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FISCAL YEAR 2007 DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND

THE BYRNE GRANT, HIDTA, AND OTHER LAW

ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS: ARE WE JEOPARDIZING FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL COOPERATION?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 23, 2006

Serial No. 109–208

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

DAVID MARIN, Staff Director

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Deputy Staff Director

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

DIANE E. WATSON, California

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director

JIM KAISER, Professional Staff Member

MALIA HOLST, Clerk

TONY HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 23, 2006 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Brooks, Ron, president, National Narcotics Officers’ Associations’ Coalition; and Director, Northern California HIDTA; Tom Carr, Director,

Washington-Baltimore HIDTA; Tom Donahue, Director, Chicago

HIDTA; Abraham Azzam, Director, Southeast Michigan HIDTA; and

John Burke, Director, Southwest Ohio Regional Drug Task Force

[SWORD] ....................................................................................................... 60

Azzam, Abraham ....................................................................................... 92

Brooks, Ron ................................................................................................ 60

Burke, John ............................................................................................... 97

Carr, Tom ................................................................................................... 75

Donahue, Tom ............................................................................................ 81

Schofield, Regina, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs

[OJP], U.S. Department of Justice; Stuart Nash, Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task

Force [OCDETF], U.S. Department of Justice; and Scott Burns, Deputy

Director for State and Local Affairs, Office of National Drug Control

Policy .............................................................................................................. 14

Burns, Scott ............................................................................................... 38

Nash, Stuart .............................................................................................. 29

Schofield, Regina ....................................................................................... 14

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Azzam, Abraham, Director, Southeast Michigan HIDTA, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 94

Brooks, Ron, president, National Narcotics Officers’ Associations’ Coalition, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 63

Burke, John, Director, Southwest Ohio Regional Drug Task Force

[SWORD], prepared statement of ................................................................ 100

Burns, Scott, Deputy Director for State and Local Affairs, Office of National Drug Control Policy, prepared statement of .................................... 39

Carr, Tom, Director, Washington-Baltimore HIDTA, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 78

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 7

Donahue, Tom, Director, Chicago HIDTA; Abraham Azzam, Director,

Southeast Michigan HIDTA, prepared statement of ................................. 84

Nash, Stuart, Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF], U.S. Department of Justice, prepared statement of ....................................................... 31

Schofield, Regina, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs

[OJP], U.S. Department of Justice, prepared statement of ....................... 17

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2007 DRUG CONTROL BUDGET

AND THE BYRNE GRANT, HIDTA, AND

OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS:

ARE WE JEOPARDIZING FEDERAL, STATE

AND LOCAL COOPERATION?

TUESDAY, MAY 23, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Schmidt, Cummings, Davis,

Watson, Ruppersberger, and Norton.

Staff present: Jim Kaiser, professional staff member and counsel;

Malia Holst, clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel; and Jean

Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. I thank you all for coming. This hearing is part of a series

of oversight hearings regarding the President’s budget proposals for

drug control programs and will focus on the President’s proposed

changes in this area.

The administration released its budget proposal for all Federal

programs for fiscal year 2007 in February. One of the most significant policies reflected in that budget is a proposal to cut most Federal support for State and local drug enforcement. Among other

things, the administration has proposed terminating the State formula grants portion of the Byrne grants to State and local law enforcement; reducing funding for the HIDTA program and transferring remaining funds to the Justice Department’s Organized Crime

Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF], program; cutting the

Meth Hot Spots program administered by the Justice Department’s

Community Oriented Policing Services [COPS], office by more than

30 percent; and reducing funding for the Counterdrug Technology

Assessment Center [CTAC], by 70 percent, while completely eliminating the Technology Transfer Program.

The subcommittee shares some of the administration’s concerns

about the potential of excessive or misdirected Federal support to

local agencies. Congress must be careful not to make State and

local agencies too dependent on Federal dollars, as these agencies

must remain under the control of and responsive to the needs of

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State and local taxpayers. State and local governments have a responsibility to fund their own counternarcotics efforts as well.

Yet it does not follow that all Federal assistance to State and

local agencies lacks national impact. State and local law enforcement personnel are fighting on the front lines in the struggle to

stop drug trafficking. They make over 90 percent of drug-related

arrests and seizures and have a wealth of intelligence that could

be very valuable if shared with Federal authorities. Federal assistance to these agencies can have a major positive impact by involving them in the national goals of enforcement, treatment and prevention.

The goal of these proposals was, is and always should be to maximize the efforts of Federal and State and local law enforcement

narcotics efforts through mutual cooperation. It was not to have

one dominate the other. We hope at this hearing to address these

broader issues and to review the administration’s specific proposals

for certain key programs.

First among them is the HIDTA program. This program was created in 1990 to help reduce the Nation’s overall supply of illegal

drugs by bringing them together, Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies in the most significant regions, each referred to

as a HIDTA, where drugs are created, smuggled or distributed.

Under current law the Director of ONDCP may designate certain

areas as HIDTAs, making them eligible for Federal funding. That

funding is administered locally by an executive board made up of

equal representation of Federal agencies on one side and State and

local agencies on the other. As the program’s budget has grown from only $25 million at its inception to $227 million in fiscal year 2006, the number of designated regions has grown as well. From the initial 5 HIDTAs in

1990, the program expanded to 28 HIDTAs, and the pressure remains in Congress to create even more of them. By the way, one

of the major reasons that pressure occurred is because of the administration’s lack of response on meth. And most of the new

HIDTAs had to deal with meth, and what looked like an attempt

by Congress to expand the number of HIDTAs was actually because of the lack of response and how to address the meth problem.

The administration has come up with two proposals: One, to cut

the program’s budget from the fiscal year 2006 enacted level of

$227 million to $208 million; two, to transfer the HIDTA program

from ONDCP to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task

Force [OCDETF], a Department of Justice program. If enacted, this

latter proposal would effectively terminate the current HIDTA program.

First, the program cannot and should not be transferred in whole

or in part to OCDETF without authorizing legislation. Such legislation is needed to define the goals of the program and the means

of its implementation.

Second, the subcommittee is troubled by the serious disruption of

drug enforcement activities in the individual HIDTAs that this

sweeping proposal would create, at least in the short term. It would

be most inadvisable for the Federal Government to take action that

drives away State and local collaboration. And as we heard last

year, they fully intend to completely withdraw.

3

Today’s hearing will also review the CTAC program, which was

established in 1990 to oversee and coordinate the Federal Government’s antidrug research and development. The administration is

requesting only $9.6 million for the CTAC program, a steep decline

from the $30 million requested for fiscal year 2006 and the $29.7

million appropriated by Congress. The proposed decreases would

cut the research program from $14 million to $9.6 million, while

completely eliminating the Technology Transfer Program. The program is certainly in need of direction and oversight. ONDCP has

not yet demonstrated that the Technology Transfer Program supports national goals reducing overall drug trafficking and improving interagency communication and cooperation. Such dramatic

cuts, however, do not amount to reform. As with HIDTA, the subcommittee intends to review the CTAC program and its future as

it continues its oversight of ONDCP.

The subcommittee has concerns about the proposed reduction in

the COPS Meth Hot Spots dedicated to law enforcement activities

against methamphetamine trafficking. Methamphetamine abuse

has ravaged communities across the United States and put severe

strains on State and local law enforcement agencies forced to find

clandestine drug labs, clean up the environmental damage they

create, and arrest the drug traffickers who operate them. To assist

these overburdened agencies, Congress approved $52.6 million in

fiscal year 2005 and $63.6 million in fiscal year 2006, once again

because the administration wasn’t taking any action. The administration is requesting only $40.1 million for fiscal

year 2007, a cut of more than 30 percent from appropriated funds

for 2006. This would greatly reduce the ability of the State and

local law enforcement agencies to help their Federal partners in reducing methamphetamine abuse, particularly given the proposed

overall reduction in State and local law enforcement assistance

grants.

The subcommittee also has serious concerns about the administration proposal to terminate the State grants component of the

Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants programs. Congress already complied with the administration’s request to consolidate previously separate grants programs into the single Byrne

grants program. The administration now proposes to eliminate

$416.5 million that Congress appropriated last year for the Byrne

grants and to restrict Federal aid to a series of enumerated grants,

most of which are previously existing programs under a Justice assistance account. In practice, this will sharply limit the amount of

money available to help State and local agencies.

We have quite a mix of witnesses with us today, and we would

especially like to welcome all the representatives of Federal, State

and local law enforcement who are joining us. From the Department of Justice, on our first panel we will hear from Regina

Schofield, Assistant Attorney General at the Office of Justice Programs, who will discuss the Byrne grants, COPS and other similar

Justice assistance programs; Stuart Nash, Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of OCDETF, who will discuss the proposed transfer and restructuring of the HIDTA program; also hear

from Scott Burns, ONDCP Deputy Director for State and Local Affairs.

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We appreciate all of the State and local representatives who are

with us on the second panel. Coming in today we will again welcome Ron Brooks, president of the National Narcotics Officers’ Associations’ Coalition and Director of the Northern California

HIDTA; Tom Carr, the Director of the Washington-Baltimore

HIDTA; Tom Donahue, Director of the Chicago HIDTA; Abraham

Azzam, Director of the Southeast Michigan HIDTA; and John

Burke, Director of the Southwest Ohio Regional Drug Task Force,

SWORD.

Before we get started I would also like to note that congratulations are in order for one of our witnesses. We got word last week

that Tom Carr’s wife recently gave birth to a baby boy, Taggart

Hunter Carr. That is wonderful news, and we are all happy for you

and your family.

Again, we thank you all for coming from so many places across

the country to be here today. We look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I, too, want to congratulate my

good friend Tom Carr. And you know, Tom, I think it was Frost

said—Robert Frost says that every time a child is born, it is God’s

affirmation that the world should continue.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding today’s very important hearing on the President’s budget request for several vital

law enforcement programs that contribute to the National Drug

Control Strategy.

A policy brief prepared last year by Carnevale Associates offered

the following analysis of the President’s fiscal year 2006 drug budget, and it said, the administration’s proposed budget of $12.4 billion

for drug control for fiscal year 2006 portends major changes in Federal drug control policy. The request increases funding for overseas

programs to curb the flow of drug from abroad and enhances border control. It also proposes a net decline in funding for demand

reduction programs, reduces or eliminates certain State and local

law enforcement programs, and shifts more responsibility for local

drug control to its State and local government partners.

To its credit, the Congress largely rejected the approach outlined

in the President’s budget last year, but the administration proposes

more of the same for fiscal year 2007. The President’s fiscal year

2007 drug budget would further shift the emphasis from demand

reduction to supply reduction, and it repeats several proposals that

would sharply undermine State and local drug enforcement efforts

and Federal-State-local partnerships.

The fiscal year 2007 request devotes 35.5 percent to demand reduction and 64.5 percent to supply reduction. By comparison, the

Federal Government spent 47 percent and 53 percent for these

functions respectively in 2001. And as you know, Mr. Chairman, I

have been a vocal advocate for expanding access to drug treatment

because we have proof that it works not just in reducing and curtailing drug use, but in decreasing all of the negative consequences

of drug abuse and the drug trade, including violent crime. The

President’s budget neglects prevention and treatment in favor of

supply reduction programs that have yet to demonstrate a sustained impact on the availability of drugs on U.S. streets.

5

Even within the category of supply reduction, there has been a

marked shift in the proportion of funds diverted to efforts beyond

U.S. borders as compared to programs that support effective cooperation among Federal, State and local law enforcement within

our borders. Overall the request would increase funding for interdiction and international supply reduction programs by 7.1 percent

and 12.6 percent respectively, while support for domestic law enforcement would increase by just 1.6 percent.

One of my major concerns involves the President’s proposal for

the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program presently administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. I am

most disappointed that the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget restates last year’s proposal to move the HIDTA program out of

ONDCP to the Justice Department under the control of the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force program. I thought

we sent a very clear message last year, and it seems as if we have

to continue to send that message.

Whereas the fiscal year 2006 budget proposed to cut HIDTA

funding by $128 million, more than half, by the way, the fiscal year

2007 proposal is a relatively modest $16.4 million decrease. Still

this would allow for level funding for all HIDTAs, while eliminating discretionary funds to respond to urgent threats. However,

there has been no indication from Justice concerning how it plans

to allocate funding among the HIDTAs. In fact, we have yet to hear

from Justice that moving HIDTA there would be wise or even desirable from its point of view.

I remain troubled that the 2006 strategy, while stating that the

intent of the proposed move is to refocus the program, provides no

explanation of how this change will make the program more effective and efficient. To date there has been no assurance from

ONDCP or Justice that the HIDTA program, if moved, would retain the unique characteristics that enable it to foster effective,

peer-level partnerships among participating Federal, State and

local agencies.

In 2005, a bipartisan coalition of members joined the National

HIDTA Directors Association in strongly opposing last year’s proposal, and this year’s proposal has already received a similar response from those who know the program best.

I am glad that we will hear today from several HIDTA Directors

including Mr. Tom Carr, who supervises the Baltimore-Washington, or Washington-Baltimore, HIDTA, an organization that makes

such a vital contribution to drug enforcement efforts in and beyond

my congressional district in Maryland, and one who—which has

done an outstanding job, and one that, like many other HIDTAs,

have brought State, local, and Federal officials together to effectively and efficiently fight that drug trafficking.

Apart from HIDTA, the President proposes to cut ONDCP’s funding of the Counter Drug Technology Assessment Center by $20.1

million. This 68 percent decrease from fiscal year 2007 appropriated amounts reflects the proposed elimination of CTAC’s Technology Transfer Program, which provides State and local law enforcement agencies with valuable equipment and training for deployment and operations.

6

The President’s request also repeats last year’s proposal to eliminate or reduce funding for key drug control programs within the

Department of Justice that support Federal, State and local cooperation. The request proposes to eliminate the Edward Byrne

Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program, which allows States

and local governments to support a broad range of activities, to

prevent and control crime, and to improve the criminal justice system.

The President proposes a more than one-third reduction in funding for the COPS Meth Hot Spots program, which allocates money

for problem-oriented policing to combat the use and distribution of

meth labs, including child endangerment programs, enforcement,

drug courts, training and treatment.

Like last year, the administration proposes to reduce funding for

the Drug Enforcement Administration Mobile Enforcement Teams,

through which DEA provides assistance to State and local law enforcement to address small toxic labs operating throughout the

country, and to eliminate the DEA’s demand reduction program.

Funding for the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws also

would be eliminated under the President’s request.

Mr. Chairman, in my view, the President’s plan to eliminate or

scale back these vital programs raises serious questions about the

depth of the administration’s commitment to reducing domestic demand for illegal drugs and supporting State and local drug enforcement efforts. Open to question is how vigorously ONDCP, as the

primary shaper of Federal drug control policy, has asserted its

budget certification authority to defend and support programs that

advance all three pillars of the National Drug Control Strategy.

And finally, today’s hearing provides an opportunity to question

administration officials and some of the Nation’s most dedicated

and knowledgeable law enforcement professionals concerning the

policy decisions and priorities reflected in the President’s fiscal

year 2007 drug control budget about how data and performance effectiveness measures informed those decisions and priorities, and

about whether the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget adequately

supports the President’s three-pillared strategy.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank all of our speakers and

guests for being with us today, and I look forward to their testimony. With that I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

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8

9

10

11

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Mr. SOUDER. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

holding this most important hearing on funding one of the key components of our Nation’s fight against crime and drugs.

Adequate funding for essential programs within the Department

of Justice is part of the many steps this Congress must take in

helping eliminate danger on our streets. Drugs are the root cause

of a significant amount of crime nationwide. Funding efforts to

eliminate drug trafficking and use should be at the forefront of our

national agenda.

