U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Use of Polygraph Examinations 

in the Department of Justice 

September 2006 

I-2006-008 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 The Department of Justice (Department) and several of its 

components use and conduct polygraph examinations for a variety of 

administrative and investigative uses. In this Office of the Inspector General 

(OIG) review, we examined the polygraph programs in the Department and 

its components, including the components’ management and use of 

polygraph examinations, the Department’s policies governing the use of 

polygraph examinations, and the oversight mechanisms for ensuring that 

the components conduct and use polygraph examinations in accordance 

with established professional and technical standards. 

In this report, we do not make recommendations regarding the 

Department’s polygraph use; rather, for informational purposes, we provide 

a detailed description of how polygraphs are used throughout the 

Department. 

 

A polygraph is an examination process that uses a diagnostic 

instrument capable of measuring and recording a subject’s physiological 

reactions as the subject answers questions. Because physiological reactions 

can vary when subjects are telling the truth and when they are being 

deceptive, by comparing a subject’s reactions to different questions a 

polygraph examiner can detect reactions that may indicate deceptive 

responses to specific questions. The results of polygraph examinations are 

generally not admissible in court. However, various components of the 

Department use polygraph examinations, primarily for criminal, foreign 

counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations, administrative 

investigations (internal affairs and misconduct), and pre-employment and 

personnel security screening. 

Four Department components – the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives (ATF); and the OIG – administer their own 

polygraph programs and have units that conduct polygraph examinations in 

support of their operations or at the request of other Department 

components and outside law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

Seven other Department components do not operate their own 

polygraph programs but use the results of polygraph examinations 

conducted by the FBI, DEA, ATF, OIG, or an outside agency or private 

contractor. These seven components are the Department’s Criminal 

Division, Justice Command Center (JCC), Antitrust Division (ATR), National 
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Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), 

Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). 

During fiscal years (FY) 2002 through 2005, Department components 

conducted over 49,000 polygraph examinations. The examinations were 

used for a variety of reasons, including making pre-employment and 

personnel security decisions; investigating criminal, administrative, and 

security violations; ensuring witness security; providing sex offender 

treatment; and providing operational support in examining or “vetting” 

foreign task force members and validating intelligence sources. 

Polygraph Programs in the Department of Justice 

In describing the four components that conduct their own polygraph 

examinations – the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG – we provide information 

concerning the following key elements of each program’s: 

• history; 

• mission; 

• policies and regulations; 

• organization and staffing; 

• polygraph examination uses and procedures; 

• examiner qualifications and training; 

• workload and program costs; 

• quality control, quality assurance, and oversight; and 

• program performance and results. 

We also discuss the Department’s limited policies regarding the use of 

polygraph examinations. Existing Department-level policies include 

guidance regarding the introduction of polygraph examinations as evidence 

and the use of polygraph for the Witness Security Program.1 There is no 

Department-wide policy concerning the conduct and use of polygraph 

examinations. Rather, each of the four components has its own policies and 

procedures governing its polygraph examinations. Those policies and 

procedures define who is subject to examination; the consequences of 

refusing to take a polygraph examination; professional, ethical, and 

1 The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Section 9-13.300, states that it is the Department’s 

policy to oppose all attempts by defense counsel to admit polygraph evidence or to have an 

examiner appointed by the court to conduct a polygraph test and that Department 

attorneys should refrain from seeking the admission of favorable examinations that may 

have been conducted during an investigation. The Section 9-21.340 also establishes a 

requirement for potential entrants to the Witness Security program to undergo polygraph 

examinations. 
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technical standards for conducting an examination; quality control and 

assurance standards and procedures; and the rights to be afforded 

individuals who undergo polygraph testing. The four components also have 

specific policies defining the use and role of polygraph examinations in 

making investigative, personnel, and security decisions. Each policy notes 

that polygraph testing is an investigative tool and should not be the sole 

basis for investigative, personnel, or security decisions. 

Purposes for Polygraph Examinations 

 

History of Polygraph Examinations in the Department. For over 

70 years, certain Department components have used polygraph 

examinations primarily as an investigation tool in criminal investigations 

and administrative misconduct investigations involving Department 

employees. The FBI first began using polygraph examiners in 1935 and 

established a centralized polygraph program for conducting testing in 1978. 

The DEA established a polygraph program in the early 1970s when it began 

conducting polygraph examinations in criminal drug and misconduct 

investigations. The OIG established its polygraph program and began 

conducting polygraph examinations in 1990 in both criminal and 

misconduct investigations. ATF, which was part of the Department of the 

Treasury until January 2003, began conducting polygraph examinations in 

criminal investigations in 1978. In more recent years, the four components 

have conducted polygraph examinations in foreign counterintelligence and 

counterterrorism investigations, pre-employment screening, personnel 

security screening, foreign vetting, and supporting the polygraph needs of 

other agencies. 

Criminal Investigations. The FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG conduct 

specific-issue polygraph examinations as a tool in criminal investigations. 

From FY 2002 though 2005, the four components conducted a total of 

8,356 polygraph examinations of criminal suspects, witnesses, and 

informants in criminal investigations. The examinations were used to detect 

and identify criminal suspects, verify information furnished by an informant 

or witness, and to obtain additional information and investigational leads. 

Administrative Investigations. The FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG 

conduct polygraph examinations in administrative investigations into 

allegations of misconduct by Department employees. From FY 2002 

through 2005, the four polygraph units conducted 149 specific-issue 

polygraph examinations of employees who were subjects, witnesses, or 

complainants in investigations of personal misconduct in the performance of 

their official duties. 
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Foreign Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Investigations. 

From FY 2002 through 2005, the FBI conducted 1,994 polygraph 

examinations of FBI and non-FBI personnel during foreign 

counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. The examinations 

were used to resolve specific issues related to espionage or sabotage, to 

validate information sources, or to make resource decisions (such as 

whether to conduct surveillance). 

Pre-Employment Screening. Between 1985 and 1998, the FBI, 

DEA, and ATF expanded their use of polygraphs to include pre-employment 

examinations for Special Agent candidates. By 1994, the FBI had extended 

its requirement for pre-employment testing to candidates for all FBI jobs. In 

1996, the DEA extended its pre-employment examination requirement to 

applicants for DEA Intelligence Research Specialist positions. From 

FY 2002 through 2005, the FBI, DEA, and ATF conducted approximately 

28,000 pre-employment polygraph examinations, which represented about 

57 percent of all polygraph examinations conducted in that period. 

Personnel Security and Counterintelligence Screening. The FBI is 

the only component that routinely conducts random and periodic personnel 

security and counterintelligence screening of its employees. In the wake of 

the arrest of FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen for espionage in February 

2001, the FBI greatly expanded its Personnel Security Program to include a 

wider use of polygraph examinations for personnel security and 

counterintelligence purposes. From FY 2002 through 2005, the FBI 

conducted 4,721 examinations for personnel security purposes. That 

number represents an almost 750-percent increase from the 331 

examinations conducted in FY 2002 to the 2,481 conducted in FY 2005. All 

personnel assigned to FBI counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and 

security programs, including state and local law enforcement personnel 

serving on Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), are now required to take 

personnel security polygraph examinations.2 FBI officials said they were 

considering extending the requirement for periodic and random personnel 

security polygraph examinations to all of the FBI’s approximately 35,000 

employees and contractor personnel, as well as personnel from other 

organizations with access to FBI information, information systems, and 

space. 

2 Since 1980, the FBI has established JTTFs to enhance interagency cooperation 

and coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in 

counterterrorism efforts. 
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Foreign Vetting. From FY 2002 through 2005, the DEA and ATF 

conducted 4,403 polygraph examinations to assess foreign personnel 

selected by their countries for membership in DEA Sensitive Investigative 

Units (SIU) overseas. The SIUs work in sensitive bilateral investigations in 

countries critical to the counter-narcotics objectives of the United States. 

ATF conducted foreign vetting polygraphs in FY 2002 at the request of other 

agencies, but has not conducted any such examinations since that time. 

Requested by Other Components. The FBI conducted 

approximately 1,661 polygraph examinations and the OIG conducted 33 

polygraph examinations at the request of seven other Department 

components that do not have their own polygraph programs. The seven 

components used the results of those polygraph examinations for witness 

security screening; administrative investigations (misconduct and internal 

affairs); criminal investigations; personnel security screening; and vetting 

foreign witnesses, prosecutors, and law enforcement personnel. In addition, 

these seven components also occasionally used polygraph examinations 

conducted by the Secret Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the BOP’s 

Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP), and a contractor working for the 

USMS on the Witness Security (WITSEC) Program. Those examination 

results were used for witness security, national security, and sex offender 

treatment. 

Requirements for Polygraph Examinations 

The consequences of polygraph examinations vary, depending on 

whether the examination is considered voluntary, mandatory, or compelled; 

the reason for the examination; and the examination results. 

Voluntary Examinations. Polygraph examinations given to federal 

employees or other individuals may be voluntary, meaning that the 

examinee may refuse to take the examination with no adverse 

consequences. For example, witnesses or subjects in a criminal 

investigation are protected by the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and therefore can refuse to speak with investigators or take a 

polygraph examination. 

 

Mandatory Examinations. In some cases, polygraph examinations 

conducted by the FBI, DEA, and ATF are mandatory. In these cases, 

completion of a successful examination is required for an individual to 

obtain a desired benefit such as consideration for employment, membership 

in a foreign investigative unit, or obtaining a security clearance. The 

consequences of refusing to take a mandatory polygraph examination – or of 
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having results that indicate deception – vary according to the policy of the 

component requiring the test. For example: 

• All applicants for employment in the FBI must undergo and pass a 

pre-employment polygraph examination. Applicants who refuse to 

take a polygraph examination are ineligible for employment. When 

the final opinion is Deception Indicated, the results are reported to 

adjudication officials who decide whether to disqualify the applicant 

or, based on other information available to the adjudicators, request 

that the applicant be retested. 

• The FBI also requires selected employees and non-FBI personnel with 

access to national security or sensitive FBI information to undergo 

periodic and random personnel security polygraphs as a deterrent to 

espionage. FBI employees who refuse to submit to mandatory 

polygraph examinations, such as during periodic security 

reinvestigations or investigations of national security matters, may be 

transferred to positions that do not require access to sensitive 

information, have their security clearances denied or re-evaluated, or 

face disciplinary action for insubordination. Because holding a 

security clearance is a condition of employment at the FBI, FBI 

employees who lose their clearances may also be dismissed. 

• In the DEA, polygraph examinations are mandatory for applicants for 

Special Agent and Intelligence Research Specialist positions, and for 

foreign candidates for membership in foreign Sensitive Investigative 

Units. Applicants for Special Agent and Intelligence Research 

Specialist positions who refuse to take a polygraph examination are 

not eligible for DEA employment. Membership in a foreign 

investigative unit is contingent on taking and passing a polygraph 

examination. 

• ATF requires all applicants for Special Agent positions to undergo a 

mandatory pre-employment polygraph examination. Those who 

refuse are not eligible for employment. If an applicant’s examination 

results in indications of deception, or if the applicant admits to 

deception or to disqualifying behavior (such as abuse of illegal drugs), 

the individual may be ineligible for employment. 

Compelled Examinations in Administrative Investigations. 

Compelled polygraph examinations are those in which employees are 

ordered to submit to examination under threat of adverse action (including 

suspension or dismissal) if the employees do not comply. Federal courts 

have reviewed a number of cases in which public employees were dismissed 
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for refusing to take a polygraph examination when compelled in an 

administrative inquiry. Those courts have held that employees can be 

compelled to submit to polygraph examinations in investigations into the 

performance of their official duties, so long as they are not also required to 

relinquish their privilege against self-incrimination. 

The Merit Systems Protection Board, which reviews adverse actions 

against federal employees covered by the Civil Service Reform Act, has never 

specifically addressed whether an employee may be removed for refusing to 

submit to a polygraph examination in an administrative inquiry. 

Within the Department, the FBI was the only component that reported 

having policies and procedures for compelling its employees to undergo 

polygraph examinations in personnel security and misconduct 

investigations. The FBI’s policies cover all FBI employees, including 

attorneys. An FBI employee can be compelled to take the examination if the 

allegations under investigation involve one or more of seven specified 

violations of law or FBI policy.3 FBI employees who refuse to take a 

polygraph examination under these circumstances face potential 

administrative discipline, up to and including dismissal. FBI policies also 

state that designated FBI officials can “compel any Bureau or non-Bureau 

person with access to FBI information or facilities to submit to a polygraph 

examination to resolve specific issues which may impact a person’s 

trustworthiness for security matters.” 

It is not clear whether employees of other Department components 

similarly can be compelled to take a polygraph in administrative 

investigations in the absence of a policy regarding compelled polygraphs. 

We found that the Department and components other than the FBI have not 

issued policies defining the circumstances under which employees can be 

compelled to submit to polygraph examinations in administrative 

misconduct investigations. We also found no evidence that an employee of 

3 FBI employees can be compelled to submit to a polygraph examination to resolve 

an issue during the investigative phase of a disciplinary matter if the employee will not do 

so without being compelled and if the matter involves: (1) intentional and unauthorized 

release of sensitive, protected information; (2) a relationship with or allegiance to a foreign 

power; (3) an illegal or improper exercise of influence; (4) intentional and unauthorized 

destruction, alteration, misplacement, taking, falsification, or other impairment of FBI 

documents or evidence; (5) use of or unauthorized dealing in controlled substances; 

(6) false statements or the failure to candidly disclose information; or (7) theft, fraud, or 

misuse of government money or property. According to the FBI’s Security Policy Manual, an 

employee’s refusal to take an examination can be treated as if the employee had failed the 

examination. However, an employee’s refusal will not by itself substantiate the misconduct 

charge. 
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any other Department component has been compelled to take a polygraph 

examination in an administrative investigation. While we are aware of 

several proposals to develop a Department-wide polygraph policy, none has 

been acted upon to date. 

For example, in August 2001 the Justice Management Division (JMD) 

provided the Deputy Attorney General with a memorandum containing three 

options for developing a Department polygraph policy and proposing that 

the Deputy Attorney General discuss with the affected components whether 

the Department should adopt a polygraph policy. The Department did not 

act on that proposal. In July 2004, JMD responded to an OIG inquiry about 

the Department’s polygraph policy during an OIG investigation of potential 

misconduct by a Department attorney. The OIG asked JMD for the 

Department’s position on whether Department employees could be 

compelled to submit to a polygraph examination. JMD informed the OIG 

that it believed, in the absence of a Department polygraph policy, that the 

Department could not compel Department employees. JMD also stated that 

it was unlikely that disciplinary action against an employee based on 

information gained through a compelled polygraph examination would be 

sustained on appeal.4 Also in July 2004, JMD’s Security and Emergency 

Planning Staff stated its understanding that, absent a Department 

polygraph policy that was approved by the Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM), the Department could not polygraph a competitive service employee, 

even with the employee’s consent.5 In response to the OIG’s 2004 inquiry, 

(Continued) 

4 Most federal government civilian employees are part of the competitive civil 

service, which is governed by the Civil Service Rules in Title 5 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations. However, some agencies, including the FBI, are exempt from those 

competitive civil service procedures. Those agencies, called excepted service agencies, 

establish their own personnel rules. 

 

5 JMD’s 2004 position that it lacked the authority to compel polygraph 

examinations was based on its understanding that an undated memorandum signed by 

President Lyndon B. Johnson (Johnson Memorandum) was the governing authority for 

federal polygraph programs. The Johnson Memorandum prohibited the use of polygraphs 

by federal agencies except for (1) pre-employment screening, personnel investigations, and 

intelligence and counterintelligence operations; (2) criminal investigations; and (3) research 

and development. As described in the Background section of this report, however, we 

found strong indications that the Johnson Memorandum was never issued. Instead, the 

President directed the Civil Service Commission (the predecessor to OPM) to issue 

regulations governing the use of polygraph examinations by Executive Branch agencies, 

which it did in 1969. Those regulations became part of the Federal Personnel Manual

(FPM), which has since been retired. In May 2006, OPM cited Executive Orders 10450 and 

10577 as its authority for overseeing the use of polygraph examinations for preemployment and personnel security screening of competitive service employees in the 

Executive Branch, using the standards for personnel security polygraphs contained in the 
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JMD again proposed developing a Department polygraph policy for 

submission to OPM, but the Department did not act on this proposal. 

Finally, as part of this review, in June 2006 the OIG met with JMD 

officials to discuss whether the Department’s position on compelled 

polygraphs had changed since 2004. After discussing JMD’s 2004 position, 

JMD officials informed the OIG that they intended to ask JMD’s Office of 

General Counsel to reexamine whether the Department has the legal 

authority to compel employees to submit to polygraph examinations during 

investigations of administrative misconduct and, if so, what procedural 

steps would be required to exercise that authority. 

Organization and Staffing of Polygraph Programs in Department 

Components 

The FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG each have a polygraph unit that 

administers the component’s polygraph program. All of the polygraph units 

have a headquarters staff supervised by a polygraph unit chief (FBI, DEA, 

and ATF) or a polygraph program manager (OIG). These officials manage 

the day-to-day operations of the polygraph units and oversee the work of the 

headquarters staff and the examiners in the field. All polygraph examiners 

in the four agencies are Special Agents who may be collaterally assigned to 

participate in criminal investigations. A description of the staffing and 

structure of each program follows. 

 The FBI has the largest polygraph unit, consisting of 119 examiners, 

support staff, and contractors at FBI Headquarters and in field offices. The 

FBI’s Headquarters Polygraph Unit is located in the Personnel Security 

Adjudication Section of the Security Division and employees 18 personnel, 

which include 13 supervisory special agent examiners. The FBI polygraph 

program’s field structure comprises 5 Regional Polygraph Program 

Managers (regional managers) who oversee the operations of 96 field 

examiners in the FBI field offices. 

 The DEA’s Polygraph Support Unit has 27 examiners in its 

headquarters and field offices. The Chief of the Polygraph Support Unit and 

Polygraph Coordinators in the unit have authority over all technical issues 

involving the administration of polygraph examinations. The three 

Polygraph Coordinators conduct quality control reviews of all polygraph 

examinations conducted by the field examiners. The DEA’s field examiners 

 

U.S. Security Policy Board’s Polygraph Memorandum of Agreement (SPB 058-99). As a 

result, procedurally OPM continues to follow the standards that were contained in the FPM. 
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work for the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the offices where they are 

assigned, but function under the technical supervision of the Chief of the 

Polygraph Support Unit. 

The ATF Polygraph Branch has a staffing level of 16 certified 

polygraph examiners, including the SAC of the Polygraph Branch, 3 regional 

team leaders, and 12 field examiners. ATF’s Polygraph Branch is located in 

the Office of Field Operations, Special Operations Division. The Chief of the 

Special Operations Division has overall responsibility for ATF’s polygraph 

program. The SAC of the Polygraph Branch reports to the Chief of the 

Special Operations Division and is responsible for establishing and 

implementing policies and procedures for the Polygraph Branch. 

As of July 2006, the OIG had three field examiner positions whose 

activities were coordinated by the SAC of the Special Operations Branch at 

OIG Headquarters. The SAC serves as the OIG’s Polygraph Program 

Manager and Coordinator, and is responsible for oversight of the polygraph 

program as well as management of its day-to-day operations. All requests, 

reports, and recommendations relating to polygraph activities are directed to 

the SAC for action. The OIG examiners are Special Agent criminal 

investigators as well as OIG-certified polygraph examiners. 

Examiner Qualifications and Training 

Each component has established qualification and training 

requirements for examiners. The FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG require that 

polygraph examiners be selected from Special Agent (GS-1811 series) 

personnel. All components require that polygraph examiner candidates 

complete training at a certified polygraph training facility. Since 1994, the 

Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DoDPI) has been the central 

provider of training for federal polygraph examiners, research, and 

monitoring of technical and scientific developments in polygraphy. The 

DEA, ATF, and OIG policies specify that examiners receive their basic 

examiner training at DoDPI, while the FBI accepts training either from 

DoDPI or a school approved by the FBI or the American Polygraph 

Association. Before they are certified, all examiner candidates must also 

complete an internship, during which they work under the supervision of an 

experienced polygraph examiner. 

Once certified, examiners must meet minimum training and 

performance standards to maintain certification. Federal polygraph 

continuing education standards require that examiners receive 80 hours of 

polygraph-related training every 2 years. For examiners to remain certified, 

the OIG requires that they conduct at least 12 examinations per year, the 
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DEA requires that they conduct 25, ATF requires that they conduct 36 (a 

minimum of 18 in each six month period), and the FBI requires that they 

conduct at least 48. DoDPI has certified that all FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG 

examiners meet established federal qualifications and training 

requirements. 

Polygraph Program Workload

From FY 2002 through 2005, the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG reported 

conducting 49,197 polygraph examinations (Table 1). The FBI conducted 

most of those examinations (over 77 percent), followed by the DEA 

(17 percent), ATF (5 percent), and the OIG (under 1 percent). The number of 

examinations conducted each year increased by about 38 percent during 

the 4-year period, primarily due to a 45-percent increase in the number of 

examinations conducted by the FBI. 

Table 1: Department of Justice Polygraph Use 

FY 2002 through 2005

Fiscal 

Year FBI DEA ATF OIG Total 

2002 7,754 1,804 654 32 10,244 

2003 7,420 2,270 712 52 10,454 

2004 11,567 2,048 710 44 14,369 

2005 11,276 2,185 624 45 14,130 

Total 38,017 8,307 2,700 173 49,197 

Source: FBI, DEA, ATF, OIG 

Overall, about 57 percent of the examinations were conducted during 

pre-employment screening; 17 percent during criminal investigations; 

10 percent during personnel security screening; 9 percent for vetting foreign 

agents; 4 percent during counterterrorism or counterintelligence 

investigations; and less than 1 percent during misconduct investigations. 

The remaining examinations (about 3 percent) were conducted at the 

request of other agencies and were not identified by these four components 

by purpose. (See Figure 1.) 

 
56.7%

9.6%

17.0%

0.3%

4.1%

3.4%

8.9%

Pre-employment screening

Personnel security screening

and investigations

Criminal investigations

Misconduct investigations

Counterintelligence and

counterterrorism investigations

Requests by other

organizations

Foreign vetting

Figure 1: Purposes of Polygraph Examinations

 Source: Component data 

Quality Control, Quality Assurance, and Oversight

 The quality control, quality assurance, and oversight mechanisms for 

the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG polygraph programs are described below. 

All of the components’ polygraph programs require that a supervisory 

polygraph official conduct an internal quality control review of all 

examination records and examiner opinions before rendering a final opinion 

on the results of a polygraph examination. The quality control reviews are 

intended to ensure satisfactory quality and the correctness of examiner 

opinions on the results of polygraphs. Each program has procedures for 

referring cases, in which the reviewer does not agree with the examiner, to a 

second reviewer before results are considered final. In addition, the 

polygraph programs of the FBI, DEA, and ATF are subject to internal 

oversight reviews conducted by the components’ internal inspection offices. 

These reviews examine general administrative management, operations 

management, and performance issues, but do not assess polygraph 

examiner performance or compliance with federal polygraph standards. 

 The FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG polygraph programs and examination 

records are reviewed under the DoDPI-administered federal Quality 

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Assurance Program. However, the DoDPI has not reviewed the polygraph 

examinations conducted by a private contractor working for the USMS 

WITSEC Program nor those conducted for the BOP’s SOTP. Since 1996, 

inspectors working at DoDPI have conducted technical reviews of federal 

polygraph programs to ensure that they are managed in compliance with 

the standards in the Federal Examiner Handbook. The DEA and ATF began 

participating in the program in 1997, the OIG in 2000, and the FBI in 2002. 

After an inspection, agency officials are given a draft report and have 30 

days to respond to any findings or recommendations. Once all issues are 

resolved, DoDPI certifies that the agency’s polygraph program complies with 

federal standards, a certification OPM requires for agencies seeking its 

approval to polygraph competitive service personnel. 

The DoDPI inspection reports we reviewed generally stated that the 

internal quality control process of each component provided independent 

and objective reviews of all polygraph examinations. The programs of the 

DEA, ATF, and OIG were consistently certified as being in compliance with 

federal standards. However, the FBI’s program was not certified as 

complying with federal standard after the three inspections DoDPI 

conducted in FY 2003 through 2005 because of repeated instances of 

noncompliance with federal polygraph standards during polygraph 

examinations. The noncompliance included instances of improperly 

constructed questions, opinions on results (i.e., Deception Indicated, No 

Deception Indicated, or Inconclusive) that were not supported by standard 

test scoring techniques, and the routine destruction of the score sheets that 

examiners and supervisors prepared when examining polygraph test results. 

Although not all issues were finally resolved, the issues were sufficiently 

addressed so that in January 2006 DoDPI certified the FBI polygraph 

program for the first time. 

The DEA and ATF must receive annual authorization from OPM 

because those two agencies use polygraph examinations for pre-employment 

screening of employees covered by the Civil Service Reform Act. For an 

agency to receive OPM authorization, OPM must first certify that the 

requesting agency has a national security mission and must approve the 

agency’s polygraph policies and regulations. In addition, agencies must 

demonstrate full compliance with federal polygraph standards, agree not to 

deny a clearance or employment based on an inconclusive polygraph result, 

and submit to a DoDPI quality assurance review at least every 2 years. 

Both the DEA and ATF have routinely received annual OPM 

reauthorizations to continue using polygraph examinations for preemployment screening. The most recent reauthorizations were granted by 

OPM on May 12, 2006, for FY 2006. The FBI does not have to obtain OPM’s 

approval for its program because most FBI employees are members of the 
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excepted service and are not covered by the Civil Service Reform Act. The 

OIG does not have to obtain OPM approval for its program because it does 

not use polygraph examinations for pre-employment or personnel security 

screening. 

Program Performance and Results

In accord with federal polygraph standards, the FBI, DEA, ATF, and 

OIG collect statistical data on the type, purpose, and results of polygraph 

examinations they conduct. The data are used to identify trends, manage 

the examination workload, monitor the work of individual examiners, 

develop budget estimates, and track performance. Certain results data 

serve as indicators of the performance of the polygraph examiners. For 

example, the skill of examiners in using the polygraph technique can be 

assessed by their rate of conclusive opinions (i.e., the percentage of 

“Deception Indicated” or “No Deception Indicated” opinions versus 

“Inconclusive” results). We examined the components’ data on the 

outcomes of polygraph examinations from FY 2002 through 2005 and found 

that all met an industry standard of 80-percent conclusive opinions for 

screening examinations. 

Seven Components that Do Not Conduct but Use Polygraph 

Examinations 

 Seven organizations in the Department reported using the results of 

polygraph examinations conducted by other federal agencies (usually the 

FBI) or by a private contractor. From FY 2002 through 2004, the Criminal 

Division, JCC, ATR, NDIC, OPR, BOP, and USMS asked other agencies to 

conduct a total of 1,728 polygraph examinations for various purposes, such 

as witness security (WITSEC) screening; administrative investigations 

(misconduct and internal affairs); criminal investigations; personnel security 

screening; sex offender treatment; and vetting foreign witnesses, 

prosecutors, and law enforcement personnel.6 

There is no central review by the Department, and DoDPI has never 

conducted a quality assurance review of the seven components’ uses of 

polygraph examinations. DoDPI may have reviewed some of the 

examination records as a part of its quality assurance reviews of the FBI 

and OIG polygraph programs, as those offices conducted examinations for 

 6 The same polygraph examinations reported in this section as requested by the 

seven components were also reported by the FBI in its number of polygraph examinations 

conducted for other agencies. 
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the seven components. However, although the FBI conducted 

approximately 96 percent of the examinations the seven users requested 

from FY 2002 through 2004, the FBI has not provided many of the records 

of those examinations for DoDPI review because of logistical problems with 

retrieving the records of criminal specific-issue, pre-employment, and 

personnel security polygraph examinations from the requesting agencies. 

Further, the FBI does not provide DoDPI with examination records 

associated with the WITSEC, Foreign Counterintelligence and 

Counterterrorism, and OPR programs for DoDPI review, whether the 

examinations were conducted for FBI purposes or for another agency, due to 

the sensitive nature of those programs. 

Of the seven users, the BOP, JCC, and NDIC have internal policies 

and procedures governing the use of polygraph examinations.7 The seven 

components’ uses of polygraph examinations are discussed below. 

Criminal Division. From FY 2002 through 2004, 4 of the 19 

organizations within the Criminal Division requested that the FBI and other 

law enforcement agencies conduct a total of 1,200 polygraph examinations: 

• The Office of Enforcement Operations uses polygraph examinations 

to evaluate prisoner-witnesses seeking entry into the WITSEC 

Program. 

• The Domestic Security Section occasionally uses polygraph 

examinations in its investigations of criminal organizations that 

smuggle aliens, including those with ties to terrorist organizations, 

into the United States. 

• The Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training 

(OPDAT) Section uses polygraph examinations in providing 

technical assistance to foreign counterparts as they establish their 

own investigative units. About 5 to 10 percent of the 50 to 60 

countries that receive OPDAT technical assistance each year use 

polygraphs (generally conducted by the FBI at the request of 

OPDAT) to determine, for example, whether the foreign prosecutors 

have taken bribes or violated human rights laws in their countries. 

7 As described in the Introduction section of the full report, the Department has 

policies and procedures dealing with the use of polygraph examinations in criminal 

investigations, prosecutions, and the Witness Security Program that apply to all of its 

components.
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• The Public Integrity Section uses polygraph examinations in 

connection with criminal cases involving public corruption to 

verify the truthfulness of cooperating witnesses, informants, and 

subjects of criminal investigations. 

Justice Command Center. The JCC, which serves as a crisis center 

for the Department and functions as an around-the-clock contact point for 

all Department operations worldwide, is a branch of the Justice 

Management Division’s Security and Emergency Planning Staff. Because 

the JCC handles highly classified intelligence information, it requires its 

employees and job candidates to pass a narrowly focused, 

counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination as part of the security 

clearance process. The JCC has 15 positions subject to mandatory 

polygraph examinations. The JCC is the only one of the seven users 

discussed in this section that OPM has ever authorized to use polygraph 

examinations for personnel security screening. Although OPM originally 

authorized the JCC’s use of polygraph examinations in October 1987, and 

reauthorized it annually through September 30, 1996, OPM officials said 

they had no record of any reauthorization requests from the Department 

from FY 1997 through 2004. On November 23, 2005, after we asked to 

review JCC records of reauthorization requests, the Department applied for 

reauthorization to use polygraph examinations for JCC personnel. On 

May 12, 2006, OPM officials granted the JCC’s reauthorization request to 

use pre-employment and personnel security screening polygraphs in 

FY 2006. 

Antitrust Division. The ATR uses polygraph examinations 

infrequently in connection with criminal investigations related to its 

enforcement of antitrust laws. From FY 2002 through 2004, the Division 

used polygraph examinations only twice. 

National Drug Intelligence Center. The NDIC’s Office of Security 

and Classified Programs uses polygraph examinations for pre-employment 

screening. From FY 2002 through 2004, the office asked the FBI to conduct 

72 polygraph examinations for its use in screening job applicants who had 

received conditional offers of NDIC employment. The NDIC’s use of 

polygraph examinations does not require OPM’s approval because the 

NDIC’s employees are in the excepted service. 

Office of Professional Responsibility. OPR has jurisdiction to 

investigate allegations of misconduct by Department of Justice attorneys 

that relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate, or provide 

legal advice. OPR also has jurisdiction to investigate allegations of 

misconduct by law enforcement personnel when they are related to 
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allegations of misconduct by attorneys within the jurisdiction of OPR. OPR 

officials reported that it uses polygraph examinations as an investigative 

tool in criminal and administrative misconduct investigations. However, 

OPR officials told us that they had not requested a polygraph examination 

since before FY 2001. An OPR official told us that, in the past, polygraph 

examinations have only been conducted when the proposed test subject has 

consented to the examination. 

Federal Bureau of Prisons. The BOP uses polygraph examinations 

as an investigative tool in administrative investigations of BOP employees, 

as a condition for inmates’ entry into the WITSEC Program, and as a 

condition for participation in the BOP’s Sex Offender Treatment Program. 

The following sections within the BOP used polygraph examinations in 

FY 2002 through 2004. 

• The BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) used polygraph 

examinations of subjects, witnesses, and complainants in 

administrative investigations into alleged misconduct by BOP 

employees. The OIA requested 21 polygraph examinations during 

administrative investigations from FY 2002 through 2004. The 

OIG conducted 17 of the examinations, and the FBI conducted 4. 

Fifteen of the examinations were administered to subjects of 

investigations, four to victims, and two to complainants. According 

to BOP internal policy, neither BOP staff nor inmates can be 

compelled to take a polygraph examination. Both inmates and 

staff must sign consent forms before they take a polygraph 

examination. 

• BOP institutions use the results of polygraph examinations in 

determining whether prisoners can be placed in a Protective 

Custody Unit and before leaving a BOP facility. The Criminal 

Division, working through the BOP, uses these polygraph 

examinations as a tool for maintaining the security of prisonerwitnesses and to help determine whether an inmate seeking 

admission to the WITSEC Program intends to harm another inmate 

in the program. From FY 2002 through 2004, the FBI and the OIG 

conducted a total of 338 polygraph examinations of WITSEC 

inmates in BOP institutions. 

• The BOP’s Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) at the Butner 

Federal Correctional Institution in North Carolina houses up to 

112 federal inmates who are convicted sex offenders. All SOTP 

participants must agree to undergo and pass polygraph 

examinations when entering the program, upon release, and 
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during probation after their release. From FY 2002 through 2004, 

the SOTP examiner conducted a total of 76 polygraph 

examinations.8 The SOTP uses polygraph examinations as an aid 

in managing the potential risks inmates pose to the community 

after they are released from prison. They are used for clinical, not 

investigative, purposes. 

U.S. Marshals Service. The USMS reported that it uses polygraph 

examinations for administrative investigations involving USMS personnel 

and for individuals in the WITSEC Program who are not incarcerated and 

claim their security has been breached. From FY 2002 through 2004, the 

USMS requested 16 polygraph examinations of witnesses in the WITSEC 

Program, but none for administrative investigations. The examinations were 

conducted by either ATF or a private contractor. 

New Requirements for Federal Personnel Security Programs 

In December 2004, the President signed into law the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-458). 

Certain provisions of this Act may require the Department to examine its 

components’ use of polygraph examinations in conducting background 

investigations for personnel security clearances. Specifically, to facilitate 

reciprocal acceptance of security clearances among federal agencies, Title III 

of the Act directs the federal government to improve the security clearance 

process by establishing central oversight and uniform policies for 

investigating and adjudicating personnel security clearances. The Act states 

that the federal government must begin: 

developing and implementing uniform and consistent 

policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and 

timely completion of security clearances and determinations 

for access to highly sensitive programs, including 

standardization of security questionnaires, financial 

disclosure requirements for security clearance applicants, 

and polygraph policies and procedures. 

As described in this report, each of the components establishes its 

own policy and procedures for conducting and using the results of 

polygraph examinations. With the exception of the polygraph examinations 

conducted by a private contractor for the USMS’s WITSEC Program and 

8 The SOTP polygraph examiner is a psychologist who was trained to conduct 

criminal investigative and national security screening examinations at DoDPI. 
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those conducted for the BOP’s SOTP, we found that the other polygraph 

programs in the Department comply with federal standards; however, the 

components are not consistent in whom they require to take polygraph 

examinations in order to receive a security clearance, how frequently the 

examinations are administered, or what happens in the event of an 

unfavorable or inconclusive result. There is no comprehensive Departmentwide polygraph policy addressing those issues and no government-wide 

policy establishing standard policies and procedures for all polygraph 

programs. 

 

As the provisions of the Intelligence Reform Act are implemented over 

the next year, the Department may need to resolve any differences in its 

components’ policies and procedures that could impede full reciprocity in 

personnel security clearances. In Executive Order 13381, issued on 

June 27, 2005, the President assigned the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) to direct the implementation of the Act’s provisions, including 

those that require a system to support reciprocity in the investigation and 

adjudication of personnel security clearances. In May 2006, OPM officials 

told us that OMB had not yet designated an agency to lead government 

efforts to develop and implement standard polygraph policy and procedures. 

In July 2006, the President extended the provisions of the Executive Order 

13381 for a year. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

LIST OF ACRONYMS

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................1

Background ............................................................................................ 1

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................... 33

RESULTS ...........................................................................................35

SECTION I: Polygraph Programs in the Department of Justice .......35

THE FBI POLYGRAPH PROGRAM ...................................................... 35

THE DEA POLYGRAPH PROGRAM ..................................................... 67

THE ATF POLYGRAPH PROGRAM ...................................................... 83

THE OIG POLYGRAPH PROGRAM ...................................................... 98

SECTION II: Polygraph Users in the Department of Justice .......... 108

Background ..................................................................................... 108

Criminal Division ............................................................................. 109

Justice Command Center ................................................................. 114

Antitrust Division............................................................................. 116

National Drug Intelligence Center..................................................... 117

Office of Professional Responsibility.................................................. 119

Federal Bureau of Prisons ................................................................ 120

United States Marshals Service ........................................................ 125
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIG Assistant Inspector General 

AO Administrative Opinion 

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

ASCLAD American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

ATR Antitrust Division 

BOP Federal Bureau of Prisons 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DI Deception Indicated 

DoDPI Department of Defense Polygraph Institute 

DSS Domestic Security Section 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FPM Federal Personnel Manual

FY Fiscal year 

INC Inconclusive 

JCC Justice Command Center 

JMD Justice Management Division 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force 

MAOP FBI’s Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures 

MIOG FBI’s Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines

MOA Memorandum of Agreement 

MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board 

NDI No Deception Indicated 

NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center 

NO No Opinion 

NSA National Security Agency 
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NSR No Significant Response 

OEO Office of Enforcement Operations 

OIA Office of Internal Affairs 

OIAP Office of Investigative Agency Policies 

OIG Office of the Inspector General 

OII Operations Support Division, Office of Internal Investigations 

OLC Office of Legal Counsel 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPDAT Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training 

OPR Office of Professional Responsibility 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

PDD Psychophysiological detection of deception 

SAC Special Agent in Charge 

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information 

SEPS Security and Emergency Planning Staff 

SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit 

SOTP Sex Offender Treatment Program 

SR Significant Response 

USMS United States Marshals Service 

WITSEC Witness Security 
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INTRODUCTION 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review of 

polygraph programs in the Department of Justice (Department) to develop 

an in-depth description of the regulatory requirements governing the use of 

polygraph examinations, the components’ management and use of 

polygraph examinations, the Department’s polygraph policy, and oversight 

mechanisms for ensuring that the components conduct and use polygraph 

examinations in accordance with professional and technical standards. In 

this introductory section, we describe the history and current status of 

federal policies regarding the use of polygraph examinations, polygraph 

examiner training and quality standards, and recent legislation relevant to 

polygraph examinations. We also describe efforts to develop policy within 

the Department regarding polygraph usage. We next describe the types and 

uses of polygraph examinations, provide general information on the use of 

polygraph examinations in the Department, and describe how we conducted 

our study of the Department’s operations. 

The results section of the review contains detailed descriptions of the 

polygraph programs of the four Department components that administer 

polygraphs: the (1) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); (2) Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA); (3) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives (ATF); and (4) OIG. We also provide a summary 

description of the uses of polygraph examinations by seven components that 

do not directly administer their own polygraph programs but use polygraphs 

conducted for them by other agencies or contractors. These components are 

the Department’s Criminal Division, Justice Command Center, Antitrust 

Division, National Drug Intelligence Center, Office of Professional 

Responsibility, Federal Bureau of Prisons, and U.S. Marshals Service. 

Background 

A polygraph is an examination process that uses a diagnostic 

instrument capable of measuring and recording a subject’s respiratory, 

electrodermal, and cardiovascular reactions.9 The theory behind polygraph 

testing is that physiological reactions exhibited by subjects as they are 

responding to questions generally vary when subjects are telling the truth 

and when they are being deceptive. By enabling an examiner to compare a 

subject’s physiological reactions when responding to different questions, a 

 9 Electrodermal reactions are related to the electrical properties of the skin. 
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polygraph examiner can detect reactions that may indicate deceptive 

responses to specific questions. These indications can then be used to 

either corroborate or challenge information provided by the subject or 

developed during an investigation. 

As of July 2006, 24 federal agencies in 11 major departments of the 

federal government had polygraph programs. Those agencies, which employ 

approximately 600 federal polygraph examiners, use polygraph 

examinations as a tool in making pre-employment and personnel security 

decisions; investigating misconduct, criminal cases, and security violations; 

and providing operational support such as vetting foreign sources and 

validating intelligence sources. In addition, many agencies without a 

polygraph program use the results of polygraph examinations conducted by 

other agencies. 

Historical Background of Federal Policy Governing the Use of Polygraph 

Examinations

Our review determined that the Executive Branch’s polygraph policy 

originated with an undated memorandum signed by President Lyndon B. 

Johnson (Johnson Memorandum).10 In this memorandum, President 

Johnson adopted the findings of an interagency committee established in 

1965 to examine the use of polygraphs in the federal government. The 

Johnson Memorandum prohibited the use of polygraphs by federal agencies 

except for (1) pre-employment screening, personnel investigations, and 

intelligence and counterintelligence operations; (2) criminal investigations; 

and (3) research and development.11 

Under the terms of the Johnson Memorandum, however, an Executive 

Branch agency could not use polygraphs for employment screening, 

 10 In 1964, a series of hearings was held by Congressman Moss of the House 

Committee on Foreign Operations and Government Information on the use of polygraph 

examinations. The hearings resulted from an attempt by the labor unions to have the use 

of “lie detector tests” by federal agencies banned. As a result of the hearings, the Moss 

Committee recommended that government polygraph programs be centralized, that quality 

control reviews be implemented in government programs, that research continue, and that 

federal examiners receive standardized education in the use of the polygraph technique. 

11 The Johnson Memorandum did not specifically address administrative 

misconduct investigations. The section of the memorandum that addresses “personnel 

investigations” has been interpreted by OPM as relating to investigations to “[e]nsure the 

suitability of applicants for and appointees to Federal positions” (i.e., pre-employment and 

security investigations), rather than to personnel misconduct investigations. 
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personnel investigations, or intelligence and counterintelligence operations 

unless the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (now the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM)) certified that the agency had an intelligence 

or counterintelligence mission directly affecting national security. If the 

Chairman so certified, the agency had to prepare regulations governing the 

use of polygraphs. The Johnson Memorandum also provided detailed 

criteria for agency regulations governing polygraph use in the context of 

employment screening and personnel investigations, and required that 

those regulations be approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service 

Commission. To gain approval, such regulations had to contain, at a 

minimum: 

1. Specific purposes for which the polygraph could be used, 

the types of positions for which it would be used, and the 

officials authorized to approve such examinations. 

2. A directive that the person to be examined was to be 

informed as far in advance as possible of the intent to use 

the polygraph and of: 

a. Other devices or aids to the interrogation that could 

be used simultaneously with the polygraph, such as 

voice recordings, etc. 

b. The person’s privilege against self-incrimination and 

right to consult with legal counsel or to secure other 

professional assistance prior to the examination. 

c. The effect of the polygraph examination or the 

subject’s refusal to take such examination on the 

subject’s eligibility for employment. The subject was 

to be informed that refusal to consent would not be 

made part of the subject’s personnel file. 

d. The characteristics and nature of the polygraph 

device and examination, including an explanation of 

the physical operation of the device, the procedures 

to be followed during the examination, and the 

disposition of the information developed. 

e. The general areas of all questions to be asked during an 

examination. 
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3. A directive that no polygraph examination would be given 

unless the person to be examined had voluntarily 

consented in writing to be examined after having been 

informed of the above. 

4. A directive that questions to be asked during a polygraph 

examination had to have specific relevance to the subject 

of the particular inquiry. 

5. Adequate standards for the selection and training of 

examiners, keeping in mind the government’s objective of 

ensuring protection for the subject of an examination and 

the accuracy of the polygraph results. 

The Johnson Memorandum’s criteria for regulations related to the use 

of polygraphs for intelligence and counterintelligence operations were 

considerably less detailed. The memorandum required that after the 

Chairman of the Civil Service Commission certified that the agency had an 

intelligence or counterintelligence mission directly affecting national 

security, the agency prepare regulations and directives governing the use of 

polygraphs in that context and that the agency head approve those 

regulations. 

The Johnson Memorandum permitted Executive Branch departments 

and agencies to use polygraphs in criminal investigations, as long as they 

had promulgated regulations governing their use and had obtained approval 

of those regulations from the Attorney General. According to the Johnson 

Memorandum, those regulations were to contain, at a minimum: 

1. The range of criminal matters in which the polygraph 

would be used. 

2. A statement that no polygraph examination would be 

given unless the person to be examined had voluntarily 

consented in writing after being fully informed of: 

a. the subject’s privilege against self-incrimination, 

b. the subject’s right to consult a lawyer prior to the 

examination, 

c. the subject’s right to refuse to submit to the 

examination, and 
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d. the characteristics and nature of the polygraph 

machine and examination, including an explanation of 

the physical operations of the machine, the procedures 

to be followed during the examination, and the 

disposition of information developed from an 

examination. 

3. An affirmation that in the case of an employee of the 

federal government refusal to consent to a polygraph 

examination would not lead to any adverse action against 

the employee and would not be made a part of the 

employee’s personnel file. 

4. Adequate standards for the selection and training of 

examiners, keeping in mind the government’s objective of 

ensuring protection for the subject of any examination 

and the accuracy of polygraph results. 

However, documents from the Johnson Library strongly suggest that 

the Johnson Memorandum itself, while signed, was never issued.12 Instead, 

it appears that President Johnson accepted the advice of his staff that he 

implement the interagency committee’s recommendations by requiring the 

Civil Service Commission to issue a directive setting forth the policy. 

Consequently, the formal Executive Branch policy for polygraph 

examinations was issued by the Civil Service Commission as Chapter 736, 

Section 2-6 of the Federal Personnel Manual (FPM).13 This section, entitled 

“Use of the Polygraph in Personnel Investigations,” tracks much of the 

12 According to an archivist with the Johnson Library who investigated the status of 

the Johnson Memorandum in some detail at our request, the memorandum was not 

contained in the Library’s collection of memorandum to heads of departments and 

agencies, nor was it located in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, which is 

where issued memorandums should be found. He stated that the Johnson Library had 

found no evidence that the memorandum was ever officially promulgated. 

13 In introducing the general requirements for the use of the polygraph in the 

Executive Branch, the FPM stated: “With the concurrence of President Lyndon B. Johnson, 

the following rules, incorporated in an interagency committee report dated July 29, 1966, 

remain in effect.” FPM, Ch. 736, § 2-6(a). Similarly, in its 1996 proposed rule to replace 

the FPM, OPM characterized the relationship between the Johnson Memorandum and the 

FPM as follows: “Chapter 736 of the former FPM contained limitations upon using 

polygraphs in personnel investigations based upon a July 29, 1966, interagency committee 

report approved by former President Lyndon B. Johnson.” See Suitability, National 

Security Positions, and Personnel Investigations, 61 Fed. Reg. 394, 396 (Jan. 5, 1996). 
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language of the Johnson Memorandum, with some important changes. The 

OPM regulations specifically excluded excepted service employees (such as 

those in the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)) from its 

oversight. We also found that in 1991, OPM reaffirmed that these 

provisions of the FPM remained in effect. 

However, the FPM was withdrawn in 1995 as a part of an effort to 

reduce government regulations. At that time, an OPM notice stated that 

“the guidance it [the FPM] contained is no longer binding upon Federal 

agencies.”14 Since 1995, no comprehensive framework governing the 

administration of polygraph examinations in the Executive Branch has been 

issued to replace the provisions of the FPM. 

It appears that various agencies, including OPM and the Department, 

continued to rely on the guidance contained in the FPM or the Johnson 

Memorandum.15 For example, in 2004, in response to inquiries from the 

OIG about an ongoing investigation related to alleged misconduct by a 

Department attorney, the Department’s Justice Management Division (JMD) 

stated that the Johnson Memorandum was still in effect and therefore the 

Department could not compel attorneys to take a polygraph examination. 

We also found that some agencies that used to seek OPM’s yearly 

approval of their polygraph policies under the FPM, including the DEA and 

ATF, continued to submit their policies for approval, even after the FPM was 

retired in 1995. Moreover, OPM has advised these agencies that, although 

the FPM has been abolished, it has not been superseded and the guidance 

contained in the FPM provides a “safe harbor” from investigation by OPM for 

those agencies that had been following the FPM in preparing and obtaining 

approval for their polygraph policies. 

14 FPM Sunset Notice, www.opm.gov/rif/html/fpm.htm. 

15 For example, among the documents we uncovered is a September 17, 1999, 

memorandum prepared by the Criminal Division’s Office of Enforcement Operations for the 

Attorney General, forwarding a request from the Department of the Interior that the 

Attorney General approve Interior’s policy governing the use of polygraph examinations in 

its criminal investigations. The memorandum recommended that the Attorney General 

approve the policy, citing the Johnson Memorandum as the source of the Attorney 

General’s authority to do so. The memorandum did not probe the basis for Interior’s 

request, but simply stated that the requisites of the Johnson Memorandum were met. This 

was the only instance we identified in which an agency sought Attorney General approval of 

its polygraph policy under the Johnson Memorandum. 
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Our reading of the law suggests that notwithstanding their continued 

use by some agencies, neither the Johnson Memorandum nor the FPM still 

governs the use of polygraphs in the Executive Branch. Instead, Executive 

Branch polygraph policy today relies on a patchwork of Executive Orders 

and other presidential policy statements, case law, regulations, and 

administrative decisions, several of which we describe below. 

Current Authorities and Guidelines for Pre-Employment and Personnel 

Security Screening Polygraphs on Competitive Service Employees

The following sections describe the current OPM guidance on its 

oversight of polygraph programs; a 1999 Memorandum of Agreement 

containing operating guidelines that was signed by most agencies that 

conduct polygraph examinations; quality assurance and training standards 

established by the Department of Defense’s Polygraph Institute; and 

requirements related to polygraph programs contained in the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 

 

Office of Personnel Management. In April 2006, OPM’s Office of 

General Counsel told us that it had reviewed OPM authorities for overseeing 

management of the competitive service and reaffirmed that OPM continues 

to have the authority and responsibility under Civil Service Rules (Rule II 

and Rule IV) to review executive agencies’ use of polygraph examinations for 

pre-employment and personnel security screening for the competitive 

service positions.16 An OPM official who reviews agency requests to use preemployment and personnel security screening polygraphs for competitive 

service employees told us that a requesting agency must still justify to OPM 

its need to use polygraph examinations based on a mission that directly 

affects the national security, submit its governing policies and regulations 

for OPM review, and stipulate to several conditions, such as participation in 

the federal quality assurance program, before OPM will approve the use of 

polygraph examinations. He also said that OPM has never extended its 

procedural requirements for using pre-employment and personnel security 

polygraphs for competitive service employees to their use for excepted 

service employees. 

 16 Most federal government civilian employees are part of the competitive civil 

service, which is governed by the Civil Service Rules in Title 5 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations. However, some agencies, including the FBI, are exempt from the competitive 

civil service procedures established in those rules. These agencies, called excepted service 

agencies, establish their own personnel rules. 
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OPM does not conduct reviews of executive agencies to verify that they 

are using polygraph examinations in compliance with OPM and Civil Service 

rules. However, OPM’s Center for Merit System Compliance does conduct 

reviews of agency compliance with federal requirements for managing 

personnel security, suitability determination, and investigation programs. 

As part of the OPM review, agencies are asked whether they use polygraph 

examinations for pre-employment and personnel security and, if they do, 

whether the agencies’ use of polygraphs has been approved by OPM. If OPM 

does not approve an agency’s request, the agency is not authorized to use 

polygraph examinations for pre-employment and personnel security 

screening of competitive service employees. Also, since at least 2002, OPM 

has required that agencies with OPM-certified polygraph programs submit 

to biennial quality assurance inspections and provide copies of the 

inspection reports as proof that they are compliant with federal polygraph 

standards. 

Even though Chapter 736, Section 2.b, of the FPM was retired in 

1995, OPM continued to follow the procedures it contained. In letters 

approving the DEA’s, ATF’s, and JCC’s continued use of polygraph 

examinations for pre-employment and personnel security screening for 

FY 2006, OPM cited Executive Orders 10450 and 10577 as its authority for 

overseeing these uses of polygraph examinations for competitive service 

employees in the Executive Branch. OPM also cited the standards for 

personnel security polygraphs contained in the U.S. Security Policy Board’s 

Polygraph Memorandum of Agreement (SPB 058-99). OPM approval letters 

further stated that “OPM follows the standards it formerly prescribed in 

FPM Chapter 736, section 2-6, titled Use of the Polygraph in Personnel 

Investigations.” 

1999 Interagency Memorandum of Agreement. Most of the federal 

agencies that conduct polygraph examinations signed a Memorandum of 

Agreement (MOA) in 1999 that contains operational requirements for 

polygraph programs, such as participation in a federal quality assurance 

program, access by federal inspectors to the records of personnel security 

examinations, the applicability of federal technical standards, examiner 

certification requirements, and the appropriate scope of certain questions. 

The development of the MOA began in 1993 when the Secretary of Defense 

and the Director of the CIA convened a Joint Security Commission to review 

and recommend improvements to federal security programs. Part of the 

review examined the use of polygraph testing in personnel screening as a 

condition for employment and in personnel security evaluations. In its 1994 
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report, the Joint Security Commission stated that it found federal agencies’ 

personnel screening program practices were inconsistent.17 For example, 

agencies varied as to when or if a screening polygraph was required, where 

or how it was administered, the subject areas covered during the test, how 

questions were worded, and what techniques were to be employed in 

administering the tests. The report recommended that the intelligence 

community develop standards to ensure consistency in the administration, 

application, and quality control of polygraph testing for personnel screening. 

In response to the Commission’s recommendation, the U.S. Security 

Policy Board developed an MOA to promote standardization and reciprocity 

in personnel security evaluation programs.18 In 1999, 12 of the 13 

members of the U.S. Security Policy Board Forum signed the MOA.19 The 

one agency that did not sign the MOA was the FBI.20 The signatory 

agencies agreed to participate in a federal quality assurance program for 

polygraph examinations, to allow federal inspectors to review the records of 

personnel security examinations, and to abide by federal technical 

standards as outlined in the Federal Psychophysiological Detection of 

Deception Examiner Handbook (Federal Examiner Handbook), among other 

things.21 They also agreed to certify the competency of their examiners 

based on federal standards. They agreed to limit the scope of 

counterintelligence questions and to minimize the intrusiveness of control 

17 Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security, A Report to the Secretary of 

Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, Washington, D.C., February 29, 1994. 

18 The U.S. Security Policy Board was established by Presidential Decision 

Directive/NSC-29, “Security Policy Coordination,” September 16, 1994. It has since been 

disbanded. 

19 The 1999 MOA was signed by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, CIA, DEA, Defense 

Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, 

Department of Energy, U.S. Navy, National Reconnaissance Organization, National Security 

Agency, and the Department of the Treasury. 

20 The U.S. Security Policy Board’s July 1999 approval memorandum noted that 

the FBI declined to sign the MOA because of unspecified “unique, on-going operational and 

policy issues.” While our study was in progress, the FBI indicated to us and to the 

Department of Defense Polygraph Institute that it was now interested in becoming a 

signatory, but as of July 2006 no action had been taken on this issue. According to the 

Institute, because the U.S. Security Policy Board has been abolished, the FBI would have to 

sign a separate agreement containing the terms of the original MOA. 

21 Federal agencies have adopted the term psychophysiological detection of 

deception (PDD) to describe the process known as a polygraph examination. PDD and 

“polygraph examination” are synonymous. 
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questions. According to the MOA, agencies would accept each others’ 

polygraph results. 

Federal Examiner Training, Standards, and Quality Assurance 

Program. Also in its February 1994 report, the Joint Security Commission 

recommended that the CIA and the Department of Defense consolidate the 

CIA’s Polygraph School with the Department of Defense’s Polygraph 

Institute (DoDPI) to form an institute that would conduct all polygraph 

education and training of federal government polygraph examiners. The 

recommendation was implemented, and since 1995, DoDPI has been the 

central provider of training for federal polygraph examiners, research, and 

monitoring of technical and scientific developments in polygraphy. Since 

1996, DoDPI has also conducted quality assurance reviews of federal 

polygraph programs. Today, most federal polygraph examiners (including 

those who work for the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG) are trained at DoDPI. On 

May 13, 1999, operational responsibilities for DoDPI were placed under the 

Defense Security Service.22 DoDPI was transferred from the Defense 

Security Service to the Department of Defense, Counterintelligence Field 

Activity on December 19, 2002, based upon a memorandum signed by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. With the cooperation and assistance of other 

federal agencies, DoDPI: 

• Manages a continuing education program for federal polygraph 

examiners that requires a minimum of 80 hours of related 

instruction every 2 years, 

• Provides for research in forensic psychophysiology and credibility 

assessment methods, 

• Maintains federal polygraph standards as established in the 

Federal Examiner Handbook, and 

• Administers the federal Quality Assurance Program for polygraph 

programs. 

DoDPI officials are assisted by an Executive Committee that is 

composed of 24 federal polygraph program managers, including program 

managers from the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG. The Executive Committee 

reviews new research, training proposals, suggested changes to the Federal 

22 See Department of Defense Directive 5105.42, “Defense Security Service.” 
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Examiner Handbook, and the quality assurance standards.23 The 

Federal Examiner Handbook contains technical standards, procedures, and 

test formats. It was developed with input from all agencies of the federal 

polygraph community, including federal law enforcement, intelligence, and 

security agencies. 

Since the Quality Assurance Program began in 1996, inspectors 

working at DoDPI have conducted technical reviews of federal polygraph 

programs to ensure that they are managed in compliance with the 

standards in the Federal Examiner Handbook. All federal agencies with 

polygraph programs, except the BOP’s SOTP and the USMS’s Witness 

Security (WITSEC) Program, participate in the Quality Assurance Program 

and undergo biennial inspections. As a matter of policy, participation is 

mandatory for Department of Defense polygraph programs and voluntary for 

other executive agencies. All federal law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies, except the FBI, agreed in the 1999 MOA to participate in the 

program, to use the Federal Examiner Handbook, and to supplement its 

instructions only when necessary to address unique requirements in their 

respective missions. The FBI began participating in the program in 2002. 

A DoDPI inspection team consists of two or more certified polygraph 

examiners who review a sample of between 50 and 100 of the agency’s 

recent polygraph examination records as well as agency policies and 

procedures to determine compliance with 118 criteria in 9 primary program 

areas. The team evaluates all aspects of an agency’s polygraph program 

and reviews the work of examiners to ensure compliance with the Federal 

Examiner Handbook. 

For example, inspectors verify that examination records contain 

consent forms signed by the examinees. They review questions asked 

during each examination to determine whether the questions were 

appropriate for the testing format used and the issue under inquiry. 

Inspectors review polygraph test charts and examiners’ numerical score 

sheets to determine whether the test data supported the examiners’ analysis 

and conclusion. Inspectors also determine whether the reviewing 

23 The federal polygraph standards were developed based on the American Society 

of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLAD) inspection process. The ASCLAD process is a 

voluntary fee-for-service inspection process that certifies most federal, state, and local 

crime laboratories. The original and all subsequent modifications to federal polygraph 

standards as found in the Federal Examiner Handbook must be approved in writing by all 

25 federal agencies that participate in the federal Quality Assurance Program administered 

by DoDPI. 
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supervisor’s score sheet for an examination agreed with the field examiner’s 

score sheet and whether a test subject was retested. Inspectors analyze the 

time taken between the polygraph examinations and the supervisory quality 

control reviews to determine whether retests were conducted within a 

reasonable time. 

After completing an inspection, the inspectors brief agency officials on 

the results of the inspection and provide them with a draft inspection 

report. When an inspected agency receives an inspection report, it has 30 

days to respond to its findings and recommendations. If there are 

outstanding issues, inspectors conduct a follow-up inspection the next year 

to verify that changes necessary for compliance certification have been 

implemented both in policy and in practice. After all issues have been 

favorably resolved, DoDPI issues a letter to agency officials certifying that 

the agency’s polygraph program is in compliance. OPM requires that 

agencies present the DoDPI certification of compliance letter when they 

apply yearly for OPM approval to polygraph competitive service personnel. 

Since OPM does not conduct compliance reviews of the polygraph programs 

it has approved, OPM stipulates participation in and compliance with 

DoDPI’s quality assurance programs as a surrogate means of verifying that 

agency programs meet minimum professional and technical standards. 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-

458), Congress directed the federal government to establish requirements 

for improving the security clearance process. Specifically, Title III, 

Section 3001 (b) (2) requires the selection of a single entity to be responsible 

for 

developing and implementing uniform and consistent 

policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient and 

timely completion of security clearances and determinations 

for access to highly sensitive programs, including . . . 

polygraph policies and procedures . . . . 

On June 27, 2005, Executive Order 13381 gave the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) responsibility for standardizing the federal 

security clearance process and ensuring uniform standards of reciprocity in 

the recognition of clearances across agencies. OMB issued a plan to 

improve the personnel security process in November 2005. The plan called 

for the development of the Clearance Verification System, a database of 

individuals’ names and their clearance status. In December 2005, OMB 

also issued a memorandum to all executive departments and agencies 
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outlining issues inhibiting reciprocity of security clearances and actions 

departments and agencies are required to take to address them. According 

to the memorandum, federal agencies had until March 31, 2006, to report to 

OPM which of their personnel received a polygraph examination as part of 

their security clearance investigations as well as the agency that conducted 

the examination. 

In May 2006, OPM officials told us that OMB had not yet designated 

an agency to lead government efforts to develop and implement standard 

polygraph policy and procedures. Hence, that work had not started. OPM 

officials said that Executive Order 13381, which was scheduled to expire on 

July 1, 2006, would probably be extended so that the work being done to 

implement the requirements of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act could continue. 

Department of Justice Polygraph Policy 

We found that the Department has no comprehensive policy regarding 

the conduct and use of polygraph examinations. As described later in this 

section, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual contains limited policies regarding the 

use of polygraph examinations in criminal investigations and for witness 

security.24 It is also Department policy to oppose attempts by defense 

counsel to admit the results of polygraph examinations into evidence or to 

have an examiner appointed by the court to conduct a polygraph 

examination.25 

 24 Department policy requires that all Witness Security (WITSEC) Program 

candidates who are incarcerated undergo a polygraph examination before acceptance into 

the program. See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Chapter 9, Section 9-21.340, Polygraph 

Examinations for Prisoner-Witness Candidates, and Section 9-21.600, Prisoner-Witnesses. 

The WITSEC Program provides for the security, health, and safety of government witnesses, 

incarcerated or not, and their immediate dependents whose lives are in danger as a result 

of their testimony against drug traffickers, terrorists, organized crime members, and other 

major criminals. 

25 The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Subsection 9-13.300, provides that the “Department 

opposes all attempts by defense counsel to admit polygraph evidence or to have an 

examiner appointed by the court to conduct a polygraph test. . . . On the other hand, the 

Department recognizes that in certain situations, as in testing the reliability of an informer, 

a polygraph can be of some value. Department policy therefore supports the limited use of 

the polygraph during investigations.” Chapter 9, Criminal Division, Section 9-13, 

Obtaining Evidence, Subsection 9-13.300, Polygraphs – Department Policy. The U.S. 

Attorneys’ Manual contains general policies and procedures relevant to the work of the 

United States Attorneys' Offices and to their relations with the legal divisions, investigative 

agencies, and other components within the Department of Justice. 
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The Department has periodically considered establishing policies 

governing the use of polygraph examinations for pre-employment and 

personnel security screening of Department employees after the FPM was 

made non-binding, but such policies have not been adopted. For example, 

in an October 21, 1996, report on the results of a Department-wide survey 

of pre-employment polygraph testing, the Attorney General asked the FBI’s 

Office of Investigative Agency Policies (OIAP) to study and provide advice on 

the need for Department policy on the use of pre-employment polygraph 

examinations. The survey showed that only three organizations – the FBI, 

DEA, and JMD – used pre-employment polygraph testing for some of their 

employees. The Attorney General asked the OIAP to answer a number of 

questions concerning the FBI’s and other components’ use of preemployment polygraphs and to advise the Attorney General as to whether 

the Department should establish a standardized set of guidelines for 

applicant and employee testing. However, the OIAP’s response in 1997 

provided an analysis only of the FBI’s policy of testing all applicants and not 

the broader analysis of Department policy that the Attorney General 

requested. 

On August 1, 2001, JMD presented to the Deputy Attorney General 

three options for a Department-wide policy on the use of polygraph 

examinations in personnel security evaluations that would have been 

applicable to all Department components except the FBI.26 The options 

provided alternatives for Department policy (applicable to all Department 

components except the FBI) on the use of counterintelligence-scope 

polygraph examinations in personnel security investigations.27 The first 

26 JMD based the proposed policy on the Johnson Memorandum, assuming that 

the memorandum had been issued. In discussing the FPM (which had, by then, been 

retired), JMD noted that “OPM continues to exercise its oversight over agency polygraph 

use despite the lack of formal regulations in effect at this time.” Even though a 

Departmental polygraph policy would affect both excepted service and competitive service 

personnel, JMD opined that “it would be advisable to comply with OPM guidance and seek 

OPM approval of any proposed regulations. Having OPM approval for Department 

regulations would also afford greater protection against any legal challenges to the 

Department’s policy.” 

27 Executive Order 12968, “Access to Classified Information,” August 2, 1995, 

established a uniform personnel security program for employees who are to be considered 

for initial or continuing access to classified information. According to the Executive Order, 

eligibility for initial access is based on a personnel security investigation of an individual’s 

background. Employees who are eligible for access to classified information must undergo 

periodic reinvestigations and may also be reinvestigated if, at any time, there is reason to 

believe that they may no longer meet the standards for access established by the Executive 

Order. 
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option was to maintain the status quo, which would continue to allow the 

components to establish component-level policies. At the time, the DEA had 

policy for pre-employment screening for Special Agent applicants, and the 

FBI had policy for pre-employment and personnel security screening. The 

second option was that the Department would require periodic polygraph 

examinations for those employees with regular access to the highest levels 

of classified information. The third option was to require polygraph 

examinations for all employees with access to any level of classified 

information. 

JMD recommended that the Deputy Attorney General raise the issue 

of polygraph examinations for personnel screening with affected components 

to determine whether the Department should adopt a policy. In its 

memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General, JMD said that, if the 

components subsequently decided that the Department needed to adopt a 

polygraph policy, JMD recommended the second option (require periodic 

examinations for those employees with regular access to the highest levels 

of classified information) over the third option (require polygraph 

examinations for all employees with access to classified information). 

However, the Department did not act on JMD’s recommendations. 

In 2004, during an OIG investigation of potential misconduct by a 

Department attorney, the OIG asked JMD for the Department’s position on 

whether Department employees could be compelled to submit to a 

polygraph examination. JMD informed the OIG that it believed, in the 

absence of a Department polygraph policy, the Department could not 

compel Department employees. JMD also stated that it was unlikely that 

disciplinary action against an employee based on information gained 

through a compelled polygraph examination would be sustained on appeal. 

In July 2004, JMD’s Security and Emergency Planning Staff (SEPS) 

proposed the formation of a working group to establish Department 

polygraph policy for pre-employment and personnel screening. JMD 

proposed this initiative after determining that it did not have the authority 

to conduct a polygraph examination of a competitive service employee, even 

with the employee’s consent. This issue arose when, during an adjudication 

of a background investigation, an employee volunteered to submit to a 

polygraph examination to resolve an issue. JMD proposed a working group 

to develop a policy to govern the Department’s use of polygraph 

examinations for pre-employment and personnel screening that would be 

submitted for OPM’s review and approval. As of July 2006, the Department 

had not formed such a working group. 
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Another proposal regarding the use of polygraphs in the Department 

was made in September 2004, when the FBI submitted a request to the 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General for approval to polygraph employees 

of other Department components who had regular access to sensitive FBI 

information. This request would have affected Department attorneys and 

other personnel who had access to the FBI’s most sensitive national security 

information. The proposal specifically identified Department employees 

assigned to the offices of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney 

General, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Criminal Division, OIG, 

and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. Under the proposal, employees in those 

components who had regular access to FBI information would have 

undergone counterintelligence-scoped polygraph examinations as a 

condition of access eligibility. On July 12, 2005, the Deputy Attorney 

General met with the FBI Director and advised him that he would not 

require Department attorneys to undergo polygraph examinations. 

As part of this review, in June 2006 the OIG met with JMD officials to 

discuss whether the Department’s position on compelled polygraphs had 

changed since 2004. After discussing JMD’s 2004 position, JMD officials 

informed the OIG that they intended to ask JMD’s Office of General Counsel 

to reexamine whether the Department has the legal authority to compel 

employees to submit to polygraph examinations during investigations of 

administrative misconduct and, if so, what procedural steps would be 

required to exercise that authority. 

