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The April 1997 Parliamentary, Countyand

Municipal Elections in Croatia

April 13, 1997

Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in

Europe

June l997

This report is based on the observation of the elections by the staf of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, as well as a pre­election briefing hosted by the Commission on March 21. The Commission wishes to thank the

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, U.S. Embassy Zagreb and the National Democratic Institute for International

Af airs for the assistance and information they provided.

SUMMARY

On April 13, 1997, Croatia held its fifth set of elections since political pluralism was introduced in

the former Yugoslav republic in 1989, and the fourth since achieving independent statehood in

1991. These were the first elections, however, held throughout the entire country in 7 years,

signaling Croatia's normalization after years of conflict, displacement and uncertainty. Seats were

contested for the upper chamber House of Counties of the parliament, or Sabor, and for municipal

and county councils.

The very holding of elections in Eastern Slavonia—the one region forcibly taken by Serb militants

in 1991 and yet to be reintegrated into the country—produced positive signs for reintegration

through peaceful means and without another tragic mass exodus of ethnic Serbs. The results

countrywide set the stage for presidential elections later in the year, and indicate Croatia's overall

political trends as the country moves beyond the turmoil associated with Yugoslavia's violent

disintegration, including the massive displacement of the population as territory was taken in 1991

and then retaken in 1995. The turmoil served to narrow the country's overall political spectrum with

a nationalist tinge, and the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) has relied on this situation to

enhance its power. The fundamental question now is whether the party will accept defeat at the

ballot box if the support of the population shifts as priorities change.

As with previous elections in Croatia, the degree to which these elections could be considered free

and fair was limited by the clear bias of the state­run broadcast media in its news coverage and by

the effect of regular attempts to limit the diversity of the print media. Some administrative decisions

regarding the elections seemed to be designed to benefit the ruling party, although the nature of

these elections precluded the blatant stretching of what is legally permissible which had been

evident in earlier elections. One decision prevented a domestic, civic­oriented non­governmental

organization (NGO) from observing the polling, even from outside the confines of the polling

station. People were generally permitted to vote freely and privately throughout Croatia on election

day, except in Eastern Slavonia. There, a surprisingly strong turnout combined with the inadequate

delivery of ballots and documents to polling stations, among other problems, causing the voting to

be extended for an extra day.

While there were some improvements over prior elections, these elections fell short of Croatia's

potential, especially as the country should now move more rapidly toward democracy. As more

critical elections approach, it remains unclear whether the Croatian authorities will permit elections

that could be considered free and fair if the result threatens their rule. The HDZ did retain its
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comfortable majority in the House of Counties and won most of the county and town councils, but

opposition coalitions won outright, or at least enough to challenge the HDZ, in some of the bigger

cities. The results in Eastern Slavonia, meanwhile, produced victories for a Serb coalition in just

over one third of the municipalities, with the HDZ taking the remainder, a fairly predictable result

that advances the issue of the region's reintegration into the rest of Croatia. Croatia's willingness to

reconcile with its Serb population and to respect the human rights of its members, however, remains

an open question.

BACKGROUND

As political pluralism swept the Communist world of East­Central Europe in the late 1980s,

Yugoslavia's six republics each held their own first multi­party elections in 1990, with results that

doomed their federation. Perceiving itself to be more like Slovenia to the north, Croatia is

prosperous and western­oriented relative to the republics and provinces to the south and came to

resent its confinement in a Yugoslav state since 1918. Again like Slovenia, it voted in a new,

nationalist leaders who moved toward confederation and, failing to achieve that, independence in

1991. President Franjo Tudjman and his ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) undertook to

remove Yugoslav authority from the republic and, in so doing, largely ignored the sensitivities

within Croatia's sizable Serb community,

1 where the traumas of victimization at the hands of

Croatian fascists during World War II were still very much alive. This situation permitted the

President of Yugoslavia's largest republic, Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, to instigate a conflict

combining his Serb nationalist supporters with harder­line Communists intent on preserving the

federation. This conflict began in the second half of 1991, using Croatia's declaration of

independence as a pretext,

2 during which nearly 9,000 persons were killed and another 400,000

displaced as one quarter of Croatian territory was seized by Serb militants with the active support of

the Yugoslav military.

From early 1992 until mid­1995, the occupied regions of Croatia remained outside of Zagreb's

control as U.N. peacekeeping efforts

3 kept a relative peace but failed to return what had been taken

by force. Frustration over the timid U.N. attempts to compel militant Serb cooperation was not

limited to just those Croats who were displaced. A fairly nationalistic, and certainly anti­Yugoslav,

polity developed in Croatia as a result, to the detriment of those opposition parties which would

otherwise prefer a more politically liberal agenda. Meanwhile, the Serbian orchestrators turned the

conflict toward Bosnia­Herzegovina with even greater ferocity. Croatian policy, which the Bosnian

Croats residing in western Herzegovina generally followed, fluctuated between joining Bosnia's

attempt to stop militant Serbs and accepting hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees on the one

hand, and cooperating with Serbia and its militants in dividing Bosnia­Herzegovina along ethnic

lines on the other.

