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S. HRG. 109–798

TO REVIEW THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN

TO DETECT AND CONTROL THE POTENTIAL

SPREAD OF AVIAN INFLUENZA INTO THE

UNITED STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 

NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 11, 2006

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.agriculture.senate.gov 

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Chairman 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

MICHEAL D. CRAPO, Idaho 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas 

DEBBIE A. STABENOW, Michigan 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

KEN SALAZAR, Colorado

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Majority Staff Director 

DAVID L. JOHNSON, Majority Chief Counsel 

VERNIE HUBERT, Majority Deputy Chief Counsel 

ROBERT E. STURM, Chief Clerk 

MARK HALVERSON, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

HEARING(S):

To Review the United States Department of Agriculture National Response 

Plan to Detect and Control the Potential Spread of Avian Influenza Into 

the United States ................................................................................................. 1

Thursday, May 11, 2006

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY SENATORS 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, a U.S. Senator from Georgia, Chairman, Committee 

on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry ............................................................. 1

Harkin, Hon. Tom, a U.S. Senator from Iowa, Ranking Member, Committee 

on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry ............................................................. 10

WITNESSES 

DeHaven, Ron, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 

United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC ............................ 3

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Harkin, Hon. Tom ............................................................................................ 22

DeHaven, Ron ................................................................................................... 24

DOCUMENT(S) SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Grassley, Hon. Charles .................................................................................... 38

Roberts, Hon. Pat ............................................................................................. 41

Statements from listed organizations representing consumers, family 

farmers, and advocates for animal welfare ................................................. 42

(1)

TO REVIEW THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN TO DETECT AND CONTROL 

THE POTENTIAL SPREAD OF AVIAN INFLUENZA INTO THE UNITED STATES 

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2006

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m., in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Saxby Chambliss, 

Chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present or Submitting a Statement: Senators Chambliss, Thomas, Harkin, and Dayton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON 

AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. I welcome you all to this hearing 

to review the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Response 

Plan to detect and control the potential spread of avian influenza 

in the United States. 

We are fortunate to have the administrator of the Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service, or APHIS, of USDA here with us 

today to provide our committee with valuable information on this 

topic of concern to all Americans. 

I thank you, Dr. DeHaven, for your participation in this hearing, 

and welcome to those who are listening via our Web site. 

In November of last year, this committee held a hearing on the 

role of U.S. agriculture, including Federal, State, and local governments and private industry, in the fight against avian influenza. 

Today’s hearing will focus solely on the role of the USDA in this 

coordinated effort. 

In April of this year, USDA’s APHIS released its draft National 

Avian Influenza Response Plan. The draft plan details how our 

Government will rapidly detect and quickly respond to highly pathogenic avian influenza if and when it reaches America’s shores. 

The plan, according to USDA, is intended to complement regional, State, and industry plans. I look forward to hearing how 

this plan will be utilized in conjunction with the President’s National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and regional and State 

plans to control and eradicate avian influenza. 

2

Many experts agree that the form of avian influenza that has 

rapidly spread across Southeast Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe 

and the Middle East is likely to reach the United States either 

through migratory birds or through birds smuggled illegally into 

our country from affected regions. 

While the arrival of the H5N1 virus in America is not a certainty, it is in the best interest of all Americans that we operate 

under the assumption that it will arrive. This will ensure that 

through advance planning, we will be prepared. I hope to hear 

more details today on how USDA is preparing to address avian influenza should it be found in the United States. 

Avian influenza has caused a great deal of concern among American families. But let us be clear to all of those listening. If the 

H5N1 form of avian influenza should appear in America tomorrow, 

it would not signal the onset of a human pandemic. The disease is, 

first and foremost, an animal disease. 

The current outbreak we see on news broadcasts and in dramatic 

made-for-television movies is almost exclusively a disease of birds. 

A limited number of human beings who have been in direct contact 

with sick birds have become infected, and some, unfortunately, 

have died. 

But to date, the virus has not shown the ability to efficiently 

pass directly from human to human. And it is not clear if it ever 

will do so. However, the threat does exist that the virus might mutate to allow for a human pandemic, and thus, we must be evervigilant and take appropriate precautions. 

The key to limiting the potential for a human pandemic is to 

focus our efforts on the current virus in birds. On the front lines 

of those efforts is the United States Department of Agriculture. 

USDA has a long history of addressing avian influenza in our domestic and wild bird populations. 

While we have not experienced an outbreak of the H5N1 strain 

of the virus that has captured the fascination of the media, USDA 

has long been charged with protecting our U.S. poultry industry 

from avian influenza. And to date, they have done a commendable 

job. However, we cannot become complacent. 

The USDA National Response Plan is based on the invaluable 

experience of Government officials who have addressed avian influenza and other foreign animal disease threats in the past. Even so, 

I am encouraged that USDA considers this a living document and 

has sought the input from other stakeholders. 

I hope that USDA will strongly consider and evaluate the input 

provided and continue an open dialog with State and local governments, as well as with industry. A transparent and communicative 

approach will be a key asset in our fight to control this disease. 

Many of you listening here today likely watched a fictional, 

made-for-television movie on ABC-TV Tuesday night that dramatized a theoretical outbreak of the H5N1 bird flu virus. In the 

movie, the virus quickly mutated into a form easily spread between 

humans, resulting in a worldwide pandemic. 

This work of fiction has undoubtedly alerted the American public 

to the potential threat of an influenza pandemic, and perhaps that 

is a good thing. However, I am concerned that sensationalist movies and inaccurate media portrayals may do more to alarm AmeriVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:47 Feb 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\30240.TXT SAG2 PsN: SAG2
3

cans than to increase their awareness. I am particularly concerned 

with how Americans might view the U.S. poultry industry with all 

of this increased attention. 

With all we know at this moment, even if the H5N1 were present 

in the United States, properly cooked poultry would remain completely safe for American consumers. I look forward to further 

clarifying that point and some of the movie’s other misleading assertions with Dr. DeHaven today. 

