1

This court sent a letter to Seleal Associates notifying it that, as a business entity,

it must be represented by a Utah licensed attorney.  See Tracy‐Burke v. Department of

Emp’t Sec., 699 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1985).  An attorney entered an appearance in the

appeal in response to the notice and moved to ratify the previously filed notice of

appeal and to join in the docketing statement filed by Weinstein.  As a result, we accept

the notice of appeal as effective for Seleal with the ratification of counsel.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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David Charles Nicholls,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

George Weinstein and Seleal Associates,

Defendants and Appellants.

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PER CURIAM DECISION

Case No. 20120276‐CA

F I L E D

(August 30, 2012)

   2012 UT App 246

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Third District, Silver Summit Department, 090500397

The Honorable Keith A. Kelly

Attorneys: George Weinstein, Park City, Appellant Pro Se

Michael A. Reason, South Ogden, for Appellant Seleal Associates

Natalie C. Segall and Cameron M. Banko, Park City, for Appellee

‐‐‐‐‐

Before Judges McHugh, Davis, and Thorne.

¶1 George Weinstein and Seleal Associates1 (Seleal) appeal the trial court’s order

awarding supplemental attorney fees incurred in defending against Weinstein’s
2

The March 5 order includes the text of prior orders, including the initial findings

and conclusions.  This information is included in the new order merely as a recital of the

factual and procedural background and does not reopen the judgment, which remains

final.

20120276‐CA 2

postjudgment motions.  This is before the court on its own motion for summary

disposition based on the lack of a substantial question for review.

¶2 Weinstein asserts that the trial court lacked authority to award additional fees for

postjudgment work not relating to actual enforcement or collection of the judgment.  In

Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court held that fees

incurred in litigating to recover fees are allowable.  See id. at 895‐96.  To avoid

eviscerating a fee shifting provision under statute, the court held that fees incurred in

defending or recovering statutory fees are within the scope of statutory fees.  See id.

Here, fees were awarded under the Utah Fit Premises Act.  See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57‐

22‐1 to ‐7 (2010 & Supp. 2012).  Accordingly, because the fees were awarded pursuant to

statute, fees incurred in defending and collecting the fees awarded are also properly

shifted to Weinstein.  The most recent fee amount was incurred defending the initial

judgment and other supplemental fee awards from another of Weinstein’s repetitious

postjudgment motions.  Because the fees were incurred defending the judgment and

previously awarded fees, the new fees were within the scope of the statutory scheme

and the trial court had the authority to award them.

¶3 Weinstein asserts several additional issues in his response to the sua sponte

motion, but they are not within the scope of this appeal.  He seeks to reach back and

again challenge the initial judgment entered after trial in March 2010.  That judgment

was affirmed on direct appeal and is final for all purposes.  He also asserts that prior fee

awards were inappropriate.  However, those awards were not timely appealed.  See

Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 52, 993 P.2d 191 (holding that postjudgment

proceedings are separate judgments subject to appellate rules).  This appeal is taken

from the March 5, 2012 order and is limited to the supplemental fees awarded by that

order.2

¶4 Seleal argues that its liability for fees or damages was limited to the amount

sought in the complaint because a default was entered against it in June 2009.  See Utah

R. Civ. P. 54(c) (providing that a judgment by default shall not exceed the amount
20120276‐CA 3

specifically requested).  The same day that the trial court signed the default judgment,

however, it vacated that judgment and set the matter for hearing.  Ultimately, the trial

court denied Nicholls’s request for the entry of a default judgment.  Accordingly,

Seleal’s argument regarding the limitations of default judgments is without support in

the record.

¶5 Furthermore, Seleal’s argument is beyond the scope of this appeal.  Seleal, like

Weinstein, seeks to challenge the 2010 judgment, which was affirmed on appeal and is

not before this court.  Seleal presents no argument regarding the specific award of

supplemental fees.  As a result, it presents no substantial issue for review warranting

further proceedings by this court.

¶6 Affirmed.

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Carolyn B. McHugh,

Presiding Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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¶7 I CONCUR IN PART AND DISSENT IN PART:

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge