 COMMAND DECISIONS 

occupied the Allied forces of the South and Southwest Pacific Areas 

for nearly two years; and the Allied westward advance along the north 

coast of New Guinea and into the Philippines. (See Map VIII, inside back 

cover.) When President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the 

U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff met at Casablanca in January 

1943 to determine Allied courses of action for 1943, they approved, 

among other projects, a westward advance through the Central Pacific and a continuation of the campaigns against Rabaul, which had 

begun in 1942 with the seizure of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands 

and the Japanese base at Buna in the Papuan Peninsula of New 

Guinea. Plans of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the theater commanders called for the Guadalcanal and Papuan operations to be followed by two co-ordinated advances involving Allied land, sea, and 

air forces. Admiral William F. Halsey's South Pacific forces would 

drive northward through the Solomons to Bougainville while MacArthur's Southwest Pacific forces advanced up the northeast New 

Guinea coast, crossed the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits, landed on New 

Britain, and seized the Admiralties to cut the Japanese line of communications to Rabaul. Once Rabaul was isolated by land, sea, and 

air action, both forces were to converge and capture the base. All operations against Rabaul by South and Southwest Pacific forces after 

the Guadalcanal campaign were under MacArthur's strategic direction, with Halsey in direct command of the Allied land, sea, and air 

forces in the South Pacific Area. 2 

Capture of Rabaul, as envisaged in early 1943, would advance 

the Allied cause in several respects. Initial operations in the great series 

of campaigns were defensive in purpose. They were designed to protect the Allied sea and air lines of communication from the United 

States to New Zealand and Australia which the Japanese had threatened by moving southward from Rabaul. Offensively, possession of 

Rabaul would give the Allies a great air and naval base to support 

MacArthur's projected, but not yet approved, advance along the north 

coast of New Guinea to the Philippines. 3 

2 Save those assigned to the land defense of New Zealand, which were under the New 

Zealand Chiefs of Staff. Most of the Solomon Islands were in the Southwest Pacific Area. 

:l These campaigns are treated in the following volumes of UNITED STATES ARMY 

IN WORLD WAR II: John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, 

1949); Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua (Washington, 1957); Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines (Washington, 1953). CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul treats 

the campaigns from 30 June 1943 through March 1944 and includes the Admiralities operations. In the AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION series, by the Historical Division, 

War Department Special Staff, The Admiralities: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division (29 February-18 May 1944) (Washington, 1946), treats the Admiralties fighting in detail. General 

\Valter Krueger devotes Chapter V of his From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth 

Army in World War II (Washington, 1953) to the Admiralties. 
MACARTHUR AND THE ADMIRALTIES 289 

The Joint Chiefs were hardly home from Casablanca when it became obvious that not enough planes and ships could be provided to 

complete the capture of Rabaul in 1943. In March, therefore, they 

postponed plans to seize it and its sister base, Kavieng, at the north 

end of New Ireland until 1944. Deciding on more limited objectives 

for 1943, they directed MacArthur to advance via the Lae-SalamauaFinschhafen-Madang area of New Guinea and occupy western New 

Britain while Halsey moved up as far as southern Bougainville. 

MacArthur and Halsey executed these missions with efficiency, and 

by October 1943 New Georgia in the Solomons and Lae, Salamaua 

Finschhafen, and Nadzab in New Guinea were in Allied hands. The 

Allies controlled the air and the sea forward from their advanced bases, 

and bombers were attacking Rabaul. 

But now the Joint Chiefs were considering another change in plans. 

Whereas in 1942 there had been general agreement that Rabaul 

should be captured, in June of 1943 members of various Washington 

planning committees who served the Joint Chiefs were more inclined 

to bypass Rabaul and neutralize it by air action. They argued that 

assaulting Rabaul directly was merely a reversal of Japanese strategy 

and would not gain, for the Allies, objectives worthy of the high price 

Rabaul's strong and well-equipped garrison would surely exact! 

At the same time the Joint Chiefs, preparing to mount amphibious 

offensives in the Central Pacific beginning with the Gilberts in November 1943, decided to transfer the 1st Marine Division from 

MacArthur's area, and the 2d Marine Division from Halsey's, to the 

Central Pacific. They also determined to use all of Halsey's assault 

transports and cargo ships as well as most of his Third Fleet warships. 

On 15 June they informed MacArthur of these decisions, but not of 

their doubts concerning the capture of Rabaul, and asked him for 

specific information regarding target dates and organization of forces 

for future offensives so that they could effectively co-ordinate his moves 

with those of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of all 

Allied forces in the Pacific Ocean Area, and immediate commander 

of the Central Pacific subarea. 5 Thus faced with the possibility of a 

rival offensive that would use divisions and ships he had planned to 

employ against Rabaul, MacArthur hurled back a vigorous reply. Arguing against the Central Pacific offensive-calling it a "diversionary 

attack" -he expounded on one of his favorite themes, the virtues of 

advancing through New Guinea to the Philippines. Withdrawal of 

4 See for example End B, JWPC S8/D, 24 Jun 43, Memo for RAINBOW Team, in 

Operations Division (OPD) File 384 Marshall Islands Sec. 1 (10 June 43). 

c, JCS Min, 92d Mtg, 15 Jun 43; Rad, JCS to MacArthur, CM-OUT 6093, 15 Jun 

43, in Gen Marshall's OUT Log. 
290 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the two Marine divisions, he argued, would prevent the ultimate assault against Rabaul. Halsey joined MacArthur to protest removal of 

the 2d Marine Division and most of his ships.6 

The problem was resolved by compromise. Halsey kept part of his 

transports-enough to move one reinforced division-and some of his 

warships throughout November 1943. The 1st Marine Division stayed 

with MacArthur, and the 2d Marine Division went to the Central 

Pacific to make its bloody, valorous assault on Tarawa in the Gilbert 

Islands in November 1943. 7 

By 21 July the arguments against assaulting Rabaul had so impressed General Marshall that he suggested to MacArthur that he seize 

Kavieng, and Manus in the Admiralties, to isolate Rabaul, and capture 

the Japanese base at Wewak in New Guinea. MacArthur saw it otherwise. Marshall's plan, he asserted, involved too many hazards. Wewak 

was too strong for direct assault and should be isolated by seizing a 

base farther west. Rabaul would have to be captured rather than 

neutralized, he insisted, because its strategic location and excellent 

harbor made it ideal to support a westward advance along New 

Guinea's north coast. 8 His logic is not easy to follow here, as Rabaul 

was a more powerful base than Wewak. On the other hand, it was 

an excellent naval base and Wewak was not. 

MacArthur's argument failed to convince Marshall, and when the 

Combined Chiefs met with the President and Prime Minister at Quebec 

in August they all agreed that Rabaul should be neutralized and bypassed, that MacArthur and Halsey should neutralize New Guinea 

as far west as Wewak and capture Manus and Kavieng to use as naval 

bases, and that MacArthur should then advance along the New 

Guinea coast to the Vogelkop Peninsula in 1944. Marshall indicated 

that Mindanao would be the next objective. 9 

Then followed, in October, November, and December 1943, and 

January 1944, the continuous bombings of Rabaul and other Japa6 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, CM-IN 13149, 20 june 43; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, CM-OUT 13605, 22 jun 43, both in Gen Marshall's IN Log. Halsey sent his views 

to MacArthur who relayed them to the jCS. 

7 jCS Min, 20 jul 43; jCS 386/1, 19 jul 43, Strategy in the Pacific; jPS 205/3, 10 

jul 43, Opns Against Marshall Islands; Draft Memo, jPS for jCS, 12 jul 43, sub: Strategy in the Pacific, and OPD Draft Memo, 14 jul 43, both in OPD File 381 Security 195; 

jPS Draft, 19 jul 43, sub: Strategy in the Pacific, and attached papers, with jPS 219/D, 

in OPD File ABC 384 Pacific (28 jun 43); OPD Brief, Notes on jWPC 58/2, in OPD 

File 384 Marshall Islands Sec. 1 (10 jun 43). 

8 Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 8604, 21 jun 43, and MacArthur to Marshall, 

No. 16419,23 jun 43, in Gen Marshall's IN and OUT Logs. 

9 Smith, Approach to the Philippines, Ch. I; CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, Final Rpt to the 

President and Prime Minister; CCS 301/3, 27 Aug 43, Specific Opns in Pacific and Far 

East, 1943-44; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur. No. 8679, 2 Oct 43, in Gen Marshall's 

OUT Log. 
MACARTHUR AND THE ADMIRALTIES 291 

nese bases in the area, and the invasions of the Treasury Islands, the 

Empress Augusta Bay region of Bougainville, Arawe and Cape 

Gloucester in western New Britain, and Saidor on the Huon Peninsula of New Guinea. 

Decision To Expand Into the Bismarck Archipelago 

The Joint Chiefs and the area commanders now turned to preparing specific plans to carry out the general missions agreed on at 

Quebec. Actually operations in the Bismarck Archipelago, in addition 

to those at Arawe and Cape Gloucester, had been contemplated for 

nearly two years as part of the campaign against Rabaul. The Joint 

Chiefs' orders which launched the campaigns called for other operations in the archipelago, while MacArthur's early plans called for the 

capture of Kavieng and of Manus in the Admiralties as well as Rabaul. 

In late 1943, MacArthur's plans called for the invasion of Hansa 

Bay, New Guinea, on 1 February 1944 to establish a light naval and 

air base, and Manus as well as Kavieng (by South Pacific forces) on 

1 March.' ° 

The Admiralties, lying 260 miles west of Kavieng and 200 miles 

northeast of Wewak, were admirably situated to assist in isolating 

Rabaul. (See Map 8.) They also provided excellent facilities to support the approach to the Philippines. Responsibility for base construction at Kavieng and at Seeadler Harbor in the Admiralties was to 

be Halsey's. Kavieng was to be a minor fleet base, a PT boat base, 

and a major air base with six airfields. In the Admiralties, where the 

Japanese had already built two airfields, Manus would serve as an 

air base and Seeadler Harbor, 6 miles wide, 20 miles long, and 120 

feet deep, was to be a major fleet base with complete repair facilities 

including drydocks. It would serve Admiral Nimitz' naval forces as 

well as Halsey's and MacArthur's. 11 

Halsey, who conferred with MacArthur in Brisbane in late 1943 

before departing on a trip to Hawaii and continental United States, 

opposed seizing Kavieng. He wanted to bypass Kavieng and occupy 

Emirau in the Saint Matthias Islands about ninety miles northwest 

of Kavieng, which had never been taken by the Japanese. Kavieng, 

on the other hand, was a major air and naval base and was reported 

to be strongly defended. In December MacArthur told members of 

Halsey's staff that an attack against Emirau or Kavieng would serve 

equally well in the isolation of Rabaul.'2 

10 GHQ Warning Instructions 3, 23 Nov 43, in ALALO Force ANCHORAGE Jnl, 1,23 

Nov 43-12 Feb 44. 

II File on Manus-Kavieng Base Development in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 43. 

I'Memo, SJC [Maj Gen Stephen J. Chamberlin, ACofS G-3, GHQ SWPAj for Jnl, 

21 Dec 43, sub: Conf at GHQ, 20 Dec 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 21 Dec 43. 
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MACARTHUR AND THE ADMIRALTIES 293 

Halsey spent four days with Nimitz at Pearl Harbor and then, in 

early January 1944, flew to San Francisco where he and Nimitz conferred with Admiral King. Here, and later in Washington, the South 

Pacific commander made known his views on Kavieng and Emirau. 13 

Halsey was not able to carry his point at this time. He did, however, discuss timing and naval support for Manus and Kavieng-important questions requiring close co-ordination now that the Central 

Pacific offensives were under way.14 Kavieng, almost 400 miles from 

the newly built Allied airfield at Empress Augusta Bay, in Bougainville, lay beyond the range of land-based fighter planes from Halsey's 

most advanced air base. Thus aircraft carriers would have to provide 

cover for the Kavieng invasion forces, and Nimitz agreed to furnish 

them. General MacArthur, who had no carriers at this time, also 

wanted them for the invasion of Manus, in case bad weather kept 

his planes grounded in New Guinea and at Cape Gloucester. Nimitz 

warned that bad weather would limit carrier operations toO. 15 

But now another problem involving ships had to be settled. Rear 

Adm. Robert B. Carney, Halsey's chief of staff, had visited Pearl 

Harbor in December and reported that the ships for Kavieng would 

not be available until 1 May. This would certainly postpone the Admiralties operations. I6 Nimitz then suggested that by delaying his second Marshalls invasion (Eniwetok) until 1 May he could provide 

support for Manus and Kavieng about 1 April. MacArthur was ready 

and willing to invade Manus and Kavieng in March before moving 

to Hansa Bay in New Guinea, but the Joint Chiefs ordered Nimitz 

to deliver a strong carrier strike, employing nearly every fast carrier 

that was operational in the Pacific, against Truk in the Carolines during March to support and cover the Eniwetok invasion. Naval supporting forces would therefore not be available for Manus and Kavieng 

until April at the earliest. Nimitz proposed that representatives of all 

l:l Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey and Lt. Comdr. J. Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey's Story 

(New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), pp. 186-87; Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and 

Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, A Naral Record (New York: W. W. Norton & 

Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 533-34. 

14 Nimitz' forces, having invaded the Gilberts in November 1943, were planning their 

initial move into the Marshalls (Kwajalein and Roi-Namur) in late January. See Philip 

A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure ojlhe Gilberts and Marshalls (Washington, 1955), 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

15 Rad, CINCPOA (Nimitz) to CINCSWPA (MacArthur), CNO (King), COMSOPAC 

(Halsey), 7 Jan 44, CM-IN 8330,· in Gen Marshall's IN Log. 

16 Memo, Carney for Halsey, 12 Dec 43, sub: CINCPOA-SOPAC Stf Conf, 9-12 Dec 

43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 21 Dec 43; Memo, B. F. [Brig Gen Bonner Fellers, G-3 

Sec GHQ SWPA], no addressee, 22 Dec 43, sub: Conf G-3 Ping Sec, in GHQ SWPA 

G-3 Jnl, 22 Dec 43. 
294 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the Pacific commands meet in Pearl Harbor to co-ordinate details and 

timing. 17 

The Joint Chiefs, reviewing plans for Pacific operations, ordered 

extension of operations in the Bismarck Archipelago, and directed 

Nimitz to provide fleet support and cover for the Manus-Kavieng 

operations but to keep his fleet units under his direct control. At the 

same time he was to attach some additional warships and assault 

shipping to MacArthur and Halsey. The exact amounts were to be 

determined at the forthcoming Pearl Harbor conference, which would 

make recommendations to Washington. MacArthur was to continue 

his strategic control over Halsey's South Pacific forces. ls 

The conference at Pearl Harbor convened on 27 January 1944. 

Halsey, flying out from Washington, had been grounded by bad 

weather at Fort Worth and again at San Francisco, and so was not 

present. Carney represented him along with Lt. Gen. Millard F. 

Harmon, who commanded all Army forces in the South Pacific. Representing MacArthur were his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Richard K. 

Sutherland, and his commanders of Allied air and naval forces, Lt. 

Gen. George C. Kenney and Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid. 

Sutherland made it clear that MacArthur wanted Halsey to take, 

not Emirau, but Kavieng, for use as an air base. Besides discussing 

operations in the Bismarck Archipelago, the conference covered a wide 

range of other subjects-the value of the Marianas, B-29's, the possibility of bypassing Truk, and the comparative merits of the Central 

and Southwest Pacific routes to the Philippines. All agreed that whether 

Truk was bypassed or taken, Seeadler Harbor was essential as a fleet 

base for the approach to the Philippines. 

Nimitz proposed giving long-range support to the Manus-Kavieng 

invasions with a two-day strike against Truk starting about 26 March. 

In addition he agreed to send two divisions of fast carriers to operate 

under Halsey's command during the invasions, while other carriers and 

fast battleships operated in covering positions. 19 Forces involved were 

large. Ironically, they were neither needed nor used, for the operations were not conducted in accordance with these plans. 

17 Rad, CINCPAC (Nimitz) to COMINCH (King), 22 Dec 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 

Jnl, 24 Dec 43; Rad, Halsey to MacArthur, 5 Jan 44, Rad, MacArthur to Marshall and 

Halsey, 6 Jan 44, Rad, COMSOPAC TO COMSOPAC ADMIN, 9 Jan 44, Rad, 

CINCPAC to CINCSWPA, CNO, and COMSOPAC, 7 Jan 44, CM-IN 8330, all in Gen 

Marshall's IN Log. 

18 JCS 679, 24 Jan 44, Dirs for Seizure of Bismarck Archipelago; Rads, JCS to 

CINCPAC and CINCSWPA, 23 Jan 44, with JCS 679. 

'0 Forces involved were: 3 CVs, 3 CVLs, 7 CRUs, and 18 DDs. In addition 4 OBBs, 

7 CRUs, 4 CVEs, 1 AGC, 19 APAs, 3 LSDs, 5 DMSs, 36 LSTs, and 36 LCIs would be 

assigned to Halsey's Third Fleet for Kavieng, while for Manus Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet 

was to receive 3 CLs, 4 CVEs, 35 DDs, 8PFs, 1 AGC, 1 APA, 1 AKA, 2 DMSs, 1 LSD, 13 
MACARTHUR AND THE ADMIRALTIES 295 

Japanese Decisions 

The advancing Allies now had the initiative, but Japanese decisions and actions, which were forced on the enemy by the Allied offensives, must be understood to grasp the significance of the Allied 

decisions and actions. Continuous bombardments of Rabaul, and to a 

lesser degree of Kavieng, reduced Japanese strength so much that on 

19 February there were no warships at Rabaul, and after that date 

no fighter planes rose to attack the Allied bombers. Such impotence 

was brought about largely by the South and Southwest Pacific air and 

naval campaigns, but it was also brought about by Nimitz' naval forces. 

The Central Pacific Forces invading Kwajalein and Roi-Namur on 

31 January had encountered no resistance from the Japanese Combined 

Fleet, which had suffered crippling losses when it sent most of its 

planes to Rabaul in late 1943 and lost them. The Kwajalein and RoiN amur operations came off so well that Allied reserve and garrison 

forces were not committed. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Nimitz they were willing to delay 

the Manus-Kavieng invasions in order to proceed directly to Eniwetok 

with the uncommitted troops. Nimitz decided to go there at once and 

invaded Eniwetok on 17 February. In support of this move he sent 

the main body of the Pacific Fleet to attack Truk on 16 and 17 February, over one month ahead of schedule. The strike was an outstanding success. The Combined Fleet had already escaped toward safer 

waters, but the naval pilots destroyed 250-275 planes as well as 

thousands of tons of shipping. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, almost bereft of planes, immediately ordered all naval 

aircraft out of the Southeast Area-the Japanese area which included 

eastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands. Army aircraft had already been sent to Wewak. Rabaul, though 

strong in ground troops (about 100,000 in early 1944), artillery, and 

machines guns, was "compelled to face the enemy with ground resources alone and completely isolated .... " 20 

Decision To Send a Reconnaissance Force to the Admiralties 

When Halsey discovered that Nimitz' December plans would postpone invasion of Manus and Kavieng, he decided to use what forces 

APDs, 30 LSTs, 30 LCls, 70 LCTs, and 30 SS. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, 

p. 188; George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War (New 

York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce 1949), p. 346; Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 7-8; 

Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific Campaign, copy in OCMH; Rad, 

CINCPAC to COMINCH-CNO, 29 Jan 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Jan 44; Ltr, 

CINCPOA to COMINCH, 30 Jan 44, sub: Assignment Naval Forces and Assault Shipping to Third and Seventh Fleets for Opns Bismarck Archipelago, ABC 384 Pac (17 Jan 

44) Sec. 3-A. 

20 Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese Monograph 50, OCMH p. 6. 
296 COMMAND DECISIONS 

he could spare to seize a base within fighter range of Kavieng, a decision which culminated in the invasion of the Green Islands, 117 

miles east of Rabaul and 220 miles southeast of Kavieng. This was 

accomplished by New Zealand troops between 15 and 20 February, 

and by 4 March a fighter field was in operation, followed before the 

end of the month by a bomber field. 

By the time Halsey invaded the Green Islands, Southwest Pacific 

plans for the invasions of the Admiralties and Hansa Bay were well 

developed. Target date for Manus and Kavieng was 1 April. Assigned 

to the Admiralties were 45,110 men, with the 1st Cavalry Division 

providing the assaulting troops. All troops were to concentrate at Oro 

Bay and Cape Cretin, New Guinea. The 6th Division was designated 

as GHQ reserve. Hansa Bay, with 26 April as D Day, was to be taken 

by the 24th and 32d Divisions. 21 

As was customary in MacArthur's area, GHQ prepared general 

plans which assigned forces, missions, and target dates. Operational 

plans were prepared by the ground, air, and naval commanders and 

their staffs. To Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commanding the U.S. Sixth 

Army and ALAMO Force,22 MacArthur gave responsibility for coordination of this planning. Krueger's responsibility gave him a preeminent position; he was primus inter pares. 

During January and the first two weeks of February General 

Kenney's planes bombed the Admiralties and Kavieng, and also continued earlier attacks against the Wewak airfields. By 6 February 

Momote and Lorengau airfields in the Admiralties were unserviceable, 

and no planes were based at either field. Antiaircraft fire had stopped 

completely, but not because the guns were destroyed. Col. Yoshio Ezaki, 

commanding in the Admiralties, had ordered his troops neither to fire 

nor to wander about in daylight in order to conceal his positions from 

the Allies. 

At this time Kenney and Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, commanding the Fifth Air Force's Advanced Echelon, were eagerly seeking methods by which the whole advance could be speeded. Whitehead 

wanted to get the Admiralties out of the way soon so that he could 

concentrate on Wewak and Hollandia in the west. Kenney, having 

had experience in New Guinea with quick seizures of airfields by light 

forces, had another such operation in mind. Some time before 23 Feb21 GHQ SWPA Warning Instructions 3, 23 Nov 43, in ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl, 1, 23 

Nov 43-12 Feb 44: Memo, Chamberlin for CINC, 9 Feb 44, sub: Outline Plan-Hansa 

Bay, and Memo, Chamberlin for Comdrs, 9 Feb 44, sub: Hansa Bay, SWPA Forces, both in 

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 9 Feb 44; Note SJC to CINC, 12 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 

Jnl, 13 Feb 44. 

22 ALAMO, actually the Sixth Army, was theoretically a task force directly under GHQ. 
MACARTHUR AND THE ADMIRALTIES 297 

ruary he told Whitehead to hit Momote airfield on Los Negros hard 

but not to crater the runway. Hoping to force the Japanese to evacuate Los Negros and retire to Manus, he ordered frequent low-altitude 

photo reconnaissance missions. 23 

The Allies were not aware that Japanese air resistance in the 

Southeast Area was a thing of the past and that they had won the 

air battle. They knew, however, that the enemy was weakening. The 

runways at Rabaul were usually cratered. On 21 February Allied intelligence reasoned that Japanese aircraft were "absconding" from 

Rabaul, probably to Truk and other bases in the Carolines. 24 

On 23 February-shortly after the great Truk raid and the withdrawal of Japanese aircraft from the Southeast Area, and after the 

Joint Chiefs and Nimitz had postponed Nimitz' fleet support for 

Manus and Kavieng by deciding on Eniwetok first-Whitehead forwarded to Kenney a reconnaissance report from three B-25's that 

had just spent ninety minutes at low altitudes over the Admiralties. 

They had not been fired on, saw no Japanese, no vehicles, and no 

laundry hung out to dry. The airfields were pitted and overgrown with 

grass. The whole area looked "completely washed out." Whitehead 

recommended that a ground reconnaissance party go in at once to 

check. 25 

During the year 1943 the Allies had won a resounding series of 

victories in the Southwest Pacific, and GHQ was now a headquarters 

wherein optimism prevailed. When Kenney, who even in GHQ was 

conspicuous for optimism, received Whitehead's message, he was at 

his office in Brisbane. Concluding that Whitehead was right and "Los 

Negros was ripe for the plucking," he hurried to MacArthur's office 

and proposed to MacArthur, Kinkaid, and part of MacArthur's staff 

that a few hundred troops go to Los Negros on APD's, seize it, and 

repair Momote airfield at once rather than capture Seeadler Harbor. 

They could be reinforced and resupplied by air. This should be a reconnaissance in force. If resistance proved too strong the invaders 

could withdraw. A quick seizure of the Admiralties, Kenney reasoned, 

would make possible the bypassing of Kavieng and Hansa Bay.26 

MacArthur made his decision almost at once. Always a man of 

faith, self-confidence, and buoyant optimism, he saw opportunities 

'" Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War II, 

IV, The Pan/ie: Guadalcanal to Saipan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), 

p. 559; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 358. 

24 GHQ SWPA G-2 Daily Summary of Enemy Inti, and GHQ SWPA G-2 Est Enemy Sit 700, 20-21 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 21 Feb 44. 

"Rad, Comdr AdVon Fifth AF to Comdr Allied Air Forces SWPA, 23 Feb 44, in 

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 23 Feb 44. 

'6 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 359. 
298 COMMAND DECISIONS 

where other men saw problems and difficulties. He bought Kenney's 

proposal. Next day he radioed orders to his subordinates to prepare 

for the reconnaissance at once. He directed that 800 men of the 1st 

Cavalry Division, a force he shortly increased to 1,000, board two destroyer transports (APD's) at Oro Bay and sail to Los Negros by 

29 February.27 

This decision, obviously made in great haste without benefit of 

much staff study, but by a general of great experience, deserves examination. MacArthur was sending a thousand men against an enemy 

island group approximately one month ahead of the time that his 

schedule had originally called for a whole division to make the invasion. Kenney's recommendation was based on aerial reconnaissance. 

Whitehead had said no Japanese troops were in sight, and on 26 February he estimated, but without indicating the basis for his conclusion, that no more than 300 Japanese were holding the Admiralties. 28 

MacArthur's own G-2 section had made a completely different 

estimate. Brig. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, his G-2, kept close track 

of enemy strength and dispositions at all bases, and especially those 

slated for invasion. MacArthur and Kenney might be optimists, but 

a G-2 must be at least half skeptic. Willoughby had to base his conclusions on evidence and logic, not faith. On 25 February he estimated 

that there were 4,050 Japanese troops in the Admiralties. 29 The 1st 

Cavalry Division, which would have to pay the price of any faulty 

intelligence estimates, put enemy strength at 4,900, although its field 

order for the reconnaissance dutifully stated, "Recent air reconnaissance . . . results in no enemy action and no signs of enemy 

occupation." 30 

In actual fact, Colonel Ezaki's garrison consisted of the 51st Transport Regiment)· the 2d Battalion) 1st Independent Mixed Regiment)· the 1st Battalion) 229th Infantry)' and elements of the 14th Naval Base Force. 

Willoughby's estimate correctly identified these units as present. AI27 Rad, MacArthur to Comdr ALA:\IO, CG AdVon Fifth AF, and Comdr VII Amphib 

Force, 24 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 24 Feb 44; Rad, MacArthur to same addressees, 25 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 25 Feb 44. 

"Rad, Comdr AdVon Fifth AF to Comdr Allied Air Forces SWPA, 26 Feb 44, in 

GHQ SWPA G-3 .Jnl, 26 Feb 44. 

'" Note, G-2 to G-3, 25 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 25 Feb 44; GHQ SWPA 

Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 29 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 29 Feb 

44. In a book published ten years after these events, General Willoughby stated that 3,250 

Japanese were estimated as holding the Admiralties. See Charles A. Willoughby and John 

Chamberlin, MacArthur: 1941-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), 

p. 151. 

30 Cf. par. la (2) of BREWEk TF FO 2, 25 Feb 44, with Annex I, Intel, in ALAMO 

ANCHORA(~E Jnl, 3, 24-26 Feb 44. ALAMO FO 9 and BREWER TF FO 1 are orders prepared for the one-division invasion of the Admiralties scheduled for 1 April. 
MACARTHUR AND THE ADMIRALTIES 

though no exact figure for enemy strength can be given today, his 

figure of 4,050 seems about right. The airmen had not seen troops in 

the open because Ezaki had ordered them to lie low during daylight 

hours.31 

Almost inevitable is the question whether General MacArthur actually accepted Whitehead's figure of 300 and rejected his own G-2's 

careful estimate. While no categorical answer can be given, the answer 

would seem to be in the negative. Willoughby's previous estimates of 

Japanese strength and dispositions in the area had been quite close to 

the mark. The fact that Willoughby served as MacArthur's G-2 from 

1941 through 1951, leaving the post voluntarily and only when President Truman relieved MacArthur of his commands, indicates 

MacArthur's continued confidence in him. Further, MacArthur ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to prepare a support force-l,500 

ground combat troops and 428 Seabees-to land on D plus 2 if the 

reconnaissance force stayed. He also alerted the rest of the division to 

get ready to follow if needed as soon as shipping became available. 

Sending such a force in to handle only 300 Japanese was surely overdoing the principle of concentration. In making his decision MacArthur 

apparently accepted the bold Kenney-Whitehead method without accepting their intelligence estimate. 

The Decision To Remain 

MacArthur decided to accompany the thousand-man reconnaissance force himself to judge from his own observation whether to 

evacuate or hold. He invited Kinkaid to go along, whereupon the admiral added two cruisers and four destroyers to the four destroyers 

initially scheduled to escort the APD's. The additions were necessary 

because a destroyer had neither accommodations nor communications 

equipment suitable for a man of MacArthur's position. ·A single 

cruiser would have served, but it was poor practice to send but one 

ship of any type on a tactical mission. Kinkaid therefore sent two 

cruisers, and the two cruisers required four additional destroyers as 

escorts.32 

General Krueger had originally planned to send a preliminary 

scouting party to the western tip of Manus, but he now canceled this 

:11 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monograph 110, p. 133, OCMH; Southeast 

Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese Monograph 50, pp. 35-36, OCMH. The 1st Cavalry 

Division, losing 326 men killed, 1,189 wounded, and 4 missing, reported that it buried a 

total counted dead of 3,280, and captured 75. Krueger estimated that the Japanese had 

disposed of 1,100 additional bodies. ALAMO Rpt BREWER Opn, p. 26 . 

. " Admiral Kinkaid's statement to author, 16 Nov 53. 
300 COMMAND DECISIONS 

plan in favor of Los Negros. As plans called for the thousand-man 

reconnaissance force to slip in through Hyane Harbor, the back door 

to Los Negros, Krueger did not wish to risk betraying the point of 

landing by scouting Hyane Harbor and Momote. He therefore sent 

six scouts by PBY and rubber boat to a point one mile south of the 

harbor on the night of 27 February. They found a large Japanese 

bivouac area on southeastern Los Negros, and reported by radio that 

the area between the coast and Momote was "lousy with Japs." But 

when the report reached GHQ Kenney discounted it. He argued, and 

with some reason, that twenty-five of the enemy "in the woods at 

night" might give that impression. 33 

The reconnaissance force, supported by air and naval bombardment, landed successfully starting at 0755 on 29 February. By 0950 

Momote airfield was in American hands; little enemy resistance had 

been encountered save some shelling by coastal guns at the entrance 

to Hyane Harbor that gave the landing craft a hard time. By 1250-

H plus 4 hours, 55 minutes-the thousand men were ashore. Two 

soldiers had been killed, three wounded; sailors of the landing craft 

crews lost an identical number. Five Japanese were reported slain. 

The force commander, Brig. Gen. William C. Chase, reported "enemy 

situation undetermined" at 0900. 34 

Few Japanese had been seen, but by afternoon it was clear that 

the island was occupied. Patrols found three kitchens and a warehouse 

full of rations, and a captured document indicated that some two 

hundred antiaircraft artillerymen were camped nearby. 

General MacArthur and Admiral Kinkaid came ashore at 1600. 

The general pinned a Distinguished Service Cross on the jacket of 

the first man ashore, 2d Lt. Marvin J. Henshaw, toured the front, 

received reports, and quickly made his decision. He directed Chase to 

"remain here and hold the airstrip at any cost." 35 Having "ignored 

sniper fire ... wet, cold, and dirty with mud up to the ears," he and 

Kinkaid returned to the cruiser Phoenix, whence MacArthur radioed 

orders to send more troops, supplies, and equipment to the Admiralties at the earliest possible moment. 36 The cruisers and six destroyers 

departed for New Guinea at 1729, leaving behind two destroyers to 

support the cavalrymen. 

;n Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 36l. 

:l4 Rad, Chase to Krueger, Serial 7, 0900, 1st Cav Brig Jnl, 29 Feb 44, Vol. III of 1st 

Cav Brig Hist Rpt Admiralty Islands Campaign. (The 1st Cavalry Division,which fought 

as infantry in World War II, was square at that time.) 

;15 Quoted in 1st Cav Brig Hist Rpt Admiralty Islands Campaign, I, 3. There are 

other versions of MacArthur's statement in existence, all to the same effect. 

36 Comment by the force G-2, Lt Col Julio Chiaramonte, attached to Ltr, Chase to the 

Chief of Military History, 6 Nov 53, OCMH files; Rad, CINCSWPA to CTF 76, CGs 

ALAMO and Fifth AF, 29 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, I Mar 44. 
MACARTHUR AND THE ADMIRALTIES 301 

In ordering the force to stay, MacArthur was obviously confident 

that it could hold out against the Japanese until supporting forces 

arrived. He did not say so, but it seems probable that he knew from 

previous experience that the Japanese would deliver piecemeal counterattacks. If so, he was right. Colonel Ezaki, who did not survive the 

campaign, received explicit orders from his superior at Rabaul to 

counterattack with his entire strength. 37 But instead, starting that very 

night, he launched a series of very resolute, but piecemeal, un-coordinated attacks that failed. The support forces arrived in time, 

cleared Los Negros hastily, then took Lorengau airfield and cleared 

the rest of Manus in more leisurely fashion. 

Momote airfield, first used by Allied aircraft in March, was ready 

for heavy bombers by 18 May. Lorengau airfield proved unusable, 

but Army aviation engineers and Seabees finished another one on 21 

April. Seabees installed two runways for carrier aircraft on the outlying islands, and developed Seeadler Harbor into one of the largest 

naval bases in the Pacific. 38 As planned, the naval base serviced the 

Third, Fifth, and Seventh Fleets in later operations, and the airfields 

supported the drives along the New Guinea coast and through the 

Central Pacific. 

MacArthur's bold decisions had repercussions that made themselves 

manifest far beyond the confines of Hyane Harbor. He and his staff 

for some time had been convinced that the invasion of Hansa Bay in 

New Guinea was not a worthwhile move. On 3 March, just after the 

reconnaissance force had landed in the Admiralties, his staff agreed 

that since Rabaul and Kavieng were now so much weaker it might 

be possible to bypass Hansa Bay and advance beyond Wewak in a 

long leap forward beyond the range of land-based fighter planes if 

carrier aviation could be provided. 39 MacArthur took up the question 

with the Joints Chiefs of Staff by radio two days later. Explaining 

that complete occupation of the Admiralties would soon follow, he 

urged that the success of the reconnaissance provided an excellent 

opportunity to speed up the war and advance west along the north 

coast of New Guinea. He suggested that his forces seize Kavieng at 

once, bypass Hansa Bay, and advance beyond Wewak all the way to 

Hollandia in Netherlands New Guinea if Admiral Nimitz' carriers 

could provide fighter cover. This would bypass the main strength of 

378th Area Army Opns, Japanese Monograph 110, p. 135, OCMH. 

;<S Building the Navy's Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the 

Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946, Vol. II (Washington, 1947), 295-302; Office of the Chief 

Engineer, GHQ, AFPAC, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945, VI, Airfield and Base 

Development (Washington, 1951),208-22, and VIII, Critique (Washington, 1951), 145-53. 

:19 Min of ConI', 1700, 3 Mar 44, at GHQ SWPA, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 3 Mar 

44; Smith, Approach to the Philippines, p. 9. 
302 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the Japanese 18th Army, then at Madang and Wewak, and speed the 

advance to the Vogelkop by several months. 40 

The Joint Chiefs, undoubtedly influenced by Halsey's arguments 

against Kavieng, as well as by MacArthur's proposals, told MacArthur 

on 12 March that his cherished dream of returning to the Philippines 

would come true. They ordered that the Kavieng plan be canceled, 

that Emirau be seized instead, that Kavieng and Rabaul be isolated 

with minimum forces, and authorized bypassing Hansa Bay in favor 

of the invasion of Hollandia which Nimitz' aircraft carriers would 

support. The latter would be the first direct move in MacArthur's 

long-hoped-for advance to the Philippines. 41 

As a result, MacArthur's forces invaded Hollandia on 22 April, 

just a little later than the time the Manus-Kavieng operations might 

have been executed had he not made the decisions in February to go 

to the Admiralties to reconnoiter, and to stay there. These decisions, 

as they turned out, had the very great virtue of hastening victory 

while reducing the number of dead and wounded. Along with the 

decisions of Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, they shortened the war by 

at least one month, rendered several scheduled invasions unnecessary, 

and thus saved precious lives. 

40 Rad, MacArthur to Cofs USA for JCS, 5 Mar 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 5 Mar 

44. 

4lJCS 713/4, Future Opns in Pac, 12 Mar 44; Rad, JCS to MacArthur, 12 Mar 44, 

in Gen Marshall's OUT Log. 
12 

Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy 

by 

Ralph S. M avrogordato 

Hitler's decision on the defense of Italy falls into the category of 

decisions made by a chief of state acting as commander in chief of 

the state's armed forces. In his decision on a counteroffensive through 

the Ardennes,l he overruled his military advisers; in his decisions on 

the defense of Italy, he chose between the conflicting recommendations of the two commanders best qualified to advise him. 

The decision not to yield southern Italy after the Anglo-American 

invasion in September 1943 led to some of the bloodiest battles of the 

war. The Rapido River, Monte Cassino, and Anzio left an indelible 

imprint on the history of World War II. These battles became necessary when Hitler reversed an earlier decision to withdraw his forces 

to the northern Apennines. He had decided not to defend southern 

and central Italy while the Allies were fighting on Sicily, and when 

he already had reason to expect that the Italian Government, no 

longer directed by his Axis partner, would switch its allegiance from 

Germany to the Allies; he reversed himself only after Marshal Pietro 

Badoglio's government had ,defected from the Axis and the Allies had 

established their lodgment in southern Italy.2 

1 See von Luttichau, "The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes," below, 

2 The main sources for this study have been the captured documents of the German 

Army, copies of which are on file at the National Archives, The most important single 

source was the War Diary of the German Armed Forces High Command, Operations 

Section (OKW /WFSt, KTB), Extensive use was also made of manuscript chapters by 

Howard McGaw Smyth which will be published in a volume of UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II entitled Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Other sources 

found useful and informative were the postwar manuscripts written by high-ranking GerRALPH S. MAVROGORDATO, Staff Member, Special Operations Research 

Office, American University. B.A., Bucknell University; graduate study in 

political science and history, Duke University; staff member, Bureau of 

Applied Social Research, CQlumbia University. U.S. Army Medical Corps, 

World War II; Intelligence Analyst, G-2, Headquarters, U.S. Forces in 

Austria, 1948-51. Historian, OCMH, 1955-58. Author: Narratives in support of volumes in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
304 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Not until almost a month after the Allies invaded the Italian mainland did Hitler make a final decision on the defense of Italy. His indecision reflected a conflict between two alternative courses of action, 

each proposed by a field marshal-on the one hand, Field Marshal 

Erwin Rommel, who was convinced that the Germans could and 

should hold only northern Italy; on the other, Field Marshal Albert 

Kesselring, who was persuaded that a defense south of Rome was not 

only possible but also advisable. 

In a situation already complex because of the necessity for anticipating possible Italian defection as well as estimating Allied offensive 

intentions, the presence of both field marshals in Italy-Rommel in 

the north and Kesselring in the south-complicated the problem of 

command. Hitler's choice of strategy in the final analysis determined 

his choice of commander. 

The armistice between Italy and the Allies, announced 8 September 1943, on the eve of the Salerno landings, was no surprise to Hitler 

and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the German High Command. German distrust of Italian intentions long before the Italian 

surrender-as early as May of that year-had caused plans to be made 

for that expected event. Benito Mussolini's deposition from power in 

July and the assumption of power by the Badoglio government convinced . Hitler, despite Badoglio's protestations to the contrary, that 

Italy had no intention of continuing the war. Yet Hitler was loath to 

take the first step in an open break between the two Axis governments or to give the Italians the slightest excuse for defection. As long 

as Italy remained a formal ally, there was still chance of co-operation, 

particularly since the Allies' insistence on unconditional surrender was 

well known. 

By 1943 Hitler needed all the help he could get. Germany was 

on the defensive in the East as well as in the Mediterranean, and no 

strategic goal determined the German over-all effort-unless it was 

Hitler's resolve to hold on to every foot of occupied territory. (See 

Map 7.) 

The basic prerequisite of a strategic defensive plan is a substantial 

strategic reserve, but after the German losses at Stalingrad during 

the winter of 1942-43 and in Tunisia in the spring of 1943 no such 

reserve existed. A reserve could have been made available only if even 

man participants in the Italian campaign, including Field Marshal Albert Kesselring and 

his former chief of staff and the commander of Tenth Army, General von Vietinghoff (OCMH 

files). A translation of the notes of Hitler's conferences with Admiral Karl Doenitz, published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and taken from the War Diary of the German 

Naval Operations Staff, provided important information on Hitler's thoughts and decisions 

and supplemented the War Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Section of the High 

Command. 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF IT AL Y 305 

limited offensive plans in the East had been abandoned and a relatively short front established. But this required retrograde movements 

on a grand scale, and Hitler refused to consider them. The result 

was that one theater could be reinforced only at the expense of 

another. 

During a conference between Hitler and Mussolini at Feltre on 

19 July 1943, Marshal Vittorio Ambrosio, Chief of the Italian High 

Command, asked Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the 

OKW, what was happening on the Russian front. Keitel could say 

no more than that the Germans were wearing the Russians down. 

"This," replied Ambrosio, "is not an active program but the renunciation of the initiative in operations. In substance the Axis is besieged, 

it is in a closed ring; it is necessary to get out. What prospects have 

you for doing this?" There were no prospects and Keitel eluded the 

question. 3 Nor did Hitler have a positive plan for victory. His belief 

in the Endsieg (final victory) was founded more and more on irrational hopes for which there was no positive foundation. First he 

wanted to wear down Russia by continuously reducing its strength in 

offensive operation;' later he merely hoped that a split between the 

Eastern and Western Allies would bring about a change in the fortunes of war. 

By May 1943 North Africa was lost and with it over 100,000 

Germans, One of the most serious consequences of the Allied conquest of Tunisia was its effect on Italian morale and determination 

to resist. Italy had never been prepared for the requirements of global 

warfare; now it had lost its best divisions in Greece, Russia, and North 

Africa. Criticism against Mussolini's conduct of the war mounted, 

particularly in army and monarchist circles. Hitler recognized the 

unstable internal situation in Italy and in May 1943 OKW began 

drafting plans to take over the defense of all of Italy and the Balkans in 

the event that Italian resistance should collapse or that the Italian 

Government should enter into a "treacherous" agreement with the 

Allies. 5 The Germans believed that further Allied offensive operations 

in the Mediterranean were imminent and, at the same time, that the 

Italians could no longer be relied on to contribute their share in the 

defense of their homeland or of the Balkans should either one be 

attacked-not a pleasant contemplation since only a few thousand 

German troops were on Italian soil in May 1943, troops that consti3 Quoted by Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. VII. 

4 German Foreign Office Document: "Aufzeichnung iiber die Unterredung zwischen dem 

RAM und dem Staatssekretaer Bastiani im Schloss Klessheim." 9 April 1943 (OCMH files) . 

. ,For a detailed discussion of German-Italian relations during 1943 and for German 

plans relating to the possibility of Italian defection, see Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender 

of Italy, Chs. III, VII, and IX. 
306 COMMAND DECISIONS 

tuted the backlog of soldiers originally scheduled for transport to North 

Africa. By contrast, less than one year ago, in the early summer of 

1942, Hitler had had visions of his armored columns advancing through 

North Africa and the Caucasus and meeting somewhere in the Near 

East in a gigantic pincer movement. 

Faced with the prospect of losing his strongest ally, Hitler contemplated several strategic alternatives. Germany could assume the 

defense of Italy and Greece (with the latter occupied primarily by 

Italian troops). Germany could surrender all of Italy to the Allies, 

thereby avoiding the commitment of additional troops in what could 

only be a secondary theater of operations. Or Germany could defend 

in Italy along a geographic line that would prevent the loss of the Po 

Valley and its rich agricultural and industrial resources. 

Hitler never seriously considered evacuating all of Italy. In addition to giving up the resources of the Po Valley, withdrawal from 

Italy would have meant placing Allied armies on the southern border 

of Germany. Though the Alps provided an obstacle to invasion, the 

Allies would be able to establish air bases within easy striking distance of south and central Germany, and northern Italy would give 

the Allies an ideal staging area for amphibious operations against southern France or southeastern Europe. Withdrawal to the Alps might 

also suggest to Hungary and other Balkan satellites that they too 

could disengage from the none-too-popular war; finally, withdrawal 

from Italy might easily have adverse effects on Turkey's neutrality. 

Similar and stronger arguments existed against evacuating Greece. 

The plan to occupy and defend all of Italy and the Balkans was 

the first plan adopted by Hitler. He charged Field Marshal Rommel 

with the activation of a skeleton army group headquarters in Munich 

to work out plans to occupy and defend Italy.6 For Rommel's use, 

six good panzer (armored) or panzer grenadier divisions were to come 

from the East; two panzer grenadier and six infantry divisions (reconstituted units that had been virtually destroyed at Stalingrad) 

were to come from France. Furthermore, two parachute divisions were 

to be made available by the Luftwaffe. The secrecy surrounding these 

plans was such that not even the senior German general in Italy, 

Field Marshal Kesselring, was informed of the early discussions. 

In June 1943, his fears concerning Italy temporarily eased, Hitler 

decided to carry out a limited offensive in Russia with the result that 

Rommel could no longer rely on the panzer divisions from the East 

for the execution of his task. Rommel thereupon informed Hitler that 

he could no longer undertake the defense of all of Italy with the troops 

60KW/WFSt/Op Nr. 661138/43, 22 May 1943, in West!. Mittelmeer, Chefsachen (CRS 

H 22/290). 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF ITALY 307 

expected to be available to him.7 Hitler seemingly accepted Rommel's 

judgment, for subsequent plans envisaged the defense of Italy only in 

the Apennines north of Rome, and in July he stated unequivocally 

that "without the Italian Army we cannot hold the entire peninsula." 8 

While Hitler, Rommel, and the OKW made plans in anticipation 

of Italy's defection, Kesselring was planning for the further conduct 

of the war in co-operation with Mussolini and the Italian High Command, the Comando Supremo. In agreement with Comando Supremo, 

German forces in Italy had been built up independently of Rommel's 

plans in preparation for Allied attacks. By the time the Allies invaded 

Sicily in July, Kesselring had placed two German divisions on Sicily, 

one panzer and one panzer grenadier, both organized out of the 

troops that had been scheduled for North Africa before the Axis 

defeat. One panzer grenadier division, still in process of organization, 

was on Sardinia, and two panzer grenadier divisions and a panzer 

division recently transferred from France were in central and southern Italy. Though these units were officially under command of Comando Supremo, German strength and Italian weakness as well as the 

fact that German troops bore the main burden of the battle for Sicily 

made their subordination to Italian commands quite perfunctory. 

Kesselring, the senior German officer in Italy, was in fact the responsible commander. 9 

A natural optimist and political idealist whose Italophile views 

prevented him from a realistic appraisal of the Italian scene, Kesselring had, partly for this reason, not been taken into Hitler's confidence on plans to deal with Italy's possible defection. Kesselring was 

convinced that Italy would continue the war and that the Italian Army, 

though weak, would fight side by side with German troops. Hitler's 

distrust of the Italians was repugnant to Kesselring, and plans for the 

evacuation of southern Italy seemed to him less than necessary. Not 

only did he object strongly to Rommel's ideas concerning Italy and 

the Italians, but he resented the fact that while his own influence 

with Hitler had declined, Rommel's had increased. Kesselring's view 

was that all of Italy could and should be defended, even if Sicily had 

to be given Up.10 

, Walter Warlimont, "Die Strategie der deutschen obersten Fuehrung im ::;weiten Vierteljahr 

1943," OCMH, MS P-049, p. 149. 

H Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1943, translation (Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1947) (hereafter referred to as Fuehrer Conferences, 1943). 

"Siegfried Westphal et al., "Der Feld::;ug in Italien," Part I, Ch. IV, "Die Verstaerkung 

der deutschen Heereskraefte und die Entwicklung der Erdlage in Italien bis ::;um Abtall des 

Bundesgenossen." OCMH MS # T-1a. 

10 Albert Kesselring, Soldat bis ::;um Let::;ten Tag (Bonn, 1953); Siegfried Westphal et al., 

"Der Feld::;ug in Italien," Part I, "Abschliessende Bemerkungen," by Albert Kesselring. OCMH 

MS # Tla-Kl. 
308 COMMAND DECISIONS 

When Mussolini fell on 25 July 1943, the King's appointment of 

Pietro Badoglio, Marshal of ~ I tal y, to be his successor shocked Kesselring; yet he believed Badoglio's solemn declarations that the war 

would continue. Hitler, Rommel, and the OKW worked under different assumptions. With the fall of Mussolini and Badoglio's assumption of control over the Italian Government, German plans covering 

an Italian collapse, rather vague and still in embryonic stages, suddenly acquired great importance and urgency. In his first excitement, 

Hitler-greatly disturbed over the fate of his fellow dictator-wanted 

to take immediate action by staging a coup d'etat with German troops, 

arresting Badoglio and the King, liberating Mussolini, and re-establishing the fascist regime under German protection. Elements of the 

2d Parachute Division were at once flown to Rome to bolster German 

strength. But caution, ignorance of Mussolini's whereabouts, and the 

apparent willingness of the Italians to maintain the alliance with Germany restrained Hitler. However, the idea was not dropped and 

General Kurt Student was charged with preparing the overthrow of 

Badoglio's government with the XI Air Corps, a parachute unit, now 

dispatched to Italy. At the same time Otto Skorzeny, a daredevil-type 

SS officer, received the mission of locating and liberating Mussolini.l1 

Instead of a sudden and dramatic move, Hitler decided to occupy 

Italy unobtrusively and gradually by increasing the number of German divisions in the country, if possible in agreement with Comando 

Supremo. 12 

Even before this time German strength in Italy had been increased 

because of the fighting on Sicily and the danger of further Allied 

moves. 

On 1 August 1943 OKW issued a new and revised version of the 

plan to take over the country. Assigned the code name A CHSE, the 

plan recognized the danger to German troops in Italy that would 

come about from Italian defection and Allied landings on the Italian 

mainland. There were as yet no strong German forces in northern 

Italy and Rommel's headquarters was still in Munich. German forces 

in southern and central Italy and on Sicily had been increased to 

eight divisions. Of these, three divisions and part of a fourth were 

fighting on Sicily, one division was located on Sardinia, and an SS 

brigade occupied Corsica. At this time it was believed that Italian 

"treachery" could isolate all the German forces in southern and cenl1 Fuehrer Conferences, 1943, pp. 102-06; Hitler's Conferences (fragments of stenographic 

notes taken at Fuehrer Hq), Nr. 14 (I), 25 Jul 43 and Nr. 16 (I), 26 Jul 43 (OCMH 

files); Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. VII. 

l2 OKW/WFSt/Op NT. 661763/43, I Aug 43, in Westliches Mittelmeer Chefsachen (CRS H 

22/290). 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF IT AL Y 309 

tral Italy as well as those fighting on Sicily. Hitler, Rommel, and the 

OKW feared that Allied forces might attempt an amphibious operation against northern Italy, while strong Italian forces there might 

attempt to block the Alpine and Apennine passes. Even more likely 

seemed a landing near Rome where five Italian divisions could assist 

Allied operations, thereby cutting off all German troops south of the 

capital. Allied operations against Calabria and Apulia were equally 

possible; so was an invasion of Sardinia as a prelude to further operations against northern Italy or southern France, for which the airfields 

on the island would make fighter cover possible. An invasion of Calabria with or without Italian co-operation would cut off German forces 

fighting on Sicily, while the air bases at Foggia in Apulia would simplify Allied operations against the Balkans. A landing in the NaplesSalerno area was not seriously considered during the first days of 

August because other areas seemed to offer greater tactical and strategic advantages to the Allies. 13 Moreover, a large-scale invasion of 

the Italian mainland was not thought likely, except by prior agreement with Italy to utilize opportunities which that country's defection 

might bring about. The strategic goal of the Allies was thought to be 

the Balkans and not primarily Italy. In this, all responsible German 

generals and military advisers of Hitler, including Kesselring, Rommel, 

and Admiral Karl Doenitz, agreed. On 17 July Hitler had informed 

the Commander-in-Chief Navy, Admiral Doenitz, that "at present it 

appears that the next enemy landing will be attempted there [in the 

Balkans]. It is as important to reinforce the Balkans as it is to hold 

Italy." 14 The reasoning behind the opinion that the Balkans were 

more immediately threatened than the Italian mainland included 

political, economic, and military factors. Placing himself in the position of the Allies, a spokesman for the OKW argued that a campaign 

in Italy would meet with the immediate and strong reaction of 

German-Italian forces which could utilize the extensive and functioning network of communications to counter any Allied move. In Greece, 

on the other hand, all Axis reinforcements and supplies would have 

to be shipped over the one existing railroad line of limited capacity, 

1300 kilometers long, and vulnerable to attack both from the air and 

by partisans. Political repercussions on Germany's southeastern allies, 

Hungary and Rumania, would be likely, while Allied pressure might 

persuade Turkey to give up her neutral status. Proximity of the Balkans to the vital Rumanian oilfields and Germany's economic depend1.1 Siegfried Westphal et al., "Der Feldzug in Italien," Part 1, Ch. IV, "Die Verstaerkung 

der deutschen Heereskraefte und rlie Entwicklung der Erdlage in Italien bis zum Abtall des Bundesgenossen." OCMH MS # T -lao 

14 Fuehrer Conferences, 1943, p. 94. 
310 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ence on the bauxite, copper, and other economic resources of the 

southeast were further reasons for fearing an invasion of that region. 15 

In addition to the difficulties of supplying German forces in Greece, 

other military factors seemed to favor the Balkans as an Allied goal. 

In Italy the Alps formed an insurmountable barrier to an invasion of 

Germany proper; the Ljubljana Gap, on the other hand, had provided the classic invasion route into central Europe throughout history. Finally, an invasion of the southeast would enable the Western 

Allies and Russia to join hands and co-ordinate their military strategy, 

while the presence of Western troops would constitute a check against 

Russian ambitions in the southeast, a point thought to be of particular concern to Great Britain. Thus Plan A CHSE was divided into two 

major parts, one for the Balkans and the other for Italy and southern 

France. The number of German divisions in the Balkans had been 

increased from five in January to more than thirteen in July.16 

Hitler, as yet, did not entertain the idea of defending Italy anywhere south of Rome in case of Italian defection. According to Plan 

ACHSE, effective on order from OKW, Rommel was to occupy all 

the important passes, roads, and railroads leading out of Italy, disarm Italian Army units, and secure the Apennine passes. Kesselring 

was to withdraw his forces toward northern Italy, disarming the Italian 

Army and crushing any resistance. The island of Sardinia was to be 

evacuated by transferring the troops to Corsica and from there to the 

mainland. Rommel was to assume command over all German forces 

in Italy as soon as "the movements in northern Italy should become 

operationally connected with those in Southern Italy." 17 

Under the impact of the Italian change of government and the 

increased danger of concerted action by Italy and the Allies, Hitler 

approved the plan to withdraw to the northern Apennines. Although 

he was always reluctant to give up ground without fighting "to the 

end," it is possible that his recent experiences at Stalingrad and in 

Tunisia had momentarily inclined him to be less rigid. Both times he 

had listened to the advice of optimists. For Italy, he listened to Rommel, who had learned to be more cautious. 

During this time Kesselring remained convinced that all was well 

in Italy; he saw no danger to his troops or to his lines of communications. He continued to clamor for reinforcements in the south for 

the defense of Calabria and Apulia. On 5 August he sent a memorandum to Hitler and OKW in which he stated: "At the moment it 

is certain that the Italian leadership and armed forces want to 

15 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.VII.-30.IX.43, entry of 9 Jul 43; Fuehrer Conferences, 1943, p. 117. 

16 Warlimont, "Die Strategie der deutschen obersten Fuehrung," MS # P-049, p. 135. 

17 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.vII.-30.IX.43, entry of 1 Aug 43. 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF IT AL Y 311 

co-operate with us. . . . I repeat my previously expressed opinion 

that Calabria and Apulia are not sufficiently secure. Also in view of 

the strategic importance of these regions as a springboard to the Balkans, I ask again for reinforcements of German troops in southern 

Italy." On 19 August he still thought that Italian "commands and 

troops will do everything possible to frustrate [Allied] attacks." 18 

Actually a few days earlier, on 15 and 16 August, Brig. Gen. Giuseppi 

Castellano with full powers from Badoglio had secretly entered into 

contact with the British Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon to negotiate an armistice with the Allies and to offer active military assistance 

to any Allied venture on the mainland.'9 

Hitler refused to accede to Kesselring's wishes and to commit additional troops in the south. According to General Alfred JodI, Chief of 

the Armed Forces Operations Staff of OKW, additional forces in the 

south would only increase the difficulties of supply. The security of 

the forces in southern Italy could be strengthened, JodI argued, only 

by evacuating Sicily and thereby augmenting the defensive potential 

of Kesselring's forces. JodI never doubted the necessity of withdrawing north in case of Italy's defection.20 Hitler's disregard of Kesselring's views and the knowledge that Rommel was eventually to succeed him in command prompted Kesselring to submit his resignation 

on 14 August. Hitler refused to accept it. 21 

On 1 August 1943 Rommel's divisions began their infiltration into 

northern Italy. Some crossed the border with the consent of Comando 

Supremo) others despite Italian opposition. As a result of these movements tension between OKW and Comando Supremo increased considerably, but as yet neither wanted to assume responsibility for an open 

break. Italy felt too insecure as long as no agreement with the Allies 

had been reached, while Germany wanted to commit as many troops 

in Italy as possible before open hostility made such movements more 

difficult. Besides, there was still a possibility that Italy might remain 

in the war, although Hitler was convinced that he had positive proof 

of Italy's armistice negotiations. During August OKW dispatched five 

infantry and two panzer divisions to northern Italy and on 16 August Rommel's headquarters moved to Lake Garda in northern Italy 

and assumed open command as Am!)! Group B. Comando Supremo and 

the Italian Government were in no doubt that Army Group B constituted in effect an occupation force, but they felt too weak to protest 

and pretended to accept the German version that Am!)! Group B was 

1, OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.VIl.-30.lX1943, entry of 5 and 19 Aug 43. 

1>1 Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. IX. 

20 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.VIl.-30.lX1943, entry of·5 and 19 Aug 43. 

21 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.VIl.-30.IX1943, entry of 14 Aug 43. 
312 COMMAND DECISIONS 

to be a strategic reserve for the Balkans, southern France, or Italy in 

case of Allied landings at any of these points. 22 Comando Supremo urged 

OKW to utilize the German divisions in the north to strengthen the 

defenses in southern Italy where, on the assumption that Italy would 

remain loyal to the Axis, an Allied attack was much more likely, while 

OKW applied pressure on Comando Supremo to withdraw its divisions 

from the north for the same reason.23 Neither trusted the other and 

neither wanted to take the first step. After the German divisions were 

firmly established in northern Italy, OKW no longer feared an Allied 

invasion north of the Apennines. 

During the second half of August the German position in southern Italy had also become more secure. By 17 August all the German 

troops in Sicily, exceeding 60,000 men, had been evacuated with their 

equipment. On 22 August the newly activated Tenth Army assumed 

command over German units in the Gaeta-Naples-Salerno region 

(the XIV Panzer Corps with three divisions) and in Calabria and Apulia 

(LXXVI Panzer Corps with two divisions and elements of a third). Two 

divisions and part of a third were grouped near Rome under the direct 

command of Kesselring. 24 Yet, despite the more favorable German 

position in Italy, Hitler did not change his plans. He personally 

informed General von Vietinghoff, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 

that Italian defection was only a matter of time and that the most 

important task was a safe withdrawal of the army to the north. 

Despite the weakness of the Italian Army, Hitler still feared that in 

co-operation with the Allies it could place German troops in the south 

in a very precarious position. 25 The army was to withdraw first to the 

Rome area and from there to the northern Apennines. 

Even before General Castellano's offer of an armistice the Allies 

had definitely decided on an invasion of the Italian mainland to secure 

the important port of Naples as a base for further operations in Italy. 

The Allies too had been aware that Italy was about to collapse and 

22 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1. Vll.-30.rX.1943, entry of 16 Aug 43. 

2:1 Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. IX. 

24 General von Vietinghoff, who commanded Tenth Army, considered it a costly mistake 

on the part of the Allies not to have attempted an invasion of Calabria before the close 

of the Sicilian campaign. Overcoming the resistance of the one and one half German 

divisions in Calabria, was, he believed, well within Allied capabilities. Such a landing 

would have cut off German troops on Sicily from their sources of supply, thereby shortening the length of time they could have resisted, and, most important, evacuation of German troops from Sicily would have been impossible. Without these forces, Vietinghoff 

maintains with considerable logic, the Germans could not have attempted resistance in 

southern and central Italy. Westphal et al., "Der Feldzug in Italien," Ch. VI, "Die Kaempfe 

der 10. Armee in Sued- und Mittelitalien" (written by Vietinghoff), p. 13. 

25 Westphal et al., "Der Feldzug in Italien," Ch. VI; Memo, "Vermerk ueber Besprechung 

Beim Fuehrer am 17.8.43" in Tenth Army, KTB, Anlagen X. VIII-12.9.43, (CRS, AOK 10, 

42803/2). 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF ITALY 313 

the invasion of the mainland had originally been intended to deliver 

the knockout blow. Shortly after General Castellano started negotiating with the Allies, German reinforcements and the successful evacuation of German troops from Sicily had changed the picture substantially. Italy was no longer master in its own house and needed Allied 

help even to effect its surrender. At the same time the Allies needed 

the assurance that Italy would offer no resistance to a landing 

operation. 26 

Allied concentration of troops and shipping in the western Mediterranean indicated to the Germans preparations for amphibious 

operations in the near future. Since northern Italy was no longer considered a likely target, OKW now regarded the region of NaplesSalerno and the island of Sardinia most threatened, while the Rome 

area was thought of as particularly endangered in case of Allied landings and simultaneous defection of Italy. Kesselring recognized the 

possibility of a landing near Naples-Salerno, but showed greater concern for Apulia with its air bases at Foggia and suitability as a staging 

area against the Balkans. Hitler admitted the possibility of an invasion at Apulia, but he refused to permit Kesselring to dissipate his forces 

in order to reinforce that area and also brushed aside new demands 

by Kesselring to commit more troops in the south. 27 Hitler reaffirmed 

his views, which OKW passed on to Kesselring in the form of an order 

dated 18 August 1943. Overriding his objections, the order instructed 

Kesselring-in his deployment and movement of Tenth Arrrry-to take 

into account the fact that Italy would capitulate sooner or later. The 

army was to put itself in a position to assure its withdrawal to central Italy even in case of Allied landings and active or passive resistance of the Italians. The order further directed the Tenth Arrrry to 

defend the most threatened coastal area of Naples and Salerno with 

at least three mobile divisions and to hold it against Allied landings. 

Only mobile forces were to remain in southern Calabria and they 

would execute a fighting withdrawal to the north. In case political 

developments made a continuation of the fight in southern Italy 

impossible, Tenth Arrrry would fall back to the Rome area, Sardinia 

would be evacuated, and further action would be taken in accordance 

with ACHSE. 2 8 

Events now rapidly approached a climax. On 30 August OKW 

issued a final revised version of A CHSE which adhered to the original concept but provided instructions more detailed and in closer accord 

26 Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. VIII. 

27 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1:VII.-30.IX.43, entry of 13 Aug 43. 

" Order, OKW /WFSt Nr. 661966/43, 18 Aug 43, in Westliches Milleimeer, Chefsachen 

(CRS H 22/290). 
314 COMMAND DECISIONS 

with eXIstmg German troop dispositions. The directive still envisaged 

Kesselring directing a withdrawal to the Rome area which was to be 

held until all troops had escaped from the south and from Sardinia. 

The Germans were to disarm the Italian Army in the process and to 

treat evacuated territory as hostile country. Rommel was to secure 

and occupy all the Alpine and Apennine passes as well as the major 

northern ports. The Italian Army was to be disarmed and the region 

of northern Italy pacified with the help of fascist organizations. Other 

sections contained instructions to the Commander-in- Chief-Southeast for 

taking over the defense of the Balkans and disarming Italian troops 

in that region. 29 

Hitler's strategy in Italy on the eve of the Allied invasion can be 

summarized as follows. As long as Italy at least outwardly maintained 

the alliance, German troops in southern Italy were to execute a fighting withdrawal from the tip of Calabria; they were to hold the NaplesSalerno area to secure vital routes of communications to the north; 

only weak German units were to assist the Italians in Apulia. Deployment of all troops in southern Italy was to be such that lines of communications to the north were secured. As soon as Italy surrendered, 

the overriding consideration would become the safety of German troops 

in southern Italy and their best chance of survival was seen in a wellorganized withdrawal to central Italy where all troops under Kesselring would be assembled in preparation for a final withdrawal to the 

northern Apennines. 

Allied intentions were somewhat clarified on 3 September when 

the British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina into Calabria. 

In accordance with the instructions from OKW, Kesselring ordered 

Tenth Arnry to delay the Eighth Army while withdrawing its troops from 

Calabria to the north. 3D Five days later, the armistice was announced 

and ACHSE went into effect. The next morning the 16th Panzer Division fought troops of the Fifth U.S. Army on the beaches of Salerno. 

Unknown to the Germans, Italy had signed an unconditional surrender on 3 September and reached agreement with the Allies that 

the armistice would not be announced until just before the planned 

InvaSiOn. 

The moment Hitler, Rommel, and the OKW had feared and 

anticipated had come: Italy had surrendered while two Allied armies 

were establishing themselves on the mainland. Kesselring was faced 

with the dual task of opposing the Allied armies and rendering the 

Italian armed forces ineffective. In this mission he was aided by the 

29 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.VII.-30.IX.43, entry of 29 and 30 Aug 43. 

:10 Order, Tenth Army, "ArmeebeJehl Nr 2," 4 Sep 43, in Tenth Army KTB, Anlagen 8. VIII.-

12.lX.43 (CRS AOK 10, 42803/2). 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF ITALY 315 

lack of Italian fighting spirit and poor planning on the part of Comando 

Supremo. In the Tenth Army sector Italian troops all but disappeared overnight; near Rome Kesselring needed only two days to convince the five 

Italian divisions located there to go home; in the north Rommel 

methodically disarmed and dissolved all Italian Army units. Italy had 

ceased to be an ally, but she also ceased to be a threat. Unhampered 

by the previously necessary regard for the sensitivity of Comando 

Supremo and the Italian Government, the Germans proceeded to conduct the defense of Italy with no considerations except their own selfinterest. 31 

Kesselring's and Hitler's great fear-an Allied landing near Rome 

and active resistance of Italian forces near the capital-proved groundless. Neither Kesselring nor Hitler knew that such a course had been 

definitely abandoned by Italy and the Allies. The 82d Airborne Division was to have landed on the airports of Rome to occupy the city 

and prevent the Germans from assuming control. The operation was 

canceled at the last minute because Italy failed to guarantee the 

security of the airfields for the time the operation was scheduled.32 

The announcement of the armistice occurring simultaneously with 

the landing at Salerno might have resulted in a very grave situation 

for all German troops in the south. By a quirk of fate it probably 

had much to do with making necessary the long and costly campaign 

of the Allies in Italy, Only the day before, on 7 September, Hitler 

had finally decided to cut the knot of Germany's entangled relations 

with Italy by sending an ultimatum to the Italian Government to 

accede to German demands. The demands themselves were not new, 

but up to that time the Italian Government and Comando Supremo had 

been evasive without refusing outright to make the demands the basis 

of discussion. Hitler instructed OKW to have the draft ready for his 

signature by 9 September. The more important points of the ultimatum, as drafted by OKW, included demands for (a) complete freedom 

of movement for German troop units-this was particularly directed 

against Italian reluctance to allow German troops near major ports; 

(b) withdrawal of all Italian troops from the German-Italian border 

area and subordination of Italian divisions in the Po Valley to Army 

Group B; (c) creation of a strong Italian front in southern Italy behind 

which Tenth Army could gain sufficient freedom of movement to counterattack against an invading enemy; (d) joint leadership (meaning 

in effect German leadership) of all armed forces. In case of Italian 

refusal the draft ultimatum stated that Germany would have to take 

11 OKWjWFSt, KTB 1.VII.-30.IX.43, entry of 8 and 9 Sep 43. 

"Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. IX. 
316 COMMAND DECISIONS 

all steps it considered necessary to assure the safety of its troopS.33 

There seems no doubt that these steps would have included withdrawal of Tenth Army at least to the Rome area. Because of the 

announced armistice on 8 September the ultimatum was not sent. 

Curiously, the Italians too were caught by surprise by the announcement of the armistice; they did not expect it until 12 September and 

had failed to give precise instructions to their officers, including army 

commanders. By 12 September Germany would probably have delivered the ultimatum and Italy-having already signed the armisticecould only have refused or stalled for time. There is at least the possibility that Tenth Army would have been in the process of withdrawing 

if the invasion had been delayed for a few days.34 Thus the German 

defense of Italy south of Rome at the time of the Salerno landings 

was due, first to Hitler's reluctance to give the Italians an excuse for 

defection by withdrawing his troops to the north before an Allied 

invasion and as long as there remained the slightest possibility that 

Italy might remain in the war, and later to the timing of the invasion and the announcement of the armistice, which prevented Germany 

from delivering its ultimatum to the Italian Government. 

Kesselring's resourcefulness and unexpected success in coping with 

the Italians and the two Allied armies during the first days after Salerno gained him at least temporary control over the conduct of 

operations. On 12 September Hitler informed Kesselring and Rommel-in response to Kesselring's request for clarification of the command situation in Italy-that Rommel was not yet authorized to 

issue directives to Kesselring; this authorization was to be issued by 

Hitler personally only after the forces of Commander-in-ChieJ South came 

within close proximity to the territory of Army Group B.35 The dividing line between the two army groups was the line Pisa-ArezzoAncona. Kesselring's advocacy of a defense of Italy as far south of 

Rome as possible had gained considerable force after the Italian Army 

ceased to be dangerous and after the Allies had failed to land in the 

area of Rome. But Hitler did not yet see his way clear to accepting 

Kesselring's strategic concept. Kesselring complied with the letter of 

OKW's instruction by ordering the Tenth Army on 14 September "to 

fall back upon the Rome area" after completion of the operations at 

Salerno, regardless of whether the Fifth Army had been forced back 

into the sea or not. "The objective," the order continued, "is to gain 

time for the evacuation of important materials as well as for the destruction of lines of communications and war industries." 36 

.J:l OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.VII.-30.1X.43, entry of 7 and 8 Sep 43. 

34 Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. VII, p. 16. 

'10 OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.VII.-30.lX.1943, entry of 12 Sep 43. 

36 Tel, Commander-in-Chle] South to Tenth Army, Nr. 6159/43, 14 Sep 43, in Tenth Army, 

KTB Anlagen 12.lX-20.lX.43 (CRS AOK 10, 42803/3). 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF IT AL Y 317 

Still anticipating withdrawal, Hitler saw as yet no need to reinforce Kesselring and thus enable him to make a permanent stand in 

the south. Kesselring asked for no reinforcements from Rommel and 

received none. After it had become obvious that the Germans could 

not dislodge the Fifth Army from Salerno and were threatened with 

envelopment by the Eighth Army, he directed the Tenth Army to 

withdra w to a succession of defensive lines, one of which was the "B" 

line, later called the Bernhard or Winter Line. This line crossed the 

narrowest sector of the Italian peninsula roughly between Gaeta and 

Ortona. Kesselring's written and oral directives and orders indicated 

that the Bernhard Line was but one of a series of defensive lines to 

be occupied by Tenth Army in the retrograde movement toward Rome. 

In a postwar account Kesselring maintained that he had never had 

any intention of complying with the "absurd" idea of withdrawing 

to the north. He accused OKW and Rommel of writing off his forces. 

With two more panzer divisions, which Rommel could well have 

spared, Kesselring in retrospect claimed he would have been assured 

of success at Salerno. 37 He also accused Hitler, in the same postwar 

account, of being inconsistent. If Hitler refused to send reinforcements 

to southern Italy, he should have withdrawn the Tenth Army before 

the Italian armistice. 38 In this argument Kesselring forgot that he 

more than anyone else had assured Hitler that there was no danger 

from the Italians as long as Germany was willing to assist in the defense of Italy. A German withdrawal from southern Italy before the 

armistice would have given the Italians every reason to break the alliance, since they were in no position to defend southern Italy without German help. In order to defend a line south of Rome-still a 

self-imposed mission-Kesselring instructed Tenth Army to fight to gain 

time for building up the Bernhard Line. 39 

It is a matter of conjecture when Hitler first entertained the idea 

that a more permanent defense of the Bernhard Line would serve 

Germany's greater strategic interests in the Balkans and in France. 

The belief that the Balkans remained the strategic goal of the Allies 

was still held throughout September and October. On 15 September 

Kesselring informed OKW that he expected the next Allied attack 

to be launched, not against central or northern Italy, but against the 

Balkans after the air bases at Foggia had been taken. 40 Similar ideas 

were expressed by the Armed Forces Operations Staff of OKW, by Ad-

:n In postwar accounts General Siegfried Westphal, Kesselring's former Chief of Staff, 

and Kesselring himself, claim to have requested the transfer of two panzer divisions from 

Army Group B to Salerno. Available records do not indicate that such a request was made 

by Commander-in-Chief South. Westphal et al., "Der Feld;::ug in Italien," Chs. VII and Kl. 

:lR Westphal et a!., "Der Feld::;ug in Italien," Tla-Kl. 

"" Westphal et a!., "Der Feld;::ug in Italien," Tla-Kl. 

40 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1. VII.-30.IX.43, entry of 15 Sep 43. 
318 COMMAND DECISIONS 

miral Doenitz, by Rommel, and by Hitler himself. Kesselring and 

Doenitz believed that a prolonged defense of southern Italy would 

delay an Allied attack against the Balkans, while the Armed Forces 

Operations Staff was of the opinion that withdrawal to the Apennines 

north of Rome would save three to four divisions which would be 

needed to reinforce the Balkans against the increased danger of an 

invasion. 41 Kesselring thought it of utmost importance to deny the 

Allies the undisputed possession of a staging area against the Balkans. 

Also a defensive line in the south would keep Allied bombers farther 

from southern Germany and the Po Valley, thus making strategic 

bombing more difficult. The Bernhard Line could be held with 11 

divisions, including 2 mobile divisions in reserve on both flanks to 

prevent amphibious flanking operations, while estimates for holding 

the Apennine line in the north ranged from 13 to 20 divisions. 42 

Defending the Bernhard Line would enable German forces to execute a 

delaying action including, if necessary, a withdrawal to the northern 

Apennines. Immediate withdrawal, on the other hand, would endanger the vital Po Valley, for once the Allies breached the Apennine 

line, no terrain suitable for defense was available short of the Alps. 

An additional advantage, in the eyes of Kesselring, lay in the possession of Rome. To prevent the Allies from occupying this city, he 

argued, would deny them the opportunity to exploit this fact for 

propaganda purposes. Finally, holding the Bernhard Line would make 

it possible for the German Army to execute a counteroffensive against 

Apulia, in case Allied preparations for an attack against the Balkans 

resulted in a withdrawal of Allied forces from the Italian front. The 

latter argument probably had considerable impact on Hitler, for 

later in October he summoned both Kesselring and Rommel to his 

headquarters to hear them express their views on the feasibility of a 

counteroffensive. 43 

The arguments presented to Hitler in favor of a northern stand 

were less dramatic, but probably equally valid. Rommel may have 

overestimated the amphibious capabilities of the Allies and he felt 

that a line too far south represented a great danger for which he 

would not want to assume responsibility, even though he admitted 

that the Bernhard Line could be held with half the divisions necessary in the northern Apennines. 44 Rommel probably shared the opin41 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.VII.-30.IX.43, entry of 8 Sep 43. 

42 LI Mtn Corps, Ia Nr. 579/43,4 Nov 43, in Italien-Verschiedenes-Allgemein. (CRS H 

22/145); Westphal et al., "Der Feld::;ug in Italien," Ch. VII. 

4.1 Westphal et al., "Der Feld::;ug in Italien," Ch. VII, "Die Auffassung der Heeresgruppe"; 

B. H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace Company, 1953) 

p.446. 

11 Siegfried Westphal, Heer in Fesseln (Bonn, 1950), p. 237; Liddell Hart, The Rommel 

Papers, p. 446. 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF ITALY 319 

ion of some members of the Armed Forces Operations Staff that withdrawal from southern Italy meant simultaneous withdrawal from Greece 

in order to avoid dispersal of German forces over a large area vulnerable to attack. 45 Hitler refused to consider withdrawal from Greece 

and gradually turned toward Kesselring's view. On 17 September 

Hitler informed Kesselring that he approved his plan for a slow withdrawal northward and indicated that it was important to .hold the 

Bernhard Line "for a longer period of time." 46 

Kesselring had not succeeded in forcing the Fifth Army from its 

beachhead, but German troops had exacted a heavy toll in men and 

equipment. They kept the port of Naples in their hands throughout 

September, and the Allies seemed checked. Thus, while Kesselring 

successfully delayed the Allied advance north, Hitler gained time to 

consider and reconsider arguments for and against a permanent defense of the Bernhard Line. Kesselring's optimism, a source of irritation to Hitler before the Italian surrender, now turned in his favor. 

Rommel, in contrast, appeared too pessimistic, as Hitler indicated 

later. Probably somewhat bitter over the outcome of his North African 

campaign, Rommel did not relish the danger of exposing another army 

to annihilation by flanking attacks from the sea. On the other hand, 

Hitler apparently had never forgiven Rommel his "unauthorized" 

retreat at EI Alamein. 47 

Such considerations may well have passed through Hitler's mind 

on 24 September 1943 when Admiral Doenitz presented his estimate 

of the situation. Southern Italy, Doenitz argued, was especially important to the enemy as a bridgehead to the Balkans. "Therefore," 

Doenitz continued, "it is necessary for us to do all in our power to 

block this route as long as possible .... Sicily ... was worth every 

sacrifice from this point of view. Now another opportunity for determined resistance presents itself in Apulia. To prepare, follow 

through, and secure a beachhead for a possible assault on the Balkans the enemy needs the air ports near Foggia. This was the pattern followed in Sicily and at Salerno. If these air fields remain in 

our hands, the attack on the Balkans will be effectively delayed." 

Hitler agreed with these observations and informed Doenitz that he 

would "issue directives for the conduct of the war accordingly." 48 

Hitler was coming closer to Kesselring's point of view. A few days 

later the force of Doenitz' argument was considerably lessened when 

the airfields at Foggia fell into British hands. Yet his argument remained valid if the airfields could be recaptured in a counteroffensive 

4' OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.VII.-30.rX.43 and 1.X.-31.XII.43, entry of 8 Sep and 4 Oct 43. 

46 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.VlI.-30.rX.43, entry of 17 Sep 43. 

47 Hitler's Conferences (fragments) Nr. 46, 31 Aug 44. 

4S Fuehrer Coriferenees, 1943, p. 140. 
320 COMMAND DECISIONS 

timed to coincide with an Allied build-up against the Balkans. Kesselring 

and Rommel on 30 September expressed their opinions on the chances 

for a counteroffensive, and, though their views were not recorded, it 

seems more than likely that Kesselring expressed himself positively in 

accordance with his earlier statements, while Rommel, at the very 

least, expressed doubt. 49 

As a result of the conference with Kesselring and Rommel, Hitler 

definitely decided to reverse his earlier plans in favor of the defense 

of the Bernhard Line. 50 Though a formal order to this effect was signed by 

Hitler and issued on 4 October, the two commands in Italy-Kesselring's and Rommel's-remained active, both continuing to function 

directly under OKW. Hitler did not yet completely accept Kesselring's optimistic prediction of being able to hold the Allies away from 

the northern Apennines from six to nine months, for the same order that 

instructed Kesselring to build up and hold the Bernhard Line charged 

Rommel with the construction of a defensive line in the northern 

Apennines. For planning purposes, Rommel could still count on all 

his forces as well as those of Kesselring. However, for the first time 

since the invasion, Rommel's army group was ordered to send reinforcements to Kesselring consisting of two infantry divisions and some 

artillery units. 51 Rommel was not yet out of the picture but Kesselring had won a major victory in the battle of concepts. Kesselring 

would hold on to Rome and tie down Allied divisions in a battle of 

attrition, thereby keeping them, he thought, from attacking the 

Balkans. 

The political role assigned Italy after the Italian armistice and the 

dissolution of the Italian Army may have strengthened Hitler's decision of 4 October 1943 to hold on to Rome and to defend the Bernhard Line. On 12 September Otto Skorzeny realized Hitler's wish to 

liberate Mussolini. 52 With Mussolini liberated and the Italian Army disbanded, the road was open for the establishment of a fascist puppet regime and for the activation of some Italian Army units to be composed 

of loyal fascist volunteers. The chief of the new army was to be Marshal 

Rodolfo Graziani who was invited to a conference with Hitler on 9 

October to discuss means by which Italy could again share in the 

conduct of the war. During the course of the conference Hitler and 

Graziani agreed that German-occupied Italy was to be treated as a 

4>, OKW/WFSt, KTB 1. X.-31.Xll.43, entry of 1 Oct 43; Liddell Hart, The Rommel 

Papers, p. 446. 

,,0 OKW/WFSt, KTB 1.X.~31.XII.43, entry of 1 Oct 43. 

'" Order, OKW/WFSt/Op Nr. 662409/43, 4 Oct 43, in Westliches Mittelmeer, CheJsachen 

(CRS H 22/290). 

" OKW/ WFSt, KTB 1. VII.~30.IX.43, entry of 25 Sep 43. 
HITLER AND THE DEFENSE OF ITALY 321 

"friendly" country in which the fascist government was to be given 

some measure of independence, excepting large areas designated as 

"zones of operation," and that the loss of Rome would seriously impair any chance of establishing Mussolini's puppet regime. Therefore, 

Hitler concluded, "the intended defense of the [Bernhard] line is of 

decisive importance to the continuance of a joint struggle." 53 

While it is doubtful that Hitler took any strategic risks for the 

sake of his former ally, it is true that he felt considerable loyalty 

toward Mussolini. Moreover, the co-operation even of a puppet government would simplify coercive measures to obtain labor and economic products for Germany. The decision to defend the Bernhard 

Line was probably strengthened by these considerations. In turn it not 

only expedited the establishment of a fascist government but also 

made possible the later propagandistic exploitation of its existence. 

Between 4 October and 6 November Hitler vacillated in his decision as to whom to give supreme command in Italy. He seemed to 

swing from Kesselring to Rommel and back to Kesselring. Both commanders were again summoned to present their ,;,iews. Asked whether 

he thought he could defend the Bernhard Line and hold on to Rome 

and central Italy, Rommel, according to a postwar source, expressed 

himself negatively. 54 By 6 November Hitler had the draft of two 

orders in front of him, one appointing Rommel, the other appointing 

Kesselring. On that date, he signed the latter with its detailed instructions regarding the defense of Italy which affirmed that "the 

Bernhard Line will mark the end of withdrawals." 55 Hitler had made 

the final decision regarding the strategy to be followed in the defense 

of Italy. Rommel was transferred out of the theater on 21 November 

and Army Group B discontinued as an active command, while Kesselring's command, now comprising the entire Italian theater, was redesignated Commander-in-Chiif Southwest and Army Group C.56 

Hitler's decision to hold and defend the Bernhard Line set the 

stage for the bloody battles of the Rapido River, Monte Cassino, and 

Anzio. Without Hitler's decision to reappraise the strategic defense 

of Italy, these places probably would have fallen to the Allies after 

light skirmishes or perhaps even unopposed. Kesselring's capable leadership made the decision payoff at least in time gained. The Allies 

did not take Rome until 4 June 1944. 

':lTel, OKW/WFSt/Op Nr. 66274/43,10 Oct 43, in Westliches Mittelmeer, Chefsachen 

(CRS H 22/290). 

54 Westphal, Heer in Fesseln, p. 236; Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, p. 446 . 

. " Order, OKW/WFSt/Op Nr. 6123/43, 6 Nov 43, in H.Gr.C., Grundsaetzliche Befehle 

(CRS HGr C 75138/12). 

56 For further details concerning Kesselring's appointment see Lucian Heichler, "Kesselring's Appointment as Commander in Chief Southwest," OCMH MS # R-3. 
322 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Hitler's decision was a gamble. He could not be sure that the 

Allies would not commit stronger forces in the Mediterranean in an 

attempt to cut off and annihilate the German forces in the south, as 

they did in their abortive attempt to cut the lines of communications 

at Anzio. Ironically enough, Hitler decided to hold the Bernhard 

Line primarily to prevent the Allies from going into the Balkans. The 

Allies had no intention of going there, although rapid conquest of 

southern and central Italy might have tempted them into such a 

venture. 

The validity of Hitler's decision is difficult to test. Kesselring's best 

claim for success can only be that he lost a campaign more slowly. 

The time Kesselring may have gained for Hitler could not be put to 

use to change the fortune of war. Possibly Rommel felt at the time 

that the chances for winning the war were negligible and that, therefore, needless sacrifice of blood for the sake of gaining time was pointless. 

Yet from a military point of view, defense of the Bernhard Line was 

perhaps the better choice, even though some of the basic assumptions, 

such as the counterattack against Apulia, could not be tested. Psychologically, the slow progress enforced on Allied armies advancing on 

Rome was not without detrimental effects on the Allied soldier and 

possibly even on the neutral nations, especially Turkey, and on Germany's southeastern allies. 
13 

General Lucas at Anzio 

by 

Martin Blumenson 

A commander can make a decision simply by ruling out what 

appears to him to be impractical or unfeasible. This was how Maj. 