We must all be mindful that viruses and pandemics do not operate on the timetable of man. Though our interest in the H5N1 

strain of avian influenza may be heightened at this time, our interest alone does not make the next pandemic any more certain or 

likely. 

In our world, we are constantly bombarded by naturally occurring biological threats. Pandemics have occurred throughout the 

course of human history, and we undoubtedly will be faced with 

this and other threats in the future. But it is only arrogance that 

will lead us to state with certainty that the H5N1 strain will cause 

the next pandemic. 

Rather than act in a reactionary and irresponsible fashion, the 

U.S. must make broad preparations for the next pandemic, in 

whatever form it might take, with purpose, guile, and compassion. 

Our preparations in the fight against avian influenza, if done correctly, will serve the American people well in this and other challenges to come. 

And again, Dr. DeHaven, we thank you for being here today, and 

we are going to look forward to your testimony. 

Before we go to you, Senator Thomas, if you have any opening 

comments to make, we will look forward to that. 

Senator THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I really don’t have an opening comment. I am interested in finding out more information about it, and therefore, I appreciate your 

having this. 

And Doctor, I am glad you are here. I am kind of interested in the $7 billion we are talking about spending. I know all of it is not 

in the Department of Agriculture, but nevertheless. So thank you 

very much, and I am looking forward to the testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

At this time, I will turn to Dr. Ron DeHaven, the administrator 

of Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department of 

Agriculture, here in Washington, D.C. 

Dr. DeHaven, you have been with us several times before. Welcome back to the committee. We look forward to your testimony on 

this extremely interesting subject this morning. 

STATEMENT OF RON DEHAVEN, ADMINISTRATOR, ANIMAL 

AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Chairman Chambliss, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee about our preparations for a 

potential introduction of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza 

virus into U.S. poultry. 

We appreciate your continued support for our efforts, and I 

would like to begin this morning by briefly touching on a few key 

4

funding and program initiatives that have unfolded since November 2005, when I last testified before this committee. 

Last week, President Bush announced his Implementation Plan 

for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. The implementation plan takes the major components of the President’s National 

Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and breaks them down into more 

than 300 critical actions. 

As the lead agency in terms of dealing with the disease in poultry, the implementation plan directs the U.S. Department of Agriculture to play either a leadership or coordinating role in 98 of 

those 300 critical actions. 

These include initiatives such as continuing our support of efforts 

overseas to slow the spread of the disease in poultry, expanding our 

domestic surveillance and early warning systems, and ensuring 

that we have a strong plan in place to respond to a detection of 

highly pathogenic H5N1 in poultry here in our country. 

USDA will continue to use a four-pronged approach to complete 

these and other critical actions. First, we are focused on slowing 

the spread of the disease overseas by assisting other nations. 

Second, we are conducting a proactive messaging campaign designed to educate the American public and poultry owners on this 

animal disease. We want to inform, while not alarming. 

Third, we are conducting an aggressive surveillance program 

that focuses on four key areas—wild bird surveillance, commercial 

poultry operations, live bird markets, and backyard flocks. 

And finally, we are prepared, when necessary, to execute our response plans. As the committee knows, we have a long and successful history of dealing with foreign animal diseases and, in particular, handling avian influenza in conjunction with our State and 

industry partners. 

Last December, Congress approved and the President signed into 

law a supplemental funding bill for pandemic influenza preparedness that included $91.35 million for the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Since that time, we have been working to ensure that our 

plans for using these funds are strategically sound and fully coordinated with our many international, Federal, State, local, and industry cooperators. 

We are using approximately $20 million to help affected countries overseas in collaboration with international organizations. We 

are participating in a coordinated effort by various interested U.S. 

Government agencies led by the Department of State to work with 

affected countries through the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, as well 

as the World Organization for Animal Health, or the OIE. 

On the domestic front, we are utilizing approximately $72 million 

of the supplemental appropriation to enhance anti-smuggling programs, continue research into the avian influenza virus, strengthen 

wild bird and other domestic surveillance efforts, increase the current animal vaccine stockpile, and improve a variety of other preparedness activities. 

Another area where we have taken steps to obtain better information is migratory bird surveillance. Wild birds are considered to 

be the natural reservoirs for many common, relatively harmless 

strains of avian influenza. We know that migratory birds have been 

5

implicated in the spread of this highly pathogenic H5N1 virus as 

well. 

On March 20th of 2006, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, and the Department of Health and Human 

Services released an interagency strategic plan that expands the 

monitoring of migratory birds in the United States for this highly 

pathogenic H5N1 virus and establishes common protocols for testing birds and tracking the data. 

The plan targets bird species in North America that have been 

the highest risk of being exposed to or infected with highly pathogenic H5N1 because of their migratory movement patterns. 

APHIS officials have begun sampling efforts in Alaska, and our 

National Wildlife Research Center has also begun processing environmental, water, and fecal samples from areas in Alaska that harbor high-risk migratory birds. Other States will begin surveillance 

and the collection of environmental samples in June based upon 

migratory sampling. 

Now I would like to update you on our plans for responding to 

a detection of any highly pathogenic AI virus in commercial poultry. Recently, APHIS posted to its Web site a draft summary of the 

National Avian Influenza Response Plan. This plan would guide 

the steps taken by USDA and our State and industry partners following the detection of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in 

domestic poultry. 

USDA has placed a robust emergency response program designed 

to complement all of our surveillance efforts. When we have unexpected poultry or other livestock disease illnesses or deaths on the 

farm, we immediately conduct a foreign animal disease investigation. We have a cadre of 450 specially trained veterinarians who 

can be on the site within 4 hours to conduct an initial examination 

and submit initial samples for tests, for laboratory testing. 

In conjunction with our State colleagues, APHIS maintains 

State-level emergency response teams on the standby. These teams 

will typically be onsite within 24 hours of a presumptive diagnosis 

of avian influenza or any other significant animal disease. 

Destruction of the affected flocks would be our primary course of 

action for highly pathogenic H5N1. We would also work with State 

or tribes to possibly impose State-level quarantines and movement 

restrictions. 