Requirements and Process of Polygraph Examinations 

Polygraph Examination Requirements. All subjects of polygraph 

examinations must consent to be tested. However, there may be 

consequences when a subject refuses to take a polygraph examination or 

when an examination indicates deception. As described in this section, the 

consequences of polygraph examinations vary, depending on whether the 

examination is considered voluntary, mandatory, or compelled; the reason 

for the examination; and the examination results. 

Voluntary Examinations. Some polygraph examinations given to 

federal employees or other individuals may be voluntary, meaning that the 

examinee may refuse to take the examination with no adverse 

consequences. For example, a witness or subject in a criminal investigation 

may be asked to take a voluntary polygraph examination to resolve 

discrepancies or confirm the veracity of his or her information. Because 

such witnesses and subjects are protected by the Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination (discussed further below), they can refuse to 
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speak with investigators or to take a polygraph examination and are not to 

suffer negative consequences for the refusal. 

Mandatory Examinations. Mandatory polygraph examinations are 

those in which a successful examination is required for an individual to, for 

example, be considered for employment, become a member of a foreign 

investigative unit, or receive a security clearance. Generally, the 

consequences of refusing to take a mandatory polygraph examination are 

related to the administrative purpose for which the examination was 

required. As described in the following examples, applicants who refuse to 

take mandatory examinations may be denied employment, and employees 

who refuse to take mandatory polygraph examinations for a security 

clearance may be denied access to national security information. 

• All applicants for employment in the FBI must undergo and pass a 

pre-employment polygraph examination. Applicants who refuse to 

take a polygraph examination are ineligible for employment. 

Applicants who fail their polygraph examinations and 

subsequently admit to deceptive or disqualifying behavior are 

normally barred from FBI employment. Applicants found to be 

deceptive, but who make no admission or confession during the 

examination process, may appeal the results of their examinations 

and may or may not be retested. 

The FBI also requires selected employees and non-FBI personnel 

with access to sensitive FBI information to undergo periodic and 

random personnel security polygraphs as a deterrent to espionage. 

Employees who refuse to submit to mandatory polygraph 

examinations, such as during periodic security reinvestigations or 

investigations of national security matters, may face transfer to a 

position with no access to sensitive information, denial or reevaluation of their security clearances, or disciplinary action for 

insubordination. Since holding a security clearance is a condition 

of employment at the FBI, revocation of an FBI employee’s 

clearance would also lead to dismissal. 

• In the DEA, polygraph examinations are mandatory for applicants 

for Special Agent and Intelligence Research Specialist positions, 

and foreign candidates for membership in Sensitive Investigative 

Units. Applicants for Special Agent and Intelligence Research 

Specialist positions who refuse to take a polygraph examination 

are not eligible for DEA employment. When an applicant’s 

polygraph results indicate deception and the applicant 
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subsequently confesses or admits deception, they are not hired. 

When the results indicate deception, but there is no subsequent 

confession, the DEA may retest the individual or try to resolve the 

issue by conducting a background investigation. However, 

membership in a foreign investigative unit is contingent on taking 

and passing a polygraph examination. 

• ATF requires all applicants for Special Agent positions to undergo a 

mandatory pre-employment polygraph examination. Those who 

refuse are not eligible for employment. If an applicant’s 

examination results in indications of deceptiveness or an 

admission of deception or disqualifying behavior, the individual 

may be ineligible for hire. Other positions in ATF do not require a 

pre-employment polygraph examination. 

Compelled Examinations. Compelled polygraph examinations are 

those in which an employee is ordered to submit to the examination under 

threat of adverse action (including suspension or dismissal) if they do not 

comply. Information gained through a compelled polygraph examination 

cannot be used in criminal proceedings against the subject, although it may 

be used for administrative purposes. Whether an agency can take adverse 

action against an employee for refusing to take a polygraph examination 

when compelled during an investigation of administrative misconduct or a 

security investigation depends on whether the employee is in the 

competitive service or excepted service, and whether the agency has 

implemented OPM-approved polygraph policies, among other things. Within 

the Department, only the FBI has issued policies outlining when employees 

can be compelled to submit to polygraph examinations. 

Federal courts have reviewed a number of cases in which public 

employees were dismissed for refusing to take compelled polygraphs during 

an investigation into administrative misconduct issues. As described below, 

these courts held that public employees can be compelled to submit to 

polygraph examinations in investigations into the performance of their 

official duties, so long as they are not also required to relinquish their 

privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, for example, the Eighth Circuit 

rejected the Fifth Amendment and due process claims of a police officer who 

was terminated after refusing to take a polygraph examination regarding the 

disappearance of a photograph of a beaten detainee: 

The [Fifth] Amendment is violated when public employees 

are compelled to testify by employers who require the 

employees to either incriminate themselves or to forfeit their 
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jobs. As long as a public employer does not demand that the 

public employee relinquish the employee’s constitutional 

immunity from prosecution, however, the employee can be 

required to either testify about performance of official duties 

or to forfeit employment.28

 Other cases that do not specifically involve polygraphs affirm the right 

of the government to compel public employees – regardless of whether they 

are law enforcement officers or not – to answer questions about the 

performance of their official duties.29 

 However, many Department employees compelled to answer questions 

(including questions asked as part of a polygraph examination) have 

procedural protections from adverse employment actions under the Civil 

Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. Since 1990, Department 

attorneys have been among that group. Id. § 7511(a)(1)(C). Before the Civil 

Service Due Process Amendments were enacted, the Department’s Office of 

Legal Counsel (OLC) had opined that a Department attorney could be 

 28 See Hill v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 

Because of “the important public interest in securing from public employees an accounting 

of their public trust,” id., only “the combined risks of both compelling the employee to 

answer incriminating questions and compelling the employee to waive immunity from the 

use of those answers” violate the employee’s privilege against self-incrimination. Id. See 

also Wiley v. Doory, 48 F.3d 773 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Fifth Amendment claims of police 

officers who were compelled to take polygraphs in connection with an investigation into a 

shooting and who were threatened with job loss, when none of the officers was compelled to 

waive his Fifth Amendment rights); Hester v. Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(rejecting Fifth Amendment claims of firefighters who were fired for refusing to take 

polygraphs in connection with an investigation into illegal drug activity, where none of the 

firefighters was compelled to waive his Fifth Amendment rights); Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 

F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting Fifth Amendment claims of Department of Public Works 

employees who were fired for refusing to take polygraphs in connection with an 

investigation into a bomb threat called in to a Department office, where none of the 

employees was compelled to waive his Fifth Amendment rights). The Second Circuit has 

upheld an FBI agent’s termination for cocaine use and lack of candor, holding that even if 

the agent was terminated for refusing to take a polygraph examination, his termination was 

not constitutionally impermissible because he “was explicitly promised throughout the 

administrative investigation that any ‘information’ resulting therefrom . . . would not be 

used against him in criminal proceedings.” Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124 (2d 

Cir. 1987). 

29 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Assoc. v. 

Commissioner, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
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removed for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination in connection 

with an investigation into a leak in an ongoing criminal matter.30 

Specifically, in its 1980 opinion, OLC stated that Department 

attorneys had no procedural protections from summary removal under the 

Civil Service Reform Act, other than a statement of reasons for the 

discharge. The OLC opinion stated: 

Substantively, Department attorneys are provided no 

protections by Department regulations. And since they are 

not covered by the “for cause” standard of the civil service 

laws, attorneys apparently serve at the pleasure of the 

Attorney General. 

OLC stated that failure to submit to a polygraph would amount to 

insubordination, which is punishable by removal, and “arguably impedes 

investigation of government misconduct.” OLC concluded, in accordance 

with the Fifth Amendment discussion above, that as long as a Department 

attorney was “warned that failure to submit to the test could lead to his or 

her dismissal and that nothing obtained in the examination will be used 

against the employee in a subsequent criminal proceeding,” the Attorney 

General could dismiss a Department attorney for failing to submit to a 

polygraph. 

 

After the Civil Service Due Process Amendments were enacted in 

1990, it is no longer true that a Department attorney could be summarily 

dismissed. A Department attorney is able to appeal certain disciplinary 

decisions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). It is unclear 

whether the MSPB would uphold a dismissal for insubordination based on 

an employee’s refusal to take a polygraph.31 However, the MSPB has not 

specifically addressed the question of whether an employee can be removed 

for refusal to take a polygraph in connection with an investigation into 

administrative misconduct. 

30 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 421 (1980).

31 In Meier v. Department of Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247 (1980), the Board declined to 

draw an adverse inference against an employee who did not take a polygraph examination 

in connection with an investigation into his alleged misconduct. Whether the agency had 

ever actually requested that the employee take a polygraph is not clear. Because the FPM’s 

restrictions on polygraph use would still have been in effect, the agency would not have 

been able to compel the employee to submit to a polygraph. 
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As of June 2006, the FBI was the only component within the 

Department that has issued policies and procedures for compelling its 

employees to undergo polygraph examinations in misconduct or security 

investigations. The FBI’s policy covers all FBI employees, including 

attorneys. Employees of the FBI also can be ordered to take a polygraph 

examination in an administrative investigation if the matter involves one or 

more of seven specified violations of law or FBI policies, such as the 

unauthorized release of sensitive information.32 FBI employees who refuse 

to take a polygraph examination under these circumstances face 

administrative discipline, up to and including dismissal. FBI policy also 

states that designated FBI officials can 

compel any Bureau or non-Bureau person with access to FBI 

information or facilities to submit to a polygraph examination 

to resolve specific issues which may impact a person’s 

trustworthiness for security matters. 

The FBI policies appear consistent with the criteria established in court 

cases for upholding dismissals when employees refuse to take compelled 

polygraph examinations.33

While FBI employees can be compelled to submit to polygraph 

examinations, it is not clear whether employees of other Department 

components can be compelled to do so in the absence of a policy regarding 

compelled polygraphs. As described previously, in 2004 JMD informed the 

OIG of the Department’s position that, in the absence of approved 

regulations, it does not have the authority to compel employees to take 

32 The seven violations are: (1) intentional and unauthorized release of sensitive, 

protected information; (2) relationship with or allegiance to a foreign power; (3) illegal or 

improper exercise of influence; (4) intentional and unauthorized destruction, alteration, 

misplacement, taking, falsification, or other impairment of FBI documents or evidence; 

(5) use of or unauthorized dealing in controlled substances; (6) false statements or the 

failure to candidly disclose information; and (7) theft, fraud, and misuse of government 

money and property. 

33 Those criteria were most clearly stated in Eshelman v. Blubaum, (App) 114 Ariz 

376, 560 P2d 1283. Eshelman concerned a Deputy Sheriff who was dismissed for willful 

disobedience of an order and insubordination for refusing to take a polygraph examination 

during an internal investigation. The court stated that the criteria for demanding a 

polygraph in the course of an internal investigation is that the employee be informed in 

advance that (1) the questions to be asked during the polygraph examination will relate 

specifically and narrowly to the performance of the employee’s duties, (2) the answers given 

will not be used against the employee in any subsequent criminal prosecution, and (3) the 

penalty for refusing can include dismissal. 
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polygraph examinations during administrative misconduct investigations. 

The Department and Department components other than the FBI have not 

issued such policies, and we found that several proposals to develop a 

Department-wide polygraph policy have not been acted upon to date. 

Consistent with the position expressed by JMD in 2004, we found no 

instance in which an employee of a Department component, other than the 

FBI, has been compelled to take a polygraph examination in an 

administrative misconduct investigation. However, when the OIG met with 

JMD officials in June 2006, the JMD officials stated that they intended to 

ask JMD’s Office of General Counsel to reexamine whether the Department 

has the legal authority to compel employees to submit to polygraph 

examinations during investigations of administrative misconduct. 

General Polygraph Examination Process. As described in the 

following paragraphs, the polygraph examination process typically includes 

a pretest interview, collection of physiological data using a polygraph 

instrument, analysis of the test data, and a post-test interview in which the 

examiner questions the subject about answers that evoked a response. (See 

Chart 1 on page 24.) Examinees are generally asked to give written consent 

before they undergo a polygraph examination. 

Pretest Interview. The first step in the polygraph process is a pretest 

interview. During the pretest interview, the examiner verifies information 

that the subject provided previously and gathers information to formulate 

the questions that will be asked during the physical test.34 According to a 

National Academy of Sciences report, a comprehensive and careful pretest is 

critical to a successful examination.35 During the pretest interview, 

subjects are encouraged to correct prior statements (for example, 

statements regarding the extent of prior drug use) and to reveal relevant 

information not previously disclosed (such as criminal behavior or security 

violations). In some cases, a subject may make an admission or confession 

during the pretest interview that will obviate the need for further testing. 

Testing. During the testing phase, the examiner asks the examinee 

questions while the examinee is connected to the polygraph instrument. 

 34 Redefining Security, A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 

Central Intelligence. 

35 The Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph established by 

the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences issued the study, The 

Polygraph and Lie Detection, published in October 2003 by the National Academies Press. 
U.S. Department of Justice 23

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

The examinee is instructed to answer each question with either a “yes” or 

“no,” and the polygraph instrument measures and records the examinee’s 

physiological reactions as the examinee answers each question. 

In general, the format and scope of the questioning depends on the 

purpose of the test. Questions follow one of two formats – specific issue and 

non-specific issue (screening). Specific-issue examinations are conducted to 

resolve questions related to specific factual issues or single known events 

under investigation.36 

Questions asked during specific-issue examinations relate to the 

specific incident and generally have little ambiguity (for example, “Did you 

see John Smith on Monday at 2 p.m.?”). In contrast, in non-specific 

examinations, such as those conducted during pre-employment testing and 

employee screening, there is no specific known event being investigated. 

The questions asked during a non-specific examination may cover multiple 

topics and may range across an entire lifetime (“Have you ever revealed 

classified information to an unauthorized person?”). 

Among non-specific polygraph examinations, there are two general 

scope categories: the counterintelligence-scope polygraph and the full-scope 

polygraph. The counterintelligence-scope polygraph focuses on identifying 

involvement in espionage, sabotage, terrorism, mishandling of classified 

information, and unauthorized contacts with representatives of foreign 

governments. The full-scope polygraph covers all of the counterintelligencescope questions and also includes questions pertaining to both security 

issues and suitability for employment. Questions involving suitability asked 

during an examination usually address criminal history, use of illegal drugs, 

and falsification of information on the personal history statement. 

36 Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security. 
Chart 1: Polygraph Examination Process 

Examinee Consents to Polygraph Examination

Examinee or Examiner

stops test before 

completing at least 

two charts.

Pretest Interview

Test Phase

Data Analysis Phase/

Preliminary Opinion

Examinee: 

1. Admits/Confesses 

2. Refuses Test 

3. Is Deemed Unfit by 

the Examiner

No Deception 

Indicated

Unresolved Resolved

Quality Control Review

Final Opinion:

1. No Deception

2. Deception

3. Inconclusive

4. No Opinion

Polygraph Process Concluded

Final Report Issued

Deception 

Indicated

Inconclusive

No Opinion/

Test Incomplete

No Opinion/ 

No Test

Post-test Interview

 

Source: OIG analysis 

U.S. Department of Justice 24

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division
U.S. Department of Justice 25

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Data Analysis. After completing the physical test, the examiner 

analyzes the physiological reactions that the subject exhibited in response 

to each question asked during the test. The examiner assigns a score to 

each response. The standards for analyzing and scoring test results are 

prescribed in the Federal Examiner Handbook. Once the analysis and 

scoring are completed, the examiner issues one of four opinions:37

• Deception Indicated – The subject’s physiological reactions when 

responding to one or more relevant questions were indicative of 

deception. 

• No Deception Indicated – The subject had no physiological reactions 

indicative of deception when responding to relevant questions. 

• Inconclusive – The examiner cannot reach a conclusion of Deception 

Indicated or No Deception Indicated. 

• No Opinion – The examiner cannot render an opinion based on the 

physiological data on the charts. A result of No Opinion often 

indicates that the subject stopped the test before it was completed.

If the examination results in a finding of No Deception Indicated, Deception 

Indicated, or Inconclusive, the polygraph process continues with a post-test 

interview or additional testing. 

Post-Test Interview. To resolve inconclusive results or determine why 

a subject exhibited indications of deceptiveness in response to specific 

questions, the examiner may discuss the test results with the subject. In 

some cases, the subject may give an acceptable explanation for why the 

subject reacted to a particular question, or the subject may confess to 

wrongdoing or undesirable behavior. 

After the polygraph examiner formulates a preliminary opinion on the 

results of the examination, a supervisory examiner reviews the examination 

record and the examiner’s opinion as a quality control measure. The 

supervisory examiner issues the final opinion on the results. The 

polygraph examination process essentially ends with the issuance of the 

 37 There are variations in terminology used in different polygraph units, but in 

general they are synonymous with these four basic opinions. Later sections of this report 

discuss variations in terminology where they exist in the Department. 
U.S. Department of Justice 26

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

final opinion and a referral of the findings to adjudicating or investigating 

officers. 

Polygraph Examinations in the Department of Justice 

Eleven components in the Department reported conducting or using 

polygraph examinations since the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 2002. Four 

of them, the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG, administer their own polygraph 

programs and conduct examinations for their organization as well as for 

other organizations. The other seven components do not conduct their own 

polygraph examinations; instead, they use the services of other agencies. 

Those seven components are the Department’s Criminal Division, Justice 

Command Center (JCC), Antitrust Division (ATR), National Drug Intelligence 

Center (NDIC), Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), Federal Bureau of 

Prisons (BOP), and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). 

Purposes of Polygraph Examinations. Polygraph examinations are 

used for several purposes, depending on the Department component’s 

mission and requirements. Components use polygraph examinations 

primarily for: 

• Pre-employment screening, 

• Personnel security screening, 

• Criminal investigations, 

• Counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations, 

• Misconduct and internal affairs investigations, 

• Witness security, and 

• Foreign vetting. 

These uses of polygraph examinations are briefly described below. 

Pre-Employment Screening. Pre-employment polygraph examinations 

are non-specific, full-scope examinations that are used to identify past 

behavior (e.g., use of illegal drugs, involvement with foreign nationals) that 

may indicate a lack of reliability in the potential employee. The FBI and the 

JCC require all applicants to undergo a pre-employment polygraph 

examination. The DEA, ATF, and NDIC require only applicants for certain 

specified positions (such as GS-1811 criminal investigators) to be tested. 

The OIG does not conduct pre-employment polygraph examinations. 
U.S. Department of Justice 27

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Personnel Security Screening. Polygraph examinations are used in 

personnel security programs to identify individuals that present serious 

threats to national security and to deter and detect unwanted behaviors 

such as espionage. Personnel security polygraphs are non-specific, 

counterintelligence-scope examinations. The examiners ask questions 

pertaining to the subject’s involvement in espionage, sabotage, terrorism, 

unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and unauthorized foreign 

contacts. Personnel security screening examinations can be conducted as a 

condition of initial access to national security or sensitive information, as a 

part of periodic security reinvestigations, or on randomly selected 

individuals. The FBI is the primary user of personnel security polygraphs in 

the Department and intends to require them of all personnel. The DEA 

conducts personnel security polygraphs only on its polygraph examiner 

trainees, who are required by DoDPI to undergo the examination before 

being accepted for training. ATF and the OIG do not conduct personnel 

security polygraphs. 

Criminal Investigations. Polygraph examinations used in criminal 

investigations are specific-issue examinations that are administered to 

subjects, witnesses, or informants to (1) detect and identify criminal 

suspects; (2) verify information furnished by an informant or a witness to 

establish or corroborate credibility; and (3) obtain additional information 

leading to new evidence or identification of additional suspects, witnesses, 

or locations. The FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG conduct and use polygraph 

examinations as a tool in criminal investigations. The FBI also conducts 

criminal, specific-issue polygraph examinations for the Department’s ATR, 

Criminal Division, and OPR when requested. 

Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Investigations. During 

investigations into suspected security breaches (espionage) or foreign or 

domestic terrorist threats to national security, specific-issue polygraph 

examinations may be administered to the subjects, witnesses, or informants 

associated with the incident or threat under investigation. The FBI is the 

only Department component that conducts and uses polygraph 

examinations in counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations. 

Misconduct and Internal Affairs Investigations. Specific-issue 

polygraph examinations may be given to employees who are subjects, 

witnesses, or complainants in investigations of personal misconduct in the 

performance of official duties. These examinations are used to substantiate 

or refute allegations, verify information furnished by complainants or 

subjects, establish or corroborate credibility, and obtain additional 

information. The FBI, DEA, OIG, BOP, USMS, and OPR reported using 
U.S. Department of Justice 28

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

polygraph examinations as a tool in misconduct investigations. (See 

Tables 2 and 3 at the end of this section.) The FBI and the OIG also 

conduct examinations when requested by the BOP, USMS, and OPR. 

WITSEC Program. “Prisoner-witnesses” who want to participate in the 

WITSEC Program must undergo a specific-issue polygraph examination to 

aid in assessing their truthfulness. According to the Department’s 

U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Title 9, Chapter 21, a polygraph examination is 

required of all WITSEC Program candidates who are incarcerated in order to 

maintain the security of individuals housed in a BOP Protective Custody 

Unit. The USMS also uses polygraph examinations for witnesses that are 

not incarcerated, but claim that their security has been breached and ask 

the USMS to move them to a new location. The FBI, OIG, or the Secret 

Service conducts polygraph examinations for the WITSEC Program when 

requested by the Department’s Criminal Division, which oversees the 

WITSEC Program. A private contractor working for the U.S. Marshals 

Service conducts polygraph examinations of WITSEC participants who are 

not incarcerated. 

Foreign Vetting. Foreign agents and law enforcement officials 

assigned to joint law enforcement task forces or overseas operations 

involving Department components are vetted using non-specific, full-scope 

polygraph examinations. These examinations are conducted to help identify 

potential security risks and to identify individuals whose past behavior 

could indicate uncertain reliability. The DEA and ATF reported using 

polygraph examinations to vet foreign participants of task forces and 

overseas operations. 

Number of Polygraph Examinations Conducted by the 

Department’s Four Polygraph Programs (FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG). 

From FY 2002 through 2005, the four Department components that 

conduct polygraph examinations (the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG) performed 

approximately 49,197 examinations.38 The examinations conducted by the 

components were used as follows: 

 

• 27,866 (56.7 percent ) for pre-employment screening (the FBI, 

DEA, and ATF), 

• 4,735 (9.6 percent) for personnel security screening and 

investigations (the FBI and DEA), 

 38 The number is an approximation because the four components do not all track 

their uses of polygraph examinations in the same way. 
U.S. Department of Justice 29

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

• 8,356 (17 percent) for criminal investigations (the FBI, DEA, ATF, 

and OIG), 

• 149 (0.3 percent) for misconduct investigations (the FBI and DEA), 

• 1,994 (4.1 percent) for counterintelligence and counterterrorism 

investigations (the FBI only), 

• 1,694 (3.4 percent) for requests by other organizations for a variety 

of uses (the FBI and OIG), and 

• 4,403 (8.9 percent) for foreign vetting (the DEA and ATF). 

Table 2 lists the number and type of polygraph examinations 

conducted by each of the four components. 
U.S. Department of Justice 30

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Table 2: Polygraph Examinations Conducted by Component 

FY 2002 through 2005

Component Polygraphs Conducted for 

Number 

Conducted 

Percentage 

of Total 

FBI • Pre-employment screening 

• Personnel security 

• Criminal investigation 

• Misconduct investigation 

• Foreign Counterintelligence and 

Counterterrorism 

• As requested by other agenciesa 

Subtotal

23,310 

4,721 

6,203 

128 

1,994 

 1,661

38,017 77.3%

DEA • Pre-employment screening 

• Personnel securityb

• Criminal investigations 

• Misconduct investigations 

• Foreign vetting 

Subtotal

3,218 

14 

733 

21 

 4,321

8,307 16.9%

ATF • Pre-employment screening 

• Criminal investigations 

• Foreign vetting for other agencies 

Subtotal

 1,338 

 1,280 

 82

2,700 5.5%

OIG • Criminal and misconduct 

investigationsc

• As requested by other agencies 

Subtotal 

140 

 

 33

173 0.4%

 Totald 49,197 100.0%

a Some of the examinations conducted by the FBI were for agencies outside of the Department. 

b While the DEA reported conducting 14 personnel security polygraphs, those were done only for polygraph 

examiner trainees who were seeking training at DoDPI, which requires that candidates undergo the 

examination as a pre-condition for acceptance. 

c The OIG does not distinguish between criminal and administrative investigations. We counted them as 

criminal investigations. 

d The total does not include limited numbers of examinations conducted by the BOP’s SOTP, Secret Service, CIA, 

and a contractor for the USMS’s WITSEC Program, which we roughly estimate at 89 examinations during the 

study period. 

Source: FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG 

 
U.S. Department of Justice 31

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Number of Polygraph Examinations Used or Conducted by Seven 

Other Department Components. From FY 2002 through 2004, the seven 

Department components that use the results of polygraph examinations 

reported using approximately 1,361, as shown in Table 3 on the next page. 

Most of those examinations are included in the numbers that the FBI, DEA, 

ATF, and OIG reported conducting, (shown in Table 2). However, some of 

the examinations shown in Table 3 were conducted by the Secret Service, 

CIA, BOP’s SOTP, and a contractor for the USMS’s WITSEC Program. The 

BOP and USMS conduct limited numbers of polygraph examinations but do 

not have polygraph programs like those of the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG. 

Table 3, on the next page, lists these “user” components, the number and 

purpose of the examinations requested or used, and the components that 

conducted the examinations. 
Table 3: Number of Polygraph Examination Results Used By Seven Other 

Components in FY 2002 through 2004

Component • Polygraphs’ Use Conducted by Results Used 

Antitrust Division • Criminal investigations FBI 2 

Bureau of Prisons • Witness security a

• Internal affairs (misconduct) b

(338) 

• Sex offender assessments c

FBI, OIG 

21 

 76 

FBI, OIG 

BOP 

Criminal Division • Foreign vetting • National security

U.S. Department of Justice 32

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

• Witness security

• Criminal investigations

FBI 

FBI, CIA 

FBI, OIG, Secret 

Service 

FBI, OIG 

725 

4 

 427 

15

 

Justice Command 

Center 

• Pre-employment screening FBI 3 

National Drug 

Intelligence Center 

• Pre-employment screening FBI 72 

Office of 

Professional 

Responsibility 

• Criminal investigations FBI 

FBI 

 0 

• Misconduct investigations 0 

U.S. Marshals 

Service 

• Misconduct investigations FBI 0 

• Witness security Contractor, ATF 16 

OIG 

Total 1,361d 

a The Office of Enforcement Operations in the Criminal Division approves all polygraph examinations conducted 

for the Witness Security program. The 338 reported by the BOP are included in the 427 total WITSEC 

examinations reported by the Criminal Division in August 2006. 

b Some of these polygraphs were administered during the course of OIG investigations. 

c The BOP’s Director of the Sex Offender Treatment Program began conducting polygraphs in mid-2002. 

d Most of these examinations are included in the numbers reported in Table 2, page 30, for polygraph 

examinations conducted by the FBI, ATF, and OIG. They also include a number of examinations conducted by 

the Secret Service (unknown), CIA (2), BOP (76), or the USMS contractor (11 of 16). The examinations 

conducted by the USMS’s WITSEC contractor and the BOP’s SOTP are limited and represent anomalies in the 

Department.

Source: Components’ data
U.S. Department of Justice 33

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The OIG conducted this study of polygraph programs in the 

Department to develop detailed information concerning the use of polygraph 

examinations in the Department, including trends in polygraph use as well 

as common issues affecting the Department’s polygraph programs and uses. 

We focused on identifying and describing: 

• Legal and regulatory requirements governing the use of polygraph 

examinations in the federal government; 

• Department policy and mechanisms for oversight of component use 

and administration of polygraph examinations; and 

• Key characteristics of the Department’s polygraph programs, the 

various uses of polygraph examinations, and how the components 

manage their use of polygraph examinations in compliance with 

federal and professional standards. 

We studied the 11 Department components that used polygraph 

examinations in FY 2002 through 2005. In conducting this examination, we 

reviewed government and private studies, component policies and 

regulations, federal and component polygraph manuals, and journal 

articles. We also reviewed federal legislation, Presidential Memorandums 

and Executive Orders, and security directives and guidelines to determine 

the legal and regulatory requirements for using and conducting polygraph 

examinations in the Department. 

In addition, we talked with officials in the criminal, intelligence, 

counterintelligence, and personnel security divisions of the Department, 

FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG to determine their use and experience with 

polygraphs. We talked with security officials, officials dealing with issues of 

misconduct, adjudicators, and personnel specialists to identify policies and 

procedures for requesting and approving polygraph examinations and the 

pool of candidates subject to initial, periodic, random, and compelled 

polygraphs. We also examined how the results of polygraphs examinations 

were interpreted, adjudicated, managed, and stored. 

We talked with polygraph examiners and officials administering 

polygraph programs and managing polygraph units for the FBI, DEA, ATF, 

and OIG. We identified the key components in each polygraph program 

and, when necessary, developed organizational charts showing both the 

headquarters and field structures. 
U.S. Department of Justice 34

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

We analyzed budget data, polygraph statistics, performance 

measures, and strategic plans regarding these polygraph programs. We also 

reviewed the mission, policies, and procedures guiding each of the units as 

well as their interaction with other polygraph units and professional 

organizations. We talked with field supervisory examiners regarding the use 

and conduct of polygraph examinations and examiner recruitment, training, 

certification, performance, and oversight. 

We traveled to DoDPI, which is located at Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina; interviewed DoDPI officials; and received a briefing on DoDPI’s 

role. We identified federal training requirements and issues regarding 

polygraph use in the federal government. We discussed federal technical 

standards and requirements for the conduct of polygraphs. 

To gauge the performance of the Department’s polygraph units and 

examiners, we reviewed quality assurance and internal inspection reports 

on the FBI, DEA, ATF, and OIG polygraph programs. We used the 

inspection results to evaluate the overall performance of the units in 

complying with internal policies and procedures and in meeting established 

standards for polygraph programs in the federal government. 
U.S. Department of Justice 35

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

RESULTS 

SECTION I: Polygraph Programs in the Department of Justice 

THE FBI POLYGRAPH PROGRAM 

Background

The FBI employed polygraph examiners as early as 1935. In the early 

to mid-1970s, the FBI sent agents for polygraph training first at Quantico, 

Virginia, and, in the late 1970s, to the U.S. Army Military Police School at 

Fort Gordon, Georgia. The FBI centralized its polygraph program in 1978. 

Before the mid-1980s, the FBI used polygraph examinations as an 

investigation tool in criminal cases. In the mid-1980s, the FBI began 

conducting polygraph examinations of its own agents when they held 

sensitive positions. FBI personnel already on duty, including Special 

Agents, were not required to take polygraph examinations unless they had 

access to certain sensitive programs or investigations coordinated through 

outside intelligence agencies. A few Special Agents in sensitive positions 

were tested when they were detailed to organizations outside the FBI (such 

as the CIA) where counterintelligence-scope polygraphs were required for 

authorization to access facilities and information. FBI personnel were also 

subject to polygraph examinations if they were investigated by the FBI’s 

Office of Professional Responsibility because of misconduct allegations. In 

1985, the FBI began limited pre-employment testing and, by 1994, all 

applicants for FBI employment were required to undergo pre-employment 

polygraph examinations. 

The FBI’s Polygraph Program expanded greatly in the wake of the 

arrest of FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen for espionage in February 2001. 

After Hanssen’s arrest, the FBI implemented a Personnel Security Polygraph 

Program that requires specified personnel to undergo personnel security 

polygraph examinations as a deterrent to those contemplating espionage or 

engaging in espionage within the ranks of the FBI. Also, the numbers of 

pre-employment screening polygraph examinations conducted by the FBI 

have grown significantly since 2001 because of hiring initiatives following 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. As shown in Figure 2 on the next 

page, overall there has been a 30-percent decline in the numbers of 
polygraphs conducted by the FBI for operations,39 but a 78-percent increase 

in the overall number of screening polygraphs (i.e., pre-employment and 

personnel security screening) from FY 2002 to FY 2005. 

 

Figure 2: FBI Polygraph Examinations Conducted and Used for 

Operational and Pre-employment Screenings 

(FY 2002 – 2005)

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

Operations (criminal,

foreign counterintelligence

and counterrorism)

2,539 1,984 1,903 1,771

Screenings (preemployment and

personnel security)

5,016 5,019 9,092 8,904

2002 2003 2004 2005

Source: FBI Polygraph Unit 

This shift in polygraph priorities was supported in part by a 

recommendation in A Review of FBI Security Programs, published by the 

Commission for the Review of the FBI Security Programs (the Webster 

Commission), dated March 31, 2002. The Webster Commission 

recommended that the FBI implement a counterintelligence polygraph 

 39 As shown in Table 5, on page 55 of this report, the decline in the use of polygraph 

examinations in operations occurred in their use in criminal investigations not in foreign 

counterintelligence and counterterrorism. Their use in criminal investigations decreased 

43 percent, while their use in foreign counterintelligence and counterterrorism increased by 

31 percent from FY 2002 to 2005. 

U.S. Department of Justice 36

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division
U.S. Department of Justice 37

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

program for employees and non-FBI personnel with access to Sensitive 

Compartmented Information (SCI) and special access clearance. Since that 

time, the FBI has elevated the role of personnel security within the FBI, 

brought personnel security expertise to the FBI from other intelligence 

agencies, established a Security Division and appointed a Director of 

Security, and shifted internal resources (including moving the Polygraph 

Unit from the Laboratory Division to the Security Division) as part of an 

ongoing restructuring plan.40 In June 2002, the FBI Director approved the 

expansion of the Personnel Security Polygraph Program to make it a 

permanent part of the FBI security process. 

From March 2001 through February 2005, the FBI also expanded the 

number of FBI positions for which it requires periodic and random 

personnel security polygraphs for access to sensitive and national security 

information from approximately 550 positions to 18,384 employees and 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) members. All personnel assigned to FBI 

counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, and security programs fall under the 

requirement for personnel security polygraph examinations, including state 

and local law enforcement personnel serving on JTTFs. Other FBI elements 

that require personnel to undergo personnel security screening include the 

Cyber Division, Records Management Division, Directorate of Intelligence, 

and Information Technology Operations Division. 