Gen. John P. Lucas, commander of the VI Corps in Italy, viewed 

and resolved his command problem immediately after the Anzio 

landing in January 1944. He rejected a course of action that to him 

appeared unwise or imprudent. 

Yet two alternatives were in fact valid and open to him, though 

neither satisfied him completely. One seemed to him to verge on 

recklessness, the other could perhaps be criticized as overcautious. 

With orders from the next higher echelon of command deliberately 

left vague, General Lucas was free to choose. Thus he alone would 

shape the pattern of events that was to develop at Anzio. 

The responsibility was great. If he made his choice on the side of 

safety or security, he would lessen the risks of an inherently hazardous operation. By gambling, he might lose the entire force under his 

command. On the other hand, if he refused to gamble, he might 

throwaway the opportunity to secure a strategic objective at little 

cost and in one master stroke bring to an end an arduous phase of 

the Italian campaign. 

The issues of this, the most significant command decision at Anzio, 

were rooted in the Allied motives for waging war on the Italian 

mainland. According to the formal directive of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, the object of invading the peninsula was to knock Italy out 

MARTIN BLUMENSON, Historian with OCMH since 1952. M.A., Bucknell University; M.A., Harvard University. Instructor: U.S. Merchant 

Marine Academy; Hofstra College. Historical Officer, European theater, 

World War II; Commanding Officer, 3d Historical Detachment, Korean 

War; Historian, Joint Task Force SEVEN. Bronze Star Medal, Commendation Ribbon. Captain, USAR. Author: Breakout and Pursuit and Salerno to 

Cassino (in preparation), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 

II; Special Problems if the Korean Conjiict (Washington, 1952); Operation 

RED WING: The Atomic Weapons Tests in the Pacific, 1956 (Washington, 1957); 

and numerous articles in military and historical journals. 
324 COMMAND DECISIONS 

of the war and tie down as many German forces as possible. The 

Allies had achieved the first purpose even as they prepared to invade 

the Italian mainland at the toe and at Salerno: Italy had surrendered 

in September 1943. The Allies, therefore, in fighting up the boot of 

Italy, were serving the cause of the second, engaging German forces 

that otherwise might be employed in battle on the Russian front or 

in preparations to repel the Allied invasion of northwest Europe 

(OVERLORD) scheduled for the spring of 1944. 1 

While containing the maximum number of German forces in Italy 

by means of offensive operations, the Allies had their minds fixed on 

Rome. Though the Combined Chiefs had not mentioned Rome as a 

goal of the Italian campaign, Prime Minister Winston Churchill 

"passionately" desired to capture the Eternal City, and this fact was 

well known among the Allied echelons of command. 2 President 

Franklin D. Roosevelt also had his eye on Rome. "Keep on giving it 

all you have," he wrote to the commander of the Fifth Army in 

December 1943, "and Rome will be ours and more beyond." 3 

Liberating Rome would be a dramatic act. The first Axis capital 

to fall to the Allies, it would demonstrate irrefutably the progress of 

Allied arms on the European continent, perhaps stimulate revolt or 

increased guerrilla activity in German-occupied Europe, and without 

doubt strike a serious blow against German morale. 

In support of the Allied predilection for Rome, military reasons 

could be marshaled. Nearby airfields were valuable. More important, 

Rome was the center of the Italian communications system. Through 

Rome passed the troops and supplies nourishing the implacable resistance that prevented the Allies from marching up the Italian boot. 

South of Rome the terrain was eminently suitable for the tenacious 

defense holding the Allies in check. North of Rome the first terrain 

on which the Germans could anchor a defense seemed no closer than 

the Pisa-Rimini line-which would represent a sizable Allied step 

1 The Italian campaign, from the autumn of 1943 to the spring of 1944, is covered in 

the author's forthcoming Salerno to Cassino, a volume in the series UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Accessible secondary sources on the Anzio landing include: Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); Lieutenant 

Colonel Chester G. Starr, ed., From Salerno to the Alps: A History of the Fifth Army, 1943-1945 

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948); Lt. General L. K. Truscott, Jr., Command 

Missions (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1954); [Capt. John Bowditch, III, and 

1st Lt. Robert W. Komer], Anzio Beachhead, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION (Washington, 1947). 

2 Summary Minutes of Meeting, Eisenhower's Villa, Algiers, 29 May-3 June 1943, in 

ABC 384. Accounts of the Algiers conference may be found in Maurice Matloff, Strategic 

Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 

II (Washington, 1959), Ch. VI, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: 

Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 193-95. 

:) Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 245. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 325 

toward Germany and which would provide more than adequate 

depth and security for the important Allied air and ground installations in south Italy. 

The desire for Rome, balked by successful German opposition in 

the intervening mountainous ground in southern Italy, led directly to 

the amphibious landing at Anzio. Even before the invasion of Italy, 

Allied leaders had recognized the difficulties of making swift overland 

advance in the troubled terrain south of Rome. Lacking numerically 

superior forces, constricted by the width of the Italian peninsula to a 

relatively short front, and limited by the mountains to well-defined 

corridors of advance, the Allied ground forces were restricted to 

frontal attack. Maneuver was possible only by means of sea-borne 

hooks-the Allies could envelop the enemy positions only by 

amphibious end runs! 

Though there had been talk in the theater of launching such 

operations on the Italian west coast, the necessity to do so became 

increasingly clear as autumn turned to winter. Not only did the Germans continue resourcefully to deny the Allies quick access to Rome, 

but the bitterly fought campaign in southern Italy seemed to be 

approaching a stalemate. In this context, a surprise amphibious 

landing behind the enemy lines appeared the only way of transforming the static warfare of the Italian campaign into a swift war of 

movement where the superior mechanized equipment of the Allies 

could be employed to advantage. 

Within this frame of reference, two place names became prominent: Anzio and the Alban Hills. The beaches near Anzio, thirtyfive miles due south of Rome, were suitable for amphibious landings, 

and the open terrain of the low, relatively level coastal plain around 

Anzio was favorable for maneuver. Good roads led to the Alban 

Hills, some twenty miles inland. The Alban high ground, fifteen miles 

southeast of the center of Rome, rises between the two main west 

coast highways leading to the capital. Dominating the southern 

approaches to the city, the hill complex was the last barrier the Germans could use to bar an Allied entry into Rome. 

Early in October 1943, a month after the Salerno invasion, Lt. 

Gen. Mark W. Clark was sufficiently interested in water-borne end 

runs to form a special amphibious planning staff and make it part of 

his Fifth U.S. Army G-3 Section. 5 The function of the special group 

4 Planning papers on the Italian invasion during the first nine months of 1943 refer 

often to the need not only for amphibious hooks but also for Rome. See Allied Force 

Headquarters (AFHQ) Microfilms. 

5 An excellent discussion of the early Anzio planning may be found in [Capt. Harris 

G. Warren and Capt. John Bowditch, III] Fifth Army History, Part IV, 16 January 1944-31 

March 1944, Cassino and Aneio (Florence, Italy: L'Impronta Press, n.d.) pp. 10-24. 
326 COMMAND DECISIONS 

was to investigate in detail all possible amphibious opportunities on 

the west coast of Italy, a task complicated by the lack of available 

troops and landing craft, the difficulty of finding suitable beaches 

within supporting distance of the main Fifth Army forces, and the 

generally unfavorable tactical situation. 

During late October and early November, General Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean 

thea ter, discussed wi th his senior su bordina te commanders the possibility of making amphibious landings on the west coast as a means of 

maintaining the momentum of the lagging offensive in Italy. The 

major problem was to secure enough landing vessels to make such an 

effort feasible. More than two-thirds of the ninety LST's then in the 

Mediterranean had to be released by 15 December for employment 

elsewhere in future operations already planned; until that date the 

landing ships were needed to transport ground troops and supplies, 

as well as Strategic Air Force units, from North Africa and Sicily into 

Italy to accelerate the build-up of Allied forces. 

The senior commanders in the theater were in agreement that if 

enough landing ships and craft could be retained beyond midDecember, an amphibious operation ought to be mounted to support 

the main offensive oriented on Rome. General Sir Harold R. L. G. 

Alexander, commander of the ground forces in Italy, felt that if the 

Allies could penetrate the main German defenses in south Italy, 

Allied troops landed on the enemy flank below Rome might so 

threaten German communications as to compel the enemy to retreat. 

As the first step in clarifying the requirements of such an operation, Alexander on 8 November 1943 instructed the Fifth Army to 

draw a plan. To guide the army staff, Alexander's 15 Army Group 

headquarters set forth his general concept. As part of a drive on 

Rome, an amphibious operation south of Rome was to be directed 

on the Alban Hills; combined with a frontal assault on the main 

enemy line, the landing threatening the enemy rear was to dispossess 

the Germans of the last defensive position on the southern approaches 

to Rome. 6 

The Fifth Army drew an outline plan, and on 25 November General Clark approved what was code-named Operation SHINGLE. An 

amphibious landing at Anzio was to take place after the Fifth Army 

reached the Capistrello-Ferentino-Priverno line near Frosinone (about 

forty miles southeast of Rome) and was ready to institute an all-out 

drive toward the Alban Hills. The Anzio force was to be small and 

6 15 Army Group Operations Instruction 31, 8 Nov 43. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 327 

its effort subsidiary. Its function was to assist the major Fifth Army 

forces in their main effort to capture the Alban hill mass. Link-up 

between the main and the Anzio fronts, it was assumed, would take 

place no later than seven days after the landing. 

Though complying with Alexander's general desire, Clark's army 

plan reversed the roles of the participating forces. According to Alexander, the Anzio force was to capture the Alban Hills. According to 

Clark, the main Fifth Army forces were to seize the hill mass. 

Reconciliation of the two concepts did not seem important for the 

moment, for it began to appear that SHINGLE was doomed to indefinite postponement. Though the theater received permission to retain sufficient landing ships and craft to make an amphibious 

operation feasible, enemy resistance, mountainous terrain, and bad 

weather so bogged down the Fifth Army advance to the north that 

the army could not get within supporting distance of the projected 

landing site. 

SHINGLE gained a new lease on life on 10 December when General Clark suggested, despite little prospect of reaching in the near 

future positions from which to support a landing at Anzio, that the 

amphibious landing be mounted nevertheless. A strengthened Anzio 

force, if assured continuous resupply by water, could, he believed, 

consolidate a beachhead and remain separated from the main Fifth 

Army forces for more than seven days. Its mere presence deep in the 

German rear would constitute a considerable threat to German security and thereby facilitate the Fifth Army advance up the peninsula 

toward Rome. 

The idea of making an amphibious envelopment at Anzio took 

concrete form on Christmas Day of 1943 at a conference in Tunis attended by Mr. Churchill and Generals Eisenhower and Alexander. 

General H. Maitland Wilson was also present, for he had been designated the successor to Eisenhower who was leaving the theater in a 

few days to assume command of the OVERLORD forces in England. 

With Eisenhower reluctant to influence the discussion because of his 

impending departure, and with Wilson virtually an observer, Churchill and Alexander decided in favor of SHINGLE. But instead of a landing to assist a main Fifth Army effort when the army was near 

Frosinone, SHINGLE was to be a larger operation launched regardless 

of where the Fifth Army stood in south Italy. (See Map III, inside back 

cover.) Despite the opinion of the theater G-2 who opposed the operation on the basis that the Germans were too strong-the "seamier 

side of the question," as Mr. Churchill characterized the issueChurchill and Alexander were convinced that an amphibious landing 
328 COMMAND DECISIONS 

of not less than two assault divisions was "essential for a decision in 

Italy." 7 

Such an operation required further retention in the Mediterranean of landing ships and craft. Churchill and Alexander met at 

Marrakech, Morocco, on 8 January 1944 to discuss this problem. 

Shortly thereafter, the Combined Chiefs of Staff allowed the theater 

to hold through the month of February sufficient vessels to execute 

SHINGLE. 8 

According to General Clark, the Anzio landing was to "exercise 

a decisive influence in the operation to capture Rome." 9 The purpose 

of the amphibious venture was to outflank the enemy positions then 

established along the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, some sixty miles 

south of Anzio. Whether the sixty miles between Anzio and the 

Garigliano was too great a distance for action on one front to influence the other was discussed, but it was accepted as an unavoidable 

risk. An amphibious landing in the Terracina area, closer to the 

main front, would permit better integration of amphibious and main 

front activities, but it would be too close to warrant hope of securing 

a strategic effect-a direct threat against Rome. 

It was, of course, impossible to predict the exact German reaction 

to a landing, but the most probable reactions seemed desirable from 

the Allied standpoint. By cutting the enemy main line of communications immediately south of Rome, the Anzio force might provoke 

the Germans at the Garigliano and Rapido to withdraw. The threat 

alone of a large force in the German rear might compel German 

withdrawal. Or the Germans might find it necessary to weaken the 

Garigliano-Rapido front in order to meet the threat at Anzio, and in 

so doing open the gate to an Allied surge up the Liri Valley toward 

Rome. 

To implement the strategic intent of the operation, the force 

scheduled to land far behind the enemy front had to be of sufficient 

strength not only to provoke a desired reaction but also to sustain 

7 Fifth Army History, Part IV, p. 15; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, 

Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, a volume in preparation for UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, MS Ch., "Scratch HERCULES and PIGSTICK; Enter 

SHINGLE"; Report by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean [General H. Maitland Wilson] to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Italian Campaign, 8 January 1944 to 10 May 1944 

(Washington, 1946), p. 6; Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis, Despatch, 19 

Apr 47 (published as "The Allied Armies in Italy from 3rd September, 1943, to 12th 

December, 1944," in the Supplement to the London Gazette of Tuesday, 6th June, 1950), p. 

2909 (referred to hereafter as Alexander Despatch); Interv, Dr. Sidney T. Mathews with 

Brig. Gen. K. W. D. Strong (formerly AFHQ G-2), 30 Oct 47, OCMH files. 

8 Alexander Despatch, p. 2910. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believed an Anzio landing essential for a drive on Rome and a line north of Rome essential for an invasion of 

southern France later in 1944. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, MS Ch. cited n. 7. 

9 Cable, Clark to Alexander, 2 Jan 44, quoted in Fifth Army History, Part IV, p. 17. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 329 

itself independently until the main Allied forces followed up the expected German withdrawal and made contact with the enveloping 

force. Yet the size and composition of the force was limited by the 

reservoir of Allied units available in the theater. The make-up of the 

force was also largely determined by the number of naval vessels on 

hand to carry out the amphibious landing. Furthermore, the operation had to be executed within a certain period of time so that 

landing ships and craft, as well as other naval vessels, could be released from the Mediterranean for the OVERLORD cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe. 

These factors determined the size of the Anzio force and the date 

of the amphibious operation. The VI Corps-originally with 2 divisions, 3 Ranger battalions, 2 Commando battalions, a parachute 

regiment, and an additional parachute battalion, plus supporting 

units and later augmented by an armored division (less a combat 

command) and an infantry regimental combat team-was to make 

an amphibious assault on the Anzio beaches on 22 January 1944. 

According to General Alexander's final instructions, the Fifth 

Army was "to carry out an assault landing on the beaches in the 

vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German 14 Corps [defending the Italian west coast along the lower Garigliano River]." In 

support of the landing, the Fifth Army was to make a strong thrust 

on the main front toward Cassino and Frosinone "shortly prior to the 

assault landing to draw in enemy reserves which might be employed 

against the landing forces and then to create a breach in his front 

through which every opportunity will be taken to link up rapidly 

with the seaborne operation." 10 

Unlike the theater G-2, intelligence officers of the 15 Army 

Group were rather optimistic. They judged that the enemy had the 

equivalent of two divisions in reserve near Rome, which was correct. 

And they felt that various troop movements and reliefs already in 

progress in January could increase the reserves able to oppose a landing at Anzio. But they counted on the effect of weather and on 

harassment by the Allied air forces to interfere not only with troop 

movements but with the German defensive dispositions. It seemed 

probable therefore that the Germans in the Rome area would lack 

balance and organization in their dispositions. Thus, there was good 

reason to hope for success at Anzio, where two divisions in the initial 

landing were to be reinforced by a strong and fully mobile striking 

force of armor and infantry., The object of the Anzio operation, Alex10 15 Army Group Operations Instruction 32, 2 Jan 44. 
330 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ander repeated, was "to cut the enemy's main communications in the 

Colli Laziali [Alban Hills] area Southeast of Rome, and to threaten 

the rear of the 14 German Corps." The results, in Alexander's view: 

The enemy will be compelled to react to the threat of his communications and rear, and advantage must be taken of this to break through his 

main defences [along the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers], and to insure 

that the two forces operating under Comd [sic] Fifth Army join hands at 

the earliest possible moment. Once this junction has been effected Comd 

Fifth Army will continue the advance North of Rome with the utmost 

possible speed .... "" 

General Clark translated General Alexander's desires as follows: 

"Mission. Fifth Army will launch attacks in the Anzio area .... a) 

To seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio. b) Advance 

on Colli Laziali [Alban Hills]." 12 What seemed on the surface to be 

perfectly clear-a mission to be executed in two logically consecutive 

parts-was in reality deliberately vague on the second portion. The 

VI Corps was to establish a beachhead, but then was it to advance 

toward the Alban Hills or to the Alban Hills? 

The reason for the deliberate vagueness stemmed from the desire 

to keep the VI Corps flexible rather than to commit it to a single 

unalterable line of action. This in turn arose from the difficulty of 

judging the German reaction at Anzio. 

The Fifth Army intelligence estimates, differing from those of the 

army group, were less optimistic, primarily because of belief that the 

seriousness of the threat carried by the landing would force the Germans into a violent reaction. 

An attack on the coast line in the vicinity of Anzio by a force the size 

of a Corps will become an emergency to be met by all the resources and 

strength available to the German High Command in Italy. It will threaten 

the safety of the Tenth Army [controlling the defense in south Italy]. It 

will also threaten to seize Rome and the airfields in the vicinity thereof 

which are of such great importance. 13 

As soon as the Germans appreciated the magnitude of the Anzio 

landing and realized no other attacks would occur at other points 

along the coast, they would, the Fifth Army believed, have to concentrate forces to defeat the landing. If they were unable to do so 

because of Allied air action, other interruptions, or lack of available 

forces, they would have to isolate the landing force and try to prevent further build-up and advance. If the Germans could not prevent 

the movement of Allied forces to the Alban Hills, the safety of the 

11 15 Army Group Operation Instruction 34, The Battle for Rome, 12 Jan 44. 

"Fifth Army FO 5, 12 Jan 44. See also, Annex 1, G-2 Plan, Outline Plan Operation 

SHINGLE, and overprinted maps. 

13 Fifth Army SHINGLE Intelligence Summary 4, 30 Dec 43. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 331 

Tenth Army would be seriously threatened to the extent of making 

withdrawal necessary and bringing to an end the successful defense 

in south Italy. 

To defend against the landing, the enemy was judged to have immediately available near Rome a corps headquarters and two divisions, plus paratroop and armored elements. By the third day of the 

operation, the Germans could perhaps draw a division from the 

Adriatic front facing the British Eighth Army. Two additional divisions could probably be near Anzio no sooner than D plus 16.'4 

Despite the relatively few German units immediately available to 

defend at Anzio, the Fifth Army assumed that the VI Corps would 

meet strong initial resistance on the beaches; it expected the corps to 

receive heavy counterattacks as soon as the Germans became aware 

of the extent and the purport of the operation. Perhaps the lesson of 

having underestimated German strength at the time of the Salerno 

invasion had been too well learned. The Fifth Army-and with it the 

VI Corps-expected the same pattern of opposition to develop at 

Anzio as had come close to inflicting defeat on the Allies at Salerno. 

The emphasis consequently turned toward defense. The corps at 

Anzio was to maintain a strong reserve. Troops were to dig in on 

initial objectives at once to hold the beachhead against armored 

counterattack. 

With additional landing craft becoming available, the Fifth Army 

decided to augment the Anzio force. In addition to the original 

units-the 3d U.S. and 1 British Divisions, the 504th U.S. Parachute 

Infantry Regiment, the 509th U.S. Parachute Infantry Battalion, a 

British Special Service Brigade of two Commando battalions, and the 

U.S. Ranger Force of three battalions-the army made available to 

the corps the 1st U.S. Armored Division (less Combat Command B), 

a regimental combat team of the 45th U.S. Division, and three more 

battalions of light and medium artillery than had originally been assigned. Should even more strength be necessary at Anzio, the remainder 

of the 1st Armored and 45th Divisions could be moved to the beachhead. 

The result was a SHINGLE force that had grown from a tentative 

original figure of 24,000 men to an expected eventual strength of 

more than 110,000. From a subsidiary operation on the left flank of 

a nearby Fifth Army, the Anzio landing had developed into a major 

operation deep in the enemy rear. Assisting the landing was to be a 

major Fifth Army attack on the main front and a demonstration on 

the part of General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighth British 

II Ibid. 
332 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Army (deployed beside the Fifth), both designed to pin down the 

enemy troops in south Italy. 

The Fifth Army effort along the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers 

was in direct support of the Anzio landing. Its primary purpose was 

to prevent the Germans from immediately reinforcing the defenders 

at Anzio. If Clark could at the same time break through the Garigliano-Rapido line, he might precipitate a German withdrawal which 

the Anzio invasion might well turn into a rout. 

Toward these ends, Clark planned a three-corps assault across the 

Garigliano and Rapido. The attack was to begin on 12 January and 

to culminate on 20 January in a thrust by the II Corps across the 

Rapido in the shadow of the enemy-held height of Monte Cassino. 

The climax of these efforts was to come two days later far in the 

enemy rear as General Lucas' VI Corps landed at Anzio. 

The Fifth Army expected the VI Corps to be ready to do one of 

two things upon landing. If the enemy reacted in strength, the corps 

was to take the defensive and assemble reserves to meet German 

counterattacks. If, on the other hand, the corps could take the offensive, it was to advance "on" the Alban Hills by one of two routes: 

directly up the Albano road to cut Highway 7; or by way of Cisterna 

and Velletri to cut not only Highway 7 but also Highway 6 near 

Valmontone. Whether the VI Corps assumed a defensive or offensive 

attitude after landing would depend on how General Lucas saw the 

situation and on how he decided to act. 

What were General Lucas' qualifications for this difficult assignment? Well thought of by General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army 

Chief of Staff, Lucas had commanded the 3d Infantry Division in 

training in the United States. He had been with the Seventh Army 

during the Sicily operation as General Eisenhower's deputy and "Personal Representative with the Combat Troops." At the end of the 

Sicily campaign, he had replaced Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley as the 

II Corps commander. On 20 September, eleven days after the Salerno 

invasion, he had been appointed commander of the VI Corps.'5 Since 

then he had competently directed the corps in the Italian campaign. 

The mountain warfare in Italy had fatigued General Lucas, so 

that by the end of 1943 he sometimes appeared dispirited and perhaps even discouraged. In mid-January 1944, eight days before the 

Anzio landing, he became fifty-four years old. "I am afraid I feel 

every year of it," he wrote in his diary.'6 "I must keep from thinking 

of the fact," he wrote on the following day, "that my order will send 

these men into a desperate attack. ... " 17 Though some feeling of 

15 Lucas Diary (photostat copy in OCMH files), Part I, Sicily, and Part II, Italy. 

16 Lucas Diary, Part III, Anzio, entry 14 Jan 44. 

17 Ibid., 15 Jan 44. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 333 

this sort must almost always be present in the mind of a commander, 

the extent of General Lucas' feeling appears to have been more than 

normal. Indeed, before the Anzio operation he seemed more impressed by its difficulties than by its opportunities. 

General Lucas first learned of SHINGLE in late December 1943, 

when General Clark informed hi:m that the VI Corps would be relieved of responsibility for its front so that the corps staff and the 

units assigned could plan and train for the operation. Lucas' immediate reaction was to urge that his corps headquarters be relieved at 

once in order to ensure enough time for planning and training. 18 

The relief occurred on 3 January 1944, and General Lucas grappled with the problem of shipping. "Unless we can get what we want 

[in the way of vessels]," he confided to his diary, "the operation becomes such a desperate undertaking that it should not, in my opinion, be attempted." Otherwise, "a crack on the chin is certain." 

Lucas would do what he was ordered to do, "but these 'Battles of 

the Little Big Horn' aren't much fun and a failure now would ruin 

Clark, probably kill me, and certainly prolong the war." 19 

A "high-powered" conference, with General Alexander presiding, 

took place on 9 January, with staff members of the 15 Army Group, 

the Fifth Army, and the VI Corps in attendance. General Lucas' impressions revealed his own state of mind. 

Apparently Shingle has become the most important operation in the 

present scheme of things. Sir Harold started the conference by stating that 

the operation would take place on January 22 with the troops as scheduled and that there would be no more discussion of these points. He 

quoted Mr. Churchill as saying, "It will astonish the world," and added, 

"it will certainly frighten Kesselring [the German commander in Italy]." 

I felt like a lamb being led to the slaughter but thought I was entitled to 

one bleat so I registered a protest against the target date as it gave me 

too little time for rehearsal. This is vital to the success of anything as terribly complicated as this. I was ruled down, as I knew I would be, many 

reasons being advanced as to the necessity for this speed. The real reasons 

cannot be military. 

I have the bare minimum of ships and craft. The ones that are sunk 

cannot be replaced. The force that can be gotten ashore in a hurry is 

weak and I haven't sufficient artillery to hold me over but, on the other 

hand, I will have more air support than any similar operation ever had 

before. A week of fine weather at the proper time and I will make it. 

After the conference Alexander told him, "We have every confidence 

in you. That is why you were picked." Lucas was hardly reassured. 

IS Lucas Diary, Part II, entries 27 and 29 Dec 43. 

19 Lucas Diary, Part III, entry 4 Jan 44. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from 

General Lucas are taken from his diary. After the war General Lucas added to his diary 

to fill in certain details, but he carefully distinguished between these later entries and his 

original remarks. Where later entries rather than the contemporary record have been used 

in this study, that fact is specifically noted. 
334 COMMAND DECISIONS 

To him, "the whole affair has a strong odor of Gallipoli and apparently the same amateur was still on the coach's bench." 

What most troubled General Lucas during the preparatory period 

was the contrast between his own concern to ensure proper planning 

and training and what he considered nonchalance in the higher 

echelons of command toward these matters. His urgent demands for 

more training time were met with the statement that both divisions 

scheduled to make the initial assault were experienced in amphibious 

operations. Lucas was not so sure. The 1 British Division, he remarked in his diary, had landed on Pantelleria more than six months 

earlier against no opposition and had not been in action since. The 

3d U.S. Division, which had landed in Sicily in July 1943 against 

opposition, had hardly been out of action since then, with the result 

that the turnover of infantry lieutenants totaled 115 percent of authorized strength-"The men that knew the answers were gone." 

The potential of the troops in the two initial assault divisions impressed Lucas. Time was "so pitifully short," however, that all aspects 

of training required to realize this potential could hardly, he felt, be 

covered adequately. "The Higher Levels just can't see that." 

A final landing rehearsal conducted on 19 January, three days 

before the Anzio operation, bore out General Lucas' pessimism. 

Everything went wrong. The British were bad, but the 3d Division 

was worse, in fact "terrible," for it lost some forty DUKW's and ten 

105-mm. howitzers in the sea. 20 Yet Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, the Allied naval commander in the Mediterranean, assured 

Lucas that "the chances are seventy to thirty that, by the time you 

reach Anzio, the Germans will be north of Rome." Lucas commented 

in his diary, "Apparently everyone was in on the secret of the German intentions except me." 

Lucas often wondered whether higher commanders had intelligence information not available to him. There must have been indications, he told himself desperately, that the enemy intended to pull 

out and move north of Rome. If so, he felt, all the more reason for 

making a strong end run with well-equipped forces that could intercept and destroy the withdrawing enemy units. But he believed his 

forces lacked the strength to do so, and he found only exaggeration, 

no ground for confidence, in Alexander's statement that Anzio would 

make OVERLORD (the cross-Channel invasion) unnecessary. 

When Lucas learned that Clark was planning to establish an advance Fifth Army command post near him at Anzio, he was upset. 

"I wish to hell he wouldn't. I don't need any help." Yet he was far 

from confident. "Army has gone nuts again," he wrote. 

20 Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 268-69. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 335 

The general idea seems to be that the Germans are licked and are 

fleeing in disorder and nothing remains but to mop up. The only reason 

for such a belief is that we have recently been able to advance a few 

miles against them with comparative ease. The Hun has pulled back a bit 

but 1 haven't seen the desperate fighting 1 have during the last four 

months without learning something. We are not (repeat not) in Rome yet. 

They will end up by putting me ashore with inadequate forces and 

get me in a serious jam. Then, who will take the blame. 

On 20 January, in an uncertain frame of mind, General Lucas 

boarded the USS Biscayne for the voyage to Anzio. "I have many 

misgivings," he wrote, "but am also optimistic." The weather was 

good, and if it continued that way for four or five days, Lucas felt, 

"I should be all right." The enemy did not seem to have discovered 

the SHINGLE intention. "I think we have a good chance to make a 

killing. " Yet he was apprehensive because he believed that his assault 

troops still lacked training. "I wish the higher levels were not so 

over-optimistic. The Fifth Army is attacking violently towards the 

Cassino line and has sucked many German troops to the south and 

the high command seems to think they will stay there. 1 don't see 

why. They can still slow us up there and move against me at the 

same time." 

General Lucas' uncertainty on the eve of the Anzio landing could 

be attributed not only to his own physical and mental fatigue but 

also to the inclination of a sensitive man to worry now that things 

were unalterably fixed-the preparations, for better or worse, were 

finished, and no deficiencies, imagined or real, could be remedied. 

There was nothing further to do but execute the mission. Under 

other circumstances, General Lucas might, on these very grounds, 

have dismissed worrisome thoughts. But part of his uncertainty arose 

from two events that had occurred shortly before the embarkation of 

his corps. 

The first was the visit of the Fifth Army G-3, Brig. Gen. Donald 

W. Brann, to Lucas' headquarters on 12 January. Brann carried with 

him and delivered personally the newly issued Fifth Army order on 

SHINGLE in order to discuss with Lucas, his chief of staff, and his 

G-3 the vague wording of the projected advance "on" the Alban 

Hills. Brann made it clear that Lucas' primary mission was to seize 

and secure a beachhead. This was all Fifth Army expected. Brann 

explained that much thought had gone into the wording of the order 

so as not to force Lucas to push on to the Alban hill mass at the 

risk of sacrificing his corps. Should conditions warrant a move to the 

heights, however, Lucas was free to take advantage of them. Such a 

possibility appeared slim to the Fifth Army staff, which questioned 

Lucas' ability to reach the hill mass and at the same time hold the 
336 COMMAND DECISIONS 

beachhead to protect the port and the landing beaches. It was perfectly obvious what the loss of the supply base would mean. If the 

enemy came to Anzio in strength and destroyed this base, the isolated Allied force would be in an exceedingly tough spot. 21 

The second event bolstered this line of reasoning. According to an 

early conception of SHINGLE, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment 

was to have been dropped at H minus 1 hour on the Anzio-Albano 

road about ten miles north of Anzio. 22 Such an operation was in accord with an offensive orientation, a reflection of the intent to reach 

and take the Alban Hills. Unfortunately, the British objected to the 

presence of paratroopers behind enemy lines. The British feared they 

might mistake the Americans for Germans and perhaps take them 

under fire. At the same time, Navy representatives pointed out that 

the paratroopers would be within range of naval guns supporting the 

landing. The relatively flat terrain of the Anzio coastal plain would 

offer little cover against naval shellfire. The result was cancellation of 

the parachute drop; the paratroopers were to come into Anzio across 

the beaches immediately after the infantry assault divisions. 

The removal of a powerful incentive for pushing the corps out 

from the landing beaches in order to make contact with the paratroopers thus coincided with the doubts expressed on the army level 

that Lucas could do more than seize and secure a beachhead. Since 

Lucas himself had reservations on the strength and the training of 

the troops under him, a successful landing and a subsequent securing 

of the beachhead despite hardy opposition would to him represent 

a successful operation. 

What everyone had overlooked, even while bending every etlort 

toward that end, was the possibility of achieving complete surprise. 

No one had taken seriously the thought that the Allies might actually gain total surprise in the landing. Yet this is what happened. 

"We achieved what is certainly one of the most complete surprises in 

history," General Lucas wrote, " ... practically no opposition to the 

landing .... The Biscayne was anchored 31/2 miles off shore, and I 

could not believe my eyes when I stood on the bridge and saw no 

machine gun or other fire on the beach." The fact was that the VI 

Corps had embarked at Naples for a water movement of 120 miles 

with an assault force of almost 50,000 men and 5,200 vehicles-a 

total of 27 infantry battalions comprising about the same strength as 

the force landed at Salerno-and arrived at Anzio without having 

been detected by the Germans. 

" Lucas Diary, later addition to entry of 12 Jan 44. 

22 Sun Force (504th Para Inf Regt) Outline Plan for Operation SHINGLE, n.d., and 

504th Combat Team Arty Outline Plan, 8 Jan 44, both in SHINGLE Correspondence File, 

Kansas City Records Center. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 337 

American and British planes of the Mediterranean Air Forces flew 

more than 1,200 sorties on D Day in direct support of the Anzio 

landing; they were hardly necessary. The only resistance offered the 

landing came from a few small coast artillery and antiaircraft detachments. Two batteries fired wildly for a few minutes before daylight 

until they were quickly silenced by naval guns. A few other 88-mm. 

guns and miscellaneous artillery pieces of French, Italian, and Yugoslav manufacture near the beaches had no chance to fire. 

Small scattered mine fields, mostly in the port of Anzio, proved 

the greatest hazard to the troops coming ashore. The only opposition 

to the push immediately inland came from elements of two depleted 

coast watching battalions which, along with two other battalions, had 

been recently relieved from the Garigliano front for rest and rehabilitation. 

How had it happened? The Germans had always regarded the 

long sea flanks in Italy as being very much exposed to Allied amphibious attacks, and in December 1943 the German High Command, OKW, issued a directive on how to cope with possible landings on the Italian coast. In the event of an Allied invasion near 

Rome, OKW planned to reinforce Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, 

the commander in Italy, with two infantry divisions sent from France, 

two infantry divisions moved from the Balkans, and about the 

equivalent of a division dispatched from Germany.23 

Kesselring and his Army Group C headquarters also made prior arrangements as to how to meet Allied landings, among them a possible descent on the coast near Rome. To deal immediately with 

such a landing, Kesselring counted on having in army group reserve 

a parachute division in the process of organization and one or two 

mobile divisions, plus a corps headquarters. To reinforce these elements, he expected to call upon the Tenth Army for a division to be 

pulled out of the active front in south Italy; he hoped to have the 

Fourteenth Army in north Italy move elements in process of activation, 

reconstitution, training, or rehabilitation-the equivalent of about one 

or two divisions. 

Why then had the VI Corps found no German units of any importance in immediate opposition at Anzio? Despite Kesselring's intention to retain reserve units around Rome, he had sent them-only 

a few days before the Anzio landing-to reinforce the Tenth Army 

front. Fearing that the Fifth Army was about to make a breakthrough along the lower Garigliano River, feeling that the fate of the 

Tenth Army right flank "hung by a slender thread," Kesselring between 18 and 20 January yielded to urgent requests for additional 

2:1 Ralph S. Mavrogordato. The Battle for the Anzio Beachhead, OCMH MS #R-124. 
338 COMMAND DECISIONS 

troops and dispatched from the Rome area the I Parachute Corps headquarters and the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions. These troops 

assumed responsibility for a portion of the XIV Panzer Corps front.24 

They had barely been committed along the Garigliano when the VI 

Corps came ashore at Anzio. As a result, there were no forces near 

Rome to counter the Anzio landings, there was no staff available to 

organize even an emergency defense. According to the first German 

estimate, the landing had a good chance of bringing the main front 

"to a state of collapse" because of the absence of immediate German 

reserves. 25 The troops in the coastal areas around Rome were so few 

that they could be counted on merely for coastal observation. 

With German defense virtually nil, Allied troops quickly moved 

ashore. The 3d Division reached its initial objectives and made ready 

to repel a counterattack that did not come. All organic division light 

artillery and the combat elements of the attached tank and antiaircraft battalions were brought to land by DUKW's and LCT's before 

daylight. Patrols seized and destroyed four bridges across the Mussolini Canal along the division right flank. By midmorning the 3d 

DIvision commander radioed Lucas he was established and ready for 

further orders. 

At the same time the Ranger Force seized the port of Anzio. The 

509th Parachute Infantry Battalion occupied Nettuno. British troops, 

delayed somewhat by mines and shallow water, were two miles inland shortly after midday. Commandos established a roadblock across 

the Albano road just north of Anzio. 

Meanwhile, Field Marshal Kesselring, as soon as he learned of 

the invasion at Anzio, assumed that the disembarking troops would 

probably try to seize the Alban Hills. At 0500, 22 January, three 

hours after the initial landing, he ordered the 4th Parachute Division, in 

the process of activation near Rome, and certain nearby replacement 

units of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division to block the roads leading 

to the Alban Hills and to Rome. An hour later, he reported the 

landing to OKW and requested troops. OKW responded that day by 

ordering the 715th Motorized lrifantry Division to move from southern 

France to Italy, the 114th Light (Jaeger) Division from the Balkans, 

miscellaneous units in about division strength from Germany, and, 

furthermore, the 92d lrifantry Division to be activated in Italy. 

Since units outside the theater could not arrive near Anzio before 

a few days at the earliest, Kesselring at 0710, 22 January, ordered 

the Fourteenth Army to make forces available. The army ordered the 

24 Albert Kesselring, A Soldier's Record (New York: William Morrow and Company, 

1954), pp. 230-31. 

"The German Operation at Anzio (German Military Documents Section, Military 

Intelligence Division, Camp Ritchie, Md., 1946), p. 9. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 339 

65th Division (less one regiment) at Genoa, the 362d Infantry Division 

(less one regiment) at Rimini, and the newly formed 16th SS Panzer 

Grenadier Division (with two regiments) to proceed immediately to the 

beachhead. Movement started that evening and continued through 

the following day. 

At 0830, 22 January, Kesselring ordered the Tenth Army to transfer 

to Anzio a corps headquarters and all the combat troops that could 

be spared. The army pulled the I Parachute Corps out of the line and 

sent combat troops then in reserve-the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division 

(less one regiment), the 7Ist Infantry Division, and parts of the Hermann 

Goering Panzer Division, all of which began to move toward Anzio that 

day. From the Adriatic portion of the Tenth Army front were soon to 

come the 26th Panzer Division and elements of the 1st Parachute Division. 

At 1700, 22 January, the I Parachute Corps headquarters took command in the Anzio sector and with arriving troops-miscellaneous 

battalions-as they became available established a defensive line 

around the beachhead. 

Having acted with coolness and dispatch, the Germans were considerably reassured by Allied behavior at the scene of the landing. 

The Allies on the beachhead on the first day of the landing did not 

conform to the German High Command's expectations. Instead of moving 

northward with the first wave to seize the Alban Mountains ... as the 

target, the landing forces limited their objective. Their initial action was 

to occupy a small beachhead. . . . As the Allied forces made no preparations for a large-scale attack on the first day of the landings, the German 

Command estimated that the Allies would improve their positions, and 

bring up more troops .... During this time, sufficient German troops 

would arrive to prevent an Allied breakthrough. 26 

By the evening of 22 January Kesselring decided that the lack of 

VI Corps aggressiveness would permit him to fashion a successful defense. Despite recommendations by the Tenth Army and XIV Panzer 

Corps commanders, who advocated immediate withdrawal and shortening of the Garigliano-Rapido front in order to get two seasoned 

divisions to Anzio, Kesselring instructed them to stand fast. 27 This 

was a courageous decision and in the nature of a gamble, for the first 

strong contingents at Anzio would come from the Tenth Army, and the 

earliest they could be expected was 24 January. If the Allies launched an 

attack on 23 or 24 January, German forces, Kesselring estimated, 

would not be strong enough to hold. 28 

There was no major action at the beachhead on 23 January, and 

26 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 

27 Ralph S. Mavrogordato, XIV Panzer Corps Defensive Operations Along the Garigliano, Gari, and Rapido Rivers, OCMH MS #R-7B. 

"OCMH MS #R-124. See also Magna M. BaLIn. Shifting of German Units. 

OCMH MS #R-75. 
340 COMMAND DECISIONS 

that evening Kesselring told the Tenth Army commander that he "believed that the danger of a large-scale expansion of the beachhead 

was no longer imminent." 29 

Operations on 24 January were also uneventful. As the Germans 

hoped, "the Allied landing forces limited themselves to reconnaissance 

and patrol ... as well as adjusting their artillery fire on German 

positions. By this time, the German defenses had been strongly reinforced, and the German Command considered the danger of an Allied 

breakthrough to be removed." 30 By restricting its forces to consolidation of the beachhead, the VI Corps restricted its efforts to local attacks, and with these, the Germans felt, they could cope. 

On the Allied side, Generals Alexander and Clark had visited 

Anzio on D Day and both seemed satisfied. Alexander was very optimistic, Clark somewhat subdued. General Lucas thought Clark depressed by the offensive on his main Garigliano-Rapido front. The 

troops there had failed to breach the German line at Cassino, the 

entrance to the Liri Valley. Though the British 10 Corps had secured 

a bridgehead across the lower Garigliano, though the French Expeditionary Corps had made unexpectedly good progress fighting in the 

mountains near Cassino, the U.S. II Corps had been unable to get 

across and remain across the Rapido River in strength, the 36th Division in the attempt sustaining very heavy casualties in assault crossings 

on 20 and 21 January. "The last thing Clark said to me on D-Day 

before he embarked for [the return trip to] Naples," General Lucas 

later remembered, "was 'Don't stick your neck out, Johnny. I did at 

Salerno and got into trouble.'" 31 

General Lucas was not about to stick his neck out. Having gained 

surprise in the landing, he proceeded to disregard the advantage it 

gave him. Two days after coming ashore, on 24 January, he was 

thinking of pushing out from the beachhead. "I must keep in motion 

if my first success is to be of any value." But his push outward was 

in no sense an all-out drive toward the Alban Hills; it was no more 

than preliminary or preparatory movement. 

The fact was that General Lucas showed more interest in building 

up his beachhead. Capturing the Anzio harbor intact and putting it 

into operation immediately to handle incoming troops and supplies 

was to him the most important achievement of the landing. He saw 

the port as his "salvation," the most significant part of the supply 

line stretching between Naples and Anzio, an umbilical cord tying 

the Anzio force to the Fifth Army. To keep the line intact, General 

Lucas personally supervised setting up an antiaircraft warning system, 

'" The German Operation at Anzio, p. 14. 

30 Ibid. 

31 Lucas Diary, later addition to entry of 24 Jan 44. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 341 

building an airfield, clearing the clutter of supplies and equipment 

that jammed the beachhead back of the first row of dunes. 

His concern with the logistical aspects of the landing came not 

only from prudence but also from apprehension that had been haunting him from the outset. He believed that the Germans using land 

communications could increase their build-up faster than he could 

with his reliance on water transport. And he feared that the Germans 

would stop his VI Corps before the corps could cut their lines of 

communication. His intelligence officers informed him that the Germans were taking troops from the Fifth Army main front to oppose 

him. This might permit the Fifth Army to advance to the north of 

Rome, but the Fifth Army, Lucas was certain, would still have to 

fight powerful rear guards. He expected no spectacular rapidity of 

movement on the part of the Fifth Army, and thus, harking back to 

an earlier conception in which the VI Corps landing was to assist 

the advance of the Fifth Army main front, he saw his force at Anzio 

consigned to at least temporary isolation. Consequently, he sought to 

build up his strength and his supplies' to enable his force to remain 

intact even though isolated. "The strain of a thing like this is a terrible burden," he confessed. "Who the hell wants to be a general." 

"My days are filled with excitement and anxiety," General Lucas 

wrote on 25 January, the fourth day of the landing operation, "although I feel now that the beachhead is safe and I can plan for 

the future with some assurance." A regimental combat team of the 

45th Division was coming ashore that day, and Lucas expected the 

1st Armored Division to arrive soon, to be followed by the remainder 

of the 45th. "That is about all I can supply but I think it will be 

enough." Meanwhile, the 1 British and 3d U.S. Divisions were 

advancing "to extend the beachhead a little." 

General Clark visited Lucas that day and revealed that he was 

disturbed over developments on the main army front, "where the 

bloodiest fight of the war is in progress .... That situation," Lucas 

felt, "will not be resolved I am afraid until I can get my feet under 

me and make some further progress. I am doing my best but it seems terribly slow. . . . I must keep my feet on the ground and my forces in 

hand and do nothing foolish. This is the most important thing I have 

ever tried to do and I will not be stampeded." 

General Alexander also paid Lucas a visit and complimented 

him. "What a splendid piece of work," he said. Lucas reminded him 

that the task was not yet finished, even though the beachhead was 

now nearly ten miles deep, not bad, Lucas though, for D plus 3. "I 

must hold it," he wrote, "and think I can." 

While General Lucas was building up his beachhead, Field Marshal 

Kesselring came to the conclusion that the Allies were preparing a 
342 COMMAND DECISIONS 

full-scale attack. The best defense, he felt, was an attack of his own. 

To prepare such an effort, he ordered the Fourteenth Army headquarters to move from north Italy and take command at the beachhead. 

At 1800, 25 January, the Fourteenth Army did so and began to plan 

an attack designed to throw the VI Corps back into the sea. 

Rain, hail, and sleet came on 26January to disrupt General Lucas' 

logistical efforts. "This waiting is terrible," Lucas wrote. "I want an 

all-out Corps effort but the time hasn't come yet and the weather 

will not help matters. Bad for tanks .... I hope to get moving soon. 

Must move before the enemy build-up gets too great." He thought 

he could attack in a few days, but he felt he needed to have the 

entire 45th Division on hand or on the way before he did. 

Two heavy air raids occurred that night, doing considerable damage-trucks destroyed, ammunition exploding, people killed, fires 

everywhere, craters in the roads-but the port was still operating, 

the ships were unloading, "thank God." 

Division commanders met with Lucas on 27 January to talk over 

future plans, and Lucas felt better about prospects. He expected 30 

LST's to be unloaded at Anzio that day as compared with 7 the day 

before, and he looked forward to getting more than 30 unloaded on 

the following day. 

Unknown to Lucas, General Alexander that day, 27 January, was 

expressing dissatisfaction to General Clark. Alexander thought the VI 

Corps was not pushing rapidly enough. This statement prodded Clark, 

who had vaguely felt also that progress was lagging. So he went to 

Anzio the next day and there received the impression that the outcome of the struggle depended on who could increase his forces more 

quickly. Though the situation was still not clear to Clark, he urged 

Lucas to take bold offensive action. As he remembered later, what 

he wanted Lucas to do was to secure Cisterna as a strongpoint in a 

defensive line. 32 

But either Clark did not remember correctly or Lucas misinterpreted his remarks. For as the result of Clark's comments, Lucas that 

evening felt obliged to explain his whole course of action. 

Apparently some of the higher levels think I have not advanced with 

maximum speed. I think more has been accomplished than anyone had 

a right to expect. This venture was always a desperate one and I could 

never see much chance for it to succeed, if success means driving the German north of Rome. The one factor that has allowed us to get established 

ashore has been the port of Anzio. Without it our situation by this time 

would have been desperate with little chance of a build-up to adequate 

strength. As it is, we are doing well and, in addition to troops, unloaded 

over 4,000 tons of supplies yesterday. 

32 Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 296. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 343 

Had I been able to rush to the high ground around Albano and Velletri immediately upon landing, nothing would have been accomplished 

except to weaken my force by that amount because the troops sent, being 

completely beyond supporting distance, would have been immediately destroyed. The only thing to do was what I did. Get a proper beachhead 

and prepare to hold it. Keep the enemy off balance by a constant advance 

against him by small units, not committing anything as large as a division 

until the Corps was ashore and everything was set. Then make a coordinated attack to defeat the enemy and seize the objective. Follow this by 

exploitation. 

This is what I have been doing but I had to have troops in to do it 

with. 

By this time, on the seventh day of the operation, with more troops 

arriving on schedule-and to the point where Lucas could envisage 

holding some in corps reserve-he was ready to make his offensive 

bid. The effort was to start the night of 29 January with the 3d Division and Ranger Force attacking toward Cisterna, northeast from 

Anzio, to cut Highway 7 and be ready to advance toward Cori-in 

the direction of Valmontone and eventual control of Highway 6. The 

British were to attack to the north to seize the area near the juncture of the Anzio-Albano road and the Cisterna-Rome railway, which 

would represent not only a breakthrough of the German defenses 

around the beachhead but a foothold on the foothills of the Alban 

mass. Units of the 1st Armored Division were then to exploit to the 

northern slope of the hill complex. Since the attacks were divergent, 

Lucas kept tight control, for he feared that if his forces became overextended, the Germans would try to come between them and cut the 

beachhead in two. 

Soon after the VI Corps jumped off, it was "engaged in a hell of 

a struggle. . . . There is never a big breakthrough except in story 

books .... The situation, from where I sit, is crowded with doubt 

and uncertainty. I expect to be counterattacked in some force, maybe 

considerable force, tomorrow morning." 

General Clark came to Anzio on 29 January with the intention 

perhaps of remaining for several days. General Lucas was not entirely 

happy with the prospect. 

His gloomy attitude is certainly bad for me. He thinks I should have 

been more aggressive on D-Day and should have gotten tanks and things 

out to the front. I think he realizes the serious nature of the whole operation. His forces are divided in the face of a superior enemy on interior lines 

and now neither of the parts is capable of inflicting a real defeat on those 

facing it. There has been no chance, with available shipping, to build 

"Shingle" up to a decisive strength and anyone with any knowledge of 

logistics could have seen that from the start. I have done what I was 

ordered to do, desperate though it was. I can win if I am let alone but I 

don't know whether I can stand the strain of having so many people looking over my shoulder. We must continue to push the Germans. 
344 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Clark was still at Anzio on the last day of the month. "I don't 

blame him for being terribly disappointed," Lucas wrote. "He and 

those above him thought this landing would shake the Cassino line 

loose at once but they had no right to think that, because the German is strong in Italy and will give up no ground if he can help it." 

It was clear by then that Lucas' attack had failed to accomplish 

much. (See Map IV, inside back cover.) Furthermore, a disastrous engagement comparable to the 36th Division experience at the Rapido had 

occurred: the Ranger Force had lost two battalions-about 800 mennear Cisterna, having met unantir:ipated opposition at an unexpectedly strong and well-organized defensive position. It seemed clear also 

that the Germans had built up their forces around Anzio to the point 

where prospects of cutting the enemy lines of communication immediately south of Rome were fading rapidly. 

What the Allies did not know was how close they came to breaking out of the beachhead. The Germans repulsed the large-scale 

attack of the VI Corps, but only with the greatest exertion. Not only 

did they have to postpone their own offensive preparations but they 

had to go over entirely to defense. They maintained their defensive 

line by a desperate juggling of forces and the commitment of all reserves, even those being held for the all-out counterattack (principally 

the 26th Panzer Division). The 715th Division arrived from France in time 

to enter the battle piecemeal near Cisterna. 

What to Allied intelligence officers seemed like overwhelming German strength was in reality what Kesselring characterized as "a 

higgledy-piggledy jumble-units of numerous divisions fighting confusedly side by side." :\l Identifying many different divisional units, 

Allied intelligence officers had to assume, by the very nature of their 

profession, that each of those divisions was present in entirety. Total 

numbers then, like total units, they guessed, outnumbered the VI 

Corps. Yet actually, opposing the approximately 100,000 men of the 

VI Corps, of which about 25,000 were service troops, were less than 

90,000 of the Fourteenth Army, of which probably 30,000 were noncombatant. 

Though numbers were almost equal, the VI Corps enjoyed a distinct advantage. Whereas by comparison the VI Corps amphibious 

operation had been thoroughly planned and prepared, the German 

countermeasures were taken on the spur of the moment in time of 

stress and emergency. The Geman defenders at Anzio had been hastily 

assembled, the defenses hastily established. For the most part, fragments, remnants, and splinters of divisions, depleted units, recently 

organized units, provisional commands, barely trained troops manned 

:ll Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, p. 233. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 345 

the line. Because the great majority of the German troops at Anzio 

were unseasoned, the fact that they held was rather miraculous from 

the German point of view. 34 

General Alexander arrived at Anzio on 1 February, and General 

Lucas found him 

... kind enough but I am afraid he is not pleased. My head will probably fall in the basket but I have done my best. There were just too many 

Germans here for me to lick and they could build up faster than I could. 

As I told Clark yesterday, I was sent on a desperate mission, one where 

the odds were greatly against success, and I went without saying anything 

because I was given an order and my opinion was not asked. The condition in which I find myself is much better than I ever anticipated or had 

any right to expect. 

When Clark and Alexander both departed Anzio, Lucas felt somewhat reassured. He had suspected they had come to see whether he 

should be relieved of command. He was pleased they had been at 

Anzio, for at least, he felt, his superiors had seen the desperate nature 

of the fighting and could appreciate the rapidity of the German buildup opposite the VI Corps. Also, he was proud to show that the port 

and the beaches were working at capacity. Supplies amassed at the 

beachhead were fully ten days ahead of schedule. 

The supply situation was so favorable that Lucas thought he could 

support two more divisions in the beachhead. When he broached the 

matter to Alexander, he received only an enigmatic smile in reply.35 

He did not know that Alexander and Clark had already decided 

on 1 February that the enemy build-up on the Anzio front dictated 

a switch to defensive tactics. Security of the beachhead became the 

overriding priority. In an order dated 2 February, Alexander instructed 

Lucas to hold his front with a minimum number of troops and prepare reserve positions to stop large-scale penetrations by the enemy. 

He was to protect the main approaches to the beachhead by establishing strongpoints reinforced by mines and wire in depth. The VI 

Corps was to turn its attention to active patrolling, to forming small 

but highly mobile reserve forces, to rehearsing defensive arrangements.36 

Lucas received the same order from Fifth Army early on 3 February. He was to cease offensive action and consolidate his positions. "I 

hate to stop attacking," Lucas wrote. "We must keep him [the enemy] 

off balance all we can." 37 

By that time, keeping the enemy off balance was a forlorn hope. 

:H Ibid.; OCMH MS #R-124. 

35 Lucas Diary, later addition to entry of 2 Feb 44 . 

. % ACMF [15 Army Group] Operations Instruction 37, 2 Feb 44. The 15 Army Group 

headquarters had been renamed Allied Central Mediterranean Forces. 

37 Lucas Diary, entry of 3 Feb 44. For the text of the Fifth Army message, see later 

addition to entry of 3 February. 
346 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The initiative had passed to the Germans, and the VI Corps was about 

to start fighting for its life, seeking to preserve the precious ground 

it held. "Things get worse and worse," Lucas wrote on 10 February. 

Five days later, "I am afraid the top side is not completely satisfied 

with f\lY work .... They are naturally disappointed that I failed to 

chase the Hun out of Italy but there was no military reason why I 

should have been able to do so. In fact, there is no military reason 

for 'Shingle.' " 

Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, deputy theater commander to General 

Wilson, visited Lucas on 16 February. He seemed to think that as 

soon as Lucas was ashore he should have gone on as fast as possible 

to disrupt enemy communications. He intimated that higher levels 

thought so and still did. "Had I done so," Lucas wrote, "1 would 

have lost my Corps and nothing would have been accomplished 

except to raise the prestige and morale of the enemy. Besides," he 

added, "my orders didn't read that way." 

The Germans launched their all-out effort on 16 February to drive 

the VI Corps back into the sea, and on the following day the commander of the 3d Division was appointed Lucas' deputy. "I think this 

means my relief and that he gets the Corps," Lucas wrote. Still, "I 

hope that 1 am not to be relieved from command. I knew when I 

came in here that 1 was jeopardizing my career because 1 knew the Germans would not fold up because of two divisions landing on their 

flank. . . . 1 do not feel that 1 should have sacrificed my command 

[by driving on to the Al ban Hills]." 

General Lucas was relieved from command of the VI Corps on 

22 February, one month after the landing-not because he had failed 

to take the Alban Hills, but because Alexander thought him exhausted 

and defeated, Devers thought him tired, and Clark believed he was 

worn out. Explaining that he, Clark, "could no longer resist the pressure ... from both Alexander and Devers," Clark relieved Lucas 

without prejudice. He had not lost confidence in Lucas, for he felt 

that Lucas had done all he could have at Anzio. Lucas, though 

shocked by the actual occurrence, was not entirely surprised by his 

relief. What bothered him most: "I thought I was winning something 

of a victory." :JR 

General Clark, as a matter of fact, thought so too. He felt that 

Lucas could have taken the Alban Hills but could not have held them. 

Had Lucas moved immediately to the hill mass objective, he would 

have so extended his force that the Germans would have cut it to 

pieces. This was why he had seen to it that his order to Lucas had 

:;, Lucas Diary, later addition to entry of 22 Feb 44; see also, Interv, Mathews with 

Clark, 20 May 48, OCMH files. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 347 

been carefully phrased--so that the VI Corps would not be assigned 

a "foolhardy mission." Clark had not thought it wise to tell Lucas 

before the operation, "You are to take the Alban Hills." For Lucas 

would then have been obliged to push to the objective before he 

secured his initial beachhead line. 

Clark completely approved Lucas' course of action during the first 

few days of the operation; he was not disappointed. Alexander, Clark 

felt, was disappointed, but Clark thought that the reason for his disappointment was "British G-2 intelligence sources which were always 

overoptimistic about the German resistance in Italy." The Germans 

built up their defenses at Anzio much faster than the British had 

believed possible, though Clark himself had always felt that Anzio had 

had little chance of success because it was not mounted in sufficient 

strength.:;" 

Quite some time after the event, General Clark, thinking about 

the blood spilled along the Garigliano and at Anzio, came to the conclusion that it might better have been spilled entirely at the main front 

rather than on a "dangerous and unorganized beachhead" where a 

powerful counterattack could well have wrecked the entire Italian 

campaign. It was true that by the end of January Clark was disappointed by Lucas' lack of aggressiveness. Where Lucas was at fault, 

Clark believed, was in having failed to make a reconnaissance in force 

at once to capture Cisterna and Campoleone, an effort, Clark thought, 

not incommensurate with the strength of his forces. 10 

Others felt much the same way about the strength available to 

Lucas. General Marshall was of the opinion that Lucas could have 

managed to get to the Alban Hills, but he thought Lucas acted wisely~ 

"for every mile of advance there were seven or more miles [to bel added 

to the perimeter." Lucas, Marshall believed, did not have enough men 

to get to the hills, to hold them, and also to hold the beachhead and 

the Anzio port. I 1 

Such was the opinion of the theater G-2 who had opposed the 

operation at the Christmas day conference at Tunis. The Anzio force 

could have advanced to the Alban Hills the first day or two, he was 

sure, but the force would then have been in a bad way without a 

concurrent Allied breakthrough on the main front. The Allies were 

unable to keep the Germans from shifting forces to Anzio from south 

as well as from north Italy, from southern France and the Balkans. 42 

Brig. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General Alexander's American 

deputy, also felt the Allies did not have the strength to hold the Alban 

:lO Clark Interv. 

40 Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 296. 

11 Interv, Mathews and others with Marshall, 25 Jul 49, OCMH files. 

4" Interv, Mathews with Strong. 
348 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Hills. General Alexander had hoped, as Lemnitzer understood the idea, 

that the threat posed by the operation, coupled with the attack on 

the main (Garigliano-Rapido) front, might force the Germans to 

withdraw. The Fifth Army order for Lucas to advance "on" the hills 

was exactly what Alexander thought possible. And when Alexander 

visited the beachhead on D Day, he was in full agreement with Lucas' 

decision not to push out far from Anzio. He thoroughly approved 

Lucas' caution. 

What inclined Alexander toward relieving Lucas, Lemnitzer 

thought, was his feeling that Lucas was unequal to the physical strain 

of the critical Anzio situation, not any feeling that Lucas had done 

anything wrong. Alexander, according to Lemnitzer, sensed that Lucas, 

"harried looking and under tremendous strain, would not be able to 

stand up physically to the hard, long struggle which by that time it 

was clear the Anzio operation would involve." 43 

It would seem then that Lucas' course of action during the first 

few days of the Anzio landing was justified. The Germans facing the 

main Fifth Army front along the Garigliano and Rapido showed no 

signs of withdrawing, and consequently the Allies saw no immediate 

prospect of forcing a general retreat and quickly linking the main 

front with the beachhead. It became far more likely that the Germans 

would move in strength against the VI Corps at Anzio. If the VI Corps 

went too far inland, it might be so extended as to risk annihilation. 

So Lucas had consolidated his positions, awaited reinforcements, and 

probed along the two main axes of advance toward the intermediate 

objectives of Cisterna and Campoleone to secure pivots for the advance 

on the Alban Hills. When he was ready to make his major effort, the 

Germans by then-after a week-had assembled sufficient forces to 

repel his attack. 

Sufficient forces, but not overwhelming strength as pictured by 

Allied intelligence during the battle and by Allied participants later. 

That the Germans were skillful at Anzio, no less in their build-up 

than in their actual defense, would be an understatement. Yet it 

would seem that Allied hesitation on the Anzio shore came from an 

appreciation of German invincibility that was little more than an 

apparition bred of doubt and uncertainty both before and during the 

operation, a myth to explain afterward a course of events that seemed 

inevitable because it happened that way. The opportunity for doing 

something else had come and gone, and after the first few days it 

was too late to do otherwise. And this was how General Lucas saw it. 

The only thing that ever really disturbed me at Anzio, except, of course, 

my inability to make speedier headway against the weight opposing me, 

was the necessity to safeguard the port. At any cost this must be preserved 

40 Interv, Mathews with Lemnitzer, 16 Jan 48, OCMH files. 
GENERAL LUCAS AT ANZIO 349 

as, without it, the swift destruction of the Corps was inevitable .... My 

orders were, to me, very clear and did not include any rash, piece-meal 

effort. These orders were never changed although the Army and the Army 

Group Commanders were constantly on the ground and could have changed 

them had they seen fit to do SO.44 

Despite his feeling that he could not have done otherwise, the 

alternative course of action open to General Lucas immediately after 

the landing remained a disturbing possibility to him. He could see 

many things that could have been done differently. A mass of armor 

and motorized infantry, he admitted, might perhaps have been able 

to make a sudden raid inland on D Day and reach the Alban Hills. 

But in his final analysis, Lucas was sure he could not have maintained 

the force there. The Germans had moved so swiftly that any force 

that far from home would have been in the greatest jeopardy. Lucas 

did not see how such a force could have escaped annihilation. "As it 

turned out," Lucas wrote, "the proper decision was made and we were 

able to reach and establish ourselves in positions from which the enemy 

was unable to drive us in spite of his great advantage in strength." 4' 

The whole idea of the Anzio operation, General Lucas continued 

to believe, was a mistake. If anyone expected him to push to the Alban 

Hills, he was bound to be disappointed. Lucas had never expected to 

push to the hill mass with the troops he had. He had seen his main 

mission as taking the port and securing the area around it. Perhaps 

part of his preoccupation with the port came from the Navy. "Make 

it clear to the Commanding General," Admiral Cunningham had 

advised the Anzio task force commander, "that no reliance can be 

placed on maintenance over beaches, owing to the probability of unfavorable weather. ... " 1H As for the idea of taking Rome, General 

Clark had told him, "You can forget this goddam Rome business." 47 

If security rather than an offensive intention had become the most 

important aspect of the operation, the Alban Hills still figured prominently. The capture of the Anzio port was an obvious objective. But 

because of the commanding position of the Alban Hills, early occupation of this terrain feature was vital to secure a limited force landed 

in a beachhead. 48 The VI Corps forces that remained isolated in the 

Anzio beachhead for four long months of agony were to appreciate 

the importance of the dominating terrain. German observers enjoyed 

44 Lucas Diary, later addition to entry of 27 Jan 44. 

45 Lucas Diary, later addition to entry of 29 Jan 44. 

4" Cunningham to Rear Adm. F. J. Lowry, Directive to the Naval Commander, Operation SHINGLE, 29 Dec 43, in SHINGLE Correspondence File, Kansas City Records 

Center. 

47 Interv, Mathews with Lucas, 24 May 48, OCMH files. 

48 Fifth Army Tactical Study of the Terrain Anzio-Nettuno-Colli Laziali-Rome, 17 

Nov 43; Fifth Army G-2 Estimate, App. 1 to Annex 1 to Outline Plan SHINGLE, 

22 Nov 43. 
350 COMMAND DECISIONS 

an excellent view over the entire beachead, a view obscured occasionally by atmospheric haze, more frequently by a heroic Allied 

expenditure of smoke, and German artillerymen found all parts of 

the beachhead within range of their guns. 49 

Was then General Lucas completely justified in building up the 

beachhead for seven days before starting his offensive? Or could he 

have got away with the gamble of an immediate drive to the Alban 

Hills? Certainly the complete surprise achieved at Anzio could have 

been exploited. And according to Tenth Army estimates, only a quick 

cutting of the lines of communication would have led to major Allied 

success, a success more than likely encompassing the capture of 

Rome. GO According to Kesselring's chief of staff, "The road to Rome 

was open, and an audacious flying column could have penetrated to 

the city .... The enemy remained astonishingly passive." 51 

What if General Lucas had taken advantage of the surprise gained? 

Suppose he had not waited but had instead made an immediate aggressive move to the heights dominating the southern approaches to Rome? 

Could the Germans have massed enough forces to withstand a dynamic 

front as they did against the static front at Anzio? In view of the 

greater mechanization and mobility of Allied forces, would the Germans have dared to hold on to both the Anzio and Garigliano fronts 

if threatened by the much greater menace that an Allied force 

ensconced on the Alban Hills would have posed? 

The answers may be found within the realm of speculation only. 

But the wisp of a nagging doubt remains. According to General Alexander, an aggressive commander at Anzio would have given the Fifth 

Army order to advance "on" the Alban Hills an interpretation different from that of General Lucas. Seizing upon the surprise attained, 

he would have-and could have-pushed patrols and light forces in 

perhaps regimental strength to the Alban Hills. The shock of finding 

Allied troops directly threatening Rome and the vital lines of communication might have so demoralized the Germans as to make possible 

Allied retention both of the hill mass and of a corridor between Anzio and the hills. A bluff, if prosecuted with imagination and daring, 

if carried through with vigor, if executed with the intention of raising 

havoc in the German rear, might have worked. Suppose, for example, 

General Patton had commanded the corps that came ashore at An- • 52 Z1O .... 

49 See Britt Bailey, The German Situation in Italy, OCMH MS # R-50. 

50 CSDIC/CMF /M296, n.d. [c. Aug. 45], Intelligence Activities, in File 383.4, Kansas 

City Records Center. 

51 Siegfried Westphal, The German Army in the West (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1951), 

p. 158. 

,,2 Intervs, Mathews with Alexander, 10-15 Jan 49, OCMH files; see also Alexander 

Despatch, pp. 2909-10. 
14 

General Clark's Decision To Drive 

on Rome 

by 

Sidney T. Mathews 

By the last week of May 1944, the Allied front in Italy had 

exploded. To the men on the Allied side who were doing the fighting, 

it seemed high time, for the forces in Italy had seen few real successes 

since the fall of 1943 when they had come ashore in Salerno Bay and 

pushed northward beyond Naples to the so-called "winter line." 

Every attempt to engineer a far-reaching success had met with bitter 

frustration. 

But now the U.S. Fifth Army along the west coast had penetrated 

the enemy's most imposing line of prepared defenses short of Rome. 

The adjacent British Eighth Army also had made notable gains up 

the valley of the Liri River, the route affording the most favorable 

terrain for an advance on Rome. At the same time the U.S. VI Corps, 

which for nearly four months had been contained by a strong enemy 

cordon in a shallow beachhead at Anzio, thirty miles south of Rome, 

had broken its confinement. The VI Corps and the rest of the Fifth 

Army at last had established contact. 1 (See Map V, inside back cover.) 

1 Details of this and earlier fighting in Italy may be found in Sidney T. Mathews 

The Drive on Rome, and Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, volume, being pre· 

pared for publication in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. For th, 

story of Anzio, see [Capt. John Bowditch and 1st Lt. Robert W. Komer] Anzio Beachhead 

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION (Washington, 1947). Other published works bearing 

on the subject include Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper & Brothers 

1950); Lt. General L. K. Truscott, Command Missions (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 

Inc., 1954); and Lieutenant Colonel Chester G. Starr, ed., From Salerno to the Alps: A History of the Fifth Army, 1943-1945 (Washington, 1948). 

SlDNEY T. MATHEWS, Staff Member, Johns Hopkins Operations Research 

Office. Ph.D. in history, The Johns Hopkins University. Taught: University of Richmond. Lecturer: Army War College, Senior Marine Corps 

School. Combat Historian, Fifth U.S. Army in Italy, World War II. Captain, USAR. Historian, OCMH, 1947-52. Author "Santa Maria Infante," 

Small Unit Actions (Washington, 1946), AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION; "Altuzzo," Three Battles (Washington, 1952) and The Drive on Rome 

(in preparation), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
352 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The commander of Allied forces in Italy, General Sir Harold 

R. L. G. Alexander, already had indicated how the Fifth and Eighth 

Armies were to capitalize on the early successes of the offensive. While 

the Eighth Army and the bulk of the Fifth were to continue to push 

northwestward in the general direction of Rome, the VI Corps from 

the Anzio beachhead was to strike northeastward to seize the town 

of Valmontone, astride Highway 6, the line of communications to the 

German Tenth Army, which was opposing the main Allied attack farther south. 2 Thus the VI Corps was to block the Tenth Army's logical 

route of withdrawal, possibly trapping the main body of the enemy, 

but certainly embarrassing further enemy operations on the southern 

front. This strike to Valmontone, General Alexander believed, was the 

most rewarding possibility open to the VI Corps for making a sizable 

contribution to the big offensive. 

The commander of the U.S. Fifth Army, Lt. Gen. Mark W. 

Clark, whose command included the VI Corps, was not so sure. General Clark's doubts about the Valmontone maneuver dated back to 

the period of planning before the start of the offensive when the Allied 

commander first had indicated his broad concept of the operation.:1 

Unlike Alexander, Clark had believed that the decisive role would 

fall, not to the Eighth Army attacking frontally against the main enemy 

defenses in the Liri Valley, but to the Fifth Army, attacking through 

mountainous terrain west of the Liri and thereby outflanking German strength in the valley. Clark also disagreed with Alexander's 

estimate of what the VI Corps, with limited forces, could accomplish 

by a strike into the enemy's rear and flank. In keeping with his 

doubts, Clark early had instructed the VI Corps commander, Maj. 

Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, to draw up alternate plans. 4 Now, on the 

morning of 25 May, as forces from Anzio and from the south made 

contact and as the VI Corps reached positions from which the strike 

to Valmontone might be launched, the time for a final decision on 

the form and direction of the VI Corps exploitation was at hand. 

The decision facing General Clark was no ordinary command decision. Indeed, since the views of the army group commander, General 

Alexander, had been spelled out so specifically, some army commanders would have considered that there was no room for decision at an 

army level at all. Yet Clark was determined that the action of the 

VI Corps should not be compromised by some predetermined concept 

but that the corps should be utilized in what he considered the most 

advantageous manner in keeping with the situation at the time. 

2 Allied Armies in Italy (AAI) Operation Order 1, 5 May 44, in FIfth Army History, 

Part V. 

3 See Min, AAI Conference of Army Commanders, 2 Apr 44, in Fifth Army files. 

4 Fifth Army FO 6, 20 Apr 44, in Fifth Army History, Part V. 
THE DRIVE ON ROME 353 

Throughout the planning before the offensive, General Clark had 

expressed uncertainty as to the most suitable direction for the exploitation and had sought to defer a decision until the nature of the enemy's reaction to the offensive on the southern front became apparent. 

Indeed, he had even delayed a decision on the direction of the initial 

axis of attack to break out of the beachhead until the enemy reaction 

was clear. Though aware early that Alexander held an almost singleminded devotion to a drive from the beachhead through the German 

stronghold of Cisterna to Valmontone, Clark still did not consider himself bound to accept this as the only course of action. All through the 

planning period, Clark's freedom to consider alternate plans had been 

facilitated by the failure of Alexander to issue a direct written order, 

even though he had expounded the general concept of the Valmontone maneuver at several conferences. Clark himself had expressed no 

opinion at these conferences about Alexander's concept. 5 

Insisting on the necessity of flexibility, Clark, in directing the VI 

Corps to draw up alternate schemes of maneuver, had suggested four 

different axes of advance and had specified that the corps be ready, 

on forty-eight hours' notice, to carry out whichever seemed appropriate." When, on 5 May, Alexander issued a formal field order prescribing the Valmontone axis and, during a visit to the beachhead, personally directed the corps commander, General Truscott, to concentrate 

his preparations on the Val mont one maneuver, Clark still did not 

swerve from his conviction that Truscott should be prepared for other 

eventualities. 7 To Alexander, Clark did not protest the substance of 

either Alexander's formal orders or his informal instructions to Truscott, but he did object to Alexander's bypassing the army command 

channel to deal directly with Truscott. With Truscott himself, Clark 

in effect contravened his superior's order by directing the corps commander to make full preparations for carrying out either of the two 

main alternative schemes: Cisterna-Valmontone attack, which Alexander favored, or a thrust northwestward along the west side of the Alban 

Hills through Albano on the most direct route to Rome. 8 

On 17 May, after progress of the big offensive on the southern 

front had made clear that favorable conditions for an attack from the 

beachhead were approaching, Clark brought up with Alexander the 

question of the direction of the VI Corps attack. Stressing the difficulties of the Valmontone maneuver, the Fifth Army commander 

5Intervs, Mathews with Clark, I O~21 May 48 (hereafter cited as Clark Intervs), 

OCMH files; Clark Diary, II May~5 Jun 44, loaned to the author by General Clark; 

Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 356. 

6 Fifth Army FO 6. 

7 AAI FO I. 

8 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 369; Truscott Diary, 6~ 7 May 44, loaned to the author 

by General Truscott. 
354 COMMAND DECISIONS 

argued that it might not be the decisive operation which Alexander 

contemplated and that, in any case, the selection of the axis of attack 

should be deferred until the enemy's situation became clearer. 

Unmoved, General Alexander indicated that he favored the Valmontone maneuver regardless of the enemy situation. For the first time, 

apparently, Alexander spelled out how the maneuver would be carried out beyond Valmontone-by light, mobile patrols striking to cut 

other roads available to the Germans north of Highway 6." 

His skepticism heightened by this additional information on the 

proposed maneuver, Clark nevertheless decided that in the face of 

Alexander's continued stand he must at least order the VI Corps to 

attack initially in the direction of Valmontone with the mission of 

breaking the German defenses at Cisterna. 'o 

This he did, but he still did not feel rigidly bound to pursue the 

attack all the way to Valmontone to the exclusion of other operations 

that circumstances might indicate. He reserved his freedom to decide 

what course to pursue after Cisterna, even though he had no expectation that Alexander would alter the scope or form of the Valmontone maneuver. In short, Clark recognized that if the situation developed favorably for an attack directly toward Rome, he would have 

to make his decision independently. II 

Without notifying Alexander, Clark instructed Truscott to be ready 

after taking Cisterna to shift the main axis of attack to the northwest 

toward Rome. He had not decided to adopt this course, but he wanted 

the VI Corps to be ready to carry it out if favorable conditions developed. The conditions which Clark had in mind included Allied 

breakthrough of the last of the enemy's prepared defenses on the 

southern front and enemy withdrawal to the Caesar Line, another 

prepared position based on the southern slopes of the Alban Hills south 

and southeast of Rome. 

By the early afternoon of 25 May, it seemed to Clark that the 

desired developments had occurred. In addition, the VI Corps at Cisterna had scored a smashing success. The time for a decision had 

come. '2 

In the circumstances, General Clark could contemplate three feasible courses of action. He could throw the entire weight of the VI 

Corps (which rested on the striking power of five good U.S. divisions) 

toward Valmontone to cut Highway 6, threaten the rear of the Ger9 Clark Diary, 17 May 44; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 350-51 

10 Clark Diary, 19, 27 May 44; Truscott Diary, 18 May 44; Clark to Truscott, 18 

May 44 (radio), in Truscott Papers; Truscott, Command Missions, p. 370. 

11 Clark Diary, 19, 27 May 44; Clark Intervs. 

12 Fifth Army G-3 Jnl, 25 May 44; Wood File, Fifth Army Messages, May-Jun 44; 

and Fifth Army Message file, May 44, all in Fifth Army files; Clark Diary, 25 May 44. 
THE DRIVE ON ROME 355 

man Tenth Army: and cut the enemy's main line of communications to 

the southern front. Or, he could turn the entire corps northwest from 

the Cisterna area in an attack against the Alban Hills along the most 

direct route toward Rome. Or, finally, he could ride both horses, 

striking simultaneously in both directions. 

Despite substantial losses in nearly three days of intensive action, 

Clark felt that the combat troops of the VI Corps were still in good 

fighting shape. Only the 1st Armored and 3d Infantry Divisions had 

been involved in the heavy fighting around Cisterna. The 36th Infantry Division had been in reserve, while the 34th and 45th Infantry 

Divisions and a specially trained mobile group, the First Special 

Service Force, had played only supporting roles. 13 

The enemy, on the other hand, Clark believed, was in a state of 

rapid deterioration, incapable of halting a VI Corps offensive, either 

against the Alban Hills or toward Valmontone. The two divisions of 

the German Fourteenth Army which had unsuccessfully opposed the VI 

Corps main effort on either side of Cisterna obviously had incurred 

heavy losses. Clark could discern no significant local reserves. The 

enemy had, Clark believed, only one possible source of major reinforcement, the Herman Goering Panzer Division, which he had good reason to believe was en route to the battlefield from reserve positions 

far north of Rome. The other three general reserve divisions available to the German theater commander, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, had already been committed on the southern front. 

Clark's evaluation of the enemy reserve situation was basically 

correct, but he underestimated the strength of the Caesar position at 

the base of the Alban Hills and the defensive capabilities of three good 

German divisions of the I Parachute Corps. which comprised the right 

(west) wing of the Fourteenth Army. Although the bulk of the reserves 

of these divisions had been ordered during the night of 24 May to 

buttress the sagging left flank of the Fourteenth Arm)}, no part of them 

had reached the threatened sector by the next morning. These units, 

therefore, still remained for the most part in their main battle positions. They were thus available, along with the other units of the 

divisions, in position opposite the western half of the Anzio beachhead, for defense of the Caesar position in the Alban Hills or for 

delaying action in front of it. 14 

13 Clark Diary; Clark Intervs; Wood File, May-Jun 401; Fifth Army G-3 Jnl, 25 May 

44; VI Corps War Room Jnl, 24-25 May 44. 

14 Fourteenth Army and 76 Panzer Corps War Diaries, text volumes, 24-27 May 44, in 

German Military Documents Section, Federal Records Center; Telephone Conversations, 

VI Corps War Room Jnl, 23-25 May 44; Fifth Army G-2 Periodic Report and G-3 Jnl 

file, 23-26 May 44; VI Corps G-2 Periodic Reports, 24-26 May 44; VI Corps 

War Room Jnl, 24-27 May 44; Truscott's Comments at Division Commanders' Conference, 25 May 44, in VI Corps files. 
356 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Should the full weight of the VI Corps be employed in the Valmontone maneuver, General Clark still doubted that the effort would 

accomplish the decisive results contemplated by Alexander. Though 

Clark recognized that a concentrated thrust by the VI Corps could 

cut Highway 6 at Valmontone, he felt it was optimistic to expect that 

this alone might trap large enemy forces in the south. The Tenth Army 

still might use other routes of withdrawal which led north from the 

Liri Valley through the mountains to Highway 5, a main lateral road 

running from the Adriatic coast through Tivoli to Rome. General 

Clark believed further that such a thrust was unnecessary to facilitate 

the advance of the Eighth Army, for the British had driven through 

the last prepared positions on the southern front. Finally, a thrust to 

Valmontone might lead the VI Corps away from, not toward, Rome. I

' 

Clark was reluctant to encourage British competition for the capture of Rome. 16 He considered Rome a gem belonging rightly in the 

crown of his Fifth Army. The brunt of the early Italian campaign, 

Clark knew, had fallen more heavily on the American elements of 

the Fifth Army than on either the British troops under his command 

or the Eighth Army. Clark and the Fifth Army in general believed 

that the Fifth Army's attack had been decisive in the breakout on 

the southern front. Clark repeatedly observed with pride that he had 

expanded the role originally assigned the Fifth Army and thereby 

found the key to the success of the operation. Not only had the 

Fifth Army made the first effective penetration of the enemy's prepared defenses: keeping the enemy off balance by successive envelopments in the Liri Valley, the Fifth Army, Clark believed, had been 

the primary factor in the Eighth Army's advance up the Liri Valley 

along what Alexander always had regarded as the "only way to Rome." 17 

The Eighth Army, in Clark's opinion, had, in turn, been slow in capitalizing on this assistance, particularly in failing to launch strong frontal 

attacks to support the envelopments. In view of this experience, he 

doubted if the Eighth Army would provide the kind of strong frontal 

effort that he thought necessary to justify throwing the main weight 

of the VI Corps toward Valmontone. In short, the Fifth Army commander was reluctant to carry out further operations to envelop the 

enemy in front of the British unless the British also assisted the Fifth 

Army's advance to Rome. 1R 

That General Clark did not see the Valmontone attack itself as 

15 Clark Diary, 17 May 44; Clark Intervs; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 350-51. 

16 Clark Intervs; Clark Diary, 15 May-5 Jun 44; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 337-66, 

passim. 

17 Clark Diary, 17-22 May 44; Clark Intervs. 

18 Clark Intervs; Clark Diary, 25, 27-30 May 44. 
THE DRIVE ON ROME 357 

an excellent opportunity for quick advance to Rome is puzzling. 

Terrain, the nature of the enemy's defenses, and the enemy's lack 

of substantial forces to halt a drive on Rome via Valmontone, all 

favored the adoption of this course. By continuing past Cisterna up 

the rolling swells of the Velletri-Artena Gap, between the Alban 

Hills and the Lepini Mountains, and along the northwest shoulder of 

the Lepini, the VI Corps might reach and cut Highway 6 northwest 

of Valmontone. The corps then could wheel northwest across fairly 

open country to breach the Caesar Line northeast of the Alban Hills 

and push rapidly to Rome. German defenses in the Caesar Line 

between the Alban Hills and Valmontone were weaker than elsewhere and had no strong natural features to buttress man-made barriers. Neither army nor corps intelligence estimates indicated substantial 

enemy forces in this area, though the VI Corps strongly suspected 

that the enemy might divert forces there either from the Adriatic 

coast or from the I Parachute Corps. 19 But Clark was perturbed by this 

prospect not at all and believed the only German reinforcement likely to 

appear in the area was the Herman Goering Panzer Division. 20 He could 

hardly have considered it likely that this division alone could halt 

the full weight of the VI Corps. 21 The only reasonable explanation 

of why Clark failed to appreciate the opportunity presented by the 

Valmontone attack for a rapid drive to Rome lies in his belief that 

the German situation had so deteriorated that the VI Corps with less 

than maximum force could reach Rome more rapidly by a more 

direct route. 22 

The second alternative which General Clark might have adopted, 

throwing the whole weight of the VI Corps into a drive west of the 

Alban Hills, had strong appeal because it was on the most direct 

route to Rome. By attacking northwest from Cisterna, he thought he 

could exploit the initial success of the beachhead attack and what 

appeared to be the enemy's rampant disorganization by driving 

through the last prepared German position in front of Rome between 

Campoleone and Lanuvio at the southwest base of the Alban Hills 

before the Germans had time to settle down into it.2:l Using the 

entire corps would ensure quick success. The maneuver offered the 

incidental advantage of destroying the rest of the Fourteenth Army by 

18 VI Corps War Room Jnl, 24-28 May 44. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Fourteenth Army and 76 Panzer Corps War Diaries, May 44. 

22 Clark to Gruenther, 25 May 44, in Clark Diary, 25 May 44; Truscott's Comments 

at Division Commanders' Conference, 25 May 44; VI Corps War Room Jnl, 25 May 44; 

Clark Intervs. 

23 Clark Diary, 25-27 May 44; Clark Intervs; VI Corps War Room Jnl, 25 May 44; 

Wood File May-Jun 44. 
358 COMMAND DECISIONS 

frontal assault, after which local turning movements could pin the 

bulk of the I Parachute Corps against the coast or cut the rear of any 

forces attempting to defend along the base of the Alban Hills. Concentrating maximum force in this direction would have little effect on 

the southern front but would, Clark believed, destroy far more German forces than the Valmontone maneuver. 21 

The great magnet of this alternative was, of course, Rome. Clark, 

like many other Allied commanders and the British Prime Minister 

himself, regarded the city as the "great prize" of the entire spring 

offensive-indeed, of the whole Italian campaign. 25 He had told 

Truscott that it was the "only worthwhile objective" for the VI Corps. 26 

Clark had only an incidental interest in the military value of the 

Italian capital-its airfields and its role as a communications hub 

(" All roads lead to Rome"). He wanted Rome because of the prestige associated with capturing it and the success such a feat would 

symbolize. In recompense for all the' frustrations of the winter stalemate in the south of Italy and for the fact that, in Clark's opinion, 

the Fifth Army had borne the brunt of the fighting, Clark felt that 

his men deserved the honor. Allied strategy, which had exaggerated 

the value of Rome out of proportion to its military importance, must 

be taken into account in explaining the emphasis Clark put on taking the city. Capturing Rome would represent to the people in the 

United States tangible evidence of American success in Italy, a dramatic event which could be more easily grasped by the American 

public than the destruction of large numbers of the enemy. Clark 

also wanted Rome in the shortest possible time because he suspected 

that Alexander wished the Eighth Army to share in the triumph. 