For highly pathogenic avian influenza, as well as for low pathogenic H5 and H7 subtypes of the virus, the response plan provides 

guidelines as to how APHIS would work with States to quarantine 

affected premises and clean and disinfect those premises after the 

birds have been properly depopulated and disposed. Surveillance 

testing would also be conducted in the quarantine zone and surrounding area to ensure the virus had been completely eradicated. 

APHIS maintains a bank of avian influenza vaccines for animals 

in the event that the vaccine would be a potential course of action 

in any outbreak situation. I do want to stress, however, that widescale vaccination of poultry is not our primary strategy against 

avian influenza. Rather, poultry vaccination could be used in response to a widespread detection of the disease to create barriers 

against further spread and to assist with our overall control and 

eradication efforts. 

6

The response plan’s focus, first and foremost, is on quickly containing and eradicating the virus before it has a chance to spread 

further in our poultry population. Our ability to respond swiftly is 

linked directly to the strong cooperation efforts APHIS is engaged 

in with our State and industry partners. 

The U.S. Poultry and Egg Association convened an industry-wide 

meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, on April 27th to facilitate dialog with 

our State counterparts, USDA officials on many operational policy 

and communications issues relative to our cooperative AI response 

and preparedness efforts. 

Many APHIS senior animal health staff and I personally attended this meeting, which we felt was extremely beneficial. There 

was a lot of discussion regarding how the response plan draws on 

our ongoing partnerships with other Federal agencies, State agriculture departments, State veterinarians, the poultry industry, and 

the conservation and wildlife communities. 

The plan is designed to be flexible and does not supersede any 

State response plans. Rather, it complements such plans already in 

existence or already under development. It incorporates much positive feedback. And by releasing a summary and posting it online, 

we fully expect further review and comment by our stakeholders. 

In this way, we intend for the response plan to be an evolving, 

dynamic document that takes into account the latest scientific information and approaches to emergency preparedness and response. 

Allow me to close by offering a couple of thoughts that you have 

heard me say before and I believe are worth repeating. First, just 

like people, there are many, many strains of influenza that affect 

birds with varying degrees of impact and importance. 

Second, a detection in birds in the United States of highly pathogenic H5N1 does not signal the start of a human pandemic. The 

virus is not easily transmitted from person to person. Human illnesses overseas have resulted from direct contact with sick or dead 

birds. 

Third, a detection in wild birds does not mean that the virus will 

reach a commercial poultry operation. We are certainly preparing 

as if it will, but the U.S. poultry industry employs a very sophisticated system of firewalls to protect the safety of their animals and 

the product that they produce. In addition, the wild migratory bird 

surveillance plan is serving as an early warning system for commercial operations. 

Fourth, even if the virus reaches a commercial operation, there 

is no reason for consumers to be concerned about the safety of poultry that they purchase and consume. I believe that our state of 

readiness for such an event is high. Our response plans would 

guide a swift, comprehensive response designed to minimize further spread of the disease. 

And finally, when it comes to food safety, consumers have the 

power to protect themselves. Quite simply, proper handling and 

cooking of poultry kills the virus and other food-borne pathogens. 

Properly prepared poultry is safe to eat. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the committee, and I look forward to answering the questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. DeHaven. 

7

I understand that we have a special group here today. There are 

25 of Indiana’s brightest and most beautiful ladies with us. And we 

certainly welcome you here. I understand you are with the Lugar 

Institute. 

And normally, Senator Lugar sits to my immediate left here, and 

I will have to tell you that your senator is not just one of the very 

best members of the U.S. Senate, he is one of the real true gentlemen of the U.S. Senate. So we welcome you here this morning. 

Dr. DeHaven, poultry growers in Georgia have raised some concerns regarding the USDA indemnification program for avian influenza. They are concerned that if the USDA does not provide 100 

percent indemnity for low pathogenic AI, early detection and eradication efforts might be compromised. 

There have also been documented cases in North America where 

low path strains have mutated into the high path strains, and the 

World Organization for Animal Health, the OIE, considers high 

path avian influenza, as well as low path H5 and H7 strains, reportable diseases. 

Does the USDA intend to propose 100 percent indemnification for 

H5 and H7 low path AI affected flocks to ensure that all potential 

cases are reported? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. 

Indeed, the current regulations that we have in place for low 

pathogenic H5 and H7 subtypes do provide for up to 50 percent indemnity, that being 50 percent of the fair market value of the 

birds. 

And indeed, your comment about the potential for H5 and H7 

low pathogenic AI viruses to mutate to high path is accurate and, 

in fact, that is why we are developing a low path H5, H7 response 

plan. Part of that process to put that program in place is to do a 

rulemaking that will give us the appropriate authorities, enhance 

the National Poultry Improvement Program to provide for a greatly 

enhanced level of surveillance testing that, by the way, would be 

useful not just for low path H5 and H7, but also for early detection 

of this highly pathogenic H5N1 virus. 

The rule that we have drafted at this point is going to the final 

clearance process. Because of the rulemaking restrictions, I can’t at 

this point in time, unfortunately, divulge the content of that rule. 

I will say that it does address the indemnity issue. 

We certainly recognize that indemnifying owners for any losses 

that they might incur in association with the disease eradication 

effort is critical. We think that some of the problems that have 

been encountered overseas in some of the developing countries that 

have this highly pathogenic H5N1 virus are because of their inability to pay indemnity. So we recognize that as a critically important 

component of our overall program. 

Just one last thing to add, and that is historically, with the incursion of a highly pathogenic AI virus in the United States, we 

have typically depended upon the Commodity Credit Corporation or 

emergency funding for our operation and indemnity costs. And with 

a highly pathogenic virus, we have historically provided 100 percent indemnity of fair market value of the birds that were destroyed. I have no reason to suspect that that would be any difVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:47 Feb 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\30240.TXT SAG2 PsN: SAG2
8

ferent if we were to find this highly pathogenic virus in commercial 

poultry. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know this rulemaking process has been ongoing 

now for a couple of years, and I hope we are getting to the end of 

that so that we can start to get some certainty here. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Mr. Chairman, it is our expectation to have that 

rule published this summer. 