Intervention by the United States in early 1994, mostly of a political nature but with a limited

military effort through NATO against Bosnian Serb militants, halted the war between Bosnian

forces and militant Croats. Croatia's policy turned to retaking its own Serb­occupied areas, which it

did militarily with relative ease in May and August 1995. The Serb population was coerced by its

own leadership to flee en masse to Serb­occupied Bosnia, Serbia or the still­occupied eastern

Slavonian region of Croatia, although harassment by vengeful Croats as they departed, with the tacit

support if not involvement of the military, and the subsequent looting and burning of property, gave

credibility to Serb propaganda. In all, the 1995 exodus included between 150,000 and 200,000

Serbs, about 60,000 of whom settled in Eastern Slavonia and largely took the houses of the more

than 70,000 Croats and others displaced by the conflict in 1991.

4 Croatia's military effort created

momentum for a joint Bosnian­Croat push which retook significant portions of Serb­occupied

Bosnia. Combined with robust NATO air strikes against them, the Bosnian Serb militants that

seemed invincible only months earlier were forced to accept their losses and a settlement negotiated
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for them by Serbian President Milosevic in late 1995 that is popularly known as the Dayton

Agreement.

5

Croatia's first elections as an independent state were held in the context of these dramatic events.

Those for the House of Representatives, and the first direct elections for President, were scheduled

for August 1992 in order to capitalize on the nationalist sentiment in the months following the war

and the recently won recognition as an independent state. The highly unusual timing of elections at

the height of summer and the shortest campaign period legally possible reflected the HDZ's clear

attempt to take every advantage. While every party in power has the right to seek advantages within

the confines of the law, it must also be acknowledged that doing so in this case is not conducive to

the healthy public debate of a campaign which is important in a developing democracy. Moreover,

there were more blatant problems in terms of overt favoritism toward the HDZ in state­run

television and radio, and the lack of transparency in the electoral system. In addition, while Croatia

was complying with promises to grant Serbs and other minority groups representation in parliament,

the granting of formal residency and citizenship in the newly independent state, while

bureaucratically slow all around, seemed particularly difficult for non­Croats, many of whom were

unable to vote as a result. In any event, HDZ power was enhanced by the results.

6 The first

elections for the House of Counties in February 1993, this time scheduled to follow the popular first

attempt to retake territory,

7 also produced an HDZ majority, but local elections produced some

victories for candidates from other political parties.

The October 1995 elections for the House of Representatives similarly were called in the immediate

aftermath of changed circumstances, namely the retaking of most occupied territory. Problems from

1992 which remained were the limited transparency of the electoral system, to the detriment of

confidence in the process and in the media, where broadcast media remained biased and some of the

more critical newspapers had been brought under HDZ control under the guise of privatization. The

HDZ also had the ability to use billboards during the campaign, while opposition parties had to

scramble to keep their posters on the top of endless layers covering walls and trees. There was no

presidential race, but the ballot for proportional party seating listed Franjo Tudjman as the head of

the HDZ, another manipulation that is not necessarily wrong but nevertheless designed to maximize

the ruling party's chances. Similarly, while the massive Serb exodus was used as a pretext to cut that

community's number of designated seats, 12 new seats—almost one­tenth of the chamber—were set

aside for Croatia's "diaspora," which in effect granted voting rights to Bosnia's Croat population.

While the intent—to gain 12 additional seats for the HDZ—was successful, in effect this also

swayed the loyalties of people who were actually citizens of a neighboring country. While overall

HDZ control of the parliament was further strengthened, the party fell just short of the two­thirds

majority needed to make constitutional changes alone, and the HDZ was surprised by the result of

an election for Zagreb's city council, in which other parties together won a majority of the council

seats.

8 Subsequent efforts to install a new mayor were stymied by President Tudjman on four

occasions,

9 and the Constitutional Court blocked his efforts to dissolve the council, leaving the

political struggle in deadlock.

Shortly after the October 1995 elections, negotiations commenced leading to the Dayton Agreement

formally settling the Bosnian conflict. Efforts were underway at the same time to resolve the

situation in Eastern Slavonia. Local Serb leaders, calculating that Serbia would not defend them if

Croatia resorted to retaking the territory by force, were more cooperative, and Croatian authorities

found their interests in a gradual but certain agreement to the region's reintegration and the return of

the displaced population.

10 The result was the Erdut, or Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia,

Baranja, and Western Sirmium,

11 adopted by the local Serb leadership and the Croatian

Government under the mediating efforts of U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith and U.N.

mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg. With agreement of the Security Council in January 1996, a U.N.

Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) was established to be led by Jacques

Klein, an American, who in effect runs the region. With the deployment of about 5,000
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peacekeeping troops, the region was demilitarized, and limited crossings to and from the rest of

Croatia were developed. Part of the U.N. mandate is to oversee local elections, which gave added

impetus to scheduling similar elections throughout the rest of Croatia. The UNTAES mandate was

for 1 year, but, in November 1996, was extended for another 6 months, with an additional 6 months

to complete its withdrawal.

While there have been problems, a settlement regarding Eastern Slavonia that could be

implemented fully without a conflict or a mass exodus and humanitarian crisis as was experienced

elsewhere in Croatia and in Bosnia­Herzegovina. In addition to developing links, including a highly

successful market, between the administered area and the rest of Croatia, as well as cooperative

arrangements in the police force, continuous dialogue produced results regarding citizenship and

property issues. Displaced Croats still could not return permanently, and some Croatian police were

harassed when brought into the region. On the other side, sudden visits by senior Croatian

politicians, including President Tudjman, irked local Serbs, and those Serbs currently in Eastern

Slavonian region who might want to return to their original homes elsewhere in the country found

Croatian authorities less accommodating. Croatian authorities also complicated matters with lists of

persons wanted for committing war crimes during the conflict in Eastern Slavonia, starting with a

long list that was subsequently whittled down at the request of UNTAES. The list has always

excluded persons who would be subject to arrest for crimes committed elsewhere. This effort had a

chilling effect on whatever Serb enthusiasm for reintegration existed.