Alexander, for example, had constantly referred to the Liri Valley, 

up which the British Eighth Army was driving, as the "only route" 

to Rome. Clark did not intend to divide the prize with the British 

and believed that he had ill his grasp an opportunity to make this 

unnecessary. 27 

Finally, General Clark wanted Rome as quickly as possible because, as he was aware, the Allied cross-Channel invasion of France 

was imminent. This invasion, the main effort against Germany, would, 

Clark knew, draw the spotlight from Italy.28 

The third alternative open to General Clark was a compromise 

between the other two. By dividing his forces and attacking in both 

24 Clark Intervs; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 356-57. 

25 Clark Intervs; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 335-66, passim. 

26 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 369. 

27 Clark Intervs; Clark Diary, 14 May-5 Jun 44. 

2< Clark Intervs; Clark Diary, 24 May-5 Jun 44; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 336-40, 

352ff. 
THE DRIVE ON ROME 359 

directions, northwest toward the Alban Hills and northeast toward Valmontone, he could exploit the opportunity to drive on Rome rapidly 

and at the same time comply with Alexander's order for cutting the 

enemy's main line of communications to the southern front. In the 

face of the estimated enemy disorganization and the commitment on 

the southern front of all major German reserves except the Herman 

Goering Panzer Division) Clark felt that he could carry out Alexander's 

maneuver to cut Highway 6 at Valmontone with one reinforced 

American division while shifting the main weight of the VI Corps 

attack toward the Italian capital. 29 This course of action had the 

advantage of complying with the letter, if not the spirit, of the order 

from Clark's superior. 

General Clark made his decision in favor of the third alternative. 

Though he expected that the enemy would commit the Herman Goering 

Panzer Division at Valmontone, he believed that a reinforced American division could handle the opposition. Even if this proved to be 

a considerable gamble, it was a gamble in the direction which Clark 

personally thought least remunerative. The bigger bet he placed on 

the drive on Rome .. ,0 

The final plan for the VI Corps designated four divisions for the 

main effort northwest against the Alban Hills. The 34th and 45th 

Infantry Divisions were to lead the assault on either side of the RomeNaples railroad northwest from Cisterna, while the 36th Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division maintained a strong supporting 

attack on the right flank toward Velletri. The 3d Infantry Division) 

supported by an armored task force and the First Special Service 

Force to cover the flanks, was to make the secondary thrust, to seize 

Artena and cut Highway 6 at Valmontone. 31 

After completing the plan, Clark flew to his command post on 

the southern front to explain the operation to his chief of staff, Maj. 

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, and to discuss operations on the southern 

front. He left his operations officer, Brig. Gen. Donald W. Brann, to 

explain the plan to the VI Corps commander, General Truscott. It 

appears, on the basis of contemporary evidence, that Truscott supported Clark's decision, reacting favorably to the shift of main effort 

to the north west and expressing confidence that the weaker force 

could reach Valmontone and cut Highway 6. His only objection 

appears to have been against a strong frontal attack on VeJletri along 

Highway 7, northwest of Cisterna, apparently because of heavy resistance which a combat command of the 1st Armored Division had 

29 Clark Diary, 24-25 May 44; Clark Intervs; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 356-57. 

,,0 Clark Diary, 25-27 May 44; Clark Intervs; Wood File May-Jun 44. 

31 Clark Diary, 25 May 44; Wood File, May-Jun 44. 
360 COMMAND DECISIONS 

met for two days in that area. At 1555 on 25 May, General Brann 

radioed General Clark that the corps commander was "entirely in 

accord" with the army commander's plan. 32 At 1755 Truscott telephoned Brann, saying, "I feel very strongly we should do this thing 

[the attack to the northwest]. We should do it tomorrow." 33 

In the evening of 25 May, Clark returned to the Anzio beachhead where, in conference with Truscott, details of the attack plan 

were worked out. As the two leaders met, latest intelligence reports 

confirmed earlier views of the seriousness of the enemy's setback. 34 

The final corps plan was precisely that decided on originally by 

Clark except that it removed the feature of a strong frontal assault 

on Velletri, which Truscott had found objectionable. "I am launching this new attack," Clark radioed his chief of staff, "with all speed 

possible in order to take advantage of the impetus of our advance 

and in order to overwhelm the enemy in what may be a demoralized condition at the present time. You can assure General Alexander 

this is an all-out attack. We are shooting the works!" 35 General 

Truscott, when he met his division commanders later in the evening, 

was equally confident. In the area which included the zone of the 

VI Corps main effort, he said, "The Boche is badly disorganized, has 

a hodge-podge of units and if we can drive as hard tomorrow as we 

have done the last three days, a great victory is in our grasp." 36 

By the decision to head directly for Rome, General Clark had, 

in effect, altered drastically Alexander's basic scheme of maneuver 

against the Tenth Army's rear. By diluting the force oriented toward 

Valmontone he had made that effort distinctly secondary and by its 

very nature primarily defensive should the enemy move in sufficient 

force in time. Yet the army commander had given no inkling of his 

intentions to Alexander, the army group commander. He had decided to act first and explain later. 37 

32 Brann to Clark, 25 May 44 (radio), Wood File, May-Jun 44. 

33 Telephone Conversation, Truscott to Brann, VI Corps War Room Jnl, 25 May 44. 

That Truscott might have had reservations about the plan, or that he might have openly 

objected to it, does not appear in any contemporary record, though after the war he recalled 

that he was "dumbfounded" by it and "protested that the conditions were not right." See 

Truscott, Command Missions, p. 375; Intervs, Mathews with Truscott, 3 and 10 Apr 48, 

OCMH files. 

"' Clark Diary; Fifth Army Advance CP G-3 Jnl, 25 May 44; Fifth Army G-2 and 

Air Support Jnls, 25 May 44; VI Corps War Room Jnl, 25 May 44. 

35 Clark Diary, 25-26 May 44; Truscott Diary, 25 May 44; VI Corps War Room Jnl, 

25 May 44. 

36 Report of Division Commanders' Meeting at VI Corps CP, 24 May 44, VI Corps 

War Room Jnl, 25 May 44. 

37 Alexander lntervs; Memo, Gruenther for Clark, 26 l'vlay 44, Clark Diary, 26 May 

44. 
THE DRIVE ON ROME 361 

During the afternoon of 25 May General Clark had prepared the 

way for breaking the news to Alexander. When visiting the Fifth 

Army command post on the southern front, he briefed General 

Gruenther, his chief of staff, with the idea that Gruenther could explain the plan to Alexander the next day, after the unilateral decision had become irrevocable. Once this had happened, Clark was 

anxious for Alexander to know that it was an "all-out attack" and that 

a strong force would be used against Valmontone. 38 At 1115 on 26 

May, nearly twenty-four hours after Clark made his decision and 

fifteen minutes after the newly oriented attack jumped off, General 

Alexander arrived at the Fifth Army command post and received the 

news from General Gruenther. 

In the presentation of his case, Clark could have had no abler 

advocate than his chief of staff or one whom Alexander liked as 

much. Alexander appeared "well pleased with the entire situation 

and was most complimentary in qis reference to the Fifth Army" and 

to Clark. Far from objecting to the shift of the main axis, Alexander 

stated: "I am for any line which the army commander believes will 

offer a chance to continue his present success." A little later, he asked 

Gruenther, "I am sure the army commander will continue to push 

toward Valmontone, won't he? I know that he appreciates the importance of gaining the high ground just south of Artena. As soon as he 

captures that he will be absolutely safe!" Gruenther was equal to the 

occasion. "I assured him," he reported later to Clark, "that you had 

that situation thoroughly in mind and that he could depend on you 

to execute a vigorous plan with all the push in the world!" Gruenther 

was convinced that Alexander "left with no mental reservations as to 

the wisdom" of Clark's decision. In fact, he commented that "if the 

Anzio Force could capture the high ground north of Velletri, it would 

put the enemy at a serious disadvantage and would practically assure 

the success of the bridgehead attack." 39 

Either Alexander was accepting with grace a virtual fait accompli 

or the Val mont one maneuver had lost its principal champion. Whichever the case, Alexander's acquiescence was strongly conditioned, if 

not determined, by the success which the Fifth Army already had 

achieved in the spring offensive and by his conception of the role of 

an Allied army group commander, especially in relation to an American army commander like Clark. In the wake of the smashing success which the VI Corps had achieved at Cisterna and the reported 

disorganization of the Fourteenth Army) Alexander could have no 

38 Clark Diary, 25-26 May 44. 

39 Memo, Gruenther for Clark, 26 May 44, cited n. 37. 
362 COMMAND DECISIONS 

readily defensible grounds for questioning Clark's judgment of the 

best course of action in Clark's own zone of responsibility.'o 

As events developed, Clark's decision neither unlocked the door 

to Rome nor cut the enemy's rear at Valmontone. Though the two 

German divisions which had opposed the VI Corps attack from the 

beachhead had been almost destroyed, the Fourteenth Army was able to 

employ against the new thrust the three good divisions of the I Parachute Corps. Also, the Fourteenth Army shifted to the threatened sector 

additional units from a division which had been manning coast defenses nearby. Kesselring, for his part, diverted some contingents of 

the Tenth Amry. With these forces the Germans delayed the VI Corps 

main effort in front of the Caesar Line at the base of the Alban Hills 

for two days and then halted repeated, bloody, and fruitless efforts by 

three American divisions at Lanuvio and along the Anzio-AlbanoRome road. The German defensive success was attributable to the 

time required for the VI Corps to shift its direction of attack, to the 

two days' delaying action which afforded time for the main German 

forces to reorganize, to the strength of the Caesar position in this sector, and to the undiminished fighting qualities of the three good divisions of the I Parachute Corps. In the optimistic glow of the sweeping 

victory against the Fourteenth Army's center and left wing on both sides 

of Cisterna, Clark, Truscott, and their intelligence officers had badly 

underestimated the defensive capabilities of the I Parachute Corps. 

German commanders actually did not recognize for several days 

the shift in the VI Corps main axis of attack. They were still too worried about the weak point in the Caesar Line between the Alban 

Hills and Valmontone. But the U.S. 3d Division, tired from three days' 

heavy fighting, did not cut Highway 6. Moving into the gap, the 

American division, in the face of resistance from scattered German 

units and first arrivals of the Herman Goering Division, assumed a primarily defensive role. Understrength in tanks to start with, the Herman Goering Division actually had been severely damaged by Allied air 

attacks en route to the south and had been slowed by a gasoline 

shortage. Only its reconnaissance battalion had been released to the 

Fourteenth Ar11?Y by the morning of 26 May, and its other units were 

committed piecemeal in the days following in small counterattacks. 

For at least three days German strength in front of Valmontone and 

westward to the Alban Hills was inadequate to have stopped a strong 

attack by even a secondary effort; even in subsequent days German 

strength was not sufficient to have halted the main effort of the VI 

Corps had it been made in that direction. For more than a week be40 Alexander Intervs. 
THE DRIVE ON ROME 363 

fore the capture of Rome, the rear and the right (west) flank of the 

German Tenth Army, withdrawing slowly toward the Caesar Line, were 

exposed and threatened with a trap which the German commanders 

feared would be closed, but which was not. 

The greatest irony was that if the VI Corps main effort had continued on the Valmontone axis on 26 May and the days following, 

Clark could undoubtedly have reached Rome more quickly than he 

was able to do by the route northwest from Cisterna. The VI Corps 

also could have cut Highway 6 and put far greater pressure on the 

Tenth Army than it did. 

Ironically, too, when the Fifth Army finally broke through the 

last of the Fourteenth Army's defenses, it accomplished this by a surprise 

night infiltration along the eastern side of the Alban Hills between 

the hills and Valmontone. When this breach had been widened, Clark 

again wheeled his forces northwest toward Rome and away from the 

withdrawing Tenth Army. Though the British Eighth Army in the advance up the Liri Valley failed to keep heavy pressure against the 

main body of the Tenth Army: the Fifth Army still might have closed 

the trap had Clark struck toward Tivoli and then eastward along the 

lateral highway toward the Adriatic coast.41 

Yet the fact remains, General Clark and the Fifth Army got to 

Rome. They captured the city on 4 June, only two days before Allied 

landing craft touched down in France. 

41 VI Corps War Room Jnl, 26 May~5 Jun 44; II Corps After Action Reports, May, 

.lun 44; Clark Diary, 26 May-.'i Jun 44; War Diaries, Tenth and Fourteenth Armies and XIV 

Panzer Corps, May~Jun 44; Alexander Intervs. See also various accounts in Der Feldzug in 

Italien, a collection of postwar manuscripts prepared by German officers, OCMH files; 

and G. W. C. Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy: 1943-45 (Ottawa, Canada, 1956), passim. 

15 

The gO-Division Gamble 

by 

Maurice Matlriff 

Of all the calculated risks taken by General George C. Marshall 

in W orId War II none was bolder than the decision in midwar to 

maintain the U.S. Army's ground combat strength at ninety divisions. 

Students of warfare will long debate whether the decision was as wise 

as it was courageous, as foresighted as it was successful. 

The decision to limit the Army, ratified in May 1944 on the eve of 

OVERLORD, was a compound of necessity and choice. A variety of influences played a part in it-national policy, Allied strategy, air 

power, American technology, the balance between American war 

economy and manpower, logistical and operational requirements, the 

needs of Allies and sister services, and General Marshall's faith in the 

fighting qualities of the American soldier. The decision came at the 

end of a long series of steps going back to the pre-Pearl Harbor days 

when American planners had first begun to be concerned about the 

problem of determining the size and shape of the Army needed for 

global and coalition warfare. 1 

1 The subject of this study is treated more fully in connection with mid war strategic 

planning in Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Waifare, 1943~1944, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959). In addition to the works 

listed in the notes, published sources that provide helpful bibliographical leads or background are: Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The Procurement and 

Training of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1948); "The Army Re-Shaped," in Kent Roberts Greenfield, The Historian 

and the Army (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954); and Bureau of the 

Budget, The United States at War (Washington, 1946). 

MAURICE MATLOFF, Historian with OCMH since 1947. Graduate fellow, Ph.D. in history, Harvard University. Taught: Brooklyn College, University of Maryland. Lecturer: Naval War College, Army War College. 

Member of the American Historical Association's Committee on the Historian and the Federal Government. U.S. Air Forces, World War II. 

Coauthor: Strategic Planning for Coalition Waifare, 1941-1942 (Washington, 

1953), and author: Strategic Planning for Coalition Waifare, 1943-1944 (Washington, 1959), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; and 

numerous articles and reviews in military and historical journals. 
366 COMMAND DECISIONS 

In the beginning the military had shared the traditional confidence of the nation at large that there would be sufficient resources 

and strength to meet the needs of war. Early estimates, in late 1941 

and in 1942, of the "cutting edge" -in divisions-needed to win the 

war were high. In the Victory Program of the fall of 1941, the War 

Department projected an Army with a peak strength of 213 divisions. The Victory Program was premised on a strategic policy of 

offensive operations in Europe and on the assumption that the Soviet 

Army might collapse and the United States and Great Britain might 

have to defeat the huge armies of Germany unaided. 2 Throughout 

most of 1942 the common assumption in the War Department was 

that it would ultimately be necessary to support at least two hundred 

divisions. 3 The Washington Army Staff recognized the parallel need 

of building a far-reaching, heavy-fisted air arm. The blueprint for 

that expansion, embodied in the 273-air-group program approved in 

September 1942, was to remain the Army Air Forces guide in World 

War II. 

By the end of 1942, despite the turning of the tide of war, General Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, and his advisers were uneasy. 

They had seen their plan for an early cross-Channel operationROUNDUP-scuttled in favor of TORCH (invasion of northwest Africa) 

and divisions that they had hoped to concentrate in the United Kingdom skimmed off to meet the requirements of the northwest African 

and Pacific campaigns. This trend reinforced sober second thoughts 

they were beginning to have about the American manpower problem. 

To continue what appeared to them to be essentially a policy of drift in 

Allied strategy raised grave issues about mobilizing and deploying 

U.S. forces. Supporting a war of attrition and peripheral action, in 

place of concentrated effort, raised serious problems about the size 

and kind of Army the United States should and could maintain. 

At the same time the conviction was growing that it was becoming both necessary and possible to plan on a more realistic, long-range 

basis for mobilizing the manpower-and resources-needed to win 

the war. The transition to the initiative in northwest Africa and in 

2 Accounts of the Victory Program planning are contained in (1) Mark Skinner Watson, ChiefofStaJf: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, 1950), Ch. XI; (2) Ray S. 

Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington, 1951), Ch. IV; and 

(3) Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Waif are, 1941-1942 

(Washington, 1953), pp. 58-62, 350-52, all in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II. 

o In September G-3 reached its peak estimate of about 350 divisions needed to win 

the war. Memo, G-3 for CotS, 15 Sep 42, sub: Mobilization Plans, War Department G-3 

files (WDGCT) 320 (9-15-42). The projected number of divisions grew in 1942, partly 

because estimated requirements for defeating Japan were superimposed on the original 

estimates for defeating Germany. 
THE 90-DIVISION GAMBLE 367 

the Pacific appeared to present the opportunity as well as the compulsion to define with greater certainty the main outlines of subsequent 

operations and to make more dependable estimates of how many 

trained and equipped units would be required. 

To establish a proper manpower balance for the United States in 

wartime was as difficult as it was important. Out of some 25,000,000 

Americans physically fit for military service, the absolute ceiling on 

the number that could be utilized for active duty was estimated to be 

between fifteen and sixteen million.4 On the surface, it was hard to 

understand, given this pool of manpower, why there should be any 

manpower problem at all. Why, if Germany could maintain a military establishment of 9,835,000 or 10.9 percent of its population and 

Britain could support 3,885,000 or 8.2, did American manpower officials insist in late 1942 that 10,500,000 or only 7.8 percent would be 

the maximum force that the country could sustain without incurring 

serious dislocation to the American economy? 5 The problem as well 

as the answer stemmed basically from the fact that the Allies had 

from the beginning accepted the proposition that the single greatest 

tangible asset the United States brought to the coalition in World 

War II was the productive capacity of its industry. From the very 

beginning, American manpower calculations were closely correlated 

with the needs of war industry. 

The Army had therefore to compete for manpower not only with 

the needs of the other services but also with the prior claims of industry. Cutting too deeply into the industrial manpower of the 

country in order to furnish men for the Army and Navy might interfere seriously with arming U.S. troops and those of the Allies for the 

successful conduct of the war. Furthermore, the United States was 

fighting a global conflict. To service its lines of communications extending around the world required large numbers of men, and great 

numbers of troops were constantly in transit to and from the theaters. 

The problem for the Army was not only how much should it receive 

as its share of the manpower pool but also how to divide that share 

most effectively to meet the diverse demands made upon it. The 

progress of the war on the Russian front and the prospective air 

bombardment over the European continent still left uncertain, at the 

end of 1942, the Army's ultimate size as well as the number of combat divisions necessary to win the war. It was also still difficult to 

4 Biennial Report oj the Chief oj Staff oj the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, 

to the Secretary oj War, p. 10 l. 

5 (I) OPD Brief, title: Notes ... 43d Mtg jPS, 28 Oct 42, filed with jPS 57/6 in 

Operations Division (OPD) files, ABC 370.01 (7-25-42), 2. (2) Memo, Brig Gcn Idwal 

H. Edwards for Lt Gen joseph T. McNarney, 4 Feb 43, sub: Troop Basis, 1943, War 

Department Chief of Staff of the Army files, WDCSA 320.2, Sec. III (1942-43). 
368 COMMAND DECISIONS 

predict with exactitude the casualty rates to be expected or the reserve strength that would be needed. 

Postponement of the plan to launch a major cross-Channel operation in 1943 made the need of mobilizing a large U.S. ground army 

less immediate. Instead, greater emphasis was placed on first developing U.S. air power. Given this and anticipated limitations in shipping, 

it appeared at the end of 1942 that the projected deployment of a 

huge air force overseas by the end of 1944 would definitely restrict 

the number of divisions that could be sent overseas by that time. It 

was clearly undesirable to withdraw men from industry and agriculture too long before they could actually be employed in military 

operations. Allowing a year to train a division, the mobilization of 

much more than a hundred divisions by the end of 1943 appeared to 

be premature. In late 1942, moreover, materiel procurement plans 

for the armed services for 1943, particularly for the Army ground 

program, were revised downward by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to a War Prod'-;1ction Board recommendation. All these limiting 

factors pointed to the 'need for scaling down previous long-range calculations, as well as for effecting economies in manpower within the 

Army.6 

The process of reducing earlier long-range estimates, begun on the 

War Department and joint planning levels toward the end of 1942, 

was clearly reflected in the approved Army troop basis for 1943, 

circulated by G-3 in January of that year. 7 This troop basis set the 

mobilization program for 1943 at 100 divisions. It called for a total 

Army strength of 8,208,000, a figure previously approved by the President. This troop basis marked the turning point in War Department 

and joint Army-Navy calculations. At last these estimates were 

approaching the ultimate ceiling strengths of the Army. 

Efforts to formulate troop bases for 1944 and beyond that were 

being made at the same time pointed to the need for drastic reductions of earlier estimates. 8 The planners were working from the old 

assumption of the late 1941 and early 1942 period that the USSR 

might be defeated by the Germans, thus forcing on the Allies a far 

greater and more costly ground effort. Since the effects of the planned 

6 For a discussion of the late 1942 factors influencing Army troop basis calculations, 

see Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell 1. Wiley, The Organization of 

Ground Combat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 

1947), pp. 214-17. 

7 Memo, G-3 for CG AGF and CG SOS, 25 Jan 43, sub: Troop Unit Basis, 1943, 

WDGCT 320.2 General (1-25-43). 

8 The Victory Program of late 1941 had assumed a total of 10,199, 101 men for the 

Army alone by June 1944, and as late as November 1942 the Joint Planners were estimating that 10,572,000 men would be needed for the Army by December 1944. 
THE 90-DIVISION GAMBLE 369 

bomber offensive from the United Kingdom were also unknown, the 

planners had had to take its p'ossible failure into consideration. Viewing both of these factors pessimistically, it was inevitable the planners 

should produce high estimates envisaging a very large ground force. 

They calculated that it would be far easier to decrease an overexpanded Army than it would be to build up an inadequate one, 

especially since it took a year to train a division for combat. Add to 

their dilemma the uncertainties of shipping and production and the 

lack of firm strategic decisions to guide them and it was small wonder 

that the planners were overshooting the mark. 

The JCS, on the other hand, faced with criticism of their use of 

manpower, had realized that the planners' figures would not be accepted and had turned the manpower problem over to their senior 

advisers. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee concluded that the 

Joint Planners had gone astray in trying to match Allied forces, division for division, with the enemy. They held that proper consideration had been given neither to the relative efficiency of forces nor to 

prospective Allied air superiority and the effect of the bomber offensive on German morale and war effort. They recognized that shipping 

would determine the amount of force that could be applied, and they 

believed that Allied superiority in production would also be a controlling factor and should be exploited in every possible way.9 

In line with this more optimistic outlook, the Army planners suggested that the most realistic approach to the manpower problem 

would be to agree upon the maximum number of men that could be 

inducted into the armed services without impairing the development 

of U.S. war production capacity. This number would represent the 

final troop basis, and strategy would be devised in accord with that 

figure. lo Since the President in September 1942 had approved an 

Army of 8,208,000 for 1943, 8,208,000 appeared to be the logical figure with which to work.l1 

In January 1943, G-3 warned that the 8,208,000-man Army might 

approach the limit of manpower available and that adjustments from 

within would have to be made to secure the kind of Army needed 

to win the war. 12 Faced with the prospects of a declining manpower 

reserve and an improving strategic situation, the Army reviewed its 

9 jCS 154/1, 24 Dec 42, title: Troop Basis for All Services for 1944 and Beyond. jCS 

approved this study at their forty-eighth meeting on 29 December 1942. 

100PD Brief, title: Notes ... 48th Mtg jCS, 29 Dec 42, with jCS 154/1 in ABC 

370m (7-25-42), 2. 

11 Memo, Admiral William D. Leahy for the President, 30 Sep 42, with jPS 57 /D in 

ABC 370m (7-25-42), 2. 

12 Memo, Edwards for CGs AAF, AGF, ASF, 29 jan 43, sub: Reduction in Training 

Establishments and Other Zone of Interior Activities, WDCSA 320.2 Sec. III (1942-43). 
370 COMMAND DECISIONS 

employment of men in the continental United States. Early in January Marshall set up the War Department Manpower Board, with 

Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser as its president, to make specific recommendations for reducing the forces assigned to the zone of the 

interior. 13 

In consonance with this economy drive, Marshall approved-in 

February-a new Army troop basis that called for an enlisted strength 

of 7,500,000 and between 120 and 125 divisions, for June 1944. The 

over-all goal for 1943 of 8,208,000, which included officers, was retained on the ground that such a force would be necessary to take 

advantage of any favorable opportunities that might come to pass. 'l 

Defense of these requirements before the Senate and against such 

critics as Herbert Hoover was made slightly more difficult by the unofficial opposition of certain Navy officers. IC, In early February five 

investigations on the subject of manpower were going on in the Senate and one in the House. The position of the Army in the face of 

this Congressional probing rested upon the heavy preponderance of 

divisions at the disposal of the enemy and the possible disaster that 

might ensue if the size of the Army was reduced and the disparity in 

combat divisions increased. In The War Department correctly gauged 

the reaction of Congress. Maj. Gen. Alexander D. Surles, director of 

the War Department Bureau of Public Relations, put it succinctly: 

"Despite all talk, Congress isn't sure, and members will not risk their 

political necks by taking a position where they might be charged with 

sabotaging the war effort. They will talk, but they won't act." 17 

Nevertheless, in order to fortify its own thinking and planning on 

mobilization, the Army decided that it should also conduct an investigation. In accord with the earnest efforts of the Chief of Staff to 

trim Army requirements, the Operations Division in February designated a special committee, headed by Col. William W. Bessell, Jr., 

to recommend changes in the current military program indicated by 

J:l (I) Ltr, Marshall to McNarney, 10 Jan 43, and (2) Memo, Gasser for ColS, II Feb 

43, sub: Missions and Functions of the War Dept Manpower Board and Methods of Procedure, both in WDCSA 334 War Dept Manpower Board. 

"(I) Memo, Brig Gen Patrick H. Tansey and Lt Col Marshall S. Carter for Maj. 

Gen Thomas T. Handy, 3 Feb 43, sub: Troop Basis Planning, and (2) Memo. Edwards 

for AColS, G-I, G-4, OPD, and CGs SOS, AAF, AGF, 25 Feb 43, sub: Troop Basis 

Planning, both in OPD 320.2, 673. 

Ie, (I) Final Draft of a Text Prepared for Mr. Green of the Senate Military Affairs 

Committee by SOS with OPD and G-3 Co-operation, 16 Feb 43, title: Size of the Army, 

OPD 320.2, 678. (2) Memo, Marshall for SW, .) Feb 43, sub: Manpower, and (3) Ltr, 

Stimson to Knox, 12 Feb 43, WDCSA 320 SS. (4) Address by Stimson, 9 Mar 43, title: 

The Size of the Army, OPD 320.2, 678. 

10 (I) Min, Gen Council Mtg, 1 Feb 43, OPD 334.8 Gen Council, II. (2) Memo, 

North for Handy, 14 Feb 43, OPD Files, Book 7, Exec 8. 

17 Min, Gen Council Mtg, 8 Mar 43, OPD 334.8 Gen Council, II. 
THE gO-DIVISION GAMBLE 371 

shifting strategic conditions. The main question the committee was to 

investigate was the efficacy of building up foreign forces-such as the 

Free French-as opposed to arming U.S. troops, and the comparative 

effects of these alternatives on the American manpower situation and 

on Allied efficiency in prosecuting the war. 18 This was a rephrasing 

of the thorny problem-how far to go in aiding Allies-which the 

Army planners had faced from the very beginning and were to 

continue to face. 

The Bessell committee survey revealed that little could be gained 

by increasing the volume of international aid to the Allies at the 

expense of the development of U.S. forces. Equipping the manpower 

of nations, other than the Soviet Union and Great Britain, with arms 

and munitions would not substantially increase the total amount of 

effective manpower that could be placed in combat, nor would it put 

troops into combat more quickly than would the current program for 

preparing American troops for active service overseas. 19 In late April 

the committee scaled down its estimates of the ultimate strength from 

185 to 155 divisions and accepted an 8,200,OOO-man total as the planning ceiling figure-·the "maximum strength" for the Army imposed 

by manpower limitations. It recommended that the U.S. Army, and 

especially the Air Forces, be developed to the maximum strength 

practicable within the estimated limitations on armed forces and be 

deployed as quickly as possible. 20 

The committee concluded that the time had definitely come for 

long-term programing to guide the war machine developing in the 

United States. Since adequate training for a division required a year, 

mobilization and production had to be planned well in advance. 

Mobilization and production had, therefore, to be linked to national 

policy and strategic planning. The basic strategy of the United States 

was still sound and should be adhered to, and "any tendency to disperse our forces to other than the main effort [should] be a voided." 

Wh.at was required, the committee decided, was a broad and longrange strategic plan for the defeat of the enemies of the United States 

whereby requirements might be balanced against means and resources 

and then translated into a realistic military program. In this connection, the committee warned that the American public wearied quickly 

of war and would not countenance any slow process of attrition. 21 

I'Memo, Handy for Bessell, et at., 26 Feb 43, sub: Current Military Program, ABC 

400 (2-20-43). 

19 Rpt by Special Army Committee, 15 Mar 43, title: Survey of Current Military Program, ABC 400 (2-20-43). 

20 Rpt by Special Army Committee (Rev.), 28 Apr 43, ABC 400 (2-20-43). 21 Ibid. 
372 COMMAND DECISIONS 

In April the need for careful manpower budgeting was further 

emphasized. The War Manpower Commission, informing the armed 

services that approximately 1,500,000 men could be furnished to them 

in 1944, stated that this figure would be close to the limit of those 

that could be withdrawn from the manpower pool without jeopardizing war production, transportation, and essential civilian services. The 

Army estimated that by vigorous economy it would be able to save 

about 485,000 men during the remainder of 1943. Since the ArmyNavy requirements for replacements alone would run about 971,000 

for 1944, there should be a cushion of about one million men to fill 

the need for new units and to meet emergencies. At this time the 

War Manpower Commission estimated 11,300,000 men, and the Joint 

Staff Planners 10,900,000, as the number that could be kept in uniform indefinitely. The JPS went so far as to recommend no increase 

in the Army for 1944 over the approved 1943 Army Troop Basis 

goals-8,200,000 total strength and 100 divisions (though the latter 

was already a somewhat dubious figure).22 

As the TRIDENT (Washington) Conference between the Americans 

and the British approached its close in late May 1943, a deepening 

realization that careful examination of troop strength and its employment was a "must" led the Army to attempt a correlation between 

the military program and the requirements imposed by the conference decisions. At this point General Marshall and his assistants took 

what proved to be an important step in calculating the wartime 

Army troop basis. A Committee on the Revision of the Military Program was appointed in the War Department General Staff to study 

that program carefully in an effort to revise it downward. This committee, composed of two Operations Division officers, Col. Ray T. 

Maddocks and Lt. Col. Marshall S. Carter, and Col. Edwin W. 

Chamberlain, G-3, was to examine the threat of overmobilization and 

"to investigate the possibility of decreasing the total number of ground 

divisions required in our troop basis." 23 It was anticipated that the findings of the committee would serve as a guide to determining the ultimate strength of the Army and the subsequent mobilization rates. 

Early in June 1943 the committee (informally called the Maddocks Committee since Colonel Maddocks was the steering member) 

issued its general report. 24 Its studies confirmed the need for reducing 

the number of divisions-a view that had been gaining increasing 

22 JPS 57/8, 26 Apr 43, title: Troop Bases for All Services for 1944 and Beyond. 

23 Memo, McNarney for Maddocks, Chamberlain, and Carter, 24 May 43, sub: Revision of 8urrent Military Program, filed with Tab G with Rpt by Special Army Committee, 15 Mar 43, in ABC 400 (2-20-43). 

24 Interim Rpt by Special Army Committee, I Jun 43, title: Revision of Current Military Program, submitted with Memo, Maddocks, Chamberlain, and Carter for ColS, 1 Jun 43, 

sub: Revision of Current Military Program, ABC 400 (2-20-43). 
THE 90-DIVISION GAMBLE 373 

support since the end of 1942. The strategic basis for this conclusion 

was in part the demonstration by the Soviet armies of their ability to 

check the German advance. Another significant factor brightening the 

strategic picture was the improving prospect of gaining air superiority 

over the Continent. These developments finally made obsolete the 

initial Victory Program estimates of 1941. 

The committee made three basic recommendations. First, it proposed the reduction of the strength of the Army authorized for 1943 

from 8,248,000 to 7,657,000. 25 Second, it called for modification of 

the current troop basis to provide a balanced force built around eightyeight divisions, the number already activated. The twelve additional 

divisions scheduled for activation during the remainder of 1943 were 

to be deleted from the 1943 program. Third, it recommended that 

the ultimate size of the Army and of the major units in it (air and 

ground) should be decided at the end of the summer. The ultimate 

size of the Army was largely to depend on the course of SovietGerman fighting and the effectiveness of the combined British-American bomber offensive in Europe. 

If the outcome of the fighting on the Soviet front and of the 

combined bomber offensive was favorable, the committee believed that 

an ultimate strength of one hundred divisions would be necessary to 

win the war. To defeat Germany would require between 60 and 70 

divisions, and from 30 to 40 divisions would be needed for operations 

against Japan and for a strategic reserve. After the downfall of Germany, additional divisions could be transferred from Europe to defeat 

Japan. 26 

In mid-June 1943 General Marshall and the Secretary of War 

approved the committee's general report.27 The Chief of Staff informed 

the press that the activation of twelve additional divisions would be 

deferred until 1944. Lest this news lead the American public to overconfidence and a relaxation of the war effort, and obversely, lest the 

enemy conclude that the reduction signified that the United States 

was unable to fulfill its mobilization schedule, he requested that the 

information be kept in confidence. 28 On 1 July 1943 the War Department circulated a new, approved troop basis for 1943. In accord with 

the committee's recommendations, it provided for 88 divisions and an 

25 Forty thousand nurses had been added to the 8,208,000 figure. 

26 Interim Rpt by the Special Army Committee, 1 Jun 43, title: Revision of Current 

Military Program, ABC 400 (2-20-43). In June 1943, soon after the completion of its 

work, the Maddocks Committee was dissolved. For the committee's studies and recommendations, see especially papers filed in OPD 320.2 and in ABC 400 (2-20-43). 

27 Interim Report by the Special Army Committee, 1 June 1943, title: Revision of 

Current Military Program, filed in ABC 400 (2-20-43) contains General Marshall's recommendations. An attached "Brief' of the report, 7 June 1943, bears the note: "This 

paper has the approval of the Secretary of War. 6/15/43. G.C.M." 

28 Ch. VII (prepared by Maj William P. Moody) in Sec. IIC, "Mobilization, Procurement and Allocation of Manpower," in JCS MS, History of World War II. 
374 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Army strength of about 7,700,000. Two provisional light divisions, 

which were also authorized, soon were given permanent status. As a 

result, the new troop basis for 1943 envisaged a 90-division Army. 

Reduction of the early 1943 Troop Basis of 8,208,000 to 7,700,000 

men, approved by the President in November, was accomplished by 

the more or less general acceptance of the 90-division limit as the 

"cutting edge" necessary to win the war. Within this limit the character of the cutting edge changed considerably. There was a definite 

trend toward increasing infantry and airborne divisions during 1943 

since strategic and tactical demands as well as the need to save shipping space favored the use of forces that were not so heavily armed 

or so completely motorized. As a result, a decrease in the rate of 

activation of armored divisions was ordered and motorized infantry 

divisions were reconverted to standard infantry divisions. At the end 

of 1942 there had been 52 infantry, 2 cavalry, 14 armored, 2 airborne, and 4 motorized divisions in the Arm y-7 4 in all. One year 

later there were 90 divisions in existence-67 infantry, 2 cavalry, 16 

armored, and 5 airborne. The 16 new divisions activated during 1943 

represented less than half the number of divisions-38-activated in 

1942. 

Accumulation of activated and trained divisions in the United 

States began to mount during 1943 because of the imbalances in 

shipping and the strain on port capacities and in the absence of final 

strategic decisions. 29 Training camps were crowded and it was difficult to activate additional divisions-only 13 divisions moved overseas during the year as compared with 17 in 1942. This left 60 divisions in various stages of readiness scattered throughout the United 

States. Many, however, were neither at hill strength nor fully equipped, 

since replacements often had to be drawn from the newer divisions 

and the outfitting of French divisions in northwest Africa had produced shortages in equipment. 3o When in late 1943 new demands 

for manpower were made to operate the B-29's, to provide for the 

rotation program, and to keep the Army Specialized Training Program going on a reduced basis, any possibility of organizing another 

fifteen divisions in 1944, as had been planned in mid-1943 and approved in the Victory Program Troop Basis of October 1943, appeared doomed. 31 

29 Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), Chs. XXV and 

XXVI. 

30 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization oj Ground Combat Troops, pp. 220-21. 

.\\ (1) Ibid" pp. 231-32. (2) Victory Program Troop Basis, 26 Oct 43, Tab Deployment of Divisions, in Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Gen Handy's copy, Exec 6, 

OPD Files. This document bears the typed notation "Approved-By Order the Secretary 

of War-Joseph T. McNamey, Deputy Chief of Staff." 
THE 90-DIVISION GAMBLE 375 

With the activation of a new division in August 1943, the 90-division program was fulfilled. Henceforth, problems of reserves and 

narrow margins of safety became nightmares to disturb the planners' 

dreams. The question whether 90 divisions would be enough was to 

plague the War Department down to the end of the war. 32 

In early 1944 the requirements in troops for the cross-Channel 

attack (OVERLORD) accentuated certain Army-wide manpower pinches 

and made the planners take another serious look at the Army troop 

basis. During the Cairo-Tehran Conference, the Joint Logistics Committee had estimated that there would be a serious shortage of service troops during 1944 for the war against Japan, and also a shortage 

of men for the B-29 program. The committee suggested that the Army 

troop basis be revised to anticipate these shortages and that the United 

States take a calculated risk and eliminate the fifteen infantry divisions that were to be set up in 1944. This would leave the Army 

with 90 divisions-43 for the war in Europe, 7 for North Africa, 22 

for the Pacific, and 18 for the continental reserve. If necessary, service troops could be organized from the eighteen reserve divisions. 33 

A report of the Operations Division's Strategy Section in late December 1943 substantiated this estimate that 90 divisions would be enough 

to win the war, although it allocated 58 divisions for Europe and 

North Africa, 25 for the Pacific, and kept only 7 in the reserve. The 

Strategy Section recognized the possibility that the Army might not 

be able to activate the additional fifteen divisions and remain within 

the 7,700,000-man ceiling adopted in November. The economy program had released some 212,000 men for reassignment during 1943, 

but Selective Service had fallen behind in its inductions, and the 

War Department was 200,000 men short of its 7,700,000 goal. On 

top of this, the rotation program approved in December would require 60,000 men during 1944, and the Air Forces had requested 

130,000 men for its B-29 program. Even if Selective Service were 

to meet its quotas in 1944 and make up the 200,000-man deficit, 

there would be a cushion of only 22,000 men left over from the 212,000 

recovered from the economy program. Besides, the Strategy Section 

concluded, there were no firm requirements for the fifteen additional 

infantry divisions. 34 

The activation of the fifteen divisions was deferred, but the con32 (I) John J. McCloy, "In Defense of the Army Mind," in Harper's Magazine (April, 

1947), Vol. 194, pp. 341-44. (2) Interv with Brig Gen Frank N. Roberts, 29 Mar 51. 

(3) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New 

York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 476. 

3"JCS 581/3, 4 Dec 43, title: Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan. 

34 (I) SS 199, 21 Dec 43, title: U.S. Divisions and Aircraft Required To Win the 

War, and (2) SS 203, 24 Dec 43, title: Summary of Current Situation With Regard to 

the 15-Division Proposal, both in ABC 381 Strategy Sec Papers, Nos. 196-213 (7 Jan 43). 
376 COMMAND DECISIONS 

tinuing scarcity of service troops led Marshall to call a conference 

of theater G-4's in Washington in late January to consider the problem. Writing personally to several theater commanders he requested 

their aid in effecting any economies possible and recommended a 

number of expedients to relieve the deficiency in service troops. 35 

The Army was trying desperately to stay within the 7,700,000 

ceiling and to meet needs from within by rigid economy and adjustment. Discussing the whole Army personnel problem frankly with the 

Joint Chiefs in early February Marshall pointed out that the ground 

forces were short about 87,000-97,000 troops and were forced to take 

men from other divisions to fill up those going overseas. Economies 

had produced a saving of 100,000 men but the need of manpower 

for the B-29 program had eaten this up. Now there was a deficiency 

of 100,000 service troops for OVERLORD, the invasion of southern 

France (ANVIL), and western Pacific operations, and a large number 

of tactical units were being used to help in the housekeeping of training establishments in the United States in order to release service forces 

for overseas duty. The need for service personnel often resulted in 

abbreviated training periods and less efficient troops. Marshall estimated that replacements and rotation fillers, added to induction shortages and ground force and service deficiencies, made the present 

deficit between 340,000 and 400,000 men. 36 

Marshall decided that the time had come for drastic action. The 

Army, he concluded, could not justify, in the face of such personnel 

shortages, the Army Specialized Training Program that had been 

set up to educate some of its more intelligent men in colleges. On 10 

February, he cut back this program to 30,000 men, releasing 120,000 

for distribution, mainly to ground and service forces. Later in the 

month he was able to secure Presidential pressure on the War Manpower Commission and the Selective Service to review occupational 

deferments and to provide the forces required by the armed services. 37 

By spring, most of the induction backlog had been made up. 

Easing the manpower situation still left the haunting question 

whether there would be enough strategic reserve in the Army troop 

basis to ensure the defeat of Germany once the troops were ashore 

in France. Of all the calculated risks taken by Marshall and his staff 

ill preparing for invasion of the Continent, the greatest was the de35 (1) Msg, Marshall to Harmon, 27 Jan 44, CM-OUT 10668. (2) Ltr, Marshall to 

Devers, 27 Jan 44, no sub, WDCSA 320.2, 4. 

36 Min, 144th Mtg JCS, 1 Feb 44. 

37 (1) Memo, Marshall for SW, 10 Feb 44, no sub; (2) Memo, G.C.M. [Marshall] for 

MeN arney, 18 Feb 44, no sub; and (3) Memo, Marshall for the President, 22 Feb 44, no 

sub, all in WDCSA 320.2, 19. 
THE 90-DIVISION GAMBLE 377 

cision to hold to the 90-division troop basis. Even on the eve of 

OVERLORD, there were uneasy doubts in high Washington military 

circles about the gamble. On 10 May Secretary Stimson, long an 

advocate of a bold cross-Channel move, raised the issue with General 

Marshall. Stimson wrote: 

I have always felt that our contribution to the war should include so 

far as possible an overwhelming appearance of national strength when we 

actually get into the critical battle. By this I mean not merely strength 

on the battle front but in reserve. It has been our fate in two world wars 

to come in as the final force after the other combatant nations had long 

been engaged. Our men have thus come to the field untested, even when 

well trained, to fight against veteran enemies. Such conditions make the 

appearance and possession of overwhelming strength on our part important both tactically and psychologically .. '8 

Stimson feared this might not be the case on the Continent in 

1944. Against the estimated fifty-six German divisions that were to 

defend France, the United States would have barely more than an 

equal number available for the offensive by the end of the summer. 

The average age of the men in the American divisions was now 

rather high, and the Army would need a large number of replacements. Army calculations, both in the European theater and in the 

United States, seemed to Stimson "to shave the line of sufficiency 

rather narrowly instead of aiming at massive abundance." When all 

the OVERLORD divisions had left the United States, there would 

remain in the United States only fourteen uncommitted divisions. 

These would constitute practically the only reserve for operations in 

France. The British could offer no such reserve to assist the United 

States. As a result, the Germans would not get a picture of overwhelming strength opposing them. Furthermore, the estimated German reserve of eleven divisions was almost as large as the American 

reserve. The German Army was better fed than in 1918, when German morale did not break. All of this led Stimson to fear that a 

stalemate might develop in November when climatic conditions on 

the Continent would reduce the power to maneuver. Even the advantageous factors of intensified air bombardment of Germany and 

the Soviet advance might not be enough to ensure complete victory. 

The Russians, he observed, were still a long way from Germany. 

"Furthermore, the Russians are already reaching boundary lines where 

they conceivably might stop with their grand strategic objective of 

national defense satisfied by the eviction of the invader and the gaining back of all they had lost, plus the Baltic states." To forestall a 

·38 Memo, Stimson for Marshall, 10 May 44, sub: Our Military Reserves, Paper 42, 

OPD Files, Item 57, Exec 10. 
378 COMMAND DECISIONS 

stalemate, Stimson asked Marshall, should not new manpower legislation be sought from Congress before the elections in November? 

Should not new divisions be activated now by the War Department? 

On 16 May, just three weeks before OVERLORD was launched, 

General Marshall replied. He agreed that everything possible must 

be done to prevent a stalemate from developing in the fall, but he 

disagreed with Stimson's analysis and conclusions. Marshall wrote 

Stimson, "We are about to invade the Continent and have staked 

our success on our air superiority, on Soviet numerical preponderance, and on the high quality of our ground combat units. :jfl Exploiting these advantages, Marshall hoped, would convince the Germans of the futility of fighting for a stalemate. He felt "the air arm 

should be our most effective weapon in bringing home to the German people and the German Army the futility of continued resistance." As a result of recent conversations between Averell Harriman 

and Stalin, he also believed the Russians would not break off their 

current efforts until Germany was defeated. Emphasizing that the 

Army was relying on the qualitative rather than the quantitative 

superiority of its ground force units, he declared, "Our equipment, 

high standard of training, and freshness should give us a superiority 

which the enemy cannot meet and which we could not achieve by 

resorting to a matching of numerical strength." Marshall pointed also 

to the advantages of the replacement system designed to keep American divisions in the line at full strength, the preponderance of artillery, and the employment of air superiority in close tactical support. 

Even on a strictly numerical basis, Marshall thought that the 

American divisions would eventually compare very favorably with 

the German forces. Shipping and other logistical factors would limit 

the build-up in Europe to about 4 divisions a month, but even at 

that rate, by April 1945 the 59 divisions available to the United States 

could be utilized. Adding some 21 British divisions, and an additional 10 to 15 U.S. and French divisions that could be made available for employment in France if a defensive position were assured 

in Italy, the Western Powers would have some 95 divisions to employ against the estimated 56 German divisions. The most troublesome factor, he informed Stimson, would be the comparatively slow 

rate of American build-up-a direct product of purely logistical limitations. That factor, above all others, might result in slowing down 

Allied operations, since the Germans, if they felt free to transfer divisions from other fronts, could deploy their forces more rapidly than 

the Americans could build up theirs . 

. 19 Memo, Marshall for SW, 16 May 44, sub: Increase in the Strength of the Army, 

Secretary of War Files, Staff. 
THE 90-DIVISION GAMBLE 379 

If, however, all current plans failed and a stalemate did occur 

in November, then Marshall felt new major strategic decisions would 

be required. A few additional divisions would probably not be enough to 

break the impasse. If new divisions and supporting units were now 

created, furthermore, "emasculating drafts" on existing divisions would 

result and present plans for their deployment would be upset. Thus, 

he reasoned, no far-reaching changes should be made in the Army 

troop basis until the outcome of the initial stages of the invasion was 

clear. "Considering the matter from all angles and with the realization of the hazards involved," Marshall concluded, "I believe that at 

the present time no increase should be made in the over-all strength 

of the Army, except as may prove to be necessary to provide replacements." Beyond "prudent" advance staff planning for increasing the 

troop basis, which he had ordered the War Department General Staff 

to undertake, Marshall was willing to stand pat. Clearly, he looked 

upon the Allied divisions in the Mediterranean as part of the strategic 

reserve for the invasion of the Continent. He was anxious to make 

what he regarded the surplus American and French divisions in Italy 

available to support the main effort in France, as earlier he had been 

to extract seven British and American divisions from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. 

Behind the calmly reasoned and formal language of Marshall's 

reply to Stimson lay one of the boldest calculations of the war. 40 

How great a calculated risk was being taken was further emphasized 

by the concomitant willingness of General Marshall and his staff to 

allocate military manpower for the B-29 program against Japan, instead of investing in more divisions. 

The remainder of the story belongs to the annals of accomplishment. The strenuous efforts of General Marshall and his staff from 

early in the war to conserve the precious stock of American military 

strength for the desired cross-Channel operation paid off. To support 

OVERLORD and its follow-up operations, the Army funneled forces 

into the United Kingdom and later into continental Europe in everincreasing numbers during the first three quarters of 1944. Actually, 

more divisions were sent overseas in the first nine months of 1944~the 

bulk of them going to the European theater~than had been shipped 

overseas during the previous two years of war. By the end of September 1944, 40 divisions were located in Europe with 4 en route, as 

against 21 in the Pacific. 41 In the air, the preponderance lay ever 

more heavily in favor of Europe-149 groups were allocated to that 

40 See McCloy, "In Defense of the Army Mind," Harper's Magazine (April, 1947). 

41 Matloff, Strategic Planning Jor Coalition Waifare, 1943~1944, Ch. XXIII and App. D. 
380 COMMAND DECISIONS 

struggle as opposed to 57 groups on the other side of the world. With 

the bulk of the Army's combat strength overseas deployed against 

the Reich, and with most of the divisions still in the United States 

slated to go to the European theater, the Chief of Staff and his planners could consider their original concept of "beat Germany first" 

well on the way toward accomplishment. Although there were still 

over three and a half million men left in the continental United States 

at the end of September, there were only some 24 combat divisions remaining. Most of these were to be sent to Europe eventually, but the 

Army planners had hoped to maintain some of the 24 divisions as a 

strategic reserve to cope with any unforeseen emergencies. The estimated size of the reserve ranged from 5 to 15 divisions, but no definite 

decision had ever been made by the Chief of Staff. With Germany supposedly on its last legs, there seemed little need for concern on this 

score. 

But there is a postscript to this story that deserves careful reflection. When the crisis caused by the Ardennes breakthrough of December 

1944 denuded the United States of all the remaining divisions and 

left the strategic reserve a memory, the possibility of having raised 

too few divisions rose again to cause War Department planners from 

Stimson on down some anxious moments. 42 Because of the unexpected 

developments in Europe, not one division was sent to the Pacific 

after August 1944. By V-J Day all eighty-nine active divisions were 

deployed overseas and all but two had seen combat!:l Fortunately 

the crisis of late 1944 was the last unpleasant surprise. If another had 

come the divisional cupboard would have been bare. 

Certain by-products and implications of the decision also deserve 

serious consideration by postwar students. The decision was a striking 

illustration of acceptance by Army leaders of the fact that there were 

limits to their slice of the American manpower pie. The 90-division 

troop basis represented their attempt to provide a realistic meeting 

ground of three fundamentals of modern warfare-strategy, production, and manpower. It represented the relatively small, if compact, 

ground combat force that the country that was also serving as the 

"arsenal of democracy" found it could provide for a global coalition 

war without unduly straining the war economy and standard of living of the American people. In the postwar debate over strategy, 

critics who have characterized the American case for concentration 

42 (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 476. (2) McCloy, "In Defense of the 

Army Mind," Harper's Magazine (April, 1947), p. 342. 

43 The 2d Cavalry Division had been inactivated in North Africa, giving a final total 

of 89. The 13th Airborne Division stationed in Europe and the 98th Infantry Division 

stationed in Hawaii failed to get into action. 
THE 90-DIVISION GAMBLE 381 

and power-drives as "narrow" and "rigid" have uniformly overlooked 

the impact of manpower ceilings on that case. It is doubtful that 

the United States could have succeeded with its 90-division ground 

combat force had not the ground forces of the Russians and other 

allies held and fought well. It is also doubtful that the United States 

could have succeeded with the size and kind of ground cutting edge 

it produced had not it also turned out an effective, heavy-fisted, long 

air arm. The self-denying limit on cutting edge of Army ground 

forces in favor of air force expansion undoubtedly spurred further 

the growing movement for air force autonomy. 

It will long be a question whether the photofinish in World War 

II reflected an uncommonly lucky gamble or a surprisingly accurate 

forecast. But few would deny that, in their performance on the field 

of battle in the critical campaigns of 1944-45, the hitherto still largely 

untested divisions of the U.S. Army, so largely a product of General 

Marshall's own faith and struggles, vindicated the bold calculation 

n Washington. 

16 

The ANVIL Decision: Crossroads of Strategy 

by 

Maurice Matloif 

On 15 August 1944 Allied forces invaded southern France-the 

last of a long series of triphibious operations in the Mediterranean. 

Within a month they swept up the valley of the Rhone and linked 

up with General George S. Patton's Third Army. The landing took 

place nine weeks after the launching of the Normandy invasion and 

after some six months of indecision. To President Roosevelt, General 

George C. Marshall, and most U.S. strategic planners, the operation 

was a logical part of the grand design fashioned at the Cairo-Tehran 

Conference to defeat Germany decisively. To Churchill and most of 

the British staff, it was an operation at the wrong time and in the 

wrong place-an undertaking that prevented the completion of the 

Italian campaign and an advance through the Ljubljana Gap toward 

Vienna. (See Map 7.) 

Behind the landings on the coast of southern France lay one of the 

most controversial decisions of World War II. No wartime debate 

between the Americans and the British showed a sharper divergence 

of opinion; none reflected a greater contrast in national approaches 

to war strategy. As the rift between the Soviet Union and the West 

has widened in the postwar period, the controversy that began in the 

secret Anglo-American war councils of 1944 has flared into the open. 

A growing chorus of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic has charged 

that the peace was lost as a result of political and strategic mistakes 

of World War II. No decision has drawn more fire from participants 

and "Monday morning quarterbacks" alike than that to invade 

southern France. It becomes all the more important, therefore, at this 

stage of the cold war, to take stock of this key decision-particularly 

to consider whether it really was as great a mistake as its critics have 

alleged it to be. 1 

1 An undocumented and somewhat abbreviated version of the following essay, which 

grew out of a talk given by the author at the Army War College, appeared in United States NaDal 

Biographical sketch of author, p. 365. 
384 COMMAND DECISIONS 

First, it is important to remember that, though the decision to 

undertake the southern France venture-the ANVIL operation-was 

made by the Americans and the British, it was definitely influenced 

by their Soviet ally. It grew out of discussions of the Big Three at 

the Cairo-Tehran Conference in November-December 1943. That 

conference was a showdown meeting among the Allies on European 

strategy, a climax of two years of debate between the Americans and 

British and of growing Soviet impatience for action in the West. A 

word must be said therefore about the three principal partners in 

the European war and their divergent approaches to that conflict. 

Great Britain, the island empire, dependent on sea lanes for its 

very existence and situated precariously on the edge of Hitler's European Fortress, had for centuries put its faith in the balance of power. 

It could be expected to seek to revive and rally the smaller nations 

and to continue to throw its weight against any strong power that 

threatened to upset the balance on the Continent. It could also be 

expected to intervene actively in the Mediterranean and the lIIiddle 

East, through which ran the lifeline to its empire in the Orient. Experienced in war, diplomacy, and empire, Great Britain had a long 

history of alliances with European powers and its military leaders 

were accustomed to working closely with its politicians and diplomats. 

Across the Atlantic stood the other Western partner in the Alliance, the United States-young, impatient, rich in resources, highly 

industrialized, the country with the technical know-how. This was 

the country whose whole tradition in war had been first to declare, 

then to prepare. Traditionally opposed to becoming involved in European quarrels, it nevertheless had strong bonds with western Europeespecially England. The American approach to European war, based 

on U.S. experiences in World \Var I, seemed to be to hold off as 

long as possible, enter only long enough to give the bully who started 

it a sound thrashing, get the boys home, and then try to remain as 

uninvolved as before. Furthermore, throughout World War II, the 

President and his military staff could never forget the war against 

Japan, which to many Americans appeared to be a more natural 

enemy than Germany. 

The third member in the alliance against Germany, the Soviet 

Union, was a land power with completely internal lines of communication. The Soviet Union represented an enigmatic, restless, and dyInstitute Proceedings (July, 1958 copyright 1958 by U.S. Naval Institute), under the title 

"Was the Invasion of Southern France a Blunder?" The Institute has kindly granted permission to reproduce portions of the article here. The subject is developed fully in the 

context of the story of Allied strategy in mid-war in Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for 

Coalition Waifare, 1943-1944, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959). Various aspects of it may be pursued further in the publications cited below. 
THE ANVIL DECISION 385 

namic force, devoted to a political and economic ideology different 

from that of the Western partners. As we get more perspective on 

the role of the USSR in World War II, it becomes evident that the 

period of its defensive struggle against Germany was merely a pause 

in twin drives for security and expansion. But for almost two years 

after the German attack the Soviet Union was engaged in a desperate fight for its very existence, and while political and territorial 

ambitions were by no means absent, military considerations were 

more immediately paramount. Still fearful of capitalist encirclement, 

suspicious of friend and foe alike, it occupied an uneasy position in 

the partnership which Maj. Gen. John R. Deane has so fittingly 

called "The Strange Alliance." 2 

The divergent approaches of the Allies toward the European war 

were at first most clearly reflected in the conflict between British and 

American strategy-between the peripheral theory, espoused by 

Churchill and the British staff, and the theory of mass and concentration advocated by General Marshall and his staff. The British 

wanted to hit the German Army at the edges of the Continent and 

launch a large-scale landing on the Continent only as the last blow 

against an enemy already in process of collapse; the Americans wanted 

to concentrate forces early at a selected time and place to meet the 

main body of the enemy head on and defeat it decisively. Both justified their theories and plans in terms of relieving the pressure on the 

Russians. Neither side could readily win the other to its concept of 

strategy and the long debate that ensued led to a delicate relationship 

with the Soviet Union. From the beginning the Russians, locked in a 

death struggle on the Eastern Front, had no doubts about the proper 

Western strategy. They wanted a second front, they wanted it soon, 

and they wanted it in the West. Each Anglo-American postponement 

of this second front added fuel to the fire. 3 

By November 1943-on the eve of Cairo-Tehran-a critical point 

had been reached in Allied war planning. Almost two years had gone 

2 For a description of wartime relations with the Soviet Union as seen from his post as 

head of the American Military Mission in Moscow, see John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: The Viking Press, 1947). 

" The debate on strategy within the Grand Alliance may be traced in Maurice Matloff 

and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953); Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning 

Jor Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959): John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, August 1943-September 1944 (London: 

Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956); Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), The Hinge of Fate 

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), and Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 

1951). 
386 COMMAND DECISIONS 

by since Pearl Harbor. Firm agreement among the three Allies on how, 

when, and where to beat even the primary foe-Germany-was still 

lacking. One Mediterranean operation had followed another. North 

Africa had led to Sicily; Sicily, to the invasion of Italy. Always the 

skillful and resourceful arguments of the Prime Minister had urged 

the need to continue the momentum and acquire the immediate 

advantages, the "great prizes" to be picked up in the Mediterranean 

while the Allies were waiting for the right opportunity to cross the 

Channel in force. True, the Western partners had in August 1943 

agreed on a major cross-Channel attack to be launched in the spring 

of 1944-0peration OVERLORD. But disturbing reports had been reaching Washington from London and Moscow. The Russians were hinting that they might accept increased pressure on the Germans in the 

Mediterranean even at the price of a delay in OVERLORD and might 

even accept aggressive action in Italy as a substitute for the second 

front.4 These hints of a reversal in the Soviet position, coming on the 

heels of reported Briti~h cooling on OVERLORD, gave the U.S. staff 

much concern.s 

What appeared to the Americans to be at stake was far more than 

the date or even the ultimate fate of OVERLORD. The whole strategy 

of the global war, the "beat Germany first" concept, the roles of the 

respective Allies in the coalition effort-all were in the balance. If in 

the war against Germany the British were still wedded to the theory 

of attritional opportunism, the Americans had staked heavily on the 

principle of concentration. From early in the war their global strategy, manpower and production balance, and strategic deployment had 

all been planned with that primary end in view. OVERLORD represented the hope-perhaps the last hope-of realizing their basic strategic faith, and they were determined to accept no further delay in 

the long-promised and much-postponed invasion across the Channel. 

While the U.S. staff was apprehensive over the British and Soviet 

attitudes, both Roosevelt and Churchill were anxious to demonstrate 

their good faith to Stalin. 

The meeting at Tehran was the decisive conference in European 

4 (I) Msg, Deane to Joint Chiefs of Staff OCS), 9 Nov 43, CM-IN 5951. (2) Msg, 

Deane to Marshall, II Nov 43, CM-IN 7461. (3) See also Gordon A. Harrison, CrossChannel Atta'ck, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), 

p, 121. 

5 '( I) Operations Division (OPD) Draft Memo, CofS for President, 8 Nov 43, sub: Conduct of the European War, with Tab 90 in ABC 381 Strategy Sec Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 

Jan 43), (2) Henry L, Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War 

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 439. (3) Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition 

Warfare, 1943-1944, Ch. XIII. 
THE ANVIL DECISION 387 

strategy.6 Preliminary exchanges between the Americans and British 

at Cairo were inconclusive. At Tehran for the first time in the war 

the President, the Prime Minister, and their staffs met with Marshal 

Stalin and his staff. The Prime Minister made eloquent appeals for 

operations in Italy, the Aegean, and the eastern Mediterranean, even 

at the expense of a delay in OVERLORD. Stalin at this point unequivocally put his weight behind the American 'concept of strategy. Confident of Russia's capabilities, he asserted his full power as an equal 

member of the coalition and came out strongly in favor of OVERLORD. 

Further operations in the Mediterranean, he insisted, should be limited 

to the invasion of southern France in support of OVERLORD. Soviet 

experience over the past two years, he declared, had shown that a 

large offensive from one direction was not wise; that pincer operations 

of the type represented by simultaneous operations against northern 

and southern France were most fruitful. These operations would best 

help the Soviet Union. In turn, the Russians promised to launch a 

simultaneous all-out offensive on the Eastern Front. 

Stalin's stand put the capstone on Anglo-American strategy. In a 

sense, therefore, he fixed Western strategy. Churchill lost out, and the 

Americans gained the decision they had so long desired. The final 

blueprint for Allied victory in Europe had taken shape. 

It was typical of the President at Tehran to act as arbitrator, if 

not judge, between the other two leaders, as different in their methods 

as in the views they represented. The President did not appear completely indifferent to Churchill's eloquence and persuasiveness and to 

the possibilities of Mediterranean ventures, particularly in the Adriatic. 

At the same time he was under strong pressure from his military 

advisers to see that nothing delay OVERLORD and in the end he held 

fast.7 The President's task in this respect was undoubtedly made easier, 

as was that of the U.S. staff, by Stalin's firm stand. Years later, 

Churchill, still convinced that the failure at Tehran to adopt his eastern Mediterranean policy was a fateful error, wrote: "I could have 

gained Stalin, but the President was oppressed by the prejudices of 

his military advisers, and drifted to and fro in the argument, with 

the result that the whole of these subsidiary but gleaming opportunities were cast aside unused." 8 

6 The following discussion on the Tehran Conference is based on (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Ch. XXIII; (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, Chs. 4, 5, 6; (3) Matloff, Strategic Planning Jor Coalition Waifare, 1943-1944, Ch. XVI. The minutes of the meetings are 

contained in the Official SEXTANT Conference Book. 

7 For interpretati'ons of the President's role at Tehran, see: (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and 

Hopkins, pp. 780, 789; (2) Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 41-43; and (3) William D. Leahy, 

1 Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), pp. 204ff. 

'Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 346. 
388 COMMAND DECISIONS 

On the morning of 30 November, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

agreed to recommend that OVERLORD be launched during May, in 

conjunction with a supporting operation against southern France. The 

operation against southern France was to be mounted on as big a 

scale as the available landing craft permitted. For planning purposes, 

D-day for southern France was to be the same as OVERLORD D-day.9 

The plan for an operation against southern France to which the 

Combined Chiefs made reference was, to say the least, vague. It was 

actually an old plan, newly dusted off. Stalin's expressed interest at 

the opening session of the conference in an invasion of southern 

France linked to OVERLORD had caught the U.S. and British delegations somewhat by surprise. It is true that for a long time the Americans and British had been thinking about some kind of southern 

France operation to be carried out eventually. As far back as April 

1943, there had been talk of such an operation, and at the Quebec 

Conference in August 1943 the CCS had put on the planning books 

a proposal for a diversionary operation against southern France to be 

launched in connection with OVERLORD. Considerable staff planning 

had already been done on such an operation. But the bulk of the 

Anglo-American planning staff had been left at Cairo, and the only 

available study at hand was a copy of a joint outline plan drawn up 

on 9 August 1943-a plan already much out of date. Working feverishly with this plan as a basis, the few U.S. planners at Tehran had 

ready on 29 November a study for the U.S. Chiefs and the President. 

It called for a two-division assault launched from Corsica and Sardinia, building up to ten divisions, and optimistically, if vaguely, 

assumed that the landing craft and the other resources would probably be available. 10 It was on the basis of this study that the Americans and the British, urged on by the Russians, committed themselves 

at Tehran to a southern France operation. 

The Tehran decisions represented far more than the fashioning, 

at long last, of a grand design and a pattern for victory. They marked 

a still subtle but significant change in the balance of military power 

within the coalition. Britain was growing relatively weaker, the United 

States and the USSR stronger. Capitalizing on lend-lease, its production behind the Urals, the sacrifice of its armies and people, and the 

effects of a war of attrition on the German invaders, the Soviet Bear 

had been able to make its weight felt in the strategic scales at a critical point in Allied councils. The Soviet Union was coming into its own. 

"Min, 132d Mtg Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 30 Nov 43. 

10 (I) Joint Planning Staff UPS) 249, 9 Aug 43, title: Plan for Invasion of Southern 

France. (2) Study, 29 Nov 43, title: Operation Against Southern France, ABC 384 Europe 

(5 Aug 43), 9a. (3) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 123-25. 
THE ANVIL DECISION 389 

The United States, too, had grown stronger. By the close of 1943, 

when Britain had practically completed its mobilization and strains 

and stresses had begun to show up in its economy, America's industrial and military machine was in high gear. In midwar, the Americans drew up to and threatened to pass the British in deployed 

strength in the European theater. The growing flow of U.S. military 

strength and supplies to the theater assured the triumph of the U.S. 

staff concept of a concentrated, decisive war, an objective reinforced 

by the addition, from the Casablanca Conference onward, of the 

unconditional surrender formula. Via the military doctrine of concentration the strategists of the Kremlin and of the Pentagon had found 

common ground. Tehran, which fixed the European strategy, marked 

the beginning of a wartime realignment in the European power 

balance. 

The upshot of the concluding Anglo-American discussions in Cairo 

was to confirm that OVERLORD and ANVIL were to be the "supreme 

operations for 1944" and that nothing was to be done in any part of 

the world to jeopardize their success.]1 ANVIL was an integral part of 

the decisions then made. But in the months that followed Tehran the 

southern France operation came perilously close to being abandoned 

in favor of further exploitation in Italy and possibly in the Balkans. 

A drawn-out debate ensued-marked by long discussions in the theater and numerous exchanges between Washington and London. Plans 

and preparations seesawed-now the operation was on, now it was 

off-not once, but several times. 

The controversy over ANVIL in the months that followed Tehran 

falls into two main phases, roughly divided by June 1944 when the 

Allies captured Rome and went ashore in Normandy. The first phase 

is a story of confusion, uncertainty, and the temporary abandonment 

of the operation; the second, of gradual recovery and triumph. 

The details of the Anglo-American debate in the early months of 

1944 need not concern us here. 12 A variety of interlocking pressures 

built up against the operation. The widespread demands to strengthen 

the OVERLORD assault, the slow progress of the Italian campaign and 

the move to speed it up, the lukewarmness of the British, the lack of 

landing craft, and shortage of other key resources-all contributed to 

ANVIL'S decline. The debate developed first as between OVERLORD and 

11 CCS 426/1, 6 Dec 43, title: Report to the President and Prime Minister. 

12 Details of the debate are traced in (1) Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfore,1943-1944, Chs, XVIII, XXI; (2) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. V; Forrest C. 

Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), Chs. VI, XII; (4) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, Chs. VI, VII, IX; (5) 

Churchill, Closing the Ring, Ch. 11, and Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Co., 1953), Ch. 4. 
390 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ANVIL and then as between ANVIL and the Italian campaign. The 

resultant keen competition for that ever-precious commodity-landing 

craft-demonstrated the existing gap in planning between the strategists and the logisticians, and gave further proof of that old axiom in 

strategy that, to be effective, plans and means must match. As priorities. for an expanded OVERLORD assault and the Italian campaign 

rose, ANVIL received the short end of the stick. 

By the beginning of February the British attitude hardened in 

opposition to the operation. The British were as much concerned by 

the additional needs of the Italian campaign as they were by those 

of the OVERLORD assault. The end run at Anzio, spurred by Churchill, had failed to break the stalemate in south Italy and pave the way 

for a subsequent drive on Rome. The British were convinced that the 

badly stalled Italian campaign must be started up again in earnest. 

The familiar specter of the draining powers of secondary operations 

rose to haunt the Washington Army staff. But Churchill, who firmly 

believed that a vigorous campaign in Italy would offer the greatest 

assistance to OVERLORD, felt that some flexibility in disposing Allied 

strength and resources in the Mediterranean was fully justified. 

General Marshall and his planning assistants were not opposed to 

the prosecution of the Italian campaign as far as Rome, or slightly 

north thereof, but they also believed that planning and preparations 

for ANVIL had to be continued at least until April if it was to have 

any chance of being launched in the spring. To the Washington staff 

ANVIL and OVERLORD were essential parts of the same undertaking. 13 

Between the War Department struggling to keep ANVIL alive and 

Churchill intent on prosecuting the Italian campaign, Eisenhower 

found himself in a difficult position. He agreed with the War Department's estimate of the significance of ANVIL, but he was charged with 

the success of OVERLORD and from his driver's seat the planning hazards began to make ANVIL appear less feasible. To help settle the issue, 

the American Joint Chiefs, at Marshall's suggestion, delegated their 

authority to Eisenhower.14 

On 24 February General Eisenhower and the British Chiefs reached 

a compromise. The campaign in Italy was to have overriding priority 

over all other operations in the Mediterranean, at least until 20 March, 

at which time the situation would be reviewed. In the interval plan1.1 For the War Department views. see especially: (1) Memo, Hull for Handy, 15 Feb 

44, no sub, Paper 253, Book 15, Exec 9; (2) Memo, Hull for Cofs, 14 Mar 44, sub: ANVIL, Book 16, Exec 9; (3) Ltr, [Handy] to Devers, 15 Mar 44, Paper 403, Book 16, Exec 9. 

11 (1) Memo, Marshall for Leahy and King, 9 Feb 44, sub: OVERLORD-ANVIL, with 

Min, 132d Mtg CCS, in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), I-A. (2) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 9 Feb 44, CM-OUT 3919. 
THE ANVIL DECISION 391 

ning for ANVIL was to continue. 15 That the President and the Prime 

Minister accepted the compromise did not really settle the question. 

General Eisenhower became more and more uneasy over the shortage 

of landing craft for OVERLORD. Despite vigorous and costly Allied 

attacks, the situation in Italy did not improve. The stalemate continued. When the time set for reviewing the situation came around, 

General "Jumbo" Wilson, the Allied commander in the Mediterranean, 

and the British Chiefs insisted that an ANVIL simultaneous with 

OVERLORD be abandoned. On 21 March Eisenhower also concluded 

that ANVIL as a simultaneous attack must be canceled. Their recommendations were adopted. 16 

The decision in late March to forego a simultaneous ANVIL did 

not end the debate over ANVIL versus the Italian campaign. Old differences between the staffs were reargued. They now boiled down to 

a matter of options-the British wished to retain the option to continue the Italian campaign; the Americans, to launch ANVIL. The 

British argued that when an all-out offensive was launched in Italy 

it should continue until June, and then a final decision could be made 

on ANVIL depending on the situation on the Italian and Normandy 

fronts. The U.S. Chiefs insisted that once the two Italian fronts were 

joined, nothing should interfere with ANVIL. 

Back of the continued U.S. pressure for keeping ANVIL alive lay 

the familiar staff concern with ending the war against Germany quickly 

and decisively and with the least political embroilments. As Brig. Gen. 

Frank N. Roberts, the chief Army planner, summed it up: 

If we cancel ANVIL completely, the following will be true: 

a. We get into political difficulties with the French. 

b. OVERLORD will lose at least ten fighting divisions. 

c. Our service forces continue to support the western Mediterranean. 

d. Our divisions and the French divisions will be committed to a costly, 

unremunerative, inching advance in Italy. The people of both the United 

States and France mayor may not take this indefinitely. 

e. Once committed to Italy, we have our forces pointed towards Southeastern Europe and will have the greatest difficulty in preventing their use 

for occupation forces in Austria, Hungary and southern Germany.17 

As a way out of the impasse, the British Chiefs proposed a new 

15 Copy of Msg, Leahy to President, 24 Feb 44, Incl to Memo, Col A. ]. McFarland, 

]CS, for OPD, and for Aide to COMINCH [U.S. Fleet], 24 Feb 44, sub: Msg From British Chiefs of Staff on Conclusions Agreed This Morning at Meeting Held Between British 

Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower, with Paper 17, Item 55, Exec 10. 

lC, (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Mar 44, CM-IN 15429. (2) CCS 465/12, 23 

Mar 44, title: Firm Recommendations With Regard to OVERLORD and ANVIL. (3) CCS 

465/14,24 Mar 44, title: OVERLORD and ANVIL. (4) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 512-13. 

17 Memo, Roberts for Handy, 23 Mar 44, sub: What Shall We Do About ANVIL?, 

Book 16, Exec 9. 
392 COMMAND DECISIONS 

compromise, and to get on with operations in the Mediterranean the 

U.S. Chiefs agreed on 18 April to go along with it. '8 Allied resources 

in the Mediterranean were to be thrown into an all-out offensive in 

Italy, which was to have first priority. ANVIL was deferred indefinitely. 

OVERLORD would have to make its own way. 

The end of the first phase of the debate over ANVIL permitted both 

the Normandy and Italian campaigns to go forward. On 12 May the 

Allied command in Italy launched the full-scale offensive. The bridgehead and the main battle line were soon linked up and the deadlock 

in Italy was broken. On 4 june, two days before the Normandy invasion, the Allies finally captured Rome. 

As the Allied armies swept into Rome and Normandy, the debate 

between the British and Americans reopened. Would the prize be the 

occupation of all Italy, the capture of Istria and Trieste, and an 

advance through the Ljubljana Gap, with political and strategic consequences for the Balkans, or the direct strengthening of OVERLORD 

and of the subsequent continental drive? The Allies must either continue the Mediterranean drive and commit themselves to a strong and 

active offense in the south or throw their might into the assault on 

Germany from the west and content themselves with a holding role 

in Italy. 

In june 1944, shortly after D-day, the U.S. Chiefs flew to London for an informal conference with the British. The American Chiefs 

held firmly to an operation in the western Mediterranean but were 

willing to consider other plans of action. In the end the CCS decided 

to explore several possibilities. General Wilson was asked to furnish 

plans and estimates for operations at Sete and Istria as well as for 

ANVIL; Eisenhower, for an operation on the Bay of Biscay. Each operation was to be planned on the basis of a three-division lift and to be 

mounted about 25 july.'9 

In the days that followed the divergent views came into clearer 

focus. General Wilson came out strongly for a push in Italy toward 

the Ljubljana Gap and southern Hungary. He thus advanced the 

British thesis that OVERLORD could be aided elsewhere than in southern France. General Eisenhower countered with a recommendation 

that ANVIL be launched by 15 August. Concerned because his operations in Normandy were behind schedule, he argued that ANVIL would 

give him an additional port, open a route to the Ruhr, and help the 

Maquis. He firmly believed that the Allies could support but one major 

18 (1) Msg, COS to Jt Stf Mission, 16 Apr 44, COS (W) 1284, Item 68, Exec 10. (2) 

Msg, COS to Jt Stf Mission, 16 Apr 44, COS (W) 1285, Item 16, Exec 3. (3) CCS 465/22, 

18 Apr 44, title: OVERLORD and ANVIL. 

'" Msg, CCS to Wilson and Eisenhower, 14 Jun 44, CM-IN 11530. 
THE ANVIL DECISION 393 

theater in the European war-the OVERLORD battle area. Both General Marshall and General Eisenhower stressed the need for a major 

port through which to pour some forty to fifty divisions waiting in 

the United States for battle in France. Since the SHAEF staff frowned 

on Bay of Biscay operations and viewed the Sete movement as impracticable because of timing, the Americans swung back to the original 

ANVIL to stay. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff now lined up solidly in back 

of General Eisenhower; the British behind General Wilson. The Prime 

Minister directed his attack on the President and Eisenhower, while 

the British Chiefs sought to sway their American opposites. In the 

face of these new onslaughts, the American lines held suprisingly 

firm.20 

Churchill was willing to help General Eisenhower but not, he 

stated, at the expense of the complete ruin "of our great affairs in the 

Mediterranean." 21 He argued that, to hasten the end of the European war, "Political considerations, such as the revolt of populations 

against the enemy or the submission and coming over of his satellites, 

are a valid and important factor." 22 

The President would not yield. To him the courses of action 

decided upon at Tehran still were the best means of bringing about 

the unconditional surrender of Germany. He agreed that the political 

factors mentioned by Churchill were significant, but the most important task at hand was to advance into Germany. Any operations into 

Istria and the Balkans would be diversionary and secondary. He could 

not agree to the employment of U.S. forces in that area. Nor did he 

think the French would support the use of their troops in the Balkans. Plans laid at Tehran had gone well so far. Any change in ANVIL 

would have to be cleared with Stalin. The President concluded by 

reminding Churchill: "Finally, for purely political considerations over 

here, I should never survive even a slight setback in 'OVERLORD' if it 

were known that fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans." 23 

Years later a still annoyed Churchill was to write, "It was his [the 

President's] objections to a descent on the Istria Peninsula and a thrust 

against Vienna through the Ljubljana Gap that revealed both the 

rigidity of the American military plans and his own suspicion of what 

2/, (1) Msg 718, Prime Minister to President, 28 Jun 44, Item 63c, Exec 10. (2) James D. 

T. Hamilton, Southern France and Alsace, MS, Ch. IV, OCMH files. (3) Churchill, Tn'-

umph and Tragedy, pp. 63ff. (4) Msg 573, President to Prime Minister, 28 Jun 44, Item 

63c, Exec 10. (5) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 27 Jun 44, CM-OUT 57012. 

21 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 63. 

22 Ibid., p. 716. 

2:) Msg, President to Prime Minister, 29 Jun 44, quoted in Churchill, Triumph and 

Tragedy, p. 723. 

512525 0-60-26 
394 COMMAND DECISIONS 

he called a campaign 'in the the Balkans.'" 24 Churchill vigorously 

denied that anyone involved in these discussions had "ever thought of 

moving armies into the Balkans." "5 

Whatever would have been the ultimate political or military effects 

of Churchill's Balkan policy-and this is still a moot point-he was 

not to win out. The President, in complete agreement with his staff, 

held firm. On 2 July he asked the Prime Minister to direct General 

Wilson to set the wheels in motion for an early ANVIL. He declared, 

"I am compelled by the logic of not dispersing our main efforts to a 

new theatre to agree with my Chiefs of Staff. . . . I always think of 

my early geometry-'a straight line is the shortest distance between 

two points.' " 26 General Marshall and his staff could ask for nothing 

more. 

The President's personal pleas broke through the Prime Minister's 

adamant position, and he consented to the issuance of the directive 

to Wilson. On 2 July the CCS issued the directive: ANVIL would be 

launched with a target date of 15 August on a three-division assault 

basis and an airborne lift to be decided later. The build-up would be 

to ten divisions. 27 After months of uncertainty, ANVIL had apparently 

become a firm commitment-only six weeks before it was to be 

launched. 

Nevertheless, in spite of their consent there were indications that 

the British did not consider the matter closed. When the Allied breakthrough at St. La proved successful during the last week in July, the 

British made their final effort to cancel ANVIL (now renamed DRAGOON). With the possibility of using the ports in Brittany to reinforce 

OVERLORD, Churchill and the British Chiefs tried again. Eisenhower 

was subjected to intense pressure from the Prime Minister to alter his 

stand. To Hopkins, Churchill also sent a last-minute appeal to intercede and influence Marshall. 28 

Any worries that the Army planners may have had proved groundless, for Eisenhower clung firmly to DRAGOON as OVERLORD'S best 

concomitant. To Churchill, Eisenhower suggested that he was willing 

to change his plan of campaign only if the Prime Minister and the 

President ruled that political considerations were to be paramount; 

on military grounds alone he would not yield in favor of a Balkan 

campaign. With the U.S. Chiefs, Hopkins, and the President in turn 

" Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 65. 

2f'Ibid. The italics are Churchill's. 

26 Quoted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 66. 

27 Msg, CCS to Wilson and Eisenhower, 2 Jul 44, CM-IN 1613. 

28 (I) Msg 742, Prime Minister to President, 4 Aug 44, Item 63c, Exec 10. (2) Dwight 

D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc, 1948), pp. 

281-84. (3) Hamilton, Southern France and Alsace, MS, Ch. IX. 
THE ANVIL DECISION 395 

standing behind the decision, the British finally conceded defeat. On 

10 August the British Chiefs notified General Wilson he was to proceed with DRAGOON as planned, a directive that the CCS confirmed 

on the following day-just four days before the landing. The British 

would have to salvage the Italian campaign as best they could. 29 

After more than two years of discussion, frequently warm and 

spirited, the great debate over the Mediterranean and the cross-Channel 

attack was finally laid to rest. The debate over the southern France 

operation in the summer of 1944 may be viewed as the last gasp of 

the peripheral strategy advocated by Churchill and his staff from the 

beginning of the European struggle. But the war had already entered 

a new era. And in his arguments for canceling the southern France 

operation, Churchill was, in effect, giving peripheral strategy a new 

twist and a more openly political form, applying it now to the Soviet 

Union as well as to Germany. Despite the valiant efforts of the British to win another reprieve for the Mediterranean, the U.S. insistence 

on supplying extra power to OVERLORD had carried the day and 

sounded the knell for any ambitious plans in southeast Europe. 

So much for the wartime debate, decisions, and revisions. It is clear 

that the differences of opinion between the Americans and British over 

ANVIL were but one expression of the underlying disagreement over 

the type of war to be fought and the objectives to be sought by the 

Anglo-American coalition. What of the postwar charge that the decision to undertake the southern France operation was a great mistakea prime example of American political and strategic na"ivete, one of 

the worst blunders of the war, a blunder that helped throw the victory to the Russians? This charge has taken two chief forms. One, 

that the operation, designed, as it were, to buttress the "big blow" 

strategy of the Americans, must share the general round of criticism 

that has been directed against that strategy. This represents a postwar version of the case for peripheral strategy over that of mass and 

concentration. The other form of attack is more specific-that strategically and politically the Western partners would have gained far 

more by an operation against the Balkans. Both have in common the 

notion that American strategists concentrated too heavily on winning 

the military victory over Germany and not enough on political considerations. 

Much of postwar writing on the grand strategy of World War II 

has been dominated by British writers-led by the incomparable 

Churchill-and the arguments advanced have become generally familiar. One can hardly pick up a book on World War II without coming 

29 (I) Msg 596, President to Prime Minister, 7 Aug 44, Item 63c, Exec 10. (2) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 281-84. (3) Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 71,99-101. 
396 COMMAND DECISIONS 

across them, or find articles on World War II in our popular magazines that do not mention examples of U.S. strategic and political 

na·ivete. Incidentally, the list of so-called blunders of World War II 

is apparently growing. Hanson Baldwin's original modest six were 

recently tripled by Captain W. D. Pules ton (USN, Ret.). 30 From all 

latest reports, the southern France decision is still holding its high 

rating on the "big blunder" hit parade. What must be noted is that 

the eloquence of the British writers, the plausibility of their case, and 

the frustrations of the postwar years as tensions with the USSR have 

increased-all have given their case great prominence. The resultant 

criticism of the U.S. strategy runs the gamut from the nostalgic "I 

told you so" of the Prime Minister and the reasoned historical analysis of a Liddell Hart in favor of a counterstrategy to a vindictive search 

for scapegoats by certain sections of the American press. What has 

been lost in all this barrage is the American case, its compulsions, its 

strong points, its logic. Obscured, too, are the positive results derived 

from the southern France operation, although General Eisenhower has 

stated in retrospect: "There was no development of that period which 

added more decisively to our advantages or aided us more in accomplishing the final and complete defeat of the German forces than did 

this secondary attack coming up the Rhone Valley." :ll 

There is not space here to examine in detail the general charges 

against American strategy around which most of the postwar criticisms on the conduct of the war have centered. Churchill has lashed 

out at what he terms the American "logical, large-scale, mass production style of thought." 12 J. F. C. Fuller; the British student of 

strategy, has expressed the same thought in referring to this type of 

strategy as "ironmongering." 33 Chester Wilmot, the late Australian 

publicist, concluded that the Americans were "militarily unsophisticated." 34 In this representation of their strategy, the Americans 

pursued relentlessly and rigidly a kind of "big business" strategy built 

around the notion of concentrating tons of hardware in the British 

Isles and hurling it across the Channel on a definite time schedule 

in such great quantities that the hapless Germans would be all but 

submerged. This criticism begs the question whether the Churchillian 

approach-the peripheral approach-however suitable to British man30 (1) Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 

1950). (2) Captain W. D. Puleston (USN, ReL), "Revealed-Blunders of World War II," 

U.S. News & World Report, February 4, 1955. 

:11 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 294. 

32 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 426. 

33 J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War, 1939-45 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 

1949), pp. 250, 266, 385. 

34 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London: Collins, 1952), p. 128. 
THE ANVIL DECISION 397 

power, economy, and traditions, was suited to U.S. capacities and 

traditions. Gordon Harrison, author of Cross-Channel Attack, has remarked "To accuse the Americans of mass-production thinking is 

only to accuse them of having a mass-production economy and recognizing the military advantage of such an economy. The Anlericans 

were power-minded." From the beginning they thought in terms of 

taking on the main German armies and beating them. What they 

wanted was a "power drive," not a "mop-up." ;\" 

Back of the U.S. Chiefs' fear of a policy of attritional and peripheral warfare against Germany in midwar lay their continued anxiety 

over its ultimate costs in men, money, and time. This anxiety was 

intensified by their concern over getting on with the war against 

Japan. Basic in their thought was a growing realization of the ultimate limits of U.S. manpower available for war purposes. To the 

military the discernible ceilings in military manpower, and anxiety 

about the effects of a long-continued period of maximum mobilization, confirmed their doctrine of concentration. But it is a mistake to 

believe that the Americans remained opposed to all Mediterranean 

operations. As the debate over the southern France operation shows, 

a good part of their labors in 1943 and 1944 was actually spent in 

reconciling Mediterranean operations with the cross-Channel operation. It should also be carefully noted that the weakening of Great 

Britain and its close dependence on the United States were well 

under way before the end of 1943-when the peripheral strategy to 

which the Prime Minister was so dedicated was still in vogue. 

The controversy that had arisen over the question of a Balkan 

operation demands special attention. Would it not have been wiser 

to have invaded the Continent through the Balkans and thereby forestalled Soviet domination of Central Europe? The fact must be emphasized that this is a postwar debate. The Balkan invasion was never 

proposed by any responsible leader in Allied strategy councils as an 

alternative to OVERLORD, and no Allied debate or planning took place 

in those terms. The evidence is clear on this point. The Balkan versus 

southern France argument is another kettle of fish. Churchill has 

steadfastly denied that he wanted a Balkan invasion and the evidence, though not entirely clear, seems to bear him out. 36 But there 

are ambiguities in his position that remain to be explained. Undoubtedly, 

he was in favor of raids, assistance for native populations, throwing 

35 Gordon Harrison, "Operation OVERLORD," transcript of an address delivered at the 

Army War College, 19 November 1951, OCMH files. 

"0 The most recent examination of the Prime Minister's position is contained in Ehrman's volumes on Grand Strategy. For Churchill's position on the Balkans in 1943, see Volume V, pages 112·-13, and Appendix, pages 554-56. 
398 COMMAND DECISIONS 

in a few armored divisions, and like measures, but nowhere in his 

wartime or postwar writing has he faced the question that so frightened the U.S. staff-the ultimate costs and requirements of an operation 

in the Balkans, an area of poor terrain and poor communications. 

This becomes all the more important in the light of World War II 

experience with Mediterranean operations-a striking demonstration 

of how great the costs of a war of attrition can be. What is also clear 

is that both the President and the U.S. staff were determined to 

stay out of the thorny politics of the Balkan area. Suffice it to say, 

the Balkan question was never argued out in full and frank military 

or political terms during World War II. 

Before we accept the case for the Balkan alternative to the southern France operation, there are other points to be pondered. With 

all due respect to the greatest phrasemaker of them all, there probably is no worse misnomer than the so-called "soft underbelly." There is 

nothing soft about the European underbelly. As any good terrain 

map will show, the Balkan area has a hard-shelled back-certainly 

not one ideally suited for armored warfare. Aside from terrain, logistical factors must be considered. Suppose an operation in the Balkans 

had bogged down or developed into a big campaign? In that case 

additional bases would have had to be built in the Middle East to 

support it. Then there was the question of turnaround time. To have 

reoriented the Allied effort to the Balkans would have required a 

great diversion from the continental build-up and might have slowed 

plans for redeployment to the Pacific. To have reoriented that effort 

to the Balkans would itself have required considerable time. That the 

Allies were not diverted from the northern campaign may even have 

been England's salvation. For otherwise, Hitler might eventually have 

pulverized Britain with V -2 projectiles from launching platforms in the 

Low Countries. 

Then there is the important factor of public opinion. Would the 

American people in the summer of 1944 have tolerated a shift from 

the much-publicized second front to an effort in the Balkans? The 

judgment of the President, the responsible American policy maker, 

was no. Here it is important to consider the divergent approaches of 

the Prime Minister and the President to the European war. To Churchill, 

anxiously watching the rapid Soviet advance into Poland and the 

Balkans, the war had become more than ever a contest for great 

political stakes, and he wished Western Allied strength diverted to 

fill the vacuum left by the retreating Germans and thereby forestall 

the Soviet surge. Had the President joined with the Prime Minister 

as he often had in the past, the U.S. military staffs concentration on 

bringing the war against Germany to a swift military conclusion 
THE ANVIL DECISION 399 

might have been tempered and the war steered into more direct 

political channels. But the President would not, and the Prime Minister 

by himself could not. Many reasons may account for the President's 

position-state of his health, anxiety to conclude the Japanese conflict, desire to get on with the tasks of peace. In any event, by the 

last year of the war the American Commander in Chief was caught 

on the horns of a political dilemma. There is reason to believe that 

he was not unconcerned about the unilateral efforts of the Soviet 

Union to put its impress on the shape of postwar Europe. But domestic political considerations required him to fight a quick and decisive war-one that would justify U.S. entry and the dispatch of 

U.S. troops abroad. He had done the job of educating the American 

people to the need for active participation in the European conflict, 

but whether he could have led them to a prolonged war or to a prolonged stay of U.S. troops in occupation duties-such as might have 

resulted from the more active U.S. role in southeastern Europe desired 

by the Prime Minister-was more doubtful. Besides, President Roosevelt's policy for peace, like President Woodrow Wilson's, seemed to 

rest on national self-determination and an international organization 

to maintain peace-not on the balance of power. To achieve this 

aim he had to take the calculated risk of being able to handle Stalin 

and of winning and keeping the friendship of the Soviet Union. To 

use U.S. military strength to play the game of European power politics might have defeated both aims. 

While the Prime Minister appeared willing to go a long way in 

the same direction, he hedged more toward the traditional balance of 

power theory. Churchill's inability in the last year of the war to 

reverse the trend bore eloquent testimony to the changed relationships between U.S. and British military weight and to the shifting 

bases of the Grand Alliance. The United States had the power but 

did not choose to use it; the Prime Minister had the purpose but 

not the power. After the middle of 1944 British war production became increasingly unbalanced, and the British fought the remainder 

of the war under a contracting economy. Clearly, the last year of 

the war saw the foundations of the Alliance in further transition, 

British influence waning, and the United States and the Soviet Union 

emerging as the two strongest powers in the world. 

It is in the light of this shift in the power balance that we must 

consider the Prime Minister's alternatives. The strong presumption in 

the postwar debate is that had the Allies entered the Balkans the 

Russians would somehow have been held in check. The counterarguments must also be weighed. Aside from questions of military feasibility, there is no certainty that such a move would have produced 
400 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the desired peace. Had the Western partners become involved in the 

Balkans, the Russians might have gone all the way to the Channel, 

perhaps picking up the strategic Ruhr along the way. Had the Western Allies entered the Balkans in force in the face of the advancing 

Russians, there is also no assurance that new embroilments might not 

have been begun then and there as the Americans feared. With the 

traditional balance of power upset, Great Britain growing weaker, 

the Russians intent on pushing their strategic frontiers westward, and 

the United States determined to leave Europe soon, more drastic 

measures than the temporary diversion of some Western military powerlargely U.S. power at that-would seem to have been required to 

check the Russians and assure the peace in Europe. 

It appears clear that back of Churchill's Balkan policy lay the 

traditional British balance of power theory. But there is a serious 

question here too for students of strategy to consider. At the risk of 

oversimplification, it may be said that traditionally the British practice rested on its treasure, its Navy, and some ground forces-all 

placed where they could do the most good. By the summer of 1944, 

Britain had neither the wealth nor the uncommitted ground forces 

to give, and its Navy could serve little against a land power such as 

the Soviet Union. Clearly it would have required Allied help-especially 

American-to make the theory work. \Vith U.S. public opinion unprepared for a sudden shift in objective-from Germany to the Soviet 

Union-and with American tradition opposed to involving U.S. forces 

in European power politics, how realistic was the Churchillian policy? 

Furthermore, Communism has been called "an ideology in Arms"-

an ideology with its own body of doctrine, tactics, and ethics that 

operates on a global scale and assumes many forms of power-political, economic, psychological, as well as military; a colossus that can 

apparently wait generations to attain its ends. That the balance of 

power theory was a useful concept in Britain's past history vis-a.-vis 

continental Europe is undoubtedly true. Whether the British experience with the traditional balance of power theory in Europe is the 

answer to the Communist threat now, any more than it could have 

been in the summer of 1944, is questionable. Willy nilly. the power 

balance in the world has changed, and power itself has assumed new 

forms. 
17 

General Bradley's Decision at Argentan 

(13 August 1944) 

by 

Martin Blumenson 

In August 1944 Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commanding the 

12th U.S. Army Group, abruptly halted the advance of the XV Corps of 

Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army. He thus prevented its movement 

northward through Argentan toward a juncture with Canadian forces 

coming south from Caen toward Falaise. As a consequence, the Allies 

failed to close the Argentan-Falaise pocket. The virtually surrounded 

German forces in Normandy, escaping through the Argentan-Falaise 

gap, avoided complete encirclement and almost certain destruction. 

Why General Bradley made his decision and whether he was correct are questions that have stirred discussion ever since World War 

II. 

The story starts during the breakout in Normandy in July 1944, 

when the First U. S. Army under General Bradley broke out of the 

confinement imposed by the Germans in the hedgerow country of 

the Cotentin and streamed in triumph toward Avranches. 1 There, on 

the first day of August, as General Patton's Third Army became operational, General Bradley relinquished command of the First Army 

to Lt. Gen. Courtney B. Hodges and assumed command of the 12th 

Army Group. Allied ground forces in western Europe then comprised 

two U.S. armies under Bradley, and a British and a Canadian army, 

both under General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's 21 Army Group. 

Until General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, assumed personal direction of the ground campaign-a task 

he undertook on the first day of September-Montgomery functioned 

as the commander of the land forces executing Operation OVERLORD. 

1 The events described in this paper arc covered in detail in the author's Breakout and 

Pursuit, a volume in preparation for UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

Biographical sketch of author, p. 323. 
402 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The objective of OVERLORD, the cross-Channel attack, was lodgment of the Allied forces in roughly that portion of northwestern 

France which lies between the Seine and the Loire Rivers. According 

to preinvasion plans, the Allies hoped to gain the lodgment through 

the following maneuver: Patton's Third Army was to go westward 

from Avranches to take Brittany and its vital ports; Hodges' First 

Army was to protect the commitment of Patton's forces into Brittany, 

wheel on the right of the British and Canadian armies to the southeast and east, and then move eastward with those armies to the 

Seine River. 2 

The Allies started this operation with Patton's drive into Brittany 

as the main effort of the 12th Army Group. But the obvious scarcity 

of enemy forces in Brittany, the disorganization of the German left 

flank forces near Avranches, and the fact that in driving to Avranches the 

Americans had outflanked the German defensive line in Normandy 

quickly led to an alteration of plans. On 3 August the Allies decided 

to clear Brittany with "a minimum of forces" (one corps), while the 

remainder wheeled eastward with their eventual sights on the Seine. 3 

The new Allied intention was to swing the right flank toward the 

Seine in order to push the Germans back against the lower part of 

the river, where all the bridges had been destroyed by air bombardment. Pressed against the river and unable to cross with sufficient 

speed to escape, the Germans west of the Seine-the bulk of the 

forces in western Europe-would in effect be encircled and face destruction. 4 Coincidentally, the Allies would come into possession of 

the lodgment area. (See Map VI, inside back cover.) 

The XV Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip and 

under Third Army control, had by this time been committed to action near Avranches-between the VIII Corps of the Third Army 

(clearing Brittany) and the VII Corps of the First Army (expecting 

orders to drive eastward from Avranches). Because the XV Corps 

was already around the German left and oriented generally south2 See, for example, Supreme Headquarters. Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)/ 171 00/ 

35/0ps, NEPTUNE, Summary of Revised Joint Operations Plan-U.S. Forces for Phase II of 

Operation OVERLORD, 20 May 44, in EUCOM Files, Box 3. See also Forrest C. Pogue, 

The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, (Washington, 

1954). 

:J 12th A Gp Ltr of Instrs 2, 3 Aug 44. The 12th Army Group letters of instruction 

and directives are conveniently reproduced in an appendix of the Third U.S. Army (TUSA), 

After Action Reports (AAR), Vol. I. 

4 21 A Gp General Operational Situation and Directive, 4 Aug 44. Scattered through 

SHAEF and 12th Army Group files, the 21 Army Group directives are most conveniently 

found in Pogue, where they are extensively quoted and paraphrased. See also Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic (New York and London: Hutchinson & 

Co., Ltd., 1947). 
GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENT AN 403 

eastward, Haislip drew the assignment of initiating the sweep of the 

Allied right flank toward the successive objectives of Laval and Le 

Mans, the first objectives of what presumably was the encircling 

maneuver eastward to the Seine. 5 

According to General Montgomery's analysis of the situation produced by the breakout, "the only hope" the Germans had of saving 

their armies was a "staged wi thdra wal to the Seine." By swinging 

the Allied right flank "round towards Paris," Montgomery hoped to 

hasten and disrupt that withdrawal. If the Germans withdrew to the 

Seine, their immediate move, Montgomery believed, would be to 

positions east of the Orne River, generally along a line between Caen 

and Flers. If Montgomery could act quickly enough and drive south 

from Caen to Falaise, he would cut behind this first stage of the 

German withdrawal he anticipated and place the Germans "in a 

very awkward situation." Thus, although the broad Allied intent was 

to pin the Germans back against the Seine, the immediate opportunity was present to "cut off the enemy ... and render their withdrawing east difficult-if not impossible." This would be but the beginning of a "wide encirclement of success," presumably meaning 

a wide swing around the German armies west of the Seine by the 

XV U.S. Corps. Meanwhile, the main instrument with which to harass 

the first part of the German withdrawal had become the First Canadian Army, which was to attack toward Falaise "as early as possible 

and in any case not later than 8 August." G 

General Montgomery reviewed his estimate of the situation and 

also his own intentions two days later. To him, the Germans faced 

terrifying alternatives in making their withdrawal to the Seine, which 

seemed to Montgomery to be the only course of action open to them. 

Not only on the basis of the troops available but also in the absence 

of established alternate lines in the rear, the Germans could neither 

hold any long front in strength nor let go both ends of their defensive line. If they persisted in holding near Caen on the right, they 

offered the Allies the opportunity of swinging completely around their 

left and cutting off their escape. If they endeavored to buttress their 

encircled left flank near Vire and thereby weakened the pivot point 

near Caen, they gave the Allies access to the shortest route to the 

Seine. In either case, they invited destruction of their forces west of 

the Seine River. 

"TUSA Ltr, Directive, 5 Aug 44 (confirming fragmentary orders issued 4 Aug). and 

Directive, 5 Aug (confirming telephone orders issued 1640, 5 Aug); 12th A Gp Ltr of Instrs 3, 6 Aug. Third Army directives are conveniently reproduced in an appendix of the 

TUSA AAR, Vol. I. 

Ii 21 A Gp Operational Situation and Directive, 4 Aug; see also Montgomery, Xmmandy to the Baltic, pp. 118-19. 
404 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Judging that the Germans would try to escape the breakout consequences by accepting the lesser evil and pivoting on the Caen area 

as they fell back, Montgomery planned to unhinge the German withdrawal by robbing the troops of their pivot point near Caen. Lt. 

Gen. Henry D. G. Crerar's First Canadian Army was to accomplish 

this by driving southward to Falaise from positions near Caen (then 

later swinging northeast from Falaise to the Seine near Rouen). As a 

complementary maneuver, Lt. Gen. Miles C. Dempsey's Second British Army which had been attacking southeast from near Caumont 

since 30 July, was to continue to push out in an arc and drive eastward through Argentan on its way to the Seine. On the Allied right, 

Bradley's 12th Army Group was to make its main effort on the right 

flank by thrusting rapidly east and northeast toward the Seine near 

Paris. 7 

In brief, Montgomery's intentions were postulated on the belief 

that the Germans had no alternative but to withdraw to and across 

the Seine. On this premise, he sought to disorganize, harass, and pursue them, transform their retreat into a rout, and destroy their forces 

while they were still west of the Seine-within the confines of the 

OVERLORD lodgment area. On this basis, Crerar prepared to jump 

off toward Falaise, Dempsey made ready to push southeast toward 

Argentan, Hodges displaced part of his forces for a drive generally 

eastward from Avranches toward Alen«on, and Patton sent the XV 

Corps southeastward from Avranches toward Le Mans. That was the 

Allied frame of reference on the day before the Germans disregarded 

Montgomery's logic and launched what became known as the Mortain counterattack. 

From ground east of Mortain, the Germans attacked westward 

on 7 August to recover Avranches. They wished to establish Avranches as 

the left (west) flank anchor of a new continuous defensive line. They 

hoped thereby to halt the mobile warfare developing from the breakout and recreate the static conditions that had made possible their 

successful containment of the Allies during June and much of July. 

In the course of their attack, the Germans overran Mortain and 

made a serious penetration on the VII Corps front, but they were 

halted on the first day of their attack by tenacious American resistance on the ground and effective Allied operations in the air. As 

General Bradley assembled and concentrated American strength near 

Mortain to guarantee Allied retention of Avranches, he conceived 

the idea of countering the attack by trapping the Germans. 

Allied commanders first discussed the idea of ensnaring the Germans on 8 August, the day after the German attack, when Bradley, 

7 21 A Gp General Operational Situation and Directive, 6 Aug. 
GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENT AN 405 

in the presence of General Eisenhower (who was visiting Bradley's 

headquarters), telephoned General Montgomery and secured approval 

for a change in plan. His proposal was based on the fact that while 

the Allied armies in Normandy had fought hard during the first week in 

August against bitter opposition conducted from good defensive positions, General Haislip's XV Corps had rounded the left flank of those 

defensive positions and was attacking through lightly defended territory in a slashing advance. The XV Corps had already taken Laval 

and was well on its way to Le Mans. By capturing Le Mans, the 

XV Corps would, in less than a week, have moved an enveloping 

Allied arm around the German left flank to a point eighty-five air 

miles southeast of Avranches. By turning the XV Corps north from 

Le Mans toward Alen<;on, the Americans would threaten from the 

south the German counterattacking forces. This action seemed doubly 

attractive because the First Canadian Army on that day, 8 August, 

had launched its attack south from positions near Caen toward Falaise 

and was thereby threatening the Germans from the north. 8 

The timing of the Canadian attack, as related to the Mortain 

counterattack, was of course accidental, but it could hardly have been 

more fortunate. Coming twenty-four hours after the unexpected German attack, the Canadian effort, in preparation for almost a week, 

had been launched in an entirely different context. With a massive 

application of air support, the Canadians had a good chance of reaching and taking F alaise. 9 

It suddenly became apparent to the Allied commanders that the 

Germans in Normandy, by attacking westward toward Avranches, 

had pushed their heads into a noose. The bulk of their forces-two 

field armies amounting to more than 100,000 men-were west of a 

north-south line through Caen, Falaise, Argentan, Alenc:;on, and Le 

Mans. If the Canadians attacking from the north took Falaise and if 

the XV Corps attacking from the south took Alenc:;on, thirty-five miles 

would separate the two Allied flanks and the Germans would be virtually surrounded. Allied possession of Falaise and Alenc:;on, besides 

threatening the Germans with complete encirclement, would deprive 

them of two of the three main east-west roads they still controlled. 

If the Canadians attacking from the north and the XV Corps attacking from the south pressed on beyond Falaise and Alen<;on, respt'c-

.< Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Stor}' (New York: Copyright, 1951, by Henry Holt and 

Company, Inc.), pp. 372, 374-75; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 98-99; Dwight 

D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948). p. 

275; Capt. Harry C. Butcher, USNR, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Silll(m 

and Schuster, 1946), p. 636. 

" The details of the Canadian attack may be found in Col C. P. Stacey, The Canari/([7! 

Army, 1939-1945: An Official HIstorical Summary (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948), pp. 201-()3. 
406 COMMAND DECISIONS 

tively, and met at Argentan, or as General Montgomery put it, "If 

we can close the gap completely, ... we shall have put the enemy 

in the most awkward predicament." 10 

The prospect of doing just that caused the Allies to suspend the 

drive to the Seine in favor of encirclement in the Falaise-Alen<;on 

area. Instead of continuing eastward toward the Seine, the XV Corps 

was to turn north toward Alen<;on after reaching Le Mans. '1 

On 9 August the Canadian attack bogged down in the CaenFalaise corridor eight miles north of Falaise. But on the same day 

the XV Corps took Le Mans, and the following day it jumped off 

to the north. 

General Montgomery made a new analysis of the situation on 11 

August and attempted to anticipate the probable consequences of the 

implicit juncture of Canadian and American troops. As the gap 

between Canadians and Americans narrowed, he estimated, the Germans could bring up additional divisions from the east, or, more 

probably, could move their armored and mobile forces eastward out of 

the pocket toward ammunition and gasoline supplies. If the Germans 

chose the latter course of action, they would probably operate in the 

Argentan-Alen<;on area "to have the benefit of the difficult 'bocage' 

country" there. Their purpose would be to hold off the Americans 

while they used the more advantageous terrain in that region to cover 

their withdrawal. Expecting, then, the Germans to mass stronger 

forces in defense of Alen<;on than of Falaise, Montgomery concluded 

that it would be easier for the Canadians to make rapid progress. 

The Canadians could probably reach Argentan from the north before 

the XV Corps could attain Argentan from the south. 

General Montgomery therefore ordered the Canadians to continue 

their efforts to capture Falaise and proceed from there to Argentan. 

Meanwhile, the XV Corps was to advance through Alen<;on to the 

army group boundary just south of Argentan, a line drawn by Montgomery to separate the zones of operation of the American (12th Army 

Group) and the British-Canadian forces (21 Army Group). He projected a meeting of Canadian and American forces just south of Argentan, which would form a literal encirclement of the Germans. The 

British Second Army and the First U.S. Army, pressing from the west, 

were to herd the Germans into the Canadian-American line and 

assist in the total destruction of the surrounded enemy forces. Should 

the Germans somehow evade encirclement at Argentan, Montgomery 

was ready with an alternate plan: the Allies were to reinstate the drive 

earlier projected to the Seine. I 2 

10 21 A Gp General Operational Situation and Directive, 11 Aug. 

11 12th A Gp Ltr of Instrs 4, 8 Aug. 

" A Gp General Operational Situation and Directive, 11 Aug. 
GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENT AN 407 

While the Canadians endeavored to resume their attack toward 

Falaise, the XV Corps drove north from Le Mans on 10 August and 

secured Alen«on two days later. General Patton had set the corps 

objective at the army group boundary-north of Alen«on and just 

south of Argentan-so Haislip's forces continued their attack. Since 

Patton's order had also directed preparation for a "further advance" 

beyond the army group boundary, and since the army group boundary seemed within reach, Haislip-on the basis of the "further advance" 

inferentially authorized-established Argentan as the new corps objective. With two armored divisions and two infantry divisions comprising his forces, Haislip judged that he could hold a solid shoulder 

between Alen«on and Argentan, and with the Canadians, who were 

to reach Argentan from the north, thus encircle the German forces 

to the west. 1:3 

As the XV Corps attacked toward Argentan, General Haislip 

pointedly notified General Patton that he was about to capture the 

last objective furnished by the army commander. By implication, 

Haislip requested authority to proceed north of Argentan if the Canadians were not yet there. He suggested that additional troops be placed 

under his command so that he could block all the east-west roads 

under his control north of Alen«on. 14 

Since the Canadians had made no further progress toward Falaise 

while the XV Corps had moved rapidly, Patton sent word for Haislip 

to go beyond Argentan. Haislip was to "push on slowly in the direction of Falaise." After reaching Falaise, Haislip was to "continue to 

push on slowly until . . . contact [is made with] our Allies," the 

Canadians. 15 

Attacking toward Argentan on the morning of 13 August, the XV 

Corps struck surprising resistance. The advance halted temporarily. 

But as the corps was preparing to make a renewed effort to get to and 

through Argentan, a surprising message came from the Third Army. 

General Bradley had forbidden further movement northward. General Patton had to order General Haislip to stop. Instead of continuing to the north to an eventual meeting with the Canadians, the 

XV Corps was to hold in place. 1G 

This is the controversial command decision. Less than twenty-five 

1:\ Memo, Patton for Gaffey, 8 Aug; TUSA Ltr of Instrs, Patton to Haislip, 8 Aug; 

TUSA Directive, 10 Aug (confirming fragmentary orders issued 8 Aug); XV Corps Operations Instructions issued 2200, 11 Aug; XV Corps Chief of Stair's Notes of Mceting. 

0730, 12 Aug. Important XV Corps papers are to be found in the XV Corps Chief of 

Stair's Journal and File. 

H Haislip to Patton, 2130, 12 Aug. 

1', Gaffey to Haislip, 0040, 13 Aug. 

Iii Gaffey to Haislip, received at XV Corps 1415, 13 Aug; see also Memo, Patton for 

Haislip, 13 Aug, and TUSA Directive, 13 Aug. 
408 COMMAND DECISIONS 

miles separated Canadians and Americans-the Argentan-Falaise gap, 

through which the Germans tried to escape. Why Bradley did not allow 

Patton to let the XV Corps continue north and seal the ArgentanFalaise pocket is the main question of debate. 

Montgomery believed-with good logic and a sound estimate of 

the probable course of German action-that the Canadians could cover 

the shorter distance to Argentan from the north more quickly than 

the XV Corps could from the south. His belief turned out to be overoptimistic. Despite his injunction for speed in getting to Falaise and 

beyond, the Canadians, halted eight miles short of Falaise by 9 August, were unable to mount a renewed attack until 14 August. They 

did not secure Falaise until the end of 16 August. According to Chester Wilmot, "the evidence suggests that the [Canadian] thrust from 

the north was not pressed with sufficient speed and strength." 17 

When the Canadians reached Falaise, U.S. troops were still just 

south of Argentan, where they had been halted by Bradley's order 

three days before. The gap between the two Allied forces had been 

narrowed, but fifteen miles still separated them. Through this gap 

German forces withdrew to the east. "Due to the extraordinary measures taken by the enemy north of Falaise," General Eisenhower wrote 

to General Marshall, "it is possible that our total bag of prisoners 

[from the Argentan-Falaise pocket] will not be so great as I first 

anticipated." 18 

The failure of the Canadians to reach Falaise more quickly made 

General Bradley's decision to halt the XV Corps appear in retrospect 

to many commanders, both Allied and German, to have been a tactical error, a failure to take full advantage of German vulnerability.'9 

It seemed particularly true because General Bradley himself had suggested and General Montgomery had accepted the idea of literal 

encirclement. So too had General Patton. If, as Patton said, the "purpose of the operation is to surround and destroy the German west of 

the Seine," as he understood it to be, the Germans had first to be 

surrounded so that their destruction would be inevitable. He envisioned 

pincers-the Canadians and the XV Corps on opposite sides-cutting 

through the German rear on relatively narrow fronts and actually 

encircling the enemy as a preliminary to destruction. Thus, he gave 

the XV Corps the task of making contact with the Canadians on the 

opposite Allied flank. 20 

17 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), pp. 

424-25. 

18 Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Aug, OCMH files. 

19 See, for example, George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 1947), p. 105, and MS # B-807 (Kuntzen), the latter (in English translation) 

in OCMH files. 

20 Sources cited n. 13. above. 
GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENTAN 409 

Yet it would seem that General Bradley was less interested in 

encirclement than in destruction. Judging, like the others, that the 

Germans by attacking had "incurred the risk of encirclement from 

the South and North," he immediately visualized destruction occurring as the result of the closing of two Allied jaws. The upper jaw 

was to consist of the Canadian army, the British army, and part of 

the First U.S. Army on the north; the lower jaw was to be formed 

by part of the First Army (the VII Corps) and part of the Third Army 

(the XV Corps) on the south. In this concept, the Canadian army 

and the XV Corps were merely the front teeth of the upper and lower 

ja ws, respectively; the remainder of the Allied forces were also to have 

a part in crushing the enemy forces caught between them. Artillery 

and tank fire, as well as air attack, had important roles to play. Holding 

the XV Corps at Argentan conformed with General Bradley's idea 

of destroying the enemy by the mashing effect of two jaws in process 

of closing. 21 

In actuality, the XV Corps at Argentan was already in an exposed 

position and vulnerable on both flanks. Though few enemy troops 

were on the XV Corps east (right) flank, the west flank was open to 

the German forces partially bottled up in the pocket. As the Allies 

increased the pressure they had to expect the Germans to make a break 

for safety. There was no better place for such an effort by the German forces concentrated for the Mortain counterattack than against 

the relatively weak flank of the XV Corps. On 13 August, when 

Bradley stopped further northward effort by the XV Corps, the contingents of the First Army on the XV Corps left were just starting 

to come up from Mayenne. In the extremely fluid situation of that 

day, a gap somewhere between twenty-five and fifty miles between 

U.S. forces near Mayenne and Argentan existed; it could not have 

been reassuring to General Bradley. And though he has not mentioned 

this as a factor in his decision, it was reasonable for him to be more 

concerned at that time with security than with encirclement. 

Though the Allied commanders did not seem to be anxious about 

the Mayenne-Argentan gap, the Germans were preparing to launch 

a massive attack against the deep left flank of the XV Corps. Had 

the Germans been successful in getting off their attack, they would 

have struck exactly in the area between Mayenne and Argentan. 22 

This alone would seem to justify Bradley's decision to halt the XV 

21 See 12th A Gp Ltr of Instrs 4, 8 Aug. 

" Hitler Order, WFSt/Op. Nr. 772830/44.g. Kdos. CheJs, 11 Aug, quoted in AGp B to 

the armies, 0030, 12 Aug, in AGp B Fuehrer BeJehle; Telecons, Blumentritt and Speidel, 

0200, 11 Aug, Kluge and Eberbach, 0315, II Aug, in AGp B KTB; Msg, Kluge 

to OKW/ WFSt (information to subordinate commands), 1745, 11 Aug, in AGp B 

Lagebeurteilungen, Wochenmeldungen. Copies of the captured German Army records are on 

file at the National Archives. OB West, a Study In Command, pp. 57, 129, OCMH. 
410 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Corps and turn it from offensive orientation to defensive preparation. 

The continuous existence of the Argentan-Falaise gap led the Germans naturally into this escape corridor, where they were vulnerable 

to destruction from Allied artillery and air. 

Long after the event, General Bradley explained that a head-on 

juncture of Canadians and Americans would have been a "dangerous 

and uncontrollable maneuver." According to General Eisenhower, it 

might have caused a "calamitous battle between friends." 23 Yet Bradley himself later offered two solutions to co-ordinate the artillery fires 

of the forces coming together: a distinctive terrain feature or conspicuous landmark could have been selected as the place of juncture; or 

the Canadian or American axis of advance could have been shifted 

several miles east or west to provide a double and stronger cordon of 

encirclement and avoid the danger of a head-on meeting. 24 

Bringing Canadians and Americans closer together had a more 

immediate disadvantage-the hampering of artillery and air activity, 

particularly the latter. Close support missions would have become 

increasingly restricted and the danger of bombing errors greater. As 

it was, the extremely fluid front necessitated considerable shifting of 

bomb safety lines and made the work of Allied pilots a delicate matter. Yet for all the hazards of error, Allied aircraft operated in the 

Argentan-Falaise area with excellent results until 17 August, when 

the bomb line in that sector was removed and air activity, at least 

theoretically or officially, ceased. 25 Had an actual meeting of Canadians and Americans occurred near Falaise or Argentan, air activity 

would have come to an end much sooner, and artillery fire would 

ha ve had to be curtailed. 

Another reason contributing to General Bradley's reluctance to 

send American troops beyond Argentan was that he preferred, as he 

later said, "a solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise." 

Although he afterward stated that he had not doubted the ability of 

the XV Corps to close the gap-and this despite increasing resistance encountered by the corps on the morning of 13 August-he had 

questioned the ability of the corps to keep the gap closed. The increasing resistance met that morning and the fact that Haislip had called 

for additional troops to ensure retention of the Alen<$on-Argentan 

area-again even though General Bradley did not mention these factors in his later account-argue in support of his decision. Further23 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 377; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 278-79. See also, 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 641. 

24 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 377. 

25 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War 

II, Vol. III, ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago: The University 

of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 253-54; 12th A Gp Memo for Record, 18 Aug. 
GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENTAN 411 

more, Bradley incorrectly believed that the bulk of the German forces 

west of the Alen<;on-Caen line were already stampeding across the 

Argentan plain and through the gap. Nineteen divisions, he feared, 

would trample the thin line of American troops if troops went beyond 

Argentan. 2 (J Though the Germans were not stampeding, the belief that 

they were helps explain the decision to stop the XV Corps. Perhaps 

the Canadians too were aware of the possible overextension of forces 

on their side of the gap. 

Two arguments advanced to explain General Bradley's decision 

must be considered even though they appear to have little validity. 

First, rumor soon after the event ascribed the halt of the XV Corps 

to warnings by the Allied air forces that time bombs had been dropped along the highways in the Argentan-Falaise area to harass German movements. Further northward advance by the XV Corps, therefore, would have exposed American ground troops to these bombs. 

Whether this had a part in shaping General Bradley's decision or not, 

the fact was that fighter-bomber pilots had sown delayed-action 

explosives over a wide area between 10 and 13 August. However, the 

bombs were fused for a maximum of twelve hours' delay, and they 

therefore could not have endangered the American ground troops. e, 

Second, it has been suggested that bringing the Canadians and 

Americans together head-on would have disarranged plans to "get 

the U.S. and British forces lined up and started together going east." 2S 

This explanation is patently weak. Arguing from hindsight, it invents 

a cause that seems to fit the results. 

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the whole question is 

General Bradley's statement that he could not have let the XV Corps 

go beyond Argentan in any event because he lacked the authority to 

do so. The corps was already at the army group boundary and indeed slightly across it and into the 21 Army Group zone. Since General Montgomery commanded the ground forces in France, and since 

Bradley had already violated the demarcation delineating his own 

sphere of operations, Bradley needed Montgomery's permission to go 

farther to the north. Though Montgomery did not prohibit American 

advance beyond Argentan, neither did Bradley propose it. 2 () Perhaps 

the main reason why they both accepted the situation was the impending Canadian attack on Falaise, the second attack, scheduled for 

"i Bradley. A Soldier's Story, p. 377. 

"Stacey, The Canadian Army, p. 204; Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 105; Craven and 

Catc, ARGUMENT to V-E Day', pp. 257-58, 

2S Answers by Generals Walter Bedell Smith and Harold R. Bull to questions by Historical Section, European Theater of Operations, U,S. Army. (ETOUSA). 14-1:) Scp 45. 

OCMH files. 

29 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p, 376, 
412 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the following day, 14 August. Canadian success in attaining not only 

Falaise but Argentan would have made unnecessary any further intrusion into the 21 Army Group zone by the XV U.S. Corps. 

General Bradley himself later considered the failure to close the 

gap a mistake, and he placed the responsibility on Montgomery. He 

recalled that he and Patton had doubted "Monty's ability to close 

the gap at Argentan" from the north, and they had "waited impatiently" for word from Montgomery to authorize continuation of the 

XV Corps advance. While waiting, according to Bradley, he and Patton had seen the Germans reinforce the shoulders of the ArgentanFalaise gap and watched the enemy pour troops and materiel eastward to escape the unsealed pocket. It seemed to him and Patton, 

Bradley remembered, that Dempsey's British Second Army, driving 

from the northwest, accelerated German movement eastward and 

facilitated German escape by pushing the Germans out of the open 

end of the pocket like squeezing a tube of toothpaste. "If Monty's 

tactics mystified me," Bradley later wrote, "they dismayed Eisenhower 

even more. And ... a shocked Third Army looked on helplessly as 

its quarry fled [while] Patton raged at Montgomery's blunder." 30 

It is true that the Germans were building up the shoulders of the 

gap by 13 August, but they were not fleeing eastward to escape encirclement by that date. The Germans had started on 11 August to withdraw to some extent their salient at Mortain, but Hitler was still 

insisting that another attack toward Avranches was necessary; to 

maintain the conditions that would make it possible, he ordered an 

attack against the deep left flank of the XV Corps. Not until 13 August, several hours before Bradley halted the XV Corps, did a highranking commander state officially for the first time what in retrospect all German commanders later claimed to have thought-that it 

was time to begin to escape the threatening Allied encirclement. 31 

Not until the following day, 14 August, did Hitler admit that further 

retraction of the Mortain salient was necessary and that a renewed 

attack toward Avranches was, at least for the moment, impossible. 

Not until the afternoon of 16 August did the Germans begin to 

organize a withdrawal through the Argentan-Falaise gap.32 

That Bradley claimed to have seen this as early as 13 August is 

due either to bad memory or to overanxious expectation of what, in 

30 Ibid., p. 377. 

:11 Lt. Gen. Josef Dietrich, commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, stated this in a telephone conversation with Lt. Gen. Hans Speidel, Lt. Gen. Friedrich Wiese, and Lt. Gen. 

Alfred Gause, 1035, 13 Aug, in AGp B KTB. 

:l2 Hitler Order, quoted in Msg, DB WEST to AGp B, 0445, 14 Aug, in AGp B Fuehrer 

Befehle; Telecon, Kluge and Jodi, 1245, 16 Aug, in AGp B KTB. See DB WEST and AGp 

B KTBs for 16 Aug. 
GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENTAN 413 

his opinion, the Germans would have to do. If American intelligence 

was at fault, it was in anticipating the difficulty of securing and transmitting-in time to be of use-information on a situation so fluid 

that reports were out of date as they were being made. Thus, Allied 

predictions were ahead of the facts. 

If Patton, in a subordinate role, could only rage at Montgomery's 

tactics, and if Bradley thought he might offend a sensitive Montgomery by requesting permission to cross the army group boundary, Eisenhower, who was in France and following the combat developments, 

might have resolved the situation had he thought it necessary. Yet 

General Eisenhower did not intervene. Interfering with a tactical 

decision made by a commander in closer contact with the situation 

was not Eisenhower's method of exercising command. Long afterward, 

General Eisenhower stated that he thought Montgomery should have 

closed the gap and that closing the gap "might have won us a complete battle of annihilation." 33 Montgomery's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. 

Sir Francis de Guingand, also believed that the Argentan-Falaise gap 

might have been closed if Montgomery had not restricted the Americans by means of the existing army group boundary, a restriction, 

Guingand thought, American commanders felt strongly.34 

Despite the foregoing observations made after the event, there is 

no doubt that the basis for General Bradley's decision at Argentan 

included four justifiable tactical considerations: (1) on the evidence 

of the increasing resistance to the XV Corps on the morning of 13 

August, there was no certainty that American troops could move 

through or around Argentan and beyond; (2) since the XV Corps 

left flank was already exposed, there was no point in closing the Argentan-Falaise gap at the expense of enlarging the Mayenne-Argentan 

gap on its deep left; (3) the Canadians were about to launch their 

second attack to Falaise, an effort that, it was hoped, would get them 

beyond Falaise to Argentan and make unnecessary a further American advance into the 21 Army Group zone; (4) bringing American 

and Canadian lines together would have inhibited the full use of the 

superior strength of Allied air and artillery. 

What were the consequences of the decision? General Patton was 

unhappy with the halt imposed on the XV Corps and impatient to 

keep moving. Bradley estimated that, "due to the delay in closing the 

gap between Argentan and Falaise, many of the German divisions 

which were in the pocket have now escaped." Thus it was unnecessary to retain a large force at Argentan. Montgomery had earlier 

"Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 278-79; see Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 214 . 

. 34 Maj. Gen. Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner's 

Sons, 1947), p. 407. 
414 COMMAND DECISIONS 

authorized, in the event the Germans escaped encirclement at Argentan, the drive to the Seine. The virtual absence of enemy forces in 

the region east of Argentan to the Seine and the greater mobility of 

American forces as compared to the Germans thought to be fleeing 

the pocket made it reasonable to turn Patton toward the eastern 

boundary of the OVERLORD lodgment area, which now appeared within 

reach. It was true that the Mayenne gap on the XV Corps left 

appeared well on its way to elimination because of the excellent 

advance of the VII Corps on 13 August, and thus the XV Corps 

could have attacked northward through Argentan with greater security on 14 August. But since Montgomery had had twenty-four hours 

to invite the XV Corps across the army group boundary and had not 

done so, Bradley, without consulting Montgomery, decided to retain 

part of the XV Corps at Argentan and send the rest eastward toward 

the Seine River. 35 General Patton seems to have had a hand in the 

decision, for he secured approval by telephone to institute this course 

of action, and on 14 August he instructed General Haislip to attack 

eastward. 36 

This of course changed the pattern of the battle. The reduced 

forces of the XV Corps reached the Seine River and crossed it at 

Mantes-Gassicourt on the night of 19 August, thereby trapping the 

German forces in Normandy. Simultaneously, the corps dispatched 

an armored division downstream from Mantes-Gassicourt on the left 

bank of the seine to drive the Germans toward the mouth where escape 

crossings were more difficult. Eventually, a corps of the First Army 

(the XIX Corps) joined this effort to deny the Germans easy crossings over the Seine. 

Meanwhile, at Argentan the Germans were implementing their 

decision of 16 August to escape through the Argentan-Falaise gap. 

The withdrawal they started that evening increased pressure on the 

remaining XV Corps forces still in place. It became evident, contrary 

to earlier Allied intelligence estimates, that a large proportion of the 

German forces in Normandy still remained within the ArgentanFalaise pocket. What the Americans had earlier judged to be escape 

efforts had in reality been troop movements to positions east of Argentan-Falaise, defensive movements designed to blunt the threats to 

Argentan and Falaise. 37 

:l5 12th A Gp Directive for Current Operations, 15 Aug; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 

378-79; see also 21 A Gp Directive, II Aug. 

36 TUSA Directive to XV Corps, 14 Aug, and Directive, 15 Aug (confirming oral 

orders, 14 Aug); Telecon, Gaffey and Menoher, 2145, 14 Aug. 

37 See, for example, XV Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 12, 0300, 15 Aug; see also Magna 

E. Bauer, Major Shifts of Divisions Made by Germans to and Within the German Normandy Front Between 30 July and 25 August 1944, and the Significance of These Movements in View of Allied Strategy, OCMH MS # R-33. 
GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENT AN 415 

Closing the gap by joining Canadians and Americans was thus as 

desirable as it had seemed on 13 August, when Bradley had halted 

the XV Corps, but closing the gap three days later was bound to be 

more difficult, not only because of the German withdrawal of the Mortain salient and the concentration of enemy troops at the shoulders 

of the gap, but also because Bradley had allowed Patton to reduce 

the forces at Argentan in favor of the drive to the Seine. 38 On the 

same day, 16 August, Montgomery phoned Bradley and suggested 

that Canadians and Americans endeavor to meet--not somewhere 

between Argentan and Falaise, but seven miles northeast of Argentan, near Chambois. 39 

No corps headquarters was on hand to direct the American part 

of the projected meeting, and the attack did not get under way until 

18 August. The actual meeting of Canadian and American forces 

occurred near Chambois on 19 August, but not until the following 

day was the pocket securely closed. By that time, American troops 

were crossing the Seine. The Germans were roped into a relatively 

small area bounded by the Seine and the sea. With Allied control of 

the air (over the Seine) and the coastal waters, the Germans were 

encircled at the Seine. 

By not closing the Argentan-Falaise pocket, the Allies were able 

to reach the Seine more quickly and encircle the Germans there at 

much less cost in terms of Allied casualties. The Germans within the 

Argentan-Falaise pocket were not so disorganized or so vulnerable as 

is sometimes thought. Considering the disadvantages under which they 

were operating-Allied air supremacy, the limited road network, the 

close proximity of Allied artillery, the relative absence of cover on the 

Argentan plain-the Germans made a well-organized and well-executed 

withdrawal out of the pocket. Overextending the XV Corps by sending it beyond Argentan could have proved disastrous to the corps. 

Leaving the gap open provided a safety valve for German escape. The 

psychological effect of findi-ng more Allied troops at the Seine after 

having escaped through the Argentan-Falaise gap must have been 

doubly discouraging and depressing to the Germans. 

Was the shallow encirclement at Argentan ever possible? It would 

appear so, but whether it could have been maintained for long remains 

questionable. General Haislip had recognized that the Foret d'Ecouves, 

a large wooded area just south of Argentan, provided the Germans 

with excellent terrain from which to deny Argentan to the XV Corps. 

38 From four divisions and twenty-two artillery battalions in the area between 

Alen<;on and Argentan on 14 August, the American forces were reduced to three divisions and seven artillery battalions. Royce L. Thompson, A Statistical Study of Artillery 

Battalions at the Argentan-Falaise Pocket, MS, OCMH files. 

:J 9 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 379. 
416 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Haislip had therefore instructed the 2d French Armored Division to 

bypass the forest on the left (west) and the 5th U.S. Armored Division to drive around the eastern edge. Disregarding the order, the 

French division commander split his command into three columns and 

sent one each around the western edge, through the forest, and 

around the eastern limit. The column on the rIght consequently 

usurped a road reserved for the American armored division and 

blocked its advance for six hours during the afternoon of 12 August. 

During those hours, the German commander, Lt. Gen. Heinrich Eberbach, hastily assembled panzer elements into a coherent defense that 

blocked the subsequent American effort. By the following morning, 13 

August, defensive preparations had progressed even further, to the 

point where German guns well sited and skillfully concealed on dominating terrain wrought a surprising amount of damage on the XV 

Corps attack formations. Yet as gratifying as this was to the Germans, 

it was also obvious to them that they were spent. They had stopped 

the American attack, but they did not expect to maintain for long 

the slender defensive line hastily established to oppose the XV Corps. 

The halt of the XV Corps attack early that afternoon came as a welcome surprise. 40 

Despite the increased resistance met at Argentan, with continued 

effort the XV Corps would more than likely have been able at the 

least to take physical possession of Argentan and thereby control the 

vital road net centering on that town. Obviously, this would have provoked violent German counteraction by the concentrated forces within 

the pocket. How far beyond Argentan the XV Corps might have gone, 

and how long it could have maintained positions in or beyond Argentan, are of course questions impossible to answer with certainty. 

What critics of Bradley's decision sometimes overlook is the fact 

that by escaping through the Argentan-Falaise gap, the Germans ran 

a gantlet of fire that stretched virtually from Mortain to the Seine. 

Artillery and air took a fearful toll of the withdrawing enemy troops. 

No one knows how many Germans escaped Argentan-Falaise and 

later Chambois. Estimates 'vary between 20,000 and 40,000 men. Not 

many more than fifty medium and heavy artillery pieces and perhaps 

that many tanks reached eventual safety. Radios, vehicles, trains, supplies were lost; "even the number of rescued machine-guns was insig40 Capitaine Even, "La 2d D.B. de son Debarquement en Normandie it la Liberation 

de Paris," Revue Historique de I'Armee, I (March, 1952), pp. 107-32; Capitaine Jean Maigne, 

"Les Forces Franc;aises et la Jonction 'OVERLORD-DRAGOON,' " Revue d' Histoire de la Deuxirme 

Guerre Mondiale, No. 19 Guly, 1955), pp. 17-33; Msgs, Haislip to Leclerc and Oliver, 

1845, 12 Aug, and Haislip to Patton, 12 Aug; XV Corps and 5th Armd Div AARs, Aug 

44; XV Corps FO 3, 9 Aug; Telecon, Speidel, Wiese, Gause, and Dietrich, 1035, 13 Aug, 

and Friedel Telecons, 1230 and 2140, 13 Aug, in AGp B KTB. 
GENERAL BRADLEY'S DECISION AT ARGENTAN 417 

nificant." 41 All that remained were fragments of two field armies, the 

Fifth Panzer and the Seventh, which had effectively bottled up the 

Allies in Normandy during June and July, before the American breakout. The Allies took 50,000 prisoners in the Argentan-Falaise area; 

10,000 dead were found on the field!2 Those who escaped had still 

to reckon with the Allied forces at the Seine. An indication of the 

additional losses suffered by the Germans there may be found in the 

fact that seven armored divisions managed to get the infinitesimal total 

of 1,300 men, 24 tanks, and 60 artillery pieces of varying caliber 

across the Seine. 43 The German remnants east of the Seine, lacking 

armament, equipment, even demolitions to destroy bridges behind 

them, could do nothing more than retreat toward Germany. 

In the holocaust of the German defeat in Normandy, General 

Bradley's decision at Argentan was perhaps the major factor. Assum- I 

ing the most advantageous conditions, how much better could the 

Allies have destroyed the Germans by closing the Argentan-Falaise 

gap? If any part of Bradley's decision might be considered a mistake, 

it is only that he halted the XV Corps before it took and secured 

Argentan, and this in retrospect seems far less momentous than it may 

have seemed at the time. 

In other respects, General Bradley's decision seems justified, particularly by the turn of events. First and foremost, he remained 

within the operational framework established by his superior in command, General Montgomery-both in terms of boundaries and objectives. Whether he planned the rest that way or not, the results were 

fortunate. He achieved security at Argentan by sacrificing offensive 

maneuver and thereby prevented what could have been a disastrous 

overextension of the XV Corps; he ensured the destruction of two German armies at little cost; relinquishing the slim possibility of making 

and maintaining effective contact with the Canadians, he sent Patton 

to the Seine and secured not only a successful encirclement in doublequick time but also the goal of the cross-Channel attack, the lodgment area of the Allied armies on the Continent. 

By the end of August, the Allies were at the Seine. The Germans 

were also at the Seine, but their shattered and disorganized elements 

could do little to oppose the Allied pursuit that was to take the 

Allied armies swiftly to the frontier of the enemy homeland. 

41 MS # A-922 (Eberbach). 

42 V Corps G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation 7, 23 Aug; FUSA AAR, Aug 44; see 

B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, The Indirect Approach (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), 

p. 317. 

43 Fifth Pan<:er Army Report, 1650, 28 Aug, in AGp B KTB. 

18 

Logistics and the Broad-Front Strategy 

by 

Roland C. Ruppenthal 

Of all decisions made at the level of the Supreme Allied Commander in western Europe during World War II, perhaps none has 

excited more polemics than that which raised the "one-thrust-broadfront" controversy. This has revolved about the decision that General 

Dwight D. Eisenhower made in September 1944 to build up his 

forces along the Rhine through the whole length of the Western 

Front, from the North Sea to Switzerland, before launching a final 

drive into the heart of Germany. It embodied what has come to be 

known as the "broad-front strategy." 

There are those who endorse the view held by the top British 

commander in the theater, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, 

that had General Eisenhower decided-preferably several weeks earlier, say, in mid-August-to concentrate all available resources in the 

north and halt all other offensive operations, the Allies with one 

bold, powerful thrust deep into Germany might have ended the war 

in late summer or early fall. Others maintain that the same end 

might have been accomplished had General Eisenhower banked all 

on a single thrust by the 12th U.S. Army Group, or even by the 

Third Army. 

The factor that adherents to both these theories have neglected 

or underestimated is logistics. Seldom a subject for news headlines, 

logistic considerations nevertheless exert a strong influence not only 

on strategic planning but also on the conduct of operations once the 

battle has begun. What is not always recognized is that General 

ROLAND G. RUPPENTHAL, Staff Member, Operations Research Office, 

The Johns Hopkins University. Ph.D. in history, University of Wisconsin. 

Taught at Akron University. Historical officer and assistant theater historian, European theater, World War II. Lieutenant Colonel, USAR. 

Historian, OCMH, 1946-53. Author: Utah Beach to Cherbourg (Washington, 

1948), AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION; Logistical Support of the Armies, 

Volume I (Washington, 1953) and Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II 

(Washington, 1959), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
420 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Eisenhower's decision in mid-September 1944 was a decision based 

in large measure on logistic factors. 1 

By mid-September 1944 the Allied armies, having driven the Germans from Normandy and then pursued them across northern France 

and Belgium, stood at the German border in the north and at the 

Moselle River in the south. (See Map VII, inside back cover.) The 

enemy was building up a capacity for increased resistance in the 

frontier defenses of the West Wall (Siegfried Line) and along the 

Moselle. But even before this had made itself felt, the Allies' triumphant pursuit was slowed down and, in some sectors, brought to a 

temporary halt by supply shortages. These were the more exasperating because they occurred in the midst of spectacular successes and 

because they contributed so strongly to frustrating a short-lived hope 

that the war might be brought quickly to an end. 

The supply situation which set the stage for General Eisenhower's 

decision was indeed all but desperate, but the reasons for it should 

not have been difficult to see. It is hardly surprising that combat 

commanders, in their exasperation over the denial to 'them of the 

means to continue the pursuit or to launch one bold thrust into Germany, should, on the American front, have immediately vented their 

annoyance on the Communications Zone, the organization responsible 

for their support. But their annoyance reflected both an unawareness 

of the impact of pursuit on supply capabilities and conveniently short 

memories concerning the invasion plan and the expected course of 

operations. 

On its operational side, OVERLORD, the plan for the invasion of 

the European continent, had been predicated on an estimate that the 

enemy would make successive stands on the major water barriers 

across France and Belgium. In accord with this assumption, it was 

expected that he would make a stand at the Seine River, a line that 

would not be reached until D plus 90. Furthermore, plans had contemplated a fairly steady rate of advance and not the pursuit of a 

disorganized enemy. While such a forecast of progress admittedly was 

I The present article was first published, in a similar form, in Military Review, XXXI, 

No. 5 (August, 1951), under the title "Logistic Limitations on Tactical Decisions." A full 

account of the logistical story in the European theater may be found in Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II (Washington, 1953), and Volume II (Washington, 1959), specifically Volume 

II, Chapter 1. See also Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954), in the 

same series; and Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic (London: 

Hutchinson & Co., Ltd, 1947); Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper 

& Brothers, 1952); George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 1947); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and 

Company, 1948); and Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and 

Company, 1951). 
LOGISTICS AND THE BROAD-FRONT STRATEGY 421 

conjectural, it formed, necessarily, the basis of logistic preparations. In 

the belief, for example, that the Seine ports would not become available quickly, great emphasis was placed on the development of the 

Brittany area, including the port of Brest. In addition, at least a 

month's pause at the Seine was expected to be necessary to develop 

an administrative base capable of supporting further offensives. Even 

on these assumptions, the margin of safety on the OVERLORD logistic 

plan was believed to be nonexistent. 2 

Since the OVERLORD operation developed quite differently from 

what had been expected, the assumptions on which the schedules 

had been based were largely voided. For the first seven weeks the 

advance was much slower than anticipated, and the Allied forces 

were confined to a shallow Normandy beachhead. From the viewpoint of logistical support, the lag in operations was not immediately 

serious, for it resulted in short lines of communications and gave the 

service forces added time to develop the port of Cherbourg, whose 

capture had been delayed. 

Whatever temporary advantage accrued from this situation quickly disappeared after the breakout at the end of July. By D plus 79 

(24 August), Allied forces had closed to the Seine, eleven days ahead 

of schedule despite a lag of approximately thirty days at the beginning of the breakout. Tactically, the spectacular drive of early August brought definite advantages, for it resulted in the almost complete 

destruction of the German Seventh Army, and it greatly accelerated 

the advance to the enemy's border. From the point of view of logistic 

support, however, the rapid advance to the Seine foreshadowed serious complications. The fact that the OVERLORD objective was reached 

on D plus 79 rather than D plus 90 was, in itself, not too serious, for 

the supply structure was sufficiently flexible to accommodate itself 

to a variation of eleven days. The departure from the scheduled advance actually had been more serious. Because of the initial lag in 

operations, American forces were still at the D plus 20 line at D plus 

49, and between D plus 49 and D plus 79, a period of thirty days, 

actually had advanced a distance which, by plan, was to have taken 

seventy days. The lines of communications could not be developed at 

the speed with which tanks and other combat vehicles were able to 

race forward. The result was that the armies already had used up 

their operational reserves by the time they reached the Seine. 

Since rail and pipelines could not be pushed forward quickly 

enough, motor transport facilities were strained to the breaking point 

to meet even the minimum needs of the armies. The Communications Zone, consequently, found it impossible to establish stocks in 

2Ruppenthal, Logistical Support a/the Armies, I, Chs. IV, VII; II, Ch. 1. 
422 COMMAND DECISIONS 

advance depots. Furthermore, none of the Brittany ports had as yet 

been captured, and only one major port-Cherbourg-was operational. 

The arrival at the Seine marked only the beginning of supply 

difficulties. Despite the logistic complications which the rapid advance 

had already foreshadowed, decisions now were made to establish a 

bridgehead across the Seine; then to encircle Paris; and, finally, to 

continue the pursuit without pause all along the front. On purely 

tactical grounds these decisions were logically indicated, for the Allies 

now enjoyed a definite superiority, and the disintegration of enemy 

resistance offered opportunities that it would have been folly to ignore. From the point of view of logistics, however, these decisions 

carried with them a supply task out of all proportion to planned 

capabilities. With the supply structure already severely strained, these 

decisions entailed the risk of a complete breakdown. 3 

The continued advance, late in August and at the beginning of 

September, consequently brought hectic days and sleepless nights to 

supply officers. All the difficulties which had already begun to appear 

during the approach to the Seine now were further aggravated. The 

main problem, as before, was the deficiency in transport. Despite 

great efforts, rail reconstruction was unable to keep pace with the advance. Air supply repeatedly failed to match its predicted capacity. 

Motor transport therefore continued to bear the principal burden of 

the forward movement of supplies, and it was unable to deliver even 

daily needs, to say nothing of stocking advance supply depots. 

The unbearable supply task which the continued advance created 

can best be appreciated by comparing planned with actual developments. At D plus 90 it had been assumed that no more than twelve 

United States divisions would have to be supported at the Seine. 

Not until D plus 120 was it thought feasible to support these divisions in their first offensive action beyond that barrier. In actuality 

at D plus 90 (4 September) sixteen divisions already were being supported at a distance of 150 miles beyond the Seine, and, within 

another week, First U.S. Army forces were operating at the German 

border in the vicinity of Aachen, well over 200 miles beyond Paris. 

By D plus 98 (12 September) the armies had advanced to a line 

which forecasts had indicated would not be reached until D plus 

350. Between 25 August and 12 September they had advanced from 

3 See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) Planning Staff 

Studies, Post-NEPTUNE, 17 Jun and 17 Aug 44, in SHAEF G-3 SHAEF / 18008/Plans 44; 

Administrative Staff Study 14, The Logistical Implications of a Rapid Advance by AEF 

Beyond the Seine, 23 Aug 44, in SHAEF G-4 381 War Plans General, I, 44; Planning 

Paper, Logistical Implications of a Rapid Thrust to Berlin, Sep 44, SHAEF G-4 Logistical Forecasts, Folder 13. 
LOGISTICS AND THE BROAD-FRONT STRATEGY 423 

the D plus 90 to the D plus 350 phase line, thus covering 260 phaseline days in 19 days. The record actually was more phenomenal than 

these figures indicate, because, in the earlier dash to the Seine, the 

armies had overcome an initial lag of 30 days. The city of Paris also 

had become an additional supply liability because of its liberation 55 

days ahead of schedule. 

Contrary to plan, therefore, and as a direct consequence of the 

August decisions, considerably greater forces were being maintained 

at much greater distances than contemplated. This was accomplished 

despite an insufficiency of motor transport (which had been predicted 

even before D Day), despite the failure to open the Brittany ports, 

and despite the premature assumption of responsibilities in connection with the civil relief of Paris. 

The probability that logistic limitations might strait-jacket tactical 

operations had been realized as early as 24 August, when General 

Eisenhower expressed anxiety over the Allies' inability to undertake, 

simultaneously, the various operations which appeared desirable. 

Flushed with success, however, the Allies had begun to develop ambitions which they had not dared consider a month earlier. The uninterrupted advance in the next two weeks continued to nourish the 

hope that strong offensives, both north and south of the Ardennes, 

might be sustained. In the first week of September, General Eisenhower decided that such simultaneous drives to both the Ruhr and 

the Saar were still within Allied capabilities, and on 10 September 

he accordingly authorized an advance across the West Wall by both 

United States armies. 5 He admitted that the supply organization already was stretched to the breaking point, but he believed the operation was a gamble worth taking in order to profit fully by the 

disorganized state of the German forces. 

The maintenance of the armies was a touch-and-go matter at this 

time, however, and it was necessary to keep a constant finger on the 

logistic pulse. Supply capabilities clearly were unequal to the support 

of sustained operations by both armies against determined opposition, 

for deliveries were being made at the rate of only 3,300 tons a day 

to the First Army and 2,500 tons to the Third-about one half of 

what they required. The dual offensive was supportable only if it 

could achieve quick success. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., Third 

Army commander, was informed, therefore, that unless he was able 

4 Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug 44, Operations Division Executive Office File 

9; see also Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Aug 44, and Eisenhower to CCS, 9 Sep, both 

in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, 1. 

5 Tedder's (Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder) Notes on Meeting at Brussels, 10 

Sep 44, OCMH files. 
424 COMMAND DECISIONS 

to force a crossing of the Moselle with the mass of his forces within 

the next few days, he was to discontinue the attacks and assume the 

defensive. G 

Within the next ten days increasing resistance in both the First 

and Third Army sectors forced General Eisenhower to make the decision which he had hoped to avoid. A survey of supply capabilities 

at this time showed that United States port discharge was averaging 

less than 35,000 tons a day, several thousand tons below requirements. Even this was more than could be cleared from the ports, for 

the number of truck companies had been greatly reduced as a result 

of the demands for line-of-communications hauling. The net effect 

of these basic deficiencies was inescapable: a restriction on the number of divisions that could be supported in active operations and, 

consequently, a limitation in the scale of combat operations. As early 

as the middle of August it had become impossible to maintain in 

combat all the divisions which were available. By early September 

three had been immobilized and their motor transportation used to 

form provisional truck companies. Two more divisions arrived in the 

middle of the month, and it was thought that their motor vehicles 

might have to be utilized in the same way. Logistic planners estimated that there would be twenty-nine divisions in the 12th Army 

Group by 1 October, but thought it unlikely, on the basis of the current logistic outlook, that more than twenty could be maintained in 

combat as far forward as the Rhine at that date. 7 

This gloomy forecast served to underscore two conclusions which 

already had been accepted at Supreme Headquarters: that, even 

should it prove possible to capture both the Saar and Ruhr objectives, these areas were at the absolute maximum distance at which 

Allied forces could be supported for the time being; and that it would 

be absolutely imperative to develop additional logistic capacity before 

attempting a power thrust deep into Germany.8 

The situation in mid-September clearly indicated an urgent need 

both to shorten the lines of communications and to secure additional 

port capacity. The maximum force which could be supported through 

Cherbourg and the beaches was being reached rapidly. In fact, the 

capacity of the beaches was certain to decrease with the advent of 

bad weather, and new capacity also was required to compensate for 

6 Bradley Ltr of Instr to Comdrs, 10 Sep 44, in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVER.LORD 

Planning, I; see also, Ltr, Whipple to CAO, U.S. Troop Flow to Support a Maximum 

Effort [early Sep 44], SHAEF G-4 Logistical Forecasts, Folder 13. 

7 Whipple Ltr, cited n. 6; Memo, Moses for CofS 12th A Gp, Use of Divisions on 

Line of Comms, 5 Sep 44, 12th A Gp G-4 Memos 1944, Folder 56, Drawer 11. 

8 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Sep 44, OPD Exec Office File 9; See also 

Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Sep 44, OPD Cable Files. 
LOGISTICS AND THE BROAD-FRONT STRATEGY 425 

that lost in Brittany. The obvious solution to this dual requirement 

lay in the development of the Seine ports and Antwerp. 9 

In the light of these circumstances, General Eisenhower, in midSeptember, considered two possible courses of action: the concentration of all resources behind a single blow on a narrow front directed 

toward the center of Germany (the proposal favored by Field Marshal 

Montgomery); or an advance along the entire front with the aim of 

seizing suitable positions on the German frontier where the Allied 

forces could regroup, establish maintenance facilities, and mount a 

broad drive into Germany. 10 The first course, often referred to as 

a "knife-like thrust" to Berlin, was rejected on both tactical and administrative grounds. Logistic resources likewise were lacking for the 

full implementation of the second course. The Supreme Commander, 

nevertheless, decided in favor of the second plan, which provided 

that the Allies push forward to the Rhine, secure bridgeheads over 

the river, seize the Ruhr, and concentrate on preparations for the 

final nonstop drive into Germany. Because of the limited logistic 

capabilities, however, the timing of the Allies' efforts toward the attainment of immediate objectives now became of utmost importance. 

The implementation of this plan, consequently, required a succession 

of attacks, first by the 21 Army Group, then by the First Army, and, 

finally, by the Third Army, with supply priorities shifting as necessary. 

Future logistic needs also were a major factor in the assignment 

of missions, for General Eisenhower specified that additional ports 

must be secured simultaneously with the attacks eastward. Accordingly, Field Marshal Montgomery's 21 Army Group was given the 

mission of securing the approaches to Antwerp or Rotterdam and 

capturing additional Channel ports; Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's 

12th Army Group was to reduce Brest as quickly as possible and 

make physical junction with the Allied forces from the south, so that 

the supply lines leading from Marseille might assist in the support of 

the 12th Army Group. 11 

On 17 September, Montgomery had launched a combined United 

States-British airborne operation in Holland to secure a bridgehead 

over the Rhine and to turn the enemy's flank in the north. General 

Eisenhower had conceived of this operation as having only a limited 

objective, however, and he emphasized this point to his top commanders and staff officers, stating that he wanted general acceptance 

9 Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug 44. 

10 A detailed discussion is found in Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 249ff., 288-98. 

11 Eisenhower to Army Comdrs, 13 Sep, and Eisenhower to A Gp Comd,.,. 15 Scp, 

in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I; Eisenhower to Montgomery, 2U Scp, in 

OCMH files. 
426 COMMAND DECISIONS 

of the fact that the possesssion of an additional major deepwater port 

on the north flank was an indispensable prerequisite for the final 

drive into Germany. He considered even the present operation in the 

north a bold bid for a big prize in view of the current maintenance 

situation. He considered the operation amply worth the risk. But he 

stressed repeatedly the conviction that a large-scale drive into the 

"enemy's heart" was unthinkable without building up additional administrative capacity, and this meant the opening of Antwerp. 12 He 

was, in effect, reiterating his decision, based in large measure on the logistical situation, to make no "one-thrust" push into Germany, but to advance on a broad front once adequate logistic support was ensured. 

The dilemma in which the Allies found themselves at this time 

was, as previously noted, a direct outcome of the earlier decisions by 

which logistic considerations had been subordinated repeatedly to the 

enticing prospects which beckoned eastward. General Eisenhower 

himself admitted that he had been willing to defer the capture of 

ports in favor of the bolder actions which had taken the Allied 

armies to the German border. The first such deferment had been 

made on 3 August, when the bulk of the Third Army was turned 

eastward rather than into Brittany as originally planned. Two weeks 

later the Supreme Commander had again subordinated logistic considerations when he decided to cross the Seine and continue to drive 

eastward. Such deferments were no longer permissible. 13 

Though the British had captured Antwerp early in September, 

estimates made later in the month indicated that the port might not 

begin operating before 1 November. As a result, there was every 

prospect that United States forces would have to depend on lines of 

communications reaching all the way back to Normandy. Because of 

this, the total tonnages which the Communications Zone could guarantee to deliver were sufficient to support an attack by one American 

army and only if all the other United States forces reverted to the 

defensive. Even such a commitment would require the postponement 

of many essential administrative measures such as building advance 

airfields, winterizing troops and equipment, and replacing worn-out 

materiel. Since the Ruhr rather than the Saar was the most important objective, it was inevitable that the burden of the sacrifice should be 

borne by those 12th Army Group forces operating south of the Ardennes 

in the direction of the Saar-General Patton's Third Army.14 

12 Min, Mtg SHAEF War Room, 22 Sep 44, and Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 

Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning. 

1:l See Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Sep 44. 

l4 Ltr, Bradley to Patton, 23 Sep 44, 12th A Gp 371.3, Mil Objs, I, Memo, Moses for 

Barringer, Confirmation of Telephone Conversation This Date, 9 Sep 44, 12th A Gp G-4 

Memos 1944, Folder 56. 
LOGISTICS AND THE BROAD-FRONT STRATEGY 427 

The developments of the next few weeks produced little cause for 

altering the conclusions reached in mid-September. At the very end 

of the month the Communications Zone presented figures on its 

delivery capabilities which revealed even more clearly the impossibility of supporting large-scale operations east of the Rhine. The 12th 

Army Group had indicated, on the basis of daily maintenance needs 

of 650 tons a division, that its requirements would total 19,000 tons 

a day during the first half of October, assuming the employment of 

twenty-two divisions, and 23,000 tons a day by 1 November, when 

the strength of the army group would reach twenty-eight divisions. 

In addition, however, the army group requested that the Communications Zone deliver 100,000 tons of supplies over and above these 

daily requirements in order to meet deficiencies in equipment and 

establish minimum reserves. The Communications Zone's reply was 

discouraging indeed. It announced that it would be approximately 

sixty days before any substantial tonnages could be built up in the 

forward area. September deliveries had averaged only 8,000 to 10,000 

tons a day to the forward areas, and for the entire month of October 

deliveries would not even meet daily maintenance needs. Not until 

mid-November did the Communications Zone expect its port and 

transportation situation to improve sufficiently to permit the build-up 

of reserves, over and above daily needs, in all the army areas. The 

outlook for the next six to eight weeks was, therefore, a depressing 

one, for there appeared no escaping the prospect that the forces 

which the 12th Army Group could maintain actively operational 

would either have to be reduced in size or continue on the starvation 

scales that had characterized their support for the past several 

weeks. '5 

It also was clear that the maintenance of large-scale operations 

would remain unsatisfactory until the port of Antwerp and adequate 

rail lines of communications were made available. The operations of 

the 21 and 12th Army Groups, consequently, were to be dominated 

throughout the fall of 1944 by the necessity of developing a new 

administrative base in closer proximity to the front lines. 

Tactical operations, to paraphrase an old maxim, had definitely 

become the art of the logistically feasible. 

If, SHAEF G-3 Appreciation, Factors Affecting Advance into Germany After Occupation of the Ruhr, 24 Sep 44; Memo by Planning Staff, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381 

Post OVERLORD Planning; Memos, Moses for Stratton, Supply Estimate, 25 Sep 44 and 

I Oct 44; SHAEF G-4 Allocation of Tonnages, I, 8 Oct 44-SHAEF G-4 400 Supplies 

General 44, IV; Memo, Ravenhill for G-4, 10 Oct 44, SHAEF G-4 Maintenance of British and U.S. Forces 153/2/GDP-I, Box I, Folder 42; Cable, SHAEF to Bradley, II Oct 

44, SHAEF AG 381-3 SHAEF to AGWAR Rpts on OVERLORD. 

19 

The Decision To Launch Operation 

MARKET-GARDEN 

by 

Charles B. MacDonald 

Was the decision to launch the largest airborne attack of World 

War II right or wrong? 

It was the decision of a theater commander to commit what was, 

in effect, his strategic reserve. It was a decision to reinforce one success among a number of successes that had been achieved. 

The commander was General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme 

Allied Commander in the invasion of Europe during World War II. 

The operation was an airborne attack deep in the enemy's rear areas 

to be launched in mid-September 1944 in conjunction with a ground 

attack by the British Second Army. The two attacks were known collectively as Operation MARKET-GARDEN.l 

The airborne attack was designed to lay a carpet of airborne 

troops along a narrow corridor extending approximately eighty miles 

into Holland from Eindhoven northward to Arnhem. (See Map 9; and 

Map VII, inside back cover.) The airborne troops were to secure bridges 

across a number of canals as well as across three major water barriers-the Maas, the Waal (the main downstream branch of the 

IThis operation is covered in detail in Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line 

Campaign, a forthcoming volume in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

See also, Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954), in the same series; 

Chester Wilmot, The Sirugglefor Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952); Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948); and Field Marshal Viscount 

Montgomery, Normandy to the Ballic (New York and London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 

1947)." 

CHARLES B. MACDONALD, Historian with OCMH since 1948. B.A., 

Presbyterian College; Secretary of the Army Fellowship, 1957-58. Rifle 

company commander, European theater, World War II. Silver Star, 

Bronze Star, Purple Heart. Author: Company Commander (Washington, 

1947); The Siegfried Line Campal/tn (in preparation) and (coauthor) Three 

Battles (Washington, 1952), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II. 
430 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Rhine), and the Neder Rijn (Lower Rhine) Rivers. Through this corridor were to pass British ground troops in a push beyond Arnhem 

to the IJsselmeer (Zuider Zee). The principal objective of the operation was to get Allied troops across the Rhine. Three main advantages were expected to accrue: cutting the land exit of those Germans 

remaining in western Holland; outflanking the enemy's frontier 

defenses, the West Wall or Siegfried Line; and positioning British 

ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North 

German plain. 

In retrospect, General Eisenhower's decision can be analyzed by 

means of three questions: 

(1) Was an airborne attack of any kind to exploit success advisable at the time? 

(2) Was General Eisenhower justified in delaying opening the port 

of Antwerp while the airborne attack took place? 

(3) If an airborne assault was advisable, why Operation MARKET 

instead of some other airborne attack? 

Consideration of the first question involves recalling the aura of 

optimism which pervaded Allied ranks in September 1944. These 

were the glorious days, the halcyon days of pursuit. The heartbreak 

of near stalemate among the hedgerows of Normandy, which had followed close on the Allied cross-Channel invasion of France, was past, 

an event belonging, it seemed, to yesteryear when the war still had 

to be won. In the place of heartbreak had come heady optimism. Having 

crossed the Seine, Allied commanders had raised their sights, not to 

the next obstacle, the West Wall, but beyond the West Wall to the 

Rhine itself.2 No less an authority than the G-2 at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), had put the matter 

this way: "The August battles have done it and the enemy in the 

West has had it. Two and a half months of bitter fighting have 

brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within 

reach." 3 

More specifically, the 21 Army Group, composed of British and 

Canadian troops, had dashed more than 250 miles since the breakout 

in Normandy. The lowlands of Flanders and the V-bomb launching 

sites in the Pas-de-Calais were behind. Brussels had fallen. A rapid 

armored thrust had taken Antwerp. As the day of the decision to 

launch Operation MARKET approached, the British reached the 

Dutch-Belgian frontier. 

2 These events are covered in Martin Biumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, a forthcoming 

volume in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. For the cross-Channel 

invasion, see Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, 1951), in the same 

series. 

3 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary 23, 26 Aug 44, in SHAEF G-2 files. 
THE ARNHEM OPERATION 

17-26 September 1944 

IJ'I}}J'}'JJ:I; FIfONT LIN[, IIIOlfl'llPlG 11 SEPTEWI(III 

~ AUtlO""t: DI'I1510lol'. tVt"'tNG 17 SEI' 

-. G(iII ..... N GOUNTUU'AC;K, OAT( ,,,OIUHD 

GIIIIlIlIbo Wur WAll 

I __ ~-,,-___ ..:'O .. ILU 

o 10 "'1.0"[T[1I5 

MAP9 
432 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The First U.S. Army had raced across Belgium and Luxembourg 

to the very gates of Germany. The Third U.S. Army had reached 

and crossed the Moselle River in northeastern France. The newly 

created Ninth U.S. Army was operational in Brittany and engaged 

in besieging the port of Brest. The 6th Army Group, arriving from 

southern France, was at the point of uniting with the Third Army 

to create a unified Western Front that would stretch from Antwerp 

to Switzerland. 

There was one cloud in this bright blue sky. Those who looked 

carefully at the scene of intertwined Allied success and German chaos 

could see that the Allies had their own private chaos in the field of 

logistics. 4 For logistical purposes, the invasion of Europe had been 

geared to a methodical advance. Yet Allied moves from the beaches 

to the Seine had been erratic, culminating in an explosive dash that 

secured the line of the Seine eleven days ahead of schedule and 

neared the German border on D plus 96 as against a predicted date 

of about D plus 300. The supply services could not keep up with this 

advance. The difficulty at first was not a lack of sufficient supplies on 

the Continent, for the build-up of supplies in Normandy had exceeded 

expectations. The difficulty was transport. With depots far behind the 

front and the continental railway system crippled by Allied bombing 

and German destruction, the logisticians did not have the means of 

getting the supplies to the armies, which in some instances were 500 

miles away. The situation spawned many supply problems, the most 

dramatic being a gasoline drought which immobilized the Third 

Army for five days at the Meuse River and a corps of the First 

Army for four days at the Belgian frontier. 5 A corps of the British 

Second Army was held for about two weeks west of the Seine so that 

its vehicles could augment the transport of the remainder of the 

army.6 

It was obvious that a solution of the transportation problem could 

not be found until ports nearer the fighting front were secured. As 

consumption of supplies mounted and as prospects of approaching 

winter and bad weather threatened the unprotected Norman beaches, 

where the bulk of supplies was still arriving, the question of ports 

assumed increasing importance. As General Eisenhower put it on 13 

September: "Our port position today is such that any stretch of a 

4 The logistical story is covered in Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of 

the Armies, Volume I, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II) Washington, 

1953) and Volume II (Washington, 1959). See above, 18, "Logistics and the Broad-Front 

Strategy," by the same author. 

5 George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Miffiin, 1947), pp. 114, 

117, 132; First Army After Action Report, Sep 44. 

6 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 214. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 433 

week or ten days of bad Channel weather-a condition that grows 

increasingly probable with the receding summer-would paralyze our 

activities and make the maintenance of our forces even in defensive 

roles exceedingly difficult." 7 

In early September the Allies were using only Cherbourg, though 

they hoped soon to open a badly damaged Le Havre. Antwerp, 

captured virtually intact, could not be utilized until the Germans 

were cleared from the banks of the Schelde estuary, a sixty-mile long 

waterway connecting Antwerp with the sea. 

General Eisenhower and his tactical commanders were not 

unaware of the logistical problems. But the tactical opportunities that 

lay before them were irresistible. If the Supreme Commander thought 

in terms of immediate objectives-like destroying enemy reserves in 

the Pas-de-Calais-his subordinates accepted no such mental discipline. As early as the latter part of August, the army groups and the 

armies were issuing operational orders couched in terms of the cities 

along the Rhine River-Mannheim, Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Koblenz. 

"It is contemplated," noted the 12th Army Group on 27 August, 

"that the Armies will go as far as practicable and then wait until the 

supply system in rear will permit further advance." Yet the operational orders made clear that the 12th Army Group hoped that "as 

far as practicable" meant the Rhine. 8 

The Americans by 10 September were no more than forty miles 

from the Rhine, the British no more than sixty. Yet the Allied war 

machine was showing signs of creaking to a halt because of logistical 

weakness. Should the Allies stop for repairs, or should they try to get 

across the last big ditch-the Rhine River-that separated them from 

quick and apparently certain victory? 

Paved with opportunity, the road taken by the Allies in late 

August and early September had not been without rough spots that 

assumed the form of controversy. Basically, these were the conflicts of 

opinion over the much discussed theories of what have come to be 

called the broad-front strategy and the one-thrust concept. 9 The aptness of General Eisenhower's decision-in effect a compromise between 

the two-is of concern here only insofar as it affected the alignment 

of the Allied forces at the time of Operation MARKET. 

During the preinvasion planning, four routes leading from northern 

1 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 13 Sep 44, in SHAEF Secretary of the General Staff 

(SGS) File 381, Vol. 1. 

8 12th A Gp Administrative Instructions 13, 27 Aug; Ltr of Instr 8, 10 Sep; Memo, 

Future Operations, 25 Aug; Ltr of Instr 6, 25 Aug; see also Ltrs, Bradley to Eisenhower, 

26 Aug, and Eisenhower to Bradley, 29 Aug, all in 12th A Gp Military Objectives File 

271.3, Vol. 1. 

9 For a detailed discussion, see Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 261ff. 
434 COMMAND DECISIONS 

France toward the objective of the Ruhr industrial area had been 

considered: (1) through the flatlands of Flanders, crisscrossed by 

waterways; (2) northeast via Liege and Aachen along the northern 

edge of the Ardennes; (3) across the Ardennes, mountainous woodland 

with a restricted road net; and (4) south of the Ardennes via Metz, 

the Saar, and Frankfurt. Terrain considerations having largely eliminated two of the routes, General Eisenhower had determined to 

advance Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's 21 Army Group 

(British and Canadian armies) along the route north of the Ardennes, 

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group (American armies) 

south of the Ardennes. The main effort was to be vested in the 

former. To strengthen the main effort, Eisenhower allotted Montgomery the airborne forces available in the theater. 10 

As the pursuit toward the German border during late August and 

early September gathered momentum, Montgomery called for additional assistance. He wanted an entire American army to move along 

his right flank north of the Ardennes. Though Bradley thought a 

corps would be sufficient and though Eisenhower believed Montgomery was being overcautious, the Supreme Commander was inclined 

to favor Montgomery's request. Eisenhower was particularly anxious 

to attain the objectives that lay to the north. Montgomery might trap 

the remaining German reserves in the Pas-de-Calais; he would secure 

the Channel ports as far as Antwerp; and he would eliminate the 

flying bomb launching sites in the Pas-de-Calais. Acceding to Montgomery's request, Eisenhower directed the First U.S. Army to advance 

alongside the British north of the Ardennes. At the same time, Eisenhower emphasized his desire to gain the objectives in the north by 

reaffirming his earlier decision to put the airborne forces in the 

theater at Montgomery's disposal. 11 

The change in plan-shifting the First Army to the right of the 

northern force-placed that army along what had been considered the 

best route into Germany, the route via Liege and Aachen. The British and the Canadians, the latter scheduled to invest the Channel 

ports, were to push directly through Flanders, a region earlier ruled 

out for major advance by the planners because of its many water 

barriers. This divergence from plan affected Operation MARKET, for, 

as it turned out, the main Allied effort did not go through the 

Aachen Gap, the route recommended by the planners, but through 

10 SHAEF Planning Drafts, 3 and 30 May 44, in SHAEF SGS File 381, I; Eisenhower 

to Marshall, 22 Aug 44, in SHAEF Cable Logs; Ltr. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Aug 

44, in SHAEF SGS File 381, I; Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Sep 44, copy in OCMH files; 

see also Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 345. 

11 Eisenhower correspondence cited n. 10. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 435 

the canal-creased lowlands of Holland, virtually the same type of 

terrain as in Flanders, rejected as a main route of advance. 

The airborne forces General Eisenhower allotted to the 21 Army 

Group were organized under the newly created headquarters of the 

First Allied Airborne Army. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Lewis H. 

Brereton, the headquarters controlled two British and three American 

airborne divisions, a Polish parachute brigade, the American troop 

carrier command, and two British troop carrier groupS.'2 

One of the principal reasons underlying the creation of the First 

Allied Airborne Army was the insistence by the U.S. War Department on greater strategic use of airborne troops. From February 1944 

Generals George C. Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff, and Henry H. 

Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, had let General Eisenhower know unmistakably that they attached great importance to the 

employment of airborne units in actual operations deep in enemy 

territory. 13 

As had been contemplated, creation of the airborne army facilitated planning for airborne operations. The first plan was tentatively 

scheduled for execution on 20 August but was canceled, presumably 

because of concern over supply to the ground forces, since supplies 

were being delivered by aircraft that would have to transport the airborne troops, and because the ground troops would soon overrun the 

target area of the airborne forces. Even as the first plan withered, , 

alternative plans were under consideration. By early September when : 

American patrols approached the German border, eighteen separate 

airborne plans had been considered. Five had reached the stage of 

detailed Iplanning; three had progressed almost to the point of 

laurtching; but none had matured. In most cases, the cancellations 

had been prompted by recognition that the fast-moving ground troops 

would overrun the objectives before an airborne force could land. 14 

The fact was that the paratroopers and glidermen resting and 

training in England had in effect become coins burning holes in 

SHAEF's pocket. This is not to say that SHAEF intended to spend 

12 For details on the formation of the First Allied Airborne Army, see James 

A. Huston, Airborne Operations, MS in OCMH files. 

J:l Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 119, 269-71, 279ff. 

H The fledgling plans had embraced a variety of objectives, among them the city of 

Boulogne; the city of Tournai, with the aim of blocking German retreat from the Channel 

coast; the vicinity of Liege, in order to get the First Army across the Meuse River; the 

Aachen-Maastricht Gap, to facilitate Allied passage through the West Wall; and Operation COMET, to put British forces across the Lower Rhine. See Hq, First Allied Airborne 

Army (FAAA) History of Headquarters First Allied Airborne Army, 2 Aug 44-20 May 

45; see also John C. Warren, Az'rborne Operatz'ons z'n World War II, European Theater. USAF 

Historical Studies: No. 97, USAF Historical Division, 1956, pp. 80, 88-100; see 

also, Huston MS. 
436 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the airborne troops in a wild or extravagant fashion. Rather, SHAEF 

had decided to buy an airborne product and was shopping around. 

The impetus to buy did not come from General Eisenhower alone. 

As late as August, General Arnold had again voiced his desire for an 

airborne operation that would have strategic implications. The War 

Department obviously wanted to see what airborne troops could do 

in actual combat; pursuit warfare, many believed, provided an excellent opportunity for their use. 

Not everyone advocated this approach at this particular time. 

General Arnold wanted the airborne army used because he felt that 

missions of troop carrier planes were not "comparing at all favorably 

with combat plane missions (other than supply and training) .... " 15 

But some commanders, notably General Bradley, believed that this 

was as it should be. Impressed by the success his ground troops were 

achieving, Bradley wanted continued use of the aircraft to supply his 

ground columns. 16 

The most notable example of General Bradley's antipathy to an 

airborne operation occurred at Tournai. Though this city lay outside 

his 12th Army Group sector and inside the British zone, Bradley 

ensured its capture before an airdrop could be staged by ordering the 

First Army to rush ahead and take it. The ground troops arrived in 

good time to make an airborne operation there unnecessary. But 

Bradley had nevertheless lost a measure of air supply because the 

troop carrier planes had been withdrawn from supply missions to 

prepare for the drop. "Although we had made good on our boast and 

Ike's air drop was washed out," General Bradley later wrote, "even 

our smugness could not compensate for the critical loss we had suffered in tonnage .... During the six-day stoppage that had resulted 

from SHAEF's planned drop at Tournai, we lost an average of 823 

tons per day. In gasoline, this loss would have equaled one and a 

half million gallons. . . ." 1 7 

Whether General Bradley's armies could have gone considerably 

farther than they did had air supply not again been halted by Operation MARKET is a matter of conjecture. It should be noted that the 

halt of both the First and the Third Armies in mid-September cannot 

be attributed specifically to the lack of everyday supplies that airlift 

might have provided. The halts were due more to a combination of 

many causes, among them the rugged terrain along the German frontier, the presence of the West Wall, the exhaustion of American com15 Quoted in Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 279. 