The CHAIRMAN. It appears the USDA is taking the proper steps 

to ensure an efficient and functional response system. In any system as complex as this one, the true test of success is in the implementation. What steps are being taken to train and position the 

proper employees to carry out the implementation of this plan? 

Is USDA planning to conduct any training, tabletop exercises, or 

simulations to identify areas of the plan that may need to be 

strengthened, and who will be in charge of the oversight of this 

plan? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Mr. Chairman, we have in place, as you know—

and have had for a number of years—an avian influenza response 

plan. The time that we have to prepare for this particular virus has 

allowed us to greatly enhance and bolster our overall response and 

detection efforts. 

To focus on your specific issues, in fact, there have been a number of tabletop exercises at various levels of Government from the 

very top levels, where there was a White House test exercise, tabletop exercise on the incursion of this highly pathogenic virus. 

Secretary Johanns had a senior department-level tabletop exercise, and indeed, part of the use of the supplemental funds that 

have been provided is to conduct 50 or more tabletop exercise at 

the State level. So, indeed, we plan to do a lot of exercising of those 

response plans. And as you point out, one of the best ways to find 

out if those response plans are complete and thorough is to test 

them. 

This would also include some efforts underway to develop some 

computer simulation models that if the virus were to find its way 

into the United States through various pathways, what would be 

the likely means of spread of the virus, and what would be the impact of various response mechanisms that we might put in place? 

So that, again, is part of our intended use of those response plans. 

We have within our Veterinary Services Unit within APHIS an 

emergency management program. And one individual, Dr. Larry 

Granger, who is the associate deputy administrator for emergency 

management, who has taken this on as a full-time job, preparing 

for highly pathogenic avian influenza. 

He is working closely with State and industry counterparts, as 

we are finding that virtually every State has some level of response 

plans. The industry has done a tremendous job in developing their 

response plans. And now we are working to make sure that those 

response plans are coordinated for everything from how we would 

humanely euthanize animals, how we would dispose of the carcasses, and ensuring that we have appropriate levels of personal 

protection for our employees. 

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned that we are coordinating with the 

various State plans. Is there any review by USDA of the various 

9

State plans around the country to determine the adequacy of those 

plans? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Part of our emergency management system within 

our veterinary services organization is to place area emergency coordinators in the States, working with the States as they develop 

their plans. This is to ensure that those State plans are not only 

complete, but also complementary and consistent with the national 

plans that we have in place. 

In the State of Georgia in particular, with an outstanding State 

veterinarian in the form of Lee Meyers, those plans are exceptionally well prepared and consistent and complement our Federal response plans. Other States, it depends on the State itself. Some are 

in better shape than others, quite frankly. 

But we are focusing, as you might imagine, with regard to highly 

pathogenic H5N1 on those States that have significant poultry populations. I think it is safe to say that those plans are in remarkably 

good shape at this point. Now the exercise is to make sure that 

State, Federal, and industry plans are coordinated. 

The CHAIRMAN. In March 2003, more than 1,800 of USDA’s plant 

protection and quarantine inspectors were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection 

Division. There is concern that these transfers may reduce USDA’s 

ability to respond to agricultural emergencies. 

What is being done to detect and eliminate illegal imports of live 

birds, including wildlife, fighting cocks, and poultry, and poultry 

products from H5N1–infected countries? And do we have any gaps 

in these specialists as a result of the transfer of these employees 

to DHS? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Mr. Chairman, as you might guess, going back to 

March of 2003 with the transfer of that many employees to a new 

agency that was just standing up, there were some bumps along 

the way. And in fact, not everything was in place as we would like 

to see it. I am pleased to report that there has been remarkable 

improvements in that regard. 

Initially, there were a number of vacancies within the agricultural specialists within the Customs and Border Protection. They 

have hired hundreds of new employees. APHIS is continuing to 

train those employees, and those agricultural specialists within the 

Customs and Border Protection are actually going through the 

same 8–week training program that they underwent when those 

employees still worked for APHIS. 

We have in place now an auditing system, a joint USDA-CBP auditing system, where we are going to those ports and borders and 

auditing their systems to make sure that they are identifying the 

problems and that those problems are being corrected. 

We have sent several alerts to Customs and Border Protection 

with regard to looking out for poultry and poultry products and 

other birds that might be coming from high path AI H5N1 affected 

countries to ensure that they are stopping those products as they 

might be entering the border. 

And in fact, I think some numbers that reflect the adequacy of 

that system with regard to smuggling interdiction activities, both 

with our own teams in APHIS as working side by side with Customs and Border Protection—in our fiscal year 2005, they had 129 

10

seizures from highly pathogenic AI infected countries. So far in fiscal year 2006, there have been 63 seizures of illegal product found 

at our ports and borders. So, in fact, we have, indeed, bolstered 

that effort. 

Of the supplemental funding, $9 million is going to enhance our 

smuggling interdiction activities, and so we are still in the process 

of adding additional employees toward that effort to further bolster 

those activities at our ports and borders. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harkin? 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM HARKIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

IOWA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 

NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late. 

Dr. DeHaven, I read your statement before, and I appreciate 

your being here and your leadership in this area. I would just ask 

that my statement be made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman. I 

appreciate that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Harkin can be found on page 

22 in the appendix.] 

Senator HARKIN. But I am told, again, we all know that this 

H5N1 is not just a possibility, but that it is coming. Just a matter 

of time and hasn’t gotten here, and it is just a question of when. 

My concern is, are we ready? Are you working across lines with 

CDC, with Health and Human Services, with State agencies to 

make sure we have a good plan in place? 

The other question I have is what do we do when we have an 

outbreak among a chicken flock someplace or some bird someplace 

in this country? It might be some other animal. But I suppose 

maybe probably chickens. What do we do? And what kind of quarantine do we have? 