Unfortunately, the President’s budget for fiscal year 2007 eliminates many important youth violence and gang prevention programs. Among the casualties are funding for the Byrne grants intended to help State and local law enforcement control violent and

drug-related crimes, funding for community-oriented policing programs that provide temporary grants to local police departments to

hire additional officers, funding for juvenile accountability block

grants intended to help States and localities improve their juvenile

justice system, and funding for programs designed to reintegrate

youthful offenders into their communities.

This is dangerously short-sighted. How are we to address the

growing threat of youth and gang violence when the President’s

budget removes most of the Federal Government spending and

drug prevention programs? In my own county, Los Angeles County,

the use of semiautomatic handguns in gang-related killings has

quadrupled. And a National League of Cities survey concluded that

72 percent of school violence is attributed to gang activity.

And I have a gun shop right in the middle of my district, in

walking distance from a local middle school, that is out of compliance, and they just received a permit to continue to sell the guns.

They are operating there legally, and they have been there 15

years. And I am very, very concerned about that because where you

have guns and ammunition, you have drugs, and that will start a

decline in the community. You go away 10 to 20 years, and that

community will be annihilated.

So in its most disturbing manifestation, the reach of gangs and

crime has just not become national, but international in scope. We

all must be on guard and concerned by these disturbing trends in

crime and drugs.

And so I want to thank again the Chair, and I want to thank

those sitting at the table for your willingness to come and testify

in order for us, all of us, to understand the dire need for the primary tools of our drug control and crime prevention policy to be

adequately funded. This subcommittee will do everything in its

power, I know, to help you get, and those others out there, the

proper funding to fight the rampant crime problems in these

United States. So I want you to please continue your diligent efforts to remove these detrimental activities from our communities.

And I yield back and, again, thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you and Mr.

Cummings. I wish more people in Congress would focus on this

drug narcotics issue, and I am sure you do, too. Thank you for your

leadership.

13

I agree with the chairman that the Federal dollars must not be

wasted and that the Federal dollars that are used for these purposes are used to supplement, not replace, State and local funding

sources. Just like last year, we are here once again discussing the

administration’s plan to cut or eliminate most Federal support for

State and local enforcement efforts.

Now, I also believe that for the programs that have demonstrated

their worth, shown to be effective and serve local and national priorities, these programs should be continued. In order to address deficiencies in any of these programs, redesigning or reforming the

programs should be the first option before cutting or dismantling.

In hearing after hearing we have heard from HIDTA personnel

that the program is successful, and that drastically reducing funds

for this program and moving it to the Department of Justice will

do irrevocable damage to State and local law enforcement

counterdrug efforts.

I am still not convinced by the argument that cutting HIDTA

funding and moving what is left to Department of Justice will be

better at keeping drugs off the street than we are doing right now.

And again, like last year, the administration wished to cut all the

funding for the Byrne grants programs. These grants are vital to

State and local law enforcement agencies. The drug war will always be fought at the local level on our city streets, in suburban

neighborhoods and in rural communities. This grant program encourages cooperation at all levels and allows communities to develop unique solutions for their own unique set of problems.

Now, in my old days, when I was a lot younger, I was an investigative prosecutor. I did a lot of drug work, and we found to be

most effective when we could have Federal, State and local working

as a team and having the sources that we worked that, getting the

money from the Federal Government, because we found in most situations that it just wasn’t within one jurisdiction. It was throughout the country. And I think it is a big mistake.

Another issue, and I am very concerned with and I will say it

here, it might not be as relevant, is the issue of terrorism. We have

to deal with the issue of terrorism. I am on the Intelligence Committee. I probably know as much as anybody about how serious

that is. But we are taking moneys and resources away from drugs,

and it is going to hurt us. You know, 85 percent of all violent crime

is drug-related, and we have to keep our focus and keep our eye

on the ball and keep the resources coming to the State and local

if we are going to be effective in our battle against drugs.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing, and I yield back

the balance of my time. Before I do that, though, before I yield, I

do want to acknowledge Tom Carr, Director of HIDTA WashingtonBaltimore. I have to go to another hearing now so I won’t be able

to hear his testimony, but we acknowledge our locals. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the gentleman for his tremendous interest

in this subject.

I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative

days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing

record, and that any answers to written questions provided by the

witnesses also be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

14

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents and

other materials referred to by the Members and the witnesses may

be included in the hearing record, and that all Members be permitted to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, it is

so ordered.

Our first panel is composed of the Honorable Regina Schofield,

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs at the U.S.

Department of Justice; the Honorable Stuart Nash, Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Organized Crime Drug

Enforcement Task Force at the U.S. Department of Justice; and the

Honorable Scott Burns, Deputy Director of State and Local Affairs

at Office of National Drug Control Policy.

As an oversight committee it is our standard practice to ask witnesses to testify under oath. So if you would stand and raise your

right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that each of the witnesses responded in the affirmative.

I thank you for coming, and we will start with Ms. Schofield.

STATEMENTS OF REGINA SCHOFIELD, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS [OJP], U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; STUART NASH, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY

ATTORNEY GENERAL AND DIRECTOR, ORGANIZED CRIME

DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE [OCDETF], U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND SCOTT BURNS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR

FOR STATE AND LOCAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF NATIONAL

DRUG CONTROL POLICY

STATEMENT OF REGINA SCHOFIELD

Ms. SCHOFIELD. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings and Ms. Watson, I am Regina

Schofield, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice

Programs. I am pleased to be here this afternoon on behalf of the

Attorney General, the U.S. Department of Justice, and especially

the Office of Justice Programs to discuss the President’s fiscal year

2007 drug control budget and his larger budget request.

Through my work at the Department of Health and Human

Services, I learned of the devastating impact of substance abuse on

our children, family and communities. My time at OJP has reinforced that understanding. I want to assure the subcommittee that

I share its commitment to eliminate illegal drugs and drug abuse.

I realize that much of the subcommittee’s focus today is on the

Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program [JAG].

As you’re aware the President’s budget does not include funding for

JAG, consistent with our fiscal year 2006 request. I recognize the

concern that this raises among Members of Congress, law enforcement and other interested parties. The decision to eliminate JAG

was not made lightly. Given the current fiscal limitations we are

all facing and the need to focus our resources on combating terrorism, the choice we made, while difficult, was necessary.

I ask that the JAG decision be looked at with the understanding

that the program represents less than 1 percent of the funding

spent by State and local governments on law enforcement. The deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Mar 05, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32440.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
15

cision should also be examined in the context of our overall budget

request. We have asked for over $1.2 billion in discretionary grant assist- ance to State and local governments, including $66.6 million to

strengthen our communities through programs providing services

such as drug treatment. We would target those resources toward

programs where we believe they can have the greatest impact. We have requested $69.1 million for our Drug Court Discre- tionary Grant program, which is a $59.3 million increase over the

fiscal year 2006 level. Drug courts use the power of the court to effectively integrate substance abuse treatment, mandatory drug

testing, sanctions and incentives, and transitional services for nonviolent substance-abusing offenders. Our fiscal year 2007 request

would allow us to provide funding for more than 100 drug courts,

which include starting new drug courts and improving existing

ones. Our request will also provide training for hundreds more

drug courts.

I have included many other examples from our budget request in

my written testimony, which I ask be submitted for the record. In

our budget request, we have also targeted initiatives that allow us

to work together with State and local law enforcement to make the

most of our limited resources, not just by working harder, but by

working smarter. Our Regional Information-Sharing Systems program [RISS], helps local police working with State and Federal

partners identify and share criminal intelligence. We currently

have more than 7,300 member RISS agencies nationwide.

The training and technical assistance we provide is another way

to make an impact with limited dollars. Training and technical assistance builds knowledge and expands capacity in the field, but it

can also be the key to helping States and localities leverage or even

save limited training dollars. This year OJP will develop a National

Drug Endangered Children Resource Center, which will provide

critical information to the Federal Government, States and local

communities on how to best help children that have been hurt by

drugs, including methamphetamine.

We also support the Center for Task Force Training, or CenTF,

which provides training for law enforcement on drug task force

management and investigative techniques. In response to law enforcement demand, we more than tripled the number of meth training courses offered nationwide during 2004 and 2005 for a total of

up to 12 courses. Working together with State and local law enforcement, we have developed performance measures to gauge effectiveness of drug task forces. This was done through a partnership with the National Narcotics Officers’ Associations’ Coalition.

The new performance measures will not only help State and local

law enforcement evaluate these task forces, but also help us to plan

and operate them more effectively.

The Coalition is one of many law enforcement organizations with

which we have a close relationship. We are also in constant contact

with State and local law enforcement agencies so that we can help

them do their jobs more effectively.

The administration, and specifically the Department of Justice,

share a commitment with our State and local law enforcement

partners to making America’s communities safe and secure. Both

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our current activities and our fiscal year 2007 proposed budget reflect these priorities. Thank you again for the opportunity to be

here today, and I would welcome the opportunity to answer any

questions.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Schofield follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Nash.

STATEMENT OF STUART NASH

Mr. NASH. Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings and

distinguished Members of Congress, I am pleased to appear before

you today.

Before I proceed, I want to thank this subcommittee for its

strong commitment to oversight of the Nation’s drug enforcement

efforts.

As you know, the President’s budget request proposes transferring the HIDTA program from the Office of National Drug Control

Policy to the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice

views the President’s proposal as a tremendous opportunity for

DOJ and HIDTA to forge an enduring and productive partnership.

In our view, HIDTA’s ability to marshal the skills and intelligence of Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies and to

coordinate those efforts in a manner conducive to the law enforcement landscape in particular areas of the country has led to important successes in the drug enforcement field. The transfer of

HIDTA to the Department of Justice would allow both HIDTA and

DOJ to pursue drug enforcement more effectively. The transfer

would permit more comprehensive coordination, enhanced

deconfliction, more extensive intelligence sharing, and more effective strategic planning between HIDTA initiatives and the drug enforcement efforts being pursued by the Department of Justice.

Several misconceptions have arisen as to what the President’s

proposal entails. First and foremost, the President’s proposal is not

a proposal to merge the HIDTA program with OCDETF. OCDETF,

as you know, is the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task

Force program, and it is the centerpiece of DOJ’s drug control efforts. OCDETF is charged with coordinating all the elements of the

Federal Government involved in drug enforcement, including DOJ,

the Department of Treasury, and the Department of Homeland Security in concerted efforts against the largest national and international drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations.

If the HIDTA program were to be transferred to DOJ, DOJ has

committed that HIDTA would be administered as a freestanding

program completely independent of OCDETF. In this connection, I

think it is necessary to explain my own status as a witness here

today. I am Director of the OCDETF program; however, I am also

Associate Deputy Attorney General serving on the Deputy Attorney

General’s staff, and advising him on all matters related to counternarcotics and asset forfeiture policy. It is in that second role that

I am here testifying today, on behalf of Deputy Attorney General

Paul McNulty as his counternarcotics advisor. The fact that I also

happen to be the Director of OCDETF should not be taken as any

kind of signal that, contrary to our specific representations,

OCDETF would somehow be involved in DOJ’s management of the

HIDTA program.

Another misconception regarding the President’s proposal is, if

granted management of HIDTA, that the Department of Justice

would impose rigid centralized controls over the program, depriving

the individual HIDTAs of their ability to tailor their operations to

the needs of their specific geographic areas. DOJ recognizes that

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HIDTA is specifically designed to allow State and local law enforcement to participate equally with Federal agencies in defining the

local drug threats and to craft localized solutions to combat those

threats. Decentralized decisionmaking is woven into the very

makeup of the HIDTA program.

Finally, there is a misconception that DOJ would use its stewardship of the HIDTA program to unfairly direct HIDTA assets to

benefit drug enforcement activities pursued by the DOJ components to the exclusion of the State and locals. However, DOJ has

committed to the bedrock principle that Federal agencies on the

one hand, and State and local agencies on the other, should have

an equal voice in managing their individual HIDTAs. DOJ appreciates as clearly as anyone how counterproductive it would be for

us to alienate our State and local partners, or, for that matter, our

non-Justice Federal partners, thereby losing their invaluable contributions to the shared enterprise of drug enforcement.

Mr. Chairman, as you were aware, in February Mr. McNulty

came to Capitol Hill to meet with you on this issue. Later that

month he met and spoke with the HIDTA Directors at their annual

conference outlining his commitment to the HIDTA program. Mr.

McNulty followed this meeting with an individual letter to each of

the HIDTA Directors requesting any input they might have on this

topic. And he and members of his staff, including me, have continued meeting with HIDTA leadership, State and local law enforcement and congressional staff to get their views on this issue.

Based on our initial meetings, the Department has developed certain fundamental principles that will guide DOJ’s administration of

the HIDTA program. Among these are HIDTA will remain as a

separate program within the Department with its own budget and

an independent management structure. HIDTA executive boards

will retain equal representation between Federal agencies and

State and local law enforcement. Assuming passage of the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request, DOJ will retain all of the

existing 28 HIDTAs. Each HIDTA executive board will retain discretion to make its own funding decisions regarding the resources

allocated to it.

In closing, I want to emphasize that the Department believes

that the HIDTA program is a valuable tool in our Nation’s efforts

to investigate and prosecute drug traffickers. The Department will

continue to strongly support the HIDTA program and will work

with its leadership to develop new initiatives to vigorously enforce

our Nation’s drug laws.

Thank you for your attention to this important issue and the opportunity to testify here today, and I am happy to answer any

questions that you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nash follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Burns.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT BURNS

Mr. BURNS. Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today in support of the President’s fiscal year 2007 national drug control budget. I want to thank the

subcommittee for its strong bipartisan commitment to our shared

national goal of reducing drug use in America, especially among

our youth.

You have inquired about the fact that for 2007, the budget proposes transferring the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

[HIDTA], program currently operated by the Office of National

Drug Control Policy to the Department of Justice. The administration’s basis for this transfer is to ensure better coordination with

the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force and the

Department of Justice’s many other drug enforcement efforts.

That’s where DEA is. That’s where the FBI is, that’s where the

U.S. marshals and Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the National

Drug Intelligence Center, NDIC, are.

The administration believes that the Department of Justice’s

management and oversight of the program will ensure that we are

fully utilizing all resources and programs to their fullest potential

to achieve the common goal of market disruption of illegal drugs.

The administration will preserve important elements of the programs such as intelligence sharing and fostering multiagency and

multijurisdictional law enforcement coordination among Federal,

State and local agencies and officials.

The Department of Justice has ensured it will make certain that

the HIDTA program plays a key role in our Nation’s drug enforcement efforts, particularly those involving coordination with State

and local departments, and do that in a manner that complements

the activities of other existing programs and of individual agencies

involved in drug enforcement.

The 2007 budget proposes $207.6 million for HIDTA as a distinct

activity within the Department of Justice. And as was mentioned

earlier by you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Cummings,

that’s level funding.

I would concur with the Department of Justice statement by Mr.

Nash and the written testimony that the HIDTA program is clearly

a valuable tool in our Nation’s efforts to investigate and prosecute

drug traffickers.

And in closing, I know that you have covered many aspects of the

President’s fiscal year 2007 Federal drug control budget with the

Office of National Drug Control Policy Director John Walters, but

I think that it is important to note that the President’s 2007 drug

control budget request is $12.6 billion. That’s an increase of $80.6

million over fiscal year 2006 enacted level.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you

today and look forward to answering any questions you or the

members of the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. I thank you all.

Let me start with a few general comments, that this subcommittee has jurisdiction over the Department of Justice as a whole, and

obviously our primary focus, because it was the choice of the leadership to make this committee a drug committee because it was divided up into so many different ones, and similarly, that was why

we created the Office of the National Drug Control Policy, that at

some point—and I want to make sure I state this on the record.

I am a strong believer in OCDETF. OCDETF has done a great job

in its task. I believe that the drug courts have been a phenomenal

impact at the local level, and it is something we need to look at

expanding. I believe that Bureau of Justice Assistance in looking

at—for example, in my district, the number of people coming out

of prisons is overwhelming certain neighborhoods, and the ability

to try to reach these people while they are in prison, to try to transition out—most of them, by the way, are there for drug and alcohol-related reasons, but as they come back in, if we didn’t have

these kind of programs to figure out how we are going to deal with

it, I don’t know what we would do.

