NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

EMILY L., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, H.R., P.G., A.G., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0355

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD538367

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

FILED 3-11-2021
EMILY L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Emily L. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order finding 

H.R., P.G., and A.G. (collectively, “the children”) dependent as to her. 

Mother argues the juvenile court’s ruling addressed concerns other than the 

dependency petition’s allegation of inappropriate supervision, and that 

reasonable evidence did not support the finding of dependency. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the biological mother of the children. Nicholas R. 

(“Nicholas”) is the biological father of H.R., and Kristopher G.-W. 

(“Kristopher”) is the biological father of P.G. and A.G.1 “On review of an 

adjudication of dependency, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s findings.” Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 21 (App. 2005) (citation omitted).

¶3 In April 2020, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) 

received a report alleging Mother and Kristopher were consistently abusing 

substances while caring for the children, leaving drug paraphernalia in 

places accessible to the children, and failing to attend to the children’s basic 

needs. The report alleged A.G. had developed a severe diaper rash and was 

behind on immunizations. None of the children—including H.R., who had 

stage-two kidney disease—had been to see a doctor since the family 

relocated from Georgia to Arizona in 2019.

¶4 DCS contacted Mother and Kristopher, who denied the 

allegations, although Kristopher admitted using recreational marijuana and 

prescription medication. On May 5, Mother and Kristopher underwent 

substance-abuse testing. Although Mother tested negative for all 

substances, Kristopher—the children’s primary caregiver—tested positive 

for an “extremely high level[]” of cocaine. Mother nevertheless claimed to 

be unaware of Kristopher’s cocaine use.

¶5 On May 18, DCS implemented a present danger plan agreed 

to by Mother and Kristopher. Under the plan, Mother and the children 

were to stay with the children’s maternal great grandparents, and Mother 

was not allowed to take the children out of the home. Two days later, 

however, Mother’s relatives notified DCS that Mother had taken the 

children and left the home. DCS took the children into temporary physical 

1 Neither father is a party to this appeal.
EMILY L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

custody later that day, after Mother reportedly had taken them to 

Kristopher and was planning to rent a car, leave Arizona, and drive them

to Michigan. On May 21, DCS held a Team Decision Making meeting and

implemented an in-home safety plan involving the maternal grandparents.

¶6 On May 26, DCS filed a dependency petition, alleging the 

children were dependent as to Mother due to neglect based on substance 

abuse and inappropriate supervision.2 The petition alleged in part that 

Mother had left the children in Kristopher’s care despite his substance 

abuse and substance-abuse-related behaviors, and she had failed to get 

appropriate medical care for the children.

¶7 DCS referred Mother to TERROS for a substance-abuse 

assessment, but after completing the intake, Mother did not meet the 

criteria for substance-abuse treatment. TERROS then recommended she

receive individual mental health counseling and a psychiatric evaluation 

based on her self-reported anxiety and depression. Mother self-referred 

through her insurance for those services. Meanwhile, Kristopher continued 

to test positive for cocaine use.

¶8 At the June 2 temporary custody hearing, Mother testified 

Kristopher would be moving to Michigan within two days. Presumably, 

therefore, he would no longer be involved in the children’s lives. On 

August 31, however, Mother informed the DCS case manager that she and 

Kristopher were still in a relationship. Moreover, Kristopher continued to 

see the children during supervised visitation, despite that as of September 

2020, Kristopher had not engaged in substance abuse treatment. The case 

manager testified that although Mother claimed to understand the danger 

presented by Kristopher’s substance abuse and planned for him to move 

out of her residence, she also minimized the issue. Mother and Kristopher 

continued in their relationship until October 6, when Mother contacted the 

2 Although Mother tested negative for all substances on May 5, 2020, 

family members had reported Mother was routinely and admittedly 

abusing cocaine. At the June 2 temporary custody hearing, the DCS case 

manager testified DCS had asked Mother to continue testing, and although 

“she was supposed to call in [for possible testing] seven times, [] she missed 

five.” Nonetheless, Mother subsequently tested negative in the following 

months, and at the October 20 dependency hearing, the DCS case manager 

testified DCS was no longer concerned about Mother’s alleged substance 

abuse. Moreover, the juvenile court did not find the children dependent as 

to Mother based on substance abuse. We therefore do not address Mother’s 

argument that DCS failed to prove neglect based on substance abuse.
EMILY L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

case manager to tell him that Kristopher was harassing her and she planned 

to leave him, stay at a hotel, and file for a restraining order. Mother did not 

file for the restraining order but claimed to have had no further contact with 

Kristopher in the two weeks before the October 20 dependency hearing.

3

¶9 Mother was also referred for parent-aide services, and she 

began engaging in those services in late September. By the time of the 

October 20 dependency hearing, she had completed an intake and “a couple 

of skill sessions.” She still had ten diminished skill capacities, however, 

including her ability “to protect [the children] against [Kristopher] and 

recognize threats.” A.G. had recently been diagnosed with autism and was 

non-verbal, and the case manager discussed with Mother how she would 

care for the two youngest children while she was at work if they were to be 

returned home.

4 Mother had no identified plan, however. Mother’s lack of 

a plan raised concerns because Mother had a “toxic relationship” with the 

maternal grandparents, wanted no involvement from them whatsoever, 

and generally “want[ed] to remain cut off [from] her family.” Thus, DCS 

was concerned that without daycare or other childcare services in place, 

Mother might revert to relying on Kristopher for help with the children.

5

¶10 On October 20, 2020, the juvenile court conducted the 

dependency adjudication hearing. After taking the matter under 

advisement, the court found the children dependent as to Mother, while

noting Mother’s diminished protective capacities and the short period since 

the breakup of her long-term relationship with Kristopher.

