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China’s Global Activism: 

Strategy, Drivers, and Tools
China’s Global Activism:

Strategy, Drivers, and Tools

by Phillip C. Saunders

Institute for National Strategic Studies 

Occasional Paper 4

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

October 2006
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Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Sources and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Grand Strategy, Economic Development, and

Foreign Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Drivers of China’s Increasing Global Activism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Tools for Chinese Global Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Data on Chinese Regional Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Is China’s Increased Global Activism the 

Product of a Global Strategy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Outlook and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Appendix: Regional Data

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Total Exports Destined for China from Asia—1993, 1998, 2003, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

PRC FDI to Asia Excluding SARs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Asia Percent of Total PRC FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Total Exports Destined for China from Africa—1993, 1998, 2003, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

PRC FDI to Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Africa Percent of Total PRC FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
vi OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Total Exports Destined for China from Latin America—1993, 1998, 2003, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

PRC FDI to Latin America Excluding FDI Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Latin America Percent of Total PRC FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

The Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Total Exports Destined for China from Middle East—1993, 1998, 2003, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Chinese Infrastructure Projects in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

PRC FDI to Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Middle East Percent of Total PRC FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

The Former Soviet Union and South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Total Exports Destined for China from the Former Soviet Union and South Asia—

1993, 1998, 2003, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Chinese Infrastructure Projects in the Former Soviet Union and South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

PRC FDI to the Former Soviet Union and South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Former Soviet Union and South Asia Percent of Total PRC FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Total Exports Destined for China from Europe—1993, 1998, 2003, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

PRC FDI to Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Europe Percent of Total PRC FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
vii

Acknowledgments

My analysis for this project draws heavily upon a wealth of data collected by a team of contractors and 

research assistants over a 6-month period. I would like to acknowledge their specific contributions. 

Daniel Melleby served as research coordinator for the project. He played a critical role in identifying 

data sources and collection methods, writing the research protocol to ensure consistency of data collection 

and analysis across different regions, collecting data for some key items, training and organizing the regional 

researchers, and conducting quality reviews of the collected data. He created many of the graphics and maps 

in the report and provided timely and extremely helpful comments on the first draft. This paper could not 

have been completed without his contributions.

Henry Yep worked as an intern and research assistant on the project. His contributions included helping identify data sources and methods, collecting much of the Asia data and centrally collected data to validate the data collection profile, creating a variety of graphics and tables, and providing comments on the draft 

report. He was also invaluable in preparing the report (and especially its graphics) for publication.

Tanya Hoke worked as an intern and research assistant on the project. Her contributions included helping to identify data sources and methods and collecting much of the Asia data to validate the data collection 

profile. She also found the graphics software used to create the maps in the appendix.

Tamara Shie provided administrative support for the contractors, research assistants, and interns working on the project. She collected some of the Asia data, commented on the draft report, and drafted the text 

boxes Island Fever, Train in Vain? and Anatomy of a State Visit. Her cogent analysis of Chinese activities in the 

South Pacific informed the argument.

Contractors/research assistants who collected data and performed analysis on Chinese activities in 

individual regions included Arturo Hines (Europe); Reza Marashi (Middle East); Sonia Nagda (South Asia/

Former Soviet Union); Nicholas Samuelson (Latin America); and Ross van Horn (Africa). Lora Saalman 

also assisted with the collection of Africa data. Catherine O’Keefe collected and analyzed data on Chinese 

trade. Sonia Nagda, Reza Marashi, and Ross van Horn provided concise analysis on Chinese activities in their 

regions that informed the paper’s arguments. Reza Marashi and Ross van Horn also provided useful comments and proofreading assistance on the first draft.

Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) intern Brian Harding came late to the project but provided timely research assistance at critical moments. He drafted the text box Language and Soft Power. INSS 

interns Daniel Michaeli and Erik Quan proofread the manuscript; INSS research assistant Steven Duke 

assisted with final editing and proofreading.

I would like to thank INSS Director Stephen J. Flanagan and INSS Research Director James Schear 

for their strong support and their insightful and timely comments on multiple drafts. Col. Anne Moisan, 

USAF, Don Mosser, and Deborah Jefferson found space for researchers and processed their contracts. INSS 

colleagues James Przystup, Renata Louie, Jay Cope, and Robert Oakley graciously shared their expertise. 

Dr. Jeffrey Smotherman of NDU Press was responsible for copyediting.

Several experts commented on drafts: Ellen Frost (Institute of International Economics); Erica S. Downs 

(Brookings Institution); Leif Rosenberger (U.S. Pacific Command); David Helvey (Office of the Secretary of 

Defense); LTC Heino Klinck (U.S. Defense Attache Office Beijing); Bernard Cole (National War College); 

and Cynthia Watson (National War College). Others helped to locate data sources: Mikkal Herberg (National 

Bureau of Asian Research); David Zweig (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology); Jason Kindopp 

(Eurasia Group); and Eric Heginbotham (RAND). Thanks to all for their assistance.

Linnea Claire Saunders and Miles Campbell Saunders tried their best to ensure this report was never 

finished; Julie Hayne made sure they did not succeed.

—Phillip C. Saunders
viii

Sources and Methodology

Much of the underlying data for this report was compiled by a team of contractors and research assistants working under the supervision of Dr. Phillip C. Saunders and research coordinator Daniel Melleby. The 

researchers were assigned to different regions and followed a detailed research protocol designed to ensure 

data comparability across regions. Some data (such as China’s trade statistics and outbound foreign direct 

investment) was collected centrally for all regions. Sources for most specific statistics and references are cited 

using endnotes.

Trade data is from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNCOMTRADE) online, 

available at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/default.aspx>. Chinese trade data from this source is 

derived from Chinese customs statistics and does not accurately account for goods imported and re-exported 

through Hong Kong. 

Chinese inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) was obtained from various editions of the Almanac 

of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the China Statistical Yearbook. Chinese outbound FDI 

data for 1992–2004 was obtained from the China Commerce Yearbook (formerly the Yearbook of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade prior to 2004) published annually by the Ministry of Commerce. Except 

for aggregate totals, most outbound figures and percentages exclude FDI in China’s special administrative 

regions Hong Kong and Macao and FDI transiting FDI havens Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Virgin 

Islands to other destinations. 

Information on Chinese diplomatic agreements and leadership travel was compiled from a variety of 

sources. The starting point was various editions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual book China’s Foreign Affairs (Beijing: World Affairs Press). Both Chinese and English editions were used. This source was 

supplemented by targeted Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Lexis, and Google searches.

Aggregate total data for Chinese foreign assistance is taken from the 2003–2005 editions of the China 

Statistical Yearbook. Researchers also used targeted FBIS and Lexis searches to collect details of Chinese assistance to particular countries and for particular projects.

Chinese infrastructure data was collected from comprehensive searches in Lexis-Nexis and the Open 

Source Center/FBIS. The year listed next to a project signifies either when the project was initially proposed 

or the date of the project’s completion. 

Values of Chinese infrastructure investments and foreign assistance were occasionally cited in currencies other than U.S. dollars. OANDA.com (http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory) was used to provide 

historic currency conversion rates between the cited currency and the U.S. dollar on the date of the open 

source article which cited the nondollar amount, or as close to it as possible if an exchange rate was not available on that particular day. All valuations are in current, not constant, dollars.
Executive Summary

Chinese leaders are pursuing a long-term grand strategy based on maintaining a peaceful international environment that allows China to build the economic and technological foundations necessary to 

become a rich and powerful country.

■ This strategy supports the Chinese leadership’s domestic objective of maintaining Communist 

Party rule by building an advanced economy and raising living standards.

■ Chinese leaders are focused on domestic challenges and view continued rapid economic growth as 

essential to maintaining social stability. Despite fears of U.S. and Japanese hostile actions, they have 

repeatedly compromised on strategic issues as necessary to maintain economic growth.

■ In practice, Chinese foreign policy reflects efforts to balance strategic and economic considerations and to coordinate the activities of diverse Chinese economic and political actors to advance 

national goals. Efforts to formulate coherent policy are impeded by bureaucratic and political conflicts of interest, while policy implementation is often hindered by incentives of Chinese actors to 

evade government directives that conflict with their interests.

China’s increased global activism is intended to secure inputs for the economy; protect against a possible U.S. containment strategy; expand Chinese political influence; and pursue Chinese commercial interests. The timing and pattern of China’s increased activism in different regions has evolved along largely 

independent strategic and economic tracks.

■ The strategic track is driven by international threats and opportunities and by China’s changing role 

in the global balance of power (with leadership fears of possible U.S. actions to contain or subvert 

China as a major factor).

◽ The end of the Cold War led China to establish relations with former Soviet states and anticommunist countries such as South Korea, Indonesia, and South Africa.

◽ China’s moves to strengthen ties in Asia (since 1996) and active efforts to promote Asian organizations that exclude the United States (since 2001) reflect a desire to deny Washington regional 

support for any potential attempt to contain China or to intervene in a Taiwan conflict. China 

seeks to reduce U.S. influence in Asia gradually.

◽ Chinese efforts to build or strengthen strategic partnerships with Russia, key European countries, and emerging powers such as India have intensified since 2001 to prevent their participation in any potential U.S. effort to contain China and to encourage them to play a more independent international role.

■ The economic track is driven primarily by development needs and by China’s changing role in the 

world economy. China’s increasing demand for economic inputs and for access to export markets 

follows a logic and geography independent of strategic concerns.

◽ China has become increasingly dependent on exports to and investment from developed countries to maintain economic growth, including dependence on countries, such as the United 

States and Japan, that its leaders regard as potential threats.

◽ The need to secure access to oil, natural gas, and other resources has prompted aggressive efforts 

by state-owned firms to purchase resources or establish long-term supply contracts. The Chinese 

government is using state economic and diplomatic resources to support these efforts. Resource 

access has led China to build close relations with questionable regimes, such as those in Iran, 

Sudan, Angola, and Burma.

◽ The dramatic increase in Chinese activity in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and (to a 

lesser degree) Central Asia since 2001 reflects efforts to acquire resources and to build export 

markets in developing countries. Chinese companies are also being pushed to go overseas by 


domestic competition. Many countries in these regions share China’s interest in resisting U.S. 

efforts to promote democracy and to intervene in other countries.

China’s economic and strategic objectives sometimes conflict, while policies are implemented by government and business actors whose interests often clash with each other and with central government objectives.

■ When strategic concerns threaten to interfere with economic growth, Chinese leaders have repeatedly compromised or pursued policies that allow growth to continue. Chinese policy toward Taiwan conforms to this pattern, although Beijing would likely use force to prevent Taiwan independence despite the economic costs.

■ The Chinese government uses campaigns (such as the “go global” campaign), economic and political incentives, and mechanisms such as senior leadership travel to try to coordinate government 

and business efforts and to resolve internal conflicts.

■ Efforts at policy coordination have produced some impressive tactical successes, such as Hu Jintao’s 

2004 trip to Latin America. However, conflicts of interest and personal incentives often lead companies, ministries, and local leaders to evade government directives and to pursue their own interests at the expense of central government goals.

China employs a variety of tools to exercise influence. Economic and diplomatic tools are the most 

important, with security assistance playing an important role in some regions and with some countries. 

Soft power and military power are less effective instruments of Chinese power (and may be negative factors in dealing with some countries).

China’s increased global activism has significantly expanded Chinese commitment of resources to 

improving relations with key countries and regions since 2001. Leadership travel, outbound foreign direct 

investment (FDI), development assistance, and trade ties have all increased dramatically and are likely to 

increase further in the sixteenth 5-year program (2006–2010).

■ China’s FDI and development assistance efforts are modest compared with U.S., European Union, 

and Japanese programs, but China uses them effectively and strategically to advance its interests.

■ China’s recent commitments to increase FDI and development assistance to Africa, Latin America, 

and the Middle East are much larger than historical levels. China probably significantly increased 

resources allocated to these activities in its 2006 5-year program.

■ The pattern of China’s actual resource allocation reflects both strategic interests (in relations with 

great powers and Asian countries) and economic interests (in securing resources and expanding 

markets in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East).

China’s increased global activism has significantly expanded its influence in Asia, Latin America, 

Africa, and the Middle East since 2001.

■ Beijing has taken advantage of opportunities created by the U.S. focus on terrorism, the unpopularity of some American policies (especially in the Muslim world), and by relative U.S. neglect of Latin 

America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

■ A backlash is developing as Chinese goods displace local products, the Chinese commercial and 

labor presence produces frictions with local workers, and heightened expectations for Chinese 

investment and development assistance are not fulfilled.

■ China’s increased influence should be kept in perspective. Chinese military power projection capability remains limited. Chinese businesses are taking their first steps in efforts to become global 

multinationals; 60 percent of China’s exports currently are produced by foreign-invested firms. 

China still operates within the framework of global institutions established by the United States.

	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4
Introduction

China’s leaders have achieved remarkable success in building a booming economy and holding their 

political system together for 15 years after communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 

Although prospects for continued growth are good, Chinese leaders confront an international system 

dominated by the United States and a globalized world economy where sophisticated multinational corporations possess technology and management skills decades ahead of their Chinese competitors. China also 

faces a host of domestic challenges, ranging from the environmental degradation produced by headlong 

growth to social tensions created by rising inequality between coastal and interior provinces and between 

rural and urban workers. A senior public security official recently admitted that there were more than 

74,000 mass protests involving 3.7 million people in 2004.1

The party’s response emphasizes efforts to alleviate social pressures by reducing the tax burden on 

rural residents and devising economic policies that will produce more balanced growth with fewer negative 

side effects. This represents an adjustment from previous policies focused on maximizing growth rates, but 

Chinese leaders will still emphasize the importance of continued rapid economic growth for maintaining 

domestic stability and attaining long-term policy goals. A prolonged economic downturn or slowdown in 

growth would aggravate social problems and likely stimulate increased protests. 