12 Still, as elections

approached, at least 90 percent of the Serbs who had been residing in the region remained; the

massive exodus feared had so far been avoided.

THE ELECTIONS

On February 12, President Franjo Tudjman formally proclaimed that elections for the House of

Counties of the Croatian Sabor and for country and municipal councils were scheduled for April 13.

Political parties seemed to have had ample time to prepare for the elections, especially since a

preliminary announcement more than a month earlier had indicated election day might be as early

as March 16. In addition, it was clear early on that elections had to be held in Eastern Slavonia, and

Croatia would want countrywide elections at the same time to make clear that Eastern Slavonia was

not a separate political entity within Croatia, but a U.N.­administered area consisting of two,

preexisting counties.

13

The House of Counties has 63 elected seats, with each of the 20 counties given 3 seats and the city

of Zagreb 3 seats. For each county and municipal council, one quarter of the seats would be filled

by candidates running in a majoritarian system, with the one getting the most votes winning.

14 The

remaining seats would be selected according to a proportional system of votes for political parties.

This meant that, across the country, voters would have five ballots, except in Zagreb, where local

elections were only for the city council and voters would therefore only have three. Those persons

who were displaced would receive all the ballots for their original locality at specially designated

polling stations, while those in the military or merchant marine would be entitled to vote only for

the House of Counties. No absentee balloting was permitted, avoiding the great controversy which

occurred in both 1992 and 1995.

This method of balloting, and the ballots themselves, seemed to be clear to the voters, and the

Central Electoral Commission seemed intentionally to choose colors for the ballots, which avoided

any appearance that the voter's choice was being influenced. The only real complaint from political

parties regarded the proportional ballots, where each political party's name was accompanied by the

name of the head of its list. Freedom to choose that name permitted the HDZ to place the name of

the country's president, Franjo Tudjman, on the ballot, which opposition parties claimed would

confuse voters into thinking they were voting in a presidential race. Election officials claimed that

the purpose was really to clarify for the voter which party was which (since many parties have
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similar names and are often referenced only by their acronym). While the opposition's claim may be

exaggerated and that of the election officials may have some validity, it was clear by the campaign

that voters were being swayed into viewing their choice for local councils as a referendum on the

country's leadership.

A lesser complaint regarded alleged gerrymandering. The Croatian authorities were accused of

gerrymandering to the benefit of the HDZ around the Dalmatian port city of Split, while the

Croatian authorities accused the UNTAES of doing this to the benefit of the Serb voting population.

Whether or not these claims were actually true, neither was raised with forceful objections.

Croatia, like other countries in the region, suffers from a plethora of political parties. There are over

60 registered, and almost one­third of them participated in these elections to one degree or another.

Even among the major political parties, there are several whose actual ideological differences seem

negligible. Stemming the confusion, the major opposition parties coalesced into two main coalitions

for the House of Counties races, and virtually all major parties, to varying degrees, jointly supported

specific candidates in local elections. The most prominent were:

The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ): The ruling party in Croatia since 1990. Starting more as a

mass movement under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman to defeat the League of Communists of

Croatia which for over 4 decades held a monopoly of power, the HDZ's power has been enhanced

by the struggle to achieve independence. This, in turn, has helped the HDZ avoid rifts which have

broken up similar mass parties elsewhere in the region, although its success to some extent has

relied on its ability to develop a type of patronage system which rewards loyalties with desired

economic and political positions. As a result, the HDZ has almost supplanted the government in its

influence in Croatian society. The only major split occurred in 1994, when Stjepan Mesic and Josip

Manolic, two powerful figures in their own right, broke from Tudjman over the latter's acceptance

the year before of policies which encouraged a conflict between Bosnian republic forces and

militant Bosnian Croats. While united, today the HDZ seems to consist of two distinct groups,

nationalists and technocrats, which could lead to further splits as the political situation in the

country normalizes.

The Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) and the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS): Leading

opposition parties that formed a coalition for the 1997 elections. The HSLS has been the leading

party in opposition to the HDZ in recent years but has failed to make a major challenge except in

certain local elections. Its members, led by Vladimir Gotovac, include many of the politically liberal

intellectuals in Croatia, but the conflict and occupation of parts of the country compelled them to

adopt certain nationalist stands to maintain credibility with the population. The HSS, led by Zlatko

Tomcic, is a smaller and more conservative party, with a solid base among the rural population. Its

anti­Communist positions helped prevent a wider coalition which would have included the former

Communists.

The Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Croatian Peoples Party (HNS), and the Croatian

Independent Democrats (HND): Another principal coalition in opposition to the HDZ. The SDP is

the direct successor to the League of Communists which held absolute political power from 1945 to

1990. In many respects it has genuinely reformed as a party under the leadership of Ivica Racan,

especially as many abandoned it to join the HDZ to save their careers. Its undemocratic heritage,

however, has been difficult to overcome, especially as the major purge of liberals from its ranks and

the crackdown on the "Croatian Spring" in 1971 by Yugoslavia's Communist dictator, Josip Broz

Tito, remains a vivid memory. Perhaps more negative than its ideological past is its Yugoslav past,

which prevented it, during the period of conflict and occupation, from making a comeback similar

to former Communist parties in other East­Central European countries. With growing

normalization, however, it is experiencing a resurgence, drawing new supporters especially from

younger voters. The HNS, led by Savka Dabcevic­Kucar, previously vied with the HSLS as the

leading party in opposition to the HDZ, with personalities keeping the two apart more than ideology
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and therefore simply dividing those willing to vote for alternatives to the HDZ. It has since become

much less influential. The HND is the party formed by Stjepan Mesic and Josip Manolic, colleagues

of President Tudjman who broke from the HDZ in 1994. While the founders are respected

personalities, the party has failed to draw many supporters from the HDZ or other parties, making a

coalition the most logical path for gaining power.

The Independent Serbian Democratic Party (SDSS): For the elections in Eastern Slavonia, various

political parties among the Serb population cast aside their differences and united in a single party

for the elections, so as not to divide their ethnic vote and hence lose more power to the displaced

Croat vote (most likely for the HDZ) than necessary. The SDSS, led by Borislav Stanimirovic,

represented the dominant position of the Serbs to cooperate in the elections and seek some

accommodation with Croatia, rather than resist reintegration and face a new military confrontation

they likely would lose.

A few other parties, though less important nationally, held the possibility of making gains in some

of the local races. They include the Action of Social­Democrats of Croatia (ASH), the Croatian

Christian Democratic Union (HKDU), and the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), which generally

represent more definite positions to the left and right of the political spectrum than the larger

parties. Certain regional parties also are of importance and popularity in their promotion of local

autonomy, including the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS), the Primorska­Goranska Assembly

(PGS), and the Christian Democrats of Medjimurje (KDM).

15 A Serbian Peoples Party (SNS) also

participated, especially seeking support of Serbs outside of Eastern Slavonia.

During the campaign period, there were few problems for political parties wishing to hold rallies or

engage in other events designed to generate support. Even in Eastern Slavonia, Croatian political

parties, including the HDZ, were permitted to have public events, albeit with specific rules, and the

rallies were conducted without major incidents. The Croatian Party of Rights, however, campaigned

among Croats displaced from the region using an inflammatory flier that claimed each vote for it

meant one fewer "chetnik" in Croatia.

16

Opposition parties seemed to have slightly improved access to billboards for larger campaign

posters than was the case in 1995, with a private company erecting many new billboards. Payment

for such advertising was expensive, and the HDZ had more funds to devote to their use. Campaign

posters appeared on building walls, trees and other public spots, although seemingly in fewer

numbers than previously. Some party supporters advertised by driving around in decorated cars, and

the Croatian Peasants Party used an airplane to carry its banner in the air around Osijek. The HDZ,

fearing loss of popularity, engaged in negative campaigning that would not likely have been

permitted for other political parties. Included among its posters, for example, was a picture of a

young college student being hauled away by two disheveled police officers, in black and white

except for the bright red star on the officer's caps, attempting to smear the SDP by insinuating it

advocates a return to the days of Yugoslavia and Communist rule.

The media was more problematic. Legally, the state­run television and radio are obligated to grant

equal time to all political parties, and did. Coalitions, however, were originally treated as one party,

in effect limiting the message of their constituent parties as a result of their decision to work

together. Lower courts sided with the decision of the Central Electoral Commission, but it was

overturned by the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the attempt to dilute the stronger opposition

parties in the mix of lesser parties indicated that election officials could not be counted upon to

perform their duties impartially.

Beyond the campaign advertisements of the political parties, actual news coverage is usually where

impartiality is more likely to appear. According to the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human

Rights, which has extensively monitored the media coverage of the campaign, the ruling HDZ

received from 60 to 75 percent of the news reporting on the activities of political party candidates
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on the evening television news coverage, while the main opposition parties rarely received more

than 2 percent. Other political programming indicated similar biases, albeit to a somewhat lesser

degree. Watching British television coverage of the campaign taking place at the same time for

national elections in the United Kingdom revealed how far Croatian media still needs to advance.

The same generally applies to state­run radio. There are alternative radio stations, including Radio

101 in Zagreb, but their range and number have been limited. Nevertheless, Radio 101's broadcasts

were sufficiently critical to cause the authorities to attempt to close it in late 1996, prompting a

major demonstration in the Croatian capital. While the authorities withdrew, at the time of the April

1997 elections the station continued to face problems, such as being told to relocate its transmitter

to a location where its broadcast range will be further circumscribed. This action was not

specifically related to the media coverage of the campaign, but the continued attacks on those media

outlets expressing criticism of the regime, both blatant and subtle, cannot help but give pause to

those reporting on election developments.

The print media has a greater degree of diversity, and editorial boards reflect different ideological

views and political preferences. Some Croatian newspapers frankly admit that their articles reflect a

government point of view. Croatian print media should not be viewed in a vacuum, however, as this

would ignore the long­term effects of bringing newspapers and magazines critical of the

government under the control of HDZ supporters. Several independent newspapers and magazines,

most notably Slobodna Dalmacija, have been absorbed by HDZ supporters. Publications which

have maintained their independence the longest are those that are less serious, of which the satirical

tabloid Feral Tribune is the best example. The result is that, for the 1997 elections, only one

newspaper, the Rijeka­based, Novi list, seemed to treat the ruling and opposition parties objectively.

Newspaper coverage of opposition parties, however, is less severely biased than television news

coverage.