16 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 

pp. 401-03. 

17 Ibid., p. 403. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 437 

bat units, the worn-out condition of their equipment, the rebirth of 

German strength, and, it has been argued, the thinly spread formation in which American troops approached the German frontier. 

In any plan for an airborne operation the matter of weather was 

important. For Operation MARKET, the planners before the attack 

were fairly optimistic on this point. One of the field orders noted that 

the weather in the region was "very unreliable and subject to rapid 

change," but that conditions were supposed to be at their best during 

summer and early autumn. Yet the First Allied Airborne Army after 

the event admitted that though the weather had been poor during 

the operation, it had been no worse than could have been expected. 'R 

It is hard to say which view General Eisenhower had before him at 

the time of his decision. 

Along with the question whether an airborne attack of any kind 

was called for should be considered also the matter of Allied intelligence. Accurate or not, the intelligence estimates current when 

General Eisenhower decided to approve Operation MARKET were the 

only basis available to the Supreme Commander for evaluating the 

enemy. These were the times when the First Army G-2 was predicting 

the possibility of German political upheaval within thirty to sixty 

days.19 Some intelligence officers, notably the Third Army G-2, 

expressed more caution. 20 But SHAEF's estimate of the situation a 

week before the airborne attack was fairly typical of the optimistic 

Allied point of view. 21 

According to this estimate, the SHAEF intelligence chief believed 

that the enemy force available to defend the entire West Wall was 

no greater than eleven infantry and four armored divisions at full 

strength. As for reinforcements, an estimate believed to be unduly 

generous noted that a "speculative dozen" divisions might "struggle 

up" in the course of the month. It was considered "most unlikely 

that more than the true equivalent of four panzer grenadier divisions 

with 600 tanks" would be found. The G-2 declared flatly: "The West 

Wall cannot be held with this amount. ... " 22 Four days before the 

attack the headquarters of the British Airborne Corps noted that the 

enemy's total armored strength in the Netherlands and vicinity 

1< FAAA, Operations in Holland; see also The Climate of the Rhine Valley, Gt'rmany. 

in XIX Corps After Action Report (AAR), Oct 44, and The Climate of Central and 

Western Germany, Annex 1 to First U.S. Army (FUSA) G-2 Periodic Report 92, 10 Sep 

44, in FUSA G-2 Files. 

19 FUSA G-2 Estimate 24, 3 Sep 44, in FUSA Operations Reports. 

20 See, for example, Third U.S. Army (TUSA) G-2 Estimate 9, 28 Aug 44, in TUSA 

AAR, Vol. II. 

21 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary 26, week ending 16 Sep 44, in SHAEF G-2 

File. 

22 Ibid. 
438 COMMAND DECISIONS 

amounted to not more than fifty to a hundred tanks.23 The only 

warning sounded before the operation was that two SS panzer divisions might be refitting near Arnhem. 24 This turned out to be true, 

but the warning had come too late to affect Eisenhower's decision. 

Thus, in considering the question whether an airborne attack of 

any kind was justified at the time of Operation MARKET, points for 

and against emerge. Most significantly, the tactical picture, from the 

Allied outlook and from intelligence estimates, was receptive to an 

exploitation maneuver. Also, demands for an airborne operation were 

great; the troops were at hand and military leaders, on the high 

echelons of command as well as in the field, wanted to see them 

used. On the other side, antipathy to an airborne operation did exist 

on the part of at least one army group commander who did not want 

the troop carrier aircraft diverted from supply missions to ground 

forces. Also, since the airborne troops would support the 21 Army 

Group, they would not be employed to reinforce the attack along the 

axis that the Allied planners had deemed most advantageous for 

entrance into Germany. 

The second question-was General Eisenhower justified in delaying the opening of the port of Antwerp in favor of the airborne attack?-is pertinent because British ground troops would be tied up 

ill Operation MARKET'S companion piece, Operation GARDEN. Thus, 

to authorize the airborne attack was to give tacit approval to delay 

at Antwerp.25 

The principal factor in this discussion was the preoccupation of 

Allied commanders with the Rhine River. General Montgomery's 

main objective was "to 'bounce' a crossing over the Rhine with the 

utmost speed." Some of the Allied preoccupation was based on a natural desire to gain and cross this formidable historic water barrier before the Germans could recoup behind it. Also, the Rhine was 

virtually synonymous with what the Supreme Commander considered 

his primary objective-the Ruhr industrial area. Anything short of 

the Ruhr-and thus by inference the Rhine-was in effect an intermediate objective, even secondary. "The envelopment of the Ruhr 

from the north by 21st Army Group, supported by 1st Army," General Eisenhower said, even after the success of Operation MARKET 

was in doubt, "is the main effort of the present phase of operations." 26 

"' Hq Air Troops Operational Instruction 1, 13 Sep 44, in 1st Airborne Division AAR 

on Operation MARKET, Parts 1-3, SHAEF FAAA. 

24 Intelligence Summary 26 cited n. 21. 

25 Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder's Notes on Eisenhower-Montgomery 

Meeting at Brussels, 10 Sep 44, copy in OCMH files; see Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 

pp. 306-07. 

26 Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 20 Sep 44, copy in OCMH files; Montgomery, 

Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 196, 213. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 439 

It would be quoting out of context not to mention that almost 

every time General Eisenhower made this stipulation about the Ruhr, 

which he did on several occasions, he added that "on the way" the 

Allies wanted Antwerp "as a matter of urgency." 27 Nevertheless, in 

the Supreme Commander's words, written after the war, "The attractive possibility of quickly turning the German north flank [that is, of 

getting across the Rhine] led me to approve the temporary delay in 

freeing the vital port of Antwerp .... " 28 

It should also be noted that General Eisenhower's concern about 

the port situation during the pursuit appears to date only from 

10 September, the day he agreed to delay on Antwerp. The Supreme 

Commander had made little written comment about the port situation up to that time, but the failure to secure hoped-for usable ports 

was only then becoming marked. Little more than a week before 

10 September, the possibility still existed of using the Brittany ports, 

in particular Brest and Quiberon Bay. Because the entire 12th Army 

Group was scheduled at that time to advance south of the Ardennes, 

these ports would still have been valuable. The Channel ports, except 

for Antwerp, were likely to be open to shipping in the near future. 

And in any event, the invasion beaches and Cherbourg were operating efficiently. A minor delay in opening Antwerp, it seemed, could 

well be countenanced. 

This is not to try in any way to minimize the importance of Antwerp to the eventual Allied victory. Even before the invasion Allied 

planners had noted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the 

availability of port capacity will ... limit the forces which can be 

maintained." 29 Getting Antwerp was one of the main reasons why 

Eisenhower had strengthened Montgomery's northern thrust. With 

the possible exception of Rotterdam, which seemed out of reach at 

the moment, there was no substitute for Antwerp. Eisenhower appreciated this. Yet he knew also how formidable the Rhine was. 

Though Antwerp would have to wait, the airborne attack, if successful, might faciljtate the task of opening the port. From the bridgehead that airborne troops were to establish across the Lower Rhine 

in Operation MARKET, British ground troops were to push on to the 

IJsselmeer. Thus Holland would be split in two and all Germans in 

western Holland isolated, including those denying both Antwerp and 

Rotterdam to the Allies. Though the Germans were great ones for 

wringing the most from bypassed, so-called "fortress defenses," it is 

27 See, for example, Eisenhower to Army Group Commanders, 15 Sep 44, in SHAEF 

SGS File 381, I; Eisenhower to Montgomery, 22 Sep 44, copy in OCMH files. 

28 Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 194.1, p. 67. 

29 SHAEF Planning Draft, 30 May 44, in SHAEF SGS File 381, I. 
440 COMMAND DECISIONS 

axiomatic that an enemy who is isolated is more easily subdued. Even 

if Operation MARKET-GARDEN failed to achieve more than a bridgehead beyond the Lower Rhine, the territory gained might serve as a 

buffer for subsequent moves to open Antwerp. From the Lower Rhine 

to the IJ sselmeer the Germans would retain only a narrow corridor 

little more than twenty-five miles wide, and through that they would 

have to funnel the supplies for all their forces in western Holland, a 

distinct disadvantage. 

The fact remained that if Operation MARKET was launched, an 

all-out campaign to open Antwerp would be delayed. The MARKETGARDEN maneuver would in any case have to be staged on a thin logistical margin. As it turned out, three newly arrived American divisions had to be immobilized in Normandy so that their vehicles might 

be used to rush five hundred tons of supply per day to the British. 

Obviously, little or no supply would be left over for Antwerp. In 

manpower, MARKET-GARDEN would tie up the entire British Second 

Army; only the First Canadian Army, already busy with investiture 

of other Channel ports, would be available to open Antwerp.30 

Among responsible Allied commanders were some who believed 

in early September that Antwerp was a dead issue. They remembered 

World War I, when the pursuit phase had marked the beginning of 

the end, the start of swift German collapse. If events ran true to the 

earlier experience, neither Antwerp nor any other port would be 

needed except to support the occupation of Germany. Whether General Eisenhower entertained similar thoughts is pure conjecture; but 

there is no doubt that some of his subordinates did. The First Army 

G-2 estimate of possible political upheaval is a clear example. 

To recapitulate, the Ruhr-and thus by inference getting across 

the Rhine-was the main objective of operations at the time of Eisenhower's decision in regard to MARKET. Antwerp, for all its value, was 

a secondary objective, perhaps more correctly, an intermediate objective. The port situation had not become critical by 10 September, 

despite serious and even alarming indications. Without Antwerp, the 

logistical situation was imminently risky. Even though MARKETGARDEN might eventually lighten the task of opening Antwerp, the 

airborne operation would delay the start of that task. 

The third question-why MARKET? why not some other airborne 

attack?-may be introduced by a prior question: What were the alternatives to Operation MARKET? Eighteen suggested airborne plans 

preceded MARKET but in most cases were canceled because of the rapid 

30 On the Canadian task, see Col. C. P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948), pp. 210ff. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 441 

ground advance. One plan, Operation COMET, was virtually identical 

with MARKET, except that the latter employed more troops. 

There were in addition eight other proposed operations that could 

have been considered current or worthwhile at the time of the MARKET 

decision. One plan to seize airfields at Berlin and the German naval 

base at Kiel was suitable only if the Germans were at the point of 

surrender or collapse. Another, to secure Walcheren Island at the 

mouth of the Schelde estuary for the purpose of assisting the opening 

of the port of Antwerp, was canceled because the island could easily 

be flooded by the Germans. The remaining six, planned variously to 

get the First or Third Army through the West Wall or across the 

Rhine, were all to take place in General Bradley's sector and thus 

required his approval. Whether Bradley's reluctance to have troop 

carrier planes diverted from ground supply missions had anything to 

do with the fact that none of these plans was chosen over MARKET 

is a matter for conjecture. 

One other alternative was suggested. General Sir Miles C. Dempsey, the commander of the British Second Army, advocated, on the 

day of the MARKET decision, 10 September, an airborne attack to get 

the British across the Rhine, not, as in MARKET, at Arnhem but upstream at Wesel. 31 In many respects, this made sense. In earlier directives, Montgomery had oriented the 21 Army Group toward Wesel, 

close to the left flank of the First U.S. Army.32 An airborne drop at 

Wesel would have conformed with announced direction and also would 

have prevented a gap from opening between the British and Americans. The gap, which caused serious concern, developed later as the 

British turned northward to Arnhem and the First Army moved eastward toward Aachen. A drop at Wesel also would have avoided what 

had begun to look like increasing German strength along the DutchBelgian border. But despite the advantages offered by a drop at Wesel, 

Field Marshal Montgomery overruled Dempsey's suggestion on the 

recommendation of air force commanders. Wesel was on the fringe 

of the Ruhr in one of the most concentrated flak belts in Europe. l:! 

Alternatives aside, Operation MARKET had certain advantages of 

its own. In the official history of General Eisenhower's headquarters, 

Forrest C. Pogue has listed these in a manner that bears repeating. 

Operation MARKET, he has written, 

31 Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 488 . 

. 12 See, for example, Montgomery to army commanders, 26 Aug 44, in SHAEF SGS 

File 381, I; see also par. 6 of 21 A Gp Operational Situation and Directive, 3 Sep, and 

Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 14 Sep 44, both in 12th A Gp Military Objectives 

File 371.3, r. 

,13 Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, p. 488. 
442 COMMAND DECISIONS 

... seemed to fit the pattern of current Allied strategy. It conformed to 

General Arnold's recommendation for an operation some distance east of 

the enemy's forward positions and beyond the area where enemy reserves 

were normally located; it afforded an opportunity for using the long-idle 

airborne resources; it was in accord with Field Marshal Montgomery's desire for a thrust north of the Rhine while the enemy was disorganized; it 

would help reorient the Allied drive in the direction 21 Army Group 

thought it should go; and it appeared to General Eisenhower to be the 

boldest and best move the Allies could make at the moment. The Supreme 

Commander realized that the momentum of the drive into Germany was 

being lost and thought that by this action it might be possible to get a 

bridgehead across the Rhine before the Allies were stopped. The airborne 

divisions, he knew, were in good condition and could be supported without throwing a crushing burden on the already overstrained supply lines. 

At worst, General Eisenhower thought the operation would strengthen the 

21 Army Group in its later fight to clear the Schelde estuary. Field Marshal Montgomery examined the objections that the proposed route of advance "involved the additional obstacle of the Lower Rhine ... as compared 

with more easterly approaches, and would carry us to an area relatively 

remote from the Ruhr." He considered that these were overridden by certain major advantages: (1) the operation would outflank the Siegfried Line 

defenses; (2) it would be on the line which the enemy would consider the 

least likely for the Allies to use; and (3) the area was the one with the 

easiest range for the Allied airborne forces. 34 

Contrary to appearances, the military climate at the time of the 

MARKET decision was unsettled. Erratic winds were blowing in several directions. There was also the likelihood of a calm, a period of 

recuperation after the whirlwind of the pursuit. In this turbulent period emerged the decision to launch Operation MARKET-GARDEN. 

The operation was a daring strategic maneuver that failed. That 

the decision to launch it has not prompted the kind of controversy 

surrounding other command decisions is somewhat singular. Here was 

no southern France, where one ally wanted it, the other opposed. Here 

was no Argentan-Falaise, where either ally could accuse the other of 

fault in failing to close the pocket. Even General Bradley, surely one 

of Field Marshal Montgomery's severest critics, has reserved his more 

pungent criticisms for other decisions. 

Perhaps the reason for the lack of acrimony can be found in the 

narrow margin by which MARKET-GARDEN failed. Or, perhaps more 

to the point, in the license afforded commanders under conditions of 

success such as existed in September 1944. As British Field Marshal 

Sir Douglas Haig put it on 22 August 1918, "Risks which a month 

ago would have been criminal to incur ought now to be incurred as 

a duty." 

34 Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 281-82. 
20 

The German Counteroffensive 

in the Ardennes 

by 

Charles V. P. von Luttichau 

The German counteroffensive through the Ardennes in the winter 

of 1944, the Battle of the Bulge, will long be recalled in American 

military annals as having inflicted on the U.S. 12th Army Group the 

first and only serious reverse it suffered in its sweep from Normandy 

to the Rhine. The heady optimism of the breakout from Normandy 

and the pursuit across France into Belgium and Luxembourg in August and September had been dashed by the failure of logistics to keep 

up with the speed of pursuit and the unexpectedly stubborn resistance 

of the Germans as they fell back on their West Wall. But in November General Eisenhower, believing that he now had available the 

strength to disregard unfavorable weather and the approach of winter, directed Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley to launch the U.S. 12th Army 

Group on an offensive north and south of the Ardennes with the Rhine 

as its objective. In December the First U.S. Army was attacking east 

of Aachen toward the Roer, and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third 

Army, south of the Ardennes, was punching its way toward the Saar. 

Counting on the defensive strength of the terrain, General Bradley 

was holding his line in the Ardennes with minimum forces. 

On 16 December the Germans crashed through these with a massive counteroffensive. It came as a complete surprise, created widespread if momentary consternation, halted the Allied offensive, and 

cost the Americans and British over 70,000 casualties before they could 

contain it. 1 

1 The planning and preparations of the German Ardennes offensive are described in 

detail in Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes, a volume in preparation for UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Other volumes in this series covering related operations 

CHARLES V. P. VON LUTTICHAU, Historian with OCMH since 1951. 

Graduate student, Universities of Berlin and Munich; M.A., American 

University. Lecturer: Army War College. German Air Force, World War II. 

Author: Narratives in support of volumes in UNITED STATES ARMY 

IN WORLD WAR II; various articles in military journals. 
444 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The German decision to launch an offensive in the Ardennes was 

Hitler's. It was a decision in which the Chief of State, acting as 

Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, overrode the judgment of his 

military advisers. Hitler was the originator of the idea. He was the 

driving force behind the astounding feat of assembling the necessary 

forces. He came to the west in person to supervise the preparations 

and direct the operation. He personally prescribed the ambitious objectives and attached the extravagant hopes to a victorious outcome 

that converted an otherwise strictly tactical operation into a fateful 

strategic decision. 2 

The late hour of the war and the fact that Hitler was committing 

Germany's last reserves in men and resources gave the venture a character of finality and grave political significance. In Hitler's own words, 

the outcome of the battle would spell either life or death for the German nation. Over the years the Fuehrer had come to identify his person 

with the German people and their destiny. Seen in this light the 

Ardennes was a battle for Hitler's survival and that of the Nazi regime. If the events to be recounted seem to defy military logic, it was, 

in part, because the founder of a Reich that was to last a thousand 

years was a fanatic whose intuition had long since triumphed over 

sound reasoning. 

The Background 

In the middle of September 1944 Hitler startled his closest advisers with the announcement that he would launch a large-scale offensive through the Ardennes in November. The decision was not a 

sudden inspiration. Indeed, the origins of the idea for a counteroffensive can be traced as far back as the end of July when Hitler was 

more immediately concerned with the aftermath of the 20 July conand events are: Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954), especially 

Chapter XX; Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, and Charles B. MacDonald, The 

Siegfried Line Campaign (both in preparation); Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign 

(Washington, 1950). 

Reference is made below to monographs (in the R-Series) dealing with special aspects 

of German operations in World War II. The R-Series monographs are historical studies 

based on German captured documents and additional information obtained from highranking German participants in the events described. These manuscripts are written in 

support of volumes in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II and are in 

OCMH files. 

2 (1) Minutes of Conference of 31 July 1944: Besprechung des Fuehrers mit Generaloberst 

Jodi am 31. 7. 1944 in der Wolfsschan:?;e (near Rastenburg, East Prussia). (2) OKW / WFSt 

(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht/ Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab-Armed Forces High Command/Armed 

Forces Operations Staff) A'riegstagebuch (War Diary, abbreviated KTB), Ausarbeitung, Der 

Westen, 1. IV.-16., XII. 44, referred to hereafter as Der Westen (Schramm). Maj. Percy E. 

Scl;tramm, keeper of the WFSt War Diary wrote this draft war diary from records and 

daily notes made at OKW headquarters. 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES 445 

spiracy that had culminated in the well-known attempt on his life at 

the Fuehrer's East Prussian headquarters and with plans to counteract the Allied breakthrough at Avranches. A succession of abortive 

attempts to turn the tide and stop the Allied advance across France 

by counterattacking at Mortain and later in Alsace appeared to have 

merely confirmed Hitler in his determination to inflict upon the Western Allies a crushing defeat that would influence in his favor the final 

outcome of the war. 3 

The plan for the big counteroffensive took shape during a period 

of internal insecurity and catastrophic Axis defeats on the fronts in 

the East and West. 

In the East the Soviet summer offensive had driven in one sweep 

from the Dnieper to the gates of Warsaw and the banks of the Vistula, had isolated-temporarily-an army group in the Baltic States, 

and had brought the Russians within reach of the German homeland. 

Here their spectacular advance, having outrun its supplies, ground to 

a halt. In the Balkans, the Russians had occupied Rumania, then 

Bulgaria, and continued an almost unopposed advance toward Hungary. This movement threatened to cut off the German forces in 

Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia, and force Hitler to order the evacuation of the first two of these occupied countries. 

In Italy the Germans had fallen back to the Gothic Line, last 

transpeninsular defense position short of the Po Valley. In the far 

north the capitulation of Finland had rendered untenable the advanced 

German positions in the Scandinavian theater of operations. 

The catastrophes in the East were matched, if not surpassed, by 

the dangers in the West. By mid-September the Allies had liberated 

most of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg and were threatening the 

all-important Ruhr area, the industrial heart of Germany. They had 

also captured the vital harbor of Antwerp, a strategic objective of whose 

importance for the conduct of future operations both Eisenhower and 

Hitler were equally convinced. To meet the mounting crisis in the 

West, Hitler had recalled from temporary retirement Field Marshal 

Gerd von Rundstedt, charging him with the defense of the western 

approaches to the Reich. Rundstedt achieved what seemed impossi3 The exact date when Hitler made his startling announcement was Sunday, 16 September, during a situation conference with his top advisers. A detailed account of the 

meeting is contained in the personal diary of the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, General 

Werner Kreipe, in OCMH files as MS # P-069 (Kreipe). See also Hitler-Jodi Conference, 31 Jul 44, cited above, n. 2. Measures taken to implement the decision to launch a 

large-scale counteroffensive were, among others, the constitution of the Sixth Panzer Army 

(Sepp Dietrich) ordered on 6 September 1944. For details on the origin of the idea and 

the course of events leading up to the Ardennes offensive see MS # R-9, The Idea for 

the German Ardennes Offensive in 1944, by Magna E. Bauer. 
446 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ble: with their backs to the imaginary safety of the Siegfried Line, 

the armies in the West once more formed a coherent defense line, 

taut and precariously thin, but strong enough to frustrate the daring 

Allied bid (Operation MARKET-GARDEN) to jump the formidable obstacles of the lower Meuse and Rhine. 

Within three months, the Wehrmacht had lost in battle 50 divisions in the East and another 28 in the West, an appalling total of 

78 divisions, or one and a half million men, and an area several times 

as big as Germany" 

Goering's once powerful Luftwaffe had ceased to be a factor that 

could influence decisively the outcome of the struggle. At this stage 

of the war the Luftwaffe had to all purposes shot its bolt. Outclassed 

by Allied air, short of trained personnel and fuel, incapable of replacing mounting losses, the German Air Force had fallen into disgrace 

in Hitler's eyes. Recalling Hermann Goering's boastful prewar remarks 

that his fighters would sweep enemy intruders out of the skies, the 

people sarcastically referred to Allied bomber formations penetrating 

the heart of the Reich almost without challenge as "Parteitag Fluege" 

(demonstration flights staged by the Luftwaffe for the prewar Nazi 

Party congresses at Nuremberg). So paralyzed was this once imposing 

sword of the German blitz campaigns that it could not even prevent 

the ever-increasing bombardments of vital synthetic fuel plants. 5 Yet 

the offensive spirit of the German fighter arm under its able commander General Adolf Galland had not been broken. Indeed, during 

the worst setbacks Galland was busy assembling a last reserve of pilots 

and planes to strike a potentially decisive blow at Allied air. Suicidal 

as the plan for this large-scale operation against Allied daylight bombers may have been, it might well have brought startling results had 

Hitler accepted it; but he did not. And thus one of the most daring 

operations planned in World War II never came to a full-blown test. 6 

Analogously the Navy had lost its former important position. As the 

Luftwaffe was reduced to abstemious use of its fighter arm, so was 

the German Navy regarding its V-boats. After the Allies had captured 

or sealed off all submarine bases in France, the remaining ones nearer 

4 MS # R-19, Germany's Situation in the Fall of 1944, Part III, The Military Situation, by Charles V. P. von Luttichau. 

5 (1) U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The Over-all Report (European War), SeptC'mber 30, 1945, and The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, October 31, 1945. (2) For additional information see MS # R-25, Germany's Situation in the 

Fall of 1944, Part II, The Economic Situation, by Charles V. P. von Luttichau. 

6 (1) The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1933-1945), issued by the Air Ministry 

(London, 1948), pp. 370-73. (2) Adolf Galland, Die Ersten und die Let::;ten (Darmstadt: 

Franz Schneekluth, 1953). (3) Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper 

& Brothers, 1952), pp. 442-44. 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES 447 

the Reich had become more vulnerable. The rapid advance of the 

Soviet armies al~ng the shores of the Baltic Sea threatened to deprive 

the Navy of the training waters that Admiral Karl Doenitz considered essential to break in the revolutionary new U-boats now under 

construction in German shipyards. Only with these faster, snorkelequipped submarines could he hope to resume the U-boat offensive 

that had once threatened to destroy the tenuous communication lines 

of Allied global warfare. So vital appeared the retention of control of 

the Baltic Sea coast to Doenitz that he persuaded Hitler, against the 

sound advice of the Army's Chief of Staff, to hold on to this northern sector of the Eastern front at the extreme risk of strategic breakthrough in the weakened center to the heart of Germany.7 

The burden of defending Hitler's Festung Europa thus had to be 

shouldered by the Army. As Napoleon I said, an army marches on 

its stomach, but in modern warfare the "stomach" had grown to include the resources and productive capacity of the nation. Vast areas 

that so far had supplied the German war machine with essential raw 

materials had now been recaptured by the Allies. It was obvious, even 

to Hitler, that Germany could not continue the struggle indefinitely. 

Under the direction of Albert Speer German production experienced 

a tremendous growth despite stepped-up Allied bombings. In September of 1944 the economy still profited from the peak production level 

reached during the summer. Yet accumulated stocks, effective dispersion of industries, and a radical curtailment of civilian needs could 

assure continued adequate supply of the armed forces for only about 

six more months. Estimates for a longer lease on life were unrealistic. 

In September the breakdown of transportation, which later was to 

deprive the German high command of the advantage of interior lines, 

was still a dreaded specter. Not until the end of the year did the 

paralysis of railroad communications hit an already collapsing economy. While the transportation crisis was still a matter of the future, 

the fuel oil drought was a present reality. It had contributed decisively 

to the grounding of the Luftwaffe. Now it threatened to immobilize 

the Army. To supply Hitler's final offensive in the West with fuel, 

the meager allotments to all other theaters of operations had to be 

cut below the minimum subsistence levels. With this decision Hitler 

incurred the grave risk of depriving already inadequate armored re7 (1) Minutes of Conferences of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with Hitler, 1-3 Jan 

44,9 Jul 44, 19 Jan 45, in Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German 

Navy 1944 and 1945, in OCMH files. (2) Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 147, 151-52,617-

20. (3) Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel, 1951) pp. 

320, 322, and 341ff.; the English edition is called Panzer Leader (New York: E. P. Dutton 

and Company, Inc., 1952). Subsequent references are to the German edition. 
448 COMMAND DECISIONS 

serves, especially on the Eastern front, of their ability to maneuver 

in the event of large-scale attack. 8 

The abortive 20 July uprising of the German underground affected 

the Ardennes decision in two ways: 

(1) The failure of the attempt confirmed Hitler in his obsession 

that he was the leader chosen by "Providence" for his mission and 

gave him the opportunity to break all opposition within Germany and 

establish complete control over the nation via the Gestapo and the 

Party. 

(2) He reacted to it by immediately putting into effect a series of 

drastic "Total War" measures, designed to supply him with additional 

forces for a final counteroffensive. By lowering the draft age to 16 

years and extending it to include the 50-year-olds and by combing 

out the home front and armed forces, he put an additional three 

quarters of a million men under arms. He thus built up a new strategic reserve consisting of 25 Volksgrenadier divisions and at least 6 

panzer divisions. These were raised and trained under the newly appointed commander of the Replacement Army, Gestapo Chief Heinrich Himmler. In addition, a great number of artillery, Werfer (rocket 

projectors), and armored units were being formed, thus theoretically 

creating a very flexible instrument in the hands of a capable supreme 

commander. 9 

In October the Germans once more achieved stabilization of the 

fronts in the main theaters of operation. Even in the Balkans and 

Hungary, where the Russians continued their advance, German resistance was stiffening. By scraping the bottom of the barrel, the German economy and war machine appeared capable of mounting one 

final large-scale offensive. It was now up to Hitler to decide where to 

launch it. 

Strategic and Tactical Considerations Influencing the Decision 

After the defeats of the summer of 1944, the remaining German 

war potential was so seriously reduced that Hitler might have concluded that he no longer could win the war and should seek an 

armistice. Germany's allies-Japan, Italy, and Finland-had undertaken, late in 1942, to induce Hitler to seek an agreement with the 

8 (I) Sources cited n. 5(1). (2) Guderian, op. cit., pp. 34 Iff. (3) For more detail see 

MS # R-25. 

" (I) KTB, ,GenStdH/Org Abt (General Staff of the Army/Organization Division), 13 Jun-31 

Aug 44, (2) For more detail see MS # R-12, The Ardennes Offensive, Planning and 

Preparations, Ch, I, The Preliminary Planning, by Charles V, p, von Luttichau, (3) Der 

Westen (Schramm), Chapter Die Vorbereitungen einer eigenen Offensive zwischen Monschau und 

Echternach. 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES 449 

Soviet Union. The Japanese continued such efforts to the day when 

Hitler appears to have made the decision to attack in the Ardennes. 

Late in 1943, Hitler himself is reported to have sounded out the 

Western Allies for a definition of the unconditional surrender formula. 

But Allied insistence upon these terms before and after the 20 July 

1944 plot all but ruled out the possibility of ending the war by 

negotiation. 10 

Unconditional surrender would have been difficult even for a German democratic government after a successful overthrow of Hitler's 

dictatorship. Certainly the "greatest captain of all times," as the 

Fuehrer liked to be referred to, was the last person to admit that Germany's situation was hopeless. Even after the Ardennes offensive had 

failed, Hitler, on 28 December, addressing the generals WllO were to 

lead a subsidiary attack in Alsace, pointed out that the war was an 

ideological conflict that could end only in Germany's victory or extinction. "By no means," he said, "am I entertaining the thought that 

the war could be lost. I have never in my life known the term 

'capitulation.' ... " 11 

If capitulation was wholly unacceptable to him, Hitler could only 

pursue the alternative of continuing the war in the vague hope that 

the unfavorable course of events could be eventually reversed by determination, perseverance, and time. Arguing that a period of grave 

military defeats was inopportune for political decisions, he resolved to 

"continue this struggle until, as Frederick the Great said, one of our 

'damned enemies give up.' Only then shall we get a peace that will 

guarantee the future existence of the German nation." 12 

After the period of victorious blitz campaigns had ended in the 

disastrous defeats in Stalingrad and Tunisia in 1943, Hitler's exuberant optimism changed to the almost mesmeric belief that he could be 

the winner of a long drawn-out struggle in which one of his enemies 

would weary and give up. Only the fittest would win in this struggle 

for survival and unless the German people could qualify they deserved 

10 (1) Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan 

Company, 1948), Vol. II, pp. 1,573-74. (2) Franz Von Papen, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse 

(Muenchen: Paul List, 1952) p. 585. (The English edition was published by Andre 

Deutsch, London, 1952.) (3) For additional information see MS # R-27, Germany's 

Situation in the Fall of 1944, Part I, The Political Situation, by Charles V. P. von Luttichau. 

11 Hitler addressing commanding generals before the Operation NORDWIND, 28 Dec 

44, Fragment No. 27, in collection known as Conferences Between Hitler and Members of the 

German Armed Forces High Command, December 1942-March 1945, referred to hereafter as Minutes of Hitler Conferences. 

12 Conference Between Hitler and Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal and Generalleutnant Hans Krebs, 31 Aug 44, Fragment No. 46, in Minutes of Hitler Conferences. 
450 COMMAND DECISIONS 

extinction. Toward the end of the war this nihilistic attitude completely overshadowed all his plans and decisions. 13 

Forced into the defense on all fronts, Hitler still refused to subscribe to a purely defensive strategy and continued to think in terms 

of an offensive. Like Clausewitz, he maintained that offense is the 

best defense. But at the same time he violated the principle that successful defense requires preservation of strength, which in turn is possible only if space can be traded for time. In 1944 Hitler was fast 

running out of both. This consideration, perhaps, precipitated the 

decision to attack in the Ardennes, for to persist in the "rot of barren 

defense" (to use Hitler's words) would merely aggravate Germany's 

position, a statement General Alfred JodI amplified: "We could not 

hope to escape the evil fate hanging over us. By fighting, rather than 

waiting, we might save something." 14 

Once Hitler had made the decision to go over to the offensive at 

any cost, he had to decide next whether to wait until he could throw 

into an all-out effort the whole remaining war potential of the nation 

and its Wehrmacht. This course of action, proposed in separate plans 

to Hitler by military and civilian advisers, amounted to a radical revision of strategy. The offensive would have carried the punch of the 

combined forces of total mobilization of Germany's economy and 

armed might with a grand effort of the Luftwaffe's fighter arm concentrated around a core of the dreaded jet planes now ready in limited 

numbers and steadily multiplying. The next offensive strategy would 

have confronted the Allies with a danger that they feared. 

This alternative to an immediate throw of the dice was the essence of a plan advanced by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, General JodI and his deputy, General Horst von ButtlarBrandenfels. They proposed to: (1) shift the main effort of the war 

to the West; (2) redeploy a considerable number of divisions from 

Scandinavia and Italy, authorizing large-scale withdrawals on these 

fronts; (3) transfer the bulk of Navy and Luftwaffe personnel to the 

Army; (4) convert the entire replacement army (about two million 

men), including all training units, into combat divisions; (5) totally 

mobilize all German resources far beyond the measures adopted in the 

July crisis; and (6) turn Germany into a fortress under martiallaw. 15 

13 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 

November 1945-1 October 1946, (Nuremberg, 1948), Vol. XVI, p. 498. 

14 (I) ETHINT 50 Godl), in OCMH files. (2) Fragment No. 27, cited above, n. 11. 

(3) Hitler addressing commanding generals before the Ardennes offensive, 12 Dec 44, 

Fragment No. 28, in Minutes of Hitler Conferences. 

15 (I) MS # T-122, The History of OB WEST (Commander in Chief West) (Generalleutnant Bodo Zimmermann et al.), Section D, pp. 329ff. This section was written by 

General von Buttlar and gives an account of the development of the plan for the Ardennes offensive. (2) MS # P-32i, Ardennes Project, Questionnaire No. I (General der 

Infantrie Hans von Greiffenberg et al.). 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES 451 

To supplement such a course of action Hitler might have accepted 

the separate proposal submitted by War Production Minister Albert 

Speer and General Galland: to strike a devastating blow at Allied 

daylight bombers with the massed strength of 2,500 fighters (including the jets) trained and assembled expressly for that purpose. Their 

estimate was that 400 to 500 Allied bombers could thus be destroyed 

for the loss of an equal number of German fighters and that an air 

victory of such proportions would break the stranglehold of the air 

blockade. '6 

While there can be no doubt that adoption of these proposals in 

combination and their application in a great ground and air offensive could not have prevented the final collapse of Germany, their 

effect on Allied strategy would have been grave. But Hitler was perhaps too apprehensive, certainly too impatient, to adopt this radical 

solution. He had never fully grasped the significance of air power, 

even during the early phase of the war when the Luftwaffe was victorious in the East and West. Now, as the conflict entered the sixth 

year, the decline of Goering's Luftwaffe had been painfully demonstrated. Hitler was disillusioned and distrustful of his air force's 

capacity to deliver the stroke Speer and Galland proposed and frustrated the plan even before it could be tested. Nor did the Jodl-ButtlarBrandenfels proposal appeal to Hitler at this time. Six months later, 

after the Russian armies had penetrated the heart of the Reich, he 

was finally ready to apply extreme measures, but in the fall of 1944 

Hitler was evidently unwilling to admit that the seriousness of the 

situation called for such a radical course. There is evidence that Hitler 

considered withdrawing troops from the northern and southern theaters of war, even to the extent of pulling back behind the Alps and 

giving up Italy altogether in order to redeploy these divisions in the 

west. But this was at the end of July, at the height of the crisis in 

Normandy, and the thought then tentatively weighed was subsequently 

allowed to die. '7 

In rejecting the radical proposals for an all-out offensive, Hitler 

thus settled for a strategic compromise. 

The question now arose as to where to launch the offensive on 

which he had decided. Initially Hitler's military advisers explored all 

theaters of operations for possibilities. But the criterion that the offensive must gain a decisive success automatically reduced the choice 

to the theaters in the East and West. '8 

General Guderian, responsible for operations on the Eastern Front, 

16 See sources cited n. 6, above. 

17 Hitler Conference, 31 Jul 44, cited above, n. 2. 

18 (I) See n. 15( I), above. (2) Der Westen (Schramm). 
452 COMMAND DECISIONS 

continually urged that the strategic reserve be sent to his theater to 

thwart any Soviet attempt to invade the German homeland. In October Guderian's fears were vividly illustrated by Soviet drives that 

cut off an army group in the Courland peninsula and penetrated the 

East Prussia defenses. During the same period the Russians had captured Belgrade and crossed the natural barrier of the Danube on a 

wide front. By Christmas they encircled Budapest and threatened 

Vienna. But Hitler refused to listen to the counsel of the Army's Chief 

of Staff and ridiculed intelligence estimates of Soviet strength and 

capabilities. 19 

In the beginning of August Hitler and his staff actually considered a carefully prepared operation in the East, while planning to 

fight a defensive battle with their backs to the Siegfried Line. These 

plans were based upon the assumption that the withdrawal from 

France could be effected gradually with successive stands to be made 

along prepared defense positions well ahead of the West Wall. After 

a victory over ,the Russians, the forces could then be shifted to the 

West with a view to repeating the exploit against the Western Allies. 

This hope faded rapidly as the Allied armies swept relentlessly across 

France driving the remnants of the German armies in the West before them. Concurrently the high-level planners realized that the Soviet Union's apparently inexhaustible manpower reserves and its 

advantage of unlimited terrain would frustrate German efforts to gain 

a strategic decision in the East. 20 

Explaining his position after the war, General JodI stated that the 

attack had to be launched "in the West because the Russians had 

so many troops that even if we had succeeded in destroying thirty 

divisions it would have made no difference. On the other hand, if we 

destroyed thirty divisions in the West, it would amount to more than 

one third of the whole invasion army." 21 Actually this would have 

been almost one half of the Allied Expeditionary Force. 

This consideration tipped the scales in favor of the West and coincided with Hitler's firm conviction that Germany's fate would be 

decided there. The geographical limits of the area-as compared to 

the endlessness of the USSR-and the far smaller number of Allied 

units would give him the chance he was seeking. A major factor in 

this connection was Hitler's view that the leadership of the West 

would waver under the impact of a massive crisis, and that public 

opinion, especially in the United States, would demand a withdrawal 

from Europe. 22 

19 MS # R-19, cited above, n. 4. 

20 See sources cited n. 15, above. 

21 ETHINT 50 (Jodi). 

22 See sources cited n. 15, above. 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES 453 

Once the theater had been determined, the Armed Forces Operations Staff planners investigated feasible courses of action, bearing in 

mind Hitler's strategic objectives, available German forces (amounting to thirty divisions), and Allied strength and capabilities. An important factor was the realization that Allied control of the air could 

not be broken by the Luftwaffe and had to be countered by other 

means. 

Hitler specified the prerequisites that would ensure success: (1) 

holding the positions in the West against all Allied breakthrough 

attempts without committing the forces being assembled for the big 

offensive; (2) achieving complete tactical surprise; (3) a period of bad 

weather extending for at least ten days to keep Allied air grounded 

during the initial phase of the operation; (4) speedy exploitation of 

the breakthrough; (5) a relatively quiet period on other fronts, especially in the East. 23 

German intelligence methodically evaluated Allied strength and 

capabilities. In September the Germans estimated that General Eisenhower's forces in France numbered sixty divisions with five more to 

be shipped to the Continent in October. It was a slight consolation 

to the German planners that their intelligence had failed to turn up 

any strategic reserves available to the Supreme Commander at this 

time. Allied main effort sectors were recognized in the Aachen area, 

where the Allies were expected to aim at closing to the Rhine on a 

broad front north of Cologne, and at Metz, where the objective was 

evidently the Saar Basin. Despite a relative shortage of ammunition, 

the Germans credited the Allied armies with the capability of launching and sustaining large-scale offensives. The numerical strength ratio 

between Allied and German forces was estimated at two to one. While 

Navy intelligence was still fearful of an amphibious landing in the 

area of the Ems estuary, Army intelligence discounted this possibility 

as well as that of a repetition of an airborne landing similar to the 

one launched at Arnhem. 24 

On the basis of these considerations the Germans weighed five 

possible courses of action to realize Hitler's intention: (1) Operation Holland, consisting of a single-thrust attack to be launched from the bridgehead of Venlo with the objective Antwerp; (2) Operation Liege-Aachen, 

a double envelopment with the main effort originating in the area of 

northern Luxembourg, driving through the Ardennes in a northwesterly direction, then turning north to meet a secondary attack launched 

simultaneously from the area northwest of Aachen with the objective 

of destroying the Allied forces in that salient; (3) Operation Luxembourg, 

23 MS # R-12, cited above, n. 9. 

24 Ibid. 
454 COMMAND DECISIONS 

a two-pronged attack from central Luxembourg and the area of Metz 

with the objective Longvy; (4) Operation Lorraine)' and (5) Operation 

Alsace) envelopment operations aimed at gaining Nancy and Vesoul, 

respectively. 

The range of choice was soon reduced to the first two solutions 

because they offered the best prospect of a decisive success. From a 

strategic point of view Operation Holland was very tempting, but was 

recognized to contain an element of grave risk. The second course, 

Liege-Aachen, which was later to become known as the "small solution;' appeared more likely to succeed. 25 

Faced with these two alternatives, Hitler reached the momentous 

decision of combining them in what von Runstedt, student of von 

Schlieffen, sarcastically characterized as an operational idea that could 

"almost" be called a stroke of genius. With this "big solution," however, Hitler gave the offensive two objectives to be attained with a 

force adequate only for one. 

Some of the reasons behind this decision were tactical, others were 

psychological and find their explanation only in Hitler's personality. 

The tactical considerations that he regarded as favorable were: (1) 

the opportunity to slice through the Allied front along its national 

seam, thus adding to expected military crisis the cumulative effect of 

anticipated political disunion; (2) the strategic and psychological 

importance of Antwerp, seemingly within reach of a bold thrust, if 

speedily executed; (3) the weakness of the Allied dispositions in the 

Ardennes sector inviting repetition of the classic breakthrough victories 

in 1914 and 1940; and (4) the suitability of the wooded Eifel for concealing a large-scale build-up and achieving surprise. Hitler had persuaded himself that he could assemble an adequate force to execute 

the offensive. He was determined to carry out the operation in the 

face of powerful Allied attacks astride Metz and the imminent thrust 

toward the Ruhr district. Distasteful as it was to him to give up valuable terrain and laboriously build defense positions, Hitler was willing 

to sacrifice both if he could thus hold intact the attack forces he was 

concentrating. A dangerously grave element in the structure of Hitler's consideration was the gross underestimation of Allied strength 

and determination and, conversely, an exaggerated overrating of the 

power and effectiveness of his own forces, especially the elite SS panzer divisions. 2

!i The overriding psychological incitement, however, for 

25 (I) Ibid. (2) Der Westen (Schramm), p. 259. (3) See sources cited n. IS, above. 

26 For a fuller discussion of Hitler's reasoning, see (I) MS # R-12, cited above, n. 9; 

(2) MS # R-13, The Ardennes Offensive, Planning and Preparations, Ch. II, The 

Framework for the Operation WACHT AM RHEIN, by Charles V. P. von Luttichau. 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES 455 

undertaking the venture of a great counteroffensive was Hitler's recurring delusion that his military genius would permit him to regain the 

initiative and decisively alter the course of the war. 27 

Proponents of the "small solution" (the Liege-Aachen operation), 

mainly Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Walter Model, based their 

objections to Hitler's concept on the following considerations: (1) the 

paucity of forces available for an objective so ambitious; (2) the serious lack of reserves to hold the shoulders and feed the offensive; (3) 

the uncertainty that the forces Hitler had promised could be held in 

reserve until the start of the offensive, in view of the impending 

resumption of Allied attacks; and (4) the conviction that the offensive, as planned by Hitler, would result only in a bulge in the German lines and not in the destruction of sizable Allied forces. 28 

Hitler categorically rejected all pleas in favor of the "small solution," and in his operation directive of 10 November marked the distant objective of Antwerp and even the disposition of the attack forces 

as "unalterable." To get what he wanted, he freely disregarded the 

counsel of his advisers and commanders, staking everything on what 

General JodI later called "an act of desperation." 2fJ 

The mission of the operation, decreed by Hitler, was "to destroy 

the enemy forces north of the line Antwerp-Brussels-Luxembourg, 

thus to achieve a decisive turn of the Campaign in the West, and possibly of the entire war." (See Map 10.) The Commander in Chief West 

(von Runstedt) was ordered to break through the weakly held front 

'of the U.S. First Army between Monschau and Wasserbillig with 

Army Group B (Model), cross the Meuse between Liege and Dinant, 

seize Antwerp and the western bank of the Schelde estuary, and 

destroy the Allied forces thus cut off from their lines of supply, and, 

in conjunction with this main attack, launch strong elements of the 

adjoining Army Group H in a supporting attack from the north. 

In the main attack with Field Marshal Model's Army Group B, the 

Sixth Panzer Army (with four armored and four infantry divisions) was 

to break through the Allied front north of the Schnee Eifel, seize 

undestroyed Meuse crossings astride Liege in co-operation with the 

l50th Panzer Brigade (SS Col. Otto Skorzeny, famed for his exploit of 

having freed Mussolini), and subsequently close to the Albert Canal 

between Maastricht and Antwerp (inclusive). To cover its right (northern) flank, the panzer army would seize and hold defense positions 

27 (1) Operation Directive, WACHT AM RHEIN, 10 Nov 44, by Hitler, in OB WEST, 

KTB Anlage 50, 1 Jul-31 Dec 44, Vol. I, pp. 95-104. (2) ETHINT 50 Oodl). 

2B Ibid. 

29 (1) ETHINT 50 Oodl). (2) MS # P-032i (Greiffenberg et al.J. The comments by 

Albert Speer bear out the fact that Hitler was fully aware of the desperate gamble he 

had undertaken. 
NETHERLANDS 

( ""1-.,/'. () .. 1') P~Olte' r.qhi !lnd 'fllr 01 Ine 

t'.~".. , 6t1'1 Ponur Army 

'-.) BEL G I U M '\ ContaIn " ih ld Forni "',In l'Iold. 

, ,ng allcu;k. south of Roarmond ~ .. -----, . ..J.,-'2...::== ::.;;..:n;:=-, 

BATTLE OF THE ARDENNES 

16-26 December 1944 

tTTTTTTT'\ ALLIED !'!tOflT ~'"[. 15 O[e[""[11 

L,.,f Of GEllMAN 1'I!:N[TUTIOIrI. 26 O[C 

~ 

ij[IUUII AII'.n' IOUHO.IIY 

WEST WALL .• •• o '0 ZO )0 1II1LO" tT[1I5 

MAP 10 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES 457 

along the Vesdre River with the bulk of its infantry divisions and 

artillery. 

Army Group B's center force, the Fifth Panzer Army (with four armored and four infantry divisions), was to use as its main axis of 

advance the road Bastogne-Namur, break through the Allied front in 

northern Luxembourg, and cross the Meuse between Amay and Namur. 

Advanced elements were to rush into the area around Brussels and 

that west of Antwerp to protect the Sixth Panzer Army's open western 

flank on the line Antwerp-Brussels-Dinant. To fulfill this task, the 

Fifth Panzer Army would stay abreast of its right neighbor-the Sixth 

Panzer Army-and disregard its own extended left flank. 

The Seventh Army (with one armored and five infantry divisions) 

was given the task of protecting the southern and southwestern flank 

of the operation and gaining defense positions starting south of Dinant 

along the Semois River and ending astride Luxembourg City. This 

army's forceful advance was to gain the time and terrain essential to 

build up strong defense positions farther to the rear. 

In a supporting attack from the north, the Fifteenth Army-reassigned for the offensive from Amry Group H to Army Group B-had a 

dual mission. With three armored and six infantry divisions it was to 

launch holding attacks between Roermond and Eupen to tie down 

Allied forces in that sector and ultimately destroy them in a secondary attack. In addition, the Fifteenth Amry had the task of assuming 

control over those units of the Sixth Panzer Army committed in the defensive position along the Vesdre River, after the mobile elements of the 

Sixth Panzer Army had crossed the Meuse. 

The reserve was reckoned at three armored and four infantry diviSIOns. 

Hitler directed von Runstedt to complete the concentration by the 

end of November-a date dictated by weather forecasts. The necessary fuel (four million gallons) and ammunition (fifty trainloads from 

the sacrosanct Fuehrer reserve), above and beyond the current needs 

of the theater, were promised. The Luftwaffe, Hitler assured his commanders, would support the attack of the ground forces with 1,500 

fighters including 100 jets. 30 

This was Hitler's original concept put into a directive. Except for 

the number and effective strength of units, it remained virtually 

unchanged until the offensive began on the morning of 16 December 

1944. 

On the eve of his offensive Hitler could point with satisfaction to 

the fulfillment of the basic prerequisites he had specified when he had 

30 See sources cited n. 27, above. 
458 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ordered the attack. The Western Front had withstood Allied breakthrough attempts at Aachen and in Lorraine, although nine panzer 

and an equal number of infantry divisions had been drawn into battle and suffered in varying degrees. Secrecy had been preserved, the 

weather was favorable, and the front in the East except for the sector 

in Hungary had remained relatively quiet. A tremendous effort had 

gone into the planning and preparations for Germany's last offensive. 

As the grenadiers and panzers moved into their jump-off positions, 

expectation was high, and success appeared within close reach. 

The Consequences oj the Ardennes Decision 

Almost immediately the operation fell short of the high hopes 

that had been attached to it. On the third day Hitler canceled the 

subsidiary attack of the Fifteenth Army and thus altered the tactical 

concept of the operation. The double envelopment was thus reduced 

to a far less effective single thrust. On the fourth day it was evident 

that the powerful Sixth Panzer Army would be unable to break through 

the Allied lines and that the distant objective of Antwerp could not 

be reached. After one week had passed, even the prospect of closing 

to the Meuse had faded. When General Patton's armor broke through 

to Bastogne on 26 December the battle was reduced to a fight for 

that city, and it was clear that the offensive had failed altogether. 31 

For the Germans the Ardennes did not officially end until 28 January, when Field Marshal Model's armies had been forced back to 

their original jump-off positions. They could claim to have drawn into 

the battle 29 U.S. and 4 British divisions and to have inflicted on them 

about 75,000 casualties.32 The offensive had achieved a temporary respite though Hitler now referred to it as "a tremendous easing of the 

situation." 33 The Allies had been forced to abandon their attacks on 

the Roer dams and the Saar, and to delay their final offensive toward 

the Rhine River for two months. But even Hitler had to admit that 

it had not gained "the decisive success that might have been expected." 34 For this modest achievement, compared to the ambitious 

aim, Hitler had paid an exorbitant price. Exact figures are not available, but reliable estimates indicate that German casualties were in 

the neighborhood of 100,000 men (about one third of the attacking 

31 For the various dates when the Ardennes offensive was considered to have failed. 

see MSS # R-11 and R-15, Key Dates During the Ardennes Offensive 1944, Parts I 

and II, by Magna E. Bauer and Charles V. P. von Luttichau . 

.32 Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 396-97. 

33 Fragment No. 27, 28 Dec 44, in Minutes of Hitler Conferences. 

34 Ibid. 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES 459 

force); at least 800 tanks (out of over 2,000 employed); and about 

1,000 planes (about half of the total fighter force assembled, including 

almost 300 lost in the "Big Strike" against Allied ground installations 

delivered on 2 January 1945).35 

These losses were irreplaceable. They left the Western theater of 

operations with no appreciable fuel reserves. Ammunition stockpiles 

were down to one third of estimated needs. Replacements for the 

casualties suffered could no longer be expected. The Ardennes had 

hurt the Allies, but, in the words of von Runstedt's historian, it had 

literally "broken the backbone of the (German) western front." 36 

Long before the official end of the offensive in the West, the full 

impact of the strategic consequences of the Ardennes was felt in the 

East. The weakness of the 1,500-mile Eastern Front is best illustrated 

by the fact that almost half of the German divisions were either isolated in the north (on the Courland peninsula in Latvia) or tied down 

in the south (in Hungary) without a chance to influence the outcome 

of the impending battle in the center. When the Russians struck on 

12 January 1945, it was too late for remedial measures. The reinforcements and supplies that for the past four months had consistently gone 

to the West and into the Ardennes had been spent in the short-lived 

Battle of the Bulge, while the Russians gained an awesome bulge of 

far greater permanence. They swept across Poland, captured almost 

all of East Prussia, drove deep into Silesia, and, finally, came to a 

halt less than fifty miles short of Berlin. Hitler's desperate gamble in 

the West had invited disaster in the East and hastened the final and 

inevitable defeat of Germany. 

'.5 For discussion of German losses see MS # R-60, The Cost of the Ardennes Offensive, by Magna E. Bauer. 

:16 MS # T-122 (Zimmermann et al.). 

21 

Luzon Versus Formosa 

by 

Robert Ross Smith 

One of the thorniest problems of strategic planning for the war 

against Japan was to decide whether the principal objective of drives 

that had brought the Allies into the western Pacific should be Luzon 

or Formosa. The decision was made by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

since the Pacific was an American area of strategic responsibility. 

They made it after long debate and careful study of the views of 

the commanders in the Central and Southwest Pacific theaters. Among 

the considerations that determined their choice when they finally 

made it, logistical factors played the major role, but here, as in other 

connections, they had to take into account the commitments and 

progress of the Allies in other theaters, and particularly in Europe. 

It was in this sense a decision in global strategy. 

The Strategic Background 

Pacific Strategy 

In January 1945, after more than three years of war, United 

States forces returned to Luzon Island in the Philippines, where in 

1942 American troops had suffered a historic defeat. 1 The loss of 

J This essay is essentially Chapter 1 of Triumph in the Philippines, by Robert Ross 

Smith, a forthcoming volume in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Additional background information is to be found in The Approach to the Philippines (Washington, 1953), by the same author; M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines 

(Washington, 1954); and Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and 

Marshalls (Washington, 1953), all in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Waif are, 1943-1944 (Washington, 1959) in 

that series, deals at length with the broad strategic aspects of the decision. 

ROBERT Ross SMITH, Historian with OCMH since 1947. B.A. and M.A. 

in history, Duke University. Historical Officer, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, World War II. Major, 

Infantry, USAR. Author: The Approach to the Philippines (Washington, 1953), 

Triumph in the Philippines (in preparation), and Southern France and Alsace (in 

preparation), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
462 COMMAND DECISIONS 

the Philippines in May of that year, after the disaster that befell the 

U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, had rendered obsolete the inoperable American prewar plans for action in the Pacific in the event 

of war with Japan. 2 By the late spring of 1943 the U.S. Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (who, by agreement of the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, were responsible for the conduct of the war in the Pacific) had 

developed a new strategic plan for the defeat of Japan. The plan was 

neither sacrosanct nor immutable-it was not intended to be-but 

its underlying concepts governed the planning and execution of operations in the Pacific during a year and a half of debate over the 

relative priority of Luzon and Formosa as primary objectives of an 

Allied drive into the western Pacific. 3 

The plan was premised upon the concept that the Allies might 

very well find it necessary to invade Japan in order to end the war 

in the Pacific. (See Map VIII, irtside back cover.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

foresaw that intensive aerial bombardment of the Japanese home islands would be prerequisite to invasion, and that such bombardment 

would have to be co-ordinated with combined air, surface, and submarine operations aimed at cutting Japan's overwater lines of communication to the rich territories she had seized in the Netherlands 

Indies and southeastern Asia. The Joint Chiefs believed that the Allies 

could best undertake the necessary bombardment of Japan from airfields in eastern China. They decided that to secure and develop 

adequate air bases in China, Allied forces would have to seize at 

least one major port on the south China coast. The Allies would require such a port to replace the poor overland and air routes from 

India and Burma as the principal means of moving men and materiel into China. 

To secure a port on the China coast, and simultaneously to cut 

Japan's line of communication to the south, the Allies would have 

to gain control of the South China Sea. Gaining this control, the 

Joint Chiefs realized, would in turn involve the seizure and development of large air, naval, and logistical bases in the strategic triangle 

formed by the south China coast, Formosa, and Luzon. But before 

they could safely move into this triangle, the Joint Chiefs decided, the 

'See Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, 1953), UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, for the opening phases of japan's attack in the Pacific 

and a description of prewar plans with especial reference to the Philippines. Morton's 

general volume on the Pacific theaters, Strategy and Command: Turning the Tide, 1941-

1943, will cover prewar plans in more detail. ~ 

3 See jCS 287/1, 8 May 43, and jPS .67/4, 29 Apr 43, both entitled Strategic Plan 

for the Defeat of japan, and associated papers in OPD ABC 381 japan (8-27-42) Sees. 

I and 2. 
LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA 463 

Allies would have to secure air bases III the southern or central Philippines from which to neutralize Japanese air power on Luzon. The 

Allies might also need staging bases in the southern and central Philippines from which to mount amphibious attacks against Luzon, Formosa, 

and the China coast. 

In accordance with these 1943 plans, Allied forces in the Pacific 

had struck westward toward the strategic triangle along two axes of 

advance. Air, ground, and naval forces of the Southwest Pacific Area, 

under General Douglas MacArthur, had driven up the north coast of 

New Guinea to Morotai Island, lying between the northwestern tip 

of New Guinea and Mindanao, southernmost large island of the Philippine Archipelago. Simultaneously, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, 

commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas, had directed the forces of 

the Central Pacific Area in a drive through the Gilberts, Marshalls, 

and Marianas to the Palau Islands, some 500 miles east of Mindanao. 4 

The Importance of Formosa 

Studying various plans for Allied entry into the strategic triangle, 

the Joint Chiefs and their subordinate advisory committees concluded 

that Formosa constituted the most important single objective in the 

target area. 5 The island possessed so many obvious advantages and 

was located in such a strategically important position that most planners in Washington believed the Allies would have to seize it no 

matter what other operations they conducted in the western Pacific. 

Until they seized Formosa, the Allies would be unable to establish 

and secure an overwater supply route to China. Formosa, therefore, 

seemed a necessary steppingstone to the China coast. Moreover, Allied 

air and naval forces could sever the Japanese lines of communication to 

the south much more effectively from Formosa than from either Luzon or 

the south China coast alone. Furthermore, from fields in northern 

Formosa, the Army Air Forces' new B-29's could carry heavier bomb 

loads against Japan than from more distant Luzon. G 

Many planners considered Formosa such a valuable strategic prize 

that they devoted considerable attention to the possibility of bypassing all the Philippines in favor of a direct descent upon Formosa. 

Discussion of this proposal waxed and waned in Washington during 

much of 1943 and 1944 despite the fact that the strategic outline 

4 Nimitz' Pacific Ocean Areas included the North, Central, and South Pacific Areas. 

c'See the sources cited in note I, above, and also JCS 713, 16 Feb 44, Strategy in the 

Pacific; JCS 713/1, 10 Mar 44, Future Opns in the Pacific, and associated sources in 

OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43). 

f; Northern Formosa, affording some good airfield sites, lies 300-odd nautical miles 

closer to Tokyo than the best airfield areas of northern Luzon. 
464 COMMAND DECISIONS 

plan for the defeat of Japan called for the seizure of bases in the 

southern or central Philippines before going on into the Luzon-Formosa-China coast triangle. Such discussions found the War and Navy 

Departments internally divided. Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of 

Naval Operations and Navy member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was 

a leading advocate of plans to bypass the Philippines. On the other 

hand, Admiral Nimitz and other ranking naval commanders in the 

Pacific favored at least reoccupying the southern or central Philippines before striking on toward Formosa. These officers believed it 

would be impossible to secure the Allied line of communications to 

Formosa until Allied land-based aircraft from southern Philippine 

bases had neutralized Japanese air power on Luzon. 7 

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff and Army member of 

the Joint Chiefs, played a relatively inactive part in the debate until 

late 1944, but at one time at least seemed inclined toward bypassing 

both the Philippines and Formosa in favor of a direct invasion of 

Kyushu in southern Japan. Some officers high in Army councils, including Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McN arney, Deputy Chief of Staff, strongly 

advocated bypassing the Philippines on the way to Formosa. General 

Henry H. Arnold, Army Air Forces member of the Joint Chiefs, also 

appears to have maintained through much of 1943 and 1944 that it 

might prove desirable to bypass the Philippines.s Other Army planners, including those of the chief logistician, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. 

Somervell, .commander of the Army Service Forces, favored taking 

the entire Philippine Archipelago before making any move toward 

Formosa or the China coast. In the field, General MacArthur stood 

adamant against bypassing any part of the Philippines, a stand in 

which he had the support of most other ranking Army officers in the 

Pacific. 9 

7 Memo, King for Marshall, 8 Feb 44, sub: CINCSWPA Despatch [sic] C-121702 Feb 

44, and other documents in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (28 Jun 43); JCS Memo for Info No. 

200, 7 Mar 44, sub: Scquence and Timing of Opns CenPac Campaign [a rpt by Nimitz], 

and associated sources in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Secs. 3-A and 4; Supplementary Minutes, JCS 145th and 150th Mtgs, 8 Feb and 7 Mar 44; Minutes, JCS 151st Mtg, 

II Mar 44; Minutes, JPS 125th Mtg, 2 Feb 44; Rad, Nimitz to King and MacArthur, 

4 Jul 44, CM-IN 2926. 

8 Memo, Marshall for King, 10 Feb 44, no sub, in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (28 Jun 

43); Memo, Col Charles K. Gailey, Jr. (Exec 0 OPD) for Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy 

(AColS OPD), 22 Feb 44, no sub [reporting McNarney remarks], and associated materials in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A;JPS 418/1,23 Mar 44, Basic Decision 

Which Will Give Strategic Guidance for ... the War in the Pacific, in OPD ABC 384 

Pacific (8 Mar 44); Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 23 Jun 44, CM-OUT 55718; Supplementary Minutes, JCS 150th Mtg, 7 Mar 44. 

9 Memo, Somervell for Handy, 15 Jul 44, sub: JCS 924, and associated papers in OPD 

ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C-3302, 20 Jun 43, 

CM-IN 13149; GHQ SWPA, Estimates of the Situation and Rough Draft RENO Plan 

[RENO I], 25 Feb 43, photostat copy in OCMH files; Minutes, JPS 134th, 157th. and 

159th Mtgs, 8 Mar, 28 Jun, and 26 Jul 44. See also below, p. 468. 
LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA 465 

In March 1944 the Joint Chiefs had directed MacArthur to be 

ready to move into the southern Philippines before the end of the 

year and to make plans to invade Luzon during February 1945. Simultaneously, they had ordered Nimitz to prepare plans for an assault 

against Formosa in February 1945. 10 These directives, which left in 

abeyance the relative priority of Luzon and Formosa, ostensibly settled 

the question of re-entry into the Philippines, but in mid-June the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff reopened the question of bypassing the archipelago. 

Developments in the Pacific, Asia, and Europe between mid-March 

and mid-June 1944 tended to support those planners who wanted to 

bypass the Philippines. The U.S. Army had acquired new intelligence indicating that the Japanese were rapidly reinforcing their 

bastions throughout the western Pacific, including Formosa. Thus, 

the longer the Allies delayed an attack on Formosa, the more the 

operation would ultimately cost. Army planners suggested that the 

Allies might be able to reach Formosa during November 1944 if the 

Joint Chiefs immediately decided to bypass the Philippines. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs were beginning to fear an imminent collapse 

of Chinese resistance-some planners felt that the only way to avert 

such an eventuality would be the early seizure of Formosa and a 

port on the China coast without undertaking intermediary operations 

in the Philippines.ll The Joint Chiefs were probably also stimulated 

by the success of the invasion of Normandy in eady June and by the 

impending invasion of the Marianas in the Central Pacific, set for 15 

June. At any rate, on 13 June, seeking ways and means to accelerate 

the pace of operations in the Pacific, and feeling that the time might 

be ripe for acceleration, the Joint Chiefs asked Admiral Nimitz and 

General MacArthur to consider the possibilities of bypassing all objectives already selected in the western Pacific, including both the 

Philippines and Formosa. 12 

Neither Nimitz nor MacArthur gave the Joint Chiefs any encouragement. Both declared that the next major step in the Pacific after 

the advance to the Palaus-Morotai line would have to be the seizure 

of air bases in the southern or central Philippines. The Joint Chiefs' 

subordinate committees, examining the theater commanders' replies and 

undertaking new studies of their own, reaffirmed the concept that 

the Allies would have to move into the central or southern Philippines before advancing to either Formosa or Luzon. Like MacArthur 

10 JCS 713/4, 12 Mar 44, Future Opns in the Pacific, in OPS ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-

43) Sec. 3-A. See also Smith, AppTO(lch to the Philippines, Ch. I. 

11 JCS 713/8, 13 Jun 44, Future Opns in the Pacific, in OPD ABC 384 Formosa (8 

Sep 43) Sec. l-C; Rad, JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 13 Jun 44, CM-OUT 50007; 

Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 23 Jun 44, CM-OUT 55718. 

12 Rad, JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 13 Jun 44, CM-OUT 50007. 
466 COMMAND DECISIONS 

and Nimitz, the advisory bodies saw no possibility of a direct jump 

to Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently with some reluctance, 

agreed. '3 

Meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a conference at 

Pearl Harbor in late July 1944, both MacArthur and Nimitz again 

emphasized that MacArthur's forces would have to be firmly established in the southern or central Philippines before any advance to 

either Formosa or Luzon could take place-on this point almost everyone 

was agreed. MacArthur then argued persuasively that it was both 

necessary and proper to take Luzon before going on to Formosa, 

while Nimitz expounded a plan for striking straight across the western Pacific to Formosa, bypassing Luzon. Apparently, no decisions on 

strategy were reached at the Pearl Harbor conferences. 14 The Formosa versus Luzon debate continued without let-up at the highest 

planning levels for over two months, and even the question of bypassing the Philippines entirely in favor of a direct move on Formosa 

again came up for serious discussion. '5 The net result of the debate 

through July 1944 was reaffirmation of the decision to strike into the 

southern or central Philippines before advancing to either Formosa 

or Luzon. The Joint Chiefs still had to decide whether to seize Luzon 

or Formosa, or both, before executing any other major attacks against 

Japan. 

The Debate Over Luzon 

The Views Presented 

General MacArthur was a most vigorous adherent of the view 

that the Allies would have to secure Luzon before moving any farther 

toward Japan. Contrary to the views held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

MacArthur believed that Luzon was a more valuable strategic prize 

1:) Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, CX-13891, 18 Jun 44, CM-IN 15058; Rad, Nimitz 

to King and MacArthur, 4 Jul 44, CM-IN 2926; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 23 Jun 44, 

CM-OUT 55718; Minutes, JPS 157th, 158th, and 159th Mtgs, 28 Jun and 12 and 21 

Jul 44; JPS 404/5, 23 Jun 44, Future Opns in the Pacific, and related papers in OPD 

ABC 384 Formosa (8 Sep 43) Sec. 1-C and ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 4; see also 

Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 451-52. 

14 No evidence that strategic decisions were reached at Pearl Harbor is to be found in 

contemporary sources. See Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C-15589, 1 Aug 44, CM-IN 

496; Memo, King for Marshall and Arnold, 9 Aug 44, no sub [quoting parts ofa letter 

on the Pearl Harbor Conference from Nimitz to King, dated 31 Jul 44], in OPD ABC 

384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 4; Ltr, Lt Gen Robert C. Richardson, COMGENPOA, to 

Marshall, 1 Aug 44, no sub, in OPD Personal File on Gen Marshall. See also Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There, (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), pp. 247-52. 

Leahy also participated in the conferences, and Richardson was MacArthur's host in 

Hawaii). 

15 See, for example, Minutes, JPS 160th Mtg, 2 Aug 44. 
LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA 467 

than Formosa. He declared that the Allies would need to reoccupy 

the entire Philippine Archipelago before they could completely sever 

Japan's lines of communication to the south. MacArthur also believed 

that an invasion of Formosa would prove unduly hazardous unless he 

provided air and logistical support from Luzon. Finally, he suggested, 

if the Allies took Luzon first they could then bypass Formosa and 

strike for targets farther north, thus hastening the end of the war. 

The Luzon-first course of action, he averred, would be the cheaper 

in terms of time, men, and money.16 

In addition, MacArthur considered that bypassing part of the 

Philippines would have the "sinister implication" of imposing a food 

blockade upon unoccupied portions of the archipelago. (His meaning 

here is not clear, inasmuch as his own plans called for seizing a foothold in southeastern Mindanao, jumping thence to Leyte in the eastcentral Philippines, and then going on to Luzon, initially bypassing 

the bulk of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and most of the Visayan 

Islands.) 17 MacArthur had a more cogent argument, and one that 

was bound to have some influence upon planning in Washington. 

The reoccupation of the entire Philippine Archipelago as quickly and 

early as possible, was, MacArthur said, a national obligation and 

political necessity. To bypass any or all the islands, he declared, would 

destroy American honor and prestige throughout the Far East, if not 

in the rest of the world as well. 

Just as General MacArthur was the most vigorous proponent of 

Luzon, so Admiral King was the most persistent advocate of the Formosa-first strategy. King believed that the seizure of Luzon before 

Formosa could only delay the execution of more decisive operations 

to the north. He also argued that the capture of Formosa first would 

greatly facilitate the subsequent occupation of Luzon. Moreover, King 

pointed out, the Allies could not secure and maintain a foothold on 

the China coast until they had seized Formosa. Finally, he suggested, 

if the Allies should bypass Formosa, then the principal objective in 

the western Pacific should be Japan, itself, not Luzon. 1s 

MacArthur believed that the plans to bypass Luzon were purely 

Navy-inspired. 19 Actually, the War and Navy Departments were as 

1(; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C-3302, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN 13139; Rad, MacArthur 

to Marshall, CX-13891, 18 Jun 44 CM-IN, 15058; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 

C-15689, 3 Aug 44, CM-IN 2479; RENO I, 25 Feb 43; GHQ SWPA, Basic Outline 

Plan for MUSKETEER (Philippine) Opns [MUSKETEER I], 10 Jul 44. 

17 MUSKETEER I, 10 Jul 44; MUSKETEER II, 29 Aug 44; MUSKETEER III, 26 Sep 44. 

I'See the sources cited in note 6, above, and alsoJCS 713/10,4 Sep 44 [memo from 

King for the JCS], and associated papers in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 5; Minutes, JCS 171st and 172d Mtg, I and 5 Sep 44. 

19 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C-15689, 3 Aug 44, CM-IN 2479. 
468 COMMAND DECISIONS 

internally split during the Luzon versus Formosa debate as they had 

been earlier over the question of bypassing all the Philippines. For 

example, at least until mid-September 1944 General Marshall favored 

the Formosa-first strategy and like Admiral King had expressed the 

opinion that Japan itself, rather than Luzon, should be considered 

the substitute for Formosa. Most Army members of the Joint Chiefs' 

subordinate committees held similar views, and until September consistently pressed for an early decision in favor of Formosa. Army Air 

Forces planners, during the summer of 1944, expressed their interest 

in Formosa as a site for B-29 bases. 2o 

Admiral Nimitz, the ranking naval officer in the Pacific, went on 

record until late September as favoring Formosa first. However, there 

are indications that his views were not enthusiastically shared by his 

staff, and there are grounds to believe that Nimitz grew steadily more 

lukewarm toward the idea of seizing Formosa. Nimitz had been at 

variance with Admiral King on the question of bypassing the entire 

Philippine Archipelago, and it is possible that his support of the Formosa-first strategy stemmed at least in part from deference to King's 

judgment. A hint of Nimitz' attitude is apparent in the fact that his 

staff was preparing plans to seize Okinawa, as a substitute for Formosa, well before such an operation gained serious consideration 

among high-level planners in Washington. 21 

The next ranking naval officer in the Pacific, Admiral William F. 

Halsey, commander of the Third Fleet (and until 15 June 1944 commander of the South Pacific Area as well), steadfastly opposed the 

Formosa-first plan. He wanted to go to Luzon and bypass Formosa 

in favor of seizing Okinawa. In this connection Halsey relates a classic 

story concerning a discussion between his chief of staff, Vice Adm. 

Robert B. Carney, and Admiral King. King, propounding his Formosa plan to Carney, who was arguing in favor of Luzon, asked, 

"Do you want to make a London out of Manila?" Carney's reply 

was: "No sir, I want to make an England out of Luzon." 22 

20jPS 414/10,29 jun 44, Future Opns in the Pacific, and associated sources in OPD 

ABC 384 Formosa (8 Sep 43) Sec. 1-C; jCS 713/14, 7 Sep 44, Proposed Directive, and 

connected materials in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 5; Minutes, jCS 171st-173d 

Mtgs, I, 5, and 8 Sep 44; Minutes, jPS 160th, 162d, 163d, 165th, and 167th Mtgs, 2, 10, 

16, and 28 Aug and 2 Sep 44. 

21 Rads, Nimitz to King, 18 and 24 Aug 44, CM-IN 16755 and CM-IN 22182; Rad, 

Nimitz to Arnold, 5 Sep 44, CM-IN 4996; Memo [unsigned but prepared by Col William L. Ritchie of OPD, who had just returned to Washington after talking with most of 

the ranking Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific], n.d. [circa 15 Aug 44], sub: 

Notes for Discussion With General Marshall [hereafter cited as Ritchie Notes for Marshall], and related sources in OPD 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 5; Fleet Admiral William F. 

Halsey, USN, and Lieutenant Commander j. Bryan, III, USNR, Admiral Halsey's Story, 

(New York: McGraw-Hili Book Company, Inc., 1947), p. 195. 

22 Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p. 195. 
LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA 469 

Most of the other senior Army and Navy officers on duty in the 

Pacific also favored the Luzon-first strategy and advocated bypassing 

Formosa. Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, commanding U.S. Army 

Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, strongly advised against Formosa. So, 

too, did MacArthur's air commander, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, 

and the Southwest Pacific Area's naval commander, Vice Adm. Thomas 

C. Kinkaid. But among the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the summer 

and early fall of 1944 only Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's 

Chief of Staff, favored going to Luzon instead of Formosa, and this 

stand represented a reversal of Leahy's earlier thinking on the subject.:!:1 

It is noteworthy that, with the possible exception of Nimitz, the ranking Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific-the men responsible 

for executing or supporting the operation-were opposed to the seizure 

of Formosa. In general, they favored a program calling for the capture of Luzon and a subsequent jump to Okinawa or Japan. In the 

face of this opinion of commanders on the spot, the consensus of most 

high-ranking Army and Navy planners in Washington-with Leahy 

and General Somervell as outstanding exceptions-was that the Formosafirst course of action was strategically the sounder and, therefore, the 

most desirable course for the Allies to follow in the western Pacific. 

The Washington planners, however, had to give careful consideration to many factors other than ideal strategy. Study of these factors 

brought the Luzon versus Formosa debate to a climax in late September 1944. 

Tactical and Logistical Problems 

Perhaps the most influential event helping to precipitate the climax 

was a drastic change in the target date for the initial invasion of the 

Philippines. Until mid-September 1944, General MacArthur's plans 

had called for the first entry into the Philippines to take place in 

southeastern Mindanao on 15 November, while the major assault into 

the archipelago would occur at Leyte on 20 December. On 15 September, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur 

canceled preliminary Mindanao operations in favor of a direct jump 

from the Palaus-Morotai line to Leyte on 20 October. 24 

Soon after this change of schedule, MacArthur informed the Joint 

Chiefs that he could push on from Leyte to Luzon on 20 December, 

two months earlier than the date currently under consideration for 

an attack on either Luzon or Formosa. This new plan, MacArthur 

2:1 Ritchie Notes for Marshall; George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, A Personal HIstory of/he Pacific War, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), p. 371; Leahy. I Was 

There, p. 259; Rad, Richardson to Marshall, R-28617, 22 Aug 44, CM-IN 19958. 

24 For the events leading up to this change in plans, see Cannon, Leyte: The Return to 

the PhilippInes, Ch. L 
470 COMMAND DECISIONS 

suggested, would permit the Allies to execute the Formosa operation 

on the date already selected, but, he went on, the prior seizure of 

Luzon would render unnecessary the occupation of Formosa. 25 

MacArthur's new schedule contained much to recommend it to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His proposed sequence of operations-Leyte 

on 20 October, Luzon on 20 December, and Formosa, possibly, on 

20 February 1945-would permit the Allies to maintain steady pressure against the Japanese. Should the Allies drop Luzon out of the 

sequence, the Japanese would have ample time to realign their defenses during the interval between the Leyte and Formosa operations. 

Moreover, dropping out Luzon could in no way accelerate the advance to Formosa-logistical problems would make it impossible for 

the Allies to mount an invasion of Formosa under any circumstances 

before late February 1945. 

While MacArthur's proposals were gaining some favor in Washington, especially among Army planners, Nimitz' proposals for advancing to Formosa and the south China coast were losing ground. 26 

Plans developed in Washington had long called for the seizure of all 

Formosa, after which amphibious forces would strike on westward to 

secure a port on the mainland. But Nimitz' latest plans provided for 

simultaneous assaults on southern Formosa and in the Amoy area of 

the China coast. Nimitz proposed to occupy the bulk of Formosa only 

if such a step proved necessary and feasible after he had established 

a firm bridgehead at Amoy. 

Army planners quickly decided that Nimitz' new plans possessed 

major drawbacks. The Japanese would hardly allow Allied forces to 

sit unmolested in southern Formosa. Instead, the Japanese would 

mount strong counterattacks from northern Formosa with troops already on the island and with reinforcements staged in from China. 

Occupying and defending one beachhead on southern Formosa and 

another at Amoy would involve problems far different from those the 

Allies had encountered previously in the Pacific. So far during the 

war, the Japanese had usually been hard put to move air and ground 

reinforcements against the island perimeters Allied amphibious task 

forces had seized. In the southern Formosa-Amoy area, on the other 

hand, the Allies would not have the protection of distance from 

25 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C-18103, 21 Sep 44, CM-IN 19803. 

26 The discussion of tactical and logistical problems in the remainder of this subsection 

is based generally upon: Minutes,jPS 162d, 165th, and 167th Mtgs, 10 and 28 Aug and 

2 Sep 44; OPD, Draft Appreciation of a Plan of Campaign, n.d. [circa 1 Sep 44], and 

associated sources in OPD 381 Strategy Section Papers (4 Sep 44); Memo, Handy for 

Marshall, n.d. [circa 5 Sep 44], sub: Opns in the Western Pacific, and related documents 

in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 5; Minutes, jCS 171st and 172d Mtgs, 1 and 5 

Sep 44. 
LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA 471 

major Japanese bases they had enjoyed in earlier campaigns. The 

Allies did not have sufficient aircraft in the Pacific to keep neutralized all existing Japanese airfields within range of southern Formosa 

and Amoy. In addition, experience in the Pacific had demonstrated 

that Allied air and naval forces could not be expected to forestall 

all Japanese efforts to move strong reinforcements across the narrow 

strait between China and Formosa. 

Having considered these factors, Army planners swung to the opinion 

that a southern Formosa-Amoy operation would be impractical. They 

believed that it would inevitably lead to protracted, costly campaigns 

to secure all Formosa and large areas of the adjacent China mainland as well. Major ground campaigns of such scope could only delay 

progress toward Japan and would prove an unacceptable drain upon 

Allied manpower resources. 

Further study of manpower needed for the southern FormosaAmoy operation revealed additional difficulties. Army intelligence estimates of Japanese strength in Formosa-Amoy region, for example, 

were far higher than those Nimitz' staff had produced. Army planners therefore believed that the southern Formosa-Amoy campaign 

would require many more combat units than Nimitz was planning 

to employ. Furthermore, according to various estimates made during 

September, Nimitz would lack from 77,000 to 200,000 of the service 

troops needed for the campaign he proposed. 

Planners studied a number of suggestions for securing the necessary service forces. One thought, originating with the Navy, which 

was seeking ways to accelerate the Formosa target date, proposed 

taking service units from the Southwest Pacific area. But MacArthur's 

command was already short of service troops. To remove any from 

his area might jeopardize the success of the Leyte operation and would 

certainly immobilize his forces in the central Philippines until long 

after Nimitz had secured the southern Formosa-Amoy region. Although 

the southern Formosa-Amoy and Luzon operations would each require about the same number of U.S. combat troops in the assault 

phase, MacArthur could count upon hundreds of thousands of loyal 

Filipinos to augment both his service and his combat strength. No 

similar source of friendly manpower would be available on Formosa. 

By mid-September 1944 so few service units were available in the 

United States that the only way Army planners could see to solve 

the service troop shortage for Nimitz' proposed operation was to await 

redeployment from Europe. Army planners and the Joint Logistic 

Committee both estimated that Nimitz could launch the southern 

Formosa-Amoy campaign even as early as 1 March 1945 only if the 

war in Europe ended by 1 November 1944, thereby permitting timely 
472 COMMAND DECISIONS 

redeployment of service units to the Pacific. And even if the Allies 

could effect such redeployment from Europe, logistical planners still 

felt that Nimitz would be unable to move against Formosa by 1 March 

1945 unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately decided to cancel 

the Luzon operation, thus providing for an early and unbroken build-up 

of the resources required to execute Nimitz' campaign. On the other 

hand, the logistical experts were convinced that MacArthur could 

move to Luzon before the end of 1944 regardless of developments in 

Europe. Army planners, not as optimistic as they had been a few 

months earlier about an early end to the war in Europe, pointed 

out that it would be unsound to schedule the southern Formosa-Amoy 

operation on the presumption of a German collapse by 1 November 

1944. Events were to prove this argument sound. 

Army planners saw other combined logistical-tactical disadvantages 

in Nimitz' plan. They believed, for instance, that the campaign would 

tie down so many troops, ships, landing craft, and planes that an 

invasion of Luzon, assuming Formosa came first, could not take place 

until November 1945. By the same token any other major step toward 

Japan, such as the seizure of Okinawa, would be equally delayed. A 

hiatus of this length would be unacceptable for tactical reasons alone. 

In addition, the Luzon-first course, it appeared, would be far safer 

logistically than the southern Formosa-Amoy undertaking. As Army 

Service Forces planners pointed out, the Allied lines of communication to Luzon would be shorter and easier to protect than those to 

Formosa. The logisticians predicted that the Allies would find it especially 

difficult to safeguard the lines of communication to Formosa if Luzon 

remained in Japanese hands. 

Other aspects of the logistical problems attained disturbing overtones. Admiral Leahy, for example, believed that although the Formosa-first course of action might ultimately hasten the end of the war 

in the Pacific, capturing Luzon and bypassing Formosa would prove 

far cheaper in terms of lives and other resources. By mid-September 

he, as well as most Army planners, was favoring what promised to 

be the longer course at the lesser cost. General MacArthur, meanwhile, expressed the opinion that the Formosa-first strategy would 

cost not only more lives but also more time. He was prepared to guarantee 

to the Joint Chiefs that he could secure the most strategically important area of Luzon-the Central Plains-Manila Bay region-within 

four to six weeks after initial landings on the island. 

General Marshall also began to show misgivings about the cost of 

the southern Formosa-Amoy operation vis-a.-vis Luzon, although he 

remained convinced that the Formosa-first course was strategically 

the more desirable. Admiral Nimitz expressed no strong opinion on 
LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA 473 

the relative cost of the two campaigns, but, "backing" into the problem, stated that the occupation of Luzon after Formosa need not 

delay the pace of the war in the Pacific. If Formosa came first, Nimitz 

pointed out, MacArthur's task on Luzon would be considerably eased 

and, presumably, less costly. Admiral King, however, declared himself convinced that the Formosa-first course would save time and, 

therefore, reduce casualties over the long run. By late September 1944 

King alone among the upper-level planners seems to have retained a 

strong conviction along these lines. 

While the discussions over tactical and logistical problems continued in Washington, the Allied position in China had been steadily 

deteriorating. In mid-September General Joseph W. Stilwell, commanding U.S. Army forces in China, Burma, and India, and Allied 

Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, reported to the Joint 

Chiefs that Japanese offensives in eastern and southeastern China 

were overrunning the last air bases from which the China-based U.S. 

Fourteenth Air Force could effectively support invasions of either 

Luzon or Formosa. Chiang's armies were unable to either hold or 

recapture the air bases. 27 

This news had an obvious impact upon the thinking of both the 

ground and the air planners in Washington. The Army Air Forces 

had intended to expand its airfields in eastern China as staging bases 

for B-29's flying against targets in Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and 

Formosa, and to base on these fields much of the tactical bombardment preceding the actual invasion of Japan. The east China fields 

now appeared irretrievably lost, and the Allies could not afford to 

expend the manpower necessary to retake and hold them. The need 

for seizure and development of a port on the China coast was therefore deprived of much of its urgency since the Allies had needed such a 

port primarily to open a good supply route into China for the development of air bases. By the same token, one of the principal reasons 

for seizing Formosa-to secure a steppingstone to the China coastbecame much less compelling. 

This line of thinking forced naval planners to reconsider the southern Formosa-Amoy plan. To most Navy planners a move to Formosa 

without the concomitant seizure of a mainland port would prove 

unsound, because Formosa lacked the anchorages and ports required 

for the large fleet and logistical bases the Allies needed in the western 

Pacific. Inevitably the question arose: If it was no longer feasible or 

desirable to seize and develop a port on the south China coast, was 

27 Rad, Stilwell to Marshall and MacArthur, CFBX-22674, 16 Sep 44, CM-IN 15768. 

See also, Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems (Washington, 1956), in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
474 COMMAND DECISIONS 

it feasible or desirable to occupy any part of Formosa? Since early 

September 1944 Army planners had been answering that question with 

an emphatic "no." 28 

The loss of existing and potential air base sites in eastern China, 

together with the limitations inherent in Nimitz' plans to occupy only 

southern Formosa, weighed heavily with Army Air Forces planners. 