Economic imperatives and strategic challenges are leading China to expand its international activities into different regions of the world. This paper analyzes the rationale and drivers for China’s increased 

global activism; examines the tools China is employing and how they are being used; assesses the empirical evidence about priorities and patterns in China’s global activities; and considers whether these activities 

reflect an underlying strategic design. The paper concludes with an overview of likely future developments 

and an assessment of the implications for the United States.

Grand Strategy, Economic Development, and Foreign Policy Priorities

Over the last 25 years, economic reforms have transformed the Chinese system from a backward and 

isolated economy run by inefficient central planning mechanisms into a large and rapidly growing economy 

driven primarily by market forces and increasingly integrated into a globalized world. This process has been 

uneven and has reflected experimentation, openness to outside economic advice, and pragmatic decisionmaking rather than a coherent master plan.2

 The Chinese government has opened its economy to foreign investment and international competition, eased social controls over its population, and reduced the state’s role in 

the economy as foreign, private, and collectively owned firms account for an increasing share of production.

Beijing’s economic reforms (and broader foreign policy) reflect both a relatively coherent grand strategy for building China into a wealthy and powerful state and a domestic strategy for ensuring the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party. The grand strategy stresses the need for a stable international 

and regional environment in which China can modernize its economy and improve its relative power position. Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 declaration that the world had entered a new era of “peace and development” 

provided a political justification to reduce defense spending and focus on economic development. China 

improved relations with other major powers and made strategic compromises to preserve an international 

environment conducive to development. Its relative economic backwardness and low technology base 

mean China will need an extended period of time to catch up with other great powers. Developing the 

capacity for indigenous technology innovation will be difficult and will likely require significant changes 

in China’s industrial structure.3 But over the long term, Chinese leaders hope to develop the economic and 

technological foundations that will create a rich and powerful country.

This international grand strategy has been accompanied by domestic efforts to build new sources 

of political support for the Communist Party as belief in Marxist ideology has eroded. This need became 

acute after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 

Union. Chinese leaders have emphasized the importance of rapid growth as a strategy for regime survival, 

with the goal of rebuilding legitimacy by demonstrating the party’s ability to build an advanced economy 

and to raise living standards. Leaders have also sought to build and appeal to Chinese nationalism.

CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM 
When strategic concerns or foreign policy conflicts have threatened to interfere with the conditions 

necessary for growth, Chinese leaders have made pragmatic compromises to keep the economy expanding. 

China has welcomed trade and investment from politically suspect sources, including Western democracies, 

Japan, and political rival Taiwan. Despite suspicions that the United States seeks to subvert China’s political 

system, leaders have welcomed U.S. investment and become increasingly dependent on exports to the United 

States. When the United States used renewal of China’s most-favored-nation status to press for human rights 

improvements in the 1990s, China grudgingly made the concessions necessary to maintain trade ties. China 

has also curtailed nuclear cooperation with countries such as Iran and Pakistan and reduced or eliminated 

assistance to Syrian, Iranian, and Pakistani missile programs in response to U.S. pressure.

Despite increased fears of movement toward Taiwanese independence since 1999, China has not 

responded to assertions of sovereignty by Taiwan political leaders with force and has tolerated increased 

U.S. arms sales and security cooperation with Taiwan. Chinese leaders appear to recognize that a military 

conflict with the United States over Taiwan would have severe consequences for China’s economic modernization (and thus for its internal stability). Similarly, when anti-Japanese sentiment has escalated to a 

point where it threatens economic ties, Chinese leaders have suppressed protests at some domestic cost. 

Examples include protests over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1990, 1996, and 1999.4 The Chinese government tolerated March 2005 street demonstrations against Japan, but moved to contain the protests when they began to threaten Japanese businesses. Shanghai city leaders subsequently assured Japanese 

businessmen that the government would protect their interests.5

Strategic and Economic Drivers of Increased Global Activism 

Over the last 15 years, Chinese international economic interests have expanded, and Chinese foreign 

policy has become more active in response. The timing and pattern of China’s increased involvement in 

different regions of the world have evolved along largely independent strategic and economic tracks.

The strategic track is driven primarily by international threats and opportunities and China’s changing role in the global balance of power (and especially its relationship with the United States). China’s 

relative weakness and the possibility of hostile action by the United States for purposes of containment or 

subversion are persistent concerns for Chinese leaders. 

The economic track is driven mainly by economic development and China’s changing role in the world 

economy. Increasing demand for inputs such as capital, technology, natural resources, and management 

expertise and for access to markets follows a logic and geography independent of strategic concerns. Despite 

Chinese strategic worries about the United States and Japan, economic ties with both countries have deepened steadily over the last 15 years, with China becoming increasingly dependent on exports to those nations.

Coordinating these competing strategic and economic demands is a central challenge for Chinese 

policymakers, who see important roles for the state in helping the economy to develop. Given intense international competition for energy and other natural resources, they believe national firms need state assistance to secure access to resources. China’s position as a latecomer to international resource markets and 

the economy’s surging demand for inputs make resource access critical for sustaining economic growth. 

Chinese leaders regard commercial diplomacy as an effective means of leveraging political ties to secure 

access to resources and expand export markets. Many also believe the state can intervene in the market successfully by providing incentives and subsidies to help achieve goals such as securing access to resources, 

upgrading the technology capability of firms, and increasing the value-added component of exports.

Balancing Economic Opportunities and Strategic Concerns 

Efforts to balance strategic threats and the demands of economic growth have been a constant thread of 

Chinese foreign policy since 1989. Economic considerations generally have taken priority, but developments 

such as the end of the Cold War have also prompted increased Chinese activism in some countries and regions. 

Foreign policy objectives over the last 15 years can be divided into three broad periods.

Overcoming post-Tiananmen isolation and the end of the Cold War (1989–1996). Chinese leaders 

sought to end diplomatic isolation and ward off economic sanctions. Japan and Southeast Asian countries 

	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4
played a crucial role in supporting China’s reentry into the international community. The end of the Cold 

War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union allowed China to establish relations with anticommunist 

countries such as South Korea, Indonesia, and South Africa and to become active in Central Asia and the 

former Soviet Union to deny Taiwan diplomatic opportunities. Widespread international recognition of 

China’s economic potential in 1992–1993 facilitated Chinese efforts to expand diplomatic and economic 

ties. This period ended in 1996 as Beijing’s military encroachments in the South China Sea and 1995–1996 

missile diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait created fears that a strong and reckless China might destabilize Asia.

Reassuring Asian neighbors and building constructive relations with the United States and European 

powers (1996–1999). Beijing responded to widespread concerns about a “China threat” by moderating its 

approach to territorial disputes in Asia and seeking to improve ties with Washington and European capitals. 

China’s approaches to Asia were generally successful and reciprocated. China stressed “omni-directional diplomacy” to build stable relations with neighboring countries in Asia (including resolving most 

land border disputes, sometimes via territorial concessions). Beijing earned plaudits during the Asian 

financial crisis for maintaining the value of its currency and offering financial assistance. Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries welcomed China into regional organizations and dialogues 

as part of a conscious strategy of engaging and entangling Beijing in a web of multilateral institutions. For 

its part, China learned to practice multilateral diplomacy effectively (including new initiatives such as the 

regional consultations that produced the Shanghai Cooperation Organization).

China’s restrained behavior and the lure of its market helped repair relations with Europe, but 

efforts to build a constructive strategic partnership with Washington via summit diplomacy collapsed in 

1999 amid accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage. North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention in 

Kosovo, the accidental bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade (which many Chinese believe was deliberate), a reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance, Taiwan’s efforts to assert its sovereignty, and U.S. efforts to develop 

ballistic missile defenses all highlighted the possibility of a confrontation with the United States.

In 1999, Chinese analysts debated whether these developments marked an end to the “era of peace 

and development” that required fundamental changes in Chinese policy. This debate ended with the leadership’s formal reaffirmation of the peaceful nature of the international environment.6 However, this decision was hedged by intensified efforts to build Chinese military capabilities, including annual double-digit 

real increases in Chinese military budgets. 

Dealing with U.S. hegemony (1999–present). Despite deep suspicions about the intentions of the 

United States, China was becoming increasingly dependent on access to the U.S. market and needed 

U.S. support for entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Beijing wrestled with several different 

approaches to its Washington problem.

China’s 1999–2001 diplomatic campaign to mobilize international opposition to U.S. ballistic missile 

defenses and potential withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ended in failure when European 

countries refused to confront the United States and Moscow cut a deal with Washington on strategic arms 

reductions that ignored Chinese concerns. This campaign represented an attempt to mobilize other great 

powers to counterbalance American power.

Chinese leaders recognized that a coalition to restrain the United States was infeasible because of 

the high value other great powers placed on cooperation with Washington. They decided that China must 

reach an accommodation with the United States and communicated their intention to improve relations 

with the next U.S. administration to U.S. Asia policymakers in fall 2000.

Beijing’s efforts to stabilize ties with Washington were facilitated by the 9/11 attacks, which refocused 

U.S. attention on terrorism and increased the value of security cooperation with China (including on 

managing the North Korean nuclear crisis). China made a number of policy adjustments to stabilize and 

improve bilateral relations with the United States. Beijing tolerated increasing U.S. security cooperation 

with Taiwan, especially after the Bush administration demonstrated that it would act to restrain moves 

toward Taiwan independence. Chinese analysts regard President Bush’s December 2003 public statement 

alongside Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that the United States opposed any Taiwan comments and actions 

that challenged the status quo as a particularly significant U.S. commitment.7

CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM 
	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

Although China opposed U.S. and British efforts to enforce Security Council resolutions in Iraq 

through military means, Beijing rejected entreaties from France and Germany to take the diplomatic lead in 

opposing the Iraq war.8 Chinese officials have also sought to reassure Washington that China regards the U.S. 

military presence in Asia as a stabilizing factor and does not seek to push the United States out of Asia.

Stabilizing relations with the United States has been a key part of China’s foreign policy, but China has 

also made increased efforts to strengthen ties with other countries wary of perceived U.S. unilateralism and 

disregard for international norms. In 2001–2002, China established strategic partnerships with major European countries and began to repair ties with India. China also deepened economic and political ties within 

East Asia via its relationship with ASEAN and the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) grouping. 

After entering the WTO in November 2001, China refocused its economic diplomacy on the tasks of 

securing access to energy and other resources, building competitive international companies, and opening developing country markets to Chinese goods and investment. This led to a major increase in Chinese 

resources devoted to Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

U.S. distraction and neglect have created opportunities for an increased Chinese diplomatic and economic role in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle 

East and perceived anti-Islamic actions in prosecuting the global war against terrorism have made China’s 

nonpolitical approach relatively attractive. Countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria view China as a 

potential means of resisting U.S. economic and political pressure. Beijing has also found many developing 

countries willing to cooperate in quiet efforts to defend the principle of sovereignty, resist U.S. attempts to 

assert a right to democratic governance, and oppose U.S. intervention.

Drivers of China’s Increasing Global Activism

The previous section described how China’s grand strategy of maintaining a peaceful international 

environment to pursue economic development and its domestic strategy of using rapid growth to rebuild 

domestic support for the Chinese Communist Party prompted an expansion of Chinese economic and diplomatic activity across different countries and regions. Four specific motivations stand out as key drivers 

of increased Chinese global activism: securing inputs for the economy; protecting against a potential U.S. 

containment strategy; expanding Chinese political influence; and pursuing Chinese commercial interests.

Securing Inputs for the Economy 

One key driver of China’s global involvement is the need to secure access to energy and other resources 

necessary for continued economic growth. Imports to fuel China’s rapid growth in 2003–2004 are the 

major cause of large jumps in the world prices of commodities such as copper, steel, iron ore, cement, and 

aluminum, and a contributing factor in higher oil and gas prices. Senior Chinese leaders have highlighted 

energy security as an essential issue for China’s future. 

The Chinese energy debate focuses both on supply security and on the need to keep energy prices as 

low as possible.9 Chinese leaders appear to recognize the need for market-oriented energy prices to spur 

increased energy efficiency, but concerns about the negative impact on economic growth and employment 

have impeded efforts to move completely to market prices. China has begun construction of a strategic oil 

reserve as part of efforts to increase energy security. The choice of above-ground storage facilities suggests 

leaders are more concerned about supply disruptions than hostile military action. China has delayed purchases to fill its first completed storage facilities due to high international oil prices.

China’s economy makes relatively inefficient use of energy, using about three times as much energy 

per dollar of gross domestic product as the United States. Continued growth, coupled with increased use of 

automobiles, will make China increasingly dependent on imported oil and gas supplies. International Energy 

Agency projections suggest Chinese oil imports will rise from the current level of 6.37 million barrels per day 

(bpd) to roughly 14 million bpd by 2030. By 2030, China will depend on imported oil for approximately 75 

percent of its total demand, with supplies coming mainly from the Persian Gulf.10 Demand for natural gas is 

also projected to increase dramatically, though coal will remain China’s primary energy source.
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 

A growing trade surplus and ample foreign currency reserves allow China to pay for imported 

energy, but leaders are reluctant to rely on international markets to secure access to energy and critical 

inputs. This reflects suspicions that the United States and other Western countries dominate the world 

economy and can use their economic power to deny China access to energy and other materials. The 

1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, when countries such as Indonesia and South Korea were punished by 

financial markets and forced to make policy concessions to secure assistance from the International Monetary Fund, increased China’s emphasis on “economic security” in its thinking about globalization. The 

fifth plenum communiqué issued in October 2005 highlights increasing global competition for resources 

as a key international trend.

The preferred approach to resource security is for Chinese firms (usually state-owned enterprises) 

to own equity in the resource. This provides access in times of scarcity and gives some protection against 

price shocks (if the government can persuade firms to supply resources to customers at below-market 

prices). Chinese enterprises have been willing to purchase minority equity shares and to enter into joint 

ventures to gain access to resources. In cases where equity is not available, China has pursued long-term 

supply contracts (which typically guarantee supply but charge prevailing market prices). Its long-term oil 

and gas supply contracts with Iran are examples.