According to the Chief of the Personnel Security Adjudication Section 

and the Chief of the Polygraph Unit, the FBI is considering requiring all 

personnel who have access to FBI space, information, and information 

systems to undergo periodic and random counterintelligence-scope 

polygraph examinations. Non-FBI personnel would also be included, among 

them employees of other Department components, JTTF members, and FBI 

contractor employees. Although no specific deadline has been set for 

imposing this requirement, if implemented, it would raise the number of FBI 

positions subject to this requirement to approximately 35,000.41 

40 The FBI established “detail” assignments to the Security Division from the CIA 

and NSA. For example, the FBI’s Assistant Director of the Security Division and the Chief 

of the Personnel Security Adjudication Section are CIA employees on temporary assignment 

to the FBI. 

41 This number is based on the FBI’s staffing level of 30,430 employees as of March 

2006, an undetermined number of contractors that may be as high as 3,500, approximately 

400 persons outside the FBI requiring initial special access, and 1,518 JTTF members. 
U.S. Department of Justice 38

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

To establish an infrastructure to support the expansion of the 

polygraph program, the FBI Polygraph Unit Chief, in FY 2004, established 

regional manager positions, which placed a supervisory polygraph examiner 

in each of seven geographical regions to provide supervisory reviews of 

polygraph examinations as part of the FBI’s quality control process. In 

addition, the FBI increased its polygraph examiner workforce. In FY 2005, 

the Polygraph Unit hired 21 new examiners, and all were expected to 

complete DoDPI training by December 2005. 

Besides using polygraph examinations in criminal investigations and 

personnel security and pre-employment screening, the FBI uses polygraph 

examinations in counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations and 

in misconduct investigations involving FBI employees. The FBI also 

conducts many of the polygraph examinations requested by Department 

components that use the results of polygraph examinations but that do not 

have their own polygraph capability. It also provides support to other 

organizations such as the Department of State, the Department of the 

Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Defense. 

During FY 2005, FBI examiners conducted over 11,000 polygraph 

examinations in the United States and abroad. The FBI’s Polygraph Unit 

provides support to the FBI’s Administrative Services; Counterintelligence, 

Counterterrorism, Criminal, and Security Divisions; Office of Professional 

Responsibility, Legal Attaché Offices, and all FBI field offices. 

Mission and Purpose

The FBI’s Polygraph Unit is located within the FBI’s Security Division, 

in the Personnel Security Adjudication Section. The stated mission of the 

Personnel Security Adjudication Section is to protect FBI people, facilities, 

and information by ensuring the trustworthiness of FBI employees and nonFBI personnel through initial and continued vetting and counterintelligence 

measures. The mission of the FBI Polygraph Unit is to provide polygraph 

support to the FBI by conducting polygraph examinations in criminal, 

counterintelligence and counterterrorism, and misconduct investigations; 

pre-employment and personnel security screening; and as requested by 

other agencies. 

Policies and Regulations 

The FBI polygraph program is governed by the FBI Security Division’s 

Security Policy Manual, the Polygraph Examiner Manual, the FBI’s Manual of 
U.S. Department of Justice 39

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

Administrative Operations and Procedures (MAOP), and the Manual of 

Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG). 

The Security Policy Manual was developed in response to 

recommendations made in the 2002 Webster Commission report and the 

FBI Director’s subsequent security program improvement initiatives. As 

previously discussed, the Webster Commission was established in March 

2001 to review FBI security programs in the aftermath of the Robert 

Hanssen espionage case. The Security Policy Manual, which took effect on 

December 1, 2005, consolidated FBI security policy regarding the use of 

polygraph examinations that was previously contained in the MAOP, MIOG, 

and other applicable security policy documents issued by the Security 

Division.42 However, the Security Policy Manual does not address the use of 

polygraph examinations in criminal investigations. The MIOG continues to 

be the primary source of FBI guidance for the use of polygraph 

examinations in investigative operations. 

The Security Policy Manual contains FBI policies regarding the use of 

polygraph in personnel security matters. Among other things, the Security 

Policy Manual addresses approving authorities, identifies personnel subject to 

routine polygraph examinations, those subject to specific-issue examinations, 

the consequences of refusing to take a voluntary polygraph examination, 

instances in which an FBI employee can be ordered to undergo an 

examination, and the consequences of a Deception Indicated polygraph result. 

The Polygraph Examiner Manual, which was last revised in 2006, 

contains technical guidance for examiners on conducting, evaluating, and 

reporting the results of a polygraph examination. Its provisions largely 

reflect those found in the Federal Examiner Handbook. 

The MIOG, Part 2, is still the primary source of general polygraph 

policy and procedures and of policy and procedures for the use of polygraph 

examinations as a tool in criminal investigations. However, the MIOG has 

not been revised to reflect changes resulting from the reorganization of the 

FBI’s Polygraph Unit, which moved from the Laboratory Division to the 

Security Division. 

42 The FBI’s Security Policy Manual, Section 1.1, Polygraph Program, replaced 

polygraph policy contained in Part 2 of the FBI’s MIOG. 
Organization and Staffing 

The FBI’s polygraph program comprises the Polygraph Unit at FBI 

Headquarters and a field structure comprised of a total of 119 personnel. 

Chart 2 shows the FBI’s polygraph program organizational structure. 

Chart 2: FBI Polygraph Organization Structure 

Security Division

Personnel Security 

Adjudication Section

Unit Chief - Polygraph

Department of 

Defense 

Polygraph 

Institute 

Supervisory 

Special Agent

Department of 

Defense 

Polygraph 

Institute 

Supervisory 

Special Agent

Contractor 

Information 

Technology

Contractor 

Personnel 

Security 

Specialist

Contractor 

Personnel 

Security 

Specialist

Management 

Assistant

Program 

Analyst

Program 

Analyst

Personnel 

Security 

Polygraph 

Supervisory 

Special Agent

Applicant 

Supervisory 

Special 

Agent

Applicant 

Supervisory 

Special 

Agent

Contractor Quality 

Control Applicant

Personnel 

Security 

Polygraph 

Supervisory 

Special Agent

Budget 

Supervisory 

Special 

Agent

Training 

Supervisory 

Special 

Agent

Information Technology 

Witness Security 

Polygraph Supervisory 

Special Agent

Foreign Counter 

Intelligence Terrorism 

International Supervisory 

Special Agent

Midwest 

Regional Polygraph 

Program Manager

Southeast 

Regional Polygraph 

Program Manager

Mountain 

Regional Polygraph 

Program Manager

Pacific 

Regional Polygraph 

Program Manager

Northeast 

Regional Polygraph 

Program Manager

Special Agent 

Polygraph 

Examiners Assigned 

to Field Offices

Special Agent 

Polygraph 

Examiners Assigned 

to Field Offices

Special Agent 

Polygraph 

Examiners Assigned 

to Field Offices

Special Agent 

Polygraph 

Examiners Assigned 

to Field Offices

Special Agent 

Polygraph 

Examiners Assigned 

to Field Offices

Source: Organization chart provided by the FBI, with field examiners added by the OIG 

Headquarters Structure and Staff

The FBI polygraph program is managed by the Polygraph Unit, which 

is responsible for: 

• establishing technical standards, 

• supervising the work of the Regional Polygraph Program Managers 

and polygraph work by field examiners, 

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• conducting quality control reviews of all FBI polygraph examinations, 

administering polygraph examinations in high-profile and sensitive 

investigations, 

• equipping and supplying examiners, 

• coordinating examiner assignments, 

• responding to requests for services from other federal agencies, 

• providing technical assistance to FBI Headquarters personnel and 

field managers, and 

• conducting training. 

As of August 24, 2006, the Polygraph Unit Headquarters had a staff of 18, 

which included a GS-15 Unit Chief, 2 Supervisory Special Agent Examiners 

assigned to DoDPI as trainers, 1 management assistant, 2 program 

analysts, 4 contractor personnel, and 8 Supervisory Special Agent 

Examiners. Polygraph examinations for pre-employment screening, 

personnel security, and Inspection Division inquiries that are conducted in 

the field are primarily initiated and requested by FBI Headquarters staff 

through the Polygraph Unit. 

Field Structure and Staff

As of August 24, 2006, the FBI polygraph program’s field organization 

comprised 5 Regional Polygraph Program Managers (regional managers) who 

were responsible for overseeing the polygraph work of 96 field examiners. 

Each of the 5 regional managers supervises the polygraph work of between 

18 to 20 field examiners who are special agents and conduct polygraph 

examinations as a collateral duty. They are under the operational 

supervision of the SAC of their assigned field offices. The field examiner 

positions include a number that were added in 2005 in preparation for the 

expansion of the FBI’s Personnel Security Polygraph Program. 

The FBI created the regional manager positions in 2004 by realigning 

eight GS-14 supervisory positions from Headquarters to five regions that 

provide coverage of the field offices. The regional managers are physically 

located in field division offices and are responsible for providing oversight of 

all polygraph operations in their assigned geographic regions. The field staff 

report directly to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of their field offices, but 

receive their administrative direction, quality control reviews, and work 

performance assessments from the Polygraph Unit. The regional managers 

conduct quality control reviews of the results of specific-issue polygraph 
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examinations conducted in field offices assigned to their region. They also 

provide direction, training, and assistance to field examiners in their regions 

and coordinate personnel security polygraph testing of individuals in their 

region as identified by FBI Headquarters. 

Polygraph Examination Uses and Procedures 

The FBI uses polygraph examinations for five primary purposes: preemployment screening, personnel security screening, counterintelligence 

and counterterrorism investigations, criminal investigations, and 

administrative investigations. The FBI also conducts polygraph 

examinations at the request of other federal agencies. 

Refusing to Take a Polygraph Examination 

According to the FBI’s Security Policy Manual, all polygraph 

examinations are “voluntary” – any individual can refuse to submit to an 

examination. Individuals that consent to undergo a polygraph examination 

must do so in writing. However, although consent is required, a refusal may 

have negative consequences, including an employee’s dismissal from the 

FBI. Even though an individual may only agree to a polygraph examination 

to avoid negative consequences, the decision to submit to a polygraph 

examination is still considered voluntary by the FBI. 

The Chief of the Personnel Security Adjudication Section told us that 

sanctions are decided on an individual basis. The specific consequences of 

a refusal depend on the purpose for which the polygraph examination would 

be used (i.e., pre-employment screening, personnel security screening, 

misconduct investigations, witness security, etc.). For example: 

• All applicants for employment with the FBI must consent in writing to 

submit to and pass a mandatory pre-employment polygraph 

examination as a condition of eligibility for employment consideration. 

• The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination protects 

criminal defendants from being compelled to take polygraph 

examinations, and the results of a polygraph examination are, by and 

large, inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. However, some 

defendants may agree to take a polygraph as part of a pre-sentencing 

agreement. 

• Employees who refuse to submit to mandatory or compelled polygraph 

examinations, such as during periodic security reinvestigations, or 
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investigations of national security matters, may face negative 

consequences, such as transfer to a position with no access to 

sensitive information, denial or re-evaluation of their security 

clearance, or disciplinary action for misconduct (insubordination). 

Since holding a security clearance is a condition of employment, 

revocation of an employee’s clearance could also lead to dismissal. 

• For employees asked to take a polygraph examination related to an 

administrative matter, the consequences of refusal depend on the 

circumstances of the request. For example, employees who are 

subjects or witnesses in routine administrative investigations may 

decline to take a polygraph examination without adverse 

administrative consequences. 

Only specific senior FBI officials are authorized to compel FBI 

employees and certain others to submit to polygraph examinations under 

specific circumstances, according to the Security Policy Manual. The 

Assistant Director, Security Division, is authorized to compel any FBI 

employee or a non-FBI person with access to FBI information or facilities to 

submit to a polygraph examination to resolve specific issues that may have 

an impact on a person’s trustworthiness.43 The Assistant Director, 

Inspection Division, can compel an employee to submit to a polygraph 

examination to resolve an issue during the investigative phase of a 

disciplinary matter if the employee first refuses voluntarily to take a 

polygraph and if the matter involves one or more of the following seven 

serious violations: 

• Intentional and unauthorized release of sensitive, protected 

information; 

• Relationship with or allegiance to a foreign power; 

• Illegal or improper exercise of influence; 

• Intentional and unauthorized destruction, alteration, 

misplacement, taking, falsification or other impairment of FBI 

documents or evidence; 

• Use of or unauthorized dealing in controlled substances; 

• False statements or the failure to candidly disclose information; 

and 

43 As defined by Executive Order 12968 and related Adjudication Guidelines. 
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• Theft, fraud, and misuse of government money and property. 

When an FBI official orders an employee to submit to a polygraph 

during an administrative investigation, the Security Policy Manual requires 

the official to first inform the employee of the consequences of a refusal and 

that failure to cooperate during the requested examination will be 

considered a refusal. If an employee refuses to take an examination when 

compelled during the adjudication process, the FBI’s Office of Professional 

Responsibility can treat the refusal as if the subject had failed the 

examination. However, the FBI policy also states that an employee’s refusal 

to take a polygraph when compelled will not by itself substantiate the 

original misconduct charge. 

Inconclusive or Deception Indicated Results 

The FBI also has policy concerning actions that may be taken based 

on the results of polygraph examinations. For pre-employment polygraph 

examinations, if the examination results are Deception Indicated, or if the 

examiner cannot render an opinion, then the applicant normally is not 

hired. The FBI policy allows an applicant to appeal the results of a 

polygraph examination, in which case the FBI may grant the applicant a 

retest. 

For polygraph examinations administered to employees, if the results 

are Inconclusive, Deception Indicated, or No Opinion, and the employee 

makes no admission, then the test result is considered “unexplained” or 

referred to as an “examination pending resolution.” The FBI policy states 

that no adverse action will be taken based solely on the results of a 

polygraph examination. In October 2005, the Chief of the FBI’s Personnel 

Security Adjudication Section told us that the FBI had not taken adverse 

action against any employee based solely on the results of a polygraph 

examination. Instead, the FBI may retest the employee or initiate an 

investigation to resolve the issues raised by the examination. 

In the case of a personnel security polygraph, the Polygraph Unit 

reports “unexplained” results to the Assistant Director, Security Division, 

who functions as the FBI’s Security Program Manager. The Assistant 

Director, Security Division, in conjunction with the employee’s division 

head, the Counterintelligence Division, and other appropriate management 

officials, initiates (1) a security risk assessment of the employee’s continued 

access to sensitive information and (2) an investigation to resolve the 

unexplained results. An employee working in a sensitive area may be 

reassigned until the investigation is completed. If derogatory information is 
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uncovered during the investigation, the employee may be suspended or the 

employee’s security clearance may be revoked. However, if no information is 

developed that indicates the examinee has engaged in a prohibited activity, 

the Security Division conducts an assessment of the security risk of 

allowing the person continued access to sensitive or national security 

information. According to the Chief of the Personnel Security Adjudication 

Section, the FBI has employees whose polygraph examinations resulted in 

an Inconclusive or Deception Indicated opinion, but the results were not 

corroborated by a follow-on investigation, and those employees have been 

cleared to continue working. 

The policy and processes for conducting each type of polygraph 

examination vary slightly. In the following sections, we discuss each use. 

Pre-Employment Polygraphs 

Under FBI security policy, all job applicants must undergo a preemployment polygraph examination on issues that relate to their 

trustworthiness.44 The process begins when an applicant receives a 

“Conditional Job Offer” for a position at the FBI and completes a Personnel 

Security Interview, which may be conducted by an FBI agent. The Security 

Division’s Personnel Security Investigations Section makes a request to the 

Polygraph Unit to conduct polygraph examinations of applicants for both 

FBI Headquarters and field office positions. From FY 2002 through 2005, 

the FBI performed 23,310 pre-employment polygraph examinations. 

For applicants for Special Agent positions, the FBI conducts the 

polygraph examination before beginning the background investigation. That 

enables the FBI to limit the costs of conducting a background investigation 

when applicants are determined to be ineligible for employment based on 

their polygraph examination results, e.g., they admitted to disqualifying 

behavior during the examination process. The FBI investigators are also 

able to use information gathered during the polygraph examination to focus 

background investigations. FBI Security officials said that, before 2005, all 

applicants were given polygraph examinations before their background 

investigations were initiated, but in 2005 the FBI decided to begin the 

background investigation process for non-agent applicants before 

conducting their polygraph examinations as a time-saving measure. 

 44 Some FBI agents were administered pre-employment polygraph examination 

examinations in the mid-1980s. The FBI’s requirement for pre-employment polygraph 

examinations was extended to all prospective applicants in 1994. 
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Pre-employment polygraph examinations are generally conducted by 

field office examiners working directly with the field office applicant 

coordinators and the Polygraph Unit. The examiners use information 

gathered during the Personnel Security Interview in formulating test 

questions during the pretest phase of the examination. The applicants are 

then given non-specific, full-scope polygraph examinations. Once an 

examination is completed, the examiner forwards the records and the 

examiner’s initial opinion on the results to the Polygraph Unit at FBI 

Headquarters for an independent quality review. For completed preemployment polygraph examinations, there are three potential outcomes –

No Deception Indicated, Deception Indicated, and Inconclusive –

Inconclusive – based on the final opinion: 

• When the final opinion is No Deception Indicated, the applicant’s 

employment processing continues. The applicant may be hired 

after successfully completing the remaining requirements, such as 

a successful background investigation. 

• When the final opinion is Deception Indicated, the results are 

reported to adjudication officials who decide whether to disqualify 

the applicant or, based on other information available to the 

adjudicators, request that the applicant be retested. According to 

FBI Security officials, the Personnel Security Adjudications Unit 

makes all hiring decisions. FBI officials reported that test results 

in which an applicants have been determined to have been 

deceptive have been validated by confessions or admissions in over 

50 percent of all cases. 

• FBI officials said that when an applicant’s test result is 

Inconclusive, the applicant is automatically retested. However, if 

an examiner suspects that an applicant is attempting to use 

countermeasures and the examiner’s suspicion is confirmed 

during the quality control review, or the supervisory reviewer 

detects the use of countermeasures during their review, the 

Polygraph Unit usually recommends that the applicant receive no 

further testing. 

 The FBI does not have written policy or procedures that require FBI 

officials to report the results of a failed polygraph examination to an 

applicant’s employing agency when the applicant is already a federal 

employee who is applying for an FBI law enforcement position. According to 

an FBI official in the Security Division, Adjudication Section, each case 

“would be examined and particular attention would be given to foreign 
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counterintelligence issues.” The official said that the FBI would have an 

obligation to report an Inconclusive or Deception Indicated result that the 

FBI could not resolve to the employee’s home agency. She said that, should 

the polygraph examination raise a foreign counterintelligence issue, the FBI 

would refer the matter to its Counterintelligence Division for follow-up. The 

applicant’s information would also be entered into an FBI database that is 

used to alert other agencies of an applicant who might go from agency to 

agency trying to get hired. She said the FBI would also contact an 

appropriate security official in the Department’s Security and Emergency 

Planning Staff (SEPS).45 However, she was not aware of any instances in 

which the FBI had reported such information on a Department employee to 

SEPS. She said there had been instances in which polygraph results of 

employees from other departments were referred to the employing agency. 

Personnel Security Polygraphs 

As of January 24, 2006, all FBI and non-FBI personnel assigned to 

the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence, Counterintelligence Division, 

Counterterrorism Division, Cyber Division, Security Division, Office of the 

Chief Information Officer, and the Information Technology Operations 

Division were required to undergo random and periodic polygraph 

examinations.46 In addition, selected personnel with access to FBI 

information or facilities who are identified by the Assistant Director, 

Security Division, as persons whose circumstances suggest that they are or 

could be subjected to coercive influences also may be asked to submit to a 

polygraph examination on a periodic basis.47 The personnel security 

polygraph program is intended to serve as an investigative tool and as a 

deterrent to espionage. The FBI Director has delegated to the Assistant 

Director of the Security Division the authority to approve polygraph 

 45 Department security officials with SEPS told us that SEPS does not have a 

process for receiving notifications when a Department employee’s polygraph results in an 

Inconclusive or Deception Indicated. They also told us they were not aware of a 

requirement for Department agencies such as the FBI, DEA, or ATF to notify SEPS when a 

Department employee fails or has an inconclusive polygraph. The SEPS official did recall 

being notified by the FBI in at least one instance in which a Department employee’s 

polygraph examination raised security issues. 

 46 Examples of these non-FBI personnel include JTTF members, contractors, and 

others who are covered by FBI policy and who perform functions requiring access to 

“sensitive” FBI information, systems, or space in the specified FBI offices and divisions. 

47 Coercive influences include extortion, blackmail, and situations where a relative 

may be held hostage. 
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examinations relating to security clearance adjudication and to compel any 

FBI or non-FBI personnel with access to FBI information or facilities to 

submit to a polygraph examination to resolve specific security issues. 

Between 2001 and 2005, the number of FBI and non-FBI personnel 

subject to mandatory random and periodic testing under the Personnel 

Security Polygraph Program increased from 550 to 18,384. The FBI 

conducted a total of 4,721 personnel security polygraph examinations from 

FY 2002 through 2005. 

The FBI’s Security Policy Manual contains a provision concerning a 

potential future expansion of the FBI’s Personnel Security Polygraph 

Program, “This policy will expand to apply to other FBI divisions over time.” 

The Chief of the Personnel Security Adjudication Section explained that this 

provision reflects the FBI’s consideration of a plan to expand the 

requirement for periodic and random counterintelligence-scope polygraph 

examinations to all of the FBI’s approximately 35,000 employees, 

contractors, task force members, and a number of non-FBI personnel with 

special access. According to the Chief of the Personnel Security 

Adjudication Section, the FBI’s plan is meant to improve personnel security, 

deter and detect espionage, and counter criticisms of the FBI’s security 

program in the wake of the Hanssen spy case. The Section Chief said that 

the FBI’s program was being expanded in response to recommendations 

contained in the Webster Commission’s report and because the FBI wants to 

strengthen its security program in awareness of insider threats to 

security.48 FBI officials began implementing this program in 2001 and have 

since increased the number of affected positions from 550 in 2001 to 

approximately 18,000 in 2005, with approximately 400 non-FBI personnel 

also being polygraphed each year.49

48 The Webster Commission report actually recommended restricting the FBI’s use 

of personnel security polygraphs. Citing the experience of the CIA when it implemented a 

similar plan, the Webster Commission cautioned the FBI concerning the potential risks to 

innocent individuals’ careers in terms of delays in assignments and promotions and 

damage to employee morale. The Commission also cautioned the FBI against an overreliance on polygraph examinations for personnel security and recommended the FBI 

“adopt a counterintelligence test in reinvestigations of employees and non-FBI personnel 

with SCI and special access clearances. This approach focuses on personnel who may pose 

the greatest risk to national security and minimizes the risk of false positives.” 

49 Non-FBI personnel include local law enforcement agency personnel assigned to 

counterterrorism task forces. The FBI’s Personnel Security Polygraph Program has been 

expanded to include all Joint Terrorism Task Force officers, contract linguists, and 

industrial security contractors with SCI access. 
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According to the Chief of the Personnel Security Adjudication Section, 

that office, in conjunction with a Field or Division Security Officer, notifies 

employees when they have been randomly selected for a polygraph 

examination or when they will be required to undergo a polygraph as part of 

a periodic security reinvestigation. If the employee refuses to take a 

polygraph examination, the employee may be transferred to a less sensitive 

position, referred to the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility, subjected 

to a security risk assessment, or have his or her security clearance 

reevaluated. Employees who consent to polygraph examinations first 

undergo Personnel Security Interviews with their Security Officers. The 

employees are then given polygraph examinations by examiners who are 

personally unfamiliar with the subjects. Individuals who are subject to 

personnel security polygraph examinations receive non-specific, 

counterintelligence-scope security polygraphs. According to FBI officials, 

test questions are limited to security issues raised by federal adjudication 

guidelines. 

After the examination is completed, the examiner forwards an 

examination report to the Polygraph Unit at FBI Headquarters, where it 

undergoes a quality review by a supervisory examiner who issues a final 

opinion on the results of the examination and forwards a report to the 

Security Division. According to the Chief of the FBI’s Personnel Security 

Adjudication Section, the potential outcome for a completed personnel 

security examination is based on the final opinion: 

• When the final opinion is No Deception Indicated, the Polygraph 

Unit notifies the Security Program Manager that the employee 

“passed” the examination. 

• When the final opinion is Inconclusive or No Opinion, the 

Personnel Security Adjudication Section usually orders a retest to 

see whether the examiner can reach a conclusive, final opinion – 

that is, a finding of Deception Indicated or No Deception Indicated. 

If the retest does not result in a conclusive opinion of No Deception 

Indicated, the FBI will conduct a security risk assessment or an 

investigation to resolve the issues. 

• When the final opinion is Deception Indicated, the FBI will attempt 

to determine whether the employee poses a security risk. The 

Analysis and Investigations Unit may conduct a more focused 

background investigation of the employee, including a thorough 

interview in an attempt to resolve the issues. The Security 

Program Manager can also recommend a range of other actions 
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such as another retest, reassignment to a less sensitive position, or 

the initiation of a criminal investigation. According to FBI officials, 

an agent in a sensitive position will be reassigned until issues 

stemming from the examination can be resolved. If the individual 

is not in a sensitive position, he or she may be allowed to remain in 

the position. If the Analysis and Investigations Unit finds no 

evidence to corroborate an issue of potential deception, the 

Security Program Manager may wait to act until the employee 

undergoes another periodic security examination. According to 

FBI Security officials, the FBI has never discharged an FBI 

employee solely on the basis of a personnel security polygraph 

examination. 

In 2004, the Security Division initiated a process for compelling 

personnel to undergo a polygraph examination to resolve specific issues 

regarding their trustworthiness. In such cases, the Assistant Director of the 

Security Division is authorized to compel any FBI or non-FBI personnel with 

access to FBI information or facilities to take a polygraph examination if the 

employee is suspected of unauthorized contact with or providing sensitive or 

classified information to a foreign intelligence service or if the employee 

poses a security risk to the FBI in some capacity. 

Foreign Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Investigations

The FBI uses polygraph examinations during counterintelligence and 

counterterrorism investigations to resolve specific issues related to 

espionage, sabotage, or validation of information sources, as well as to make 

resource decisions such as whether to conduct surveillance. FBI officials 

told us that the process for initiating, approving, and conducting polygraph 

examinations and using their results in counterintelligence and 

counterterrorism investigations is similar to that for criminal investigations. 

As with polygraphs conducted for criminal investigations, which will be 

discussed in the next section, the FBI Director has delegated approving 

authority for polygraph examinations used in connection with nonadministrative investigations to the Assistant Director in Charge, SAC, or 

person acting in that capacity on a specific investigation. Consistent with 

that policy, polygraph examinations conducted in counterintelligence and 

counterterrorism investigations require the written approval of the Assistant 

Director in Charge or the SAC of the relevant field office. The FBI conducted 

a total of 1,994 counterintelligence and counterterrorism polygraph 

examinations from FY 2002 through 2005. 
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Polygraphs conducted for counterintelligence investigations are 

overseen by the Counterintelligence Division, which provides centralized 

management and oversight of all foreign counterintelligence investigations. 

Any government agency can refer a case for investigation by the 

Counterintelligence Division, including requesting a polygraph examination. 

As with polygraph examinations used in other FBI investigations, the case 

agent requests authorization to conduct a polygraph examination from the 

SAC of the field division.50 The Counterintelligence Division also has to give 

permission before a field office can interview a case subject, including 

conducting a polygraph examination. The Section Chief, Counterespionage 

Section (part of the Counterintelligence Division), said that the decision on 

whether to use a polygraph examination depends on the specifics of each 

case. According to the Chief of the Counterespionage Section, between 65 

and 85 percent of the subjects in espionage cases undergo polygraph 

examinations. 

 

The conduct of a polygraph examination in a counterintelligence 

investigation depends on the purpose for the test. Polygraph examinations 

are also used during counterintelligence investigations to validate sources in 

high-risk investigations and at the end of investigations as a final check of 

case facts. The results obtained through polygraph examinations during 

counterintelligence investigations may be used several ways. If the case 

began as a referral from another agency, the results would be provided to 

the referring agency, and that agency would take the appropriate action. If 

the subject was an FBI employee and they did not pass the foreign 

counterintelligence elements of the polygraph test, further investigation 

would be conducted.51 If that investigation confirmed the results of the 

polygraph, and no foreign government was involved, the case would be 

referred to the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility for adjudication. If 

a foreign government was involved, and a crime was detected, the case 

would be referred to the Criminal Investigative Unit for prosecution. 

50 The Assistant Section Chief of International Terrorism Section I of the 

Counterterrorism Division said that all counterterrorism investigations are criminal in 

nature and are based in one of the FBI’s 56 field offices. 

51 A counterintelligence or counterterrorism investigation can sometimes involve an 

FBI employee. The FBI has had approximately 15 espionage cases in the past 10 years that 

involved FBI employees, including the case of former Special Agent Robert Hanssen and, 

more recently, analyst Leandro Aragoncillo. These are categorized as personnel security 

cases and handled by the FBI’s Security Division. 
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Criminal Investigations

The FBI uses polygraph examinations during criminal investigations 

to resolve specific issues related to developing investigative leads and 

information; to verify information provided by subjects, witnesses, and 

informants; and to elicit confessions. The FBI Director has delegated 

approving authority for polygraph examinations used in connection with 

non-administrative investigations to the Assistant Director in Charge, SAC, 

or person acting in that capacity on a specific investigation. In field offices, 

the SAC can authorize polygraph examinations in connection with ongoing 

cases. From FY 2002 through 2005, the FBI performed 6,203 polygraph 

examinations related to criminal investigations. 

Requests for specific-issue polygraph examinations that originate in 

the FBI’s field offices are handled and scheduled by the polygraph examiner 

assigned to that field office. The case agent usually talks with an examiner 

to determine whether a polygraph examination should be conducted. The 

case agent obtains the SAC’s approval for conducting the test, and the 

examiner and the case agent set a mutually agreeable date for conducting 

the test. 

Prior to an examination, the examiner discusses with the case agent 

the facts and issues of the case and why a polygraph examination is needed. 

All examinees must voluntarily consent in writing to undergo a polygraph 

examination. After the FBI issues a final opinion on the results of a 

polygraph, a copy of the polygraph report and test charts are provided to the 

case agent for inclusion in the investigative file. If the examination was 

requested by an Assistant United States Attorney, the case agent or the 

agent’s supervisor is responsible for providing the attorney with a copy of 

the polygraph examination report. 

In general, the results of polygraph examinations in criminal 

investigations are used as a tool to focus and direct the investigation and to 

elicit information and confessions. According to Department policy, the 

results of polygraph examinations are generally not used in court 

proceedings. However, voluntary admissions and statements made by 

individuals during examinations may be used in testimony.52

 52 See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Title 9 – Criminal Division, Chapter 9-13.300 

Polygraphs – Department Policy; 9-21.340, Polygraph Examinations for Prisoner-Witness 

Candidates; and 9-21.600 Prisoner-Witnesses, October 1999. See also the Criminal 

Resource Manual, at 259 et seq., for a discussion of case law on polygraph examinations. 
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Misconduct Investigations 

The FBI conducts polygraph examinations to resolve allegations 

against FBI employees or to confirm the veracity of a complainant in an 

administrative investigation involving potential disciplinary action. The FBI 

conducted a total of 128 polygraph examinations related to misconduct 

investigations from FY 2002 through 2005. The FBI Director has delegated 

the authority to approve polygraph examinations concerning employee 

disciplinary matters to the Assistant Director, Inspection Division. FBI 

regulations identify two types of administrative polygraph examinations – a 

voluntary examination and a compelled examination an employee is ordered 

to take. The FBI’s Inspection Division decides whether or not to conduct an 

investigation and, if so, whether it will request an employee to volunteer to 

take a polygraph or order an employee to submit to a polygraph when 

needed. The results of these polygraph examinations are used to make 

investigative or adjudicative decisions. 

Other Agency Requests 

The Polygraph Unit has provided services for the DEA and BOP and 

also for other federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, 

Department of State, and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian 

Affairs. It has routinely conducted polygraph examinations for the 

Department’s ATR, Criminal Division, JCC, NDIC, OPR, and USMS. The 

unit has also provided foreign governments with support – primarily the 

governments of Mexico and Colombia – by conducting polygraph 

examinations of their investigation units. Between FY 2002 and 2005, the 

FBI’s Polygraph Unit reported that FBI examiners conducted 1,661 

polygraph examinations at the request of other federal agencies and foreign 

governments. 

An outside federal agency or foreign government must provide a 

written request for services. A polygraph examination will be conducted in 

response only after the Assistant Director, Security Division has approved 

the request and the Polygraph Unit has determined that resources are 

available and that FBI priorities will not be affected by responding to the 

request. When a polygraph examination is done in response to one of these 

requests, the Polygraph Unit is responsible for arranging and scheduling the 

examination if it is to be conducted by an examiner at FBI Headquarters. If 

it is to be done in the field, the SAC of the field office must also approve the 

request, and an examiner in the field office schedules and conducts the 

examination. The requesting agency receives a copy of the examination 
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report and a copy of the report is also retained for 2 years in the examiner’s 

file. 

Examiner Qualifications and Training 

The FBI selects polygraph examiners from among its Special Agent 

workforce. Candidates must have at least 5 years of FBI investigative 

experience and demonstrated success as an interviewer, interrogator, and 

case agent in complex investigations. Candidates must also have the ability 

to perform well under stress and in confrontational situations. Prior to 

selection, examiner candidates must undergo a personnel security 

polygraph examination. 

Candidates with prior experience at conducting polygraph 

examinations must have completed a basic polygraph course at a polygraph 

school approved by the FBI or certified by the American Polygraph 

Association. Candidates who are not experienced examiners or do not have 

training from an approved school are sent to DoDPI’s 14-week course for 

examiner trainees. After graduation from the DoDPI course, new examiners 

are mentored by a senior examiner during a supervised internship. New 

examiners receive 1 week of specialized training in the Polygraph Unit, and 

their first 12 examinations are monitored by a senior examiner. Examiners 

who successfully complete all required training and a 1-year internship, 

during which they complete at least 48 polygraph examinations, are 

certified by the FBI. FBI examiners are required to complete at least 48 

polygraph examinations a year to maintain their certification. They also 

must complete a minimum of 80 hours of polygraph-related training every 2 

years as part of their continuing education. Because of the extensive 

training provided to new FBI examiners, they are expected to serve for a 

minimum of 3 years. 

As of December 2005, the FBI Polygraph Unit’s supervisory personnel 

had an average of 18 years of investigative experience and an average of 9 

years of polygraph experience. Field examiners had an average of 17 years 

of investigative experience and 9 years of polygraph experience. 