And are you satisfied with the status right now of preparations 

for the first bird with H5NI and that is going to be headlines. It 

is going to be headlines across America. It is going to be on the 

evening television shows. 

And with this show I just saw the other night on ABC News a 

lot of it was not quite right. I understand that. But still, people are 

going to get concerned about it. 

That first bird that gets analyzed that has H5N1, and then the 

destruction of the flock is going to be big news across America. 

What do we do? What happens then? And are you convinced that 

we have the things in place right now to get on top of it in a hurry? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Thank you, Senator Harkin, for your comments 

and question. 

The short answer would be, yes, I think that we are prepared. 

We have been responding to incursions of avian influenza in the 

United States successfully for a number of years. So while this particular virus is new, and it is unique, it is not new and unique for 

APHIS to respond to working closely with our State and industry 

colleagues, respond to and successfully contain and eradicate avian 

influenza viruses. 

11

Having said that, I would be the first to say, without question, 

this particular virus does represent some unique challenges. We 

are, in fact, working very closely with our colleagues in other Federal agencies and also working very closely with State departments 

of agriculture, State wildlife departments, as well as our industry 

colleagues, who, as you might guess, on the commercial side have 

done a tremendous job in preparing for a potential response. 

We are satisfied that we, in fact, will be able to respond quickly, 

effectively, to contain and eradicate the incursion if it happens. 

Having said that, I think if we ever get to the point where we are 

complacent and think that we have arrived, if we ever think that 

we can’t improve upon the existing plans is a very, very dangerous 

position to be in. 

So while I think we are prepared, we are far better prepared 

today than we were 6 months ago or a year ago, we can always improve. 

In terms of what happens when we find the virus, we would estimate that the first inclination will probably be a very significant 

increase in mortality in a commercial flock. We will see far more 

birds dying than what would ordinarily die in a large commercial 

operation. 

We would immediately dispatch one of our foreign animal disease 

diagnosticians, collect samples, and within hours would have test 

results as to whether or not we, based on presumptive laboratory 

results, are dealing with an H5 type virus. If we have presumptive 

laboratory indication that we have an H5 virus, plus we have clinical signs in that flock suggestive of a highly pathogenic virus, we 

would start depopulation immediately. 

So that depopulation effort involves placing a quarantine under 

the affected flock, establishing a control zone probably about 10 kilometers or 6.2 miles around that infected premises, where we control all movement of poultry, poultry products, poultry equipment, 

anything on or off those farms, and then, of course, begin the depopulation process. 

Once the birds are humanely destroyed, we would also clean and 

disinfect the premise. We would do surveillance testing in that 10–

kilometer or 6.2–mile zone, and we would also start an epidemiological investigation. What has come onto that premises, what has 

left that premises, and——

Senator HARKIN. Trying to find out how it got there in the first 

place? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Correct. 

Senator HARKIN. Dr. DeHaven, the supplemental appropriation 

provided $91 million for USDA avian flu prevention and control activities. Eighteen million of that was allocated to international biosecurity and surveillance and diagnostic measures. I understand 

that less than $10 million has been set aside to assist States in 

their preparedness plans. 

Is the $18 million enough to continue and expand the efforts on 

the international efforts to eradicate H5N1 in Asia? That is what 

that $18 million was for. Let me ask you, do you have any idea—

if you don’t know right now, could you get it to me—what is the 

total dollar amount the U.S. has spent on international efforts to 

eradicate H5N1 in Asia? 

12

Dr. DEHAVEN. That $18 million was money, as you indicated, out 

of the supplemental appropriation that the Department of Agriculture identified for use in international efforts to assist affected 

countries. By itself, that $18 million does not go very far, given the 

fact that we now have some 50 affected countries, and we are dealing with this virus on 3 continents. 

When that request was generated, we were dealing with 7 or 8 countries on 1 continent. So, indeed, that $18 million was not intended to respond to the scope of what we are looking at. No one 

anticipated the rapidity with which that virus has spread. But I would also point out that our $18 million is just one small 

contribution in a sea of contributions. You will recall that there 

was a donors conference in Beijing in January of this year, and the 

international community pledged $1.9 billion toward this overall effort, recognizing that perhaps one of the, if not the best, ways that 

we can protect public health is to attack this virus at its source in 

birds. 

So our $18 million, while seemingly a small amount, is part of 

a much larger contribution where, at the Beijing conference, a recognition that virtually half of the $1.9 billion that was pledged 

needs to go toward better attacking this virus at its source in animals. 

Senator HARKIN. Mr. Chairman, I just have one last question. 

You said something about this 10–mile radius, I picked up. But I 

understand that under the department’s plan, response plan that 

the entire State would be quarantined. Am I missing something 

here? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Let me clarify. We would anticipate, under the 

typical scenario where we have a single-point source of infection, 

a single flock where we have the virus, where we have found the 

virus, that our typical response would be a 10–kilometer or 6.2–

mile control zone, where we would control movement and conduct 

intensive surveillance. 

If we are faced with a scenario where we think that there may 

be multiple outbreaks, and we haven’t been able to determine exactly where that virus might or might not be, we, in fact, could 

quarantine an area as large as the entire State. We wouldn’t take 

that action lightly, recognizing the impact that that might have on 

commercial industry. 

So we are modifying the draft National Response Plan that we 

have published on our Web site to clarify how and when we would 

use various quarantines. That 6.2–mile or 10–kilometer zone, by 

the way, is consistent with the OIE standard, the requirement that 

would be expected, recognizing that based on specific circumstances 

we may need to adjust that even to the extent of potentially quarantining an entire State. We wouldn’t anticipate that being the 

case. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Dr. DeHaven. 

Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for having this hearing. I hate 

to say this, but we may have to have more. A lot of people think 

of avian flu as only the human aspect of transmission. But the impact it could have on our livestock producers. We didn’t even get 

into swine, and we now know that it is transmissible to swine. But 

what it could do to our poultry flocks. 

13

And then if it goes into swine, what it could do to swine in America would be just devastating economically to this country. We 

know about it. But I don’t think a lot of the American people have 

really focused on this. 