The geographical distribution of energy and other resources dictates where China must go to secure 

supplies. As late entrants to the market, Chinese firms face conditions where the best resource supplies are 

often committed to long-term contracts or being exploited by nationally owned firms. Chinese companies 

are therefore drawn to sites where political conditions limit competition by Western multinationals (such as 

Iran, Sudan, and Angola) or where resources are difficult or expensive to recover. However, Chinese firms 

often lack the advanced technology necessary to exploit some available oil and gas deposits.

Increasing dependence on imported energy and resources (and the need to transport large quantities of export goods to trade partners) makes China heavily dependent on reliable transportation, with sea 

lines of communications (SLOCs) particularly important. Tankers carrying oil and gas to China from the 

Middle East travel through the narrow Malacca Strait, where they are vulnerable to piracy and the possibility of terrorist action. China must also reckon with the U.S. Navy, which has global reach and the potential 

ability to interdict China’s energy and trade routes. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has only 

limited power projection capability and lacks the ships and overseas bases necessary to sustain a naval 

presence along, let alone control over, the SLOCs that are vital to Chinese economic prosperity.11 Chinese 

naval strategists have written extensively about this vulnerability.

Protecting Against a Potential U.S. Containment Strategy

A second motivation is to deny the United States the ability to contain China. Many People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) elites see the United States as practicing a strategy of “soft containment” that seeks to limit China’s power and subvert its political system. Recent examples cited by Chinese analysts include Washington’s 

interventions with the European Union to delay a planned lifting of the arms embargo against China and 

efforts to cut off the flow of military technology from Israel. By building good political relations and strong 

economic ties with neighboring countries and other great powers, Beijing hopes to deny Washington partners in any potential future effort to contain China.12

Geography and relative power dictate the focus of these efforts. China is most concerned about 

bordering countries that could provide a foothold for U.S. military actions. This partly explains Chinese 

neuralgia about the U.S. military presence in Central Asia (and intensifies concerns about U.S. security 

ties with Taiwan). China has paid particular attention to key U.S. allies in Asia: Thailand, the Philippines, 

and Australia have all hosted high-level visits by Chinese leaders and received significant Chinese foreign 

investment or economic assistance. 

This objective dictates efforts to build strategic partnerships with other great powers and potential 

power centers:

■ Russia. Beijing’s strategic partnership with Moscow emphasizes cooperation as a means of balancing 

U.S. power. Russian arms sales and technology transfers are key components of the relationship,
	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

but events such as the August 2005 “Peace Mission” joint exercise are intended to convey the relevance of the strategic partnership to regional and global security issues. Activities in the exercise 

(which included amphibious assault training) and extensive press coverage suggest Chinese efforts 

to raise the perceived costs of U.S. and Japanese involvement in a Taiwan conflict.

■ Europe. China has used market access, infrastructure contracts, and purchases of high-value products 

such as airliners to strengthen ties with key European 

countries. Beijing has also used the Asia-Europe 

Meeting and bilateral diplomacy in its efforts to build 

a strategic partnership with the European Union. 

■ India. Beijing has used high-level dialogue and economic cooperation to improve ties with New Delhi 

since 2001. Despite an unresolved border dispute and 

concerns over India’s strategic ambitions, China has 

emphasized joint interests in promoting economic 

opportunities for developing countries and limiting 

U.S. global influence.

China’s international efforts to protect against possible U.S. containment activity rely mostly on political 

actions but also involve attempts to acquire advanced 

military technologies and to expand Chinese intelligence 

collection capabilities. Technology acquisition efforts 

focus primarily on Russia, Western Europe, the United 

States, and Israel. (U.S. efforts to disrupt the longstanding flow of military and dual-use technology from Israel 

to China are likely viewed as part of a U.S. containment 

strategy.) Although China does not have overseas military bases, Chinese firms have supported the expansion 

of port facilities in Pakistan and Burma that may have 

a contingency role for Chinese naval activities. China 

reportedly supports signals intelligence collection facilities in Cuba and Great Coco Island (off the coast of 

Burma) and operates satellite tracking facilities in Kiribati 

(reportedly closed following the government’s shift to 

diplomatic recognition of Taiwan), Pakistan, Kenya, and 

Namibia.13

Expanding Chinese Political Influence

In addition to its traditional emphasis on great 

power diplomacy, Beijing invests resources to build ties 

with small countries whose principal value lies in their 

votes in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 

and other international meetings or organizations. China’s growing involvement in the South Pacific and with 

smaller African countries is a prime example. China 

has a range of motives for building political influence 

with countries in various regions of the world.

Isolating Taiwan. Efforts to achieve unification 

with Taiwan are central to Chinese foreign policy. 

Island Fever

While the United States and its allies 

have gradually scaled back their involvement in the South Pacific since the early 

1990s, China has been increasing its presence. China now has eight embassies in 

the South Pacific (including a care-taking 

group in Kiribati) and the largest number of 

diplomats in the region.

The South Pacific is a key battleground in the China-Taiwan contest for 

diplomatic recognition. Of the 14 Pacific 

Islands Forum members, 8 recognize the 

People’s Republic of China; 6 recognize 

Taiwan. Many of the countries have flipflopped over the years.

Beijing has showered countries with 

major infrastructure and assistance projects 

from a US$5.5 million sports complex in 

Kiribati to the donation of 2 cargo ships 

worth US$9.4 million to Vanuatu. Commercial 

deals emphasize natural resources needed 

in China (such as minerals, timber, and 

fish), while providing much-needed investment for the South Pacific. Agreements 

include a US$625 million nickel and cobalt 

mine in Papua New Guinea and millions to 

upgrade a Cook Islands fishing and processing plant.

China is a major donor to the Pacific 

Islands Forum and the highest paying 

subscriber to the South Pacific Tourism 

Organization. In addition to votes in the 

United Nations, the South Pacific has strategic value to China. In 1997, China established a satellite-tracking station in Kiribati. 

Ostensibly tied to China’s space program, 

the station may have been used to spy 

on U.S. bases in the Marshall Islands. The 

station was dismantled following Kiribati’s 

diplomatic defection to Taiwan in November 2003. Beijing is reportedly looking for 

another place in the region to use as a new 

base of operations.
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 

China’s global competition with Taiwan for exclusive diplomatic recognition is a zero-sum game. The 25 

countries that formally recognize Taiwan (mainly small countries in Latin America, Africa, and the South 

Pacific) and other countries potentially susceptible to financial enticements from Taipei to switch diplomatic recognition receive special attention from Beijing. 

China’s diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan include limiting participation by its representatives in international economic meetings such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; mobilizing international opposition to its annual efforts to join the United Nations and to participate in the World Health Organization; and soliciting statements of support for the “one China principle” from countries that recognize the PRC.

Protecting Chinese interests from adverse international actions. The prototypical example is China’s 

effort to prevent the UN Human Rights Commission from considering resolutions critical of human rights 

conditions in China. Throughout the 1990s, Beijing built diplomatic coalitions and lobbied developing 

countries to prevent debate on human rights conditions in China. Its successful efforts to exempt developing countries from binding obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and to organize opposition to Japanese 

efforts to join the UN Security Council are also examples.

Advancing Chinese diplomatic goals. China’s campaign to enter the WTO in the late 1990s illustrates 

efforts to use political influence on behalf of specific policy objectives. Since 2004, Beijing has sought to 

persuade countries to declare China a “market economy” not subject to stringent anti-dumping actions 

under WTO rules. Beijing has practiced “ricochet diplomacy,” using declarations by small countries 

to press large trading partners to recognize China as a market economy. For example, Singapore’s and 

Malaysia’s declarations of China’s market economy status in May 2004 were used to press other ASEAN 

states to follow suit, which they did at the China-ASEAN summit in Laos in November 2004. China is using 

its recognition as a market economy by 37 countries to press the European Union for a similar status.

Limiting Japan’s international role. The legacy of Japanese imperialism and a growing sense of regional 

rivalry stoke Chinese fears that Japan will become a normal country with military capabilities to match its 

economic and technological prowess. Beijing regularly cites this history to oppose Japanese efforts to relax 

restraints on its military capabilities and activities and to play a larger role in regional and global affairs. 

China supports the U.S.-Japan security alliance so long as it restrains Japan, but fears the alliance might 

play a negative role in efforts to achieve Taiwan unification. Japan’s power and economic presence in Asia 

are seen as obstacles to greater Chinese regional influence.

Pursuing Commercial Interests

Commercial interests are also an important rationale for Chinese global involvement. PRC authorities 

regard rapid economic growth as critical for maintaining social stability, so helping firms pursue commercial 

opportunities overseas is seen as advancing national goals. Leaders have sought to use China’s openness to 

foreign investment to acquire technology and management expertise and to use competition from foreign 

firms operating in China to prepare Chinese companies to compete in the global economy. Three objectives 

are prominent.

Opening new markets for Chinese goods and labor. China’s development strategy has emphasized 

exports to major developed country markets such as the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. 

Exports to these markets have grown rapidly but are beginning to stimulate protectionist reactions. 

China has sought to diversify and develop new export markets, paying particular attention to developing 

countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 

This effort reflects a variety of government and firm motivations:

■ Infrastructure construction in foreign countries increases Chinese access to resources and employs 

Chinese workers. Some construction reportedly may be subsidized or encouraged by the Chinese 

government to build political influence in particular countries.

■ Improvements in port, road, river, and rail transportation networks in Southeast Asia help develop 

southwest China, improve access to regional markets, and create alternate pathways for energy and 

goods that bypass potential chokepoints in the Malacca Straits.14
10	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

■ Individual firms that lack the technology or management skills to compete successfully in domestic 

markets can use exports or investment in less competitive developing markets as a survival strategy. 

Surveys of Chinese firms cite intense competition in the China market as an important motivation 

for outbound foreign investment.15 The chief executive officer of Haier has noted, “Every multinational [has] set up in China. Margins are low here. If we don’t go outside, we can’t survive.”16

Building national champions, brands, and distribution networks. Chinese exports are booming, but 

about 60 percent of them are produced by foreign-funded enterprises based in China.17 The percentage is 

even higher in high-tech sectors such as industrial machinery (79 percent), computers (92 percent), and 

electronics and telecommunications (74 percent).18 Many Chinese companies are locked into low valueadded niches in global supply chains with limited opportunity to innovate or earn large profits.19

Chinese policymakers want to build national companies that can compete internationally. This was 

one motive behind the “grasp the big, let go of the small” approach to privatizing state-owned enterprises. 

Chinese companies such as Haier, TCL-Thompson, and Lenovo have all recently pursued acquisitions of 

foreign businesses in order to acquire internationally recognized brands and access to established distribution networks.

Haier, China’s leading home-appliance manufacturer, has faced increasingly tough competition in the 

domestic market, which accounts for 80 percent of its sales. Haier has had zero profit growth for the last 

3 years, which led executives to expand further into the U.S. market. Weaknesses in design skills, distribution, and service networks limited Haier’s success and prompted the company to make a $1.28 billion bid 

in 2005 to purchase Maytag. Haier sought Maytag’s brand name and sales network, but ultimately was outbid by Whirlpool.

Chinese computer maker Lenovo purchased International Business Machines’ personal computer 

business in December 2004 for $1.75 billion. The acquisition was motivated by increasing competition 

and falling profits in the domestic market and by Lenovo’s desire to acquire an internationally recognized 

brand name that would allow it to compete effectively at the global level.20

Acquire advanced technology. Chinese firms also seek to use acquisitions or joint ventures to obtain 

technology necessary to improve their competitive ability. Joint ventures with foreign firms investing in 

China have been a primary means of acquiring technology in the past, but China’s WTO commitments 

now allow foreign firms to establish wholly owned subsidiaries (thus avoiding the need to share technology with Chinese partners). 

This provides increased incentives for Chinese firms to pursue technology by acquiring foreign 

companies. For example, Huawei, a major Chinese telecommunications manufacturer, has expressed 

interest in purchasing the British firm Marconi.21 Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp (SAIC), a leading 

Chinese auto manufacturer, purchased Korean automaker SsangYong Motors for $500 million in October 2004. 

Access to the Korean firm’s technology and research and development capability was an important motive 

for the deal.22

Beijing also seeks technology through other channels. China has signed technology sharing agreements with more than 50 countries, including Russia, Israel, and major Western European countries. These 

agreements provide channels for China to acquire technology legitimately. China also acquires advanced 

technologies illegally, either through organized espionage or from individuals who know that bringing 

commercially valuable technology to China will be helpful in securing employment.23

Tools for Chinese Global Influence

China employs various tools to exercise influence in different regions of the world. Economic and 

diplomatic tools are the most important, with security assistance playing an important role in some regions 

and with some countries. China’s success in achieving rapid economic growth without political liberalization may eventually become a source of soft power if it inspires emulation by other authoritarian regimes. 

China’s limited power projection capabilities make military power only a minor tool of influence outside 

Asia, but PLA military capabilities matter greatly inside the region.
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 11

Beijing cannot necessarily use all these tools in a coordinated manner. The stovepiped bureaucracy 

in China complicates coordination across ministerial boundaries and between the center and local governments. Some tools (such as development assistance, diplomatic initiatives, and security assistance) are 

under direct central government control. Others (such as trade and foreign investment) are influenced 

by economic factors, implemented by independent actors, and only partially subject to direction through 

incentives and administrative controls. Some potential tools such as soft power and military power may 

have negative side effects. To address some of these issues, China organized a major internal meeting 

on “Economic Diplomacy Toward Developing Countries.” Held in August 2004, the meeting reviewed 

existing cooperation programs, sought to improve coordination, and outlined a work plan for expanding economic and political cooperation with developing countries.24 Despite these efforts to improve 

policy coordination, it would be a mistake to assume that all activities of Chinese entities are under central 

government control.

Economic Tools

China is an avid practitioner of commercial diplomacy. In addition to using diplomatic efforts to 

advance the economic interests of the country and its companies, Beijing also seeks to leverage economic 

ties on behalf of Chinese diplomatic and strategic objectives. Trade, outbound foreign investment, and foreign aid are particularly important tools.