Workload and Program Costs 

The FBI’s polygraph program is the largest in the Department, both in 

the number of polygraph examinations conducted each year and the 

financial resources dedicated to the program. From FY 2002 through 2005, 

the FBI conducted 38,017 polygraph examinations (Table 4). The number of 

examinations conducted annually increased by approximately 45 percent 
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from FY 2002 to 2005. Most of the increase resulted from increases in the 

number of pre-employment and personnel security polygraph examinations, 

which by FY 2005 accounted for approximately 79 percent of the polygraph 

examinations conducted by the FBI. At the same time, the FBI’s use of 

polygraph examinations in criminal investigations dropped by over 

40 percent, from almost 2,100 to about 1,200. 

Table 4: FBI Polygraph Unit Workload by Use 

FY 2002 through 2005

PreEmployment Criminal Personnel 

Security FCI/CTa Misconduct 

For Other 

Agency Total 

2002 4,685 2,098 331 441 33 166 7,754

2003 4,354 1,562 665 422 39 378 7,420

2004 7,848 1,351 1,244 552 35 537 11,567

2005 6,423 1,192 2,481 579 21 580 11,276

Total 23,310 6,203 4,721 1,994 128 1,661 38,017

a Counterintelligence (CI) and Counterterrorism (CT). 

Source: FBI Polygraph Unit

As previously discussed, the FBI is considering policy changes that 

could increase the number of FBI and non-FBI personnel required to 

undergo periodic or random personnel security polygraph examinations to 

approximately 35,000 individuals. If the FBI requires all 35,000 employees 

to undergo personnel security polygraph examinations, the number of 

personnel security examinations would increase from 2,481 conducted in 

FY 2005 to over 7,000. 

Polygraph Program Costs 

At our request, the FBI’s Polygraph Unit and budget and finance 

offices provided us with estimates of polygraph program budget and cost 

data for FY 2003, 2004, and 2005. In FY 2002, the Polygraph Unit did not 

have a separate budget because it was part of the FBI’s Laboratory Division, 

and funding for the polygraph program was not separately identified within 

that Division’s budget. Subsequently, the Polygraph Unit was transferred to 

the FBI’s Security Division. Although records of the funding dedicated to 

the polygraph program were not maintained, the FBI estimated for us that it 

spent approximately $6 million in FY 2002 to establish the polygraph 
U.S. Department of Justice 56

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

program as part of the Security Division and to cover the salaries of its fulltime examiners.53 

The FBI requested additional funding for FY 2003 to expand its 

polygraph program to conduct an additional 7,100 personnel security 

polygraph examinations annually. For FY 2003, Congress provided an 

additional $6.8 million, which included $4.5 million for Polygraph Unit 

operations and $2.3 million for hiring 15 new examiners and 2 new program 

analysts. These additions raised the authorized number of examiners from 

73 to 88. The money requested for hiring new examiners included only the 

costs for new examiner training and equipment, not the cost of salaries. In 

the FBI, all personnel costs are centrally funded and managed. The FBI 

estimated for us that its FY 2003 expenditures for Polygraph Unit 

operations, authorized new hires, and full-time examiner salaries was 

approximately $7.5 million.54 

In its FY 2004 budget request, the FBI sought another budget 

enhancement of $5.7 million for hiring, training, and equipping 32 

additional examiners and 5 support personnel, and $1.4 million for nonpersonnel costs. The FBI planned to increase the number of examiners 

from 88 to 120 to handle its projected polygraph workload. Congress 

provided $6.4 million, which included approximately $1.4 million for nonpersonnel costs and $5 million for hiring 32 additional examiners and 5 

additional support staff. The FBI estimated for us that its expenditures for 

FY 2004 were approximately $8.9 million for Polygraph Unit operations, new 

examiner training, equipment, and full-time examiner salaries. 

In FY 2005, the FBI did not request or receive a budget enhancement 

for its polygraph program. At the beginning of FY 2005, the Polygraph Unit, 

working with the Security Division Program and Plans Unit, estimated 

$5.8 million in recurring funding needs and developed an annual spending 

plan that designated funds for operational and training travel, conference 

expenses, education, supplies, consulting services, and equipment. During 

the course of the fiscal year, the Security Division received approximately 

$3.3 million in various budget cuts for the polygraph program. 

Consequently, the FBI’s polygraph program had a net authorization of 

approximately $2.5 million in FY 2005. 

53 The FBI’s estimated expenditures do not include the costs for facilities build-out, 

General Services Administration rent, and field office costs for part-time examiners. 

54 The FBI’s Personnel Security Adjudication Section Chief said that the Security 

Division does not have the ability to estimate the costs of the hours that examiners devote 

to activities other than polygraph examinations. 
U.S. Department of Justice 57

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Quality Control and Oversight 

The quality control and oversight mechanisms for the FBI’s polygraph 

program include quality control provided by the FBI’s Polygraph Unit, 

internal oversight by the FBI’s Inspection Division, and external quality 

assurance provided by the DoDPI Quality Assurance Program. Each of 

these efforts is described below. 

Quality Control 

The FBI’s Polygraph Unit implements the FBI’s internal quality control 

review process. According to the Federal Examiner Handbook, each agency 

within the federal government with a polygraph examination capability must 

maintain a program and procedures for conducting independent and 

objective quality control reviews of all polygraph reports, technical 

documents, and polygraph charts. The reviews are intended to ensure 

satisfactory quality and the correctness of examiner opinions on the results 

of polygraphs. Under the FBI’s procedures, all polygraph examination 

records undergo a supervisory review before final opinions on the results are 

rendered. For each specific-issue polygraph examination, the field examiner 

forwards the original and one copy of the polygraph report, test data, and all 

other related documents to the Regional Polygraph Program Manager for a 

quality control review. All other polygraph examinations are forwarded to 

the FBI Polygraph Unit for a quality control review. 

Following a quality control review, the polygraph materials for a 

criminal or foreign counterintelligence or counterterrorism polygraph 

examination are returned to the examiner. Polygraph materials for other 

matters are forwarded to the proper unit or outside agency for review and 

storage. 

 The Polygraph Unit’s quality control process consists of a supervisory 

review of the test data from each examination. The supervisory review must 

be completed before the examination result is considered final. If the 

reviewing supervisor disagrees with the examiner’s conclusion, the 

supervisor may request a second review by another supervisor. In some 

cases, the Unit Chief may be asked to review the data and provide the final 

decision. If the reviewing supervisor agrees with the examiner’s initial 

conclusion, the examination record is returned to the examiner. The DoDPI 

inspection reports on the FBI’s Polygraph Unit that we reviewed consistently 

stated that the FBI’s internal quality control process resulted in a 

thoroughly independent and objective review of all polygraph examinations 

conducted by FBI examiners.
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

Internal Oversight 

The FBI Inspection Division provides internal oversight of all FBI 

divisions through triennial reviews. The Polygraph Unit was last inspected 

in August 2004 as part of a review of the productivity of each unit in the 

Security Division. The inspection examined the unit’s administrative 

management, operations management, and performance. The inspection 

did not report any management deficiencies and concluded that the 

Polygraph Unit was effectively and efficiently managed. The inspection did 

not include any specific assessment of polygraph examiner performance or 

compliance with federal polygraph standards. 

External Quality Assurance 

In January 2006, the FBI polygraph program was certified by DoDPI 

for the first time since the FBI agreed, in 2002, to allow a limited quality 

assurance review by the DoDPI Quality Assurance Program. DoDPI 

conducted four inspections during FY 2002 through 2006. During each of 

the inspections, DoDPI reviewed 118 criteria in 9 primary areas specified in 

the Quality Assurance Program, Inspection Manual Standards and Criteria

(1999). In the 3 inspections conducted in FY 2002 through 2005, DoDPI 

inspectors reviewed a total of 318 criminal, specific-issue, and preemployment polygraph examination records, or approximately 100 records 

during each inspection. During those years, the FBI allowed DoDPI 

inspectors to review only records of examinations conducted for criminal 

investigations and pre-employment screenings. DoDPI was not allowed to 

review the records of examinations conducted for the WITSEC Program, 

Personnel Security, Office of Professional Responsibility, or Foreign 

Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism programs.55 Although limited in 

scope, the DoDPI inspections resulted in a number of findings and 

recommendations that, had they been implemented, would have brought the 

FBI into full compliance with federal standards found in the Federal 

Examiner Handbook and resulted in DoDPI’s certification of FBI compliance. 

However, some of the issues DoDPI raised involved repeat findings that were 

not resolved until January 2006. In DoDPI’s FY 2006 inspection report, the 

results of a review of 100 polygraph examination records resulted in four 

 55 According to DoDPI inspection reports, the FBI requested that polygraph records 

from these programs not be reviewed because of the sensitive nature of the programs. In 

FY 2006, the FBI allowed DoDPI inspectors to review the results of personnel security 

polygraph examinations but, as it had previously, requested that polygraphs conducted for 

the Witness Security, Office of Professional Responsibility, and Foreign Counterintelligence 

and Counterterrorism programs not be included as part of the inspection. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

recommendations that were resolved within the resolution period. DoDPI 

then certified the FBI polygraph program for the first time. 

 

DoDPI inspection reports for FY 2002 through 2004 noted repeated 

instances of noncompliance with the federal polygraph standards. For 

example, DoDPI found that the FBI was using nonstandard techniques and 

practices during polygraph examinations, and noted that FBI examiners: 

• Used improperly constructed polygraph test questions. DoDPI 

criticized the FBI for using “sensitive norm” comparison questions, 

which are a type of irrelevant question that mentions the relevant 

issue.56 The FBI was also using probable-lie comparison questions 

that were not clearly separated from the relevant issue.57 Federal 

standards do not allow for the use of sensitive norm questions, and 

probable-lie questions are allowed under federal standards only if 

they are constructed so that they are clearly separated from the 

relevant issue by time, place, or category. The FBI’s Polygraph 

Unit Chief told us that in May 2005 he instructed FBI examiners to 

stop using sensitive norm questions. In response to DoDPI’s 

concerns over improperly constructed probable-lie questions, the 

FBI agreed to issue instructions to the field examiners to create a 

clear dichotomy between relevant and comparison questions. 

• Rarely conducted known-solution acquaintance tests. The Federal 

Examiner Handbook recommends as a best practice that subjects 

receive a known-solution acquaintance test before they are given a 

polygraph examination to familiarize the examinee with the basic 

concepts of the examination and to demonstrate the reliability of 

 56 According to the FBI Polygraph Unit Chief, although sensitive norm questions 

address the relevant issue, they do not encompass the relevant area for which the 

examination is being conducted. For example, an FBI examiner inquiring about the use of 

illegal drugs may ask, “Have you ever been around friends or relatives who have used illegal 

drugs?” to overcome examinee concerns about their response to a relevant question (i.e., if 

the examinee used drugs themselves). The examinee may not use drugs, but a member of 

his or her family may and the fact of the family member’s drug use may cause a “false” 

reaction to a relevant question about the examinee’s own drug use. The Chief of the DoDPI 

Quality Assurance Program said that there has been no research to support the use of 

sensitive norm questions or to determine what effect(s), if any, their use might have on the 

outcome of the polygraph examination. 

57 Probable-lie comparison questions are constructed so that most people who 

answer “no” will be lying. An example of a probable-lie question would be, “Have you ever 

stolen anything?” 
U.S. Department of Justice 60

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

the polygraph. However, DoDPI reported that few subjects were 

given this type of acquaintance test (2 of 55 in 2002; and 3 of 48 

applicant examinations and 24 of 57 specific-issue examinations in 

2004). After the 2004 inspection, the FBI agreed to revise its policy 

to require examiners to conduct appropriate acquaintance tests for 

subjects that had not previously undergone a polygraph 

examination. In all other cases, FBI field examiners’ use of the 

acquaintance test would be discretionary. Nevertheless, FBI 

polygraph policies still allowed examiners to conduct unknown 

solution acquaintance tests – a test for which there is no empirical 

research and that all other federal agencies have discontinued 

using. 

• Rendered opinions not supported by standard test data analysis 

techniques. In 2004, DoDPI reported three issues related to the 

opinions rendered by FBI examiners. DoDPI reported that in 9 of 

48 pre-employment polygraph records it reviewed, the FBI field 

examiners had rendered conclusive opinions that were not in 

accordance with standard numerical evaluation procedures and 

cutoff scores. In these cases, the FBI examiners rendered an 

opinion of No Deception Indicated or Deception Indicated when 

standard scoring techniques would have resulted in an opinion of 

Inconclusive. DoDPI also reported that FBI examiners did not 

always follow federal standards that require them to evaluate all 

the test results (such as respiration, heart rate, and skin reactions) 

before rendering an opinion. In six of the nine cases that DoDPI 

questioned, the FBI examiners had rendered their opinions based 

on only two components of the test. Finally, DoDPI found that FBI 

examiners used a “global evaluation technique” in which a 

subjective conclusion is rendered on the overall polygraph test, 

rather than by a systematic numerical comparison among 

questions.58 

• Destroyed score sheets. In the inspections conducted in FY 2002 

through 2004, DoDPI reported that the FBI routinely destroyed the 

 58 In October 2005, the Chief of the FBI Polygraph Unit told us that the FBI used 

global scoring in these instances because he believed the use of standard cutoff scores 

would have resulted in too many Inconclusive results and subsequent retests. He said that 

global scoring allows the examiner to use his experience and judgment in assessing the test 

subject’s responses when the scoring is close. He also said that polygraph schools other 

than DoDPI use different scoring formats and different numerical scales and that examiner 

experience is important in evaluating physiological indicators of deception. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

score sheets that examiners and supervisors prepared when 

examining polygraph test results. Under federal standards, the 

score sheets are part of the permanent examination record. 

However, according to the FBI’s polygraph procedures, quality 

control personnel in the FBI’s Polygraph Unit destroy the score 

sheets after rendering a final opinion on the test results.59 After 

DoDPI raised this issue for the third time in 2004, the FBI’s 

Polygraph Unit responded that the score sheets are meaningless 

because only the determination of the quality control supervisor at 

Headquarters is final. The Chief of the FBI Polygraph Unit also 

asserted that the score sheets could be used to raise questions in 

court concerning the credibility of the FBI’s polygraph results, 

especially when there are differences between the field examiner’s 

scoring and that of the quality control supervisor. 

According to DoDPI, using nonstandard questions and evaluation 

techniques may reduce the reliability of polygraph examination results, 

which has both security and personnel implications. For example, making a 

determination of No Deception Indicated when standard test scoring 

techniques should have resulted in an Inconclusive result and a retest has 

the potential to allow a security risk to pass undetected. Also, law 

enforcement agencies often ask applicants whether they have previously 

taken a polygraph and whether they passed or failed. Therefore, making a 

determination of Deception Indicated when standard test scoring techniques 

should have resulted in an Inconclusive result could have a significant 

impact on a subject, particularly if the subject is seeking employment in law 

enforcement. Although the results of FBI polygraphs are now readily 

accepted by other federal agencies, DoDPI officials warned that continued 

failure to adhere to standardized numerical scoring techniques could impact 

the FBI’s future reciprocity agreements. 

Because of the continuing unresolved issues, in 2004 DoDPI 

concluded that the FBI’s internal quality control process did not ensure that 

its examiners followed federal technical standards in conducting polygraph 

examinations. According to the DoDPI Quality Assurance Program Chief, 

subsequent to the March 2003 DoDPI inspection, the FBI Polygraph Unit 

Chief developed policies for the FBI that almost fully complied with federal 

 59 After the FBI is notified that a DoDPI inspection is planned, the FBI retains score 

sheets for 90 days to enable DoDPI to evaluate examiner and supervisor performance. FBI 

examiners can keep personal copies of their score sheets, at their discretion. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

standards.60 However, after the January 2004 inspection, FBI polygraph 

officials advised the DoDPI Quality Assurance Program Chief that they were 

unable to implement these policies because they lacked adequate quality 

control staff. In August 2005, DoDPI officials told the OIG team that, even 

where the FBI had revised its policy to conform to federal standards, the FBI 

supervisory staff had not implemented the policy. Because the FBI did not 

revise its operations to address the outstanding issues, DoDPI would not 

certify that the FBI polygraph program was operating in compliance with 

federal standards. 

In FY 2006, DoDPI inspectors reviewed 100 examination records, 

which for the first time included records of personnel security polygraphs as 

well as those conducted for criminal, specific-issue investigations, and preemployment screening. The scope of the FY 2006 DoDPI inspection, 

completed in December 2005, was still limited because it did not include 

records of examinations conducted for the WITSEC Program, Office of 

Professional Responsibility, and Foreign Counterintelligence and 

Counterterrorism programs.61 DoDPI inspectors told us that the FBI is one 

of only two federal agencies that exclude any examination records from 

review.62 FBI officials stated that they did not allow DoDPI to review those 

records because of the sensitive nature of those elements of the polygraph 

program. 

The results of the FY 2006 DoDPI inspection indicated that the FBI 

was more responsive to DoDPI’s inspection findings than in previous years. 

The DoDPI report contained a total of four recommendations that the: 

1. FBI policy changed to discontinue the use of the unknownsolution acquaintance test. 

2. Enforce existing policy and discontinue use of the sensitive 

norm question in all FBI testing formats. 

60 The revised policies would not have resolved the issues involving the removal of 

score sheets and the use of the known-solution acquaintance test. 

61 We also found that DoDPI has never reviewed the records of polygraph 

examinations the FBI conducted for other components. We were told by FBI and DoDPI 

officials that logistical problems prevented the FBI from gathering some of those records 

from the requesting components for inspection. 

62 The CIA is the only other agency that restricts DoDPI review of polygraph 

examination records. The CIA does not allow DoDPI to review its foreign intelligence 

operations examination records. 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

3. Maintain the original test data analysis score sheets of field 

examiners and quality control personnel. 

4. FBI use movement sensor devices during the conduct of all 

(polygraph) examinations. 

According to the DoDPI Quality Assurance Program Chief and the FBI 

Polygraph Unit Chief, only two recurring issues from previous inspections 

were still at issue: (1) the continued destruction of score sheets and (2) the 

continued use of the unknown-solution acquaintance test. 

In response to DoDPI recommendations to address these issues, the 

FBI Polygraph Unit Chief reported that the FBI will continue to destroy score 

sheets and that the FBI’s Polygraph Examiner Manual was revised to 

partially implement DoDPI’s recommendation to discontinue the use of the 

unknown-solution acquaintance test.63 In response to DoDPI’s two other 

recommendations for the FBI polygraph program, the FBI Polygraph Unit 

Chief reported that all examiners were reminded to stop using “sensitive 

norm” questions and that the FBI planned to ensure that all examiners use 

movement sensor devices when conducting polygraph examinations.64 On 

January 31, 2006, DoDPI certified the FBI’s polygraph for the first time 

since the FBI agreed to allow DoDPI inspectors to review its polygraph 

results in 2002. 

63 On January 18, 2006, the Polygraph Unit Chief responded to DoDPI’s 

recommendations contained in the FBI’s December 2005 quality assurance report that the 

FBI would not comply with DoDPI’s recommendation to retain the original data analysis 

score sheets because “we [the FBI] continue to believe that it is not the agency’s best 

interest to maintain original score sheets.” Regarding the continued use of the unknownsolution acquaintance test, the Polygraph Unit Chief reported to DoDPI that, “In May 2005, 

the FBI’s Polygraph Examiner Manual was revised to reflect that the examiner should utilize 

either the known-solution acquaintance test or a blind-stimulation test for those 

examinations wherein the examinee has not previously taken a polygraph examination. Its 

use in examinations wherein the examinee has previously undergone an FBI or other 

agency examination is at the discretion of the examiner.” The FBI did not give a specific 

reason as to why it would continue to use the unknown solution acquaintance test in some 

cases. 

64 The Chief reported that approximately 70 percent of all FBI examiners were in 

compliance with DoDPI’s recommendation that movement sensors – which detect physical 

countermeasures – be used in all polygraph examinations and stated that he anticipated 

procuring all of the necessary equipment by December 2006. 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

OPM Oversight 

As noted in the Background section of this report, OPM does not 

require that organizations whose employees are in the excepted service 

receive OPM certification of their polygraph programs in order to conduct 

pre-employment and personnel security polygraphs. Consequently, the 

FBI’s polygraph program has never been reviewed or certified by OPM. 

However, we noted that, although FBI employees are in the excepted service, 

the FBI is polygraphing employees of other agencies who are not in the 

excepted service. These examinations may be conducted at the request of 

the employee’s parent agency or because the employee has been assigned to 

work with the FBI. In some cases, the parent agency also conducts 

polygraphs and has a polygraph program that is certified by OPM (for 

example, the DEA). 

 

As detailed in the Workload and Program Costs section above, the FBI 

conducted 1,661 examinations for other agencies from FY 2002 through 

2005. In a few cases involving requests by Department components, such 

as those requested by the Justice Command Center, the examinations were 

of competitive service employees and required OPM oversight of the FBI’s 

polygraph program to ensure it was managed in compliance with federal 

standards. Early in the review, we discussed this issue with the OPM 

Program Manager, Center for Federal Investigative Services, who said that 

OPM was unaware that competitive service employees were being examined 

by the FBI. 

In 2006, for the first time, OPM required that the FBI provide OPM 

with copies of its DoDPI quality assurance report and subsequent DoDPI 

certification letter stating that the FBI polygraph program was compliant 

with federal polygraph standards. OPM’s requirement occurred after a 

request by the Justice Command Center for reauthorization to continuing 

using the results of polygraph examinations for its competitive service 

employees. The FBI complied with OPM’s requests in May 2006 (see full 

discussion in Section II, under JCC), and OPM reauthorized JCC to 

continue using polygraph examinations for FY 2006. 

Program Performance and Results 

In accordance with federal polygraph standards, the FBI collects 

statistical data on its polygraph program operations. The FBI’s Polygraph 

Unit collects the data using a dedicated database that can extract a wide 

range of statistical analyses related to the polygraph program. It uses 

information on the type, purpose, and results of examinations to identify 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

trends, manage its examination workload, monitor the work of individual 

examiners, develop budget estimates, characterize its productivity, and 

measure its performance. 

According to the Deputy Director, DoDPI, the interrogation skills of 

examiners can be gauged by the confession rate they achieve, but their skill 

in using the polygraph technique for assessing truthfulness is better judged 

by how well they follow professional standards of conduct. He also said that 

the performance of federal polygraph programs is now being assessed to 

some degree by their achieved rate of conclusive opinions (the percentage of 

Deception Indicated or No Deception Indicated opinions). As shown in 

Table 5, the FBI compiles data on the results of all polygraph examinations. 

We examined the FBI’s data on the outcomes of polygraph 

examinations from FY 2002 through 2005 and found that FBI examiners 

issued conclusive opinions (No Deception Indicated or Deception Indicated) 

in 92.2 percent (34,468) of all examinations (37,336), which is well above 

the industry standard of 80 percent. For that same time period, the results 

of 7.8 percent (2,898) of all completed examinations were inconclusive. 

The FBI also uses the “confession rate” as a measure of its polygraph 

performance. The confession rate is calculated by dividing the number of 

times examinees with a final opinion of Deception Indicated ended up 

making an admission or confession that confirmed the polygraph result. In 

2006, the FBI’s Polygraph Unit reported to DoDPI that 61 percent of 

individuals with final opinions of Deception Indicated made an admission or 

confession, a rate that is considered high within the polygraph community. 
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Table 5: FBI Polygraph Examination Results 

FY 2002 through 2005

Examinations Examination Result 

Use Number 

No 

Deception 

Indicated 

Deception 

Indicated Inconclusive 

No 

Opinion Total 

Non Specific-Issue (Screening) Polygraph Examinations 

Pre-Employment 23,310 67% 24% 8% 1% 100%

Personnel Security 4,721 95% 2% 3% 0% 100%

Specific-Issue Polygraph Examinations 

Criminal 6,203 37% 47% 11% 5% 100%

CI/CT 1,994 50% 35% 13% 3% 100%

Misconduct 128 48% 41% 5% 6% 100%

FBI requests 36,356 N/A N/A N/A N/A 

Outside agency 

requests 1,661 78% 18% 3% 2% 100%

Total 38,017 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Source: FBI Polygraph Unit 

 
U.S. Department of Justice 67

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Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

THE DEA POLYGRAPH PROGRAM 

Background 

The DEA uses polygraph examinations in criminal and misconduct 

investigations, pre-employment and personnel security screenings, and 

screening foreign personnel assigned to investigative units overseas. The 

DEA began administering specific-issue polygraph examinations in drug 

and internal integrity (misconduct) investigations in the early 1970s. In 

1995, the DEA began requiring applicants for Special Agent positions to 

pass a polygraph examination as a condition for employment. Also in 1995, 

the DEA began requiring foreign nationals seeking assignment to Sensitive 

Investigative Units overseas to pass a polygraph examination as a condition 

of membership in the unit. In 1996, the DEA extended the polygraph 

requirement to applicants for DEA intelligence research specialist positions. 

Mission and Purpose 

The mission of the DEA Polygraph Support Unit is to provide 

polygraph support for DEA investigations on a worldwide basis. The unit 

also provides polygraph assistance to federal, state, foreign, and local law 

enforcement agencies in anti-drug operations.65 In addition, it provides 

applicant screening for designated DEA employees and supports the 

polygraph requirements of the DEA’s Office of Professional Responsibility. 

Policies and Regulations 

The DEA’s polygraph program policy is contained in its Office of 

Investigative Technology’s Technical Operations Manual, Chapter 6, Section 

6.5, “Polygraph Program.” Specific DEA policy, for the use of polygraph 

examinations as a tool for corroborating or disproving allegations of 

misconduct, is found in the DEA’s Planning and Inspections Manual, Section 

8313.5, “Use of the Polygraph Examination.” The DEA’s policy regarding 

polygraph requirements for members of Sensitive Investigative Units is 

contained in the Sensitive Investigative Unit Program’s Standard Operating 

Policies and Procedures.66 

65 The unit provides polygraph support to the counter-narcotics enforcement 

agencies of various allied governments. 

66 All of these documents are marked “DEA Sensitive.” 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

The DEA’s Technical Operations Manual provides general information 

concerning the use of polygraph examinations and requires the 

administration of all polygraph examinations in a manner consistent with 

policies and procedures taught at DoDPI and all applicable DEA rules and 

regulations. Among other things, the Technical Operations Manual describes 

why the polygraph program was established, its mission, and the purposes 

for which the polygraph may be used. According to the manual, the DEA 

must notify the appropriate U.S. Attorney’s Office when a polygraph 

examination is conducted as part of a DEA investigation. All requests for 

polygraph examinations are to be made through either the DEA division 

examiner in one of the field division offices or directly to the Chief of the 

Polygraph Support Unit. If the Chief approves a request for polygraph 

examinations, he arranges for an examiner, in coordination with the 

examiner’s divisional office, to conduct the examination. The Technical 

Operations Manual also provides policy for examiner selection, training, 

continuing education, certification, supervision, and performance 

monitoring. It establishes quality control and assurance policy, and details 

procedures for reviewing all polygraph examinations and for resolving 

differences of opinion regarding the results of an examination. 

The DEA previously maintained a polygraph procedures handbook. 

However, as of March 2006, the Chief of the Polygraph Unit said that the 

DEA handbook was no longer in force. Instead, DEA examiners have been 

instructed to use the Federal Examiner Handbook for procedural and 

technical guidance. 

As discussed in the following sections, DEA polygraph policies 

describe when an individual may refuse to take a polygraph examination 

and the potential consequences. The DEA policies and procedures also 

establish the consequences for an individual whose polygraph results 

indicate deception. The DEA does not retest individuals whose test results 

indicate deception, but the results of a polygraph examination are just one 

factor in the overall hiring decision. If the test result is inconclusive, no 

determination can be made as to the person’s truthfulness. The DEA does 

not require employees to take a polygraph examination to receive access to 

sensitive or national security information and does not conduct random or 

periodic personnel security polygraph examinations of its employees or 

other personnel working for the DEA.67

(Continued) 

67 Although not a primary program purpose, the DEA has conducted 14 personnel 

security screening polygraphs of examiner trainees before they entered DoDPI because 

DoDPI requires that trainees pass a screening polygraph as a condition for admission to its 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

Organization and Staffing 

The DEA’s polygraph program is administered by the DEA’s 

Operational Support Division. The Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office 

of Investigative Technology, has overall responsibility for the polygraph 

program and certifies DEA examiners to conduct polygraph examinations. 

The Chief of the Communications and Polygraph Support Section is 

responsible for establishing and implementing the policies and procedures 

that govern the DEA polygraph program. The Chief of the Polygraph 

Support Unit reports to the Chief of the Communications and Polygraph 

Support Section. Polygraph program operations are coordinated by the 

Polygraph Support Unit. 

The Polygraph Support Unit is staffed with a Unit Chief and three 

polygraph coordinators. Polygraph coordinators are senior polygraph 

examiners (GS-1811-14) who have at least 2 years of experience as a DEAcertified polygraph examiner. The Chief of the Polygraph Support Unit and 

the polygraph coordinators have authority over all technical issues involving 

the administration of polygraph examinations. The three polygraph 

coordinators conduct quality control reviews of all polygraph examination 

records. 

Most polygraph examinations are conducted at field offices by 24 

GS-1811-13 Special Agents who are certified polygraph examiners. The 

DEA field office polygraph examiners work for the SAC of the office, but 

function under the technical supervision of the Chief of the Polygraph 

Support Unit. Special Agents in Charge of the field offices are responsible 

for logistics and supervision of the Special Agent examiners assigned to 

their offices (see Chart 3). 

basic examiner training program. These are personnel security polygraphs that include 

counterintelligence-scope questioning. 
Chart 3: DEA Polygraph Program 

Operational

Support Division

(SC)

Office of

Investigative

Technology

(ST)

Communications &

Polygraph Support

Section (STC)

Polygraph Support

Unit Chief (STCP)

Polygraph

Coordinator

Polygraph

Coordinator

(Vacant)

Polygraph

Coordinator

24 Polygraph Officers (with 4 Vacancies)

in 21 Field Division Offices and 2 Foreign Offices

Source: DEA Operational Support Division 

Polygraph Examination Uses and Procedures 

The DEA uses polygraph examinations primarily for pre-employment 

suitability screening of Special Agent and intelligence research specialist job 

applicants; investigating misconduct and criminal allegations; and vetting 

foreign nationals seeking assignment to Sensitive Investigative Units 

overseas. The policies and processes for conducting polygraph 

examinations vary with each use. The DEA does not routinely require its 

employees to take periodic or random personnel security polygraph 

examinations. 

U.S. Department of Justice 70

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division
Pre-Employment Screening

DEA Test Result Designations 

The DEA differs slightly from the other 

components in how it labels pre-employment 

polygraph test results. Like other components, 

DEA examiners render conclusions of No 

Deception Indicated (NDI), Deception Indicated 

(DI), Inconclusive (INC), and No Opinion (NO). 

However, for pre-employment polygraph 

screening only, the DEA uses the terms “No 

Significant Response” (NSR) and “Significant 

Response” (SR) instead of NDI and DI. 

According to DoDPI officials, the alternative 

terms are synonymous with DI and NDI, but 

carry a less negative connotation in the law 

enforcement community. For consistency, in 

this report we use the decision terms DI and 

NDI instead of SR and NSR. In addition, DEA 

examiners use the term “No Test” to indicate 

that a full test cycle was not completed. This 

can occur for a number of reasons such as 

that the examiner determined the examinee 

was unfit for an examination or the examinee 

made a pretest admission or confession. 

All applicants for Special Agent and Intelligence Research Specialist 

positions in the DEA must take pre-employment polygraph examinations to 

be hired.68 Because the DEA hiring process is lengthy, the background 

investigation may begin prior to the polygraph. The applicants are given 

non-specific, full-scope 

examinations that include 

questions related to national 

security issues, past drug 

use, serious criminal activity, 

and truthfulness on the 

application form. All test 

results are reviewed by 

Polygraph Support Unit 

personnel who make the final 

determination on test results. 

According to the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, 

Office of Investigative 

Technology, the results of a 

polygraph are never the sole 

factor in determining an 

applicant’s suitability for 

employment. 

When the results of a 

DEA polygraph examination 

show no indication of 

deceptiveness, the DEA 

proceeds with the background investigation and the hiring process. If a 

DEA examiner finds indications of deceptiveness and the applicant 

subsequently makes a disqualifying admission, the DEA stops both the 

background investigation and the hiring process. The DEA does not retest 

individuals whose polygraph results indicate deception; however, 

 68 Because each DEA field division office handles its own recruiting of Special 

Agents, the pre-employment polygraph process for these applicants is initiated by a request 

from the DEA recruiter in a division office to the division polygraph examiner. The division 

polygraph examiner then requests authorization from the Polygraph Support Unit staff at 

DEA Headquarters to conduct the examination. Examination requests for Intelligence 

Research Specialist candidates are submitted directly to the DEA Polygraph Support Unit 

by the Intelligence Division at DEA Headquarters. 

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individuals whose results are inconclusive are retested. The hiring 

recommendation is based on all factors, including the polygraph results. 

DEA does not disqualify an applicant solely on the basis of an inconclusive 

polygraph examination result.69 

Criminal Investigations

The DEA’s polygraph program was initially established as an 

investigative tool in criminal cases. Criminal defendants, suspects, or 

witnesses in an investigation may voluntarily undergo a polygraph 

examination. According to DEA policy and the Deputy Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Investigative Technology, a subject or witness in a 

criminal investigation can refuse to take a polygraph examination, with one 

exception. The exception is when a defendant consents to undergo a 

polygraph examination as part of a plea agreement and subsequently 

reneges. In that case, the refusal may violate the terms of the plea 

agreement. 

DEA officials evaluate each case to determine whether it involves an 

investigative issue that could be aided by a polygraph examination. When a 

DEA field agent or an Assistant U.S. Attorney identifies a need to polygraph 

an individual associated with a criminal investigation, the DEA field agent 

submits a request for an examination to the polygraph examiner assigned to 

the agent’s field office. The field agent and examiner review the case file for 

an investigative issue that lends itself to the use of a polygraph examination 

and, if so, discuss and formulate the questions to be asked during the 

examination. The examiner reviews the questions with the examiner’s 

supervisor at the Polygraph Support Unit and obtains authorization from 

the Polygraph Support Unit before conducting the examination. 