And I hope through this hearing and through our Agriculture 

Committee efforts here, we can alert the American people that 

there is more to this than just the human aspect. We hope it never 

transmits into humans, but we know that it is transmissible in 

poultry and now in swine. 

And we just have to be on top of this thing. I say ‘‘if’’—we obviously hope that it doesn’t happen here. But everything I have been 

led to believe is that somehow it is going to get here—migratory 

fowl, imported birds, something like that. It is going to get here 

some way or another. 

So the American people really need to understand that we need 

to come up front with the money, and we need to have our plans 

in place when this happens. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harkin, you are absolutely right. It may 

be just a matter of when, not if it is going to happen. But whether 

it is this strain or not, the next strain may be the one that ultimately arrives in the United States, or the next one after that. So 

preparedness is of utmost importance. 

Senator Dayton? 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for 

holding this very important hearing. 

I have been attempting unsuccessfully to get the Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on which I serve to 

hold a similar hearing on our preparedness, and I thank you very 

much for your initiative and leadership in doing so. 

I hear not as frequently from my constituents back home as I do 

about energy prices, but I hear very frequently people’s concerns 

about this. So I know it is very much on their minds. And coming, 

as both of my colleagues do here, from an agricultural State, I 

think even more so people are aware of the presence of turkeys, 

chickens. And you know, Senator Harkin pointed out, it is not limited to that, but it is on everybody’s mind as they see this and calculate their own exposure. 

I also, Dr. DeHaven, wanted to thank you publicly for your terrific response a couple of months ago when some Minnesota farmers up in the northwestern part of our State suffered the loss of 

their entire farms because of a bovine tuberculosis outbreak. 

And I want to just read for the record part of my letter to Secretary Johanns, which I said, ‘‘I would like to acknowledge Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service administrator Ron DeHaven 

for releasing urgently needed funds for the owners of Minnesota’s 

fifth infected herd last Friday, January 20th. Dr. DeHaven’s quick 

work was a welcome lifeline to the three ranchers who had suffered 

more than $43,000 in loss due to bureaucratic delays, nearly driving their farm into bankruptcy.’’

So I thank you very much. It was really a remarkably quick response on your part and the Secretary’s. And the farmers up there 

had seen some of their neighbors devastated by a flood in 2002 and 

14

suffering through a lack of Federal responsiveness from FEMA, 

and they were just astonished that they got such a swift response. 

So I thank you on their behalf. And anytime you would like to 

take over the administration of FEMA, please let me know. I will 

be glad to submit your name for consideration. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Senator, thank you for your kind comments. I am 

thoroughly enjoying my current position. Thank you very much. 

And will just add that, as you know, we have a lot of work to do 

yet in Minnesota with regard to TB. 

Senator DAYTON. I wanted to read something that the Minnesota 

Department of Health has a fact sheet, March 2006, for Minnesotans concerns about this danger. I would just ask if this is accurate 

and if there is anything else that we need to do to assist in its further development? 

It says, ‘‘Wildlife biologists, migratory bird specialists, veterinarians, and epidemiologists from the USDA, DOI, and Health and 

Human Services (HHS), along with the International Association of 

Fish and Wildlife Agencies, the National Association of Public 

Health Veterinarians, and the State of Alaska have developed an 

early detection system for Asian H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild migratory birds—U.S. interagency strategic plan.’’

Is that interagency strategic plan complete? Are the States informed? Is everything being done that needs to be done? Do you 

have resources, funding necessary to continue that? If not, what 

else do you need? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Thank you, Senator Dayton, for the question. 

And in fact, we are just now embarking on the implementation 

portion of our wild bird surveillance program. It has been an excellent partnership with our colleagues in HHS, Department of Interior, the State agencies, the International Association of State 

Wildlife Agencies. Great partnership. 

And we are now beginning to see the fruits of that labor in terms 

of some of the actual sampling of those birds just now beginning. 

Let me clarify in that we are currently seeing the arrival of migratory birds, not only from North America along our Pacific 

flyway, but also birds from Asia that are now arriving at nesting 

and breeding grounds in the State of Alaska. So we will be testing 

those birds throughout the summer. And so far, in fact, we have 

collected some 250 samples from live birds, dead birds, water, environmental sample. Of course, they are all negative. And we will 

continue and expand that testing through the summer. 

The concern is that there might be birds that are carrying that 

virus from Asia that would mingle with our North American birds. 

And then late summer, early fall when those North American birds 

migrate south, they could bring the virus to the continental United 

States. 

So the second part of that implementation plan is late summer, 

early fall, testing those birds as they are migrating south. We have 

four major flyways—not just the Pacific flyway, but Central, Mississippi, and Eastern flyway. We will be doing surveillance testing 

in all four of those flyways, looking, as that press release or that 

statement from the Minnesota Department of Public Health indicated, that this provides an excellent early warning system. 

15

If we find that virus in migratory birds, it provides us the opportunity to respond in the appropriate geographical area relative to 

that finding and bolster surveillance and biosecurity efforts. 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you. One more question, if I may, Mr. 

Chairman? 

The University of Minnesota is a national leader in the surveillance of avian flu. The Minnesota poultry testing laboratory in 

Willmar, Minnesota, tests every flock in the State, more than 

70,000 samples each year. And yet they are starved for funding, 

and that is partly or largely a State government responsibility. 

But what do you consider to be the role of grassroots programs 

like the one in Minnesota in this united effort to prevent an outbreak of avian flu? And of the $7.1 billion requested by President 

Bush, how much of that will flow to the States through cooperative 

agreements with USDA? And you can give me that answer for the 

record later if you would prefer, sir. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. OK. Let me explain some of the interaction that 

we have with the States. Much of it, of course, goes to our overall 

response plans, where if we have an outbreak in a given State, the 

response will be a State-Federal joint effort, working close with the 

industry to respond to that overall effort. 

Many of the monies that have been made available are going to 

provide for the equipment, supplies, those kinds of things that 

would be necessary for a State-Federal task force. So, indirectly, 

much of those monies would be going to the States. 