Trade. China’s booming exports have created a parallel growth in imports, as Chinese firms import 

capital goods and raw materials and multinational corporations ship in parts and components for assembly in Chinese factories. As living standards and disposable income rise, China’s domestic market is also 

increasingly attractive to foreign companies. 

Chinese imports are fueling growth throughout Asia and in other regions of the world. For example, 

in 2003, China became the largest export market for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The China market 

is credited with helping to revive the Japanese economy from its decade-long slump. Chinese imports of 

energy and other resources are driving commodity prices and have given a major boost to commodity 

exporters in Africa and Latin America. In 2004, exports to China increased by 45 percent in South Africa, 

71 percent in Brazil, and 48 percent in Panama. The appendix illustrates how dependence on the China 

market has increased in different regions and countries.

The Chinese government has long used market access and purchases of foreign goods as diplomatic 

tools, especially when dealing with developed countries. During U.S. debates over renewal of China’s mostfavored-nation status in the early 1990s, China sent purchasing delegations to buy billions of dollars’ worth 

of U.S. goods prior to key Congressional votes. This tactic was revived in April 2006, when Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington was preceded by a stop in Seattle where Chinese companies signed $16 

billion worth of contracts. Beijing has also used large infrastructure contracts and major purchases (such 

as commercial aircraft) to reward or punish countries for their policies toward Taiwan.

China’s increasing role in world trade (and expectations of future growth) makes it an attractive market 

and gives Beijing leverage in dealing with trade partners. Chinese leaders and analysts appear to believe that 

trade dependence can generate significant political influence as groups that benefit from trade mobilize to 

protect their economic interests. However, these groups do not necessarily exert a dominant influence within 

other countries. For example, Japanese business groups have called for better Sino-Japanese relations, but this 

has not been sufficient to outweigh other Japanese groups seeking a more assertive policy toward China.

Two new elements recently have emerged in China’s trade strategy. One is an increased focus on 

developing countries as trade partners. Even in cases where Chinese products and technologies are not 

state-of-the-art, they may be well suited for developing country markets, especially if Chinese companies 

are willing to import other goods in return. An August 2004 internal conference highlighted the importance of expanding Chinese trade with developing countries and the need to “regulate and guide behaviors 

of Chinese enterprises in their market penetration in developing countries.”25

A second element is China’s efforts to negotiate regional and bilateral free trade agreements. 

China’s agreement with ASEAN is the most significant example, but China is currently discussing bilateral 
12	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

agreements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Chile, India, and others.26 Chinese officials 

also regularly use trade-facilitation agreements or nonbinding bilateral trade targets to leverage market 

access as a diplomatic tool in bilateral relations. 

Investment. China is a major FDI destination for multinational corporations, hosting $622.3 billion as 

of the end of 2005.27 China significantly liberalized regulations on inbound FDI as part of its WTO entry 

negotiations, but the government still seeks to use the approval process to obtain technology transfers, establish research and development facilities in China, and increase production of high-technology and highvalue-added products. Willingness to facilitate or obstruct major projects can be an important tool in dealing with investors in the United States, Europe, and Asia. (However, streamlined procedures that delegated 

approval to provincial or city officials have reduced the central government’s ability to employ this tool.)

China is also becoming increasingly important as a source of outbound FDI. The “go global” campaign launched in the late 1990s encourages both state-owned enterprises and smaller private and collective enterprises to invest abroad. The “go global” strategy was highlighted in work reports at the 2003 

National People’s Congress and promoted at Chinese business conferences in 2004. The government subsequently streamlined FDI approval procedures and developed lists of target countries and sectors where 

investment is encouraged.28 The China Import-Export Bank and China Construction Bank likely provide 

subsidized loans for Chinese companies investing in priority countries or functional areas such as resource 

acquisition.

As of the end of 2005, China’s officially recorded total outbound FDI was $43.9 billion.29 This figure 

omits some types of outbound FDI and probably significantly understates the total amount. About $25 

billion of this total is reportedly invested in Hong Kong.30 Developing countries welcome Chinese FDI as 

a means of building their economies and infrastructure. It is a particularly useful tool in countries where 

Western companies are reluctant to invest due to economic conditions or political risk. 

Foreign Aid. Development assistance has been an important part of China’s foreign policy since the 

1960s, when China competed with the Soviet Union and the United States for political influence in Africa. 

As a significant recipient of international assistance, China has downplayed its spending on development 

assistance. However, aggregate figures have been released since 2003 (see table 1).

Table 1. Chinese External Assistance (U.S. $millions)

2002 2003 2004

602.77 630.36 731.20 31

China also provides development assistance in the form of subsidized loans. These are typically 

financed through the China Import-Export Bank for industrial or infrastructure projects. Financing 

requires most of the loaned money to be spent on Chinese materials and labor for the project. The China 

Import-Export Bank’s annual report does not provide the total amount spent on concessional loans. The 

bank reportedly received $5 billion in July 2005 from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange to 

finance its policy operations.32 The China Import-Export Bank’s operations, including its role as a conduit 

for development assistance, may expand significantly in the 2006 5-year program.33

Chinese development assistance typically lacks the political and economic conditions that accompany 

aid from the World Bank or Western countries. China does not impose human rights conditions, require 

rigorous cost-benefit analysis, or emphasize anticorruption measures to ensure that funds are spent properly. Many projects, such as construction of stadiums in Africa, have limited economic returns. In some 

cases, purchasing influence by funneling money to foreign leaders may be China’s primary motive.

These relatively modest expenditures for development assistance and outgoing foreign investment 

are out of proportion with the multibillion-dollar commitments Chinese leaders have made to foreign 

countries over the last several years. This may indicate that official figures for development assistance 

and foreign investment are too low, that other (unreported) channels are used to approve and convey 

development assistance, or that Beijing will be unable to fulfill many of its commitments.
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 13

Currency. Foreign currency reserves allow a 

country to exert some influence over the relative value 

of its currency (and potentially over the values of the 

currencies of other countries). China’s decision in 1997 

not to devalue its currency during the Asian financial 

crisis allowed affected Asian countries to benefit from 

increased exports as their currencies depreciated, 

winning China praise from other Asian countries for 

its responsible behavior. China has currency swap 

arrangements with Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 

South Korea, and the Philippines as part of the Chiang 

Mai initiative. These bilateral arrangements provide 

countries with liquidity in the event of a balance of 

payments crisis. 

Until July 2005, China pegged the value of its currency to the U.S. dollar, which produced a decline in 

the yuan’s value relative to European and other Asian 

currencies as the dollar has declined. Other countries 

(including U.S. manufacturers) have complained that 

the yuan is undervalued, giving Chinese exporters an 

unfair trade advantage. China’s $853 billion foreign currency reserves (as of February 2006) are mainly invested 

in dollar-denominated U.S. Government securities.34

China has purchased large quantities of U.S. assets to 

maintain its currency peg with the dollar, in effect helping to underwrite the U.S. trade deficit. If China were to 

sell large quantities of U.S. securities, it could cause the 

value of the dollar to fall, but would negatively affect the 

value of its own holdings (and also reduce the volume of 

Chinese exports to the United States).

Diplomatic Tools

A striking aspect of China’s recent diplomacy is the dramatic improvement in the quality and effectiveness of its diplomatic corps. Chinese diplomats are better educated, more sophisticated, and able to 

operate more effectively in both bilateral and multilateral settings.35 Aside from the issues of Taiwan and 

Japan, where nationalism and domestic political sensitivities inhibit flexibility, China’s diplomacy is characterized by a willingness to listen closely to the desires and interests of its diplomatic partners and to 

formulate proposals for cooperation that respond to their needs while advancing Chinese interests. China 

uses diplomatic channels to employ or capitalize on the economic tools described above. 

Several distinctive patterns are evident in China’s diplomatic approaches. 

Strategic partnerships. China seeks to establish “strategic partnerships” with major countries and 

key regional organizations. To date, China has established partnerships with Brazil (1993), Russia (1996), 

France (1997), Saudi Arabia (1999), Iran (2000), ASEAN (2003), the European Union (2003), India (2003), 

the United Kingdom (2004), and Germany (2004).36 A strategic partnership is a political declaration of 

mutual importance and goodwill; the content can vary from a quasi-alliance (some aspects of the SinoRussian strategic partnership) to a vague political declaration (the partnership with India). China’s partnerships with Russia, India, and the European Union, and its (failed) efforts to work toward a “constructive 

strategic partnership” with the United States, represent an implicit movement toward the multipolar world 

Chinese leaders would prefer. By supporting alternative power centers independent of the United States, 

China can increase its scope for diplomatic maneuver.

Train in Vain?

Philippine President Gloria Macapagal 

Arroyo’s September 2004 state visit to China 

was hailed as a major success. One highlight was Beijing’s agreement to finance the 

first phase of the North Rail project, a 32.2-

kilometer railroad line from Metro Manila 

to Malolos City. The China Export-Import 

Bank provided a $400 million loan that covered 95 percent of the total cost, at a special concessional interest rate of 3 percent 

over 20 years.

Critics have cited the deal in impeachment complaints against President Arroyo, 

claiming the no-bid contract awarded to 

China National Machinery and Equipment 

Corporation (CNMEC) was the product of 

corruption. The Arroyo administration claims 

the project is a state-to-state agreement 

exempt from public bidding.

Although highly rated as a construction company, CNMEC has no experience 

building railways. Questions have been 

raised as to cost and why the line extends 

to Malolos City, a relatively uncongested 

commute, instead of burgeoning Angeles City. The project may have won China 

friends in the Arroyo administration but 

is unlikely to win much goodwill with the 

broader public.
14	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

Beijing also employs the strategic partnership label as a tool for manipulating other countries. 

Actions that work against Chinese interests are criticized as evidence of hostility or behavior inconsistent with the strategic partnership. This theme figured prominently in Chinese efforts to persuade the 

European Union to lift its arms embargo. Beijing also pressures countries to demonstrate their commitment by increasing cooperation or making concessions. A strategic partnership also serves as a political umbrella for subsidiary agreements, for bilateral 

cooperation at lower levels, and for strategic dialogue 

between China and its diplomatic partners. China 

typically seeks to hold regular meetings with partners 

that serve as a venue for strategic discussions and provide opportunities to press China’s current diplomatic 

agenda with foreign partners. 

Leadership travel and meetings. China’s top leaders travel extensively and regularly host visits with 

senior political figures from large and small countries. 

The Chinese system places high value on leadership 

meetings, both as symbols of political commitment 

and as a means of obtaining substantive agreements. 

Major visits by Chinese leaders (and, to a lesser degree, 

visits to China by foreign leaders) also help coordinate 

foreign policy issues across ministerial boundaries.

Beijing emphasizes form and hospitality to ensure 

that foreign leaders have enjoyable visits (thus creating 

an implicit sense of obligation). This tactic is particularly effective with leaders of smaller countries, who are 

often flattered by the attention. China also pressures 

diplomatic partners to make concessions or enter into 

agreements to make high-level visits successful. For 

example, Philippine President Arroyo’s September 2004 

visit to Beijing was upgraded from an official visit to 

a state visit once the Philippines agreed to sign a joint 

agreement for seismic exploration in the South China 

Sea and to recognize China as a market economy.37

Regional organizations as “influence multipliers.” 

China actively engages regional organizations such 

as the European Union, ASEAN, the Organization of 

American States, African Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Gulf Cooperation 

Council. China conducts formal dialogues with some 

organizations; in others it has observer status. Attending meetings of regional organizations allows China 

to get its messages across to all members in one stop 

and to hold multiple bilateral meetings on the margins. 

China has provided many regional organizations with 

financial and technical assistance such as computers 

and telecommunications equipment. 

China often uses its influence in regional organizations to advance its national objectives. For example, 

the July 2005 vote calling for SCO members to set a 

withdrawal date for U.S. forces using bases in Central 

Anatomy of a State Visit

President Hu Jintao, accompanied by 

200 Chinese businessmen, visited Brazil, 

Argentina, Chile, and Cuba from November

11–23, 2004, in conjunction with his attendance at the 12th Asia Pacific Economic 

Cooperation (APEC) leadership meeting in 

Santiago.

Before the Brazilian congress, Hu 

stated China would invest $100 billion in 

Latin America over the next 10 years, with 

$10 billion invested in Brazil in the next 3 

years. Hu pledged $20 billion in Argentina 

over the next 10 years to finance infrastructure, railway, aerospace, communications, 

and fossil fuel projects. While in Chile, Hu 

and Chilean President Ricardo Lagos agreed 

to begin talks on a free-trade agreement, 

and Chile was added to the list of approved 

Chinese tourist destinations. In Havana, 16 

commercial agreements worth more than 

$500 million were signed. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile all recognized China’s market 

economy status during the trip; Peru, Venezuela, Suriname, and Guyana followed suit 

within months.

Preparations for Hu’s trip began long 

before he touched ground in South America. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da 

Silva and Argentine President Nestor Kirchner both led major business delegations to 

China earlier in 2004. Da Silva attended the 

opening of the Beijing offices of the Brazilian state oil firm Petrobras, which signed 

a joint oil exploration accord with Sinopec 

later that month. Kirchner and Hu signed 

five cooperative agreements, with Argentina 

securing approved destination status for Chinese tourists. These high-profile visits were 

supported by numerous lower-level visits by 

ministers, party leaders, and business representatives in the year before Hu’s arrival. In 

2004, Argentina and Chile both exchanged 

more than 60 delegations with China at or 

above the vice-ministerial level.
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 15

Asia reflected Chinese and Russian concerns about a perceived U.S. role in the revolutions in Georgia, 

Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.38 China also exerted influence in the African Union to frustrate Japanese efforts 

to win endorsement of its bid for a permanent Security Council seat. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs had expected that Tokyo’s development assistance to the region would produce support for Japan’s 

Security Council bid.39

China leverages its bilateral and regional multilateral diplomacy to reinforce each other. Bilateral 

influence is cultivated with weaker or poorer members of regional organizations. China uses them as 

sources of information on the organization’s agenda and the positions of key members, then seeks to persuade them to advance Chinese positions or proposals within the multilateral setting. Conversely, if most 

members of a regional organization support a Chinese initiative, pressure is produced against reluctant 

countries not to frustrate consensus.