Once the examination is conducted, a quality control review is 

completed (described in the Quality Assurance section below), and a final 

opinion is issued, the examiner forwards a copy of the polygraph report to 

the requesting DEA agent, who then notifies the Assistant U.S. Attorney 

assigned to the case. The agent maintains a copy of the polygraph report in 

 69 Derogatory information obtained from a pre-employment polygraph examination 

of a current Department employee (including a DEA employee seeking to move from a 

position that does not require a polygraph to one that does) is referred to the DEA’s Office 

of Professional Responsibility (OPR), which determines if the information warrants further 

action and how it should be disseminated. OPR officials said that they were not aware of 

any such information ever being referred back to an employing Department agency or to 

SEPS. 
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the criminal case file. The polygraph subject is then notified of the final 

results of the examination. If the subject or subject’s attorney requests a 

copy of the polygraph report, the Assistant U.S. Attorney may provide one. 

Misconduct Investigations

The DEA’s OPR receives allegations of misconduct from DEA 

employees and from external sources such as law enforcement officials, 

confidential informants, cooperating witnesses, other governmental 

agencies, and the public. According to the DEA’s Planning and Inspection 

Manual, OPR is responsible for deciding whether a polygraph examination 

will be used as an investigative tool in a misconduct investigation. 

Specifically, the OPR Assistant Administrator for Planning and Inspection 

and the OPR Deputy Assistant Administrator may authorize a polygraph 

examination in an integrity, misconduct, or internal security matter. The 

DEA policy also states that a polygraph examination should be offered and 

used as a matter of course for an individual who makes an allegation 

against a DEA employee. 

When a DEA OPR investigation is initiated, an OPR Associate Deputy 

Chief Inspector determines whether the investigation will be conducted by 

an OPR investigator or delegated to a SAC of a division field office or other 

office head at DEA Headquarters. Less serious administrative cases, such 

as those that do not appear to involve a criminal or integrity issue, generally 

are delegated for investigation. An OPR investigator monitors delegated 

cases for quality and timeliness. 

The OPR investigator typically interviews the subject, complainant, 

witnesses, and other pertinent individuals, and gathers relevant documents 

and other evidence. The investigator may ask the subject or witnesses in a 

misconduct investigation to voluntarily consent to undergo a polygraph 

examination. A request for an employee to take a polygraph examination is 

made off the record and, if refused, nothing is reflected in the investigative 

file unless the employee at first agreed, but later reneged. Employees or 

individuals must voluntarily consent to undergo a polygraph examination. 

The DEA does not compel its employees to undergo polygraph examinations 

in misconduct investigations. 

When an individual agrees to take a polygraph examination, the OPR 

inspector or case agent submits a request for a polygraph examination to 

the DEA’s Polygraph Support Unit, and Unit officials assign an examiner to 

conduct the examination. The examiner reviews the examination questions 

with Unit officials and the inspector before the examination and obtains 
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Office of the Inspector General 

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authorization from Unit officials to proceed with the examination. Once the 

polygraph examination is completed, the examiner analyzes the test data 

and renders a preliminary opinion on the results. A Polygraph Coordinator 

at the Polygraph Support Unit conducts a quality control review of the 

examination record, renders a final opinion on the results of the 

examination, and notifies the examiner of the results via electronic mail. 

The Polygraph Coordinator or the examiner gives OPR the results of the 

examinations. OPR forwards the final investigation record, including the 

results of a polygraph examination, to the DEA’s Board of Professional 

Conduct. 

The Board of Professional Conduct reviews investigative and 

polygraph evidence in reaching a decision on disciplinary or adverse action. 

The Board weighs all of the evidence gathered during the misconduct 

investigation (a polygraph examination is only one piece of evidence) and 

cannot base recommendations solely on polygraph results. The Chairman 

of the Board of Professional Conduct said that polygraph examination 

results have not figured prominently in any decision that he has made for 

proposed action as the result of an integrity investigation. Once all of the 

evidence has been evaluated, the Board recommends clearing, disciplining, 

or removing the employee, and a final decision is made by the Deciding 

Official. 

Foreign Agent Vetting

In the Department’s FY 1997 Appropriations Act, Congress authorized 

and approved funding for the DEA to create, train, and support Sensitive 

Investigative Units (SIU), or foreign vetted units, to work in sensitive 

bilateral investigations in key countries critical to the counter-narcotics 

objectives of the United States. The personnel selected by their respective 

countries to participate in the SIU program undergo a strict security 

screening. The vetting process includes drug testing, medical and 

psychological screening, and a background investigation. All foreign 

nationals who volunteer to become members of an SIU do so with the 

knowledge that the vetting process includes a polygraph examination. The 

polygraph examination is the final step in the vetting process, and 

acceptance into an SIU is contingent on the results. 

A DEA Country Office sends a request for a foreign vetting polygraph 

examination to the DEA’s Office of Investigative Technology. The request is 

forwarded to the DEA’s Polygraph Support Unit. The Polygraph Unit sends 

a team of polygraph examiners to the requesting country to conduct the 

examination. A Polygraph Coordinator from the Polygraph Support Unit 
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frequently accompanies the examiners to manage the assignment, conduct 

a quality control review of the examination record, and make a final decision 

as to the results of the examination. The DEA sends a notification of the 

official results to the Country Attaché in the DEA Country Office. Foreign 

candidates for SIU membership whose polygraph examination results 

indicate deception are not accepted into the unit. 

Foreign law enforcement officers who pass the vetting process attend 

a 5-week SIU special training program at the DEA Training Academy in 

Virginia and, later, in-service training. SIU support personnel, such as 

accountants, maintenance personnel, and translators, undergo the required 

background, drug test, and polygraph portion of the vetting process, but do 

not attend the training. 

After 24 months in an SIU, members are subject to random polygraph 

examinations. In general, 25 percent of the SIU members are subjected to 

random polygraphs each year. To accomplish this, DEA polygraph 

examiner teams travel to SIU locations and conduct these examinations at 

the same time. A finding of Deception Indicated results in the expulsion of 

the SIU member. In cases where mitigating or extenuating circumstances 

exist, the Country Attaché may request a retest of the SIU member. 

Along with initial and random polygraphs, members of an SIU are 

subject to polygraph examinations at any time questions arise concerning 

the member’s integrity. If a Special Agent Advisor believes that there may 

be an integrity issue, the Advisor can send a request for a polygraph 

examination to the Office of Investigative Technology. 

Examiner Qualifications and Training 

Candidates for DEA polygraph examiner positions are selected from 

among the DEA’s career Special Agent workforce. When there is a vacancy 

for a polygraph examiner, any career Special Agent who meets the DEA’s 

requirements for the position may be considered. To qualify, an agent must 

meet minimum federal standards that include being: (1) a U.S. citizen, 

(2) at least 25 years old, (3) a graduate of an accredited 4-year college (or 

equivalent), (4) an experienced investigator with a recognized federal 

government or other law enforcement agency, (5) of high moral character 

and sound emotional temperament based on a background investigation, 

and (6) judged suitable for the position after taking a polygraph 

examination. 
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Each field division handles its own recruiting, and candidates apply 

through their division chain of command to Headquarters. The selection is 

coordinated between the SAC and the Deputy Assistant Administrator, 

Office of Investigative Technology. 

The DEA’s examiner candidates must complete basic training and an 

internship to be certified to conduct polygraph examinations. For training, 

the DEA requires examiners to complete a basic examiner’s course at 

DoDPI. After successfully completing their basic training at DoDPI, DEA 

examiners also must complete an internship under the supervision of a 

certified senior examiner who is assigned by the Chief of the Polygraph 

Support Unit. During the internship, the examiner must conduct at least 

25 examinations that have been monitored, reviewed, and approved by a 

certified examiner. Interns must demonstrate to the senior examiner that 

they have the ability to conduct examinations independently and in 

accordance with federal standards and DEA policy. On the successful 

completion of the internship, an examiner receives a written certification of 

proficiency. Certified examiners are required to conduct at least 25 

polygraph examinations per fiscal year to demonstrate continued proficiency 

in the use of the polygraph technique. They must also complete 80 hours of 

continuing education every 2 years. 

As of January 2005, the DEA reported that its Chief of the Polygraph 

Support Unit had over 16 years of investigative experience including 4 years 

of polygraph experience. The Unit’s 3 Polygraph Coordinators had an 

average of 13.5 years of investigative experience and 8 years of polygraph 

experience.70 The field examiners had an average of 13.5 years of 

investigative experience and 5 years of polygraph experience. Field 

examiners conducted an average of 79 examinations each in FY 2004. 

Workload and Program Costs

From FY 2002 through 2005, DEA Office of Investigative Technology 

records show that DEA examiners conducted a total of 8,307 polygraph 

examinations. Of the 8,307 polygraph examinations, 52 percent were used 

for vetting foreign agents, 38.7 percent were used for pre-employment 

screening, and 8.8 percent were used in criminal investigations (Table 6). 

Less than one-half of 1 percent of the examinations was used for personnel 

security screening and misconduct investigations. 

70 DEA policy requires GS-14 Special Agents with 3 years in a polygraph 

management position to rotate out of the DEA polygraph program. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

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Table 6: DEA Polygraph Support Unit’s Workload by Use 

FY 2002 through 2005

Fiscal 

Year 

Foreign 

Vetting 

PreEmploymentCriminal 

Investigation

Misconduct 

Investigation

Personnel 

Security Total 

2002 995 552 248 5 4 1,804 

2003 1,112 947 205 4 2 2,270 

2004 987 889 159 8 5 2,048 

2005 1,227 830 121 4 3 2,185 

Total 4,321 3,218 733 21 14 8,307 

Source: DEA Polygraph Support Unit 

 

Polygraph Program Costs

The DEA does not track or request specific funding through the 

budget process for the polygraph program. In response to our request for 

information on the costs of the DEA polygraph program, the DEA provided 

estimates of polygraph-related expenditures for FY 2002 through 2004 for 

its Headquarters component only. The figures in Table 7 include only the 

direct costs (personnel, travel, training and equipment, and polygraph 

services) for the polygraph program at Headquarters. It does not include the 

costs of obligated expenditures and overhead costs such as rent and 

utilities. The DEA could not provide cost estimates for polygraph work done 

at field offices.71 

 71 The DEA manages its polygraph program centrally for matters such as training, 

policy, and quality control. However, most DEA polygraph examiners are assigned to DEA 

field offices. The majority of polygraph work involves cases and applicants under the field 

offices’ areas of responsibilities, and DEA officials said they do not capture or centrally 

track those expenditures under the polygraph program initiative code. Consequently, the 

costs shown in Table 8 do not reflect field costs such as travel-related expenses or salaries 

and benefits for field examiners, which are funded and recorded at the field level. 
Table 7: DEA Polygraph Program Headquarters Cost Estimates 

FY 2000 through 2004 

Fiscal 

Year Personnel Travel Training Equipment

Polygraph 

Services Total 

2002 $3,792,752 $120,053 $98,965 $69,540 $24,502 $4,105,812

2003 $3,959,264 $95,107 $97,227 $98,872 $11,262 $4,261,732

2004 $4,132,855 $99,420 $94,336 $74,102 $10,726 $4,411,439

Total $11,884,871 $314,580 $290,528 $242,514 $46,490 $12,778,984

Source: DEA Polygraph Unit

Quality Control and Oversight 

The DEA’s quality control and oversight mechanisms to ensure the 

integrity of its polygraph program include quality control provided by the 

DEA’s Polygraph Support Unit and external quality assurance provided by 

the DoDPI Quality Assurance Program. In addition, the DEA’s polygraph 

program is also subject to the oversight of OPM. Each of these mechanisms 

is described below.

Quality Control

Internal quality control for the DEA polygraph program is provided 

primarily through technical reviews conducted by the DEA’s Polygraph 

Support Unit. At the conclusion of each polygraph examination, the DEA 

field examiner conducts a numerical test data analysis of the polygraph 

charts and forwards the examination record, including all charts, forms, 

worksheets, and electronic media to a Polygraph Coordinator in the 

Polygraph Support Unit. The Polygraph Coordinator reviews the field 

examiner’s notes and then conducts an independent test data analysis. The 

Polygraph Coordinator compares his or her analysis of test results with the 

analysis of the field examiner. If the Polygraph Coordinator disagrees with 

the field examiner’s original conclusion, another Polygraph Coordinator 

conducts a second review. If both coordinators disagree with the field 

examiner’s conclusion, the examination record is returned to the field 

examiner for correction or retest. If all aspects of the examination are 

approved, the Polygraph Coordinator sends a confirmation of the results to 

the field examiner. The final results of all examinations conducted by field 

examiners are filed at the Polygraph Support Unit, which is located in 

Lorton, Virginia, and are accessible only to the unit’s personnel. 

U.S. Department of Justice 78

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External Quality Assurance

The DEA agreed to participate in the DoDPI Quality Assurance 

Program in 1997. Since then, DoDPI has conducted reviews of the DEA’s 

polygraph program in FY 2001, 2003, and 2005. DoDPI reviewed a total of 

189 polygraph examination files during the 3 inspections. Each DoDPI 

review encompassed a sample of all DEA pre-employment and specific-issue 

polygraph examination records and resulted in the following 

recommendations: 

• The DEA’s first DoDPI inspection in January 2001 resulted in 

recommendations that the DEA: (1) reconsider its policy of limiting 

the tenure of polygraph examiners in management positions to 

3 years because the policy resulted in a loss of experienced 

examiners, and (2) stop its examiners from using comparison 

questions that encompassed relevant issues because the questions 

did not comply with federal standards. 

• A January 2003 DoDPI review resulted in only one finding, which was 

that the DEA follow its own policy of requiring that the Chief of the 

Polygraph Support Unit provide input into the examiner selection 

process. The inspection revealed that the DEA policy was not being 

followed in many cases. DoDPI inspectors believed that, by including 

input from its polygraph experts in the selection process, the DEA 

could reduce the number of DEA students failing to complete DoDPI 

basic examiner training (22 percent in FY 1991 through 2002). In 

comparison, DoDPI had found that federal law enforcement agencies 

that included expert input in the selection process only had a 

1-percent dropout rate during the same period. 

• In January 2005, DoDPI inspectors found that two DEA examiners 

had not completed their continuing education requirement of 80 

hours every 2 years. Therefore, the DEA was out of compliance with 

the requirements of the Federal Polygraph Continuing Education 

Certification Program. DoDPI recommended that the DEA comply 

with the requirements in all cases. 

Each of the three DoDPI inspection reports on the DEA polygraph 

program concluded that the DEA’s internal quality control program met or 

exceeded federal quality control standards for federal polygraph programs, 

that the program included an independent and objective review of all 

examinations, and that the process was free of undue influence. After each 
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inspection, DoDPI certified the DEA program as compliant with DEA policies 

and procedures as well as with federal standards for polygraph programs. 

After receiving the DoDPI reports, the DEA implemented corrective 

action for all but one of DoDPI’s recommendations. The DEA did not change 

its procedures concerning the tenure of polygraph managers, which was not 

a compliance issue.72 

OPM Oversight

Because the DEA uses polygraph examinations for pre-employment 

screening and personnel security screening for competitive service 

employees, the DEA polygraph program falls within the purview of OPM’s 

oversight responsibilities. OPM requires the DEA to apply to OPM each year 

for re-authorization to continue using polygraph examinations in its preemployment screening program for Special Agent and Intelligence Research 

Specialist positions. For the DEA to receive OPM authorization, OPM must 

first have certified the DEA’s national security mission and approved the 

DEA’s policy and regulations for conducting pre-employment screening and 

personnel investigations. In addition, the DEA must meet three 

requirements stipulated by OPM as follows: 

• The DEA must demonstrate full compliance with polygraph 

community standards for the use of polygraph examinations, 

including those contained in the Federal Examiner Handbook. The 

DEA meets this requirement by citing its most recent DoDPI 

inspection report and letter of compliance certification. 

• The DEA’s Chief of the Security Office must review proposed denials of 

employment or security clearances when results of polygraph 

examinations are inconclusive, and he must review and approve any 

denials that involve uncorroborated information gleaned from 

polygraph examinations. The DEA meets this requirement by 

agreeing to continue its policy of not denying a clearance or 

employment based on an inconclusive polygraph result. 

 72 In its report, DoDPI noted that DEA policy requires GS-14 Special Agents with 

3 years in a management position to leave the DEA polygraph program. DoDPI noted that 

other federal polygraph programs maintain experienced personnel in order to retain their 

technical expertise and recommended that the DEA review its policy regarding polygraph 

program managers. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

 

• The DEA must schedule and submit to a quality assurance review of 

the DEA’s polygraph program by DoDPI at least every 2 years and ask 

DoDPI to forward a copy of the results of these reviews to OPM’s 

Federal Investigative Services and to the Department’s Security and 

Emergency Planning Staff. To satisfy this requirement, the DEA 

informs OPM of the date of its next DoDPI review and agrees to 

provide the results of the review as required. 

The DEA has routinely received OPM authorization to continue its use of 

polygraph examinations for screening DEA employees.73

Program Performance and Results 

The DEA collects and maintains statistical data on its polygraph 

program in its Polygraph Information Tracking System. The DEA uses the 

data to analyze its polygraph program, characterize polygraph productivity, 

and measure program performance. DoDPI, in February 2005, certified that 

the DEA’s polygraph program met federal standards for maintaining 

statistical reports regarding polygraph examination activity. The results of 

the DEA’s polygraph examinations are shown in Table 8. 

We examined the data on the outcomes of polygraph examinations 

from FY 2002 through 2005 and found that DEA examiners reached 

conclusive opinions (No Deception Indicated/No Significant Response and 

Deception Indicated/Significant Response) in 91.2 percent (7,154) of all 

examinations that were completed (7,843), which is well above the standard 

of 80 percent. For that same period, 8.8 percent (689) resulted in 

Inconclusive or No Opinion. The remaining 464 polygraph tests were not 

completed and are not included in the calculation of the DEA’s Conclusive 

Opinion rate. The DEA does not routinely track its polygraph examiners’ 

confession and admission rate. 

73 On May 12, 2006, OPM officials granted the DEA authorization to use polygraph 

examinations for pre-employment and personnel security screening in FY 2006. 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

Table 8: DEA Polygraph Examination Results, 

FY 2002 through 2005

Examinations Examination Result (Percentage) 

Use Number NDI (NSR) DI (SR) INC NO Total 

Non-Specific Issue (Screening) Polygraph Examinations 

Pre-Employment 3,218 67.2% 16.6% 12.1% 4.2% 100%

Personnel Security 14 85.7% 7.1% 0.0% 7.1% 100%

Foreign Vetting 4,321 78.8% 13.9% 4.7% 2.5% 100%

Specific-Issue Polygraph Examinations 

Criminal 733 26.6% 31.2% 12.8% 29.3% 100%

Misconduct 21 42.9% 23.8% 9.5% 23.8% 100%

DEA total 8,307 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Source: DEA Polygraph Support Unit 
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THE ATF POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

Background 

ATF’s mission is to conduct criminal investigations, regulate the 

firearms and explosives industries, and assist other law enforcement 

agencies as part of the federal government’s effort to counter terrorism, 

reduce violent crime, and protect the public. ATF, which was part of the 

Department of the Treasury until January 24, 2003, began using polygraph 

examinations as an investigative aid in the resolution of criminal 

investigations under its jurisdiction in 1978. In September 1998, OPM 

allowed Treasury to expand its polygraph program to include preemployment polygraph examinations for applicants for ATF GS-1811 Special 

Agent positions. On October 27, 2003, OPM granted approval for the 

transfer of Treasury’s authority for the ATF polygraph program to the 

Department of Justice. 

Mission and Purpose 

ATF’s Polygraph Branch provides technical support for ATF’s law 

enforcement mission and the applicant screening process. The Polygraph 

Branch also develops and presents training at the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center; coordinates with other federal, state, and local agencies; 

and provides intelligence support to Special Agents related to the specific 

use of the polygraph technique.

Policies and Regulations

ATF’s policies and regulations regarding the use of polygraph 

examinations are contained in several ATF orders and an examiners’ 

handbook.74 ATF’s draft handbook for examiners, Standard Operating 

Procedures: Polygraph, provides guidelines for the use of polygraph testing. 

The draft handbook is designed to serve as an examiners’ field reference on 

74 As of March 2006, ATF’s policies and regulations were under revision. The 

revisions were required because the documents were written while the agency was still part 

of Treasury and included some references and office names that were outdated as the 

result of reorganization in 2005. A proposed substantive change in the ATF polygraph 

policy, according to ATF officials, involves ATF’s hiring decisions related to “significant 

responses.” Currently, applicants for ATF positions are told that they will not be hired if 

there is an unresolved “significant response” during their pre-employment polygraph 

examination. The draft handbook proposes that applicants be told that they may not be 

hired if there is an unresolved response. 
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recommended procedures and to supplement examiners’ DoDPI training. 

According to the draft handbook, all polygraph examinees are to be tested 

with the presumption that they are being truthful. ATF examiners are 

charged with ensuring that the ATF polygraph program is conducted within 

the guidelines of the American Polygraph Association’s Code of Ethics and 

the technical parameters established by DoDPI. Examiners are instructed 

to use polygraph testing only as an investigative tool and not as a 

replacement for a proper and thorough investigative effort. 

The draft handbook provides guidance for scheduling polygraph 

examinations and establishes a scheduling priority based on the nature and 

immediacy of the investigation. It also encourages examiners to conduct no 

more than two examinations in a single day and to provide for the presence 

of a second examiner in complex cases. 

Along with the draft handbook, ATF has policy and guidance dealing 

with specific uses of polygraph examinations in criminal investigations and 

pre-employment screening. A 1999 order is currently being rewritten, but, 

according to the SAC of the Polygraph Branch, it still provides applicable 

ATF policy for the use of polygraph examinations in criminal 

investigations.75 

An August 2005 ATF policy document updated ATF’s policies and 

procedures for the pre-employment screening and reflects several ATF office 

name changes that resulted from ATF’s reorganization as a bureau within 

the Department of Justice.76 As previously discussed, OPM has authorized 

ATF to administer polygraph examinations only to Special Agent applicants. 

ATF does not compel its employees to take polygraph examinations or to 

undergo personnel security polygraph examinations on a routine or random 

basis. 

Organization and Staffing 

ATF’s polygraph program is carried out by the Polygraph Branch, 

located in the Office of Field Operations, Special Operations Division. The 

Chief of the Special Operations Division has overall responsibility for ATF’s 

75 The order being rewritten is ATF Order 3210.7C, Investigative Priorities, 

Procedures and Techniques, Chapter J, Investigative Resources, Section 122, Polygraph; 

February 25, 1999. 

76 ATF Brief 2123.4, Pre-employment Polygraph Screening Program, August 25, 

2005 (expires August 25, 2007). 
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polygraph program. The SAC of the Polygraph Branch reports to the Chief 

of the Special Operations Division and is responsible for establishing and 

implementing policies and procedures for the Polygraph Branch. 

The ATF Polygraph Branch comprises 16 certified polygraph 

examiners, including the SAC of the branch, 3 regional team leaders 

(currently 1 vacancy), and 12 field examiners (currently 1 vacancy). All 

polygraph examiners are Special Agents. 

The SAC of the Polygraph Branch coordinates polygraph services at 

both the ATF Headquarters and Field Division levels. The SAC is 

responsible for training new examiners, ensuring the proper use of 

polygraph examinations, serving as technical advisor for field examiners, 

and monitoring the overall activities of the polygraph program. 

Three regional team leaders report to the SAC of the Polygraph 

Branch but are physically located in field offices. Currently, the three team 

leader positions are located in division field offices in Massachusetts, North 

Carolina, and Illinois. Each of the team leaders is a lead criminal 

investigator. The team leaders, while having the same responsibility for 

conducting polygraph examinations as field examiners, also have additional 

duties. When requested, they conduct polygraph examinations for ATF’s 

Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations on issues of 

employee integrity or conduct. They also conduct quality control reviews for 

and provide technical supervision over field examiners who carry out 

polygraph examinations in a designated geographical area. 

The 12 field examiners serve as Special Agent criminal investigators. 

They are assigned to the Special Operations Division organizationally, but 

are physically located in 12 of ATF’s 23 division field offices. While most of 

the field examiners’ time is spent conducting GS-13 level investigations, a 

portion of their time is spent conducting polygraph examinations as a 

collateral duty. The SAC of the Polygraph Branch and the team leaders may 

assign any field examiner to conduct any polygraph examination that falls 

within ATF’s purview regardless of the issue or the geographical location of 

the examination. The examiners’ respective Field Division SAC and the SAC 

of the Polygraph Branch can approve requests for polygraph examinations, 

but the final decision on whether to conduct a polygraph examination rests 

with the polygraph examiner. (See Chart 4.) 
Chart 4: ATF Polygraph Program 

Office of Field

Operations

Special

Operation

Division

Polygraph

Branch

Team Leader

MA

Team Leader

NC

Team Leader

IL

Field Examiners

Assigned to Field

Division Offices*

Field Examiners

Assigned to Field

Division Offices*

Field Examiners

Assigned to Field

Division Offices*

* Twelve Special Agent Polygraph Examiners in

AZ, CA, FL, GA, IL, MI, PA, TN, TX, VA, WA

 Source: ATF Polygraph Unit 

Polygraph Examination Uses and Procedures 

ATF uses polygraph examinations for two primary reasons: specificissue examinations as a tool in criminal investigations and pre-employment 

screening to verify the truthfulness of Special Agent applicants. Before 

transferring to the Department, ATF’s Polygraph Branch also supported the 

DEA, USMS, and the U.S. Secret Service by conducting polygraph 

examinations to vet foreign candidates seeking membership in sensitive 

investigative units in other countries. ATF has not conducted foreign 

vetting polygraphs since transferring to the Department in 2003. 

The SAC of the Polygraph Branch told us that she must approve the 

use of polygraph examinations in an administrative misconduct 

investigation, but that the Polygraph Branch had not conducted any 

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examinations for that purpose in the past 3 years. She said that some 

employees were asked during that time to volunteer for polygraph 

examinations for administrative investigations, but they had declined 

without consequences to the employees for their declinations. 

ATF’s processes for conducting polygraph examinations vary with 

each distinct use in terms of who requests, authorizes, conducts, analyzes, 

reviews, and issues the final opinion on examination results. Different 

results or outcomes of polygraph examinations also trigger specific actions. 

In the following sections, we discuss each use. 

Criminal Investigations

ATF uses polygraph examinations during criminal investigations to 

achieve its law enforcement objectives, including: 

• detecting and identifying criminals; 

• verifying information from informants or witnesses to establish 

or corroborate credibility; and 

• obtaining additional information leading to new evidence or 

identification of additional suspects, witnesses, or locations. 

According to ATF Order 3210.7C, ATF Special Agents or an attorney 

with a U.S. Attorney’s Office can request a polygraph examination in 

support of a criminal investigation. Such requests must first be reviewed 

and approved by the local SAC and then authorized by the ATF Division 

Director. Authorized agents can request polygraph services from the 

examiner who serves the agent’s geographic area, the SAC of the Polygraph 

Branch, or the Chief of the Special Operations Division. All such polygraph 

examinations in criminal investigations are taken voluntarily without 

repercussions from declining to undergo one, unless the polygraph 

examination is required as a part of a plea agreement. In that case, refusing 

to take the examination may invalidate the agreement. 

Prior to beginning the examination, the examiner must determine 

whether the proposed test subject is mentally and physically fit to undergo 

the examination. If the test subject is deemed fit, a Special Agent (usually 

the examiner) advises the subject of his or her rights and asks the subject to 

consent, in writing, to take the examination. If the subject does not formally 

consent, the examination process stops. 
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If the examination goes forward, a Special Agent familiar with the case 

assists the examiner during the pretest interview, the actual examination, 

and the post-test interview. All polygraph examinations used in criminal 

investigations are specific-issue examinations. 

After the examination, the field examiner sends the examination 

records to a regional team leader or to the Polygraph Branch at ATF 

Headquarters for a quality review. The reviewer issues the final opinion on 

the results of the examination, and the results are then transmitted back to 

the field examiner. The examiner verbally informs the test subject and the 

subject’s attorney of the results. 

Pre-Employment Screening

ATF uses pre-employment screening polygraph examinations as a tool 

to assist in verifying information provided by job candidates and to evaluate 

applicants’ eligibility for employment. ATF Brief 2123.4 provides guidance 

on the role of polygraph testing in pre-employment screening, examiner 

responsibilities, and the consequences of either an admission made during 

the examination or the discovery of a discrepancy in information previously 

provided by the examinee. 

When an applicant receives a tentative job offer and submits an 

application for a security clearance, ATF’s Human Resources Division or the 

Chief of the Recruitment and Hiring Center forwards a formal request for a 

security investigation and a copy of the application materials to the 

Personnel Security Branch, Security and Emergency Programs Division, 

Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations. The Personnel 

Security Branch forwards the application materials, background 

information, and a written polygraph authorization to the SAC of the 

Polygraph Branch. The applicant’s name is entered into a control log and a 

polygraph examiner is assigned. The assigned examiner is responsible for 

scheduling and conducting the examination, obtaining the applicant’s 

consent to be polygraphed, and advising the applicant of the applicant’s 

constitutional rights concerning self-incrimination and seeking the advice of 

counsel. 

The polygraph examination begins with the pretest interview and 

documentation of any significant pretest admissions or discrepancies in 

information previously provided by the applicant that could affect the 

results of the polygraph examination and prevent the completion of the 

examination. If significant admissions occur or discrepancies in 

information previously provided by the applicant are found during the 
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pretest, in-test, or post-test phases, the examiner forwards that information 

through the SAC of the Polygraph Branch to the Chief of the Special 

Operations Division. The Chief of the Special Operations Division reviews 

the results and forwards them through the Office of Professional 

Responsibility and Security Operations, which sends them on to the Chief of 

the Recruitment and Hiring Center for disposition. 

An exception to this process occurs when an applicant’s admission 

concerns ongoing criminal behavior. If an applicant who is not an ATF 

employee makes an admission concerning ongoing criminal behavior that 

warrants prompt attention, the information is forwarded to the local SAC for 

referral to the appropriate authorities. The polygraph consent form signed 

by an applicant makes clear that any derogatory information that is 

developed as a result of the polygraph examination could be disqualifying 

and lead to disciplinary action, including dismissal from the applicant’s 

current job. 

If a Department employee applies for an ATF position and fails the 

polygraph examination, ATF officials in the Security and Emergency 

Programs Division reported that, to their knowledge, there is no ATF or 

Department policy requiring or ensuring that such information is provided 

to the employing agency in the Department. However, they told us that, if a 

Department employee failed the national security portion of the polygraph 

examination, they would probably seek approval to provide the information 

to the employing agency or office. They could not recall a case in which that 

happened. 

If an applicant is an ATF employee who takes a pre-employment 

polygraph examination in order to change positions within ATF, the 

information is forwarded to the Office of Professional Responsibility and 

Security Operations. Admissions of past criminal behavior by an ATF 

employee are included in the polygraph report and forwarded through the 

Chief of the Special Operations Division to the Personnel Security Branch in 

the Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations, where the 

information is evaluated and, if necessary, referred to the appropriate 

authorities. 

If an applicant’s pre-employment polygraph examination results in 

unresolved, significant responses indicative of deception, the applicant may 

be ineligible for hire. The applicant may also be ineligible if the examiner 

detects any attempt by the applicant to manipulate the results of the 

examination. If the examination results in a No Opinion determination 

because the examiner cannot render a conclusive opinion based on the test 
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charts, the Polygraph Branch will, when appropriate, retest the applicant in 

an attempt to obtain a conclusive determination. If a conclusive 

determination cannot be made, the results are documented and sent 

through the SAC of the Polygraph Branch to the Chief of the Special 

Operations Division who sends the results on to Office of Professional 

Responsibility and Security Operations. In accordance with OPM 

requirements, ATF does not deny employment on the basis of an 

Inconclusive polygraph examination without a review of the decision by 

ATF’s Office of Chief Counsel. 

Foreign Vetting

Although ATF has not conducted a polygraph examination for foreign 

vetting since 2002, when ATF conducted those examinations, they were 

governed by an agreement with the host country and the requesting agency 

(the DEA, USMS, or U.S. Secret Service). All the examinations were 

conducted in the host country, and the requesting agency made 

arrangements with the host country for authorization to conduct the tests. 

ATF conducted the polygraph examinations, performed quality control on 

site, and reported the results to the requesting agency. The examinations 

were all personnel security screening polygraph examinations. They were 

used to detect security risks and to assess the suitability of candidates for 

membership in Sensitive Investigative Units overseas. The requesting 

agency and the host country decided how the results of those examinations 

were used. ATF was not involved in deciding how to use the results and 

tracked only the number of examinations conducted for reporting purposes. 

Examiner Qualifications and Training 

The ATF draft examiners’ handbook establishes that a candidate for 

the position of polygraph examiner must meet the following minimum 

standards: 

• U.S. citizenship, 

• at least 25 years old, 

• graduate of an accredited 4-year college, 

• at least 2 years of experience as an investigator with a recognized 

federal or other law enforcement agency, 

• job qualifications at the GS-12 journeyman level, 

• successful background investigation and polygraph examination, 

• make a 5-year commitment to serve as a polygraph examiner, 

• be interviewed by the SAC of the Polygraph Branch, 
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•

cial Operations Division and the SAC of 

the Polygraph Branch. 

sed 

to 

mends them for full membership in the American 

Polygraph Association. 

tion, 

h 

uring 

 complete advanced polygraph training. 

, 

ve 

ears of investigative experience and 5 years of polygraph 

xperience. 

orkload and Program Costs 

r 

at the request of 

e DEA, USMS, and the U.S. Secret Service (Table 9). 