There was no question but that B-29's could operate more effectively 

against Japan from northern Formosa than they could from northern 

Luzon, the Mariana Islands, or western China, but the big bombers 

could accomplish little more from southern Formosa than they could 

from the other base areas. Indeed, Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas lay closer to Tokyo than Nimitz' proposed base area in southern 

Formosa, and the two islands of the Marianas were secure from 

Japanese air attack. Even northern Luzon, some 200 miles farther 

from Tokyo than southern Formosa, had some advantages over southern Formosa-it had more room for B-29 fields and was safer from 

air attack. Finally, assuming that Nimitz could meet the most optimistic target date for the invasion of southern Formosa-1 March 

1945-B-29's could not begin operations from that island until the 

late spring or early summer. The Army Air Forces was already planing to initiate B-29 operations from the Marianas before the end of 

1944. In brief, by mid-September, the Army Air Forces had lost 

interest in Formosa and had begun to see eye to eye with other Army 

elements on the disadvantages and drawbacks of the southern FormosaAmoy scheme. 

An obvious political consideration may have had a bearing on the 

ultimate decision in the Luzon versus Formosa debate. General MacArthur's argument that it would be disastrous to United States prestige 

to bypass any part of the Philippines could not be dismissed. Perhaps 

more important, Admiral Leahy took the same point of view. By virtue of his intimate contact with President Roosevelt, it must be presumed that his colleagues of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Leahy's 

opinion careful consideration. 

Decision 

Whatever the political implication involved, the Formosa versus 

Luzon question was decided primarily upon its military merits. By 

the end of September 1944 almost all the military considerationsespecially the closely interrelated logistical problems concerning troops 

and timing-had weighted the scales heavily in favor of seizing Luzon, 

2R Memo, Hull for Handy, 2 Sep 44, sub: Pacific Strategy; OPD, Draft Appreciation 

of a Plan of Campaign, n.d. [circa 1 Sep 44], botli, with associated sources, in OPD 384 

Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 5; Minutes,JCS 172d Mtg, 5 Sep 44. 
LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA 475 

bypassing Formosa, forgetting about a port on the China coast, and 

jumping on to Okinawa. Admiral King was the only member of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, if not the only prominent military figure as well, 

who still maintained a strong stand in favor of bypassing Luzon and 

executing the southern Formosa-Amoy operation. 

Realizing that the military and political factors had undermined 

his position, King took a new, negative tack in the debate by raising 

objections to the Luzon operation per se. He argued that the Luzon 

campaign as MacArthur had planned it would tie up all the Pacific 

Fleet's fast carrier task forces for at least six weeks for the purposes 

of protecting the Luzon beachhead and Luzon-bound convoys and 

neutralizing Japanese air power on both Luzon and Formosa. To pin 

down the carriers for so long would be unsound, King averred, and he 

therefore declared MacArthur's plan unacceptable to the U.S. Navy.29 

Alerted by his deputy chief of Staff (Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, then in Washington on official business), General MacArthur 

was able to provide Army planners with ammunition to counter 

King's last-ditch arguments.:Jo MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs 

that his only requirement for carriers after the initial assault on Luzon would be for a small group of escort carriers to remain off the 

island for a few days to provide support for ground operations until 

his engineers could ready a field for land-based planes at the invasion beaches. MacArthur continued by pointing out that only the first 

assault convoys would be routed through dangerous waters north of 

Luzon and consequently require protection from the fast carrier task 

forces. Resupply and reinforcement convoys would come through the 

central Philippines under an umbrella of land-based aircraft from 

Mindoro Island, south of Luzon, and would require no carrier-based 

air cover. Thus, MacArthur declared he would have no long-term 

requirement for the fast carrier task forces, which he could quickly 

release so that Nimitz could employ them elsewhere. MacArthur concluded with the counterargument that the fast carriers would be tied 

down to a specific area much longer during the proposed southern 

Formosa-Amoy operation, especially if Luzon remained in Japanese 

hands, than would be the case for the Luzon invasion .. " 

'" Memo, King for Marshall, 23 Sep 44, no sub, in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) 

Sec. 5 . 

. 10 Rads, R. ]. Marshall to MacArthur, 26 Sep 44, CM-OUT 37000 and 37001. The 

first radio informed MacArthur of the nature of King's arguments, told MacArthur what 

Army planners needed to counter King's objections, and cautioned MacArthur to make no 

reference to the first radio in replying to the second. The second radio, signed by R. ]. 

Marshall, was actually a formal request for information sent by the] oint Chiefs of Staff 

to MacArthur. 

:\1 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C-18496, 28 Sep 44, CM-IN 26358. 
476 COMMAND DECISIONS 

This exchange took much of the wind out of King's sails. Next, 

Admiral Nimitz withdrew whatever support he was still giving the 

Formosa plan. He had concluded that sufficient troops could not be 

made available for him to execute the southern Formosa-Amoy campaign within the foreseeable future. Accordingly, at the end of September, he threw the weight of his opinion behind the Luzon operation, proposing that plans to seize Formosa be at least temporarily 

dropped. Simultaneously, Nimitz presented for Admiral King's consideration a planned series of operations designed to maintain steady 

pressure against the Japanese and carry Allied forces speedily on toward 

Japan: MacArthur's forces would initiate the Luzon campaign on 20 

December 1944; Central Pacific forces would move against Iwo Jima, 

in the Volcano Islands some 650 miles south of Tokyo, late in January 1945; and the Central Pacific would next attack Okinawa, 850 

miles southwest of Tokyo, and other targets in the Ryukyu Islands, 

beginning on 1 March 1945.32 

King accepted Nimitz' recommendations, with one last reservation. 

King felt that the hazards involved in routing the Luzon assault convoys into the waters between Luzon and Formosa were so great that 

approval for such action should come directly from the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. He raised similar objections to plans for having the Pacific 

Fleet's fast carrier task forces operate in the same restricted waters. 

The other three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, agreed 

to leave the decision on these problems up to Nimitz and MacArthur, 

a settlement that King finally accepted. 33 

After King's eleventh-hour change of position, the Joint Chiefs 

were able to attain the unanimity that their major strategic decisions 

required. On 3 October 1944 they directed General MacArthur to 

launch the invasion of Luzon on or about 20 December and instructed 

Admiral Nimitz to execute the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations on 

the dates he had proposed. Nimitz would provide naval cover and 

support, including fast and escort carriers, for the invasion of Luzon; 

MacArthur would provide Nimitz with as much air support as he 

could from Luzon for the attack on Okinawa. The two commanders 

would co-ordinate their plans with those of B-29 units in the Pacific 

32 Conf Notes, Rear Adm Forrest P. Sherman (Nimitz' planning chief) and Rear Adm 

Charles M. Cooke (King's deputy chief of staff), 27 Sep 44, in OPD Exec Files 17, Binder 

3; JCS 713/18, 2 Oct 44. Future Opns in the Pacific [a memo by King to the JCS], in 

OPD 384 Pacific (1-17-43), Sec. 5. Nimitz personally presented his views to King at a 

secret conference in San Francisco over the weekend of 29 September-1 October 1944. 

3.1 JCS 713/18, 2 Oct 44; Rad, JCS to MacArthur, Nimitz, and Stilwell, 3 Oct 44, 

CM-OUT 40782. 
LUZON VERSUS FORMOSA 477 

and India and with the plans of General Stilwell and the Fourteenth 

Air Force in China.:J4 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not formally cancel the Formosa 

operation. Instead, they left in abeyance a final decision on the seizure 

of that island, but thereafter the occupation of Formosa as an operation of World War II never came up for serious consideration at the 

higher levels of Washington planning councils. 

The Joint Chiefs had not reached their decision to take Luzon, 

bypass Formosa, and, in effect, substitute Okinawa for Formosa, either 

lightly or easily. From the beginning of the Luzon versus Formosa 

debate they had believed the seizure of Formosa and a port on the 

south China coast-bypassing Luzon:-to be the best strategy the 

Allies could follow in the western Pacific. In the end, however, the 

Joint Chiefs had had to face the fact that the Allies could, not assemble the resources required to execute that strategy, at least until after 

the end of the war in Europe. They could not seriously consider delaying the progress of the war in the Pacific until Germany collapsed. 

In the last analysis then, logistical considerations alone would have 

forced the Joint Chiefs to the decision they reached in favor of Luzon, 

although other military realities, and possibly political factors as well, 

had some influence upon the outcome of strategic planning for operations in the western Pacific. 

For the Allied forces of the Pacific theaters, the Joint Chiefs' 

directive of 3 October 1944 ended months of uncertainty. The die 

was cast. Luzon would be taken; Formosa would be bypassed. United 

States forces would recapture the entire Philippines Archipelago in a 

consecutive series of advances, just as General MacArthur had been 

planning ever since he had left Corregidor in March 1942. 

34 Ibid. The B-29's operated under the direct control of the JCS, with General Arnold 

acting as the JCS executive agent. 

22 

The Decision To Halt at the Elbe 

by 

Forrest C. Pogue 

On 12 April 1945, the day of President Roosevelt's death and 

eighteen days before the Russians took Berlin, Ninth U.S. Army units 

crossed the Elbe River near Magdeburg, some fifty miles from the 

German capital. (See Map IX, inside back cover.) They established a second bridgehead farther south on the following day. German counterattacks forced them to withdraw from the northern position on the 

14th, but the Americans held the southern bridgehead. These elements 

were ordered to hold in place while other units arriving at the Elbe 

were turned toward objectives south and north along the west bank 

of the river. On 5 May, a week before the Russians liberated Prague, 

the Third U.S. Army pushed spearheads inside the Czechoslovak 

frontier and,on the day the war ended, was in a position to advance 

in force to the Czechoslovak capital. Despite the pleas of the Czechoslovak leaders and the appeals of Mr. Churchill, these units were not 

sent forward. Many observers have concluded that only a political 

decision, perhaps made weeks before, could have held General Dwight 

D. Eisenhower's forces at the Elbe. Careful examination of the Supreme Commander's action indicates that he halted his troops short 

of Berlin and Prague for military reasons only.1 

I This study in substantially its present form was published with the title, "Why Eisenhower's Forces Stopped at the Elbe," in World Politics, IV, No.3 (April, 1952),356-68. 

It is based on Chapters XXIII and XXIV of the author's volume The Supreme Command 

(Washington, 1954) in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II with additions 

based on subsequent publications. Other published works valuable for a study of the subject are: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, 

Inc., 1948); Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 

1951); William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book 

FORREST C. POGUE, Director, George C. Marshall Research Center. 

Ph.D. in history, Clark University; American Exchange Fellow, Paris, 1937-

38. Taught: Murray State Teachers College. Combat historian with the 

First U.S. Army, World War II. Croix de Guerre. Historian, OCMH, 

1947-52. Author: The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954), UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
480 COMMAND DECISIONS 

The Situation in the Spring of 1945 

It is important to remember that before the first of April 1945-

the time at which General Eisenhower decided to halt his forces when 

they reached the Elbe-the zones of occupation for Germany and the 

sectors of occupation for Berlin had been agreed upon by the United 

States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. France had been invited 

to participate in the arrangements. The zones had been outlined, along 

general lines suggested by the British, by the European Advisory 

Commission (EAC) as early as January 1944. The United States and 

Great Britain had agreed on the main proposals at the Quebec Conference in Septem ber 1944 and had settled everything except the 

control of the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave when their representatives met at Malta in January 1945 on their way to the Yalta Conference. The Soviet Union accepted the EAC recommendations at 

Yalta in early February 1945, and the fact that zones of occupation 

had been established was announced at the close of the meeting. As 

a result many people assumed that the zones were worked out at this 

time and some bargain made in regard to Berlin and Prague. Prime 

Minister Churchill, in writing of this question, has made the situation 

clear in his statement: "The Soviet armies were at this very moment 

swarming over the pre-war frontiers, and we wished them all success . 

. . . It was well understood by everyone that the agreed occupational 

zones must not hamper the operational movements of the armies. 

Berlin, Prague, and Vienna could be taken by whoever got there 

first.. " 2 

At the time of the Yalta Conference, when final plans for the 

defeat and occupation of Germany were being discussed, it was reasonable to assume that Berlin, Prague, and even cities west of the Elbe 

might fall to the Red forces. 3 The Allied forces, which were just recovCompany, 1950); Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 1952);John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. VI (London: Her Majesty's Stationer, 

1956) in the British official History of the Second World War; U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences of Malta and ralta (Washington, 1955). 

2 Philip E. Mosely [adviser to the U.S. delegation to the European Advisory Commission in London], "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones were 

Drawn," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, No.4 Ouly, 1950), 580-604; U.S. Dept. of State, Conferences at Malta and ralta, 1945, pp. 110-23, 131,498-99,511-12,514-15,570,592-93, 

639,970; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 510. 

3 Roosevelt obviously assumed that Berlin would fall to the Russians if one may judge 

by his statement to Stalin that he had made several bets en route to Yalta as to whether 

the Americans would capture Manila before the Russians took Berlin. Stalin said he felt 

the Americans would win their prize first because of the heavy resistance which the Russians were meeting on the Oder. U.S. Dept of State, Conferences at Malta and ralta, 1945, 

pp. 510, 727. 
THE DECISION TO HALT AT THE ELBE 481 

ering from the effects of the Ardennes counteroffensive, not only were 

still west of the Rhine, but still faced heavy fighting along the flooded 

Roer. There were disquieting reports, later proved inaccurate, that 

the Germans were preparing a mountain redoubt in southern Germany 

and Austria from which they could harry the Allies and prolong the 

war for months to come. This was a particularly unpleasant prospect 

for the United States which wanted to end the war quickly in Europe 

in order to shift men and supplies to General MacArthur in the 

Pacific. Moreover, it is doubtful if U.S. public opinion-far more favorable to a return to normal than to political arrangements for the 

future, especially arrangements considered to be more in the interest 

of Britain and France than of the United States-would have backed 

any action which required new commitments in Europe, particularly 

east of the Elbe. 

So far as military commanders were concerned, their desire was 

to end the war in Europe as quickly as possible and to avoid political complications. This view seems to have been shared to some extent 

by members of the State Department. 4 General Eisenhower, schooled 

in a military tradition which held that commanders should keep their 

eyes on the military road to victory and leave political decisions to 

civil authorities, was operating under a directive which called only 

for military action against Germany. This initial directive, which was 

not changed during the war, stated that his task was to "enter the 

continent of Europe, and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, 

undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." In the absence of any requirement from 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take measures which would strengthen 

the position of the Western Allies against future Soviet aggression, he 

emphasized a military rather than a political approach in planning the 

final offensive. Nothing in the contemporary record indicates that he 

deviated from the position which he stated after the war when writing about the effect of his plans of the division of Germany into occupation zones. This division, he wrote, "did not influence our military 

plans for the final conquest of the country. Military plans, I believed, 

should be devised with the single aim of speeding victory; by later 

4 In mid-April 1945, officials of the European and Russian Affairs Divisions of the Department of State were reported to believe "that for governments to direct movements of 

troops definitely indicated political action and that such movements should remain a military 

consideration at least until SHAEF is dissolved and the ACC (Allied Control Commission) 

is set up" .[italics in the original]. Members of the War Department in noting this view 

concluded that the State Department preferred "a straight military solution" to the problem of moving Allied troops out of areas which they might seize in the Russian zone of 

occupation. Memo by G. A. L. [Brig Gen G. A. Lincoln] to Gen Hull, Military Contacts 

with the Russians, 13 Apr 45, CCS 805/7 and CCS 805/8, OPD 381, Sec. V. 
482 COMMAND DECISIONS 

adjustment troops of the several nations could be concentrated in their 

own national sectors." .5 

Berlin 

Berlin was listed as the military goal of the Western Powers by 

SHAEF in a pre-D-Day plan of May 1944.6 However, by midSeptember 1944, when Soviet forces had reached the gates of Warsaw 

and had forced the collapse of Rumania, the Supreme Commander 

declared that while Berlin was still "the main prize," Allied strategy 

would have to be co-ordinated with that of the Russians. He thought 

that, should the Red forces "beat us to Berlin," the British forces 

ought to be pushed northward to take the Hanover area and the ports 

around Hamburg and that Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's forces should 

seize part or all of the Leipzig-Dresden area "depending upon the 

progress of the Russian advance." 7 

In the fall of 1944, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery 

pressed repeatedly for a single Allied thrust toward Berlin, northeastward from the Rhine, preferably by his army group aided by an 

American army under his command. In discussions over the "broad 

front" versus "narrow front" strategy, General Eisenhower made clear 

that for the moment he was more interested in the Ruhr than in 

Berlin. Germany, he believed, had two hearts: one, industrial (the 

Ruhr), and the other, political (Berlin). He wished to concentrate on 

the Ruhr on the theory that if the industrial heart stopped, the political heart would also die. 8 

After the Ardennes battle, the British commander revived his proposals for a single thrust to Berlin. Any chance which he had for leading the main offensive in his sector was ended in March when Bradley's forces seized the Remagen bridge and developed a major bridgehead across the Rhine. With the Umted States forces, which now far 

outnumbered the British troops on the Continent,9 in a strong posi5 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 396. (Copyright 1948 by Doubleday and Company, 

Inc. Reprinted by permission.) 

G SHAEF Planning Draft of Post-NEPTUNE Courses of Action after the Capture of the 

Lodgment Area, Main Objectives and Axes of Advance, I, 3 May 44, SHAEF SGS Post 

OVERLORD Planning, 381, I. 

7 Eisenhower to Bradley, Montgomery, and Devers, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS Post 

OVERLORD Planning, 381, I. 

, This concept appears in several of General Eisenhower's letters. The particular figure 

of speech is that of Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, SHAEF Chief of Staff, who used it in 

explaining the Supreme Commander's viewpoint. Interv with Smith, 1 Nov 51. 

9 Mr. Churchill recognized the importance of this disproportion of strength in his statement to the British Chiefs of Staff during the March and April debate over strategy: "I 

hope ... we shall realise that we have only a quarter of the forces invading Germany, 

and that the situation has thus changed remarkably from the day of June 1944 .... " 

Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 460. See also Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 409-13. 
THE DECISION TO HALT AT THE ELBE 483 

tion to attack through central Germany to the Leipzig-Dresden area, 

it is not surprising that General Bradley's advice stressed the difficulties of the advance on Berlin and the value of striking toward 

Dresden. The U.S. commander has summarized the situation as he 

then saw it in A Soldier's Story. Nearly two hundred miles separated 

Montgomery's Rhine bridgehead from the Elbe, while Marshal Georgi 

K. Zhukov had nearly a million men on the Oder with some elements 

within thirty or forty miles of the German capital. Even if the Allies 

reached the Elbe before Zhukov crossed the Oder, the British and 

U.S. forces would still have to cross fifty miles of lowlands marked by 

lakes, streams, and canals to get to Berlin. When asked by General 

Eisenhower for an opinion, General Bradley estimated that a breakthrough from the Elbe would cost 100,000 casualties. "A pretty stiff 

price to pay for a prestige objective ," he told the Supreme Commander. 

And, remembering that the Allies had already agreed that the Russian occupation zone would run within one hundred miles of the 

Rhine, he added, "Especially when we've got to fall back and let the 

other fellow take over." He says candidly of his thinking of this period: 

I could see no political advantage accruing from the capture of Berlin 

that would offset the need for quick destruction of the German army on 

our front. As soldiers we looked naively on this British inclination [the 

desire to go on to Berlin] to complicate the war with political foresight 

and non-military objectives.!O 

With these arguments in mind and fearing that the enemy might 

successfully establish his redoubt in the south, General Eisenhower 

concluded near the end of March that he should push his main force 

from the Kassel-Frankfurt area to the Elbe, split the German forces, 

cut off Berlin from the National Redoubt area, and then turn his 

forces directly to the north and to the southwest of the Elbe. These 

maneuvers would enable him to seize ports on the North Sea and the 

Baltic and also clean up the area to the south before the enemy could 

assemble a force there. This meant that the main offensive would be 

under Bradley's command. '1 On 28 March he asked the Allied military missions in Moscow to inform Marshal Stalin of his intentions. 

The British Chiefs objected strongly, saying that the Supreme Commander had gone outside proper channels in notifying Stalin of his 

plan to stop at the Elbe. They held that Eisenhower's proposals were 

contrary to his previous assurances that the-main battle would be 

fought in the north; that they relegated their forces to a secondary 

position; and that they failed to include capture of Berlin-an impor10 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 531-37, 544. 

11 Eisenhower to Mil Mission, Personal to Marshal Stalin, SCAF -252, 28 Mar 45, 

SHAEF SGS Bomb-Line, Liaison, and Co-ordination of Fronts, 373.5, 1. 
484 COMMAND DECISIONS 

tant political prize. It was apparent that the minimizing of the British 

position in the final offensive was of great importance at this stage of 

the debate. Mr. Churchill made this clear in a private memorandum 

to the British Chiefs of Staff on 31 March when he said: 

3. It seems to me that the chief criticism of the new Eisenhower plan 

is that it shifts the axis of the main advance upon Berlin to the direction 

through Leipzig to Dresden, and thus raises the question of whether the 

Twenty-one Army Group will not be so stretched as to lose its offensive 

power, especially after it has been deprived of the Ninth United States 

Army. Thus we might be condemned to an almost static role in the north 

and virtually prevented from crossing the Elbe until an altogether later 

stage in the operations has been reached. All prospect also of the British 

entering Berlin with the Americans is ruled out. '2 

Churchill had warned the British Chiefs of Staff that Eisenhower's 

credit with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff stood very high as a result of 

recent victories and that they might "riposte heavily." "The Americans 

will feel that, as the victorious Supreme Commander, he has a right, and 

indeed a vital need, to try to elicit from the Russians their views as 

to the best point for making contact by the armies of the West and 

of the East." In a sharp exchange, in which the American Chiefs of 

Staff seemed to criticize British strategy and operations in the Rhineland, the Joint Chiefs held that in the existing fluid state of fighting, 

Eisenhower was the only person in a position to judge what measures 

were best for destroying the armies and their will to resist. '3 

The Prime Minister moved quickly to deal with and dispose of 

"these misunderstandings between the truest friends and comrades that 

ever fought side by side as allies." He denied any attempt to disparage or lower the prestige of the Supreme Commander. While indicating that he felt that the U.S. Joint Chiefs had done less than justice to British efforts by their remarks, he made clear that his great 

concern was that the shift in the direction of the attack would leave 

the British forces in a static condition along the Elbe when and if 

they reached it. He then proceeded to shift the argument from the 

military to the political level by noting that the Russians were already 

in a position to overrun Austria and take Vienna. He asked: "If they 

also take Berlin, will not their impression that they have been the 

overwhelming contributor to the common victory be unduly imprinted 

in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will 

raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far east into 

12 Marshall to Eisenhower, W-61337, 31 Mar 45, Eisenhower personal file; Churchill, 

Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 460-61. 

13 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 46-62; Marshall to Eisenhower, W-61337, 

31 Mar 45, Eisenhower personal file. 
THE DECISION TO HALT AT THE ELBE 485 

Germany as possible, and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should 

certainly take it. This also appears sound on military grounds." 14 

The President, in a reply which clearly reflected the U.S. Army's 

views, held the debate to military considerations. He explained that 

the U.S. Chiefs' insistence on upholding the Supreme Commander 

was an enunciation of a well-known military principle rather than an 

anti-British reaction. Any impression that they were reflecting on the 

performances of the 21 Army Group arose, he thought, from a failure to stress factors such as military obstacles and the strength and 

quality of opposing forces which had contributed to the difficulties 

facing Field Marshal Montgomery's units. The President could not 

see that Eisenhower's plans involved any far-reaching changes from 

the strategy approved at Malta. He regretted that at the moment of 

a great victory the Allies should "become involved in such unfortunate reactions." 15 

General Eisenhower assured the British Prime Minister that he 

had no intention of relegating the British forces to a restricted sphere. 

He thought it likely that once Allied forces reached the Elbe, U.S. 

forces would be shifted to Field Marshal Montgomery who would then 

be sent across the river in the north and to a line reaching at least 

to Luebeck on the Baltic coast. As for the drive to Berlin, he made 

no promises. If it could be brought into the Allied orbit, he declared, 

honors would be equally shared between the British and U.S. forces.16 

Mr. Churchill informed the President that the changes in strategy were 

fewer than he had initially believed and assured Roosevelt that relations with Eisenhower were still of the most friendly nature." 7 

Mr. Churchill's words ended the discussion over the British role 

in future campaigns, but did not dispose of the question of Berlin as 

a political matter. Made suspicious by the alacrity with which Marshal Stalin agreed to General Eisenhower's decision to drive for 

Leipzig instead of Berlin and by Soviet agreement that Berlin was 

no longer of strategic importance, the British Chiefs urged that this 

point be reconsidered. The U.S. Chiefs replied that "Only Eisenhower 

IS in a position to know how to fight his battle, and to exploit to the 

14 Churchill to Roosevelt, 931, 1 Apr 45, Inc! to CCS 805, 29 Mar 45, ABC 384 Europe 

(5 Aug 43), Sec. I-D; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 464-66; Eisenhower, Crusade in 

Europe, p. 399. 

15 Draft of message for the President to the Prime Minister (with notation "dispatched 

as is per White House") in reply to message of 1 Apr 45, Operations Division (War Department) files ABC-384, Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec. I-D. 

16 Eisenhower to Churchill, FWD-18428, 1 Apr 45, Eisenhower personal file. 

17 Churchill to Roosevelt, 933, 5 Apr 45; Marshall to Eisenhower, W-64244, 6 Apr 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. Churchill's message ended with the Latin quotation: "Amantium 

irae amoris integratio est" which the War Department translated as "Lovers' quarrels are a 

part of love" and sent to General Eisenhower. 
486 COMMAND DECISIONS 

full the changing situation." As for Berlin, they felt that such "psychological and political advantages as would result from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the imperative military consideration, which in our opinion is the destruction 

and dismemberment of the German armed forces." 18 

On 7 April, General Eisenhower presented his views to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said he was reluctant to make Berlin a major 

objective since it had lost much of its military importance; it was in 

ruins and many of the government workers had left the city. His chief 

interest at the moment was in dividing the enemy forces by a thrust 

to the Elbe near Leipzig and by establishing the Allied left flank on 

the Baltic near Luebeck. His only political reaction was shown in his 

statement that the push to the Baltic coast would prevent the Red 

Army from occupying any part of the Danish peninsula. If, after 

accomplishing these aims, his forces could take Berlin, well and good. 

He made it quite clear that while he was working on a basis of military objectives, he was willing to consider political factors in his decisions. He then added: 

But I regard it as militarily unsound at this stage of the proceedings 

to make Berlin a major objective, particularly in view of the fact that it 

is only 35 miles from the Russian lines. I am the first to admit that a war 

is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely 

military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust my plans 

and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation.'9 

Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in 

Chief, has written that there is no evidence in his notes that the Combined Chiefs of Staff ever took up the question of Berlin. The decision was thus left to the Supreme Commander, who was free to make 

it on purely military bases. His attitude was made clear on 8 April 

when, in answer to Montgomery's request for ten U.S. divisions for a 

main thrust toward Luebeck and Berlin, he said: 

As regards Berlin I am quite ready to admit that it has political and 

psychological significance, but of far greater importance will be the location of the remaining German forces in relation to Berlin. It is on them 

that I am going to concentrate my attention. Naturally, if I can get a 

chance to take Berlin cheaply, I shall take it.20 

That General Eisenhower's decision was not based on a desire to 

favor American forces over the British was made clear less than a 

" Paraphrase of U.S. views given Marshall to Eisenhower, W-64349, 6 Apr 45, Eisenhower personal file; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 511-12. 

19 Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-1871O, 7 Apr 45, Eisenhower personal file. 

20 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 8 Apr 45, Eisenhower personal file. 
THE DECISION TO HALT AT THE ELBE 487 

week later when the Ninth U.S. Army reached the Elbe and its commander, Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, asked permission to go to the 

German capital. The Supreme Commander reiterated his order to 

hold on the Elbe and to turn units northward in the direction of Luebeck and southward toward the so-called National Redoubt. His action 

recalled the strategy which he had suggested as early as September 

1944. In informing the War Department of his action, General Eisenhower said that not only were the Baltic and Bavarian objectives more 

important than Berlin but that to plan for an immediate effort against 

the German capital "would be foolish in view of the relative situation 

of the Russians and ourselves .... While it is true we have seized a 

small bridgehead over the Elbe, it must be remembered that only our 

spearheads are up to that river; our center of gravity is well back of 

there." 21 

By the third week in April, Mr. Churchill seems to have accepted 

the Supreme Commander's views on Berlin. He cabled Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, then in the United States, on 19 April: 

... It would seem that the Western Allies are not immediately in a position to force their way into Berlin. The Russians have two and a half 

million troops on the section of the front opposite that city. The Americans have only their spearheads, say twenty-five divisions, which are covering an immense front and are at many points engaged with the Germans .... 

In views which paralleled earlier suggestions of General Eisenhower's, 

he emphasized that it was most important for Montgomery to take 

Luebeck, since his arrival there "before our Russian friends from Stettin 

would save a lot of argument later on." He also believed it important to push on to Linz to meet the Red forces there and to gain 

the region south of Stuttgart where the main German installations 

connected with atomic research were located. Mr. Eden agreed completely, adding: "I am sure that you still have Prague in mind. It 

might do the Russians much good if the Americans were to occupy 

the Czech capital. ... " 22 

It is not clear whether the British Foreign Minister discussed Mr. 

Churchill's views with Mr. Truman. The President made his views 

evident on 21 April when, in answer to Churchill's cable regarding 

arrangements relative to zones of occupation, he replied that "the 

tactical deployment of American troops is a military one," and suggested that a certain latitude and discretion be permitted the Supreme 

Commander in these matters. Admiral Leahy, in commenting on the 

21 Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Apr 45, Eisenhower personal file; Bradley, A Soldier's 

Story, pp. 537-39. 

22 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 515-16. 
488 COMMAND DECISIONS 

President's message, sums up the Berlin situation admirably for our 

purposes: 

. . . He [Eisenhower] made a military decision in the field to rest on the 

Elbe, to which he knew he would have to withdraw anyway as soon as 

the German resistance collapsed. My notes do not show that the matter 

ever came before the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Russians, after overcoming savage street-by-street resistance, anounced the complete capture 

of Berlin on May 2, 1945.23 

A Line if Demarcation 

Thus far the discussion has dealt with military objectives which 

General Eisenhower hoped to seize by stopping west of the Elbe. It 

is now necessary to consider a second factor-one which affected 

Prague as well as Berlin-namely, the effort to establish an easily recognized line of demarcation where the advancing armies could stop. 

Efforts had been made since late 1943 to establish bomb-lines and 

since the June 1944 landings to provide closer liaison between Soviet 

and Western land forces. Near the end of March 1945, the War Department recalled that in 1939 armed clashes arose between German 

and Soviet troops in Poland until both accepted the Vistula as a line 

of demarcation. Perhaps prompted by this memorandum, General 

Marshall wrote the Supreme Commander on March 26: 

One of the problems which arises . . . is that of meeting the Russians. 

What are your ideas on control and coordination to prevent unfortunate 

incidents and to sort out the two advancing forces? One possibility is an 

agreed line of demarcation. The arrangements we now have with the Russians appear quite inadequate for the situation you may face and its seems 

that steps ought to be initiated without delay to provide for the communication and liaison you will need with them during the period when your 

forces may be mopping up in close proximity or in contact with the Russian forces. 24 

General Eisenhower and his advisers initially preferred that no set 

line be established and that the forces be allowed to go forward until 

contact was made, using recognition signals to avoid incidents. After 

considering the matter, the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized General Eisenhower to tell the Russians that Allied troops would advance 

until contact was imminent. Army group commanders were then to 

agree on zones of responsibility. This soon led to complications, as the 

23 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 514-15; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, rear 

of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 61-62,83; quotation from William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 

1950), pp. 350-5\. 

24 WD Memo, with covering note by Maj Gen Clayton L. Bissell, G-2, German Line 

of Demarcation Between Anglo-American and Soviet Operations, 22 Mar 45, OPD 381; 

Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Mar 45, Eisenhower personal file; U.S. Dept of State, The 

Malta and ralta Conferences, 1945, pp. 603-05, 640ff. 
THE DECISION TO HALT AT THE ELBE 489 

Soviet leaders suspected that the Allies were trying to change the zones 

of occupation and would not be satisfied until General Eisenhower 

personally assured them that there was no such intent. 25 

On 21 April the Supreme Commander notified the Russians that, 

since the logistical position of the Allies was stretched in the center 

as a result of the rapid drive to the Elbe, they would make no move 

at that point for some weeks at least. He added that he expected to 

cross the Elbe .in the north to open the north German ports and to 

drive the Germans north of the Kiel Canal. Other forces were to go 

southward into the Danube valley. On the following day he suggested 

that, since a meeting appeared likely in the Wittenberg-Dresden area, 

he would choose the line of the Elbe-Mulde on the central front as 

an easily identified line. 26 If the Russians wanted to stop on the Elbe 

and desired the Western Allies to advance eastward to Dresden, he 

was willing to do so. He suggested a firm junction on a recognizable 

line before final mutual adjustments based on local tactical situations 

were made. 27 

The Russians accepted the line of the Elbe and the Mulde on 24 

April. General Alexei Antonov, Red Army Chief of Staff, added that 

the Soviet Command contemplated occupying Berlin and clearing the 

Germans from the east bank of the Elbe north and south of Berlin 

and from the Moldau River valley.28 This last provision meant that 

Prague would be taken by the Russians. 

Prague 

Near the end of April the British Chiefs of Staff pointed out that 

the Western Allies could derive remarkable political advantages from 

liberating Prague and as much of the rest of Czechoslovakia as possible. General Marshall passed this on to General Eisenhower, adding: 

"Personally, and aside from all logistic, tactical, or strategical impli25 Eisenhower to War Dept, 5 Apr 45; War Dept to SHAEF, 12 Apr 45; Mil Mission 

Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-23875, 14 Apr 45; and Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, 

SCAF 282, 15 Apr 45, all in SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb-Line, Liaison, and Co-ordination 

of Fronts, 1. 

26 While, for convenience sake, the Allied halt is usually spoken of as "the halt on the 

Elbe," it is not a strictly accurate statement. North of Wittenberge (to be distinguished 

from Wittenberg), the Allied forces crossed the Elbe; from Wittenberge to a point near the 

Czechoslovak border they used the Elbe-Mulde line; south of that they followed the KarlsbadPilsen line. In the Dresden area the Elbe was east of the area where Eisenhower planned 

to stop. 

27 Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, 21 Apr 45, and Eisenhower to Mil Mission 

Moscow, 22 Apr 45, both in SHAEF SGS 373.5, Bomb-Line, Liaison, and Co-ordination 

of Fronts, 1. 

2R Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24032, 24 Apr 45, and Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24055, 25 Apr 45, both in SHAEF SGS 373.5, Bomb-Line, 

Liaison, and Co-ordination of Fronts, 1. 
490 COMMAND DECISIONS 

cations, I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes." 29 

General Eisenhower insisted that the northern thrust-toward Luebeck and Kiel and the southern drive in the direction of Linz and 

the National Redoubt be given priority. Provided additional means 

were at hand, he planned to attack the enemy also in Czechoslovakia, 

Denmark, and Norway. He thought that the Western Allies would 

be able to deal with Denmark and Norway, but concluded that the 

Red Army was in a perfect position to clean out Czechoslovakia and 

would certainly reach Prague before the U.S. forces. He assured General Marshall: "I shall not attempt any move I deem militarily unwise merely to gain a political advantage unless I receive specific 

orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff." There is nothing to indicate that they gave him any such orders. 30 

The Supreme Commander informed the Russians on 30 April that, 

while the operational position was being adjusted along the Elbe and 

the Mulde, he would cross the lower Elbe to establish a firm flank 

near Wismar. From the headwaters of the Mulde southward, he 

intended to hold the line approximately along the 1937 frontiers of 

Czechoslovakia. Later, Allied forces could advance to Karlsbad, Pilsen, and Budejovice. On the southern flank, he proposed to advance 

in the general area of Linz. If at any time the situation required the 

Allies to advance farther, he was willing to take such action.31 

When, on 4 May, General Eisenhower indicated his willingness to 

move from the Pilsen-Karlsbad area to the line of the Elbe and Moldau and to clear their western banks, the Russians strongly dissented. 

To avoid possible incidents, General Antonov asked General Eisenhower not to move his forces in Czechoslovakia east of the line Budejovice-Pilsen-Karlsbad. He pointedly reminded the Supreme Commander that the Red Army had stopped east of Wismar on the Baltic 

at his request, and hoped by the same token that the Allies would 

stop their advance in Czechoslovakia. General Eisenhower agreed not 

to move farther. Thus he left Prague to be liberated by the Russians.32 

SHAEF was notified on 5 May that Czech partisans had liberated 

Prague. Before the day's end, German armored forces converged on the 

29 Marshall to Eisenhower, W-74256, 28 Apr 45, SHAEF Cable Log. (This also contains a statement of the British position.) 

30 Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-20225, 29 Apr 45, SHAEF Cable Log. In a letter 

to the author of 20 Feb 1952, General Eisenhower said that no political directive was ever 

given him to stop at the Elbe or to go to Berlin or Prague. 

31 Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF-323, 30 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 373.5, BombLine, Liaison, and Co-ordination of Fronts, II. 

32 Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, 4 May 45; Mil Mission Moscow, MX-24166, 

4 May 45; and Mil Mission Moscow, MX-24193, 5 May 45, all in SHAEF SGS 373.5, 

Bomb-Line, Liaison, and Co-ordination of Fronts, II. 
THE DECISION TO HALT AT THE ELBE 491 

city from outside Prague and on the following morning Czechoslovak 

representatives asked for aid. They also requested that Czechoslovak 

forces, then with General Bradley's army group, be sent into Prague. 

Czechoslovak appeals were also made directly to Lt. Gen. George S. 

Patton, Jr., whose forces were near Pilsen. This word reached Col. 

Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., of the European Allied Contact Section at SHAEF, on the morning of 7 May after the Germans had 

surrendered at Reims. He naturally said that Prague was included in 

the terms of surrender and that hostilities had ended. 33 

Unfortunately, seizure of the radio station in Prague by Czechoslovak partisans had led to confusion on the part of Germans in 

Czechoslovakia, who were inclined to discredit the report and continue fighting. Therefore, although the war was ended, Prague was 

still in danger from the German forces near that city. Mr. Churchill 

wired General Eisenhower on 7 May that he hoped the latter's statements as to his intentions would not prevent an advance to Prague if 

forces were available and they did not meet the Russians first.)' 

More urgent appeals came from the Czechoslovaks on 7 and 8 

May, some being made directly to Mr. Churchill. When the Czechs 

talked later to SHAEF officials, they were told that the proper procedure had been followed, since if Mr. Churchill felt that something 

could be done he had the facilities for taking up the matter directly 

with the U.S. Government.:l5 

General Eisenhower continued to honor General Antonov's request 

of 5 May that the U.S. forces remain west of the Pilsen-Karlsbad 

line, while keeping the Russians informed of Czechoslovak pleas for 

aid. Thus, when on 8 May the Czechoslovaks asked for bombers to 

be sent to Prague, SHAEF forwarded the message to Moscow with 

the comment that no action was being taken. On the same day a 

report was passed on to the effect that Czech Partisans were under 

attack by the Germans. The Czechoslovaks were notified that Allied 

forces had stopped at the request of the Russians and that all appeals 

for help should go to them. 36 

In order to stop the enemy attacks, a U.S. patrol was sent with 

a German representative of Admiral Karl Doenitz' headquarters to 

Field Marshal Ferdinand Schoerner, who commanded the forces in 

Czechoslovakia, and warned him of the serious consequences which 

:l:l Series of messages, 6, 7, and 8 May 45, SHAEF EACS SH/9 Czechoslovak. 

:14 Churchill to Eisenhower, 2920, 7 May 45, Eisenhower personal file. 

35 Note on transmittal slip of request from Czech Mil Mission, 9 May 45, SHAEF 

EACS SH/9 Czechoslovakia. 

36 Czech Mil Mission to SHAEF, 6 May 45; 12th Army Group to SHAEF, 7 May 45; 

and SHAEF to Mil Mission Moscow, FWD-21001, 8 May 45, all in SHAEF SGS 370.64 

Czechoslovakian Resistance Groups; Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, 8 May 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
492 COMMAND DECISIONS 

would follow if he did not speedily bring hostilities to an end. General Eisenhower warned all German soldiers by radio that any continuation of hostilities would be severely punished by the Allies. 37 

The Russian forces ultimately entered Prague on 12 May. Some 

eighteen days passed before they gave permission for Czechoslovaks 

in General Bradley's army group to come to the city. 

Conclusion 

The decision to halt Allied troops short of Berlin and Prague has 

been severely criticized both in Europe and the United States on 

political grounds. It is urged that Churchill was right in suggesting 

that we proceed as far as possible into Germany in order to strengthen 

our hands for later negotiation with the Russians. 38 Others say that 

we should have recognized the Russian menace earlier and have prepared our strategy to block the Soviet advance into Central Europe. 

This obviously takes us beyond the scope of this study into the making of foreign policy. We should also have to answer such questions 

as: (1) what would the Russians have done if we had embarked on 

a policy of racing them to various European capitals in the spring 

of 1945? and (2) what would have been the effect of the action on 

the war in the Pacific? 

It is evident that the political leaders in the United States had 

framed no policy for dealing with an aggressive Soviet Union in Central Europe. It is equally clear that no political directive was ever 

issued to General Eisenhower by his American superiors or by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. His initial directive called for the defeat of 

Germany's armed forces, and it was obvious from messages that he 

received from Washington that military solutions were preferred. In 

this situation, the Supreme Commander reached his decisions relative 

to Berlin and Prague on military rather than political grounds. It is 

difficult to believe that critics of his decision would argue that he 

should have taken political action on his own initiative. When considered from the purely military viewpoint of the quickest way to 

end the war in Germany with the fewest number of casualties to our 

troops, leaving the maximum number available for rapid redeployment to the Pacific, his decision was certainly the proper one. 

37 Report of Col. Wilhelm Meyer-Detring [OKW officer who was sent by Doenitz to 

Schoerner, 10 May 45], OKW, Einsatzabteilung Heer 2. V.-22. V.45. The broad details of the 

report are confirmed by V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 454; Eisenhower to OKW, 10 May 45, 

and Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow. 10 May 45, both in Eisenhower personal file. 

38 The British official historian on the strategy of this period says that the strategy 

which the British wished to adopt in Germany was designed "not for reasons of defence or 

attack against Russia ... but with the object, which they recognized must remain subsidiary to the immediate military task, of negotiating from strength." Ehrman, Grand 

Strategy, VI, p. 150. 
23 

The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb 

by 

Louis Morton 

On 6 August 1945 the United States exploded an atomic bomb 

over Hiroshima and revealed to the world in one blinding flash the 

start of the atomic age. As the meaning of this explosion and the nature of the force unleashed became apparent, a chorus of voices rose 

in protest against the decision that opened the Pandora's box of atomic 

warfare. 

The decision to use the atomic bomb was made by President 

Truman. There was never any doubt of that and despite the rising 

tide of criticism Mr. Truman took full responsibility for his action. 

Only recently succeeded to the Presidency after the death of Roosevelt and beset by a multitude of problems of enormous significance 

for the postwar world, Mr. Truman leaned heavily on the advice of 

his senior and most trusted advisers on the question of the bomb. 

Bu t the final decision was his and his alone. 1 

The justification for using the atomic bomb was that it ended the 

war, or at least ended it sooner and thereby saved countless American-and Japanese-lives. But had it? Had not Japan been defeated 

and was she not already on the verge of surrender? What circumstances, it was asked, justified the fateful decision that "blasted the 

web of history and, like the discovery of fire, severed past from 

present"? 2 

The first authoritative explanation of how and why it was decided 

to use the bomb came in February 1947 from Henry L. Stimson, wartime Secretary of War and the man who more than any other was 

responsible for advising the President in this matter. 3 This explana1 The study that follows was published in substantially its present form in Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. XXV, No.2 Oanuary, 1957). It is reprinted by special permission from 

Foreign Affairs; copyright by Council on Foreign Relations, New York. 

2 James Phinney Baxter, 3rd, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946), p. 419. 

3 Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's Magazine 

(February, 1947). The article is reproduced with additional comments in Henry L. StimBiographical sketch of author, p. 11. 
494 COMMAND DECISIONS 

tion did not answer all the questions or still the critics. During the 

years that have followed others have revealed their part in the decision and in the events shaping it. These explanations have not ended 

the controversy but they have brought to light additional facts bearing on the decision to use the bomb. 

The Interim Committee 

The epic story of the development of the atomic bomb is well 

known! It began in 1939 when a small group of eminent scientists 

in this country called to the attention of the United States Government the vast potentialities of atomic energy for military purposes 

and warned that the Germans were already carrying on experiments 

in this field. The program initiated in October of that year with a 

very modest appropriation and later expanded into the two-billiondollar Manhattan Project had only one purpose-to harness the energy of the atom in a chain reaction to produce a bomb that could 

be carried by aircraft if possible, and to produce it before the Germans 

could. 5 That such a bomb, if produced, would be used, no responsible official even questioned. "At no time from 1941 to 1945," declared 

Mr. Stimson, "did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by 

another responsible member of the Government, that atomic energy 

should not be used in the war." And Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer recalled in 1954 that "we always assumed if they [atomic bombs] were 

needed, they would be used." 6 

So long as the success of the project remained in doubt there seems 

to have been little or no discussion of the effects of an atomic weapon 

or the circumstances under which it would be used. "During the 

son and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & 

Brothers, 1948), Chapter XIII, and in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. III, No.2 

(February, 1947). 

4 The best semitechnical account of the development of the bomb is by H. D. Smyth, 

A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes . .. 

(Washington, 1945). An excellent short account is in Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 

419-50. The best popular accounts are W. L. Laurence, Dawn Over Zero (New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 1946) and J. W. Campbell, The Atomic Story (New York: Henry Holt 

and Company, 1947). For a graphic account of the establishment of the Los Alamos 

Laboratory, see the testimony of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer in U.S. Atomic Energy 

Commission, Transcript of Hearings Before Personnel Security Board in the Matter of Dr. J. Robert 

Oppenheimer, 12 April-6 May 1954 (Washington, 1954), pp. 12-15, 28-29. For a vivid 

account of the bombing see Merle Miller and Abe Spitzer, We Dropped the A-Bomb (New 

York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1946), and Laurence, Dawn Over Zero, pp. 207-11. 

5 The one exception was the Navy's work in the field of atomic energy as a source of 

power for naval vessels. Hearings Before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 79th Cong., 

1st Sess., Senate, S.R. 179, Part 3, pp. 364-89, testimony of Dr. Ross Gunn. 

6 Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, p. 98; Oppenheimer 

Hearings, p. 33. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 495 

early days of the project," one scientist recalled, "we spent little time 

thinking about the possible effects of the bomb we were trying to 

make." 7 It was a "neck-and-neck race with the Germans," the outcome 

of which might well determine who would be the victor in World 

War II. But as Germany approached defeat and as the effort to produce an atomic bomb offered increasing promise of success, those few 

men who knew what was being done and who appreciated the enormous implications of atomic energy became more and more concerned. 

Most of this concern came from the scientists in the Metallurgical 

Laboratory at Chicago, where by early 1945 small groups began to 

question the advisability of using the weapon they were trying so hard 

to build. 8 It was almost as if they hoped the bomb would not work 

after it was completed. 

On the military side, realization that a bomb would probably be 

ready for testing in the summer of 1945 led to concrete planning for 

the use of the new weapon, on the assumption that the bomb when 

completed would work. By the end of 1944 a list of possible targets 

in Japan had been selected, and a B-29 squadron was trained for 

the specific job of delivering the bomb. 9 It was also necessary to inform certain commanders in the Pacific about the project, and on 

30 December 1944 Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan District, recommended that this be done. 10 

Even at this stage of development no one could estimate accurately 

when the bomb would be ready or guarantee that, when ready, it 

would work. It is perhaps for this reason-and because of the complete secrecy surrounding the project-that the possibility of an atomic 

weapon never entered into the deliberations of the strategic planners. 

It was, said Admiral William D. Leahy, "the best kept secret of the 

entire war" and only a handful of the top civilian and military officials in Washington knew about the bomb." As a matter of fact, one 

7 Hearings Before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, Part 2, p. 302, testimony of Dr. 

John A. Simpson. 

8 Ibid., p. 303; Oppenheimer Hearings, p. 33; Leo Szilard, "A Personal History of the 

Bomb," The Atlantic Community Faces the Bomb, University of Chicago Roundtable 601, 

September 25, 1949, p. 14; Arthur H. Compton, Atomic Quest (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1956); Alice Kimball Smith, "Behind the Decision to Use the Atomic 

Bomb: Chicago 1944-45," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, XIV, No.8 (October, 1958), pp. 288-

312. 

9 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, 

Vol. V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 

1953), pp. 705-08. 

10 Memo, Groves for Cofs, 30 Dec 44, sub: Atomic Fission Bombs, printed in Foreign 

Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta-ralla, 1945 (Washington, 19~) 

(hereafter cited as Malta-ralta Conferences). 

11 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey Ho~, 1950), 

p. 434. 
496 COMMAND DECISIONS 

bright brigadier general who innocently suggested that the Army might 

do well to look into the possibilities of atomic energy suddenly found 

himself the object of the most intensive investigation. 12 So secret was 

the project, says John J. McCloy, that when he raised the subject at 

a White House meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1945 it 

"caused a sense of shock even among that select group." 13 It was 

not until March 1945 that it became possible to predict with certainty 

that the bomb would be completed in time for testing in July. On 

March 15, Mr. Stimson discussed the project for the last time with 

President Roosevelt, but their conversation dealt mainly with the effects of the use of the bomb, not with the question of whether it ought 

to be used.14 Even at this late date, there does not seem to have been 

any doubt at the highest levels that the bomb would be used against 

Japan if it would help bring the war to an early end. But on lower 

levels, and especially among the scientists at the Chicago laboratory, 

there was considerable reservation about the advisability of using the 

bomb. 15 

After President Roosevelt's death, it fell to Stimson to brief the 

new President about the atomic weapon. At a White House meeting 

on 25 April, he outlined the history and status of the program and 

predicted that "within four months we shall in all probability have 

completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history." I? 

This meeting, like Stimson's last meeting with Roosevelt, dealt largely 

with the political and diplomatic consequences of the use of such a 

weapon rather than with the timing and manner of employment, the 

circumstances under which it would be used, or whether it would be 

used at all. The answers to these questions depended on factors not 

yet known. But Stimson recommended, and the President approved, 

the appointment of a special committee to consider them.17 

12 Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 347, 348n. 

13 John J. McCloy, The Challenge to American Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 42. See also Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Walter Muir 

Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King (New York: Norton, 1952), pp. 620-21; James F. Byrnes, 

Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 257. 

14 Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, page 98, prints the 

memorandum Stimson prepared on this conversation; King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral 

King, page 621, indicates the status of the project and the optimism of the period. See 

also, Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 258. 

15 Hearings, Before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, Part 2, p. 303ff, testimony of 

Dr. Simpson. 

16 His memorandum of this meeting is printed in Stimson, "The Decision To Use the 

Atomic Bomb," Harper's pages 99-100. 

17 Ibid., Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, rear of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 10-11; William Hillman, ed., Mr. President (New 

York: Farrar, Straus, 1952), p. 249; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 259. President Truman 

actually first learned about the bomb from Byrnes. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 497 

This special committee, known as the Interim Committee, played 

a vital role in the decision to use the bomb. Secretary Stimson was 

chairman, and George L. Harrison, President of the New York Life 

Insurance Company and special consultant in the Secretary's office, 

took the chair when he was absent. James F. Byrnes, who held no 

official position at the time, was President Truman's personal representative. Other members were Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of 

the Navy, William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, and Drs. 

Vannevar Bush, Karl T. Compton, and James B. Conant. Generals 

Marshall and Groves attended at least one and possibly more of the 

meetings of the committee. 18 

The work of the Interim Committee, in Stimson's words, "ranged 

over the whole field of atomic energy, in its political, military, and 

scientific aspects." 19 During the first meeting the scientific members 

reviewed for their colleagues the development of the Manhattan Project 

and described vividly the destructive power of the atomic bomb. They 

made it clear also that there was no known defense against this kind 

of attack. Another day was spent with the engineers and industrialists 

who had designed and built the huge plants at Oak Ridge and Hanford. Of particular concern to the committee was the question of how 

long it would take another country, particularly the Soviet Union, to 

produce an atomic bomb. "Much of the discussion," recalled Dr. Oppenheimer who attended the meeting of 1 June as a member of a 

scientific panel, "revolved around the question raised by Secretary 

Stimson as to whether there was any hope at all of using this development to get less barbarous relations with the Russians." 20 

The work of the Interim Committee was completed 1 June 1945,21 

when it submitted its report to the President, recommending unanimously that: 

1. The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible. 

2. It should be used against a military target surrounded by other 

buildings. 

3. It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the 

weapon. (One member, Ralph A. Bard, later dissented from this portion of the committee's recommendation.) 

1R Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, p. 100; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 259; Oppenheimer Hearings, p. 34; Smith, "Behind the Decision To Use the 

Atomic Bomb: Chicago 1944-45," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, pp. 296-97. 

1" Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, p. 100. 

20 Oppenheimer Hearings, pp. 34, 257, testimony of Drs. Oppenheimer and Compton; 

Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 260-61; Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," 

Harper's, pp. 100-101. 

21 Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, p. 101; Truman, Year 

of Decisions, p. 419. Byrnes mistakenly states that the Interim Committee made its recommendations on 1 July. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly. 
498 COMMAND DECISIONS 

"The conclusions of the Committee," wrote Stimson, "were'similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to 

extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would 

carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the empire. Such an 

effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both 

American and Japanese, than it would cost." 22 

Among the scientists working on the Manhattan Project were 

many who did not agree. To them, the "wave of horror and repulsion" that might follow the sudden use of an atomic bomb would 

more than outweigh its military advantages. "It may be very difficult," they declared, "to persuade the world that a nation which was 

capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a new weapon, 

as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such 

weapons abolished by international agreement." 23 The procedure these 

scientists recommended was, first, to demonstrate the new weapon 

"before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations on the 

desert or a barren island," and then to issue "a preliminary ultimatum" 

to Japan. If this ultimatum was rejected, and "if sanction of the 

United Nations (and of public opinion at home) were obtained," then 

and only then, said the scientists, should the United States consider 

using the bomb. "This may sound fantastic," they said, "but in nuclear weapons we have something entirely new in order of magnitude 

of destructive power, and if we want to capitalize fully on the advantage their possession gives us, we must use new and imaginative 

methods." 24 

These views, which were forwarded to the Secretary of War on 

11 June 1945, were strongly supported by sixty-four of the scientists 

in the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory in a petition sent directly 

to the President. At about the same time, at the request of Dr. Arthur 

H. Compton, a poll was taken of the views of more than a hundred 

and fifty scientists at the Chicago Laboratory. Five alternatives ranging from all-out use of the bomb to "keeping the existence of the bomb 

a secret" were presented. Of those polled, about two thirds voted for 

"Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, p. 101. The same 

idea is expressed by Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Cambridge: Houghton 

Mifflin Company, 1953), p. 638-39. 

23 "Report of the Committee on Social and Political Implications," signed by Professor 

James Franck of the University of Chicago and submitted to the Secretary of War, [[ 

June [945, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. I, No. [0 (May [, [946), p. 3; Smith, "Behind 

the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb: Chicago [944-45," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, pp. 

299-302. 

24 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 499 

a preliminary demonstration, either on a military objective or an uninhabited locality; the rest were split on all-out use and no use at all."" 

These views, and presumably others, were referred by Secretary 

Stimson to a distinguished Scientific Panel consisting of Drs. Arthur H. 

Compton, Enrico Fermi, E. O. Lawrence, and J. Robert Oppenheimer, 

all nuclear physicists of the first rank. "We didn't know beans about 

the military situation," Oppenheimer later said. "We didn't know 

whether they [the Japanese] could be caused to surrender by other 

means or whether the invasion [of Japan] was really inevitable .... 

We thought the two overriding considerations were the saving of lives 

in the war and the effect of our actions on the stability of the postwar world." 26 On 16 June the panel reported that it had studied 

carefully the proposals made by the scientists but could see no practical way of ending the war by a technical demonstration. Almost regretfully, it seemed, the four members of the panel concluded that 

there was "no acceptable alternative to direct military use." 27 "Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort," wrote Stimson, 

"than a warning or demonstration followed by a dud-and this was 

a real possibility." With this went the fear expressed by Byrnes, that 

if the Japanese were warned that an atomic bomb would be exploded 

over a military target in Japan as a demonstration, "they might bring 

our boys who were prisoners of war to that area." 28 Furthermore, 

only two bombs would be available by August, the number General 

Groves estimated would be needed to end the war; these two would 

have to obtain the desired effect quickly. And no one yet knew, nor 

would the scheduled ground test in New Mexico prove, whether a 

bomb dropped from an airplane would explode. 29 

Nor, for that matter, were all those concerned certain that the 

bomb would work at all, on the ground or in the air. Of these doubters, 

the greatest was Admiral Leahy, who until the end remained unconvinced. "This is the biggest fool thing we have ever done," he told 

Truman after Vannevar Bush had explained to the President how 

the bomb worked. "The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an 

expert in explosives." 30 

2.' Ibid., p. 1; Szilard, "A Personal History of the Bomb," University of Chicago Roundtable 601, p. 15. See also P. M. S. Blackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb (N cw York: Whit: 

tlesey House, 1949), pp. 114-16. 

26 Oppenheimer Hearings, p. 34. 

27 Quoted in Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, p. 101. 

The Scientific Panel was established to advise the Interim Committee and its report was 

made to that body. 

2H Ibid.; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 261. 

29 Ibid.; Oppenheimer Hearings, p. 163, testimony of General Groves. 

00 Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 11. Leahy in his memoirs frankly admits this error. 
500 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Thus, by mid-June 1945, there was virtual unanimity among the 

President's civilian advisers on the use of the bomb. The arguments 

ef the opponents had been considered and rejected. So far as is known, 

the President did not solicit the views of the military or naval staffs, 

nor were they offered. 

Military Considerations 

The military situation on 1 June 1945, when the Interim Committee submitted its recommendations on the use of the atomic bomb, 

was distinctly favorable to the Allied cause. Germany had surrendered 

in May and troops from Europe would soon be available for redeployment in the Pacific. Manila had fallen in February; Iwo Jima 

was in American hands; and the success of the Okinawa invasion was 

assured. Air and submarine attacks had all but cut off Japan from 

the resources of the Indies, and B-29's from the Marianas were pulverizing Japan's cities and factories. The Pacific Fleet had virtually 

driven the Imperial Navy from the ocean, and planes of the fast carrier forces were striking Japanese naval bases in the Inland Sea. 

Clearly, Japan was a defeated nation. 

Though defeated in a military sense, Japan showed no disposition 

to surrender unconditionally. And Japanese troops had demonstrated 

time and again that they could fight and inflict heavy casualties even 

when the outlook was hopeless. Allied plans in the spring of 1945 took 

these facts into account and proceeded on the assumption that an invasion of the home islands would be required to achieve at the earliest 

possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan-the announced 

objective of the war and the first requirement of all strategic planning. 31 

Other means of achieving this objective had been considered and, 

in early June, had not yet been entirely discarded. One of these called 

for the occupation f)f a string of bases around Japan to increase the 

intensity of air bOIT_ "Jardment. Combined with a tight naval blockade, 

such a course would, many believed, produce the same results as an 

invasion and at far less cost in lives. 32 "I was unable to see any justification," Admiral Leahy later wrote, "for an invasion of an already 

thoroughly defeated Japan. I feared the cost would be enormous in 

31 For an account of the strategic plans evolved for the defeat of Japan, see The Entry 

of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945 (Department of Defense Press Release, September 1955), pp. 28, 62-67, and passim; Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XVII; Leahy, I Was There, pp. 383-85; Craven and Cate, The Army Air 

Forces in World War II, Vol. V, p. 702, and passim. 

'2 The alternatives to invasion were outlined by General Marshall for MacArthur in 

a message of 12 April 1945, reproduced in The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against 

Japan, pp. 54 -55. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 501 

both lives and treasure." Admiral King and other senior naval officers agreed. To them it had always seemed, in King's words, "that 

the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone, 

without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands 

by ground troops." 33 

The main arguments for an invasion of Japan-the plans called 

for an assault against Kyushu (OLYMPIC) on 1 November 1945, and 

against Honshu (CORONET) five months later-are perhaps best summarized by General Douglas MacArthur. Writing to the Chief of Staff 

on 20 April 1945, he declared that this course was the only one that 

would permit application of the full power of our combined resourcesground, naval, and air-on the decisive objective. Japan, he believed, 

would probably be more difficult to invade the following year. An 

invasion of Kyushu at an early date would, moreover, place United 

States forces in the most favorable position for the decisive assault 

against Honshu in 1946, and would "continue the offensive methods 

which have proved so successful in Pacific campaigns." 34 Reliance 

upon bombing alone, MacArthur asserted, was still an unproved 

formula for success, as was evidenced by the bomber offensive against 

Germany. The seizure of a ring of bases around Japan would disperse 

Allied forces even more than they already were, MacArthur pointed 

out, and (if an attempt was made to seize positions on the China coast) 

might very well lead to long-drawn-out operations on the Asiatic 

mainland. 

Though the Joint Chiefs had accepted the invasion concept as the 

basis for preparations, and had issued a directive for the Kyushu assault on 25 May, it was well understood that the final decision was 

yet to be made. By mid-June the time had come for such a decision 

and during that period the Joint Chiefs reviewed the whole problem 

of Japanese strategy. Finally, on 18 June, at a meeting in the White 

House, they presented the alternatives to President Truman. Also 

present (according to the minutes) were Secretaries Stimson and 

James V. Forrestal and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy.35 

General Marshall presented the case for invasion and carried his 

colleagues with him, although both Admirals Leahy and King later 

33 Leahy, I Was There, pp. 384-85; King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 598. 

See also H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 595-96; 

Major General Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New 

York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 287-88. 

34 This message is reproduced in The Entry oj the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, 

pp. 55-57. 

35 For a summary of this meeting, see The Entry oj the Soviet Union Into the War Against 

Japan, pp. 77-85. See also, McCloy, Challenge to American Foreign Policy, pp. 42-43; Walter 

Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 70-71; Leahy, 1 Was 

There, pp. 383-85; King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 598, 605-06. 
502 COMMAND DECISIONS 

declared they did not favor the plan. After considerable discussion of 

casualties and of the difficulties ahead, President Truman made his 

decision. Kyushu would be invaded as planned and preparations for 

the landing were to be pushed through to completion. Preparations 

for the Honshu assault would continue, but no final decision would 

be made until preparations had reached the point "beyond which 

there would not be opportunity for a free choice." 36 The program 

thus approved by Truman called for: 

1. Air bombardment and blockade of Japan from bases in Okina wa, I wo Jima, the Marianas, and the Philippines. 

2. Assault of Kyushu on 1 November 1945, and intensification of 

blockade and air bombardment. 

3. Invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo 

Plain in central Honshu, tentative target date 1 March 1946. 37 

During the White House meeting of June 18, there was discussion of the possibility of ending the war by political means. The 

President displayed a deep interest in the subject and both Stimson 

and McCloy emphasized the importance of the "large submerged class 

in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion 

and influence had never yet been felt." 38 There was discussion also 

of the atomic bomb, since everyone present knew about the bomb 

and the recommendations of the Interim Committee. The suggestion 

was made that before the bomb was dropped, the Japanese should 

be warned that the United States had such a weapon. "Not one of 

the Chiefs nor the Secretary," recalled Mr. McCloy, "thought well 

of a bomb warning, an effective argument being that no one could 

be certain, in spite of the assurances of the scientists, that the 'thing 

would go off.' " 39 

Though the defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese 

homeland was considered a prerequisite to Japan's surrender, it did 

not follow that Japanese forces elsewhere, especially those on the Asiatic 

mainland, would surrender also. It was to provide for just this contingency, as well as to pin down those forces during the invasion of 

36 McCloy, Challenge to American Foreign Policy, p. 41. See also sources cited in preceding note. 

:17 The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, p. 90; Leahy, I Was There, 

p. 385; King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 606; Malta-Yalta Conferences, pp. 

388-400, 827-32. 

:18 The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, p. 83; Joseph C. Grew, The 

Turbulent Era, edit~d by Walter Johnson, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 

1952), Ch. XXXVI; McCloy, Challenge to American Foreign Policy, pp. 42-43; Ltr, McCloy 

to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed. Foreign Affairs, 18 Jun 56. 

ee, McCloy, Challenge to American Foreign Policy, p. 43. See also Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 

pp. 70-71. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 503 

the home islands, that the Joint Chiefs had recommended Soviet entry into the war against Japan. 

Soviet participation was a goal long pursued by the Americans. 4o 

Both political and military authorities seem to have been convinced 

from the start that Soviet assistance, conceived in various ways, would 

shorten the war and lessen the cost. In October 1943, Marshal Stalin 

had told Cordell Hull, then in Moscow for a conference, that the Soviet Union would eventually declare war on Japan. At the Tehran 

Conference in November of that year, Stalin had given the Allies 

formal notice of this intention and reaffirmed it in October 1944. In 

February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt and Stalin had 

agreed on the terms of Soviet participation in the Far Eastern war. 

Thus, by June 1945, the Americans could look forward to Soviet intervention at a date estimated as three months after the defeat of 

Germany. 

But by the summer of 1945 the Americans had undergone a change 

of heart. Though the official position of the War Department still 

held that "Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that 

almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save 

American lives," 41 few responsible American officials were eager for 

Soviet intervention or as willing to make concessions as they had been 

at an earlier period.<2 What had once appeared extremely desirable 

appeared less so now that the war in Europe was over and Japan 

was virtually defeated. President Truman, one official recalled, stated 

during a meeting devoted to the question of Soviet policy that agreements with Stalin had up to that time been "a one-way street" and 

that "he intended thereafter to be firm in his dealings with the Russians." 43 And at the 18 June meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with 

the President, Admiral King had declared that "regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensa40 An excellent official summary of this subject which reproduces the most important 

documents is The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan. The subject is also 

well covered in Ernest R. May, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945," Pacific Historical Review (May, 1955), pages 153 -74. See also, John 

R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: Viking Press, 1947); Statement of W. Averell 

Harriman in MacArthur Hearings, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1951), Part 5, pp. 

3328-42; William H. McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, Their Cooperation and ConJiict, 

1941-1946 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). 

41 Ltr, Stimson to Grew, 21 May 45, reproduced in Grew, The Turbulent Era, Vol. II, 

p. 1458, and in The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, pp. 70-71. 

42 For expressions of this view, see Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 263-65; Leahy, I 

Was There, 'pp'. S18, 339; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 207-09; Millis, The Forrestat Dzaries, 

p. 78; King and Whitehill, Fleet A {mira I King, p. 606. 

4:J Millis, The Fonestat Diaries, p. 50, minute by Charles E. Bohlen dated 23 April 1945; 

Truman, rear of Decisions, p. 72. 
504 COMMAND DECISIONS 

ble and he did not think we should go as far as to beg them to come 

in." 44 Though the cost would be greater, he had no doubt "we could 

handle it alone." 

The failure of the Soviets to abide by agreements made at Yalta 

had also done much to discourage the American desire for further 

co-operation with them. But after urging Stalin for three years to declare war on Japan, the United States Government could hardly ask 

him now to remain neutral. Moreover, there was no way of keeping 

the Russians out even if there had been a will to do so. In Harriman's view, "Russia would come into the war regardless of what we 

might do." 45 

A further difficulty was that Allied intelligence still indicated that 

Soviet intervention would be desirable, if not necessary, for the success of the invasion strategy. In Allied intelligence, Japan was portrayed as a defeated nation whose military leaders were blind to defeat. 

Though her industries had been seriously crippled by air bombardment and naval blockade and her armed forces were critically deficient in many of the resources of war, Japan was still far from 

surrender. She had ample reserves of weapons and ammunition and 

an army of 5,000,000 troops, 2,000,000 of them in the home islands. 

The latter could be expected to put up a strong resistance to invasion. In the opinion of the intelligence experts, neither blockade nor 

bombing alone would produce unconditional surrender before the date 

set for invasion. And the invasion itself, they believed, would be costly 

and possibly prolonged. 46 

According to these intelligence reports, the Japanese leaders were 

fully aware of their desperate situation but would continue to fight in 

the hope of avoiding complete defeat by securing a better bargaining 

position. Allied war-weariness and disunity, or some miracle, they 

hoped, would offer them a way out. "The Japanese believe," declared 

an intelligence estimate of 30 June, "that unconditional surrender 

would be the equivalent of national extinction, and there are as yet 

no indications that they are ready to accept such terms." 47 It appeared 

44 The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, p. 85. 

45 Statement to Leahy quoted in I Was There, p. 369. See also Harriman's statement, 

MacArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 3341; War Department memorandum of 21 May 1945. 

quoted in Grew, The Turbulent Era, Vol. II, p. 1458. 

46 The Ent~y of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, pp. 85-88; OPD Study by 

Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln, dated 4 June 1945, quoted in Cline, Washington Command 

Post, p. 344. See also, Leahy, I Was There, pp. 343, 346-47; Stimson, "The Decision To 

Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, pp. 101-02; Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 

1941-1951, p. 286; Allied Operations in Southwest Pacific Area, GHQ SWPA, I, pp. 397 -404. 

47 G-2 Memorandum prepared for OPD and quoted in Cline, Washington Command 

Post, p. 347. The same study was presented to the Combined Chiefs and is reproduced in 

part in The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, pp. 85-88. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 505 

also to the intelligence experts that Japan might surrender at any 

time "depending upon the conditions of surrender" the Allies might 

offer. Clearly these conditions, to have any chance of acceptance, 

would have to include retention of the imperial system. 48 

How accurate were these estimates? Judging from postwar accounts 

of Japan, they were very close to the truth. Since the defeat at Saipan, 

when Tojo had been forced to resign, the strength of the "peace army" 

had been increasing. In September 1944 the Swedish Minister in Tokyo 

had been approached unofficially, presumably in the name of Prince 

Konoye, to sound out the Allies on terms of peace. This overture 

came to nought, as did another the following March. But the Swedish 

Minister did learn that those who advocated peace in Japan regarded 

the Allied demand for unconditional surrender as their greatest obstacle. 49 

The Suzuki Cabinet that came into power in April 19~5 had an unspoken mandate from the Emperor to end the war as quickly as possible. But it was faced immediately with an additional problem when 

the Soviet Government announced it would not renew the neutrality 

pact after April 1946. The German surrender in May produced another 

crisis in the Japanese Government and led, after considerable discussion, to a decision to seek Soviet mediation. But the first approach, 

made on June 3 to Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador, produced 

no results. Malik was noncommittal and merely said the problem 

needed further study. 50 

At the end of June, the Japanese finally approached the Soviet 

Government directly through Ambassador Sato in Moscow, asking 

that it mediate with the Allies to bring the Far Eastern war to an 

end. In a series of messages between Tokyo and Moscow, which the 

Americans intercepted and decoded, the Japanese Foreign Office outlined the position of the government and instructed Ambassador Sato 

to make arrangements for a special envoy from the Emperor who 

would be empowered to make terms for Soviet mediation. Unconditional surrender, he was told, was completely unacceptable, and time 

was of the essence. But the Russians, on one pretext and another, 

delayed their answer until mid-July when Stalin and Molotov left 

for Potsdam. Thus, the Japanese Government had by then accepted 

4R Ibid. This view is presented by Karl T. Compton in an article entitled "If the Atomic 

Bomb Had Not Been Dropped," Atlantic Monthly (December, 1946), pp. 54-60. 

49 Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 

1954), pp. 40, 54-57. Other accounts of the situation in Japan are Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); U.S. Strategic Bombing 

Survey, Japan's Struggle To End the War (Washington, 1946); Takushiro Hattori, Complete 

History of the Greater East Asia War Oapan: Masu Shobo Co., 1953), Vol. IV. 

50 Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, pp. 90-91, 125-31; Hattori, Complete History of 

the Greater East Asia War, Vol. IV, pp. 274,312-16; USSBS, Japan's Struggle To End the 

War, pp. 6-7; Kase, Journey to the Missouri, pp. 193-94. 
506 COMMAND DECISIONS 

defeat and was seeking desperately for a way out; but it was not 

willing even at this late date to surrender unconditionally, and would 

accept no terms that did not include the preservation of the imperial 

system. 

Allied intelligence had estimated the situation in Japan correctly. 

Allied invasion strategy had been re-examined and confirmed in midJune, and the date for the invasion fixed. The desirability of Soviet 

assistance had been confirmed also and plans for Russian entry into 

the war during August could now be made. No decision had been 

reached on the use of the atomic bomb, but the President's advisers 

had recommended it. The decision was the President's and he faced 

it squarely. But before he could make it he would want to know 

whether the measures already concerted would produce unconditional 

surrender at the earliest moment and at the lowest cost. If they could 

not, then he would have to decide whether circumstances warranted 

employment of a bomb that Stimson had already labeled as "the 

most terrible weapon ever known in human history." 

The Decision 

Though responsibility for the decision to use the atomic bomb was 

the President's, he exercised it only after careful study of the recommendations of his senior advisers. Chief among these was the Secretary of War, under whose broad supervision the Manhattan Project 

had been placed. Already deeply concerned over the cost of the projected invasion, the political effects of Soviet intervention, and the 

potential consequences of the use of the atomic bomb, Stimson sought 

a course that would avoid all these evils. The difficulty, as he saw 

it, lay in the requirement for unconditional surrender. It was a phrase 

that might make the Japanese desperate and lead to a long and unnecessary campaign of attrition that would be extremely costly to 

both sides. 51 But there was no way of getting around the term; it was 

firmly rooted in Allied war aims and its renunciation was certain to 

lead to charges of appeasement. 

But if this difficulty could be overcome, would the Japanese respond if terms were offered? The intelligence experts thought so, and 

the radio intercepts from Tokyo to Moscow bore them out. 52 So far 

as the Army was concerned there was much to be gained by such a 

course. Not only might it reduce the enormous cost of the war, but 

51 Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, p. 102; Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 345; Millis, The Fonestal Diaries, pp. 68-70. 

·".Millis, The Fonestal Diaries, pp. 74-77; Ellis M. Zacharias, Secret Missions (New York: 

Putnam, 1946), p. 335. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 507 

it would also make possible a settlement in the western Pacific "before too many of our allies are committed there and have made substantial contributions toward the defeat of japan." 53 In the view of 

the War Department these aims justified "any concessions which might 

be attractive to the japanese, so long as our realistic aims for peace in the 

Pacific are not adversely affected." 54 

The problem was to formulate terms that would meet these conditions. There was considerable discussion of this problem in Washington in the spring of 1945 by officials in the Department of State 

and in the War and Navy Departments. joseph C. Grew, Acting 

Secretary of State, proposed to the President late in May that he 

issue a proclamation urging the japanese to surrender and assuring 

them that they could keep the Emperor. Though Truman did not 

act on the suggestion, he thought it "a sound idea" and told Grew 

to discuss it with his cabinet colleagues and the joint Chiefs. On 18 

june, Grew was back with the report that these groups favored the 

idea, but that there were differences on the timing. 55 

Grew's ideas, as well as those of others concerned, were summarized 

by Stimson in a long and carefully considered memorandum to the 

President on 2 july. 56 Representing the most informed military and 

political estimate of the situation at this time, this memorandum constitutes a state paper of the first importance. If anyone document 

can be said to provide the basis for the President's warning to japan 

and his final decision to use the atomic bomb, this is it. 

The gist of Stimson's argument was that the most promising alternative to the long and costly struggle certain to follow invasion was 

to warn the japanese "of what is to come" and to give them an opportunity to surrender. There was, he thought, enough of a chance 

that such a course would work to make the effort worthwhile. japan 

no longer had any allies, her navy was virtually destroyed, and she 

was increasingly vulnerable to air attack and naval blockade. Against 

her were arrayed the increasingly powerful forces of the Allies, with 

their "inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources." In these 

circumstances, Stimson believed the japanese people would be susceptible to reason if properly approached. "japan," he pointed out, "is 

53 OPD Compilation for the Potsdam Conference, quoted in Cline, Washl'nglon Command Post, p. 345. 

54 Ibid., pp. 345-46. 

55 Truman, rear of Decisions, pp. 416-17. A detailed account of Grew's efforts can be 

found in Grew, The Turbulent Era, Vol. II, Chapter XXXVI. 

56 The memorandum is reproduced in Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic 

Bomb," Harper's, pp. 102-04. For the background of the memorandum, see Grew, The 

Turbulent Era, Vol. II, Ch. XXXVI; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 68-70; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 206, 262; McCloy, Challenge to American Foreign Policy, pp. 42-43; Stimson 

and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 624. 
508 COMMAND DECISIONS 

not a nation composed of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours. On the contrary, she has within the past century 

shown herself to possess extremely intelligent people .... " But any 

attempt, Stimson added, "to exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend to produce a fusion of race 

solidity and antipathy .... " 

A warning to Japan, Stimson contended, should be carefully timed. 

It should come before the actual invasion, before destruction had reduced the Japanese "to fanatical despair," and, if the Soviet Union 

had already entered the war, before the Russian attack had progressed too far. 57 It should also emphasize, Stimson believed, the inevitability and completeness of the destruction ahead and the determination of the Allies to strip Japan of her conquests and to destroy 

the influence of the military clique. It should be a strong warning and 

should leave no doubt in Japanese minds that they would have to 

surrender unconditionally and submit to Allied occupation. 

The warning, as Stimson envisaged it, had a double character. While 

promising destruction and devastation, it was also to hold out hope 

to the Japanese if they heeded its message. In his memorandum, therefore, 

Stimson stressed the positive features of the warning and recommended 

that it include a disavowal of any intention to destroy the Japanese 

nation or to occupy the country permanently. Once Japan's military 

clique had been removed from power and her capacity to wage war 

destroyed, it was Stimson's belief that the Allies should withdraw and 

resume normal trade relations with the new and peaceful Japanese 

Government. "I personally think," he declared, "that if in saying this 

we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under 

the present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chance of 

acceptance.' , 

Not once in the course of this lengthy memorandum was mention 

made of the atomic bomb. There was no need to do so. Everyone 

concerned understood clearly that the bomb was the instrument that, 

by its powers of destruction, would impress on the Japanese Government the hopelessness of any course but surrender. As Stimson expressed it, the atomic bomb was "the best possible sanction," the 

single weapon that would convince the Japanese "of our power to 

destroy the empire." 58 

57 In his diary, under the date 19 June, Stimson wrote: "The last-chance warning ... 

must be given before an actual landing of the ground forces in Japan, and fortunately the 

plans provide for enough time to bring in the sanctions to our warning in the shape of 

heavy ordinary bombing attack and an attack of S-1 [the atomic bomb]." Stimson and 

Bundy, On Active Service, p. 624. 

58 Stimson, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, pp. 101, 104. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 509 

Though Stimson considered a warning combined with an offer of 

terms and backed up by the sanction of the atomic bomb as the 

most promising means of inducing surrender at any early date, there 

were other courses that some thought might produce the same result. 

One was continuation and intensification of air bombardment coupled 

with surface and underwater blockade. This course had already been 

considered and rejected as insufficient to produce surrender, though 

its advocates were by no means convinced that this decision was a 

wise one. And Stimson himself later justified the use of the bomb on 

the ground that by 1 November conventional bombardment would 

have caused greater destruction than the bomb. This apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that the atomic bomb was considered to be capable of a psychological effect entirely apart from the 

damage wrought. 59 

Nor did Stimson, in his memorandum, consider the effect of the 

Soviet Union's entry into the war. By itself, this action could not be 

counted on to force Japan to capitulate, but combined with bombardment and blockade it might do so. At least that was the view of 

Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln, one of the Army's top planners, who 

wrote in June that "probably it will take Russian entry into the war, 

coupled with a landing, or imminent threat of landing, on Japan 

proper by us, to convince them [the Japanese] of the hopelessness of 

their position." 60 

Why, therefore, was it not possible to issue the warning before a 

Soviet declaration of war against Japan and rely on that event, together with an intensified air bombardment, to produce the desired 

result? If together they could not secure Japan's surrender, would 

there not still be time to use the bomb before the scheduled invasion 

of Kyushu in November? 61 

No final answer to this question is possible with the evidence at 

hand. But one cannot ignore the fact that some responsible officials 

feared the political consequences of Soviet intervention and hoped 

that ultimately it would prove unnecessary. This feeling may unconsciously have made the atom bomb solution more attractive than it 

might otherwise have been. 62 Some officials may have believed, too, 

that the bomb could be used as a powerful deterrent to Soviet ex59 Ibid., p. 105. 

60 Quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 344. 

61 For an exposition of this view, see Blackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb, p. 136; Hanson W. 

Baldwin, Great Mistakes oJ the War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 100-101. 

62 See for example, Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 208; Stimson and Bundy, On Active 

Service, p. 637; Leahy, I Was There, p. 419; Blackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb, Ch. X; 

Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, "A Beginning for Sanity," Saturday Review oj 

Literature, XXIX, No.4 (June 15, 1946),5-8. 
510 COMMAND DECISIONS 

pansion in Europe, where the Red tide had successively engulfed 

Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In an 

interview with three of the top scientists in the Manhattan Project 

early in June, Mr. Byrnes did not, according to Leo Szilard, argue 

that the bomb was needed to defeat Japan, but rather that it should 

be dropped to "make Russia more manageable in Europe." 63 

It has been asserted also that the desire to justify the expenditure 

of the two billion dollars spent on the Manhattan Project may have 

disposed some favorably toward the use of the bomb. Already questions had been asked in Congress,64 and the end of the war would 

almost certainly bring on a full-scale investigation. What more striking justification of the Manhattan Project than a new weapon that 

had ended the war in one sudden blow and saved countless American lives? "It ~as my reaction," wrote Admiral Leahy, "that the 

scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast 

sums that had been spent on the project. Truman knew that, and so 

did other people involved." 65 

This explanation hardly does credit to those involved in the Manhattan Project and not even P. M. S. Blackett, one of the severest 

critics of the decision to use the bomb, accepted it. "The wit of man," he 

declared, "could hardly devise a theory of the dropping of the bomb, 

both more insulting to the American people, or more likely to lead 

to an energetically pursued Soviet defense policy." 66 

But even if the need to justify these huge expenditures is discounted-and certainly by itself it could not have produced the decision-the question still remains whether those who held in their 

hands a weapon thought capable of ending the war in one stroke 

could justify withholding that weapon. Would they not be open to 

criticism for failing to use every means at their disposal to defeat the 

enemy as quickly as possible, thereby saving many American lives? 

And even at that time there were some who believed that the 

new weapon would ultimately prove the most effective deterrent to 

war yet produced. How better to outlaw war forever than to demonstrate the tremendous destructive power of this weapon by using it 

against an actual target? 

By early July 1945 the stage had been set for the final decision, 

6:1 Szilard, "A Personal History of the Atomic Bomb," pp. 14-15. 

64 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 257 -58; Hillman, Mr. President, p. 247. The Truman 

Committee had already made inquiries, but its investigators were called off at the request 

of Mr. Stimson. Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 10. 

65 Leahy, I Was There, p. 441. For a statement of the same argument, but with a refutation, sec "Report of the Committee on Social and Political Implications," 11 June 1945, 

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (May 1, 1946), Vol. I, No. 10, p. 4. 

66 Blackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb, p. 138. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 511 

Stimson's memorandum had been approved in principle and on July 

4 the British had given their consent to the use of the bomb against 

Japan. 67 It remained only to decide on the terms and timing of the 

warning. This was the situation when the Potsdam Conference opened on 

17 July, one day after the bomb had been successfully exploded in a 

spectacular demonstration at Alamogordo, New Mexico. The atomic 

bomb was a reality and when the news reached Potsdam it aroused 

great excitement among those who were let in on the secret. Instead 

of the prospect of long and bitter months of fighting the Japanese, 

there was now a vision, "fair and bright indeed it seemed" to Churchill, 

"of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks." 68 

President Truman's first action was to call together his chief advisers-Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall, King, and Arnold. "I asked 

for their opinion whether the bomb should be used," he later wrote. 

The consensus was that it should. 69 Here at last was the miracle to 

end the war and solve all the perplexing problems posed by the necessity 

for invasion. But because no one could tell what effect the bomb 

might have "physically or psychologically," it was decided to proceed 

with the military plans for the invasion. 

No one at this time, or later in the conference, raised the question 

of whether the Japanese should be informed of the existence of the 

bomb. That question, it will be recalled, had been discussed by the 

Scientific Panel on 16 June and at the White House meeting with 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service Secretaries, and Mr. McCloy on 

18 June. For a variety of reasons, including uncertainty as to whether 

the bomb would work, it had been decided that the Japanese should 

not be warned of the existence of the new weapon. The successful 

explosion of the first bomb on 17 July did not apparently outweigh 

the reasons advanced earlier for keeping the bomb a secret; and evidently none of the men involved thought the question needed to be 

reviewed. The Japanese would learn of the atomic bomb only when 

it was dropped on them. 

The secrecy that had shrouded the development of the atomic bomb 

was torn aside briefly at Potsdam, but with no visible effect. On 

67 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 639. For the co-ordination between the British 

and Americans on the development of the atomic bomb, see Smyth, Atomic Energy Jor 

Military Purposes, passim; Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge oj Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 1950), pp. 377-81; Truman, Year oj Decisions, p. 418; Leahy, I Was There, pp. 265, 

432. General Groves opposed this co-ordination and so testified later. Oppenheimer Hearings, 

p. 175. 

GS Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 638. 

69 Hillman, Mr. President, p. 248; Truman, Year oj Decisions, p. 415. General Eisenhower 

was at Potsdam and his advice, Truman says, was asked. The various participants differ in 

their recollections of this meeting. King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 621; Arnold, 

Global Mission, p. 585. 
512 COMMAND DECISIONS 

24 July, at the suggestion of his chief advisers, Truman informed 

Marshal Stalin "casually" that the Americans had "a new weapon 

of unusual destructive force." "The Russian Premier," he recalled, 

"showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear 

it and hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese.' " 70 

One cannot but wonder whether the marshal was preoccupied at the 

moment or simulating a lack of interest. 