China has worked the bilateral/regional dynamic most effectively with Asia, where it has become 

a major player in regional diplomacy. Interviews with officials in key ASEAN countries indicate that 

Chinese bilateral influence in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma gives it significant influence over 

ASEAN’s agenda.40 Because ASEAN is a consensus-based organization, China can use its relationships to 

block unwanted initiatives or actions by the group. China has also leveraged its relationship with ASEAN 

to garner support for the ASEAN+3 process and build momentum for regional economic integration. Chinese trade liberalization initiatives have placed Tokyo in a reactive posture, since Japanese internal politics 

limit Tokyo’s flexibility.

China has used multilateral diplomacy effectively outside Asia. For example, Chinese President Hu 

coupled participation in the November 2004 APEC Summit in Santiago with high-profile bilateral visits to 

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. He used the trip to tout significant Chinese investments in the region and to 

begin negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement with Chile. 

Within Asia, Beijing clearly prefers multilateral organizations that exclude the United States, allowing China to exert more influence. China has taken the initiative in this area rather than reacting to strategic developments. Beijing has backed the creation of new organizations and initiatives such as the SCO, 

ASEAN+3, and the East Asian Summit but has been less enthusiastic about the APEC forum and the 

ASEAN Regional Forum, both of which include the United States. Beijing prefers to address regional trade 

liberalization in the ASEAN+3 setting rather than APEC.

China’s recent Asian diplomacy illustrates this tendency. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing attended 

the first day of the July 2005 meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and then skipped the rest for an 

extended bilateral visit to Burma. Beijing’s enthusiasm for the East Asian Summit in December 2005 

cooled remarkably following the expansion of the group to include India, Australia, and New Zealand. 

China likely supported the requirement that summit participants accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and 

Cooperation as a means of excluding the United States.

The preference for organizations that exclude the United States extends to the nongovernmental 

level, where Beijing established the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks in 2002 to support research and 

nongovernmental formulation of proposals for increased regional cooperation on issues such as economic 

integration and energy security. Wu Jianmin, president of the China Foreign Affairs University (under the 

Foreign Ministry), serves as the “General Coordinator” of the network.41

Exercising influence on behalf of others. China sometimes uses its influence in multilateral organizations on behalf of friendly states to advance its regional interests indirectly. As a member of the Security 

Council and a key player in other international organizations, China can block or delay these organizations 

from taking action. Often this influence is used on behalf of pariah states or to relieve pressure on governments friendly to China to comply with international norms. 

Beijing’s efforts to prevent or delay referral of Iran’s noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the UN Security Council illustrate this tool. 

Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing traveled to Tehran in early November 2004 to meet with Iranian

President Mohammad Khatami to discuss the issue; Iran’s representative to the IAEA subsequently visited Beijing for consultations on the eve of a critical IAEA board meeting.42 China has continued to work 
16	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

closely with Russia to limit Security Council action on the issue. Beijing’s primary motive is securing 

long-term access to Iranian oil and natural gas for Chinese national oil companies.43 China has also frustrated Security Council action against the Sudan government for human rights violations in Darfur. China 

National Petroleum Corporation has extensive oil investments in Sudan, which supplies half of Chinese 

overseas oil production.44

Defense Cooperation

China employs a range of security assistance tools to advance its foreign policy interests. Arms sales 

and exports of technology for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles were important 

sources of Chinese influence in the 1980s through the mid-1990s, but have declined in importance as Chinese arms have become less competitive in the marketplace and as China has taken on increasingly specific 

nonproliferation commitments. China now places greater emphasis on military diplomacy and capacitybuilding programs and is starting to become a significant exporter of conventional military technology.

Arms Exports. China’s global arms exports have declined dramatically from the peak years in the mid1980s, when Chinese firms were supplying both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. In 1987, China’s arms sales hit a 

high point of $5.8 billion.45 In contrast, Chinese arms sales totaled $300 million in 2003 and $600 million in 

2004.46 Because China’s defense industries still cannot produce state-of-the-art weapons systems, Chinese 

arms compete on the basis of price rather than capabilities. Customers tend to be cash-strapped developing countries in South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East that are willing to trade advanced 

capabilities for lower cost. Willingness to finance purchases or to provide arms at “friendship prices” is often 

an important selling point. Some countries, such as Kuwait and Thailand, have purchased Chinese arms as 

a symbol of political cooperation.47 Continuing improvements in China’s defense industry may improve the 

future quality of its arms and the relative importance of arms sales as a foreign policy tool.48

Increasing emphasis on military diplomacy. China has stepped up its military diplomacy activities 

dramatically since late 2001. Annual defense consultations with Thailand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, 

Germany, South Africa, and Mongolia have been established to complement existing relationships with 

France, Russia, Japan, and the United States. According to the 2004 Defense White Paper, China has established military relations with more than 150 countries in the world and set up over 100 military attaché 

offices. In 2003 and 2004, the PLA sent high-level military delegations to over 60 countries and hosted at 

least 130 delegations of military leaders from over 70 countries.49 One new pattern is that military region 

commanders, political commissars, and staff officers below the four military department heads conducted 

much of the travel to Africa and Latin America, while senior PLA officers focused on larger countries and 

relations with major powers. (This partly reflects PLA regulations that limit flag officers to one overseas 

trip per year.) China has conducted maritime search and rescue exercises with India, France, the United 

Kingdom, and Australia, and held counterterrorism exercises with Pakistan and the SCO.50

Security assistance and training. Security assistance efforts are concentrated on smaller developing 

countries where a limited investment of resources can produce substantial political dividends. Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia are the central arenas for these activities. 

China often provides relatively small grants to purchase uniforms or military equipment for foreign 

militaries, police, and internal security forces in African, Latin American, and South Asian countries. 

Typical examples include uniforms for the armies of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, 20 jeeps for Kyrgyzstan’s 

Ministry of Public Security, and 40 all-terrain vehicles for the Kazakhstan military. Underfunded militaries 

and security services welcome these small amounts of assistance. China has also used the SCO framework 

to provide counterterrorism training and border security assistance for Central Asian countries, including 

funding for radiation detection equipment at border crossings.

China has used its relationship with ASEAN to propose security cooperation in the ASEAN+China 

and ASEAN+3 settings. China and ASEAN signed a joint declaration on cooperation on nontraditional 

security measures in November 2002.51 China likely views cooperation on these issues as less sensitive and 

therefore more acceptable to ASEAN countries concerned about protecting their sovereignty.
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 17

Exports of military technology. Beijing has used military technology transfers and transfers of missile 

and WMD technology as political tools in the past, notably in its transfer of nuclear weapons design information and missile technology to Pakistan and its assistance to Iranian missile programs. 

China’s gradual acceptance of nonproliferation norms, membership in key nonproliferation 

regimes, and efforts to build an effective export control system have significantly reduced Chinese proliferation activity, both in terms of the sensitivity of the items transferred and the number of countries 

involved. However, China continues to supply some missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, and likely 

other countries as a means of advancing its strategic interests.52 Much of this activity involves exports 

of dual-use technologies with legitimate commercial applications that can also be used in WMD and 

missile programs.

Chinese exports of defense production technology may be increasing. China has longstanding 

defense technology ties with Pakistan that include transfers of production technology for tanks and 

aircraft. In 2004, China offered to supply arms and technology for arms production to the Philippines, 

Malaysia, and Indonesia.53 Beijing subsequently signed defense cooperation agreements with Indonesia (July 2005) and Malaysia (September 2005). The Indonesian agreement reportedly includes Chinese 

assistance in helping Jakarta develop and produce antiship missiles.54

China’s security relationship with Russia has expanded in recent years to include Chinese funding for 

joint military technology development projects. Chinese arms purchases and support for military research 

and development activities play a critical role in sustaining Russia’s defense science and technology infrastructure. This provides Beijing a source of influence and facilitates access to advanced Russian military 

technology through overt and covert means. Russian officials and defense firms have also expressed interest in collaboration with China to produce advanced fighter aircraft.55

Soft Power

China has carved out a new identity as a successful “authoritarian development state.” Some believe 

the approach of reforming the economy while limiting political freedom represents a new model with 

considerable appeal to authoritarian leaders in developing countries.56 China’s manned space flights are 

cited as evidence of scientific and technological success that creates soft power. China’s development model 

actually draws heavily on orthodox development economics and benefits from special factors such as a 

large domestic market and large labor supply that cannot readily be replicated by most other countries.57

Domestic problems, social inequality, environmental degradation, and periodic political clampdowns 

also limit China’s attractiveness as a model for others to emulate. A slowdown in growth or a major political incident would highlight these issues and significantly reduce China’s ability to employ soft power as a 

diplomatic tool. 

The Chinese government is devoting significant resources to promoting Chinese culture and language as a means of increasing its soft power. Foreign student enrollment in Chinese universities has 

increased from 85,000 in 2002 to 110,000 in 2004. About 75 percent of foreign students are from Asian 

countries, with South Korea (43,600) and Japan (19,000) sending the most students in 2004. Much of this 

increase is due to the commercial orientation of Chinese universities, which profit from foreign student 

enrollments and have developed programs to serve this market. However, the Chinese government provides scholarships and financial assistance for students from developing countries. This funding likely 

accounts for significant increases in the number of students from Africa and South Asia.58

Appeals to cultural and linguistic affinities are especially important in dealing with countries with 

considerable ethnic Chinese minorities. Malaysia and Indonesia, which previously viewed their ethnic 

Chinese populations with suspicion, now regard them as an asset and comparative advantage in building economic relations with China. China found some sympathy in Southeast Asia for appeals to “Asian 

values” during its efforts to resist human rights pressure from the United States and Europe in the 1990s. 

However, cultural and linguistic diversity in Asia is likely to limit China’s ability to harness purported 

common “Confucian values” as a diplomatic tool.
18	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

Military Power

The PRC possesses significant military capabilities, which it has historically been willing to use in 

pursuit of its national interests.59 The immediate focus 

of Beijing’s military buildup is on deterring Taiwan 

independence and creating the conditions necessary 

for unification on PRC terms. However, China is gradually expanding its power projection capability within 

Asia, which will increase its regional influence. 

Military power is an important element of 

national power, but it can also have unwanted side 

effects. China’s growing defense spending and expanding military capabilities are sparking concerns within 

Asia. These are most evident in Japan, which increasingly views China as a regional rival and potential 

military threat. Beijing’s efforts to reassure its Asian 

neighbors that it does not pose a security threat are 

complicated by its expanding military power.

China’s limited power projection capabilities 

reduce the risk that its military power will interfere 

with efforts to expand Chinese influence in more distant regions. China’s response to the Indian Ocean tsunami revealed limitations on its ability to provide military assistance in an emergency or a military conflict. 

China does provide increasing numbers of military 

and police forces to several UN peacekeeping operations. As of December 2004, more than 1,000 Chinese 

military and police personnel were deployed on 11 

different operations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, 

and Europe.60 China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions usually consist of engineering or support 

troops rather than combat units.

Data on Chinese Regional Priorities

Lack of direct knowledge about internal Chinese strategic deliberations necessitates examination of 

China’s observed behavior and making inferences about its underlying priorities and strategy. One starting 

point is to analyze the factors driving China’s increased global activity and how China is employing available foreign policy tools. Two additional approaches can help illuminate Chinese priorities and strategies. 

One approach is to compare PRC official statements to different domestic and international audiences with observed behavior. What do discrepancies in statements to different audiences and divergences 

between stated objectives and observed behavior suggest about Chinese objectives and strategies? 

Chinese leaders obviously adapt their remarks to particular audiences, but some points stand out 

clearly from a brief review of themes in Chinese speeches and statements:

■ Chinese public statements consistently emphasize the “win-win” and mutually beneficial nature 

of economic cooperation with other countries and highlight common interests in strengthening 

economic ties. Internal writings and statements, however, tend to focus on intense international 

competition for resources and markets and highlight the need for the state to play an active role in 

assisting Chinese companies in this competition.

Language and Soft Power

China’s growing interest in expanding 

its soft power is highlighted by efforts to 

promote the Chinese language. The National 

Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language has earmarked $200 million annually to 

establish a global network of Confucius Institutes to promote the study of the Chinese 

language. The aim is to “enhance the mutual 

understanding and friendship between the 

Chinese people and other peoples of the 

world, promote economic and trade cooperation as well as scientific, technological and 

cultural exchanges between them.”

The first of 27 Confucius Institutes was 

established in Seoul in November 2004, with 

plans for approximately 100 within 5 years. 

Locations are scattered around the globe 

from Pakistan and Uzbekistan to Canada and 

Japan. The first American Confucius center 

was recently established at the University of 

Maryland.

The National Office provides general guidance and priorities, but Confucius 

Institutes are administered autonomously. 

Political activities are specifically prohibited. 

However, Confucius Institutes may further 

marginalize Taiwan by promoting the use 

of simplified Chinese used in the mainland 

rather than the traditional characters used in 

Taiwan.


CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 21

political leaders to China increased significantly in the 2002–2004 period compared with 1993, with the 

increase in visits by European presidents and prime ministers especially notable. Contacts between Chinese 

cabinet ministers and their counterparts in Europe and Asia have also increased significantly.

Outbound foreign direct investment. Official Chinese data on outbound FDI captures investments that 

go through a formal government approval process. This data misses a significant amount of FDI financed 

by retained foreign earnings of Chinese enterprises and by funds raised via foreign capital markets. The 

Chinese government may also have other mechanisms for approving investments that bypass the established process. Figures 3 through 6 exclude FDI to Hong Kong and Macao (which account for the bulk of 

Chinese FDI) or routed through Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Virgin Islands to unknown destinations. Despite these shortcomings, the official data give some indication of Chinese priorities.