This isn’t about the other programs. What we are focused here

right now is more directly on the narcotics efforts, some of which

overlap, and some of which don’t overlap. So—and let me also say

it’s not about individuals. Let me be real honest. As the only remaining—I shouldn’t speak for Mr. Cummings. Let’s just say on

the Senate side, every major antidrug person has already asked for

the resignation of the drug czar, and I have not done so at this

point, but my frustration is high. And I know many others in the

House have tried to bring forth a resolution to do that, and thus

far I don’t think the President really cares.

But I am saying this directly. I don’t have a problem with Attorney General Gonzalez running a lot of these programs. He actually

spoke up first on meth. He’s been very articulate. This isn’t about

individuals. Paul McNulty has been a friend of mine for many

years. I can’t think of another individual that I would more trust

running a program than Paul McNulty. He’s a wonderful guy. We

worked with this. This is about structure. And one of my questions

to Mr. Nash is, do you know why we created the Office of National

Drug Control Policy? Do you know why we created the drug czar?

Mr. NASH. Yes, I do. And I am very sensitive to the concerns, and

I think it was a well-conceived notion at the time that it was taken,

and it remains a well-conceived notion. It is very important to have

someone who has the President’s ear and who has the bully pulpit

to make sure that drug enforcement remains front and center in

the national attention.

I think that consistent with that, however, and consistent with

the President’s proposals, is the notion that shop is within the office of the White House. It is a policy shop, and the types of programs that office runs are programs that are different in nature

than the HIDTA program. They are not law enforcement operations, and it is somewhat anomalous to have a law enforcement

operation being run out of the White House, whereas at the Department of Justice that’s what we do. And I think that there

would be significant benefits to be gained by moving this law enforcement program into the Department of Justice and allowing

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people with law enforcement background, like Mr. McNulty, as you

acknowledged, to take control of a number of these assets and to

align them so that they are all engaged in a nonduplicative, effective fashion. And I think that’s what motivates the President’s proposal here.

Mr. SOUDER. I can’t tell you how much I appreciate that answer

because it is a straightforward answer about—that I believe actually reflects much of what is going on behind the scenes. And I

want to make clear that I am putting some words in your mouth

that you did not intend, but let me kind of give an interpretation

to what you just said, and then you can disagree, because I don’t

think you’re going to like the way I interpret it.

Your statement today gives more guidance as to how you would

do the restructuring of the HIDTA, and I appreciate some of the

attempts in there to clarify. But this clearly was driven by something beyond a frustration with the HIDTA, because, to date, nobody in a private or public statement has been willing to say

HIDTA—they don’t think it is working well. They haven’t really,

other than it is somehow going to streamline the relationship. But

when I ask both informally and publicly, ‘‘oh, you mean the Attorney General’s office doesn’t coordinate with the drug czar? You

mean you don’t coordinate with the HIDTAs now?’’ And everybody

says, ‘‘oh, no, we cooperate now. But how would you cooperate

more? You mean there are things you could do to cooperate with

the current HIDTAs that you’re not currently doing?’’ Nobody

wants to say that.

This is driven by policy decisions beyond what’s immediately in

front of us. One is budget, because if it isn’t isolated as part, where

we can see it on narcotics directly, it gets much harder for us to

sort out what’s with narcotics. But the second is a philosophical position, and the philosophical position behind what you just said is

a change of what the drug czar’s office was intended to be by Congress, who drew it up over the objections of administration in the

first place; not the current President, but long before this. And the

concept of Congress was not—was to give the drug czar direct control over some programs, rather than to sit in some building—room

in the Executive Office Building giving his opinions and being ignored by the Secretary of State, ignored by the Secretary of Defense, ignored by the Attorney General, ignored by the President

because he didn’t have any actual money or people to mobilize.

That’s why we created the drug czar’s office; that we already

know that drug czar isn’t being, in my opinion, a very effective advocate for many of the policy decisions that are being made. We

have yet to identify any kind of programmatic decision that he’s objected to. And Dr. Rice, Secretary Rice, or Secretary Rumsfeld goes,

oh, yeah, you’re right, we actually do need to deploy more things

on heroin in Afghanistan, we actually do need to do this down in

Colombia; because he isn’t treated with the respect even now with

all this behind him.

Taking HIDTA out roughly takes—I think it’s what, close to 50

percent of the dollars of the agency, other than their immediate

staff. Then the CTAC is being reduced dramatically, which is another big chunk of the budget, which leaves the media campaign,

which at best is shaky ground here. And I know from talking to

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Director Walters, he somehow thinks he is going to strengthen the

media campaign. Congress is furious that the media campaign

hasn’t been focused more on meth, and unless it’s focused more on

meth, it’s going to be cut again and maybe disappear. So there

won’t be any reason to have any drug czar’s office if we take all

these things out.

But the honesty of your statement, which is, by the way, not dissimilar to some of these other types of things as we tried to move

through the faith-based office question and its direct control, is a

philosophy of the administration. The administration does not have

a right, by fiat, to change policies that aren’t authorized by Congress. This proposal is dead on arrival as long as I am here and

as long as the Republicans are in the majority and I am here, and

I can assure you from Senator Biden that he has no intention

whatsoever should the Democrats take over in the Senate. And I

think you heard from our colleagues here in the House that their

goal here isn’t to gut the drug czar’s office.

This proposal is a waste of everybody’s time. It is a waste of any

kind of staff time you have developing it. It isn’t going to happen.

What we need to do is figure out how to make the HIDTAs more

effective to integrate. If there’s an integration problem, let’s deal

with the integration program with the Department of Justice.

This isn’t just about the Department of Justice. This is about the

Department of Homeland Security and how you are going to integrate with the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard and ICE. This

is about the State Department and how you integrate their efforts

and satellite information and the data and all this. This isn’t just

about the Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice does a terrific job, and there was a

fundamental question, should we have a drug czar or should we

make the DEA, in effect, the drug czar’s office, should everything

run in DEA. But because so many departments—the Agriculture

Department gets into research and spraying. The National Forest

Service has much of the marijuana on their grounds. It doesn’t

make sense to consolidate all of these joint-type efforts. You yourself and in your testimony, which was very good on showing the

different HIDTAs and what they do, show that this isn’t much of

what they do, isn’t even in your domain. It’s partly in your domain.

Without the U.S. attorneys, without the prosecutors, this wouldn’t

work. Without DEA it wouldn’t work. But it’s also in other people’s

domain. That’s why we created the drug czar’s office, and the budget this year is a direct assault on that, which then gets underneath

the assault on State and local cooperation, because to try to entice

their dollars in, we didn’t say everything had to be national or that

it was going to be national goals. We tried to adjust this sharing.

Furthermore, many of us warned about the COPS program, that

locals were going to get too dependent on the Federal dollars, but

as a practical matter, because often we as Republicans at every

level don’t want to raise taxes.

What happened in the narcotics efforts is that the Byrne grants

and the HIDTA are the last remaining frontiers of where the local

law enforcement is funding their narcotics operation. Only 1 percent of their budget, but it may be 80 percent of their narcotics

budget. Now we’re faced with the reality in front of us. If we wipe

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out this budget, there will be no narcotics task forces. There will

be nobody putting money into the HIDTAs, and we won’t have a

narcotics program. Then the national efforts that are so important

to OCDETF, to Panama Express and all those groups, if your locals

pull out of the stuff, nobody’s going to be making the street arrests

with us to make the Federal cases.

We have the potential house of cards, and it’s going to go like

that. And that’s why in Congress there’s such a push back, not because of the individuals involved, not because of that we have an

argument with the Justice Department which we overall think is

doing a good job; we have frustrations with the drug czar’s office,

we have frustrations with the general thrust of it. But some of it,

which is what we deeply felt from the time, and I have been a

strong supporter of this administration, but almost from the word

go, there was first a movement afoot to take the drug czar’s office

down from Cabinet-level status. There was objection when we put

in the ONDCP reauthorization that it had to have because we can’t

do that, only the administration can, but suggested that it should

be treated that way. Then the administration tried to take it out

of our ONDCP bill, that there is a lack of fundamental awareness

of what—why we have this office and our concern that we are

going to go—narcotics are going to remain a core challenge in this

country, and we are going to go chasing off on different types of

terrorism, we are going to go chasing off on bird flu, we are going

to go chasing off on church burnings, we are going to go chasing

off on missing children, and that’s what the Attorney General has

a wide sweeping thing.

The DEA and the drug czar’s office are the two things that their

focus is narcotics, and if we weaken that office, we will weaken the

narcotics efforts.

If you would like to make any comments. I didn’t mean to misstate that, but I felt that you articulated what is, in fact, the administration’s concerns.

Mr. NASH. I obviously can’t, in the timeframe, respond to each

and every one of your points. I would like to pick out one of your

points, however, and address it because I don’t want my own comments to be misconstrued, and that is in focusing on coordination

between HIDTA and the Department of Justice, I don’t want to

leave the impression that HIDTA presents a special case, and that

it is more difficult for the Department of Justice to coordinate with

HIDTA than it is for the Department of Justice to coordinate with

the Department of State or the Department of Homeland Security

or the Department of Treasury, or any of the other Federal departments that have a piece of the drug enforcement mission.

The fact is that coordination of drug—multifaceted drug enforcement investigations that span State jurisdictional boundaries, that

span international jurisdictional boundaries is one of the more difficult tasks that confronts modern law enforcement, and to the extent that anything can be done to lower barriers for that coordination, the Department of Justice’s viewpoint that should be done,

and that is one of the things motivating this proposal, is that in

our experience it clearly is easier to coordinate parts of an investigation when the two entities being coordinated are housed within

the same shop. And so the same thing that makes HIDTA effective,

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which is collocated State and locals from various police departments and Federal agencies sitting together in the same place

working cases in conjunction with one another, that motivation

that makes that work and that caused us to bring them together

in that environment, that argument also makes sense in taking

HIDTA and folding it into a more central place, in our view.

Mr. SOUDER. So maybe the Southwest border should go under

DHS, the San Diego should go under DHS, because it’s not bordering HIDTA. I mean, if the principle is where do they overlap the

most, Justice Department isn’t necessarily where you would put it.

That’s how we got into the whole concept of the drug czar in the

beginning.

Mr. NASH. The Department of Justice does have the Federal mission for domestic law enforcement, and from that perspective it certainly makes sense that the HIDTA program reside, in our view,

because it is a wonderful program and because, you know, we

would be foolish to look a gift horse in the mouth, we certainly

would love to be associated with that program and to take advantage of those resources. If there is some sentiment that the HIDTA

program should be designed as a border protection resource, then

certainly Congress should look to the Department of Homeland Security. But as presently constituted, as a law enforcement entity

designed to aid the coordination between State and local and Federal law enforcement, in our view, the Department of Justice is the

appropriate place.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, you touched on another point, and that is the

Department of Homeland Security is also supposed to be doing narcotic enforcement, and that would include at the border, inside the

border and elsewhere. ICE, if they are, do not view part of their

mission—which is one of the things we had a concern about, that

the administration separated counternarcotics out from terrorism,

and our staff learned that the Homeland Security Committee, of

which I’m part, has changed that under law, but that suggested another concern there which is the administration’s lack of understanding the link in terrorism, immigration and narcotics.

I’ll yield to Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

To Mr. Burns, Director Walters gave us a number of assurances

when he first came to us as a nominee, and those assurances included a very strong commitment to support demand reduction programs and HIDTA. President Bush, then Governor Bush, personally pledged his commitment to HIDTA during his first Presidential campaign. So everyone involved with the HIDTA program

appears, you know—we are beginning to feel a bit of a betrayal

with regard to the commitment to HIDTA because these proposals

would pretty much terminate the program as we know it. As we

know it. What considerations have led the administration to reverse course with respect to HIDTA? And I do see it as a reversal.

Mr. BURNS. Well, I wasn’t here, Congressman, when Mr. Walters

was confirmed. I’m not privy to statements and discussions or negotiations you or others had with him.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. But how long have you been with the Department?

Mr. BURNS. Since 2002.

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Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. Well, you know what’s happened over the

last few years.

Mr. BURNS. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And some of this, things I’m talking about, are

things more recent that have happened since you have been there.

So let’s just separate, since you weren’t back there during the

nominating process, and talk about this evolution of how we got

here today as far as HIDTA is concerned, from your standpoint.

Mr. BURNS. From my standpoint I don’t believe that anyone

could not recognize the effectiveness of HIDTA, its ability to bring

Federal, State and local law enforcement together. If you take into

account the 93 percent of all law enforcement in this country is

State and local, and 7 percent is Federal, clearly if we are going

to coordinate efforts in this country with respect to reducing the

flow and the demand, and thus addiction to illegal drugs, there has

to be a cooperative effort between Federal, State and local.

I think Mr. Nash’s statement, which is the same that is in my

opening statement, is that this administration believes—and it may

be a policy dispute—but this administration believes that the Office

of National Drug Control Policy should be first and foremost a policy office, and that it ought not be running operational programs.

This is the only supply side operational program that I am aware

of in the White House. And I don’t want to speak specifically for

Director Walters, but I can tell you that he believes that it ought

to be placed with other operational supply side agencies and offices,

DEA, FBI, OCDETF, and that there it will be in a position to coordinate better.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well——

Mr. SOUDER. I should have, because I didn’t realize ONDCP was

taking this same position. So that means the national media campaign should move to because it’s operational?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I said the only supply side operational program

that I’m aware of. That would be a prevention and education program.

Mr. SOUDER. Should CTAC be moved?

Mr. BURNS. I’m sorry, I can’t hear you.

Mr. SOUDER. The CTAC, the different things that local police—

that you proposed to reduce, should that program be moved out of

your Department?

Mr. BURNS. I would say that’s consistent with the policy of this

year’s proposal. We are cutting all of the technology transfer aspect.

Mr. SOUDER. You would keep that whole thing out of your Department?

Mr. BURNS. I think the 9 million is research.

Mr. SOUDER. So why would you keep research and demand but

not supply? Is there any precedence in the White House that you

would run—I can’t think of another White House agency that runs

a national media campaign of any sort. If the principle is that you

shouldn’t be doing—you should be policy and not running agencies,

I assume that, to be consistent, everything would be taken out except for the policy. Research is done by NIH. Research isn’t managed in a White House policy shop.

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If you’re arguing you’re just a White House policy shop, which,

by the way, you aren’t, you’re created by Congress, but the slippery

slope you’re on is that your other programs would follow that same

criteria. There aren’t other White House policy shops that run research operations that manage it, that manage national media

campaigns. I mean, this is a slippery slope you’re on.

Mr. BURNS. I’m just telling you that the administration’s position

is that the HIDTA program, in response to the question, is a supply side operational law enforcement-type program that this administration believes is better situated in the Department of Justice.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, you understand that the HIDTA Directors

have a whole different view of this; do you not?

Mr. BURNS. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I know for a fact that you have a tremendous respect for these Directors because you know that they are

out there every day giving it everything they’ve got, sometimes

going against very difficult circumstances. And so you really believe

in them, right?

Mr. BURNS. Yes. Absolutely.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. And these are the folks who basically are on

the ground. Would you say they are the ones who are pretty much

dealing with these drug problems almost face to face with the persons who are dealing in the drug trafficking; is that correct?

Mr. BURNS. Absolutely.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And one of the things that the President says

when he always talks about giving due respect to those who are on

the ground, and I’m not trying to be smart or anything, but it

makes sense that if you’ve got people who are on the ground, who

are dealing with it every day, who are facing every day the very

people that go out there not knowing—into the streets and into the

meth labs not knowing whether they are going to come back to

their families, they deal with that every day, and if they say—and

you already said that you have a tremendous amount of respect for

what they do. If they say they don’t think this is a good idea, I

mean, have you all taken that into consideration? Do you understand what I’m saying?