¶11 Mother timely filed a notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction 

under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-235(A), 12-

120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

3 At the October 20 dependency hearing, Mother testified Kristopher 

had not been living with her for approximately “a couple months.”

4 Four days before the dependency hearing, DCS placed the eldest 

child, H.R., with Nicholas, her biological father, who lives in North Dakota. 

The two youngest children remained placed with the maternal 

grandparents.

5 At the time of the dependency hearing, Mother’s relationship with

Kristopher had just recently ended, and the DCS case manager expressed 

concern it might not truly be over.
EMILY L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶12 We review an order adjudicating a child dependent for an 

abuse of discretion and will not disturb the ruling unless no reasonable 

evidence supports it. Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 13

(App. 2016). In a dependency matter, the juvenile court’s primary 

consideration is the best interests of the children. Michael M. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 230, 234, ¶ 17 (App. 2007). The juvenile court is vested 

with “a great deal of discretion,” Cochise Cnty. Juv. Action No. 5666-J, 133 

Ariz. 157, 160 (1982), in part because that court is “in the best position to 

weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe the parties, 

and make appropriate factual findings,” Pima Cnty. Dependency Action No. 

93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546 (App. 1987). We do not reweigh the evidence on 

review. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 

2002).

¶13 To find a child dependent as to a parent, the juvenile court 

must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations contained 

in the petition are true. A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1). A “dependent child” includes

a child adjudicated to be:

(i) In need of proper and effective parental care and control 

and who has . . . no parent or guardian willing to exercise or 

capable of exercising such care and control [or]

. . . .

(iii) A child whose home is unfit by reason of . . . neglect[6]. . . 

by a parent, a guardian or any other person having custody 

or care of the child.

A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a).

¶14 Mother argues the juvenile court failed to address the 

dependency petition’s allegation of inappropriate supervision and instead 

found the children dependent for reasons other than those alleged in the 

petition. She contends that DCS’ concerns at the time of trial—including 

6 Under A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a), “neglect” means “[t]he inability or 

unwillingness of a parent . . . to provide [her] child with supervision, food, 

clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes 

unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.”
EMILY L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

that she (1) had no clear childcare plan, (2) had a strained and contentious 

relationship with the maternal grandparents, (3) had only recently begun 

engaging in parent-aide services, (4) had a child (A.G.) recently diagnosed 

with autism, (5) had expressed concerns over her mental health, (6) lacked

a support system, and (7) had only recently separated from Kristopher—

were unrelated to the dependency petition’s allegation of inappropriate 

supervision. Mother further argues no reasonable evidence supports the 

finding of dependency based on improper supervision.

¶15 Here, the dependency petition alleged the children were 

dependent due to inappropriate supervision, which was manifested in

Mother’s leaving the children with Kristopher as the children’s primary 

caregiver—despite Kristopher abusing cocaine and displaying substanceabuse-related behaviors while caring for the children—and Mother 

subsequently violating the present danger plan by taking the children to 

Kristopher and planning to leave Arizona with them. The juvenile court 

found that “Mother allowed contact with [Kristopher] after being informed 

of [Kristopher’s] substance abuse and the dangers it presented to the 

children.” The court also found Mother “has several diminished protective 

capacities”—primarily related to her inability to protect the children from 

Kristopher’s substance abuse—and noted she “has not [yet] enhanced any 

of these protective capacities” during her brief engagement with parentaide services. Finally, the court noted that although Mother testified that 

she had discontinued her relationship with Kristopher two weeks earlier, 

“it has been a short period of time given the length of their relationship.” 

The juvenile court’s findings—that Mother left the children in Kristopher’s 

care despite his cocaine abuse, violated the present danger plan, planned to 

leave Arizona with the children and Kristopher, and claimed to have ended 

her relationship with Kristopher only two weeks before the dependency 

hearing—all related to the allegation in the petition that Mother was 

inappropriately supervising the children.

¶16 Moreover, reasonable evidence supported the juvenile court’s 

findings. Although Mother claimed to be unaware of Kristopher’s cocaine 

use, he initially tested positive for an extremely high level of cocaine,

continued to test positive, and reportedly displayed behaviors related to 

substance abuse around the children. Further, Mother acknowledged she 

left her grandparents’ home with the children, which was a violation of the 

agreed-upon present danger plan, and the children reported Mother took

them to Kristopher and was planning to leave Arizona with them. And 

although Mother had begun parent-aide services, she still had ten 

diminished skill capacities at the time of the dependency hearing, including 

her capacity to protect the children against Kristopher and recognize threats
EMILY L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

to the children. Finally, although Mother testified that she ended the 

relationship with Kristopher as of October 6, the court had strong reason to

question the permanence of the breakup, given that she testified similarly 

at the June 2 temporary custody hearing. Yet, Kristopher remained in 

Arizona and continued to see Mother and the children. See Dependency 

Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. at 546 (recognizing it is the juvenile court’s 

province to judge the credibility of the parties). Reasonable evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s order adjudicating the children dependent as 

to Mother.

7

CONCLUSION

¶17 The juvenile court’s order adjudicating the children 

dependent as to Mother is affirmed.

7 Without fully developing her argument, Mother also argues the 

juvenile court failed to consider as a mitigating factor the availability of 

reasonable services to her to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of 

the children and her efforts to obtain and participate in services. See A.R.S. 

§ 8-844(B). We disagree. The juvenile court clearly considered the services 

Mother received, including the present danger/safety plan initiated by 

DCS, Mother’s substance abuse assessment with TERROS, which 

recommended counseling and a psychiatric evaluation, and Mother’s 

engagement in parent-aide services.