On the military side, the Potsdam Conference developed nothing 

new. The plans already made were noted and approved. Even at this 

late stage the question of the bomb was divorced entirely from military plans and the final report of the conference accepted as the main 

effort the invasion of the Japanese home islands. November 15, 1946, 

was accepted as the planning date for the end of the war against 

Japan. 71 

During the conference, Stalin told Truman about the Japanese 

overtures-information that the Americans already had. The marshal 

spoke of the matter also to Churchill, who discussed it with Truman, 

suggesting cautiously that some offer be made to Japan. "Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, and the President," he later wrote, "were evidently searching their hearts, and we had no need to press them. We 

knew of course that the Japanese were ready to give up all conquests 

made in the war." That same night, after dining with Stalin and 

Truman, the Prime Minister wrote that the Russians intended to attack Japan soon after 8 August-perhaps within two weeks of that 

date. 72 Truman presumably received the same information, confirming Harry Hopkins' report of his conversation with Stalin in Moscow 

in May.73 

All that remained now was to warn Japan and give her an opportunity to surrender. In this matter Stimson's and Grew's views, as 

outlined in the memorandum of 2 July, were accepted, but apparently 

on the advice of the former Secretary of State Cordell Hull it was 

decided to omit any reference to the Emperor. 74 Hull's view, solicited 

by Byrnes before his departure for Potsdam, was that the proposal 

smacked of appeasement and "seemed to guarantee continuance not 

70 Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 416. See also Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 263. 

71 Combined Chiefs of Staff Report to the President and Prime Minister, 24 July 1945, 

quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 346, and reproduced in The Entry of the Soviet 

Union Into the War Against Japan, pp. 89-91. 

72 Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 306; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 642. See also 

Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 205; Leahy, I Was There, p. 420. 

73 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & 

Brothers, 1948), p. 902, Leahy, I Was There, p. 383.' 

74 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), II, pp. 1591-94; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 205-07; Stimson and Bundy, 

On Active Service, pp. 626-27; Grew, The Turbulent Era, II, pp. 1424-27. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 513 

only of the Emperor but also of the feudal privileges of a ruling caste." 

And, should the Japanese reject the warning, the proposal to retain 

the imperial system might well encourage resistance and have "terrible political repercussions" in the United States. For these reasons 

he recommended that no statement about the Emperor be made until "the climax of Allied bombing and Russia's entry into the war." 75 

Thus, the final terms offered to the Japanese in the Potsdam declaration on 26 July made no mention of the Emperor or of the imperial 

system. Neither did the declaration contain any reference to the atom 

bomb but simply warned the Japanese of the consequences of continued resistance. 76 Only those already familiar with the weapon could 

have read the references to inevitable and complete destruction as a 

warning of atomic warfare. 77 

The receipt of the Potsdam Declaration in Japan led to frantic 

meetings to decide what should be done. It was finally decided not 

to reject the note but to await the results of the Soviet overture. At 

this point, the military insisted that the government make some statement to the people, and on 28 July Premier Suzuki declared to the 

press that Japan would ignore the declaration, a statement that was 

interpreted by the Allies as a rejection. 78 

To the Americans the rejection of the Postdam Declaration confirmed the view that the military clique was still in control of Japan 

and that only a decisive act of violence could. remove it. The instrument for such action lay at hand in the atomic bomb; events now 

seemed to justify its use. But in the hope that the Japanese might 

still change their minds, Truman held off orders on the use of the 

bomb for a few days. Only silence came from Tokyo, for the Japanese 

were waiting for a reply from the Soviet Government, which would 

not come until the return of Stalin and Molotov from Potsdam on 

6 August. Prophetically, Foreign Minister Togo wrote Sato on 2 August, the day the Potsdam Conference ended, that he could not afford to 

lose a single day in his efforts to conclude arrangements with the 

Russians "if we were to end the war before the assault on our mainland." 79 By that time, President Truman had already decided on the 

use of the bomb. 

75 Hull, Memoirs, II, p. 1593. 

76 The text of the declaration is printed in Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, and 

in Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, Appendix C. 

77 For expressions of this view, see Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, pp. 91-92; McCloy, 

Challenge to American Foreign Policy, p. 43. 

78 This incident has given rise to a controversy best understood by a linguist. It is covered in detail in Kazuo Kawaii, "Mokusatsu," Pacific Historical Review (November, 1950), 

pp. 409-14; and William ]. Coughlin, "The Great Mokusatsu," Harper's Magazine, 

(March, 1953), pp. 31-40. 

79 Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 222. 
514 COMMAND DECISIONS 

Preparations for dropping the two atomic bombs produced thus 

far had been under way for some time. The components of the bombs had 

been sent by cruiser to Tinian in May and the fissionable material 

was flown out in mid-July. The B-29's and crews were ready and 

trained, standing by for orders, which would come through the Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, Lt. 

Gen. Carl A. Spaatz. Detailed arrangements and schedules were completed and all that was necessary was to issue orders. 80 

At General Arnold's insistence, the responsibility for selecting the 

particular target and fixing the exact date and hour of the attack 

was assigned to the field commander, General Spaatz. In orders issued 

on 25 July and approved by Stimson and Marshall, Spaatz was ordered 

to drop the "first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual 

bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, 

Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki." He was instructed also to deliver a 

copy of this order personally to MacArthur and Nimitz. Weather was 

the critical factor because the bomb had to be dropped by visual 

means, and Spaatz delegated to his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Curtis E. 

LeMay, the job of deciding when the weather was right for this most 

important mission. 

From the dating of the order to General Spaatz it has been argued 

that President Truman was certain the warning would be rejected 

and had fixed the date for the bombing of Hiroshima even before 

the issuance of the Potsdam Declaration. 81 But such an argument 

ignores the military necessities. For operational reasons, the orders 

had to be issued in sufficient time "to set the military wheels in motion." In a sense, therefore, the decision was made on 25 July. It 

would stand unless the President changed his mind. "I had made the 

decision," wrote Truman in 1955. "I also instructed Stimson that the 

order would stand unless I notified him that the Japanese reply to 

our ultimatum was acceptable." 82 The rejection by the Japanese of 

the Potsdam Declaration confirmed the orders Spaatz had already 

received. 

The Japanese Surrender 

On Tinian and Guam, preparations for dropping the bomb had 

been completed by 3 August. The original plan was to carry out the 

80 For an account of these preparations, see Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, Vol. V, pp. 713-25. 

81 Ibid., p. 714. The relevant documents, including a letter from President Truman to 

Professor Gate, are reproduced on pages 696-97, 712-13. See also Leahy, I Was There, pp. 

430-31, and Truman's letter to Dr. Karl T. Compton, published in Atlantic Monthly, (February, 1947), p. 27. 

82 Truman, rear of Decisions, pp. 420-21. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 515 

operation on 4 August, but General LeMay deferred the attack because 

of bad weather over the target. On 5 August the forecasts were favorable and he gave the word to proceed with the mission the following 

day. At 0245 on 6 August, the bomb-carrying plane was airborne. 

Six apd a half hours later the bomb was released over Hiroshima, 

Japan's eighth largest city, to explode fifty seconds later at a height of 

about 2,000 feet. The age of atomic warfare had opened. 83 

Aboard the cruiser Augusta on his way back to the United States, 

President Truman received the news by radio. That same day a previously prepared release from Washington announced to the world 

that an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and warned 

the Japanese that if they did not surrender they could expect "a rain 

of ruin from the air, the like of which had never been seen on this 

earth." 84 

On 7 August, Ambassador Sato in Moscow received word at last 

that Molotov would see him the next afternoon. At the appointed hour 

he arrived at the Kremlin, full of hope that he would receive a favorable reply to the Japanese proposal for Soviet mediation with the Allies 

to end the war. Instead he was handed the Soviet declaration of war, 

effective on 9 August. 85 Thus, three months to the day after Germany's surrender, Marshal Stalin had lived up to his promise to the 

Allies. 

Meanwhile, President Truman had authorized the use of the second bomb-the last then available. The objective was Kokura, the 

date 9 August. But the plane carrying the bomb failed to make its 

run over the primary target and hit the secondary target, Nagasaki, 

instead. 86 The next day Japan sued for peace. 

The close sequence of events between 6 and 10 August, combined 

with the fact that the bomb was dropped almost three months before 

the scheduled invasion of Kyushu and while the Japanese were trying desperately to get out of the war, has suggested to some that the 

bombing of Hiroshima had a deeper purpose than the desire to end 

the war quickly. This purpose, it is claimed, was nothing less than a 

desire to forestall Soviet intervention in the Far Eastern war. Else why 

this necessity for speed? Certainly nothing in the military situation 

'.1 Two other dates can be said to have opened the atomic age: 2 December 1942, 

when Enrico Fermi succeeded in establishing a chain reaction; and 16 July 1945, when 

the test bomb was exploded in New Mexico. 

R1 For a vivid account of the bombing, see Miller and Spitzer, We Dropped the A-Bomb 

and Laurence, Dawn Over Zero, pp. 207-11. The statement is published in The New rork 

Times, August 7, 1945. See also, Leahy, I Was There, p. 430, and Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 

p. 209. 

8J Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, pp. 153-54; The New rork Times, August 9, 1945. 

86 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. V, pp. 714-23; Laurence, 

Dawn Over Zero, pp. 228-43; Miller and Spitzer, We Dropped the A-Bomb, pp. 89-124. 
516 COMMAND DECISIONS 

seemed to call for such hasty action. But if the purpose was to forestall Soviet intervention, then there was every reason for speed. And 

even if the Russians could not be kept out of the war, at least they 

would be prevented from making more than a token contribution to 

victory over Japan. In this sense it may be argued that the bomb 

proved a success, for the war ended with the United States in full 

control of Japan. 87 

This theory leaves several matters unexplained. In the first place, 

the Americans did not know the exact date on which the Soviet Union 

would declare war but believed it would be within a week or two of 

8 August. If they had wished to forestall a Soviet declaration of war, 

then they could reasonably have been expected to act sooner than 

they did. Such close timing left little if any margin for error. Secondly, had the United States desired above everything else to keep 

the Russians out, it could have responded to one of the several unofficial 

Japanese overtures, or made the Potsdam Declaration more attractive 

to Japan. Certainly the failure to put a time limit on the declaration 

suggests that speed was not of the essence in American calculations. 

Finally, the date and time of the bombing were left to Generals 

Spaatz and LeMay, who certainly had no way of knowing Soviet 

intentions. Bad weather or any other untoward incident could have 

delayed the attack a week or more. 

There is reason to believe that the Russians at the last moved more 

quickly than they had intended. In his conversations with Harry Hopkins in May 1945 and at Potsdam, Marshal Stalin had linked Soviet 

entry with negotiations then in progress with Chinese representatives 

in Moscow. 88 When these were completed, he had said, he would act. 

On 8 August these negotiations were still in progress. 

Did the atomic bomb accomplish its purpose? Was it, in fact, as 

Stimson said, "the best possible sanction" after Japan rejected the 

Potsdam Declaration? The sequence of events argues strongly that it 

was, for bombs were dropped on the 6th and 9th, and on the 10th 

Japan surrendered. But in the excitement over the announcement of 

the first use of an atomic bomb and then of Japan's surrender, many 

overlooked the significance of the Soviet Union's entry into the war 

on the 9th. The first bomb had produced consternation and cOIifusion among the leaders of Japan, but no disposition to surrender. The 

Soviet declaration of war, though not entirely unexpected, was a devastating blow and, by removing all hope of Soviet mediation, gave 

87 Blackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb, p. 137. Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter take the same position in the article, "A Beginning for Sanity." 

88 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 902; Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1949), p. 91. 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 517 

the advocates of peace their first opportunity to come boldly out into 

the open. When Premier Suzuki arrived at the palace on the morning of the 9th, he was told that the Emperor believed Japan's only 

course now was to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The militarists 

could and did minimize the effects of the bomb, but they could not 

evade the obvious consequences of Soviet intervention, which ended 

all hope of dividing their enemies and securing softer peace terms. 89 

In this atmosphere, the leaders of Japan held a series of meetings 

on 9 August, but were unable to come to an agreement. In the morning 

came word of the fate of Nagasaki. This additional disaster failed to 

resolve the issues between the military and those who advocated surrender. Finally the Emperor took the unprecedented step of calling 

an Imperial Conference, which lasted until 3 o'clock the next morning. When it, too, failed to produce agreement the Emperor told his 

minister that he wished the war brought to an end. The constitutional 

significance of this action is difficult for Westerners to comprehend, 

but it resolved the crisis and produced in the cabinet a formal decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration, provided it did not prejudice 

the position of the Emperor. 

What finally forced the Japanese to surrender? Was it air bombardment, naval power, the atomic bomb, or Soviet entry? The United 

States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that Japan would have 

surrendered by the end of the year, without invasion and without the 

atomic bomb. 90 Other equally informed opinion maintained that it 

was the atomic bomb that forced Japan to surrender. "Without its 

use," Dr. Compton asserted, "the war would have continued for many 

months." 91 Admiral Nimitz believed firmly that the decisive factor was 

"the complete impunity with which the Pacific Fleet pounded Japan," 

and General Arnold claimed it was air bombardment that had brought 

Japan to the verge of collapse. 92 But Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, 

wartime air commander in China, maintained that Soviet entry into 

the Far Eastern war brought about the surrender of Japan and would 

have done so "even if no atomic bombs had been dropped." 93 

g9 The story of the last few days of the war in Japan is told in considerable detail in 

Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender; USSBS, Japan's Struggle To End the War; USAAF, Mission Accomplished (Washington, 1946). On the American side, the chief sources are Byrnes, 

Speaking Frankly, pp. 209-11; Leahy, I Was There, pp. 434-45; Millis, The Forrestal Dian'es, 

pp. 82-85; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 626-67; Deane, The Strange Alliance, 

pp. 277-78. 

90 USSBS, Japan's Struggle T~ End the War, p. 13. See also Arnold, Global Mission, p. 598. 

91 Dr. Karl T. Compton, "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Dropped," Atlantic 

Monthly (December, 1946), p. 54. 

92 Arnold, Global Mission, p. 598. Nimitz' statement is quoted in Baldwin, Great Mistakes 

of the War, p. 93. 

"' The New rork Times, August 15, 1945, quoting an interview with Chennault. 
518 COMMAND DECISIONS 

It would be a fruitless task to weigh accurately the relative importance of all the factors leading to the Japanese surrender. There is no 

doubt that Japan had been defeated by the summer of 1945, if not 

earlier. But defeat did not mean that the military clique had given 

up; the Army intended to fight on and had made elaborate preparations for ~he defense of the homeland. Whether air bombardment and 

naval blockade or the threat of invasion would have produced an early 

surrender and averted the heavy losses almost certain to accompany 

the actual landings in Japan is a moot question. Certainly they had 

a profound effect on the Japanese position. It is equally difficult to 

assert categorically that the atomic bomb alone or Soviet intervention 

alone was the decisive factor in bringing the war to an end. All that 

can be said on the available evidence is that' Japan was defeated in 

the military sense by August 1945 and that the bombing of Hiroshima, 

followed by the Soviet Union's declaration of war and the bombing 

of Nagasaki and the threat of still further bombing, acted as catalytic 

agents to produce the Japanese decision to surrender. Together they 

created so extreme a crisis that the Emperor himself, in an unprecedented move, took matters into his own hands and ordered his ministers to surrender. Whether any other set of circumstances would have 

resolved the crisis and produced the final decision to surrender is a 

question history cannot yet answer. 
1 September 

3 

5 

8 

6 October 

4 November 

30 

12 March 

9 April 

14 

23 

10 May 

3 June 

4 

10 

14 

21 

3 July 

10 

27 August 

3 September 

16 

22 

27 

6 October 

Chronology 

1939 

Germany invades Poland. 

Great Britain and France declare war on Germany. 

United States proclaims neutrality. 

President of United States declares limited national 

emergency. 

Last remnant of Polish forces surrenders to German 

Army. 

Congress passes law permitting "cash and carry" sale 

of munitions to belligerents. 

USSR attacks Finland. 

1940 

Soviet-Finnish war ends. 

Germany occupies Denmark and invades Norway. 

-20. British land troops in Norway. 

Greece concludes armistice with Germany. 

Germany launches invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and France. 

Churchill succeeds Chamberlain as British Prime 

Minister. 

United States releases war material to Great Britain. 

Dunkerque is evacuated. 

Italy declares war on France and Great Britain. 

Germans march into Paris. 

France and Germany conclude armistice. 

British naval forces attack French fleet at Oran. 

Germany begins air offensive against Great Britain. 

Congress authorizes call of reserve components for 12 

months' duty. 

United States and Great Britain conclude agreement 

to exchange destroyers (U .S.) for base rights (British). 

Selective Service law enacted by Congress. 

Japanese invade French Indochina. 

Germany, Italy, Japan conclude three-power pact. 

-31. Last phase of air battle of Britain. 
520 

29 January 

11 March 

27 May 

22 June 

7 July 

26 

14 August 

4 September 

25 

October 

7 December 

8 

9 

10 

11 

20 

23 

24 

1 January 

2 

7 

9 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

1941 

-29 March. British-American Staff Conversations. 

Congress passes Lend-Lease Act. 

President Roosevelt proclaims state of unlimited na· 

tional emergency. 

Germany invades the USSR. 

United States forces land in Iceland. 

United States declares oil embargo on Japan. 

Roosevelt and Churchill announce Atlantic Charter. 

German torpedo attack on USS Greer opens undeclared shooting war in Atlantic. 

Army and Navy Secretaries, at President's direction, 

submit Victory Program-an estimate of U.S. 

forces needed to defeat the Axis and Japan. 

First Soviet Protocol signed by U.S., Great Britain, 

and USSR at Moscow. 

-8. Japan delivers simultaneous bombing attacks on 

Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Wake, and Guam, 

invades Malaya and Thailand, seizes Shanghai, 

and declares war on the U.S. and Great Britain. 

German offensive in Russia bogs down. 

China declares war on Japan, Germany, Italy. 

Japanese capture Guam, land on Luzon in Philippmes. 

Germany and Italy declare war on United States, 

and United States declares itself at war with them. 

Chennault's Flying Tigers enter combat againstJapanese in China. 

General MacArthur decides to evacuate Manila and 

withdraw to Bataan. 

Wake Island captured by Japanese. 

-14 January 1942. 

Anglo-American Conference (ARCADIA) at Washington. 

1942 

United Nations Declaration signed by twenty-six nations at war with Axis. 

Japanese occupy Manila. 

American and Filipino forces complete withdrawal 

into Bataan. 

Combined Chiefs of Staff established. 

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff established. 
CHRONOLOGY 521 

19 January 

23 

1 February 

2 

27 

March 

7 

9 

17 

8 April 

9 

18 

2 May 

6 

8 

20 

27 

3 June 

7 

21 

1 July 

2 

4 

7 

15 

18 

21 

7 August 

19 

23 

14 September 

Japanese capture British North Borneo. 

Japanese capture Rabaul and Kavieng in the Bismarck Archipelago, invade Bougainville in the 

Solomons. 

U.S. Navy bombards Gilberts and Marshalls. 

Singapore surrenders. 

-28. Battle of Java Sea. Japanese invade Java. 

-November. Submarine sin kings in Atlantic rise to 

record heights. 

Japanese occupy Burma. 

War Department is reorganized. 

General MacArthur reaches Australia to take command of Allied forces. 

-15. British-American conversations in London result 

in conditional agreement on BOLERO-RoUNDUP 

Plan. 

Surrender of Bataan. 

First U.S. air bombardment of Tokyo. 

Japanese land on Tulagi, adjacent to Guadalcanal, 

where they soon began to build an airstrip. 

Surrender of all U.S. forces in Philippines. 

Battle of the Coral Sea. 

Japanese complete conquest of Burma. 

Rommel opens drive into Egypt. 

-4. Battle of Midway. 

Japanese invade western Aleutians. 

Tobruk falls to Axis. 

Germans capture Sevastopol. 

Rommel's advance stops at border of Egypt. 

One of the most devastating submarine attacks on 

convoy to USSR along the northern route. 

Second Soviet Protocol signed. 

British suspend convoys to USSR on northern route. 

-25. British-American conversations in London, resulting in decision to invade North Africa. 

Japanese landing near Gona, New Guinea, starts 

Papua Campaign. 

South Pacific forces invade Guadalcanal, Florida, 

and Tulagi Islands, in the Solomons. 

British Commonwealth force raids Dieppe, France. 

Churchill accepts Roosevelt's proposal that the U.S. 

operate Persian Gulf facilities for aid to USSR. 

Battle for Stalingrad begins. 
522 

23 October 

8 November 

10 

11 

13 

15 

19 

27 

24 December 

14 January 

22 

27 

2 February 

9 

20 

25 

2 March 

16 

18 

20 

11 May 

12 

13 

1 June 

30 

10 July 

25 

14 August 

17 

23 

25 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

British open counteroffensive at El Alamein. 

Allies land at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers ill 

French North Africa. 

Axis troops move into Tunis and Bizerte. 

British offensive reaches Libya. 

French resistance to Allies in North Africa ceases. 

Axis troops march into unoccupied France. 

British recapture Tobruk. 

Allied offensive in West reaches Tunisia. 

USSR opens offensive at Stalingrad. 

French fleet scuttled in Toulon harbor. 

Allied drive on Tunis ends in stalemate. 

1943 

-23. Allied conference at Casablanca. 

Campaign for Papua, New Guinea, ends. 

Eighth Air Force makes its first attack on Germany, 

at Wilhelmshaven. 

Soviet Army destroys remnants of German Sixth 

Army at Stalingrad. 

Organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal 

ceases. 

Rommel breaks through Kasserine Pass, Tunisia. 

Allies retake Kasserine Pass. 

-4. Battle of the Bismarck Sea. 

J:inal Allied offensive in Tunisia begins. 

Americans capture El Guettar. 

-27. Montgomery breaks through the Mareth Line. 

-31. With recapture of Attu by Allies Japanese are 

driven from the Aleutians. 

-25. TRIDENT Conference in Washington. 

Axis forces in Tunisia surrender. 

-30. Shipping losses reach new low, signalizing victory over U-boat. 

Allies begin operation for reduction of Rabaul (CARTWHEEL) with attacks in central Solomons and New 

Guinea. 

Allies invade Sicily. 

Fall of Mussolini proclaimed. 

-24. QUADRANT Conference at Quebec. 

End of Sicily campaign. 

Germans abandon Kharkov. 

Allies complete occupation of New Georgia, Solomon Islands. 
CHRONOLOGY 523 

3 September 

4 

8 

9 

11 

1 October 

2 

13 

14 

19 

1 November 

5 

20 

22 

14 December 

26 

15 January 

20 

22 

31 

12 February 

18 

20 

24 

29 

5 March 

20 

British troops invade Southern Italy. 

-16. Southwest Pacific forces recapture Lae-Salamaua, New Guinea. 

Italy surrenders. 

Allies under U.S. Fifth Army land on the Salerno 

beaches; British troops land at Taranto. 

Italian Fleet is surrendered at Malta. 

Allies enter Naples and occupy Foggia airfields. 

Australians seize Finschhafen, New Guinea. 

Italy declares war on Germany. 

Soviets reach Zaporodzhe, industrial center of Ukraine. 

-30. Soviet, British, American Foreign Ministers and 

military representatives confer in Moscow. 

South Pacific forces invade Bougainville. 

U.S. Fifth Army attacks German Winter Line in 

Italy. 

Opening of Central Pacific offensive (Makin and Tarawa in Gilberts). 

-7 December. Allied conferences, Cairo-Tehran (SEXTANT, EUREKA). 

Soviet armies begin first phase of winter offensive. 

Southwest Pacific troops invade New Britain at Cape 

Gloucester. 

1944 

USSR opens offensive to relieve Leningrad. 

In Italy, beginning of unsuccessful operations to 

cross the Rapido River and seize Cassino. 

VI Corps, U.S. Fifth Army, lands at Anzio. 

Central Pacific forces invade the Marshall Islands. 

General Eisenhower is formally designated Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, Europe, 

by Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

U.S. Naval forces attack Truk in Caroline Islands. 

Reduction of Rabaul completed with Japanese abandonment of it as an airbase. 

In Burma, Merrill's Marauders advance into Hukawng Valley, with the Myitkyina airfield as 

their goal. 

Southwest Pacific forces begin invasion of Admiralty 

Islands, Bismarck Archipelago. 

Soviet Army opens drive in the Ukraine to destroy 

enemy in Dnieper bend. 

German troops occupy Hungary. 
524 

10 April 

22 

9 May 

11 

17 

18 

23 

27 

4 June 

6 

9 

12 

15 

19 

27 

18 July 

19 

20 

25 

1 August 

3 

4 

7 

15 

20 

25 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Odessa retaken by Russian troops. 

Southwest Pacific forces land at Aitape and Hollandia, New Guinea. 

Sevastopol retaken by Soviet forces. 

In Italy, Allies open a general offensive against the 

Gustav Line. 

Myitkyina airstrip captured by Chinese forces. 

Allied forces capture Cassino. 

U.S. VI Corps launches offensive to break out of 

the Anzio Beachhead. 

Southwest Pacific force lands on Biak Island, New 

Guinea. 

U.S. Fifth Army enters Rome. 

D Day. Allied Forces invade France, landing on 

coast of Normandy, in Operation OVERLORD. 

Soviet forces launch attack against the Finnish positions on Karelian Isthmus. 

Germans launch first V-I bombs against England. 

B-29's based in China, make their first attack on 

Japanese homeland. 

Central Pacific forces invade the Marianas. 

-20. First Battle of the Philippine Sea. 

Organized resistance ceases at Cherbourg. 

U.S. forces, concluding "the battle of the hedgerows," 

capture St. LB. 

Leghorn falls to the U.S. Fifth Army. 

Attempt to assassinate Hitler fails. 

U.S. First Army launches Operation COBRA from St. 

LB area to gain a breakthrough. 

Polish underground forces revolt as Soviet offensive 

nears Warsaw. 

U.S. Third Army becomes operational in France. 

In Burma, Myitkyina is taken. 

British Eighth Army reaches Florence. 

In Normandy, Germans launch Mortain counterattack. 

American and French troops, under U.S. Seventh 

Army, invade southern France in Operation 

DRAGOON-ANVIL. 

Allied forces in France close pincers on Germans 

caught retreating from Mortain in the FalaiseArgentan pocket. 

U.S. Third Army crosses the Seine. U.S. and French 

troops liberate Paris. 
CHRONOLOGY 525 

28 August 

30 

31 

3 September 

4 

10 

11 

12 

15 

16 

17 

18 

20 

1 October 

13 

14 

15 

18 

20 

21 

23 

28 

8 November 

Germans surrender Toulon and Marseille. 

Ploesti, center of Rumanian oil industry, falls to 

Soviet troops. 

In Italy, British Eighth Army penetrates the Gothic 

Line. 

British liberate Brussels. 

Hostilities between Finland and the USSR cease 

under truce agreement. 

U.S. First Army liberates Luxembourg. 

Patrols of U.S. First Army enter Germany. 

-16. Second Quebec Conference (OCTAGON). 

German g~rrison of Le Havre surrenders. 

Rumania signs armistice with Allies. 

Southwest and Central Pacific forces reach Morotai 

and the Palaus. 

Soviet forces enter Sofia, capital of Bulgaria. 

First Allied Airborne Army launches Operation 

MARKET to secure axis of advance toward Arnhem for British Second Army. Ground forces 

(GARDEN) open assault northward. 

U.S. Ninth Army takes Brest. 

Finland signs armistice with Allies. 

In Italy, the British Eighth Army reaches the 

Rimini Line. 

Soviet troops cross the Danube in force and push 

toward Belgrade. 

U.S. First Army begins siege of Aachen. 

Germans suppress insurrection of patriots in Warsaw. 

Germans launch first V-bomb against Antwerp. 

Soviet troops overrun Riga, capital of Latvia. 

U.S. naval force in air attacks neutralizes Formosa. 

Northern China Area Command opens offensive to 

clear North Burma. 

Soviet troops advance from Poland into Czechoslovakia. 

General Stilwell is recalled from China by President 

Roosevelt. 

Belgrade falls· to Soviet and Yugoslav forces. 

U.S. forces, landing on Leyte, invade the Philippines. 

Aachen surrenders. 

-26. The battle for Leyte Gulf. 

Bulgaria signs armistice with Allies. 

U.S. Third Army begins drive to breach the West 

Wall and reach the Rhine. 
526 

16 November 

24 

28 

13 December 

16 

26 

27 

9 January 

12 

16 

17 

3 February 

4 

5 

13 

19 

25 

6 March 

7 

10 

15 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

u.S. First Army begins drive to cross Roer River 

and reach the Rhine. 

B-29's begin attacks on Tokyo from bases in the 

Marianas. 

First Allied cargo ship drops anchor in Antwerp 

harbor. 

U.S. First Army launches attack to capture Roer 

River Dams. 

Germans open all-out counteroffensive in the Ardennes (Battle of the Bulge). 

In U.S. First Army area, enemy's westward drive is 

stopped short of the Meuse. 

U.S. Third Army raises siege of Bastogne. 

Soviet troops complete encirclement of Budapest. 

1945 

U.S. Sixth Army lands on Luzon. 

Soviet forces open powerful winter offensive across 

the Vistula in South Poland. 

U.S. First and Third Armies join at Houffalize. 

Warsaw falls to Soviet forces. 

Sixth Army attacks Manila in a battle lasting until 

4 March. 

-9. Conference at Yalta (ARGONAUT). 

-9. In Alsace, American and French forces wipe out 

the Colmar Pocket. 

Soviet Army completes capture of Budapest. 

U.S. Marines invade Iwo Jima. 

In Italy, U.S. Fifth Army begins limited offensive in 

the Apennines. 

U.S. Ninth Army units complete drive from Roer 

to Rhine. 

Soviet troops seize key point of German defense system on the lower Vistula in Poland. 

Cologne falls to U.S. First Army. 

U.S. First Army seizes bridge at Remagen and establishes bridgehead across the Rhine. 

U.S. Eighth Army units land on Zamboanga Peninsula, Mindanao. 

VII Corps, U.S. First Army, crosses the Rhine. U.S. 

Seventh Army opens offensive to break through 

the West Wall and join U.S. Third Army in clearing the Saar-Palatinate triangle. 
CHRONOLOGY 527 

23 March 

23 

30 

1 April 

9 

11 

12 

13 

20 

23 

24 

25 

29 

30 

3 May 

7 

8 

5 June 

18 

22 

26 

10 July 

u.s. Third Army crosses the Rhine. 

-24. Allied forces, under Field Marshall Montgomery, 

cross the Rhine north of the Ruhr. 

Soviet troops capture Danzig; other Soviet forces 

continue offensive in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 

and Austria. 

U.S. Tenth Army lands on Okinawa. 

U.S. First and Ninth Armies complete encirclement 

of the Ruhr. 

Organized German resistance, in East Prussia, ends. 

The 2d Armored Division, Ninth Army, reaches the 

Elbe south of Magdeburg. 

President Roosevelt dies at Warm Springs, Georgia. 

Harry S. Truman sworn in as President. 

Vienna falls to Soviet troops. 

U.S. Seventh Army captures Nuremburg, Germany. 

Soviet Army forces break into Berlin. 

In Italy, U.S. Fifth Army units cross the Po. 

United Nations Conference opens at San Francisco. 

In Germany, U.S. and Soviet patrols establish contact on the Elbe near Torgau. 

German forces in Italy surrender at Caserta, effective 2 May. 

Adolf Hitler commits suicide in Berlin; Admiral 

Doenitz becomes head of state. 

Hamburg surrenders to British Second Army. 

British recapture Rangoon, Burma. 

German High Command surrenders all land, sea, 

and air forces unconditionally to Allied forces, 

effective 9 May. All offensive operations are immediately halted. 

President Truman proclaims this day V-E Day (Victory in Europe). 

The Berlin Declaration is made by France, Great 

Britain, United States, and USSR, announcing 

their assumption of supreme authority in occupied Germany. 

Organized resistance ends on Mindanao. 

U.S. Tenth Army completes capture of Okinawa. 

The United Nations Organization Charter is signed 

at San Francisco by fifty nations. 

Carrier-based and land-based planes open powerful 

and sustained attacks on Japan in preparation 

for invasion. 
528 

11 July 

16 

6 August 

8 

14 

30 

2 September 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

In Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, is dissolved. 

-26. Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL). Potsdam ultimatum, issued on 26 July, calls for Japan to surrender unconditionally or face "utter destruction." 

Atomic bomb dropped by U.S. Air Forces on Hiroshima. Second bomb dropped 9 August on 

Nagasaki. 

USSR declares war on Japan. 

Japanese Government agrees to unconditional surrender of its armed forces. 

Occupation of Japan by U.S. forces begins. 

V-J Day-Victory over Japan. Formal terms of surrender signed by Japanese envoys. 
ABC-1 

ACHSE 

ALABASTER 

ALAMO 

ANCHORAGE 

ANVIL 

ARCADIA 

ARGONAUT 

BARRISTER 

BLACK 

BOLERO 

BREWER 

BUCCANEER 

CARTWHEEL 

CATHERINE 

CHAMPION 

COMET 

Code Names 

Agreements reached at Washington Conference, January-March 1941. 

German plan to take over control of Italy. 

Troop convoy Jrom Greenock to Iceland, 

17 May 1940. 

Code for U.S. Sixth Army while it was operating as a special ground task force headquarters directly under GHQ SWPA. 

Code name originally used for projected 

Hansa Bay operation. ANCHORAGE was 

used for ALAMO Force journals kept during the Admiralties operation. 

The planned 1944 Allied invasion of southern 

France in the Toulon-Marseille area. 

U.S.-British Conference held in Washington, 

December 1941-January 1942. 

International Conference held at Malta· and 

Yalta, January-February 1945. 

Plan for capture of Dakar (formerly BLACK 

and PICADOR). 

Plan for seizure of Dakar (later PICADOR and 

BARRISTER ). 

Build-up of U.S. forces and supplies in United 

Kingdom for cross-Channel attack. 

Operations in the Admiralties. 

Plan for amphibious operation in the Andaman Islands. 

Converging drives on Rabaul by South Pacific 

and SWP A forces. 

Plan for sending British naval forces into the 

Baltic Sea to gain control of those waters 

and stop Swedish ore traffic. 

Late 1943 plan for general offensive in 

Burma. 

British plan, not carried out, for an air drop 

on 7 September 1944 in the ArnhemNijmegen area. 
530 

CORONET 

CULVERIN 

DRAGOON 

EUREKA 

GELB 

GREEN 

GYMNAST 

HERCULES 

HUSKY 

INDIGO 

JUPITER 

MAGIC 

MARKET-GARDEN 

MUSKETEER 

NEPTUNE 

NORD WIND 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Assault planned for 1 December 1945 on 

Tokyo Plain. 

Plan for assault on Sumatra. 

Allied invasion of southern France, 15 August 

1944, planned under the code name 

ANVIL. 

The Tehran Conference, 28 November-l December 1943. 

German plan for the invasion of France, the 

Netherlands, and Belgium. 

Prewar plan of operations in event of war 

with Mexico. 

Early plan for invasion of North Africa, referring to either the American plan for 

landing at Casablanca or the British plan 

for landing farther eastward on the Mediterranean coast (see SUPER-GYMNAST). 

German plan to invade Malta. 

Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943. 

Plan for movement of troops to Iceland. 

Plan for operations in northern Norway. 

Code name applied to intercepted and decoded Japanese messages. 

Operation in September 1944 to establish 

bridgeheads across three rivers in the 

Netherlands (Maas, Waal, and Lower 

Rhine) and reach the IJ sse! Meer. Airborne phase was called Operation MARKET. Companion ground attack was Operation GARDEN. 

Code name for a series of plans covering operations for recapture of Philippine Islands. 

Actual 1944 operations wi thin OVERLORD. 

Used for security reasons after September 1943 on all OVERLORD planning papers that referred to target area and date. 

German counterattack in Alsace, January 

1945. 
CODE NAMES 

OlYMPIC 

ORANGE 

OVERLORD 

PIGSTICK 

POINTBLANK 

QUADRANT 

RAINBOW 

RANKIN 

RED 

RENO 

ROUNDUP 

ROYAL MARINE 

SEXTANT 

SHINGLE 

SLEDGEHAMMER 

SUPER-GYMNAST 

TERMINAL 

TORCH 

TRIDENT 

531 

Plan for March 1946 invasion of Kyushu, 

japan. 

Prewar plan of operations in event of war 

with japan. 

Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest 

Europe,june 1944. 

Limited operation on south Mayu Peninsula. 

The Combined Bomber Offensive from the 

United Kingdom against Germany. 

U.S.-British Conference at Quebec, August 

1943. 

Various plans prepared between 1939 and 

1941 to meet Axis aggression involving 

more than one enemy. 

Plans for an emergency return to the Continent in event of a collapse of German 

resistance. 

Prewar plan of operations in event of war 

with Great Britain. 

SWPA plans for operations in the Bismarck 

Archi pelago, along northern coast of New 

Guinea and thence to Mindanao, P.I. 

Plan for major U.S.~British attack across the 

Channel in 1.943. 

British proposal for sowing fluvial mines in 

the Rhine. 

Cairo-Tehran Conference, 22 November7 December 1943. 

Amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy. 

Plan for limited cross-Channel attack in 1942. 

Plan for Anglo-American invasion of French 

North Africa, combining U.S. and British 

plans and often used interchangeably with 

GYMNAST. 

International Conference near Potsdam, 16-

26 july 1945. 

Allied invasion of North and Northwest 

Africa, November 1942. 

U.S.-British Conference held at Washington, 

May 1943. 
532 

WESERUEBUNG 

WESERUEBUNG 

NORD 

WESERUEBUNG SUED 

WILFRED 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

German operation against Norway and 

Denmark. 

Plan for occupation of Norway by means of 

air and seaborne landings at the most important places along the coast. 

Plan for occupation of all of Denmark. 

Plan for laying of mine fields in Norwegian 

waters. 
Basic Military Map Symbols * 

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within 

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply 

point. 

Military Units-Identification 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Armored Command ... 

Army Air Forces 

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery 

Cavalry, Horse 

Cavalry, Mechanized .. 

Chemical Warfare Service. 

Coast Artillery 

Engineers 

Infantry. 

Medical Corps 

Ordnance Department. 

Quartermaster Corps .. 

Signal Corps 

Tank Destroyer. 

Transportation Corps. 

Veterinary Corps. 

~ 

IC)I 

B 

8 

C2J 

~ 

m 

rn 

m 

rgJ 

EE 

[]] 

[]] 

m 

ITOI 

cmJ 

lS2l 

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing 

symbol with the arm or service symbol: 

Airborne Artillery. 

Airborne Infantry . 

'For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period, see 

FM 21-30, dated October 1943, from wQich these are taken. 
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 

Size Symbols 

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or 

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying 

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization: 

Squad • 

Section .. •• 

Platoon ••• 

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight 

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron. . I I 

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) III 

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force 

W~ X 

Division or Command of an Air Force. . XX 

Corps or Air Force XXX 

Army. XXXX 

Group of Armies XXXXX 

EXAMPLES 

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the 

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent 

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below 

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines: 

Company A, 137th Infantry ........... ' ... " .",., A~137 

8th Field Artillery Battalion. 

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division. 

Observation Post, 23d Infantry. 

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division 

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry 

Weapons 

Machine gun 

Gun. 

Gun battery 

Howitzer or Mortar. 

Tank 

Self-propelled gun 

~8 

AI~II t~ 

~23 

~5 137 

-111-

138 
Index 

Aachen, 422, 434, 441, 443, 453, 458 

Abadan, 235, 237 

ABC-I. See American-British Conversations. 

ACHSE, 308, 310, 313, 314 

Admiralty Islands, 287, 281\ 291, 293, 296, 

297, 298, 298n, 299, 300 

Adriatic Sea, 271, 331, 339, 356, 357, 363, 

387 

Aegean Sea, 265, 268, 270-79, 284 

Africa, 24, 28, 36,45, 182, 214, 228 

Agno River, 162, 163, 164 

Ahwaz, 235, 236, 248 

Air bases 

in Asia 104, 462, 463, 463n, 46B, 473, 

474 

in Atlantic, 76 

in Norway, 72 

in Phillippincs, 463, 463ft 

in southern Italy, 325 

in Southwest Pacific, 291, 294, 296, 463, 

463n 

Air blockade, 451, 500-502, 504 

Air forces, U.S., 82, 94, 95, 155, 168, 169, 

210, 211, 214, 238, 240,435. See also 

Fifth Air Force; Fourteenth Air Force; 

Ninth Air Force. 

build-up in British Isles, 214 

expansion of, 366, 368, 371, 381 

and Iceland expedition, 82, 94, 95, 97 

on Luzon, 163 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 468 

manpower requirements, 374, 375, 376 

overseas, 379, 380 

and plans for bombing of japan, 463, 

473, 474 

plans for overseas deployment, 368 

troop basis, 366 

Air offensive, 32, 53 

against Allies, 446, 450, 451 

against Germany, 32, 33, 197, 209, 258, 

318,367, 369, 373, 432 

against japan, 266, 462, 463, 468,473, 

474, 501, 502, 504, 509 

Air power 

Allied, 177,369,378,413,416,446,447, 

451,453,471 

British, 43 

German, 185, 189, 446, 450, 451, 453, 

457 

japanese, 151, 170,475 

U.S., 368, 381 

Air supply, 422, 435, 436, 438, 441 

Air support, 190, 193, 294 

Airborne Division, 13th, 380n 

Airborne Division, 82d, 315 

Airborne operations, 60, 62, 64, 66, 78, 315 

in France, plans for, 394, 435, 435n 

in Holland, 425-26, 429-42, 453 

Airborne troops, 429, 434, 435, 436 

Aircraft, 67,94, 100, 111, 120, 228, 232, 

234, 289, 295, 297, 301, 446, 459,471 

Aircraft, bombardment, 67, 81, 82, 151, 

155, 222, 232, 297, 301 

Aircraft, pursuit, 81, 82, 155 

Aircraft, transport, 268, 436, 441 

Aircraft assembly plants, 235, 236, 237 

Aircraft carriers, U.S., 293, 294, 294n, 295, 

301, 302,475,500 

Aircraft factories, 135, 136, 142 

Airfields 

in Denmark, 64 

in France, 426 

in Italy, 309, 315, 324, 358 

on Luzon, 151, 158, 159, 168 

in Norway, 60 

in Pacific, 151, 158, 159, 168, 291, 293, 

296, 297, 300, 471 

on Sardinia, 309 

ALA~o Force, 296, 296n 

Alaska, 18, 19, 22,24, 47, 144, 217, 239 

Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle, 18, 19,22, 

24, 47 

Alban Hills, 325-27, 330, 332. 335. 336, 

339, 340, 343-49, 353-55, 357, 359, 

362, 363 

Albano, 343, 353, 362 

Albano Road, 332, 336, 338, 343 

Alenc;on, 404, 405, 406, 407, 410, 415n 

Alexander, General Sir Harold R. L. G., 

326-30, 333, 334, 340-42, 345, 346, 

348, 350, 352-54, 356, 360-62 

Algeria, 185, 189, 211 

Algiers, 191, 193-96 

Aliens 

enemy, 125-37, 139-45, 142n, 147, 148 

German, 125, 126, 137, 141, 142, 142n, 

147, 148 

Italian, 125, 126, 131, 137, 141,142, 142n, 

147 

japanese, 125-30, 132-37, 139-42, 144, 

145, 147 

Aliens Division, Office of Provost Marshal 

General, 129 

Allied Supreme War Council, 59, 68 
536 

Alpine passes, 309, 310, 311 

Alps, 306, 310, 313, 318, 451 

Alsace, 445, 449 

Ambrosio, Marshal Vittorio, 3D5 

American-British Conversations, 41-47, 74, 

76, 77, 86, 176 

Ammunition, 81, 91, 138, 160, 167, 406, 

453, 457, 504 

Amoy, 457,470,471, 472, 473, 476 

Amphibious operations, 119, 259, 453 

in Adriatic, plans for, 392 

in Bay of Biscay, plans for, 392, 393 

in Burma, plans for, 267-69, 280, 281 

in China, plans for, 463, 470 

in Denmark, 64 

in Italy, 263, 275, 276, 285, 322, 323, 

325-35, 325n, 336-38, 390 

on Luzon, 151, 158, 159, 161, 163, 165, 

169 

in Mediterranean, 260, 263, 275, 276, 

285, 322, 325-35, 325n, 336-38, 390 

in North Africa, 173 

in North Africa, plans for, 188-96 

in Northwest Europe, ~63, 430 

in Norway, 66 

in Pacific, plans for, 172, 179, 288-300, 

463 

in Sicily, 260 

in southern France, plans for, 256, 276, 

277, 279, 279n, 280, 283, 285, 383, 

387 -92, 394, 395 

Amphibious training, 182, 184 

Andaman Islands, 267-69, 269n, 280, 281. 

See also BUCCANEER. 

Andimeshk, 235, 236, 237 

Anti-Comintern Pact, 18, 101-05, 114, 119 

Antiaircraft artillery, 296, 300, 337, 340 

Antiaircraft defense, 81 

Antisubmarine operations, 74, 81, 201, 216, 

222, 260 

Antisubmarine vessels, 260 

Antonov, General Alexei, 489, 490, 491 

Antwerp, 425-27, 430, 433, 434, 438-40, 

445, 453-55, 457, 458 

ANVIL, 284, 284n, 285, 376, 388, 391 

Allied decision on, 256, 277 

assault, plans for, 276-80, 279n, 283, 

388, 392, 394, 395 

British opposition to, 390, 394 

versus operations in Balkans, 389, 392-

93, 397-98 

versus operations in Italy, 389-93, 395 

and OVERLORD, 279, 285, 389-93 

postponement of, 391, 392 

Anzio, 303, 321 

Allied forces at, 329-32, 336 

Allied landings at, 285, 322, 323, 336-

38, 390 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Anzio~Continued 

Allied plans for landings at, 324-35, 

325n 

German forces at, 329-31, 337, 338,339 

port, 336, 338, 340, 348, 349 

Anzio beachhead 

Allied communication with, 340 

Allied operations in, 336-50, 351-55, 

357-63 

Allied plan for junction with, 327, 328, 

341, 349 

consolidation of, 340-43, 345, 349 

German forces in, 344-45 

German operations against, 338-42, 346-

50 

junction of, with main front, 392 

AP A's, 190, 294n 

APD's, 297, 298, 299 

Apennine Mountains, 303, 307, 309, 310, 

312, 313, 314, 318 

Apulia, 309-14, 318, 319, 322 

ARCADIA Conference, 47, 174-77 

Arctic Sea supply route, 228-30, 232-34, 

237-43, 247, 249, 252 

Ardennes, 27, 423, 426, 434, 439 

Allied forces in, 454, 458 

Allied losses in, 443, 458 

German counteroffensive in, 380, 443-45, 

445n, 453, 453-55, 457-59, 481, 482 

Argentan, 401, 404, 406-15, 415n, 416, 

417,442 

Argentan-Falaise gap, 401, 408, 412-17 

Armored Division, 1st, 331, 341, 343, 355, 

359 

Armored Division, 2d French, 416 

Armored Division, 5th, 416 

Army, U.S., 210. See also Air forces, U.S.; 

Army Service Forces, U.S.; Ground 

combat troops. U.S.; War Department. 

and Atlantic-first strategy, 38 

and Axis threat to Western Hemisphere, 

20 

and BOLERO, 212 

and British .and French Navies, 28 

and British import program, 220 

and control of enemy aliens, 126-29, 131, 

132 

and defense of Philippines, 14, 152, 156, 

157, 161 

and evacuation of Japanese from Pacific 

coast. 125. 127, 129. 133-35, 137, 

141-44, 146-49 

expansion of, 27 

forces in France, 421, 422, 423, 426 

forces in Philippines, 151, 152, 154, 156, 

163 

forces in South Pacific, 294 

and German Army compared, 377-78 
INDEX 

Army, U.S.-Continued 

and Iceland expedition, 77, 82-92, 87n, 

94, 97 

and Japanese threat in Pacific, 113, 117 

and landing craft production, 179 

losses, 299n, 300 

and negotiations with Japan, 116, 117 

operations in France, 422, 423, 426, 433, 

436, 437 

operations on Los Negros, 299, 300 

operations on Luzon, 171-72 

and ORANGE, 15, 19 

overseas deployment of, 258, 379, 380 

and Persian Corridor supply route, 225, 

241-45 

and plans for Allied occupation of Germany, 485 

and plans for defense of Manila Bay, 14 

plans for deployment overseas, 214 

and plans for ground operations against 

Germany, 46 

and RAINBOW I, 24 

and RAINBOW 5, 46 

replacement system, 377, 378 

shipping requirements, 220, 222 

special observers in London, 31-33 

strength of, 365, 366, 366n, 368, 368n, 

369-72, 374-7~ 380 

training of, 228, 371, 374, 376, 378 

troop basis, 365, 366, 366n, 367, 368, 

368n, 369-76 

and unconditional surrender policy, 506-

07 

and U.S. strategy in Pacific, 23 

in zone of interior, 380 

Army Group, 6th, 432 

Army Group, 12th, 401, 402, 404, 406, 

419,424-27, 433-36, 439, 443, 491 

Army Group, 15, 326, 329, 333, 3J5n 

Army-Navy Joint Board. See Joint Board. 

Army Service Forces, U.S., 284n, 464, 472 

Army Specialized Training Program, 374, 

376 

Arnhem, 429, 438, 463 

Arnold, General Henry H., 435, 436, 442, 

464, 477n, 511, 514, 517 

Arnold, Capt. Richard R., 87, 88 

Artena, 357, 359, 361 

Artillery, 158, 161, 162, 378, 409, 413 

German, 320, 416, 417, 448 

Norwegian, 60 

U.S., 415, 415n, 416 

Asia, 26, 34, 100, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 

114, 176,462 

Asiatic Fleet, U.S., 40, 105, 113, 167, 169 

Assault forces, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196 

Assault shipping, 294 

lor Anzio landings, 327-29, 333 

Assault shipping-Continued 

in Atlantic, 259-60 

537 

for attack on Rhodes, 266, 270, 271 

275-79, 284 

British production of, 283 

for Formosa-Amoy campaign, 472 

for invasion of Norway, 58 

and invasion of Sicily, 259 

for landings ih southern France, 275-80, 

279n, 283, 284, 284n, 285 

in Mediterranean, 263, 265, 275-77, 

279, 326, 328 

for operations in Burma, 267, 278, 280 

for operations in Italy, 274-78, 285, 326-

29, 333 

for OVERLORD, 260, 261, 263, 265, 270, 

271, 276, 277 279n, 280, 283, 284, 

284n, 285 

shortage, 259n, 260, 261 

for TORCH, 190, 191, 191n, 193, 194, 

195 

U.S. production of, 259, 259n, 260, 261, 

270, 274, 274n, 277, 283, 284 

Assault transports, 190, 195 

Asserson, Lt. William C. (USN), 87 

Associated Powers, 45-46 

Atlantic 

Allied shipping losses in, 74, 211, 258 

Axis threat in, 34, 76, 80, 232 

British naval power in, 13, 25, 78 

convoying in, 40, 74, 76, 84-91, 93 

German naval power in, 54, 78, 79 

German submarine operations in, 74, 76, 

211, 258, 260 

neutrality patrol, 27, 40, 76, 77, 80 

plans for concentration of U.S. Fleet in, 

31 

supply routes, 20, 74, 80, 203, 228 

U.S. assault shipping in, 260 

U.S. bases in, 33, 76 

U.S.-British strategic responsibility in, 

177 

U.S. naval responsibility in, 25 

U.S. plan for operations in, 24, 26, 42 

U.S. shipping in, 206, 221 

U.S. strategy in, 16-17, 19, 20, 29, 34, 

37-41, 47 

Atlantic-first strategy, 29-31, 34, 36-47. 

See also Germany-first strategy. 

Atomic bomb 

debate over use of, 494-500, 508, 508n, 

509-11 

development of, 494, 495, 497 

and hopes for outla wing war, 510 

preparations for use of, 495, 514 

protests against use of, 495, 496, 498, 

499 

secrecy of development of, 495, 496, 511 
538 

Atomic bomb-Continued 

selection of targets for, 495, 497, 514, 

515 

testing of, 511, 515n 

Atomic research, 487, 494, 495, 497 

Attorney General, U.S. 128, 129, 134. See 

also Biddle, Francis. 

Attrition, 366, 371 

Australasia, 42, 43, 151, 168, 169, 288 

Austria, 391,481,484 

Avranches, 401, 402, 404, 405, 412, 445 

Axis Powers, II, 19, 20, 45, 74, 103, 156, 

157, 175, 191,303. See also Germany; 

Italy; Japan. 

Allied plans for defeat of, 41-47, 174 

British strategy for defeat of, 32, 33, 38, 

42, 43 

threat of collaboration by, 22, 23, 34, 40 

U.S. plans for defeat of, 24, 25, 35-41, 

47 

Azores, 76-79,85 

B-I7's, 155, 168 

B-25's, 297 

B-29's, 294, 374-76, 379, 463, 468, 473, 

474, 476, 477n, 495, 500, 514 

"B" Line, 317 

Badoglio, Marshal Pietro, 303, 304, 308, 

311 

Bailey, Admiral Sir Sidney, 31 

Baldwin, Hanson, 396 

Balkan Peninsula, 394 

Allied aid to guerrilla forces in, 262, 265, 

277 

Allied threat to, 309-13, 317-20, 322 

British plans for operations in, 389, 392, 

393, 397-98 

French plan for operations in, 59 

German forces in, 310, 445, 448 

German plans for defense of, 305, 306, 

308-12, 314, 317, 318 

as invasion route, 397-400 

transfer of German divisions from, 337, 

338, 347 

Soviet operations in, 398, 400, 445, 448 

Baltic, 54, 56, 57, 62, 228, 447, 483, 486, 

490 

Bandar Shahpur, 235, 237, 243, 244 

Bard, Ralph A., 497 

Basra, 231, 235, 236, 242, 243 

Bastogne, 457, 458 

Bataan Peninsula, 158 

Japanese decision not to defend, 171 

MacArthur's decision to withdraw to, 

151, 163-65 

plan for supply of U.S. forces in, 152, 

154, 166, 167 

surrender of U.S. forces on, 172 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Bataan Peninsula-Continued 

U.S. defense of, 172 

U.S. plans for withdrawal to, 154, 159, 

163-67 

withdrawal of U.S. forces to, 169 

Bauxite, 102, 205, 219, 310 

Beaches, supply over, 349, 424, 432, 439 

Beachhead, 64, 316, 317, 318,421,475. 

See also Anzio beachhead. 

Belgium, 420, 430, 432, 441 

Allied operations in, 443, 445 

German invasion of, 27, 71 

German plans for operations in, 53, 62 

Bendetsen, Lt. Co!. Carl R., 129, 130, 

133-37, 139, 140, 143-46, 143n, 

145n 

Bengal, Bay of, 267-69, 280, 281 

Bergen, 60, 64, 67, 68 

Berlin, 61, 119, 425, 441 

Allied plans for occupation of, 480, 482, 

482n, 483, 484 

Soviet capture of, 479, 488 

Soviet threat to, 459, 489 

Bernhard Line, 317-22 

Bessell, Col. William W., Jr., 370 

Bessell Committee, 370-72 

Biddle, Col. Anthony J. Drexel, Jr., 491 

Biddle, Francis, 128-31, 134, 135, 142, 146 

Big Three, 256, 384 

Biscay, Bay of, 392, 393 

Bismarck Archipelago, 109-11, 287, 291, 

294, 295 

Blackett, P. M. S., 510 

Blockade, 20, 36, 50, 52, 59, 155 

Blockade, economic, 105, 106 

Blockade, naval, 500. 508. 50<) 

BOLERO, 176-78, 181, 183, 184, 231, 246-

48, 252 

Bomber offensive. See Air offensive. 

Bombing, strategic. See Air offensive. 

Bone, 189, 193, 195 

Borneo, 106, 109, 117 

Bougainville, 258, 288, 289, 291, 293 

Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N., 2, 6, 332, 425, 

434 

and Allied offensive in eastern France, 

443 

decision of, to halt advance on Argentan, 9, 401, 407-17 

and liberation of Prague, 491, 492 

and plans for Allied airborne operations, 

436, 441, 442 

and plans for invasion of Germany, 482, 

483 

and plans for trapping German forces in 

Normandy, 404, 405, 408-13 

Brann, Brig. Gen. Donald W., 335, 359, 

360 
INDEX 

Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H., 168, 435 

Brest, 78, 421, 425, 432, 439 

Bridgehead, 206, 425, 440, 442 

on China coast, 420 

over Elbe, 479, 487 

in Formosa, 470 

across Rhine, 482, 483 

Brisbane, 291, 297 

British Admiralty, 20, 25, 31, 38, 81, 95, 

232, 238 

Briti~.h Army 

in Crete, 78 

in France, 430, 433, 434 

in Greece, 74 

in Holland, 430 

in Iceland, 74, 75 

losses, 74, 78 

in Middle East, 228, 236 

in North Africa, 74 

overseas deployment of, 258 

and plans for operations in Norway, 66-

67 

transport operations in Iran, 236 

U.S. supplies for, 235 

British Chiefs of Staff, 45, 185, 188 

and ABC-I, 46 

on Allied occupation of Prague, 489 

on Allied strategy in Mediterranean, 

265, 275, 276, 277, 392, 393 

and Allied strategy in southeastern Asia, 

267, 271, 276,278 

on DRAGOON, 395 

on German build-up in Italy, 263 

on German strength in France, 264, 265 

and OVERLORD, 263-65, 271, 275-77, 

390-92 

and plans for advance to Berlin, 485 

and plans for invasion of southern 

France, 276, 279, 390-94 

on SLEDGEHAMMER, 182 

and strategy for defeat of Germany, 231, 

263-65 

on U.S. plan for halt at Elbe, 483-84 

British Commonwealth, 39, 41, 42, 181, 

230 

British East Indies, 100, 106, 109, 110 

British Empire, 30, 32. 35, 38. See also 

British Commonwealth. 

British garrisons, 74, 75, 77, 79-83, 87-89, 

92, 94, 95, 97 

British Government, 202, 205, 215, 217 

British Home Fleet, 32, 78 

British Imperial General Staff, 87 

British Isles, 54. See also Great Britain. 

British Joint Staff Mission, 95, 182, 207 

British Ministry of War Transport, 182 

British units 

Army, Second, 404, 406, 412, 429, 432, 

440, 441 

539 

British units-Continued 

Army, Eighth, 181, 186, 189, 230, 314, 

317, 331, 332, 351, 352, 356, 358,363 

Army, Tenth, 230, 231 

Corps, Airborne, 437 

Corps, 10, 340 

Division, 1 Infantry, 331, 334, 341 

Brittany, 402, 421, 422, 425, 426, 432 

Broad-front strategy, 419, 423, 425, 433, 

482 

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan, 17:'. 

197, 206, 271, 273, 274, 277, 282 

Brussels, 430, 455, 457 

BUCCANEER, 267-71, 275-78, 280-82 

Bulgaria, 45, 278n, 284n, 445, 510 

Bulge, Battle of the, 443, 459. See also 

Ardennes. German counteroffensive 

m. 

Burma 

Allied build-up in, 213, 217 

Allied occupation of, 288 

Allied plans for offensive in, 221, 222n, 

266, 267, 276 

British operations in, 210, 258 

British views on offensive in, 221 

Japanese conquest of, 174 

Japanese plans for conquest of, 102, 109, 

110 

U.S. shipping for British forces in, 214, 

220-21 

Bush, Dr. Vannevar, 497, 499 

Bushire, 235, 236, 243 

Buttlar-Brandenfels, Gen. Horst von, 450, 

451 

Byrnes, Justice James F., 270, 497, 499, 

510, 511 

Caen, 401, 403, 404, 405 

Caesar Line, 354, 355, 357, 362, 363 

Cairo Conference (August 1942), 243, 245 

Cairo Conferences (November-December 

1943), 255, 259, 261, 264-71, 264n, 

278-82, 387, 389. See also Tehran 

Conference. 

Cairo-Tehran Conferences (November-December 1943),375, 383-89 

Calabria, 309-14, 312n 

California 

control of enemy aliens in, 130, 134, 142 

discrimination against Japanese in, 138 

evacuation of Japanese from, 125 

Japanese in, 126 

plans for evacuation of Japanese from, 

133, 135, 136, 142, 144, 147, 148 

Canada 

and ABC-I, 46 

and Allied operations in Europe, 430 

forces of, in France, 40 1-11, 417 

and Iceland, 74, 75 
540 

Canadian Army, 74, 75, 430, 434, 440 

Canadian First Army, 403-11, 440 

Canadian garrisons, 74, 75 

Cargo ships, assault, 190, 289 

Caribbean, 16, 23, 30 

Carney, Rear Adm. Robert B., 293, 294, 

468 

Caroline Islands, 279n, 293, 294 

Carrier task forces, 475, 476, 500 

Carriers, aircraft, 190, 190n, 278, 281 

Carter, Lt. Col. Marshall S., 372 

Casablanca, 174n, 188, 189, 191-96 

Casablanca Conference, 199, 206-11, 215, 

216, 262, 288, 389 

Cassino, 329, 335, 340, 344 

Castellano, Brig. Gen. Guiseppe, 311-13 

CATHERINE, 56 

Chinese Army, 211, 266, 267, 269, 269n 

Caucasus, 79, 182, 230, 238-40, 306 

Cavalry Division, 1st, 287, 296, 298, 299, 

299n, 300n 

Cavalry Division, 2d, 380n 

Central Pacific Area, 289, 294, 461 

Chamberlain, Col. Edwin W., 372 

Chambois, 415,416 

CHAMPION, 267, 269 

Chaney, Maj. Gen. James E., 79, 81, 86-

91, 87n, 93, 95, 96 

Chase, Brig. Gen. William c., 300 

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L., 210, 266, 

517 

Chiang Kai-shek, 114, 473 

and Allied strategy in southeastern Asia, 

267-69, 280-82, 281n 

and Cairo Conference, 264n, 267-69 

and U.S. negotiations with Japan, 116 

Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, 495, 

496, 498 

Chief of Naval Operations, U.S., 13 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 13. See also 

Marshall, General George C. 

China, 45, 108, 116, 200, 246, 278, 465 

air, land, and sea supply routes to, 211, 

266, 281, 462, 463, 473 

and Allied strategy in Southeast Asia, 

266, 267 

Japanese expansion in, 10, 22, 100-103, 

108, 112, 114 

Japanese forces in, 102, 111, 113 

Japanese plans for withdrawal from, 114, 

115, 170 

U.S. air forces in, 210-11, 266, 267,473, 

474 

U.S. airlift to, 268, 269, 281 

U.S. plans for bases in, 266, 281, 462, 

473,474,501 

U.S. plans for operations on mainland 

of, 471 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

China-Continued 

U.S. plans for seizing ports in, 462, 463, 

470-73,477 

U.S. support of, 37, 108, 266, 267, 462 

and USSR, 516 

China-Burma-India Theater, 210,266,473 

Cherbourg, 421, 422, 424, 433, 439 

Churchill, Win,ston S., 8, 26, 34, 38, 56, 

78, 80, 174, 200, 203, 205, 218, 220, 

239, 267, 269, 282, 288, 290, 482n, 

512 

and aid to USSR, 241 

on Allied advance in Germany, 484, 

485, 487 

on Allied strategy in Mediterranean, 

264, 274, 275, 386 

and Anzio landings, 327, 328, 333, 390 

and ARCADIA Conference, 174 

and Arctic convoys, 232, 233, 238, 239, 

242, 249 

on atomic bombing of Japan, 511 

and BUCCANEER, 268, 269, 271, 280 

and Cairo-Tehran decisions, 256 

on invasion of Europe, 178, 180, 181, 

184, 192, 197,239 

on landing craft production, 261, 277 

on occupation of Berlin, 480, 485, 487 

on occupation of Prague, 479, 480, 491 

on operations in Balkans, 393-94, 397, 

398 

on operations in eastern Mediterranean, 

265, 268, 271, 272, 274, 275, 284, 

387, 393-94 

and operations in Italy, 184, 390, 393 

and OVERLORD, 271, 273, 275, 282, 283, 

285, 390 

and plan for capture of Rome, 272, 324, 

358-63 

and plans for development of Persian 

Gulf supply route, 227, 242-44, 247, 

248 

and plans for invasion of North Africa, 

76, 175, 178, 181, 184, 185, 188, 191-

94 

and plans for invasion of southern France, 

274, 275, 383, 390, 391, 393-95 

and Stalin, 192, 386 

at Tehran Conference, 387 

and U.S. negotiations with Japan, 116 

on U.S. shipping aid to Great Britain, 

213 

Cisterna, 332, 342-44, 347, 353-55, 357, 

359, 361, 363 

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 2, 6, 132 

and Allied delay in Anzio beachhead, 

342-47 

and Allied landings at Anzio, 325-28, 

330, 334, 340 
INDEX 

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.-Continued 

decision of, to drive on Rome, 9, 359-63 

and drive on Valmontone, 352-57, 359 

and Fifth Army, 341, 356 

and plans for drive on Rome, 328, 349, 

352-60 

and plans for evacuation of Japanese 

from Pacific coast, 137, 138, 143-46, 

146n 

Clark, Thomas C., 134-36 

Clark Field, 120, 151, 168, 172 

Clayton, William L., 497 

Coast Artillery Corps, U.S., 87 

Color plans, 12-13, 25, 52. See also ORANGE 

War Plan; RAINBOW war plans. 

Comando Supremo, 307, 311, 312, 314, 315 

Combat loaders, 187, 281 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 174,213,217, 

241, 288, 290, 328, 462 

on Allied aims in Italy, 323-24 

on amphibious operations in Burma, 

269, 281 

and ANVIL, 280, 283, 388, 394 

and areas of strategic responsibility, 230-

31 

decisions of, 2, 6, 250-51, 283, 492 

on DRAGOON, 395 

on invasion of northwestern Europe, 

184-85, 209 

and OVERLORD, 280, 283, 388 

and plans for Allied advance into Germany, 486, 488, 490, 492 

and plans for development of Persian 

Gulf supply route, 6, 227, 248, 250-51 

and plans for invasion of North Africa, 

175, 186, 196 

on U.S. deployment to Great Britain, 

206-07, 209 

Combined Military Transportation Committee, 215, 219, 223 

Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards, 

202 

Combined Staff Planners, 248-49 

COMET, 435n, 441 

Command decisions. See also Decisions, 

Allied; Decisions, British; Decisions, 

German; Decisions, Japanese; Decisions, U.S. 

collective nature of, 2, 4 

definition of, 1 

economic-logistical factors in, 7 

of heads of state, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 

by individuals, 4 

political factors in, 7-8 

process of, 2-3 

role of committees in, 2, 4, 5 

role of staff work in, 2, 4, 5, 6 

541 

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. See 

Hart, Admiral Thomas C. 

Commando raids, 281 

Communications Zone, ETO, 420, 421, 

426, 427 

Communism, 400 

Compton, Karl T., 497, 498, 499, 517 

Conant, James B., 497 

Conference in the Imperial Presence, 103, 

113-14 

Congress, U.S., 12,370, 378 

and atomic bomb, 510, 510n 

and Iceland expedition, 75 

and Japanese aggression in southeastern 

Asia, 123 

and plans for evacuation of Japanese 

from Pacific coast, 133, 134, 137, 138, 

146, 147, 149 

and restrictions on overseas military 

service, 95-97 

and U.S. war plans, IS 

Continental commands, U.S., 15 

Continental reserve, 375 

Convoy schedules, 191, 192, 195 

Convoys, 40 

Arctic, 72, 215, 215n, 217, 232, 233, 

237-39, 241, 242, 249, 252 

in Atlantic, 74, 76, 84-91, 93 

for Iceland expedition, 84, 85, 86, 87, 

88, 89, 90, 91, 93 

to Luzon, 475, 476 

in Mediterranean, 215n 

to' North Africa, 204, 211-13 

Co-ordinator of Alien Enemy Control program, 134 

CORONET, SOl 

Corps, II, 340 

Corps, VI, 145, 323, 329-33, 335-36, 338-

50 

and drive on Rome, 351-53, 354, 355, 

356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 

363 

Corps, VII, 402, 404, 409, 414 

Corps, VIII, 402 

Corps, XV, 401-17 

Corps, XIX, 414 

Corps Area, Fourth, 145 

Corps Area, Sixth, 145, 148 

Corps Area, Seventh, 148 

Corps Area, Eighth, 145, 148 

Corps Area, Ninth, 127, 145, 148 

Corps of Engineers, U.S., 87 

Corregidor, lSI, 154, 159, 160, 163, 167, 

477 

decision to move USAFFE headquarters 

to, 165 

surrender of U.S. forces on, 172 
542 

Corsica, 173,262,276,308,310, 388 

Cox, Oscar, 76 

Craig, General Malin, 26n 

Crerar, Lt. Gen. Henry D. G., 404 

Cross-Channel invasion. See Europe, northwestern, Allied plans for invasion of; 

OVERLORD; RANKIN; ROUNDUP; 

SLEDGEHAMMER. 

Cruisers, 68, 71, 294n, 299, 300 

Cummins, Maj. Gen. Joseph M., 85 

Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrcw B., 334, 

349 

Curtis, Maj. Gen. H. 0., 87, 88 

Czechoslovakia, 479, 489, 490, 510 

Dakar, 77, 174n, 176, 194 

Danube River, 452, 489 

Deane, Maj. Gen. John R., 264, 385 

Decision-making 

analysis of, 2-3 

historical approach to, 2, 3, 9 

military and political influences on, 7-8 

process, 2-6 

Decisions, AJlied 

on advance in Italy, 277 

on airborne operations in Holland, 429, 

430, 438, 440, 442 

on broad-front strategy in Europe, 7, 

419, 420, 425-27, 433 

at Cairo-Tehran Conferences, 256, 277-

78, 282-85 

to cancel amphibious operations III 

Burma, 280 

to cancel SLEDGEHAMMER, 282 

to defeat Germany first, 4, 11, 41-47 

on delay at Anzio, 345 

on Europe versus Pacific, 284 

to halt at the El be, 8 

to intervene in Scandinavia, 59, 67, 69, 

72 

on invasion of North Africa, 187, 188, 

195-98, 238, 239, 262, 366 

on invasion of northwest Europe, 386, 

388 

on invasion of Sicily, 262 

on invasion of southern France, 7, 256, 

277, 283-85, 383, 384, 388, 394-400 

on OVERLORD versus Mediterranean, 7, 

256, 282-85 

to postpone cross-Channel invasion, 366 

to postpone invasion of southern France, 

391, 392 

to pursue German forces in France, 422 

on reduction of Rabaul, 288 

to strengthen OVERLORD and ANVIL, 283 

to suspend Arctic convoys, 249 

on U.S. operation of Persian Corridor, 

6, 225-27, 241, 242, 244, 245, 251-53 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Decisions, British 

to abandon SLEDGEHAMMER, 182 

to invade North Africa, 174 

to suspend Arctic convoys, 237-38 

Decisions, German 

on Ardcnnes countcroffensive, 6, 303, 

444, 445, 445n, 448-50, 459 

to defend southern Italy, 6, 303, 304, 

320-22 

to hold Garigliano-Rapido line, 339 

to invade Norway and Denmark, 49 

on occupation of Norway and Denmark, 

6 

against total mobilization, 451 

to withdraw to Apennines, 303 

Decisions, Japanese 

to abandon Bataan Peninsula, 171 

to defend northern Luzon, 169-72 

on war against U.S. and Great Britain, 

4, 99, 108-10, 108n, 113, 118, 119, 

122-24 

to withdraw air forces from Rabaul area, 

295 

to accelerate central Pacific offensive, 295 

to accelerate southwestern Pacific offensive, 301-02 

Decisions, U.S. 

to bypass Hansa Bay, 301-02 

to cancel SLEDGEHAMMER. 186, 187 

to delay at Anzio, 9, 323-24, 344-50 

to drive on Rome (May 1944), 9, 351, 

359-63 

to evacuate Japanese from Pacific coast, 

125, 143, 146, 148, 149 

to halt advance toward Argentan, 9, 401, 

407-17 

to halt at Elbe, 479,480,483,485-92, 289n 

to invade Japan, 502 

to invade Luzon, 461, 476, 477 

to invade southern Philippines, 466 

to invade North Africa, 5, 7, 8, 174, 187, 

188 

on 90-division Army, 4, 7, 365, 374, 

376-81 

not to occupy Prague, 490, 491, 492 

not to warn Japan of atomic bomb, 511 

on occupation of Iceland, 6, 73, 80, 94, 

96 

on reduction of military supply programs, 

368 

on reinforcement of Iceland, 94-97 

to resist Japanese expansion, 105 

to seize Admiralty Islands, 9, 287 

to seize Los Negros, 297-99, 301, 302 

to send reconnaissance force to Admiralties, 297-99 

on shipping aid to Great Britain, 5, 7, 

199-200, 220-23 
INDEX 

Decisions, U.S.--Continued 

to use atomic bomb, 5, 493, 511, 513, 

514 

to withdraw to Bataan Peninsula, 8, 151, 

163-67, 169 

Demarcation line in Germany, 488 

Dempsey, Lt. Gen. Miles C., 404, 412, 441 

Denmark, 70, 490 

German invasion of, 27, 49 

German plans for occupation of, 61, 62, 

6+, 66 

neutrality of, 50 

Soviet threat to, 486 

Deployment of U.S. forces 

to British Isles, 206-07, 208, 208n, 209, 

211, 212, 213, 214, 230 

to Europe, 379, 389 

to France, 393 

to North Africa, 366 

overseas, 208, 208n, 214, 215, 232, 258, 

366, 368, 374, 379-81 

to Pacific, 230, 366, 379, 380 

Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See 

McNarney, Lt. Gen. joseph T. 

Deputy Provost Marshal General, 140 

Destroyer-bases exchange, 33 

Destroyers, 60, 71, 76, 294n, 299, 300 

Devers, Lt. Gen. jacob L., 346 

DeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L. 

and control of enemy aliens, 127-31,133, 

134, 141 

and measures against sabotage and espionage, 129-32, 134 

and plans for evacuation of enem y aliens, 

127,128,130,131,134,135,136,137, 

139-41, 140n, 143, 145n, 147-49 

Dill, Fidd Marshal Sir john, 181, 183, 216 

Dnieper River, 258, 445 

Dodeeanese Islands, 262, 265, 268, 270-79, 

284 

Doenitz, Admiral Karl, 309, 318, 319, 447, 

491 

Douglas, Lewis W., 202, 211, 212, 218-23 

DRAGOON, 394, 395 

Drake, Brig. Gen. Charles C., 167 

Dr~de~ 482-84, 489, 489n 

DUKW's, 334, 338 

Dunkerque, 27, 193, 262 

Early, Stephen, 96 

East Prussia, 445, 451, 452 

Eastern Front, 174, 182, 225, 227, 231, 

256-58, 264, 272, 274n, 367 

and Allied aid to USSR, 228, 240, 253 

Allied plans for relieving German pressure on, 178-80, 187, 264, 271, 324, 

385 

German defensive strategy on, 304, 305 

543 

Eastern Front-Continued 

German operations on, 182, 185, 206, 

238, 239, 253, 445, 458, 459 

German plans for offensive on, 306, 452 

German strength on, 184 

I talian losses on, 305 

and OVERLORD, 274, 377 

Soviet operations on, 445, 447, 458,459 

Soviet plans for offensive on, 387 

and U.S. mobilization, 366, 368, 373 

Eberbach, Lt. Gen. Heinrich, 416 

Eden, Anthony, 213, 219, 220, 264, 487 

Egypt, 181, 182, 186, 189, 229 

Axis threat to, 74, 79 

British operations in, 74, 230 

German operations in, 79, 238 

U.S. air forces in, 238, 240 

U.S. mission to, 230, 231 

Eighth Army, British, 181, 230, 317, 331 

operations in Italy, 314, 331, 332,351, 

352, 356, 358, 363 

plans for counteroffensive, 189 

plans for reinforcement of, 186 

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., I, 6, 177, 

183, 188, 213, 263, 275, 332, 401, 

405, 408, 410, 412, 445, 453 

and Allied airborne operations, 425, 426, 

429, 430, 435, 436, 438, 440, 442 

and Allied offensive in eastern France, 

443 

and ANVIL-OVERLoRD-Italy debate, 390-

94 

on broad-front strategy, 7, 419, 420, 425-

27, 433 

commands ETOUSA, 185, 188n 

commands OVERLORD, 280n, 327 

commands TORCH, 188n, 189-90 

decision of, to halt U.S. forces on Elbe, 

8, 479, 480, 483, 485-92, 489n 

decision of, not to occupy Prague, 490, 

491, 492 

and German retreat from Normandy, 

408,413 

on invasion of southern France, 277, 394, 

396 

and plans for amphibious operations in 

Italy, 326, 327 

and plans for atomic bombing of japan, 

511n 

and plans for capture of Ruhr, 438, 439 

and plans for invasion of Germany, 419, 

423, 425, 426, 427, 482-87, 482n 

and plans for invasion of North Africa, 

190-91, 192, 194, 196 

on port capacity, 392, 393, 426, 432, 433 

on SLEDGEHAMMER, 185 

and U.S. occupation policy in Europe, 

481-82 
544 

EI Alamein, 319 

Elbe River, 479-81, 483-92, 489n 

Elliot, Col. D. O. 245, 245n 

Embargo, 105, 106 

Emirau, 291, 293, 294, 302 

Emmons, Maj. Gen. Delos C. 31, 32 

Emperor of Japan, 103-05, 113, 118, 120, 

121, 498, 505, 507, 512, 513, 517 

Empress Augusta Bay, 291, 293 

Encirclement, 402-10, 412, 413, 416,417 

Engineer Regiment, 5th, 97 

English Channel, 52, 179, 206, 425, 433 

Eniwetok, 293, 295 

Equipment, military, 84-86, 92, 228, 240, 

243, 246, 247, 437 

Espionage, 129, 132, 133, 138, 319 

Europe, 77, 79, 174, 206, 309, 310 

Allied air power in, 378 

Allied forces in, 482, 482n 

Axis aggression in, 2 I 

British plans for ground operations in, 

32, 33 

deployment of British forces in, 389 

plans for redeployment of forces from, 

373,471, 472, 492 

Soviet threat to, 398, 400, 481, 492, 510 

U.S. divisions for, 375 

U.S. plans for operations in, 24, 25, 36, 

45, 47 

U.S. policy on postwar commitments in, 

399-400 

versus Pacific, 284 

war in, 26, 74, 102, 123, 124, 201 

Europe, northwestern, 262 

Allied operations in, 40 1-17 

Allied plans for invasion of, 175n, 177, 

206, 209, 231, 238, 255-56, 259, 260-

65, 270-74, 282, 283, 324, 358, 366, 

368, 385-91 

Allied views on invasion of, I 75, I 78-

83, 185, 197 

command of Allied forces in, 40 I, 411 

German forces in, 184 

plans for build-up of Allied forces ill, 

378 

Europe, western 

Allied operations in, 284, 285, 363, 383, 

389,391,392,395,401-17,419-27, 

429-43, 445, 453, 458, 480-82 

deployment of U.S. forces to, 379, 380 

German control of, 228 

German defenses in, 209 

German operations in, 27, 28, 70-72, 

380, 40 I, 402, 404, 405, 408, 411-16, 

420-22, 4·30, 432, 435n, 437, 443-45, 

453-55, 457-59, 481, 482 

German plans for offensive in, 52, 53, 

57, 58, 62 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Europe, western-Continued 

German strength in, 197, 206, 263-65, 

275, 377 

German victories in, 27, 28, 33 

U.S. forces in, 379, 380 

European Theater of Operations, II, 42, 

185, 188n, 389 

Ezaki, Col. Yoshio, 296, 298-300 

Falaise, 401, 403-08, 410-14, 442 

Falkenhorst, Lt. Gen. Nikolaus von, 61, 62 

Far East, 28, 209. See also Asia; Southeast 

Asia; Pacific, western. 

British prewar strategy in, 32, 38, 42, 43, 

44 

European possessions in, 14, 25, 37, 39, 

106 

Japanese expansion in, 21, 22, 34 

Japanese plans for expansion in, 106, 

109, 110 

Japanese power in, 13 

Japanese threat in, 34, 37 

Soviet bases in, 106 

U.S. possessions in, 106 

U.S. prewar strategy in, 47, 156 

Far East Air Force, U.S., 151, 168, 169 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 126, 128-

30, 132, 134, 138, 139 

Fermi, Enrico, 499, 515n 

Festung Europa, 177, 197,447 

Field Artillery Battalion, 46th, 97 

Fifth Air Force, 296 

Fifth Army, U.S., 285, 314, 316, 317, 319 

advance on Rome, 327, 328, 341 

and Anzio landings, 345. See also Corps 

VI. 

and capture of Rome, 363 

offensive on Garigliano front, 337 

operations in southern Italy, 323-50, 351-

63 

and plans for capture of Alban Hills, 327, 

330,331,335,336,348 

and plans for landings at Anzio, 325-35 

5th Engineer Regiment, U.S., 97 

Fifth Fleet, U.S., 301 

Finland, 50, 55, 56, 61-63, 66, 67, 69, 72, 

445, 448-49 

Finnish Army, 59, 66 

Finschhafen, 258, 289 

First Allied Airborne Army, 435, 437 

First Army, U.S., 401, 402, 406, 409, 414, 

422-25, 432, 434, 435n, 436, 438, 441, 

443, 455 

1st Sea Transport Echelon (German), 70 

First Special Service Force, 355, 359 

504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 331, 

336 
INDEX 

509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, 331, 

338 

Five-Power Naval Treaty of 1922, 14 

Flanders, 430, 434, 435 

Foggia, 309, 313, 317, 319 

Foreign Office, Japanese 102, 505 

Formosa, 115 

Japanese air forces on, 120, 475 

Japanese forces on, 111 

Japanese reinforcement of, 465 

logistical problems in invasion of, 471-

73, 475 

versus Luzon, strategic debate over, 461-

77 

ports in, 473 

Forrestal, James V., 96, 501 

Fourteenth Air Force, 473, 477 

Fourth Army, 127 

Fourth Corps Area, 145 

France, 13, 14, 18, 28, 29, 102 

Allied operations in, 419-27, 429, 430, 

433, 443, 445, 481 

Allied plans for airborne operations in, 

435, 435n 

and Allied plans for intervention in 

Scandinavia, 56, 59, 62, 67-70 

Allied plans for invasion of, 177, 358. 

See also Europe, northwestern, Allied 

plans for invasion of. 

Allied plans for offensive in, 423 

and Axis Powers, 175, 185 

German forces in, 184,263-65,275,283, 

306,401-03,405-09,411-14,417,437-

38 

German operations in, 69, 71,420-22,445, 

458,459,481 

German plans for offensive against, 52,53, 

54,58,61,62 

German plans for withdrawal from, 452 

and occupation of Germany, 480, 481 

railroads in, 421, 422, 427, 432 

surrender of, 27, 3 1, 45 

transfer of German divisions from, 337, 

338, 344, 347 

and U.S. war plans, 22, 24, 25 

and war against Axis, 185, 391 

France, northwestern 

Allied operations in, 401-17 

German operations in, 401, 402, 404, 

405,408,409,411-14,416,417 

France, southern, 173 

Allied decision to invade, 256, 277, 283-

85 

Allied plans for invasion of, 272-85, 

328n, 376, 383, 387-92, 394, 395, 432 

Allied threat to, 309 

German plans for defense of, 310-12, 

317 

Frankfurt, 433, 434, 483 

Fredendall, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R., 176 

Free French, 45, 371 

French Army, 67 

French Expf'ditionary Corps, 340 

545 

French Morocco, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 

193, 211, 328 

French Navy, 28-31 

French North Africa, 193, 194, 194n 

French West Indies, 78 

Frosinore, 326, 327, 329 

Fuller, J. F. C., 396 

Gaeta, 312, 317 

Galland, General Adolf, 446, 451 

GARDEN, 438. See also MARKET; MARKETGARDEN. 

Garigliano River, 328, 329, 332, 337-40, 

347, 348 

Garrisons, U.S., 81, 93, 94-97 

Gasoline, 167, 362, 406, 432, 436 

Gasser, Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D .. 370 

GELB, 62. 71 

General Headquarters, U.S. Army, 86, 92, 

93,96, 127, 129, 132, 143, 143n, 144, 

146, 176, 296, 297 

General Headquarters reserve, 296 

German Air Force, 33, 52, 53, 56-58, 62, 

63, 446, 44 7, 450, 451, 453, 457 

German Armed Forces Operations Staff, 

317-19, 453 

German Army, 385 

Allied plans for defeat of, 44, 176 

Allied respect for, 262, 348, 366, 377, 

378 

forces in western Europe, 437-38 

fuel shortage of, 447-48 

losses, 70, 71, 305, 416, 417,421,446 

operations on Eastern Front, 225, 445, 

448 

operations in France, 380, 401, 402, 404, 

405, 408, 409, 411-14, 416, 417, 420-

22, 437, 443-45, 445n, 446, 458, 459, 

481,482 

operations in Holland, 430 

operations in Italy, 306-09, 311-15, 317, 

317n, 318, 320, 329-31, 337-39, 352, 

354, 355, 357 

operations in North Africa, 305 

operations in Norway and Denmark, 70, 

71 

operations in western Europe, 27, 28 

and plans for occupation of Denmark, 

61, 64 

and plans for occupation of Norway, 52, 

53,57, 61, 62 

and plans for offensive in western 

Europe, 52-53, 58 
546 

German Army-Continued 

surrender of, in Norway, 72 

units, See German units, 

and war against USSR, 181, 225, 445, 

448 

German Army High Command, 53, 62, 70 

German High Command, 52, 55-59, 62, 

70, 304, 337, 339 

German National Redoubt, 481, 483,487, 

490 

German Navy, 50, 52, 53, 55, 57, 61,62, 

64, 69, 70, 71, 446-47, 450 

German paratroops, 60, 62, 64, 78, 331, 

435, 445 

German-Soviet Pact. See Germany, and 

nonaggression pact with USSR, 

German units 

Army Group B, 311,315,316, 317n, 321, 

455, 457 

Army Group C, 321, 337 

Army Group H, 455, 457 

Army, Fifth Panzer, 417, 457 

Army, Sixth Panzer, 445n, 455, 457, 458 

Army, Seventh, 417, 421, 457 

Army, Tenth, 312, 312n, 313-17, 330, 

331, 337, 339, 349, 350, 352, 355, 

356, 360, 362, 363 

Army, Fourteenth, 337, 338, 342, 344, 355, 

357, 361-63 

Army, Fifteenth, 457, 458 

Corps, I Parachute, 338, 339, 355, 357, 

358, 362 

Corps, XI Air, 308 

Corps, XIV Panzer, 312, 329, 330, 338, 

339 

Corps, XXI, 61 

Corps, XXXI, 64 

Corps, LXXVI Panzer, 312 

Division, 1st Parachute, 339 

D,'vision, 2d Parachute, 308 

Division, 3d Panzer Grenadier, 339 

Division, 3d Mountain, 63 

Division, 4th Parachute, 338 

Division, 7th Air, 60, 62, 63 

Division, 16th Panzer, 314 

Division, 16th SS Panzer Grenadier, 339 

Division, 22d Infantry, 62, 63 

Division, 22d (Airborne) Infantry, 60 

Division, 26th Panzer, 339, 344 

Dim'sion, 29th Panzer Grenadier, 338 

Division, 65th Infantry, 339 

Division, 69th Infantry, 63 

Division, 7Ist Infantry, 339 

Division, 90th Panzer Grenadier, 338 

Division, 92d Infantry, 338 

Division, II4th Light (Jaeger), 338 

D'Vlsion, I63d Infantry, 63 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

German units-Continued' 

Division, I70th Infantry, 63, 64 

Division, IBIstInfantry, 63 

Division, I96th Infantry, 63 

Division, I9Bth Infantry, 63 

Division, 2I4th Infantry, 63 

Division, 362d Infantry, 339 

Division, 7I5th Motorized Infantry, 338, 344 

Division, Hermann Goering Panzer, 338, 

339, 355, 357, 359 

Brigade, 11th Motorized Rifle, 63, 64 

Brigade, I50th Panzer, 455 

Group XXI, 62, 63, 66 

Germany, 4, 12, 23,52,53,61, 66, 72, 74, 

77, 78, 119, 322 

Allied air offensive against, 258, 318, 

367, 369, 373, 446, 501 

and Allied convoys to USSR, 232, 233 

Allied invasion of, 479 

Allied plans for defeat of, 41-47, 174, 

176, 177, 185,209,225,231,258,262, 

273, 384, 387 

Allied plans for invasion of, 419, 420, 

423, 424, 430, 433, 434, 435, 438, 480, 

482, 483 

Allied plans for occupation of, 440, 480, 

481, 483, 489 

Allied plans for strategic bombing of, 

197, 209 

and Allied threat to Norway, 56-58, 61-

63, 66 

and Anti-Comintern Pact, 18 

anti-Nazi conspiracy in, 444, 445, 448, 

449 

and Ardennes counteroffensive, 444, 459 

and atomic energy experiments, 494, 495 

and Balkans, 306, 309, 310 

borders of, 420-22, 425, 426, 432, 434-37 

British plans for air offensive against, 32, 

33 

British strategy for defeat of, 32, 33, 38, 

42, 197, 255-56, 263-65, 385-87, 390-

93, 395, 396 

and conquest of Crete, 78, 79 

construction of submarines in, 447 

demarcation line in, 488, 489 

expectations of collapse of, 472, 477 

and invasion of Norway, 49-72 

and Italy, 303-11, 315-17, 320, 337, 338, 

347 

manpower of, 367, 448, 450, 451 

military weakness of, 304, 305 

mobilization in, 367, 369, 448, 450, 451 

and nonagression pact with USSR, 56 

and occupation of Denmark, 49, 62, 64 

and plans for agreement with USSR, 

448-49 
INDEX 

Germany-Continued 

and Russo-Finnish war, 55, 56, 66 

Soviet advance toward, 445, 447 

Soviet forces in, 483, 487 

Soviet invasion of, 451, 480, 482, 483 

strategic reserves of, 444, 448, 459 

surrender of, 491, 500, 505 

and Swedish iron ore, 50 56, 62, 66, 68, 

72 

transfer of forces from, 337, 338, 347 

U.S. operations in, 479, 481, 482, 487, 

489 

U.S. strategy for defeat of, 24-31, 35-41, 

45, 47, 156, 157, 197, 255-56, 366, 

371, 385-87, 389-93, 395-97, 471-72 

war economy of, 56, 369, 447, 450, 451 

Germany-first strategy, 4, 11, 25, 26, 33, 

36-47, 156, 176, 380, 386 

Gerow, Brig. Gen. Leonard T., 92, 93, 

116, 117 

Ghormley, Rear Adm. Robert L., 31, 33, 

36, 38 

Gibraltar, 32, 188, 189, 191 

Gibraltar, Strait of, 188, 189 

Gilbert Islands, 258, 289, 290, 293n, 463 

Goering, Field Marshal Hermann, 59, 446, 

451 

Gothic Line, 445 

Grand Alliance, 399 

Graziani, Marshal Rodolfo, 320 

Great Britain, 4, 16, 17, 17n, 18, 20, 21, 

43, 56, 57, 120, 175, 179, 224, 310, 

326, 329, 400, 511 

and aid to USSR, 215, 225, 227, 237-39 

and Arctic convoys to USSR, 233, 237-

38, 239, 241, 242 

and Axis threat, 20, 21, 25, 49, 52, 53, 

75, 80, 120 

build-up of U.S. forces in, 186, 206-09, 

208n, 211-14, 230, 231, 252, 258, 262, 

272. 366 

and decision to invade southern France, 

304, 388, 389, 395 

and development of Persian Gulf supply 

route, 220-31, 234-37, 240, 244, 249-

51 

and Dodecanese Islands, 262, 265, 266, 

268, 270, 271 

German air attacks on, 33, 62, 75 

and German conquest of Crete, 78, 79 

and Germany-first strategy, 33, 38 

and Iceland, 74, 75, 94 

imports into, 201-05, 202n, 203n, 207-

09, 211-22, 218n 

and invasion of North Africa, 194-96 

and japan, 105, 116, 120, 269 

and japan, U.S. plans for war against, 

16, 17, 17n, 20, 21 

547 

Great Britain-Continued 

lend-lease aid to, 230, 246, 259 

manpower of, 74, 200, 367, 271, 277 

and Mediterranean, 74, 79, 384 

and Middle East, 177, 178, 181, 182, 

182n, 284 

military strength of, 388, 389, 397, 399, 

400 

mobilization in, 200, 258, 367, 389 

naval power of, 13, 16, 25, 26, 43, 66 

and Norwav, 50, 52, 53. 57. 68, 70-72 

and occupation of Germany, 480-84, 

492, 492n 

and plans for Allied operations in Scandinavia, 56, 59, 67, 68, 69, 70 

plans for build-up of U.S. forces in, 79, 

175, 177, 184,206-14, 248 

and plans for invasion of northwestern 

Europe, 175, 178-83, 255-56, 262-64, 

282, 283 

possessions of, in Far East, 14, 25, 37, 

39, 102, 110 

prospects for survival of, 22, 27-32, 35, 

36, 45 

reserve stocks in, 201-02, 205 

shipment of landing craft to, 183, 261 

and stratf'gy against European Axis, 32, 

33, 38, 42, 43 

and slrategy against southeastern Asia, 

266-69, 276, 278-79, 281, 282 

and United States, 13, 29-34, 36, 37, 

39-42, 44, 76, 79, 80, 116, 177, 199-

223, 371 

U.S. plans for collaboration with, 19-26, 

29, 31, 32, 33, 35-47 156 

U.S. shipping aid to, 201-05, 202n, 203n, 

207, 209, 211-22 

war economy of, 199, 200, 201, 207, 213, 

217-19, 258, 389, 399 

Greece, 45, 74, 305, 306, 309, 319, 445 

Green, Lt. Col. Kirby, 81 

Greenland, 49, 76, 87 

Grew, joseph C., 113, 115, 121, 507, 512 

Griner Lt. Col. George W., jr., 88, 90, 93 

Gross, Col. Charles P., 83, 208n, 212,215, 

219, 221 

Ground combat troops, U.S., 82-86, 87n, 

88, 89, 91, 92, 94-97, 365-70, 366n, 

367-70, 376, 378 

Groves, Maj. Gen. Leslie R., 495, 497 

Gruenther, Maj. Gen. Alfred M., 359, 361 

Grunert, Maj. Gen. George, 152n 

Guadalcanal, 190n, 288 

Guam, 14, 110, Ill, 117, 120, 122, 123, 

156, 514 

Guderian, General Heinz, 451, 452 

Guingand, Maj. Gen. Sir Francis, 413 
548 

Gullion, Maj. Gen. Allen W., 128, 129, 

135, 136, 139, 140, 145, 145n, 146 

GYMNAST, 174n, 176, 176n, 181-83, 186 

Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas, 442 

Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade H., 402, 403, 

405, 407, 410, 414-16 

Halder, Generaloberst Franz, 62 

Halsey, Admiral William F., 288-90, 291, 

293, 295-96, 468 

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T., 216 

Hansa Bay, 291, 293, 296, 297, 301 

Harmon, Lt. Gen. Millard F., 294 

Harriman, Averill, 202, 212, 218, 241-45, 

247, 378, 504 

Harrison, George L., 497 

Harrison, Gordon, 397 

Hart, Adm. Thomas c., 105, 113, 120, 167 

Hawaii, 152, 291, 380n 

base for U.S. Fleet, 40 

Japanese attack on, 122 

Japanese plans for attack on, 102, 106, 

109-11,115,119 

Japanese threat to, 16 

U.S. plans for defense of, 15, 18, 22, 138 

war alert to, 117, 121 

Henshaw, 2d Lt. Marvin J., 300 

High Commissioner, Philippines, 160. See 

also Sayre, Francis B. 

Himmler, Heinrich, 448 

Hiroshima, 493, 514, 515, 518 

Hitler, Adolf, 7, 50, 53, 54, 56, 57,63, 69, 

74,78,119, 181,232,306,316,398, 

412, 452 

on Allied plans for invasion of Norway, 

61, 68 

on Allied threat to Balkans, 309, 318, 

319, 322 

as Chief of State, 49 

conspiracy against, 445, 448, 449 

decision of, on Ardennes counteroffen-

~ve, 6, 303, 444-45, 445n, 448-50, 

455n, 459 

decision of, on defense of southern Italy, 

6, 303, 304, 320, 321, 322 

decision of, to invade Norway and Denmark, 6, 69-70, 71, 72 

decision of, against total mobilization, 

451 

decision of, to withdraw to Apennines, 

303 

and defection of Italy, 304, 310-12, 314, 

316 

defensive strategy of, 304, 305, 321, 322 

and German operations in Norway, 70, 

71 

and German strategy in Italy, 306, 307, 

309-12,314-16,318-21 

and German strategy in western Europe, 

52-54, 58, 62, 453-55, 457, 458 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Hitl!'r, Adolf-Continued 

as head of German armed forces, 49, 59, 

303 

and Kesselring, 307, 311, 313, 316, 317, 

318, 319, 321 

and Mussolini, 305, 308, 320, 321 

and plans for air counteroffensive, 446, 

451 

and plans for agreement with USSR, 

448-49 

and plans for Ardennes counteroffensive, 

453-55, 457, 458 

and plans for occupation of Norway and 

Denmark, 55, 58, 62, 63, 68, 69 

and plans for offensive on Western Front, 

58, 62, 453-55, 457, 458 

and Rommel, 307, 311, 319, 320, 321 

on surrender, 449, 449n 

and threat of Allied landings in Italy, 

309, 310, 312 

Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney B., 401, 402, 

404 

Hollandia, 296, 301, 302 

Holman, Sen. Rufus C., 137 

Homma, Lt. Gen. Masaharu, 151, 161, 169 

Hong Kong, 14, 122 

Honshu, 501, 502 

Hoover, Herbert, 370 

Hopkins, Harry, 121, 177, 178, 183,280, 

394 

and British request for U.S. shipping, 

217, 218, 219 

on invasion of North Africa, 185, 187 

and Persian Gulf supply route, 234, 236, 

241, 242 

and Soviet intervention against Japan, 

512, 516 

and U.S. occupation of Iceland, 76, 77, 

80 

Housing, troop, 81, 85-89, 87n 

Hubatsch, Professor Walther, 72 

Huff, Lt. Col. Sidney L., 160n 

Hull, Cordell, 21, 34, 38, 39 

and negotiations with Japan, 104, 104n, 

112,115,116,118, 120,121 

on peace offer to Japan, 512-13 

and Soviet pledge to intervene against 

Japan, 503 

and U.S. strategy against Axis Powers, 

39 

Hump airlift, 211, 266-69, 281 

Hungary, 45, 306, 309, 391, 392, 445, 458, 

459, 510 

Huon Peninsula, 258, 291 

HUSKY, 206, 213, 214, 221 

Iceland, 49, 233, 237 

British air strength in, 81, 82 

British forces in, 74, 75, 77, 79-83, 87-

89 
INDEX 

Iceland-Continued 

British plans for withdrawal from, 74, 

79, 80, 81, 86, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 97 

landing of U.S. Marines on, 87n, 96 

plans for relief of Marines in, 88, 94-97 

plans for U.S. Theater of Operations in, 

79 

preparations for expedition to, 82-93, 96 

U.S. forces for occupation of, 81-84, 89, 

91, 93-97 

U.S. plans for bases in, 87 

U.S. plans for defense and occupation of, 

74-76, 77, 79, 80, 82-90, 92, 93, 94, 

95, 97 

IJsseimeer, 430, 439, 440 

Imports, British, 201-05, 202n, 203n, 207-

09, 211-22, 218n 

India, 210, 229, 242, 266, 477 

British plans for defeat of, 43 

famine in, 205 

supply routes from, to China, 462 

U.S. forces in, 246 

U.S. shipping for British forces in, 214, 

222 

withdrawal of assault shipping from, 275, 

276, 281, 282 

Indian Ocean, 38, 178,205,214,215 

INDIGO, 87, 93-96 

Indochina, 33, 102, 104, 109, 110, 114, 115 

Industry, U.S., 367, 368, 384 

and Allied strategy, 366-69, 371, 380 

manpower requirements of, 367, 368, 

369 

mobilization of, 30, 258 

Infantry Division, 1st, 78, 81, 82, 84, 85, 

86 

Infantry Division, 3d, 331, 332, 334, 338, 

341, 343, 346, 355, 359, 362 

Infantry Division, 5th, 77, 81, 82, 85, 86, 

92 

Infantry Division, 24th, 296 

Infantry Division, 32d, 296 

Infantry Division, 34th, 355, 359 

Infantry Division, 36th, 340, 344, 355, 359 

Infantry Division, 45th, 331, 341, 355,359 

Infantry Division, 98th, 380n 

Infantry Regiment, 10th, 99 

Ingersoll, Capt. Royal E., 20, 96 

Inland Sea, 155, 500 

Intelligence, Allied 

of German build-Up at Anzio, 341 

of German plans for invasion of France, 

58-59 

Intelligence, British, 347 

Intelligence, German, 55-57, 59, 68, 69, 

452, 453 

Intelligence, U.S. 

of Japanese war plans and preparations, 

103, 115, 119, 120 

of North Africa, 193 

549 

Intelligence, U.S.-Continued 

of German withdrawal from Mortain, 

413 

Intelligence, U.S. Army, 132, 465, 471 

Intelligence estimates, Allied 

of German forces, 329, 357, 362, 414, 

437, 438 

of German reaction to Anzio landings, 

330-31 

of Japanese defensive capabilites, 504-07 

of Japanese forces, 298, 298n, 299 

Internment, 126, 127, 134, 140, 145, 147, 

148 

Iran, 228, 237 

Allied plans for operations in, 186 

British traffic control in, 249, 250 

British zone in, 229, 230, 231,241 

plans for development of supply route 

through, 229-31, 234-36, 240-52 

plans for U.S. railroad operations in, 

241-42 

Soviet zone in, 229, 232, 234-36 

U.S. mission to, 230-32, 234, 236, 240 

Iranian State Railway, 229, 232, 237, 

:141, 242, 251 

Iraq, 79, 182, 230, 231, 234, 235, 242 

Iraqui railway, 236 

Irwin, Col. Constant L., 160, 160n 

Iry, Lt. Col. Clarence N., 96 

Ismay, Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L., 271 

Italian armistice, 304, 311-17, 320 

Italian Army, 305, 307, 310, 314-16, 320 

Italian High Command, 305, 307, 311, 

312, 314,315 

Italy, 13, 14, 18,23,27,74, 173, 185,262, 

352 

Allied invasion of, 303, 304, 314, 324, 

386 

Allied operations in, 258, 263, 264, 272, 

273, 284, 323-50, 351-63, 383, 389-92 

Allied plans for amphibious operations 

in, 263, 265, 271, 274-76, 278, 285, 

325-35, 325n 

Allied plans for invasion of, 312, 313 

Allied strategy in, 323-24, 378 

and armistice negotiations with Allies, 

311,312, 313, 314 

Axis communications in, 309, 310, 314, 

322, 324, 326, 328, 330, 344, 350 

British strategy for defeat of, 32, 38, 42, 

390-93, 395 

German forces in, 263, 305-09, 311-13, 

312n, 315, 316, 317, 320, 321, 329-31, 

335, 337, 338, 355, 357-59, 361-63, 

445 

German plans for counteroffensive in, 

318, 319, 320 

German plans for defense of, 305-20, 

321, 324, 325, 326, 330, 337, 338, 339, 

340, 354, 355, 357 
550 

Italy-Continued 

German plans for withdrawal 310, 311, 

313,314,318,320,450,451 

and plans for Soviet-German agreement, 

448-49 

surrender of, 255, 258, 267, 304, 314, 

U.S.-British plans for war against, 41-47 

U.S. plans for war against, 24-31, 35-41 

I wo Jima, 476, 500, 502 

Jackson, "Stonewall," 2 

Japan, 4, 14, 20, 23, 45, 151, 170, 228, 229 

aims of, 100, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 

114, 123 

and Anti-Comintern Pact, 18, 34, 101, 

102, 103, 104, 105, 114, 119 

atomic bombing of, 493, 515-17 

and Axis Powers, 10 1-05, 114, 119, 157 

British strategy against, 32, 38, 42, 43 

causes of surrender of, 517-18 

and decision for war, 99, 108-10, 108n, 

113, 118, 119, 122-24 

and Great Britain, U,S. plans for war 

against, 16, 17, 17n, 20, 21 

limited war aims of, 110, 122, 123, 124, 

504 

peace overtures by, 505, 515, 516 

plans for air offensive against, 266, 462, 

463,468,473, 474, 500, 501,502,504, 

509 

plans for invasion of, 266, 462, 464, 465, 

467-69, 500-506, 512 

and Potsdam Declaration, 513,514,516, 

517 

and Russo-German War, 103, 104, 108, 

123, 448-49 

seeks Soviet mediation, 505, 512, 513 

Soviet intervention in war against, 515-18 

and unconditional surrender policy, 504-

07 

and United States, 13, 99, 101, 103-06, 

108,110-16,118-21 

U.S.-British plans for war against, 41-47, 

269 

U.S. defense strategy against, 28, 29, 31, 

34, 36-41,42,44,47 

U.S. plans for atomic bombing of, 495-

99, 502, 508-12, 508n, 513 

U.S. plans for ultimatum to, 506-09, 

508n, 511, 512 

U.S, redeployment for war against, 481, 

592, 500 

U.S. strategy for defeat of, 13-26, 36-42, 

44, 47, 152, 156, 157, 258, 260, 266, 

366, 366n, 397, 462, 464 

and war in China, 100-103, 108, 110, 

112, 114 

war plans of, 101-03, 105-14 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Japanese-Americans 

evacuation of, from Pacific states, 125, 

148 

plans for evacuation of, from California, 

133, 135, 136, 137 

plans for evacuation ot~ from wcst coast, 

127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 

137, 139, 140, 142, 144 

public hostility to, 126, 130, 132, 133, 

138 

scizure of goods of, 138, 139 

suspected disloyalty of, 139 

Japanese Air Force, 101, 111, 170 

Japanese Army 

deployment plans, 111, 112 

expansion and training of, 10 I, 102 

and Japanese politics, 99, 100, 113 

forces on Luzon, 163 

forces at Rabaul, 295 

losses, 299n, 300 

and oil shortage, 100, 10 I, 105, 1 12 

operations on Los Negros, 299, 300 

operations on Luzon, 159, 161, 162, 169, 

170-72 

plan for attack on Pearl Harbor, 111 

and plans for conquest of southeast Asia, 

102, 103, 106 

and plans for defense of Japan, 518 

plans for operations in Pacific, 111, 118, 

119 

preparations for war, 115 

strength oC 111, 504 

units. See Japanese units. 

war plans, 101-03, 106, 108-11, 114 

Japanese Army General Staff, 102, 109 

Japanese Cabinet, 103, 104, 113 

Japanese garrisons, 111 

Japanese High Command, 113 

Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, 111, 

170 

Japanese Navy, 14,99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 

106, 108, 109-11, 112, 114, 115, 118, 

119, 170, 295, 500 

Japanese Navy General Staff, 109, 110 

Japanese units 

Army, 14th Area, 169 

Army, 14th, 151, 161, 162 

Army, 18th, 302 

Arm),,25th, 120 

Army, Southern, 115, 118 

Fleet, Combined, 102, 111, 115, 119, 154, 

295 

Fleet, 4th, 111 

Fleet, 5th, 111 

Fleet, 6th, 111 

Naval Base Force, 14th, 298 

Pearl Harbor Striking Force, 111, 115, 120 

Regiment, 1st Independent Mixed, 298 
INDEX 

Japanese units-Continued 

Regiment, 51st Transport, 298 

Regiment, 229th Infantry, 298 

Japanese War Ministry, 102 

Java, 106, 109, 110, 169 

Jodi, Brig. Gen. Alfred, 56, 61, 311,450-

52, 455 

Johnson, Sen. Hiram, 137 

Joint Army-Navy Board. See Joint Board. 

Joint Board, 13, 19,21, 26, 38, 39, 41, 156, 

157, 174n 

and American-British Conversations, 42, 

46 

and Iceland expedition, 87, 93 

and ORANGE, 18, 19, 20 

and RAINBOW 4, 28, 28n 

and RAINBOW 5, 24, 45, 46 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1,2, 177, 188,216, 

217, 219, 259, 293, 294, 295, 301-02, 

368, 390, 465, 474, 477n, 503, 507, 

511 

and acceleration of Philippines invasion 

plans, 469, 1-70 

on amphibious operations in Burma, 267-

71, 278, 281 

on ANVIL versus Italian campaign, 391, 

93 

and Army troop basis, 369, 376 

on British attitude toward OVERLORD, 

263 

on British views on ROUNDUP, 183 

and development of atomic bomb, 496 

and decision to cancel BUCCANEER, 280, 

281 

decision to invade southern Philippines, 

466 

decision on invasion of Luzon, 461, 476, 

477 

and invasion of North Africa, 192 

on invasion of southern France, 276, 277, 

328n, 391-93 

and Italian campaign, 263, 265, 328n, 

391-93 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 468, 

469,470,476,477 

on operations in eastern Mediterranean, 

276, 279 

and OVERLORD, 263, 270, 271, 273, 276, 

283 

and plans for Allied advance in Germany, 484, 485, 486 

and plans for control of South China 

Sea, 462-63 

and plans for invasion of Japan, 501, 502 

and Roosevelt, 199, 218, 270, 271 

and strategy for defeat of Germany, 231 

and Rabaul, 210, 289 

on Soviet position at Tehran Conference, 

263-64, 270 

551 

Joint Chiefs of Staff-Continued 

and U.S. shipping aid to Britain, 199, 

207, 215, 221 

Joint Logistics Committee, 375, 471-72 

Joint Planning Committee, 13, 21, 22, 23, 

27, 368n 

and Iceland expedition, 87, 93 

and ORANGE, 18 

on national defense policy, 39, 41 

and RAINBOW, 2, 27 

and RAINBOW, 4, 28 

on support of Great Britain, 31, 39, 41 

42 

on support of Great Britain and France, 

29, 30, 39 

Joint Staff Planners, 369, 372 

Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 216, 216n, 

369 

JUPITER, 181, 186, 239, 249 

Justice Department, 126-39, 141, 142, 146, 

147 

Karachi, 236, 242, 243, 246 

Karlsbad, 489n, 490, 491 

Karlsbad-Pilsen line, 489n, 491 

Kaupisch, Gen. der Fliegel' Leonard, 64 

Kavieng, 289-91, 293-97, 294n, 301, 302 

Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm, 59, 61, 305 

Kellogg-Briand Pact, 12 

Kenney, Lt. Gen. George c., 294, 296, 

297, 300, 469 

Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert, 355 

and Allied invasion of Italy, 313, 314, 

317 

and Allied landings at Anzio, 337, 338, 

339, 341 

and defense of southern Italy, 304, 306-

11,313,314,316-21, 317n, 362, 363 

and disarming of Italian forces, 314-15 

and German collaboration with Italy, 

307, 308, 310, 311, 317 

and Hitler, 307, 311, 313, 316-19, 321 

and Rommel, 307, 311, 316, 317, 318, 

319,320,321 

Khorramshahr, 234, 236, 243, 244 

Kido, Marquis Koichi, 105, 113 

Kimmel, Admiral Husband E., 113 

King, Brig. Gen. Edward P., Jr., 158 

King, Admiral Ernest J., 221, 241, 277, 

293 

on assault lift for ANVIL, 279, 279n 

and assault lift for OVERLORD, 261, 283 

and British request for shipping, 215, 

217, 218 

on cancellation of BUCCANEER, 280 

on diverting assault shipping from Pacific, 

270 

on invasion of Japan, 501, 502 
552 

King, Admiral Ernest j.-Continued 

and invasion of North Africa, 185-87, 

191 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 464, 

467,478,473,475, 475n, 476 

and ROUNDUP, 183, 185, 187 

on ROUNDUP versus TORCH, 185 

on Soviet intervention against japan, 503 

Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C., 294, 297, 

299, 300, 469 

Knox, Frank, 28n, 39, 42, 80, 120 

Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, 103-05, 108, 

108n, 112, 113, 118, 505 

Korematsu v. United States, 148-49 

Krancke, Capt. Theodor, 59 

Krancke Plan, 60, 61 

Krancke staff, 59 

Kremlin, 217, 389, 515 

Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter, 296, 296n, 300 

Kuril Islands, 110, 115 

Kurusu, Seburo, 115, 118, 120, 121 

Kwajalein, 120, 293n, 295 

Kyushu, 464, 501, 502, 509 

Land, Rear Adm. Emory S., 203 

Landing craft, 259n, 270, 300, 326-29, 388. 

See also Assault shipping; LCI(L)'s; 

LCT's; LSD's; LST's. 

for cross-Channel operations, 179, 180, 

182 

for OVERLORD, 260, 261, 263, 277, 279n, 

280, 283, 284, 284n 

shortage of, 179, 183, 184, 196, 197, 

259-61, 389, 390 

for SLEDGEHAMMER, 182, 183, 184 

U.S. production of, 179, 183, 184 

Landing ships, 259, 259n. See also LST's; 

LSD's .. 

Latin America, 16, 22-25, 27, 40 

Laval, 403, 405 

Lawrence, E. 0., 499 

LCI(L),s, 261, 283, 284n, 294n 

LCM's, 183 

LCP's, 183 

LCT's, 261, 279n, 283, 284n, 294n, 338 

LCT(7)'s, 261 

LCV's, 183 

Le Havre, 433 

Le Mans, 403, 404. 405, 406, 407 

LeMay, Maj. Gen. Curtis E., 514, 515, 516 

Leahy, Admiral William D., 26n, 218, 270, 

271, 276, 469, 472, 474, 486, 488, 

495, 499, 499n, 500-502, 510, 511 

Leathers, Lord Frederick, 182, 207, 208, 

209, 210, 211, 212 

Ledo Road, 266 

Leipzig, 482-86 

Lemnitzer, Brig. Gen. Lyman L., 347-48 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Lend-lease, 202 

for developrnent of Persian Gulf supply 

route, 230 

to Great Britain, 76, 230, 246, 259 

to USSR, 225, 227, 228, 230, 232-37, 

239-41, 243, 244-48, 250-53 

Lerch, Col. Archer L., 140 

Leyte, 170,467,469,470 

Liaison Conference, 1 13, 118, 120 

Libya, 181, 185, 230 

Liddell Hart, B. H., 396 

Liege, 434, 435n, 453, 455 

Limited war, 110, 122, 123, 124 

Lincoln, Brig. Gen. George A., 509 

Lingayen Gulf, 151, 158, 160-64, 169 

Liri Valley, 328, 340, 351, 352, 356, 358, 

363 

Ljubljana Gap, 310, 383, 392, 393 

Logistical planning, 420-22, 425-27, 432, 

439 

Logistics, 421 

in Allied operations in western Europe, 

419-27, 432, 433, 439, 440-43 

in German operations, 446 

role of, in military decisions, 7 

in U.S. operations in western Pacific, 

470-75, 477 

London, 20,67,82,87,95,177,178,180, 

205, 212, 213, 263, 264, 389 

Conference (April 1942), 231 

Conference Ouly 1942), 238 

Los Negros Island, 287, 297-300, 298n 

Low Countries, 54, 58, 62, 71, 184, 275, 

398 

Lower Rhine. See Neder Rijn. 

LSD's, 294n 

LST's, 279n, 294n 

construction of, 191, 191n, 259-61, 270, 

283 

intertheater transfers of, 263, 266, 267, 

281, 282, 326, 329 

in Mediterranean, 275, 277, 326, 328, 

342 

for OVERLORD, 259-61, 263, 265, 270, 

275, 283, 284, 284n 

for Pacific, 259, 270 

plans for retention of, in Mediterranean, 

275, 277, 326, 328 

Lucas, Maj. Gen. john P., 2 

on Allied supply build-up at Anzio, 

342-44 

on Anzio landings, 333, 336 

decision of, to delay at Anzio, 9, 323-24, 

344-50 

on German threat to Anzio beachhead, 

332-35, 340-45, 347-49 

relief of, 346 

Luebeck, 485-87, 490 

Luftwaffe. See German Air Force. 
INDEX 

Lutes, Brig. Gen. LeRoy, :245 

Luxemhourg, 443. 445, 453-55. 457 

Luzon, 120, 152 

Japanese air power on, 463, 464, 475 

Japanese defense of, 169-72 

Japanese landings on, 151, 158, 159, 163, 

165, 169 

Japanese plans for defense of, 170-71 

U.S. forces on, 151, 163, 164 

U.S. operations on, 170-72, 461, 462 

U.S. plans for bypassing of, 463, 464, 

466-68, 472, 475 

U.S. plans for defense of, 154, 156 

U.S. plans for invasion of, 462, 465-76 

Luzon versus Formosa strategic debate, 

461-77 

LVT's, 261 

Lyttelton, Sir Oliver, 202 

MacArth ur, General Douglas, 1, 6, 120, 

155, 288, 293, 299, 300, 463, 464, 

481, 501, 514 

and acceleration of Philippines invasion 

plans, 469, 470, 472 

on Central Pacific offensive, 289-90 

confers with Halsey at Brisbane, 291 

decision of, to land on Los Negros, 297-

99, 301, 302 

decision of, to seize Admiralty Islands, 9, 

287 

decision of, to withdraw to Bataan, 8, 

151, 152, 162, 164, 165, 166, 169 

declares Manila open city, 167, 168 

and defense of Philippines, 151-69 

and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 301-02 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 466-

67,470,472,475, 475n, 477 

ordered to invade Philippines, 465 

and plans for defense of Philippines, 154-

56, 159 

McCloy, John J., 135, 136, 140, 140n, 

143, 145, 145n, 146, 496, 501, 502, 

511 

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 146 

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 19, 179, 

464 

Maddocks, Col. Ray T., 372 

Maddocks Committee, 372-73, 373n 

MAGIC, 103, 115 

Mahan, Adm. Albert T., 26 

Malaya, 102, 106, 109-11, 115, 119, 120, 

122, 151, 174,266 

Mallonee, Col. Richard c., 160, 106n 

160n 

Malony, Brig. Gen. Harry J., 92, 93 

Malta Conference, 480, 485 

Manchuria, 111,112,119,473 

Maneuvers, 109, 116n, 165. 

553 

Manhattan Project, 494, 495, 497, 498, 

506, 510 

Manila, 120, 151, 154, 158-60, 162, 163, 

164, 165, 166-69, 171-72,500 

Manila Bay, 152, 155, 156, 166, 169-71 

Mannerheim, Field Marshal Carl Gustaf, 

59, 67 

l'.lanpower 

British, 74, 200, 230, 258 

German, 448, 450, 451 

Japanese, 101 

Soviet, 258 

U.S., 30, 200, 365-76, 366n, 368n, 380, 

381, 397, 398 

Manus. 290, 291, 293-97, 294n, 299, 300 

Mariana Islands, 294, 463, 465, 474, 500, 

502 

Marine Corps, and Iceland expedition, 85, 

87, 87n, 88, 94-97 

Marine Corps units 

1st Division, 289, 290 

2d Division, 289, 290 

1 st Brigade (Provisional), 85 

6th Regiment, 85 

Maritime Commission, U.S., 83, 203 

MARKET, 430, 433, 434, 436-42 

MARKET-GARDEN, 429, 440, 442, 446 

Marshall, General George C., 1, 5, 6, 20, 

26n, 30, 45, 47, 74, 80, 83, 86, 91, 95, 

116n, 121, 156, 180, 186, 188n, 190, 

216. 218n, 221, 242, 249, 268, 269, 

366, 376, 383, 390, 394, 408, 464, 488, 

514 

and ANVIL, 383, 390 

and Army troop basis, 370, 372, 373, 

376 

and atomic bomb, 497, 511, 512 

decision of, on 90-division Army, 4, 7, 

365, 376-81 

on defense of Singapore, 34, 35 

and development of Persian Gulf supply 

route, 241, 245, 248 

on forces for defeat of Germany, 378, 

379 

and General Lucas, 332, 347 

and invasion of North Africa, 181, 185-

87, 188n, 190, 197-98 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 468, 

472 

on operations in Italy, 390 

on OVERLORD versus Mediterranean, 271 

and plans for airborne operations in Hoiland, 435 

and plans for amphibious operations in 

Burma, 278, 281n 

and plans for evacuation of Japanese 

from Pacific coast, 135, 143n, 146n 

and plans for invasion of Japan, 501 
554 

Marshall, General George C.-Continued 

and plans for invasion of northwestern 

Europe, 177, 178, 183, 185-87, 197, 

198 

and plans for peace offer to Japan, 512 

on plans for U.S. withdrawal to Bataan, 

163 

on Rabual, 290, 291 

and restrictions on overseas service, 86, 

95, 96 

on shipping for British, 218 

on Soviet position at Tehran Conference, 

272 

on U.S. occupation of Prague, 489-90 

on U.S. strategy, 29, 38, 366 

Marshall, Maj. Gen. Richard]', 152n, 165, 

167, 475, 475n 

Marshall Islands, 110, 293, 293n, 463 

Marshall Memorandum, 177 

Matsuoka, Y osuke, 103, 104 

Maxwell, Maj. Gen. Russell L., 230, 238, 

242-44, 246 

Mayenne-Argentan gap, 409, 414 

Mediterranean, 20, 41, 42, 181, 209, 259 

Allied forces in, 265, 272 

Allied operations in, 173, 258, 262-64, 

386, 390-93 

Allied plans for amphibious landings in, 

190-95 

Allied plans for opening of, 174, 175, 

185, 204, 217, 220, 221 

Allied plans for operations in, 174, 189, 

190-95 

Allied strategy in, 43, 44, 174, 197, 255-

56, 262-65, 270-74, 277, 279, 282-85, 

323, 324, 384, 386, 387, 390-93, 395 

British naval losses in, I 76 

British operations in, 74, 76, 79 

closed to Allied shipping, 174, 175,' 185, 

204,217,220,221,228 

command of Allied forces in, 265, 327 

German defensive strategy in, 304, 305, 

306 

German threat to Allied communications 

in, 174, 188, 189, 191 

versus OVERLORD, 255, 256, 262-65, 

270-74, 279, 282-85, 379, 395, 397 

plans for retention of assault shipping in, 

263, 265, 275-77, 326, 328 

plans for transfer of assault shipping 

from, 265, 276, 277, 279, 326, 329 

plans for transfer of forces from, 272, 

379 

shipping for, 204, 214, 222 

Mediterranean, eastern 

Allied strategy in, 174 

British strategy in, 32, 262, 264, 265, 

266, 270, 271, 387, 392 

U.S. shipping for British forces in, 214 

Mediterranean Air Forces, 337 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Metz, 434, 435, 454 

Meuse River, 432, 435n, 446, 455, 457, 

458 

Middle East, 20 I, 210, 243, 244, 247, 398 

British forces in, 229, 230, 241 

British interests in, 178, 197, 384 

British operations in, 228, 238, 240 

British strategic responsibility for, 177, 

230, 231, 234, 241 

German threat to, 174, 182, 182n 

U.S. missions to, 230, 231, 232, 234, 

238 

U.S. service troops for, 231, 238, 246 

U.S. support of British in, 231, 235, 238, 

240 

Mindanao, 290, 463, 467, 469 

Missions, U.S. 

to Egypt, 230, 231 

to Iran, 230, 231, 232, 234 

in London, 205 

to Middle East, 79, 230-32, 234, 238 

to North Africa, 238 

Mobilization 

German, 447, 448, 450, 451 

Japanese, 100, 101, 105, 106, 108, 109, 

110, 112 

Soviet, 258 

U.S., 365-76, 366n, 368n, 380, 381,397 

Mobilization planning, U.S., IE, 28-30 

Model, Field Marshal V\Talter, 455, 458 

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 180, 239, 505, 

513, 515 

Monroe Doctrine, 16, 24, 28, 75 

Monte Cassino, 303, 321, 332 

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L., 

331, 401, 438, 485 

and plans for invasion of Germany, 419, 

425, 434, 441, 442, 482, 485, 486 

and plans for operations in northwestern 

France, 403, 404, 405, 406, 408, 412, 

413,414, 417, 441, 442 

Morison, Admiral Samuel Eliot, 122 

Morotai Island, 463, 465, 469 

Mortain, 404, 405, 409, 412, 416, 445 

Moscow, 67, 192, 227, 491, 505, 512 

Allied military missions in, 483 

Foreign Ministers' Conference at, 261, 

263, 264 

Moselle River, 420, 424, 432 

Mountbatten, Vice Adm. Lord Louis, 182, 

266, 278, 280-82 

MT ships, 279n 

Munich, 21, 306, 308 

Munitions, U.S., 29, 100, 101, 201, 202, 

216, 225, 233, 258, 371 

Munitions Assignments Board, 242 

Murmansk, 59,72,215,217,228,232 

Mussolini, Benito, 119, 305, 307, 321 

deposition of, 304, 308, 310 

liberation of; 320, 455 
INDEX 

Nagano, Admiral Osami, 105, 112, 114 

Nagasaki, 514, 515, 517, 518 

Naples, 309, 313, 319, 336, 340, 359 

Narrow-front strategy, 419, 425, 482 

Narvik, 50, 52, 55, 56, 59-61, 60n, 64, 67, 

68, 70 

Naval bases, 14, 50, 52, 53, 54, 72, 76, 

104, 291, 301, 441 

Naval Conference of 1936, 101 

Naval support, 191-93, 195, 293-95, 297 

Navy, U.S., 17, 28, 34, 76, 82, 156, 187, 

214, 370, 372. See also King, Admiral 

Ernest J.; Navy Department, U.S. 

building program, 14, 179, 184, 260, 261 

and control of Japanese aliens, 130, 131 

forces withdrawn from Philippines, 168, 

169 

losses, 190, 190n, 300 

and negotiations with Japan, 116, 117 

and occupation of Iceland, 84, 85, 87, 

90, 91 

and ORANGE, 15, 19 

and plans for collaboration with Great 

Britain, 25, 26, 31 

and plans for invasion of North Africa, 

192 

and production of landing craft, 179, 

184, 260, 261 

and RAINBOW plans, 24 

special observers in London, 31-33 

staff conversations with Royal Navy, 20, 

21,25, 26, 31 

and war in Pacific, 117, 261, 294n, 295 

Navy Department, U.S., 30, 83, 464, 467, 

468, 475, 507 

Nazi-Soviet Pact. See Germany, and nonaggression pact with USSR. 

Near East, 306. See also Middle East. 

Neder Rijn, 430, 435n, 439, 440, 442 

Netherlands, 105, 453 

Allied plans for airborne operations in, 

429-42 

Far East possessions of, 102, I 10. See 

alsu Netherlands East Indies. 

German forces in, 430, 433, 437, 438, 

439 

German invasion of, 27, 71 

German plans for invasion of, 53, 54, 62 

Netherlands East Indies, 45 

Japanese arms in, 100, 102, 103, 110, 

114 

Japanese conquest of, 151, 174, 176, 462 

Japanese plans for conquest of, 34, 102-

06, 109 

Neutrality 

of Scandinavian governments, 50, 57, 58, 

61,62, 68 

of United States, 27, 74, 79 

of USSR, 505 

Neutrality Act of 1939, 76 

Neutrality patrol, 76, 77, 80 

New Britain, 287-89, 291 

555 

New Guinea, 206, 258, 288-91, 293, 295, 

300-02, 463 

New Zealand, 42, 43, 288, 288n, 296 

Newfoundland, 87, 95 

Nieto, Col. Manuel, 160n 

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 289, 291, 

293, 293n, 294, 463, 514 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 464, 

466, 468-74, 476 

on occupation of southern and central 

Philippines, 466, 468 

on Pacific Fleet and Japanese surrender, 

517 

and plans for bypassing Phili ppines and 

Formosa, 465, 468 

and plans for landings on China coast, 

470-72,476 

Ninth Air Force, 240 

Ninth Army, 432, 479, 484, 487 

Nisei, 126, 138. See also J apanese-Americans. 

Nomura, Admiral Kichisaburo, 104, 108, 

112, 114, 115, 118, 120, 121 

NORDWIND,449n 

Normandy, 284, 420, 426, 440, 443, 451 

Allied breakout in, 40 I 

Allied operations in, 383, 389, 391, 392, 

401-17,421,430,465 

Allied supply build-up in, 432 

German forces in, 401-03, 405-09, 411-

14, 417 

North Africa, 76, 204, 210, 215, 246, 305, 

326, 375, 380n 

Allied operations in, 204, 206, 211, 366, 

386 

Allied plans for invasion of, 173-98, 238, 

239, 255, 262 

British views on invasion of, 175, 185, 

197 

date for Allied invasion of, 107, 190, 

191, 192, 195, 196 

diversion of U.S. forces to, 366 

French forces in, 211, 374 

German control of, 228 

German operations in, 74, 79, 211, 319 

German plans for deployment to, 306 

North America, 49. See also Western 

Hemisphere. 

North Atlantic, 44, 76, 77, 80, 181, 203, 

206, 211 

North Luzon Force, 157, 158, 160, 162, 

164 

North Sea, 50, 52, 54, 419, 483 

Norwa~ 6~ 67, 232, 490 

Allied operations in, 56, 59, 69-72 

British plans for invasion of, 178, 181, 

186, 239 

German air and naval forces in, 232 
556 

Norway-Continued 

German fear of Allied occupation of, 56-

58, 61-63, 66 

German plans for occupation of, 52, 53, 

54, 56, 57, 59-64, 66, 68 

neutrality of, 50, 55, 57, 58, 61, 62, 68 

and supply route to USSR, 228 

Norwegian Army, 59, 60, 60n, 63, 70 

Norwegian garrisons, 60 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, 304, 309, 

312 

and plans for defense of Balkans and 

Italy, 305, 307, 308, 309, 311, 313-

14,317,318,337 

and plans for occupation of Italy, 308-

II, 313-15 

O'Connell, Lt. Col. Geoffrey M., 87, 88 

O'Connell-Arnold Report, 88 

Occupation forces, 391, 399 

Occupation zones, 480, 481, 483, 489 

Occupational deferment, 376 

Oil, 100-03, 105, 106, 108, 112, 114, 182, 

182n, 230, 235, 238, 250, 309, 447 

Okinawa, 468, 469, 472, 476, 477, 500, 

502 

Olson, Gov. Culbert L., 133, 135, 137 

OLYMPIC, 501 

One-thrust strategy, 433 

Open-door policy, 101 

Operation Holland, 453, 454 

Operation Liege-Aachen, 453, 454, 455 

Operation Lorraine, 454 

Operation Luxembourg, 453-54 

Operations Division, WDGS, 6, 179, 216, 

249, 370, 375 

Operations Order No. 1 for the Occupation of Denmark, 64 

Operations Order No. 1 for the Occupation of Norway, 63 

Operations Staff, Armed Forces High 

Command, 56, 59 

Oppenheimer, Dr. J. Robert, 494, 497, 499 

Oran, 191-96 

ORANGE War Plan, 14-20, 15n, 20n, 21, 

22,25,36,37,152, 152n, 154, 155n, 156, 

158, 164-66, 169, 170 

Oregon, 125, 132, 141, 142, 144, 147, 148 

Oslo, 50, 55, 60n, 64, 66 

OVERLORD, 324, 334, 365, 374, 375, 376, 

377,378, 397,420,421 

Allied decision on, 386, 388 

and ANVIL, 279, 285, 389-93 

assault, plans for, 260-63, 270, 271, 277, 

279, 279n, 280, 283, 284, 284n, 389, 

390 

British views on, 255, 256, 262-65, 270, 

271, 273, 282, 283, 386 

command of, 265, 274, 280, 280n, 327, 

401 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

OVERLORD-Continued 

lodgment area, 402, 404, 417 

and Mediterranean, 255-56, 262-65, 

270-74, 279, 282-85, 379, 392, 395, 

397 

plans for postponement of, 259, 262-66, 

268,270,271,273-77,386-88 

Pacific, 206, 209, 258 

Allied lines of advance in, 288-90, 293, 

294 

allocation of LST's to, 259, 270 

assault shipping for, 179, 260 

deployment of U.S. forces to, 230, 366 

versus Europe, 284 

Japanese defensive strategy in, 110, 123 

Japanese lines of communication in, 19 

Japanese naval power in, 13, 14, 101 

Japanese plans for operations in, 109, 

110, 111 

plans for concentration of U.S. Fleet in, 

32, 42 

redeployment of U.S. forces to, 500 

U.S. forces in, 379, 380 

U.S. naval power in, 14, 101, 119, 260 

U.S. plans for defense strategy in, 16-17, 

22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 34, 36-41,42, 

44,47, 156 

U.S. plans for naval operations in, 154 

U.S. plans for offensive strategy in, 19, 

20, 24, 25, 37, 183 

U.S. plans for operations in, 154, 278, 

462-68, 470-77 

U.S. plans for redeployment to, 481, 492 

U.S. strategic responsibility for, 177, 231, 

461, 462 

U.S. war alert in, 117 

Pacific, central 

plans for transfer of forces to, 289 

U.S. operations in, 258, 293, 295, 301, 

463 

U.S. plans for offensive in, 288-90, 294, 

476 

Pacific, northern, 118, 215n, 228, 233, 239, 

240, 252 

Pacific, South, 109-11, 210, 258, 288, 295 

Pacific, southwestern, 37, 115, 174, 295, 

463 

Pacific, western, 14-17,20,23,24, 109-11, 

462-68, 470-77 

Pacific coast Congressional subcommittee, 

137, 144, 146 

Pacific coast states 

aircraft factories in, 135, 136, 142 

Congressional representatives of. 137, 

144, 146 

control of enemy aliens in, 128, 129, 

130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 141, 142 

evacuation of Japanese from, 125, 148 

Japanese plans for attack on, 111 
INDEX 

Pacific coast states-Continued 

plans for evacuation of Japanese from, 

127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 

137, 139, 140, 142, 144, 145 

U.S. plans for defense of, 16, 18 

Pacific Fleet, U.S., 109-11, 113, 115, 154, 

295, 462, 475, 500 

Pacific Ocean Areas, 289, 294, 469 

Palau Islands, 463, 465, 469 

Palaus-Morotai line, 465. 469 

Panama, 15, 18,27, 117, 121 

Panama Canal, 16, 77, 85 

Parker, Brig. Gen. George M., Jr., 158 

Paris, 67, 404, 422, 423 

Pas-de-Calais, 430, 433, 434 

"Pass and permit" system, 129-31 

Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 350, 383, 

401,402,404,407,408,412-15,417, 

423, 426, 443, 458, 491 

PBY's, 168, 300 

Pearl Harbor 

conference at, 293, 294, 466, 466n 

Japanese attack on, 11, 73, 99, 120, 121, 

123, 124, 126, 127, 132, 133, 138, 151, 

176, 223, 228, 230, 260, 462 

Japanese movement toward, 118 

Japanese plans for attack on, 102, 106, 

109, 110, 111, 115, 119, 120 

Japanese threat to, 117 

Pearl Harbor Striking Force, 111, 115, 120 

Peripheral strategy, 175, 197 

Persia. See Iran. 

Persian Corridor, 182, 231, 237, 243 

plans for development of U.S. service 

command in, 245-51 

supply route to USSR, 215n, 217, 225-

53 

Persian Gulf. See Persian Corridor. 

Persian Gulf Command, 251 

Persian Gulf Service Command, 245-51 

Philippeville, 189, 192, 193, 195 

Philippine archipelago. See Philippine 

Islands. 

Philippine Army, 156 

defeat of, 161-62, 164 

divisions, 155 

and plans for defense of Philippines, 152 

units, 158, 160, 162 

Philippine Commonwealth Government, 

160, 163 

Philippine Department, 152, 164 

Philippine Department Plan ORANGE, 152n 

Philippine Division (USA), 154, 155n, 162-

64 

Philippine Islands, 14, 40, 123, 151, 210, 

502. See also Leyte, Luzon, Mindanao. 

Allied advance toward, 288, 302 

Allied plans for return to, 291 

command of U.S. forces in, 152 

557 

Phili ppine Islands-Continued 

Japanese attack on, 11, 122, 151, 158, 

159, 163, 165, 169, 170-72 

Japanese conquest of, 151, 174, 176 

Japanese operations in, 151, 158, 159, 

163, 165, 169, 170-72 

Japanese plans for conquest of, 102, 106, 

109-11, 119 

Japanese preparations for illVaSlQn of, 

115 

Japanese threat to, 34, 104, 117 

MacArthur's plans for advance to, 288, 

291, 294 

U.S. forces in, 106, 110, 119, 154, 155, 

156, 163, 164 

U.S. operations in, 170-72,461,462 

U.S. plans for abandonment of, 43, 47, 

156 

U.S. plans for air bases in, 463, 463n 

Philippine Scouts (USA), 161-63 

26th Cavalry Regiment, 161, 162 

Philippine units, 158, 160, 162 

Philippines, central, 465, 466 

Philippines, southern, 465, 466 

Phillips, Adm. Sir Tom, 120 

PHOENIX, 300 

Pieper, N. J. L., 130, 133 

Pisa-Rimini Line, 265, 277, 324 

Plan Dog memorandum, 35-38 

Plan R 4, 68, 69, 70 

Planners, British, 189, 191 

Planners, German, 453 

Planners, U.S. Army, 34, 38, 154, 188, 189, 

231,369,388,390,465 

on British control of Persian Gulf traffic, 

249-50 

and defense of Western Hemisphere, 18, 

19,28, 73 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 470-

72,475,475n 

and occupation of Iceland, 73, 77, 78 

and plans for Formosa-Amoy operations, 

471,472 

and RAINBOW, 2, 27 

Planners, U.S. Navy, 19,27,473 

Planning Board,Japanese, 105, 112 

Po Valley, 306, 315, 318, 445 

Pogue, Forrest C., 441, 442 

Poland,50, 52, 258,398, 435,459,488 

Polish Army, 237 

Port capacity, 374, 392, 393,424,425,432, 

433, 439 

Port Darwin, 168, 169 

Ports 

in Brittany, 394, 402, 421, 422, 425, 439 

in China, 462, 470-73,477 

on English Channel, 425, 434, 439, 440 

in France, 394, 402, 421-26, 432-34, 439 

in Germany, 69, 489 
558 

Ports-Continued 

in Great Britain, 205, 233 

in Italy, 315 

in Low Countries, 425, 426 

in North Africa, 188, 189 

in Norway, 50, 53, 56, 60, 61, 66 

on Persian Gulf, 217, 229, 231, 235-37, 

24~ 242-44, 247-50 

in United States, 135, 232 

in USSR, 228, 232 

Portugal, 77, 78, 311 

Potsdam Conference, 505, 511-13, 511n 

Potsdam Declaration, 513, 514, 516, 517 

Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley, 38 

PQ-17,237-38. See also Convoys, Arctic. 

Prague, 479, 488-90, 492 

Priorities 

for BOLERO, 241, 251 

for Persian Gulf, 234, 237, 240-42, 246, 

247, 251, 252 

for Soviet aid shipments, 241, 250-52 

for supplies to Middle East, 231, 250 

Production, British, 201, 202, 216, 259, 283 

Production, Japanese, 100, 101 

Production, U.S., 19,200,369,371,372 

of civilian goods, 258 

for coalition warfare, 367, 369, 380 

of landing craft, 183, 184, 259-61, 270, 

274, 274n, 277, 283, 284 

Provost Marshal General. See Gullion, 

Maj. Gen. Allen W. 

Provost Marshall General, Office of, 127, 

129, 131, 135, 137, 144, 145 

PT boats, 291 

Puleston, Captain W. D., 396 

Pursuit Squadron, 33d, 97 

QUADRANT Conference. See Quebec Conference (August 1943). 

Quebec Conference (August 1943), 223, 

261, 263, 283, 290, 291, 388; (September 1944), 480 

Quezon, Manuel L., 159, 163, 165 

Quisling, Vidkun, 54, 55, 56 

Rabaul 

Allied plans for base at, 288 

U.S. operations against, 287, 289-91, 295 

U.S. plans for bypassing of, 289, 301, 

302 

U.S. plans for capture of, 210 

withdrawal of Japanese air forces from, 

297 

Radio, 129, 131, 138, 168 

Radio intercepts, 505, 506. See also MAGIC 

Raeder, Fleet Admiral Erich, 50, 52, 54, 

57, 58, 66, 68, 69 

RAINBOW I, 24, 26, 26n, 37 

RAINBOW 2, 24, 25, 27, 37, 45 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

RAINBOW 3, 24, 25, 27, 37, 45 

RAINBOW 4, 24, 25, 28, 28n, 37, 45 

RAINBOW 5, II, 24, 25, 37, 45, 46, 47, 

156, 157, 176 

Ranger Force, U.S., 331, 338, 343, 344 

RANKIN, 265, 265n 

Rapido River, 303, 321, 328, 332, 339, 

340, 344, 348 

Reconnaissance Squadron "Rowel," 56, 57 

Red Army, 258 

Allied fear of collapse of, 178, 182,238, 

366, 368 

numerical preponderance of, 378 

and occupation of Germany, 490 

and war against Finland, 56 

RED-ORANGE War Plan, 16-18, 17n, 20, 

21 

Redeployment of U.S. forces, 373, 398, 

471,472,481,492,500 

Regular Army, U.S., 86, 152, 162 

Remagen Bridge, 482 

Reykjavik, 84, 88,90, 91, 237 

Reynaud, Paul, 68 

Rhine River, 69, 284, 419, 424, 425, 427, 

430, 433, 438-43, 446, 453, 458, 481-

83 

Rhodes, 265, 266, 268, 270-79, 284 

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., 469 

Roberts, Brig. Gen. Frank N., 391 

Roberts Commission, 132, 133 

Rockwell, Rear Adm. Francis W., 167, 168 

Roer River, 443, 458, 4'81 

Rome, 258, 304 

Allied advance toward, 263, 265, 272-

74, 277, 341, 351-63, 390 

Allied capture of, 321, 363, 392 

Allied plans for amphibious landings 

near, 263, 275, 276, 278, 285, 326-35 

Allied plans for capture of, 324, 325, 

328, 328n 

German forces near, 312, 329-31, 337, 

338 

German plans for defense of, 318, 320, 

321,337, 338 

threat of Allied landings near, 309, 313, 

315, 316, 330 

Rome-Berlin Axis, 34. See also Axis 

Powers. 

Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin, 79,181,182 

and campaign in Tunisia, 211 

on defense of northern Italy, 304 

on defense of southern Italy, 317-22 

and disarming of Italian forces, 315 

and German offensive in Egypt, 238 

and Kesselring, 307, 311, 316-21 

Romulos, Maj. Carlos, 169 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., I, 2, 6, 21, 23, 29, 

35,78,84,103, 125, 177,202,213, 

221, 288, 290, 384, 474, 479, 496 
INDEX 

Roosevelt. Franklin D.-Continued 

and aid to Great Britain, 30, 31, 80, 

183, 217 

and Allied slrategy, 181, 183-86, 238, 

271,387,393 

and American-British Conversations, 42, 

45, 46 

and ANVIL, 383, 391, 393, 394 

and ARCADIA Conference, 174 

and Arctic convoys, 217, 232, 233, 249 

and Army troop basis, 368, 369 

and Atlantic sea lanes, 26, 40, 76, 80 

and Balkans, 393, 398 

and British request for shipping, 199, 

217, 220 

on Britisb shipping losses, 203 

and Cairo-Tebran decisions, 256 

and cancellation of BUCCANEER, 280, 281, 

281n, 282 

on capturing Rome, 324 

and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo Conference, 264n, 267, 269, 270, 280, 281, 

281n 

and control of enemy aliens, 126 

decision of, to cancel BUCCANEER, 280 

decision of, to evacuate Japanese from 

West, 125, 143, 146, 148, 149 

decision of, to invade Nortb Africa, 5, 7, 

8, 174, 187, 188, 238 

decision of, on occupation of Iceland, 6, 

73, 96 

decision of, to reinforce Iceland, 94, 95, 

96, 97 

decision of, on shipping aid to Great 

Britain, 5, 7, 221-22 

declares unlimited national emergency, 

80 

and development of Persian Gulf supply 

route, 227, 241, 242, 247, 248, 250, 

251 

and economic measures against Japanese, 

104. 105 

and evacuation of Japanese /i'om Pacihc 

coast. 134, 140, 142-45 

and Germany-hrst strategy, 47, 176 

on Gn,INAST, 181 

and invasion of North Africa, 175, 181, 

186, 187, 190-94, 197 

and Japanese decision for war, 123 

and Japanese occupation of Indocbina, 

104 

and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 174, 183, 185, 

186, 199, 218, 270, 271 

and landing craft production, 179, 270, 

274 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 466 

and negotiations with Japanese, 112, 117, 

120, 121 

and occupation of Iceland, 73, 80, 85, 

92-94, 97 

559 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.-ContinuBd 

and OVERLORD, 270, 271, 273, 275, 

275n, 387 

and Plan Dog, 38, 39 

on plans for air offensive in China, 267 

and plans for Allied advance into Germany, 485 

and plans for ampbibious operations in 

Burma, 269-71, 269n, 280-82, 281n 

and plans for invasion of Europe, 180, 

184-86, 187, 238, 239 

and plans for postponement of OVERLORD, 270, 271, 273, 275, 275n 

proclamation of neutrality by, 27 

and RAINBOW war plans, 28n, 46 

and shipping aid to Great Britain, 203, 

203n, 204, 207-09, 207n, 211, 217-20, 

222 

and Soviet intervention against Japan, 

503 

and Soviet Union, 180,217,232,233, 

241, 249, 386, 399 

and strategy for defeat of Germany, 40, 

47, 176, 183-86, 238, 393, 398, 399 

at Tehran Conference, 387, 388 

and U.S. withdrawal to Bataan, 163 

Rosenberg, Reichslciter Alfred, 54, 55 

Rotation program, 374-7 6 

Rotterdam, 425, 439 

ROUNDUP, 177, 179, 180, 181, 231, 238, 

259, 366 

British views on, 182, 183, 185 

and plans for invasion of North Africa, 

185-88, 197 

Rowe, James, Jr., 130 

Royal Air Force, 32, 81 

Royal Navy, 101, 259n 

antisubmarine operations, 74, 201 

and Arctic convoys, 232, 233, 249 

losses, 78, 79, 176, 190, 190n, 233 

in Mediterranean, 78, 79, 176, 267 

and Norway campaign, 55, 70, 71 

tbreat of Axis capture of, 28, 29, 30, 31 

U.S. plans for collaboration with, 20, 21, 

25, 26, 31, 40 

Ruhr, 53, 392, 400, 423-26, 434, 438, 440-

42, 445, 454, 482 

Rumania, 45, 309, 445, 482, 510 

Rundstcdt. Field Marshal Gerd von, 445, 

454, 455, 457 

Saar, 423, 424, 426, 434, 443, 453, 458 

Sabotage, 129, 132, 134, 138-40, 144 

Saipan, 474, 504, 505 

Salerno, 304, 309, 312-14, 316, 317, 319, 

324, 340, 351 

Salter, Sir Artbur, 209, 212, 219, 223 

San Diego, 85, 141, 142 

San Francisco, 117, 123, 127, 129, 141, 

144, 293, 294 
560 

Sardinia, 173,262,307-10,313, 314, 388 

Sato, Ambassador, 505, 513, 515 

Sayre, Francis B., 163, 165 

Scandinavia. See also Finland; Norway; 

Sweden. 

Allied plans for operations in, 56, 58, 59, 

67-70 

anti-German opinion in, 57 

German plans for withdrawing from, 450 

neutrality of, 50, 57, 58, 61, 62, 68 

Schelde estuary, 433, 441, 442, 455 

Schoerner, Field Marshal Ferdinand, 491 

Scientists, atomic, 495, 496, 498-99, 499n, 

511 

Scouts, Philippine (USA), 161-63 

Sea power, Allied, 471 

Sea power, British, 13, 16, 25, 26,43,66. 

See also Royal Navy. 

Sea power, Japanese, 14, 151. See also 

Japanese Navy. 

Sea power, U.S., 14, 28, 260 

Seabees, 299, 301 

Seaborne operations, 64, 66. See also Amphibious operations. 

Second Army, British, 404, 406, 412, 429, 

432, 440, 441 

Second Front, 180, 185,239,272,283,385, 

386 

Secretary of the Navy, U.S., 13. See also 

Knox, Frank. 

Secretary of State, U.S. See Hull, Cordell. 

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, British. See Eden, Anthony. 

Secretary of War, U.S., 13. See also Stimson, Henry L. 

Seeadler Harbor, 291, 294, 297, 301 

Seine River, 420-23, 425, 426, 430, 432 

Allied plans for advance to, 402-04, 406, 

414 

German retreat to, 412 

ports, 421 

U.S. crossing of, 414, 415 

Selectees, 82, 84, 86, 92, 95, 97 

Selective Service 82, 375, 376 

Selective Service Act, 84, 97 

Service command, 240, 245-51 

Service troops, U.S., 209, 243, 421 

for ANVIL, 376 

in Anzio beachhead, 344 

for BOLERO and TORCH, 246 

for Iceland, 97 

for Middle East, 231, 238, 243, 246 

for OVERLORD, 376 

for Persian Gulf, 243, 246, 247 

shortage of, 375, 376, 471, 472 

Services of Supply, U.S. Army, 206, 245 

in India, 231, 246 

in Middle East, 240 

Seventh Fleet, U.S., 294n. 301 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

SEXTANT Conference, 282. See also Cairo 

Conferences. 

SHINGLE, 326-36, 347. See also Anzio. 

Shingler, Col. Don G., 231, 235, 236, 240, 

242, 243, 245, 247, 251 

Ship conversion, 190, 191 

Shipbuilding, U.S., 201-04, 203n, 213, 223, 

258-60, 259n 

Shipping, Allied, 85, 182,216,217,265, 

293, 378 

for aid to USSR, 215, 215n, 228, 232 

Allied plans for opening Mediterranean 

to, 174, 175, 185 

for build-up in British Isles, 186, 206, 

208, 209 

German attacks on, 232, 233, 237-38 

losses, 74, 182, 186, 201, 206, 211, 216, 

222, 223, 232, 233, 249, 258, 260 

pooling of, 200, 201 

for SLEDGEHAMMER, 182 

shortage, 176, 185, 228, 240, 272 

and U.S. manpower, 368, 369, 374 

Shipping, British, 54, 90, 201, 205 

for British import program, 205, 208 

losses, 201-04, 207, 213, 237, 238 

for supply to USSR, 228 

for U.S. build-up in British Isles, 208-10, 

208n, 210, 211, 212, 214, 262 

U.S. request for, 208, 208n, 211, 212 

Shipping, cargo, 84, 85, 91, 93, 190, 195, 

201, 208, 214 

Shipping, German, 50, 53, 54, 64 

Shipping, Japanese, 110, 115, 170, 295 

Shipping, Soviet, 229 

Shipping, troop, 83, 84, 90, 201, 208, 208n, 

247, 249 

Shipping, U.S., 201n, 230 

for aid to USSR, 228, 239, 240, 247, 249 

for British import program, 201-05, 

202n, 203n, 207, 209, 211-22, 218n 

for Burma, 213, 221 

construction of. See Shipbuilding, U.S. 

for French rearmament, 211, 212 

for Iceland expedition, 87, 88, 89, 90 

losses, 201, 201n, 204, 237, 238 

for Pacific, 1 76 

for Persian Gulf, 232, 234, 246, 247, 

248, 249, 252 

shortage, 289, 368 

for support of British forces, 213-15, 

220-22 

Shipping authorities, British, 233, 236 

Shipping authorities, U.S., 233, 234 

Shipyards, U.S., 258, 259 

Siam, 266 

Siberia, 115, 239 

Sicily, 173,319,326 

Allied invasion of, 258-60, 303, 307, 

332, 334, 386 
INDEX 

Sicily-Continued 

Allied operations in, 215, 312n 

Allied plans for invasion of, 206, 213, 

214 

German evacuation of, 311-13 

German forces in, 308, 309 

Siegfried Line, 420, 430, 442, 446, 452 

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H., 487 

Singapore, 266 

British plans for defense of, 34, 38, 42-44 

Japanese threat to, 104 

16th Naval District, 167 

Sixth Army, U.S., 296, 296n 

6th Army Group, U.S., 432 

6th Fleet, Japanese, 111 

61st Antiaircraft Regiment, 84 

68th Antiaircraft Regiment, 85 

Skaggerak, 61, 67 

Skorzeny, Col. Otto, 308, 320, 455 

SLEDGEHAMMER, 178-82, 231, 238, 259n 

British opposition to, 178-80, 182, 184, 

185 

cancellation of, 182, 186, 187 

landing craft for, 179, 180, 182, 183, 196, 

197 

Smith, Capt. Oscar, 91 

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 482n 

Snorkel submarines, 447 

Solomon Islands, 206, 210, 258, 288, 288n, 

289, 295 

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 206, 210 

on British shipping aid to U.S., 208, 

208n, 211, 212 

and Luzon versus Formosa debate, 464, 

469 

and Persian Gulf supply route, 236, 241, 

245, 247, 248 

and U.S. shipping aid to Britain, 207-12, 

208n, 215, 217-19, 221, 222. 

South America, 23, 24, 28, 30, 73, 77 

South China Sea, 155, 462, 463, 470-73 

South Luzon Force, 157, 158, 166 

South Pacific Area, 288, 289, 294, 468 

Southeast Asia 

Allied strategy in, 260, 266-69, 276, 278, 

279, 281, 282 

European possessions in, 102, 110 

Japanese arms in, 100, 102, 103, 106, 

109, 110, 114, 123 

Japanese conquests in, 22, 34, 176, 462 

Southwest Pacific Area, 169, 287-89, 294, 

300, 461, 463, 469, 471 

Soviet-Finnish war, 55-57, 59, 62, 66-68 

Soviet-German war, 103, 108, 123, 157, 

174, 178-80, 182, 206, 225, 227, 228, 

304, 305, 307, 324, 366, 373, 377, 385 

Soviet Protocols, 227, 227n, 232, 233, 234, 

239, 240, 251, 252 

561 

Soviet Union, 52, 72, 239, 265, 310, 384, 

395, 452, 506. See al50 Red Army. 

Allied aid to, 215, 215n, 217, 225-53, 

264, 371 

and Allied decision to invade southern 

France, 384, 387, 388, 393 

Allied fear of collapse of, 174, 177, 178, 

182, 184-87, 197, 231, 241, 366, 368 

Allied negotiations with, 227, 228, 233 

and Allied operations in Mediterranean, 

263, 264, 271-75, 283 

Allied plans for support of, 174, 177, 

180, 183 

Arctic supply route to, 228-30, 232-34, 

237-40, 243, 247, 249, 252 

and atomic bomb, 497 

German invasion of, 103, 157, 385 

industry of, 258, 388 

and invasion of North Africa, 239 

and Japan, 111-13, 119, 503-05, 512, 

515, 516 

lend-lease aid to, 225, 227, 230, 232, 

233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 243, 

371. See al50 Soviet Protocols, 

manpower of, 371, 378, 452 

military strength of, 388, 389 

and occupation of Germany, 480, 481. 

483, 489 

and OVERLORD, 264, 270, 271, 272, 273, 

274, 275, 282, 285 

Persian Gulf supply route to, 225-53 

and Second Front, 180, 385, 386 

and war with Finland, 55,56,66,67,69. 

See also Soviet-Finnish war. 

and war with Germany, 79, 103, 157, 

174, 177, 178, 182, 184-87, 197, 231, 

241, 366, 368, 385, 445, 447, 458, 459. 

See al50 Eastern Front. 

and Western Allies, 227, 228, 233, 385-

88 

Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl A., 514, 516 

Spain, 78, 188, 189, 191, 195, 311 

Spalding, Brig. Gen. Sidney P., 242, 244, 

247, 251 

Spanish Morocco, 191 

Special Observers Group, London, 31-33, 

79,81,86,87,96 

Special Service Brigade, British, 331 

Speer, Albert, 447, 451, 455n 

Staff conversations, U.S.-British, 20, 21, 25, 

26, 31-33, 36, 38-45, 74, 76 

Staff work, 2, 4, 5, 6 

Staffs, British, 156, 239 

Staffs, Soviet, 264 

Staffs, U.S., 239, 366. See al50 Joint Logistics Committee; Joint Planning Committee; Joint Staff Planners; Joint 

Strategic Survey Committee. 
562 

Stalin, Joseph, 192, 242, 273n, 278n, 378, 

386,505,512,513 

on Allied operations in Mediterranean, 

263, 264, 272-75, 283, 387, 393 

and Cairo-Tehran decisions, 256, 283, 

284, 285 

on invasion of southern France, 272, 

273, 274, 275, 387, 393 

and occupation of Germany, 483, 485 

and OVERLORD, 264, 272-75, 274n, 283, 

285, 387 

on suspension of Arctic convoys, 238, 239 

and Tehran Conference, 271-78, 387 

and war against Japan, 271, 272, 276, 

278, 503, 504, 512, 515, 516 

Stalingrad, 252, 253, 304, 306, 310, 449 

Stanton, Edwin M., 2 

Stark, Admiral Harold R., 26n, 29, 30, 94, 

105, 121 

and ABC-I, 45 

on defense of Singapore, 34, 35 

on Japanese threat to west coast, 138, 

139 

on U.S. strategy against Axis, 35-39 

on war threat in Pacific, 113, 115, 116 

State Department, 30 

on German threat to USSR, 78 

and negotiations with Japan, 104, 121, 

507 

on U.S. defense of Iceland, 75 

and U.S. occupation policy III Europe, 

481, 481n 

Stavanger, 60, 64, 67, 68 

Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W., 176,210,211, 

266, 267, 269,473, 477 

Stimson, Henry L., 28n, 39, 42, 47, 117, 

120, 251, 262, 373, 377, 497, 501, 502 

on atomic bombing of Japan, 498 

on decision to use atomic bomb, 493-94 

on enemy aliens, 131 

on forces for defeat of Germany, 377, 

378 

and Iceland expedition, 76, 80, 85, 96 

on invasion of North Africa, 181 

on invasion of northwestern Europe, 177 

and measures against sabotage and espionage, 129, 135 

and plans for atomic bombing of Japan, 

496,497, 506, 508, 509,511, 514 

and plans for evacuation of Japanese 

from Pacific coast, 135, 136, 139, 

143-46 

and plans for peace negotiations with 

Japan, 506, 507, 508, 509, 512, 516 

on warning Japan of atomic bomb, 507-

09, 508n, 516 

Strategic Air Force, U.S., 326 

Strategic Bombing Survey, U.S., 517 

Strategic estimates, 21, 22, 29-31, 35-38 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Strategic Logistics Division, SOS, 245 

Strong, Brig. Gen. George V., 29-32 

Student, General Kurt, 308 

StudieNord, 57,58,59,61 

Subic Bay, 155, 156 

Submarines, British, 67 

Submarines, German, 52, 53, 66, 74, 76, 

176, 204, 211, 216, 223, 228, 258, 446, 

447 

Submarines, Japanese, 111, 131 

Submarines, U.S., 168, 500 

Subversive activity, 40, 117, 131, 139. See 

also Sabotage. 

Suez Canal, t81, 238 

Sugiyama, General Gen, 109, 112, 115 

Sumatra, 106, 110, 266 

SUPER GYMNAST, 174n, 176, 176n 

Supplies, 154, 167, 265 

for Allied forces in France, 420-25, 427, 

432, 435, 436, 440 

for British forces in Middle East, 235, 

237, 238, 243, 244, 250 

for development of Persian Gulf supply 

route, 231, 235, 240, 246, 247 

for Iceland expedition, 84, 87-93 

shortage of, 420-25, 427, 432, 435 

for USSR, 225, 228, 230, 232-37, 239-

41, 243, 244, 248, 250-53 

Supply levels, 90, 91, 93 

Supply plans, 154, 166, 167 

Supply programs, 258, 368 

Supply routes, 72, 74, 76, 84-91, 93, 215, 

217, 225-53, 265, 462, 463, 473 

Supply services. See Services of Supply, 

U.S. Army. 

Supply ships, 69 

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary 

Forces. See Eisenhower, General 

Dwight D. 

Supreme Court, 148 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, 393, 424, 430, 435-37, 

481n, 482. 491 

Surles, Maj. Gen. Alexander D., 370 

Sutherland, Lt. Gen. Richard K., 152n, 

165, 294 

Suzuki, Teiichi, 105, 505, 513, 517 

Sweden, 54, 55, 63, 505 

Allied plans for occupation of, 59, 67-70 

German imports of iron ore from, 50, 56 

62, 66-68, 72 

neutrality of, 50, 68 

Switzerland, 419, 432 

Syria, 194, 230 

Szilard, Leo, 510 

Tanuma, 235, 236, 243 

Tanks, 161, 182-84,362,409,416,417, 

421,437,438,459 
INDEX 

Tarawa, 258, 290 

Tehran, 235, 236, 242, 244' 

Tehran Conference, 255, 259, 261, 263, 

264n, 270-78, 386-89, 393, 503 

Thailand, 45, 46, 102, 109, 120 

Third Army, 383, 401, 402, 407,409,412, 

419, 423, 424, 425, 426, 432, 436, 441, 

443,479 

Third Fleet, U.S., 289, 294n, 301, 468 

Thirteenth Naval District, 131 n 

Tinian, 474, 514 

Tivoli, 356, 363 

Tobruk, 181 

Togo, Shigenori, 114, 119n, 121, 513 

Tojo, General Hideki, 104, 108, 108n, 112, 

113, 118, 122, 124, 505 

Tokyo, 113, 121, 124,474, 476, 505 

Tokyo Plan, 502 

TORCH, 174, 174n, 238, 239, 249, 366 

and Allied fear of Spanish intervention, 

189, 195 

assault shipping for, 190, 19 I, 19 In, 193-

95 

Combined Chiefs of Staff decision on, 

187 

command of, 188n, 189-90 

convoy schedules for,. 191, 192, 195 

logistical planning of, 188-95, 196 

priorities for, 241, 246, 250 

versus ROUNDUP, 185-88, 197 

timing of, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196 

"Total War," 448 

Total War Research Institute, 102, 105, 

106 

Toyoda, Admiral Soemu, 104, 112 

Training, 101,447 

for amphibious operations, 182, 184, 190, 

191, 334, 335 

for atomic bombing, 495 

of U.S. forces, 182, 184, 190, 19 I, 228, 

334. 335, 368, 369, 371, 374. 376. 378, 

495 

Trans-Persian railroad. See Iranian State 

Railway. 

Trans-Siberian Railroad, 228 

"Transatlantic essay contest," 189-95 

Transportation Corps, U.S. Army, 246 

Transportation Section, G-4, 83 

Transports, 58, 60, 64, 68, 83, 84, 267, 

282, 283, 289, 294n 

TRIDENT Conference, 221-23, 260, 261, 

267, 283, 284, 372 

Tripartite Pact, 18, 34, 10 1-05, 114, 119 

Trondheim, 52, 53, 60, 64, 67, 68 

Troop basis, U.S. Army, 365-76, 366n. 

368n 

for defeat of Germany and japan, 373, 

375-77 

service troops in, 231, 243 

Troop carrier aircraft, 435, 436, 441 

Truck assembly plants, 235, 236, 237 

Trucks, 232, 234, 236, 243, 245-47 

Truk, 279n, 293-95, 297 

Truman, Harry S., 299 

563 

and atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 515 

on dealings with USSR, 503 

decision of, on atomic bombing of japan, 

5,493, 511, 513, 514 

decision of, to invade japan, 502 

learns of atomic bomb, 496n 

and plans for atomic bombing of japan, 

497-500, 506, 510·-13 

and plans for defeat of japan, 501,502 

and plans for use of atomic bomb, 496, 

497 

and plans for warning japan, 506, 507 

on U.S. occupation policy in Germany, 

487 

Truman Committee, 51 On 

Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian K., 352-54, 

358, 359, 360, 360n, 362 

Tunis, 327 

Tunisia, 185, 195, 262, 304, 310, 449 

Allied operations in, 206, 211, 214 

Allied plans for occupation of, 176, 189, 

191 

Turkey, 214, 322 

and Allied plans for Aegean operations, 

265, 279, 284 

British negotiations with, 278, 284 

neutrality of, 306, 309 

and plans for entry in war, 262, 265, 

266, 278, 279, 284, 284n 

Turnaround time, 204, 248, 398 

Twelfth Naval District, 131 n 

Two-ocean war, 16-18, 17n, 20-25, 36-42, 

44, 47 

273-air-group program, 366 

U-boats. See Submarines, German. 

Umm Qasr, 231, 234 

Unconditional surrender policy, 304, 314, 

389, 393, 449, 504-06 

United Kingdom, See Great Britain. 

United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, 

236, 237, 243 

United Nations, 202, 220, 481, 498 

United States, 4, 49, 158, 202, 358, 467, 

474,491 

and aid to USSR, 215, 225, 227, 233, 

234,241-43 

and Arctic convoys to USSR. 233, 241 

and British sea power, 26, 27, 28 

British shipping aid to, 20 I, 204, 208-10 

211, 212 

and China, 101, 108, 112, 113, 124, 266, 

267 

and decision to invade southern France, 

384, 388, 389 

and development of atomic bomb, 494 
564 

United States-Continued 

and development of Persian Gulf supply 

route, 230, 231, 234, 235, 237 

economy of, 122, 175,200,367-69,384 

forces of, in TORCH landings, 194-96 

and Great Britain, 13, 29-34, 36, 37, 

39-42, 44, 76, 80, 116, 177, 199-223, 

371 

and Iceland, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 83, 

84, 85, 86, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95 

industry in, 122, 367-69, 384 

isolationism in, 12, 384 

and Japan, 13, 101, 103-06, 104n, 112-

16, 118-21, 123, 124, 384, 495-99, 

502, 508-12, 508n, 511,512, 513, 516 

manpower. See Manpower, U,S. 

military strength of, 388, 389 

and missions to Middle East, 230, 231, 

234 

mobilization in, 200, 201 

neutrality policy, 27, 74, 79 

and occupation of Germany, 480, 481, 

481n, 483, 492 

plans for defense of, 16, 19, 24, 43-44-

sea power, 14, 28, 260 

and Soviet intervention against Japan, 

503-04, 506, 509, 510, 512, 515, 516 

war economy, 365, 367, 372 

U.S, Army Forces in the British Isles, 79 

U.S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India, 

473 

U,S. Army Forces in the Far East, 155, 

162, 165 

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, 238, 

240, 242 

U.S, Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, 

469 

U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces in Pacific, 

514-

U.S. Fleet, 19. See also Navy, U.S. 

Axis threat to, 21, 28 

bases, 14, 40 

plans for concentration of, in Atlantic, 

16, 31 

plans for concentration of, in Pacific, 24, 

32, 42 

strength of, 101 

V-bomb launching sites, 430, 434 

Vichy Government, 78, 104, 193 

Victory Program, 366, 368n, 373, 374 

Vienna, 383, 393, 452, 480, 484 

Vietinghoff, General von, 312, 312n 

Visayan-Mindanao Force, 157 

Vistula River, 445, 488 

Vladivostok, 215n, 228, 239 

Vogelkop Peninsula, 290, 302 

Voroshiloff, Marshal Klementy, 274 

COMMAND DECISIONS 

Wainwright, Maj. Gen. Jonathan M., 155, 

158, 160-62, 164, 166, 172 

Wake Island, 47, 110, 120, 122, 156 

Wallgren, Senator Mon C., 137 

War Cabinet, British, 182, 201, 216 

War Council, U,S., 40, 81 

War Department, 30, 73, 77, 117, 155, 

163, 165, 231, 243, 503, 507. See also 

Marshall, General George C.; Planners, U.S. Army; Stimson, Henry L. 

and airborne operations in Holland, 435, 

436 

and ANVIL, 390 

and control of enemy aliens, 126-29, 

131, 132, 134-37, 139, 141 

and occupation of Iceland, 81, 82, 86, 

87, 89-93, 95-97 

and plans for defense of Philippines, 156 

and plans for evacuation of Japanese 

from west coast, 127, 133-35, 137, 

141-44, 146-49 

and troop basis, 366, 366n, 368, 370, 

373,374,375, 378 

and U.S. occupation policy in Europe, 

481n 

and U.S. strategy in western Pacific, 

464, 467, 468, 470-72 

War Department General Staff, 85, 372 

War Department Manpower Board, 370 

War plans, U.S., 13-47, 92, 152, 462 

War Plans Division, U.S. Navy, 13, 20 

War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, 13, 29, 77, 84, 116, 177 

and General Headquarters, 92, 93 

and occupation of Iceland, 75, 77, 81, 

83-86, 88-96 

War Production Board, 259, 368 

War Relocation Authority, 139 

War Shipping Administration, 207, 221. 

See also Douglas, Lewis W. 

and military shipping requirements, 220, 

222 

and shipping for British import program, 

204, 207, 207n, 210-13, 218, 219 

Warlimont, General der Artillerie a.D, 

Walter, 71 

Warren, Earl, 133 

Warship Group 1, 70 

Warship Group 2, 70 

Washington, 25, 80, 96, 111, 113, 155, 180, 

212, 213, 293, 376, 389, 470, 507 

Washington (state), 125, 132, 141, 142, 144, 

147, 148 

Washington Conference (1922), 14 

Washington Conference Oune 1942), 180, 

181 

Washington Conference (May 1943), 221-

23, 260, 261, 267, 283, 284,372 
INDEX 

Washington Treaties, 1921~22, 12 

Weather conditions, 69, 327, 424, 432, 433, 

443,453, 458, 514~16 

Wehrmacht, 66, 304, 443, 446, 450. See 

also German Army. 

Welles, Sumner, 76, 96 

WESER Day, 69, 70 

WESER Time, 69 

WESERUEBUNG, 59~62, 66, 70~72 

WESERUEBUNG NORD, 62 

WESERUEBUNG SUED, 62, 64 

West coast, U.S. See Pacific coast states. 

West Point, 246~4 7 

West Wall, 420, 423, 430, 435n, 436,437, 

441,443,452 

Western Defense Command, 127, 128, 134, 

145, 147, 148 

Western Front, 53. See also Belgium; Europe, northwestern; Europe, western; 

France; Normandy. 

Allied operations on, 284, 285, 363, 383, 

389,391, 392, 395, 401~17. 419~27, 

429~43, 445, 453, 458, 480~82 

German operations on, 27, 28, 70~ 72, 

380, 401, 402, 404, 405, 408, 411~16, 

420~22, 430, 432, 435, 443~45, 453~ 

55, 45 7 ~59, 481, 482 

German plans for offensive on, 52, 53. 

54, 57, 58,61,62 

Western Hemisphere, 13, 217 

boundaries of, 76, 84 

restrictions on military service outside, 

84, 86, 95 

565 

Western Hemisphere-Continued 

U.S. plans for defense of, 16, 18, 19, 22~ 

26, 28~30, 36, 37, 39~41, 43, 73, 74, 

77, 78 

Westphal, General Siegfried, 317n 

Wewak, 290, 295, 296, 30 I 

Wheeler, Senator Burton, 95 

Wheeler, Brig. Gen. Raymond A., 230, 

231, 246 

White House, 123, 143, 188, 219, 496,501, 

502 

Whitehead, Maj. Gen. Ennis C., 296, 297 

WILFRED, 68~ 70 

Willough by, Brig. Gen. Charles A., 298, 

298n, 299 

Wilmot, Chester, 396, 408 

Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland, 327, 

391, 392, 394, 395 

Wilson, Woodrow, 399 

Winant, John G., 80, 265 

World War I, 12, 13, 14, 50, 64, 384,440 

WPO~3. See ORANGE War Plan. 

Yalta Conference (February 1945), 480, 

503, 504 

Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku, 102, 109, 110, 

115, 119, 123 

Yamashita. Gen('ral Tomoyuki. 169~72 

Yugoslavia, 45, 445, 510 

Zhukov, Marshal Georgi K., 483 

Zone of the interior, 127 

Zuider Zee, 430, 439, 440 

t< U.S. GOVERNMENT PPINTING OFFICE: 1987 0-186-502 
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