All campaigning and campaign coverage was supposed to end 24 hours before the elections, but

Radio 101 sources claimed there were three violations of the "election blackout," two of which were

television programs showing HDZ candidates or rallies, and one newspaper article attacking

opposition party leaders.

For Eastern Slavonia there is not much diversity in political life, and the campaign period was less

like an election than for a referendum, since voting was tantamount to accepting reintegration into

Croatia. In short, even the international community was less interested in how free and fair the

procedures were as in simply getting through the elections successfully, with an outcome that

permits the process of reintegration begun by the Erdut Agreement to continue. Serb political

leaders debated vigorously about whether to encourage a boycott of the elections or to encourage

full participation. Even the week before the elections, it was not entirely clear what would happen.

But, if the Serbs voted on election day, there were no real competing alternatives to the SDSS.

While it is difficult to scrutinize the campaign period in Eastern Slavonia the same as elsewhere in

Croatia, clearly future elections should allow for greater diversity among Serbs and tolerance of

their parties and politicians by Croats as they reintegrate into Croatia.

On election day, the polls opened at 7:00 a.m., and were to remain open for 12 hours, after which

the ballots were counted and sent, along with the tabulations and other information from the polling

committees, to the local Electoral commissions. The local commissions would announce the results

of the county and municipal races while the Central Electoral Commission was mandated to

tabulate and announce the results for the House of Counties. In Eastern Slavonia, general confusion

regarding changes in procedure caused delayed openings at many polling stations, and even on the

second day, when voting was extended there, some opened late. During the night of April 13­14,

polling stations were kept secure by UNTAES peacekeepers standing guard.

Polling committee members were selected from the local community and were not to be affiliated

with any political party. One may reasonably skeptical about this assertion, but those observed on
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election day generally performed in a highly professional manner. In addition, two party

representatives—one from the ruling party and one chosen from among the opposition parties—

were permitted to participate in the proceedings, almost to the point of being committee members

themselves. Furthermore, any party fielding a candidates, or group of voters in the case of

independent candidates, could have a party observer present at the relevant polling stations. This

system was an improvement over that which existed for 1995, when only two observers could be

present, although in practice it seemed as if party representatives and observers were not themselves

entirely clear of their respective roles. Nevertheless, the additional openness seemed to give some

added confidence to the system.

Non­partisan observers, however, were not permitted, except in Eastern Slavonia, where the U.N.

Administrator set the rules. One domestic civic organization, Citizens Organized to Observe the

Vote ("GONG" is its Croatian acronym), sought such permission for all of Croatia but was denied,

despite urging from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, which was assisting

the group, the Helsinki Commission and the U.S. Government. While OSCE States have an

obligation to invite foreign observers for elections held for national offices, OSCE provisions only

declare that domestic observers too "can enhance the electoral process.

17 Nevertheless, those who

do not permit them are asked to explain, especially since the building of a civic consciousness

among citizens is more difficult than the development of partisan ranks to the political parties in

countries undergoing democratic development. The main reason given in this case was space at the

polling station. The Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, Ivan Mrkonjic, claimed that,

with the permission given to party representatives and observers, as many as 40,000 individuals

could claim the right to be at the polling stations for the entire day, and this figure does not include

the polling committees. He added that permitting GONG to observe would open the door for any

one of 1,800 non­governmental organizations to seek permission as well. Finally, the Chairman

pointed to the law as permitting party observers, implying that other domestic observers would not

be permitted, and that the party observers were sufficiently involved to permit adequate observation

of the proceedings.

The reality of polling committee sites on election day bore little resemblance to that theorized by

the Chairman. Rarely were more than three observers present, usually from the HDZ and one or two

leading opposition parties, and space never became so tight that polling committees had to ask

observers to leave. Even if such an occasion would arise, they could not reduce the number of

monitors to less than five. Thus, there was plenty of space for non­partisan observers. Making

matters worse, when GONG members sought to observe the elections from outside polling stations,

police in Karlovac, Zagreb and elsewhere demanded that they leave and warned them that they

could be detained even if found in front of the building. Since the polling committees made no

complaint about the GONG member's presence—and actually intervened with the police to say that

they had no complaint—the act of the police entering a polling station site and removing a citizen

on their own was the questionable act. At most, the police should respond when summoned by the

polling committee or its chair, not on their own volition. The surprisingly hostile attitude of the

authorities toward GONG and non­partisan domestic observers more generally was counter to

Croatia's OSCE declaration that such observers could enhance the credibility of the process.

The approximately 500 foreign observers experienced no difficulties in observing the elections,

except for some obstacles entering Eastern Slavonia. Observers were present under the auspices of

the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary

Assembly, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, and the Congress of Local and Regional

Authorities in Europe. The United States had an official delegation of its own, and supplied

additional observers from American contingents to the OSCE election supervising effort in BosniaHerzegovina. UNTAES also received assistance from a U.N. pool of election observers. Foreign

observers concentrated overwhelmingly in Eastern Slavonia and surrounding areas where displaced

persons would be voting, somewhat to the detriment of observing the balloting taking place in other

parts of the country. Indeed, many analysts pointed to Zagreb as the place needing the most
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observation, given the closeness of the contest for control of the city council and the implications of

the results, despite the fact that capital cities are normally viewed as the least problematic on

election day.