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. I mean, I’m just curious. And they are adamant, and I don’t think that this is a just some little turf battle

for them. They’re very, very upset about this. And we, up here, we

are trying to hear all of it, but we are also trying to make sure that

whatever we do in spending the taxpayers’ dollars is done effectively and efficiently.

So what we have on the one hand are the people who are on the

ground saying, Congresspersons, I beg you not to put this under

Justice because we don’t think that it will be as effectively run if

you do that. But on the other hand, we have the administration

saying, you know, we want to do it our way. And I guess what I

am getting to is who should we be listening to?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I have the utmost respect for each and every

one of these 28 HIDTA Directors, 27 men and Mona Neill in north

Dallas, TX. They are not only my colleagues, they are my friends.

But, Congressman, I am here today on behalf of the Office of NaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Mar 05, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32440.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
49

tional Drug Control Policy. The President’s budget proposal and

that of the Directors is that this program is better situated in the

Department of Justice where it is with like Federal operational

programs and not in the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Other Directors of what? Not the HIDTA Directors. The HIDTA Directors believe that this ought to be under

what?

Mr. BURNS. Oh, no. The HIDTA Directors in unanimity believe

that it ought not be transferred to the Department of Justice. I’m

just telling you that the President’s budget proposal, and I am here

on behalf and in support of that.

Mr. SOUDER. Just for the record, because he said directors, you

meant the OMB Directors, the ONDCP Director; is that who you

meant by directors, the President’s directors?

Mr. BURNS. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me—and I know

that when you say that, basically what you’re saying is you’re coming with the marching orders from the President. I got that piece

pretty much right. And from your Director, Director Walters; is

that right?

Mr. BURNS. Yes. My job as Deputy Director at the Office of National Drug Control Policy for State and Local Affairs is to support

the President’s budget.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. Now. I guess what I’m asking you is how

did you get there? In other words, how did you all get—we have

on the one hand these folks who are saying, you know, this is not

going to work; begging and pleading, saying, Congresspeople,

please, don’t let this go into Justice. We love Justice. Justice is

wonderful. We respect them. That’s what they’re saying to us. But

they’re saying, this will not work. Now—and we’ve got you saying

what you’re saying.

And all I’m trying to say to you is that we are like sort of in the

middle here. We want to hear the President, and pay, you know,

due respect to the President, but we’ve also got folks that are like

our constituents who are out on the street. And so I am saying,

how did you all—did you all come together with the HIDTA Directors and say, look, this is what we think we ought to do? Did you

get any input from them? Because what you’re doing affects what

they do every day. I’m just curious.

And by the way, we had this same argument last year. See,

that’s the other piece. And so I was wondering in that year—well,

first of all, did you do it before for last year’s budget, and then did

you do it again for this year’s budget, knowing that it was an

issue?

Mr. BURNS. Yeah. And I think Congress spoke last year, and

whatever you do this year will be dispositive with respect to the

issues. You have an administration that believes a program should

be in Justice. You have what I believe is a successful program, the

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, with 28 of the finest law enforcement officers in the country saying it ought to remain where it is. And you’re right, we went through the same

thing last year, and here we are again.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, last year you all recommended a 56 percent

cut in funding for HIDTA; is that correct?

50

Mr. BURNS. That’s correct.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And this year the proposal is substantially less

of a cut. Can you explain to me why that is? In other words, why

did you decide this year, because you came in with some strong arguments last year, 56 percent, let’s do this cutting? And you were

trying to convince us that this was what we should do, and now

it is substantially less of a cut. I think, what was it, 16.4? Substantially less of a cut. So what’s the difference between last year and

this year?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I would say two things. One, the $207.6 million

is what the President has asked for the last 3 or 4 or 5 years.

That’s level-funded. It would not be indicative of a cut from $228

million. That’s supplemental money that the Congress has added

to the President’s budget request each and every year. So the

$207.6 million number is consistent.

With respect to $100 million last year, and now requesting, as we have in past years, the $207.6 million number, all I can say to

you, Congressman, is we heard what you said last year: Congress

believes in this program, don’t cut it. Here we are back at a levelfunded amount.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So what are you trying to tell me? You heard

with the left ear that we said don’t cut it, but you didn’t hear with

the right ear that we said don’t put it in Justice. Is that a fair

statement?

Mr. BURNS. It’s a fundamental difference of opinion between two

branches of our government, the executive branch and the congressional branch.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. I just have two more questions, and I want

to go to Ms. Schofield.

Ms. Schofield, can you describe the consultation that took place

between ONDCP and the Justice Department concerning the President’s proposal to eliminate the Byrne Justice Assistance Grant

program?

Ms. SCHOFIELD. Mr. Cummings, I had no such discussion with

ONDCP, and I’m not aware that there were discussions between

OJP and ONDCP about the budget.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So it wouldn’t surprise you if there were no discussions? All right.

Mr. SOUDER. Can I ask a question? I thought that the Justice

Department was proposing it be a policy shop.

Ms. SCHOFIELD. I’m sorry?

Mr. SOUDER. I thought the Justice Department and the White

House position was they wanted the drug czar to be a policy shop

where the drug czar was in charge of giving suggestions on the

drug budget. And you’re saying you didn’t consult on that; no?

Ms. SCHOFIELD. No. What I am saying is I am not aware of any

discussions. I came to OJP last June after being confirmed by the

Senate and inherited part of the 2007 budget, but we have had no

discussions with ONDCP about our——

Mr. SOUDER. Would you check with other people in the Department of Justice?

Ms. SCHOFIELD. I certainly will, and I will let you know.

Mr. SOUDER. The oversight committee, we would like to know—

we are not going to get into arguments about the documents—is

51

was there substantive discussions with ONDCP about the Byrne

grants that directly affect drug law enforcement, because we heard

under oath that the administration’s position was that the drug

czar’s office shouldn’t operate programs, they should be a policy

shop. And if they’re a policy shop and not talked to on policy, then

what are they?

Ms. SCHOFIELD. I will, and I will let you know.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Nash, you seem to have a lot of faith that if HIDTA is under

Justice, HIDTA’s going to do just fine. Is that right? In other words

they’ll do just as great a job as they are doing right now. I think

that’s pretty much what you said. If that’s not what you believe,

just say it.

Mr. NASH. No, no. I do believe that they are an excellent program now. I do have confidence that this proposal is designed to

make them an even better program.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And although they don’t believe that it would

make it a better program, the Directors, that is——

Mr. NASH. I think they have voiced that opinion very strongly,

yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So it is sort of like Big Brother says this is good

for you.

Mr. NASH. Well, I will say, as I tried to correct in my initial testimony, I do believe that much of the proposal that the HIDTA Directors have been responding to in the past was based on misconceptions as to what it would mean if the program were moving

to the Department of Justice.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what were the major misconceptions that

you, you know—apparently you have some idea what you think

they were.

Mr. NASH. Well, I do believe that the messaging—and I’m not

sure how this was interjected into the messaging, but the belief is

that the HIDTA program would be merged into the OCDETF program, and if not merged, it would be run like the OCDETF program. And my—the thrust of my testimony was in the hopes of dispelling that notion.

I think we do, at the Department of Justice, have an appreciation

for what it is that makes the HIDTA a successful program and one

that should be preserved in its current form if it were to move to

the Department of Justice.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I can tell you that I agree with the chairman with regard to OCDETF. I think OCDETF does a great job.

It has always been, as long as the chairman has been chairman

and I have been ranking member, it has been a major concern of

ours that we always are concerned, particularly after September

11th, that the whole idea of fighting the drug war would take a—

not a back seat, but would be maybe put in the trunk. And then

the war on terrorism, which is very, very important, and all of us

agree we’ve got to do it, but we did not want it to fall back into

the trunk, so to speak.

And I think one of the concerns is that when you—moving it over

to Justice, because Justice is dealing with so many things, you

know, that it might be pushed back. That’s one of the concerns.

And it sounds to me, when I listen to your testimony, as if you’re

52

going to. The program basically would be put under Justice, and

then the program would basically kind of operate just like it’s been

operating. So then the question becomes, then if it’s going to do

what it’s been doing, and we’re just kind of moving it over, then

why do it?

You know, and I’ve heard your testimony, but that’s what really

makes me wonder. And the reason why I’m so concerned about it

is that if I’m the person who’s on the ground, and I’m putting my

life on the line, and I say that I don’t think this is going to work,

then, you know, I would just hope that—and then, not only that,

but I’ve got the Congress saying that we feel pretty comfortable

with the way things are, that is, with HIDTA not being under the

Department of Justice. It seems to me that we would stop and just

say, OK, all right, OK. Let’s do it that way and let it go forward.

And so now we’re going to have to go through this same exercise

again. And I can guarantee you—I can’t guarantee because I can’t

speak for the Congress, but there’s a pretty good chance it’ll come

out the way it’s been, the way it came out last year. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. And I want to say that I believe your

statement did clarify some, as did Mr. McNulty’s meeting with me.

However, the misconception is because last year, under oath, there

were no assurances, there was nothing that was sent up to Congress, and therefore we leaped to the assumption that since it was

being put under OCDETF, and since the OCDETF model didn’t include participation, and, in fact, testified under oath relative to

that, that’s how the misconceptions occurred. It wasn’t like we

pulled them out of thin air. It’s there was nothing there.

This is the first time we have seen any details in print. We did

have some verbal conversations. It didn’t change our minds, obviously, but at least it had some guidelines for the first time that we

have ever seen in print.

Yield to Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I listened very diligently as to the reason why you

have these programs that moved on the Justice Department so

there could be better coordination, but it does not work on the

streets. You know, this is not the first hearing I have been in and

I hear all these grandiose proposals and we are going to do this

that and the other. It does not work on the streets. And I am wondering, how do you evaluate success? How are you going to show

that the move will make the programs more effective.

Now I am going to throw out some thoughts; and whichever ones

of you would like to answer, please do so.

But the President’s request repeats last year’s proposal to eliminate or reduce funding for key drug control programs within the

Department of Justice that support Federal, State and local cooperation. The President proposes a more than one-third reduction

in the funding for the COPS Meth Hot Spots program which allocates money for problem-oriented policing to combat the use and

distribution of meth labs, including child endangerment programs,

enforcement, drug courts, training and treatment.

On August 29th, I lost my 22-year old niece in Sacramento, CA,

because of methamphetamine use once or twice. We identified a

property where young people were going in, cooking up the ingredients and turning them into pills and selling them. These things

53

lived with me in Sacramento when I was in the Senate. We called

and we cannot get law enforcement out because the county sheriffs’

office is shorthanded. The people that report are intimidated and

fire bombed. I am on the ground.

I just lost a niece, 22 years old. So you can sit here and talk

about the coordination at the same time you are cutting the ability

for the State, the counties and the cities to enforce? And I don’t

hear a word about how you are going to evaluate these programs,

to see that when you reduce their dollars, the program is still effective. I don’t understand that when our cities and counties are hurting and our States are hurting and we are not putting money into

COPS programs and meth is getting out of control in the suburban

areas.

I lived in the most unlikely area for drug sales and drug use, but

it is more prevalent in rural and suburban areas. That means we

need boots on the ground, and how do we do that when these programs are being cut?

Would someone like to respond? Mr. Burns.

Mr. BURNS. Well, I would rather defer to the other two.

Ms. WATSON. Whoever.

Mr. BURNS. Let me just say this.

First of all, I am sorry for your tragic loss——

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. And I mean that.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. I am sorry, too.

Mr. BURNS. That is terrible. But you raise a number of important

issues, and I know that the chairman’s time is tight, but we could

be here all day, and I would love to do that and sit down with

anyone——

Ms. WATSON. Just explain to me how you do it when you cut the

budgets of these programs locally.

Mr. BURNS. I will tell you this. The overall President’s request

for this year is higher than last year. So when you say ‘‘cut,’’ it is

a matter then of sitting down and making a determination with respect to, well, what got cut? Was because if something got cut,

something certainly got added. Drug court slash, there were $10

million, $10 million. They are an effective program in this country.

The proposal this year is $70 million. So there has been a $60 million increase in the request from the President.

Methamphetamine labs have to be cleaned up in Sacramento and

all across the country. Last year, there was $20 million available

for that. This year, we have asked for a $20 million increase.

So those are two examples of things that haven’t been cut——

Ms. WATSON. I need you to yield——

Mr. BURNS. Those are examples of things that haven’t been cut.

Ms. WATSON. I need you to yield for a moment. Is this not correct? The President proposes a more than one-third reduction in

funding for the COPS Meth Hot Spots program. Is that true or not

true?

Mr. BURNS. My understanding is that is true.

Ms. WATSON. That is what I am referring to. That is why I used

the example of my niece, because it was methamphetamine that effected her heart and took her life.

54

And so how do you explain to me that there’s an increase somewhere?

Mr. BURNS. Well, because you latched on to one program that

was cut——

Ms. WATSON. Exactly.

Mr. BURNS. An additional $30 million in meth-specific treatment that has been requested, $30 million more to reach out to people

in your community and across the country, to meet a need that everyone agrees was lacking. So there has been an increase in that.

It is a fundamental decision by the administration to look at programs. There is a process in place to judge them, and we can all

agree or disagree what the scorecard was——

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Burns.

Mr. BURNS. Yes.

Ms. WATSON. I mentioned one specific program that has been

cut.

Mr. BURNS. Yes.

Ms. WATSON. And the results of cutting that program means

there is less training of local police and treatment locally. And you

can talk about all over the country. But when there is—of course,

you can say it is an increase if you are talking about the whole

country. But when you cut those specifically in these programs—

and I told you we saw the lab. You can’t even get it closed down.

So we are talking about Hot Spots. And the money for these Hot

Spots and to train law enforcement and to coordinate has been cut.

So how can you say because there is more money nationally but

for this specific program there is less? We are seeing the negative

results of less funding. So I don’t understand your explanation of

how you could cut this program and expect things to get better.

Mr. SOUDER. Will the gentlelady yield?

Ms. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. Did you say it was an increase from your budget

request?

Ms. WATSON. I can’t hear you.

Mr. SOUDER. Did you say it was an increase from your budget

request?

Mr. BURNS. My understanding is that the President’s fiscal year

2007 Federal drug control budget is an increase over the 2006 Federal drug control budget.

Mr. SOUDER. So you are saying you increased your proposal

which Congress actually increased more the previous year?

Mr. BURNS. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. So it is actually a reduction in what we spent last

year?

Mr. BURNS. It is an increase over what was enacted in 2006. It

is more—we are asking for more than what you enacted last year,

Congressman.

Mr. SOUDER. So we are—so there has certainly been a shift.

I will yield back. Ms. Watson, did you have any further questions?

Ms. WATSON. I just wanted to say that funding for the National

Alliance for Model State Drug Laws would be eliminated under the

President’s request. And to propose elimination and scaling back of

vital demand reduction and domestic law enforcement programs

55

raises serious questions about the depth of the administration’s

commitment to reducing domestic demand for illegal drugs and

supporting State and local drug enforcement agencies and efforts.

And this is what I am concerned about on the ground.

If we accommodate these requests and cut, we can’t get the job

done. It is not really attacking the problem. And I am trying to find

out how you think we can really address these issues without the

kind of resource supports down to the local level.

Mr. BURNS. Well, my response, without being repetitive, is twofold. One, these cuts haven’t taken place yet or these changes. This

is proposed for 2007. So as we sit here today there has not been

a one-third cut in the program——

Ms. WATSON. That is the budget we are working with. You know,

the President proposes. We advise and consent. So you are representing the administration. I am raising the question of ‘‘tell me

why the proposal would be made such as it is.’’ Of course, we are

going to work with it, and we are going to do all we can to see that

it does not go into force. But you are sitting here, and we are having a discussion, and I just want to know what your thinking is

and what your real commitment is if you want it to be successful

and how you measure that.

Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Let me ask this question again. You are saying that your total budget request is how much of an increase? Was it $20 million? Is

that what you said?