We have greatly expanded our laboratory testing capacity as 

well. We recognize that if we have widespread outbreak of highly 

pathogenic AI, that we may need to run literally thousands and 

thousands of samples. 

We now have certified some 39 State diagnostic laboratories to 

do some of that testing for us, making sure that they have the 

equipment, and then we, of course, would provide the reagents for 

them to do that testing. So that we would have the capacity to run 

up to 18,000 samples per day, if that became necessary in a widespread outbreak situation. 

We are also partnering very closely with the University of Minnesota’s Center for Food Safety and Animal Health. We are working for them in collaboration with our APHIS unit in Fort Collins 

to become an OIE collaborating center, doing not only outreach domestically, but doing outreach internationally, training experts in 

terms of assisting underdeveloped countries with their overall response programs. 

So our whole response effort, much of our education and outreach 

is totally dependent upon State partners, much of that at the university level. So I think that partnership is there. And H5N1, with 

all of the dark clouds, does provide some silver lining in terms of 

enhancing already-existing partnerships. 

Senator DAYTON. I thank you for your efforts, and I would just 

say if you need any resources for anything related to this effort and 

for the State partnerships, please let us know. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

16

Dr. DeHaven, in December 2005, Congress approved an emergency supplemental funding bill for pandemic influenza preparedness and included $91.35 million in funding for USDA-specific efforts. Again, you have talked a little bit about this. But just for the 

record, how much of that funding has actually been obligated and 

to what specific programs or program areas? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Chairman Chambliss, we have, as of today, obligated a relatively small portion of that money. Obligations as of 

May 10th were $5.1 million out of the $91 million. 

Having said that, we are on the verge of letting a number of contracts, signing a number of cooperative agreements. And so, we 

would anticipate that by September of this year, we will have obligated over $66 million of that $91 million, which would provide for 

a carryover of approximately $14 million. 

In terms of what the monies have been spent for, a number of 

areas to enhance cooperative agreements for domestic surveillance 

and diagnostic activities. This would be some of the cooperative 

agreements with the States to improve their response plans, as 

well as some of the efforts at those State laboratories to provide additional diagnostic capability. 

We have expended some of those monies in enhancing our antismuggling and regulatory enforcement efforts, to bolster our activities at the ports and borders. But also going to some of the retail 

outlets where some of these prohibited products might be found 

and then tracing them back to their point of origin. There has been $1.7 million expended to enhance the national 

veterinary stockpile. These would be monies for vaccine, supplies 

such as Tyvek suits, respirator masks, gloves, all of the equipment 

and supplies that we might need to respond, with the concept of 

preparing ‘‘push packs.’’

These would be packs of materials that would be ready to go, everything that 10 people would need for 10 days that are palletized 

and be ready to go onsite in an outbreak situation. 

We are working to provide for in-country experts and experts at 

the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Organization of 

International Epizootics, or the OIE, as they are working internationally to provide assistance. In fact, I just returned from the 

Food and Agriculture Organization headquarters in Rome, where I 

have been working internationally to help them stand up a crisis 

management center. 

If we were to have an outbreak in the United States at the national level, we would have an overall coordinating organization in 

our national emergency operation center. The concept for the FAO 

is the same, except on a global scale. 

This is a situation where they have not had to respond in this 

order of magnitude in the past, and they haven’t had before the 

mechanism to coordinate the efforts ongoing in many countries simultaneously. So helping them stand up this emergency operation 

center will go a long way toward helping them globally to better 

respond to that effort. So we pledged a considerable sum toward 

that overall effort. 

So, again, the short answer is we have only obligated as of today 

$5.1 million. We would expect by September for that number to increase to over $66 million. 

17

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask that, say, in 30–day intervals. I don’t 

expect you to do it every time you execute a contract. But in 30–

day intervals between now and the end of the fiscal year, if you 

would provide the committee with contracts you have entered into 

and funding that is obligated and for what purpose? It would be 

very good information for us to have. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. We would be glad to do so, Mr. Chairman, and, 

in fact, can give you that initial report very quickly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. 

On Tuesday night, ABC aired this movie entitled ‘‘Fatal Contact: 

Bird Flu In America.’’ The movie was full of frightening images to 

secure ratings. But unfortunately, it did little to educate the public 

on the realistic threats associated with a pandemic. 

I would have been pleased if the movie had simply raised the 

awareness of the American public and encouraged them to play an 

active role in the fight against avian flu. But unfortunately, the 

movie provided a worst-case scenario that likely confused and 

scared many Americans. 

In your testimony, you stated that proper precautions in the 

preparation and the cooking of poultry will protect consumers from 

avian influenza. This is an important point to address, and I would 

ask you to comment again on that and emphasize with some certainty exactly what people need to think of in terms of cooking 

poultry and how safe it is. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start at the beginning. First of all, we think we have in 

place an excellent surveillance and detection system. So that if the 

virus does arrive in the United States, we think that we would find 

it very quickly, particularly in commercial poultry, which is the 

concern, obviously, from a food safety standpoint. 

We would very quickly, within those affected flocks, work to contain and eradicate it, to ensure that birds that might be in those 

infected flocks never make it into the food chain. 

To the extent that there would be an early infection that went 

undetected on the farm, I would point out that we have Food Safety Inspection Service there doing inspection at slaughter, and they 

are trained to recognize any of the signs, symptoms, post mortem 

lesions that would be characteristic of a disease like highly pathogenic avian influenza. So the second level of protection is the onsite 

inspection at those slaughter plants. 

If by some rare occurrence product were to make its way into the 

food chain, and I think this focuses on the nature of your question, 

that is where just good sanitation practices and cooking will take 

over and provide all of the protection. And indeed, the consumer 

has the ability to provide all the protection that is necessary with 

regard to poultry or poultry products. 