Detailed 2005 data broken out by country is not yet available. However, press reports indicate total 

outbound FDI was $6.92 billion. About $4.07 billion was new capital investment from China, with the rest 

derived from retained overseas earnings of Chinese companies.62 A significant portion of this investment 

was used to acquire foreign companies.63 FDI in the mining/energy sector increased from $1.38 billion 

(48.4 percent) in 2003 to $1.9 billion (53 percent) in 2004 before falling to $1.17 billion in 2005.64 Outbound investment in the first quarter of 2006 totaled $2.68 billion, suggesting that Chinese outbound FDI 

is accelerating.65

Available data reveal a significant increase in outbound Chinese FDI, but the total amounts captured in the official data fall far short of the numerous substantial investments mentioned in press reports. 

For example, Hu Jintao pledged during his 2004 trip that China would invest $100 billion in FDI into 

Latin America over the next decade, including $20 billion in Argentina. The official FDI data cited above 

does not appear to include large (often multi-billion-dollar) oil and gas investments by Chinese national 

oil companies in Iran, Angola, Ecuador, and Sudan. These investments may be funded using resources 

the companies acquire from international capital markets or by loans from Chinese banks that are not 

included in the official FDI data.66

Chinese development assistance. The limited official data available are insufficient to accurately determine the total volume of Chinese grant and loan aid or the precise breakout in terms of recipients. Open 

source data describe many projects that receive Chinese assistance and sometimes report aggregate totals 

for Chinese bilateral assistance. However, press reports typically lack details on the nature and form of 

Chinese assistance, report total project costs without specifying the percentage of Chinese support, and 

confuse commercial investments with foreign assistance. Reports often incorporate previous and prospective assistance to arrive at exaggerated totals.

Despite these caveats, some important details emerge from an analysis of open source reports on 

Chinese development assistance:

■ China provided more than $5 billion in assistance to Indonesia and Thailand in 1998 during the 

Asian financial crisis.

■ Chinese assistance to Pakistan increased dramatically in 2003–2004, with press reports citing more 

than $6.8 billion in assistance for projects such as a nuclear reactor, powerplants, railroad improvements, and general development assistance. This assistance follows a major Chinese project to 

expand the Pakistani port of Gwadar and is likely intended to help stabilize Pakistan politically (or 

to build a presence that will ensure good ties with any successor regime).

■ Chinese development assistance in Africa includes numerous large grants and loans to oil-producing states such as Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria. Some grants fund infrastructure projects such 

as railroads, powerplants, and power lines. Others involve debt relief or provide financing for the 

purchase of Chinese goods. 

■ Open source analysis suggests a crude estimate of total Chinese grant and loan development assistance in 2004 is approximately $10 billion. Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea appear to be the largest 

beneficiaries. The total amount of development assistance announced appears to have increased 

significantly in the last 2 years.

CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 23

Table 2. Dependence on Imports from and Exports to China (Percent of Total Imports/Exports)

1993 1998 2002 2004 1993 1998 2002 2004

Imports Imports Imports Imports Exports Exports Exports Exports

East Asia 6.24 9.62 13.17 15.89 6.64 6.99 12.35 16.32

Japan 6.53 10.56 14.37 16.16 6.42 7.29 12.83 16.68

South Korea 3.30 6.70 10.21 11.89 6.25 11.31 17.69 25.19

Taiwan 1.91 3.70 5.85 8.07 15.20 15.04 29.15 37.2

ASEAN 2.29 4.02 6.64 8.43 2.94 3.83 7.71 11.03

South Asia 3.54 3.83 5.79 7.59 1.57 2.59 4.03 7.53

Several important patterns stand out in China’s trade relations. First, other East Asian countries are 

becoming more dependent on exports to China, but China’s relative dependence on East Asian markets 

is staying the same (see table 2). This reflects both the shift of export production from other East Asian 

economies to tap Chinese labor and the Chinese domestic market’s appetite for imports from Asia. If the 

China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement is implemented, ASEAN dependence on the China market will 

increase even more.

Second, China’s economy remains heavily dependent on exports to the United States, Japan, and 

Europe. China runs large trade surpluses with the United States ($114.2 billion in 2005) and Europe ($35.4 

billion in 2004). These figures are PRC customs data that do not capture all exports that pass through 

Hong Kong, and therefore understate China’s total dependence on these markets. (U.S. Customs data show 

a PRC trade surplus of $201.6 billion in 2005.) 

China’s dependence on these export markets likely raises concerns for Chinese leaders that increasing 

protectionist sentiment may slow future export growth to these countries. Japan has lowered trade barriers 

to Chinese exports, partly because many of the goods Japan imports are produced in factories owned by 

Japanese multinational corporations.

Third, China runs a trade deficit with the Middle East due to imports of oil and natural gas. This 

deficit ($2.3 billion in 2004) will rise as Chinese energy imports from Middle Eastern countries increase in 

coming decades. Beijing hopes to increase exports of consumer and industrial goods and of labor and construction services to the Middle East to offset this trade deficit.

Fourth, trade with the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Australia is increasing as a percentage 

of China’s total trade. Imports from these regions are growing rapidly as Chinese demand for energy, natural resources, and commodities surges. (The appendix contains maps that illustrate the increasing dependence of different regions and countries on the China market.) Chinese exports to these regions, especially 

to Latin America, are also increasing rapidly (see table 3).

Table 3. Chinese Export and Import Growth (in percent)

2003 Imports 2003 Exports 2004 Imports 2004 Exports

 Middle East 53.2 43.6 48.6 28.3

 Africa 54.0 13.6 87.2 35.6

 Latin America 78.7 24.3 45.9 55.0

 Australia 24.8 36.6 58.3 41.1

 World 38.4 33.8 34.8 35.4
24	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

Is China’s Increased Global Activism the Product of a 

Global Strategy? 

Do the pattern of increased Chinese activity and the resource commitments described above reflect a 

common strategy that is being applied across different regions? Almost all the Chinese activities discussed 

in this report are consistent with a grand strategy of maintaining a peaceful international environment that 

allows China to build the economic and technological foundations necessary to become a rich and powerful country. These principles can be understood as the basis of a relatively coherent grand strategy. However, they are too vague to provide specific guidance about how China should deal with great powers, allocate resources across different regions, and manage the domestic and international challenges of achieving 

rapid development in a globalized world economy.

In practice, Chinese foreign policy reflects efforts to balance strategic and economic considerations and 

to coordinate the activities of diverse Chinese economic and political actors to advance national goals. Foreign policy is subordinate to domestic concerns, especially given the perceived imperative for rapid economic 

growth to maintain Communist Party rule. Efforts to formulate a coherent policy are impeded by bureaucratic 

and political conflicts of interest, while policy implementation is often impeded by incentives of Chinese actors 

to evade government directives that conflict with their underlying economic and political interests.

Balancing Strategic and Economic Considerations

Chinese foreign policy is best understood as the outcome of the interaction between two largely 

independent sets of policies, one focused on strategic concerns and the other on meeting economic development needs (which are critical for domestic stability and regime survival).

The strategic track is driven by international threats and opportunities and by China’s changing role 

in the global balance of power (with leadership fears of possible U.S. actions to contain or subvert China a 

critical factor). 

This logic explains Chinese efforts to build or strengthen strategic partnerships with Russia, key 

European countries, and emerging powers such as India. China seeks to prevent their participation in any 

potential future U.S. effort to contain China and to encourage them to play a more independent international role to balance U.S. power. 

It also explains China’s efforts to strengthen ties in East Asia and Central Asia (since 1996) and to 

promote Asian regional organizations that exclude the United States (since 2001). China’s actions reflect 

a desire to deny Washington regional support for any potential future efforts to contain China or to intervene in a Taiwan conflict. Stronger relations with Asian countries (and U.S. allies in particular) also support PRC efforts to gradually reduce U.S. influence in the region.

The economic track is driven primarily by development needs and by China’s changing role in the 

world economy. China’s increasing demand for economic inputs and for access to export markets follows 

a logic and geography independent of strategic concerns. For example, China has become more dependent on exports to developed countries to maintain economic growth—including on countries such as the 

United States and Japan, which its leaders regard as potential threats.

The dramatic increase in Chinese activity in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and (to a lesser 

degree) Central Asia since 2001 reflects both resource acquisition and efforts to build export markets in 

developing countries. Chinese companies are also being pushed to expand overseas by domestic competition. Many countries in these regions share China’s interest in resisting U.S. efforts to promote democracy 

and to intervene in other countries.

Strategic and economic concerns are intertwined in Chinese efforts to secure access to oil, natural 

gas, and other resources necessary for economic development. Chinese leaders see intensifying international competition to secure long-term access to energy and other resources and believe the state must play 

a major role to support its national oil companies. 

The Chinese government is using diplomatic efforts to support companies and is likely providing 

significant financial support through the banking system. (Lack of information about the balance sheets 
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 25

of Chinese policy banks and the operations of China’s state-owned oil and resource companies preclude an 

estimate of the amount of state resources devoted to this effort. Fragmentary evidence suggests the amount 

may be in the tens of billions of dollars, although this likely includes agreements that have not been implemented yet.) 

Government pressure and commercial considerations have prompted state-owned firms to make 

aggressive efforts to purchase resources and establish long-term supply contracts. This has led to increased 

activity focused on countries with available stocks of resources, including investments in states with questionable regimes such as those in Iran, Sudan, Angola, and Burma. It may also have led Chinese firms to 

pay inflated prices for access to some resources.

The strategic and economic rationales for China’s increasing global activism reinforce each other 

in some places (especially in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East) and conflict in other 

places (especially in relations with the United States and Japan). When strategic and economic interests 

have come into conflict, Chinese leaders have usually compromised on strategic issues in order to allow 

economic growth to continue. Beijing’s efforts to accommodate Washington since fall 2000 are the most 

important example, but relations with Tokyo also broadly fit this pattern.

Taiwan’s importance to regime legitimacy and role in internal leadership competition make this issue 

a potential exception. However, China has focused its diplomacy on the near-term objective of preventing 

Taiwan independence and hopes that long-term trends will help it achieve its stated objective of peaceful 

reunification without a conflict with the United States that would derail China’s economic development.68

Implementation Challenges and Conflicting Interests

Much of this report has focused on Chinese national interests as viewed by top leaders, including 

emphasis on the conflicts between strategic and economic considerations. This conceptual approach provides important insights into Chinese strategic thinking and policy choices. However, analysis of national 

interests must be supplemented by an awareness of the bureaucratic and domestic political forces that 

influence policymaking and by an understanding of how the conflicting interests of Chinese government 

and commercial actors affect (and often impede) efforts to implement a coherent national policy.

Coordination mechanisms. The Chinese government seeks to use campaigns (such as the “go global” 

investment campaign), economic and political incentives, and mechanisms such as leadership travel to 

coordinate government and commercial efforts and to resolve conflicts of interest. 

These efforts sometimes produce impressive tactical successes, such as Hu Jintao’s 2004 trip to Latin 

America. The involvement of a senior Chinese official forced the relevant ministries to coordinate their 

individual efforts to produce the concrete diplomatic and economic agreements necessary to make Hu’s trip 

a success. Hu’s potential ability to open doors with foreign governments attracted numerous Chinese company leaders (who also valued the chance to advance their business interests with senior Chinese officials). 

According to Western consultants, Chinese officials have sometimes forced Chinese companies to 

undertake construction projects in Africa at a loss in order to advance broader national interests. However, 

conflicts of interest and personal incentives often lead ministries, companies, and local government leaders 

to pursue their own interests rather than central government goals.

Bureaucratic interests, domestic politics, and the policy process. The Chinese policy process reflects diverse 

bureaucratic and political interests and typically produces incremental policy changes that reflect compromises 

between competing actors and interests. Sustained attention by senior leaders can sometimes overcome this 

tendency, but only on a limited number of issues where top leaders are actively and consistently engaged. 

Chinese policy on energy security illustrates the limits that competing bureaucratic interests and 

domestic political considerations can place on policy coherence. Chinese leaders clearly recognize the 

importance of energy security and have demanded active efforts by government ministries and Chinese 

national oil companies to secure energy supplies needed to support future growth. Energy security was 

the subject of a Politburo study session in June 2005; press reports claim that Hu Jintao has demanded that 

Chinese energy companies become more active in efforts to secure supplies.69
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However, energy security is an inherently difficult objective that requires coordinating domestic 

investments in energy production and transmission; domestic price and tax incentives to ensure adequate 

distribution and efficient use of scarce energy resources; foreign policy efforts to provide diplomatic support for access to overseas energy sources; financial efforts to provide resources to Chinese state-owned 

energy companies; and technological and infrastructure investments to build the capability to extract and 

transport energy to China in a useable form.

A rational energy policy requires making optimal trade-offs between short- and long-term supply 

issues, between investments in alternative sources of energy, between security of supply and the lowest 

price, and between national sources of supply and energy purchased on international markets. Making 

optimal choices (and adapting them as energy market conditions change) is a huge challenge for China’s 

decisionmaking system, which relies heavily on bureaucratic compromise.70

China has sought to address energy security by establishing a new energy leading group headed 

by Premier Wen Jiabao to make policy decisions on energy security. Implementation will be handled 

by the Energy Bureau, a subministerial body under the State Development and Reform Commission.71 However, Western energy experts doubt that these bodies have sufficient bureaucratic stature 

to craft and implement a coherent policy for energy security. They also note that the policymaking 

offices are understaffed and have routinely approached Chinese national oil companies for policy suggestions (when the offices are supposed to be developing national policy to regulate the activities of 

Chinese oil companies).

Concerns about the impact of rising energy prices on domestic output and employment prompted the 

Chinese government to allow the gap between subsidized domestic oil and gasoline prices and world prices 

to increase significantly in 2004–2005. As a result, Chinese producers and consumers were paying artificially 

low prices for energy (and therefore consuming too much), while Chinese refiners and energy producers had 

economic incentives to export gasoline rather than selling it to domestic consumers at a loss. These conditions 

produced scattered oil and gasoline shortages that forced a number of Guangdong factories to shut down production in summer 2005. The Chinese government eventually responded by raising domestic prices.