Mr. BURNS. My understanding, Congressman, is that the Presi- dent has asked for in the 2007 drug control budget $12.6 billion;

and that is $80.6 million over what Congress enacted in 2006. So

it is a——

Mr. SOUDER. So it is less than 1 percent.

Mr. BURNS. But the point being, if we are talking about cuts and

how could you come before us with all of the—it makes the point

that this President and this drug czar are as committed this year

in overall funding against this issue than what was enacted by

Congress last year. We are asking for more than what was enacted.

It makes that simple point, nothing more.

Mr. SOUDER. We will be putting into the record—we will at least

take some of the summaries. We submitted this report that went

through the entire committee with additional views, all of us

signed on, and it literally takes apart a whole bunch—for example,

you didn’t count the war supplemental funds, previous year in Afghanistan, on narcotics. We have disputes at how you reallocated

and made changes in the DOD budget, what you allocated to narcotics, that it doesn’t account for the fact that—so we don’t believe

that the budget comparison is accurate.

The second point being we are also here arguing about shifts inside the budget that move from State and local assistance to Federal, which is a policy question. It is true that the overall budget

isn’t being shifted by 40 percent. It is being done if dollars are

going to State and local, whether we are getting into safe and drug

free schools, which is another argument that we have had. The

part that was going directly to schools was being eliminated, the

part that was going to the Federal was increased, and there was

56

a philosophical shift in addition to a dispute about whether the

total dollars are there.

The way that the Department of Homeland Security was being

accounted, all of a sudden arbitrarily the administration decided to

assign part of that into the narcotics budget. That is part of our

frustration even in matching oranges to oranges.

Yield to Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I know that I missed most of the discussion because I was someplace else talking about an ounce of prevention is worth much more

than a pound of cure; and I am just wondering, Mr. Burns, did I

hear you mention the word ‘‘treatment’’ in your response to Representative Watson?

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. There may have been some increase someplace that

maybe treatment would take care of some of the need that she was

raising some of the issue about?

Mr. BURNS. My response, Congressman Davis, was she asked me

why a particular program may be cut. And my response, and probably awkwardly, was to tell her that the administration in weighing and grading and judging a number of programs. Indeed, it recommends cuts of some, but then there are increases of others. I

gave her some examples of what has been increased; and I used the

example of treatment, specifically methamphetamine treatment,

because there has been a specific recommendation this year in addition to the same $1.8 billion that goes toward treatment in this

country that several million be directed specifically toward methamphetamine.

Mr. DAVIS. And so there is some increase in treatment resources

that in terms of the overall problem should help with reduction.

Mr. BURNS. I would hope.

Mr. DAVIS. Let me ask the other one question that I really wanted to ask, is how much coordination is there between the different

approaches? I mean, is there an effort to seriously coordinate trafficking, prevention, law enforcement with treatment? Are there

programs designed where we try and bring all of the entities together to kind of look at how effective are we really being, dealing

with all components at the same time?

Mr. BURNS. That is a great question; and the answer to that is

the Office of National Drug Control Policy has not only tried to do

that on a national level, a State level, a city level, but a State and

local level.

We have a major cities initiative, Congressman, where we go into

Chicago, we go to Los Angeles, we go to Miami; and we say we

need to coordinate. We need to coordinate prevention and education

and treatment and law enforcement. Do we have a balance? Is too

much being spent on one area and not another? How much are the

cities putting in? Maybe the State isn’t spending as much money

as it should or sharing its burden, and maybe the Federal Government has not looked at community coalition or treatment modalities or that law enforcement needs some beefing up.

So, to answer your question, that is the crux of what we have

been trying to do with respect to coordination across the country.

57

Do we have the appropriate balance and are we funding and supplying the various programs enough?

Mr. DAVIS. Is the lead the same in each area? Are there different

lead entities that might handle the coordinated effort? For example, could it perhaps be law enforcement in one area, maybe somebody from the treatment community in a different area, or prevention people in another area? Is there any one model for that or are

there different approaches based upon what might be taking place

in different communities?

Mr. BURNS. Congressman Cummings mentioned Big Brother.

The last thing we do at the White House is go to a city and tell

them what they need. We go there and we ask them—because each

city, as you know, is unique—what is the best model? And each one

is different. And certainly in some cities it is the prevention entities that are leading the way; in others, it is treatment.

But I have to tell you, in the vast majority, the major cities in

this country, it has been law enforcement that has stepped up and

brought everyone together, broken down barriers in some instances

that have been there for a long time; and, for that, they have to

receive credit.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much; and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Thank you.

Ms. Schofield, does the bureau—does the Office of Justice Assistance—have you done some of the kind of coordinated things that

Mr. Davis asked about?

Ms. SCHOFIELD. There are Justice Assistance under RJP, yes.

Going back to the discussion on drug courts and adding to what

Mr. Burns mentioned, that the original request in 2007, 2006, is

actually $70 million for drug courts. We received a $10 million increase, a $10 million—I am sorry—amount from the Congress. We

have asked for $69 million this year, and that money actually

would go toward treatment and prevention.

Drug courts have proven to be extremely successful. We are in

the 4th year of a 5-year intensive study. The first year that people

have finished up on specifically with meth treatment, 83 percent of

those people have been meth free; the second year of the study has

shown that 72 percent of them have been meth free. That is a success story that we would like to buildupon and why we have asked

for additional resources for drug courts.

Mr. SOUDER. And I want to say for the record, first off, I have

been willing to express my frustration. I am pleased that the proposed meth treatment part inside the treatment, it is not additional money, but it’s a setaside for meth treatment because we

didn’t have enough programs, and Ms. Setacury has been expanding those on the treatment side. This is another effort by the administration to try to address that on the treatment side.

The drug courts, where they are in areas where methamphetamine, either mom and pop, Nazi labs or the crystal meth, have

been trying to work with it; and we’re making some progress.

As far as the dollars increase in treatment, it’s mostly been in

the faith-based initiative which I support but which Congress has

been mixed on and—but it hasn’t been an overall major increase

in treatment.

58

But the administration has been studying, asking more for drug

courts than Congress has been willing to give; and that is a problem here in Congress. We don’t like to rob Peter to pay Paul. But

the fact is that we have to do some of those kind of things in the

budget. And the drug court is a place that has been strong, it can

be easily overexaggerated for its impact. This is tough stuff, but at

least we are making measurable progress where people are getting

drug tested and we are—you have, if it is an effective program

where the judges are overlooking the individuals and holding them

accountable and the alternative is incarceration, it tends to be a

stronger incentive than a lot of our other types of programs. And

it’s had a measurable impact on society and deserves the funding,

and I want to thank you for that.

One last question, let me ask Ms. Schofield, did you develop the

Bureau of Justice Assistance programs like drug courts? Have you

personally had interaction with the drug czar’s office?

Ms. SCHOFIELD. Yes, I have, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. So in each of the different programs you have a—

you ask them what they have been learning in the field and how

it relates?

Ms. SCHOFIELD. Particularly in my Bureau of Justice Assistance

we have been working with Mr. Burns personally on regional conferences dealing with meth, and we look forward to continue working with him. The first one I believe will be in August. We talked

about it actually at the beginning of this session here today. OJP

will be cosponsoring with us in ONDCP.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. I guess about 3 or 4 hours ago a reporter

was asking me about meth. He asked, well, do you feel that meth

has received a lot more attention than crack cocaine, heroin, and

cocaine? And I said I think that they have all received quite a bit

of attention, and I want us to—you will find no greater advocate

of making sure that we deal with the meth problem than you are

going to find sitting right here. But I also want to make sure that

those problems that have been historically problems for my district

and so many urban districts, like crack cocaine, heroin, cocaine,

that we are addressing those vigorously.

The drug court, what made me think about that is when the

chairman was talking about the drug courts we found that the

drug courts have been extremely effective in Baltimore. But—and

so I was very pleased to hear about that. That is a good thing.

But going back to you, Mr. Burns, when Mr. Davis asked you the

question about the balance and making sure that you do things

and make sure that everything is balanced, prevention, treatment

and whatever, I couldn’t help but think about the fact that—like

the Baltimore-Washington HIDTA has all that within it, treatment,

prevention and certainly the law enforcement piece. So I guess,

well, they have that balance within the HIDTA itself.

So I think that we have to keep that balance. Because I got to

tell you, while I do—I am concerned about the supply side, I am

very concerned about the folks who are using it and cutting down

the demand side.

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Because I think both are important. But I don’t want us to get

lost in the process or forget that there are a lot of people—if you

called a convention of all the former drug addicts in Baltimore and

those who are under treatment, you would have a major convention.

So that is all I wanted to say, and I wanted to thank you all.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Burns, I know this is kind of an odd question. That is, due

to the fact that you are the—the official administration position is

you would like to get rid of HIDTAs, out of the drug czar’s office.

Have you ever had a discussion that HIDTAs were intended to deal

with drug trafficking and that is why they are in law enforcement?

And there has been an exemption, I think, for two HIDTAs.

But I have often wondered why the same model wasn’t put together for prevention and treatment. Just like we have HIDTAs for

drug trafficking, we don’t have similar pooling at the State level.

There have been efforts on drug prevention and treatment separate from law enforcement. Why at the Federal level haven’t we

tried to look at taking our efforts in drug free schools, in drug

treatment under the multiple agencies there, our national ad campaign and look at how can we, in regional as well as national, do

something in prevention and treatment much like we are doing in

drug trafficking? That when we start to merge them sometimes we

get—you have a battle for where you put which. But, to me, we

haven’t ever had this kind of concentrated local thing unless there

is some kind of community effort like happened in my county

where it pops up or in Cincinnati where it pops up.

We have CADCA out there, community anti-drug groups that

would be logical to merge with this, SADD, MADD, PRIDE, all the

DARE programs, all this kind of stuff. Have you ever even had an

internal discussion to talk about structuring that? I know you deal

with it on an ad hoc basis. But where we would systemize and say,

look, we are putting literally hundreds of millions of dollars into

these things at the Federal level. Why don’t we look at how to do

a model like HIDTA?

Mr. BURNS. Well, certainly there are multi-disciplined approaches in States and in communities. And again, with additional

time, Mr. Chairman, I would love to sit down and talk to you about

it.

Some people would say we do it now; we just don’t call it anything, that certainly we coordinate Federal block grants and some

moneys for treatment. There are States and communities that come

up with moneys for prevention and education. Somebody sits down

with the chief of police and the sheriff in that town and they say,

we should have a group; and they get a community coalition grant,

$100,000 a year for 5 years, and there it is. And that is happening

across this big country we have. But we don’t call it HIDTA or we

don’t call it some national treatment prevention effort. But it is

something I would love to discuss with you more.

Mr. SOUDER. Because they are colocated.

One of the key things in HIDTA is they are colocated. The question would be, is it prevention treatment if you had a regional representative like, in our State of Indiana, the Governor’s office has

this, but you were colocated where you had somebody—not necVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Mar 05, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32440.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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essarily every day. It is a little different from drug trafficking. But

you had a regional center where you had different major treatment

people represented. You had CADCA community person represented. You had anybody who is going out and doing drug education in the schools. If a drug treatment grant is coming in, if the

Department of Justice assistance grants are coming in for people

coming out of prisons—because it does seem like a very ad hoc type

of basis when you actually get down into the weeds, as I do; and

I just don’t believe we have had as effective a focus of coordinating

on prevention and treatment like we have in drug trafficking.

And I don’t want to—I am the last one who wants to undermine

law enforcement where it is, in effect, working to be colocated. But

I believe we haven’t had the same focus and I just wonder if that

has been an internal discussion.

Any other questions on this panel?

Thank you very much for your patience.

We are going to, I believe, have a vote before too long, so if we

can get the next panel up, sworn in and see if we can get through

opening statements.

Thank you for coming. I know it was a wonderful, pleasurable

experience, but it is part of the oversight function to try to figure

out and work through our differences.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. We appreciate you coming today, and we look forward to your testimony. Each of you have been involved in this for

a long time, bring lots of law enforcement experience and lots of

interaction in multiple agencies; and we appreciate the opportunity

to hear from you.

Start with Mr. Brooks.

STATEMENTS OF RON BROOKS, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL NARCOTICS OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATIONS’ COALITION; AND DIRECTOR, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA HIDTA; TOM CARR, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE HIDTA; TOM DONAHUE, DIRECTOR, CHICAGO HIDTA; ABRAHAM AZZAM, DIRECTOR,

SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN HIDTA; AND JOHN BURKE, DIRECTOR, SOUTHWEST OHIO REGIONAL DRUG TASK FORCE

[SWORD]

STATEMENT OF RON BROOKS

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The 44 State associations and more than 62,000 law enforcement

officers I represent as president of the National Narcotic Officers’

Associations’ Coalition are grateful for the continuing leadership

that you, Congressman Cummings and the Speaker of the House

provide on this issue.

As a police officer, you learn to live with risk and expect the danger. That is really our world. But what keeps me up at night is the

deaths, fear, ruined lives that I’ve seen at the hands of addiction

and violent crime.

The present drug control budget takes law enforcement for granted. It recommends the elimination of the Byrne Justice Assistance

Grant and the transfer of HIDTA to the Department of Justice.

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Mr. Chairman, you, Mr. Cummings and your colleagues have

stood by us for years. I am asking the Congress to stand by us at

this critical hour and not let this happen.

Thanks to the vision of leadership provided by the U.S. Congress,

there is good news in our fight against drug criminals. Significant

reductions in overall drug use have been reported, and violent

crime has fallen. But this budget proposes to kill the programs that

have been instrumental in those successes.

Drug abuse kills more than 28,000 Americans each year, and the

impact on our economy is estimated to be $180 billion. Drug trafficking and abuse are the most significant and continuing threats

to our domestic security.

Since September 11th, no child on U.S. soil has been injured or

killed in a foreign organized terrorist attack, but almost every child

will be asked by friends or acquaintances to try dangerous illegal

drugs and, unfortunately, too many will make the wrong choice.

This budget request would tie the strong hand of State and local

law enforcement behind its back, reducing support for multi-jurisdictional drug enforcement. HIDTA task forces are the lifeblood of

State and local drug enforcement, which make up 97 percent of all

drug arrests; and they have demonstrated clear results. In 2004,

Byrne-funded task forces were responsible for seizing over 5,600

meth labs, 54,000 weapons and massive quantities of narcotics and

cash assets. These real, quantifiable results indicate the power of

using Federal dollars to leverage State and local investment in

public safety.

The administration argues that the Federal Government has gotten too deep into funding State and local law enforcement activities, but I strongly disagree that Byrne-JAG and HIDTA fall into

this category.

Minimal funding through Byrne-JAG leverages massive State

and local investments in Justice programs to enhance cooperation,

build good cases and pursue organizational targets. Drug trafficking is an interstate and international problem which calls for Federal investment. The best way for the Federal Government to assist

State and law enforcement in targeting priority organizations is

through multi-jurisdictional task forces. These task forces take full

advantage of State and local intelligence and expertise, and they

contribute to investigations of national and international drug trafficking organizations.

The NNOAC is not alone in calling on Congress to recognize the

importance of the Byrne-JAG program. Fifteen major organizations

representing hundreds of thousands of public servants across this

country joined us in signing a letter supporting full funding for the

Byrne-JAG formula program and retention of the HIDTA program

at the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

In addition to our concerns of Byrne, the NNOAC strongly opposes the administration’s proposed transfer of the HIDTA program

to Justice. HIDTAs are the single most effective collaborative partnership in the history of the criminal justice system. They have

balanced governance and are administered through ONDCP, which

is agency neutral. A transfer to Justice would lead to a disintegration of those valuable partnerships.