• willingness to travel during the required internship period, and 

willingness to respond to specific polygraph needs and requests 

from the Chief of the Spe

Special Agents selected for training must successfully complete 

DoDPI’s 14-week Polygraph Examiner Training Course and a supervi

6-month internship as an ATF examiner before they can be certified 

competent to conduct polygraph examinations. During the internship, 

trainees must conduct at least 25 polygraph examinations and reach an 

acceptable level of proficiency and competency in the polygraph technique 

be certified. The SAC of the Polygraph Branch certifies the competency of 

ATF examiners and recom

To remain certified, ATF examiners are required to meet the 

requirements of the Federal Polygraph Continuing Education Certifica

which is a minimum of 80 hours of creditable education during each 

consecutive 2-year period in which they are assigned duties as a polygrap

examiner. With the exception of the SAC of the Polygraph Branch, each 

examiner should conduct a minimum of 18 polygraph examinations d

each 6 month period. When possible, ATF examiners attend annual 

conferences sponsored by the American Association of Police Polygraphists 

or the American Polygraph Association. ATF also encourages its examiners 

to

In DoDPI’s June 2004 biennial report on ATF’s polygraph program

DoDPI reported that the SAC of the Polygraph Branch had 20 years of 

investigative experience and 5 years of polygraph experience. Overall, ATF’s 

polygraph program team leaders had an average of 25 years of investigati

experience and 12 years of polygraph experience. ATF’s field examiners

averaged 15 y

e

W

From FY 2002 through 2005, ATF reported conducting 2,700 

polygraph examinations. Of those, about 50 percent were conducted fo

pre-employment screening, 47 percent for criminal investigations, and 

3 percent for vetting foreign agent candidates. The 82 foreign screening 

examinations that ATF conducted in FY 2002 were done 

th
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Table 9: ATF Polygraph Unit Workload by Use 

FY 2002 through 2005

Fiscal 

Year 

PreEmployment* Criminal Foreign 

Vetting* 

Total 

2002 266 306 82 654

2003 384 328 0 712

2004 372 338 0 710

2005 316 308 0 624

Total 1,338 1,280 82 2,700

* The number of pre-employment screening and foreign vetting examinations includes the 

total number of tests and retests. 

Source: ATF Polygraph Unit 

From FY 2002 through 2004, ATF spent an average of approximately 

$2.5 million per year for its polygraph program (Table 10). ATF’s Special 

Operations Division tracks all polygraph program costs – both Headquarters 

and field costs. 

 

Table 10: ATF Polygraph Program Costs 

FY 2002 through 2004

Fiscal 

Year Personnel Travel Training 

Other 

Expenses* Total 

2002 $2,096,401 $130,026 $102,671 $43,846 $2,372,944

2003 $2,153,296 $170,710 $81,599 $39,929 $2,445,534

2004 $2,272,372 $161,287 $59,309 $56,108 $2,549,076

Total $6,522,069 $462,023 $243,579 $139,883 $7,367,554

* Other Expenses include the costs of shipping, rentals, services, supplies, and equipment. 

Source: ATF Polygraph Branch

Quality Control and Oversight 

Quality control and oversight mechanisms to ensure the integrity of 

ATF’s polygraph program include: (1) internal quality control checks of 

polygraph results by the ATF Polygraph Branch, (2) internal oversight 

provided by ATF’s Inspections Division, (3) external quality assurance 

provided by the DoDPI Quality Assurance Program, and (4) external 

oversight by OPM. Each of these mechanisms is described below. 
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Quality Control

The ATF Polygraph Branch conducts a quality control review of each 

polygraph examination to ensure that ATF examiners conform to accepted 

polygraph practices prescribed in ATF’s draft examiner’s handbook and as 

set forth by DoDPI. ATF defines its quality control review as a systematic 

evaluation, review, and critique of each polygraph examination conducted 

by ATF examiners. Examination results are not final until the polygraph 

examination records undergo a quality review and the reviewing official or 

officials agree with the results of the examination and issue a final opinion 

on the results. 

All quality control reviews are conducted by the SAC of the Polygraph 

Branch, a team leader, or other designated senior examiner. The quality 

control process for polygraph examinations conducted by one of ATF’s 12 

field examiners is slightly different from the quality control process for 

polygraph examinations conducted by one of the three team leaders. 

When a field examiner completes a polygraph examination, the test 

data, including the test charts and all related paperwork, is forwarded to 

one of the three team leaders for a quality control review. The team leader 

reviews the entire examination, analyzes test question construction, 

evaluates the polygraph charts independently, and reviews the overall 

technical aspects of the examination. The quality review is intended to 

ensure that the field examiner followed required procedures and that the 

polygraph charts are compatible with the field examiner’s opinion on the 

results of the examination. The team leader reviews the polygraph charts 

first, rather than the report summary, so that his review is objective and 

unbiased by the information in the summary report. 

If the team leader agrees with the field examiner’s opinion, the 

examination package is forwarded to the SAC of the Polygraph Branch, who 

reviews the examination to determine whether the team leader and the field 

examiner agreed on the examination results. When there is agreement, the 

examination is considered complete. 

If the team leader disagrees with the field examiner’s opinion on the 

examination, the team leader contacts the examiner to discuss the review 

and to identify corrective action. If there is still disagreement, the team 

leader forwards the complete packet to a second team leader for review. If 

the second team leader agrees with the field examiner, the case is 

considered complete. If the second team leader agrees with the initial team 
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leader, additional testing is scheduled or the examination report is amended 

as appropriate. 

The difference in the quality control process for team leaders is that, 

when a team leader conducts an examination, the results are forwarded to 

another team leader for a quality control review. If there is disagreement 

between the two team leaders, the examination is sent to the SAC of the 

Polygraph Branch for additional evaluation and a final opinion on the 

results. The SAC of the Polygraph Branch also annually reviews at least one 

polygraph examination conducted by each ATF examiner to further ensure 

compliance with applicable policies and procedures. 

In DoDPI’s last three reports on the ATF polygraph program, DoDPI 

has reported that ATF’s quality control program includes an independent 

and objective review that is free of undue influence from the original 

examiner or other sources. 

Internal Oversight

ATF management is responsible for ensuring that its various divisions 

and offices comply with all applicable laws and regulations. To ensure 

compliance, ATF performs triennial reviews of all of its operations. During 

the week of December 12 through 15, 2005, ATF’s Office of Professional 

Responsibility and Security Operations, Inspection Division, conducted an 

inspection of the Polygraph Branch. The inspection covered the period of 

October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2005. The Polygraph Branch 

received an overall rating of “Green” for “Effective and Efficient,” which is 

the highest rating attainable.

External Quality Assurance

ATF has participated in the DoDPI Quality Assurance Program since 

1997 and underwent its first review on September 30, 1997. DoDPI 

conducted its last three reviews in September 2000, May 2002, and June 

2004. Each of the DoDPI reviews covered 118 criteria in 9 primary areas of 

ATF’s polygraph program. The next DoDPI review is expected to be 

conducted in 2006. 

We reviewed DoDPI’s last two reports on ATF’s polygraph program, 

and all subsequent findings and recommendations, and we found that ATF 

had responded to all issues in a timely manner. According to the 2002 

report, DoDPI reviewed 73 polygraph examinations (41 pre-employment 

screenings and 32 specific-issue examinations). DoDPI inspectors made 
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only one recommendation, which stemmed from a finding of improper 

question construction. DoDPI inspectors found that the probable lie 

comparison questions used in several applicant screening examinations did 

not meet federal standards for question construction because they were not 

clearly separated from the relevant issue. DoDPI recommended that all 

probable lie comparison questions conform to federal standards. According 

to the FY 2004 report, DoDPI officials reviewed 70 polygraph examinations 

(35 pre-employment screening and 35 specific-issue examinations). DoDPI 

officials made no recommendations regarding the 118 criteria that were 

reviewed. 

Subsequent to both reviews, DoDPI issued a letter to ATF stating, 

“The ATF Polygraph Branch was found to comply with ATF polygraph 

policies and procedures and its polygraph program and staff met the 

standards required of a Federal Government polygraph program.”77

OPM Oversight

ATF employees are part of the competitive civil service and fall under 

the purview of OPM. OPM annually reviews and approves ATF’s request to 

be allowed to continue using pre-employment polygraph examinations as a 

screening tool for determining the suitability of job applicants for ATF 

Special Agent positions. OPM has continued to grant ATF annual 

reauthorization to administer pre-employment screening polygraphs. To 

continue receiving OPM’s approval, ATF has to re-apply to OPM each year 

and attest to its continuing policies of: 

• Complying with polygraph standards that are at least as stringent as 

or more stringent than those found in the Federal Examiner 

Handbook,

• Not denying employment or a security clearance based on the results 

of an Inconclusive polygraph examination without the review and 

approval of ATF’s Chief Security Officer, 

• Participating in the federal quality assurance review program by 

undergoing biennial reviews by DoDPI and submitting the results of 

the reviews to OPM and ATF’s Office of Security. 

 77 The most recent letter from DoDPI attesting to ATF’s compliance with federal 

standards was dated June 24, 2004. 
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ATF’s last application for OPM approval was September 8, 2005. In 

its application, ATF asked OPM for a 1-year authorization for the expanded 

use of polygraph in the screening of competitive and excepted service 

GS-1811 criminal investigator, Special Agent applicants, as part of the preemployment background investigation process. The request was for 

authorization for the period of October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2006. On 

April 26, 2006, OPM officials granted ATF authorization to use polygraph 

examinations for pre-employment and personnel security screening for 

FY 2006 

From February to June 2004, OPM’s Center for Merit System 

Compliance conducted an appraisal of the ATF personnel security, 

suitability determination, and investigation programs for compliance with 

applicable requirements. As part of the appraisal, OPM asked whether ATF 

used polygraph examinations for security or suitability purposes and 

whether OPM had approved the agency’s use for competitive service 

appointment. ATF answered “Yes” to both questions. Further, OPM found 

that ATF had a strong program that met or exceeded federal requirements.78

Program Performance and Results 

The ATF Polygraph Branch maintains a database that is used to 

generate monthly and annual reports on the quantity and quality of 

polygraph examinations conducted by ATF’s polygraph examiners. ATF 

uses the data to analyze its polygraph program, characterize polygraph 

productivity, and measure program performance. In its June 2004 report 

on the ATF polygraph program, DoDPI found that ATF’s polygraph program 

database and the statistical reports generated from the database met federal 

requirements for program statistics. 

Table 11 shows that during FY 2002 through 2005, ATF’s conclusive 

rate for criminal, specific-issue polygraphs was 62.7 percent. Its conclusive 

rate was 81.2 percent for pre-employment screenings and 84.1 percent for 

foreign vetting polygraph examinations. ATF’s conclusive rate for pre78 Executive Order 10450, “Security Requirements for Government Employees,” 

April 27, 1953, grants OPM authority to make these appraisals to determine whether an 

agency has established and maintained an effective program to insure that employment 

and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee is clearly consistent with 

national security interests. The appraisals involve a review of an agency’s program 

operations and guidelines, personnel security records, suitability files, adjudication 

decisions, official personnel folders, and other related documents and records, and 

interviews with agency managers and employees. 
employment screening and foreign vetting exceeds an industry standard of 

80 percent.79 While ATF tracks the number of pre-employment 

examinations during which the examinee made an admission or confession 

in the pretest phase, ATF does not track the overall confession rate of its 

examiners. 

ATF uses categories for reporting polygraph results that are slightly 

different from those used by the FBI and DEA. For example, similar to the 

DEA, ATF uses the terms “No Significant Response” (NSR) and “Significant 

Response” (SR) when reporting the results of pre-employment screening and 

foreign vetting polygraph examinations. ATF also uses a “No Opinion” (NO) 

to mean that the examiner could not render an opinion based on the 

physiological data on the charts. ATF’s “NO” is similar in definition to the 

FBI’s and DEA’s “Inconclusive” result. ATF also uses the term 

“Administrative Opinion” (AO) to categorize tests that were scheduled but 

not conducted for a variety of reasons, such as when the test subject 

refused to go through with the examination or the examiner determined that 

the test subject was not medically, physically, or mentally fit to undergo the 

examination. 

Table 11: ATF Polygraph Examination Results 

FY 2002 through 2005

Examinations Examination Result (Percentage) 

Use Number NDI (NSR) DI (SR)* NO AO Total 

Non-Specific Issue (Screening) Polygraph Examinations 

Pre-Employment 1,338 72.3% 8.9% 16.0% 2.8% 100%

Foreign Vetting 82 76.8% 7.3% 14.6% 1.2% 100%

Specific-Issue Polygraph Examinations 

Criminal 1,280 29.3% 33.4% 15.1% 22.2% 100%

Total 2,700 N/A. N/A N/A N/A 100%

*Includes pre-test confessions/admissions. 

Source: ATF Polygraph Branch 

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 79 ATF reports the results of each series of questions that an examinee undergoes 

during a pre-employment or foreign vetting screening – not the results of the overall 

examination as do the FBI and DEA. When calculating ATF’s conclusive rate, we used the 

total number of series as the basis. 
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THE OIG POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

Background 

The OIG investigates alleged violations of criminal and civil laws, and 

regulations pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978 and Attorney 

General Order 1393-90, dated January 29, 1990. 

Mission and Purpose 

The OIG Polygraph Unit is staffed by Special Agents whose primary 

responsibility is to conduct investigations of suspected criminal and 

administrative violations affecting Department resources and programs. 

When requested, the OIG Polygraph Unit also sometimes conducts 

examinations in support of the BOP, USMS, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and 

other federal agencies. 

Policies and Regulations 

The OIG’s Assistant Inspector General (AIG) of Investigations has been 

delegated responsibility for the formulation and implementation of policy 

and procedures pertaining to the administration and conduct of polygraph 

examinations by OIG personnel. 

OIG polygraph policy is contained in the Inspector General Manual,

Volume III, Investigations, Chapter 265, Polygraph Examinations, 

January 16, 2001, and in the Inspector General Handbook, Investigations 

Division, Polygraph Examiner Handbook, January 2003. Chapter 265 of the 

OIG Investigations Manual establishes procedures and guidelines for the use 

of polygraph examinations as a tool in OIG investigations. The OIG 

Polygraph Examiner Handbook establishes procedures and guidelines for the 

conduct of polygraph examinations by polygraph examiners. Its provisions, 

along with those of Chapter 265 of the Investigations Manual, apply to all 

polygraph examinations conducted by examiners in the OIG’s Investigations 

Division. OIG policy states that polygraph examiners are to strictly adhere 

to all OIG rules, regulations, and established procedures so that they are 

prepared to defend their competence, procedures, opinions, and standards 

before all judicial bodies concerning any examination in which they are 

involved. 

Individuals polygraphed by the OIG normally are not compelled to 

take a polygraph examination, and they may refuse to do so without adverse 
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administrative action or a negative inference. An exception occurs when the 

OIG is conducting an administrative investigation involving FBI employees 

who, under FBI policy, can be compelled to take a polygraph examination if 

an administrative investigation concerns a serious violation of the law or 

FBI policy. The FBI can compel its employees to cooperate with OIG 

investigations and to take polygraph examinations in certain circumstances 

(described on pages 43 and 44) or face disciplinary action. 

Provisions of the OIG Investigations Manual require OIG examiners to 

use DoDPI question formulation procedures for all authorized polygraph 

examinations. The manual’s provisions also state that the examiner’s 

opinion should not be the sole factor in determining the guilt or innocence 

of the test subject. 

The OIG’s Polygraph Examiner Handbook addresses the more general 

aspects of conducting polygraph examinations and includes policy on 

initiating a polygraph examination, certifying OIG examiners, controlling 

examination quality, authorization and reporting procedures, and polygraph 

examination procedures. 

Organization and Staffing

As shown in Chart 5, the SAC of the Special Operations Branch has 

been designated by the AIG of the Investigations Division to serve as the 

OIG’s Polygraph Program Manager and Coordinator. The SAC, assigned to 

OIG Headquarters in Washington, D.C., is responsible for specific oversight 

of the polygraph program as well as management of its day-to-day 

operations. All requests, reports, and recommendations relating to 

polygraph activities are directed to the SAC for action. 

The SAC is assisted by three Special Agent/Polygraphers. The three 

Special Agent/Polygraphers, who are GS-1811 Special Agent criminal 

investigators, may be assigned to participate in criminal investigations as 

well as to conduct polygraph examinations. The Special Agents maintain an 

investigative caseload in their assigned field offices and also conduct 

polygraph examinations as assigned. 

 
Chart 5: OIG Polygraph Program 

 

Inspector General

Deputy Inspector General

Assistant Inspector General 

Investigations Division 

SAC Special Operations Branch 

Washington, D.C.

Special Agent/ 

Polygrapher 

Field Office 

Special Agent/ 

Polygrapher 

Field Office 

Special Agent/ 

Polygrapher 

Field Office 

Source: OIG Polygraph Unit 

Polygraph Examination Uses and Procedures 

The OIG uses specific-issue polygraph examinations in its 

investigations into allegations of criminal activity or other misconduct by 

Department employees. The OIG does not require its job applicants to 

undergo a pre-employment polygraph examination. Further, the OIG does 

not subject its employees to random or periodic personnel security 

screening polygraphs as a condition for access to sensitive information or to 

obtain a security clearance. 

In addition to its own polygraph activities, the OIG sometimes 

conducts polygraph examinations for Department components that do not 

have their own polygraph programs. These examinations are conducted at 

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the request of the other agencies with the approval of the SAC of the Special 

Operations Branch.80

The SAC of the Special Operations Branch must authorize all OIGadministered polygraph examinations, including those requested by other 

law enforcement and intelligence agencies. A polygraph examination may 

be authorized for any offense subject to investigation by the OIG. If there is 

a conflict between OIG polygraph procedures and those of a requesting 

agency, the OIG uses its own procedures. 

Polygraph examinations conducted by the OIG are normally requested 

by an investigating agent. Prior to making an official request for polygraph 

assistance, the case agent determines whether a polygraph examination 

would be useful and whether a proposed test subject would be willing to 

take a polygraph examination.81 If the case agent is unsure about the 

feasibility of using a polygraph examination in an investigation, the agent is 

encouraged to discuss the matter with the SAC of the Special Operations 

Branch. The case agent is also encouraged to use the polygraph as an 

investigative tool only when other investigative leads have been exhausted, 

but the primary issues have not been resolved.82 Requests can be made in 

writing or by telephone, but all requests must include specific information

concerning the proposed test subject (such as age, physical and mental 

condition, and special requirements) and the investigation (such as the 

name of the requestor, type of case, and issues needing resolution). 

The SAC of the Special Operations Branch must approve all polygraph 

examinations the OIG conducts. Once an examination is scheduled, the 

case agent is responsible for providing logistical support to the assigned 

examiner, being available to confer with the examiner concerning the 

specifics of the case, ensuring the examinee is present at the scheduled 

time, witnessing the advisement of the examinee’s rights and the signing of 

the consent form, monitoring the examination when possible, and obtaining 

a formal statement in the event that the examinee makes a confession or 

80 From FY 2002 through 2005, the OIG conducted 33 polygraph examinations for 

other Department components. These polygraphs were conducted for Federal Bureau of 

Prisons internal affairs investigations and Criminal Division criminal investigations. 

81 For cases involving FBI employees, OIG investigators do not take into account 

whether the subject of the investigation would be willing to take a polygraph examination. 

82 On occasion, the OIG will conduct polygraphs on complainants at the start of an 

investigation. 
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admission during the examination process. When practical, the OIG honors 

requests made by an examinee’s legal counsel to observe the examination. 

The examiner is responsible for developing a written report on the 

results of the examination. The examiner can render one of three 

preliminary opinions regarding the results of a completed examination: 

• Deception Indicated, 

• No Deception Indicated, or 

• Inconclusive. 

Multiple series, or retests, may be conducted at the discretion of the 

examiner to clarify an initial inconclusive opinion.83 If the examiner finds 

indications of deception, the examiner conducts a post-test interview to 

attempt to resolve any relevant issues. 

The examiner develops an examination report for each test and 

submits it to the SAC of the Special Operations Branch within 5 days of the 

examination. Each polygraph report and preliminary opinion by the 

examiner is reviewed by the SAC for quality, and the SAC renders the final 

opinion on the results of the examination. Polygraph examinations are not 

complete until the SAC signs the polygraph report. 

The original polygraph report is sent to the requesting area or field 

office where the investigation originated for retention in the working and 

permanent case file. When the OIG conducts a polygraph examination at 

the request of another component, the original report is sent to the 

requesting component. A copy of all examination reports is retained in the 

OIG Investigations Division’s files. 

Examiner Qualifications and Training 

The AIG for Investigations is responsible for selecting and training 

OIG polygraph examiners. Only OIG-certified polygraph examiners conduct 

OIG-sponsored polygraphs, unless the AIG for Investigations authorizes the 

use of another federally certified examiner. 

OIG Special Agents selected to be trained as polygraph examiners are 

GS-1811 series criminal investigators who must have a minimum of 4 years 

83 An OIG examiner’s opinion can be rendered based on a minimum of two 

polygraph test charts – one less than most federal polygraph program standards require. 
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of criminal investigative experience and pass a mandatory integrity 

screening polygraph examination. OIG examiner trainees receive basic 

examiner training at DoDPI and must successfully complete a supervised 

internship. 

After examiners complete all required training, they receive a 

certificate of competence from the Inspector General through the AIG for 

Investigations. To maintain their certification, examiners must conduct, 

review for quality, or act as second examiner for a minimum of 12 polygraph 

examinations per year. Examiners also have to participate in the federal 

continuing education program by attending at least one polygraph-related 

training course or by accumulating at least 80 hours of advanced training 

courses biannually.84

The AIG for Investigations can decertify OIG examiners, which means 

they can no longer conduct polygraph examinations for the OIG. Examiners 

can be decertified for repeatedly failing to demonstrate the ability to conduct 

proper examinations, render accurate opinions, meet reporting 

requirements, or act in a professional manner consistent with the 

professional and ethical standards of the OIG. 

As of January 2006, the SAC of the Special Operations Branch had 

over 31 years of investigative experience and 22 years of polygraph 

experience. 

Workload and Program Costs 

In FY 2002 through 2005, the OIG Polygraph Unit conducted 173 

polygraph examinations. (See Table 12.) The OIG conducted 81 percent 

(140) of the examinations as part of OIG criminal and misconduct 

investigations.85 The OIG conducted the other 19 percent (33) in response 

to requests made by other agencies that included the BOP (17), Criminal 

Division (5), the WITSEC Program (3), U.S. Attorneys (2), and agencies 

outside of the Department (6). 

84 OIG examiners are also required to be members of the American Polygraph 

Association. Examiners are encouraged to belong to other law enforcement-related 

professional organizations as well. 

85 The OIG does not distinguish between examinations conducted for criminal 

investigations and those conducted for misconduct investigations. Both criminal and 

administrative investigations are handled in the same manner. A case may be initiated as 

a criminal investigation but change to an administrative investigation at some point. 
Table 12: OIG Polygraph Unit Workload 

FY 2002 through 2005

Fiscal Year Misconduct* 

2002 32 

2003 52 

2004 44 

2005 45 

Total 173 

* The OIG does not compile data for criminal and misconduct investigations 

separately. 

Source: OIG Polygraph Unit 

As shown in Table 13, the OIG spent approximately $559,000 in 

support of its polygraph program in fiscal years 2002 through 2004. 

Table 13: OIG Polygraph Unit Budget Costs 

FY 2002 through 2004

Fiscal 

Year Polygraphs 

DoDPI and 

Other 

Training Personnel Travel Equipment Total 

2002 32 $8,629 $121,162 $14,374 $11,709 $155,874 

2003 52 $9,234 $163,194 $23,946 $0 $196,374 

2004 44 $9,451 $174,325 $21,852 $1,515 $207,143 

Total 128 $27,314 $458,681 $60,172 $13,224 $559,391

Source: OIG Polygraph Unit 

Quality Control and Oversight

The OIG’s polygraph program has two oversight and quality control 

mechanisms – an internal quality control program conducted by the SAC of 

the Special Operations Branch and an external quality assurance review by 

DoDPI. 

Quality Control Review

The SAC of the Special Operations Branch, or a senior examiner who 

is designated by the SAC, conducts a quality control review of every 

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examination record to ensure that the examination was conducted 

according to the highest standards of professionalism, accuracy, and 

reliability. The SAC’s opinion is based on an independent and objective 

analysis of the test data followed by a review of all other documentation, 

including the examination report. The SAC can “concur” or “non-concur” 

with the examiner’s preliminary opinion on the results of the examination. 

The SAC’s chart analysis, opinion, and other commentary become a 

permanent part of the examination file. 

If the SAC concurs with the examiner’s opinion, the examination 

report is considered complete and the original polygraph report is sent to 

the controlling field office to be used in the investigation and to become a 

part of the case file. If the SAC does not agree with the examiner’s opinion, 

the file is forwarded to the U.S. Secret Service or the FBI for a third and 

final opinion that is binding. When the SAC conducts a polygraph 

examination, another senior OIG examiner is designated to conduct a 

quality control review of the examination record. No examination is 

considered valid and complete until the quality control review has been 

completed and the SAC has signed the polygraph report. 

In its three quality assurance reviews of the OIG Polygraph Unit, 

DoDPI has consistently found that the OIG’s quality control process is 

independent, objective, and free of undue influence. 

DoDPI Quality Assurance Reviews

DoDPI provides external oversight of the OIG Polygraph Unit through 

its biennial quality assurance reviews. In 2000, 2002, and 2004, DoDPI 

reviewed 112 examination records to determine whether the program was 

being managed and implemented in compliance with OIG polygraph policies 

and procedures and the standards established for federal polygraph 

programs. The examination records were reviewed for compliance with the 

118 criteria in 9 primary management and technical areas. 

A number of recommendations were made in DoDPI’s 2000 review, 

and all but one were implemented prior to the completion of the review. 

Consequently, DoDPI’s report on its 2000 review contained one 

recommendation, which addressed the OIG’s use of a fourth chart, or a 

fourth round of questioning. Although OIG policy limited the use of a fourth 

chart, records showed that examiners had used a fourth chart in 

circumstances that were not supported by OIG policy and federal standards. 

The DoDPI report recommended that the OIG ensure that a fourth chart was 

used only when appropriate. 
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In 2002, DoDPI recommended that OIG polygraph examiners adhere 

to OIG policies pertaining to question formulation and examination test 

formats. The recommendation stemmed from a DoDPI finding that, in 3 of 

the 32 examinations, examiners had not followed OIG policies and 

procedures for test question construction. 

In 2004, the DoDPI report contained no recommendations because 

DoDPI inspectors found that the OIG program met or exceeded all the 

requirements expected of a federal polygraph program. 

DoDPI reported that, after each of its three reviews of the OIG 

Polygraph Unit, the OIG responded in a timely and cooperative manner to 

all DoDPI recommendations and was subsequently certified compliant with 

federal standards. The most recent certification was on November 9, 2004. 

Program Performance and Results 

The OIG maintains a database concerning its use of polygraph 

examinations. The database includes information on who was polygraphed, 

whether they were a subject or witness in an investigation, the organization 

with jurisdiction in the case, and the results of the examination. The SAC of 

the Special Operations Branch uses the information to manage the OIG’s 

polygraph program, to characterize and report its workload and 

productivity, and to meet federal standards for maintaining program 

statistics. The results of the OIG’s polygraph examinations are shown in 

Table 14. 

We examined data on the outcomes of polygraph examinations from 

FY 2002 through 2005 and found that OIG examiners reached conclusive 

opinions (e.g., No Deception Indicated or Deception Indicated) in 94 percent 

(145) of all examinations that were completed (155). This means that OIG 

examiners had an inconclusive rate of 6 percent. The remaining 18 

examinations resulted in a “No Opinion” (NO) because the examiner stopped 

the examination before collecting enough data to render a conclusive 

decision or in a “No Examination” because the proposed examinee did not 

undergo an examination as scheduled. DoDPI reported that during FY 2004 

OIG examiners had a confession rate of over 84 percent. 
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Table 14: OIG Polygraph Examination Results 

FY 2002 through 2005

Examinations Examination Result (Percentage) 

Use Number 

No Deception 

Indicated 

Deception 

Indicated Inconclusive 

No Opinion 

or No 

Examination Total 

Specific-Issue Polygraph Examinations 

Criminal and 

Misconduct 

Investigations 173 49% 35% 6% 10% 100%

Source: Special Operations Branch 
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SECTION II: Other Polygraph Users in the 

Department of Justice 

Background

Seven organizations in the Department reported using the results of 

polygraph examinations that were conducted by other federal agencies, 

such as the FBI, OIG, and CIA, or by a private contractor. The seven users 

were the Department’s Criminal Division, Justice Command Center (JCC), 

Antitrust Division (ATR), National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR), BOP, and USMS. From FY 2002 through 

2004, the seven users requested other agencies to conduct a total of 1,728 

polygraph examinations for witness security screening, administrative 

(misconduct and internal affairs) investigations, criminal investigations, 

personnel security screening, sex offender treatment, and vetting foreign 

witnesses, prosecutors, and law enforcement personnel.86 Over 96 percent 

of the examinations were conducted by the FBI. 

Of the seven users, only the BOP, JCC, and NDIC have internal 

policies and procedures governing the use of polygraph examinations.87 The 

JCC is the only user that OPM has approved to use narrowly focused, 

counterintelligence-scope polygraph examinations as part of the security 

clearance process for its competitive service employees and recruits. OPM 

granted the Department authority to use polygraph examinations for 

positions in the JCC after OPM determined that the JCC had a national 

security mission supporting the use of polygraphs and approved the JCC’s 

polygraph policies and procedures. 

DoDPI has never conducted a quality assurance review of the seven 

components’ uses of polygraph examinations. DoDPI has reviewed some of 

the examination records via its quality assurance reviews of the polygraph 

programs of the agencies such as the DEA, ATF, and OIG that conduct 

examinations. Although the FBI conducted approximately 96 percent of the 

examinations requested by the seven users in FY 2002 through 2004, the 

FBI has not provided the records of those examinations for DoDPI review. 

86 The same polygraph examinations reported in this section as requested by the 

seven user components were also reported by the FBI in its number of polygraph 

examinations conducted for other agencies. 

87 As described in the Introduction section, the Department has policies and 

procedures dealing with the use of polygraph examinations in criminal investigations, 

prosecutions, and the Witness Security Program that apply to all of its components.
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The FBI cited the logistical problems of retrieving the records of criminal 

specific-issue, pre-employment and personnel security polygraph 

examinations from the requesting agencies as the reason for not providing 

them to DoDPI for review. The FBI does not provide examination records 

associated with the WITSEC Program, Foreign Counterintelligence and 

Counterterrorism, and Office of Professional Responsibility programs for 

DoDPI review, whether they are conducted for FBI purposes or for another 

agency, due to the sensitive nature of those programs. 

A description of the polygraph policy and operations of each of the 

seven components that use polygraph examination results follows. 

Criminal Division 

The Department’s Criminal Division and the 93 U.S. Attorneys have 

responsibility for overseeing criminal matters under more than 900 federal 

statutes as well as certain civil litigation. The Division also approves or 

monitors sensitive areas of law enforcement, such as participation in the 

WITSEC Program and the use of electronic surveillance. According to the 

Criminal Division, 4 of the 19 organizations within the Division oversee or 

use the results of polygraph examinations. From FY 2002 through 2004, 

the 4 organizations requested that the FBI and other law enforcement 

agencies conduct a total of 1,171 polygraph examinations. Each of the four 

organizations is described below. 

Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO)

OEO provides U.S. Attorneys’ Offices with assistance on wiretaps, 

subpoenas, witness security, and prisoner transfers. OEO uses the results 

of polygraph examinations primarily to evaluate prisoner-witnesses seeking 

entry into the WITSEC Program. (See the box on page 136 for a description 

of polygraph usage in WITSEC.) The FBI conducts most of the 

examinations, but the OIG and the Secret Service have also conducted them 

for OEO. Although rare, OEO has asked the FBI and OIG to polygraph 

informants in undercover operations to verify their truthfulness. 

The Chief of the WITSEC Security Unit and the Director of OEO and 

the WITSEC Program are responsible for overseeing polygraph 

examinations. They use the provisions of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, which 
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contains Department policy and guidance for prisoner-witnesses seeking 

entry into the WITSEC Program.88 

OEO Intelligence Analysts initiate requests for polygraph 

examinations via memorandums to the FBI, OIG, or Secret Service, 

depending on the availability of examiners. After an individual takes a 

polygraph examination, the examining authority (FBI, OIG, or Secret 

Service) submits a report on the results to OEO. Candidates for the 

WITSEC Program who fail a polygraph examination are not admitted to a 

BOP Protective Custody Unit. 

About 7 months before an individual in a Protective Custody Unit 

leaves prison, the individual undergoes an exit polygraph examination. The 

purpose of this examination is to determine whether someone leaving the 

Protective Custody Unit is or is planning to exchange information on how to 

contact someone else in the unit. If the polygraph results are inconclusive, 

OEO authorizes another examination, but it never authorizes more than 

two. The conducting agency sends OEO the polygraph examination report. 

OEO maintains a copy of the report because it is ultimately responsible for 

the prisoners. The BOP also receives a copy. OEO provides the results of 

exit polygraph examinations to the USMS, which assumes responsibility for 

protecting WITSEC Program participants who are not incarcerated. OEO 

officials said that they do not know whether the agency conducting the 

polygraph examination (usually the FBI) keeps a copy of the examination 

records. The results of the polygraph examinations remain in OEO’s files as 

part of the prisoner-witness’s permanent record. OEO restricts access to 

those files to only WITSEC staff. 

OEO officials said that neither the Department nor DoDPI has 

reviewed OEO’s use of polygraph examinations. Although DoDPI conducts 

biennial reviews of the polygraph programs managed by the FBI, OIG, and 

the Secret Service, the FBI conducts most of the examinations and it does 

not make those records available to DoDPI for review. 

88 The purpose of Title 9, Chapter 9-21 of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual is to provide 

information and guidance to Department attorneys with respect to the Witness Security 

Reform Act of 1984, Part F of Chapter XII of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 

(Pub. L. No. 98-473). According to Section 9-21.340, Polygraph Examinations for PrisonerWitness Candidates, “A polygraph examination is required of all Witness Security Program 

candidates who are incarcerated . . . .” The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual further provides that 

candidates must consent to take an examination in writing. 
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Domestic Security Section (DSS) 

The DSS investigates and prosecutes criminal organizations that 

smuggle aliens, including those that could be used to smuggle terrorists 

into the United States. The DSS also investigates and prosecutes 

individuals that harbor aliens, provide false identification documents, and 

contract with smuggling groups to obtain illegal workers for factories and 

plants. The DSS sometimes supports bringing to the United States 

potential witnesses, such as persons who were being smuggled or are 

connected to the smuggling organization. DSS officials said that, while they 

themselves rarely, if ever, use polygraph examinations, they work closely 

with other agencies that may use polygraphs more frequently, such as the 

FBI and CIA. If the results of a polygraph examination are available and 

have any application to a DSS investigation, DSS officials may review the 

results of a polygraph examination because it may be relevant to assessing 

the reliability of a witness. DSS officials said that they recently concurred 

in a decision to polygraph two potential witnesses for national security 

purposes. The DSS uses Department regulations in the U.S. Attorneys’ 

Manual for guidance in their use of polygraph examinations. The DSS also 

reviewed the results of four polygraph examinations from FY 2002 through 

2004. 

Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT)

OPDAT trains and provides technical assistance to foreign 

counterparts to develop reliable law enforcement partners overseas.89 

OPDAT offers technical assistance, including arranging for and supporting 

polygraph examinations, to host countries that decide to establish vetted 

units staffed by investigators and prosecutors, as well as, in some 

instances, financial and administrative support staff. Host country officials 

choose the prosecutors and investigators for membership in the units and 

also determine whether the candidates will be vetted. OPDAT officials told 

us that only 4 percent of the approximately 70 countries that receive OPDAT 

technical assistance have been assisted with FBI polygraph services. If the 

host country request polygraph services, OPDAT arranges for FBI examiners 

to conduct the polygraph examinations to determine, for example, whether 

the foreign prosecutors have taken bribes or violated human rights laws in 

 89 The Department of State provides funding for technical assistance to OPDAT 

through an interagency agreement. 
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their countries.90 As shown in Table 3, during our study period, FY 2002 

through 2004, the FBI conducted 725 polygraph examinations for OPDAT. 

However, OPDAT began using polygraph examinations in its programs in 

FY 1999. OPDAT officials reported in August 2006, that, over the life of the 

program, a total of 1,954 examinations have been conducted at OPDAT’s 

request: 

• FY 1999 - 162; 

• FY 2000 - 224; 

• FY 2001 - 198; 

• FY 2002 - 302; 

• FY 2003 - 136; 

• FY 2004 - 287; 

• FY 2005 - 420; and 

• FY 2006 - 225 (as of August 2006). 

OPDAT does not have written internal policy or procedures for its use 

of polygraph examinations for foreign vetting. To initiate a polygraph 

examination, OPDAT personnel in Washington, D.C., forward a request to 

the FBI based on information received from an OPDAT office in another 

country. OPDAT staff work with FBI examiners to develop test questions, 

and the FBI Polygraph Unit uses OPDAT funding to send a group of 

examiners to the designated country to conduct the examinations. An 

individual who fails a polygraph examination is not allowed to work with a 

vetted task force and, in some countries, may be ineligible to receive OPDAT 

assistance. OPDAT relies heavily on polygraph examination results because 

of the limitations on the background investigations that can be done on 

foreign prosecutors. The results of an examination are reported to OPDAT 

and shared with the FBI Embassy Legal Attaché, Embassy Regional Security 

Officer, and the host country. A senior-level team leader supervises the FBI 

polygraph examiners in-country. OPDAT’s Resident Legal Advisors also 

provide oversight to the teams while they are in-country. 

 

 DoDPI has not reviewed OPDAT’s use of polygraph examinations for 

foreign vetting. OPDAT officials said they relied on the FBI to comply with 

federal standards. DoDPI has certified that the FBI’s polygraph program 

meets federal technical, professional, and ethical standards. However, 

DoDPI has not reviewed the FBI’s records of the OPDAT examinations or the 

OPDAT files. 

90 According to OPDAT officials, if FBI examiners are not available, OPDAT asks the 

DEA to conduct an examination. 
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Public Integrity Section 

The Public Integrity Section prosecutes public corruption cases 

nationwide, typically working with the law enforcement agencies, especially 

the FBI and the OIG community, to investigate alleged crimes. The Public 

Integrity Section uses polygraph examinations in connection with criminal 

cases to verify the truthfulness of cooperating witnesses and informants, as 

well as the subjects of criminal investigations. The Criminal Division 

reported to us that polygraph examinations were used by law enforcement 

agents in 15 instances in matters handled by the Public Integrity Section in 

FY 2002 through 2004. 

The Public Integrity Section follows Department polygraph policy 

contained in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.91 The Public Integrity Section does 

not have a formal process for initiating a request for a polygraph 

examination. Typically, the law enforcement agent that is working with the 

Public Integrity Section staff on an investigation will initiate the idea of 

using a polygraph examination as an investigative tool and officials in the 

Public Integrity Section will either object or agree to its use. Public Integrity 

Section officials said that law enforcement agents are more inclined to use 

polygraph examinations than others who are involved in their cases such as 

the prosecutor. All requests are handled by the law enforcement agency’s 

case agent who is working with the Public Integrity Section. Usually, the 

Public Integrity Section’s Deputy Chief and the trial attorney discuss a 

request from the case agent and decide whether to grant it based on the 

potential value of the examination results in the investigation. Their 

decision is conveyed to the case agent. Proposed subjects cannot be 

compelled to take a polygraph examination. Results of polygraph 

examinations are placed in the appropriate case files. 

 91 Title 9, Chapter 13 of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Section 9-13.300, Polygraphs – 

Department Policy, states that that the “Department opposes all attempts by defense 

counsel to admit polygraph evidence or to have an examiner appointed by the court to 

conduct a polygraph test. Government attorneys should refrain from seeking the 

admission of favorable examinations that may have been conducted during the 

investigatory stage. . . . Given the present theoretical and practical deficiencies of 

polygraphs, the government takes the position that polygraph results should not be 

introduced into evidence at trial. On the other hand, in respect to its use as an 

investigatory tool, the Department recognizes that in certain situations, as in testing the 

reliability of an informer, a polygraph can be of some value. Department policy therefore 

supports the limited use of the polygraph during investigations. This limited use should be 

effectuated by using the trained examiners of the federal investigative agencies, primarily 

the FBI, in accordance with internal procedures formulated by the agencies . . . .” 
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Public Integrity Section officials told us that their use of polygraph 

examinations has not been reviewed by DoDPI. However, the FBI and the 

OIG maintain copies of those polygraph examination records, and DoDPI 

may have reviewed the FBI’s or the OIG’s copies of some of the records 

during its biennial quality assurance reviews of the FBI’s and OIG’s 

polygraph program. 

Justice Command Center 

The JCC, which serves as a crisis center for the Department, is a 

branch of the Justice Management Division’s SEPS. The JCC is the primary 

crisis management facility for the Attorney General and other senior 

Department decision makers. It also functions as an around-the-clock 

contact point for all Department operations worldwide. 

Because the JCC handles highly classified intelligence information, 

the JCC requires its employees and job recruits to pass a narrowly focused, 

counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination as part of the security 

clearance process. The JCC established the requirement for polygraph 

examinations in 1987 at the request of the National Security Agency, which 

was the controlling authority for some of the cryptographic information and 

information systems accessed by JCC personnel.92 

The JCC has 15 positions subject to mandatory polygraph 

examinations. Three personnel security polygraph examinations were 

conducted by the FBI for the JCC in FY 2002 through 2004.93

The JCC is the only one of the seven users discussed in this section 

that OPM has authorized to use polygraph examinations for personnel 

security screening. In October 1987, as then required by federal 

regulations,94 the Department’s Assistant Attorney General for 

Administration applied to the OPM Director for authority to require 

92 At the time, NSA and CIA employees with similar access were required to take 

polygraph examinations. The JCC’s employees who were hired before 1987 had never been 

tested, but volunteered to be tested when asked in 1987. 

93 Only three JCC employees were hired during this period. The remaining 

employees had previously submitted to mandatory polygraph examinations during their 

pre-employment hiring process or when the requirement was established in 1987. 

 94 See Subchapter 2-6 of the Federal Personnel Manual, dated January 6, 1984, 

regarding federal requirements for using polygraph examinations in personnel 

investigations. 
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polygraph examinations of the JCC’s competitive service employees and any 

future recruits. On November 24, 1987, the OPM Director granted authority 

to the Department to conduct polygraph examinations of JCC personnel 

with access to cryptographic keying material and SCI. OPM required that 

the Department reapply each year for continued authority to polygraph its 

personnel. Records OPM provided to us show that the Assistant Attorney 

General for Administration reapplied to OPM in FY 1988 through 1995 and 

that the OPM Director approved each reauthorization request through 

September 30, 1996. OPM officials said they had no record of 

reauthorization requests by the Department in FY 1997 through 2004, and 

JCC officials could not provide us any additional authorizations. 

On November 23, 2005, after we asked to review JCC records of 

reauthorization requests, the Department applied for reauthorization to use 

polygraph examinations for JCC personnel. In early May 2006, OPM 

officials told us that their reauthorization letters to all agencies had been 

delayed while OPM officials reviewed OPM’s authorities for requiring 

reauthorizations and revised the language contained in previous 

authorization letters to federal agencies.95 However, on May 12, 2006, OPM 

officials grant JCC’s authorization to use polygraph examinations for preemployment and personnel security screening for FY 2006. 

The SEPS Director authorizes requests for polygraph examinations for 

JCC job applicants. A supervisory security specialist in the JCC has 

managerial responsibility for the polygraph process. JCC job 

announcements indicate that successful completion of a background 

investigation, including a polygraph examination, is a mandatory condition 

of employment. Applicants who refuse to take a polygraph examination are 

not considered for employment in the JCC. If applicants are currently 

employed in the Department, the refusal to take the polygraph examination 

is not made a part of their personnel file. 

95 OPM’s reauthorization of the JCC’s use of polygraphs was also delayed because 

the FBI, which conducts the examinations for the JCC, had not provided OPM with a copy 

of its most recent DoDPI quality assurance review report, as required by OPM. (OPM’s 

requirement to submit a copy of a DoDPI quality assurance review report was probably 

instituted sometime after 1995, that is, after the Federal Personnel Manual was retired. A 

review of OPM’s authorization of the DEA’s program, for example, showed that OPM’s 

requirement for a copy of a DoDPI report was not in its FY 1994 or FY 1995 authorization 

letters to the DEA.) This is the first time that OPM has asked for a copy of the FBI’s DoDPI 

quality assurance report and OPM is still in discussion with OPM about the necessity of 

providing the report as a precondition for approving the request for JCC reauthorization. 
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After selecting a candidate, the JCC supervisor sends a memorandum 

to the FBI requesting an examination, and the FBI examiner contacts the 

applicant to schedule the examination. According to the Department’s JCC 

polygraph regulations, the scope of the polygraph examination is limited to 

questions related to counterintelligence, and a list of the questions is 

provided to the job applicant before testing begins. The FBI conducts the 

examination and forwards a report on the results to the SEPS Director, who 

is responsible for adjudicating personnel security decisions. 

The Department’s use of polygraph examinations for JCC personnel 

has never been reviewed by DoDPI as part of the federal quality assurance 

program. Also, records of examinations conducted by the FBI for the JCC 

have never been reviewed by DoDPI inspectors during quality assurance 

reviews of the FBI’s polygraph program because the FBI did not allow DoDPI 

to begin reviewing its personnel security examination records until DoDPI’s 

last review of the FBI polygraph program in December 2005.

Antitrust Division 

 The ATR enforces antitrust laws to protect the competitive process 

from prohibited practices such as price-fixing and bid-rigging conspiracies, 

corporate mergers likely to reduce competition, and business practices 

designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power. The ATR prosecutes 

serious and willful violations of the antitrust laws by filing civil and criminal 

suits. Criminal prosecutions can lead to large fines and jail sentences. 

The ATR uses polygraph examinations only in connection with 

criminal investigations. The ATR is involved in about 100 criminal 

investigations each year. It has used polygraph examinations only twice 

from FY 2002 through 2004. The examinations were conducted at the 

ATR’s request by the FBI and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation 

Command.96

The ATR has no internal policies or procedures for using polygraph 

examinations and no formal process for requesting other agencies to 

96 The Army Criminal Investigation Command polygraphed one of the subjects in a 

now-closed investigation into bidding irregularities on a major contract and possible 

acceptance of gratuities from the winner of that contract. It did not cover criminal antitrust 

issues (collusion) because there was no such evidence at the time (or subsequently). The 

Army Criminal Investigation Command, which had initiated and formed a multi-agency 

task force to handle the investigation, arranged for the polygraph. The ATR did not request 

the polygraph, but did approve it. 
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conduct examinations for the ATR’s use. However, the ATR’s Director of 

Criminal Enforcement said that he had attended an FBI class on the uses of 

polygraph examinations. The ATR’s Director of Criminal Enforcement said 

that an investigating agency or a defendant’s attorney probably requested 

the two examinations conducted during our study period. Before making a 

request for an examination, a federal agent discusses the potential use of an 

examination with the ATR’s Director of Criminal Enforcement and litigation 

staff, according to the Director. A defendant’s attorney may also request a 

polygraph; however, the Director said that he usually denies defense 

attorneys’ requests if ATR staff members believe they already have sufficient 

evidence to prove their case. If the Director approves a request for a 

polygraph examination, the investigating agency conducts the polygraph 

examination and reports the results to the ATR. According to the Director, 

the results of an examination may influence an ATR investigation, but the 

ATR would not enter the results of a polygraph examination as evidence at 

trial.

National Drug Intelligence Center 

The NDIC, located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, is responsible for the 

production of domestic, strategic, drug-related intelligence. When the NDIC 

was created in 1992, it was organized under the FBI. The NDIC was 

reorganized in 1996 as a separate component of the Department of Justice. 

The NDIC’s Office of Security and Classified Programs uses polygraph 

examinations for pre-employment screening. From FY 2002 through 2004, 

the NDIC’s Office of Security and Classified Programs asked the FBI to 

conduct 72 polygraph examinations for its use in screening job applicants 

who had received conditional offers of NDIC employment. 

In 1997, the Department gave the NDIC Director approval to hire 

NDIC employees into the excepted service and to use pre-employment 

polygraph examinations in its hiring process.97 The Department’s Director 

of Personnel asked the NDIC to develop written internal policy addressing 

why polygraph examinations were necessary, who would be subject to 

97 Most federal government civilian positions are part of the competitive civil 

service, which means they must compete with other applicants according to competitive 

civil service procedures. Agencies’ compliance with those procedures is overseen by OPM. 

Excepted service agencies, like the NDIC, are excluded from the competitive civil service 

procedures and OPM oversight. In 1997, OPM officials wrote to the Department saying that 

the NDIC did not need OPM approval to use pre-employment polygraph examinations 

because its employees were in the excepted service. 
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polygraph examinations, and how the examinations would be conducted. 

NDIC Procedure Number SEC-26, “Security Program Unit Hiring Process for 

New Employees,” provides policy and implementing guidance for the NDIC’s 

use of polygraph examinations. According to SEC-26, all new employees 

hired from outside the federal government, including those working with 

government contractors at the time of hire, are required to pass a full-scope, 

pre-employment polygraph examination before assuming a position at the 

NDIC. NDIC policy does not specifically require new hires from within the 

federal government to pass a polygraph examination. An NDIC official told 

us that the NDIC usually waives the requirement for a polygraph 

examination for new hires who are already working in the federal 

government and who have Top Secret security clearances issued by another 

agency. 

NDIC vacancy announcements include a notice that a polygraph is 

required for employment and that an applicant who refuses to take a 

polygraph examination will not be hired. After the NDIC Human Resources 

Office makes an applicant a conditional offer of employment, a member of 

the Office of Security and Classified Programs makes a direct request to an 

FBI examiner located in the NDIC’s geographic region. The FBI conducts 

most of the examinations at the NDIC facility in Johnstown. The FBI 

examiner provides a copy of the results of the examination as well as the 

polygraph test charts to the NDIC’s Chief of the Office of Security and 

Classified Programs. According to the Chief, four people in his office 

(including the Chief) have authority to adjudicate personnel security 

decisions based on the results of polygraph examinations. 

If the FBI examiner detects indications of deception during the initial 

polygraph examination, the NDIC’s Office of Security and Classified 

Programs notifies the Human Resource unit of the test results, and the 

Human Resources unit sends a letter to the applicant withdrawing its 

conditional offer of employment. However, if after receipt of the letter, the 

applicant submits a formal request for a retest, a second polygraph is 

generally granted. If the applicant does not pass the second examination, 

the applicant cannot be hired because the applicant does not meet the 

requirements of the job. If an applicant passes, the Security Office advises 

the Human Resources unit to proceed with the hiring process. 

DoDPI has not reviewed the NDIC’s use of polygraph examinations or 

its polygraph activities. However, the FBI maintains copies of the NDIC’s 

polygraph examination records, and DoDPI may have reviewed the FBI’s 
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copies of some of the records during its biennial quality assurance reviews 

of the FBI’s polygraph program.98 

Office of Professional Responsibility

The Department’s OPR was established by the Attorney General in 

1975. It has the jurisdiction: 

to investigate allegations of misconduct by Department of 

Justice attorneys that relate to the exercise of their authority to 

investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice; and to investigate 

allegations of misconduct by law enforcement personnel when 

they are related to allegations of misconduct by attorneys with 

the jurisdiction of OPR.99 

OPR can use the results of polygraph examinations, which the FBI 

conducts for OPR, as an investigative tool in criminal and administrative 

misconduct investigations. OPR’s investigations also may involve agents 

and witnesses who have already taken a polygraph examination. OPR 

officials told us that they had not requested a polygraph examination since 

before FY 2001. 

According to an OPR official, a request for a polygraph examination 

would be initiated by an OPR team conducting an investigation. The OPR 

Counsel and Deputy Counsel review requests for polygraph examinations; if 

they approve the request, the OPR Counsel asks the FBI to arrange and 

conduct the examination. The FBI sends a report on the results of the 

polygraph examination to OPR, which may or may not include it in its final 

investigative report. An OPR official told us that, in the past, polygraph 

examinations have only been conducted when the proposed test subject has 

voluntarily consented to the examination. 

98 We were unable to determine if the NDIC’s polygraph examination records were 

included in DoDPI’s review of the FBI’s polygraph examination records. 

99 28 C.F.R. Sec. 0.39a (a). 
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Federal Bureau of Prisons

The BOP is responsible for the administration of 106 institutions, 6 

regional offices, a Central Office (headquarters), 2 staff training centers, and 

28 community corrections offices. It is responsible for the custody and care 

of approximately 185,000 federal offenders. 

The BOP uses polygraph examinations as an investigative tool in 

administrative investigations of BOP employees, as a condition for inmates’ 

entry into the WITSEC Program, and as a condition for participation in the 

BOP’s Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP).100 BOP units used the 

results of 435 polygraph examinations in FY 2002 through 2004. The 

following sections detail the BOP’s uses of polygraph examinations. 

Office of Internal Affairs 

The BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) is a branch of the Office of 

General Counsel and Review. In coordination with the OIG, it is responsible 

for investigating allegations of administrative misconduct by BOP 

employees. The OIA uses the results of polygraph examinations that the 

FBI or the OIG conducts of subjects, witnesses, and complainants in 

administrative investigations into alleged misconduct. The OIA requested 

21 polygraph examinations during administrative investigations from 

FY 2002 through 2004. The OIG conducted 17 of the examinations, and the 

FBI conducted 4. Fifteen of the polygraph examinees were the subjects of 

misconduct investigations, four were alleged victims, and two were 

complainants. 

BOP Program Statement 1210.24 provides policy and guidance for the 

use of polygraph examinations in administrative investigations.101 All 

requests for polygraph examinations regarding staff misconduct must be 

coordinated through the OIA. When considering a request for a polygraph 

examination, a “Chief Executive Officer” discusses the matter with the OIA 

 100 A BOP warden also may permit an inmate to take a polygraph examination in 

connection with a state or federal criminal felony investigation if the inmate consents to the 

examination. Program Statement 5110.13, “Administering of Polygraph Tests,” 

December 15, 1999, details the procedures for requesting and administering a polygraph 

examination of a federal inmate. All requests for polygraph testing must be approved by 

the warden of the institution where the inmate is incarcerated. 

101 See Program Statement 1210.24, “Office of Internal Affairs,” May 20, 2003, for 

details of the procedures for reporting allegations of misconduct to the OIA. 
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Chief and receives the Chief’s approval prior to arranging an examination.102 

The OIA Chief has the sole authority to approve the use of a polygraph 

examination during the course of a BOP-run investigation into staff 

misconduct.103 According to BOP internal policy (Office of Internal Affairs 

Program Statement 1210.24, May 20, 2003), neither BOP staff nor its prison 

inmates can be compelled to take a polygraph examination. BOP staff and 

inmates must voluntarily consent in writing prior to undergoing an 

examination. 

All requests for polygraph examinations regarding staff misconduct 

must be coordinated through the OIA. Office of Internal Affairs Program 

Statement 1210.24 says that, whenever possible, the BOP should use the 

FBI or OIG Polygraph Unit examiners to conduct the examinations.104 The 

examiners then provide the OIA with a written report of examination results 

that becomes part of the investigation record, although the OIA may or may 

not mention the results of a polygraph examination in its final investigative 

report. The final investigative report is provided to the warden of the 

institution that employs the subject of the investigation and to the BOP 

Assistant Director who makes the decision on appropriate disciplinary 

action. 

OIA officials told us that the OIA’s use of polygraph examinations has 

not been reviewed by the BOP, the Department, or DoDPI. The OIA relies on 

the FBI and OIG examiners conducting the examinations to comply with 

federal polygraph standards. DoDPI reviews both the FBI and OIG 

polygraph programs as part of the federal quality assurance review program. 

The OIG provides its files for DoDPI reviews and, consequently, the OIA files 

may have been included in a DoDPI review. However, the FBI does not allow 

DoDPI to review its records of examinations conducted as part of a 

misconduct investigation. 

102 A Chief Executive Officer can be a warden of a correctional facility, director of a 

staff training center, Regional Director of a regional office, or Assistant Director of a division 

at the BOP’s Central Office. 

103 OIA approval to use a polygraph examination is not necessary in cases 

unrelated to staff misconduct or when outside authorities, such as the OIG, are conducting 

an external investigation of staff misconduct. 

104 If an FBI or OIG polygraph examiner is not available, OIA personnel may get a 

local police department to conduct an examination. This has happened only two or three 

times since calendar year 2000. 
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WITSEC Program 

All BOP prisoners seeking entry into the Criminal Division-run 

WITSEC Program are required to take polygraph examinations to determine 

whether they can be placed in a BOP Protective Custody Unit. (See box on 

page 136 for an overview of the WITSEC Program.) The BOP has seven 

Protective Custody Units that house program inmates. The Criminal 

Division, working through the BOP, uses polygraph examinations as a tool 

for maintaining the security of prisoner-witnesses and to help determine 

whether an inmate seeking admission to the WITSEC Program intends to 

harm another WITSEC Program inmate. If prisoner-witnesses fail the 

polygraph examination, they may or may not be accepted into the WITSEC 

Program. If they fail, but are still accepted into the program, they may not 

be housed in a Protective Custody Unit. 

The Criminal Division, working through the BOP, also requires 

prisoner-witnesses in the WITSEC Program to take a polygraph examination 

before leaving a BOP facility. The purpose of the second polygraph, 

according to BOP officials, is to deter prisoner-witnesses from sharing 

information about other WITSEC inmates. Prisoner-witnesses know they 

have to undergo a polygraph and, if they believe a polygraph examination 

would detect this activity, they may be less likely to share information about 

other inmates. The Criminal Division contacts the FBI or the OIG to 

conduct the examinations for the BOP. In FY 2002 through 2004, the FBI 

and the OIG conducted a total of 338 polygraph examinations of proposed 

WITSEC inmates in BOP institutions. 

The BOP WITSEC Program Chief is responsible for managerial 

oversight of the BOP’s role in the WITSEC Program. BOP Program 

Statement 5180.04, “Central Inmate Monitoring System Operations 

Manual,” August 16, 1996, Chapter 8, provides internal guidance for 

temporary designations of WITSEC cases.105 The BOP Chief of the WITSEC 

Program said that neither the Department nor DoDPI had reviewed the 

BOP’s use of polygraph examinations for the WITSEC Program. As 

previously discussed, the FBI does not open its WITSEC polygraph 

examination files to DoDPI’s quality assurance reviews. 

 105 The BOP’s Inmate Monitoring Section receives applications from prisonerwitnesses seeking entry into WITSEC and designates those prisoners as temporary WITSEC 

cases until they undergo commitment interviews and polygraph examinations. 
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Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP)

The BOP’s SOTP is located at the Butner Federal Correctional 

Institution in North Carolina. The SOTP is a voluntary program that can 

accommodate up to 112 of the approximately 12,000 federal inmates that 

are convicted sex offenders. Each institution at the Federal Correctional 

Complex in Butner has a Chief Psychologist. The Chief Psychologist for the 

Psychological Services Department at the Federal Correctional Institution 

(Medium), Butner, has overall responsibility for the SOTP. Authority for 

conducting polygraph examinations for the SOTP comes from the Assistant 

Director of Correctional Programs, BOP Central Office. All SOTP 

participants must voluntarily agree to undergo a polygraph examination as 

a condition for admission to the program. However, an inmate’s admission 

to and retention in the SOTP are not contingent on the results of the 

polygraph examinations. Participants may undergo an additional 

examination sometime later in the course of treatment as clinically 

indicated. Additional polygraph examinations may be conducted at the 

discretion of the United States Probation Office.106

The SOTP at Butner began in 1989, but SOTP officials did not begin 

using polygraph examinations until FY 2002. In FY 2002 through 2004, the 

SOTP examiner conducted a total of 76 polygraph examinations. The SOTP 

polygraph examiner is a psychologist who was trained to conduct criminal 

investigative and national security screening examinations at DoDPI. He 

also received advanced training at DoDPI in the use of polygraph 

examinations in the treatment of sex offenders. 

SOTP staff told us that polygraph examinations are used for noninvestigative, post-conviction sexual histories and as an aid in managing the 

potential risks inmates pose to the community after they are released from 

prison. The questions used for polygraph examinations conducted in the 

treatment of sex offenders are different from those used in other types of 

examinations (for example, criminal investigations and personnel security 

screening). The examiner asks deliberately broad questions that are 

designed to encourage inmates to be truthful about the full parameters of 

their past criminal behavior. Although inmates are encouraged to be 

truthful, they are not required to disclose self-incriminating aspects of their 

past criminal behavior. Inmates are informed that, if they elect to do so, 

 106 The BOP has no jurisdiction over inmates once they are released from their 

terms of incarceration. The level of monitoring and any frequency in the administration of 

polygraph examinations would be solely determined by probation officials. 
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they risk criminal prosecution. For example, the inmates are encouraged to 

reveal whether they raped someone in the past, not who they raped or where 

the crime was committed because the information is used for clinical, not 

investigative, purposes. 

Bureau policy establishes the general requirement that an inmate 

entering the SOTP have a maximum of 24 months and a minimum of 12 

months remaining on their current incarceration period. A polygraph 

examination is administered toward the end of the treatment program to 

confirm the inmate’s self-reported sexual offence history. The results of the 

polygraph examination contribute to the final risk assessment and are 

incorporated into the inmate’s risk management plan for community 

supervision.107 

SOTP staff told us that the only oversight mechanism for the SOTP is 

self-auditing by the staff. In August 2006, BOP officials reported that the 

SOTP had developed an informal peer review process concerning technical 

issues such as test question construction with other practitioners 

specializing in examining sex offenders. 

Nonetheless, the SOTP does not have an internal process that 

provides for a quality control review of 100 percent of the examinations as 

required by federal polygraph standards, and SOTP officials have declined to 

participate in the federal quality assurance review program administered by 

DoDPI. 

In August 2006, DoDPI officials told us that significant decisions are 

being made based in part on the results of polygraph examinations 

conducted by the SOTP. DoDPI officials also stated that although these 

SOTP polygraphs are being conducted under the auspices of the 

Department of Justice, the quality of the work product is not known 

because the SOTP polygraphs have not been subjected to standard quality 

assurance reviews through the federal Quality Assurance Program 

administered by DoDPI. DoDPI also said that most of the federal agencies 

participating in the program at one time considered this oversight 

unnecessary, but in every instance those agencies have found great benefit 

in adopting standardized procedures. DoDPI officials suggested that both 

the BOP’s SOTP and the USMS’s WITSEC Program adopt a quality control 

107 During probation, inmates also may be required to undergo polygraph 

examinations that are used as a monitoring tool. Inmates are monitored closely for up to 

3 years after their release and may be subject to polygraph examinations every 6 months. 

However, those examinations are not conducted by the SOTP examiner. 
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process that ensures an independent and objective review of all examination 

records before a final opinion on the results is rendered and that they be 

required to undergo biennial quality assurance reviews in compliance with 

federal polygraph standards. 

United States Marshals Service

The USMS mission is to provide support to all elements of the federal 

justice system, including protecting the federal judiciary and apprehending 

fugitives. The USMS uses polygraph examinations for administrative 

investigations involving USMS personnel and for individuals in the WITSEC 

Program who are not incarcerated and claim their security has been 

breached. From FY 2002 through 2004, the USMS requested 16 polygraph 

examinations of witnesses in the WITSEC Program, but none for 

administrative investigations. 

The FBI and a contractor who is a retired USMS WITSEC Program 

Inspector administer examinations for USMS. The USMS has no internal 

policy or regulations addressing the use of polygraphs and no quality 

control or oversight of the polygraph examinations conducted by the USMS’s 

contractor as required by federal technical standards. 

Operations Support Division

In coordination with the OIG, the Operations Support Division, Office 

of Internal Investigations (OII) oversees administrative investigations 

involving USMS personnel. According to USMS, when a dispute or 

discrepancy arises during the course of an OII investigation, the OII 

Inspector can offer the subject or witness the opportunity to take a 

polygraph examination. The individual must sign a form to accept or 

decline to take a polygraph examination. According to USMS officials, most 

individuals refuse this offer and no action is taken against those who refuse. 

If an individual accepts, the OII will ask the FBI to arrange and conduct the 

examination. The OII Inspector works with the FBI examiner to formulate 

questions for the examination.108 Examination results are sent to the OII 

Inspector and included in the case file. Along with the OII Inspector’s 

findings, polygraph results are ultimately used by the USMS Discipline 

Panel assigned to make a determination in the administrative investigation. 

 108 On rare occasions, the FBI examiner, after reviewing the case, may determine 

that the administrative investigation is not a good case for a polygraph examination and 

decline to administer one. 
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Neither the Department nor any other entity has reviewed the USMS’s 

polygraph activities. According to USMS, no polygraph examinations were 

conducted for OII from FY 2002 through 2004. 

WITSEC Program

The USMS’s WITSEC and Prisoner Operations Division is responsible 

for providing security for protected witnesses who are not incarcerated and 

their families. The USMS provides 24-hour protection to these witnesses 

while they are in a high-threat environment, including while attending 

pretrial conferences, testifying at trial, and attending other court 

appearances. In certain cases, a protected witness will claim that a security 

breach has occurred, but the USMS cannot independently corroborate the 

breach. In those cases, the USMS will request that the witness take a 

polygraph examination as a means of confirming that a security breach has 

really occurred before the USMS permanently relocates the witness for their 

safety. The USMS uses the examinations to deter protected witnesses from 

falsely claiming they are in danger because they want to move. Witnesses 

who believe that a polygraph examination would detect deception are less 

likely to make false claims. Witnesses will often admit to the security 

breach or their false claims of a security breach with the threat of a 

polygraph examination. According to a WITSEC Supervisory Inspector, if 

WITSEC participants refuse, they most likely would be removed from the 

program. 

In FY 2002 through 2004, USMS officials used the results of 16 

polygraph examinations conducted by either ATF (5) or a private contractor 

(11). A WITSEC Chief Inspector told us that he would use more polygraph 

examinations in the WITSEC Program if he had a dedicated USMS 

polygraph examiner. 

USMS officials said they had no formal internal policy for conducting 

polygraph examinations of witnesses. However, they do follow the 

provisions of Title 9, Chapter 21, of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual that provides 

Department policy for witness security. USMS officials said there has been 

no internal review or DoDPI review of their use of polygraph examinations. 
USMS. Non-incarcerated witnesses in the 

WITSEC Program who claim that their security 

has been breached are asked to take a polygraph 

examination by the USMS, the agency responsible 

for providing protection to these individuals. The 

examinations are conducted by either ATF or a 

private contractor (a retired USMS WITSEC 

Inspector). According to the USMS, the 

contractor (11) or ATF (5) conducted 16 polygraph 

examinations from FY 2002 through 2004. 

BOP. Individuals incarcerated in BOP 

facilities that seek entry into the WITSEC 

Program are required to have a polygraph 

examination before entering a BOP Protective 

Custody Unit. If granted entry into the WITSEC 

Program, these witnesses are also required to 

take a polygraph examination before leaving a 

BOP facility. The FBI or the OIG conducts these 

examinations. According to the BOP, 338 

polygraphs were conducted of federal inmates for 

the WITSEC Program from FY 2002 through 

2004, which are part of the 427 examinations 

reported by OEO. 

Criminal Division. The WITSEC Program 

is overseen by the Criminal Division’s OEO, which 

is responsible for authorizing or denying 

applicants to the WITSEC Program and for 

coordinating matters related to the program with 

the BOP and USMS. Polygraph examinations for 

non-incarcerated witnesses seeking entry into the 

WITSEC Program are voluntary. The FBI 

conducts most of the polygraphs for OEO. 

According to the Criminal Division, a total of 427 

polygraphs were conducted for OEO from 

FY 2002 through 2004 and another 175 in FY 

2005, for a total of 602 examinations. 

Polygraph Usage in the Federal 

Witness Security Program 

 The WITSEC Program was established to 

provide protection and security for witnesses in 

official proceedings. The program involves three 

Department components – the Criminal Division, 

BOP, and the U.S. Marshals Service – and, for 

some witnesses, requires polygraph 

examinations. 

 Also, the USMS has not 

established an internal quality control 

program or procedures that ensure 

an independent and objective review 

of all examinations conducted by its 

contractor. Federal standards require 

that agencies provide for a technical 

review of all examination records by a 

certified federal examiner before a 

final opinion on the examination 

results is rendered. However, there 

was no independent technical review 

of the 11 examinations conducted by 

the USMS contractor from FY 2002 

through 2004. 

DoDPI officials said that the 

use of contractors to conduct 

polygraph examinations is a common 

practice throughout the federal 

government. Federal agencies that 

use contractors, however, must 

ensure that those contractors 

conduct polygraph examinations in 

compliance with established technical 

standards by providing quality control 

reviews. According to Chapter C2 of 

the Federal Examiner Handbook, the 

USMS can do that by either: 

(1) hiring a certified federal examiner 

to conduct quality control reviews 

and oversee the examinations 

conducted by its contractor, or 

(2) entering into an agreement with 

another federal agency to obtain 

quality control services. USMS 

officials recently told DoDPI officials 

that they had decided not to hire a 

senior federal examiner or to 

establish a USMS polygraph 

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program.109 DoDPI officials maintain that without the required oversight, 

the quality of the decisions being provided the USMS cannot be established. 

109 In November 2004, DoDPI and USMS officials discussed the possibility of the 

USMS initiating a formal polygraph program in support of its WITSEC mission. However, 

in FY 2005, the USMS told DoDPI officials that it was not going to pursue its own program.