The number of voters in Croatia exceeds 3.6 million, and the 7,539 polling stations seemed

generally adequate to accommodate voter turnout. Voter registration lists seemed much improved

over previous lists, except in Eastern Slavonia, where a special situation prevailed. Excluding very

rural areas where voters were few, each polling station had a list of about 1,000 voters, with

variations between 50 percent smaller and 50 percent larger than that figure. Of the polling stations

observed by the Helsinki Commission observer, the number of people who came to the polling

station who were not on the list only once rose above 50 persons, and was actually much less at

most other stations. These persons could not vote immediately, but did have the option of going to

the municipal authorities—who were working on election day—to receive a certificate entitling

them to vote. Almost all originally turned away were reported to have returned later in the day with

such a certificate; the lowest return rate was 70 percent. The ease with which people seem to have

received the certificate almost brought the process into question; only the vigilance of the local

authorities seemed to stand between ensuring those that had a right to vote could do so and giving a

certificate to a person already voting at one place permitting him or her to do so at another.

Eligible voters included persons originally from Croatia and Bosnian Croat refugees who had

essentially resettled in Croatia, had all intentions of remaining, and had sufficient documentation

permitting them to vote. There is nothing improper about this, except to the extent that ethnic Serbs

originally from Croatia may have faced a far more difficult time in obtaining their documentation.

In many respects, the registration of Serbs in Eastern Slavonia to vote was a more important act

than their actual choice on election day. The Serbs who lived in the occupied areas of the selfproclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina, whether by choice or not, had refused to register

themselves as citizens of Croatia, but the situation in 1997 was vastly different. Many of those who

fled Croatia's retaking of occupied territory now wanted to return, and those originally from Eastern

Slavonia took the same approach. Throughout 1996, Croatia had not been forthcoming in

processing these people, and only a small percentage of people, primarily family reunification cases

in which the Serbs did not return to what were the occupied regions, were given documentation

allowing them to return. On January 13, 1997, however, Croatia issued a "Letter of Intent"

regarding the Serb populations, offering a new chance for reintegration. Included in the Letter was

the promise of documentation and an assurance of employment in areas relating to utilities,

communications and education, as well as a broader representation of the interests of those from

Eastern Slavonia in a Council of Municipalities. Twenty­one administrative offices of the

Government of Croatia were established to process applications for documentation.

The total number of persons registered to vote for elections being held in the region exceeded

130,000; a majority—just under 70,000—were Croats and others who were displaced in 1991, and

voted at special polling stations outside the region. Seventy­five polling stations were established in

Croatia for this balloting. The remainder—over 60,000 voters—were mostly Serbs originally from

the region, most of whom decided to register. About 8,000, however, were Serbs who entered the

region before January 1996 and were eligible to vote for offices representing the region. Five times

that number might have been eligible to vote but did not register. There were 193 polling stations in

Eastern Slavonia. About 1,600 additional Serbs successfully registered to vote for offices in other

regions of the country, and had 30 special polling stations available.

While voter turnout across the country was just over 71 percent, with the lowest for any one county

being about 63 percent, the two counties which cover Eastern Slavonia had the highest turnouts,

together averaging 81.5 percent. Displaced Croats and Serbs from within the region contributed to

this figure, reflecting their interest in controlling local governments. The turnout of displaced Croats

and other non­Serbs was a high 58,000, but the Serb turnout was exceptionally high at almost
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73,000. Unfortunately, the lists of registered voters at polling stations within Eastern Slavonia were

not accurate, and the requirement restricting voting only to those on the voters' list was dropped.

Voting also had to be extended into a second day to accommodate the volume of voters. While this

rightly franchised people who should have been on the lists, the extension created enormous

organizational problems, especially in notifying the polling committees, and it also created a strong

potential for double voting by individuals. Moreover, had the lists in the remainder of Croatia not

been accurate enough to allow all eligible people to vote, allowing some to vote though not on the

list while others were denied, would have raised a more general issue of fairness.

Most of the polling stations observed operated smoothly, except in Eastern Slavonia where

inaccurate lists, the change in procedures and major shortages of ballots caused a major disruption

on the first day. These problems even continued on the second day, including ballot shortages or

polling stations receiving the wrong or misprinted ballots. U.N. officials blamed Croatian

authorities for many of these problems, especially the insufficient or improper delivery of ballots,

and local Serb leaders complained that the irregularities were about to undermine the legitimacy of

the elections. Complaints by the Serb Party, the SDSS, about a county electoral commission

elsewhere convinced Croatia's Constitutional Court to annul the elections for the city council of

Pakrac in Western Slavonia, and new elections were scheduled for that city 2 weeks later.

At polling sites throughout the country, cardboard dividers were available, though not always

maximizing privacy, to allow voters secret balloting, but in many cases, people chose not to use

them. People were observed voting together as a group. As with previous elections in Croatia, there

were no indications that there was an intent to manipulate the result. While Croatian authorities did

not m make a concerted effort to educate the population more about their right to secrecy, group or

open voting was less prevalent than in previous elections. Similarly, the counting of the ballots was

done in an organized manner, albeit with some differences at each polling station. Some polling

committees divided ballots for counting instead of working as a committee, creating the potential

for intentional alteration of the results or at least a greater likelihood of a miscount. Again, there

was no sign that this was an intentional act to manipulate the results, and the practice was not

widespread.