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Mr. Chairman, ONDCP is a critical institution with a pivotal role

in national security and drug policy. But it needs strong leadership,

and that has been lacking. I cannot understand how this drug czar

can support recommendations by OMB to dismantle the most effective State and local drug control programs in the Nation. It reflects

a lack of understanding of the importance of State and local law

enforcement in the Nation’s drug control strategy; and it allows a

disturbing pattern, including ONDCP burying its head in the sand

on the methamphetamine issue, arbitrarily defunding our community prevention coalitions, and most recently being caught flat-footed by Mexican legislation to legalize drug possession.

In our experience, only Deputy Director for State and Local Affairs Mr. Scott Burns has reached out to key stakeholders. But because of that lack of meaningful consultation with drug enforcement by the director and his staff, Representative Terry offered an

amendment which you supported that directed ONDCP to consult

with law enforcement in the development of drug control strategies.

Mr. Chairman, our members are truly grateful for your recognition of the value of our expertise on this matter. Mr. Chairman, we

are at a critical decision point. My colleagues and I have served

and protected the public our entire careers. Eighteen thousand of

my brothers and sisters are now memorialized on a wall just down

the street, including my partner who died in my arms after being

shot by a marijuana trafficker and another partner whose hand I

held as he died from complications of exposure to meth lab chemicals. We are united in our support for the Byrne-JAG program and

the retention of the HIDTA at ONDCP.

Mr. Chairman, let me just close by saying that our group knows

that the true drug warriors in this country don’t just wear vests

or carry guns. Our partners in the fight against drugs have been

the members of this subcommittee that have taken a leadership

role. Our 62,000 members hold you, Mr. Cummings and the members of this committee in very high regard.

Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Carr.

STATEMENT OF TOM CARR

Mr. CARR. Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings and

distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear

before you today to discuss the HIDTA Director’s concerns with the

administration’s fiscal year 2007 budget proposal that contains

what we believe to be unacceptable budget cuts for Byrne and Justice Assistance Grant programs and the proposed transfer of the

HIDTA program to the Department of Justice.

I come to you with over 35 years of law enforcement experience,

including over 21 years of experience in drug law enforcement and

policy development.

Since its inception in February 1994, I have had the honor to

serve as the Director of the Washington-Baltimore HIDTA. Among

my many duties as a HIDTA Director I chaired the committee that

developed the HIDTA Performance Management Process used nationwide in the HIDTA program today to measure its efficiency and

its effectiveness.

On March 10, 2005, when I testified before this committee about

the administration’s fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, you may recall that the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of

National Drug Control Policy alleged that the HIDTA program was

inefficient and ineffective. I am pleased to see that at least today

these offices are not assailing the program with that flimsily supported charge.

Mr. Souder, Mr. Cummings, Ms. Watson and members of the

subcommittee, as you well know, the HIDTA program was one of

the most successful government programs in existence today. My

fellow Directors and I assert that a drug control program that

yields a return on investment of $63 for every program dollar invested, seizes $10.5 billion in illicit drugs at wholesale value, nearly a half billion dollars in illegal drug assets or drug profits, dismantles and disrupts over 35 drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, destroys more than 4,500 clandestine drug laboratories capable of producing a minimum of $31 million worth of

methamphetamine, and apprehends more than 12,000 fugitives, to

mention only a few of its many accomplishments over a 12-month

span, can hardly be thrown in the ash heap because it is not demonstrating results. Indeed, the HIDTA program should be emulated, not immolated.

At this time, I would like to provide you a copy of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program 2004 Annual Report for the

record; and I have provided that to the committee. This report details, as you well know, all the program’s marvelous accomplishments for calendar year 2004.

Our 2005 performance results will be published this summer.

However, I can tell you in advance that the program has already

identified over 5,000 drug trafficking organizations and 491 money

laundering organizations. Of these, 1,600 or so were international,

1,500 multi-State, and 2,400 were local in scope. We have done

over 429 RPOT investigations, and we have referred over 1,100

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cessfully dismantled 950 drug trafficking organizations and disrupted over 2,000.

And, by the way, I thought you would be interested to know that

Mexico is the principal source for the drugs being trafficked on our

streets, according to our records; and, based upon our information,

it also appears that the largest single ethnic group involved in

DTOs is Mexican.

Our HIDTA program was built on the premise that Federal,

State and local agencies have an equal voice in managing the

HIDTA—the individual HIDTAs and addressing the regional drug

threats.

Mr. Nash, who, by the way, I truly admire for his commitment

and dedication to helping resolve this Nation’s drug problems,

spoke about the complications that would be resolved by moving

the HIDTA program to the Department of Justice. I submit to you

that these complications are in the minds of those vying for control

of the HIDTA program, not in the minds of those performing the

day-to-day work of coordinating activities, deconflicting cases, exchanging intelligence and information, planning activities, and ultimately dismantling and disrupting drug trafficking organizations.

It appears to have taken the Department of Justice some 15

years to recognize what, Mr. Chairman, you pointed out, that the

HIDTA program with its emphasis on regional drug threats links

directly to the larger national and international aspects of the drug

trade. HIDTA’s bottom-up approach to dismantling and disrupting

drug trafficking organizations on the local, multi-State and international levels has proven to be a most effective one, as our performance indicators have shown for the last 2 years.

Mr. Nash and others at the Department of Justice assert that by

moving the HIDTA program to Department of Justice HIDTA

would gain resources and would become a stronger program. I have

no doubt that in many ways this is true. My question is, why does

it have to be moved to accomplish this? There is no reason that

every benefit Mr. Nash cited cannot be afforded the program now.

What prevents Department of Justice from coordinating activities,

enhancing deconfliction services, sharing intelligence and developing strategic plans that include the HIDTA program?

Mr. Nash states that the HIDTA program would remain an independent, free-standing program within the Department of Justice.

They hold that status now within the Office of National Drug Control Policy. However, ONDCP is viewed by Federal, State and local

law enforcement as a neutral authority. By that I mean ONDCP

is not the beneficiary of funding.

If moved to DOJ, Justice agencies would have an upper hand

when it comes to obtaining HIDTA funds. State and local law enforcement would no longer have an equal footing with our Federal

counterparts on the HIDTA executive boards when it came to devising strategies and obtaining funding. This fact would change

and actually undermine the entire HIDTA process.

The Department of Justice plan—and I am glad to see this year

they have a plan and have articulated one so we can at least gain

some attempt to understand it—really contains only one new element. The other elements are already in place in the HIDTA program. That new element, however, is very disconcerting to us.

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HIDTAs have not seen a programmatic increase since 1998. Operating costs have steadily escalated, and our ability to conduct operations has already been placed in jeopardy.

By reducing the baseline funding to HIDTAs in order to create

a competitive discretionary fund, task forces will, by necessity,

have to be eliminated or severely reduced in every HIDTA, regardless of their performance.

The proposition was put forth that, in order to achieve maximum

impact, HIDTAs will be encouraged to coordinate enforcement initiatives more closely with other department crime fighting initiatives, including Project Safe Neighborhoods, the Safe Streets Violent Gang Task Forces, and the OCDETF program.

In the Washington-Baltimore HIDTA, Mr. Cummings, as you

well know, we fund two Safe Street Task Forces. I sit on the Virginia Project Safe Streets Advisory Board, and Mr. Azzam sits on

a similar project in his HIDTA. Tomorrow, my deputy director and

program manager for intelligence are meeting with a regional

OCDETF coordinator to assist in developing a new strategy for targeting for OCDETF. We are also in the process of procuring a gang

data base compatible with that used by the FBI, ICE and ATF and

used by everyone in our HIDTA region.

I can’t imagine how we could achieve any more impact or any

higher level of coordination than I just described for you.

Mr. Nash astutely mentioned barriers to sharing intelligence and

that these would be reduced when the HIDTA program is moved

to the Department of Justice. Again, I submit to you that these

barriers are artificial and in the minds of those vying for control

of the program.

Many HIDTA intelligence analysts have Top Secret clearances,

we have facilities approved to handle classified material, and, most

importantly, we have been and are willing to continue to share any

and all information with the Department of Justice. It is the Department of Justice that has often been less than forthcoming.

Let me close by saying that, under Mr. Bagnoli’s leadership, the

Washington-Baltimore HIDTA has prospered. I consider him a

close friend. Personally, I have every reason to believe that the

HIDTA program would also prosper in Justice now that he is the

Deputy Attorney General. However, it just does not have to be

moved to Justice for this to occur.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the

National HIDTA Directors’ Association, I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today; and I look forward to responding

to any questions you may have of me.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carr follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. It was outlined in the plan at least, which was

more than what we had before.

Mr. DONAHUE. They called it a plan, but this is correct.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Donahue, thanks for coming in.

STATEMENT OF TOM DONAHUE

Mr. DONAHUE. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cummings and Congresswoman Watson, I thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today. As you know, we testified on the same problem in

March 2005. I predicted then that there would be an adverse impact on the Chicago HIDTA, and that has sadly come true. I predict that if the 2007 proposal is also passed, it will effect the Chicago HIDTA adversely.

The Chicago HIDTA has ensured that law enforcement drug operations have consistent direction, follow policy guidelines, and engage in strategic planning communicated across organizations and

jurisdictions. These sectors give law enforcement an advantage

over criminals that would be difficult to achieve if working independently.

HIDTA initiatives have been instrumental in assisting law enforcement agencies with accessing an all-source counterdrug investigative support center and source of counterdrug intelligence products, including a heroin offender trafficking base. They have also

been involved in destructing distribution networks that supply organized street gangs in the greater Chicago metropolitan area.

They continue to target numerous open air drug markets operated

by street gangs in Chicago, especially the heroin markets of the

west side, interdicting drug currency shipments via the highway

system and governmental private carriers, disrupting organizations

involved in laundering illicit money from the drug trade, and enabling the development of task cases against these dealers.

They are also involved in financial analysis directed at seizing

assets acquired through illicit drug proceeds. They are involved in

identifying the international sources of supply of drug trafficking

groups that operate in the Chicago area. They also are instrumental in case and trial support as well as post-case seizure analysis.

All these activities speak to the comprehensive strategy that is

required for intervening in drug crime. Each HIDTA has developed

a cohesive, comprehensive program combining regional and locally

focused initiatives to implement the national mission of countering

that drug trade.

The drug problem in the Chicago area has increased dramatically

over the past years. According to the Illinois Department of Human

Services, there is a dramatic increase in the number of people requesting treatment for heroin and cocaine abuse. The Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse noted that in 2005 there were over

38,000 admissions for heroin addiction and over 20,000 admissions

for cocaine addiction. Heroin alone was a 54 percent increase from

2004.

Since August 2005, it has been discovered that we have another

problem in Chicago. That is fentanyl, which has been distributed

in the heroin markets in Chicago. Fentanyl is a Schedule 2 substance under the Controlled Substances Act. The drug has shown

up as pseudo heroin and also as an adulterant used with heroin.

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Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid more than 100 times more potent

than morphine or heroin. The use of this drug has left

unsuspecting heroin abusers the victims of overdose and death. In

the last year, there have been over 300 overdoses and over 40

deaths in the use of fentanyl.

HIDTA clearly represents a model for leveraging all resources in

order to provide comprehensive approaches for stopping drug

crime. The joint leadership of the HIDTA Executive Board has been

instrumental in ensuring that law enforcement engages in strategic

planning and coordination of efforts to disrupt drug markets, halt

the proliferation of criminal networks and reduce drug-related

deaths. Without the ability to maintain the operational collaboration made possible by HIDTA resources, local law enforcement

faces a risk of returning to the days when cooperation was episodic,

delivered on a case-by-case basis, and found to be generally ineffective in disrupting drug trafficking. Under these circumstances, it

will be impossible to maintain the declining crime rates and prevent drug-related violence from again spiraling out of control.

The Chicago HIDTA has proven to have an established and effective Investigative Support Center. Since its inception, the Chicago

HIDTA ISC has clearly defined the intelligence component for its

enforcement initiatives. The Chicago HIDTA has lost focus due to

the proposals in the 2006 budget in which the administration asked

to move the HIDTA to ONDCP and cut its budget by 56 percent.

As a result of that, I lost five very experienced analysts in my Investigative Support Center. It wasn’t until approximately a week

ago that I was able to replace those individuals, and I can’t blame

them for what they did because of the uncertainty of their future

employment. The inability to provide quality work products, due to

heavy workloads and job insecurity, has caused a great deal of

stress and low morale in the ISC staff.

The ISC’s intelligence program has had a solid reputation for

novel methods to support law enforcement. The momentum from

creativity and innovation has come to a screeching halt. During

2005, the ISC has had to turn down more than 40 local drug conspiracies, several Federal wiretap investigations and countless law

enforcement inquiries. The intelligence elements of the following

multi-agency law enforcement initiatives has ended or has been severely compromised due to the lack of experienced analysts at the

Chicago ISC. They include our Package Interdiction Team, Domestic Highway Interdiction, the North Suburban Drug Units, the

South Suburban Drug Units, our West Side Heroin Task Force,

Drug-Related Violent Crimes Initiative and our Money Laundering

and Financial Crimes Initiative.

Within the last year, agency intelligence systems and personnel

are not being offered to the ISC by Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies. The Chicago ISC has not been invited to participate with newly created intelligence groups such as the Illinois

State Police STIC Center and Federal ‘‘fusion’’ centers due to the

viewed lack of support in the HIDTA program. Agencies do not

want to commit to a program that may not exist in the future.

Clearly, the lack of confidence in the HIDTA program has undermined its purpose. Clearly, the President’s 2007 budget would impair the HIDTA program.

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Thank you for this opportunity.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donahue follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Next we will hear from Mr. Azzam. I always like

to have him in here so he can say ‘‘young man’’ to me, because not

that many people call me that any more. But those of you at this

table here have so much more experience, and we really appreciate

you coming.

Mr. Azzam.

STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM AZZAM

Mr. AZZAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Abraham Azzam, the Executive Director of the Michigan

HIDTA. I have attached a professional biography of my law enforcement career and experience, and that chronicles 49 years of

anti-drug law enforcement.

HIDTA has been in existence since 1997. We have an annual

budget of only three and a quarter million. We support 24 task

forces with value-added assets. We have an Investigative Support

Center. That Investigative Support Center provides deconfliction

services and analytical support to the whole State of Michigan, and

I have attached a brief description of the Michigan HIDTA and its

daily operations. I have also attached a breakdown of the 383 Federal, State and local law enforcement members and our task forces.

As you know, we have a 700-mile border with Canada, our good

neighbors.

The Michigan HIDTA has been committed to the most important

HIDTA function; and that is simply coordinating and synchronizing

Federal, State and local law enforcement. We have an animated

and engaged executive board. Our HIDTA provides that neutral

and effective environment for all our law enforcement community

to potentate their multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional strengths.

Our most notable HIDTA effect has been the creation of a mechanism for our State and local partners, the policemen out there, the

road warriors, to interact and interface their valuable information

with our Federal partners. This has proven to be very valuable in

our anti-terrorism efforts.

They are aware of the events of 2005 and 2006 as regard to

budgeting. These ill-conceived proposals had an actual operational

posture on the Michigan HIDTA. The first reaction was shock and

disbelief that we were betrayed by our own parent agency. The

next result was a destabilization of the HIDTA infrastructure, similar to Mr. Donahue’s. This was internally and externally.

There was no hope that we would survive until the end of 2005.

We fought hard, and we relied upon our State and local assets and

our legislators. Our Federal partners expressed support of HIDTA

privately. Privately, they said, we are with you. Publicly, they were

forced to be mute on the subject; and that detracted from their

credibility with our State and local partners.

Internally, also, in spite of constant reassurance, I could soon detect the effects of the destabilization on our HIDTA staff. The loyal,

dedicated people that make a HIDTA run—in my HIDTA at least—

include a finance manager who once managed a credit union. She

is a single mother. She has two teenage children. I have an IT

manager who is a college graduate. He has triplets. I have an administrative assistant, also a college grad and a single mother of

a teenager; and I have my deputy director who is a former major

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in the U.S. Army. He has been with me since we started. He and

I constantly reassure and calm our staff, asking them to trust us

and trust the Congress to rectify this terrible and onerous mistake

by ONDCP.