Conflicting incentives and policy implementation. Chinese foreign economic policies are implemented 

by a diverse group of actors that includes government ministries, provincial and local government officials, 

state-owned enterprises responsive to both profit incentives and government edicts, and even to some 

extent the foreign-invested enterprises that account for about 60 percent of Chinese exports.

Chinese leaders seek to employ commercial diplomacy, incentives, and administrative guidance 

to encourage Chinese enterprises to pursue state goals such as increasing export growth or acquiring 

resources. Yet these policy tools often run at cross purposes with the economic interests of individual firms 

and the political incentives of local government officials.

Chinese firms are increasingly focused on profitability. While managers take advantage of subsidies 

and other forms of state assistance, firms face increasing domestic and international competition that limits their ability to engage in unprofitable activities. Many Chinese firms are pursuing foreign investment as 

a survival strategy due to declining profit margins and increased competition in domestic markets.

Firms routinely evade environmental and labor regulations likely to interfere with profitability. 

Sometimes this involves the use of bribes to persuade government officials to look the other way; in other 

cases, mutual interest in promoting local economic growth is sufficient. Illegal coal mines, which violate 

environmental laws and often have unsafe working conditions, became a major issue following a series of 

deadly accidents in summer 2005.

The Chinese government has been unable to impose a geographical or functional division of labor on 

the three major national oil companies (China National Petrochemical Corporation, China National Petroleum Company, and China National Offshore Oil Company). All three companies have subsidiaries that are 

listed on international stock markets and have independent representatives on their boards. Chinese national 

oil companies pursue independent strategies to try to secure access to oil and natural gas fields, which sometimes results in two Chinese companies bidding against each other for the same development opportunity. 
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 27

Meeting or exceeding economic growth targets is a key criterion for promotion of local government 

officials to higher positions. This gives local leaders strong incentives to evade central government policies 

that impede growth and to make concessions to attract foreign investment. Government policies that have 

delegated decisions on approving incoming and outbound foreign investment down to provincial and city 

governments further reduce Beijing’s ability to implement a national policy.

Outlook and Implications 

China has significantly increased its commitment of resources to improving relations with key countries and regions since 2001. Leadership travel, outbound FDI, development assistance, and trade ties have 

all increased dramatically, especially in 2004 and 2005. Over the next 5 years, significant additional increases 

in resource commitments and in China’s level of global activism are likely. 

China’s FDI and development assistance efforts are relatively modest compared with U.S., European 

Union, and Japanese programs. However, China uses these tools effectively and strategically to advance 

specific interests. The pattern of China’s actual resource allocation reflects both strategic interests (in relations with great powers and Asian countries) and economic interests (in securing resources and expanding 

markets in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East). China’s recent commitments to increase FDI 

and development assistance to Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East are much larger than historical 

levels. China probably significantly increased resources allocated to these activities in its 2006 5-year program, but it is still unlikely to be able to fulfill all of its pledged commitments. 

China has expanded its influence in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and (to a lesser degree) the Middle 

East. Beijing has taken advantage of opportunities created by the U.S. Government focus on terrorism, the 

unpopularity of some U.S. policies and actions (especially in the Muslim world), and relative U.S. neglect 

of Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. China’s limited allocation of resources can yield significant 

influence, especially in areas where U.S. and Western activities and attention are limited.72

One countervailing factor is an emerging backlash as Chinese goods displace local products from 

domestic and traditional export markets and as the Chinese commercial and labor presence produces 

political frictions with local workers and businesses. If heightened expectations of Chinese investment and 

development assistance are not fulfilled, anti-Chinese sentiment is likely to intensify. For example, Mexico 

and Brazil have expressed reservations about the economic impact of competition with China; Southeast 

Asian nations worry that China’s attractiveness as a site for international FDI is diverting investment and 

damaging their economic development prospects.

After a decade of relatively balanced global trade, China is beginning to run significant trade surpluses. In 2005, China enjoyed a $102 billion trade surplus. If goods re-exported through Hong Kong are 

included, the total Chinese trade surplus was likely even higher (perhaps $125 billion).73 China’s currency 

peg to the dollar has resulted in a weaker renminbi as the U.S. dollar has declined in value. European and 

Asian exporters (and U.S. manufacturers) complain that this gives Chinese goods an unfair advantage in 

international markets. China’s shift to a managed float exchange regime in July 2005 has produced a slight 

increase in the value of the yuan against the dollar, but not enough to address complaints that the Chinese 

government is manipulating the value of its currency to gain a trade advantage. These macroeconomic factors are likely to become a growing source of friction in China’s bilateral relations.

All things being equal, the increased Chinese resource commitments on the horizon are likely to 

translate into significant increases in Chinese global and regional influence over the next 5 years. However, 

China’s ability to deliver on its promises depends heavily on the government’s ability to maintain domestic 

stability and to continue rapid economic growth.

Implications for the United States

China’s increased global activism and influence pose a variety of diplomatic, economic, and security 

concerns for the United States. Not all of the implications are negative. Many aspects of China’s expanding 
28	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

activities are a necessary byproduct of its rapid economic growth and integration into the world economy. 

China’s growth produces some significant benefits and opportunities for the United States, especially when 

contrasted against the alternative of a failing China. 

Diplomatic implications. China’s growing regional and global influence is the product of more sophisticated diplomacy and increased Chinese economic power. Chinese diplomats have learned how to operate 

effectively in both bilateral and multilateral settings. China’s increasing global economic and diplomatic 

presence will complicate U.S. diplomatic efforts at the bilateral, regional, and global levels.

China’s pragmatic, nonideological approach to bilateral relations (provided countries accept the PRC 

position on Taiwan) provides foreign governments with an alternative to dependence on the United States, 

thereby reducing U.S. influence in many countries. China cannot match the U.S. ability to deliver or deny 

economic and diplomatic benefits on a global basis. But by providing countries with a partial alternative, 

Beijing gives them increased leverage in dealing with Washington on a range of issues. China’s willingness 

to deal with states that have autocratic or corrupt leaders (such as North Korea, Burma, Sudan, and Zimbabwe) without political conditions will make it more difficult for the United States to isolate these regimes 

and press their leaders to undertake anticorruption measures or political reforms. Efforts by the U.S. Government and U.S. nongovernmental organizations to engage China’s foreign aid bureaucracy in a dialogue 

on “best practices” in foreign aid could be one way of mitigating some of these concerns.

China’s interactions with regional organizations around the world will complicate U.S. regional diplomacy and make it harder to engage regional organizations in support of U.S. objectives. Chinese leaders 

appear to be conscious of U.S. sensitivities about Chinese involvement in the Middle East and Latin America, which may restrain their diplomatic initiatives in these regions. China will find it easier to increase 

its influence in regions or countries that are not top priorities for the United States (such as sub-Saharan 

Africa). This may set up a competitive dynamic where the United States feels pressure to increase the attention and resources it devotes to countries and regions that would otherwise be considered low priorities.

Asia is a special case where China’s increasing regional activism and influence could conflict with 

important U.S. interests. In recent years, China has started or supported a variety of regional initiatives 

that do not include the United States. Some view this as evidence of increasing Sino-U.S. competition for 

influence in Asia, with both trying to strengthen ties with key Asian states. China’s preference for regional 

institutions that do not include the United States raises concerns that Asian regionalism could evolve in 

a direction that undermines U.S. alliances and locks the United States out of the region. However, Asian 

countries want the United States to remain actively engaged in Asia to balance Chinese influence. The 

United States has considerable hard and soft power resources and is well positioned to compete effectively 

with China if necessary. 

China’s increased influence in international organizations will complicate U.S. efforts to pursue a 

global agenda that includes democracy promotion, human rights, and labor issues. Beijing can use its selfproclaimed position as a leader of the developing world to mobilize opposition to initiatives that it views 

as contrary to its economic or political interests. China is likely to continue its principled opposition to 

military intervention on humanitarian or security grounds, but its increased diplomatic influence may 

make it more difficult for the United States to work around Chinese objections than in the past. China’s 

diplomatic opposition to sanctions (and willingness to deal directly with leaders of repressive regimes) will 

make it harder to isolate and pressure countries, especially if the United States or other countries become 

concerned about Chinese influence in those countries. This dynamic is already operating in Burma, where 

India has begun dealing directly with the government without raising human rights issues. 

Economic implications. China’s rapid economic growth (and accompanying demand for energy and 

natural resources) will have direct and indirect effects on U.S. economic interests. These effects will occur 

through China’s impact on global prices, competition for market access, and bearing on global economic 

rules. China’s growing weight in a globalized world economy will increase competition, which will work to 

the detriment of some U.S. companies and workers.

Increased Chinese demand contributes to higher global prices for oil, natural gas, and commodities 

ranging from copper to soybeans to cement. The first-order impact is higher prices for U.S. consumers 
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 29

and producers. A second-order impact is increased international competition to secure long-term access 

to resources. This competition is most acute in the energy sector, where China’s national oil companies 

have actively pursued contracts around the world. Efforts to lock up supplies of equity oil did not succeed 

for Japanese oil companies and are unlikely to work for China in the long run. However, the short-term 

willingness of Chinese firms to secure access to energy and other natural resources at prices that are not 

commercially viable may make it difficult for U.S. firms to compete, especially given the opaque corporate 

structure of Chinese national oil companies and their likely access to state-subsidized loans. The United 

States could engage China and other countries in discussions about international rules for state financing 

and support for investment in energy resources, although China (like other late entrants into the international energy game) will be reluctant to give up these policy tools. Chinese multibillion-dollar infrastructure and energy/mining investments are likely to increase global supplies of energy and other commodities, which will help mitigate price pressures. Efforts to engage the Chinese central government (and local 

governments) on improving energy efficiency are likely to be more successful (and may also provide commercial opportunities for U.S. companies).

Chinese competition with U.S. firms for markets in the United States and around the world will also 

have an impact on U.S. interests. China enjoys a position as the low-cost supplier of many manufactured 

goods, although many “Chinese” exports are merely assembled in China from imported components by 

foreign-owned companies. The percentage of value-added in China is often quite low. There is a high 

degree of complementarity between U.S. and Chinese exports, with American firms specializing in goods 

that are land-, technology-, and capital-intensive, while Chinese exports are mostly labor-intensive. Chinese exports mainly compete with goods from other Asian countries and developing countries.

Although the massive U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China has attracted much political attention 

in Washington, competition and market mechanisms are the best way to regulate trade. U.S. Government 

concerns should be focused on cases where Chinese government actions to subsidize inputs or influence 

currency values have a negative impact on U.S. companies or workers. Protection of intellectual property 

rights is another key issue, both within China and in competition for third-country markets. The Chinese 

government seeks to leverage market access as a tool in trade negotiations; the United States can also play 

this game successfully. 

A third area where China’s increasing influence is likely to affect U.S. economic interests is in setting 

global economic rules. Asian countries currently have less influence in international financial institutions 

than the size of their economies warrant. To date, China has identified itself as a developing country and 

has been reluctant to participate actively in global economic institutions such as the Group of 8 and the 

International Monetary Fund (even though many of its international economic interests are more aligned 

with developed countries than with developing countries). This partly explains China’s relatively passive 

position in the Doha round of global trade talks. However, as China’s economy grows, Beijing is likely to 

seek an increased role in setting economic rules. The impact on the United States will vary: on some issues 

(tariff reductions, protection for investments), Beijing and Washington are likely to find common ground; 

on others (industrial policy, state subsidies), positions are likely to be opposed. In any case, China will 

clearly become a more important factor in U.S. economic diplomacy. 

Security implications. With the exception of China’s nuclear arsenal, its traditional power projection 

capabilities outside Asia remain limited. China’s military capabilities and influence within Asia are increasing, but the PLA still has a very limited impact outside the region (mainly through military diplomacy, 

participation in peacekeeping operations, and arms sales). China’s ambitious military modernization 

efforts are likely to improve the PLA’s capability to project power globally, but this will be a gradual, longterm process. However, increased Chinese military capabilities—and especially power projection capabilities—are likely to stimulate Asian and U.S. concerns about Chinese long-term intentions.

One question is whether China’s expanded global interests will be used to justify efforts to build the 

PLA into a force capable of global operations. In the early 1990s, Chinese strategists sought to use the need 

to defend China’s sovereignty and resource claims as the justification for increased military spending.74

These arguments faded as Taiwan’s perceived moves toward independence became an accepted rationale 
30	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

for annual double-digit increases in defense spending. There are some indications that PLA strategists are 

beginning to look beyond the Taiwan issue and articulate the rationale for building a Chinese military 

capable of global operations.75 The need to defend China’s SLOCs would be a key argument in this debate. 

Chinese efforts to build a blue-water navy capable of dominating Asia or projecting naval power outside 

the region would affect U.S. freedom of action and likely be viewed in highly negative terms by the United 

States.

Conclusion

China’s global activism (and the mix of economic and strategic motives driving it) merits careful 

attention and analysis. However, China’s increased influence also needs to be kept in perspective. Chinese 

military power projection capability remains limited; Chinese businesses are taking their first steps in 

efforts to become global multinationals. China is an export powerhouse, but 60 percent of its exports are 

produced by foreign invested firms. Chinese global influence is increasing, but China still operates within 

the framework of global institutions established by the United States.

Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick was correct when he argued that China has been a 

major beneficiary of the existing international system over the last 25 years and that it needs to take more 

responsibility for sustaining this system.76 The United States should look for opportunities to influence Chinese definitions of global interests and attitudes toward international norms in positive directions. China’s 

increasing regional and global activism will inevitably affect U.S. interests, sometimes in negative ways. 

Some aspects of U.S.-China relations are likely to be competitive, but the relationship is not a zero-sum 

competition. The United States and China have both common and conflicting interests, and there is considerable scope for cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. Engagement and dialogue are critical aspects of U.S. efforts to turn China into a responsible stakeholder that will play a positive global role.