RESULTS

The 71 percent voter turnout was normal for Croatian elections, although the actual voting

population had changed somewhat from earlier elections. For example, while 70,000 Serbs obtained

documentation and voted for the first time in Croatian elections, the diaspora vote of 1995, which

totaled almost 110,000 persons (mostly from Bosnia­Herzegovina), were not eligible to vote in this

election, either because they had no permanent residency in a county and municipality in Croatia, or

because there was no absentee voting for these elections. In addition, the issue of Eastern Slavonia's

reintegration, and perhaps a new stress on local issues, encouraged voter turnout and compensated

for the absence of nationwide contests.

The results for the House of Counties did not change party representation dramatically from that

which has existed since 1993. Representation by the HDZ has increased, and the SDP and the HNS

in coalition made a small but significant gain. Both advances came at the expense of the HSLS and

the HSS, who had a better combined showing in 1993 when they were not in coalition with each

other. The HDZ, in any event retains its absolute majority.

18

The new seats in the House of Counties are as follows:

Party

1993

Seats

1997

Seats

Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 37 40
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HDZ/Croatian Democratic Union KDU)/

Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)/Christian

Democrats of Medjimurje

0 1

Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) 16 1

Croatian Peasants Party (HSS) 5 2

HSLS/HSS Coalition 0 12

Croatian Peoples Party (HNS) 1 0

Social Democratic Party (SDP) 1 0

SDP/HNS Coalition 0 2

SDP/HNS/ Primorsko­Goranski Assembly

(PGS) Coalition

0 2

HSLS/HSS/HNS Coalition 0 1

Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) 3 2

Total 63 63

The HDZ proved successful at the county and municipal levels as well. It won a majority of council

seats in 14 of the 20 counties, plus the city of Zagreb, and received half the seats in another three

counties. In municipal races, it won majorities in 57 councils, relative majorities in another 21,

leaving only 21 others to the domination of other political parties and coalitions. The Zagreb city

council was of particular importance, given the stalemate regarding the selections of a mayor which

has existed since 1995. The HDZ won 24 of the 50 seats on the council, permitting them to obtain a

majority by drawing in a smaller party with seats. Opposition parties effectively won or kept their

majorities in Rijeka, Osijek, Split and Dubrovnik. In Eastern Slavonia, the HDZ won majorities in

17, and the SDSS in 11, of the 28 municipalities.

CONCLUSION

There were areas where improvements had been made in Croatia's electoral process in April 1997,

including the transparency of the process, and the inclusion, really for the first time since 1997, of a

large segment of the Serb population which had broken away in 1991. The efficiency of the system,

particularly in terms of the voter registration lists, was also improved. That said, these

improvements were marginal, and were sufficiently countered by a restricted media and stretching

of the election rules to the advantage of the ruling party. In the end, the free will of the people,

though strongly manipulated, was expressed.

The chaos associated with the balloting in Eastern Slavonia may have no serious long­term effects,

as the results were satisfactory to both sides, and the enormous complexities of the accurate

registration of very different populations, along with the provision of a secure environment for the

participation in the elections, cannot be ignored. Considering the problems with holding the

elections in Eastern Slavonia, the international community should be cautioned about the potential

for quick progress in further implementation of the Erdut Agreement, especially the return of

displaced Croats to the region and the complementary voluntary resettlement of those Serbs not

from Eastern Slavonia to their original homes.

Prior to the April 1997 elections, Vesna Pusic of the University of Zagreb and currently with

Georgetown University, told an audience at a Helsinki Commission briefing that the elections are
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not for the most important positions, but they are important nonetheless "because they come at a

time of Croatia's second transition ... from wartime politics to peacetime politics ... and from more

of an authoritarian kind of regime with limited pluralism and strong control over the media through

... a negotiated transition, to a democratic type of political system... By negotiated transition, I mean

a political change that comes through some basic agreement among all the different political

players, and the basic agreement would be that everybody would abide by the democratic rules of

the game, that everybody would actually respect election results and democratic procedures... These

elections will really show whether all the political players are prepared to enter the negotiated

transition."

19

There is little doubt that this transition is taking place, and the ruling party, the opposition parties

and the people generally seem to be conscious of it. Awareness, however, does not translate into

preparedness, as Pusic notes, and the transition may in fact be slower than many outside analysts

expect. First, the conflict has passed, but its remnants are very much apparent: the gutted buildings,

the empty villages, the tens of thousands who continue to be displaced. The segment of the Croatian

population that must live in this setting—or anybody who would have to face it daily—cannot

engage in the enlightened analysis of who did what and why, and where to go from here, if the

analysis ignores their own personal victimization. Issues like human rights for all citizens, and

social reconciliation for the sake of a better future, are not yet popular campaign themes.

The HDZ, as a result, is undeniably still popular for all its faults, and despite the low opinion the

public claims to have of it. Party controls over important aspects of Croatian society demonstrate its

ability to sustain itself. The media, for example, regularly paints the process which is, in fact, the

reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia, as one in which Zagreb makes one concession after

another. The HDZ has been willing to cooperate in this process beyond most analysts' expectations,

but it knows that presenting dark images of the country's Yugoslav past and the struggle for

independence makes the present look brighter. The intentional portrayal of Croatian authorities as

being pressured by the international community to be conciliatory indicates that the willingness of

these authorities to cooperate with the international community is not necessarily genuine.

Perhaps the opposition that claims to want it a transition in Croatian politics needs to be the first to

make a transition of its own. As one Croatian newspaper commented, "These elections proved that

it is still unknown which party is the second strongest. The HSLS has lost this position, the HSS has

never had it, and the SDP has not yet managed to retrieve it."