And I leave it right on ONDCP. It would have been justified for

any of them to leave the Michigan HIDTA for more stable employment. I am proud to say they stayed.

The Executive Board and law enforcement community were generally relieved and grateful to Congress for the relief you have

given us in 2005.

Now in 2006, on the first Monday of February, the incredible occurred. Mr. Walters and ONDCP are again proposing the disruption and destruction of the most effective law enforcement collaboration program in history. We do not understand how completely

out of touch with reality Mr. Walters and his immediate staff have

become. It seems as though the actions of Congress in 2005 just

didn’t happen.

ONDCP actions regarding issues of the Performance Program,

policy and procedures, fiduciary issues, the disregard of our threat

assessments, their reluctance to embrace the Highway Interdiction

Program, which has proven to be the most excellent anti-terrorism

collective around these days, and the continued effort to move us

out of ONDCP all seem to be aimed at circumventing the will of

Congress and for no good reason that I can see.

HIDTA’s basic strength comes from the fact that it is neutral. It

emanates from the national Office of Drug Control Policy, from the

President of the United States. It’s been an asset that provides

comfort to all the participants, comes from the President’s office.

The U.S. Department of Justice is strong and professional, and

they are part of our operation, but I fear it cannot provide the neutrality necessary to engender voluntary participation. The HIDTA

program must be regionally administered, equal and neutral.

One of the problems that I have is that the HIDTA program has

some 52 intelligence operations which are totally, absolutely disregarded by Homeland Security in their effort to stand fusion centers. The HIDTA currently has the most integrated intelligence

function in the country, and if they would recognize us and join us

they could save millions.

I will continue, sirs and madam, to continue to reassure my staff

that their careers are secure. They are looking to me and to you

to do the right thing. I will continue to reassure my law enforcement colleagues that HIDTA has a future.

And I am available for your questions. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Azzam follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Burke, I appreciate you being our clean-up witness today. Good to see you again.

STATEMENT OF JOHN BURKE

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here.

I testified in the field hearing that you had in Wilmington, OH.

You may remember I was born in Fort Wayne, IN.

I am the commander of the Greater Warren County HIDTA Drug

Task Force in southwest Ohio, an agency that has received Byrne

memorial and JAG funding for the past several years. In addition.

I am also the vice president of the Ohio Task Force Commanders

Association. I represent the 36 drug task forces in the State of

Ohio; and I am jointly in charge, along with the FBI, of the Southwest Ohio Drug Task Force [SWORD], initiative that is part of the

Southern Ohio High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. I have been

a law enforcement officer—I thought—for a long time, 38 years,

until I heard that he had been involved for 49.

The illicit drugs in the United States continues to plague our jurisdictions and the good citizens that we protect. These drugs are

brought into our communities usually from Mexico into our southwest border States and then transported by motor vehicle or

shipped through a variety of commercial entities, including the

U.S. Post Office.

In addition, millions of licit drugs—pharmaceuticals—are being

smuggled into the United States from Mexico and Canada or

shipped through freight handlers when citizens procure them

through illegal Internet sites. These drugs then feed addictions

and/or provide a ready supply of pharmaceuticals for sale. Prescription drug addiction conservatively makes up 25 to 30 percent of the

overall drug problem in America and in some States is causing

more overdose deaths than their illicit counterparts. One thing I

saw on the news this morning was that a terrorist group has apparently earned millions of dollars through counterfeit Viagra

sales.

Our region is also fighting a significant problem with the clandestine production of methamphetamine. Our labs have tripled

from 2004 to 2005, and incredible resources of both manpower and

money are being expended in order to fight the production of a

drug that, in my opinion, is clearly the most addictive on the planet. We have been able to combine resources with our State investigative agency, local law enforcement and the Drug Enforcement

Administration to address this growing concern.

However, as the problems of clandestine labs are handled, somewhat handled, the influx of ‘‘ice’’ or crystal methamphetamine from

Mexico has already begun to infiltrate our region of the country.

The Byrne Memorial/JAG Grants. The reduction in Byrne Memorial/JAG Grant funding in Ohio has been devastating over the past

2 years toward fighting the illegal drug problem. In calendar year

2006, we have seen a minimum of a 50 percent reduction in these

funds available to our task forces, with calendar year 2007 promising at least another 50 percent cut.

These cuts, if allowed to remain intact, will effectively eliminate

a portion of the drug task forces in Ohio in 2007 and across the

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country and cripple many others who manage to continue to exist.

In most cases, the region’s drug task force is the only law enforcement agency working full time on prosecuting high-level drug dealers.

These task forces work in concert with State, local and Federal

law enforcement groups in combating the illegal drug trade. Local

officers oftentimes provide the manpower and the intelligence associated with their own communities. This is an invaluable asset to

State and Federal officers of law enforcement as they pursue this

problem together.

Without the full reinstatement of Byrne Memorial/JAG Grants to

the States, the resources provided by local law enforcement will be

greatly curtailed and in several instances eliminated all together.

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. Southern Ohio has become

the newest addition to HIDTAs in the United States. The Office of

National Drug Control Policy funded program has already been

highly effective in pursuing high-level drug trafficking criminal enterprises in southern Ohio.

HIDTA funds have provided our region with the ability to house

local, State and Federal officers within the same office and work

together on a daily basis pursuing national and international drug

traffickers.

In my office, which we called SWORD, we currently house

agents—I currently have agents from the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, along with several local law enforcement officers and administrative staff, to conduct complex and sometimes lengthy drug investigations. To complement this effort, we also have a criminal analyst from the Ohio National Guard’s Counter Drug Task Force to

assist us in this endeavor.

HIDTA funds provide us the ability to aggressively pursue criminal enterprises that oftentimes are based near or outside the borders of the United States, most commonly Mexico. With HIDTA

funding, we have been able to pursue large drug trafficking rings,

money launderers and a violent murder-for-hire criminal coalition

that yielded multiple indictments in the fall of 2005.

This unprecedented cooperation between local, State and Federal

agencies has only been accomplished because of the existence of the

Ohio HIDTA. If funding were to be eliminated for this very important program, the cooperation between these agencies in most cases

would return to the minimal levels that existed before HIDTA’s existence. If that happens, only the criminal element that preys on

our region will benefit.

One last thing, the restriction on Federal forfeiture that does not

allow enforcement to use the funds for current employees is in need

of revision. This unnecessary restriction oftentimes ties the hands

of local drug task forces who may secure large amounts of Federal

forfeiture funds but cannot use them to support salaries of current

employees. This can leave these task forces in the position of having ample funds for equipment, overtime and many other services

but being totally unable to pay for the salary of the investigator.

In conclusion, this enormous job requires that these agencies

work closely together and local drug task forces receive ample

funding for their own existence. This funding has been provided in

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the past through the Byrne Memorial/JAG Grants, which have

dwindled to only a fraction of the levels provided in calendar year

2005. Restoring this funding to at least 2005 levels is extremely

important to our drug enforcement efforts.

In over 38 years in law enforcement, I have not seen a program

that better equips local, State and Federal officers to combat the

illegal drug trade than HIDTA. The successful joint law enforcement enterprise that HIDTA has given my region of Ohio has been

invaluable as we continue to partner into more complex national

and international drug smuggling operations that would have been

impossible without this federally funded program.

Local and State law enforcement needs the financial and resource assistance available from the Federal Government in order

to combat the drug problem. Although we see the problems at the

local level, they are the aftermath of national and international

drug trafficking that can only be detoured through multiple agency

cooperation, fueled by consistent and thoughtful funding.

I want to thank you very much for your time.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Burke.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burke follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. First, let me thank you for all the help you have

provided to our committee over the years, and the subcommittee.

As a business major, I think one of the first things you do is, when

you are managing something, is you try to learn from your customers, from people who work for you and that type of thing; and

especially in this case, since Congressman Terry worked on the

floor to pass through the House of Representatives, basically unanimously, that they ought to consult at ONDCP with the HIDTA directors, with local law enforcement, before they make these kind of

proposals. So I just wondered, since it would be a good management procedure and since clearly it was the will of Congress, how

did the meetings go?

Mr. BROOKS. Well, it was only really three organizations who

represent America’s narcotic officers: Mine, which represents

62,000; the National HIDTA Directors Association, which represents our directors; the National Alliance of State Drug Enforcement Agencies, which represents the heads of each of the 50 State

drug enforcement groups. I am in constant contact with the other

two groups and I, of course, manage my own group.

We have never had a meeting to date on the outcome of the

HIDTA program, on whether Byrne-JAG should be funded, on the

newly released methamphetamine synthetic drug plan, on the

about-to-be-released southwest border drug plan, on the national

drug control strategy, or on other issues that might affect us, such

as what is going on in Afghanistan, the issue of microherbicides

and how it affects the domestic supply, the issue of how we interact

with the community anti-drug coalitions, the Drug-Free School Act,

the National Alliance of Model State Drug Laws, and the list goes

on and on.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy is an absolute critical

office if we are to ever get a handle on the drug problem in America. The leadership there is critical. From a symbolic nature, we

need a Cabinet officer with direct access to the President and the

ability to call Cabinet meetings and the ability to interact with

each of the concerned agencies and the ability to interact directly

with you and the Congress. We need that office, and the office is

critical.

I would never suggest for a minute that I think that we shouldn’t

have that office and that it shouldn’t have Cabinet status. But I

will suggest that this office has never once, under this administration, under the administration of Director Walters, has never once

stepped up, has never called a constituent meeting, has never

brought us together for consultation. Nor has it provided the leadership that our members had expected when we vigorously supported his confirmation in 2001.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Donahue and Mr. Azzam both testified that the

mere discussion about dismantling the HIDTAs had discouraged

your staff, had resulted, in the case of Chicago, of a number of people leaving and coming back. Were those local law enforcement

agencies that thought it was marginal and they had tight budgets?

Is that it?

Mr. DONAHUE. No, it was basically the Federal law enforcement.

DEA is our biggest supporter, but once the Federal law enforceVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Mar 05, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32440.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ment agencies determined that we were going to be in a sinking

ship, most of their resources went off to Homeland Security.

Mr. SOUDER. Most of you had a long time in law enforcement.

First, what was your reaction to the idea of the drug czar’s office

should be a policy shop and not minister things, that they should

sit around and discuss things?

And then a second comment, which is kind of a loaded question—

I will give you a second loaded question—do you get the impression

sometimes that, as people who been out in the field a long time,

that this is a policy shop and they haven’t talked to you, that it

is a lot of young people sitting around in Washington talking about

a theory and none of them have actually done it?

Mr. DONAHUE. I think that is evident by the current administration and the immediate staff. There is no one in that capacity that

has any prior experience in law enforcement.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Azzam.

Mr. AZZAM. I haven’t seen a comprehensive strategy coming out

of ONDCP in the last 3 years. There is no strategy.

There is one other thing about our staffs. The same thing is happening in Detroit as Chicago. Federal agencies are slaves to their

organizations. And they look upon us, oh, you are going to Justice.

The money is going away. And our State and local partners continually tell us in a private basis, you have to stay neutral, you have

to stay neutral.

This is very simple, sir. I feel like an athlete with a coach who

won’t call a play. And I am part of a team—an excellent team—

and we are all sitting around. And those in ONDCP who do call

plays are negated. They are put in neutral immediately.

It is very difficult to—it is very difficult for all of us directors.

Mr. SOUDER. I don’t have your background, but, as I recall, you

were DEA.

Mr. AZZAM. Yes, sir, 25 years.

Mr. SOUDER. You were hostile to the Department of Justice.

Mr. AZZAM. I am not at all hostile to the Department of Justice.

I learned my skills from the Department of Justice. I did 25 years

with DEA. I achieved very high status with that organization. I

was Deputy Assistant Administrator for International Operations

for 3 years and ended my career as Executive Assistant to the Administrator and Deputy Administrator.

And I was there when President Reagan called for his drug adviser, Admiral Dan Murphy of the Navy, and he came to the conclusion that there were some 135—or probably more now at the

time—agencies that had something to do with the anti-drug effort

and were totally uncoordinated. As a matter of fact, I was at a

meeting at DEA headquarters when Admiral Murphy in frustration

stood up and said, if I had to fight a war the way I am getting information from you, I would probably lose. And this was in like

1982. It was several years ago later that the Congress enacted the

Anti-Drug Abuse Act and created the office of ONDCP.

And the fact is that there are too many agencies out there. Each

one is an excellent agency, as is Justice, as is Treasury, State Department. All of them have a mission, and they have a strength.

It took ONDCP and the Office of the Director to coordinate all

those efforts, to bring it together and eliminate the stovepiping.

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, this has been a long day; and I

will be very brief.

First of all, I want to thank all of you for what you do. I have

often said that it is indeed a very thin blue line, and it is thin. I

think so often we take so much for granted, but I just want to take

time out on behalf of all of us to thank you for holding on and holding out.

One of the things that I think I love so much about HIDTA is

the coordination and trying make sure that you pull all of the local,

the State and Federal folk together so that you can use our resources effectively. It just seems to make sense to me.

Mr. Azzam, you were saying a moment ago that there was a time

when things seemed like they were really kind of separate, but

HIDTA was able to do that. But would you say that is probably one

of the greatest things that HIDTA does, that it pulls the folks together?

Mr. AZZAM. Absolutely. Coordinating and synchronizing.

Mr. CUMMINGS. No doubt about it?

Mr. AZZAM. No doubt in my mind, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And, Mr. Carr, I think it was, or Mr. Brooks, one

of you all was going down—it was you, Mr. Carr—all the accomplishments of HIDTA. And I guess without that coordination you

wouldn’t have been able to make that statement, would you?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. That is what HIDTA is all about. The whole—

I guess you could say the gimmick behind HIDTA, the game behind

HIDTA, is getting State and local and Federal agencies, whether

it is law enforcement, in our case, treatment and prevention, to

come together to the same table to see their commonalities, to see

what their common goals and objectives are and work together to

obtain them. That is what it is all about.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Does it surprise you all that—you all heard the

testimony a little bit earlier from ONDCP. I wanted to make sure,

first of all, that you all were respected and that was clear that you

are respected by ONDCP. But are you surprised that those folks

are not sitting down with you and saying, OK, we are all in this

boat together, we are fighting a very difficult enemy or enemies,

and let’s see how we can really sit down and not be talking about

each other but talking to each other? I mean, are you all surprised

by that?

Mr. CARR. I think we all have our own opinions. I am no longer

surprised. We are frustrated to the nth degree.

For example, we know we have the model for sharing information. And yet, as Mr. Azzam pointed out, we are frustrated by the

fact that no one is touting that model to Homeland Security. So we

are wasting millions of dollars nationwide because now other departments in the government are going around creating another

stovepipe intelligence center.

We are frustrated because we are not included in developing

meth strategies, when, in fact, we are the ones that developed

those meth strategies that are being used. We are frustrated because we are not included in developing a strategy for the southwest border that is being revised, and clearly now revised again,

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because all of a sudden the National Guard is involved in it. So we

are frustrated by all of this.

I think that the ONDCP in many ways treats policy as alchemy.

They don’t include the partners that should be included, and they

don’t consider the timeliness of when they should be included. If

they are going to develop a national drug control strategy and include input from State and locals, you start to do that in January

and February for a document that is going to be published the following January. You don’t wait until November, 2 months before

it is going to be published.

Mr. DONAHUE. Congressman, if I might to answer your question,

nothing does surprise me. However, I am surprised that, within a

year’s time, we have turned from an ineffective program that

should be abolished to one of the most wonderful law enforcement

programs in the history of the United States. I wonder how that

could be and, if it is so, why would you take the star away from

your organization and, to coin your phrase, put it in the trunk?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Cummings, if I could also, the national drug

control policy, the national drug control strategy—there was a time

prior to Director Walters when they would hold national focus

groups, bring the constituent groups together for robust discussions. I can remember vividly sitting together and working long

hours to help develop that document.