And providing those protections for avian influenza also provides 

the protection for a number of potential food-borne pathogens. So 

these should be practices that are already in place in every kitchen 

in the country. But it is things like making sure that you don’t 

cross-contaminate cooked poultry with raw product. If you are 

using a knife or other utensil on raw product, make sure that you 

wash it before it is used on a cooked product. 

18

Any surfaces utensil that would come in contact with raw poultry 

should be properly cleaned and sanitized before it would have the 

opportunity to come in contact with a cooked product. 

And then the last thing is normal cooking temperatures. If poultry is raised to the internal temperature of 165 degrees, it not only 

will kill any avian influenza virus, it will render harmless a number of other potential food-borne pathogens. 

So, in summary, I think simply by practicing good sanitation, hygiene practices in the kitchen, proper cooking temperatures, there 

is no risk to the consumers from poultry or poultry products. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. 

Again, with reference to the movie, it showed a Virginia salesman that caught a virus in Hong Kong, returned home, and it 

showed him spreading the virus through napkins, by an olive in his 

martini, by simply touching a woman on the shoulder, by handshakes, or through just about any other way imaginable. Any of 

that realistic? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Well, we are delving into the human health aspect 

of this virus. And so, let me tread cautiously, recognizing that my 

area of expertise is limited to animals. 

But I would simply point out that there is a seasonal flu every 

year in this country, and I think our public forgets the fact that 

that seasonal flu virus that we have every year typically kills in 

the neighborhood of 36,000 people in this country. So let us not lose 

sight of the fact that that occurs on a regular basis. 

What is common to that seasonal flu virus that is not common 

to this bird virus that we are currently seeing in other parts of the 

world is the ability to transmit easily from person to person. And 

the concern, of course, is that through mutation that the H5N1 

highly pathogenic virus would mutate and be one that is spread 

easily from person to person. 

We can only surmise that that spread would be or the ability of 

the virus to spread would be comparable to the seasonal flu virus 

that we experience every fall, winter, and early spring in this country. 

And so, yes, indeed, the virus potentially could be one that would 

be easily spread from person to person. It would be my estimation 

that the movie on TV depicted the absolute worst and perhaps exaggerated scenario of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, any other questions? 

Senator HARKIN. The only other thing I would have, Mr. Chairman, is when you talk about depopulating flocks and stuff, obviously, you have got to train some people to do that out there. You 

don’t have the personnel to do that if you are going to depopulate 

flocks, I assume. And so, you are going to have to train people. 

Are you doing that now—training personnel on how to depopulate a flock? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Correct. Well, Senator Harkin, again, dealing with 

avian influenza is not something that is new to us. 

Senator HARKIN. So you know how to do depopulation anyway? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. We do know how to do that and, in fact, destroyed 

several million birds in southern California and other Southwestern States as part of our Exotic Newcastle Disease outbreak. 

So whether it is for Exotic Newcastle Disease, low pathogenic avian 

19

influenza, or this highly pathogenic virus, we do, in fact, have considerable expertise in depopulating flocks and taking care of carcasses. 

Having said that, I think the level of awareness, the level of 

preparation within the industry is higher than it ever has been. So 

I think we will have willing and experienced partners in the form 

of industry as well. The industry that already has catch crews that 

are involved in catching birds to take them to slaughter, et cetera, 

and those simple skills come in handy in this situation as well. 

But they are also being trained in terms of employing appropriate personal protective measures. And therein, I think, lies the 

area. We are, indeed, providing additional training to our people, 

State employees, and will be coordinating very closely with the industry in terms of training that is provided. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I did have one other question. Throughout your 

travels around the world, you have witnessed firsthand the veterinary infrastructure and biosecurity capabilities of many countries 

affected by avian influenza. A key component of the National Response Plan is preventing the spreading of avian influenza and controlling the virus in foreign countries where it currently exists. 

Could you talk for a minute about what we are doing relative to 

having a presence in countries where we know this virus already 

exists and what we are doing with regard to in-country work there, 

both from a personnel standpoint and otherwise to make sure it 

doesn’t come here? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Let me address that in two ways. APHIS has responded in a number of countries where specific requests were 

made for particular areas, particular expertise, whether it be poultry virology, diagnostic capability, emergency response. And so, we 

have provided a number of people for weeks to months in country 

in countries that had requested and needed that kind of assistance. 

We have also put on a number of training courses, both in terms 

of emergency response training, on laboratory diagnostic capability, 

and those kinds of things. So we have provided that as requested 

response on a country-by-country basis. 

But we are also attacking it more globally by forming a coalition 

of like-minded developed countries, working initially with the 

World Organization for Animal Health, the OIE, to develop an assessment tool and then training teams of experts that can go into 

affected countries for the mid-and long-range effort of assessing 

what is their strategy for attacking the virus, assessing whether 

that strategy is appropriate given the level of virus, the sophistication or lack of sophistication of their industry, and their overall 

wherewithal to respond—is that an appropriate strategy? 

And if so, what is it that they need to better address the needs 

and attack the virus in accordance with that strategy. So we are 

now at the point of working with the OIE to start those training 

courses. Teams of experts would be trained to use this assessment 

tool and go in country, do the assessment, and find out what their 

needs are. 

Once the needs have been identified, working with funding countries and the World Bank, ensuring through the FAO that those 

needs are satisfied. This then goes to the FAO, that would take the 

20

lead in terms of implementation and making sure those needs were 

met. This goes to the crisis management center at the global level 

that I mentioned, having the regional OIE and FAO structure to 

oversee the activities in a region of the world, and then actually 

working in country to provide the expertise, the equipment, the resources that they need. 

So we think that the appropriate strategy to attack the virus is 

through international organizations working with like-minded developed countries that have the resources and the experts to provide the assistance and providing the FAO and the OIE what they 

need to better attack the virus. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DeHaven can be found on page 

24 in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. DeHaven, thank you very much for appearing today. Thanks for the good work you are doing down there. We 

look forward to staying in touch. 

And hopefully, we will, at some point in time, be celebrating the 

fact that the United States escaped the introduction of this virus 

into the United States. 

So thank you very much, and this hearing is now concluded. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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