20 The SDP came out of the April

1997 elections with the greatest gains, a positive sign that its castigation by the HDZ as a Yugonostalgic group of people responsible for denying Croats their rights and freedoms for decades is

losing effect. Still, the SDP has a long way to go, with or without the other opposition parties,

before it can successfully challenge the HDZ, and it could easily fail as well. There is a better

chance that reformers within the HDZ, if they are not bought off, could do more in the short­term to

move the country through the transition than the opposition.

The Serb population has little influence on the course of this transition, except to the extent that its

own radicals believe they can resist reintegration and try to do so. As UNTAES prepares to leave,

an existing OSCE Mission in Croatia is expected to fill the gap in the reintegration of Eastern

Slavonia and its current population. This task will be difficult but also necessary for Croatia's

transition to proceed.

In conclusion, as Croatia prepares for presidential elections, a political transition will continue. As

the country grows more confident as an independent state and seeks integration into European

institutions like the European Union and NATO, it should move closer to becoming a democracy.

Croatia's obvious potential as a viable civil and democratic society, based on its Western orientation,

is, in fact, what leads to so much disappointment by observers of the conduct of Croatian elections.

The additional problems that will certainly arise on the way are less predictable. The international
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community must continue to watch the situation closely and to react as necessary to keep the

situation moving positively and peacefully.

NOTES

1 Almost 600,000 persons, or 12 percent of Croatia's total population, according to the 1991 census.

While spread throughout the republic, and consisting of many who came during the Communist

period since World War II, this community had concentrations, though not necessarily the majority

of local populations, in the "Krajina" region with the fortress city of Knin as its center, as well as in

parts of western and eastern Slavonia.

2 Slovenia actually led the way in declaring independence at the same time, but that republic's final

confrontation with Yugoslav authority was brief and with relatively few casualties.

3 Known first as the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which actually was deployed in BosniaHerzegovina and Macedonia as well. In early 1995, the deployments were separated, creating the

U.N. Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) with a new mandate that focused more heavily on

the occupied areas' borders with Serb­occupied regions of Bosnia­Herzegovina and with Serbia

itself.

4 A few Serbs did remain in Croatia, mostly elderly persons, some of whom were harassed and even

killed as Croats returned to the area.

5 The agreement was negotiated at Wright­Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, and was

formally brought into effect when signed by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian

President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Paris, France on December

14, 1995.

6 For greater details on these elections, see: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in an Independent Croatia, August 1992.

7

In January 1993, a Croatian offensive sought to retake the areas around Maslenica bridge near

Zadar, and the Peruca dam to the south.

8 For more on these elections and the context in which they were held, see: Commission on Security

and Cooperation in Europe, 1995 Parliamentary Elections in Croatia, February 1996, and OSCE

Parliamentary Assembly, Report on the Elections to the House of Representatives in the Republic of

Croatia, November 1995.

9 The President of the Republic does have legal authority to reject the nominee for the capital city's

mayor.

10 The pre­war population of Eastern Slavonia was about 194,000, 44 percent of whom were

Croats, 33 percent Serbs, and the remaining 21 percent Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Yugoslavs

and others. Today, the number of persons displaced from the region stands at about 80,000, while

the population inside the region is generally believed to be about 140,000, almost evenly divided

between Serbs originally residing there and Serbs who fled the retaking of the Krajina region

previously held by militant Serbs.

11 Erdut is a small town in Eastern Slavonia just across the Danube from Serbia. Baranja and

Western Sirmium are regions within Eastern Slavonia which, for the purposes of this report, are

considered part of Eastern Slavonia. Croatian officials will often use "Danubian region" to describe
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Eastern Slavonia, in order to stress the artificial and temporary existence of the region as a distinct

political entity.

12 For a critical review of the lists of war crime suspects, see: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki,

Croatia: Human Rights in Eastern Slavonia During and After the Transition of Authority, April

1997.

13 Eastern Slavonia's Serb leaders had sought to establish Eastern Slavonia as a political entity, but

Croatian authorities steadfastly refused to abandon the principle that the region consisted of two

counties that were occupied by force in 1991.

14 Elsewhere, such races are complicated by requiring the winner to receive over half the votes,

forcing a second round between the two leading candidates one or two weeks later,

15

Istria is a large peninsula and county on the northeast Adriatic coast. Primorska­Goranska is a

region and country next to Istria and the border with Slovenia. Medjimurje is a region and county in

the far north near the border with Slovenia and Hungary.

16

"Chetniks" were Serb forces formed in the Serbian kingdom during the 19th century, as well as

anti­fascist fighters supporting the reinstallation of the Serb monarchy to Yugoslavia during World

War II who were subsequently defeated by the Communist Partisans of Josip Broz Tito. Today,

some militant Serbs claim the name, but Croats, Bosniacs, and other non­Serbs in the region often

use the term derogatorily for Serbs as a whole.

17 Copenhagen Document of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (now OSCE),

June 1990.

18

In 1993, the President of the republic was entitled to choose five additional members of the

chamber. For 1997, this was cut to three, with the other two given to the Serb community to fill as

part of the effort to reintegrate Serbs in the country's political life.

19 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Current Situation in Croatia, March

21, 1997.

20Mirjana Kasapovic, "HDZ Triumphant, SDP Successful, HSLS and HSS in Crisis, and HNS

Disastrous," Globus, April 18, 1997.