I know that both you and the chairman hold your staffs to a very

high degree of perfection. I could tell you, if that document came

out of either of your staffs, some heads would roll.

You have both read it. It no longer provides the guidance. It no

longer identifies the threat. It went 3 years without talking about

methamphetamine at all, when everybody, small towns to big cities

in America, could pick up their newspaper or turn on their local

news and understand the threat posed by meth.

There has been—you know, Director—Deputy Director Scott

Burns has done a lot to try to coordinate with the HIDTA directors

and has been very respectful. I just received a letter as the President of the National Narcotic Officers Coalition from Director Walters where he reminded me that I had helped participate in the development of the national synthetic drug strategy and the national

drug control strategy. Well, I can tell you that 2 years ago I sent

a letter asking him to please take our name off the national drug

control strategy because not only did we not think it was an effective document we had never participated in writing it.

I have never once nor has my organization been asked to consult

since Director Walters has been there on any of the policy documents that have come out of the shop, despite the fact that it is

my members that are out doing the job every single day on the

ground. There is absolutely no coordination. There is an arrogance

within that organization that prohibits them philosophically from

talking to the cops that do the job on the street. That hasn’t always

been that way at ONDCP. But it has been that way since Director

Walters got there. And it is truly a shame to ignore the hundreds

of thousands of years of experience that could come from bringing

our organizations together and discussing with the true drug warriors what is going on in America.

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Mr. CUMMINGS. Just this last thing. You know, I tell my staff—

you are talking about staff. I tell my staff we spend 5 percent of

our time figuring out the problem and figuring out the solution.

But let’s spend the rest of our time, the 95 percent, doing the solution. And you know——

I mean, what do you see? We had that amendment on the floor

that said—which I thought was incredible—that said that there

had to be consultation. I don’t think you—kind of hard to legislate

that kind of stuff, consultation between ONDCP and folks like you

all. But what would you all like to see us do, if anything, with regard to this issue of collaboration? I am sure that is something that

you consider very significant.

And I was so glad that statements were not made earlier in the

earlier panel that this was just a turf battle. I think they realize

that you are very sincere about what you’re trying to do and what

you are doing. So the question is how we—what suggestions do you

have for us to do the solution, to make it happen?

Mr. BROOKS. Well, if I might, the first suggestion I would have

is to continue to do what you do. Because although this is probably

not the way the system was designed, your committee, under the

leadership of chairman Souder and you, Mr. Cummings, has become de facto the Office of National Drug Control Policy. It is your

support on the HIDTA, on Justice funding and on a whole host of

other things, from drug-free schools and community anti-drug coalitions and drug courts, that has led the policy discussions in America. So I think that at least the members of my organization, our

suggestion is to thank you for what you do and to ask you to continue to do it as long as that need and that void exists.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Again—yes.

Mr. DONAHUE. I think one of the things that has to happen in

the next year is that the law enforcement community has to be assured that there is some permanency in HIDTA, that is an organization where collaboration is the way to go in the future. We need

to bring people together. We don’t need to push them away.

I have been involved as a HIDTA director for 6 years. There

hasn’t been a marked increase in the funding in that 6-year time.

I can tell you that costs are sky-rocketing and the drug problem is

not going away. We need additional funding to bring more of these

organizations into this collaborative effort.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I hope that when you go back—and I am

sure Mr. Souder feels the same way. The last thing we want is for

the morale of your employees to wane. I mean, that is the last

thing we want. And certainly one of the easiest way for that to

happen is when people are uncertain about their jobs—they have

to survive. They have to do for their families. So I hope that you

all will take the message back to them that we will continue to

fight with everything that we have because we realize how important what you do is and what they do is to our Nation.

Again, we thank all of you, we really do, for what you do.

Mr. SOUDER. Thanks.

I have a few more followup questions.

Mr. Brooks, did they talk to your organization about the new border strategy that the Attorney General announced last week?

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Mr. BROOKS. No, sir, we have never been consulted on any strategy or policy document since Director Walters has been there.

Mr. SOUDER. Anybody here consulted?

Are you aware that was a southwest border strategy focused with

Mexico? Are you aware that they are about to unveil another meth

strategy?

Mr. BROOKS. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. Any of you consulted on that?

Mr. BROOKS. No.

Mr. SOUDER. How did you become aware that they were going to

do it?

Mr. BROOKS. We have heard discussions from the Office of State

and Local Affairs that this document is in process. In fact, in Director Walters’ letter to me, he told me that I had in fact consulted

with him, but that is not true. I have not. My organization has not.

Mr. SOUDER. In Detroit, Mr. Azzam, when the big meth bust occurred there from Canada that took at that point 40 percent of the

known precursor chemicals, was your HIDTA involved with that,

with DEA?

Mr. AZZAM. The pseudoephedrine that was coming across that—

DEA is an important part of our HIDTA as our—actually, the Canadians as well. We host the Canadians on a regular basis, trade

information and the effect that we have—IBITS, ICATS, all the

things that make that work well. And HIDTA was—two or three

of our task forces worked under them. One of our funded task

forces was instrumental, out of Detroit, working with Chicago and

the west coast and the southern border in eliminating that problem.

Our operations in Detroit with DEA was also instrumental in

working with the Canadian authorities to come up with the regulations which sort of stopped that.

Mr. SOUDER. So even when there was something that was clearly

national, through a HIDTA you were able to bring State and local.

Mr. AZZAM. Absolutely.

Everything national and international that occurs out there, I

guarantee you one of our HIDTAs has something to do with it. Our

cases might begin small and become big. We make sure that there

is a Federal agent in every task force to be able to carry that investigation to its ultimate, including OSEDEF, including whatever.

We have several international cases out of Detroit, and I know Chicago has and the border has as well.

Mr. SOUDER. Because you’re on the international border directly,

do you have any ICE and CBP people in your HIDTA?

Mr. AZZAM. I do. I have two ICE agents. However, we used to

have five but, because of the turmoil, they withdrew three of them.

We have CBP as well, and we have Canadian customs.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you see some backing up of DHS from their commitment to the narcotics or what do you think is behind some of

the reduction?

Mr. AZZAM. I think it is their other priorities that have been

mandated upon them. They were gracious enough to leave two

agents there, which means they still have a presence; and I am

sure if they get additional personnel they will bring it back up.

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Brooks and the northern California HIDTA,

clearly, we have had a number of problems with the Forest Service

and so on. Do you have Forest Service people involved in your

HIDTA? What would be some of the other agencies that would be

involved there? And also, being from California on the southwest

border, do you see CBP and ICE people there?

Mr. BROOKS. The Forest Service that we do not have is a direct

component of our HIDTA. However, we have worked our marijuana

team and DEA’s decep teams and our State campaign against

marijuana planting team which our intel center and technology

center support, work very closely with the Forest Service, BLM,

and other Federal components. We do a lot of major open space

public land grows, some in the 70,000, 80,000, 90,000 plant range,

mostly being operated by poly drug Mexican national drug trafficking organizations.

As to ICE and CBP, on the southwest border there is some involvement in the San Diego partnership of the southwest border

HIDTA. We have an ICE money laundering initiative in our

HIDTA. But, as you know, unfortunately, from the position of our

group, not my HIDTA, we have been concerned that there has not

been enough coordination from the DHS counternarcotic officer. I

am hoping with the appointment of Mr. Dillon that we may see

better coordination. But, from our organization, we strongly believe

that the DHS will encounter narcotic operations, has been degrading and has declined significantly.

Mr. SOUDER. And I doubt if any of you feel moving to the Department of Justice would strengthen that?

Mr. BROOKS. That’s correct.

Mr. DONAHUE. That’s correct.

Mr. SOUDER. And how many of you have some kind of Treasury

presence or money laundering in your HIDTAs? How do you feel

they would respond being under the Department of Justice?

Mr. AZZAM. They would respond as they did historically. They

would go do their thing and leave us to our Justice operations, as

would our State and local partners, probably, many of them.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, that is the type of—substantive type of input

that seems to be absent in the discussions, and I appreciate your

willingness to come and put this on the table. As you heard me say

earlier, I just—I can’t believe that they not only are—that they

have any—the big battle was last year. I mean, we had to convince

the appropriators and others; and now it is like, ‘‘why are you continuing to pursue this?’’ That we have to stay vigilant with it.

I think that we will prevail. I think the bipartisanship with it

means that we will prevail. But it has been an incredibly frustrating process, particularly when you have something that in the antidrug efforts this kind of thing ebbs and flows—and you have all

seen this. We charge over and do drugs—not do drugs, but do antidrug enforcement for 2 or 3 years and then we will be off to something else and then it will come back up.

In this case, everybody is begging to have more HIDTAs, and it

is like a punishment that the more HIDTAs there are, the more determined they become to eliminate the HIDTAs. It is like a backward—I mean, politically, I don’t understand it. Usually, when you

have this much demand for a program—maybe, to some degree, the

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Department of Justice does want to steal it, but, at the same time,

you would think that there would be a different attitude on funding

and it would be looking at how to expand the program, not how to

freeze and cut.

One last thing is this has to be a relatively unique event in the

annals of Congress and that is you all just gave pretty strong opinions about how you feel about the current office of the drug czar

and about his lack of willingness to talk to you. At the same time,

you are all asking that you stay there.

If you want to know how bad this policy proposal is, to hear the

frustration you all have with the agency you are in and yet unanimously say, look, this isn’t about us or about the individual, this

is about the structure. We are worried about the structure in the

long term of your HIDTAs, not just about the individual that happens to be sitting in the director’s office. And that ought to be an

incredibly strong message to the Congress, to be that frustrated

and yet wanting to stay in that division and just get it cleaned up.

Mr. Davis, do you have any questions?

Mr. DAVIS. I have one open-ended question, and I guess about a

1-minute answer each will put us in time to go and vote. And that

is, perhaps beginning with you, Mr. Brooks, how expensive do you

think it will be in—relative to keeping the supply of drugs down?

Mr. BROOKS. If you are talking about the supply of drugs coming

from outside this Nation, I don’t think we are being very effective.

There is an endless supply of drugs within the United States, none

of which comes from within the United States except domestic cannabis and some amount of marijuana, but even that is controlled

with precursors from outside the United States. That is why drug

enforcement—State and local drug enforcement is so critical.

State and local officers make 97 percent of all drug arrests in

America; and when you talk to the DEA candidly they will tell that

you that the other 3 percent that they are responsible for came as

part of a cooperative effort from leads provided to them in task

force settings like the HIDTA or Byrne task forces, from State and

local law enforcement.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Carr.

Mr. CARR. I can say this much, that our program seized $10.5

billion—and that is a conservative estimate—in 2004, which tells

me that the national estimates that we have been suffering with

for I don’t know how many years have been off. If our program

seized that much, our national estimates have been off; and I think

a policy shop like ONDCP should be responsible for giving us solid

drug estimates. That is one—another area, I think, they have really been amiss on. They have fallen short of doing that.

Have we been successful? I think we have been successful. I

think it is something that is hard to measure, hard to get your

arms around. However, I hate to think of how bad a position we

would be in if we hadn’t been doing as well as we have been doing.

How bad would the streets be then? How bad would the meth problem be if it hadn’t been for programs such as ours and hard work

and dedication of law enforcement and prevention and treatment

folks?

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Donahue.

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Mr. DONAHUE. Congressman, without the HIDTA in Chicago we

would be lost. I can tell you that over the last 5 years the amounts

of assets and drugs that are seized has gone up dramatically. It’s

tripled since 2000. And the reason is because of the strengthening

relationships between the State, Federal and local agencies. The

only thing that has kind of been a bump in the road has been the

proposals that have come out of the administration that have kind

of taken the footing away from HIDTA.

Mr. AZZAM. Sir, I look to what we did with methamphetamine

labs in Michigan, and I think back to the question that Congressman Watson asked. We had a situation in Michigan 7 years ago

where sheriffs were pointing fingers at the State police, and the

State police were pointing at the Feds. You take care of our meth

problem.

HIDTA came in, brought them together and, again, coordinating,

synchronizing, put together a very effective operation. We haven’t

conquered it, but last year we had 183 labs, and I think that is 10

or 12 or 25 less than the year before. So we haven’t won, but we

have kept it somewhat in a reasonable fashion.

It reminds me of that lawn of mine at home. I have to cut it

every week whether I want to or not, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. My 30-some years in law enforcement the one thing

I have found is that measuring prevention is probably the most difficult thing you can do. And I have to agree with whoever said it.

I think that—is there a substantial amount of drugs in our region?

Absolutely. We have 20-year-olds that are selling kilos of cocaine,

being able to buy $20,000 worth and sell these. Tells me that the

supply is plentiful, again, from Mexico.

I think that we are making some significant progress in some of

the cases we have done; and these drug operations, cartels that we

have been able to dismantle I think have been highly effective. I

think, as someone else said, I don’t know what would have happened had we not done that. So I guess the answer is, yes, I think

it is working; and I would hate to see what the outcome would be

if we were not doing this.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you gentlemen very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Have any of the others of you other than Mr. Donahue seen

fentanyl? The heroin? The fentanyl? You have seen it in Detroit as

well?

Mr. AZZAM. We had a terrible situation this weekend. We had 12

overdose deaths of heroin and fentanyl in the Detroit area in 24

hours, and I believe since then we have had eight more. It is a terrible thing. Since I think September, October, we have had about

120 deaths.

It is a major operation going on back there as we speak in that

regard. CDC came in from Atlanta on Monday to examine the situation. The Drug Enforcement Administration has been on it since

last fall. We put out public notices to be careful; and we suspect

that it, as Mr. Donahue points out, that they haven’t figured out

that this fentanyl is a terribly killing drug.

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Mr. SOUDER. My staff notes it is what the Russian special forces

use against Chechnyan terrorists—fentanyl.

Mr. DONAHUE. That’s correct. It was found in Philadelphia, too.

Mr. SOUDER. Because a few years ago we had this rash of heroin

overdoses in Dallas and in a few other places, and we will followup

to try to get some more specific data.

Once again, let me thank you all for your leadership. I am very

frustrated by this intelligence stovepiping even within the narcotics

area.

But, Mr. Azzam, particularly in the Detroit area, the one model

we have that is great is New York City because they were forced

to deal with it and there you see the HIDTA integrated with the

Homeland Security. And the fact is that in the Detroit metropolitan

area as well as in the Buffalo area we have huge Arab American

populations, and it spills down into my district in northeastern Indiana, most of whom are hard-working, dedicated Americans, but

they are communities in which to hide. And if there is anyplace we

ought to be looking at how to integrate the intelligence agencies

that we have and the movement, it is a lot on the north border

right now; and it is just incredible to me that, even though they

have the New York City model, it hasn’t been something that is

looked at across the board.

I don’t want to diminish the narcotics by getting it too entangled

in the homeland security, but it is a real challenge.

Mr. AZZAM. Mr. Chairman, I am a strong proponent that if you

are doing a good job of anti-drug war you are going to do an excellent job of anti-terrorism work. I believe I mentioned that at the

hearings you had in Detroit a couple of years ago.

The important thing is that the HIDTA program, because of its

nature, coordinating, synchronizing, has made itself available

through all its resources to both the city of Detroit Department of

Emergency Management fusion center as well as the one that the

State is putting up.

As a matter of fact, Thursday we are having some meetings because our executive board has said this HIDTA will participate

with you. And we haven’t waited for any instructions from Washington. None of my colleagues have, either. We have just come forward and said our ISCs are available and we will work well with

your fusion centers on anti-terrorism work as well as anti-drug

work.

Mr. SOUDER. We are having—in the Homeland Security, we are

having a problem in each division of Homeland Security wants to

have its own stovepipe operation. We are having enough problem

inside it, let alone getting together with you guys.

But thank you for bringing these things to our attention. Thank

you for your commitment. Please relay back, as Mr. Cummings

said, to all the people working in your agencies how much we appreciate their efforts.

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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