Notes

1 “The Cauldron Boils,” The Economist, September 29, 2005; Murray Scot Tanner, “China Rethinks Unrest,” Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 

(Summer 2004), 137–156. 2

 Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978–1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 3

 George J. Gilboy, “The Myth Behind China’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4 (July/August 2004), 33–48. 4

 Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International 

Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/1999), 114–146.

5

 Private statements by Japanese business representatives, Washington, DC, April 18, 2006.

6

 See David Finkelstein, China Reconsiders its National Security: The ‘Great Peace and Development Debate’ of 1999 (Alexandria, VA: Center 

for Naval Analyses Corporation, December 2000). 7

 Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, “Bush Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to One-China Policy,” 

December 9, 2003, available at <usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2003&m=December&x=20031209173641esuarKS

0.2866632&t=xarchives/xarchitem.html>. 8

 Interviews with Chinese analysts, 2003.

9

 Erica S. Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” China Quarterly, no. 177 (March 2004), 21–41; David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, 

“China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005), 25–38. 10 Jeffrey Logan, “Energy Outlook for China: Focus on Oil and Gas,” testimony prepared for hearing on Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook for 2005, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, February 3, 2005, available at <www.iea.org/

textbase/speech/2005/jl_china.pdf>. 11 Bernard Cole, “Waterways and Strategy: China’s Priorities,” paper presented at Woodrow Wilson Center, January 2005.

12 One Beijing analyst privately called this a “pre-emptive counter-containment strategy.” Interview, Beijing, China, November 2005.

13 Desmond Ball, “SIGINT strengths form a vital part of Burma’s military muscle,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10, no. 3 (March 1, 1998), 

35; “Space Programme Facilities,” Chinese Defence Today, available at <www.sinodefence.com/space/facility/default.asp>; The Realized Dream of 

Human Space Flight: Taken from the Internal Report of China’s Human Space Flight Program, ed. Zhu Zengquan (Bejing: Huayi Press, 2003), 145; 

Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program (Chichester, UK: Praxis Publishing, 2004), 187; and “13 Monitoring Stations to Ensure Successful Manned 

Spaceflight,” Xinhua News Service, 15 October 2003, accessed at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-10/15/content_1124282.htm>. 14 See John W. Garver, “Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-west, and South Asia,” China Quarterly, no. 185 (March 2006), 1–22. 15 See China Goes Global: A Survey of Chinese Companies Outward Direct Investment Intentions, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and 

China Council for Promotion of International Trade (September 2005); John Wong and Sarah Chan, “China’s Outward Direct Investment: 

Expanding Worldwide,” China: An International Journal, no. 2 (September 2003), 273–301; Mark Yaolin Wang, “The Motivations Behind China’s 

Government Initiated Industrial Investments Overseas,” Pacific Affairs 75, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 187–206. 16 “Business: Haier’s purpose; Chinese business,” The Economist, March 20, 2004. 17 Oded Shenkar, “Learning from China’s Export Boom,” BusinessWeek, January 19, 2006, available at <www.businessweek.com/technology/

content/jan2006/tc20060119_322122.htm>.
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 31

18 These percentages are 2003 data from Gilboy, 38–40.

19 Edward S. Steinfeld, “Chinese Enterprise Development and the Challenge of Global Integration,” in Shahid Yusuf, ed., East Asian Networked Production (Washington, DC: World Bank, November 2002). 20 Freidrich Wu, “Corporate China Goes Global,” September 2005, available at <www.cctr.ust.hk/articles/200509_corporate.pdf>. 21 “The Dragon Tucks In,” The Economist, June 30, 2005. 22 “SAIC Takes on Ssangyong Motors,” China Daily, October 29, 2004, available at <www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Oct/110682.htm>. 23 See David Zweig, Wilfried Vanhonacker, and Chung Siu Fung, “Reverse Migration and Technology: The Case of China,” Hong Kong 

University of Science and Technology Center on China’s Transnational Relations, Working Paper No. 11 (October 2005), available at <www.cctr.

ust.hk/articles/pdf/WorkingPaper11.pdf>. 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s Foreign Affairs 2005 (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005), 71–72. 25 Ibid., 72.

26 “China Moves on Free Trade Negotiations,” Asia Pulse, March 8, 2005. 27 Jiang Wei, “China Expects Steady Foreign Investment,” China Daily, June 17, 2006, FBIS-CPP20060117074018. 28 “Regulations of Verification Matters in Relation to Overseas Investment for the Establishment of Enterprises,” Ministry of Commerce Order 

No. 16, October 1, 2004; “Guide Catalog of Countries and Industries for overseas Investment,” Ministry of Commerce, circa July/August 2004. 29 Cumulative outbound FDI through the end of 2004 was $37 billion; FDI in 2005 was $6.92 billion. “China makes more overseas investment in 2005, mainly in Asia,” People’s Daily Online, FBIS-CPP20060211501006, February 11, 2006. 30 “China Daily Excerpts China Outbound Investment Statistics Report,” October 22, 2004 (and underlying Ministry of Commerce report), 

FBIS-CPP20041022000008. 31 Derived from entries in “main items of budgetary expenditure of central and local governments” table, China Statistical Yearbook, 2003–

2005 editions. Converted to $US at 8.3 yuan to the dollar. 32 Asian Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2005. 33 Interviews with Chinese and Western analysts, October 2005.

34 Associated Press, “Foreign reserves at U.S. $853.7b, ‘probably outstrip Japan’s,’” South China Morning Post, March 28, 2006. 35 Evan S. Medeiros and Taylor M. Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003), 22–35. 36 China’s Foreign Affairs, 2004 and 2005 editions. 37 Interviews, Manila, March 2005.

38 Yongding, “China’s Color-Coded Crackdown,” Foreign Policy (October 18, 2005), available at <www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.

php?story_id=3251>. 39 Interviews, Tokyo, Japan, August 2005.

40 Interviews in Southeast Asia, 2004­–2005. 41 Network of East-Asian Think Tanks, available at <www.neat.org.cn/neatweb_en/index/index.php>. 42 Antoaneta Bezlova, “China-Iran tango threatens U.S. leverage,” Asia Times, November 30, 2004, available at <www.atimes.com/atimes/

Middle_East/FK30Ak01.html>. 43 Energy Information Administration, “Iran Country Analysis Brief,” (March 2005), 12, available at <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.pdf>. 44 Logan.

45 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986–1993 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

July 29, 1994), 92.

Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997–2004 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

August 29, 2005), 41. 46 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997–2004 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

August 29, 2005), 41. 47 Daniel L. Byman and Roger Cliff, China’s Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 22–23. 48 See Evan S. Medeiros, Analyzing China’s Defense Industries and the Implications for Chinese Military Modernization (Arlington, VA: 

RAND Corporation, 2004), 1–2, 11. 49 China’s National Defense in 2004, available at <www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm>. 50 Ibid.

51 “Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues 6th ASEAN-China Summit,” 

Phnom Penh, November 4, 2002, available at <www.aseansec.org/13185.htm>. 52 See Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,” available at <www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm>. 53 Interviews with Southeast Asian defense officials, 2004–2005.

54 Mure Dickie and Shawn Donnan, “Jakarta In Missile Deal With Beijing,” Financial Times, August 1, 2005; Joniston Bangkuai, “Defence 

MoU Signed,” New Straits Times, September 3, 2005, FBIS-SEP20050903000009. 55 People’s Daily Online, “China May Collaborate with Russia in Developing Fighters,” April 27, 2006, FBIS-CPP20060427501006. 56 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), available at <fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>; Joshua 

Kurlantzick, “Cultural Revolution: How China Is Changing Global Diplomacy,” New Republic, June 27, 2005, 16–21. 57 However, Chinese labor costs are beginning to rise, especially in major cities in Southeast China. Some labor-intensive production is 

beginning to move to countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam that have lower labor costs. 58 Figures for foreign students studying in China are from China’s Foreign Affairs, volumes from 2003 to 2005. 59 Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 60 China’s National Defense in 2004, Appendix VI, available at <www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm>. 61 Interviews with Japanese and Southeast Asian officials, 2003–2005.

62 “China Makes More Overseas Investment in 2005, Mainly in Asia,” People’s Daily Online, FBIS-CPP20060211501006, February 11, 2006; 

Ministry of Commerce, “2005 nian woguo duiwai zhijie touzi tongji,” February 20, 2006, available at <www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/hzzn/200602/

20060201546252.html>; Xinhua, “China Still Not a Major Exporter of Capital,” July 1, 2005, FBIS-CPP20050701000180; FBIS Feature, “Analysis: 

China Advances Relations with Latin America,” June 27, 2005, FBIS-FEA20050624004578. 63 Jiang Wei, “China’s Overseas Acquisitions Skyrocket,” China Daily, October 11, 2005, FBIS-CPP20051011079014. 64 “China Makes More Overseas Investment in 2005, Mainly in Asia,”; “2005 nian woguo duiwai zhijie touzi tongji”; “China Pours More 

Money Overseas,” China Daily, October 22, 2004, FBIS-CPP20041022000008; “Broaden Investment Horizons,” China Daily, August 1, 2005, FBISCPP20050801000005.
32	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

65 Ministry of Commerce, “Chinese Non-financial Overseas Direct Investment Increasing by a Big Margin in the First Quarter,” April 27, 

2006, available at <english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/significantnews/200604/20060402021454.html>. 66 Detailed 2005 data by country is not yet available, but press reports highlight significant investments in Venezuela, Sudan, and Nigeria 

that are probably in the energy sector. “China Makes More Overseas Investment in 2005, Mainly in Asia,” People’s Daily Online. 67 The classic work is Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945). 68 See Phillip C. Saunders, “Long-Term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy,” Asian Survey 45, no. 6 

(November/December 2005), 970–991. 69 “Hu Jintao Speaks on Energy Conservation and Development at Politburo Study Session 27 June,” June 28, 2005, FBISCPP20050628000189; and James Irwin, “China: Beijing Dictates Expansion,” Energy Compass, January 22, 2004. 70 Kenneth Lieberthal has highlighted these points in conversations with the author.

71 Qiu Xin, “China Overhauls Energy Bureaucracy,” Asia Times, June 3, 2005, available at <www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GF03Ad01.html>. 72 For an excellent illustration of this dynamic in the South Pacific, see Tamara Renee Shie, “Island Fever: China Woos the South Pacific” 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, forthcoming). 73 David Barboza, “China’s Trade Surplus Tripled in 2005,” The New York Times, January 11, 2006. 74 John W. Garver, “China’s Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of National and Bureaucratic Interests,” China Quarterly, 

no. 132 (December 1992), 999–1028. 75 See interview with Rear Admiral Yang Yi in Tao Shelan, “Military Expert: In China’s Peaceful Development It Is Necessary To Uphold 

the Dialectical Strategic Thinking of Making the Country Rich and Building Up Its Military Strength,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, May 15, 2006, FBISCPP20060515072002; Sun Xuefu, “Forge a Military Force Commensurate with China’s International Status,” Jiefangjun Bao, April 28, 2006, FBISCPP20060502502001. 76 Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” remarks to National Committee on 

U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 21, 2005, available at <www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm>.
Appendix: Regional Data

CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM

33
CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 35

Asia

Mongolia

China

Vietnam Philippines

Taiwan

Mala Brunei ysia

Singapore

Indonesia

East Timor

Japan

North Korea

South 

Korea

Burma

Laos

Thailand

Cambodia






















CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM	 59

About the Author

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders has been a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute 

for National Strategic Studies since January 2004. He conducts research on China and on a range of East 

Asian security issues. Dr. Saunders recently co-organized a highly successful seminar and conference series 

examining Chinese influence in Asia in conjunction with the American Enterprise Institute. He has also 

organized and participated in a wide variety of roundtables, conferences, and seminars on Asian security.

He previously worked at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he served as Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies from 1999 to 

2004 and taught courses on Chinese politics, Chinese foreign policy, and East Asian security. While at 

Monterey, he organized a variety of training programs on arms control, nonproliferation, and international 

security for East Asian government officials, military officers, and scholars. 

Dr. Saunders has conducted research and consulted on East Asian security issues for Princeton University, the Council on Foreign Relations, RAND, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. 

From 1989 to 1993, he served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He was assigned to the Pentagon, where 

he worked as a staff officer on Asian policy issues.

Dr. Saunders has published numerous book chapters and articles on China and Asian security in 

journals including International Security, China Quarterly, The China Journal, Survival, Asian Survey, 

Pacific Review, and Orbis. His recent publications include “Long-Term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: 

Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy” (Asian Survey); “China’s Strategic Force Modernization,” in Albert 

Willner and Paul Bolt, eds., China’s Nuclear Future; and “Korea as Viewed from China,” in Jonathan Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot. 

The author speaks Mandarin Chinese and has traveled throughout Asia. He attended Harvard College, where he graduated summa cum laude with a degree in History. He received his MPA, MA, and PhD 

in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. His current research 

projects include Chinese influence in East Asia; deterrence and U.S. alliances in Asia; and a book-length 

study examining China’s global activities.
The National Defense University (NDU) educates military and civilian

leaders through teaching, research, and outreach in national security

strategy, national military strategy, and national resource strategy; joint and multinational operations; information strategies, 

operations, and resource management; acquisition; and regional 

defense and security studies.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy research 

and strategic gaming organization within NDU serving the Department of Defense, its components, and interagency partners. Established in 1984, the institute provides senior decisionmakers with 

timely, objective analysis and gaming events and supports NDU 

educational programs in the areas of international security affairs 

and defense strategy and policy. Through an active outreach program, including conferences and publications, INSS seeks to promote 

understanding of emerging strategic challenges and policy options.

NDU Press of INSS publishes books, monographs, reports, and occasional papers on national and international security affairs, defense

policy, and military strategy, primarily the output of university 

research and academic programs. In addition, it produces Joint Force 

Quarterly, a professional military and security journal published for 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.